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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Life of Gordon, Volume II, by 
+Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Life of Gordon, Volume II
+
+Author: Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26493]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF GORDON, VOLUME II ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's Note: Every effort has been made to replicate this text
+as faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings
+and other inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an
+obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook.]
+
+
+
+
+  THE LIFE OF GORDON
+
+  MAJOR-GENERAL, R.E., C.B.; TURKISH FIELD-MARSHAL, GRAND
+  CORDON MEDJIDIEH, AND PASHA; CHINESE TITU (FIELD-MARSHAL),
+  YELLOW JACKET ORDER.
+
+
+  "_'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,
+  And never will, I trust--most surely never
+  By such a youth as thou._"
+
+                            --SWINTON ON ADAM GORDON.
+
+
+  BY
+
+  DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER
+
+  AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF CHINA;" "ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL
+  ASIA;" "LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK," ETC., ETC.
+
+
+  WITH PORTRAIT
+
+
+  VOLUME II
+
+
+  LONDON
+  T. FISHER UNWIN
+  PATERNOSTER SQUARE
+
+  MDCCCXCVI
+
+  [_All rights reserved._]
+
+
+[Illustration: Portrait of C. G. Gordon with signature.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+VOLUME II.
+
+  CHAP.                                           PAGE
+
+  VIII. GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN               1
+
+    IX. MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA             38
+
+     X. THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO      65
+
+    XI. THE LAST NILE MISSION                       97
+
+   XII. KHARTOUM                                   136
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN.
+
+
+When General Gordon left Egypt for England in December 1876 it was
+with the expressed determination not to return; but the real state of
+his mind was not bitterness at any personal grievance, or even desire
+for rest, although he avowed his intention of taking six months'
+leave, so much as disinclination to leave half done a piece of work in
+which he had felt much interest, and with which he had identified
+himself. Another consideration presented itself to him, and several of
+his friends pressed the view on him with all the weight they
+possessed, that no signal success could be achieved unless he were
+placed in a position of supreme authority, not merely at the Equator,
+but throughout the vast province of the Soudan. Such was the decision
+Gordon himself, influenced no doubt by the views of two friends whose
+names need not be mentioned, but who were well known for their zeal in
+the anti-slavery cause, had come to a few weeks after his arrival in
+England; and not thinking that there was any reasonable probability of
+the Khedive appointing him to any such post, he telegraphed to the
+British Consul-General, Mr Vivian, his determination not to return to
+Egypt. This communication was placed before the Khedive Ismail, who
+had a genuine admiration for Gordon, and who appreciated the value of
+his services. He at once took the matter into his own hands, and wrote
+the following letter, which shows that he thoroughly understood the
+arguments that would carry weight with the person to whom they were
+addressed:--
+
+     "MY DEAR GORDON,--I was astonished yesterday to learn of the
+     despatch you had sent to Mr Vivian, in which you inform me that
+     you will not return; all the more so when I recall your interview
+     at Abdin, during which you promised me to return, and complete
+     the work we had commenced together. I must therefore attribute
+     your telegram to the very natural feelings which influenced you
+     on finding yourself at home and among your friends. But I cannot,
+     my dear Gordon Pasha, think that a gentleman like Gordon can be
+     found wanting with regard to his solemn promise, and thus, my
+     dear Gordon, I await your return according to that promise.--Your
+     affectionate
+
+                                             "ISMAIL."
+
+To such a letter as this a negative reply was difficult, if not
+impossible; and when General Gordon placed the matter in the hands of
+the Duke of Cambridge, as head of the army, he was told that he was
+bound to return. He accordingly telegraphed to the Khedive that he was
+willing to go back to the Soudan if appointed Governor-General, and
+also that he would leave at once for Cairo to discuss the matter. On
+his arrival there, early in February 1877, the discussion of the terms
+and conditions on which Gordon would consent to return to the Upper
+Nile was resumed. He explained his views at length to the Minister,
+Cherif Pasha, who had succeeded Nubar as responsible adviser to the
+Khedive, concluding with the ultimatum: "Either give me the Soudan, or
+I will not go." The only compromise that Gordon would listen to was
+that the Khedive's eldest son should be sent as Viceroy to Khartoum,
+when he, for his part, would be willing to resume his old post at the
+Equator. The Egyptian Ministers and high officials were not in favour
+of any European being entrusted with such a high post, and they were
+especially averse to the delegation of powers to a Christian, which
+would leave him independent of everyone except the Khedive. But for
+the personal intervention of the Khedive, Gordon would not have
+revisited Cairo; and but for the same intervention he would never have
+been made Governor-General, as, after a week's negotiation with
+Cherif, an agreement was farther off than ever, and Gordon's patience
+was nearly exhausted. The Khedive, really solicitous for Gordon's
+help, and suspecting that there was something he did not know, asked
+Mr Vivian to explain the matter fully to him. On hearing the cause of
+the difficulty, Ismail at once said: "I will give Gordon the Soudan,"
+and two days later he saw and told General Gordon the same thing,
+which found formal expression in the following letter, written on 17th
+February 1877, the day before Gordon left for Massowah:--
+
+     "MY DEAR GORDON PASHA,--Appreciating your honourable character,
+     your energy, and the great services that you have already
+     rendered to my Government, I have decided to unite in one great
+     Governor-Generalship the whole of the Soudan, Darfour, and the
+     Equatorial Provinces, and to entrust to you the important mission
+     of directing it. I am about to issue a Decree to this effect.
+
+     "The territories to be included in this Government being very
+     vast, it is necessary for good administration that you should
+     have under your orders three Vakils--one for the Soudan properly
+     so called and the Provinces of the Equator, another for Darfour,
+     and the third for the Red Sea coast and the Eastern Soudan.
+
+     "In the event of your deeming any changes necessary, you will
+     make your observations to me.
+
+     "The Governor-Generalship of the Soudan is completely independent
+     of the Ministry of Finance.
+
+     "I direct your attention to two points, viz.--the suppression of
+     slavery, and the improvement of the means of communication.
+
+     "Abyssinia extends along a great part of the frontiers of the
+     Soudan. I beg of you, when you are on the spot, to carefully
+     examine into the situation of affairs, and I authorise you, if
+     you deem it expedient, to enter into negotiations with the
+     Abyssinian authorities with the view of arriving at a settlement
+     of pending questions.
+
+     "I end by thanking you, my dear Gordon Pasha, for your kindness
+     in continuing to Egypt your precious services, and I am fully
+     persuaded that, with the aid of your great experience and your
+     devotion, we shall bring to a happy end the work we are pursuing
+     together.
+
+     "Believe, my dear Gordon Pasha, in my sentiments of high esteem
+     and sincere friendship.--Your affectionate
+
+                                             ISMAIL."
+
+Nothing could be more gracious than this letter, which made General
+Gordon independent of the men who he feared would thwart him, and
+responsible to the Khedive alone. It was followed up a few weeks
+later--that is to say, after the new Governor-General had left for his
+destination--by the conferring of the military rank of Muchir or
+Marshal. At the same time the Khedive sent him a handsome uniform,
+with £150 worth of gold lace on the coat, and the Grand Cordon of the
+Medjidieh Order, which, it may be worth noting here, General Gordon
+only wore when in Egyptian uniform. These acts on the part of the
+Khedive Ismail show that, whatever may have been his reasons for
+taking up the slavery question, he was really sincere in his desire to
+support Gordon, who fully realised and appreciated the good-will and
+friendly intentions of this Egyptian ruler. When an unfavourable
+judgment is passed on Ismail Pasha, his consistent support of General
+Gordon may be cited to show that neither his judgment nor his heart
+was as bad as his numerous detractors would have the world believe.
+
+Having settled the character of the administration he was to conduct,
+General Gordon did not waste a day at Cairo. The holiday and rest to
+which he was fully entitled, and of which there can be no doubt that
+he stood greatly in need, were reduced to the smallest limits. Only
+two months intervened between his departure from Cairo for London on
+coming down from the Equator, and his second departure from Cairo to
+the Soudan. Much of that period had been passed in travelling, much
+more in exhausting and uncongenial negotiation in the Egyptian
+capital. All the brief space over enabled him to do was to pass the
+Christmas with several members of his family, to which he was so
+deeply attached, to visit his sisters in the old home at Southampton,
+and to run down for a day to Gravesend, the scene of his philanthropic
+labours a few years before. Yet, with his extraordinary recuperative
+force, he hastened with fresh strength and spirit to take up a more
+arduous and more responsible task than that he had felt compelled to
+relinquish so short a period before. With almost boyish energy,
+tempered by a profound belief in the workings of the Divine will, he
+turned his face once more to that torrid region, where at that time
+and since scenes of cruelty and human suffering have been enacted
+rarely surpassed in the history of the world.
+
+Having thus described the circumstances and conditions under which
+General Gordon consented to take up the Soudan question, it is
+desirable to explain clearly what were the objects he had in his own
+mind, and what was the practical task he set himself to accomplish.
+Fortunately, this description need not be based on surmise or
+individual conjecture. General Gordon set forth his task in the
+plainest language, and he held the clearest, and, as the result
+showed, the most correct views as to what had to be done, and the
+difficulties that stood in the way of its accomplishment. He wrote on
+the very threshold of his undertaking these memorable sentences:--
+
+     "I have to contend with many vested interests, with fanaticism,
+     with the abolition of hundreds of Arnauts, Turks, etc., now
+     acting as Bashi-Bazouks, with inefficient governors, with wild
+     independent tribes of Bedouins, and with a large semi-independent
+     province lately under Zebehr Pasha at Bahr Gazelle.... With
+     terrific exertion, in two or three years' time I may, with God's
+     administration, make a good province, with a good army, and a
+     fair revenue and peace, and an increased trade, and also have
+     suppressed slave raids."
+
+No one can dispute either the Titanic magnitude of the task to be
+accomplished or the benefit its accomplishment would confer on a
+miserably unhappy population. How completely the project was carried
+out by one man, where powerful Governments and large armies have
+failed both before and since, has now to be demonstrated.
+
+General Gordon proceeded direct from Cairo to Massowah, which route he
+selected because he hoped to settle the Abyssinian dispute before he
+commenced operations in the Soudan. Both the Khedive and the British
+Government wished a termination to be put to the troubles that had for
+some time prevailed in the border lands of Abyssinia and the Eastern
+Soudan, and it was hoped that Gordon's reputation and energy would
+facilitate the removal of all difficulties with King John, who, after
+the death of Theodore, had succeeded in obtaining the coveted title of
+"Negus."
+
+In order to understand the position, a few historical facts must be
+recorded. By the year 1874 King John's authority was established over
+every province except in the south, Shoa, where Menelik retained his
+independence, and in the north, Bogos, which was seized in the year
+stated by Munzinger Bey, a Swiss holding the post of Governor of
+Massowah under the Khedive. In seizing Bogos, Munzinger had
+dispossessed its hereditary chief, Walad el Michael, who retired to
+Hamaçem, also part of his patrimony, where he raised forces in
+self-defence. Munzinger proposed to annex Hamaçem, and the Khedive
+assented; but he entrusted the command of the expedition to Arokol
+Bey, and a Danish officer named Arendrup as military adviser, and
+Munzinger was forced to be content with a minor command at Tajoura,
+where he was killed some months later. The Egyptian expedition
+meantime advanced with equal confidence and carelessness upon Hamaçem,
+Michael attacked it in several detachments, and had the double
+satisfaction of destroying the troops and capturing their arms and
+ammunition. Such was the disastrous commencement of those pending
+questions to which the Khedive Ismail referred in his letter to
+General Gordon.
+
+The Khedive decided to retrieve this reverse, and to continue his
+original design. With this object a considerable number of troops were
+sent to Massowah, and the conduct of the affair was entrusted to Ratib
+Pasha and an American soldier of fortune, Colonel Loring Pasha. By
+this time--1876--Michael had quarrelled with King John, who had
+compelled him to give up the weapons he had captured from the
+Egyptians, and, anxious for revenge, he threw in his lot with his
+recent adversaries. The Egyptian leaders showed they had not profited
+by the experience of their predecessors. They advanced in the same
+bold and incautious manner, and after they had built two strong forts
+on the Gura plateau they were induced, by jealousy of each other or
+contempt for their enemy when he appeared, to leave the shelter of
+their forts, and to fight in the open. The Egyptian Ratib had the good
+sense to advise, "Stay in the forts," but Loring exclaimed: "No! march
+out of them. You are afraid!" and thus a taunt once again sufficed to
+banish prudence. The result of this action, which lasted only an hour,
+was the loss of over 10,000 Egyptian troops, of 25 cannon, and 10,000
+Remington rifles. The survivors took refuge in the forts, and
+succeeded in holding them. Negotiations then followed, and King John
+showed an unexpected moderation and desire for peace with Egypt, but
+only on the condition of the surrender of his recalcitrant vassal
+Michael. Michael retaliated by carrying raids into King John's
+territory, thus keeping the whole border in a state of disorder, which
+precluded all idea of a stable peace.
+
+Such was the position with which General Gordon had to deal. He had to
+encourage the weakened and disheartened Egyptian garrison, to muzzle
+Michael without exposing the Khedive to the charge of deserting his
+ally, and to conclude a peace with Abyssinia without surrendering
+either Bogos or Michael. At this stage we are only called upon to
+describe the first brief phase of this delicate question, which at
+recurring intervals occupied Gordon's attention during the whole of
+his stay in the Soudan. His first step was to inform Michael that the
+subsidy of money and provisions would only be paid him on condition
+that he abstained from attacking the Abyssinian frontier; his next to
+write a letter to King John, offering him fair terms, and enclosing
+the draft of a treaty of amity. There was good reason to think that
+these overtures would have produced a favourable result if it had been
+possible for General Gordon to have seen King John at that time, but
+unfortunately a fresh war had just broken out with Menelik, and King
+John had to proceed in all haste to Shoa. He did not reply to Gordon's
+letter for six months, and by that time Gordon was too thoroughly
+engaged in the Soudan to take up the Abyssinian question until the
+force of events, as will be seen, again compelled him to do so.
+
+Having decided that the Abyssinian dispute must wait, General Gordon
+proceeded by Kassala on his journey to Khartoum. Travelling not less
+than thirty miles a day, in great heat, organising the administration
+on his way, and granting personal audience to everyone who wished to
+see him, from the lowest miserable and naked peasant to the highest
+official or religious personage, like the Shereef Said Hakim, he
+reached Khartoum on the 3rd May. He did not delay an hour in the
+commencement of his task. His first public announcement was to abolish
+the _courbash_, to remit arrears of taxation, and to sanction a
+scheme for pumping the river water into the town. The _Kadi_ or mayor
+read this address in the public square; the people hailed it with
+manifestations of pleasure, and Gordon himself, carried away by his
+enthusiasm for his work, compresses the long harangue into a brief
+text: "With the help of God, I will hold the balance level."
+
+But the measures named were not attended by any great difficulty in
+their inception or execution. They were merely the preliminaries to
+the serious and risky disbandment of the Bashi-Bazouks, and the steps
+necessary to restrict and control, not merely the trade in, but the
+possession of, slaves. As General Gordon repeatedly pointed out, his
+policy and proceedings were a direct attack on the only property that
+existed in the Soudan, and justice to the slave could not be equitably
+dispensed by injustice to the slave-owner. The third class of slave
+raider stood in a separate category, and in dealing with him Gordon
+never felt a trace of compunction. He had terminated the career of
+those ruthless scourges of the African races at the Equator, and with
+God's help he was determined to end it throughout the Soudan. But the
+slave question in Egypt was many-sided, and bristled with difficulties
+to anyone who understood it, and wished to mete out a fair and equable
+treatment to all concerned.
+
+It was with the special object of maintaining the rights of the owners
+as well as of the slaves that Gordon proposed a set of regulations,
+making the immediate registration of slaves compulsory, and thus
+paving the way for the promulgation of the Slave Convention already
+under negotiation. His propositions were only four in number, and read
+as follows:--
+
+     1. Enforce the law compelling runaway slaves to return to their
+     masters, except when cruelly treated.
+
+     2. Require masters to register their slaves before 1st January
+     1878.
+
+     3. If the masters neglect to register them, then Regulation 1 not
+     to be enforced in their favour.
+
+     4. No registration to be allowed after 1st January 1878.
+
+By these simple but practical arrangements General Gordon would have
+upheld the rights of the slave-owners, and thus disarmed their
+hostility, at the same time that he stopped the imposition of
+servitude on any fresh persons. In the course of time, and without
+imposing on the Exchequer the burden of the compensation, which he saw
+the owners were in equity entitled to, he would thus have put an end
+to the slave trade throughout the Soudan.
+
+The Anglo-Egyptian Convention on the subject of the slave trade,
+signed on 4th August 1877, was neither so simple nor so practical,
+while there was a glaring inconsistency between its provisions and the
+Khedivial Decree that accompanied it.
+
+The second article of the Convention reads: "Any person engaged in
+traffic of slaves, either directly or indirectly, shall be considered
+guilty of stealing with murder (_vol avec meurtre_)," and consequently
+punishable, as General Gordon assumed, with death.
+
+But the first and second clauses of the Khedive's Decree were to a
+different effect. They ran as follows:--
+
+     "The sale of slaves from family to family will be prohibited.
+     This prohibition will take effect in seven years in Cairo, and in
+     twelve years in the Soudan.
+
+     "After the lapse of this term of years any infraction of this
+     prohibition will be punished by an imprisonment of from five
+     months to five years."
+
+The literal interpretation of this decree would have left Gordon
+helpless to do anything for the curtailment of the slave trade until
+the year 1889, and then only permitted to inflict a quite insufficient
+punishment on those who broke the law. General Gordon pointed out the
+contradiction between the Convention and the Decree, and the
+impossibility of carrying out his original instructions if he were
+deprived of the power of allotting adequate punishment for offences;
+and he reverted to his original proposition of registration, for which
+the Slave Convention made no provision, although the negotiators at
+Cairo were fully aware of his views and recommendations expressed in
+an official despatch three months before that Convention was signed.
+To these representations Gordon never received any reply. He was left
+to work out the problem for himself, to carry on the suppression of
+the slave trade as best he could, and to take the risk of official
+censure and repudiation for following one set of instructions in the
+Convention in preference to those recorded in the Decree. The outside
+public blamed the Khedive, and Gordon himself blamed Nubar Pasha and
+the Egyptian Ministry; but the real fault lay at the doors of the
+British Government, which knew of Gordon's representations and the
+discrepancy between the orders of the Khedive and the Convention they
+had signed together, and yet did nothing to enforce the precise
+fulfilment of the provisions it had thought it worth while to resort
+to diplomacy to obtain. The same hesitation and inability to grasp the
+real issues has characterised British policy in Egypt down to the
+present hour.
+
+If Gordon had not been a man fearless of responsibility, and resolved
+that some result should ensue from his labours, he would no doubt have
+expended his patience and strength in futile efforts to obtain clearer
+and more consistent instructions from Cairo, and, harassed by
+official tergiversation and delay, he would have been driven to give
+up his task in disgust if not despair. But being what he was--a man of
+the greatest determination and the highest spirit--he abandoned any
+useless effort to negotiate with either the English or the Egyptian
+authorities in the Delta, and he turned to the work in hand with the
+resolve to govern the Soudan in the name of the Khedive, but as a
+practical Dictator. It was then that broke from him the characteristic
+and courageous phrase: "I will carry things with a high hand to the
+last."
+
+The first and most pressing task to which Gordon had to address
+himself was the supersession of the Turkish and Arab irregulars, who,
+under the name of "Bashi-Bazouks," constituted a large part of the
+provincial garrison. Not merely were they inefficient from a military
+point of view, but their practice, confirmed by long immunity, had
+been to prey on the unoffending population. They thus brought the
+Government into disrepute, at the same time that they were an element
+of weakness in its position. Gordon saw that if the Khedive had no
+better support than their services, his authority in the Soudan was
+liable at any moment to be overthrown. It had been the practice of the
+Cairo authorities to send up, whenever reinforcements were asked for,
+Arnaut and Arab loafers in that city, and these men were expected to
+pay themselves without troubling the Government. This they did to
+their own satisfaction, until Gordon resolved to put an end to their
+misdeeds at all cost, for he found that not merely did they pillage
+the people, but that they were active abettors of the slave trade. Yet
+as he possessed no military force, while there were not fewer than
+6000 Bashi-Bazouks scattered throughout the provinces, he had to
+proceed with caution. His method of breaking up this body is a
+striking illustration of his thorough grasp of detail, and of the
+prudence, as well as daring, with which he applied what he conceived
+to be the most sensible means of removing a grave difficulty. This
+considerable force was scattered in numerous small garrisons
+throughout the province. From a military point of view this
+arrangement was bad, but it enabled each separate garrison to do a
+little surreptitious slave-hunting on its own account. General Gordon
+called in these garrisons, confined the Bashi-Bazouks to three or four
+places, peremptorily stopped the arrival of recruits, and gradually
+replaced them with trustworthy black Soudanese soldiers. Before he
+laid down the reins of power, at the end of 1879, he had completely
+broken up this body, and as effectually relieved the Soudanese from
+their military tyrants as he had freed them from the whip.
+
+Having put all these matters in trim, Gordon left Khartoum in the
+middle of the summer of 1877 for the western province of Darfour,
+where a number of matters claimed his pressing attention. In that
+province there were several large Egyptian garrisons confined in two
+or three towns, and unable--through fear, as it proved, but on account
+of formidable enemies, as was alleged--to move outside them. The
+reports of trouble and hostility were no doubt exaggerated, but still
+there was a simmering of disturbance below the surface that portended
+peril in the future; and read by the light of after events, it seems
+little short of miraculous that General Gordon was able to keep it
+under by his own personal energy and the magic of his name. When on
+the point of starting to relieve these garrisons, he found himself
+compelled to disband a regiment of 500 Bashi-Bazouks, who constituted
+the only force at his immediate disposal. He had then to organise a
+nondescript body, after the same fashion as he had adopted at the
+Equator, and with 500 followers of this kind--of whom he said only 150
+were any good--he started on his march for the districts which lie
+several hundred miles west of the White Nile, and approach most nearly
+of the Khedive's possessions to Lake Tchad.
+
+The enemies with whom General Gordon had to deal were two. There was
+first Haroun, who claimed, as the principal survivor after Zebehr's
+invasion of Darfour, already described, to be the true Sultan of that
+State; and secondly, Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, and the nominal
+leader of the slave-dealers. While the former was in open revolt, the
+latter's covert hostility was the more to be dreaded, although
+Suleiman might naturally hesitate to throw off the mask lest his
+revolt might be the signal for his father's execution at Cairo--Zebehr
+having been detained there after his too confiding visit a few years
+before. It was therefore both prudent and necessary to ignore Suleiman
+until Haroun had been brought into subjection, or in some other way
+compelled to desist from acts of hostility.
+
+General Gordon's plan was simple in the extreme. Leaving the Nile with
+500 men, he determined to collect _en route_ the efficient part of the
+scattered garrisons, sending those who were not efficient to the river
+for transport to Khartoum, and with this force to relieve the garrison
+at Fascher, the most distant of the large towns or stations in
+Darfour. It will be understood that these garrisons numbered several
+thousand men each, while Gordon's relieving body was only a few
+hundreds; but their _morale_ had sunk so low that they dared not take
+the field against an enemy whom their own terror, and not the reality,
+painted as formidable. Even before he began his advance, Gordon had
+taken a fair measure of the revolt, which he expressed himself
+confident of suppressing without firing a shot. At Dara, the place
+which in the Mahdist war was well defended by Slatin Pasha, he
+released 1800 troops; but he was kept in inactivity for some weeks
+owing to the necessity of organising his force and of ascertaining how
+far Suleiman, with his robber confederacy of 10,000 fighting men at
+Shaka--only 150 miles south-east of Dara--might be counted on to
+remain quiet. During this period of suspense he was compelled to take
+the field against a formidable tribe called by the name of the
+Leopard, which threatened his rear. It is unnecessary to enter upon
+the details of this expedition, which was completely successful,
+notwithstanding the cowardice of his troops, and which ended with the
+abject submission of the offending clan.
+
+Having assembled a force of a kind of 3,500 men, he resolved to make a
+forced march to Fascher, and then with the same promptitude to descend
+on Shaka, and settle the pending dispute with Suleiman. These plans he
+kept locked in his own bosom, for his camp was full of spies, and his
+own surroundings were not to be trusted.
+
+Leaving the main portion of his troops at Dara, he advanced on Fascher
+at the head of less than 1000 men, taking the lead himself with the
+small bodyguard he had organised of 150 picked Soudanese. With these
+he entered Fascher, where there were 3000 troops, and the Pasha,
+Hassan Helmi, had 10,000 more at Kolkol, three days' journey away.
+Gordon found the garrison quite demoralised, and afraid to move
+outside the walls. He at once ordered Hassan Pasha to come to him,
+with the intention of punishing him by dismissal for his negligence
+and cowardice in commanding a force that, properly led, might have
+coerced the whole province, when the alarming news reached the
+Governor-General that Suleiman and his band had quitted Shaka, and
+were plundering in the neighbourhood of Dara itself. The gravity of
+this danger admitted of no delay. Not a moment could be spared to
+either punish an incapable lieutenant or to crush the foe Haroun,
+whose proceedings were the alleged main cause of trouble in Darfour.
+Gordon returned with his bodyguard as fast as possible, and, leaving
+even it behind, traversed the last eighty-five miles alone on his
+camel in a day and a half. Here may be introduced what he wrote
+himself on the subject of these rapid and often solitary camel
+journeys:--
+
+     "I have a splendid camel--none like it; it flies along, and quite
+     astonishes even the Arabs. I came flying into this station in
+     Marshal's uniform, and before the men had had time to unpile
+     their arms, I had arrived, with only one man with me. I could not
+     help it; the escort did not come in for an hour and a half
+     afterwards. The Arab chief who came with me said it was the
+     telegraph. The Gordons and the camels are of the same race--let
+     them take an idea into their heads, and nothing will take it
+     out.... It is fearful to see the Governor-General arrayed in
+     gold clothes, flying along like a madman, with only a guide, as
+     if he were pursued.... If I were fastidious, I should be as many
+     weeks as I now am days on the road; I gain a great deal of
+     prestige by these unheard-of marches. It makes the people fear me
+     much more than if I were slow."
+
+The situation was in every way as serious as was represented. The Dara
+garrison as a fighting force was valueless, and with the exception of
+his small bodyguard, still on the road from Fascher, Gordon had not a
+man on whom he could count. Suleiman and his whole force were encamped
+not three miles from the town. Gordon quite realised the position; he
+saw that his own life, and, what he valued more, the whole work on
+which he had been so long engaged, were at stake, and that a moment's
+hesitation would mean ruin. He rose to the crisis. At daybreak,
+attired in his official costume, with the Medjidieh gleaming on his
+breast, he mounted his horse and rode off to Suleiman's camp. Suleiman
+meditated treachery, and a trifle would have decided him to take the
+step of seizing Gordon, and holding him as hostage for his father. Had
+Gordon delayed even a few hours, there is no doubt that the
+slave-hunters would have executed their original design; but his
+extraordinary promptitude and self-confidence disconcerted them, and
+probably saved his own life. Gordon rode down the brigand lines;
+Suleiman, described as "a nice-looking lad of twenty-two," received
+him with marks of respect, and the Governor-General, without giving
+them a moment to think, at once summoned him and his chief lieutenants
+to an audience in the tent placed at his disposal. Here Gordon went
+straight to the point, accusing them of meditated rebellion, and
+telling them that he meant to break up their confederacy. After
+listening to this indictment, they all made him submission very
+abjectly; but Gordon saw that Suleiman had not forgiven him, and when
+the truth came afterwards to be known, it was found that he did not
+carry out his project only because his principal lieutenants had
+deserted him. When the negotiations were over, Suleiman retired with
+1500 men to Shaka, where we shall hear of him again, and Gordon took
+into his pay the other half of the brigand force. In this remarkable
+manner did he stave off the greatest peril which had yet threatened
+him in the Soudan.
+
+The following corroborative account of this incident was furnished
+long afterwards by Slatin Pasha:--
+
+     "In the midst of all this discussion and difference of opinion,
+     Gordon, travelling by Keriut and Shieria, had halted at a spot
+     about four hours' march from Dara; and having instructed his
+     escort to follow him as usual, he and his two secretaries started
+     in advance on camels. Hearing of his approach, Suleiman had
+     given orders to his troops to deploy in three lines between the
+     camp and the fort, and while this operation was being carried
+     out, Gordon, coming from the rear of the troops, passed rapidly
+     through the lines, riding at a smart trot, and, saluting the
+     troops right and left, reached the fort. The suddenness of
+     Gordon's arrival left the leaders no time to make their plans.
+     They therefore ordered the general salute; but even before the
+     thunder of the guns was heard, Gordon had already sent orders to
+     Suleiman and his chiefs to appear instantly before him.... Thus
+     had Gordon, by his amazing rapidity and quick grasp of the
+     situation, arrived in two days at the settlement of a question
+     which literally bristled with dangers and difficulties. Had
+     Suleiman offered resistance at a time when Darfour was in a
+     disturbed state, Gordon's position and the maintenance of
+     Egyptian authority in these districts would have been precarious
+     in the extreme."
+
+What Gordon's own opinion of this affair was is revealed in the
+following extremely characteristic letter written to one of those
+anti-slavery enthusiasts, who seemed to think that the whole
+difficulty could be settled by a proclamation or two, and a rigid
+enforcement of a strict law sentencing every one connected with the
+slave trade without discrimination to death:--
+
+     "There are some 6000 more slave-dealers in the interior who will
+     obey me now they have heard that Zebehr's son and the other
+     chiefs have given in. You can imagine what a difficulty there is
+     in dealing with all these armed men. I have separated them here
+     and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass.
+     Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be
+     considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our Government
+     once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came
+     into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? I would have
+     given £500 to have had you and the Anti-Slavery Society in Dara
+     during the three days of doubt whether the slave-dealers would
+     fight or not. A bad fort, a coward garrison, and not one who did
+     not tremble--on the other side a strong, determined set of men
+     accustomed to war, good shots, with two field-pieces. I would
+     have liked to hear what you would all have said then. I do not
+     say this in brag, for God knows what my anxiety was."
+
+The drama, of which the first act took place in Suleiman's camp
+outside Dara, was not then ended. Gordon knew that to leave a thing
+half done was only to invite the danger to reappear. Suleiman had
+retired with his 1500 men to Shaka, the followers of Zebehr from all
+sides throughout the province would flock to his standard, and in a
+little time he would be more formidable and hostile than before. Four
+days after Suleiman left Dara, Gordon set out for the same place, at
+the head of four companies, and after a six days' march through
+terrible heat he reached Shaka. The slave-hunters had had no time to
+recover their spirits, they were all completely cowed and very
+submissive; and Suleiman craved favour at the hands of the man against
+whose life he had only a few days before been plotting. Unfortunately
+Gordon could not remain at Shaka, to attend in person to the
+dispersion of Suleiman's band, and after his departure that young
+leader regained his confidence, and resorted to his hostile and
+ambitious designs; but the success of General Gordon's plans in the
+summer of 1877 was complete, and sufficed to greatly diminish the
+gravity of the peril when, twelve months later, Suleiman broke out
+afresh, and fell by the hands of Gessi.
+
+While General Gordon was facing these personal dangers, and coping
+with difficulties in a manner that has never been surpassed, and that
+will stand as an example to all time of how the energy, courage, and
+attention to detail of an individual will compensate for bad troops
+and deficient resources, he was experiencing the bitter truth that no
+one can escape calumny. The arm-chair reformers of London were not at
+all pleased with his methods, and they were quite shocked when they
+heard that General Gordon, whom they affected to regard as the nominee
+of the Anti-Slavery Society, and not as the responsible lieutenant of
+a foreign potentate, was in the habit, not merely of restoring
+fugitive slaves to their lawful owners, but even of purchasing slaves
+with his own and the Government money, in order to convert them into
+soldiers. From their narrow point of view, it seemed to them that
+these steps were a direct encouragement of the slave-trade, and they
+denounced Gordon's action with an extraordinary, but none the less
+bitter, ignorance of the fact that he was employing the only practical
+means of carrying out the mission which, in addition to his
+administrative duties, had been practically imposed on him as the
+representative of civilization. These good but misinformed persons
+must have believed that the Egyptian garrison in the Soudan was
+efficient, that communications were easy, and the climate not
+unpleasant, and that Gordon, supported by zealous lieutenants, had
+only to hold up his hand or pass a resolution, in the fashion of
+Exeter Hall, for the chains, real and metaphysical, to fall from the
+limbs of the negro population of Inner Africa. That was their dream.
+The reality was a worthless and craven army, a climate that killed
+most Europeans, and which the vigour and abstemiousness of Gordon
+scarcely enabled him to endure, communications only maintained and
+represented by the wearying flight of the camel across the desert,
+treachery and hostility to his plans, if not his person, among his
+colleagues--all these difficulties and dangers overcome and rendered
+nugatory by the earnestness and energy of one man alone. Well might
+his indignation find vent in such a grand outburst as this:--
+
+     "I do not believe in you all. You say this and that, and you do
+     not do it; you give your money, and you have done your duty; you
+     praise one another, etc. I do not wonder at it. God has given you
+     ties and anchors to this earth; you have wives and families. I,
+     thank God, have none of them, and am free. Now understand me. If
+     it suit me, I will buy slaves. I will let captured slaves go down
+     to Egypt and not molest them, and I will do what I like, and what
+     God, in His mercy, may direct me to do about domestic slaves; but
+     I will break the neck of slave raids, even if it cost me my life.
+     I will buy slaves for my army; for this purpose I will make
+     soldiers against their will, to enable me to prevent raids. I
+     will do this in the light of day, and defy your resolutions and
+     your actions. Would my heart be broken if I was ousted from this
+     command? Should I regret the eternal camel-riding, the heat, the
+     misery I am forced to witness, the discomforts of everything
+     around my domestic life? Look at my travels in seven months.
+     Thousands of miles on camels, and no hope of rest for another
+     year. You are only called on at intervals to rely on your God;
+     with me I am obliged continually to do so. Find me the man and I
+     will take him as my help who utterly despises money, name, glory,
+     honour; one who never wishes to see his home again; one who looks
+     to God as the Source of good and Controller of evil; one who has
+     a healthy body and energetic spirit, and one who looks on death
+     as a release from misery; and if you cannot find him, then leave
+     me alone. To carry myself is enough for me; I want no other
+     baggage."
+
+Gordon's troubles were not only with English visionaries. The Egyptian
+officials had always regarded the delegation of supreme powers to him
+with dislike, and this sentiment became unqualified apprehension when
+they saw how resolute he was in exercising them. Ismail Pasha was
+disposed to place unlimited trust in his energetic Governor-General,
+but he could not but be somewhat influenced by those around him while
+Gordon was far away. When, therefore, Gordon took into his own hands
+the power of life and death, and sentenced men to be hanged and shot,
+he roused that opposition to the highest point of activity, and
+received repeated remonstrances by telegraph from Cairo. To these he
+replied firmly, but quietly, that on no other condition could the
+administration be carried on, and that his authority as Viceroy would
+be undermined if he could not dispense prompt justice. Notwithstanding
+all his representations, he never obtained the ratification of his
+right to pass death sentences; but with that strong will that he
+showed in every crisis, he announced his determination to act on his
+own responsibility. On at least two occasions he expresses a feeling
+of gratification at having caused murderers to be hung.
+
+This is a suitable moment to lay stress on the true views Gordon held
+on the subject of bloodshed. While averse to all warfare by
+disposition, and without the smallest trace of what might be called
+the military spirit, General Gordon had none of that timid and
+unreasoning shrinking from taking life, which is often cruel and
+always cowardly. He punished the guilty without the least false
+compunction, even with a death sentence, and if necessity left no
+choice, he would have executed that sentence himself, provided he was
+quite convinced of its justice. As a rule, he went unarmed in the
+Soudan, as in China; but there were exceptions, and on at least one
+occasion he took an active and decisive part in a conflict. He was
+being attacked by one of the tribes, and his men were firing wildly
+and without result. Then Gordon snatched a rifle from one of his men,
+and firing at the hostile leader, killed him. There are at least two
+other incidents that will show him in a light that many of his
+admirers would keep suppressed, but that bring out his human nature. A
+clumsy servant fired off his heavy duck-gun close to his head, and
+Gordon very naturally gave him a smart box on the ears which the
+fellow would remember for a week. Excited by the misery of a
+slave-gang, he asked the boy in charge of them to whom they belonged,
+and as he hesitated, he struck him across the face with his whip.
+Gordon's comment on this act is that it was "cruel and cowardly, but
+he was enraged, and could not help it." One feels on reading this that
+one would have done so oneself, and that, after all, Gordon was a man,
+and not a spiritual abstraction.
+
+Thus ended the first eventful year of General Gordon's tenure of the
+post of Governor-General of the Soudan. Some idea of the magnitude of
+the task he had performed may be gathered from the fact that during
+this period he rode nearly 4000 miles on his camel through the desert.
+He put before himself the solution of eight burning questions, and by
+the end of 1877 he had settled five of them more or less permanently.
+He had also effected many reforms in the military and civil branches
+of the administration, and had formed the nucleus of a force in which
+he could put some confidence. By the people he was respected and
+feared, and far more liked than he imagined. "Send us another Governor
+like Gordon" was the burden of the Soudanese cry to Slatin when the
+shadow of the Mahdi's power had already fallen over the land. He had
+respected their religion and prejudices. When their Mahommedan
+co-religionists had ground them down to the dust, even desecrating
+their mosques by turning them into powder magazines, General Gordon
+showed them justice and merciful consideration, restored and endowed
+their mosques, and exhorted them in every way to be faithful to the
+observance of their religion. He was always most exact in payment for
+services rendered. This became known; and when some of the Egyptian
+officials--a Pasha among others--seized camels for his service without
+paying for them, the owners threw themselves on the ground, kissing
+Gordon's camel's feet, told their tale, and obtained prompt redress.
+What more striking testimony to his thoughtfulness for others could be
+given than in the following anecdote? One of his native lieutenants, a
+confirmed drunkard, but of which Gordon was ignorant, became ill, and
+the Governor-General went to see and sit by him in his tent. All the
+man asked for was brandy, and General Gordon, somewhat shocked at the
+repeated request, expostulated with him that he, a believer in the
+Koran, should drink the strong waters so expressly forbidden by that
+holy book. But the man readily replied, "This is as medicine, and the
+Prophet does not forbid us to save life." Gordon said nothing, but
+left the tent, and some hours later he sent the man two bottles of
+brandy from his own small store. Even the Soudanese, who were afraid
+of him in his terrible mood, knew the many soft corners he kept in his
+heart, and easily learnt the way to them. For misfortune and suffering
+of every kind his sympathy was quickly won, and with his sympathy went
+his support, to the utmost limit of his power.
+
+After the campaign in Darfour, Gordon returned to Khartoum, where he
+was preparing for fresh exertions, as well as for a settlement of the
+Abyssinian difficulty, when a sudden and unexpected summons reached
+him to come down to Cairo and help the Khedive to arrange his
+financial affairs. The Khedive's telegram stated that the Egyptian
+creditors were trying to interfere with his sovereign prerogative, and
+that His Highness knew no one but Gordon who could assist him out of
+this position. The precise date on which this telegram reached Gordon
+was 25th January 1878, when he was passing Shendy--the place on the
+Nile opposite Metammeh, where the British Expedition encamped in
+January 1885--but as he had to return to Khartoum to arrange for the
+conduct of the administration during his absence, he did not arrive at
+Dongola on his way to the capital until the 20th of the following
+month. He reached Cairo on 7th March, was at once carried off to dine
+with the Khedive, who had waited more than an hour over the appointed
+time for him because his train was late, and, when it was over, was
+conveyed to one of the finest palaces, which had been specially
+prepared in his honour. The meaning of this extraordinary reception
+was that the Khedive Ismail thought he had found a deliverer from his
+own troubles in the man who had done such wonders in the Soudan. That
+ruler had reached a stage in his affairs when extrication was
+impossible, if the creditors of Egypt were to receive their dues. He
+was very astute, and he probably saw that the only chance of saving
+himself was for some high authority to declare that the interests of
+himself and his people must be pronounced paramount to those of the
+foreign investors. There was only one man in the world likely to come
+to that conclusion, with a spotless reputation and a voice to which
+public opinion might be expected to pay heed. That man was Gordon.
+Therefore he was sent for in post haste, and found the post of
+President of "An Inquiry into the State of the Finances of the
+Country" thrust upon him before he had shaken off the dust of his long
+journey to Cairo.
+
+The motives which induced the Khedive to send for General Gordon
+cannot be mistaken; nor is there any obscurity as to those which led
+General Gordon to accept a task in which he was bound to run counter
+to the views of every other European authority, and still more to the
+fixed policy of his and other Governments. In the first place, Gordon
+being the servant of the Khedive, it would have been impossible for
+him to have said no to a request which was entitled to be regarded as
+a command. In the second place, Gordon did not know all the currents
+of intrigue working between Cairo and the capitals of Europe, and he
+convinced himself that a sound workable plan for the benefit of Egypt
+and her people would command such general approval that "the financial
+cormorants," as he termed the bondholders, or rather their leaders,
+would have to retire beaten from the field. He had no doubt that he
+could draw up such a plan, based on a suspension and permanent
+reduction of interest, and the result will convince any disinterested
+person of the fact, but Gordon was destined to find that all persons
+cannot be guided by such disinterestedness as his, of which the way he
+treated his Egyptian salary furnished such a striking instance. When
+sent to the Equator, he was offered £10,000 a year, and accepted
+£2000; as Governor-General, he was nominated at £12,000 a year, and
+cut it down to a half; and when, during this very Cairo visit, a new
+and unnecessary official was appointed under the Soudan
+Administration, he insisted that his own salary should be further
+reduced to £3000, to compensate for this further charge. Such an
+example as this did not arouse enthusiasm or inspire emulation in the
+Delta. General Gordon never dealt with a question in which abstract
+justice was deemed more out of place, or had less chance of carrying
+the day.
+
+As the matter was very important, and interested persons might easily
+have misrepresented his part in it, General Gordon drew up a
+memorandum explaining every incident in the course of the affair.
+This document was published by his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, in 1886,
+and the following description merely summarises its contents.
+
+As far back as the year 1875 the Khedive Ismail began to discover that
+the financial position of his Government was bad, and that it would be
+impossible to keep up the payment of the interest on the debt at the
+high rate of seven per cent., which Egypt had bound itself to pay. He
+therefore applied to the British Government for advice and assistance.
+In response to his representations, a Financial Commission, composed
+of three members--Mr Cave, Colonel Stokes, and Mr Rivers Wilson--was
+sent to Egypt for the purpose of inquiring into the financial position
+of that country. They had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion
+that it was unsound, and that the uneasiness of Ismail Pasha had not
+been expressed a day too soon. They recommended that an arrangement
+should be come to with the bondholders by which all the loans were to
+be placed on the same footing, and the rate of interest reduced to
+some figure that might be agreed upon. It then became necessary to
+negotiate with the bondholders, who appointed Mr Goschen for the
+English section, and M. Joubert for the French, to look after their
+rights. The result of their efforts in 1876 was that they united the
+loans into one, bearing a uniform rate of six per cent, instead of
+seven, and that four Commissioners were appointed to look after the
+debt in the interests of the bondholders, while two other European
+officials were nominated--one to control the receipts, the other the
+expenditure. In less than two years Ismail Pasha discovered that this
+arrangement had not remedied the evil, and that the Government was
+again on the verge of bankruptcy. It was at this juncture that the
+Khedive applied to General Gordon, in the hope that his ability and
+reputation would provide an easy escape from his dilemma.
+
+General Gordon agreed to accept the post of President of this
+Commission of Inquiry, and he also fell in with the Khedive's own wish
+and suggestion that the Commissioners of the Debt should not be
+members of the Commission. This point must be carefully borne in mind,
+as the whole negotiation failed because of the Khedive's weakness in
+waiving the very point he rightly deemed vital for success. Having
+laid down the only principle to which he attached importance, the
+Khedive went on to say that M. de Lesseps would act in conjunction
+with General Gordon, and that these two, with some vague assistance
+from financial experts, were to form the Commission. It soon became
+evident that M. de Lesseps had no serious views on the subject, and
+that he was only too much disposed to yield to external influences.
+
+On the very threshold of his task, which he took up with his usual
+thoroughness and honest desire to get at the truth, General Gordon
+received a warning that the greatest difficulties were not those
+inherent to the subject, but those arising from the selfish designs of
+interested persons. As soon as it became known that General Gordon had
+accepted this task, and that he had agreed to the Khedive's suggestion
+that the Debt Commissioners were not to sit on the Commission, there
+was a loud outburst of disapproval and dismay in diplomatic and
+financial circles. This part of the story must be given in his own
+words:--
+
+     "Mr Vivian, the English Consul-General, said to me, 'I wonder you
+     could accept the Presidency of the Commission of Inquiry without
+     the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'I was free to accept or
+     refuse.'
+
+     "I then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the
+     French and Austrian Consuls-General, and also Vivian, came in,
+     and attacked me for having accepted the post of President. I said
+     'I was free.' And then they said, 'I was risking his Highness his
+     throne; that he ran a very serious risk personally, if he formed
+     the Commission of Inquiry without the creditors' representatives,
+     viz. the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'Why do you not tell
+     him so?' They said, 'You ought to do so.' I said, 'Well, will you
+     commission me to do so, from you, with any remarks I like to make
+     as to the futility of your words?' They all said, 'Yes, we
+     authorise you to do so--in our names.'"
+
+General Gordon went that evening to the Abdin Palace, where he was
+engaged to dine with the Khedive; and having asked permission to make
+an important communication, saw Ismail before dinner, when words to
+this effect were exchanged:--
+
+Gordon said: "I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they
+told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious
+personal risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the
+Commissioners of Debt being upon it."
+
+The Khedive replied as follows: "I do not care a bit. I am only afraid
+of England, and I feel sure she will not move. You will see Lesseps
+to-morrow, and arrange the _enquête_ with him." Encouraged by the
+Khedive's firmness, and fully convinced that no good result would
+follow if the Debt Commissioners, who only considered the bondholders'
+interests, were on this inquiry, Gordon met Lesseps the next morning
+in the full expectation that business would now be begun. The further
+ramifications of the intrigue, for it soon became one, for the
+discomfiture and discrediting of Gordon, must be told in his own
+words:
+
+     "The next day Lesseps came to my Palace with Stanton (Stokes's
+     old Danube Secretary, now Resident-Commissioner for the British
+     Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of mine).
+     Lesseps began, 'We must have the Commissioners of the Debt on the
+     _enquête_.'
+
+     "I said, 'It is a _sine quâ non_ that they are not to be upon
+     it.' Lesseps replied, 'They must be upon it.'
+
+     "Then in came Cherif Pasha (the Premier), and said, 'Are you
+     agreed?' I left Lesseps to speak, and he said, 'Yes,' at which I
+     stared and said, 'I fear not.' Then Lesseps and Cherif discussed
+     it, and Lesseps gave in, and agreed to serve on the Commission
+     without the Commissioners of the Debt, but with the proviso that
+     he would ask permission to do so from Paris. Cherif Pasha was
+     pleased.
+
+     "But I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so I asked
+     Cherif to stop a moment, and said to Stanton, 'Now, see that
+     Lesseps does not make a mess of it. Let him say at once, Will he
+     act without the Commissioners of Debt or not? Do this for my
+     sake; take him into that corner and speak to him.' Stanton did
+     so, while I took Cherif into the other corner, much against his
+     will, for he thought I was a bore, raising obstacles. I told him
+     that Lesseps had declared before he came that he would not act
+     unless with the Commissioners of the Debt. Cherif was huffed with
+     me, and turned to Lesseps, whom Stanton had already dosed in his
+     corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation
+     again for some time; and then Cherif came to me and said,
+     'Lesseps has accepted without the Commissioners of the Debt.'
+
+     "I disgusted Cherif as I went downstairs with him by saying, 'He
+     will never stick to it.'"
+
+If Gordon was not a diplomatist, he was at least very clear-sighted.
+He saw clearly through M. de Lesseps, who had no views on the subject,
+and who was quite content to play the part his Government assigned
+him. A few minutes after the interview described he obtained further
+evidence of the hostility the projected inquiry without the
+Commissioners had aroused. He met Major Evelyn Baring, then beginning
+the Egyptian career which he still pursues as Lord Cromer, who was
+desirous of knowing what decision had been arrived at. On hearing that
+the Commissioners were to be excluded, Major Baring remarked, "It was
+unfair to the creditors," which seems to have drawn from Gordon some
+angry retort. There is no doubt that at this moment Gordon lost all
+control over himself, and employed personalities that left a sore
+feeling behind them. That they did so in this case was, as I am
+compelled to show later on, amply demonstrated in December 1883 and
+January 1884. The direct and immediate significance of the occurrence
+lay in its furnishing fresh evidence of the unanimity of hostility
+with which all the European officials in the Delta regarded the
+Khedive's proposal, and his attempt to make use of General Gordon's
+exceptional character and reputation. It is a reflection on no
+particular individual to assert that they were all resolved that
+General Gordon's appeal to the abstract sense of justice of the world
+should never be promulgated.
+
+The first practical proposal made was to telegraph for Mr Samuel
+Laing, a trained financier, who had acted in India at the head of the
+finances of that country; but General Gordon refused to do this,
+because he knew that he would be held responsible for the terms he
+came on; and instead he drew up several propositions, one of them
+being that the services of Mr Laing should be secured on conditions to
+be fixed by the Khedive. During this discussion, it should be noted,
+Lesseps paid no attention to business, talking of trivial and
+extraneous matters. Then Gordon, with the view of clinching the
+matter, said:
+
+     "There are two questions to decide:
+
+     "_First_, How to alleviate the present sufferings of the unpaid
+     civil employés and of the army, as well as the pressing claims of
+     the floating debt.
+
+     "_Second_, And afterwards to inquire into the real state of the
+     revenue by a Commission."
+
+This was the exact opposite of the bondholders' view, for the
+settlement of the grievances of the public and military service and of
+the floating debt would _then_ have left nothing for the payment of
+the coupons on the permanent external debt of a hundred millions. In
+fact, General Gordon boldly suggested that the funds immediately
+wanted must be provided by the non-payment of the next coupon due.
+
+It is impossible to resist the conclusion that if General Gordon had
+had his way, the Arabi revolt would have been averted; the Khedive
+Ismail, the ablest member of his house, would not have been deposed;
+and an English occupation of Egypt, hampered by financial and
+diplomatic shackles that neutralise the value of its temporary
+possession, need never have been undertaken. But _dis aliter visum_.
+It is equally impossible to resist the conclusion that the forces
+arrayed against Gordon on this occasion were such as he could not
+expect to conquer.
+
+The concluding scenes of the affair need only be briefly described. M.
+de Lesseps had never swerved from his original purpose to refer the
+matter to Paris, but even Gordon was not prepared for the duplicity he
+showed in the matter, and in which he was no doubt encouraged by the
+prevalent feeling among the foreigners at Cairo. The first point in
+all tortuous diplomacy, Eastern or Western, is to gain time; and when
+General Gordon, intent on business, called on Lesseps the next
+day--that is to say, two days after his arrival from Khartoum--the
+French engineer met him with the smiling observation that he was off
+for a day in the country, and that he had just sent a telegram to
+Paris. He handed Gordon a copy, which was to this effect: "His
+Highness the Khedive has begged me to join with M. Gordon and _the
+Commissioners of the Debt_ in making an inquiry into the finances of
+Egypt; I ask permission." Gordon's astonished ejaculation "This will
+never do" was met with the light-hearted Frenchman's remark, "I must
+go, and it must go."
+
+Then General Gordon hastened with the news and the draft of the
+telegram to the Khedive. The copy was sent in to Ismail Pasha in his
+private apartments. On mastering its contents, he rushed out, threw
+himself on a sofa, and exclaimed, "I am quite upset by this telegram
+of Lesseps; some one must go after him and tell him not to send it."
+Then turning to Gordon, he said, "I put the whole affair into your
+hands." Gordon, anxious to help the Khedive, and also hoping to find
+an ally out of Egypt, telegraphed at great length to Mr Goschen, in
+accordance with the Khedive's suggestion. Unfortunately, Mr Goschen
+replied with equal brevity and authority, "I will not look at you; the
+matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government." When we remember
+that Gordon was the properly-appointed representative of an
+independent Prince, or at least of a Prince independent of England, we
+cannot wonder at his terming this a "rude answer." Mr Goschen may have
+had some after-qualms himself, for he telegraphed some days later in a
+milder tone, but Gordon would not take an affront from any man, and
+left it unanswered.
+
+At this crisis Gordon, nothing daunted, made a proposal which, if the
+Khedive had had the courage to carry it out, might have left the
+victory with them. He proposed to the Khedive to issue a decree
+suspending the payment of the coupon, paying all pressing claims, and
+stating that he did all this on the advice of Gordon. Failing that,
+Gordon offered to telegraph himself to Lord Derby, the Foreign
+Secretary, and accept the full responsibility for the measure. Ismail
+was not equal to the occasion. He shut himself up in his harem for two
+days, and, as Gordon said, "the game was lost."
+
+General Gordon was now to experience the illimitable extent of human
+ingratitude. Even those who disagreed with the views he expressed on
+this subject cannot deny his loyalty to the Khedive, or the magnitude
+of the efforts he made on his behalf. To carry out the wishes of the
+Prince in whose service he was for the time being, he was prepared to
+accept every responsibility, and to show an unswerving devotion in a
+way that excited the opposition and hostility even of those whom he
+might otherwise have termed his friends and well-wishers. By an
+extreme expedient, which would either have ruined himself or thwarted
+the plans of powerful statesmen, and financiers not less powerful, he
+would have sealed his devotion to Ismail Pasha; but the moral or
+physical weakness of the Oriental prevented the attempt being made.
+The delay mentioned allowed of fresh pressure being brought to bear on
+the Khedive; and while Gordon emphatically declared, partly from a
+sense of consistency, and partly because he hoped to stiffen the
+Khedive's resolution that he would not act with the Debt Commissioners
+on the Inquiry, Ismail Pasha was coerced or induced into surrendering
+all he had been fighting for. He gave his assent to the Commissioners
+being on the Inquiry, and he turned his back on the man who had come
+from the heart of Africa to his assistance. When Gordon learnt these
+facts, he resolved to return to the Soudan, and he was allowed to do
+so without the least mark of honour or word of thanks from the
+Khedive. His financial episode cost him £800 out of his own pocket,
+and even if we consider that the financial situation in the Delta,
+with all its cross-currents of shady intrigue and selfish designs, was
+one that he was not quite qualified to deal with, we cannot dispute
+that his propositions were full of all his habitual nobility of
+purpose, and that they were practical, if they could ever have been
+put into effect.
+
+This incident serves to bring out some of the limitations of Gordon's
+ability. His own convictions, strengthened by the solitary life he had
+led for years in the Soudan, did not make him well adapted for any
+form of diplomacy. His methods were too simple, and his remedies too
+exclusively based on a radical treatment, to suit every complaint in a
+complicated state of society; nor is it possible for the majority of
+men to be influenced by his extraordinary self-abnegation and
+disregard for money. During this very mission he boasted that he was
+able to get to bed at eight o'clock, because he never dined out, and
+that he did not care at everyone laughing at him, and saying he was in
+the sulks. This mode of living was due, not to any peculiarity about
+General Gordon--although I trace to this period the opinion that he
+was mad--but mainly to his honest wish not to be biassed by any
+European's judgment, and to be able to give the Khedive absolutely
+independent advice, as if he himself were an Egyptian, speaking and
+acting for Egypt. Enough has been said to explain why he failed to
+accomplish a really impossible task. Nor is it necessary to assume
+that because they differed from him and strenuously opposed his
+project, the other Englishmen in authority in the Delta were
+influenced by any unworthy motives or pursued a policy that was either
+reprehensible or unsound.
+
+From this uncongenial task General Gordon returned to the work which
+he thoroughly understood, and with regard to which he had to apprehend
+no serious outside interference, for the attraction of the flesh-pots
+of Egypt did not extend into the Soudan. Still, he felt that his
+"outspokenness," as he termed it, had not strengthened his position.
+He travelled on this occasion by the Red Sea route to Aden, thence to
+Zeila, with the view of inspecting Harrar, which formed part of his
+extensive Government. During this tour Gordon saw much that disquieted
+him--a large strip of country held by fanatical Mahommedans, the slave
+trade in unchecked progress where he had not thought it to exist--and
+he wrote these memorable words: "Our English Government lives on a
+hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet some
+day or other they or some other Government will have to know them, for
+things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. His Highness will be curbed
+in, and will no longer be absolute sovereign; then will come the
+question of these countries."
+
+At Harrar, Gordon dismissed the Governor Raouf, whom he describes as a
+regular tyrant, but who, none the less for his misdeeds, was
+proclaimed Governor-General of the Soudan when Gordon left it less
+than two years after this visit to Harrar. When this affair was
+settled, General Gordon proceeded _via_ Massowah and Souakim to
+Khartoum, where he arrived about the middle of June. On his way he had
+felt bound to remove eight high military officers from their commands
+for various offences, from which may be gathered some idea of the
+colleagues on whom he had to depend. He reached Khartoum not a moment
+too soon, for the first news that greeted him was that Suleiman had
+broken out in open revolt, and was practically master of the Province
+of Bahr Gazelle, which lies between Darfour and the Equatorial
+Province.
+
+But before describing the steps he took to suppress this formidable
+revolt, which resembled the rising under the Mahdi in every point
+except its non-religious character, some notice may be given of the
+financial difficulties with which he had to cope, and which were much
+increased by the Khedive's practice of giving appointments in a
+promiscuous manner that were to be chargeable on the scanty and
+inadequate revenues of the Soudan.
+
+In the year 1877 the expenditure of the Soudan exceeded the revenue by
+over a quarter of a million sterling; in 1878 Gordon had reduced this
+deficit to £70,000. In the return given by the Khedive of his
+resources when foreign intervention first took place, it was stated
+that the Soudan furnished a tribute of £143,000. This was untrue; it
+had always been a drain on the Cairo exchequer until in 1879 General
+Gordon had the satisfaction, by reducing expenditure in every possible
+direction and abolishing sinecures, of securing an exact balance. The
+most formidable adversary Gordon had to meet in the course of this
+financial struggle was the Khedive himself, and it was only by
+sustained effort that he succeeded in averting the imposition of
+various expenses on his shoulders which would have rendered success
+impossible. First it was two steamers, which would have cost £20,000;
+then it was the so-called Soudan railway, with a liability of not less
+than three quarters of a million with which the Khedive wished to
+saddle the Soudan, but Gordon would have neither, and his firmness
+carried the day. When the Cairo authorities, in want of money, claimed
+that the Soudan owed £30,000, he went into the items, and showed that,
+instead, Cairo owed it £9000. He never got it, but by this he proved
+that, while he was the servant of the Khedive, he would not be
+subservient to him in matters that affected the successful discharge
+of his task as that Prince's deputy in the Soudan.
+
+We must now return to the revolt of Suleiman, the most serious
+military peril Gordon had to deal with in Africa, which was in its
+main features similar to the later uprising under the Mahdi. At the
+first collision with that young leader of the slave-dealers, Gordon
+had triumphed by his quickness and daring; but he had seen that
+Suleiman was not thoroughly cowed, and he had warned him that if he
+revolted again the result would inevitably be his ruin. Suleiman had
+not taken the warning to heart, and was now in open revolt. His most
+powerful supporters were the Arab colonies, long settled in interior
+Africa, who, proud of their descent, were always willing to take part
+against the Turco-Egyptian Government. These men rallied to a certain
+extent to Suleiman, just as some years later they attached themselves
+to the Mahdi. As General Gordon wrote in 1878: "They were ready, and
+are still ready, to seize the first chance of shaking off the yoke of
+Egypt." It was during Gordon's absence at Cairo that Suleiman's plans
+matured, and he began the campaign by seizing the province of Bahr
+Gazelle. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, General Gordon
+fitted out an expedition; and as he could not take the command
+himself, he intrusted it to his best lieutenant, Romolo Gessi, an
+Italian of proved merit.
+
+Natural difficulties retarded the advance of the expedition. Heavy
+floods kept Gessi confined in his camp during three months, and the
+lukewarm supporters of the Government regarded this inaction as proof
+of inferiority. They consequently rallied to Suleiman, who soon found
+himself at the head of a force of 6000 men, while Gessi had only 300
+regulars, two cannon, and 700 almost useless irregulars. It was as
+difficult for him to let the Governor-General know that he needed
+reinforcements as it was for General Gordon to send them. Some of his
+subordinates, in command of outlying detachments, refused to obey his
+summons, preferring to carry on a little slave-hunting on their own
+account. His troops were on the verge of mutiny: he had to shoot one
+ringleader with his own hand.
+
+At last the floods fell, and he began his forward movement, fighting
+his way against detached bodies of slave-hunters, but after each
+success receiving the welcome of the unfortunate natives, of whom
+Suleiman had consigned not fewer than 10,000 in the six previous
+months to slavery. At last Gessi was himself compelled to halt at a
+place called Dem Idris, fifty miles north of the fort which Suleiman
+had constructed for his final stand, and named after himself. These
+places are about 200 miles south of both Dara and Shaka, while between
+them runs the considerable stream called Bahr Arab. Gessi was now in
+close proximity to the main force under Suleiman, but he had to halt
+for five months before he felt in any way equal to the task of
+attacking it. During that period he had to stand on the defensive, and
+sustain several attacks from Suleiman, who had made all his plans for
+invading Darfour, and adding that province to the Bahr Gazelle.
+
+The first of these engagements was that fought on 28th December 1878,
+when Suleiman, at the head of 10,000 men, attacked Gessi's camp at Dem
+Idris. Fortunately, he had neglected no precaution, and his regulars,
+supported by a strong force of friendly natives, nobly seconded his
+efforts. Suleiman's force was repulsed in four assaults, and had to
+retire with a loss of 1000 men. But Gessi's difficulties were far from
+removed by this victory. Suleiman's losses were easily repaired, while
+those of Gessi could not be replaced. His men were also suffering from
+fever, and the strain on himself, through the absence of any
+subordinates to assist him, was terrible. It was a relief to him when
+Suleiman delivered his second attack, fifteen days after the first. On
+this occasion Suleiman appealed to the religious fanaticism of his
+followers, and made them swear on the Koran to conquer or die; and the
+black troops, as the less trustworthy, were placed in the van of
+battle and driven to the assault by the Arabs. Gessi made an excellent
+disposition of his troops, repulsing the two main attacks with heavy
+loss; and when the attack was resumed the next day, his success was
+equally complete. Unfortunately, Gessi was unable to follow up this
+advantage, because his powder was almost exhausted, and his men were
+reduced to pick up bullets from the field of combat. Tidings of his
+position reached Suleiman, who made a final attack on the 28th of
+January 1879, but owing to the fortunate arrival of a small supply of
+powder, Gessi was able to fight and win another battle.
+
+It was not until the 11th March, however, that Gessi received a
+sufficient supply of ammunition to enable him to assume the offensive.
+Suleiman's camp or fort was a strongly barricaded enclosure,
+surrounded by a double row of trunks of trees. The centre of the
+enclosure was occupied by an inner fort, which was Suleiman's own
+residence. On Gessi attacking it, his first shell set fire to one of
+the huts, and as the wood was dry, the whole encampment was soon in a
+blaze. Driven to desperation, the brigands sallied forth, only to be
+driven back by the steady fire of Gessi's troops, who by this time
+were full of confidence in their leader. Then the former broke into
+flight, escaping wherever they could. Suleiman was among those who
+escaped, although eleven of his chiefs were slain, and the unfortunate
+exhaustion of Gessi's powder again provided him with the respite to
+rally his followers and make another bid for power.
+
+This further period of enforced inaction terminated at the end of
+April, when the arrival of a full supply of powder and cartridges
+enabled Gessi to take the field for the last time. On the 1st May the
+Egyptian commander started to attack the slave robber in his last
+stronghold, Dem Suleiman. Three days later he fought the first of
+these final battles outside that fort, and succeeded in cutting off
+the retreat of the vanquished Arabs into that place of shelter. He
+then broke into the fort itself, where there were only a few men, and
+he almost succeeded in capturing Suleiman, who fled through one gate
+as Gessi entered by another. Thanks to the fleetness of his horse,
+Suleiman succeeded in making good his escape. Before his hurried
+flight Suleiman murdered four prisoners sooner than allow of their
+recapture, and throughout the long pursuit that now began all slaves
+or black troops who could not keep up were killed. These were not the
+only crimes perpetrated by these brigands. Superstition, or the mere
+pleasure of cruelty, had induced them when their fortunes were getting
+low to consecrate a new banner by bathing it in the blood of a
+murdered child. For these iniquities the hour of expiation had now
+arrived.
+
+After the capture of Dem Suleiman, Gessi began a pursuit which,
+considering the difficulties of the route owing to heavy rain,
+topographical ignorance, and the deficiency of supplies, may be
+characterised as remarkable. Gessi took with him only 600 men, armed
+with Remington rifles; but they could carry no more than three or four
+days' provisions, which were exhausted before he came up with even the
+rearmost of the fugitive Arabs. There the troops turned sulky, and it
+was only by promising them as spoil everything taken that he restored
+them to something like good temper. Six days after the start Gessi
+overwhelmed one band under Abou Sammat, one of the most active of the
+slave-hunters, and learnt that Suleiman himself was only twenty-four
+hours ahead. But the difficulties were such that Gessi was almost
+reduced to despair of the capture of that leader, and as long as he
+remained at large the rebellion could not be considered suppressed.
+
+Fortune played the game into his hand at the very moment that the
+result seemed hopeless. In the middle of the night several men came to
+his camp from Sultan Idris, one of the Arab chiefs, thinking it was
+that of Rabi, the chief of Suleiman's lieutenants. Gessi sent one of
+them back to invite him to approach, and at once laid his own plans.
+He resolved to destroy Rabi's force, which lay encamped close by,
+before the other band could come up; and by a sudden assault at
+daybreak he succeeded in his object. The whole band was exterminated,
+with the exception of Rabi himself, who escaped on a fast horse. Then
+Gessi laid his ambuscade for Sultan Idris, who marched into the trap
+prepared for him. This band also was nearly annihilated, but Sultan
+Idris escaped, leaving, however, an immense spoil, which put the
+Egyptian soldiers in good humour. For the disposal of this booty, and
+for other reasons, Gessi resolved to return to Dem Suleiman.
+
+At this point it was alone possible to criticise the action of the
+energetic Gessi during the whole course of the campaign, and General
+Gordon no doubt thought that if he had paid no attention to the spoil
+captured from Rabi and Sultan Idris, but pressed the pursuit against
+Suleiman, he might then and there have concluded the campaign. On the
+other hand, it is only fair to state that Gessi had to consider the
+sentiment of his own troops, while he was also ill from the mental
+strain and physical exertion of conducting the campaign virtually by
+himself. The spoil, moreover, did not benefit him in the least. It
+went into the coffers of the Government, or the pockets of the
+soldiers, not into his. So little reward did he receive that Gordon
+intended at first to give him £1000 out of his own pocket, and
+eventually found himself able to increase it to a sum of £2000 out of
+the Soudan exchequer.
+
+But Suleiman was still at large, and the slave-dealers were fully
+determined to preserve their profitable monopoly, if by any means they
+could baffle the Government. The Egyptian officials were also inclined
+to assist their efforts, and while Gessi was recovering his strength,
+he had the mortification of seeing the fruits of his earlier success
+lost by the inaction or more culpable proceedings of his lieutenants.
+It was not until July 1879 that Gessi felt able to take the field in
+person, and then with less than 300 men, while Suleiman's band alone
+numbered 900. But there was no time to wait for reinforcements if
+Suleiman, who had advanced to within a short distance of Gessi's camp,
+was to be captured. Owing to the promptitude of his measures, Gessi
+came up with Suleiman in three days' time at the village of Gara,
+which he reached at daybreak on 16th of July. His measures were prompt
+and decisive. Concealing his troops in a wood, so that the smallness
+of their numbers might not be detected, he sent in a summons to
+Suleiman to surrender within ten minutes. Surprised, and ignorant of
+the strength of the Egyptian force, he and his followers agreed to lay
+down their arms: but when Suleiman saw the mere handful of men to whom
+he had yielded, he burst out crying. The situation suggested to him
+the hope of escape. Gessi learnt that when night came Suleiman and his
+men had arranged to break their way through. He therefore resolved to
+anticipate them. He held in his hands the ringleaders of the
+rebellion. If they escaped, all his work was lost; a summary act of
+justice would conclude the affair, and secure the Government against
+fresh attacks for a long time. To use his own words, Gessi "saw that
+the time had come to have done with these people once for all."
+
+He divided the captives into three bands. The first, composed of the
+black soldiers, little better than slaves, he released on the
+condition that they left at once and promised to settle down to a
+peaceful life. This they agreed to joyfully. Having got rid of these,
+the larger number of Suleiman's band, he seized the smaller body of
+slave-dealers--157 in number--and having chained them, sent them under
+a guard as prisoners to his own camp. Then he seized Suleiman and ten
+of his chief supporters, and shot them on the spot. Thus perished
+Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, in whose name and for whose safety he had
+gone into revolt, in the very way that Gordon had predicted two years
+before in the midst of his brigand power at Shaka; and thus, with a
+remarkable combination of skill and courage, did Gessi bring his
+arduous campaign of twelve months' duration to a victorious
+conclusion.
+
+Although the credit of these successful operations was entirely due to
+Gessi, it must not be supposed that General Gordon took no part in
+controlling them; but, for the sake of clearness, it seemed advisable
+to narrate the history of the campaign against Suleiman without a
+break. Early in 1879, when Gessi, after obtaining some successes, had
+been reduced to inaction from the want of ammunition, Gordon's anxiety
+became so great on his account that he determined to assume the
+command in person. His main object was to afford relief to Gessi by
+taking the field in Darfour, and putting down the rebels in that
+province, who were on the point of throwing in their lot with
+Suleiman. Gordon determined therefore to march on Shaka, the old
+headquarters of Zebehr and his son. On his march he rescued several
+slave caravans, but he saw that the suppression of the slave trade was
+not popular, and the contradictory character of the law and his
+instructions placed him in much embarrassment. Still, he saw clearly
+that Darfour was the true heart of the slave trade, as the supply from
+Inner Africa had to pass through it to Egypt, and he thought that a
+solution might be found for the difficulty by requiring every one of
+the inhabitants to have a permission of residence, and every traveller
+a passport for himself and his followers. But neither time nor the
+conditions of his post allowed of his carrying out this suggestion. It
+remains, however, a simple practical measure to be borne in mind when
+the solution of the slave difficulty is taken finally in hand by a
+Government in earnest on the subject, and powerful enough to see its
+orders enforced.
+
+General Gordon reached Shaka on 7th April, and at once issued a notice
+to the slave-dealers to quit that advantageous station. He also sent
+forward reinforcements of men and stores to Gessi, but in a few days
+they returned, with a message from Gessi that he had received enough
+powder from his own base on the Nile to renew the attack on Suleiman.
+Within one week of Gordon's arrival not a slave-dealer remained in
+Shaka, and when envoys arrived from Suleiman, bearing protestations
+that he had never been hostile to the Egyptian Government, he promptly
+arrested them and sent them for trial by court-martial. Their guilt as
+conspirers against the Khedive was easily proved, and they were shot.
+Their fate was fully deserved, but Gordon would have spared their
+lives if Suleiman had not himself slain so many hostages and helpless
+captives.
+
+Gordon's final operations for the suppression of the slave trade in
+Darfour, carried on while Gessi was engaged in his last struggle with
+Suleiman, resulted in the release of several thousand slaves, and the
+dispersal and disarmament of nearly 500 slave-dealers. In one week he
+rescued as many as 500 slaves, and he began to feel, as he said, that
+he had at last reached the heart of the evil.
+
+But while these final successes were being achieved, he was recalled
+by telegraph to Cairo, where events had reached a crisis, and the days
+of Ismail as Khedive were numbered. It may have been the instinct of
+despair that led that Prince to appeal again to Gordon, but the
+Darfour rebellion was too grave to allow of his departure before it
+had been suppressed; and on the 1st July he received a telegram from
+the Minister Cherif, calling on him to proclaim throughout the Soudan
+Tewfik Pasha as Khedive. The change did not affect him in the least,
+he wrote, for not merely had his personal feelings towards Ismail
+changed after he threw him over at Cairo, but he had found out the
+futility of writing to him on any subject connected with the Soudan,
+and with this knowledge had come a feeling of personal indifference.
+
+On his return to Khartoum, he received tidings of the execution of
+Suleiman, and also of the death of the Darfourian Sultan, Haroun, so
+that he felt justified in assuming that complete tranquillity had
+settled down on the scene of war. The subsequent capture and execution
+of Abdulgassin proved this view to be well founded, for, with the
+exception of Rabi, who escaped to Borgu, he was the last of Zebehr's
+chief lieutenants. The shot that killed that brigand, the very man who
+shed the child's blood to consecrate the standard, was the last fired
+under Gordon's orders in the Soudan. If the slave trade was then not
+absolutely dead, it was doomed so long as the Egyptian authorities
+pursued an active repressive policy such as their great English
+representative had enforced. The military confederacy of Zebehr, which
+had at one time alarmed the Khedive in his palace at Cairo, had been
+broken up. The authority of the Khartoum Governor-General had been
+made supreme. As Gordon said, on travelling down from Khartoum in
+August 1879, "Not a man could lift his hand without my leave
+throughout the whole extent of the Soudan."
+
+General Gordon reached Cairo on 23rd August, with the full intention
+of retiring from the Egyptian service; but before he could do so there
+remained the still unsolved Abyssinian difficulty, which had formed
+part of his original mission. He therefore yielded to the request of
+the Khedive to proceed on a special mission to the Court of King John,
+then ruling that inaccessible and mysterious kingdom, and one week
+after his arrival at Cairo he was steaming down the Red Sea to
+Massowah. His instructions were contained in a letter from Tewfik
+Pasha to himself. After proclaiming his pacific intentions, the
+Khedive exhorted him "to maintain the rights of Egypt, to preserve
+intact the frontiers of the State, without being compelled to make any
+restitution to Abyssinia, and to prevent henceforth every encroachment
+or other act of aggression in the interests of both countries."
+
+In order to explain the exact position of affairs in Abyssinia at this
+period, a brief summary must be given of events between Gordon's first
+overtures to King John in March 1877, and his taking up the matter
+finally in August 1879. As explained at the beginning of this chapter,
+those overtures came to nothing, because King John was called away to
+engage in hostilities with Menelik, King of Shoa, and now himself
+Negus, or Emperor of Abyssinia. In the autumn of the earlier year King
+John wrote Gordon a very civil letter, calling him a Christian and a
+brother, but containing nothing definite, and ending with the
+assertion that "all the world knows the Abyssinian frontier." Soon
+after this Walad el Michael recommenced his raids on the border, and
+when he obtained some success, which he owed to the assistance of one
+of Gordon's own subordinates, given while Gordon was making himself
+responsible for his good conduct, he was congratulated by the Egyptian
+War Minister, and urged to prosecute the conquest of Abyssinia.
+Instead of attempting the impossible, he very wisely came to terms
+with King John, who, influenced perhaps by Gordon's advice, or more
+probably by his own necessities through the war with Menelik, accepted
+Michael's promises to respect the frontier. Michael went to the King's
+camp to make his submission in due form, and in the spring of 1879 it
+became known that he and the Abyssinian General (Ras Alula) were
+planning an invasion of Egyptian territory. Fortunately King John was
+more peacefully disposed, and still seemed anxious to come to an
+arrangement with General Gordon.
+
+In January 1879 the King wrote Gordon a letter, saying that he hoped
+to see him soon, and he also sent an envoy to discuss matters. The
+Abyssinian stated very clearly that his master would not treat with
+the Khedive, on account of the way he had subjected his envoys at
+Cairo to insult and injury; but that he would negotiate with Gordon,
+whom he persisted in styling the "Sultan of the Soudan." King John
+wanted a port, the restoration of Bogos, and an Abouna or Coptic
+Archbishop from Alexandria, to crown him in full accordance with
+Abyssinian ritual. Gordon replied a port was impossible, but that he
+should have a Consul and facilities for traffic at Massowah; that the
+territory claimed was of no value, and that he certainly should have
+an Abouna. He also undertook to do his best to induce the British
+Government to restore to King John the crown of King Theodore, which
+had been carried off after the fall of Magdala. The envoy then
+returned to Abyssinia, and nothing further took place until Gordon's
+departure for Massowah in August, when the rumoured plans of Michael
+and Ras Alula were causing some alarm.
+
+On reaching Massowah on 6th September, Gordon found that the
+Abyssinians were in virtual possession of Bogos, and that if the
+Egyptian claims were to be asserted, it would be necessary to retake
+it. The situation had, however, been slightly improved by the downfall
+of Michael, whose treachery and covert hostility towards General
+Gordon would probably have led to an act of violence. But he and Ras
+Alula had had some quarrel, and the Abyssinian General had seized the
+occasion to send Michael and his officers as prisoners to the camp of
+King John. The chief obstacle to a satisfactory arrangement being
+thus removed, General Gordon hastened to have an interview with Ras
+Alula, and with this intention crossed the Abyssinian frontier, and
+proceeded to his camp at Gura. After an interview and the presentation
+of the Khedive's letter and his credentials, Gordon found that he was
+practically a prisoner, and that nothing could be accomplished save by
+direct negotiation with King John. He therefore offered to go to his
+capital at Debra Tabor, near Gondar, if Ras Alula would promise to
+refrain from attacking Egypt during his absence. This promise was
+promptly given, and in a few days it was expanded into an armistice
+for four months.
+
+After six weeks' journey accomplished on mules, and by the worst roads
+in the country, as Ras Alula had expressly ordered, so that the
+inaccessibility of the country might be made more evident, General
+Gordon reached Debra Tabor on 27th October. He was at once received by
+King John, but this first reception was of only a brief and formal
+character. Two days later the chief audience was given at daybreak,
+King John reciting his wrongs, and Gordon referring him to the
+Khedive's letters, which had not been read. After looking at them, the
+King burst out with a list of demands, culminating in the sum of
+£2,000,000 or the port of Massowah. When he had finished, Gordon asked
+him to put these demands on paper, to sign them with his seal, and to
+give the Khedive six months to consider them and make a reply. This
+King John promised to do on his return from some baths, whither he was
+proceeding for the sake of his health.
+
+After a week's absence the King returned, and the negotiations were
+resumed. But the King would not draw up his demands, which he realised
+were excessive, and when he found that Gordon remained firm in his
+intention to uphold the rights of the Khedive, the Abyssinian became
+offended and rude, and told Gordon to go. Gordon did not require to be
+told this twice, and an hour afterwards had begun his march, intending
+to proceed by Galabat to Khartoum. A messenger was sent after him with
+a letter from the King to the Khedive, which on translating read as
+follows: "I have received the letters you sent me by _that man_ (a
+term of contempt). I will not make a secret peace with you. If you
+want peace, ask the Sultans of Europe." With a potentate so vague and
+so exacting it was impossible to attain any satisfactory result, and
+therefore Gordon was not sorry to depart. After nearly a fortnight's
+travelling, he and his small party had reached the very borders of the
+Soudan, their Abyssinian escort having returned, when a band of
+Abyssinians, owning allegiance to Ras Arya, swooped down on them, and
+carried them off to the village of that chief, who was the King's
+uncle.
+
+The motive of this step is not clear, for Ras Arya declared that he
+was at feud with the King, and that he would willingly help the
+Egyptians to conquer the country. He however went on to explain that
+the seizure of Gordon's party was due to the King's order that it
+should not be allowed to return to Egypt by any other route than that
+through Massowah.
+
+Unfortunately, the step seemed so full of menace that as a precaution
+Gordon felt compelled to destroy the private journal he had kept
+during his visit, as well as some valuable maps and plans. After
+leaving the district of this prince, Gordon and his small party had to
+make their way as best they could to get out of the country, only
+making their way at all by a lavish payment of money--this journey
+alone costing £1400--and by submitting to be bullied and insulted by
+every one with the least shadow of authority. At last Massowah was
+reached in safety, and every one was glad, because reports had become
+rife as to King John's changed attitude towards Gordon, and the danger
+to which he was exposed. But the Khedive was too much occupied to
+attend to these matters, or to comply with Gordon's request to send a
+regiment and a man-of-war to Massowah, as soon as the Abyssinian
+despot made him to all intents and purposes a prisoner. The neglect to
+make that demonstration not only increased the very considerable
+personal danger in which Gordon was placed during the whole of his
+mission, but it also exposed Massowah to the risk of capture if the
+Abyssinians had resolved to attack it.
+
+The impressions General Gordon formed of the country were extremely
+unfavourable. The King was cruel and avaricious beyond all belief, and
+in his opinion fast going mad. The country was far less advanced than
+he had thought. The people were greedy, unattractive, and quarrelsome.
+But he detected their military qualities, and some of the merits of
+their organisation. "They are," he wrote, "a race of warriors, hardy,
+and, though utterly undisciplined, religious fanatics. I have seen
+many peoples, but I never met with a more fierce, savage set than
+these. The King said he could beat united Europe, except Russia."
+
+The closing incidents of Gordon's tenure of the post of
+Governor-General of the Soudan have now to be given, and they were not
+characterised by that spirit of justice, to say nothing of generosity,
+which his splendid services and complete loyalty to the Khedive's
+Government demanded. During his mission into Abyssinia his natural
+demands for support were completely ignored, and he was left to
+whatever fate might befall him. When he succeeded in extricating
+himself from that perilous position, he found that the Khedive was so
+annoyed at his inability to exact from his truculent neighbour a
+treaty without any accompanying concessions, that he paid no
+attention to him, and seized the opportunity to hasten the close of
+his appointment by wilfully perverting the sense of several
+confidential suggestions made to his Government. The plain explanation
+of these miserable intrigues was that the official class at Cairo,
+seeing that Gordon had alienated the sympathy and support of the
+British Foreign Office and its representatives by his staunch and
+outspoken defence of Ismail in 1878, realised that the moment had come
+to terminate his, to them, always hateful Dictatorship in the Soudan.
+While the Cairo papers were allowed to couple the term "mad" with his
+name, the Ministers went so far as to denounce his propositions as
+inconsistent. One of these Ministers had been Gordon's enemy for
+years; another had been banished by him from Khartoum for cruelty;
+they were one and all sympathetic to the very order of things which
+Gordon had destroyed, and which, as long as he retained power, would
+never be revived. What wonder that they should snatch the favourable
+opportunity of precipitating the downfall of the man they had so long
+feared! But it was neither creditable nor politic for the
+representatives of England to stand by while these schemes were
+executed to the detraction of the man who had then given six years'
+disinterested and laborious effort to the regeneration of the Soudan
+and the suppression of the slave trade.
+
+When Gordon discovered that his secret representations, sent in cipher
+for the information of the Government, were given to the Press with a
+perverted meaning and hostile criticism, he hastened to Cairo. He
+requested an immediate interview with Tewfik, who excused himself for
+what had been done by his Ministers on the ground of his youth; but
+General Gordon read the whole situation at a glance, and at once sent
+in his resignation, which was accepted. It is not probable that, under
+any circumstances, he would have been induced to return to the Soudan,
+where his work seemed done, but he certainly was willing to make
+another attempt to settle the Abyssinian difficulty. Without the
+Khedive's support, and looked at askance by his own countrymen in the
+Delta, called mad on this side and denounced as inconsistent on the
+other, no good result could have ensued, and therefore he turned his
+back on the scene of his long labours without a sigh, and this time
+even without regret.
+
+The state of his health was such that rest, change of scene, and the
+discontinuance of all mental effort were imperatively necessary, in
+the opinion of his doctor, if a complete collapse of mental and
+physical power was to be avoided. He was quite a wreck, and was
+showing all the effects of protracted labour, the climate, and
+improper food. Humanly speaking, his departure from Egypt was only
+made in time to save his life, and therefore there was some
+compensation in the fact that it was hastened by official jealousy and
+animosity.
+
+But it seems very extraordinary that, considering the magnitude of the
+task he had performed single-handed in the Soudan, and the way he had
+done it with a complete disregard of all selfish interest, he should
+have been allowed to lay down his appointment without any
+manifestation of honour or respect from those he had served so long
+and so well. Nor was this indifference confined to Egyptians. It was
+reflected among the English and other European officials, who
+pronounced Gordon unpractical and peculiar, while in their hearts they
+only feared his candour and bluntness. But even public opinion at
+home, as reflected in the Press, seemed singularly blind to the fresh
+claim he had established on the admiration of the world. His China
+campaigns had earned him ungrudging praise, and a fame which, but for
+his own diffidence, would have carried him to the highest positions in
+the British army. But his achievements in the Soudan, not less
+remarkable in themselves, and obtained with far less help from others
+than his triumph over the Taepings, roused no enthusiasm, and received
+but scanty notice. The explanation of this difference is not far to
+seek, and reveals the baser side of human nature. In Egypt he had hurt
+many susceptibilities, and criticised the existing order of things.
+His propositions were drastic, and based on the exclusion of a costly
+European _régime_ and the substitution of a native administration.
+Even his mode of suppressing the slave trade had been as original as
+it was fearless. Exeter Hall could not resound with cheers for a man
+who declared that he had bought slaves himself, and recognised the
+rights of others in what are called human chattels, even although that
+man had done more than any individual or any government to kill the
+slave trade at its root. It was not until his remarkable mission to
+Khartoum, only four years after he left Egypt, that public opinion
+woke up to a sense of all he had done before, and realised, in its
+full extent, the magnitude and the splendour of his work as
+Governor-General of the Soudan.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA.
+
+
+General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880--having
+lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome--resolved as far
+as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had
+thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last
+few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not
+leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought.
+Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his
+country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character
+and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the
+public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and
+energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous
+friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened
+with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had
+little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and
+health.
+
+After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland,
+where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting _en route_ at
+Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian
+Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial
+crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this
+case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon
+promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married
+while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as
+of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the
+same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial
+you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or
+less a cowed look."
+
+It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact
+with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the
+prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo,
+somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar.
+The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the
+circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:--
+
+
+                                   "HOTEL DE BELLE-VUE, BRUXELLES,
+                                   "_Tuesday, 2nd March 1880_.
+
+     "I arrived here yesterday at 6 P.M., and found my baggage had not
+     come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
+     boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 A.M.). I found I was
+     _detected_, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
+     to dinner at 6.30 P.M. It was then 6.20 P.M. I wrote my excuses,
+     telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 A.M., and no
+     baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 A.M.
+     I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.
+
+     "I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
+     Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
+     of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
+     the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
+     Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
+     great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
+     near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
+     their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
+     A.M., and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 A.M.;
+     remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 A.M.--No
+     baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
+     10.48 A.M.--No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
+     is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
+     Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
+     results.' 12.30 P.M.--Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
+     see the King--a very tall man with black beard. He was very
+     civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
+     quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
+     get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 A.M. My
+     baggage has come."
+
+During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the
+numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that
+he suffered from _angina pectoris_. This apprehension, although
+retained until a very short period before his final departure from
+England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With
+restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five
+weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again
+he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th
+April he left that place for London.
+
+Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his
+feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused
+the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment.
+While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the
+following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:--"My
+Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces
+should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read
+as follows:--"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be
+accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring
+that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities
+requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office
+accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer
+command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, £1500; your services
+required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course
+that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks
+for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an
+appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable
+post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of
+health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind
+whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the
+Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his
+good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and
+at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he
+would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and
+rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But
+after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise
+circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.
+
+While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the
+study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real
+reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and
+expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject
+which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up
+a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for
+clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international
+question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State
+papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very
+short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until
+September 1885, when it appeared in the _Times_ of the 24th of that
+month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men,
+and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later,
+testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon"
+diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum
+in its integrity:--
+
+     "The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
+     recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
+     to these terms, the Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
+     able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
+     responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
+     that her own interests were not interfered with. The
+     Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
+     ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
+     come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
+     the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
+     under the impression during the war _that England would help
+     them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually_.
+     England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
+     in her resistance.
+
+     "Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
+     intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe--there
+     was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
+     treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
+     Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.
+
+     "By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
+     kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
+     Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
+     to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
+     other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
+     have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
+     she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
+     Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.
+
+     "Therefore I maintain, that _once_ the Russo-Turkish War had been
+     permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
+     Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
+     believe that the Russians felt this as well.
+
+     "I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
+     Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
+     alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
+     of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
+     the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
+     Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
+     two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
+     commercial.
+
+     "By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
+     around it. Though the _only port_ on the Black Sea between Kertch
+     and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
+     was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
+     possession--'grapes were sour.'
+
+     "I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
+     was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the _coup de grâce_ to
+     Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.
+
+     "By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
+     alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
+     mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
+     great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
+     a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
+     south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
+     men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
+     place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
+     Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
+     Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
+     them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
+     lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
+     long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
+     laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
+     Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
+     wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
+     does not wish it?
+
+     "Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
+     be regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
+     wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
+     I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
+     Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.
+
+     "I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
+     by the Treaty of Berlin. _They were fully aware that the Treaty
+     of San Stephano was their_ coup de grâce. But the Treaty of
+     Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
+     lost _not only Bulgaria_ and _Roumelia_ (for she has virtually
+     lost it), but _Bosnia_ and _Herzegovina_, while she gained the
+     utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
+     hostile nation to north and south.
+
+     "I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
+     Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.
+
+     "I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
+     on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
+     ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
+     foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
+     when boys, have been bought at prices varying from £50 to £70,
+     and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
+     purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
+     and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
+     by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
+     Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
+     men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
+     they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
+     respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
+     rid of.
+
+     "Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
+     Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
+     the better. Why undertake the impossible?
+
+     "What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
+     definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
+     definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
+     and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
+     ways.'
+
+     "Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
+     followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
+     years:--
+
+     "1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.
+
+     "2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.
+
+     "3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.
+
+     "4. The increase of Greece.
+
+     "5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.
+
+     "6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.
+
+     "7. Annexation of Egypt by England, _either directly or by having
+     paramount and entire authority_.
+
+     "8. Annexation of Syria by France--ditto--ditto--ditto. (By this
+     means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
+     as England is.)
+
+     "9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.
+
+     "10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
+     establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
+     not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
+     parasite Pashas).
+
+     "I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
+     advantage of being _definite_, and a definite policy, however
+     imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.
+
+     "I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
+     view, and let events work themselves out.
+
+     "I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
+     shot being fired.
+
+     "I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
+     Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
+     false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
+     She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
+     _we_ been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
+     between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
+     to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
+     of 1856) in those years? _Absolutely nothing._
+
+     "What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
+     Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
+     world, is _the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
+     and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan_. By this means, when
+     the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
+     the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
+     on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
+     occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
+     the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."
+
+Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for
+which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was
+that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by
+character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of
+trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should
+accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India
+cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its
+correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent
+idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission
+of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission
+would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a
+philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from
+official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the
+idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at
+the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the
+proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon.
+Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to
+put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in
+this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame
+on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before
+General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but
+whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by
+his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to
+a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept
+the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made
+on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would
+take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the
+14th of that month.
+
+It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before,
+as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview
+with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described.
+The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his
+departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the
+invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The
+Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with
+which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought
+to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon,
+sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see
+me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting
+conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess
+came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said
+they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."
+
+Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and
+if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been
+slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he
+might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period,
+and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his
+own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post,
+there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the
+midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an
+independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."
+
+The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday
+Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:--
+
+     "MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--You will be surprised to hear that I have
+     accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
+     just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
+     haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.--Yours,
+
+                                             C. G. GORDON."
+
+His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:--
+
+"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments
+which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have
+exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has
+treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt
+greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."
+
+And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what
+took place in the following letter:--
+
+     "In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
+     Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
+     sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
+     position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
+     the face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
+     seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
+     those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
+     was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
+     some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
+     and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
+     parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
+     unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
+     possession of secrets of State that--considering my decision
+     eventually to leave--I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
+     stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
+     but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
+     pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
+     go at once."
+
+If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of
+his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without
+delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following
+circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive
+payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries
+were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in
+the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had
+formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878,
+and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance,
+in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing
+from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing
+officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's
+contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not
+wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few
+responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but
+no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During
+the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for
+Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led
+him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like,
+and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the
+statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following
+September or October.
+
+He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received
+and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that
+brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is
+absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given
+by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the
+determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.
+
+That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the
+death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity he had
+signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as
+British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on
+1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were
+murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was
+Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the
+first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and
+joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt
+as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the
+facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was
+unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate
+to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage
+guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they
+found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the
+Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign
+Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and
+Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an
+able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier
+politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan,
+so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.
+
+But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to
+negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in
+Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to
+present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and
+indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880,
+an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had
+been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three
+or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still
+to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than
+would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of
+Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the
+acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached
+Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the
+crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the
+persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not
+regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least
+known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before
+he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost
+during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities
+with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan.
+Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari,
+he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.
+
+Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his
+secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the
+Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as
+possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the
+region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any
+designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival
+into the camp of Indian officialdom.
+
+The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign
+Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence
+negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer
+Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at
+once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would
+stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these
+representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to
+Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the
+arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still
+considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and
+also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he
+also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official
+classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who
+were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness
+he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly
+detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set
+forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography
+of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian
+Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about
+Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is
+only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial
+experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that
+he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a
+political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical
+comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being
+appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.
+
+General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:--
+
+     "Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
+     Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
+     Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
+     proof of this intention? They do not exist.
+
+     "Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
+     imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
+     Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
+     intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
+     is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
+     against all reason to say he did. He was coerced into taking
+     one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
+     composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
+     to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
+     and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
+     evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
+     equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
+     evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
+     seen if ever published. This Court of _Enquiry_ found him guilty
+     and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
+     secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
+     from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
+     want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
+     defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
+     I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
+     The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
+     fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
+     and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
+     forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
+     responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
+     moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
+     altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
+     consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
+     happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
+     ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
+     £10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
+     Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
+     the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
+     her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
+     Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
+     Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
+     entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
+     Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
+     Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
+     protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
+     Chamberlaine."
+
+Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I
+append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville
+Chamberlaine:--
+
+     "An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
+     _émeute_ of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
+     and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
+     unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
+     by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
+     evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
+     soldiers was in any way not deplored by the Ameer, but was
+     regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
+     conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
+     accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
+     myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
+     permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
+     soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
+     ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
+     inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
+     culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
+     annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
+     resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
+     offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
+     heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
+     undeniable rights."
+
+Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the
+2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it
+had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But
+before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary
+sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid
+every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord
+Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the
+subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses
+are all due to my not acting on my _own_ instinct. However, for the
+future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly
+burst with the trammels.... A £100,000 a year would not have kept me
+there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."
+
+The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of
+Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese
+Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the
+following telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the
+Inspector-General of the Department in China:--
+
+     "I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
+     for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
+     large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
+     all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
+     six months' leave and come."
+
+As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought
+it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the
+resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this
+intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations,
+it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the
+message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old
+colleague Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in
+the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's
+departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed
+between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following
+characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon
+while he was at Khartoum:--
+
+     "DEAR SIR,--I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
+     Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
+     October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
+     glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
+     parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
+     often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
+     The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
+     your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
+     played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
+     for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.
+
+     "Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
+     civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
+     the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
+     suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
+     long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
+     whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
+     a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
+     other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
+     brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
+     following are the answers:--Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
+     official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta Jên died a
+     great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
+     the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
+     Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
+     you left China, and it is now in very good condition.
+
+     "Kwoh Ta jên, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
+     pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
+     to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
+     to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
+     is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
+     spot.
+
+     "I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
+     highest regards,--I remain, yours very truly
+
+               "(For LI HUNG CHANG),        TSÊNG LAISUN."
+
+Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and
+inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by
+affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best
+next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following
+message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first
+opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."
+
+At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in
+consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the
+province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the
+Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How,
+who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to
+death--the treaty itself had been repudiated--and hostilities were
+even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese
+Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly
+replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the
+resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that
+China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons
+who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to
+assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation.
+Never was there a clearer case of _post hoc, propter hoc_; but even
+the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and
+their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very
+catastrophe they wanted to avoid.
+
+On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese
+invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General
+for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until
+end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government."
+Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of
+the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not
+surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The
+official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and
+position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the
+following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China
+before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of
+insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of
+confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of
+criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable
+justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an
+ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the
+case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known
+idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be
+suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official
+telegram--"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved,"
+was somewhat harsh.
+
+It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying
+out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus
+worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service;
+ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not
+war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even
+if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further
+communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord
+Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his
+resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his
+own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the
+sum required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his
+mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He
+sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors
+and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless
+condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of
+knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often
+retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him
+the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It
+was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration
+of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian
+irritation:
+
+     "My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
+     Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
+     the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
+     breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
+     but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
+     desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
+     with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
+     be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
+     to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
+     heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
+     regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
+     China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
+     for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
+     promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."
+
+With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world,
+Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying,
+"Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to
+make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying
+them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth,
+and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace
+not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost
+he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this
+telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service
+in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be
+feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will
+take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British
+Government."
+
+Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the
+threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that
+were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse
+the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in
+fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is
+never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and
+splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice
+and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was
+Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was
+fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no
+control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it.
+There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of
+intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also
+among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of
+these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office
+never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its
+representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as
+the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving
+the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and
+prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with
+official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do
+nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar
+and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the
+British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards,
+from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had
+failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously
+failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the
+British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission.
+Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter
+its portals during the whole of his stay in China.
+
+That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian
+question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first
+occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the
+situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth
+recording at some length.
+
+There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed
+at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The
+uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier,
+with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of
+communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with
+China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz.,
+a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it
+had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue
+until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its
+share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government
+looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is
+necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in
+any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China;
+her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether
+the Russian Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince
+Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his
+chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not
+certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German
+Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold
+measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a
+man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths
+to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the
+means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the
+only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with
+his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is
+no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung
+Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two
+other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and
+one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the
+sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for
+him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the
+country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a
+mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be
+supreme.
+
+Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is
+necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He
+reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or
+two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found
+sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton.
+Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he
+found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a
+letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at
+Peking, and not to stop _en route_ to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin.
+As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that,
+whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who
+sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on
+approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by
+inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question
+that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to
+Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon
+assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it
+formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German
+Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of
+Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man
+of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese
+almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion
+he was actuated by the highest possible motives, but it must be
+recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between
+himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did
+realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same
+camp, and had the same objects in view--only this was not apparent at
+the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang
+sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting
+him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice
+against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew
+exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save
+Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and
+also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the
+support of Gordon's military genius.
+
+But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end
+it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons
+was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at
+Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend
+of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate
+China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung
+Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who
+had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the
+attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking
+that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own
+plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of
+Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll
+comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of
+filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think
+there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had
+not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He
+recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only
+thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety--if he were
+safe I would not care--but some people are egging him on to rebel,
+some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift.
+There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for
+their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling
+with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the
+promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He
+thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand,
+and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards:
+"I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I
+cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act
+as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her
+Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his
+Government of all responsibility for his acts--although they responded
+to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing
+Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest--Gordon threw himself
+into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained
+to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the
+pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the
+German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of
+France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it
+was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following
+unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular
+moment:--
+
+     "I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties--Li Hung Chang
+     (1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
+     peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
+     told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
+     third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
+     By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
+     not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
+     except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
+     best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
+     remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
+     of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
+     Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
+     indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
+     hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
+     be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
+     fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
+     and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
+     going on, but where heads are in gage."
+
+Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various
+matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws
+light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it
+here, although somewhat out of its proper place:--
+
+     "Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
+     made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
+     sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
+     Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into--
+
+     "1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.
+
+     "2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
+     have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
+     difficulties.
+
+     "3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
+     etc., etc.
+
+     "I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
+     merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
+     and encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
+     make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
+     I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
+     for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
+     those I may be with, and I like these people as much--well, say
+     nearly as much--as I like my countrymen.
+
+     "There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
+     and B. All this is wrong. China must _fara da se_. I painted this
+     picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
+     about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
+     'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
+     etc., etc.
+
+     "People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
+     during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
+     at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
+     come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
+     made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
+     power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
+     great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
+     administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
+     to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
+     mind.
+
+     "I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
+     railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
+     they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
+     the country and they would not understand it, and would be
+     fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
+     understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."
+
+Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by
+Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader
+of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also
+present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the
+first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help
+them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed
+him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the
+Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their
+opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said
+they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was
+that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the
+opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh
+epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary,
+looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on
+the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The
+end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make
+peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the
+only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said
+this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the
+use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life,
+you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for
+help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless
+to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger
+to assist you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion
+at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is
+the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the
+question of the Marquis Tsêng's negotiations in the Russian capital,
+was perfectly correct.
+
+Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the
+Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the
+following extracts will suffice:--
+
+     "China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
+     troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
+     wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
+     overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
+     rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
+     spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
+     case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
+     truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
+     China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
+     quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
+     attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her
+     enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
+     should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
+     Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
+     of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
+     field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
+     speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
+     which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
+     the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
+     first-class power; it is too near the sea."
+
+The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general
+application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the
+smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat
+a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and
+practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the
+regeneration of China might be brought about.
+
+     "In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
+     acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
+     country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_
+     united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
+     nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
+     hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
+     some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
+     prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
+     crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
+     words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
+     corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
+     these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
+     Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
+     confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
+     appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
+     being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
+     each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
+     surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
+     another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that
+     the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
+     would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
+     Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
+     the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
+     intending to enter into war.
+
+     "The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
+     Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
+     China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
+     they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
+     They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
+     ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
+     ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
+     themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.
+
+     "It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
+     Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
+     is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
+     move.
+
+     "The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
+     Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
+     the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
+     their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
+     Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.
+
+     "From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
+     the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
+     people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
+     people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
+     upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
+     of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
+     of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
+     Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
+     of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
+     Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
+     hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
+     the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
+     that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
+     the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
+     be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
+     last for years and cause endless misery.
+
+     "It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?
+     How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
+     industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
+     to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
+     revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
+     most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
+     have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
+     the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
+     open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
+     the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
+     request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
+     into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
+     the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
+     seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
+     recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
+     treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
+     one life need be lost.
+
+     "The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
+     people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
+     the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
+     where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
+     yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
+     to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
+     consideration, and grant our wishes.'
+
+     "I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
+     by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
+     I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
+     too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
+     Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
+     Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
+     Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
+     drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
+     Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
+     China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
+     the drones in winter."
+
+There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to
+Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he
+referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already
+quoted.
+
+Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war
+between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung
+Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China
+without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found
+another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation
+not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not
+reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might
+have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the
+arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist
+on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him
+nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his
+alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can
+be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least
+creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and
+unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely
+preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous
+diplomatists and selfish governments.
+
+With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country
+associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding
+this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later
+expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting
+letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in
+1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--
+
+     "The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
+     aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
+     war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
+     allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
+     with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
+     used the following argument to them when I was there:--The
+     present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may
+     say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
+     the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
+     extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
+     Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of
+     Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
+     dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
+     smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
+     Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight;
+     if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
+     are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
+     difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
+     would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
+     one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
+     France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
+     will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
+     fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
+     the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
+     increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
+     but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
+     by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
+     and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
+     mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
+     As for the European population in China, write them down as
+     identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
+     without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
+     China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
+     call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
+     on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
+     community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
+     benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
+     State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
+     Isle of Bourbon or Réunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
+     is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
+     planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
+     of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
+     that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
+     European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
+     countries?"
+
+In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same
+views are expressed:--
+
+     "I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is
+     and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
+     embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
+     would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
+     humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
+     following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
+     civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
+     success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
+     had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
+     private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
+     would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
+     clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
+     more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
+     the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
+     think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
+     country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
+     go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
+     of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
+     with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
+     Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."
+
+In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote
+finally on this branch of the subject:--
+
+     "I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
+     it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
+     consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
+     of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
+     and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
+     end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
+     could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
+     etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."
+
+There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very
+strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I
+combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on
+this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his
+other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese
+authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since
+attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also
+in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the
+Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--
+
+                                   "PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.
+
+     "About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the
+     Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the
+     question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt
+     by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
+     with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
+     opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had
+     the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
+     on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
+     spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
+     mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
+     the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
+     Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.
+
+     "I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
+     say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
+     would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
+     give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
+     could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
+     action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour
+     propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
+     defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
+     till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
+     for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
+     China.
+
+     "I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
+     than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us
+     say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
+     force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
+     wrong, even if it was eggs.
+
+     "Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
+     this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
+     prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
+     1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
+     The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
+     defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
+     soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
+     people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
+     chance.
+
+     "A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
+     therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
+     whether eggs are good or not.
+
+     "Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
+     power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
+     pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
+     whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
+     which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
+     Hung Chang.
+
+     "People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive
+     fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
+     nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
+     want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
+     do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
+     is outrageous.
+
+     "Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
+     Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
+     that Office the Chinese Government would make £2,000,000 a year
+     more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
+     because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
+     it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
+     Marquis Tsêng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
+     to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
+     'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
+     beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
+     of the people.'
+
+     "Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
+     'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'
+
+     "I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
+     smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
+     say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
+     only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
+     position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
+     article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
+     tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
+     though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
+     ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
+     Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
+     deleterious drug.
+
+     "The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de
+     bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
+     political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
+     As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
+     affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
+     injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
+     justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
+     allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
+     allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
+     should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"
+
+In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General
+Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--
+
+     "As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
+     to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
+     article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
+     foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
+     that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
+     as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
+     yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
+     while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
+     not very clear.
+
+     "What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
+     take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
+     forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
+     thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
+     case.
+
+     "What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say,
+     let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
+     renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.
+
+     "Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
+     foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
+     increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
+     it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
+     altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.
+
+
+There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he
+would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian
+Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade
+from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came,
+and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at
+Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a
+truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of
+the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the
+British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him
+whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to
+turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that,
+as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him
+to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in
+London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written
+chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on
+the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly
+interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence
+as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried
+in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for
+Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was
+not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about
+anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to
+be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for
+these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those
+who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end
+of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the
+establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan,
+and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear
+when events confirmed them.
+
+After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was
+at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely
+enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told
+that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to
+discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence
+on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he
+selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his
+visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite
+apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will
+vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and
+Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that
+quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of
+cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would
+strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was
+so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole
+province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything
+he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same
+places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of
+their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to
+his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on
+paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a
+friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer
+officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish
+family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which
+Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that
+General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on
+3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being
+taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a
+subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.
+The following is its text:--
+
+     "You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this
+     country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I
+     may say the same of you.
+
+     "I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope
+     of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish
+     question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as
+     a nation.
+
+     "I have come to the conclusion that--
+
+     "1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants
+     of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf
+     which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a
+     complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is
+     useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I
+     call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of
+     the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness
+     there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the
+     tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.
+
+     "2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say
+     to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.
+     They would be rendered--as past Land Acts in Ireland have
+     been--quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do
+     away with their force. Any half-measures will only place the
+     Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the
+     champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound
+     to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can
+     foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common
+     weal.
+
+     "3. My idea is that, seeing--through this cause or that, it is
+     immaterial to examine--a deadlock has occurred between the
+     present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up
+     the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of
+     Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,
+     Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these
+     districts is some four millions; if the Government give the
+     landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,
+     which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest
+     of £2,800,000, of which £2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands
+     would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land
+     Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration
+     Commission, which might for a short time need £100,000. This
+     would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an
+     interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law
+     which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the
+     public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or
+     control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,
+     etc., should be under the Land Commission.
+
+     "4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free
+     sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.
+
+     "In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own
+     observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts
+     I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let
+     alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,
+     that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same
+     time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of
+     starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.
+
+     "The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off
+     than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with
+     their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In
+     these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant
+     University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a
+     Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a £5 note from a
+     Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of ----
+     and of ----, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind
+     feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about
+     this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was
+     administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of
+     estates by landlords were expended.
+
+     "In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost
+     of twenty millions--worth now thirty millions. This money left
+     the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of
+     eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the
+     hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well
+     off, but I would offer ---- or his agent £1000, if either of them
+     would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed
+     as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by
+     their caricatures--firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the
+     crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,
+     secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the
+     Channel, and they do no good.
+
+     "It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our
+     existence."
+
+This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated
+difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement.
+The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple
+cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will.
+When the English people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish
+are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old
+prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least
+Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief
+observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond
+belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of
+the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.
+
+The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written
+opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed
+during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very
+much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal
+of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to _The Times_
+expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that
+letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although
+the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any
+_single_ ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But
+the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be
+found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer
+of Cabul, the man?
+
+On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of
+his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand,
+when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a
+British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord
+Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of
+the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry
+between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched
+up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment
+there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than
+of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left
+Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its
+possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to
+the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even
+able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been
+eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the
+extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer
+Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,
+it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has
+proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well
+have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the
+probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other
+supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that
+Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had
+been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest
+administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.
+
+     "Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
+     the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
+     advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
+     in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
+     evacuation.
+
+     "I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
+     of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
+     thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
+     otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
+     exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
+     alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
+     would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
+     predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
+     natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
+     latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
+     likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
+     plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position
+     and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at
+     the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?
+     If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small
+     inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some
+     say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think
+     that any people like being governed by aliens in race or
+     religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a
+     stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly
+     prosperity the latter may give.
+
+     "We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced
+     children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,
+     etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble
+     enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our
+     way to add to their numbers?
+
+     "From a military point of view, by the retention we should
+     increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of
+     Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to
+     be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,
+     which on the loss of a battle there--and such things must be
+     always calculated as within possibility--would aid the advance of
+     the enemy to the Indus. The _débouché_ of the defiles, with good
+     lateral communications between them, is the proper line of
+     defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot
+     have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles
+     are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the
+     enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not
+     prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.
+
+     "The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in
+     India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an
+     additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British
+     subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro
+     in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.
+
+     "That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I
+     doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our
+     word--_i.e._ that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against
+     his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with
+     any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.
+
+     "India should be able, by a proper defence of her present
+     frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look
+     after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier
+     will aid her.
+
+     "I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much
+     more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern
+     colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval
+     establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an
+     outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim
+     as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they
+     are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by
+     anything she can do in Central Asia.
+
+     "Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be
+     retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the
+     internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure
+     of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception
+     of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a
+     surfeit of late."
+
+During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects--the
+Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough
+styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not
+appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later,
+the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on
+irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active
+races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our
+experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the
+Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by
+the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they
+appeared in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. For this reason I quote the
+article in its entirety:--
+
+     "The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,
+     abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers
+     are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private
+     soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from
+     cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of
+     operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and
+     the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is
+     accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to
+     long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his
+     daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the
+     country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a
+     loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are
+     encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in
+     his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his
+     foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty
+     in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of
+     discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with
+     individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in
+     comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,
+     but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when
+     the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the
+     description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a
+     very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the
+     field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as
+     their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I
+     therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign
+     under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary
+     haste, for time does not press with them, while every day
+     increases the burden on a country without resources and
+     unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,
+     unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack
+     fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment
+     of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,
+     to be avoided, except by corps raised from people who in their
+     habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised
+     for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable
+     from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone
+     of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done
+     better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war
+     with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of
+     posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It
+     is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the
+     speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while
+     its effects on the scattered enemy is almost _nil_. An advance of
+     regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of
+     march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must
+     be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The
+     enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular
+     day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely
+     where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like
+     wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the
+     work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their
+     foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars[1] regular troops
+     should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be
+     done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,
+     commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by
+     regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery
+     should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state
+     that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not
+     had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.
+     Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were
+     barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that
+     point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove
+     back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the
+     absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having
+     cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,
+     who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly
+     despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give
+     instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops
+     could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,
+     in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about
+     by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be
+     most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is
+     quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which
+     exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids
+     which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was
+     taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this
+     hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the
+     '_Veni, vidi, vici_' principle. It may be very fine, but it is
+     bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur
+     to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,
+     bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that
+     military science should be entirely thrown away when combating
+     native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans
+     always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country
+     or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in
+     Circassia."
+
+          [1] In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.
+
+Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when
+he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape
+authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two
+years at £700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering
+Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the courtesy
+of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier
+the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and
+that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as
+showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question,
+and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for
+the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.
+
+He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually
+met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own
+corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having
+fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at
+the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of
+service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went
+on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In
+his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry
+yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere
+else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has
+been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by
+General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could
+regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident
+that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter
+to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over
+cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep
+over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which
+were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for
+Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that
+Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no
+payment was to be made to him as was usual--in this case about
+£800--on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus
+saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a
+considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard
+met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip
+during illness to Madeira.
+
+Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his
+Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the
+island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the
+interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense
+amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some
+valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius
+the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters,
+and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that
+drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning
+the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to
+pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a
+state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage
+already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends,
+and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much
+taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with
+enemies on every hand--"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our
+power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work,
+but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is
+eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the
+reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the
+Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours
+inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for
+their duties, one has reason to fear the future."
+
+During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate
+importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of
+Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on
+coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the
+comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within
+the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special
+consideration. With regard to the former of these two important
+subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything
+has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:--
+
+     "I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling
+     stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large
+     French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and
+     Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese
+     populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any
+     time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation
+     would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime
+     fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between
+     Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a
+     beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for
+     the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of
+     great strategical importance _vis à vis_ with India, Suez, and
+     Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the
+     need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of
+     soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our
+     forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient
+     points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but
+     from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.
+     By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic
+     complications could arise, while by their means we could unite
+     all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective
+     support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against
+     the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept
+     watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.
+     The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the
+     principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with
+     suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."
+
+Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of
+the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in
+San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and
+the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mahé. The
+Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands--thirty in number--and
+Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money
+to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat
+imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the
+Garden of Eden.
+
+The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of
+the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority
+of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were
+less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are
+sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of
+reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be
+well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no
+reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them
+both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a
+Russian possession.
+
+     "I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The
+     Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other
+     nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and
+     arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war
+     with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would
+     inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has
+     changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean
+     close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is _war
+     in a basin_, the borders of which are in the hands of other
+     nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all
+     likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be
+     against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean
+     trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but
+     of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade
+     east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its
+     being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were
+     blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage
+     to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it--at any
+     rate I would say, let our _first care_ be for the Cape route, and
+     secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route
+     entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a
+     precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small
+     is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part
+     of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The
+     Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and
+     Bombay to _that_ Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing
+     for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its
+     protection."
+
+While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of
+Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent
+out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence
+he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of
+all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he
+might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done,
+owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers
+of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more
+probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had
+discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but
+had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's
+uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high
+official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too
+many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others
+from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.
+
+Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this
+matter, fate had provided him with another destination.
+
+Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made
+by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment
+in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd
+February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon
+would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government
+again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and
+moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir
+Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following
+telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:--
+
+     "Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would
+     permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.
+     Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony
+     for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be
+     adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament
+     sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage
+     his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to
+     their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the
+     war and administering Basutoland."
+
+Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and
+thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate
+departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto
+question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to
+Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they
+stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and
+energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by
+the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to
+visit the Colony "at once"--repeating the phrase twice. All these
+messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he
+started in the sailing vessel _Scotia_, no other ship being
+obtainable.
+
+The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the
+dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty,
+although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did
+not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood
+that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited
+in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of
+dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just
+as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous
+circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more
+difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which
+he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient
+discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the
+requisite authority.
+
+Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the
+financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first
+office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of £1500; in 1881 Gordon
+had offered to go for £700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of
+arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered £1200 a year.
+He refused to accept more than £800 a year; but as he required and
+insisted on having a secretary, the other £400 was assigned for that
+purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under
+the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of £500 a year would
+continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June
+1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius,
+and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned.
+Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that
+he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some
+bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a
+company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion
+the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to
+compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his
+savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe
+I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him
+out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum
+was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money,
+and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it.
+But on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that
+"money was not his object."
+
+As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the
+Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that
+question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of
+access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the
+Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the
+Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable
+Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and
+freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs--Letsea, Masupha,
+Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon
+in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the
+natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from
+absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and
+they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality
+three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the
+tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the
+regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans,
+then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea
+and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha
+fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for
+war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total
+cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when
+Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general
+description of the question, it will be well to state the details of
+the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined
+all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and
+well-informed witnesses.
+
+His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:--
+
+     "In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her
+     Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were
+     recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by
+     convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land
+     on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's
+     Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.
+
+     "In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of
+     Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's
+     Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the
+     territories they possessed.
+
+     "Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a
+     large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of
+     Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by
+     hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart
+     as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.
+
+     "In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,
+     leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of
+     the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up
+     with the Basuto people.
+
+     "In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate
+     and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.
+
+     "In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and
+     a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great
+     extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This
+     was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's
+     Government.
+
+     "In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the
+     Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and
+     were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for
+     the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her
+     Majesty's High Commissioner.
+
+     "In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the _Crown_ Colony of the Cape
+     of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.
+
+     "In 1872 the _Crown_ Colony became a colony with a responsible
+     Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another
+     power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial
+     Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the
+     mistake committed which led to these troubles.
+
+     "Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto
+     War, and present state of affairs.
+
+     "From this chronology there are four points that stand out in
+     relief:--
+
+     "1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made
+     treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally
+     binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a
+     powerful state and a weak one.
+
+     "2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.
+
+     "3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being
+     consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to
+     another power--the Colonial Government.
+
+     "4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a
+     process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like
+     the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of
+     understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any
+     people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,
+     who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in
+     defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and
+     who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament
+     was only a prelude to their extinction.
+
+     "The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was
+     that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this
+     day.
+
+     "The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the
+     Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the
+     Colonial Government. They should have called together a national
+     assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer
+     could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root
+     of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung
+     up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any
+     malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,
+     and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a
+     Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of
+     sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some
+     such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know
+     the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the
+     Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.
+
+     "To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this
+     course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and
+     desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;
+     and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be
+     palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever
+     hearing the name again.
+
+     "This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials
+     ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is
+     the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto
+     people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.
+
+     "Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British
+     Government, and to its masters--the British people.
+
+     "Provided the demands of the Basutos--who will, for their own
+     sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the
+     colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free
+     State--are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all
+     expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance
+     of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government
+     should accept them.
+
+     "With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the
+     cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each
+     family, that is £40 per diem, or £1200 per month, and they have
+     been rationed during six months at cost of £7200. Their claims
+     may therefore be said to be some £80,000. Now, if these 800
+     families (some say half) have claims amounting to £30 each
+     individually (say 400 families at £30), £12,000 paid at once
+     would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these
+     families, viz. £600 a month (the retention of them would only add
+     to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).
+
+     "I believe that £30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce
+     their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to
+     send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission
+     will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of
+     administration at Cape Town, during all which time £1200 a month
+     are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the
+     Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of £30,000 should
+     be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)
+     that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of
+     the National Pitso.
+
+     "The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the
+     National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive
+     proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The
+     greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary
+     Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for
+     the distribution of the £30,000 I would select those on whom the
+     responsibility of such distribution could be put, without
+     reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps
+     the colonial sanction should be taken.
+
+     "I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that
+     presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.
+
+     "In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;
+     (2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.
+
+     "I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could
+     be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government
+     would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,
+     and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be
+     produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."
+
+Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the
+chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or
+National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being
+present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and
+consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to
+everything that Government had been doing, should have completely
+taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being
+accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy
+in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers
+at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the
+hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt
+at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question
+was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape
+Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed
+it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was
+not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on
+what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In
+the interval Gordon was employed on different military and
+administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary
+charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which
+he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to
+follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the
+essential cause of his presence in South Africa.
+
+On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to
+Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks
+later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already
+quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention
+that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and
+Masupha any _entente_ would seem impossible." The basis of that
+convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its
+full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as
+the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had
+gone on for years without any prospect of termination.
+
+     CONVENTION BETWEEN COLONY, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE CHIEF AND
+                            PEOPLE OF BASUTOLAND.
+
+     "The Colonial Government having nominated as their
+     representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the
+     Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and
+     Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following
+     convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:--
+
+     "Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all
+     who have taken part in the late hostilities.
+
+     "Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's
+     chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.
+
+     "Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity
+     of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided
+     upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits
+     respected by the Orange Free State.
+
+     "Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the
+     Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult
+     with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures
+     concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the
+     Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the
+     jurisdiction of the chiefs.
+
+     "Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the
+     leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland
+     will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils
+     can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme
+     Council.
+
+     "Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the
+     chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The
+     sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident £2000 a
+     year, all included: the sub-residents £1200 a year, all included;
+     in providing for the education of people (now costing £3320 a
+     year); in making roads, etc.
+
+     "Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.
+     of the sums they collect.
+
+     "Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will
+     be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are
+     followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of
+     £20 to £60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they
+     are responsible for.
+
+     "Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents
+     for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.
+
+     "_Query_--Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries
+     after sub-residents?
+
+     "Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the
+     chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident
+     or sub-residents.
+
+     "Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange
+     Free State to be by and through the Resident.
+
+     "Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies
+     being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in
+     possession of the Basuto chiefs.
+
+     "Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment
+     of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to
+     withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial
+     administration."
+
+To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on
+7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas
+Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of
+26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that
+memorandum, which were as follows:--
+
+     "I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by
+     Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a
+     discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it
+     will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I
+     informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s
+     Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be
+     taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in
+     Basutoland."
+
+The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that
+declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was
+it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a
+sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one
+in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the
+necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of
+the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went
+on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of
+hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the
+other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's
+deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by
+granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention
+providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all
+external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan
+informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for
+Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose
+policy was directly impugned.
+
+On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in
+residence at the Grand Depôt of the Cape forces, he at once asked him
+to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on
+two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the
+convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or
+any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion,
+because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed
+visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and
+two servants."
+
+After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far
+waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's
+territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations
+with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he
+became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in
+league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might
+be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no
+possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also
+accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory,
+north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon
+found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the
+Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum,
+dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the
+hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others.
+Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government,
+which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire
+to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons,
+yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded
+but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his
+views were to prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately
+resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure
+the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never
+been surpassed.
+
+While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of
+Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted
+with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at
+that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack
+Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached
+Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first
+construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had
+been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable
+invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news
+to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been
+established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far
+Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply--"Refuse to have
+any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and
+his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced
+Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the
+plot.
+
+A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in _The Times_,
+20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character
+marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard
+for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as
+possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the
+other way, he is a fiend incarnate."
+
+Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on,
+and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the
+Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among
+Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when
+exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath
+of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his
+resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received
+their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal
+colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape
+to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and
+responsible duties.
+
+Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of
+conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the
+beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but
+they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely
+because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only
+necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his
+return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated
+was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head
+by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of
+Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct
+dependence under the British Crown.
+
+     "I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is
+     misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at
+     them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an
+     expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an
+     expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives
+     apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;
+     but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless
+     expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did
+     so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While
+     carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So
+     you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in
+     fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was
+     to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia
+     knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we
+     heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the
+     time."
+
+And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of
+July 1883:--
+
+     "I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was
+     twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an
+     account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a
+     letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that
+     Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed
+     between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having
+     let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but
+     this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."
+
+With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the
+description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at
+the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present
+administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.
+
+     "In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall
+     to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all
+     implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove
+     him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I
+     accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement
+     that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system
+     of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the
+     Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and
+     July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the
+     great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by
+     letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.
+     Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en
+     route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not
+     afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his
+     defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet
+     when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved
+     Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to
+     terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified
+     hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi
+     prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he
+     sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the
+     Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government
+     sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I
+     was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two
+     Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while
+     the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes
+     to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a
+     sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him
+     magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To
+     show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with
+     Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the
+     Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post
+     of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not
+     at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through
+     wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native
+     territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent
+     down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.
+     I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like
+     the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the
+     present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any
+     arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight
+     against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with
+     whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he
+     would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even
+     suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would
+     result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,
+     who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about
+     whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a
+     Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall
+     to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former
+     Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the
+     colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who
+     resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well
+     warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led
+     astray."
+
+Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of
+the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on
+that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the
+following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the
+Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to
+follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."
+
+The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state
+paper:--
+
+                           THE NATIVE QUESTION.
+
+     "1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to
+     an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who
+     will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with
+     respect to the natives.
+
+     "2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and
+     the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates
+     lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,
+     in the Government not supervising the action of these
+     magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging
+     those faults which come to their cognisance.
+
+     "3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native
+     magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could
+     fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the
+     greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a
+     great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among
+     the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or
+     of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native
+     territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but
+     the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is
+     contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.
+
+     "4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,
+     exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.
+     They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very
+     flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,
+     the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual
+     series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,
+     eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which
+     Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such
+     revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the
+     South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,
+     "Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry
+     Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the
+     now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the
+     causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a
+     great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support
+     of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating
+     causes before they proceeded to coercion.
+
+     "5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of
+     Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it
+     is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of
+     coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.
+
+     "6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men
+     proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the
+     hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not
+     driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of
+     some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and
+     fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into
+     every grievance, is the _sine quâ non_ of any quiet in the native
+     territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the
+     _modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief,
+     and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any
+     infraction of such charter.
+
+     "7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost
+     the Colony for administration some £9000 per annum for
+     administration of magistracies; the receipts are some £3000,
+     leaving a deficit of some £6000 per annum. To this deficit has to
+     be added some £150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of
+     Transkei ended in capture of some £60,000 worth of cattle, and
+     that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost
+     Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly £4,000,000. It is
+     surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to
+     investigate the administration of the Transkei.
+
+     "8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething
+     discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone
+     prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great
+     expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all
+     enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one
+     general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for
+     promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are
+     given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as
+     best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain
+     from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,
+     the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn
+     against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and
+     2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800
+     Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure
+     of £210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of
+     periodical troubles.
+
+     "9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of
+     Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each
+     magistrate, and also his capabilities.
+
+     "10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue
+     from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no
+     object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in
+     that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of
+     discontent among the natives, then what object is there in
+     insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far
+     inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier
+     than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on
+     sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into
+     rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is
+     on a scale costing £30,000 per annum.
+
+     "11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha
+     the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war
+     with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in
+     the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal
+     and Her Majesty's Government.
+
+     "12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the
+     Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the
+     calling together of the people to decide on their future
+     government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British
+     Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve
+     it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to
+     meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever
+     course is followed it is a _sine quâ non_ that the present
+     officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have
+     lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos
+     desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as
+     aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have
+     suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire
+     at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.
+     Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei
+     is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.
+
+     "13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of
+     affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony
+     demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be
+     composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
+     called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
+     difficulties.
+
+                                             C. G. GORDON.
+
+     "October 19, 1882.
+
+     "_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
+     Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
+     be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."
+
+The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,
+and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other
+matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,
+apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the
+Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him
+in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined
+urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then
+Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post
+thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of
+work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,
+and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still
+that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in
+a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of
+insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to
+cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while
+matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry
+went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The
+measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and
+Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the
+Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,
+was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew
+up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular
+forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in
+efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.
+This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most
+striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape
+would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it
+already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed
+the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by
+administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might
+be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not
+quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the
+whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than
+the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local
+jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never
+carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently
+composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has
+been peace there during all the other South African troubles.
+
+The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only
+be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no
+good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because
+Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were
+much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape
+Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five
+and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape
+authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.
+The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at
+least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman."
+But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and
+employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and
+as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the
+Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military
+reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be
+invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing
+Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had
+failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when
+Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under
+no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin
+of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and
+the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The
+indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and
+every particular.
+
+Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest
+principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser
+man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he
+incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his
+army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage
+for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he
+quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a
+Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this
+without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such
+an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he
+was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious
+condition.
+
+Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some
+correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred
+to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England
+on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a
+long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he
+might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of
+the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary
+degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a
+holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time
+a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir
+William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem,
+where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as
+companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During
+his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length
+into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I
+do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as
+several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote
+on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any
+interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical
+questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his
+quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once
+declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in
+itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison,
+which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one
+being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he
+returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the
+progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger,
+which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was
+brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a
+canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus
+dilates upon the scheme:--
+
+     "Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be
+     done. The reasons are:--
+
+     "1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose
+     tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the
+     people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of
+     the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are
+     _hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we
+     support these vampires.
+
+     "2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the
+     interest of £90,000,000 will be paid or not.
+
+     "3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the
+     rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we
+     cannot rid ourselves.
+
+     "4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,
+     and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the
+     Palestine Canal--
+
+     "1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,
+     Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.
+
+     "2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no
+     missions.
+
+     "3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the
+     Bedouins.
+
+     "4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of
+     Egypt.
+
+     "5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.
+
+     "6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _débouché_.
+
+     "7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of
+     Damascus.
+
+     "8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except
+     for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the
+     waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah
+     Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.
+
+     "9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,
+     which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is
+     pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.
+
+     "10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;
+     it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great
+     Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being
+     owned by a Great Power.
+
+     "11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;
+     population 130,000, quite a small country.
+
+     "Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.
+     10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea
+     (_i.e._ Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one
+     going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.
+
+     "The cost would be--
+
+          Canal from Haifa to Jordan,            £2,000,000
+          Compensation to Jordan peoples,         1,000,000
+          Canal through Akabah,                   6,000,000
+          Ports at Haifa,                         1,000,000
+          Ports at Akabah,                          500,000
+                                                ___________
+
+                                                £10,500,000
+                                                ===========
+
+     say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of
+     Egypt and Soudan for ever!
+
+     "Revenue, Palestine, £120,000, of which £80,000 goes to Sultan.
+     Do not quote _me_, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the
+     late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.
+     Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a
+     correspondent."
+
+He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never
+succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view,
+the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is
+somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior
+merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen
+the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to
+declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial
+route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the
+character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and
+more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second
+sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece
+of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf,
+whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.
+
+In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a
+summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter
+from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians
+now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.
+
+When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians
+wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter
+into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of
+having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made
+a _sine quâ non_ of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by
+Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree
+to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons,
+which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then
+became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his
+Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the
+Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and
+King Leopold.
+
+Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered
+necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department
+replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the
+Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State
+declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph
+clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government,
+altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of
+the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch _via_ Acre and Genoa
+to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night
+he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (_D.V._) next month to the
+Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and
+four days later a leading article in _The Times_ informed his
+countrymen of Gordon's new mission.
+
+On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and
+Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the
+difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go
+anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a
+pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that
+he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death,
+whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if
+he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it
+was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and
+that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at
+once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a
+matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left
+to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he
+had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated
+the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who
+negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the
+King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would
+be £7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which
+was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the
+King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner,
+furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit
+of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and
+now again when destined for the Congo.
+
+All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three
+days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared
+for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same
+day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the
+Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly
+with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th
+of February. _Dis aliter visum._ For the moment he worked up some
+enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their
+haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of
+slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened
+out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are
+passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his
+heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on
+the Congo.
+
+The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight
+to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking,
+the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of
+the month--that is, the same day as he arrived--he wrote the formal
+letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army,
+and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had
+guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at
+once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic
+official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition
+to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and
+the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of
+General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid
+application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no
+individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers,
+but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only
+should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his
+commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay
+as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole
+truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been
+carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance
+of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the
+public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which
+seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the
+Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and
+returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British
+Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As
+this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to
+keep it secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the
+16th of that eventful January.
+
+When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two
+o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think
+that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of
+extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could
+see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of
+business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to
+treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to
+Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question
+whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead
+of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant
+such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the
+permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I
+have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a
+few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon
+then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr
+Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the
+execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the
+Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be
+preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the
+King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided
+the Government of my own country does not require my services." The
+generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his
+Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating
+the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the
+spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying
+the orders of his own Government.
+
+Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive
+an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded
+by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many
+of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to
+carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the
+following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel,
+and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his
+last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby,
+and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but
+instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure
+till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given
+to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The
+article, based on his information, appeared in _The Times_ of 17th
+January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed,
+"There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he
+set out for Brussels, whether he was accompanied by his friend
+Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as
+the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with
+confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on
+the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly,
+which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter
+communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact
+within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a
+telegram was received--"Gordon goes to the Soudan."
+
+The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir
+Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January,
+which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get
+his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw
+King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he
+guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so
+sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at
+Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain
+Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely
+revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen
+to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five
+o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at
+once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state
+of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked
+"When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.
+
+To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of
+carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever
+since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on
+the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He
+was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his
+Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had
+only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle--and
+nothing less would have sufficed--he might relieve them from
+responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it
+have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of
+England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo,
+where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have
+fought and won the battle of humanity.
+
+I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at
+10 A.M., he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows--"Do not
+mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for
+two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two
+o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back to
+London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town,
+_but keep it a dead secret_, for I hope to leave it again the same
+evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only
+report on situation." After this came a post-card--18th January, 6
+A.M. "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night."
+That very night he left for Egypt.
+
+That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the
+following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the
+only account of his interview with the members of the Government that
+sent him out:--
+
+                                                       "19. 1, 1884.
+
+     "MY DEAR AUGUSTA,--I arrived in town very tired, at 6 A.M.
+     yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went
+     to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 P.M. I went back
+     to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 P.M. Wolseley came for me. I
+     went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
+     Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand
+     their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said
+     to me as to their ideas, which was '_they would evacuate
+     Soudan_.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would
+     I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it
+     was over. I started at 8 P.M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and
+     Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.
+     Gordon); no one else except Stokes--all very kind. I have taken
+     Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont
+     Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord
+     Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I
+     was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at
+     once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to
+     all.--Your affectionate brother,
+
+                                             "C. G. GORDON."
+
+As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to
+mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson,
+wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required--in
+fact, fitted him out--during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These
+kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his
+baggage--clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.--was captured with the money
+at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at
+Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on
+his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more
+imagination than love of truth.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE LAST NILE MISSION.
+
+
+When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to
+truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: "No man could
+lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me." Yet
+he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they
+were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878:
+"Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very
+ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other
+Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as
+they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be
+absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries....
+There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not
+pay more attention to the Soudan--if they do not establish at Khartoum
+a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done--the
+disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This
+disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese
+through their allies in Lower Egypt--the black soldiers I mean--will
+carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are
+the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything." The
+gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more
+remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went
+on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like
+a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least
+a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a
+rude and startling awakening.
+
+It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or
+indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at
+Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices
+of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the
+spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta--for it was
+completely successful, and would have continued so but for the
+intervention of British arms--was calculated to encourage those who
+entertained a desire to upset the Khedive's authority in the upper
+regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi
+rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not
+in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had
+scarcely begun his career, he wrote: "If they send the Black regiment
+to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops
+up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all
+hate." It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty
+months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi
+master of the Soudan.
+
+It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish,
+named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the
+Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the
+authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated
+such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this
+matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a
+course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well
+as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and
+other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile
+near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of
+Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt
+by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his
+religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of "a wretched
+Dongolawi," but the courage with which he defied and exposed an
+arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran,
+redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this
+wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive's Governor-General.
+Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these
+was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by
+Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the
+slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely
+the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a
+worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious
+propaganda.
+
+Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian
+Governor-General Raouf, Gordon's successor, and stigmatised by him as
+the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to
+interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report
+brought back was that he was "a madman," and it was at once considered
+safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year
+1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the
+receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had
+considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended by an
+armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at
+this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission,
+and took unto himself the style of Mahdi--the long-expected messenger
+who was to raise up Islam--at first secretly among his chosen friends,
+but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears
+of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder
+above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed
+in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time
+had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not
+diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading
+a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over
+many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons
+from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was
+followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders
+to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.
+
+Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that
+if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He
+probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had
+seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the
+Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more
+inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha
+therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an
+armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his
+person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to
+Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in
+the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: "By the grace of God
+and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go
+to Khartoum to justify myself."
+
+After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the
+Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.
+
+It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the
+affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon's old
+steamer, the _Ismailia_, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in
+August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops
+this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent
+commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth.
+Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and
+divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they
+were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they
+fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.
+
+In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other,
+and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed
+the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by
+swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of
+this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph
+of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed,
+the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile
+navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold
+his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering
+his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan,
+where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special
+reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans
+that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and
+Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the
+same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure
+the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.
+
+During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the
+local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted
+manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any
+danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the
+Government.
+
+Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces
+on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to
+bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed
+Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is
+entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and
+if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the
+carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his
+scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the
+Mahdi's followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was
+an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple
+precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell
+upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400
+men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable
+character of the victor's fighting power. This battle was fought on
+9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm
+establishment of the Mahdi's power in a considerable part of the
+Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so
+marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have
+sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.
+
+At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by
+Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and who
+had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in
+conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
+but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
+concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task
+he set himself--and indeed it was the justification of his
+re-appointment--was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
+the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
+4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
+Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
+Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
+1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
+end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
+levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
+over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
+derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
+might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
+a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
+position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
+dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
+camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
+degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
+irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
+one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
+Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
+heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
+Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.
+
+The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
+active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
+towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
+defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
+other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
+reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
+might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
+formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
+Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
+by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
+distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
+engrossed in troubles nearer home--the Arabi revolt and the
+intervention of England in the internal administration--seemed
+paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan,
+which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only
+direct result of Yusuf's defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black
+regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the
+Government was already shaken, their presence, as Gordon apprehended,
+was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.
+
+Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi's capture of
+the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within
+the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said
+Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled
+all the Mahdi's attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to
+succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months' siege. If
+there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the
+power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained.
+The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the
+spread of the Mahdi's reputation and power than the several victories
+he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January
+1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and
+a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and
+resource. More than that, an English officer--Colonel Hicks--was given
+the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of
+sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one
+blow.
+
+The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made
+with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from
+Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established
+for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile,
+opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a
+force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers,
+300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery,
+including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal
+command, several English and other European officers were appointed
+to serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the
+Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to
+the Mahdi's triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added,
+confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents,
+one of whom was Edmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
+years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
+ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.
+
+The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
+for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
+tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
+and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
+warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
+military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
+chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
+preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
+stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
+of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
+Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
+of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
+the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
+tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
+aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
+the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
+conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
+before Osman had struck a blow.
+
+The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
+his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
+military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
+men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
+the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
+overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
+untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
+sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
+of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
+prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
+Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
+strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
+the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
+expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
+measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
+Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
+be most certainly shown.
+
+But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the
+campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be
+no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that
+the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the
+start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample
+warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at
+Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a
+further delay of two months occurred there before they began their
+march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with
+disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even
+believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European
+lieutenants.
+
+The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El
+Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas
+had the northern route _via_ Gebra and Bara been taken, a certain
+supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important,
+the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still
+hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important
+error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by
+6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements
+by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of
+success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it
+became with each day's march more hopelessly involved in its own
+difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature
+attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to
+its doom.
+
+On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened
+by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the
+garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly
+promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through
+a difficult country, the Mahdi's forces began their attack. Concealed
+in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the
+conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing
+themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on,
+because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of
+the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But
+this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had
+reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient
+followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The
+Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The
+Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in
+a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole
+force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special
+stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken
+were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling
+character of the destruction of Hicks's army, which seemed to shatter
+at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive's power in the
+Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular
+quarter of the Dark Continent.
+
+The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in
+London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the
+region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been
+holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha
+was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at
+Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among
+these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin
+Pasha. That able officer had held the place for months under the
+greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in
+the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the
+situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under
+him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and
+reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin
+surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr
+Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and
+extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan,
+where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to
+Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat
+scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.
+
+By New Year's Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was
+triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the
+Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle
+course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some
+outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal
+Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the
+less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind
+at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
+out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
+moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
+authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
+Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
+sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
+practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
+field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
+over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
+Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
+admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
+elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
+the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
+sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
+races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
+tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
+policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
+that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
+hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
+Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
+the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
+backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
+whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the
+Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
+incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
+might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
+which has not yet lost its efficacy.
+
+In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
+in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
+succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
+warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
+he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
+easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
+be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
+were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
+moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
+Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and
+gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a
+difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and
+destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they
+established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an
+unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his
+own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism
+and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off
+single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith
+of his power.
+
+In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history,
+it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it
+may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to
+any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was
+undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against
+the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going,
+and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not
+think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that
+they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course
+it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at
+all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this
+mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in
+never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any
+real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed
+grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot,
+which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it.
+He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would
+turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount
+to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to
+the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in African
+history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for "a respite,"
+and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate
+in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it
+right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals
+should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let
+one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?
+
+It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond
+dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last
+Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon
+left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of
+interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and
+China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important
+memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon
+gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in _The
+Times_, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordon's
+thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he
+had served so long. The following is the full text:--
+
+     "On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as
+     Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when
+     Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime
+     Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the
+     Rivers-Wilson and de Blignières Ministry in May. Between June and
+     August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the
+     country a representative form of government, and had only a short
+     time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik.
+     Cherif's idea was that, the representation being in the hands of
+     the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her
+     independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will
+     be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their
+     debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible
+     except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail
+     responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of
+     Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was
+     quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly
+     considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he
+     had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge
+     Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position
+     to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had
+     always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister
+     whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.
+
+     "A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or
+     its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would
+     bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by
+     men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose
+     _parti pris_ was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a
+     minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with
+     other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice
+     been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one
+     who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate
+     him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is
+     essentially not an intriguer.
+
+     "To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on
+     August 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European
+     Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif,
+     praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the
+     ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif's
+     proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute
+     ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain
+     _kudos_ in Europe, and protect his absolute power.
+
+     "After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif's place, and then
+     Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European
+     desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience
+     exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute
+     power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father
+     he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he
+     wished with regard to the internal government of the country.
+     Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences--one, the
+     bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking
+     to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than
+     Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders
+     than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops,
+     such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the
+     bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the
+     present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give
+     no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik
+     finds him _de trop_, and by working up the military element
+     endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to
+     keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too
+     strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking
+     things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of,
+     and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif
+     then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what
+     he demanded before his dismissal.
+
+     "It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
+     in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
+     they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.
+
+     "There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak
+     of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The
+     people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again
+     that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has
+     altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit
+     of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot
+     of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same
+     oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates
+     as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik
+     will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals
+     of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the
+     local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is
+     essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing
+     to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute
+     power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear
+     of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the
+     Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him,
+     at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his
+     people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is
+     liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his
+     prerogative.
+
+     "It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise.
+     The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were
+     bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be
+     done by the curtailment of Tewfik's power. The present
+     arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The
+     Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the
+     country is quiet and the people well treated. They are
+     responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged
+     with the finances and the welfare of the country, but to whom
+     are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he
+     cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to
+     the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are
+     Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
+     these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
+     bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
+     Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
+     to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
+     advice.
+
+     "The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
+     having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
+     Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
+     Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office--in fact,
+     Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
+     supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
+     Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
+     with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
+     Residents. By this means the continual change of French
+     Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
+     between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
+     fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
+     As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
+     one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
+     two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
+     the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
+     which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.
+
+     "One thing should certainly be done--the giving of concessions
+     ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
+     Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
+     should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
+     by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
+     people."
+
+The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
+with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
+absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
+Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
+troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
+insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
+on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
+repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:--"Unless Hicks is given supreme
+command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate
+position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never
+end things satisfactorily." At the same time, he came to the
+conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that
+was Nubar Pasha. He wrote:--"If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime
+Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only
+man who can rule that country." This testimony to Nubar's capacity is
+the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not
+appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than
+any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan
+troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these
+difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and errors of
+any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy
+on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British
+Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September
+1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:--
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a
+     decided step _in re_ Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the
+     same time cannot avoid the _onus_ of being the real power in
+     Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is
+     undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in
+     power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable
+     from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government
+     have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their
+     present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over
+     the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with
+     France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act
+     in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further
+     than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the
+     odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt
+     fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her
+     Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for
+     the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on
+     in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at
+     least. I say therefore to avoid all this, _if Her Majesty's
+     Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country_
+     (which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get
+     the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own
+     salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This
+     anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the
+     travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy
+     now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a
+     responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and
+     dangerous."
+
+In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he
+enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were
+insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of
+Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdi's advance lent
+special interest:--
+
+     "I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you
+     will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in
+     London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers
+     (official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his
+     son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long,
+     and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the
+     history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr's
+     son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and
+     gold. It was my address to people of Soudan--Apologia. Isaiah
+     XIX. 19, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the
+     saviour who will come from the frontier."
+
+The note enclosed was published in _The Times_ of 5th January, and
+read as follows:--
+
+     "A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the
+     Mahdi's troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is
+     an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the
+     future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama
+     knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this isle, and so,
+     though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this
+     omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to
+     Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained
+     there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken
+     prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the
+     Mahdi's forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious,
+     and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation
+     of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of
+     Mehemet Ali's dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook's
+     office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and
+     protected by Sultan's Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall
+     when the Sultan's rule ends. It lost a large limb during the
+     Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no
+     doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria,
+     and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted
+     up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks
+     was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria
+     backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting
+     her go into Armenia--England and France neutralising one another.
+
+     "If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt,
+     and the union of England and France to support and control the
+     Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to
+     terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was
+     entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians."
+
+These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to
+have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W.
+T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, on 8th
+January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The
+substance of that statement is as follows:--
+
+     "So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is
+     indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your
+     hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern
+     Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain
+     your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as
+     exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned.
+     That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White
+     Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be
+     feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady
+     Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever
+     go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature.
+     It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering
+     Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will
+     exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities
+     in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may
+     do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they
+     may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this
+     danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous
+     fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in
+     Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the
+     Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the
+     Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take
+     fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope
+     with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if
+     nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened
+     by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady
+     Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attack. You might
+     as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be
+     kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real,
+     and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with
+     Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation
+     cannot possibly be justified.
+
+     "There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in
+     Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons
+     in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be
+     sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their
+     Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to
+     their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But
+     Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350
+     from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from
+     Khartoum--to say nothing of other places--and all the Europeans
+     in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you
+     going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply
+     them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will
+     not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be
+     plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be
+     spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot
+     evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either
+     surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all
+     hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be
+     entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi's
+     forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of
+     panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the
+     Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of
+     Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal
+     consequences.
+
+     "The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
+     weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is
+     because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was
+     thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had
+     refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck,
+     that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan
+     may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm
+     in Egypt. Everything depends on that.
+
+     "What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in
+     power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian
+     Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he
+     thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support
+     him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be
+     distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of
+     Tewfik or any of Nubar's rivals, will be allowed for a moment to
+     interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find
+     that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring
+     you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really
+     desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be
+     necessary for you to protect Nubar's Administration from any
+     direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be
+     depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office
+     without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes
+     office, it is the best security that you can have for the
+     restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case
+     with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any
+     stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no
+     hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them
+     continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have
+     worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar
+     should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he
+     will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say;
+     but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at
+     Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions
+     sterling--a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better
+     be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the
+     consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who
+     possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for
+     the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan,
+     and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.
+
+     "It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and
+     engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was
+     granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would
+     ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants
+     in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate
+     emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation
+     was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no
+     less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that
+     direction should be done gradually, and by a process of
+     registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar
+     thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the
+     natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also
+     might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the
+     abuses which prevail in the prisons.
+
+     "With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably
+     send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If
+     subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel
+     Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession
+     of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best
+     governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old
+     warning should not be lost sight of--"Put not your trust in
+     princes"; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at
+     least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to
+     him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of
+     Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him
+     possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might
+     also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things
+     in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on
+     there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the
+     adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would
+     be possible--not to say easy--to re-establish the authority of
+     the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.
+
+     "As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it
+     will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will
+     cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the
+     revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all
+     probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and
+     the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that
+     sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will
+     need a subsidy of £200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however,
+     would be temporary. During the last years of my administration
+     the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The
+     bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium
+     was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to
+     Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have
+     arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely
+     attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest
+     misgovernment.
+
+     "The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all
+     popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have
+     occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has
+     witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited
+     so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be
+     told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against
+     the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks
+     have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they
+     plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression
+     begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the
+     armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of
+     the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again
+     was attempted to be met by increasing taxation, and that still
+     further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a
+     dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in
+     a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in
+     rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were
+     subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely
+     unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only
+     method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the
+     same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they
+     rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the
+     Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to
+     regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he
+     personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential
+     Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The
+     movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
+     times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible
+     to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to
+     the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded
+     full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a
+     right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians,
+     who had harried the population. I had taught them something of
+     the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a
+     higher ideal of government than that with which they had
+     previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and
+     Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system
+     was re-established; my old _employés_ were persecuted; and a
+     population which had begun to appreciate something like decent
+     government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish
+     rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said
+     that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years
+     during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than
+     Turkish principles.
+
+     "The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere
+     compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well
+     with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing
+     them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and
+     Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on
+     to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for
+     the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They
+     deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to
+     terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to
+     offer them security for decent government in the future. If this
+     were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was
+     truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it
+     impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly
+     suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr's
+     father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he
+     had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of
+     the popular rights.
+
+     "There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can
+     differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to
+     evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have
+     said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given
+     up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship
+     the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously
+     increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not
+     rendered impossible.
+
+     "The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in
+     Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the
+     condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now,
+     with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that
+     must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad
+     and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the
+     people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and in Egypt, instead of
+     constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we
+     have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn.
+     Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to
+     say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers,
+     and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European _employés_
+     might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining
+     tenth--thoroughly efficient--should be retained; but, whatever
+     you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood's army, which is destined
+     to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with
+     Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much
+     foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more
+     popular. As for the European population, let them have charters
+     for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer
+     corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more
+     shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let
+     them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement
+     provides for its own defence and its own government. I should
+     like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest
+     standing--such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E.
+     Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of
+     the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar
+     in the saddle, sift out unnecessary _employés_, and warn
+     evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to
+     play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence
+     everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier
+     should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time."
+
+A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what
+thoughts were uppermost in Gordon's mind at the very moment when he
+was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the
+Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his
+noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have
+thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work,
+made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not
+know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the
+very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the
+situation, was ready--nay, eager--to take all the burden on his
+shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to
+proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for
+precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper
+treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of
+view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at
+heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a
+worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted
+with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really
+arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very
+Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself,
+in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to
+face.
+
+Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a
+Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage,
+confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it can
+be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him _sed
+pede claudo_ to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives,
+they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a
+definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the
+defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment,
+carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he
+saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and
+especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party
+principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some
+domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of
+an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan
+fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon
+overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was
+dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their
+country's fame.
+
+If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the
+development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi's power, those who
+had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the
+task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the
+Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt
+that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly,
+reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt,
+I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have
+been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the
+Mahdi's power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the
+Khedive.
+
+But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that
+General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the
+Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the
+overthrow of Hicks and his force?
+
+I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by
+myself in _The Times_ of January and February 1883. Until the capture
+of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local
+affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt
+to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of
+those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in _The
+Times_ on "The Soudan," occurs this passage:--
+
+     "It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation,
+     and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General
+     Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the
+     good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with
+     the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be
+     lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be
+     little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of
+     his achievements, when working for a half-hearted Government,
+     and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the
+     black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable
+     pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by
+     Englishmen."
+
+Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:--
+
+     "The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by
+     constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would
+     constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt.
+     On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive's sovereign
+     rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the
+     responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour,
+     Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable
+     administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation
+     cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any
+     circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be
+     entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile
+     us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would
+     be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours,
+     and that he would accept the charge."
+
+As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early
+part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive
+step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in
+Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was
+to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing
+Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe
+to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.
+
+I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon,
+who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of
+exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one
+of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was
+generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the
+Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had
+some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the
+end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet
+as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special
+knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting
+Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government
+Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883,
+Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and
+asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be
+of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord
+Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December
+that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."
+Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the
+fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose
+the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on
+public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be
+informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the
+incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better
+than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was
+far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the
+mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who
+had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan
+difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he
+treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a
+word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the
+objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the
+course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public
+opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to
+the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible,
+but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene
+in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on
+the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this
+matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty,
+and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one
+man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon
+could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in
+February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to
+completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to
+save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was
+only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal
+results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
+early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
+down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
+making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
+open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
+February had been spent.
+
+The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
+by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened
+by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
+would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
+the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
+slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our
+representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
+and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
+will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."
+
+But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
+Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
+situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
+for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
+might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
+and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
+The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
+dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
+territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
+loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
+chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
+10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
+available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
+the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
+replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
+employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
+the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
+"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
+British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
+get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
+matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
+despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
+adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the
+responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to
+be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.
+
+On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary
+to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
+powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements
+possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum
+showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the
+people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the
+enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly
+Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on
+9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum,
+which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the
+greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other
+garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and
+Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he
+discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he
+absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a
+hopeless errand.
+
+All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's
+recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high
+authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision
+was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January,
+because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover
+possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile
+downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject
+during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one
+"English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task
+finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance,
+some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January,
+Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks
+whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered
+circumstances. The "altered circumstances" must have been inserted for
+the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible,
+for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had
+been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir
+Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's
+services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had
+recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be
+sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not
+taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible
+conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was
+not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views
+more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for
+an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of
+Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own
+Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or
+word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there
+were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.
+
+The publication of General Gordon's views in the _Pall Mall Gazette_
+of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and
+urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least
+one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought
+that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that
+publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's
+telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what
+people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that
+Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other
+considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring
+would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high,
+dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's
+name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless
+Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and
+willing to adopt any suggestion--even to resign its place to "the
+unspeakable Turk"--so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.
+
+At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to
+undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and
+millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the
+occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The
+only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of
+forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too
+strong.
+
+On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last
+chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will
+go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the
+King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of
+his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given
+on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should
+always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with
+generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is
+naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain
+Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is
+therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.
+In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir
+Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating
+that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the
+Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the
+British representative could make no demur short of resigning his
+post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that
+"Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone
+conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come
+at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles
+Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in
+the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.
+
+In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the
+heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals
+who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be
+shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has
+filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his
+country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he
+allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that
+Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague;
+that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic
+timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in
+the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the
+single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they
+none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his
+resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment
+in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that
+retarded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was
+longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it
+solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards,
+the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without
+any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now
+Lord Cromer.
+
+Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection
+in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward
+General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster,
+and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling
+the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do,
+this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.
+Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending
+Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord
+Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect
+that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer
+that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode
+of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the
+Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when
+he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of
+H.M.'s Government."
+
+Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer
+who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it,
+left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to
+send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last
+moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance
+of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership
+practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and
+stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had
+assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's
+nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger which
+I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be
+far behind."
+
+Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting
+events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his
+sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of
+considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to
+face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out
+cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a
+subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views.
+The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
+quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
+hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
+I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
+them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
+rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
+after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
+previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
+between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
+of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
+conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
+start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
+difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
+garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
+establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
+which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
+the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
+the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
+Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
+thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
+The following instructions should be read by the light of these
+reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
+same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
+had widely different goals in view:--
+
+                              "FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
+     once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
+     Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
+     the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
+     that country, and for the safety of the European population in
+     Khartoum.
+
+     "You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
+     of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
+     upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
+     by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
+     be secured.
+
+     "In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
+     consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be
+     taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly
+     be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary
+     movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the
+     interior.
+
+     "You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and
+     Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
+     Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.
+
+     "You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform
+     such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
+     entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.
+     Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will
+     assist you in the duties thus confided to you.
+
+     "On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir
+     E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you
+     whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go
+     yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _viâ_ the Nile."
+
+General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to
+see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know
+the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor
+throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt
+to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to
+evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence
+to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own
+policy had been well set forth in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and might
+be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the
+impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the
+Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a
+Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to
+that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there
+was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British
+Government and its too brilliant agent.
+
+The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was
+about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ
+him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided
+against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the
+close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his
+father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster
+of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion
+that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the
+whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried
+away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the
+project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.
+It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind
+on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should
+not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good
+or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he
+telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging
+that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt
+as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives
+of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared,
+for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were
+murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been
+incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and
+thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.
+
+During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a
+memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had
+crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best
+course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the
+board--that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the
+Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in
+existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when
+he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his
+shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate
+from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very
+sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest
+course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge
+of the country."
+
+General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and
+to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to
+arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of
+proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was
+rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by
+the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was
+met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from
+his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to
+"throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could
+not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon,
+who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham;
+and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one,
+that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it,
+although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which
+showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon
+accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on
+the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by
+Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of
+Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any
+minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the
+interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on
+without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year;
+but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to
+stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its
+emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which
+it had decided should cease to exist.
+
+This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his
+turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested
+for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made
+a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between
+that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute
+between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon,
+whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament
+would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said
+at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss
+any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity
+was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe
+attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed
+towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with
+those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even
+days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern
+his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government
+would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would
+be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he
+could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to
+remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in
+the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.
+
+This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by
+General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and
+entitled by him "Zebehr Pasha _v._ General Gordon":--
+
+     "Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I
+     was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo,
+     being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in
+     Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces
+     in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I
+     called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never
+     moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the
+     rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was
+     in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the
+     Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to
+     Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.
+     Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that
+     they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.
+     I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to
+     be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman
+     be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of
+     Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned
+     me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I
+     therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those
+     chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another
+     direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my
+     terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with
+     some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did
+     not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being
+     settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there
+     with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the
+     sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman,
+     under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular
+     troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered
+     to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr
+     Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for
+     Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and
+     killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi
+     against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course
+     of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of
+     Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to
+     revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the
+     Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a
+     sort of _exposé_ to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been
+     put down--viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but
+     one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this
+     must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to
+     Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in
+     Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court
+     martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned
+     Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I
+     alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With
+     details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the
+     papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him,
+     and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about
+     Zebehr and myself.
+
+     "Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever
+     existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a
+     capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a
+     capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.
+     All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi
+     on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.
+     Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a
+     man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have
+     been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr
+     ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has
+     regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears
+     me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a
+     father.
+
+     "I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear
+     the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's
+     approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse
+     in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.
+
+     "It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian
+     Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its
+     evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which
+     could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be
+     accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of
+     months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, _i.e._ to
+     evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, _vis-à-vis_ the
+     safety of the Egyptian employés.
+
+     "To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
+     leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
+     _sine quâ non_.
+
+     "Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s
+     Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of
+     affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want
+     to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr
+     should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then
+     do not send him, and I have confidence one will (_D.V._) get out
+     the Egyptian employés in three or four months, and will leave a
+     cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be
+     done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action
+     against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally
+     against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain
+     settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this
+     Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after
+     he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as
+     his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this
+     inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be
+     the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.
+
+     "With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for
+     there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy
+     the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest
+     stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.
+     that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr
+     up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar
+     Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and
+     which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met
+     him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in
+     hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I
+     own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel
+     towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the
+     Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would
+     bear the responsibility of recommending it.
+
+                                   "C. G. GORDON, Major-General."
+
+An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th
+January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should
+also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon
+Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were
+present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham,
+Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the
+charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter,
+signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his
+son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of
+course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other
+incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that
+letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it
+being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the
+Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's
+instructions to attack him.
+
+     "Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness
+     towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore
+     do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and
+     menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and
+     deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him
+     in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a
+     mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief."
+
+It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr
+called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi
+rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the
+original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and
+bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as
+well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's
+complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.
+
+In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears
+no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at
+once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference
+to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only
+to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after
+the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to
+those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely
+control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal
+resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found
+expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn
+the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the
+incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General
+Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take
+Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and
+Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or
+both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal
+danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's attitude towards him
+personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the
+ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo;
+but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they
+considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early
+stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly
+blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he
+frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with
+his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first
+condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was
+perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for
+mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his
+earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of
+safety was not adopted.
+
+The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether
+Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's attitude towards
+himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a
+bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he
+considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of
+great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him,
+and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in
+reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the
+ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the
+last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote:
+"I hope _much_ from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all
+up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.
+
+Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss
+Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the
+Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To
+that Zebehr replied as follows:--
+
+     "TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON,--I am very grateful to you for
+     having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and
+     am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi,
+     because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do
+     not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of
+     the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these
+     reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your
+     wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life
+     through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.
+
+     "Please accept my best respects.
+
+                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.
+
+     "CAIRO, _22nd January 1885_."
+
+Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further
+communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to
+Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the
+following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this
+letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the
+officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his
+original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for
+General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:--
+
+                              "CAIRO [_received by Miss Gordon
+                                  about 12th October 1887_].
+
+     "HONOURABLE LADY,--I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
+     receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
+     Excellency Watson Pasha.
+
+     "This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of
+     the friendly relations that existed between me and the late
+     Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart,
+     and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me
+     and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo" [that is,
+     after his banishment to Gibraltar].
+
+     "I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
+     the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
+     that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.
+
+     "You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
+     Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
+     time.
+
+     "My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
+     their best respects.
+
+     "Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been
+     previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to
+     your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the
+     letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of
+     any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the
+     enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read.--Believe me,
+     honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,
+
+                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH."
+
+                            REPORT ENCLOSED.
+
+     "When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept
+     myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan
+     or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to
+     that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high
+     Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with
+     H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell,
+     that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my
+     relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of
+     compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about
+     it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches
+     addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached
+     Khartoum and remitted what he had.
+
+     "These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan
+     1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with
+     General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived
+     there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and
+     without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on
+     him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for
+     the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to
+     the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and
+     in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of
+     the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my
+     messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a
+     sum of £500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the
+     dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides
+     that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel
+     Stewart, £13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days
+     after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General
+     Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to
+     Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several
+     letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put
+     in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to
+     the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger,
+     with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a
+     special steamer.
+
+     "But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all
+     the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above
+     referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested,
+     and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by
+     General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the
+     steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she
+     went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre
+     of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters
+     carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter
+     addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for
+     my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and
+     decided to seize all my goods and properties, comprising them in
+     their _Beit-el-Mal_ (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.
+
+     "Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
+     treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
+     difficult.
+
+     "Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion
+     thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I
+     have requested the high Government officials referred to above to
+     give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all
+     gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take
+     the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in
+     all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the
+     information I have obtained from persons I have reason to
+     believe."
+
+Some further evidence of Zebehr's feelings is given in the following
+letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:--
+
+     "Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
+     thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
+     will kindly send me yours.
+
+     "The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was
+     sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will
+     excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I
+     was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had
+     not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied
+     at once.
+
+     "I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received
+     fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E.
+     Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the
+     letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what
+     tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook
+     knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to
+     see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I
+     presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the
+     property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your
+     brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me
+     for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to
+     this present moment.
+
+     "Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
+     best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
+     sister.
+
+                                                   "ZEBEHR.
+     "_28th Oct. 1884._"
+
+To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the
+authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility
+when they remained deaf to all Gordon's requests for the co-operation
+of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a
+tender regard for Gordon's own safety. At least this was the only
+point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived
+of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now
+adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of
+Zebehr's co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot
+be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he
+said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at
+once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr's
+ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a
+success.
+
+On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight
+hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English
+companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, _en
+route_ to Khartoum.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+KHARTOUM.
+
+
+Before entering on the events of this crowning passage in the career
+of this hero, I think the reader might well consider on its threshold
+the exact nature of the adventure undertaken by Gordon as if it were a
+sort of everyday experience and duty. At the commencement of the year
+1884 the military triumph of the Mahdi was as complete as it could be
+throughout the Soudan. Khartoum was still held by a force of between
+4000 and 6000 men. Although not known, all the other garrisons in the
+Nile Valley, except Kassala and Sennaar, both near the Abyssinian
+frontier, had capitulated, and the force at Khartoum would certainly
+have offered no resistance if the Mahdi had advanced immediately after
+the defeat of Hicks. Even if he had reached Khartoum before the
+arrival of Gordon, it is scarcely doubtful that the place would have
+fallen without fighting. Colonel de Coetlogon was in command, but the
+troops had no faith in him, and he had no confidence in them. That
+officer, on 9th January, "telegraphed to the Khedive, strongly urging
+an immediate withdrawal from Khartoum. He said that one-third of the
+garrison are unreliable, and that even if it were twice as strong as
+it is, it would not hold Khartoum against the whole country." In
+several subsequent telegrams Colonel de Coetlogon importuned the Cairo
+authorities to send him authority to leave with the garrison, and on
+the very day that the Government finally decided to despatch Gordon he
+telegraphed that there was only just enough time left to escape to
+Berber. While the commandant held and expressed these views, it is not
+surprising that the garrison and inhabitants were disheartened and
+decidedly unfit to make any resolute opposition to a confident and
+daring foe. There is excellent independent testimony as to the state
+of public feeling in the town.
+
+Mr Frank Power had been residing in Khartoum as correspondent of _The
+Times_ from August 1883, and in December, after the Hicks catastrophe,
+he was appointed Acting British Consul. In a letter written on 12th
+January he said: "They have done nothing for us yet from Cairo. They
+are leaving it all to fate, and the rebels around us are growing
+stronger!" Such was the general situation at Khartoum when General
+Gordon was ordered, almost single-handed, to save it; and not merely
+to rescue its garrison, pronounced by its commander to be partly
+unreliable and wholly inadequate, but other garrisons scattered
+throughout the regions held by the Mahdi and his victorious legions. A
+courageous man could not have been charged with cowardice if he had
+shrunk back from such a forlorn hope, and declined to take on his
+shoulders the responsibility that properly devolved on the commander
+on the spot. A prudent man would at least have insisted that his
+instructions should be clear, and that the part his Government and
+country were to play was to be as strictly defined and as obligatory
+on them as his own. But while Gordon's courage was of such a quality
+that I believe no calculation of odds or difficulties ever entered
+into his view, his prudence never possessed the requisite amount of
+suspicion to make him provide against the contingencies of absolute
+betrayal by those who sent him, or of that change in party convenience
+and tactics which induced those who first thought his mission most
+advantageous as solving a difficulty, or at least putting off a
+trouble, to veer round to the conclusion that his remaining at
+Khartoum, his honourable but rigid resolve not to return without the
+people he went to save, was a distinct breach of contract, and a
+serious offence.
+
+The state of feeling at Khartoum was one verging on panic. The richest
+townsmen had removed their property and families to Berber. Colonel de
+Coetlogon had the river boats with steam up ready to commence the
+evacuation, and while everyone thought that the place was doomed, the
+telegraph instrument was eagerly watched for the signal to begin the
+flight. The tension could not have lasted much longer--without the
+signal the flight would have begun--when on 24th January the brief
+message arrived: "General Gordon is coming to Khartoum." The effect of
+that message was electrical. The panic ceased, confidence was
+restored, the apathy of the Cairo authorities became a matter of no
+importance, for England had sent her greatest name as a pledge of her
+intended action, and the unreliable and insufficient garrison pulled
+itself together for one of the most honourable and brilliant defences
+in the annals of military sieges. Yet it was full time. Two months had
+been wasted, and, as Mr Power said, "the fellows in Lucknow did not
+look more anxiously for Colin Campbell than we are looking for
+Gordon." Gordon, ever mindful of the importance of time, and fully
+impressed with the sense of how much had been lost by delay, did not
+let the grass grow under his feet, and after his two days' delay at
+Cairo sent a message that he hoped to reach Khartoum in eighteen days.
+Mr Power's comment on that message is as follows: "Twenty-four days
+is the shortest time from Cairo to Khartoum on record; Gordon says he
+will be here in eighteen days; but he travels like a whirlwind." As a
+matter of fact, Gordon took twenty days' travelling, besides the two
+days he passed at Berber. He thus reached Khartoum on 18th February,
+and four days later Colonel de Coetlogon started for Cairo.
+
+The entry of Gordon into Khartoum was marked by a scene of
+indescribable enthusiasm and public confidence. The whole population,
+men, women, and children, turned out to welcome him as a conqueror and
+a deliverer, although he really came in his own person merely to cope
+with a desperate situation. The women threw themselves on the ground
+and struggled to kiss his feet; in the confusion Gordon was several
+times pushed down; and this remarkable demonstration of popular
+confidence and affection was continued the whole way from the
+landing-place to the _Hukumdaria_ or Palace. This greeting was the
+more remarkable because it was clear that Gordon had brought no
+troops--only one white officer--and it soon became known that he had
+brought no money. Even the Mahdi himself made his contribution to the
+general tribute, by sending General Gordon on his arrival a formal
+_salaam_ or message of respect. Thus hailed on all hands as the one
+pre-eminently good man who had been associated with the Soudan, Gordon
+addressed himself to the hard task he had undertaken, which had been
+rendered almost hopeless of achievement by the lapse of time, past
+errors, and the blindness of those who should have supported him.
+
+Difficult as it had been all along, it was rendered still more
+difficult by the decisive defeat of Baker Pasha and an Egyptian force
+of 4000 men at Tokar, near Souakim. This victory was won by Osman
+Digma, who had been sent by the Mahdi to rouse up the Eastern Soudan
+at the time of the threatened Hicks expedition. The result showed that
+the Mahdi had discovered a new lieutenant of great military capacity
+and energy, and that the Eastern Soudan was for the time as hopelessly
+lost to Egypt as Kordofan and Darfour.
+
+The first task to which Gordon addressed himself was to place Khartoum
+and the detached work at Omdurman on the left bank of the White Nile
+in a proper state of defence, and he especially supervised the
+establishment of telegraphic communication between the Palace and the
+many outworks, so that at a moment's notice he might receive word of
+what was happening. His own favourite position became the flat roof of
+this building, whence with his glass he could see round for many
+miles. He also laid in considerable stores of provisions by means of
+his steamers, in which he placed the greatest faith. In all these
+matters he was ably and energetically assisted by Colonel Stewart; and
+beyond doubt the other Europeans took some slight share in the
+incessant work of putting Khartoum in a proper state of defence; but
+even with this relief, the strain, increased by constant alarms of the
+Mahdi's hostile approach, was intense, and Mr Power speaks of Gordon
+as nearly worn out with work before he had been there a month.
+
+When Gordon went to the Soudan his principal object was to effect the
+evacuation of the country, and to establish there some administration
+which would be answerable for good order and good neighbourship. If
+the Mahdi had been a purely secular potentate, and not a fanatical
+religious propagandist, it would have been a natural and feasible
+arrangement to have come to terms with him as the conqueror of the
+country. But the basis of the Mahdi's power forbade his being on terms
+with anyone. If he had admitted the equal rights of Egypt and the
+Khedive at any point, there would have been an end to his heavenly
+mission, and the forces he had created out of the simple but
+deep-rooted religious feelings of the Mahommedan clans of the Soudan
+would soon have vanished. It is quite possible that General Gordon had
+in his first views on the Mahdist movement somewhat undervalued the
+forces created by that fanaticism, and that the hopes and opinions he
+first expressed were unduly optimistic. If so, it must be allowed that
+he lost not a moment in correcting them, and within a week of his
+arrival at Khartoum he officially telegraphed to Cairo, that "if Egypt
+is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed up."
+
+When the British Government received that message, as they did in a
+few days, with, moreover, the expression of supporting views by Sir
+Evelyn Baring, they ought to have reconsidered the whole question of
+the Gordon mission, and to have defined their own policy. The
+representative they had sent on an exceptional errand to relieve and
+bring back a certain number of distressed troops, and to arrange if he
+could for the formation of a new government through the notabilities
+and ancient families, reports at an early stage of his mission that in
+his opinion there is no solution of the difficulty, save by resorting
+to offensive measures against the Mahdi as the disturber of the peace,
+not merely for that moment, but as long as he had to discharge the
+divine task implied by his title. As it was of course obvious that
+Gordon single-handed could not take the field, the conclusion
+necessarily followed that he would require troops, and the whole
+character of his task would thus have been changed. In face of that
+absolute _volte-face_, from a policy of evacuation and retreat to one
+of retention and advance, for that is what it signified, the
+Government would have been justified in recalling Gordon, but as they
+did not do so, they cannot plead ignorance of his changed opinion, or
+deny that, at the very moment he became acquainted with the real state
+of things at Khartoum, he hastened to convey to them his decided
+conviction that the only way out of the difficulty was to "smash up
+the Mahdi."
+
+All his early messages show that there had been a change, or at least
+a marked modification, in his opinions. At Khartoum he saw more
+clearly than in Cairo or in London the extreme gravity of the
+situation, and the consequences to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt
+that would follow from the abandonment of Khartoum to the Mahdi. He
+therefore telegraphed on the day of his arrival these words: "To
+withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be
+the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though
+all Egyptian element were withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and
+inhuman." In the same message he repeated his demand for the services
+of Zebehr, through whom, as has been shown, he thought he might be
+able to cope with the Mahdi. Yet their very refusal to comply with
+that reiterated request should have made the authorities more willing
+and eager to meet the other applications and suggestion of a man who
+had thrust himself into a most perilous situation at their bidding,
+and for the sake of the reputation of his country. It must be recorded
+with feelings of shame that it had no such effect, and that apathy and
+indifference to the fate of its gallant agent were during the first
+few months the only characteristics of the Government policy.
+
+At the same period all Gordon's telegrams and despatches showed that
+he wanted reinforcements to some small extent, and at least military
+demonstrations along his line of communication with Egypt to prove
+that he possessed the support of his Government, and that he had only
+to call upon it to send troops, and they were there to come. He,
+naturally enough, treated as ridiculous the suggestion that he had
+bound himself to do the whole work without any support; and fully
+convinced that he had only to summon troops for them to be sent him in
+the moderate strength he alone cared for, he issued a proclamation in
+Khartoum, stating that "British troops are now on their way, and in a
+few days will reach Khartoum." He therefore begged for the despatch of
+a small force to Wady Halfa, and he went on to declare that it would
+be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi" if 200 British troops
+were sent to Wady Halfa, and if the Souakim-Berber route were opened
+up by Indian-Moslem troops. Failing the adoption of these measures, he
+asked leave to raise a sum, by appealing to philanthropists,
+sufficient to pay a small Turkish force and carry on a contest for
+supremacy with the Mahdi on his own behoof. All these suggestions
+were more or less supported by Sir Evelyn Baring, who at last
+suggested in an important despatch, dated 28th February, that the
+British Government should withdraw altogether from the matter, and
+"give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
+Government to do what seems best to them."
+
+Well would it have been for Gordon and everyone whose reputation was
+concerned if this step had been taken, for the Egyptian Government,
+the Khedive, his ministers Nubar and Cherif, were opposed to all
+surrender, and desired to hold on to Khartoum and the Souakim-Berber
+route. But without the courage and resolution to discharge it, the
+Government saw the obligation that lay on them to provide for the
+security and good government of Egypt, and that if they shirked
+responsibility in the Soudan, the independence of Egypt might be
+accomplished by its own effort and success. They perceived the
+objections to giving Egypt a free hand, but they none the less
+abstained from taking the other course of definite and decisive action
+on their own initiative. As Gordon quickly saw and tersely expressed:
+"You will not let Egypt keep the Soudan, you will not take it
+yourself, and you will not permit any other country to occupy it."
+
+As if to give emphasis to General Gordon's successive
+requests--Zebehr, 200 men to Wady Halfa, opening of route from Souakim
+to Berber, presence of English officers at Dongola, and of Indian
+cavalry at Berber--telegraphic communication with Khartoum was
+interrupted early in March, less than a fortnight after Gordon's
+arrival in the town. There was consequently no possible excuse for
+anyone ignoring the dangerous position in which General Gordon was
+placed. He had gone to face incalculable dangers, but now the success
+of Osman Digma and the rising of the riparian tribes threatened him
+with that complete isolation which no one had quite expected at so
+early a stage after his arrival. It ought, and one would have expected
+it, to have produced an instantaneous effect, to have braced the
+Government to the task of deciding what its policy should be when
+challenged by its own representative to declare it. Gordon himself
+soon realised his own position, for he wrote: "I shall be caught in
+Khartoum; and even if I was mean enough to escape I have not the power
+to do so." After a month's interruption he succeeded in getting the
+following message, dated 8th April, through, which is significant as
+showing that he had abandoned all hope of being supported by his own
+Government:--
+
+     "I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to
+     British and American millionaires to give me £300,000 to engage
+     3000 Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This
+     would settle the Soudan and Mahdi for ever. For my part, I think
+     you (Baring) will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being
+     caught here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with
+     sandalled feet. Not that (_D.V._) I will ever be taken alive. It
+     would be the climax of meanness after I had borrowed money from
+     the people here, had called on them to sell their grain at a low
+     price, etc., to go and abandon them without using every effort to
+     relieve them, whether those efforts are diplomatically correct or
+     not; and I feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomatically, I
+     have your support, and that of every man professing himself a
+     gentleman, in private."
+
+Eight days later he succeeded in getting another message through, to
+the following effect:--
+
+     "As far as I can understand, the situation is this. You state
+     your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber,
+     and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according
+     to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I
+     can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall
+     retire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of
+     abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola,
+     with the _certainty_ that you will eventually be forced to smash
+     up the Mahdi under greater difficulties if you wish to maintain
+     peace in, and, indeed, to retain Egypt."
+
+Before a silence of five and a half months fell over Khartoum, Gordon
+had been able to make three things clear, and of these only one could
+be described as having a personal signification, and that was that the
+Government, by rejecting all his propositions, had practically
+abandoned him to his fate. The two others were that any settlement
+would be a work of time, and that no permanent tranquillity could be
+attained without overcoming the Mahdi.
+
+Immediately on arriving at Khartoum he perceived that the evacuation
+of the Soudan, with safety to the garrison and officials, as well as
+the preservation of the honour of England and Egypt, would necessarily
+be a work of time, and only feasible if certain measures were taken in
+his support, which, considerable as they may have appeared at the
+moment, were small and costless in comparison with those that had
+subsequently to be sanctioned. Six weeks sufficed to show Gordon that
+he would get no material help from the Government, and he then began
+to look elsewhere for support, and to propound schemes for pacifying
+the Soudan and crushing the Mahdi in which England and the Government
+would have had no part. Hence his proposal to appeal to wealthy
+philanthropists to employ Turkish troops, and in the last resort to
+force his way to the Equator and the Congo. Even that avenue of safety
+was closed to him by the illusory prospect of rescue held out to him
+by the Government at the eleventh hour, when success was hardly
+attainable.
+
+For the sake of clearness it will be well to give here a brief summary
+of the siege during the six months that followed the arrival of
+General Gordon and the departure of Colonel Stewart on 10th September.
+The full and detailed narrative is contained in Colonel Stewart's
+Journal, which was captured on board his steamer. This interesting
+diary was taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and is said to be carefully
+preserved in the Treasury. The statement rests on no very sure
+foundation, but if true the work may yet thrill the audience of the
+English-speaking world. But even without its aid the main facts of the
+siege of Khartoum, down at all events to the 14th December, when
+Gordon's own diary stops, are sufficiently well known for all the
+purposes of history.
+
+At a very early stage of the siege General Gordon determined to try
+the metal of his troops, and the experiment succeeded to such a
+perfect extent that there was never any necessity to repeat it. On
+16th March, when only irregular levies and detached bodies of
+tribesmen were in the vicinity of Khartoum, he sent out a force of
+nearly 1000 men, chiefly Bashi-Bazouks, but also some regulars, with a
+fieldpiece and supported by two steamers. The force started at eight
+in the morning, under the command of Colonel Stewart, and landed at
+Halfiyeh, some miles down the stream on the right bank of the Nile.
+Here the rebels had established a sort of fortified position, which it
+was desirable to destroy, if it could be done without too much loss.
+The troops were accordingly drawn up for the attack, and the gun and
+infantry fire commenced to cover the advance. At this moment about
+sixty rebel horsemen came out from behind the stockade and charged the
+Bashi-Bazouks, who fired one volley and fled. The horsemen then
+charged the infantry drawn up in square, which they broke, and the
+retreat to the river began at a run. Discouraging as this was for a
+force of all arms to retire before a few horsemen one-twentieth its
+number, the disaster was rendered worse and more disheartening by the
+conduct of the men, who absolutely refused to fight, marching along
+with shouldered arms without firing a shot, while the horsemen picked
+off all who straggled from the column. The gun, a considerable
+quantity of ammunition, and about sixty men represented the loss of
+Gordon's force; the rebels are not supposed to have lost a single man.
+"Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men
+even on camels, pursuing close to troops who with shouldered arms
+plodded their way back." Thus wrote Gordon of the men to whom he had
+to trust for a successful defence of Khartoum. His most recent
+experience confirmed his old opinion, that the Egyptian and Arab
+troops were useless even when fighting to save their own lives, and he
+could only rely on the very small body left of black Soudanese, who
+fought as gallantly for him as any troops could, and whose loyalty and
+devotion to him surpassed all praise. Treachery, it was assumed, had
+something to do with the easy overthrow of this force, and two Pashas
+were shot for misconduct on return to Khartoum.
+
+Having no confidence in the bulk of his force, it is not surprising
+that Gordon resorted to every artifice within engineering science to
+compensate for the shortcomings of his army. He surrounded
+Khartoum--which on one side was adequately defended by the Nile and
+his steamers--on the remaining three sides with a triple line of land
+mines connected by wires. Often during the siege the Mahdists
+attempted to break through this ring, but only to meet with repulse,
+accompanied by heavy loss; and to the very last day of the siege they
+never succeeded in getting behind the third of these lines. Their
+efficacy roused Gordon's professional enthusiasm, and in one passage
+he exclaims that these will be the general form of defence in the
+future. During the first months of the siege, which began rather in
+the form of a loose investment, the Nile was too low to allow of his
+using the nine steamers he possessed, but he employed the time in
+making two new ones, and in strengthening them all with bulwarks of
+iron plates and soft wood, which were certainly bullet-proof. Each of
+these steamers he valued as the equivalent of 2000 men. When it is
+seen how he employed them the value will not be deemed excessive, and
+certainly without them he could not have held Khartoum and baffled all
+the assaults of the Mahdi for the greater part of a year.
+
+After this experience Gordon would risk no more combats on land, and
+on 25th March he dismissed 250 of the Bashi-Bazouks who had behaved so
+badly. Absolutely trustworthy statistics are not available as to the
+exact number of troops in Khartoum or as to the proportion the Black
+Soudanese bore to the Egyptians, but it approximates to the truth to
+say that there were about 1000 of the former to 3000 of the latter,
+and with other levies during the siege he doubled this total. For
+these and a civilian population of nearly 40,000 Gordon computed that
+he had provisions for five months from March, and that for at least
+two months he would be as safe as in Cairo. By carefully husbanding
+the corn and biscuit he was able to make the supply last much longer,
+and even to the very end he succeeded in partially replenishing the
+depleted granaries of the town. There is no necessity to repeat the
+details of the siege during the summer of 1884. They are made up of
+almost daily interchanges of artillery fire from the town, and of
+rifle fire in reply from the Arab lines. That this was not merely
+child's play may be gathered from two of Gordon's protected ships
+showing nearly a thousand bullet-marks apiece. Whenever the rebels
+attempted to force their way through the lines they were repulsed by
+the mines; and the steamers not only inflicted loss on their fighting
+men, but often succeeded in picking up useful supplies of food and
+grain. No further reverses were reported, because Gordon was most
+careful to avoid all risk, and the only misfortunes occurred in
+Gordon's rear, when first Berber, through the treachery of the Greek
+Cuzzi, and then Shendy passed into the hands of the Mahdists, thus, as
+Gordon said, "completely hemming him in." In April a detached force up
+the Blue Nile went over to the Mahdi, taking with them a small
+steamer, but this loss was of no great importance, as the men were of
+what Gordon called "the Arabi hen or hero type," and the steamer could
+not force its way past Khartoum and its powerful flotilla. In the four
+months from 16th March to 30th July Gordon stated that the total loss
+of the garrison was only thirty killed and fifty or sixty wounded,
+while half a million cartridges had been fired against the enemy. The
+conduct of both the people and garrison had been excellent, and this
+was the more creditable, because Gordon was obliged from the very
+beginning, owing to the capture of the bullion sent him at Berber, to
+make all payments in paper money bearing his signature and seal.
+During that period the total reinforcement to the garrison numbered
+seven men, including Gordon himself, while over 2600 persons had been
+sent out of it in safety as far as Berber.
+
+The reader will be interested in the following extracts from a letter
+written by Colonel Duncan, R.A., M.P., showing the remarkable way in
+which General Gordon organised the despatch of these refugees from
+Khartoum. The letter is dated 29th November 1886, and addressed to
+Miss Gordon:--
+
+     "When your brother, on reaching Khartoum, found that he could
+     commence sending refugees to Egypt, I was sent on the 3rd March
+     1884 to Assouan and Korosko to receive those whom he sent down.
+     As an instance of your brother's thoughtfulness, I may mention
+     that he requested that, if possible, some motherly European woman
+     might also be sent, as many of the refugees whom he had to send
+     had never been out of the Soudan before, and might feel strange
+     on reaching Egypt. A German, Giegler Pasha, who had been in
+     Khartoum with your brother before, and who had a German wife, was
+     accordingly placed at my disposal, and I stationed them at
+     Korosko, where almost all the refugees arrived. I may mention
+     that I saw and spoke to every one of the refugees who came down,
+     and to many of the women and children. Their references to your
+     brother were invariably couched in language of affection and
+     gratitude, and the adjective most frequently applied to him was
+     'just.' In sending away the people from Khartoum, he sent away
+     the Governor and some of the other leading Egyptian officials
+     first. I think he suspected they would intrigue; he always had
+     more confidence in the people than in the ruling Turks or
+     Egyptians. The oldest soldiers, the very infirm, the wounded
+     (from Hicks's battles) were sent next, and a ghastly crew they
+     were. But the precautions he took for their comfort were very
+     complete, and although immediately before reaching me they had to
+     cross a very bad part of the desert between Abou Hamed and
+     Korosko, they reached me in wonderful spirits. It was touching to
+     see the perfect confidence they had that the promises of Gordon
+     Pasha would be fulfilled. After the fall of Khartoum, and your
+     brother's death, a good many of the Egyptian officers who had
+     been with your brother managed to escape, and to come down the
+     river disguised in many cases as beggars. I had an opportunity of
+     talking to most of them, and there was no collusion, for they
+     arrived at different times and by different roads. I remember
+     having a talk with one, and when we alluded to your brother's
+     death he burst out crying like a child, and said that though he
+     had lost his wives and children when Khartoum was taken, he felt
+     it as nothing to the loss of 'that just man.'"
+
+The letters written at the end of July at Khartoum reached Cairo at
+the end of September, and their substance was at once telegraphed to
+England. They showed that, while his success had made him think that
+after all there might be some satisfactory issue of the siege, he
+foresaw that the real ordeal was yet to come. "In four months (that is
+end of November) river begins to fall; before that time you _must_
+settle the Soudan question." So wrote the heroic defender of Khartoum
+in words that could not be misunderstood, and those words were in the
+hands of the British Ministers when half the period had expired. At
+the same time Mr Power wrote: "We can at best hold out but two months
+longer." Gordon at least never doubted what their effect would be, for
+after what seemed to him a reasonable time had elapsed to enable this
+message to reach its destination, he took the necessary steps to
+recover Berber, and to send his steamers half-way to meet and assist
+the advance of the reinforcement on which he thought from the
+beginning he might surely rely.
+
+On 10th September all his plans were completed, and Colonel Stewart,
+accompanied by a strong force of Bashi-Bazouks and some black
+soldiers, with Mr Power and M. Herbin, the French consul, sailed
+northwards on five steamers. The first task of this expedition was if
+possible, to retake Berber, or, failing that, to escort the _Abbas_
+past the point of greatest danger; the second, to convey the most
+recent news about Khartoum affairs to Lower Egypt; and the third was
+to lend a helping hand to any force that might be coming up the Nile
+or across the desert from the Red Sea. Five days after its departure
+Gordon knew through a spy that Stewart's flotilla had passed Shendy in
+safety, and had captured a valuable Arab convoy. It was not till
+November that the truth was known how the ships bombarded Berber, and
+passed that place not only in safety, but after causing the rebels
+much loss and greater alarm, and then how Stewart and his European
+companions went on in the small steamer _Abbas_ to bear the tale of
+the wonderful defence of Khartoum to the outer world--a defence which,
+wonderful as it was, really only reached the stage of the miraculous
+after they had gone and had no further part in it. So far as Gordon's
+military skill and prevision could arrange for their safety, he did
+so, and with success. When the warships had to return he gave them the
+best advice against treachery or ambuscade:--"Do not anchor near the
+bank, do not collect wood at isolated spots, trust nobody." What more
+could Gordon say? If they had paid strict heed to his advice, there
+would have been no catastrophe at Dar Djumna. These reflections invest
+with much force Gordon's own view of the matter:--"If _Abbas_ was
+captured by treachery, then I am not to blame; neither am I to blame
+if she struck a rock, for she drew under two feet of water; if they
+were attacked and overpowered, then I am to blame." So perfect were
+his arrangements that only treachery, aided by Stewart's
+over-confidence, baffled them.
+
+With regard to the wisdom of the course pursued in thus sending away
+all his European colleagues--the Austrian consul Hensall alone
+refusing to quit Gordon and his place of duty--opinions will differ to
+the end of time, but one is almost inclined to say that they could not
+have been of much service to Gordon once their uppermost thought
+became to quit Khartoum. The whole story is told very graphically in a
+passage of Gordon's own diary:--
+
+     "I determined to send the _Abbas_ down with an Arab captain.
+     Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then
+     Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting
+     me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I cannot go; but if you go you
+     do great service.' I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to
+     write him an order. I said 'No; for, though I fear not
+     responsibility, I will not put you in any danger in which I am
+     not myself.' I wrote them a letter couched thus:--'_Abbas_ is
+     going down; you say you are willing to go in her if I think you
+     can do so in honour. You can go in honour, for you can do
+     nothing here; and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my
+     views.'"
+
+There are two points in this matter to which I must draw marked
+attention. The suggestion for any European leaving Khartoum came from
+M. Herbin, and when Gordon willingly acquiesced, Colonel Stewart asked
+leave to do likewise. Mr Power, whose calculation was that provisions
+would be exhausted before the end of September, then followed suit,
+and not one of these three of the five Europeans in Khartoum seem to
+have thought for a moment what would be the position of Gordon left
+alone to cope with the danger from which they ran away. The suggestion
+as to their going came in every case from themselves. Gordon, in his
+thought for others, not merely threw no obstacle in their way, but as
+far as he could provided for their safety as if they were a parcel of
+women. But he declined all responsibility for their fate, as they went
+not by his order but of their own free-will. He gave them his ships,
+soldiers, and best counsel. They neglected the last, and were taken in
+in a manner that showed less than a child's suspicion, and were
+massacred at the very moment they felt sure of safety. It was a cruel
+fate, and a harsh Nemesis speedily befell them for doing perhaps the
+one unworthy thing of their lives--leaving their solitary companion to
+face the tenfold dangers by which he would be beset. But it cannot be
+allowed any longer that the onus of this matter should rest in any way
+on Gordon. They went because they wanted to go, and he, knowing well
+that men with such thoughts would be of no use to him ("you can do
+nothing here") let them go, and even encouraged them to do so. Under
+the circumstances he preferred to be alone. Colonel Donald Stewart was
+a personal friend of mine, and a man whose courage in the ordinary
+sense of the word could not be aspersed, but there cannot be two
+opinions that he above all the others should not have left his
+brother-in-arms alone in Khartoum.
+
+After their departure Gordon had to superintend everything himself,
+and to resort to every means of husbanding the limited supply of
+provisions he had left. He had also to anticipate a more vigorous
+attack, for the Mahdi must quickly learn of the departure of the
+steamers, the bombardment of Berber, and the favourable chance thus
+provided for the capture of Khartoum. Nor was this the worst, for on
+the occurrence of the disaster the Mahdi was promptly informed of the
+loss of the _Abbas_ and the murder of the Europeans, and it was he
+himself who sent in to Gordon the news of the catastrophe, with so
+complete a list of the papers on the _Abbas_ as left no ground for
+hope or disbelief. Unfortunately, before this bad news reached Gordon,
+he had again, on 30th September, sent down to Shendy three
+steamers--the _Talataween_, the _Mansourah_, and _Saphia_, with
+troops on board, and the gallant Cassim-el-Mousse, there to await the
+arrival of the relieving force. He somewhat later reinforced this
+squadron with the _Bordeen_; and although one or two of these boats
+returned occasionally to Khartoum, the rest remained permanently at
+Shendy, and when the English troops reached the Nile opposite that
+place all five were waiting them. Without entering too closely into
+details, it is consequently correct to say that during the most
+critical part of the siege Gordon deprived himself of the co-operation
+of these vessels, each of which he valued at 2000 men, simply and
+solely because he believed that reinforcements were close at hand, and
+that some troops at the latest would arrive before the end of November
+1884. As Gordon himself repeatedly said, it would have been far more
+just if the Government had told him in March, when he first demanded
+reinforcements as a right, that he must shift for himself. Then he
+would have kept these boats by him, and triumphantly fought his way in
+them to the Equator. But his trust in the Government, notwithstanding
+all his experience, led him to weaken his own position in the hope of
+facilitating their movements, and he found their aid a broken reed. In
+only one passage of his journal does Gordon give expression to this
+view, although it was always present to his mind:--"Truly the
+indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view,
+a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was
+always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us." But in
+the telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr Egerton, which the
+Government never dared to publish, and which are still an official
+secret, he laid great stress on this point, and on Sir Evelyn Baring's
+message forbidding him to retire to the Equator, so that, if he sought
+safety in that direction, he would be indictable on a charge of
+desertion.
+
+The various positions at Khartoum held by Gordon's force may be
+briefly described. First, the town itself, on the left bank of the
+Blue Nile, but stretching almost across to the right bank of the White
+Nile, protected on the land side by a wall, in front of which was the
+triple line of mines, and on the water side by the river and the
+steamers. On the right bank of the Blue Nile was the small North Fort.
+Between the two stretched the island of Tuti, and at each end of the
+wall, on the White Nile as well as the Blue, Gordon had stationed a
+_santal_ or heavy-armed barge, carrying a gun. Unfortunately, a large
+part of the western end of the Khartoum wall had been washed away by
+an inundation of the Nile, but the mines supplied a substitute, and so
+long as Omdurman Fort was held this weakness in the defences of
+Khartoum did not greatly signify. That fort itself lay on the left
+bank of the White Nile. It was well built and fairly strong, but the
+position was faulty. It lay in a hollow, and the trench of the
+extensive camp formed for Hicks's force furnished the enemy with
+cover. It was also 1200 yards from the river bank, and when the enemy
+became more enterprising it was impossible to keep up communication
+with it. In Omdurman Fort was a specially selected garrison of 240
+men, commanded by a gallant black officer, Ferratch or Faragalla
+Pasha, who had been raised from a subordinate capacity to the
+principal command under him by Gordon. Gordon's point of observation
+was the flat roof of the Palace, whence he could see everything with
+his telescope, and where he placed his best shots to bear on any point
+that might seem hard pressed. Still more useful was it for the purpose
+of detecting the remissness of his own troops and officers, and often
+his telescope showed him sentries asleep at their posts, and officers
+absent from the points they were supposed to guard.
+
+From the end of March until the close of the siege scarcely a day
+passed without the exchange of artillery and rifle fire on one side or
+the other of the beleaguered town. On special occasions the Khedive's
+garrison would fire as many as forty or even fifty thousand rounds of
+Remington cartridges, and the Arab fire was sometimes heavier. This
+incessant fire, as the heroic defender wrote in his journal, murdered
+sleep, and at last he became so accustomed to it that he could tell by
+the sound where the firing was taking place. The most distant points
+of the defence, such as the _santal_ on the White Nile and Fort
+Omdurman, were two miles from the Palace; and although telegraphic
+communication existed with them during the greater part of the siege,
+the oral evidence as to the point of attack was often found the most
+rapid means of obtaining information. This was still more advantageous
+after the 12th of November, for on that day communications were cut
+between Khartoum and Omdurman, and it was found impossible to restore
+them. The only communications possible after that date were by bugle
+and flag. At the time of this severance Gordon estimated that the
+garrison of Omdurman had enough water and biscuit for six weeks, and
+that there were 250,000 cartridges in the arsenal. Gordon did
+everything in his power to aid Ferratch in the defence, and his
+remaining steamer, the _Ismailia_, after the grounding of the
+_Husseinyeh_ on the very day Omdurman was cut off, was engaged in
+almost daily encounters with the Mahdists for that purpose. Owing to
+Gordon's incessant efforts, and the gallantry of the garrison led by
+Ferratch, Omdurman held out more than two months. It was not until
+15th January that Ferratch, with Gordon's leave, surrendered, and then
+when the Mahdists occupied the place, General Gordon had the
+satisfaction of shelling them out of it, and showing that it was
+untenable.
+
+The severance of Omdurman from Khartoum was the prelude to fiercer
+fighting than had taken place at any time during the earlier stages of
+the siege, and although particulars are not obtainable for the last
+month of the period, there is no doubt that the struggle was
+incessant, and that the fighting was renewed from day to day. It was
+then that Gordon missed the ships lying idle at Shendy. If he had had
+them Omdurman would not have fallen, nor would it have been so easy
+for the Mahdi to transport the bulk of his force from the left to the
+right bank of the White Nile, as he did for the final assault on the
+fatal 26th January.
+
+At the end of October the Mahdi, accompanied by a far more numerous
+force than Gordon thought he could raise, described by Slatin as
+countless, pitched his camp a few miles south of Omdurman. On 8th
+November his arrival was celebrated by a direct attack on the lines
+south of Khartoum. The rebels in their fear of the hidden mines, which
+was far greater than it need have been, as it was found they had been
+buried too deep, resorted to the artifice of driving forward cows, and
+by throwing rockets among them Gordon had the satisfaction of
+spreading confusion in their ranks, repulsing the attack, and
+capturing twenty of the animals. Four days later the rebels made the
+desperate attack on Omdurman, when, as stated, communications were
+cut, and the _Husseinyeh_ ran aground. In attempting to carry her off
+and to check the further progress of the rebels the _Ismailia_ was
+badly hit, and the incident was one of those only too frequent at all
+stages of the siege, when Gordon wrote: "Every time I hear the gun
+fire I have a twitch of the heart of gnawing anxiety for my penny
+steamers." At the very moment that these fights were in progress he
+wrote, 10th November: "To-day is the day I expected we should have had
+some one of the Expedition here;" and he also recorded that we "have
+enough biscuit for a month or so"--meaning at the outside six weeks.
+Throughout the whole of November rumours of a coming British
+Expedition were prevalent, but they were of the vaguest and most
+contradictory character. On 25th November Gordon learnt that it was
+still at Ambukol, 185 miles further away from Khartoum than he had
+expected, and his only comment under this acute disappointment was,
+"This is lively!"
+
+Up to the arrival of the Mahdi daily desertions of his Arab and other
+soldiers to Gordon took place, and by these and levies among the
+townspeople all gaps in the garrison were more than filled up. Such
+was the confidence in Gordon that it more than neutralised all the
+intrigues of the Mahdi's agents in the besieged town, and scarcely a
+man during the first seven months of the siege deserted him; but after
+the arrival of the Mahdi there was a complete change in this respect.
+In the first place there were no more desertions to Gordon, and then
+men began to leave him, partly, no doubt, from fear of the Mahdi, or
+awakened fanaticism, but chiefly through the non-arrival of the
+British Expedition, which had been so much talked about, yet which
+never came. Still to all the enemy's invitations to surrender on the
+most honourable terms Gordon gave defiant answers. "I am here like
+iron, and I hope to see the newly-arrived English;" and when the
+situation had become little short of desperate, at the end of the
+year, he still, with bitter agony at his heart, proudly rejected all
+overtures, and sent the haughty message: "Can hold Khartoum for twelve
+years." Unfortunately the Mahdi knew better. He had read the truth in
+all the papers captured on Stewart's steamer, and he knew that
+Gordon's resources were nearly spent. Even some of the messages Gordon
+sent out by spies for Lord Wolseley's information fell into his hands,
+and on one of these Slatin says it was written: "Can hold Khartoum at
+the outside till the end of January." Although Gordon may be
+considered to have more than held his own against all the power of the
+Mahdi down to the capture of Omdurman Fort on 15th January, the Mahdi
+knew that his straits must be desperate, and that unless the
+expedition arrived he could not hold out much longer. The first
+advance of the English troops on 3rd January across the desert towards
+the Nile probably warned the enemy that now was the time to renew the
+attack with greater vigour, but it does not seem that there is any
+justification for the entirely hypothetical view that at any point the
+Mahdi could have seized the unhappy town. Omdurman Fort itself fell,
+not to the desperate onset of his Ghazis, but from the want of food
+and ammunition, and with Gordon's expressed permission to the
+commandant to surrender. Unfortunately the details of the most tragic
+part of the siege are missing, but Gordon himself well summed up what
+he had done up to the end of October when his position was secure, and
+aid, as he thought, was close at hand:--
+
+     "The news of Hicks's defeat was known in Cairo three weeks after
+     the event occurred; since that date up to this (29th October
+     1884) nine people have come up as reinforcements--myself,
+     Stewart, Herbin, Hussein, Tongi, Ruckdi, and three servants, and
+     not one penny of money. Of those who came up two, Stewart and
+     Herbin, have gone down, Hussein is dead; so six alone remain,
+     while we must have sent down over 1500 and 700 soldiers, total
+     2200, including the two Pashas, Coetlogon, etc. The regulars, who
+     were in arrears of pay for three months when I came, are now only
+     owed half a month, while the Bashi-Bazouks are owed only a
+     quarter month, and we have some £500 in the Treasury. It is quite
+     a miracle. We have lost two battles, suffering severe losses in
+     these actions of men and arms, and may have said to have
+     scrambled through, for I cannot say we can lay claim to any great
+     success during the whole time. I believe we have more ammunition
+     (Remington) and more soldiers now than when I came up. We have
+     £40,000 in Treasury _in paper_ and £500. When I came up there was
+     £5000 in Treasury. We have £15,000 out in the town in paper
+     money."
+
+At the point (14th December) when the authentic history of the
+protracted siege and gallant defence of Khartoum stops, a pause may be
+made to turn back and describe what the Government and country which
+sent General Gordon on his most perilous mission, and made use of his
+extraordinary devotion to the call of duty to extricate themselves
+from a responsibility they had not the courage to face, had been doing
+not merely to support their envoy, but to vindicate their own honour.
+The several messages which General Gordon had succeeded in getting
+through had shown how necessary some reinforcement and support were at
+the very commencement of the siege. The lapse of time, rendered the
+more expressive by the long period of silence that fell over what was
+taking place in the besieged town, showed, beyond need of
+demonstration, the gravity of the case and the desperate nature of the
+situation. But a very little of the knowledge at the command of the
+Government from a number of competent sources would have enabled it to
+foresee what was certain to happen, and to have provided some remedy
+for the peril long before the following despairing message from Gordon
+showed that the hour when any aid would be useful had almost expired.
+This was the passage, dated 13th December, in the last (sixth) volume
+of the Journal, but the substance of which reached Lord Wolseley by
+one of Gordon's messengers at Korti on 31st December:--
+
+     "We are going to send down the _Bordeen_ the day after to-morrow,
+     and with her I shall send this Journal. _If some effort is not
+     made before ten days' time the town will fall._ It is
+     inexplicable this delay. If the Expeditionary forces have reached
+     the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we
+     require just to show themselves.... Even if the town falls under
+     the nose of the Expeditionary forces it will not in my opinion
+     justify the abandonment of Senaar and Kassala, or of the
+     Equatorial Province by H.M.'s Government. All that is absolutely
+     necessary is for fifty of the Expeditionary force to get on board
+     a steamer and come up to Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be
+     felt. This is not asking much, but it must happen _at once_, or
+     it will (as usual) be too late."
+
+The motives which induced Mr Gladstone's Government to send General
+Gordon to the Soudan in January 1884 were, as has been clearly shown,
+the selfish desire to appease public opinion, and to shirk in the
+easiest possible manner a great responsibility. They had no policy at
+all, but they had one supreme wish, viz. to cut off the Soudan from
+Egypt; and if the Mahdi had only known their wishes and pressed on,
+and treated the Khartoum force as he had treated that under Hicks,
+there would have been no garrisons to rescue, and that British
+Government would have done nothing. It recked nothing of the grave
+dangers that would have accrued from the complete triumph of the
+Mahdi, or of the outbreak that must have followed in Lower Egypt if
+his tide of success had not been checked as it was single-handed by
+General Gordon, through the twelve months' defence of Khartoum. Still
+it could not quite stoop to the dishonour of abandoning these
+garrisons, and of making itself an accomplice to the Mahdi's
+butcheries, nor could it altogether turn a deaf ear to the
+representations and remonstrances of even such a puppet prince as the
+Khedive Tewfik. England was then far more mistress of the situation at
+Cairo than she is now, but a helpless refusal to discharge her duty
+might have provoked Europe into action at the Porte that would have
+proved inconvenient and damaging to her position and reputation.
+Therefore the Government fell back on General Gordon, and the hope was
+even indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation
+of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his
+success might induce the public and the world to accept that
+abnegation of policy as the acme of wisdom. In all this they were
+destined to a complete awakening, and the only matter of surprise is
+that they should have sent so well-known a character as General
+Gordon, whose independence and contempt for official etiquette and
+restraint were no secrets at the Foreign and War Offices, on a mission
+in which they required him not only to be as indifferent to the
+national honour as they were, but also to be tied and restrained by
+the shifts and requirements of an embarrassed executive.
+
+At a very early stage of the mission the Government obtained evidence
+that Gordon's views on the subject were widely different from theirs.
+They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's
+policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out
+that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he
+thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, "if Egypt
+is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up." The hopes that had
+been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of
+representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus
+dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool,
+was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the
+evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to
+be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to
+the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum.
+While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief
+part of his task, viz. the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all
+the Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and
+the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that
+should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress.
+All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole
+matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase
+he revealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes,
+however repressed his charge might keep them, really were.
+
+Having told them that "the Mahdi must be smashed up," he went on to
+say that "we cannot hurry over this affair" (the future of the Soudan)
+"if we do we shall incur disaster," and again that, although "it is a
+miserable country it is joined to Egypt, and it would be difficult to
+divorce the two." Within a very few weeks, therefore, the Government
+learnt that its own agent was the most forcible and damaging critic of
+the policy of evacuation, and that the worries of the Soudan question
+for an administration not resolute enough to solve the difficulty in a
+thorough manner were increased and not diminished by Gordon's mission.
+At that point the proposition was made and supported by several
+members of the Cabinet that Gordon should be recalled. There is no
+doubt that this step would have been taken but for the fear that it
+would aggravate the difficulties of the English expedition sent to
+Souakim under the command of General Gerald Graham to retrieve the
+defeat of Baker Pasha. Failing the adoption of that extreme measure,
+which would at least have been straightforward and honest, and
+ignoring what candour seemed to demand if a decision had been come to
+to render Gordon no support, and to bid him shift for himself, the
+Government resorted to the third and least justifiable course of all,
+viz. of showing indifference to the legitimate requests of their
+emissary, and of putting off definite action until the very last
+moment.
+
+We have seen that Gordon made several specific demands in the first
+six weeks of his stay at Khartoum--that is, in the short period before
+communication was cut off. He wanted Zebehr, 200 troops at Berber, or
+even at Wady Halfa, and the opening of the route from Souakim to the
+Nile. To these requests not one favourable answer was given, and the
+not wholly unnatural rejection of the first rendered it more than ever
+necessary to comply with the others. They were such as ought to have
+been granted, and in anticipation they had been suggested and
+discussed before Gordon felt bound to urge them as necessary for the
+security of his position at Khartoum. Even Sir Evelyn Baring had
+recommended in February the despatch of 200 men to Assouan for the
+moral effect, and that was the very reason why Gordon asked, in the
+first place, for the despatch of a small British force to at least
+Wady Halfa. It is possible that one of the chief reasons for the
+Government rejecting all these suggestions, and also, it must be
+remembered, doing nothing in their place towards the relief and
+support of their representative, may have been the hope that this
+treatment would have led him to resign and throw up his mission. They
+would then have been able to declare that, as the task was beyond the
+powers of General Gordon, they were only coming to the prudent and
+logical conclusion in saying that nothing could be done, and that the
+garrisons had better come to terms with the Mahdi. Unfortunately for
+those who favoured the evasion of trouble as the easiest and best way
+out of the difficulty, Gordon had high notions as to what duty
+required. No difficulty had terrors for him, and while left at the
+post of power and responsibility he would endeavour to show himself
+equal to the charge.
+
+Yet there can be no doubt that those who sent him would have rejoiced
+if he had formally asked to be relieved of the task he had accepted,
+and Mr Gladstone stated on the 3rd April that "Gordon was under no
+orders and no restraint to stay at Khartoum." A significant answer to
+the fact represented in that statement was supplied, when, ten days
+later, silence fell on Khartoum, and remained unbroken for more than
+five months. But at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that
+statement as to Gordon's liberty of movement, the Government knew of
+the candid views which he had expressed as to the proper policy for
+the Soudan. It should have been apparent that, unless they and their
+author were promptly repudiated, and unless the latter was stripped of
+his official authority, the Government would, however tardily and
+reluctantly, be drawn after its representative into a policy of
+intervention in the Soudan, which it, above everything else,
+wished to avoid. Gordon concealed nothing. He told them "time,"
+"reinforcements," and a very considerable expenditure was necessary to
+honourably carry out their policy of evacuation. They were not
+prepared to concede any of these save the last, and even the money
+they sent him was lost because they would send it by Berber instead of
+Kassala. But they knew that "the order and restraint" which kept
+Gordon at Khartoum was the duty he had contracted towards them when he
+accepted his mission, and which was binding on a man of his principles
+until they chose to relieve him of the task. The fear of public
+opinion had more to do with their abstaining from the step of ordering
+his recall than the hope that his splendid energy and administrative
+power might yet provide some satisfactory issue from the dilemma, for
+at the very beginning it was freely given out that "General Gordon
+was exceeding his instructions."
+
+The interruption of communications with Khartoum at least suspended
+Gordon's constant representations as to what he thought the right
+policy, as well as his demands for the fulfilment by the Government of
+their side of the contract. It was then that Lord Granville seemed to
+pluck up heart of grace, and to challenge Gordon's right to remain at
+Khartoum. On 23rd April Lord Granville asked for explanation of "cause
+of detention." Unfortunately it was not till months later that the
+country knew of Gordon's terse and humorous reply, "cause of
+detention, these horribly plucky Arabs." Lord Granville, thinking this
+despatch not clear enough, followed it up on 17th May by instructing
+Mr Egerton, then acting for Sir Evelyn Baring, to send the following
+remonstrance to Gordon:
+
+     "As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been
+     dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with
+     the countenance of H.M.'s Government, General Gordon is enjoined
+     to consider, and either to report upon, or, if possible, to adopt
+     at the first proper moment measures for his own removal and for
+     that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him, or
+     who have served him faithfully, including their wives and
+     children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial
+     regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects."
+
+Then followed suggestions and authority to pay so much a head for
+refugees safely escorted to Korosko. The comment Gordon made on that,
+and similar despatches, to save himself and any part of the garrison
+he could, was that he was not so mean as to desert those who had nobly
+stood by him and committed themselves on the strength of his word.
+
+It is impossible to go behind the collective responsibility of the
+Government and to attempt to fix any special responsibility or blame
+on any individual member of that Government. The facts as I read them
+show plainly that there was a complete abnegation of policy or purpose
+on the part of the British Government, that Gordon was then sent as a
+sort of stop-gap, and that when it was revealed that he had strong
+views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him,
+it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall
+him, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post
+and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless
+he would execute a _sauve qui peut_ sort of retreat to the frontier.
+Very harsh things have been said of Mr Gladstone and his Cabinet on
+this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so
+very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and
+displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the
+question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but
+that they had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the
+decision, as Gordon wrote, "to abandon altogether and not care what
+happens."
+
+But all these minor points were merged in a great common national
+anxiety when month after month passed during the spring and summer of
+1884, and not a single word issued from the tomb-like silence of
+Khartoum. People might argue that the worst could not have happened,
+as the Mahdi would have been only too anxious to proclaim his triumph
+far and wide if Khartoum had fallen. Anxiety may be diminished, but is
+not banished, by a calculation of probabilities, and the military
+spirit and capacity exhibited by the Mahdi's forces under Osman Digma
+in the fighting with General Graham's well-equipped British force at
+Teb and Tamanieb revealed the greatness of the peril with which Gordon
+had to deal at Khartoum where he had only the inadequate and
+untrustworthy garrison described by Colonel de Coetlogon. During the
+summer of 1884 there was therefore a growing fear, not only that the
+worst news might come at any moment, but that in the most favourable
+event any news would reveal the desperate situation to which Gordon
+had been reduced, and with that conviction came the thought, not
+whether he had exactly carried out what Ministers had expected him to
+do, but solely of his extraordinary courage and devotion to his
+country, which had led him to take up a thankless task without the
+least regard for his comfort or advantage, and without counting the
+odds. There was at least one Minister in the Cabinet who was struck by
+that single-minded conduct; and as early as April, when his colleagues
+were asking the formal question why Gordon did not leave Khartoum, the
+Marquis of Hartington, then Minister of War, and now Duke of
+Devonshire, began to inquire as to the steps necessary to rescue the
+emissary, while still adhering to the policy of the Administration of
+which he formed part. During the whole of that summer the present Duke
+of Devonshire advocated the special claim of General Gordon on the
+Government, whose mandate he had so readily accepted, and urged the
+necessity of special measures being taken at the earliest moment to
+save the gallant envoy from what seemed the too probable penalty of
+his own temerity and devotion. But for his energetic and consistent
+representations the steps that were taken--all too late as they
+proved--never would have been taken at all, or deferred to such a date
+as to let the public see by the event that there was no use in
+throwing away money and precious lives on a lost cause.
+
+If the first place among those in power--for of my own and other
+journalists' efforts in the Press to arouse public opinion and to urge
+the Government to timely action it is unnecessary to speak--is due to
+the Duke of Devonshire, the second may reasonably be claimed by Lord
+Wolseley. This recognition is the more called for here, because the
+most careful consideration of the facts has led me to the conclusion,
+which I would gladly avoid the necessity of expressing if it were
+possible, that Lord Wolseley was responsible for the failure of the
+relief expedition. This stage of responsibility has not yet been
+reached, and it must be duly set forth that on 24th July Lord
+Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, wrote a noble letter, stating that,
+as he "did not wish to share the responsibility of leaving Charley
+Gordon to his fate," he recommended "immediate action," and "the
+despatch of a small brigade of between three and four thousand British
+soldiers to Dongola, so that they might reach that place about 15th
+October." But even that date was later than it ought to have been,
+especially when the necessity of getting the English troops back as
+early in the New Year as possible was considered, and in the
+subsequent recriminations that ensued, the blame for being late from
+the start was sought to be thrown on the badness of the Nile flood
+that year. General Gordon himself cruelly disposed of that theory or
+excuse when he wrote, "It was not a bad Nile; quite an average one.
+You were too late, that was all." Still, Lord Wolseley must not be
+robbed of the credit of having said on 24th July that an expedition
+was necessary to save Gordon, "his old friend and Crimean comrade,"
+towards whom Wolseley himself had contracted a special moral
+obligation for his prominent share in inducing him to accept the very
+mission that had already proved so full of peril. In short, if the
+plain truth must be told, Lord Wolseley was far more responsible for
+the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum than Mr Gladstone.
+
+The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and
+the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, was that the Government gave
+in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of
+Khartoum, and acquiesced in the despatch of an expedition to relieve
+General Gordon. Having once made the concession, it must be allowed
+that they showed no niggard spirit in sanctioning the expedition and
+the proposals of the military authorities. The sum of ten millions was
+devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had
+rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that total. Ten
+thousand men selected from the _élite_ of the British army were
+assigned to the task for which he had begged two hundred men in vain.
+It is impossible here to enter closely into the causes which led to
+the expansion of the three or four thousand British infantry into a
+special corps of ten thousand fighting men, picked from the crack
+regiments of the army, and composed of every arm of the service
+compelled to fight under unaccustomed conditions. The local
+authorities--in particular Major Kitchener, now the Sirdar of the
+Egyptian army, who is slowly recovering from the Mahdi the provinces
+which should never have been left in his possession--protested that
+the expedition should be a small one, and if their advice had been
+taken the cost would have been about one-fourth that incurred, and the
+force would have reached Khartoum by that 11th November on which
+Gordon expected to see the first man of it. But Major Kitchener,
+although, as Gordon wrote, "one of the few really first-class officers
+in the British army," was only an individual, and his word did not
+possess a feather's weight before the influence of the Pall Mall band
+of warriors who have farmed out our little wars--India, of course,
+excepted--of the last thirty years for their own glorification. So
+great a chance of fame as "the rescue of Gordon" was not to be left to
+some unknown brigadiers, or to the few line regiments, the proximity
+of whose stations entitled them to the task. That would be neglecting
+the favours of Providence. For so noble a task the control of the most
+experienced commander in the British army would alone suffice, and
+when he took the field his staff had to be on the extensive scale that
+suited his dignity and position. As there would be some reasonable
+excuse for the dispensation of orders and crosses from a campaign
+against a religious leader who had not yet known defeat, any friend
+might justly complain if he was left behind. To justify so brilliant a
+staff, no ordinary British force would suffice. Therefore our
+household brigade, our heavy cavalry, and our light cavalry were
+requisitioned for their best men, and these splendid troops were
+drafted and amalgamated into special corps--heavy and light
+camelry--for work that would have been done far better and more
+efficiently by two regiments of Bengal Lancers. If all this effort and
+expenditure had resulted in success, it would be possible to keep
+silent and shrug one's shoulders; but when the mode of undertaking
+this expedition can be clearly shown to have been the direct cause of
+its failure, silence would be a crime. When Lord Wolseley told the
+soldiers at Korti on their return from Metemmah, "It was not _your_
+fault that Gordon has perished and Khartoum fallen," the positiveness
+of his assurance may have been derived from the inner conviction of
+his own stupendous error.
+
+The expedition was finally sanctioned in August, and the news of its
+coming was known to General Gordon in September, before, indeed, his
+own despatches of 31st July were received in London, and broke the
+suspense of nearly half a year. He thought that only a small force was
+coming, under the command of Major-General Earle, and he at once, as
+already described, sent his steamers back to Shendy, there to await
+the troops and convey them to Khartoum. He seems to have calculated
+that three months from the date of the message informing him of the
+expedition would suffice for the conveyance of the troops as far as
+Berber or Metemmah, and at that rate General Earle would have arrived
+where his steamers awaited him early in November. Gordon's views as to
+the object of the expedition, which somebody called the Gordon Relief
+Expedition, were thus clearly expressed:--
+
+     "I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
+     expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our
+     National honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a
+     position in which our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons.
+     I was Relief Expedition No. 1; they are Relief Expedition No. 2.
+     As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment, if I
+     wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief
+     expedition was to bolt, and the steamers fell into the hands of
+     the Mahdi. This second relief expedition (for the honour of
+     England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat
+     hampered. We, the first and second expeditions, are equally
+     engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up
+     to extricate the garrison, and failed. Earle comes up to
+     extricate garrisons, and I hope succeeds. Earle does not come to
+     extricate me. The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to
+     affect our "National honour." If Earle succeeds, the "National
+     honour" thanks him, and I hope recommends him, but it is
+     altogether independent of me, who, for failing, incurs its blame.
+     I am not _the rescued lamb_, and I will not be."
+
+Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an
+expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of
+supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried
+out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and
+less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only
+arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions
+reached him in the following form:--"The primary object of your
+expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and
+you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that
+object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations
+of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and
+clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had,
+however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the
+National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned
+an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its
+long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With
+extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its
+purpose, and wrote:--"I very much doubt what is really going to be the
+policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola,"
+and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond
+Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."
+
+The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed that
+there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four
+months, which would have carried the garrison on till the end of
+November. As the greater part of that period had expired when these
+documents reached Lord Wolseley's hands, it was quite impossible to
+doubt that time had become the most important factor of all in the
+situation. The chance of being too late would even then have presented
+itself to a prudent commander, and, above all, to a friend hastening
+to the rescue of a friend. The news that Colonel Stewart and some
+other Europeans had been entrapped and murdered near Merowe, which
+reached the English commander from different sources before Gordon
+confirmed it in his letters, was also calculated to stimulate, by
+showing that Gordon was alone, and had single-handed to conduct the
+defence of a populous city. Hard on the heels of that intelligence
+came Gordon's letter of 4th November to Lord Wolseley, who received it
+at Dongola on 14th of the same month. The letter was a long one, but
+only two passages need be quoted:--"At Metemmah, waiting your orders,
+are five steamers with nine guns." Did it not occur to anyone how
+greatly, at the worst stage of the siege, Gordon had thus weakened
+himself to assist the relieving expedition? Even for that reason there
+was not a day or an hour to be lost.
+
+But the letter contained a worse and more alarming passage:--"We can
+hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." Forty
+days would have meant till 14th December, one month ahead of the day
+Lord Wolseley received the news, but the message was really more
+alarming than the form in which it was published, for there is no
+doubt that the word "difficult" is the official rendering of Gordon's,
+a little indistinctly written, word "desperate." In face of that
+alarming message, which only stated facts that ought to have been
+surmised, if not known, it was no longer possible to pursue the
+leisurely promenade up the Nile, which was timed so as to bring the
+whole force to Khartoum in the first week of March. Rescue by the most
+prominent general and swell troops of England at Easter would hardly
+gratify the commandant and garrison starved into surrender the
+previous Christmas, and that was the exact relationship between
+Wolseley's plans and Gordon's necessities.
+
+The date at which Gordon's supplies would be exhausted varied not from
+any miscalculation, but because on two successive occasions he
+discovered large stores of grain and biscuits, which had been stolen
+from the public granaries before his arrival. The supplies that would
+all have disappeared in November were thus eked out, first till the
+middle of December, and then finally till the end of January, but
+there is no doubt that they would not have lasted as long as they did
+if in the last month of the siege he had not given the civil
+population permission to leave the doomed town. From any and from
+every point of view, there was not the shadow of an excuse for a
+moment's delay after the receipt of that letter on 14th November.
+
+With the British Exchequer at a commander's back, it is easy to
+organise an expedition on an elaborate scale, and to carry it out with
+the nicety of perfection, but for the realisation of these ponderous
+plans there is one thing more necessary, and that is time. I have no
+doubt if Gordon's letter had said "granaries full, can hold out till
+Easter," that Lord Wolseley's deliberate march--Cairo, September 27;
+Wady Halfa, October 8; Dongola, November 14; Korti, December 30;
+Metemmah any day in February, and Khartoum, March 3, and those were
+the approximate dates of his grand plan of campaign--would have been
+fully successful, and held up for admiration as a model of skill.
+Unfortunately, it would not do for the occasion, as Gordon was on the
+verge of starvation and in desperate straits when the rescuing force
+reached Dongola. It is not easy to alter the plan of any campaign, nor
+to adapt a heavy moving machine to the work suitable for a light one.
+To feed 10,000 British soldiers on the middle Nile was alone a feat of
+organisation such as no other country could have attempted, but the
+effort was exhausting, and left no reserve energy to despatch that
+quick-moving battalion which could have reached Gordon's steamers
+early in December, and would have reinforced the Khartoum garrison,
+just as Havelock and Outram did the Lucknow Residency.
+
+Dongola is only 100 miles below Debbeh, where the intelligence
+officers and a small force were on that 14th November; Ambukol,
+specially recommended by Gordon as the best starting-point, is less
+than fifty miles, and Korti, the point selected by Lord Wolseley, is
+exactly that distance above Debbeh. The Bayuda desert route by the
+Jakdul Wells to Metemmah is 170 miles. At Metemmah were the five
+steamers with nine guns to convoy the desperately needed succour to
+Khartoum. The energy expended on the despatch of 10,000 men up 150
+miles of river, if concentrated on 1000 men, must have given a
+speedier result, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the
+year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to
+make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.
+
+The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking
+six weeks to do what--the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not
+of the main force, but of 1000 men--ought to have been done in one
+week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel
+corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's
+power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward movement of
+the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was
+effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy
+in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not
+forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this
+difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud
+Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the
+camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and
+the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The
+last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi
+with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining
+reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would
+have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly
+expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of
+contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of
+the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as
+far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at
+home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a
+line of communication of over 1200 miles.
+
+Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a
+well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave
+Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well
+known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places,
+and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The
+officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert
+Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others
+impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the
+view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was
+trammelled by his instructions, which were to this effect--he was to
+establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water
+there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be
+determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and
+so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his
+1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full,
+he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish
+the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case
+when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but
+even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.
+
+The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January
+1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss,
+unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British
+relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be
+a reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart
+had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would
+undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops
+would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it
+must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the
+required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord
+Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.
+
+General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with
+him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more
+urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid
+did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might
+fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who
+brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart
+left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him
+orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but
+the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a
+preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole
+expedition.
+
+The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a
+surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the
+subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume
+the offensive.
+
+On 12th January--that is, nine days after his first arrival at
+Jakdul--General Stewart reached the place a second time with the
+second detachment of another 1000 men--the total fighting strength of
+the column being raised to about 2300 men. For whatever errors had
+been committed, and their consequences, the band of soldiers assembled
+at Jakdul on that 12th of January could in no sense be held
+responsible. Without making any invidious comparisons, it may be
+truthfully said that such a splendid fighting force was never
+assembled in any other cause, and the temper of the men was strung to
+a high point of enthusiasm by the thought that at last they had
+reached the final stage of the long journey to rescue Gordon. A number
+of causes, principally the fatigue of the camels from the treble
+journey between Korti and Jakdul, made the advance very slow, and five
+days were occupied in traversing the forty-five miles between Jakdul
+and the wells at Abou Klea, themselves distant twenty miles from
+Metemmah. On the morning of 17th January it became clear that the
+column was in presence of an enemy.
+
+At the time of Stewart's first arrival at Jakdul there were no hostile
+forces in the Bayuda desert. At Berber was a considerable body of the
+Mahdi's followers, and both Metemmah and Shendy were held in his name.
+At the latter place a battery or small fort had been erected, and in
+an encounter between it and Gordon's steamers one of the latter had
+been sunk, thus reducing their total to four. But there were none of
+the warrior tribes of Kordofan and Darfour at any of these places, or
+nearer than the six camps which had been established round Khartoum.
+The news of the English advance made the Mahdi bestir himself, and as
+it was known that the garrison of Omdurman was reduced to the lowest
+straits, and could not hold out many days, the Mahdi despatched some
+of his best warriors of the Jaalin, Degheim, and Kenana tribes to
+oppose the British troops in the Bayuda desert. It was these men who
+opposed the further advance of Sir Herbert Stewart's column at Abou
+Klea. It is unnecessary to describe the desperate assault these
+gallant warriors made on the somewhat cumbrous and ill-arranged square
+of the British force, or the ease and tremendous loss with which these
+fanatics were beaten off, and never allowed to come to close quarters,
+save at one point. The infantry soldiers, who formed two sides of the
+square, signally repulsed the onset, not a Ghazi succeeded in getting
+within a range of 300 yards; but on another side, cavalrymen, doing
+infantry soldiers' unaccustomed work, did not adhere to the strict
+formation necessary, and trained for the close _melée_, and with the
+_gaudia certaminis_ firing their blood, they recklessly allowed the
+Ghazis to come to close quarters, and their line of the square was
+impinged upon. In that close fighting, with the Heavy Camel Corps men
+and the Naval Brigade, the Blacks suffered terribly, but they also
+inflicted loss in return. Of a total loss on the British side of
+sixty-five killed and sixty-one wounded, the Heavy Camel Corps lost
+fifty-two, and the Sussex Regiment, performing work to which it was
+thoroughly trained, inflicted immense loss on the enemy at hardly any
+cost to itself. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Fred. Burnaby,
+one of the noblest and gentlest, as he was physically the strongest,
+officers in the British army. There is no doubt that signal as was
+this success, it shook the confidence of the force. The men were
+resolute to a point of ferocity, but the leaders' confidence in
+themselves and their task had been rudely tried; and yet the breaking
+of the square had been clearly due to a tactical blunder, and the
+inability of the cavalry to adapt themselves to a strange position.
+
+On the 18th January the march, rendered slower by the conveyance of
+the wounded, was resumed, but no fighting took place on that day,
+although it was clear that the enemy had not been dispersed. On the
+19th, when the force had reached the last wells at Abou Kru or Gubat,
+it became clear that another battle was to be fought. One of the first
+shots seriously wounded Sir Herbert Stewart, and during the whole of
+the affair many of our men were carried off by the heavy rifle fire of
+the enemy. Notwithstanding that our force fought under many
+disadvantages and was not skilfully handled, the Mahdists were driven
+off with terrible loss, while our force had thirty-six killed and one
+hundred and seven wounded. Notwithstanding these two defeats, the
+enemy were not cowed, and held on to Metemmah, in which no doubt those
+who had taken part in the battles were assisted by a force from
+Berber. The 20th January was wasted in inaction, caused by the large
+number of wounded, and when on 21st January Metemmah was attacked, the
+Mahdists showed so bold a front that Sir Charles Wilson, who succeeded
+to the command on Sir Herbert Stewart being incapacitated by his, as
+it proved, mortal wound, drew off his force. This was the more
+disappointing, because Gordon's four steamers arrived during the
+action and took a gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the
+effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly
+unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the
+gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming.
+He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid
+did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be
+desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir
+Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement--the very last entry
+under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the
+Expeditionary Force--and I ask for no more than 200 men--does not come
+in ten days, _the town may fall_, and I have done my best for the
+honour of our country. Good-bye."
+
+The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the
+view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch
+of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his
+sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence,
+have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel
+Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and
+Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after
+ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our
+people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their
+movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents,
+which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is
+impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to
+Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum
+was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute,
+had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been
+destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of
+reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body
+under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who think
+that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last
+moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the
+earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when
+I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any
+suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and
+untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a
+sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at daybreak
+on the 26th, for the theory that the Mahdi could have entered the town
+one hour before he did was never a serious argument, while the
+evidence of Slatin Pasha strengthens the view that Gordon was at the
+last moment only overcome by the Khalifa's resorting to a surprise. On
+one point of fact Sir Charles Wilson seems also to have been in error.
+He fixes the fall of Omdurman at 6th January, whereas Slatin, whose
+information on the point ought to be unimpeachable, states that it did
+not occur until the 15th of that month.
+
+When Sir Herbert Stewart had fought and won the battle of Abou Klea,
+it was his intention on reaching the Nile, as he expected to do the
+next day, to put Sir Charles Wilson on board one of Gordon's own
+steamers and send him off at once to Khartoum. The second battle and
+Sir Herbert Stewart's fatal wound destroyed that project. But this
+plan might have been adhered to so far as the altered circumstances
+would allow. Sir Charles Wilson had succeeded to the command, and many
+matters affecting the position of the force had to be settled before
+he was free to devote himself to the main object of the dash forward,
+viz. the establishment of communications with Gordon and Khartoum. As
+the consequence of that change in his own position, it would have been
+natural that he should have delegated the task to someone else, and in
+Lord Charles Beresford, as brave a sailor as ever led a cutting-out
+party, there was the very man for the occasion. Unfortunately, Sir
+Charles Wilson did not take this step for, as I believe, the sole
+reason that he was the bearer of an important official letter to
+General Gordon, which he did not think could be entrusted to any other
+hands. But for that circumstance it is permissible to say that one
+steamer--there was more than enough wood on the other three steamers
+to fit one out for the journey to Khartoum--would have sailed on the
+morning of the 22nd, the day after the force sheered off from
+Metemmah, and, at the latest, it would have reached Khartoum on
+Sunday, the 25th, just in time to avert the catastrophe.
+
+But as it was done, the whole of the 22nd and 23rd were taken up in
+preparing two steamers for the voyage, and in collecting scarlet coats
+for the troops, so that the effect of real British soldiers coming up
+the Nile might be made more considerable. At 8 A.M. on Saturday, the
+24th, Sir Charles Wilson at last sailed with the two steamers,
+_Bordeen_ and _Talataween_, and it was then quite impossible for the
+steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover,
+the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that
+navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka
+cataract was passed at 3 P.M. on the afternoon of Sunday; then the
+_Bordeen_ ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 P.M. on the
+fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was
+reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was
+killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past
+Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in
+the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream
+under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black
+gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the
+_Talataween_ ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the
+_Bordeen_. Two days later the _Bordeen_ shared the same fate, but the
+whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer,
+brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the
+subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously
+failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to
+accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it
+must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and
+spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning
+their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon
+himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main
+fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its
+capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so
+long defied.
+
+I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of
+which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been
+published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not
+been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's
+intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command
+at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it
+been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's
+strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English
+soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would
+have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against
+orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sole object of the
+Expedition have been attained without regard for the national honour,
+and without the discovery of that policy, the want of which was the
+only cause of the calamities associated with the Soudan.
+
+After the 14th of December there is no trustworthy, or at least,
+complete evidence, as to what took place in Khartoum. A copy of one of
+the defiant messages Gordon used to circulate for the special purpose
+of letting them fall into the hands of the Mahdi was dated 29th of
+that month, and ran to the effect, "Can hold Khartoum for years."
+There was also the final message to the Sovereigns of the Powers,
+undated, and probably written, if at all, by Gordon, during the final
+agony of the last few weeks, perhaps when Omdurman had fallen. It was
+worded as follows:--
+
+     "After salutations, I would at once, calling to mind what I have
+     gone through, inform their Majesties, the Sovereigns, of the
+     action of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me
+     as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing
+     the rebellion in that country.
+
+     "During the twelve months that I have been here, these two
+     Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth, and the other for her
+     military force, have remained unaffected by my situation--perhaps
+     relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who
+     surrendered of his own accord.
+
+     "Although I, personally, am too insignificant to be taken into
+     account, the Powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the
+     engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield
+     the honour of the Governments.
+
+     "What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God
+     will help me."
+
+Although this copy was not in Gordon's own writing, it was brought
+down by one of his clerks, who escaped from Khartoum, and he declared
+that the original had been sent in a cartridge case to Dongola. The
+style is certainly the style of Gordon, and there was no one in the
+Soudan who could imitate it. It seems safe, as Sir Henry Gordon did,
+to accept it as the farewell message of his brother.
+
+Until fresh evidence comes to light, that of Slatin Pasha, then a
+chained captive in the Mahdi's camp, is alone entitled to the
+slightest credence, and it is extremely graphic. We can well believe
+that up to the last moment Gordon continued to send out
+messages--false, to deceive the Mahdi, and true to impress Lord
+Wolseley. The note of 29th December was one of the former; the little
+French note on half a cigarette paper, brought by Abdullah Khalifa to
+Slatin to translate early in January, may have been one of the latter.
+It said:--"Can hold Khartoum at the outside till the end of January."
+Slatin then describes the fall of Omdurman on 15th January, with
+Gordon's acquiescence, which entirely disposes of the assertion that
+Ferratch, the gallant defender of that place during two months, was a
+traitor, and of how, on its surrender, Gordon's fire from the western
+wall of Khartoum prevented the Mahdists occupying it. He also comments
+on the alarm caused by the first advance of the British force into the
+Bayuda desert, and of the despatch of thousands of the Mahdi's best
+warriors to oppose it. Those forces quitted the camp at Omdurman
+between 10th and 15th January, and this step entirely disposes of the
+theory that the Mahdi held Khartoum in the hollow of his hand, and
+could at any moment take it. As late as the 15th of January, Gordon's
+fire was so vigorous and successful that the Mahdi was unable to
+retain possession of the fort which he had just captured.
+
+The story had best be continued in the words used by the witness. Six
+days after the fall of Omdurman loud weeping and wailing filled the
+Mahdi's camp. As the Mahdi forbade the display of sorrow and grief it
+was clear that something most unusual had taken place. Then it came
+out that the British troops had met and utterly defeated the tribes,
+with a loss to the Mahdists of several thousands. Within the next two
+or three days came news of the other defeat at Abou Kru, and the loud
+lamentations of the women and children could not be checked. The Mahdi
+and his chief emirs, the present Khalifa Abdullah prominent among
+them, then held a consultation, and it was decided, sooner than lose
+all the fruits of the hitherto unchecked triumph of their cause, to
+risk an assault on Khartoum. At night on the 24th, and again on the
+25th, the bulk of the rebel force was conveyed across the river to the
+right bank of the White Nile; the Mahdi preached them a sermon,
+promising them victory, and they were enjoined to receive his remarks
+in silence, so that no noise was heard in the beleaguered city. By
+this time their terror of the mines laid in front of the south wall
+had become much diminished, because the mines had been placed too low
+in the earth, and they also knew that Gordon and his diminished force
+were in the last stages of exhaustion. Finally, the Mahdi or his
+energetic lieutenant decided on one more arrangement, which was
+probably the true cause of their success. The Mahdists had always
+delivered their attack half an hour after sunrise; on this occasion
+they decided to attack half an hour before dawn, when the whole scene
+was covered in darkness. Slatin knew all these plans, and as he
+listened anxiously in his place of confinement he was startled, when
+just dropping off to sleep, by "the deafening discharge of thousands
+of rifles and guns; this lasted for a few minutes, then only
+occasional rifle shots were heard, and now all was quiet again. Could
+this possibly be the great attack on Khartoum? A wild discharge of
+firearms and cannon, and in a few minutes complete silence!" He was
+not left long in doubt. Some hours afterwards three black soldiers
+approached, carrying in a bloody cloth the head of General Gordon,
+which he identified. It is unnecessary to add the gruesome details
+which Slatin picked up as to his manner of death from the gossip of
+the camp. In this terrible tragedy ended that noble defence of
+Khartoum, which, wherever considered or discussed, and for all time,
+will excite the pity and admiration of the world.
+
+There is no need to dwell further on the terrible end of one of the
+purest heroes our country has ever produced, whose loss was national,
+but most deeply felt as an irreparable shock, and as a void that can
+never be filled up by that small circle of men and women who might
+call themselves his friends. Ten years elapsed after the eventful
+morning when Slatin pronounced over his remains the appropriate
+epitaph, "A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have
+fallen; his sufferings are over!" before the exact manner of Gordon's
+death was known, and some even clung to the chance that after all he
+might have escaped to the Equator, and indeed it was not till long
+after the expedition had returned that the remarkable details of his
+single-handed defence of Khartoum became known. Had all these
+particulars come out at the moment when the public learnt that
+Khartoum had fallen, and that the expedition was to return without
+accomplishing anything, it is possible that there would have been a
+demand that no Minister could have resisted to avenge his fate; but it
+was not till the publication of the journals that the exact character
+of his magnificent defence and of the manner in which he was treated
+by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the
+nation.
+
+The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment
+being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I
+have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have
+been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with
+impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the
+following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the
+Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to
+accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General
+Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and
+accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest
+the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not
+require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government,
+for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made
+upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some
+against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No
+incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite
+arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the
+precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of
+him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind.
+Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really
+as far as the poles asunder.
+
+There then comes the second phase of the question--the alleged
+abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his
+services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and
+difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond
+dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard
+to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and
+success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take
+the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does
+not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It
+rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by
+rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and
+an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to
+its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the
+cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This
+decision, too late as it was to assist in the formation of a new
+administration for the Soudan, or to bring back the garrisons, was
+taken in ample time to ensure the personal safety and rescue of
+General Gordon. In the literal sense of the charge, history will
+therefore acquit Mr Gladstone and his colleagues of the abandonment of
+General Gordon personally.
+
+With regard to the third phase of the question--viz. the failure of
+the attempt to rescue General Gordon, which was essentially a
+military, and not a political question--the responsibility passes from
+the Prime Minister to the military authorities who decided the scope
+of the campaign, and the commander who carried it out. In this case,
+the individual responsible was the same. Lord Wolseley not only had
+his own way in the route to be followed by the expedition, and the
+size and importance attached to it, but he was also entrusted with its
+personal direction. There is consequently no question of the
+sub-division of the responsibility for its failure, just as there
+could have been none of the credit for its success. Lord Wolseley
+decided that the route should be the long one by the Nile Valley, not
+the short one from Souakim to Berber. Lord Wolseley decreed that there
+should be no Indian troops, and that the force, instead of being an
+ordinary one, should be a picked special corps from the _élite_ of the
+British army; and finally Lord Wolseley insisted that there should be
+no dash to the rescue of Gordon by a small part of his force, but a
+slow, impressive, and overpoweringly scientific advance of the whole
+body. The extremity of Gordon's distress necessitated a slight
+modification of his plan, when, with qualified instructions, which
+practically tied his hands, Sir Herbert Stewart made his first
+appearance at Jakdul.
+
+It was then known to Lord Wolseley that Gordon was in extremities,
+yet when a fighting force of 1100 English troops, of special physique
+and spirit, was moved forward with sufficient transport to enable it
+to reach the Nile and Gordon's steamers, the commander's instructions
+were such as confined him to inaction, unless he disobeyed his orders,
+which only Nelsons and Gordons can do with impunity. It is impossible
+to explain this extraordinary timidity. Sir Herbert Stewart reached
+Jakdul on 3rd January with a force small in numbers, but in every
+other respect of remarkable efficiency, and with the camels
+sufficiently fresh to have reached the Nile on 7th or 8th January had
+it pressed on. The more urgent news that reached Lord Wolseley after
+its departure would have justified the despatch of a messenger to urge
+it to press on at all costs to Metemmah. In such a manner would a
+Havelock or Outram have acted, yet the garrison of the Lucknow
+Residency was in no more desperate case than Gordon at Khartoum.
+
+It does not need to be a professor of a military academy to declare
+that, unless something is risked in war, and especially wars such as
+England has had to wage against superior numbers in the East, there
+will never be any successful rescues of distressed garrisons. Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the advance from Korti to Metemmah,
+whence his advance guard did not reach the latter place till the 20th,
+instead of the 7th of January. His lieutenant and representative, Sir
+Charles Wilson, would not risk anything on the 21st January, whence
+none of the steamers appeared at Khartoum until late on the 27th, when
+all was over. Each of these statements cannot be impeached, and if so,
+the conclusion seems inevitable that in the first and highest degree
+Lord Wolseley was alone responsible for the failure to reach Khartoum
+in time, and that in a very minor degree Sir Charles Wilson might be
+considered blameworthy for not having sent off one of the steamers
+with a small reinforcement to Khartoum on the 21st January, before
+even he allowed Cassim el Mousse to take any part in the attack on
+Metemmah. He could not have done this himself, but he would have had
+no difficulty in finding a substitute. When, however, there were
+others far more blameworthy, it seems almost unjust to a gallant
+officer to say that by a desperate effort he might at the very last
+moment have snatched the chestnuts out of the fire, and converted the
+most ignominious failure in the military annals of this country into a
+creditable success.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The tragic end at Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the
+career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the
+ordinary experiences of mankind. No man who ever lived was called upon
+to deal with a greater number of difficult military and
+administrative problems, and to find the solution for them with such
+inadequate means and inferior troops and subordinates. In the Crimea
+he showed as a very young man the spirit, discernment, energy, and
+regard for detail which were his characteristics through life. Those
+qualities enabled him to achieve in China military exploits which in
+their way have never been surpassed. The marvellous skill, confidence,
+and vigilance with which he supplied the shortcomings of his troops,
+and provided for the wants of a large population at Khartoum for the
+better part of a year, showed that, as a military leader, he was still
+the same gifted captain who had crushed the Taeping rebellion twenty
+years before. What he did for the Soudan and its people during six
+years' residence, at a personal sacrifice that never can be
+appreciated, has been told at length; but pages of rhetoric would not
+give as perfect a picture as the spontaneous cry of the blacks: "If we
+only had a governor like Gordon Pasha, then the country would indeed
+be contented."
+
+"Such examples are fruitful in the future," said Mr Gladstone in the
+House of Commons; and it is as a perfect model of all that was good,
+brave, and true that Gordon will be enshrined in the memory of the
+great English nation which he really died for, and whose honour was
+dearer to him than his life. England may well feel proud of having
+produced so noble and so unapproachable a hero. She has had, and she
+will have again, soldiers as brave, as thoughtful, as prudent, and as
+successful as Gordon. She has had, and she will have again, servants
+of the same public spirit, with the same intense desire that not a
+spot should sully the national honour. But although this breed is not
+extinct, there will never be another Gordon. The circumstances that
+produced him were exceptional; the opportunities that offered
+themselves for the demonstration of his greatness can never fall to
+the lot of another; and even if by some miraculous combination the man
+and the occasions arose, the hero, unlike Gordon, would be spoilt by
+his own success and public applause. But the qualities which made
+Gordon superior not only to all his contemporaries, but to all the
+temptations and weaknesses of success, are attainable; and the student
+of his life will find that the guiding star he always kept before him
+was the duty he owed his country. In that respect, above all others,
+he has left future generations of his countrymen a great example.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX.
+
+
+  _Abbas_, steamer, ii. 144;
+    loss of, 145-6.
+  Abd-el-Kader, ii. 100, 102, 119.
+  Abdulgassin, ii. 32.
+  Abdullah, the present Khalifa, ii. 98, 102.
+  Abdurrahman, ii. 45, 68.
+  Abou Hamid, ii. 144.
+  Abou Klea, ii. 163;
+    battle of, 164;
+    loss at, _ibid._, 166.
+  Abouna, an, ii. 33.
+  Abou Kru, ii. 164;
+    battle of, 165, 169.
+  Abou Sammat, ii. 29.
+  Abou Saoud, i. 149.
+  Abyssinia, the expedition to, i. 131-2; ii. 5, 32, 35, 70 _passim_.
+  Academy, Royal Military, i. 5, 6, 7.
+  Adye, Sir John, i. 137.
+  Afghanistan, ii. 45, 68, 69, 70.
+  Alagos, i. 40.
+  Albert Lake, i. 155, 156.
+  Alexandropol, i. 35.
+  Alla-ed-Din, ii. 102.
+  Alma, i. 8, 16.
+  Amoy, i. 72.
+  Anderson, W. C., i. 41.
+  Anfina, i. 158.
+  Ani, i. 37, 38.
+  Arabi Pasha, ii. 97.
+  Arabs as soldiers, i. 150.
+  Ararat, Mount, i. 38, 39.
+  Aras, i. 33.
+  Arendrup, ii. 5.
+  Arokol Bey, ii. 5.
+  _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 70.
+  Ashantee Expedition, i. 138.
+  Assiout, ii. 133.
+  Assouan, ii. 153.
+  Athens, i. 15.
+  Ayoob, ii. 68.
+
+  Bahr Arab, ii. 27.
+  Bahr Gazelle, ii. 25, 105, 128.
+  Baker, Sir S., i. 142, 143, 145, 149, 157; ii. 113, 118, 139.
+  Baker Pasha, ii. 105, 136.
+  Balaclava, i. 15, 16.
+  Bara, ii. 103.
+  Bari tribe, i. 150, 151, 153.
+  Baring, Sir Evelyn, _see_ Lord Cromer.
+  Bashi-Bazouks, ii. 4, 9, 10, 141, 142, 144.
+  Basutoland and its question, ii. 71, 72, 75 _et seq._;
+    description of, 77-82.
+  Basutos, as cavalry, ii. 87.
+  Bayuda desert, ii. 161, 162, 163.
+  Bedden, i. 153.
+  Beechy, i. 90.
+  Bellal Bey, i. 143.
+  Berber, i. 147; ii. 96, 139, 140, 143, 145, 159, 163.
+  Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. 166;
+    rescues Sir C. Wilson, 167.
+  Berzati Bey, ii. 65.
+  Bessarabia, i. 32.
+  Bismarck, Prince, ii. 54, 55.
+  Bisson, General, ii. 137.
+  Blignières, M. de, ii. 107.
+  Bogos, ii. 5, 33.
+  Bolgrad, i. 32, 33.
+  Boma Sola, i. 32.
+  Bombay, ii. 45.
+  Bonham, Sir G., i. 76.
+  Bonnefoy, Capt., i. 92, 102.
+  Bordeen, ii. 147, 151, 167.
+  Borgu, ii. 32.
+  Brandt, Herr von, ii. 54-55.
+  Brocklehurst, Colonel, ii. 95-96.
+  Brown, General, i. 90.
+  Brown, Major, i. 116.
+  Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 47, 110, 121.
+  Brussels, ii. 92-95.
+  Burgevine, i. 54-59, 78, 81, 89, 90, 92-93.
+  Burgoyne, Sir John, i. 14.
+  Burnaby, Colonel Fred., ii. 164.
+
+  Cairo, i. 145;
+    affairs at, 145-6; ii. 159, 161.
+  Cambridge, Duke of, i. 112, 123; ii. 96, 122.
+  Camel, the, ii. 11, 16.
+  Camel Corps, the, ii. 164.
+  Campbell, Mr J. D., ii. 49.
+  Campbell, Major, i. 147.
+  Candahar, ii. 45, 68-69.
+  Cape Government, ii. 39, 75-76.
+  Cape Town, ii. 76;
+    opinion at, 88-89.
+  Cardew, Lieut., i. 47.
+  Cassim el Mousse, ii. 165, 172.
+  Cathcart, Sir George, ii. 77, 86.
+  Cave, Mr, ii. 19.
+  Cere, Colonel, i. 20.
+  Chagos Group, ii. 73.
+  Chamberlaine, Sir N., ii. 48.
+  Chan-chia-wan, i. 45.
+  Changchufu, i. 113, 118.
+  Chang Kwoliang, i. 66, 72, 74.
+  Changsha, i. 67.
+  Chanzu, i. 79-81, 93, 94.
+  Chatham, Engineers' Headquarters, i. 7, 45.
+  Cherif Pasha, ii. 2, 21, 31, 107, 139.
+  Chesney, Sir George, i. 19, 116.
+  China, scenery of, i. 53, 60-64.
+  Ching, General, i. 57, 82, 84, 88-89, 91-93, 96-103, 113.
+  Chinkiangfoo, i. 69.
+  Chippendall, Lieut., i. 148.
+  Cholin, i. 51.
+  Chung How, ii. 50.
+  Chung Wang, i. 50, 55-56, 71-76, 92-99, 113, 116, 118, 121.
+  Chunye, i. 84-87.
+  Clarke, Miss A. M., i. 3.
+  Clayton, Capt., i. 84.
+  Coetlogon, Colonel de, ii. 105, 119, 134-136.
+  Congo, the, ii. 89, 91-95, 140.
+  Constantinople, i. 33-41, 139.
+  Cookesley, Colonel, i. 83.
+  Corfu, i. 14.
+  _Courbash_, the, abolished in Soudan, ii. 6.
+  Crimea, i. 8-9, 14, 16, 138.
+  Cromer, Lord, ii. 21;
+    Gordon's scene with, _ibid._;
+    opposes Gordon, 118-122, 125, 128, 137;
+    his suggestion, 139, 140, 147, 153.
+  Culloden, i. 3.
+  Cumberland, Duke of, i. 3.
+  Cuzzi, ii. 143.
+  Cyprus, ii. 125.
+
+  Danube, i. 136-7.
+  Dara, ii. 10-12, 14, 27, 104.
+  Dar Djumna, ii. 145.
+  Dardanelles, i. 15.
+  Darfour, i. 143-4; ii. 9-11, 17, 30-31, 113.
+  Davidson, Capt., i. 85.
+  De Norman, i. 45.
+  Debbeh, ii. 161.
+  Debra Tabor, ii. 34.
+  Dem Idris, ii. 27.
+  Dem Suleiman, ii. 28.
+  Dent, Mr H., i. 108.
+  Derby, Earl of, ii. 23.
+  Devonshire, Duke of, first moves to render Gordon assistance, ii. 156;
+    his preparations for an expedition, ii. 156-7.
+  Dilke, Sir C., ii. 96, 117, 121.
+  Dongola, ii. 98, 139, 157, 159, 160, 161.
+  Donnelly, General J., i. 22; ii. 66.
+  Dubaga, i. 160.
+  Duem, i. 103.
+  Duncan, Colonel, ii. 143-4.
+  Durand, Sir M., ii. 47.
+
+  Earle, Major-General, ii. 158-9.
+  Eastern Question, the, ii. 40-42.
+  Eden, Garden of, ii. 74.
+  Egerton, Mr, ii. 147, 155.
+  El Obeid, ii. 101, 103.
+  Elphinstone, Sir Howard, ii. 72.
+  Empress-Regents, the, i. 123, 133.
+  Enderby, Elizabeth, Gordon's mot 3-4.
+    _See_ also Mrs Gordon.
+  Enderby, Mr George, i. 94.
+  England, her hesitating policy, ii. 8;
+    power of, 73.
+  Equator, the, ii. 140, 147.
+  Equatorial Province, the, i. 147, 151.
+  Eristaw, Prince, i. 42.
+  Erivan, i. 38.
+  Erzeroum, i. 34.
+  Etchmiazin, i. 40.
+  Ever-Victorious Army, i. 56, 58-60.
+  Expedition, the Relief, ii. 157-8.
+  Eyre, General, i. 24.
+
+  Fascher, ii. 10-11.
+  Fashoda, i. 148.
+  Ferratch Pasha, ii. 148.
+  _Firefly_, the, i. 113.
+  Fisher, Corporal, i. 39-40.
+  Forrester, Colonel, i. 57.
+  Forster, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii, 115.
+  Foweira, i. 156.
+  France, i. 62.
+  Franco-Chinese, the, i. 92, 102.
+  French soldiers, Gordon's opinion of, i. 17-8.
+  Fusaiquan, i. 97.
+  Fusham, i. 80-81, 116.
+
+  Gagarin, Prince, i. 42.
+  Galatz, i. 32, 136-8.
+  Gandamak, i. 45.
+  Gara, ii. 30.
+  Gebra, i. 103.
+  Geographical Society, Royal, i. 156.
+  Gessi Romulus, i. 148, 155-7; ii. 26-31.
+  Gezireh, i. 111.
+  Giegler Pasha, ii. 143.
+  Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. 94, 122;
+    Gladstone and his Government, ii. 151;
+    how they came to employ Gordon, ii. 151-2;
+    undeceived as to Gordon's views, ii. 152-3;
+    their indecision, ii. 153;
+    statement in House, ii. 154;
+    dismayed by Gordon's boldness, ii. 155;
+    their radical fault, ii. 156;
+    degree of responsibility, ii. 170;
+    acquittal of personal abandonment of Gordon, ii. 171.
+  Golden Fleece, the, i. 15.
+  Gondar, ii. 34.
+  Gondokoro, i. 146, 147, 155.
+  Gordon, derivation of name, i. 1, 2.
+  Gordon, Charles George:
+      birth, i. 1;
+      family history, 1-4;
+      childhood, 4;
+      enters Woolwich Academy, 5;
+      early escapades, 5-6;
+      put back six months and elects for Engineers, 6;
+      his spirit, 7;
+      his examinations, _ibid._;
+      gets commission, _ibid._;
+      his work at Pembroke, 8;
+      his brothers, 9;
+      his sisters, 10;
+      his brother-in-law, Dr Moffitt, _ibid._;
+      personal appearance of, 11-14;
+      his height, 11;
+      his voice, 12;
+      ordered to Corfu, 14;
+      changed to Crimea, _ibid._;
+      passes Constantinople, 15;
+      views on the Dardanelles' forts, _ibid._;
+      reaches Balaclava, 16;
+      opinion of French soldiers, 17, 18;
+      his first night in the trenches, 18-19;
+      his topographical knowledge, 19;
+      his special aptitude for war, _ibid._;
+      account of the capture of the Quarries, 21-22;
+      of the first assault on Redan, 22-24;
+      Kinglake's opinion of, 25;
+      on the second assault on Redan, 26-28;
+      praises the Russians, 28;
+      joins Kimburn expedition, _ibid._;
+      destroying Sebastopol, 29-31;
+      his warlike instincts, 31;
+      appointed to Bessarabian Commission, 32;
+      his letters on the delimitation work, 33;
+      ordered to Armenia, _ibid._;
+      journey from Trebizonde, 34;
+      describes Kars, 34-35;
+      his other letters from Armenia, 35-39;
+      ascends Ararat, 39-40;
+      returns home, 41;
+      again ordered to the Caucasus, 41, 42;
+      some personal idiosyncrasies, 43, 44;
+      gazetted captain, 45;
+      appointment at Chatham, 45;
+      sails for China, _ibid._;
+      too late for fighting, _ibid._;
+      describes sack of Summer Palace, 46;
+      buys the Chinese throne, _ibid._;
+      his work at Tientsin, 47;
+      a trip to the Great Wall, 47-49;
+      arrives at Shanghai, 49;
+      distinguishes himself in the field, 50;
+      his daring, 51;
+      gets his coat spoiled, 52;
+      raised to rank of major, _ibid._;
+      surveys country round Shanghai, 52, 53;
+      describes Taepings, 53;
+      nominated for Chinese service, 54;
+      reaches Sungkiang, 60;
+      qualifications for the command, 78;
+      describes his force, 79;
+      inspects it, _ibid._;
+      first action, 79, 80;
+      impresses Chinese, 80;
+      described by Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+      made Tsungping, _ibid._;
+      forbids plunder, 81;
+      his flotilla, _ibid._;
+      his strategy, _ibid._;
+      captures Taitsan, 82;
+      difficulty with his officers, 83;
+      besieges Quinsan, _ibid._;
+      reconnoitres it, 84;
+      attacks and takes it, 85-87;
+      removes to Quinsan, 87;
+      deals with a mutiny, 88;
+      incident with General Ching, 89;
+      resigns and withdraws resignation, _ibid._;
+      contends with greater difficulties, 90;
+      undertakes siege of Soochow, 91;
+      negotiates with Burgevine, 92, 93;
+      relieves garrison, 94;
+      great victory, _ibid._;
+      describes the position round Soochow, 95;
+      his hands tied by the Chinese, 96;
+      his main plan of campaign, 97;
+      his first repulse, _ibid._;
+      captures the stockades, 98;
+      his officers, 99;
+      his share in negotiations with Taepings, _ibid._;
+      difficulty about pay, 100;
+      resigns command, _ibid._;
+      guards Li Hung Chang's tent, _ibid._;
+      enters Soochow, 101;
+      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
+      asks Dr Macartney to go to Lar Wang, _ibid._;
+      questions interpreter, _ibid._;
+      detained by Taepings, _ibid._;
+      and then by Imperialists, 102;
+      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
+      identifies the bodies of the Wangs, _ibid._;
+      what he would have done, _ibid._;
+      the fresh evidence relating to the Wangs, 103 _et seq._;
+      conversation with Ching, 103;
+      and Macartney, _ibid._;
+      relations with Macartney, 103, 104;
+      offers him succession to command, 104, 105;
+      letter to Li Hung Chang, 106;
+      Li sends Macartney to Gordon, _ibid._;
+      contents of Gordon's letter, 107;
+      possesses the head of the Lar Wang, 107, 108;
+      frenzied state of, 108;
+      scene with Macartney at Quinsan, 108, 109;
+      his threats, 109;
+      his grave reflection on Macartney, 109, 110;
+      writes to Macartney, 111;
+      makes public retractation, 111;
+      other expressions of regret, 112;
+      refuses Chinese presents, _ibid._;
+      suspension in active command, _ibid._;
+      retakes the field, 113;
+      "the destiny of China in his hands," _ibid._;
+      attacks places west of Taiho Lake, 114-5;
+      enrolls Taepings, 115;
+      severely wounded, 116;
+      second reverse, _ibid._;
+      receives bad news, _ibid._;
+      alters his plans, _ibid._;
+      his force severely defeated, 117;
+      retrieves misfortune, _ibid._;
+      describes the rebellion, 118;
+      made Lieut.-Colonel, _ibid._;
+      his further successes, 119;
+      another reverse, _ibid._;
+      his final victory, 120;
+      what he thought he had done, _ibid._;
+      visits Nanking, _ibid._;
+      drills Chinese troops, 121;
+      appointed Ti-Tu and Yellow Jacket Order, 122;
+      his mandarin dresses, 123;
+      his relations with Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+      the Gold Medal, _ibid._;
+      his diary destroyed, 124;
+      returns home, _ibid._;
+      view of his achievements, 125-6;
+      a quiet six months, 128;
+      his excessive modesty, _ibid._;
+      pride in his profession, 129;
+      appointment at Gravesend, _ibid._;
+      his view of the Thames Forts, 130;
+      his work there, _ibid._;
+      his mode of living, 131;
+      supposed _angina pectoris_, _ibid._;
+      wish to join Abyssinian Expedition, 132;
+      described as a modern Jesus Christ, _ibid._;
+      his mission work, 132-3;
+      his boys, 133;
+      sends his medal to Lancashire fund, _ibid._;
+      his love for boys, 134;
+      his kings, _ibid._;
+      some incidents, _ibid._;
+      his pensioners, 135;
+      his coat stolen, _ibid._;
+      his walks, 136;
+      the Snake flags, _ibid._;
+      leaves Gravesend, _ibid._;
+      at Galatz, 137;
+      no place like England, _ibid._;
+      goes to Crimea, 138;
+      attends Napoleon's funeral, _ibid._;
+      casual meeting with Nubar, and its important consequences, 139-40;
+      "Gold and Silver Idols," 140;
+      appointed Governor of the Equatorial Province, 145;
+      reasons for it, _ibid._;
+      leaves Cairo, 146;
+      describes the "sudd," _ibid._;
+      his steamers, 147;
+      his facetiousness, _ibid._;
+      reaches Gondokoro, _ibid._;
+      his firman, _ibid._;
+      his staff, 148;
+      his energy, _ibid._;
+      establishes line of forts, _ibid._;
+      collapse of his staff, 149;
+      his Botany Bay, _ibid._;
+      his policy and justice, 150;
+      his poor troops, _ibid._;
+      organises a black corps, 151;
+      his sound finance, _ibid._;
+      deals with slave trade, 152;
+      incidents with slaves, _ibid._;
+      makes friends everywhere, 153;
+      his goodness a tradition, 153-4;
+      his character misrepresented, 154;
+      his line of forts, 155;
+      the ulterior objects of his task, _ibid._;
+      the control of the Nile, 156;
+      shrinks from notoriety, _ibid._;
+      describes the Lakes, 157;
+      the question with Uganda, 157 _et seq._;
+      proceeds against Kaba Rega, 158-60;
+      his extraordinary energy, 161;
+      does his own work, 161;
+      incident of his courage, 161-2;
+      views of Khedive, 163;
+      returns to Cairo, 163;
+      and home, _ibid._
+      Decision about Egyptian employment, ii. 1;
+      receives letter from Khedive, 2;
+      consults Duke of Cambridge, _ibid._;
+      returns to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, 2-3;
+      appointed Muchir, or Marshal, etc., 3;
+      sums up his work, 4;
+      his first treatment of Abyssinian Question, 5-6;
+      his entry into Khartoum, 6;
+      public address, 7;
+      first acts of Administration, _ibid._;
+      proposes Slavery Regulations, 7;
+      receives contradictory orders on subject, 8;
+      his decision about them, 8-9;
+      disbands the Bashi-Bazouks, 9;
+      goes to Darfour, _ibid._;
+      relieves garrisons, 10-11;
+      enters Fascher, 11;
+      recalled by alarming news in his rear, _ibid._;
+      his camel described, _ibid._;
+      reaches Dara without troops, 12;
+      his interview with Suleiman, _ibid._;
+      Slatin's account of scene, 12-13;
+      his views on the Slave Question, 13;
+      follows Suleiman to Shaka, 14;
+      indignant letter of, 15;
+      his decision about capital punishment, _ibid._;
+      his views thereupon, 16;
+      some characteristic incidents, _ibid._;
+      what the people thought of him, _ibid._;
+      "Send us another Governor like Gordon," _ibid._;
+      his regular payments, 17;
+      his thoughtfulness, _ibid._;
+      summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      appointed President of Financial Inquiry, 18;
+      his views of money, _ibid._;
+      acts with Lesseps, 19;
+      meets with foreign opposition, 20;
+      scene with Lesseps, 21;
+      scene with Major Evelyn Baring, _ibid._;
+      Gordon's financial proposal, 22;
+      last scenes with Khedive, 23;
+      Gordon's bold offer, _ibid._;
+      financial episode cost Gordon £800, 24;
+      his way of living, _ibid._;
+      leaves Cairo and visits Harrar, 25;
+      his finance in the Soudan, 25-6;
+      deals with Suleiman, 26 _et seq._;
+      takes the field in person, 30;
+      clears out Shaka, 31;
+      again summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      proclaims Tewfik, _ibid._;
+      returns to Cairo, 32;
+      entrusted with mission to Abyssinia, _ibid._;
+      receives letter from King John, 33;
+      called "Sultan of the Soudan," _ibid._;
+      enters Abyssinia, 34;
+      goes to Debra Tabor, _ibid._;
+      interview with King John, _ibid._;
+      prevented returning to Soudan, 35;
+      his opinion of Abyssinia, _ibid._;
+      Khedive's neglect of, 36;
+      called "mad," _ibid._;
+      his work in the Soudan, 36-7;
+      goes to Switzerland, 38;
+      his opinion of wives, 38;
+      first meeting with King of the Belgians, 39;
+      offered Cape command, 40;
+      his memorandum on Eastern Question, 40-2;
+      accepts Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, 42;
+      regrets it, 43;
+      interview with Prince of Wales, _ibid._;
+      his letters about it, 44;
+      views on Indian topics, _ibid._;
+      sudden resignation, _ibid._;
+      the Yakoob Khan incident, 45-8;
+      invited to China, 49;
+      full history of that invitation, 49-50;
+      letter from Li Hung Chang, 49;
+      his telegrams to War Office, 50-1;
+      leaves for China, 51;
+      announces his intentions, 52;
+      what he discovered on arrival in China, 53;
+      ignores British Minister, _ibid._;
+      stays with Li Hung Chang, 55;
+      his reply to German Minister, 56;
+      his letter on Li, 57;
+      his advice to China, 58-61;
+      baffles intrigues and secures peace, 59;
+      further passages with War Office, 60;
+      on the Franco-Chinese war, 61, 62;
+      on the Opium Question, 63-4;
+      arrives at Aden, 65;
+      his Central African letters, _ibid._;
+      visits Ireland, 65-6;
+      letter on Irish Question in _Times_, 66-7;
+      letter on Candahar, 68-70;
+      opinion of Abyssinians, 70;
+      his article on irregular warfare, 70-1;
+      offers Cape Government his services for Basutoland, 71;
+      takes Sir Howard Elphinstone's place in the Mauritius, 72;
+      his work there, 72-3;
+      views of England's power, 73;
+      views on coaling stations, _ibid._;
+      visits Seychelles, 74;
+      views on Malta and Mediterranean, 74-5;
+      attains rank of Major-General, 75;
+      summoned to the Cape, _ibid._;
+      leaves in a sailing ship, 76;
+      financial arrangement with Cape Government, _ibid._;
+      his pecuniary loss by Cape employment, _ibid._;
+      his memorandum on Basutoland, 77-9;
+      accepts temporarily post of Commandant-General, 80;
+      drafts a Basuto Convention, 80-1;
+      requested by Mr Sauer to go to Basutoland, 82;
+      relations with Masupha, _ibid._;
+      visits Masupha, 83;
+      betrayed by Sauer, _ibid._;
+      peril of, _ibid._;
+      his account of the affair, 84-5;
+      memorandum on the Native Question, 85-7;
+      his project of military reform, 88;
+      his resignation of Cape command, _ibid._;
+      corresponds with King of the Belgians, 89;
+      goes to the Holy Land, _ibid._;
+      his view of Russian Convent at Jerusalem, 90;
+      advocates Palestine Canal, 90-1;
+      summoned to Belgium, 91;
+      telegraphs for leave, 92;
+      the mistake in the telegram, _ibid._;
+      decides to retire, _ibid._;
+      King Leopold's arrangement, _ibid._;
+      his plans on the Congo, 93-4;
+      public opinion aroused by his Soudan policy, 93-5;
+      visit to War Office, 94;
+      makes his will, _ibid._;
+      goes to Brussels, _ibid._;
+      Soudan not the Congo, 95;
+      leaves Charing Cross, 95;
+      final letters to his sister, 95-6;
+      interview with ministers, 96;
+      loses clothes and orders, _ibid._;
+      his predictions about the Soudan, 97-8;
+      the task imposed on him, 106;
+      why he accepted it, 106-7;
+      memorandum on Egyptian affairs, 107-9;
+      opinions on Hicks's Expedition, 109;
+      on English policy, 110;
+      on the Mahdi, _ibid._;
+      his interview with Mr Stead of _Pall Mall Gazette_, 111-5;
+      his eagerness to go to the Soudan, 115;
+      suggestions by the Press of his fitness for the post, 116-7;
+      "generally considered to be mad," 117;
+      Sir Charles Dilke puts his name forward, _ibid._;
+      Lord Granville's despatch, _ibid._;
+      Lord Cromer opposes his appointment, 118, _et seq._;
+      consequences of that opposition, and the delay it caused, 118-21;
+      the arrangement with King Leopold, 121;
+      went to Soudan at request of Government, 122;
+      his departure, _ibid._;
+      his instructions, 123-4;
+      doubts about them, 124;
+      his views about Zebehr, 124 _et seq._;
+      suggests his being sent to Cyprus, 125;
+      change in his route, _ibid._;
+      goes to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      changed view towards Zebehr, 126;
+      his memorandum on their relations, 126-8;
+      wishes to take him, 128;
+      a "mystic feeling," _ibid._;
+      interview with Zebehr, _ibid._;
+      final demands for Zebehr, 129-30;
+      leaves Cairo, 133;
+      the task before him, 134-5;
+      hastens to Khartoum, 136;
+      reception by inhabitants, _ibid._;
+      his first steps of defence, _ibid._;
+      his conclusion that "Mahdi must be smashed up," 137;
+      his demands, 138;
+      on our "dog in the manger" policy, 139;
+      "caught in Khartoum," _ibid._;
+      appeal to philanthropists, _ibid._;
+      "you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi," 140;
+      his lost diary, 141;
+      his first fight, _ibid._;
+      bad conduct of his troops, 141-2;
+      lays down three lines of mines, 142;
+      his steamers, _ibid._;
+      their value, _ibid._;
+      force at his disposal, _ibid._;
+      loses a steamer, 143;
+      sends down 2600 refugees, _ibid._;
+      his care for them, 143-4;
+      Soudan Question _must_ be
+      settled by November, 144;
+      sends down _Abbas_, 145;
+      full history of that incident, 144-6;
+      left alone at Khartoum, 146;
+      sends away his steamers to help the Expedition, 146-7;
+      hampered by indecision of Government, 147;
+      his telegrams never published, _ibid._;
+      position at Khartoum, _ibid._;
+      his point of observation, 148;
+      cut off from Omdurman, _ibid._;
+      anxiety for his steamers, 149;
+      "To-day I expected one of the Expedition here," _ibid._;
+      the confidence felt in Gordon, _ibid._;
+      his defiance of the Mahdi, 150;
+      his position, 150-1;
+      his last Journal, 151;
+      views on Soudan Question, 152-3;
+      his relations with the Government, 152-6;
+      effect of silence from Khartoum, 156;
+      his view of the Relief Expedition, 159;
+      his shrewdness, _ibid._;
+      his last messages, 160;
+      situation desperate, _ibid._;
+      "the town may fall in ten days," 165;
+      "quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty,"
+        _ibid._;
+      "spilt milk," _ibid._;
+      his last message of all, 168;
+      death of, 169;
+      details supplied by Slatin, 169-70;
+      a great national loss, 173;
+      his example, 173.
+  Gordon, David, i. 2.
+  Gordon, General Enderby, i. 8, 9.
+  Gordon, Fred, i. 5, 138.
+  Gordon, Sir Henry W., i. 4-6, 8-10, 60, 102, 134; ii. 19, 43, 91,
+     92, 95, 132.
+  Gordon, Miss Mary Augusta, i. 10; ii. 130;
+    correspondence with Zebehr, 130-2, 143.
+  Gordon, General Peter, i. 2.
+  Gordon, William Augustus, i. 3.
+  Gordon, William Augustus, junior, i. 5.
+  Gordon, Mrs, mother of Charles Gordon, i. 127, 128;
+    death of, 138.
+  Gordon, William Henry, Lieut.-General, i. 3, 4.
+  Gordon, Sir William, i. 131.
+  Gordon, Sir William, of Park, i. 2.
+  Goschen, Mr, ii. 19, 23.
+  Graham, Sir G., i. 12, 13, 22, 24, 25; ii. 125, 128, 129, 153,
+    156, 165.
+  Grand Canal, the, i. 69.
+  Grant, Colonel, ii. 51.
+  Granville, Earl, ii. 96, 117-123, 155.
+  Gravesend, i. 129, 132, 136.
+  Gresswell, Mr, ii. 83.
+  Griffin, Sir Lepel, ii. 45.
+  Gubat, _see_ Abou Kru, ii. 164.
+  Gura, ii. 34.
+  Gura plateau, ii. 5.
+  Guyon, General, i. 34.
+
+  Hake, Mr Egmont, revives Gordon's retracted libel on Sir Halliday
+    Macartney, 109.
+  Halfiyeh, ii. 141, 167.
+  Hamaçem, ii. 5.
+  Hangchow, i. 116.
+  Hankow, i. 68, 69.
+  Hanyang, i. 68.
+  Harcourt, Sir W., ii. 40.
+  Harrar, ii. 25.
+  Haroun Sultan, ii. 10, 32.
+  Hart, Sir Robert, i. 113; ii. 49, 54, 55.
+  Hartington, Marquis of, ii. 96.
+    _See_ Devonshire.
+  Hassan Helmi, ii. 11.
+  Havelock, reference to, ii. 161, 172.
+  Heang Yung, i. 71.
+  Hensall, M., ii. 145.
+  Herbin, M., ii. 144-46.
+  Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102, 103, 109.
+  Hienfung, Emperor, i. 47.
+  Hill, Dr Birkbeck, ii. 11, 47, 65.
+  Holland, Capt., i. 57-60.
+  Holy Land, the, ii. 89-91.
+  Hoo Wang, i. 74, 119.
+  Hoonan, i. 67, 68.
+  Hope, Admiral, i. 45, 49, 57.
+  Hukumdaria, the, ii. 136.
+  Hung-tsiuen, i. 62,
+    _see_ Tien Wang.
+  Huntly family, the, i. 2, 3.
+  _Husseinyeh_, ii. 148, 149.
+  Hwaiking, i. 69.
+  Hwangho, the, i. 69.
+  _Hyson_, steamer, i. 81, 83-87, 90-92, 94, 95.
+
+  Ibrahim Pasha, i. 141.
+  Idris Ebter, ii. 128.
+  Inkerman, i. 16-7.
+  Ireland, ii. 65-8.
+  Ismail, Khedive, i. 106, 140;
+    his alarm, 143-4;
+    why he appointed Gordon, 145-7, ii. 1-3, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
+      24, 31;
+    Gordon's opinion of, 114, and _passim_.
+  Ismail Yakoob Pasha, ii. 144, 146-8.
+  _Ismailia_, steamer, ii. 99, 148-9.
+
+  Jaalin tribe, ii. 164.
+  Jaffa, ii. 89.
+  Jakdul, ii. 161-3;
+    splendid force at, 163, 172.
+  James, Sir H., i. 32.
+  Jebel Gedir, ii. 100.
+  Jebel Masa, ii. 100.
+  Jefferies, Mr, i. 4.
+  Jerusalem, ii. 89.
+  John, King of Abyssinia, ii. 5-6, 32, 33-4.
+  Jones, Captain, i. 92.
+  Jones, Sir Harry, i. 31.
+  Joubert, M., ii. 19.
+  Journal, the, ii. 165.
+
+  Kaba Rega, i. 155, 157-9, 162.
+  Kabbabish tribe, the, ii. 104.
+  Kachiaou, i. 56.
+  Kahding, i. 50-2.
+  Kahpoo, i. 91.
+  Kaifong, i. 69.
+  _Kajow_, the, i. 90-2, 94.
+  Kalgan, i. 48.
+  Kanghi, i. 122.
+  Kars, i. 34, 36.
+  Kassala, ii. 105, 134, 151.
+  Katamori, i. 32.
+  Kawa, i. 98.
+  Kemp, Mr, i. 148.
+  Kemp Terrace, i. 1.
+  Khalifa Abdullah, ii. 169.
+  Khartoum, advantageous position of, i. 141-2; ii. 6, 101-3, 105;
+    panic at, ii. 119;
+    position at, ii. 134-5;
+    scene at, ii. 136;
+    distance from Cairo, ii. 136, 140;
+    position of, 147-8;
+    the only relieving force to, ii. 150;
+    anxiety in England about, ii. 156.
+  Kherson, i. 28.
+  Kimberley, Earl of, ii. 75, 80-1.
+  Kimburn, i. 28.
+  King William's Town, ii. 82.
+  Kinglake, i. 9, 20, 22, 24;
+    opinion of Gordon, i. 25.
+  Kintang, i. 115-6.
+  Kirkham, Major, i. 94.
+  Kitchener, Sir H., Gordon's opinion of, ii. 158;
+    his suggestion, _ibid._
+  Kiukiang, i. 68-9.
+  Kolkol, ii. 11.
+  Kongyin, i. 116-8.
+  Kordofan, i. 99, 102.
+  Korosko Desert, i. 154; ii. 143, 155.
+  Korti, ii. 158, 161-3.
+  Kuldja, ii. 50.
+  Kung Prince, i. 123.
+  Kurds, the, i. 36.
+  Kuyukdere, i. 34, 36.
+  Kweiling, i. 66.
+
+  Laguerre, Admiral, i. 72.
+  Laing, Mr Samuel, ii. 22.
+  Lar Wang, i. 98-9-100-2, 105, 108.
+  Lardo, i. 155.
+  Lausanne, ii. 38-39.
+  Lazes, the, i. 37.
+  Leeku, i. 97.
+  Leopard tribe, ii. 11.
+  Leopold, King of the Belgians, ii. 39, 89, 91, 92;
+    agrees to compensate Gordon, _ibid._; 93-95, 121.
+  Lerothodi, ii. 77, 83-85.
+  Lesseps, M. de, ii. 19-23.
+  Letsea, ii. 77, 82, 83, 85.
+  Li Hung Chang, i. 57, 58;
+    admires Gordon, 80;
+    reconnoitres Quinsan, 84;
+    opposes Burgevine, 89;
+    relations with Macartney, 89, 90;
+    energy of, 95;
+    statement about Gordon, 99;
+    withholds pay, 100;
+    protected by Gordon, _ibid._;
+    seeks shelter in Macartney's camp, 106;
+    exonerates Gordon, 107;
+    sends Macartney as envoy to Quinsan, 107;
+    gives a breakfast to Gordon and Macartney, 111;
+    summons Gordon to return, 116;
+    solicitude for Gordon, _ibid._;
+    supports Gordon, 119;
+    lays wreath on Gordon's monument, 123; ii. 50, 53-59, 61, 63.
+  Lilley, Mr W. E., i. 13, 135.
+  Limming Pass, i. 70.
+  Linant, M., i. 147, 150.
+  Liprandi, General, i. 17.
+  Livadia, ii. 50.
+  Liyang, i. 114-116, 119.
+  Long, Colonel, i. 147, 157.
+  Loring, Colonel, ii. 5, 6.
+  Low Mun, the, i. 97, 98.
+  Lucknow Residency, resemblance between its siege and Khartoum,
+    ii. 161, 172.
+  Lupton Bey, ii. 105.
+  Lytton, Lord, ii. 45.
+
+  Macartney, Sir Halliday: sent to Gordon on a mission, i. 88-9;
+    his work described by Gordon, 89-90;
+    with Gordon on the wall of Soochow, 101;
+    scene there, 103;
+    requested by Gordon to go to Lar Wang's palace, _ibid._;
+    his earlier relation with Gordon, 104;
+    offered and accepts succession to command of army, 104-5;
+    what he learnt at the palace, 105;
+    tries to find Gordon, 106;
+    and Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+    discovers latter in his own camp, _ibid._;
+    declines to translate Gordon's letter, _ibid._;
+    sent to Quinsan by Li, 107;
+    Gordon shows him the head of Lar Wang, _ibid._;
+    scene at the breakfast-table, 108;
+    his advice, 108-9;
+    hastens back to Soochow, 109;
+    Gordon's libel on, 110;
+    explains facts to Sir Harry Parkes and Sir F. Bruce, 110-11;
+    receives letter from Gordon, 111;
+    Gordon's public apology and retractation, 111-12;
+    a full _amende_, 112;
+    happy termination of incident, 113; ii. 43.
+  Mackinnon, Sir W., ii. 65, 89, 91, 92.
+  Macmahon, Marshal, ii. 137.
+  Magungo, i. 156, 157.
+  Mahdi, the (or Mahomed Ahmed), ii. 98;
+    his first appearance, _ibid._;
+    defies Egyptian Government, 99;
+    meaning of name, _ibid._;
+    his first victory, 100;
+    defeats Rashed, _ibid._;
+    further victories, 101;
+    captures El Obeid, 102;
+    annihilates Hicks's expedition, 104;
+    height of his power, 105;
+    basis of his influence, 105-6;
+    Zebehr on, 130, 135;
+    salaams Gordon, 136;
+    basis of his power, 137;
+    learns of loss of _Abbas_, 146;
+    arrives before Khartoum, 149;
+    knowledge as to state of Khartoum, 150;
+    exaggerated fear of, 161;
+    aroused by Stewart's advance, 163;
+    sends his best warriors to Bayuda, 164;
+    captures Khartoum, 167;
+    mode of that capture, 169.
+  Mahe, i. 74.
+  Mahmoud Khalifa, ii. 162.
+  Maida, i. 3.
+  Maiwand, ii. 45, 68.
+  Majuba Hill, ii. 70.
+  Malakoff, the, i. 21-23, 26.
+  Malta, ii. 74.
+  Mamelon, the, i. 21, 22.
+  Mansourah, ii. 147.
+  Markham, Mr, i. 80.
+  Marseilles, i. 14, 15.
+  Masindi, i. 157, 159.
+  Massowah, ii. 25, 32-35.
+  Masupha, ii. 77, 80, 82;
+    character of, 83, 85-89.
+  Mauritius, the, ii. 72-75.
+  Mediterranean, the, ii. 74.
+  Medjidieh Order, i. 160; ii. 3.
+  Mehemet Ali, conquers Soudan, i. 141, 154.
+  Menelik, ii. 6, 32.
+  Merowe, ii. 160.
+  Merriman, Mr, ii. 84, 85, 87, 88.
+  Metemmah, ii. 17, 161-166;
+    delay at, 166-7.
+  Moffitt, Dr Andrew, i. 10.
+  Moffitt, Mrs, i. 10.
+  Molappo, i. 77, 82.
+  Mombasa, i. 155.
+  Monding, i. 94.
+  Mow Wang, i. 75, 90, 93, 98-100.
+  Mrooli, i. 158.
+  Mtesa, i. 155, 157-60, 162.
+  Muchir or Marshal, ii. 3.
+  Munzinger Bey, ii. 5.
+  Murchison Falls, i. 157.
+
+  Najao, i. 51.
+  Nanking, i. 49, 58, 68, 69, 72, 76, 120;
+    capture of, 121.
+  Nanning, i. 64.
+  Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. 132.
+  Naval Brigade, the, ii. 164.
+  Negus, the, ii. 32.
+  Nelson, references to, ii. 162, 172.
+  _New York Herald_, ii. 62.
+  Niam Niam, i. 151.
+  Nile, the, ii. 142;
+    "not a bad Nile," 157.
+  _Nineteenth Century, The_, i. 14; ii. 129.
+  Ningpo, i. 74, 81.
+  Northbrook, Earl of, ii. 96, 132.
+  _North China Herald_, the, i. 111.
+  North Fort, the, ii. 147.
+  Nubar Pasha, i. 139, 140, 145; ii. 109, 120, 128, 139.
+  Nuehr Agha, i. 158, 159.
+
+  O'Donovan, Edmond, ii. 102.
+  Omdurman, i. 141; ii. 102, 103, 136;
+    fort of, 147-8;
+    isolated, 149;
+    capture of, 149, 150, 163, 164;
+    scene at, 169;
+    date of fall, 166.
+  Opium, ii. 63, 64.
+  Orpen, Mr, ii. 80, 84, 85.
+  Osman Bey, i. 35.
+  Osman Digma, ii. 103, 105, 136, 139, 156.
+  Outram, reference to, ii. 161, 172.
+
+  Palestine Canal, the, ii. 90, 91.
+  _Pall Mall Gazette_, the, ii. 111, 120, 124.
+  Paoting-fu, i. 49.
+  Parkes, Sir H., i. 110.
+  Paskievitch, i. 34.
+  Patachiaou, i. 91, 93.
+  Pattison, Mr A., ii. 83.
+  Peking, ii. 46, 47, 56, 70.
+  Pelissier, General, i. 20, 22, 25.
+  Pelissier, Colonel, i. 34.
+  Pembroke Dock, i. 8, 14.
+  Perry, Capt., i. 99.
+  Pitso, A., ii. 79.
+  Power, Mr Frank, ii. 134, 135, 137, 144;
+    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
+    death of, 145-6.
+  Prestonpans, i. 2.
+  Protet, Admiral, i. 50, 52.
+
+  Quarries, the, i. 21.
+  Quinsan, i. 78, 81, 82-88, 90, 107, 108.
+
+  Rabi, ii. 29, 32.
+  Raglan, Lord, i. 22, 23, 25.
+  Ragouf Pasha, i. 147.
+  Raouf Bey, i. 149.
+  Raouf Pasha, ii. 25, 98-100.
+  Ras Alula, ii. 33, 34.
+  Ras Arya, ii. 34.
+  Rashed Bey, ii. 100.
+  Ratib Pasha, ii. 5, 6.
+  Redan, the, i. 21-2;
+    attack on, 22-4;
+    second attack, 26-7.
+  Redout, Kaleh, i. 41.
+  Revenue, the, of Soudan, ii. 25-26.
+  Riaz Pasha, ii. 108.
+  Rionga, i. 157-158.
+  Ripon, Marquis of, ii. 42-44, 47-49, 68.
+  Rivers Wilson, Mr, now Sir Charles, ii. 19, 107.
+  Roberts, Lord, ii. 68.
+  Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. 75, 87.
+  Rockstone Place, i. 127.
+  Rogers, Mr, i. 4.
+  Russia, i. 54-55, 62.
+  Russian Army, Gordon's opinion of, i. 28.
+  Russian Convent at Jerusalem, ii. 90.
+
+  Said Pasha, ii. 102.
+  San Diego, ii. 74.
+  San Tajin, i. 81-82, 95-97, 113, 116.
+  Sankolinsin, i. 70.
+  _Santals_, the, ii. 147-148.
+  _Saphia_, ii. 147.
+  Saubat, i. 148.
+  Sauer, Mr, ii. 82;
+    betrays Gordon, 83;
+    his treachery, _ibid._;
+    his misrepresentation, 84-85.
+  Scanlan, Mr T., ii. 81-82, 88.
+  Schweinfurth, Dr, i. 142-143, 156.
+  Scotia, ii. 76.
+  Sebastopol, i. 16-17, 28-30.
+  Sennaar, ii. 134, 151.
+  Seton, Sir Bruce, ii. 43.
+  Seward, Mr, i. 93.
+  Seychelles, ii. 72, 74.
+  Shabloka, ii. 167.
+  Shaka, ii. 12, 14, 27, 31.
+  Shanghai, i. 49-50-55;
+    Triad rising at, i. 72;
+    loss of Chinese city, i. 73.
+  Shekan, ii. 104.
+  Shendy, ii. 17, 143, 145-147, 158.
+  Shereef Said Hakim, ii. 6.
+  Siaon Edin, i. 85-86.
+  Simmons, Sir Lintorn, i. 33, 41.
+  Siuen-hoa, i. 48.
+  Slatin Pasha, i. 162; ii. 12-13, 16, 104-105, 166, 168-169;
+    his epitaph on Gordon, ii. 170.
+  Slave Trade, i. 148-149, 152-153;
+    proposed regulations, ii. 7;
+    Convention, ii. 8.
+  Smith, Sir Harry, ii. 86.
+  Snake flags, the, i. 136.
+  Soady, Captain, i. 5.
+  Soochow, i. 74-75, 78, 84-87, 91, 94-98, 100-102.
+  Souakim, i. 146; ii. 25, 153.
+  Soudan, meaning of name, i. 141;
+    easily conquered, i. 142;
+    slave trade in, _ibid._;
+    situation in, ii. 97;
+    the, Gordon's views on, ii. 111, _et seq._ _passim_;
+    people of, ii. 114.
+  Southampton, i. 127;
+    the home at, ii. 93.
+  Speke, Captain, i. 142.
+  Stanley, Mr H. M., ii. 93.
+  Stannard, Mr Arthur, i. 14, 129-130.
+  Stanton, Colonel, i. 32-33; ii. 21.
+  Staveley, Sir Charles, i. 19, 50-52, 54, 56, 58-60, 78, 132.
+  Stead, Mr W. T., ii. 111.
+  Steamers, the penny, ii. 142;
+    bullet marks on, ii. 143, 147, 151.
+  Stewart, Colonel Donald, ii. 122, 125, 137, 141, 144;
+    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
+    fate of, ii. 144-146;
+    should not have left Gordon, ii. 146.
+  Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. 162;
+    trammelled by his instructions, _ibid._;
+    returns to Jakdul, 163;
+    wounded, 164;
+    death of, 165;
+    his intention, 166.
+  Stokes, Colonel, ii. 19.
+  Strangeways, General, i. 9.
+  "Sudd," the, i. 146.
+  Suders, General, i. 31.
+  Suleiman, Zebehr's son, ii. 10-14, 25-29;
+    execution of, ii. 30; ii. 126-128.
+  Sulina, i. 137.
+  Sultan, proposal to surrender Soudan to the, ii. 119, 121.
+  Sultan Idris, ii. 29.
+  Summer Palace at Peking, i. 45-46.
+  Sungkiang, i. 54-55, 60, 78-80, 83, 88, 90, 121.
+  Sussex Regiment, the, ii. 164.
+
+  Ta Edin, i. 85, 91.
+  Taeping, meaning of name, i. 65.
+  Taepings, the, i. 50, 53-54, 59 (_see_ Chapter IV.);
+    capture Nanking, i. 68;
+    march on Peking, i. 69-70;
+    their military strength, i. 75;
+    and the missionaries, i. 76.
+  Taiho Lake, i. 95, 101-102, 113.
+  Taitong, i. 48.
+  Taitsan, i. 52, 59, 80-83.
+  Taiyuen, i. 49.
+  Takee, i. 54, 56-58.
+  Taku Forts, i. 45, 47; ii. 59.
+  _Talataween_, ii. 147, 167.
+  Tamanieb, ii. 156.
+  Taoukwang, i. 61.
+  Tapp, Colonel, i. 119.
+  Taunton, i. 4.
+  Tayan, i. 119.
+  Tchad, Lake, ii. 10.
+  Tchernaya, i. 17, 26.
+  Teb, ii. 156.
+  Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), ii. 31-32, 36, 106-109, 118, 125, 139.
+  Thaba Bosigo, ii. 77.
+  Thames Forts, i. 129-130.
+  Theodore, ii. 33.
+  Tientsin, i. 45-47, 70.
+  Tien Wang, i. 49, 62, 65;
+    occupies Nanking, i. 68;
+    retires into his palace, i. 71-72;
+    death of, i. 120-121.
+  _Times, The_, i. 124; ii. 40, 66, 68, 92, 94, 110, 116-117, 134.
+  Ti-Tu, i. 122.
+  Todleben, General, i. 17.
+  Tokar, ii. 105, 136.
+  Transkei, the, ii. 77.
+  Travers, Colonel John, i. 6.
+  Trebizonde, i. 34.
+  Triads, the, i. 61, 66.
+  Tseedong, i. 56.
+  Tseki, i. 57.
+  Tseng Marquis, ii. 59.
+  Tseng Kwofan, i. 67-68, 72-73, 120.
+  Tseng Kwotsiuen, i. 74.
+  Tsing, i. 70.
+  Tsinghai, i. 70.
+  Tsingpu, i. 50-52, 54-55, 57.
+  Tsipu, i. 50.
+  Tung Wang, i. 71.
+  Tunting, i. 67.
+  Tuti Island, ii. 147, 167.
+
+  Uganda, i. 155, 159.
+  Unyoro, i. 155, 157.
+
+  Victoria Lake, i. 155-156.
+  Vivian, Mr (afterwards Lord), ii. 1-2, 20, 38.
+  Vivian, Mrs, ii. 39.
+
+  Wadelai, i. 155.
+  Wade, Sir Thomas, ii. 53-55.
+  Wady Halfa, i. 144; ii. 138-139, 154, 159, 161.
+  Waiquaidong, i. 85-86, 95.
+  Waisso, i. 117, 119.
+  Walad el Michael, ii. 5, 6, 33.
+  Wales, Prince of, ii. 43.
+  Wales, Princess of, ii. 43.
+  Wall, the Great, i. 47-9.
+  Wangchi, i. 101.
+  Wangs, the, i. 65.
+  Wangs, execution of, i. 102.
+  Wanti, i. 95.
+  War Office, ii. 92, 93 _passim_.
+  Ward, i. 54-57.
+  Watson, Colonel Charles, i. 148; ii. 96, 128-30, 165.
+  Watson, Mrs, ii. 96, 165.
+  Willes, Capt., i. 51, 52.
+  Wilson, Sir Charles, succeeds to the command, ii. 165;
+    his book "Korti to Khartoum," _ibid._;
+    not to be made a scapegoat, 166;
+    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
+    sails for Khartoum, 167;
+    under hot fire, _ibid._;
+    wrecked, _ibid._;
+    rescued by Lord C. Beresford, _ibid._;
+    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
+    comparatively small measure of his responsibility, 172.
+  Wittgenstein, Prince F. von, i. 102.
+  Wokong, i. 94.
+  Wolseley, Lord, ii. 95, 96, 121, 125, 138;
+    receives message from Gordon, 151;
+    his letter of 24th July, 157;
+    largely responsible for Khartoum mission, _ibid._;
+    his address to the soldiers, 158;
+    his view of the expedition, 159;
+    receives full news of Gordon's desperate situation, 160;
+    his grand and deliberate plan, 161;
+    perfect but for--Time, _ibid._;
+    will risk nothing, 162;
+    his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart, _ibid._;
+    sole responsibility of, 171;
+    ties Stewart's hands, _ibid._;
+    the real person responsible for death of Gordon and failure of
+      expedition, 172.
+  Wongepoo, i. 57.
+  Wongkadza, i. 50, 56.
+  Wood, Sir Evelyn, ii. 125.
+  Woolwich Common, i. 1.
+  Wouchang, i. 68.
+  Wou Sankwei, i. 67, 122.
+  Wuliungchow, i. 94, 95.
+  Wurantai, i. 64, 66.
+  Wusieh, i. 94, 95, 113, 116.
+
+  Yakoob Khan, ii. 44-49, 68.
+  Yalpukh, i. 32.
+  Yangchow, i. 69.
+  Yellow Jacket Order, its origin, i. 122.
+  Yesing, i. 114, 115.
+  Yungan, i. 66.
+  Yusuf Pasha, ii. 101.
+
+  Zanzibar, ii. 65.
+  Zebehr Rahama, i. 143, 144; ii. 10, 13, 32, 98, 101, 105, 110, 111,
+    118, 119, 124-26;
+    interview with Gordon, 128-29;
+    doubts as to his real attitude, 129-30;
+    letters to Miss Gordon, 130-32;
+    to Sir Henry Gordon, 132;
+    his power, 133.
+  Zeila, ii. 25.
+  Zouaves, the, i. 20.
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+[Transcriber's Notes:
+
+The transcriber made the following changes to the text to
+correct obvious errors:
+
+  1. p. 110, Madhi's --> Mahdi's
+  2. p. 137, opinons -->opinions
+  3. p. 142, trooops --> troops
+  4. p. 144, beween --> between
+  5. p. 149, Thoughout --> Throughout
+  6. p. 153, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  7. p. 166, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  8. p. 175, Burnaby, ... i. 164. --> Burnaby, ... ii. 164.
+  9. p. 178, returns to Cairo, 164; --> returns to Cairo, 163;
+ 10. p. 180, Hicks, Colonel, 102 --> Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102
+ 11. p. 182, Outram, ... i. 161, 172. --> Outram, ... ii. 161, 172.
+ 12. p. 183, Suleiman ... 25-19 --> Suleiman ... 25-29
+
+End of Transcriber's Notes]
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Life of Gordon, Volume II, by 
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+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Life of Gordon, Volume II, by 
+Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Life of Gordon, Volume II
+
+Author: Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26493]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF GORDON, VOLUME II ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+
+<div class="trans-note">
+<p class="heading">Transcriber's Note</p>
+<p>Every effort has been made to replicate this text as
+faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings and other
+inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an obvious error
+is noted at the <a href="#END">end</a> of this E-text.</p>
+
+<p>Also, this E-text contains links to "The Life of Gordon", Volume I, in the Project Gutenberg collection.
+Although we verify the correctness of these links at the time of posting,
+these links may not work, for various reasons, for various people, at various times.</p>
+</div>
+
+<h1 class="spacious"><small>THE</small><br />
+LIFE OF GORDON</h1>
+
+<h3 class="title-normal">MAJOR-GENERAL, R.E., C.B.; TURKISH FIELD-MARSHAL, GRAND<br />
+CORDON MEDJIDIEH, AND PASHA; CHINESE TITU (FIELD-MARSHAL),<br />
+YELLOW JACKET ORDER.</h3>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>"<i>'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,</i><br />
+<i>And never will, I trust&mdash;most surely never</i><br />
+<i>By such a youth as thou.</i>"</h4>
+<p class="author">&mdash;Swinton on Adam Gordon.</p>
+
+<br />
+
+<h4>BY</h4>
+
+<h3>DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER</h3>
+
+<h4 class="title-normal">AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF CHINA;" "ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL<br />
+ASIA;" "LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK," ETC., ETC.</h4>
+
+<br />
+
+<h3>WITH PORTRAIT</h3>
+
+<br />
+
+<h3>VOLUME II</h3>
+
+<br />
+
+<h3 class="spacious">LONDON<br />
+T. FISHER UNWIN</h3>
+<h4>PATERNOSTER SQUARE</h4>
+
+<h5>MDCCCXCVI</h5>
+
+<h4>[<i>All rights reserved.</i>]</h4>
+
+<br />
+
+<div class="figcenter" style="width: 284px;">
+<img src="images/frontispiece.jpg" width="284" height="469" alt="Portrait of C. G. Gordon with signature." title="" />
+</div>
+
+<br />
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+<hr class="tiny" />
+<p class="heading">VOLUME II.</p>
+
+<div class='center'>
+<table class="toc" summary="Contents">
+<tr><td align='right'>CHAP.</td><td align='left'>&nbsp;</td><td align='right'>PAGE</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='right'>VIII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN</a></td><td align='right'>1</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='right'>IX.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">MINOR MISSIONS&mdash;INDIA AND CHINA</a></td><td align='right'>38</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='right'>X.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_X">THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO</a></td><td align='right'>65</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='right'>XI.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">THE LAST NILE MISSION</a></td><td align='right'>97</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='right'>XII.</td><td align='left'><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">KHARTOUM</a></td><td align='right'>136</td></tr>
+</table></div>
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_VIII" id="CHAPTER_VIII"></a>CHAPTER VIII.</h2>
+
+<h3>GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN.</h3>
+
+
+<p>When General Gordon left Egypt for England in December 1876 it was
+with the expressed determination not to return; but the real state of
+his mind was not bitterness at any personal grievance, or even desire
+for rest, although he avowed his intention of taking six months'
+leave, so much as disinclination to leave half done a piece of work in
+which he had felt much interest, and with which he had identified
+himself. Another consideration presented itself to him, and several of
+his friends pressed the view on him with all the weight they
+possessed, that no signal success could be achieved unless he were
+placed in a position of supreme authority, not merely at the Equator,
+but throughout the vast province of the Soudan. Such was the decision
+Gordon himself, influenced no doubt by the views of two friends whose
+names need not be mentioned, but who were well known for their zeal in
+the anti-slavery cause, had come to a few weeks after his arrival in
+England; and not thinking that there was any reasonable probability of
+the Khedive appointing him to any such post, he telegraphed to the
+British Consul-General, Mr Vivian, his determination not to return to
+Egypt. This communication was placed before the Khedive Ismail, who
+had a genuine admiration for Gordon, and who appreciated the value of
+his services. He at once took the matter into his own hands, and wrote
+the following letter, which shows that he thoroughly understood the
+arguments that would carry weight with the person to whom they were
+addressed:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">My Dear Gordon</span>,&mdash;I was astonished yesterday to learn of the
+despatch you had sent to Mr Vivian, in which you inform me that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>
+you will not return; all the more so when I recall your interview
+at Abdin, during which you promised me to return, and complete
+the work we had commenced together. I must therefore attribute
+your telegram to the very natural feelings which influenced you
+on finding yourself at home and among your friends. But I cannot,
+my dear Gordon Pasha, think that a gentleman like Gordon can be
+found wanting with regard to his solemn promise, and thus, my
+dear Gordon, I await your return according to that promise.&mdash;Your
+affectionate</p>
+
+<p class="author">"Ismail."</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>To such a letter as this a negative reply was difficult, if not
+impossible; and when General Gordon placed the matter in the hands of
+the Duke of Cambridge, as head of the army, he was told that he was
+bound to return. He accordingly telegraphed to the Khedive that he was
+willing to go back to the Soudan if appointed Governor-General, and
+also that he would leave at once for Cairo to discuss the matter. On
+his arrival there, early in February 1877, the discussion of the terms
+and conditions on which Gordon would consent to return to the Upper
+Nile was resumed. He explained his views at length to the Minister,
+Cherif Pasha, who had succeeded Nubar as responsible adviser to the
+Khedive, concluding with the ultimatum: "Either give me the Soudan, or
+I will not go." The only compromise that Gordon would listen to was
+that the Khedive's eldest son should be sent as Viceroy to Khartoum,
+when he, for his part, would be willing to resume his old post at the
+Equator. The Egyptian Ministers and high officials were not in favour
+of any European being entrusted with such a high post, and they were
+especially averse to the delegation of powers to a Christian, which
+would leave him independent of everyone except the Khedive. But for
+the personal intervention of the Khedive, Gordon would not have
+revisited Cairo; and but for the same intervention he would never have
+been made Governor-General, as, after a week's negotiation with
+Cherif, an agreement was farther off than ever, and Gordon's patience
+was nearly exhausted. The Khedive, really solicitous for Gordon's
+help, and suspecting that there was something he did not know, asked
+Mr Vivian to explain the matter fully to him. On hearing the cause of
+the difficulty, Ismail at once said: "I will give Gordon the Soudan,"
+and two days later he saw and told General Gordon the same thing,
+which found formal expression in the following letter, written on 17th
+February 1877, the day before Gordon left for Massowah:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">My Dear Gordon Pasha</span>,&mdash;Appreciating your honourable character,
+your energy, and the great services that you have already
+rendered<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> to my Government, I have decided to unite in one great
+Governor-Generalship the whole of the Soudan, Darfour, and the
+Equatorial Provinces, and to entrust to you the important mission
+of directing it. I am about to issue a Decree to this effect.</p>
+
+<p>"The territories to be included in this Government being very
+vast, it is necessary for good administration that you should
+have under your orders three Vakils&mdash;one for the Soudan properly
+so called and the Provinces of the Equator, another for Darfour,
+and the third for the Red Sea coast and the Eastern Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>"In the event of your deeming any changes necessary, you will
+make your observations to me.</p>
+
+<p>"The Governor-Generalship of the Soudan is completely independent
+of the Ministry of Finance.</p>
+
+<p>"I direct your attention to two points, viz.&mdash;the suppression of
+slavery, and the improvement of the means of communication.</p>
+
+<p>"Abyssinia extends along a great part of the frontiers of the
+Soudan. I beg of you, when you are on the spot, to carefully
+examine into the situation of affairs, and I authorise you, if
+you deem it expedient, to enter into negotiations with the
+Abyssinian authorities with the view of arriving at a settlement
+of pending questions.</p>
+
+<p>"I end by thanking you, my dear Gordon Pasha, for your kindness
+in continuing to Egypt your precious services, and I am fully
+persuaded that, with the aid of your great experience and your
+devotion, we shall bring to a happy end the work we are pursuing
+together.</p>
+
+<p>"Believe, my dear Gordon Pasha, in my sentiments of high esteem
+and sincere friendship.&mdash;Your affectionate</p>
+
+<p class="author">Ismail."</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>Nothing could be more gracious than this letter, which made General
+Gordon independent of the men who he feared would thwart him, and
+responsible to the Khedive alone. It was followed up a few weeks
+later&mdash;that is to say, after the new Governor-General had left for his
+destination&mdash;by the conferring of the military rank of Muchir or
+Marshal. At the same time the Khedive sent him a handsome uniform,
+with &pound;150 worth of gold lace on the coat, and the Grand Cordon of the
+Medjidieh Order, which, it may be worth noting here, General Gordon
+only wore when in Egyptian uniform. These acts on the part of the
+Khedive Ismail show that, whatever may have been his reasons for
+taking up the slavery question, he was really sincere in his desire to
+support Gordon, who fully realised and appreciated the good-will and
+friendly intentions of this Egyptian ruler. When an unfavourable
+judgment is passed on Ismail Pasha, his consistent support of General
+Gordon may be cited to show that neither his judgment nor his heart<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>
+was as bad as his numerous detractors would have the world believe.</p>
+
+<p>Having settled the character of the administration he was to conduct,
+General Gordon did not waste a day at Cairo. The holiday and rest to
+which he was fully entitled, and of which there can be no doubt that
+he stood greatly in need, were reduced to the smallest limits. Only
+two months intervened between his departure from Cairo for London on
+coming down from the Equator, and his second departure from Cairo to
+the Soudan. Much of that period had been passed in travelling, much
+more in exhausting and uncongenial negotiation in the Egyptian
+capital. All the brief space over enabled him to do was to pass the
+Christmas with several members of his family, to which he was so
+deeply attached, to visit his sisters in the old home at Southampton,
+and to run down for a day to Gravesend, the scene of his philanthropic
+labours a few years before. Yet, with his extraordinary recuperative
+force, he hastened with fresh strength and spirit to take up a more
+arduous and more responsible task than that he had felt compelled to
+relinquish so short a period before. With almost boyish energy,
+tempered by a profound belief in the workings of the Divine will, he
+turned his face once more to that torrid region, where at that time
+and since scenes of cruelty and human suffering have been enacted
+rarely surpassed in the history of the world.</p>
+
+<p>Having thus described the circumstances and conditions under which
+General Gordon consented to take up the Soudan question, it is
+desirable to explain clearly what were the objects he had in his own
+mind, and what was the practical task he set himself to accomplish.
+Fortunately, this description need not be based on surmise or
+individual conjecture. General Gordon set forth his task in the
+plainest language, and he held the clearest, and, as the result
+showed, the most correct views as to what had to be done, and the
+difficulties that stood in the way of its accomplishment. He wrote on
+the very threshold of his undertaking these memorable sentences:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have to contend with many vested interests, with fanaticism,
+with the abolition of hundreds of Arnauts, Turks, etc., now
+acting as Bashi-Bazouks, with inefficient governors, with wild
+independent tribes of Bedouins, and with a large semi-independent
+province lately under Zebehr Pasha at Bahr Gazelle.... With
+terrific exertion, in two or three years' time I may, with God's
+administration, make a good province, with a good army, and a
+fair revenue and peace, and an increased trade, and also have
+suppressed slave raids."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>No one can dispute either the Titanic magnitude of the task to be
+accomplished or the benefit its accomplishment would confer on a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>
+miserably unhappy population. How completely the project was carried
+out by one man, where powerful Governments and large armies have
+failed both before and since, has now to be demonstrated.</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon proceeded direct from Cairo to Massowah, which route he
+selected because he hoped to settle the Abyssinian dispute before he
+commenced operations in the Soudan. Both the Khedive and the British
+Government wished a termination to be put to the troubles that had for
+some time prevailed in the border lands of Abyssinia and the Eastern
+Soudan, and it was hoped that Gordon's reputation and energy would
+facilitate the removal of all difficulties with King John, who, after
+the death of Theodore, had succeeded in obtaining the coveted title of
+"Negus."</p>
+
+<p>In order to understand the position, a few historical facts must be
+recorded. By the year 1874 King John's authority was established over
+every province except in the south, Shoa, where Menelik retained his
+independence, and in the north, Bogos, which was seized in the year
+stated by Munzinger Bey, a Swiss holding the post of Governor of
+Massowah under the Khedive. In seizing Bogos, Munzinger had
+dispossessed its hereditary chief, Walad el Michael, who retired to
+Hama&ccedil;em, also part of his patrimony, where he raised forces in
+self-defence. Munzinger proposed to annex Hama&ccedil;em, and the Khedive
+assented; but he entrusted the command of the expedition to Arokol
+Bey, and a Danish officer named Arendrup as military adviser, and
+Munzinger was forced to be content with a minor command at Tajoura,
+where he was killed some months later. The Egyptian expedition
+meantime advanced with equal confidence and carelessness upon Hama&ccedil;em,
+Michael attacked it in several detachments, and had the double
+satisfaction of destroying the troops and capturing their arms and
+ammunition. Such was the disastrous commencement of those pending
+questions to which the Khedive Ismail referred in his letter to
+General Gordon.</p>
+
+<p>The Khedive decided to retrieve this reverse, and to continue his
+original design. With this object a considerable number of troops were
+sent to Massowah, and the conduct of the affair was entrusted to Ratib
+Pasha and an American soldier of fortune, Colonel Loring Pasha. By
+this time&mdash;1876&mdash;Michael had quarrelled with King John, who had
+compelled him to give up the weapons he had captured from the
+Egyptians, and, anxious for revenge, he threw in his lot with his
+recent adversaries. The Egyptian leaders showed they had not profited
+by the experience of their predecessors. They advanced in the same
+bold and incautious manner, and after they had built two strong forts
+on the Gura plateau they were induced, by jealousy of each other or
+contempt<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> for their enemy when he appeared, to leave the shelter of
+their forts, and to fight in the open. The Egyptian Ratib had the good
+sense to advise, "Stay in the forts," but Loring exclaimed: "No! march
+out of them. You are afraid!" and thus a taunt once again sufficed to
+banish prudence. The result of this action, which lasted only an hour,
+was the loss of over 10,000 Egyptian troops, of 25 cannon, and 10,000
+Remington rifles. The survivors took refuge in the forts, and
+succeeded in holding them. Negotiations then followed, and King John
+showed an unexpected moderation and desire for peace with Egypt, but
+only on the condition of the surrender of his recalcitrant vassal
+Michael. Michael retaliated by carrying raids into King John's
+territory, thus keeping the whole border in a state of disorder, which
+precluded all idea of a stable peace.</p>
+
+<p>Such was the position with which General Gordon had to deal. He had to
+encourage the weakened and disheartened Egyptian garrison, to muzzle
+Michael without exposing the Khedive to the charge of deserting his
+ally, and to conclude a peace with Abyssinia without surrendering
+either Bogos or Michael. At this stage we are only called upon to
+describe the first brief phase of this delicate question, which at
+recurring intervals occupied Gordon's attention during the whole of
+his stay in the Soudan. His first step was to inform Michael that the
+subsidy of money and provisions would only be paid him on condition
+that he abstained from attacking the Abyssinian frontier; his next to
+write a letter to King John, offering him fair terms, and enclosing
+the draft of a treaty of amity. There was good reason to think that
+these overtures would have produced a favourable result if it had been
+possible for General Gordon to have seen King John at that time, but
+unfortunately a fresh war had just broken out with Menelik, and King
+John had to proceed in all haste to Shoa. He did not reply to Gordon's
+letter for six months, and by that time Gordon was too thoroughly
+engaged in the Soudan to take up the Abyssinian question until the
+force of events, as will be seen, again compelled him to do so.</p>
+
+<p>Having decided that the Abyssinian dispute must wait, General Gordon
+proceeded by Kassala on his journey to Khartoum. Travelling not less
+than thirty miles a day, in great heat, organising the administration
+on his way, and granting personal audience to everyone who wished to
+see him, from the lowest miserable and naked peasant to the highest
+official or religious personage, like the Shereef Said Hakim, he
+reached Khartoum on the 3rd May. He did not delay an hour in the
+commencement of his task. His first public announcement was to abolish
+the <i>courbash</i>, to remit arrears of taxation, and to sanction a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>
+scheme for pumping the river water into the town. The <i>Kadi</i> or mayor
+read this address in the public square; the people hailed it with
+manifestations of pleasure, and Gordon himself, carried away by his
+enthusiasm for his work, compresses the long harangue into a brief
+text: "With the help of God, I will hold the balance level."</p>
+
+<p>But the measures named were not attended by any great difficulty in
+their inception or execution. They were merely the preliminaries to
+the serious and risky disbandment of the Bashi-Bazouks, and the steps
+necessary to restrict and control, not merely the trade in, but the
+possession of, slaves. As General Gordon repeatedly pointed out, his
+policy and proceedings were a direct attack on the only property that
+existed in the Soudan, and justice to the slave could not be equitably
+dispensed by injustice to the slave-owner. The third class of slave
+raider stood in a separate category, and in dealing with him Gordon
+never felt a trace of compunction. He had terminated the career of
+those ruthless scourges of the African races at the Equator, and with
+God's help he was determined to end it throughout the Soudan. But the
+slave question in Egypt was many-sided, and bristled with difficulties
+to anyone who understood it, and wished to mete out a fair and equable
+treatment to all concerned.</p>
+
+<p>It was with the special object of maintaining the rights of the owners
+as well as of the slaves that Gordon proposed a set of regulations,
+making the immediate registration of slaves compulsory, and thus
+paving the way for the promulgation of the Slave Convention already
+under negotiation. His propositions were only four in number, and read
+as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>1. Enforce the law compelling runaway slaves to return to their
+masters, except when cruelly treated.</p>
+
+<p>2. Require masters to register their slaves before 1st January
+1878.</p>
+
+<p>3. If the masters neglect to register them, then Regulation 1 not
+to be enforced in their favour.</p>
+
+<p>4. No registration to be allowed after 1st January 1878.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>By these simple but practical arrangements General Gordon would have
+upheld the rights of the slave-owners, and thus disarmed their
+hostility, at the same time that he stopped the imposition of
+servitude on any fresh persons. In the course of time, and without
+imposing on the Exchequer the burden of the compensation, which he saw
+the owners were in equity entitled to, he would thus have put an end
+to the slave trade throughout the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>The Anglo-Egyptian Convention on the subject of the slave trade,
+signed on 4th August 1877, was neither so simple nor so practical,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>
+while there was a glaring inconsistency between its provisions and the
+Khedivial Decree that accompanied it.</p>
+
+<p>The second article of the Convention reads: "Any person engaged in
+traffic of slaves, either directly or indirectly, shall be considered
+guilty of stealing with murder (<i>vol avec meurtre</i>)," and consequently
+punishable, as General Gordon assumed, with death.</p>
+
+<p>But the first and second clauses of the Khedive's Decree were to a
+different effect. They ran as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The sale of slaves from family to family will be prohibited.
+This prohibition will take effect in seven years in Cairo, and in
+twelve years in the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>"After the lapse of this term of years any infraction of this
+prohibition will be punished by an imprisonment of from five
+months to five years."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The literal interpretation of this decree would have left Gordon
+helpless to do anything for the curtailment of the slave trade until
+the year 1889, and then only permitted to inflict a quite insufficient
+punishment on those who broke the law. General Gordon pointed out the
+contradiction between the Convention and the Decree, and the
+impossibility of carrying out his original instructions if he were
+deprived of the power of allotting adequate punishment for offences;
+and he reverted to his original proposition of registration, for which
+the Slave Convention made no provision, although the negotiators at
+Cairo were fully aware of his views and recommendations expressed in
+an official despatch three months before that Convention was signed.
+To these representations Gordon never received any reply. He was left
+to work out the problem for himself, to carry on the suppression of
+the slave trade as best he could, and to take the risk of official
+censure and repudiation for following one set of instructions in the
+Convention in preference to those recorded in the Decree. The outside
+public blamed the Khedive, and Gordon himself blamed Nubar Pasha and
+the Egyptian Ministry; but the real fault lay at the doors of the
+British Government, which knew of Gordon's representations and the
+discrepancy between the orders of the Khedive and the Convention they
+had signed together, and yet did nothing to enforce the precise
+fulfilment of the provisions it had thought it worth while to resort
+to diplomacy to obtain. The same hesitation and inability to grasp the
+real issues has characterised British policy in Egypt down to the
+present hour.</p>
+
+<p>If Gordon had not been a man fearless of responsibility, and resolved
+that some result should ensue from his labours, he would no doubt have
+expended his patience and strength in futile efforts to obtain clearer
+and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> more consistent instructions from Cairo, and, harassed by
+official tergiversation and delay, he would have been driven to give
+up his task in disgust if not despair. But being what he was&mdash;a man of
+the greatest determination and the highest spirit&mdash;he abandoned any
+useless effort to negotiate with either the English or the Egyptian
+authorities in the Delta, and he turned to the work in hand with the
+resolve to govern the Soudan in the name of the Khedive, but as a
+practical Dictator. It was then that broke from him the characteristic
+and courageous phrase: "I will carry things with a high hand to the
+last."</p>
+
+<p>The first and most pressing task to which Gordon had to address
+himself was the supersession of the Turkish and Arab irregulars, who,
+under the name of "Bashi-Bazouks," constituted a large part of the
+provincial garrison. Not merely were they inefficient from a military
+point of view, but their practice, confirmed by long immunity, had
+been to prey on the unoffending population. They thus brought the
+Government into disrepute, at the same time that they were an element
+of weakness in its position. Gordon saw that if the Khedive had no
+better support than their services, his authority in the Soudan was
+liable at any moment to be overthrown. It had been the practice of the
+Cairo authorities to send up, whenever reinforcements were asked for,
+Arnaut and Arab loafers in that city, and these men were expected to
+pay themselves without troubling the Government. This they did to
+their own satisfaction, until Gordon resolved to put an end to their
+misdeeds at all cost, for he found that not merely did they pillage
+the people, but that they were active abettors of the slave trade. Yet
+as he possessed no military force, while there were not fewer than
+6000 Bashi-Bazouks scattered throughout the provinces, he had to
+proceed with caution. His method of breaking up this body is a
+striking illustration of his thorough grasp of detail, and of the
+prudence, as well as daring, with which he applied what he conceived
+to be the most sensible means of removing a grave difficulty. This
+considerable force was scattered in numerous small garrisons
+throughout the province. From a military point of view this
+arrangement was bad, but it enabled each separate garrison to do a
+little surreptitious slave-hunting on its own account. General Gordon
+called in these garrisons, confined the Bashi-Bazouks to three or four
+places, peremptorily stopped the arrival of recruits, and gradually
+replaced them with trustworthy black Soudanese soldiers. Before he
+laid down the reins of power, at the end of 1879, he had completely
+broken up this body, and as effectually relieved the Soudanese from
+their military tyrants as he had freed them from the whip.</p>
+
+<p>Having put all these matters in trim, Gordon left Khartoum in the
+middle of the summer of 1877 for the western province of Darfour,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>
+where a number of matters claimed his pressing attention. In that
+province there were several large Egyptian garrisons confined in two
+or three towns, and unable&mdash;through fear, as it proved, but on account
+of formidable enemies, as was alleged&mdash;to move outside them. The
+reports of trouble and hostility were no doubt exaggerated, but still
+there was a simmering of disturbance below the surface that portended
+peril in the future; and read by the light of after events, it seems
+little short of miraculous that General Gordon was able to keep it
+under by his own personal energy and the magic of his name. When on
+the point of starting to relieve these garrisons, he found himself
+compelled to disband a regiment of 500 Bashi-Bazouks, who constituted
+the only force at his immediate disposal. He had then to organise a
+nondescript body, after the same fashion as he had adopted at the
+Equator, and with 500 followers of this kind&mdash;of whom he said only 150
+were any good&mdash;he started on his march for the districts which lie
+several hundred miles west of the White Nile, and approach most nearly
+of the Khedive's possessions to Lake Tchad.</p>
+
+<p>The enemies with whom General Gordon had to deal were two. There was
+first Haroun, who claimed, as the principal survivor after Zebehr's
+invasion of Darfour, already described, to be the true Sultan of that
+State; and secondly, Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, and the nominal
+leader of the slave-dealers. While the former was in open revolt, the
+latter's covert hostility was the more to be dreaded, although
+Suleiman might naturally hesitate to throw off the mask lest his
+revolt might be the signal for his father's execution at Cairo&mdash;Zebehr
+having been detained there after his too confiding visit a few years
+before. It was therefore both prudent and necessary to ignore Suleiman
+until Haroun had been brought into subjection, or in some other way
+compelled to desist from acts of hostility.</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon's plan was simple in the extreme. Leaving the Nile with
+500 men, he determined to collect <i>en route</i> the efficient part of the
+scattered garrisons, sending those who were not efficient to the river
+for transport to Khartoum, and with this force to relieve the garrison
+at Fascher, the most distant of the large towns or stations in
+Darfour. It will be understood that these garrisons numbered several
+thousand men each, while Gordon's relieving body was only a few
+hundreds; but their <i>morale</i> had sunk so low that they dared not take
+the field against an enemy whom their own terror, and not the reality,
+painted as formidable. Even before he began his advance, Gordon had
+taken a fair measure of the revolt, which he expressed himself
+confident of suppressing without firing a shot. At Dara, the place
+which in the Mahdist war was well defended by Slatin Pasha, he
+released 1800<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> troops; but he was kept in inactivity for some weeks
+owing to the necessity of organising his force and of ascertaining how
+far Suleiman, with his robber confederacy of 10,000 fighting men at
+Shaka&mdash;only 150 miles south-east of Dara&mdash;might be counted on to
+remain quiet. During this period of suspense he was compelled to take
+the field against a formidable tribe called by the name of the
+Leopard, which threatened his rear. It is unnecessary to enter upon
+the details of this expedition, which was completely successful,
+notwithstanding the cowardice of his troops, and which ended with the
+abject submission of the offending clan.</p>
+
+<p>Having assembled a force of a kind of 3,500 men, he resolved to make a
+forced march to Fascher, and then with the same promptitude to descend
+on Shaka, and settle the pending dispute with Suleiman. These plans he
+kept locked in his own bosom, for his camp was full of spies, and his
+own surroundings were not to be trusted.</p>
+
+<p>Leaving the main portion of his troops at Dara, he advanced on Fascher
+at the head of less than 1000 men, taking the lead himself with the
+small bodyguard he had organised of 150 picked Soudanese. With these
+he entered Fascher, where there were 3000 troops, and the Pasha,
+Hassan Helmi, had 10,000 more at Kolkol, three days' journey away.
+Gordon found the garrison quite demoralised, and afraid to move
+outside the walls. He at once ordered Hassan Pasha to come to him,
+with the intention of punishing him by dismissal for his negligence
+and cowardice in commanding a force that, properly led, might have
+coerced the whole province, when the alarming news reached the
+Governor-General that Suleiman and his band had quitted Shaka, and
+were plundering in the neighbourhood of Dara itself. The gravity of
+this danger admitted of no delay. Not a moment could be spared to
+either punish an incapable lieutenant or to crush the foe Haroun,
+whose proceedings were the alleged main cause of trouble in Darfour.
+Gordon returned with his bodyguard as fast as possible, and, leaving
+even it behind, traversed the last eighty-five miles alone on his
+camel in a day and a half. Here may be introduced what he wrote
+himself on the subject of these rapid and often solitary camel
+journeys:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have a splendid camel&mdash;none like it; it flies along, and quite
+astonishes even the Arabs. I came flying into this station in
+Marshal's uniform, and before the men had had time to unpile
+their arms, I had arrived, with only one man with me. I could not
+help it; the escort did not come in for an hour and a half
+afterwards. The Arab chief who came with me said it was the
+telegraph. The Gordons and the camels are of the same race&mdash;let
+them take an idea into their heads, and nothing will take it
+out.... It is fearful to see the Governor-General<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> arrayed in
+gold clothes, flying along like a madman, with only a guide, as
+if he were pursued.... If I were fastidious, I should be as many
+weeks as I now am days on the road; I gain a great deal of
+prestige by these unheard-of marches. It makes the people fear me
+much more than if I were slow."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The situation was in every way as serious as was represented. The Dara
+garrison as a fighting force was valueless, and with the exception of
+his small bodyguard, still on the road from Fascher, Gordon had not a
+man on whom he could count. Suleiman and his whole force were encamped
+not three miles from the town. Gordon quite realised the position; he
+saw that his own life, and, what he valued more, the whole work on
+which he had been so long engaged, were at stake, and that a moment's
+hesitation would mean ruin. He rose to the crisis. At daybreak,
+attired in his official costume, with the Medjidieh gleaming on his
+breast, he mounted his horse and rode off to Suleiman's camp. Suleiman
+meditated treachery, and a trifle would have decided him to take the
+step of seizing Gordon, and holding him as hostage for his father. Had
+Gordon delayed even a few hours, there is no doubt that the
+slave-hunters would have executed their original design; but his
+extraordinary promptitude and self-confidence disconcerted them, and
+probably saved his own life. Gordon rode down the brigand lines;
+Suleiman, described as "a nice-looking lad of twenty-two," received
+him with marks of respect, and the Governor-General, without giving
+them a moment to think, at once summoned him and his chief lieutenants
+to an audience in the tent placed at his disposal. Here Gordon went
+straight to the point, accusing them of meditated rebellion, and
+telling them that he meant to break up their confederacy. After
+listening to this indictment, they all made him submission very
+abjectly; but Gordon saw that Suleiman had not forgiven him, and when
+the truth came afterwards to be known, it was found that he did not
+carry out his project only because his principal lieutenants had
+deserted him. When the negotiations were over, Suleiman retired with
+1500 men to Shaka, where we shall hear of him again, and Gordon took
+into his pay the other half of the brigand force. In this remarkable
+manner did he stave off the greatest peril which had yet threatened
+him in the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>The following corroborative account of this incident was furnished
+long afterwards by Slatin Pasha:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In the midst of all this discussion and difference of opinion,
+Gordon, travelling by Keriut and Shieria, had halted at a spot
+about four hours' march from Dara; and having instructed his
+escort to follow him as usual, he and his two secretaries started
+in advance on camels.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> Hearing of his approach, Suleiman had
+given orders to his troops to deploy in three lines between the
+camp and the fort, and while this operation was being carried
+out, Gordon, coming from the rear of the troops, passed rapidly
+through the lines, riding at a smart trot, and, saluting the
+troops right and left, reached the fort. The suddenness of
+Gordon's arrival left the leaders no time to make their plans.
+They therefore ordered the general salute; but even before the
+thunder of the guns was heard, Gordon had already sent orders to
+Suleiman and his chiefs to appear instantly before him.... Thus
+had Gordon, by his amazing rapidity and quick grasp of the
+situation, arrived in two days at the settlement of a question
+which literally bristled with dangers and difficulties. Had
+Suleiman offered resistance at a time when Darfour was in a
+disturbed state, Gordon's position and the maintenance of
+Egyptian authority in these districts would have been precarious
+in the extreme."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>What Gordon's own opinion of this affair was is revealed in the
+following extremely characteristic letter written to one of those
+anti-slavery enthusiasts, who seemed to think that the whole
+difficulty could be settled by a proclamation or two, and a rigid
+enforcement of a strict law sentencing every one connected with the
+slave trade without discrimination to death:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"There are some 6000 more slave-dealers in the interior who will
+obey me now they have heard that Zebehr's son and the other
+chiefs have given in. You can imagine what a difficulty there is
+in dealing with all these armed men. I have separated them here
+and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass.
+Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be
+considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our Government
+once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came
+into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? I would have
+given &pound;500 to have had you and the Anti-Slavery Society in Dara
+during the three days of doubt whether the slave-dealers would
+fight or not. A bad fort, a coward garrison, and not one who did
+not tremble&mdash;on the other side a strong, determined set of men
+accustomed to war, good shots, with two field-pieces. I would
+have liked to hear what you would all have said then. I do not
+say this in brag, for God knows what my anxiety was."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The drama, of which the first act took place in Suleiman's camp
+outside Dara, was not then ended. Gordon knew that to leave a thing
+half done was only to invite the danger to reappear. Suleiman had
+retired with his 1500 men to Shaka, the followers of Zebehr from all
+sides throughout the province would flock to his standard, and in a
+little time he would be more formidable and hostile than before. Four
+days after Suleiman left<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> Dara, Gordon set out for the same place, at
+the head of four companies, and after a six days' march through
+terrible heat he reached Shaka. The slave-hunters had had no time to
+recover their spirits, they were all completely cowed and very
+submissive; and Suleiman craved favour at the hands of the man against
+whose life he had only a few days before been plotting. Unfortunately
+Gordon could not remain at Shaka, to attend in person to the
+dispersion of Suleiman's band, and after his departure that young
+leader regained his confidence, and resorted to his hostile and
+ambitious designs; but the success of General Gordon's plans in the
+summer of 1877 was complete, and sufficed to greatly diminish the
+gravity of the peril when, twelve months later, Suleiman broke out
+afresh, and fell by the hands of Gessi.</p>
+
+<p>While General Gordon was facing these personal dangers, and coping
+with difficulties in a manner that has never been surpassed, and that
+will stand as an example to all time of how the energy, courage, and
+attention to detail of an individual will compensate for bad troops
+and deficient resources, he was experiencing the bitter truth that no
+one can escape calumny. The arm-chair reformers of London were not at
+all pleased with his methods, and they were quite shocked when they
+heard that General Gordon, whom they affected to regard as the nominee
+of the Anti-Slavery Society, and not as the responsible lieutenant of
+a foreign potentate, was in the habit, not merely of restoring
+fugitive slaves to their lawful owners, but even of purchasing slaves
+with his own and the Government money, in order to convert them into
+soldiers. From their narrow point of view, it seemed to them that
+these steps were a direct encouragement of the slave-trade, and they
+denounced Gordon's action with an extraordinary, but none the less
+bitter, ignorance of the fact that he was employing the only practical
+means of carrying out the mission which, in addition to his
+administrative duties, had been practically imposed on him as the
+representative of civilization. These good but misinformed persons
+must have believed that the Egyptian garrison in the Soudan was
+efficient, that communications were easy, and the climate not
+unpleasant, and that Gordon, supported by zealous lieutenants, had
+only to hold up his hand or pass a resolution, in the fashion of
+Exeter Hall, for the chains, real and metaphysical, to fall from the
+limbs of the negro population of Inner Africa. That was their dream.
+The reality was a worthless and craven army, a climate that killed
+most Europeans, and which the vigour and abstemiousness of Gordon
+scarcely enabled him to endure, communications only maintained and
+represented by the wearying flight of the camel across the desert,
+treachery and hostility to his plans, if not his person, among his
+colleagues&mdash;all these difficulties and dangers overcome and rendered
+nugatory by the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> earnestness and energy of one man alone. Well might
+his indignation find vent in such a grand outburst as this:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I do not believe in you all. You say this and that, and you do
+not do it; you give your money, and you have done your duty; you
+praise one another, etc. I do not wonder at it. God has given you
+ties and anchors to this earth; you have wives and families. I,
+thank God, have none of them, and am free. Now understand me. If
+it suit me, I will buy slaves. I will let captured slaves go down
+to Egypt and not molest them, and I will do what I like, and what
+God, in His mercy, may direct me to do about domestic slaves; but
+I will break the neck of slave raids, even if it cost me my life.
+I will buy slaves for my army; for this purpose I will make
+soldiers against their will, to enable me to prevent raids. I
+will do this in the light of day, and defy your resolutions and
+your actions. Would my heart be broken if I was ousted from this
+command? Should I regret the eternal camel-riding, the heat, the
+misery I am forced to witness, the discomforts of everything
+around my domestic life? Look at my travels in seven months.
+Thousands of miles on camels, and no hope of rest for another
+year. You are only called on at intervals to rely on your God;
+with me I am obliged continually to do so. Find me the man and I
+will take him as my help who utterly despises money, name, glory,
+honour; one who never wishes to see his home again; one who looks
+to God as the Source of good and Controller of evil; one who has
+a healthy body and energetic spirit, and one who looks on death
+as a release from misery; and if you cannot find him, then leave
+me alone. To carry myself is enough for me; I want no other
+baggage."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Gordon's troubles were not only with English visionaries. The Egyptian
+officials had always regarded the delegation of supreme powers to him
+with dislike, and this sentiment became unqualified apprehension when
+they saw how resolute he was in exercising them. Ismail Pasha was
+disposed to place unlimited trust in his energetic Governor-General,
+but he could not but be somewhat influenced by those around him while
+Gordon was far away. When, therefore, Gordon took into his own hands
+the power of life and death, and sentenced men to be hanged and shot,
+he roused that opposition to the highest point of activity, and
+received repeated remonstrances by telegraph from Cairo. To these he
+replied firmly, but quietly, that on no other condition could the
+administration be carried on, and that his authority as Viceroy would
+be undermined if he could not dispense prompt justice. Notwithstanding
+all his representations, he never obtained the ratification of his
+right to pass death sentences; but with that strong will that he
+showed in every crisis, he announced his determination<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> to act on his
+own responsibility. On at least two occasions he expresses a feeling
+of gratification at having caused murderers to be hung.</p>
+
+<p>This is a suitable moment to lay stress on the true views Gordon held
+on the subject of bloodshed. While averse to all warfare by
+disposition, and without the smallest trace of what might be called
+the military spirit, General Gordon had none of that timid and
+unreasoning shrinking from taking life, which is often cruel and
+always cowardly. He punished the guilty without the least false
+compunction, even with a death sentence, and if necessity left no
+choice, he would have executed that sentence himself, provided he was
+quite convinced of its justice. As a rule, he went unarmed in the
+Soudan, as in China; but there were exceptions, and on at least one
+occasion he took an active and decisive part in a conflict. He was
+being attacked by one of the tribes, and his men were firing wildly
+and without result. Then Gordon snatched a rifle from one of his men,
+and firing at the hostile leader, killed him. There are at least two
+other incidents that will show him in a light that many of his
+admirers would keep suppressed, but that bring out his human nature. A
+clumsy servant fired off his heavy duck-gun close to his head, and
+Gordon very naturally gave him a smart box on the ears which the
+fellow would remember for a week. Excited by the misery of a
+slave-gang, he asked the boy in charge of them to whom they belonged,
+and as he hesitated, he struck him across the face with his whip.
+Gordon's comment on this act is that it was "cruel and cowardly, but
+he was enraged, and could not help it." One feels on reading this that
+one would have done so oneself, and that, after all, Gordon was a man,
+and not a spiritual abstraction.</p>
+
+<p>Thus ended the first eventful year of General Gordon's tenure of the
+post of Governor-General of the Soudan. Some idea of the magnitude of
+the task he had performed may be gathered from the fact that during
+this period he rode nearly 4000 miles on his camel through the desert.
+He put before himself the solution of eight burning questions, and by
+the end of 1877 he had settled five of them more or less permanently.
+He had also effected many reforms in the military and civil branches
+of the administration, and had formed the nucleus of a force in which
+he could put some confidence. By the people he was respected and
+feared, and far more liked than he imagined. "Send us another Governor
+like Gordon" was the burden of the Soudanese cry to Slatin when the
+shadow of the Mahdi's power had already fallen over the land. He had
+respected their religion and prejudices. When their Mahommedan
+co-religionists had ground them down to the dust, even desecrating
+their mosques by turning them into powder magazines, General Gordon
+showed them justice and merciful consideration, restored and endowed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>
+their mosques, and exhorted them in every way to be faithful to the
+observance of their religion. He was always most exact in payment for
+services rendered. This became known; and when some of the Egyptian
+officials&mdash;a Pasha among others&mdash;seized camels for his service without
+paying for them, the owners threw themselves on the ground, kissing
+Gordon's camel's feet, told their tale, and obtained prompt redress.
+What more striking testimony to his thoughtfulness for others could be
+given than in the following anecdote? One of his native lieutenants, a
+confirmed drunkard, but of which Gordon was ignorant, became ill, and
+the Governor-General went to see and sit by him in his tent. All the
+man asked for was brandy, and General Gordon, somewhat shocked at the
+repeated request, expostulated with him that he, a believer in the
+Koran, should drink the strong waters so expressly forbidden by that
+holy book. But the man readily replied, "This is as medicine, and the
+Prophet does not forbid us to save life." Gordon said nothing, but
+left the tent, and some hours later he sent the man two bottles of
+brandy from his own small store. Even the Soudanese, who were afraid
+of him in his terrible mood, knew the many soft corners he kept in his
+heart, and easily learnt the way to them. For misfortune and suffering
+of every kind his sympathy was quickly won, and with his sympathy went
+his support, to the utmost limit of his power.</p>
+
+<p>After the campaign in Darfour, Gordon returned to Khartoum, where he
+was preparing for fresh exertions, as well as for a settlement of the
+Abyssinian difficulty, when a sudden and unexpected summons reached
+him to come down to Cairo and help the Khedive to arrange his
+financial affairs. The Khedive's telegram stated that the Egyptian
+creditors were trying to interfere with his sovereign prerogative, and
+that His Highness knew no one but Gordon who could assist him out of
+this position. The precise date on which this telegram reached Gordon
+was 25th January 1878, when he was passing Shendy&mdash;the place on the
+Nile opposite Metammeh, where the British Expedition encamped in
+January 1885&mdash;but as he had to return to Khartoum to arrange for the
+conduct of the administration during his absence, he did not arrive at
+Dongola on his way to the capital until the 20th of the following
+month. He reached Cairo on 7th March, was at once carried off to dine
+with the Khedive, who had waited more than an hour over the appointed
+time for him because his train was late, and, when it was over, was
+conveyed to one of the finest palaces, which had been specially
+prepared in his honour. The meaning of this extraordinary reception
+was that the Khedive Ismail thought he had found a deliverer from his
+own troubles in the man who had done such wonders in the Soudan. That
+ruler had reached a stage in his affairs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> when extrication was
+impossible, if the creditors of Egypt were to receive their dues. He
+was very astute, and he probably saw that the only chance of saving
+himself was for some high authority to declare that the interests of
+himself and his people must be pronounced paramount to those of the
+foreign investors. There was only one man in the world likely to come
+to that conclusion, with a spotless reputation and a voice to which
+public opinion might be expected to pay heed. That man was Gordon.
+Therefore he was sent for in post haste, and found the post of
+President of "An Inquiry into the State of the Finances of the
+Country" thrust upon him before he had shaken off the dust of his long
+journey to Cairo.</p>
+
+<p>The motives which induced the Khedive to send for General Gordon
+cannot be mistaken; nor is there any obscurity as to those which led
+General Gordon to accept a task in which he was bound to run counter
+to the views of every other European authority, and still more to the
+fixed policy of his and other Governments. In the first place, Gordon
+being the servant of the Khedive, it would have been impossible for
+him to have said no to a request which was entitled to be regarded as
+a command. In the second place, Gordon did not know all the currents
+of intrigue working between Cairo and the capitals of Europe, and he
+convinced himself that a sound workable plan for the benefit of Egypt
+and her people would command such general approval that "the financial
+cormorants," as he termed the bondholders, or rather their leaders,
+would have to retire beaten from the field. He had no doubt that he
+could draw up such a plan, based on a suspension and permanent
+reduction of interest, and the result will convince any disinterested
+person of the fact, but Gordon was destined to find that all persons
+cannot be guided by such disinterestedness as his, of which the way he
+treated his Egyptian salary furnished such a striking instance. When
+sent to the Equator, he was offered &pound;10,000 a year, and accepted
+&pound;2000; as Governor-General, he was nominated at &pound;12,000 a year, and
+cut it down to a half; and when, during this very Cairo visit, a new
+and unnecessary official was appointed under the Soudan
+Administration, he insisted that his own salary should be further
+reduced to &pound;3000, to compensate for this further charge. Such an
+example as this did not arouse enthusiasm or inspire emulation in the
+Delta. General Gordon never dealt with a question in which abstract
+justice was deemed more out of place, or had less chance of carrying
+the day.</p>
+
+<p>As the matter was very important, and interested persons might easily
+have misrepresented his part in it, General Gordon drew up a
+memorandum explaining every incident in the course of the affair.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>
+This document was published by his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, in 1886,
+and the following description merely summarises its contents.</p>
+
+<p>As far back as the year 1875 the Khedive Ismail began to discover that
+the financial position of his Government was bad, and that it would be
+impossible to keep up the payment of the interest on the debt at the
+high rate of seven per cent., which Egypt had bound itself to pay. He
+therefore applied to the British Government for advice and assistance.
+In response to his representations, a Financial Commission, composed
+of three members&mdash;Mr Cave, Colonel Stokes, and Mr Rivers Wilson&mdash;was
+sent to Egypt for the purpose of inquiring into the financial position
+of that country. They had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion
+that it was unsound, and that the uneasiness of Ismail Pasha had not
+been expressed a day too soon. They recommended that an arrangement
+should be come to with the bondholders by which all the loans were to
+be placed on the same footing, and the rate of interest reduced to
+some figure that might be agreed upon. It then became necessary to
+negotiate with the bondholders, who appointed Mr Goschen for the
+English section, and M. Joubert for the French, to look after their
+rights. The result of their efforts in 1876 was that they united the
+loans into one, bearing a uniform rate of six per cent, instead of
+seven, and that four Commissioners were appointed to look after the
+debt in the interests of the bondholders, while two other European
+officials were nominated&mdash;one to control the receipts, the other the
+expenditure. In less than two years Ismail Pasha discovered that this
+arrangement had not remedied the evil, and that the Government was
+again on the verge of bankruptcy. It was at this juncture that the
+Khedive applied to General Gordon, in the hope that his ability and
+reputation would provide an easy escape from his dilemma.</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon agreed to accept the post of President of this
+Commission of Inquiry, and he also fell in with the Khedive's own wish
+and suggestion that the Commissioners of the Debt should not be
+members of the Commission. This point must be carefully borne in mind,
+as the whole negotiation failed because of the Khedive's weakness in
+waiving the very point he rightly deemed vital for success. Having
+laid down the only principle to which he attached importance, the
+Khedive went on to say that M. de Lesseps would act in conjunction
+with General Gordon, and that these two, with some vague assistance
+from financial experts, were to form the Commission. It soon became
+evident that M. de Lesseps had no serious views on the subject, and
+that he was only too much disposed to yield to external influences.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>On the very threshold of his task, which he took up with his usual
+thoroughness and honest desire to get at the truth, General Gordon
+received a warning that the greatest difficulties were not those
+inherent to the subject, but those arising from the selfish designs of
+interested persons. As soon as it became known that General Gordon had
+accepted this task, and that he had agreed to the Khedive's suggestion
+that the Debt Commissioners were not to sit on the Commission, there
+was a loud outburst of disapproval and dismay in diplomatic and
+financial circles. This part of the story must be given in his own
+words:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Mr Vivian, the English Consul-General, said to me, 'I wonder you
+could accept the Presidency of the Commission of Inquiry without
+the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'I was free to accept or
+refuse.'</p>
+
+<p>"I then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the
+French and Austrian Consuls-General, and also Vivian, came in,
+and attacked me for having accepted the post of President. I said
+'I was free.' And then they said, 'I was risking his Highness his
+throne; that he ran a very serious risk personally, if he formed
+the Commission of Inquiry without the creditors' representatives,
+viz. the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'Why do you not tell
+him so?' They said, 'You ought to do so.' I said, 'Well, will you
+commission me to do so, from you, with any remarks I like to make
+as to the futility of your words?' They all said, 'Yes, we
+authorise you to do so&mdash;in our names.'"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>General Gordon went that evening to the Abdin Palace, where he was
+engaged to dine with the Khedive; and having asked permission to make
+an important communication, saw Ismail before dinner, when words to
+this effect were exchanged:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>Gordon said: "I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they
+told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious
+personal risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the
+Commissioners of Debt being upon it."</p>
+
+<p>The Khedive replied as follows: "I do not care a bit. I am only afraid
+of England, and I feel sure she will not move. You will see Lesseps
+to-morrow, and arrange the <i>enqu&ecirc;te</i> with him." Encouraged by the
+Khedive's firmness, and fully convinced that no good result would
+follow if the Debt Commissioners, who only considered the bondholders'
+interests, were on this inquiry, Gordon met Lesseps the next morning
+in the full expectation that business would now be begun. The further
+ramifications of the intrigue, for it soon became one, for the
+discomfiture and discrediting of Gordon, must be told in his own
+words:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The next day Lesseps came to my Palace with Stanton (Stokes's
+old Danube Secretary, now Resident-Commissioner for the British
+Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of mine).
+Lesseps began, 'We must have the Commissioners of the Debt on the
+<i>enqu&ecirc;te</i>.'</p>
+
+<p>"I said, 'It is a <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> that they are not to be upon
+it.' Lesseps replied, 'They must be upon it.'</p>
+
+<p>"Then in came Cherif Pasha (the Premier), and said, 'Are you
+agreed?' I left Lesseps to speak, and he said, 'Yes,' at which I
+stared and said, 'I fear not.' Then Lesseps and Cherif discussed
+it, and Lesseps gave in, and agreed to serve on the Commission
+without the Commissioners of the Debt, but with the proviso that
+he would ask permission to do so from Paris. Cherif Pasha was
+pleased.</p>
+
+<p>"But I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so I asked
+Cherif to stop a moment, and said to Stanton, 'Now, see that
+Lesseps does not make a mess of it. Let him say at once, Will he
+act without the Commissioners of Debt or not? Do this for my
+sake; take him into that corner and speak to him.' Stanton did
+so, while I took Cherif into the other corner, much against his
+will, for he thought I was a bore, raising obstacles. I told him
+that Lesseps had declared before he came that he would not act
+unless with the Commissioners of the Debt. Cherif was huffed with
+me, and turned to Lesseps, whom Stanton had already dosed in his
+corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation
+again for some time; and then Cherif came to me and said,
+'Lesseps has accepted without the Commissioners of the Debt.'</p>
+
+<p>"I disgusted Cherif as I went downstairs with him by saying, 'He
+will never stick to it.'"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>If Gordon was not a diplomatist, he was at least very clear-sighted.
+He saw clearly through M. de Lesseps, who had no views on the subject,
+and who was quite content to play the part his Government assigned
+him. A few minutes after the interview described he obtained further
+evidence of the hostility the projected inquiry without the
+Commissioners had aroused. He met Major Evelyn Baring, then beginning
+the Egyptian career which he still pursues as Lord Cromer, who was
+desirous of knowing what decision had been arrived at. On hearing that
+the Commissioners were to be excluded, Major Baring remarked, "It was
+unfair to the creditors," which seems to have drawn from Gordon some
+angry retort. There is no doubt that at this moment Gordon lost all
+control over himself, and employed personalities that left a sore
+feeling behind them. That they did so in this case was, as I am
+compelled to show later on, amply demonstrated in December 1883 and
+January 1884. The direct and immediate significance of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> occurrence
+lay in its furnishing fresh evidence of the unanimity of hostility
+with which all the European officials in the Delta regarded the
+Khedive's proposal, and his attempt to make use of General Gordon's
+exceptional character and reputation. It is a reflection on no
+particular individual to assert that they were all resolved that
+General Gordon's appeal to the abstract sense of justice of the world
+should never be promulgated.</p>
+
+<p>The first practical proposal made was to telegraph for Mr Samuel
+Laing, a trained financier, who had acted in India at the head of the
+finances of that country; but General Gordon refused to do this,
+because he knew that he would be held responsible for the terms he
+came on; and instead he drew up several propositions, one of them
+being that the services of Mr Laing should be secured on conditions to
+be fixed by the Khedive. During this discussion, it should be noted,
+Lesseps paid no attention to business, talking of trivial and
+extraneous matters. Then Gordon, with the view of clinching the
+matter, said:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"There are two questions to decide:</p>
+
+<p>"<i>First</i>, How to alleviate the present sufferings of the unpaid
+civil employ&eacute;s and of the army, as well as the pressing claims of
+the floating debt.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Second</i>, And afterwards to inquire into the real state of the
+revenue by a Commission."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>This was the exact opposite of the bondholders' view, for the
+settlement of the grievances of the public and military service and of
+the floating debt would <i>then</i> have left nothing for the payment of
+the coupons on the permanent external debt of a hundred millions. In
+fact, General Gordon boldly suggested that the funds immediately
+wanted must be provided by the non-payment of the next coupon due.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible to resist the conclusion that if General Gordon had
+had his way, the Arabi revolt would have been averted; the Khedive
+Ismail, the ablest member of his house, would not have been deposed;
+and an English occupation of Egypt, hampered by financial and
+diplomatic shackles that neutralise the value of its temporary
+possession, need never have been undertaken. But <i>dis aliter visum</i>.
+It is equally impossible to resist the conclusion that the forces
+arrayed against Gordon on this occasion were such as he could not
+expect to conquer.</p>
+
+<p>The concluding scenes of the affair need only be briefly described. M.
+de Lesseps had never swerved from his original purpose to refer the
+matter to Paris, but even Gordon was not prepared for the duplicity he
+showed in the matter, and in which he was no doubt encouraged by the
+prevalent feeling among the foreigners at Cairo. The first point in
+all tortuous diplomacy, Eastern or Western, is to gain time; and when<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span>
+General Gordon, intent on business, called on Lesseps the next
+day&mdash;that is to say, two days after his arrival from Khartoum&mdash;the
+French engineer met him with the smiling observation that he was off
+for a day in the country, and that he had just sent a telegram to
+Paris. He handed Gordon a copy, which was to this effect: "His
+Highness the Khedive has begged me to join with M. Gordon and <i>the
+Commissioners of the Debt</i> in making an inquiry into the finances of
+Egypt; I ask permission." Gordon's astonished ejaculation "This will
+never do" was met with the light-hearted Frenchman's remark, "I must
+go, and it must go."</p>
+
+<p>Then General Gordon hastened with the news and the draft of the
+telegram to the Khedive. The copy was sent in to Ismail Pasha in his
+private apartments. On mastering its contents, he rushed out, threw
+himself on a sofa, and exclaimed, "I am quite upset by this telegram
+of Lesseps; some one must go after him and tell him not to send it."
+Then turning to Gordon, he said, "I put the whole affair into your
+hands." Gordon, anxious to help the Khedive, and also hoping to find
+an ally out of Egypt, telegraphed at great length to Mr Goschen, in
+accordance with the Khedive's suggestion. Unfortunately, Mr Goschen
+replied with equal brevity and authority, "I will not look at you; the
+matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government." When we remember
+that Gordon was the properly-appointed representative of an
+independent Prince, or at least of a Prince independent of England, we
+cannot wonder at his terming this a "rude answer." Mr Goschen may have
+had some after-qualms himself, for he telegraphed some days later in a
+milder tone, but Gordon would not take an affront from any man, and
+left it unanswered.</p>
+
+<p>At this crisis Gordon, nothing daunted, made a proposal which, if the
+Khedive had had the courage to carry it out, might have left the
+victory with them. He proposed to the Khedive to issue a decree
+suspending the payment of the coupon, paying all pressing claims, and
+stating that he did all this on the advice of Gordon. Failing that,
+Gordon offered to telegraph himself to Lord Derby, the Foreign
+Secretary, and accept the full responsibility for the measure. Ismail
+was not equal to the occasion. He shut himself up in his harem for two
+days, and, as Gordon said, "the game was lost."</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon was now to experience the illimitable extent of human
+ingratitude. Even those who disagreed with the views he expressed on
+this subject cannot deny his loyalty to the Khedive, or the magnitude
+of the efforts he made on his behalf. To carry out the wishes of the
+Prince in whose service he was for the time being, he was prepared to
+accept every responsibility, and to show an unswerving<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> devotion in a
+way that excited the opposition and hostility even of those whom he
+might otherwise have termed his friends and well-wishers. By an
+extreme expedient, which would either have ruined himself or thwarted
+the plans of powerful statesmen, and financiers not less powerful, he
+would have sealed his devotion to Ismail Pasha; but the moral or
+physical weakness of the Oriental prevented the attempt being made.
+The delay mentioned allowed of fresh pressure being brought to bear on
+the Khedive; and while Gordon emphatically declared, partly from a
+sense of consistency, and partly because he hoped to stiffen the
+Khedive's resolution that he would not act with the Debt Commissioners
+on the Inquiry, Ismail Pasha was coerced or induced into surrendering
+all he had been fighting for. He gave his assent to the Commissioners
+being on the Inquiry, and he turned his back on the man who had come
+from the heart of Africa to his assistance. When Gordon learnt these
+facts, he resolved to return to the Soudan, and he was allowed to do
+so without the least mark of honour or word of thanks from the
+Khedive. His financial episode cost him &pound;800 out of his own pocket,
+and even if we consider that the financial situation in the Delta,
+with all its cross-currents of shady intrigue and selfish designs, was
+one that he was not quite qualified to deal with, we cannot dispute
+that his propositions were full of all his habitual nobility of
+purpose, and that they were practical, if they could ever have been
+put into effect.</p>
+
+<p>This incident serves to bring out some of the limitations of Gordon's
+ability. His own convictions, strengthened by the solitary life he had
+led for years in the Soudan, did not make him well adapted for any
+form of diplomacy. His methods were too simple, and his remedies too
+exclusively based on a radical treatment, to suit every complaint in a
+complicated state of society; nor is it possible for the majority of
+men to be influenced by his extraordinary self-abnegation and
+disregard for money. During this very mission he boasted that he was
+able to get to bed at eight o'clock, because he never dined out, and
+that he did not care at everyone laughing at him, and saying he was in
+the sulks. This mode of living was due, not to any peculiarity about
+General Gordon&mdash;although I trace to this period the opinion that he
+was mad&mdash;but mainly to his honest wish not to be biassed by any
+European's judgment, and to be able to give the Khedive absolutely
+independent advice, as if he himself were an Egyptian, speaking and
+acting for Egypt. Enough has been said to explain why he failed to
+accomplish a really impossible task. Nor is it necessary to assume
+that because they differed from him and strenuously opposed his
+project, the other Englishmen in authority in the Delta were
+influenced by any unworthy motives or pursued a policy that was either
+reprehensible or unsound.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>From this uncongenial task General Gordon returned to the work which
+he thoroughly understood, and with regard to which he had to apprehend
+no serious outside interference, for the attraction of the flesh-pots
+of Egypt did not extend into the Soudan. Still, he felt that his
+"outspokenness," as he termed it, had not strengthened his position.
+He travelled on this occasion by the Red Sea route to Aden, thence to
+Zeila, with the view of inspecting Harrar, which formed part of his
+extensive Government. During this tour Gordon saw much that disquieted
+him&mdash;a large strip of country held by fanatical Mahommedans, the slave
+trade in unchecked progress where he had not thought it to exist&mdash;and
+he wrote these memorable words: "Our English Government lives on a
+hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet some
+day or other they or some other Government will have to know them, for
+things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. His Highness will be curbed
+in, and will no longer be absolute sovereign; then will come the
+question of these countries."</p>
+
+<p>At Harrar, Gordon dismissed the Governor Raouf, whom he describes as a
+regular tyrant, but who, none the less for his misdeeds, was
+proclaimed Governor-General of the Soudan when Gordon left it less
+than two years after this visit to Harrar. When this affair was
+settled, General Gordon proceeded <i>via</i> Massowah and Souakim to
+Khartoum, where he arrived about the middle of June. On his way he had
+felt bound to remove eight high military officers from their commands
+for various offences, from which may be gathered some idea of the
+colleagues on whom he had to depend. He reached Khartoum not a moment
+too soon, for the first news that greeted him was that Suleiman had
+broken out in open revolt, and was practically master of the Province
+of Bahr Gazelle, which lies between Darfour and the Equatorial
+Province.</p>
+
+<p>But before describing the steps he took to suppress this formidable
+revolt, which resembled the rising under the Mahdi in every point
+except its non-religious character, some notice may be given of the
+financial difficulties with which he had to cope, and which were much
+increased by the Khedive's practice of giving appointments in a
+promiscuous manner that were to be chargeable on the scanty and
+inadequate revenues of the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>In the year 1877 the expenditure of the Soudan exceeded the revenue by
+over a quarter of a million sterling; in 1878 Gordon had reduced this
+deficit to &pound;70,000. In the return given by the Khedive of his
+resources when foreign intervention first took place, it was stated
+that the Soudan furnished a tribute of &pound;143,000. This was untrue; it
+had always been a drain on the Cairo exchequer until in 1879 General<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>
+Gordon had the satisfaction, by reducing expenditure in every possible
+direction and abolishing sinecures, of securing an exact balance. The
+most formidable adversary Gordon had to meet in the course of this
+financial struggle was the Khedive himself, and it was only by
+sustained effort that he succeeded in averting the imposition of
+various expenses on his shoulders which would have rendered success
+impossible. First it was two steamers, which would have cost &pound;20,000;
+then it was the so-called Soudan railway, with a liability of not less
+than three quarters of a million with which the Khedive wished to
+saddle the Soudan, but Gordon would have neither, and his firmness
+carried the day. When the Cairo authorities, in want of money, claimed
+that the Soudan owed &pound;30,000, he went into the items, and showed that,
+instead, Cairo owed it &pound;9000. He never got it, but by this he proved
+that, while he was the servant of the Khedive, he would not be
+subservient to him in matters that affected the successful discharge
+of his task as that Prince's deputy in the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>We must now return to the revolt of Suleiman, the most serious
+military peril Gordon had to deal with in Africa, which was in its
+main features similar to the later uprising under the Mahdi. At the
+first collision with that young leader of the slave-dealers, Gordon
+had triumphed by his quickness and daring; but he had seen that
+Suleiman was not thoroughly cowed, and he had warned him that if he
+revolted again the result would inevitably be his ruin. Suleiman had
+not taken the warning to heart, and was now in open revolt. His most
+powerful supporters were the Arab colonies, long settled in interior
+Africa, who, proud of their descent, were always willing to take part
+against the Turco-Egyptian Government. These men rallied to a certain
+extent to Suleiman, just as some years later they attached themselves
+to the Mahdi. As General Gordon wrote in 1878: "They were ready, and
+are still ready, to seize the first chance of shaking off the yoke of
+Egypt." It was during Gordon's absence at Cairo that Suleiman's plans
+matured, and he began the campaign by seizing the province of Bahr
+Gazelle. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, General Gordon
+fitted out an expedition; and as he could not take the command
+himself, he intrusted it to his best lieutenant, Romolo Gessi, an
+Italian of proved merit.</p>
+
+<p>Natural difficulties retarded the advance of the expedition. Heavy
+floods kept Gessi confined in his camp during three months, and the
+lukewarm supporters of the Government regarded this inaction as proof
+of inferiority. They consequently rallied to Suleiman, who soon found
+himself at the head of a force of 6000 men, while Gessi had only 300
+regulars, two cannon, and 700 almost useless irregulars.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> It was as
+difficult for him to let the Governor-General know that he needed
+reinforcements as it was for General Gordon to send them. Some of his
+subordinates, in command of outlying detachments, refused to obey his
+summons, preferring to carry on a little slave-hunting on their own
+account. His troops were on the verge of mutiny: he had to shoot one
+ringleader with his own hand.</p>
+
+<p>At last the floods fell, and he began his forward movement, fighting
+his way against detached bodies of slave-hunters, but after each
+success receiving the welcome of the unfortunate natives, of whom
+Suleiman had consigned not fewer than 10,000 in the six previous
+months to slavery. At last Gessi was himself compelled to halt at a
+place called Dem Idris, fifty miles north of the fort which Suleiman
+had constructed for his final stand, and named after himself. These
+places are about 200 miles south of both Dara and Shaka, while between
+them runs the considerable stream called Bahr Arab. Gessi was now in
+close proximity to the main force under Suleiman, but he had to halt
+for five months before he felt in any way equal to the task of
+attacking it. During that period he had to stand on the defensive, and
+sustain several attacks from Suleiman, who had made all his plans for
+invading Darfour, and adding that province to the Bahr Gazelle.</p>
+
+<p>The first of these engagements was that fought on 28th December 1878,
+when Suleiman, at the head of 10,000 men, attacked Gessi's camp at Dem
+Idris. Fortunately, he had neglected no precaution, and his regulars,
+supported by a strong force of friendly natives, nobly seconded his
+efforts. Suleiman's force was repulsed in four assaults, and had to
+retire with a loss of 1000 men. But Gessi's difficulties were far from
+removed by this victory. Suleiman's losses were easily repaired, while
+those of Gessi could not be replaced. His men were also suffering from
+fever, and the strain on himself, through the absence of any
+subordinates to assist him, was terrible. It was a relief to him when
+Suleiman delivered his second attack, fifteen days after the first. On
+this occasion Suleiman appealed to the religious fanaticism of his
+followers, and made them swear on the Koran to conquer or die; and the
+black troops, as the less trustworthy, were placed in the van of
+battle and driven to the assault by the Arabs. Gessi made an excellent
+disposition of his troops, repulsing the two main attacks with heavy
+loss; and when the attack was resumed the next day, his success was
+equally complete. Unfortunately, Gessi was unable to follow up this
+advantage, because his powder was almost exhausted, and his men were
+reduced to pick up bullets from the field of combat. Tidings of his
+position reached Suleiman, who made a final attack on the 28th of
+January 1879, but owing to the fortunate arrival of a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> small supply of
+powder, Gessi was able to fight and win another battle.</p>
+
+<p>It was not until the 11th March, however, that Gessi received a
+sufficient supply of ammunition to enable him to assume the offensive.
+Suleiman's camp or fort was a strongly barricaded enclosure,
+surrounded by a double row of trunks of trees. The centre of the
+enclosure was occupied by an inner fort, which was Suleiman's own
+residence. On Gessi attacking it, his first shell set fire to one of
+the huts, and as the wood was dry, the whole encampment was soon in a
+blaze. Driven to desperation, the brigands sallied forth, only to be
+driven back by the steady fire of Gessi's troops, who by this time
+were full of confidence in their leader. Then the former broke into
+flight, escaping wherever they could. Suleiman was among those who
+escaped, although eleven of his chiefs were slain, and the unfortunate
+exhaustion of Gessi's powder again provided him with the respite to
+rally his followers and make another bid for power.</p>
+
+<p>This further period of enforced inaction terminated at the end of
+April, when the arrival of a full supply of powder and cartridges
+enabled Gessi to take the field for the last time. On the 1st May the
+Egyptian commander started to attack the slave robber in his last
+stronghold, Dem Suleiman. Three days later he fought the first of
+these final battles outside that fort, and succeeded in cutting off
+the retreat of the vanquished Arabs into that place of shelter. He
+then broke into the fort itself, where there were only a few men, and
+he almost succeeded in capturing Suleiman, who fled through one gate
+as Gessi entered by another. Thanks to the fleetness of his horse,
+Suleiman succeeded in making good his escape. Before his hurried
+flight Suleiman murdered four prisoners sooner than allow of their
+recapture, and throughout the long pursuit that now began all slaves
+or black troops who could not keep up were killed. These were not the
+only crimes perpetrated by these brigands. Superstition, or the mere
+pleasure of cruelty, had induced them when their fortunes were getting
+low to consecrate a new banner by bathing it in the blood of a
+murdered child. For these iniquities the hour of expiation had now
+arrived.</p>
+
+<p>After the capture of Dem Suleiman, Gessi began a pursuit which,
+considering the difficulties of the route owing to heavy rain,
+topographical ignorance, and the deficiency of supplies, may be
+characterised as remarkable. Gessi took with him only 600 men, armed
+with Remington rifles; but they could carry no more than three or four
+days' provisions, which were exhausted before he came up with even the
+rearmost of the fugitive Arabs. There the troops turned sulky, and it
+was only by<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> promising them as spoil everything taken that he restored
+them to something like good temper. Six days after the start Gessi
+overwhelmed one band under Abou Sammat, one of the most active of the
+slave-hunters, and learnt that Suleiman himself was only twenty-four
+hours ahead. But the difficulties were such that Gessi was almost
+reduced to despair of the capture of that leader, and as long as he
+remained at large the rebellion could not be considered suppressed.</p>
+
+<p>Fortune played the game into his hand at the very moment that the
+result seemed hopeless. In the middle of the night several men came to
+his camp from Sultan Idris, one of the Arab chiefs, thinking it was
+that of Rabi, the chief of Suleiman's lieutenants. Gessi sent one of
+them back to invite him to approach, and at once laid his own plans.
+He resolved to destroy Rabi's force, which lay encamped close by,
+before the other band could come up; and by a sudden assault at
+daybreak he succeeded in his object. The whole band was exterminated,
+with the exception of Rabi himself, who escaped on a fast horse. Then
+Gessi laid his ambuscade for Sultan Idris, who marched into the trap
+prepared for him. This band also was nearly annihilated, but Sultan
+Idris escaped, leaving, however, an immense spoil, which put the
+Egyptian soldiers in good humour. For the disposal of this booty, and
+for other reasons, Gessi resolved to return to Dem Suleiman.</p>
+
+<p>At this point it was alone possible to criticise the action of the
+energetic Gessi during the whole course of the campaign, and General
+Gordon no doubt thought that if he had paid no attention to the spoil
+captured from Rabi and Sultan Idris, but pressed the pursuit against
+Suleiman, he might then and there have concluded the campaign. On the
+other hand, it is only fair to state that Gessi had to consider the
+sentiment of his own troops, while he was also ill from the mental
+strain and physical exertion of conducting the campaign virtually by
+himself. The spoil, moreover, did not benefit him in the least. It
+went into the coffers of the Government, or the pockets of the
+soldiers, not into his. So little reward did he receive that Gordon
+intended at first to give him &pound;1000 out of his own pocket, and
+eventually found himself able to increase it to a sum of &pound;2000 out of
+the Soudan exchequer.</p>
+
+<p>But Suleiman was still at large, and the slave-dealers were fully
+determined to preserve their profitable monopoly, if by any means they
+could baffle the Government. The Egyptian officials were also inclined
+to assist their efforts, and while Gessi was recovering his strength,
+he had the mortification of seeing the fruits of his earlier success
+lost by the inaction or more culpable proceedings of his lieutenants.
+It was not until July 1879 that Gessi felt able to take the field in
+person, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> then with less than 300 men, while Suleiman's band alone
+numbered 900. But there was no time to wait for reinforcements if
+Suleiman, who had advanced to within a short distance of Gessi's camp,
+was to be captured. Owing to the promptitude of his measures, Gessi
+came up with Suleiman in three days' time at the village of Gara,
+which he reached at daybreak on 16th of July. His measures were prompt
+and decisive. Concealing his troops in a wood, so that the smallness
+of their numbers might not be detected, he sent in a summons to
+Suleiman to surrender within ten minutes. Surprised, and ignorant of
+the strength of the Egyptian force, he and his followers agreed to lay
+down their arms: but when Suleiman saw the mere handful of men to whom
+he had yielded, he burst out crying. The situation suggested to him
+the hope of escape. Gessi learnt that when night came Suleiman and his
+men had arranged to break their way through. He therefore resolved to
+anticipate them. He held in his hands the ringleaders of the
+rebellion. If they escaped, all his work was lost; a summary act of
+justice would conclude the affair, and secure the Government against
+fresh attacks for a long time. To use his own words, Gessi "saw that
+the time had come to have done with these people once for all."</p>
+
+<p>He divided the captives into three bands. The first, composed of the
+black soldiers, little better than slaves, he released on the
+condition that they left at once and promised to settle down to a
+peaceful life. This they agreed to joyfully. Having got rid of these,
+the larger number of Suleiman's band, he seized the smaller body of
+slave-dealers&mdash;157 in number&mdash;and having chained them, sent them under
+a guard as prisoners to his own camp. Then he seized Suleiman and ten
+of his chief supporters, and shot them on the spot. Thus perished
+Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, in whose name and for whose safety he had
+gone into revolt, in the very way that Gordon had predicted two years
+before in the midst of his brigand power at Shaka; and thus, with a
+remarkable combination of skill and courage, did Gessi bring his
+arduous campaign of twelve months' duration to a victorious
+conclusion.</p>
+
+<p>Although the credit of these successful operations was entirely due to
+Gessi, it must not be supposed that General Gordon took no part in
+controlling them; but, for the sake of clearness, it seemed advisable
+to narrate the history of the campaign against Suleiman without a
+break. Early in 1879, when Gessi, after obtaining some successes, had
+been reduced to inaction from the want of ammunition, Gordon's anxiety
+became so great on his account that he determined to assume the
+command in person. His main object was to afford relief to Gessi by
+taking the field in Darfour, and putting down the rebels in that
+province,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> who were on the point of throwing in their lot with
+Suleiman. Gordon determined therefore to march on Shaka, the old
+headquarters of Zebehr and his son. On his march he rescued several
+slave caravans, but he saw that the suppression of the slave trade was
+not popular, and the contradictory character of the law and his
+instructions placed him in much embarrassment. Still, he saw clearly
+that Darfour was the true heart of the slave trade, as the supply from
+Inner Africa had to pass through it to Egypt, and he thought that a
+solution might be found for the difficulty by requiring every one of
+the inhabitants to have a permission of residence, and every traveller
+a passport for himself and his followers. But neither time nor the
+conditions of his post allowed of his carrying out this suggestion. It
+remains, however, a simple practical measure to be borne in mind when
+the solution of the slave difficulty is taken finally in hand by a
+Government in earnest on the subject, and powerful enough to see its
+orders enforced.</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon reached Shaka on 7th April, and at once issued a notice
+to the slave-dealers to quit that advantageous station. He also sent
+forward reinforcements of men and stores to Gessi, but in a few days
+they returned, with a message from Gessi that he had received enough
+powder from his own base on the Nile to renew the attack on Suleiman.
+Within one week of Gordon's arrival not a slave-dealer remained in
+Shaka, and when envoys arrived from Suleiman, bearing protestations
+that he had never been hostile to the Egyptian Government, he promptly
+arrested them and sent them for trial by court-martial. Their guilt as
+conspirers against the Khedive was easily proved, and they were shot.
+Their fate was fully deserved, but Gordon would have spared their
+lives if Suleiman had not himself slain so many hostages and helpless
+captives.</p>
+
+<p>Gordon's final operations for the suppression of the slave trade in
+Darfour, carried on while Gessi was engaged in his last struggle with
+Suleiman, resulted in the release of several thousand slaves, and the
+dispersal and disarmament of nearly 500 slave-dealers. In one week he
+rescued as many as 500 slaves, and he began to feel, as he said, that
+he had at last reached the heart of the evil.</p>
+
+<p>But while these final successes were being achieved, he was recalled
+by telegraph to Cairo, where events had reached a crisis, and the days
+of Ismail as Khedive were numbered. It may have been the instinct of
+despair that led that Prince to appeal again to Gordon, but the
+Darfour rebellion was too grave to allow of his departure before it
+had been suppressed; and on the 1st July he received a telegram from
+the Minister Cherif, calling on him to proclaim throughout the Soudan
+Tewfik Pasha as Khedive. The change did not affect him in the least,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>
+he wrote, for not merely had his personal feelings towards Ismail
+changed after he threw him over at Cairo, but he had found out the
+futility of writing to him on any subject connected with the Soudan,
+and with this knowledge had come a feeling of personal indifference.</p>
+
+<p>On his return to Khartoum, he received tidings of the execution of
+Suleiman, and also of the death of the Darfourian Sultan, Haroun, so
+that he felt justified in assuming that complete tranquillity had
+settled down on the scene of war. The subsequent capture and execution
+of Abdulgassin proved this view to be well founded, for, with the
+exception of Rabi, who escaped to Borgu, he was the last of Zebehr's
+chief lieutenants. The shot that killed that brigand, the very man who
+shed the child's blood to consecrate the standard, was the last fired
+under Gordon's orders in the Soudan. If the slave trade was then not
+absolutely dead, it was doomed so long as the Egyptian authorities
+pursued an active repressive policy such as their great English
+representative had enforced. The military confederacy of Zebehr, which
+had at one time alarmed the Khedive in his palace at Cairo, had been
+broken up. The authority of the Khartoum Governor-General had been
+made supreme. As Gordon said, on travelling down from Khartoum in
+August 1879, "Not a man could lift his hand without my leave
+throughout the whole extent of the Soudan."</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon reached Cairo on 23rd August, with the full intention
+of retiring from the Egyptian service; but before he could do so there
+remained the still unsolved Abyssinian difficulty, which had formed
+part of his original mission. He therefore yielded to the request of
+the Khedive to proceed on a special mission to the Court of King John,
+then ruling that inaccessible and mysterious kingdom, and one week
+after his arrival at Cairo he was steaming down the Red Sea to
+Massowah. His instructions were contained in a letter from Tewfik
+Pasha to himself. After proclaiming his pacific intentions, the
+Khedive exhorted him "to maintain the rights of Egypt, to preserve
+intact the frontiers of the State, without being compelled to make any
+restitution to Abyssinia, and to prevent henceforth every encroachment
+or other act of aggression in the interests of both countries."</p>
+
+<p>In order to explain the exact position of affairs in Abyssinia at this
+period, a brief summary must be given of events between Gordon's first
+overtures to King John in March 1877, and his taking up the matter
+finally in August 1879. As explained at the beginning of this chapter,
+those overtures came to nothing, because King John was called away to
+engage in hostilities with Menelik, King of Shoa, and now himself
+Negus, or Emperor of Abyssinia. In the autumn of the earlier year King
+John wrote Gordon a very civil letter, calling him a Christian and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> a
+brother, but containing nothing definite, and ending with the
+assertion that "all the world knows the Abyssinian frontier." Soon
+after this Walad el Michael recommenced his raids on the border, and
+when he obtained some success, which he owed to the assistance of one
+of Gordon's own subordinates, given while Gordon was making himself
+responsible for his good conduct, he was congratulated by the Egyptian
+War Minister, and urged to prosecute the conquest of Abyssinia.
+Instead of attempting the impossible, he very wisely came to terms
+with King John, who, influenced perhaps by Gordon's advice, or more
+probably by his own necessities through the war with Menelik, accepted
+Michael's promises to respect the frontier. Michael went to the King's
+camp to make his submission in due form, and in the spring of 1879 it
+became known that he and the Abyssinian General (Ras Alula) were
+planning an invasion of Egyptian territory. Fortunately King John was
+more peacefully disposed, and still seemed anxious to come to an
+arrangement with General Gordon.</p>
+
+<p>In January 1879 the King wrote Gordon a letter, saying that he hoped
+to see him soon, and he also sent an envoy to discuss matters. The
+Abyssinian stated very clearly that his master would not treat with
+the Khedive, on account of the way he had subjected his envoys at
+Cairo to insult and injury; but that he would negotiate with Gordon,
+whom he persisted in styling the "Sultan of the Soudan." King John
+wanted a port, the restoration of Bogos, and an Abouna or Coptic
+Archbishop from Alexandria, to crown him in full accordance with
+Abyssinian ritual. Gordon replied a port was impossible, but that he
+should have a Consul and facilities for traffic at Massowah; that the
+territory claimed was of no value, and that he certainly should have
+an Abouna. He also undertook to do his best to induce the British
+Government to restore to King John the crown of King Theodore, which
+had been carried off after the fall of Magdala. The envoy then
+returned to Abyssinia, and nothing further took place until Gordon's
+departure for Massowah in August, when the rumoured plans of Michael
+and Ras Alula were causing some alarm.</p>
+
+<p>On reaching Massowah on 6th September, Gordon found that the
+Abyssinians were in virtual possession of Bogos, and that if the
+Egyptian claims were to be asserted, it would be necessary to retake
+it. The situation had, however, been slightly improved by the downfall
+of Michael, whose treachery and covert hostility towards General
+Gordon would probably have led to an act of violence. But he and Ras
+Alula had had some quarrel, and the Abyssinian General had seized the
+occasion to send Michael and his officers as prisoners to the camp of
+King John. The chief obstacle to a satisfactory arrangement being<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>
+thus removed, General Gordon hastened to have an interview with Ras
+Alula, and with this intention crossed the Abyssinian frontier, and
+proceeded to his camp at Gura. After an interview and the presentation
+of the Khedive's letter and his credentials, Gordon found that he was
+practically a prisoner, and that nothing could be accomplished save by
+direct negotiation with King John. He therefore offered to go to his
+capital at Debra Tabor, near Gondar, if Ras Alula would promise to
+refrain from attacking Egypt during his absence. This promise was
+promptly given, and in a few days it was expanded into an armistice
+for four months.</p>
+
+<p>After six weeks' journey accomplished on mules, and by the worst roads
+in the country, as Ras Alula had expressly ordered, so that the
+inaccessibility of the country might be made more evident, General
+Gordon reached Debra Tabor on 27th October. He was at once received by
+King John, but this first reception was of only a brief and formal
+character. Two days later the chief audience was given at daybreak,
+King John reciting his wrongs, and Gordon referring him to the
+Khedive's letters, which had not been read. After looking at them, the
+King burst out with a list of demands, culminating in the sum of
+&pound;2,000,000 or the port of Massowah. When he had finished, Gordon asked
+him to put these demands on paper, to sign them with his seal, and to
+give the Khedive six months to consider them and make a reply. This
+King John promised to do on his return from some baths, whither he was
+proceeding for the sake of his health.</p>
+
+<p>After a week's absence the King returned, and the negotiations were
+resumed. But the King would not draw up his demands, which he realised
+were excessive, and when he found that Gordon remained firm in his
+intention to uphold the rights of the Khedive, the Abyssinian became
+offended and rude, and told Gordon to go. Gordon did not require to be
+told this twice, and an hour afterwards had begun his march, intending
+to proceed by Galabat to Khartoum. A messenger was sent after him with
+a letter from the King to the Khedive, which on translating read as
+follows: "I have received the letters you sent me by <i>that man</i> (a
+term of contempt). I will not make a secret peace with you. If you
+want peace, ask the Sultans of Europe." With a potentate so vague and
+so exacting it was impossible to attain any satisfactory result, and
+therefore Gordon was not sorry to depart. After nearly a fortnight's
+travelling, he and his small party had reached the very borders of the
+Soudan, their Abyssinian escort having returned, when a band of
+Abyssinians, owning allegiance to Ras Arya, swooped down on them, and
+carried them off to the village of that chief, who was the King's
+uncle.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The motive of this step is not clear, for Ras Arya declared that he
+was at feud with the King, and that he would willingly help the
+Egyptians to conquer the country. He however went on to explain that
+the seizure of Gordon's party was due to the King's order that it
+should not be allowed to return to Egypt by any other route than that
+through Massowah.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, the step seemed so full of menace that as a precaution
+Gordon felt compelled to destroy the private journal he had kept
+during his visit, as well as some valuable maps and plans. After
+leaving the district of this prince, Gordon and his small party had to
+make their way as best they could to get out of the country, only
+making their way at all by a lavish payment of money&mdash;this journey
+alone costing &pound;1400&mdash;and by submitting to be bullied and insulted by
+every one with the least shadow of authority. At last Massowah was
+reached in safety, and every one was glad, because reports had become
+rife as to King John's changed attitude towards Gordon, and the danger
+to which he was exposed. But the Khedive was too much occupied to
+attend to these matters, or to comply with Gordon's request to send a
+regiment and a man-of-war to Massowah, as soon as the Abyssinian
+despot made him to all intents and purposes a prisoner. The neglect to
+make that demonstration not only increased the very considerable
+personal danger in which Gordon was placed during the whole of his
+mission, but it also exposed Massowah to the risk of capture if the
+Abyssinians had resolved to attack it.</p>
+
+<p>The impressions General Gordon formed of the country were extremely
+unfavourable. The King was cruel and avaricious beyond all belief, and
+in his opinion fast going mad. The country was far less advanced than
+he had thought. The people were greedy, unattractive, and quarrelsome.
+But he detected their military qualities, and some of the merits of
+their organisation. "They are," he wrote, "a race of warriors, hardy,
+and, though utterly undisciplined, religious fanatics. I have seen
+many peoples, but I never met with a more fierce, savage set than
+these. The King said he could beat united Europe, except Russia."</p>
+
+<p>The closing incidents of Gordon's tenure of the post of
+Governor-General of the Soudan have now to be given, and they were not
+characterised by that spirit of justice, to say nothing of generosity,
+which his splendid services and complete loyalty to the Khedive's
+Government demanded. During his mission into Abyssinia his natural
+demands for support were completely ignored, and he was left to
+whatever fate might befall him. When he succeeded in extricating
+himself from that perilous position, he found that the Khedive was so
+annoyed at his inability to exact from his truculent neighbour a
+treaty without<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> any accompanying concessions, that he paid no
+attention to him, and seized the opportunity to hasten the close of
+his appointment by wilfully perverting the sense of several
+confidential suggestions made to his Government. The plain explanation
+of these miserable intrigues was that the official class at Cairo,
+seeing that Gordon had alienated the sympathy and support of the
+British Foreign Office and its representatives by his staunch and
+outspoken defence of Ismail in 1878, realised that the moment had come
+to terminate his, to them, always hateful Dictatorship in the Soudan.
+While the Cairo papers were allowed to couple the term "mad" with his
+name, the Ministers went so far as to denounce his propositions as
+inconsistent. One of these Ministers had been Gordon's enemy for
+years; another had been banished by him from Khartoum for cruelty;
+they were one and all sympathetic to the very order of things which
+Gordon had destroyed, and which, as long as he retained power, would
+never be revived. What wonder that they should snatch the favourable
+opportunity of precipitating the downfall of the man they had so long
+feared! But it was neither creditable nor politic for the
+representatives of England to stand by while these schemes were
+executed to the detraction of the man who had then given six years'
+disinterested and laborious effort to the regeneration of the Soudan
+and the suppression of the slave trade.</p>
+
+<p>When Gordon discovered that his secret representations, sent in cipher
+for the information of the Government, were given to the Press with a
+perverted meaning and hostile criticism, he hastened to Cairo. He
+requested an immediate interview with Tewfik, who excused himself for
+what had been done by his Ministers on the ground of his youth; but
+General Gordon read the whole situation at a glance, and at once sent
+in his resignation, which was accepted. It is not probable that, under
+any circumstances, he would have been induced to return to the Soudan,
+where his work seemed done, but he certainly was willing to make
+another attempt to settle the Abyssinian difficulty. Without the
+Khedive's support, and looked at askance by his own countrymen in the
+Delta, called mad on this side and denounced as inconsistent on the
+other, no good result could have ensued, and therefore he turned his
+back on the scene of his long labours without a sigh, and this time
+even without regret.</p>
+
+<p>The state of his health was such that rest, change of scene, and the
+discontinuance of all mental effort were imperatively necessary, in
+the opinion of his doctor, if a complete collapse of mental and
+physical power was to be avoided. He was quite a wreck, and was
+showing all the effects of protracted labour, the climate, and
+improper food. Humanly speaking, his departure from Egypt was only
+made in time to save his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> life, and therefore there was some
+compensation in the fact that it was hastened by official jealousy and
+animosity.</p>
+
+<p>But it seems very extraordinary that, considering the magnitude of the
+task he had performed single-handed in the Soudan, and the way he had
+done it with a complete disregard of all selfish interest, he should
+have been allowed to lay down his appointment without any
+manifestation of honour or respect from those he had served so long
+and so well. Nor was this indifference confined to Egyptians. It was
+reflected among the English and other European officials, who
+pronounced Gordon unpractical and peculiar, while in their hearts they
+only feared his candour and bluntness. But even public opinion at
+home, as reflected in the Press, seemed singularly blind to the fresh
+claim he had established on the admiration of the world. His China
+campaigns had earned him ungrudging praise, and a fame which, but for
+his own diffidence, would have carried him to the highest positions in
+the British army. But his achievements in the Soudan, not less
+remarkable in themselves, and obtained with far less help from others
+than his triumph over the Taepings, roused no enthusiasm, and received
+but scanty notice. The explanation of this difference is not far to
+seek, and reveals the baser side of human nature. In Egypt he had hurt
+many susceptibilities, and criticised the existing order of things.
+His propositions were drastic, and based on the exclusion of a costly
+European <i>r&eacute;gime</i> and the substitution of a native administration.
+Even his mode of suppressing the slave trade had been as original as
+it was fearless. Exeter Hall could not resound with cheers for a man
+who declared that he had bought slaves himself, and recognised the
+rights of others in what are called human chattels, even although that
+man had done more than any individual or any government to kill the
+slave trade at its root. It was not until his remarkable mission to
+Khartoum, only four years after he left Egypt, that public opinion
+woke up to a sense of all he had done before, and realised, in its
+full extent, the magnitude and the splendour of his work as
+Governor-General of the Soudan.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_IX" id="CHAPTER_IX"></a>CHAPTER IX.</h2>
+
+<h3>MINOR MISSIONS&mdash;INDIA AND CHINA.</h3>
+
+
+<p>General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880&mdash;having
+lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome&mdash;resolved as far
+as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had
+thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last
+few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not
+leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought.
+Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his
+country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character
+and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the
+public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and
+energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous
+friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened
+with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had
+little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and
+health.</p>
+
+<p>After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland,
+where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting <i>en route</i> at
+Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian
+Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial
+crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this
+case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon
+promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married
+while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as
+of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the
+same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial
+you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or
+less a cowed look."</p>
+
+<p>It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact
+with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the
+prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo,
+somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar.
+The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the
+circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">
+"<span class="smcap">Hotel de Belle-Vue, Bruxelles</span>,<br />
+"<i>Tuesday, 2nd March 1880</i>.<br />
+</p>
+
+<p>"I arrived here yesterday at 6 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span>, and found my baggage had not
+come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
+boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>). I found I was
+<i>detected</i>, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
+to dinner at 6.30 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> It was then 6.20 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> I wrote my excuses,
+telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>, and no
+baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>
+I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.</p>
+
+<p>"I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
+Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
+of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
+the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
+Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
+great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
+near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
+their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
+<span class="smcap">a.m.</span>, and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>;
+remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>&mdash;No
+baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
+10.48 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>&mdash;No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
+is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
+Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
+results.' 12.30 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span>&mdash;Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
+see the King&mdash;a very tall man with black beard. He was very
+civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
+quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
+get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span> My
+baggage has come."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the
+numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that
+he suffered from <i>angina pectoris</i>. This apprehension, although
+retained until a very short period before his final departure from
+England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With
+restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five
+weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again
+he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th
+April he left that place for London.</p>
+
+<p>Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his
+feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused
+the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment.
+While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the
+following<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:&mdash;"My
+Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces
+should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read
+as follows:&mdash;"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be
+accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring
+that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities
+requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office
+accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer
+command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, &pound;1500; your services
+required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course
+that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks
+for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an
+appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable
+post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of
+health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind
+whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the
+Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his
+good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and
+at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he
+would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and
+rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But
+after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise
+circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.</p>
+
+<p>While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the
+study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real
+reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and
+expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject
+which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up
+a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for
+clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international
+question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State
+papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very
+short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until
+September 1885, when it appeared in the <i>Times</i> of the 24th of that
+month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men,
+and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later,
+testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon"
+diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum
+in its integrity:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
+recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
+to these terms, the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
+able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
+responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
+that her own interests were not interfered with. The
+Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
+ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
+come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
+the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
+under the impression during the war <i>that England would help
+them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually</i>.
+England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
+in her resistance.</p>
+
+<p>"Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
+intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe&mdash;there
+was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
+treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
+Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.</p>
+
+<p>"By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
+kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
+Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
+to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
+other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
+have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
+she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
+Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore I maintain, that <i>once</i> the Russo-Turkish War had been
+permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
+Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
+believe that the Russians felt this as well.</p>
+
+<p>"I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
+Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
+alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
+of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
+the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
+Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
+two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
+commercial.</p>
+
+<p>"By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
+around it. Though the <i>only port</i> on the Black Sea between Kertch
+and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
+was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
+possession&mdash;'grapes were sour.'</p>
+
+<p>"I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
+was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the <i>coup de gr&acirc;ce</i> to
+Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.</p>
+
+<p>"By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
+alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
+mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
+great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
+a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
+south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
+men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
+place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
+Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
+Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
+them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
+lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
+long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
+laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
+Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
+wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
+does not wish it?</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
+be<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
+wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
+I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
+Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.</p>
+
+<p>"I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
+by the Treaty of Berlin. <i>They were fully aware that the Treaty
+of San Stephano was their</i> coup de gr&acirc;ce. But the Treaty of
+Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
+lost <i>not only Bulgaria</i> and <i>Roumelia</i> (for she has virtually
+lost it), but <i>Bosnia</i> and <i>Herzegovina</i>, while she gained the
+utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
+hostile nation to north and south.</p>
+
+<p>"I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
+Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.</p>
+
+<p>"I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
+on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
+ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
+foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
+when boys, have been bought at prices varying from &pound;50 to &pound;70,
+and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
+purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
+and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
+by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
+Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
+men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
+they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
+respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
+rid of.</p>
+
+<p>"Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
+Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
+the better. Why undertake the impossible?</p>
+
+<p>"What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
+definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
+definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
+and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
+ways.'</p>
+
+<p>"Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
+followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
+years:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.</p>
+
+<p>"2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.</p>
+
+<p>"3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.</p>
+
+<p>"4. The increase of Greece.</p>
+
+<p>"5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.</p>
+
+<p>"6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.</p>
+
+<p>"7. Annexation of Egypt by England, <i>either directly or by having
+paramount and entire authority</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"8. Annexation of Syria by France&mdash;ditto&mdash;ditto&mdash;ditto. (By this
+means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
+as England is.)</p>
+
+<p>"9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.</p>
+
+<p>"10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
+establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
+not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
+parasite Pashas).</p>
+
+<p>"I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
+advantage of being <i>definite</i>, and a definite policy, however
+imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.</p>
+
+<p>"I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
+view, and let events work themselves out.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
+shot being fired.</p>
+
+<p>"I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
+Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
+false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
+She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
+<i>we</i> been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
+between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
+to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
+of 1856) in those years? <i>Absolutely nothing.</i></p>
+
+<p>"What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
+Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
+world, is <i>the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
+and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan</i>. By this means, when
+the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
+the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
+on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
+occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
+the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for
+which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was
+that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by
+character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of
+trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should
+accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India
+cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its
+correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent
+idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission
+of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission
+would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a
+philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from
+official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the
+idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at
+the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the
+proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon.
+Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to
+put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in
+this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame
+on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before
+General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but
+whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by
+his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to
+a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept
+the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made
+on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would
+take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the
+14th of that month.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before,
+as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview
+with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described.
+The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his
+departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the
+invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The
+Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with
+which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought
+to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon,
+sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see
+me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting
+conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess
+came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said
+they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."</p>
+
+<p>Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and
+if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been
+slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he
+might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period,
+and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his
+own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post,
+there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the
+midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an
+independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."</p>
+
+<p>The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday
+Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">My Dear Macartney</span>,&mdash;You will be surprised to hear that I have
+accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
+just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
+haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.&mdash;Yours,</p>
+
+<p class="author">C. G. Gordon."</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments
+which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have
+exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has
+treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt
+greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."</p>
+
+<p>And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what
+took place in the following letter:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
+Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
+sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
+position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
+the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
+seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
+those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
+was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
+some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
+and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
+parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
+unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
+possession of secrets of State that&mdash;considering my decision
+eventually to leave&mdash;I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
+stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
+but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
+pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
+go at once."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of
+his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without
+delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following
+circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive
+payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries
+were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in
+the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had
+formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878,
+and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance,
+in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing
+from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing
+officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's
+contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not
+wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few
+responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but
+no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During
+the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for
+Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led
+him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like,
+and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the
+statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following
+September or October.</p>
+
+<p>He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received
+and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that
+brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is
+absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given
+by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the
+determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.</p>
+
+<p>That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the
+death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> he had
+signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as
+British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on
+1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were
+murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was
+Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the
+first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and
+joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt
+as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the
+facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was
+unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate
+to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage
+guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they
+found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the
+Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign
+Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and
+Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an
+able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier
+politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan,
+so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.</p>
+
+<p>But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to
+negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in
+Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to
+present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and
+indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880,
+an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had
+been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three
+or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still
+to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than
+would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of
+Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the
+acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached
+Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the
+crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the
+persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not
+regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least
+known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before
+he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost
+during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities
+with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan.
+Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari,
+he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.</p>
+
+<p>Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>
+secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the
+Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as
+possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the
+region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any
+designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival
+into the camp of Indian officialdom.</p>
+
+<p>The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign
+Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence
+negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer
+Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at
+once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would
+stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these
+representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to
+Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the
+arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still
+considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and
+also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he
+also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official
+classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who
+were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness
+he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly
+detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set
+forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography
+of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian
+Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about
+Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is
+only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial
+experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that
+he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a
+political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical
+comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being
+appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
+Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
+Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
+proof of this intention? They do not exist.</p>
+
+<p>"Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
+imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
+Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
+intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
+is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
+against all reason<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> to say he did. He was coerced into taking
+one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
+composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
+to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
+and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
+evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
+equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
+evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
+seen if ever published. This Court of <i>Enquiry</i> found him guilty
+and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
+secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
+from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
+want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
+defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
+I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
+The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
+fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
+and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
+forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
+responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
+moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
+altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
+consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
+happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
+ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
+&pound;10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
+Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
+the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
+her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
+Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
+Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
+entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
+Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
+Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
+protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
+Chamberlaine."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I
+append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville
+Chamberlaine:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
+<i>&eacute;meute</i> of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
+and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
+unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
+by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
+evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
+soldiers was in any way not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> deplored by the Ameer, but was
+regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
+conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
+accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
+myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
+permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
+soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
+ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
+inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
+culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
+annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
+resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
+offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
+heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
+undeniable rights."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the
+2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it
+had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But
+before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary
+sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid
+every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord
+Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the
+subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses
+are all due to my not acting on my <i>own</i> instinct. However, for the
+future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly
+burst with the trammels.... A &pound;100,000 a year would not have kept me
+there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."</p>
+
+<p>The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of
+Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese
+Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the following
+telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the
+Inspector-General of the Department in China:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
+for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
+large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
+all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
+six months' leave and come."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought
+it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the
+resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this
+intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations,
+it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the
+message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old
+colleague<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in
+the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's
+departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed
+between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following
+characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon
+while he was at Khartoum:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">Dear Sir</span>,&mdash;I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
+Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
+October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
+glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
+parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
+often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
+The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
+your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
+played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
+for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.</p>
+
+<p>"Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
+civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
+the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
+suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
+long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
+whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
+a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
+other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
+brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
+following are the answers:&mdash;Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
+official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta J&ecirc;n died a
+great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
+the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
+Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
+you left China, and it is now in very good condition.</p>
+
+<p>"Kwoh Ta j&ecirc;n, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
+pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
+to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
+to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
+is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
+spot.</p>
+
+<p>"I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
+highest regards,&mdash;I remain, yours very truly</p>
+
+<p class="author-normal">
+"(For <span class="smcap">Li Hung Chang</span>),&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  <span class="smcap">Ts&ecirc;ng Laisun</span>."<br />
+</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and
+inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by
+affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best
+next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following
+message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first
+opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."</p>
+
+<p>At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in
+consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the
+province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the
+Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How,
+who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to
+death&mdash;the treaty itself had been repudiated&mdash;and hostilities were<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>
+even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese
+Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly
+replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the
+resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that
+China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons
+who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to
+assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation.
+Never was there a clearer case of <i>post hoc, propter hoc</i>; but even
+the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and
+their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very
+catastrophe they wanted to avoid.</p>
+
+<p>On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese
+invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General
+for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until
+end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government."
+Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of
+the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not
+surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The
+official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and
+position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the
+following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China
+before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of
+insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of
+confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of
+criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable
+justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an
+ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the
+case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known
+idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be
+suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official
+telegram&mdash;"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved,"
+was somewhat harsh.</p>
+
+<p>It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying
+out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus
+worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service;
+ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not
+war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even
+if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further
+communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord
+Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his
+resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his
+own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the
+sum<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span> required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his
+mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He
+sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors
+and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless
+condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of
+knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often
+retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him
+the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It
+was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration
+of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian
+irritation:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
+Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
+the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
+breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
+but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
+desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
+with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
+be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
+to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
+heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
+regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
+China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
+for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
+promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world,
+Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying,
+"Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to
+make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying
+them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth,
+and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace
+not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost
+he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this
+telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service
+in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be
+feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will
+take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British
+Government."</p>
+
+<p>Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the
+threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that
+were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse
+the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in
+fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is
+never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>
+splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice
+and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was
+Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was
+fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no
+control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it.
+There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of
+intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also
+among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of
+these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office
+never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its
+representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as
+the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving
+the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and
+prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with
+official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do
+nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar
+and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the
+British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards,
+from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had
+failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously
+failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the
+British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission.
+Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter
+its portals during the whole of his stay in China.</p>
+
+<p>That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian
+question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first
+occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the
+situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth
+recording at some length.</p>
+
+<p>There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed
+at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The
+uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier,
+with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of
+communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with
+China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz.,
+a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it
+had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue
+until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its
+share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government
+looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is
+necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in
+any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China;
+her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether
+the Russian<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince
+Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his
+chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not
+certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German
+Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold
+measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a
+man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths
+to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the
+means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the
+only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with
+his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is
+no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung
+Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two
+other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and
+one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the
+sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for
+him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the
+country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a
+mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be
+supreme.</p>
+
+<p>Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is
+necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He
+reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or
+two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found
+sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton.
+Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he
+found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a
+letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at
+Peking, and not to stop <i>en route</i> to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin.
+As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that,
+whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who
+sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on
+approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by
+inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question
+that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to
+Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon
+assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it
+formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German
+Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of
+Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man
+of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese
+almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion
+he was actuated by the highest possible<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> motives, but it must be
+recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between
+himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did
+realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same
+camp, and had the same objects in view&mdash;only this was not apparent at
+the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang
+sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting
+him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice
+against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew
+exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save
+Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and
+also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the
+support of Gordon's military genius.</p>
+
+<p>But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end
+it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons
+was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at
+Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend
+of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate
+China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung
+Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who
+had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the
+attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking
+that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own
+plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of
+Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll
+comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of
+filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think
+there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had
+not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He
+recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only
+thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety&mdash;if he were
+safe I would not care&mdash;but some people are egging him on to rebel,
+some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift.
+There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for
+their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling
+with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the
+promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He
+thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand,
+and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards:
+"I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I
+cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>
+as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her
+Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his
+Government of all responsibility for his acts&mdash;although they responded
+to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing
+Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest&mdash;Gordon threw himself
+into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained
+to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the
+pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the
+German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of
+France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it
+was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following
+unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular
+moment:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties&mdash;Li Hung Chang
+(1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
+peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
+told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
+third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
+By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
+not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
+except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
+best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
+remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
+of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
+Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
+indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
+hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
+be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
+fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
+and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
+going on, but where heads are in gage."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various
+matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws
+light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it
+here, although somewhat out of its proper place:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
+made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
+sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
+Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.</p>
+
+<p>"2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
+have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
+difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>"3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
+etc., etc.</p>
+
+<p>"I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
+merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
+and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
+make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
+I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
+for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
+those I may be with, and I like these people as much&mdash;well, say
+nearly as much&mdash;as I like my countrymen.</p>
+
+<p>"There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
+and B. All this is wrong. China must <i>fara da se</i>. I painted this
+picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
+about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
+'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
+etc., etc.</p>
+
+<p>"People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
+during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
+at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
+come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
+made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
+power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
+great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
+administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
+to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
+mind.</p>
+
+<p>"I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
+railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
+they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
+the country and they would not understand it, and would be
+fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
+understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by
+Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader
+of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also
+present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the
+first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help
+them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed
+him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the
+Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their
+opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said
+they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was
+that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the
+opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh
+epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary,
+looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on
+the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The
+end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make
+peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the
+only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said
+this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the
+use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life,
+you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for
+help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless
+to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger
+to assist<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion
+at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is
+the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the
+question of the Marquis Ts&ecirc;ng's negotiations in the Russian capital,
+was perfectly correct.</p>
+
+<p>Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the
+Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the
+following extracts will suffice:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
+troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
+wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
+overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
+rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
+spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
+case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
+truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
+China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
+quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
+attacks <i>not pushed home</i>&mdash;in a continuous worrying of her
+enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
+should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
+Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
+of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
+field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
+speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
+which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
+the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
+first-class power; it is too near the sea."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general
+application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the
+smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat
+a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and
+practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the
+regeneration of China might be brought about.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
+acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
+country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are <i>au fond</i>
+united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
+nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
+hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
+some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
+prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
+crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
+words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
+corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
+these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
+Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
+confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
+appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
+being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
+each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
+surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
+another nail in their coffin. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> Central Government fear that
+the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
+would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
+Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
+the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
+intending to enter into war.</p>
+
+<p>"The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
+Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
+China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
+they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
+They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
+ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
+ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
+themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.</p>
+
+<p>"It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
+Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
+is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
+move.</p>
+
+<p>"The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
+Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
+the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
+their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
+Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.</p>
+
+<p>"From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
+the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
+people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
+people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
+upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
+of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
+of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
+Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
+of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
+Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
+hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
+the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
+that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
+the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
+be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
+last for years and cause endless misery.</p>
+
+<p>"It may be asked&mdash;How can the present state of things be altered?
+How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
+industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
+to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
+revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
+most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
+have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
+the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
+open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
+the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
+request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
+into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
+the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
+seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
+recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
+treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
+one life need be lost.</p>
+
+<p>"The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
+people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
+the Central Government&mdash;'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
+where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
+yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
+to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
+consideration, and grant our wishes.'<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
+by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
+I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
+too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
+Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
+Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
+Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
+drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
+Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
+China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
+the drones in winter."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to
+Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he
+referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already
+quoted.</p>
+
+<p>Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war
+between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung
+Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China
+without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found
+another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation
+not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not
+reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might
+have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the
+arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist
+on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him
+nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his
+alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can
+be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least
+creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and
+unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely
+preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous
+diplomatists and selfish governments.</p>
+
+<p>With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country
+associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding
+this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later
+expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting
+letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in
+1882, was published by the <i>New York Herald</i>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
+aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
+war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
+allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
+with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
+used the following argument to them when I was there:&mdash;The
+present dynasty of China is a usurping one&mdash;the Mantchou. We may
+say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
+the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
+extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
+Russian frontier. A war with<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> Russia would imply the capture of
+Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
+dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
+smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
+Bee&mdash;<i>i.e.</i> the Emperor&mdash;into the centre of China and then fight;
+if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
+are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
+difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
+would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
+one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
+France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
+will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
+fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
+the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
+increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
+but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
+by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
+and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
+mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
+As for the European population in China, write them down as
+identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
+without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
+China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
+call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
+on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
+community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
+benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
+State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
+Isle of Bourbon or R&eacute;union is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
+is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
+planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
+of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
+that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
+European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
+countries?"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same
+views are expressed:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I do not think I could enlighten <i>you</i> about China. Her game is
+and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
+embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
+would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
+humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
+following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
+civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
+success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
+had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
+private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
+would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
+clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
+more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
+the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
+think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
+country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
+go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
+of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
+with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
+Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote
+finally on this branch of the subject:<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
+it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
+consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
+of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
+and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
+end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
+could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
+etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very
+strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I
+combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on
+this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his
+other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese
+authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since
+attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also
+in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the
+Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">
+"<span class="smcap">Port Louis</span>, <i>3rd February 1882</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"About the opium article, I think your article&mdash;'History of the
+Opium Traffic,' <i>Times</i>, 4th January 1884&mdash;reads well. But the
+question is this. The Chinese <i>amour propre</i> as a nation is hurt
+by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
+with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
+opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, <i>i.e.</i> had
+the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
+on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
+spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
+mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
+the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
+Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.</p>
+
+<p>"I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
+say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
+would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
+give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
+could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
+action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their <i>amour
+propre</i>. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
+defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
+till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
+for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
+China.</p>
+
+<p>"I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
+than this, <i>i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it</i>, let us
+say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
+force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
+wrong, even if it was eggs.</p>
+
+<p>"Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
+this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
+prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
+1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
+The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
+defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
+soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
+people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
+chance.</p>
+
+<p>"A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
+therefore<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
+whether eggs are good or not.</p>
+
+<p>"Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
+power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
+pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
+whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
+which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
+Hung Chang.</p>
+
+<p>"People may laugh at <i>amour propre</i> of China. It is a positive
+fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
+nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
+want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
+do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
+is outrageous.</p>
+
+<p>"Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
+Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
+that Office the Chinese Government would make &pound;2,000,000 a year
+more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
+because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
+it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
+Marquis Ts&ecirc;ng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
+to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
+'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
+beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
+of the people.'</p>
+
+<p>"Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
+'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'</p>
+
+<p>"I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
+smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
+say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
+only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
+position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
+article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
+tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
+though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
+ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
+Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
+deleterious drug.</p>
+
+<p>"The opium wars were not about opium&mdash;opium was only a <i>cheval de
+bataille</i>. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
+political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
+As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
+affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
+injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
+justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
+allowances <i>above</i> rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
+allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
+should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General
+Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
+to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
+article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
+foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
+that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
+as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
+yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
+while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
+not very clear.</p>
+
+<p>"What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
+take a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
+forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
+thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
+case.</p>
+
+<p>"What could our Government do <i>in re</i> opium? Well, I should say,
+let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
+renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.</p>
+
+<p>"Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
+foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
+increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
+it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
+altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_X" id="CHAPTER_X"></a>CHAPTER X.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.</h3>
+
+
+<p>There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he
+would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian
+Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade
+from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came,
+and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at
+Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a
+truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of
+the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the
+British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him
+whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to
+turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that,
+as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him
+to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in
+London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written
+chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on
+the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly
+interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence
+as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried
+in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for
+Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was
+not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about
+anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to
+be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for
+these years&mdash;my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those
+who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end
+of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the
+establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan,
+and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear
+when events confirmed them.</p>
+
+<p>After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was
+at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely
+enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told
+that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to
+discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence
+on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he
+selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his
+visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite
+apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will
+vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and
+Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that
+quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of
+cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would
+strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was
+so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole
+province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything
+he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same
+places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of
+their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to
+his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on
+paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a
+friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer
+officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish
+family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which
+Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that
+General Donnelly sent it to <i>The Times</i>, in which it was published on
+3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being
+taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a
+subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.
+The following is its text:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this
+country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I
+may say the same of you.</p>
+
+<p>"I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope
+of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish
+question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as
+a nation.</p>
+
+<p>"I have come to the conclusion that&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants
+of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf
+which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a
+complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is
+useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I
+call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of
+the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness
+there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the
+tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.</p>
+
+<p>"2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say
+to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.
+They would be rendered&mdash;as past Land Acts in Ireland have
+been&mdash;quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do
+away with their force. Any half-measures<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> will only place the
+Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the
+champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound
+to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can
+foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common
+weal.</p>
+
+<p>"3. My idea is that, seeing&mdash;through this cause or that, it is
+immaterial to examine&mdash;a deadlock has occurred between the
+present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up
+the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of
+Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,
+Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these
+districts is some four millions; if the Government give the
+landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,
+which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest
+of &pound;2,800,000, of which &pound;2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands
+would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land
+Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration
+Commission, which might for a short time need &pound;100,000. This
+would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an
+interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law
+which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the
+public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or
+control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,
+etc., should be under the Land Commission.</p>
+
+<p>"4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free
+sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.</p>
+
+<p>"In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own
+observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts
+I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let
+alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,
+that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same
+time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of
+starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.</p>
+
+<p>"The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off
+than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with
+their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In
+these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant
+University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a
+Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a &pound;5 note from a
+Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of &mdash;&mdash; and
+of &mdash;&mdash;, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind
+feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about
+this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was
+administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of
+estates by landlords were expended.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost
+of twenty millions&mdash;worth now thirty millions. This money left
+the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of
+eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the
+hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well
+off, but I would offer &mdash;&mdash; or his agent &pound;1000, if either of them
+would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed
+as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by
+their caricatures&mdash;firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the
+crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,
+secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the
+Channel, and they do no good.</p>
+
+<p>"It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our
+existence."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated
+difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement.
+The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple
+cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will.
+When the English<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish
+are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old
+prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least
+Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief
+observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond
+belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of
+the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.</p>
+
+<p>The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written
+opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed
+during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very
+much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal
+of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to <i>The Times</i>
+expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that
+letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although
+the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any
+<i>single</i> ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But
+the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be
+found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer
+of Cabul, the man?</p>
+
+<p>On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of
+his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand,
+when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a
+British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord
+Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of
+the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry
+between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched
+up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment
+there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than
+of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left
+Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its
+possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to
+the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even
+able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been
+eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the
+extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer
+Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,
+it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has
+proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well
+have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the
+probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other
+supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that
+Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> had
+been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest
+administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
+the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
+advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
+in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
+evacuation.</p>
+
+<p>"I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
+of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
+thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
+otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
+exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
+alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
+would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
+predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
+natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
+latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
+likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
+plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position
+and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at
+the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?
+If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small
+inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some
+say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think
+that any people like being governed by aliens in race or
+religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a
+stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly
+prosperity the latter may give.</p>
+
+<p>"We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced
+children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,
+etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble
+enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our
+way to add to their numbers?</p>
+
+<p>"From a military point of view, by the retention we should
+increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of
+Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to
+be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,
+which on the loss of a battle there&mdash;and such things must be
+always calculated as within possibility&mdash;would aid the advance of
+the enemy to the Indus. The <i>d&eacute;bouch&eacute;</i> of the defiles, with good
+lateral communications between them, is the proper line of
+defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot
+have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles
+are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the
+enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not
+prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.</p>
+
+<p>"The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in
+India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an
+additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British
+subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro
+in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.</p>
+
+<p>"That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I
+doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our
+word&mdash;<i>i.e.</i> that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against
+his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with
+any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.</p>
+
+<p>"India should be able, by a proper defence of her present
+frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look
+after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier
+will aid her.</p>
+
+<p>"I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much
+more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern
+colonies, now<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span> that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval
+establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an
+outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim
+as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they
+are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by
+anything she can do in Central Asia.</p>
+
+<p>"Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be
+retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the
+internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure
+of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception
+of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a
+surfeit of late."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects&mdash;the
+Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough
+styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not
+appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later,
+the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on
+irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active
+races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our
+experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the
+Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by
+the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they
+appeared in the <i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>. For this reason I quote the
+article in its entirety:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,
+abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers
+are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private
+soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from
+cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of
+operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and
+the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is
+accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to
+long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his
+daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the
+country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a
+loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are
+encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in
+his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his
+foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty
+in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of
+discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with
+individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in
+comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,
+but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when
+the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the
+description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a
+very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the
+field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as
+their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I
+therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign
+under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary
+haste, for time does not press with them, while every day
+increases the burden on a country without resources and
+unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,
+unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack
+fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment
+of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,
+to be avoided, except by corps raised from people<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> who in their
+habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised
+for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable
+from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone
+of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done
+better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war
+with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of
+posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It
+is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the
+speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while
+its effects on the scattered enemy is almost <i>nil</i>. An advance of
+regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of
+march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must
+be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The
+enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular
+day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely
+where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like
+wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the
+work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their
+foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> regular troops
+should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be
+done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,
+commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by
+regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery
+should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state
+that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not
+had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.
+Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were
+barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that
+point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove
+back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the
+absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having
+cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,
+who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly
+despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give
+instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops
+could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,
+in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about
+by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be
+most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is
+quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which
+exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids
+which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was
+taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this
+hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the
+'<i>Veni, vidi, vici</i>' principle. It may be very fine, but it is
+bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur
+to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,
+bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that
+military science should be entirely thrown away when combating
+native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans
+always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country
+or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in
+Circassia."</p></blockquote>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.</p></div>
+
+<p>Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when
+he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape
+authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two
+years at &pound;700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering
+Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> courtesy
+of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier
+the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and
+that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as
+showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question,
+and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for
+the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.</p>
+
+<p>He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually
+met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own
+corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having
+fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at
+the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of
+service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went
+on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In
+his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry
+yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere
+else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has
+been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by
+General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could
+regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident
+that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter
+to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over
+cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep
+over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which
+were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for
+Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that
+Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no
+payment was to be made to him as was usual&mdash;in this case about
+&pound;800&mdash;on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus
+saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a
+considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard
+met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip
+during illness to Madeira.</p>
+
+<p>Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his
+Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the
+island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the
+interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense
+amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some
+valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius
+the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters,
+and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that
+drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>
+the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to
+pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a
+state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage
+already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends,
+and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much
+taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with
+enemies on every hand&mdash;"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our
+power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work,
+but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is
+eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the
+reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the
+Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours
+inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for
+their duties, one has reason to fear the future."</p>
+
+<p>During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate
+importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of
+Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on
+coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the
+comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within
+the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special
+consideration. With regard to the former of these two important
+subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything
+has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling
+stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large
+French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and
+Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese
+populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any
+time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation
+would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime
+fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between
+Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a
+beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for
+the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of
+great strategical importance <i>vis &agrave; vis</i> with India, Suez, and
+Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the
+need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of
+soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our
+forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient
+points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but
+from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.
+By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic
+complications could arise, while by their means we could unite
+all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective
+support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against
+the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept
+watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.
+The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the
+principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with
+suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."</p></blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of
+the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in
+San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and
+the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mah&eacute;. The
+Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands&mdash;thirty in number&mdash;and
+Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money
+to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat
+imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the
+Garden of Eden.</p>
+
+<p>The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of
+the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority
+of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were
+less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are
+sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of
+reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be
+well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no
+reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them
+both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a
+Russian possession.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The
+Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other
+nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and
+arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war
+with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would
+inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has
+changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean
+close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is <i>war
+in a basin</i>, the borders of which are in the hands of other
+nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all
+likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be
+against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean
+trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but
+of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade
+east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its
+being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were
+blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage
+to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it&mdash;at any
+rate I would say, let our <i>first care</i> be for the Cape route, and
+secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route
+entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a
+precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small
+is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part
+of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The
+Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and
+Bombay<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> to <i>that</i> Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing
+for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its
+protection."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of
+Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent
+out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence
+he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of
+all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he
+might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done,
+owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers
+of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more
+probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had
+discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but
+had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's
+uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high
+official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too
+many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others
+from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.</p>
+
+<p>Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this
+matter, fate had provided him with another destination.</p>
+
+<p>Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made
+by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment
+in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd
+February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon
+would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government
+again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and
+moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir
+Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following
+telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would
+permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.
+Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony
+for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be
+adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament
+sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage
+his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to
+their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the
+war and administering Basutoland."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and
+thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate
+departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto
+question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to
+Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>
+stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and
+energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by
+the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to
+visit the Colony "at once"&mdash;repeating the phrase twice. All these
+messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he
+started in the sailing vessel <i>Scotia</i>, no other ship being
+obtainable.</p>
+
+<p>The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the
+dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty,
+although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did
+not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood
+that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited
+in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of
+dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just
+as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous
+circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more
+difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which
+he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient
+discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the
+requisite authority.</p>
+
+<p>Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the
+financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first
+office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of &pound;1500; in 1881 Gordon
+had offered to go for &pound;700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of
+arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered &pound;1200 a year.
+He refused to accept more than &pound;800 a year; but as he required and
+insisted on having a secretary, the other &pound;400 was assigned for that
+purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under
+the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of &pound;500 a year would
+continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June
+1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius,
+and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned.
+Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that
+he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some
+bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a
+company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion
+the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to
+compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his
+savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe
+I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him
+out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum
+was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money,
+and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it.
+But<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that
+"money was not his object."</p>
+
+<p>As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the
+Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that
+question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of
+access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the
+Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the
+Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable
+Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and
+freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs&mdash;Letsea, Masupha,
+Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon
+in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the
+natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from
+absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and
+they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality
+three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the
+tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the
+regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans,
+then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea
+and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha
+fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for
+war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total
+cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when
+Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general
+description of the question, it will be well to state the details of
+the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined
+all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and
+well-informed witnesses.</p>
+
+<p>His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her
+Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were
+recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by
+convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land
+on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's
+Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of
+Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's
+Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the
+territories they possessed.</p>
+
+<p>"Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a
+large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of
+Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by
+hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart
+as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,
+leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of
+the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up
+with the Basuto people.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate
+and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and
+a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great
+extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This
+was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's
+Government.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the
+Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and
+were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for
+the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her
+Majesty's High Commissioner.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the <i>Crown</i> Colony of the Cape
+of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.</p>
+
+<p>"In 1872 the <i>Crown</i> Colony became a colony with a responsible
+Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another
+power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial
+Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the
+mistake committed which led to these troubles.</p>
+
+<p>"Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto
+War, and present state of affairs.</p>
+
+<p>"From this chronology there are four points that stand out in
+relief:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made
+treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally
+binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a
+powerful state and a weak one.</p>
+
+<p>"2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.</p>
+
+<p>"3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being
+consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to
+another power&mdash;the Colonial Government.</p>
+
+<p>"4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a
+process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like
+the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of
+understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any
+people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,
+who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in
+defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and
+who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament
+was only a prelude to their extinction.</p>
+
+<p>"The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was
+that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this
+day.</p>
+
+<p>"The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the
+Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the
+Colonial Government. They should have called together a national
+assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer
+could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root
+of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung
+up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any
+malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,
+and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a
+Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of
+sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some
+such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know
+the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the
+Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.</p>
+
+<p>"To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this
+course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and
+desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;
+and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be
+palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever
+hearing the name again.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials
+ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is
+the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto
+people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.</p>
+
+<p>"Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British
+Government, and to its masters&mdash;the British people.</p>
+
+<p>"Provided the demands of the Basutos&mdash;who will, for their own
+sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the
+colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free
+State&mdash;are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all
+expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance
+of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government
+should accept them.</p>
+
+<p>"With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the
+cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each
+family, that is &pound;40 per diem, or &pound;1200 per month, and they have
+been rationed during six months at cost of &pound;7200. Their claims
+may therefore be said to be some &pound;80,000. Now, if these 800
+families (some say half) have claims amounting to &pound;30 each
+individually (say 400 families at &pound;30), &pound;12,000 paid at once
+would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these
+families, viz. &pound;600 a month (the retention of them would only add
+to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).</p>
+
+<p>"I believe that &pound;30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce
+their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to
+send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission
+will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of
+administration at Cape Town, during all which time &pound;1200 a month
+are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the
+Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of &pound;30,000 should
+be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)
+that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of
+the National Pitso.</p>
+
+<p>"The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the
+National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive
+proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The
+greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary
+Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for
+the distribution of the &pound;30,000 I would select those on whom the
+responsibility of such distribution could be put, without
+reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps
+the colonial sanction should be taken.</p>
+
+<p>"I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that
+presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.</p>
+
+<p>"In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;
+(2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.</p>
+
+<p>"I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could
+be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government
+would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,
+and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be
+produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the
+chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or
+National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being
+present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and
+consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to
+everything that Government had been doing, should have completely<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>
+taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being
+accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy
+in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers
+at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the
+hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt
+at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question
+was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape
+Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed
+it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was
+not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on
+what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In
+the interval Gordon was employed on different military and
+administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary
+charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which
+he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to
+follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the
+essential cause of his presence in South Africa.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to
+Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks
+later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already
+quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention
+that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and
+Masupha any <i>entente</i> would seem impossible." The basis of that
+convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its
+full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as
+the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had
+gone on for years without any prospect of termination.</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Convention between Colony, Cape of Good Hope, and the Chief and
+People of Basutoland</span>.</p>
+
+<p>"The Colonial Government having nominated as their
+representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the
+Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and
+Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following
+convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all
+who have taken part in the late hostilities.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's
+chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity
+of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided
+upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits
+respected by the Orange Free State.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the
+Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult
+with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures
+concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the
+Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the
+jurisdiction of the chiefs.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the
+leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland
+will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils
+can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme
+Council.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the
+chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The
+sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident &pound;2000 a
+year, all included: the sub-residents &pound;1200 a year, all included;
+in providing for the education of people (now costing &pound;3320 a
+year); in making roads, etc.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.
+of the sums they collect.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will
+be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are
+followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of
+&pound;20 to &pound;60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they
+are responsible for.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents
+for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>Query</i>&mdash;Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries
+after sub-residents?</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the
+chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident
+or sub-residents.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange
+Free State to be by and through the Resident.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies
+being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in
+possession of the Basuto chiefs.</p>
+
+<p>"Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment
+of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to
+withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial
+administration."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on
+7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas
+Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of
+26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that
+memorandum, which were as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by
+Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a
+discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it
+will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I
+informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s
+Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be
+taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in
+Basutoland."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that
+declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was
+it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>
+sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one
+in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the
+necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of
+the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went
+on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of
+hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the
+other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's
+deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by
+granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention
+providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all
+external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan
+informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for
+Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose
+policy was directly impugned.</p>
+
+<p>On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in
+residence at the Grand Dep&ocirc;t of the Cape forces, he at once asked him
+to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on
+two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the
+convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or
+any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion,
+because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed
+visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and
+two servants."</p>
+
+<p>After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far
+waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's
+territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations
+with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he
+became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in
+league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might
+be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no
+possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also
+accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory,
+north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon
+found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the
+Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum,
+dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the
+hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others.
+Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government,
+which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire
+to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons,
+yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded
+but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his
+views were to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately
+resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure
+the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never
+been surpassed.</p>
+
+<p>While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of
+Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted
+with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at
+that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack
+Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached
+Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first
+construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had
+been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable
+invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news
+to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been
+established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far
+Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply&mdash;"Refuse to have
+any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and
+his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced
+Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the
+plot.</p>
+
+<p>A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in <i>The Times</i>,
+20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character
+marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard
+for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as
+possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the
+other way, he is a fiend incarnate."</p>
+
+<p>Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on,
+and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the
+Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among
+Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when
+exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath
+of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his
+resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received
+their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal
+colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape
+to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and
+responsible duties.</p>
+
+<p>Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of
+conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the
+beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but
+they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely
+because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only
+necessary to add<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his
+return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated
+was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head
+by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of
+Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct
+dependence under the British Crown.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is
+misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at
+them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an
+expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an
+expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives
+apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;
+but read the words. <i>I knew Sauer was going</i> to try the useless
+expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and <i>before he did
+so</i> we <i>agreed I should go and try and make peace</i>. While
+carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So
+you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in
+fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was
+to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia
+knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we
+heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the
+time."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of
+July 1883:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I saw Masupha one day at 10 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>, and spoke to him; Sauer was
+twenty miles away. At 1 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> I came back, and wrote to Sauer an
+account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a
+letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that
+Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed
+between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having
+let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but
+this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the
+description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at
+the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present
+administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall
+to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all
+implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove
+him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I
+accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement
+that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system
+of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the
+Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and
+July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the
+great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by
+letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.
+Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him <i>en
+route</i>, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not
+afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his
+defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet
+when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved
+Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to
+terms respecting the acceptance<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> of magistrates, a modified
+hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi
+prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he
+sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the
+Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government
+sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I
+was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two
+Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while
+the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes
+to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a
+sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him
+magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To
+show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with
+Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the
+Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post
+of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not
+at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through
+wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native
+territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent
+down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.
+I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat&mdash;in fact, I like
+the altar&mdash;only that you may know my views. As long as the
+present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any
+arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight
+against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with
+whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he
+would not be controlled by some men like &mdash;&mdash; and &mdash;&mdash;? Even
+suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would
+result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,
+who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about
+whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a
+Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall
+to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former
+Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the
+colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who
+resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well
+warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led
+astray."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of
+the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on
+that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the
+following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the
+Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said&mdash;"As a Colony we must try to
+follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."</p>
+
+<p>The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state
+paper:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p class="center"><span class="smcap">The Native Question.</span></p>
+
+<p>"1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to
+an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who
+will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with
+respect to the natives.</p>
+
+<p>"2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and
+the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates
+lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,
+in the Government not supervising the action of these
+magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging
+those faults which come to their cognisance.</p>
+
+<p>"3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native
+magistrates<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> as if their duties were such as any one could
+fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the
+greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a
+great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among
+the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or
+of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native
+territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but
+the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is
+contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.</p>
+
+<p>"4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,
+exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.
+They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very
+flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,
+the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual
+series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,
+eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which
+Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such
+revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the
+South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,
+"Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry
+Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the
+now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the
+causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a
+great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support
+of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating
+causes before they proceeded to coercion.</p>
+
+<p>"5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of
+Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it
+is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of
+coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.</p>
+
+<p>"6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men
+proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the
+hospitality of those whose conduct they <i>go</i> to investigate, not
+driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of
+some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and
+fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into
+every grievance, is the <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> of any quiet in the native
+territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the
+<i>modus vivendi</i>, the limits of territory of each district chief,
+and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any
+infraction of such charter.</p>
+
+<p>"7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost
+the Colony for administration some &pound;9000 per annum for
+administration of magistracies; the receipts are some &pound;3000,
+leaving a deficit of some &pound;6000 per annum. To this deficit has to
+be added some &pound;150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of
+Transkei ended in capture of some &pound;60,000 worth of cattle, and
+that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost
+Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly &pound;4,000,000. It is
+surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to
+investigate the administration of the Transkei.</p>
+
+<p>"8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething
+discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone
+prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great
+expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all
+enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one
+general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for
+promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are
+given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as
+best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain
+from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,
+the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn
+against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and
+2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>
+Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure
+of &pound;210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of
+periodical troubles.</p>
+
+<p>"9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of
+Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each
+magistrate, and also his capabilities.</p>
+
+<p>"10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue
+from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no
+object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in
+that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of
+discontent among the natives, then what object is there in
+insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far
+inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs&mdash;far happier
+than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on
+sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into
+rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is
+on a scale costing &pound;30,000 per annum.</p>
+
+<p>"11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha
+the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war
+with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in
+the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal
+and Her Majesty's Government.</p>
+
+<p>"12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the
+Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the
+calling together of the people to decide on their future
+government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British
+Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve
+it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to
+meet the Basuto people, and arrange a <i>modus vivendi</i>. Whichever
+course is followed it is a <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> that the present
+officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have
+lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos
+desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as
+aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have
+suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire
+at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.
+Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei
+is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.</p>
+
+<p>"13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of
+affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony
+demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be
+composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
+called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
+difficulties.</p>
+
+<p class="author">C. G. Gordon.</p>
+
+<p>"October 19, 1882.</p>
+
+<p>"<i>P.S.</i>&mdash;Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
+Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
+be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,
+and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other
+matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,
+apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the
+Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him
+in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined
+urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> then
+Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post
+thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of
+work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,
+and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still
+that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in
+a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of
+insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to
+cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while
+matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry
+went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The
+measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and
+Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the
+Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,
+was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew
+up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular
+forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in
+efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.
+This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most
+striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape
+would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it
+already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed
+the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by
+administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might
+be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not
+quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the
+whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than
+the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local
+jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never
+carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently
+composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has
+been peace there during all the other South African troubles.</p>
+
+<p>The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only
+be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no
+good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because
+Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were
+much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape
+Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five
+and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape
+authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.
+The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at
+least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman."
+But the plain truth was that Gordon was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> summoned to South Africa and
+employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and
+as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the
+Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military
+reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be
+invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing
+Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had
+failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when
+Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under
+no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin
+of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and
+the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The
+indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and
+every particular.</p>
+
+<p>Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest
+principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser
+man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he
+incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his
+army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage
+for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he
+quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a
+Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this
+without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such
+an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he
+was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious
+condition.</p>
+
+<p>Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some
+correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred
+to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England
+on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a
+long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he
+might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of
+the Bible&mdash;his inseparable companion&mdash;had made him in an extraordinary
+degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a
+holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time
+a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir
+William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem,
+where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as
+companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During
+his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length
+into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I
+do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as
+several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote
+on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any
+interest<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical
+questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his
+quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once
+declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in
+itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison,
+which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one
+being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he
+returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the
+progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger,
+which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was
+brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a
+canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus
+dilates upon the scheme:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be
+done. The reasons are:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose
+tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the
+people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of
+the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are
+<i>hopeless</i>. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we
+support these vampires.</p>
+
+<p>"2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the
+interest of &pound;90,000,000 will be paid or not.</p>
+
+<p>"3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the
+rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we
+cannot rid ourselves.</p>
+
+<p>"4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,
+and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.</p>
+
+<hr class="short" />
+
+<p>"On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the
+Palestine Canal&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,
+Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.</p>
+
+<p>"2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no
+missions.</p>
+
+<p>"3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the
+Bedouins.</p>
+
+<p>"4. We are free of all four objections <i>in re</i> occupation of
+Egypt.</p>
+
+<p>"5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.</p>
+
+<p>"6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean <i>d&eacute;bouch&eacute;</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of
+Damascus.</p>
+
+<p>"8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except
+for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the
+waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah
+Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.</p>
+
+<p>"9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,
+which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is
+pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.</p>
+
+<p>"10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;
+it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great
+Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being
+owned by a Great Power.</p>
+
+<p>"11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;
+population 130,000, quite a small country.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.
+10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea
+(<i>i.e.</i> Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one
+going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.</p>
+
+
+<p>"The cost would be&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<div class='center'>
+<table  summary="Cost">
+<tr><td align='left'>Canal from Haifa to Jordan,</td><td align='right'>&pound;2,000,000</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>Compensation to Jordan peoples,</td><td align='right'>1,000,000</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>Canal through Akabah,</td><td align='right'>6,000,000</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>Ports at Haifa,</td><td align='right'>1,000,000</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>Ports at Akabah,</td><td class='right bb'>500,000</td></tr>
+<tr><td align='left'>&nbsp;</td><td class='right bbd'>&pound;10,500,000</td></tr>
+</table></div>
+
+
+<p>say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of
+Egypt and Soudan for ever!</p>
+
+<p>"Revenue, Palestine, &pound;120,000, of which &pound;80,000 goes to Sultan.
+Do not quote <i>me</i>, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the
+late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.
+Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a
+correspondent."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never
+succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view,
+the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is
+somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior
+merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen
+the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to
+declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial
+route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the
+character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and
+more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second
+sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece
+of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf,
+whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.</p>
+
+<p>In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a
+summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter
+from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians
+now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.</p>
+
+<p>When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians
+wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter
+into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of
+having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made
+a <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by
+Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree
+to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>
+which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then
+became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his
+Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the
+Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and
+King Leopold.</p>
+
+<p>Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered
+necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department
+replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the
+Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State
+declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph
+clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government,
+altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of
+the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch <i>via</i> Acre and Genoa
+to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night
+he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (<i>D.V.</i>) next month to the
+Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and
+four days later a leading article in <i>The Times</i> informed his
+countrymen of Gordon's new mission.</p>
+
+<p>On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and
+Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the
+difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go
+anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a
+pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that
+he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death,
+whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if
+he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it
+was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and
+that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at
+once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a
+matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left
+to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he
+had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated
+the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who
+negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the
+King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would
+be &pound;7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which
+was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the
+King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner,
+furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit
+of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and
+now again when destined for the Congo.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three
+days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared
+for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same
+day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the
+Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly
+with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th
+of February. <i>Dis aliter visum.</i> For the moment he worked up some
+enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their
+haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of
+slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened
+out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are
+passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his
+heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on
+the Congo.</p>
+
+<p>The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight
+to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking,
+the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of
+the month&mdash;that is, the same day as he arrived&mdash;he wrote the formal
+letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army,
+and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had
+guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at
+once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic
+official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition
+to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and
+the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of
+General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid
+application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no
+individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers,
+but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only
+should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his
+commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay
+as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole
+truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been
+carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance
+of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the
+public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which
+seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the
+Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and
+returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British
+Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As
+this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to
+keep it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the
+16th of that eventful January.</p>
+
+<p>When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two
+o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think
+that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of
+extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could
+see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of
+business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to
+treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to
+Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question
+whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead
+of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant
+such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the
+permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I
+have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a
+few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon
+then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr
+Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the
+execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the
+Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be
+preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the
+King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided
+the Government of my own country does not require my services." The
+generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his
+Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating
+the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the
+spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying
+the orders of his own Government.</p>
+
+<p>Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive
+an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded
+by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many
+of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to
+carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the
+following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel,
+and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his
+last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby,
+and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but
+instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure
+till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given
+to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The
+article, based on his information, appeared in <i>The Times</i> of 17th
+January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed,
+"There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he
+set out for Brussels,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> whether he was accompanied by his friend
+Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as
+the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with
+confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on
+the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly,
+which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter
+communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact
+within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a
+telegram was received&mdash;"Gordon goes to the Soudan."</p>
+
+<p>The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir
+Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January,
+which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get
+his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw
+King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he
+guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so
+sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at
+Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain
+Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely
+revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen
+to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five
+o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at
+once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state
+of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked
+"When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.</p>
+
+<p>To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of
+carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever
+since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on
+the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He
+was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his
+Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had
+only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle&mdash;and
+nothing less would have sufficed&mdash;he might relieve them from
+responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it
+have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of
+England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo,
+where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have
+fought and won the battle of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at
+10 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>, he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows&mdash;"Do not
+mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for
+two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two
+o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> to
+London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town,
+<i>but keep it a dead secret</i>, for I hope to leave it again the same
+evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only
+report on situation." After this came a post-card&mdash;18th January, 6
+<span class="smcap">a.m.</span> "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night."
+That very night he left for Egypt.</p>
+
+<p>That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the
+following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the
+only account of his interview with the members of the Government that
+sent him out:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">"19. 1, 1884.</p>
+
+<p>"<span class="smcap">My Dear Augusta</span>,&mdash;I arrived in town very tired, at 6 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span>
+yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went
+to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> I went back
+to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> Wolseley came for me. I
+went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
+Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand
+their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said
+to me as to their ideas, which was '<i>they would evacuate
+Soudan</i>.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would
+I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it
+was over. I started at 8 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and
+Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.
+Gordon); no one else except Stokes&mdash;all very kind. I have taken
+Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont
+Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord
+Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I
+was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at
+once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to
+all.&mdash;Your affectionate brother,</p>
+
+<p class="author">"C. G. Gordon.</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to
+mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson,
+wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required&mdash;in
+fact, fitted him out&mdash;during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These
+kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his
+baggage&mdash;clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.&mdash;was captured with the money
+at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at
+Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on
+his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more
+imagination than love of truth.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XI" id="CHAPTER_XI"></a>CHAPTER XI.</h2>
+
+<h3>THE LAST NILE MISSION.</h3>
+
+
+<p>When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to
+truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: "No man could
+lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me." Yet
+he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they
+were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878:
+"Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very
+ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other
+Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as
+they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be
+absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries....
+There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not
+pay more attention to the Soudan&mdash;if they do not establish at Khartoum
+a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done&mdash;the
+disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This
+disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese
+through their allies in Lower Egypt&mdash;the black soldiers I mean&mdash;will
+carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are
+the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything." The
+gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more
+remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went
+on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like
+a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least
+a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a
+rude and startling awakening.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or
+indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at
+Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices
+of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the
+spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta&mdash;for it was
+completely successful, and would have continued so but for the
+intervention of British arms&mdash;was calculated to encourage those who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>
+entertained a desire to upset the Khedive's authority in the upper
+regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi
+rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not
+in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had
+scarcely begun his career, he wrote: "If they send the Black regiment
+to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops
+up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all
+hate." It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty
+months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi
+master of the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish,
+named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the
+Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the
+authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated
+such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this
+matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a
+course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well
+as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and
+other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile
+near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of
+Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt
+by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his
+religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of "a wretched
+Dongolawi," but the courage with which he defied and exposed an
+arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran,
+redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this
+wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive's Governor-General.
+Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these
+was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by
+Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the
+slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely
+the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a
+worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious
+propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian
+Governor-General Raouf, Gordon's successor, and stigmatised by him as
+the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to
+interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report
+brought back was that he was "a madman," and it was at once considered
+safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year
+1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the
+receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had
+considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> by an
+armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at
+this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission,
+and took unto himself the style of Mahdi&mdash;the long-expected messenger
+who was to raise up Islam&mdash;at first secretly among his chosen friends,
+but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears
+of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder
+above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed
+in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time
+had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not
+diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading
+a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over
+many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons
+from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was
+followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders
+to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.</p>
+
+<p>Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that
+if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He
+probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had
+seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the
+Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more
+inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha
+therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an
+armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his
+person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to
+Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in
+the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: "By the grace of God
+and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go
+to Khartoum to justify myself."</p>
+
+<p>After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the
+Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.</p>
+
+<p>It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the
+affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon's old
+steamer, the <i>Ismailia</i>, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in
+August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops
+this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent
+commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth.
+Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and
+divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they
+were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they
+fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.</p>
+
+<p>In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>
+and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed
+the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by
+swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of
+this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph
+of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed,
+the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile
+navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold
+his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering
+his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan,
+where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special
+reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans
+that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and
+Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the
+same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure
+the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.</p>
+
+<p>During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the
+local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted
+manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any
+danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the
+Government.</p>
+
+<p>Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces
+on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to
+bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed
+Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is
+entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and
+if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the
+carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his
+scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the
+Mahdi's followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was
+an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple
+precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell
+upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400
+men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable
+character of the victor's fighting power. This battle was fought on
+9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm
+establishment of the Mahdi's power in a considerable part of the
+Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so
+marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have
+sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.</p>
+
+<p>At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by
+Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> who
+had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in
+conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
+but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
+concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task he set
+himself&mdash;and indeed it was the justification of his
+re-appointment&mdash;was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
+the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
+4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
+Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
+Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
+1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
+end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
+levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
+over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
+derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
+might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
+a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
+position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
+dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
+camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
+degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
+irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
+one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
+Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
+heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
+Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.</p>
+
+<p>The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
+active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
+towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
+defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
+other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
+reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
+might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
+formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
+Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
+by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
+distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
+engrossed in troubles nearer home&mdash;the Arabi revolt and the
+intervention of England in the internal administration&mdash;seemed
+paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan,
+which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only
+direct result of Yusuf's defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black
+regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the
+Government was already shaken, their presence,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> as Gordon apprehended,
+was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.</p>
+
+<p>Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi's capture of
+the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within
+the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said
+Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled
+all the Mahdi's attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to
+succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months' siege. If
+there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the
+power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained.
+The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the
+spread of the Mahdi's reputation and power than the several victories
+he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January
+1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and
+a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and
+resource. More than that, an English officer&mdash;Colonel Hicks&mdash;was given
+the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of
+sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one
+blow.</p>
+
+<p>The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made
+with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from
+Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established
+for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile,
+opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a
+force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers,
+300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery,
+including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal
+command, several English and other European officers were appointed to
+serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the
+Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to
+the Mahdi's triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added,
+confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents,
+one of whom was Edmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
+years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
+ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.</p>
+
+<p>The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
+for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
+tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
+and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
+warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
+military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
+chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
+preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
+stirring up<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
+of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
+Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
+of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
+the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
+tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
+aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
+the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
+conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
+before Osman had struck a blow.</p>
+
+<p>The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
+his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
+military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
+men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
+the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
+overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
+untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
+sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
+of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
+prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
+Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
+strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
+the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
+expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
+measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
+Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
+be most certainly shown.</p>
+
+<p>But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the
+campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be
+no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that
+the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the
+start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample
+warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at
+Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a
+further delay of two months occurred there before they began their
+march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with
+disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even
+believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European
+lieutenants.</p>
+
+<p>The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El
+Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas
+had the northern route <i>via</i> Gebra and Bara been taken, a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> certain
+supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important,
+the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still
+hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important
+error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by
+6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements
+by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of
+success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it
+became with each day's march more hopelessly involved in its own
+difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature
+attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to
+its doom.</p>
+
+<p>On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened
+by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the
+garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly
+promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through
+a difficult country, the Mahdi's forces began their attack. Concealed
+in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the
+conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing
+themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on,
+because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of
+the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But
+this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had
+reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient
+followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The
+Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The
+Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in
+a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole
+force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special
+stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken
+were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling
+character of the destruction of Hicks's army, which seemed to shatter
+at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive's power in the
+Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular
+quarter of the Dark Continent.</p>
+
+<p>The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in
+London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the
+region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been
+holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha
+was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at
+Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among
+these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin
+Pasha. That able officer had held the place<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> for months under the
+greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in
+the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the
+situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under
+him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and
+reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin
+surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr
+Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and
+extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan,
+where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to
+Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat
+scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.</p>
+
+<p>By New Year's Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was
+triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the
+Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle
+course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some
+outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal
+Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the
+less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind
+at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
+out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
+moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
+authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
+Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
+sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
+practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
+field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
+over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
+Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
+admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
+elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
+the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
+sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
+races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
+tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
+policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
+that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
+hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
+Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
+the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
+backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
+whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>
+Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
+incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
+might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
+which has not yet lost its efficacy.</p>
+
+<p>In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
+in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
+succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
+warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
+he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
+easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
+be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
+were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
+moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
+Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and
+gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a
+difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and
+destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they
+established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an
+unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his
+own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism
+and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off
+single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith
+of his power.</p>
+
+<p>In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history,
+it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it
+may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to
+any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was
+undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against
+the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going,
+and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not
+think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that
+they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course
+it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at
+all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this
+mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in
+never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any
+real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed
+grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot,
+which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it.
+He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would
+turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount
+to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to
+the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> African
+history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for "a respite,"
+and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate
+in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it
+right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals
+should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let
+one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?</p>
+
+<p>It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond
+dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last
+Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon
+left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of
+interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and
+China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important
+memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon
+gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in <i>The
+Times</i>, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordon's
+thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he
+had served so long. The following is the full text:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as
+Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when
+Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime
+Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the
+Rivers-Wilson and de Bligni&egrave;res Ministry in May. Between June and
+August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the
+country a representative form of government, and had only a short
+time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik.
+Cherif's idea was that, the representation being in the hands of
+the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her
+independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will
+be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their
+debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible
+except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail
+responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of
+Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was
+quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly
+considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he
+had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge
+Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position
+to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had
+always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister
+whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.</p>
+
+<p>"A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or
+its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would
+bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by
+men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose
+<i>parti pris</i> was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a
+minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with
+other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice
+been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one
+who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate
+him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is
+essentially not an intriguer.</p>
+
+<p>"To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on
+August<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European
+Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif,
+praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the
+ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif's
+proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute
+ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain
+<i>kudos</i> in Europe, and protect his absolute power.</p>
+
+<p>"After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif's place, and then
+Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European
+desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience
+exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute
+power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father
+he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he
+wished with regard to the internal government of the country.
+Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences&mdash;one, the
+bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking
+to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than
+Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders
+than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops,
+such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the
+bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the
+present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give
+no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik
+finds him <i>de trop</i>, and by working up the military element
+endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to
+keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too
+strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking
+things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of,
+and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif
+then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what
+he demanded before his dismissal.</p>
+
+<p>"It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
+in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
+they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.</p>
+
+<p>"There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak
+of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The
+people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again
+that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has
+altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit
+of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot
+of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same
+oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates
+as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik
+will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals
+of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the
+local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is
+essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing
+to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute
+power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear
+of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the
+Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him,
+at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his
+people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is
+liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his
+prerogative.</p>
+
+<p>"It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise.
+The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were
+bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be
+done by the curtailment of Tewfik's power. The present
+arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The
+Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the
+country is quiet and the people well treated. They are
+responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged
+with the finances and the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span> welfare of the country, but to whom
+are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he
+cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to
+the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are
+Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
+these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
+bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
+Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
+to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
+advice.</p>
+
+<p>"The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
+having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
+Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
+Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office&mdash;in fact,
+Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
+supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
+Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
+with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
+Residents. By this means the continual change of French
+Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
+between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
+fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
+As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
+one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
+two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
+the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
+which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.</p>
+
+<p>"One thing should certainly be done&mdash;the giving of concessions
+ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
+Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
+should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
+by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
+people."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
+with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
+absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
+Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
+troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
+insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
+on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
+repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:&mdash;"Unless Hicks is given supreme
+command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate
+position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never
+end things satisfactorily." At the same time, he came to the
+conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that
+was Nubar Pasha. He wrote:&mdash;"If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime
+Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only
+man who can rule that country." This testimony to Nubar's capacity is
+the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not
+appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than
+any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan
+troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these
+difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> errors of
+any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy
+on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British
+Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September
+1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a
+decided step <i>in re</i> Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the
+same time cannot avoid the <i>onus</i> of being the real power in
+Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is
+undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in
+power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable
+from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government
+have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their
+present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over
+the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with
+France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act
+in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further
+than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the
+odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt
+fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her
+Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for
+the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on
+in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at
+least. I say therefore to avoid all this, <i>if Her Majesty's
+Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country</i>
+(which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get
+the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own
+salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This
+anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the
+travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy
+now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a
+responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and
+dangerous."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he
+enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were
+insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of
+Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdi's advance lent
+special interest:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you
+will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in
+London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers
+(official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his
+son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long,
+and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the
+history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr's
+son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and
+gold. It was my address to people of Soudan&mdash;Apologia. Isaiah
+XIX. 19, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the
+saviour who will come from the frontier."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The note enclosed was published in <i>The Times</i> of 5th January, and
+read as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the
+Mahdi's troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is
+an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the
+future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama
+knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> isle, and so,
+though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this
+omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to
+Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained
+there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken
+prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the
+Mahdi's forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious,
+and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation
+of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of
+Mehemet Ali's dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook's
+office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and
+protected by Sultan's Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall
+when the Sultan's rule ends. It lost a large limb during the
+Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no
+doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria,
+and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted
+up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks
+was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria
+backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting
+her go into Armenia&mdash;England and France neutralising one another.</p>
+
+<p>"If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt,
+and the union of England and France to support and control the
+Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to
+terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was
+entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to
+have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W.
+T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, on 8th
+January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The
+substance of that statement is as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is
+indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your
+hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern
+Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain
+your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as
+exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned.
+That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White
+Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be
+feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady
+Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever
+go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature.
+It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering
+Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will
+exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities
+in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may
+do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they
+may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this
+danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous
+fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in
+Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the
+Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the
+Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take
+fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope
+with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if
+nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened
+by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady
+Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attack. You might
+as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be
+kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>
+and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with
+Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation
+cannot possibly be justified.</p>
+
+<p>"There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in
+Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons
+in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be
+sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their
+Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to
+their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But
+Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350
+from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from
+Khartoum&mdash;to say nothing of other places&mdash;and all the Europeans
+in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you
+going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply
+them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will
+not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be
+plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be
+spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot
+evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either
+surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all
+hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be
+entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi's
+forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of
+panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the
+Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of
+Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal
+consequences.</p>
+
+<p>"The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
+weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is
+because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was
+thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had
+refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck,
+that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan
+may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm
+in Egypt. Everything depends on that.</p>
+
+<p>"What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in
+power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian
+Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he
+thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support
+him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be
+distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of
+Tewfik or any of Nubar's rivals, will be allowed for a moment to
+interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find
+that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring
+you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really
+desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be
+necessary for you to protect Nubar's Administration from any
+direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be
+depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office
+without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes
+office, it is the best security that you can have for the
+restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case
+with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any
+stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no
+hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them
+continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have
+worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar
+should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he
+will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say;
+but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at
+Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions
+sterling&mdash;a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better
+be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the
+consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who
+possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for
+the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan,
+and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.</p>
+
+<p>"It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and
+engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was
+granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would
+ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants
+in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate
+emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation
+was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no
+less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that
+direction should be done gradually, and by a process of
+registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar
+thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the
+natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also
+might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the
+abuses which prevail in the prisons.</p>
+
+<p>"With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably
+send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If
+subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel
+Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession
+of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best
+governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old
+warning should not be lost sight of&mdash;"Put not your trust in
+princes"; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at
+least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to
+him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of
+Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him
+possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might
+also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things
+in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on
+there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the
+adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would
+be possible&mdash;not to say easy&mdash;to re-establish the authority of
+the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.</p>
+
+<p>"As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it
+will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will
+cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the
+revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all
+probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and
+the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that
+sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will
+need a subsidy of &pound;200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however,
+would be temporary. During the last years of my administration
+the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The
+bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium
+was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to
+Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have
+arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely
+attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest
+misgovernment.</p>
+
+<p>"The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all
+popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have
+occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has
+witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited
+so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be
+told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against
+the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks
+have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they
+plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression
+begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the
+armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of
+the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again
+was attempted to be met by increasing<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> taxation, and that still
+further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a
+dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in
+a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in
+rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were
+subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely
+unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only
+method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the
+same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they
+rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the
+Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to
+regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he
+personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential
+Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The
+movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
+times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible
+to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to
+the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded
+full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a
+right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians,
+who had harried the population. I had taught them something of
+the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a
+higher ideal of government than that with which they had
+previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and
+Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system
+was re-established; my old <i>employ&eacute;s</i> were persecuted; and a
+population which had begun to appreciate something like decent
+government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish
+rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said
+that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years
+during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than
+Turkish principles.</p>
+
+<p>"The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere
+compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well
+with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing
+them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and
+Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on
+to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for
+the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They
+deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to
+terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to
+offer them security for decent government in the future. If this
+were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was
+truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it
+impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly
+suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr's
+father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he
+had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of
+the popular rights.</p>
+
+<p>"There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can
+differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to
+evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have
+said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given
+up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship
+the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously
+increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not
+rendered impossible.</p>
+
+<p>"The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in
+Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the
+condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now,
+with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that
+must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad
+and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the
+people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> in Egypt, instead of
+constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we
+have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn.
+Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to
+say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers,
+and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European <i>employ&eacute;s</i>
+might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining
+tenth&mdash;thoroughly efficient&mdash;should be retained; but, whatever
+you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood's army, which is destined
+to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with
+Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much
+foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more
+popular. As for the European population, let them have charters
+for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer
+corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more
+shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let
+them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement
+provides for its own defence and its own government. I should
+like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest
+standing&mdash;such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E.
+Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of
+the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar
+in the saddle, sift out unnecessary <i>employ&eacute;s</i>, and warn
+evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to
+play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence
+everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier
+should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what
+thoughts were uppermost in Gordon's mind at the very moment when he
+was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the
+Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his
+noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have
+thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work,
+made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not
+know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the
+very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the
+situation, was ready&mdash;nay, eager&mdash;to take all the burden on his
+shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to
+proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for
+precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper
+treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of
+view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at
+heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a
+worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted
+with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really
+arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very
+Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself,
+in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to
+face.</p>
+
+<p>Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a
+Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage,
+confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> can
+be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him <i>sed
+pede claudo</i> to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives,
+they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a
+definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the
+defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment,
+carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he
+saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and
+especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party
+principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some
+domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of
+an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan
+fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon
+overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was
+dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their
+country's fame.</p>
+
+<p>If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the
+development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi's power, those who
+had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the
+task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the
+Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt
+that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly,
+reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt,
+I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have
+been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the
+Mahdi's power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the
+Khedive.</p>
+
+<p>But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that
+General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the
+Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the
+overthrow of Hicks and his force?</p>
+
+<p>I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by
+myself in <i>The Times</i> of January and February 1883. Until the capture
+of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local
+affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt
+to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of
+those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in <i>The
+Times</i> on "The Soudan," occurs this passage:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation,
+and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General
+Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the
+good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with
+the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be
+lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be
+little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of
+his achievements, when working for a half-hearted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> Government,
+and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the
+black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable
+pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by
+Englishmen."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by
+constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would
+constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt.
+On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive's sovereign
+rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the
+responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour,
+Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable
+administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation
+cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any
+circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be
+entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile
+us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would
+be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours,
+and that he would accept the charge."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early
+part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive
+step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in
+Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was
+to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing
+Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe
+to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.</p>
+
+<p>I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon,
+who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of
+exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one
+of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was
+generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the
+Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had
+some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the
+end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet
+as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special
+knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting
+Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government
+Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883,
+Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and
+asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be
+of any use, and if so in what<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord
+Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December
+that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."
+Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the
+fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose
+the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on
+public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be
+informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the
+incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better
+than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was
+far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the
+mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who
+had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan
+difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he
+treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a
+word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the
+objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the
+course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public
+opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to
+the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible,
+but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene
+in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on
+the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this
+matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty,
+and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one
+man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon
+could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in
+February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to
+completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to
+save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was
+only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal
+results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
+early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
+down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
+making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
+open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
+February had been spent.</p>
+
+<p>The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
+by personal <i>animus</i> and an old difference is certainly strengthened
+by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
+would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
+the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
+slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> informed our
+representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
+and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
+will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."</p>
+
+<p>But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
+Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
+situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
+for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
+might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
+and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
+The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
+dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
+territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
+loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
+chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
+10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
+available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
+the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
+replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
+employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
+the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
+"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
+British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
+get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
+matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
+despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
+adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the
+responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to
+be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.</p>
+
+<p>On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary
+to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
+powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements
+possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum
+showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the
+people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the
+enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly
+Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on
+9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum,
+which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the
+greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other
+garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and
+Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> but when he
+discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he
+absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a
+hopeless errand.</p>
+
+<p>All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's
+recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high
+authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision
+was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January,
+because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover
+possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile
+downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject
+during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one
+"English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task
+finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance,
+some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January,
+Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks
+whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered
+circumstances. The "altered circumstances" must have been inserted for
+the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible,
+for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had
+been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir
+Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's
+services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had
+recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be
+sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not
+taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible
+conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was
+not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views
+more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for
+an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of
+Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own
+Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or
+word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there
+were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.</p>
+
+<p>The publication of General Gordon's views in the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>
+of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and
+urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least
+one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought
+that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that
+publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's
+telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what
+people thought or said at home, coldly replied on<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> 11th January that
+Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other
+considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring
+would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high,
+dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's
+name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless
+Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and
+willing to adopt any suggestion&mdash;even to resign its place to "the
+unspeakable Turk"&mdash;so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.</p>
+
+<p>At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to
+undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and
+millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the
+occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The
+only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of
+forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too
+strong.</p>
+
+<p>On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last
+chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will
+go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the
+King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of
+his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given
+on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should
+always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with
+generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is
+naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain
+Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is
+therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.
+In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir
+Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating
+that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the
+Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the
+British representative could make no demur short of resigning his
+post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that
+"Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone
+conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come
+at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles
+Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in
+the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.</p>
+
+<p>In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the
+heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals
+who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be
+shirked<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has
+filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his
+country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he
+allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that
+Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague;
+that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic
+timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in
+the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the
+single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they
+none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his
+resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment
+in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that
+retarded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was
+longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it
+solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards,
+the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without
+any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now
+Lord Cromer.</p>
+
+<p>Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection
+in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward
+General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster,
+and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling
+the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do,
+this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.
+Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending
+Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord
+Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect
+that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer
+that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode
+of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the
+Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when
+he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of
+H.M.'s Government."</p>
+
+<p>Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer
+who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it,
+left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to
+send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last
+moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance
+of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership
+practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and
+stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had
+assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's
+nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> which
+I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be
+far behind."</p>
+
+<p>Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting
+events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his
+sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of
+considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to
+face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out
+cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a
+subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views.
+The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
+quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
+hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
+I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
+them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
+rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
+after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
+previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
+between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
+of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
+conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
+start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
+difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
+garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
+establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
+which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
+the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
+the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
+Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
+thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
+The following instructions should be read by the light of these
+reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
+same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
+had widely different goals in view:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">"<span class="smcap">Foreign Office</span>, <i>January 18th, 1884</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
+once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
+Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
+the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
+that country, and for the safety of the European population in
+Khartoum.</p>
+
+<p>"You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
+of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
+upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
+by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
+be secured.</p>
+
+<p>"In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
+consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be
+taken to counteract the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> stimulus which it is feared may possibly
+be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary
+movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the
+interior.</p>
+
+<p>"You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and
+Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
+Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.</p>
+
+<p>"You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform
+such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
+entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.
+Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will
+assist you in the duties thus confided to you.</p>
+
+<p>"On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir
+E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you
+whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go
+yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum <i>vi&acirc;</i> the Nile."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to
+see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know
+the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor
+throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt
+to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to
+evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence
+to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own
+policy had been well set forth in the <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, and might
+be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the
+impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the
+Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a
+Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to
+that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there
+was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British
+Government and its too brilliant agent.</p>
+
+<p>The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was
+about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ
+him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided
+against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the
+close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his
+father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster
+of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion
+that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the
+whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried
+away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the
+project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.
+It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind
+on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should
+not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good
+or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he
+telegraphed from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging
+that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt
+as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives
+of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared,
+for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were
+murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been
+incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and
+thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.</p>
+
+<p>During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a
+memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had
+crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best
+course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the
+board&mdash;that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the
+Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in
+existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when
+he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his
+shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate
+from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very
+sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest
+course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge
+of the country."</p>
+
+<p>General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and
+to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to
+arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of
+proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was
+rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by
+the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was
+met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from
+his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to
+"throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could
+not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon,
+who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham;
+and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one,
+that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it,
+although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which
+showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon
+accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on
+the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by
+Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of
+Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any
+minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the
+interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on
+without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year;
+but it does seem<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> strange, if the British Government were resolved to
+stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its
+emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which
+it had decided should cease to exist.</p>
+
+<p>This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his
+turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested
+for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made
+a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between
+that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute
+between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon,
+whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament
+would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said
+at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss
+any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity
+was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe
+attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed
+towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with
+those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even
+days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern
+his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government
+would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would
+be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he
+could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to
+remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in
+the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.</p>
+
+<p>This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by
+General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and
+entitled by him "Zebehr Pasha <i>v.</i> General Gordon":&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I
+was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo,
+being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in
+Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces
+in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I
+called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never
+moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the
+rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was
+in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the
+Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to
+Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.
+Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that
+they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.
+I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to
+be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman
+be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of
+Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned
+me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I
+therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those
+chiefs<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span> who were inclined to accept my terms in another
+direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my
+terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with
+some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did
+not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being
+settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there
+with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the
+sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman,
+under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular
+troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered
+to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr
+Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for
+Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and
+killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi
+against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course
+of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of
+Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to
+revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the
+Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a
+sort of <i>expos&eacute;</i> to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been
+put down&mdash;viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but
+one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this
+must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to
+Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in
+Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court
+martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned
+Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I
+alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With
+details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the
+papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him,
+and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about
+Zebehr and myself.</p>
+
+<p>"Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever
+existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a
+capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a
+capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.
+All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi
+on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.
+Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a
+man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have
+been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr
+ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has
+regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears
+me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a
+father.</p>
+
+<p>"I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear
+the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's
+approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse
+in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.</p>
+
+<p>"It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian
+Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its
+evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which
+could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be
+accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of
+months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, <i>i.e.</i> to
+evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, <i>vis-&agrave;-vis</i> the
+safety of the Egyptian employ&eacute;s.</p>
+
+<p>"To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
+leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
+<i>sine qu&acirc; non</i>.</p>
+
+<p>"Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s
+Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of
+affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want
+to be free of this religious fanatic?<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> If they do, then Zebehr
+should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then
+do not send him, and I have confidence one will (<i>D.V.</i>) get out
+the Egyptian employ&eacute;s in three or four months, and will leave a
+cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be
+done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action
+against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally
+against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain
+settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this
+Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after
+he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as
+his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this
+inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be
+the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.</p>
+
+<p>"With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for
+there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy
+the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest
+stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.
+that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr
+up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar
+Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and
+which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met
+him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in
+hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I
+own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel
+towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the
+Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would
+bear the responsibility of recommending it.</p>
+
+<p class="author-normal">
+"<span class="smcap">C. G. Gordon</span>, Major-General."</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th
+January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should
+also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon
+Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were
+present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham,
+Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the
+charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter,
+signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his
+son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of
+course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other
+incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that
+letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it
+being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the
+Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's
+instructions to attack him.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness
+towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore
+do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and
+menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and
+deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him
+in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a
+mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief."</p></blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr
+called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi
+rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the
+original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and
+bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as
+well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's
+complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.</p>
+
+<p>In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears
+no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at
+once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference
+to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only
+to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after
+the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to
+those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely
+control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal
+resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found
+expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn
+the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the
+incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General
+Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take
+Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and
+Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or
+both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal
+danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's attitude towards him
+personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the
+ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo;
+but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they
+considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early
+stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly
+blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he
+frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with
+his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first
+condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was
+perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for
+mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his
+earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of
+safety was not adopted.</p>
+
+<p>The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether
+Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's attitude towards
+himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a
+bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he
+considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>
+great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him,
+and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in
+reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the
+ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the
+last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote:
+"I hope <i>much</i> from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all
+up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.</p>
+
+<p>Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss
+Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the
+Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To
+that Zebehr replied as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<span class="smcap">To Her Excellency Miss Gordon</span>,&mdash;I am very grateful to you for
+having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and
+am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi,
+because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do
+not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of
+the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these
+reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your
+wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life
+through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.</p>
+
+<p>"Please accept my best respects.</p>
+
+<p class="author-normal"><span class="smcap">Zebehr Rahamah</span>, Pasha.</p>
+
+<p>"<span class="smcap">Cairo</span>, <i>22nd January 1885</i>."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further
+communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to
+Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the
+following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this
+letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the
+officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his
+original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for
+General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">
+"<span class="smcap">Cairo</span> [<i>received by Miss Gordon<br />
+about 12th October 1887</i>].</p>
+
+<p>"<span class="smcap">Honourable Lady</span>,&mdash;I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
+receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
+Excellency Watson Pasha.</p>
+
+<p>"This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of
+the friendly relations that existed between me and the late
+Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart,
+and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me
+and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo" [that is,
+after his banishment to Gibraltar].</p>
+
+<p>"I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
+the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
+that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.</p>
+
+<p>"You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
+Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
+time.</p></blockquote><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
+their best respects.</p>
+
+<p>"Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been
+previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to
+your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the
+letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of
+any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the
+enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read.&mdash;Believe me,
+honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,</p>
+
+<p class="author">Zebehr Rahamah."</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+
+<blockquote><p class="center"><span class="smcap">Report Enclosed</span>.</p>
+
+<p>"When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept
+myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan
+or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to
+that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high
+Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with
+H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell,
+that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my
+relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of
+compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about
+it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches
+addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached
+Khartoum and remitted what he had.</p>
+
+<p>"These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan
+1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with
+General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived
+there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and
+without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on
+him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for
+the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to
+the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and
+in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of
+the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my
+messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a
+sum of &pound;500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the
+dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides
+that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel
+Stewart, &pound;13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days
+after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General
+Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to
+Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several
+letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put
+in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to
+the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger,
+with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a
+special steamer.</p>
+
+<p>"But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all
+the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above
+referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested,
+and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by
+General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the
+steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she
+went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre
+of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters
+carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter
+addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for
+my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and
+decided to seize all my goods<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> and properties, comprising them in
+their <i>Beit-el-Mal</i> (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.</p>
+
+<p>"Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
+treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
+difficult.</p>
+
+<p>"Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion
+thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I
+have requested the high Government officials referred to above to
+give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all
+gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take
+the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in
+all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the
+information I have obtained from persons I have reason to
+believe."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Some further evidence of Zebehr's feelings is given in the following
+letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
+thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
+will kindly send me yours.</p>
+
+<p>"The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was
+sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will
+excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I
+was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had
+not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied
+at once.</p>
+
+<p>"I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received
+fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E.
+Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the
+letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what
+tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook
+knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to
+see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I
+presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the
+property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your
+brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me
+for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to
+this present moment.</p>
+
+<p>"Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
+best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
+sister.</p>
+
+<p class="author">"Zebehr.</p>
+<p class="close">"<i>28th Oct. 1884.</i>"</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the
+authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility
+when they remained deaf to all Gordon's requests for the co-operation
+of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a
+tender regard for Gordon's own safety. At least this was the only
+point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived
+of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now
+adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of
+Zebehr's co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot
+be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he
+said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>
+once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr's
+ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a
+success.</p>
+
+<p>On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight
+hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English
+companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, <i>en
+route</i> to Khartoum.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="CHAPTER_XII" id="CHAPTER_XII"></a>CHAPTER XII.</h2>
+
+<h3>KHARTOUM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Before entering on the events of this crowning passage in the career
+of this hero, I think the reader might well consider on its threshold
+the exact nature of the adventure undertaken by Gordon as if it were a
+sort of everyday experience and duty. At the commencement of the year
+1884 the military triumph of the Mahdi was as complete as it could be
+throughout the Soudan. Khartoum was still held by a force of between
+4000 and 6000 men. Although not known, all the other garrisons in the
+Nile Valley, except Kassala and Sennaar, both near the Abyssinian
+frontier, had capitulated, and the force at Khartoum would certainly
+have offered no resistance if the Mahdi had advanced immediately after
+the defeat of Hicks. Even if he had reached Khartoum before the
+arrival of Gordon, it is scarcely doubtful that the place would have
+fallen without fighting. Colonel de Coetlogon was in command, but the
+troops had no faith in him, and he had no confidence in them. That
+officer, on 9th January, "telegraphed to the Khedive, strongly urging
+an immediate withdrawal from Khartoum. He said that one-third of the
+garrison are unreliable, and that even if it were twice as strong as
+it is, it would not hold Khartoum against the whole country." In
+several subsequent telegrams Colonel de Coetlogon importuned the Cairo
+authorities to send him authority to leave with the garrison, and on
+the very day that the Government finally decided to despatch Gordon he
+telegraphed that there was only just enough time left to escape to
+Berber. While the commandant held and expressed these views, it is not
+surprising that the garrison and inhabitants were disheartened and
+decidedly unfit to make any resolute opposition to a confident and
+daring foe. There is excellent independent testimony as to the state
+of public feeling in the town.</p>
+
+<p>Mr Frank Power had been residing in Khartoum as correspondent of <i>The
+Times</i> from August 1883, and in December, after the Hicks catastrophe,
+he was appointed Acting British Consul. In a letter written on 12th
+January he said: "They have done nothing for us yet from Cairo. They
+are leaving it all to fate, and the rebels around us<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span> are growing
+stronger!" Such was the general situation at Khartoum when General
+Gordon was ordered, almost single-handed, to save it; and not merely
+to rescue its garrison, pronounced by its commander to be partly
+unreliable and wholly inadequate, but other garrisons scattered
+throughout the regions held by the Mahdi and his victorious legions. A
+courageous man could not have been charged with cowardice if he had
+shrunk back from such a forlorn hope, and declined to take on his
+shoulders the responsibility that properly devolved on the commander
+on the spot. A prudent man would at least have insisted that his
+instructions should be clear, and that the part his Government and
+country were to play was to be as strictly defined and as obligatory
+on them as his own. But while Gordon's courage was of such a quality
+that I believe no calculation of odds or difficulties ever entered
+into his view, his prudence never possessed the requisite amount of
+suspicion to make him provide against the contingencies of absolute
+betrayal by those who sent him, or of that change in party convenience
+and tactics which induced those who first thought his mission most
+advantageous as solving a difficulty, or at least putting off a
+trouble, to veer round to the conclusion that his remaining at
+Khartoum, his honourable but rigid resolve not to return without the
+people he went to save, was a distinct breach of contract, and a
+serious offence.</p>
+
+<p>The state of feeling at Khartoum was one verging on panic. The richest
+townsmen had removed their property and families to Berber. Colonel de
+Coetlogon had the river boats with steam up ready to commence the
+evacuation, and while everyone thought that the place was doomed, the
+telegraph instrument was eagerly watched for the signal to begin the
+flight. The tension could not have lasted much longer&mdash;without the
+signal the flight would have begun&mdash;when on 24th January the brief
+message arrived: "General Gordon is coming to Khartoum." The effect of
+that message was electrical. The panic ceased, confidence was
+restored, the apathy of the Cairo authorities became a matter of no
+importance, for England had sent her greatest name as a pledge of her
+intended action, and the unreliable and insufficient garrison pulled
+itself together for one of the most honourable and brilliant defences
+in the annals of military sieges. Yet it was full time. Two months had
+been wasted, and, as Mr Power said, "the fellows in Lucknow did not
+look more anxiously for Colin Campbell than we are looking for
+Gordon." Gordon, ever mindful of the importance of time, and fully
+impressed with the sense of how much had been lost by delay, did not
+let the grass grow under his feet, and after his two days' delay at
+Cairo sent a message that he hoped to reach Khartoum in eighteen days.
+Mr Power's comment on that message<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span> is as follows: "Twenty-four days
+is the shortest time from Cairo to Khartoum on record; Gordon says he
+will be here in eighteen days; but he travels like a whirlwind." As a
+matter of fact, Gordon took twenty days' travelling, besides the two
+days he passed at Berber. He thus reached Khartoum on 18th February,
+and four days later Colonel de Coetlogon started for Cairo.</p>
+
+<p>The entry of Gordon into Khartoum was marked by a scene of
+indescribable enthusiasm and public confidence. The whole population,
+men, women, and children, turned out to welcome him as a conqueror and
+a deliverer, although he really came in his own person merely to cope
+with a desperate situation. The women threw themselves on the ground
+and struggled to kiss his feet; in the confusion Gordon was several
+times pushed down; and this remarkable demonstration of popular
+confidence and affection was continued the whole way from the
+landing-place to the <i>Hukumdaria</i> or Palace. This greeting was the
+more remarkable because it was clear that Gordon had brought no
+troops&mdash;only one white officer&mdash;and it soon became known that he had
+brought no money. Even the Mahdi himself made his contribution to the
+general tribute, by sending General Gordon on his arrival a formal
+<i>salaam</i> or message of respect. Thus hailed on all hands as the one
+pre-eminently good man who had been associated with the Soudan, Gordon
+addressed himself to the hard task he had undertaken, which had been
+rendered almost hopeless of achievement by the lapse of time, past
+errors, and the blindness of those who should have supported him.</p>
+
+<p>Difficult as it had been all along, it was rendered still more
+difficult by the decisive defeat of Baker Pasha and an Egyptian force
+of 4000 men at Tokar, near Souakim. This victory was won by Osman
+Digma, who had been sent by the Mahdi to rouse up the Eastern Soudan
+at the time of the threatened Hicks expedition. The result showed that
+the Mahdi had discovered a new lieutenant of great military capacity
+and energy, and that the Eastern Soudan was for the time as hopelessly
+lost to Egypt as Kordofan and Darfour.</p>
+
+<p>The first task to which Gordon addressed himself was to place Khartoum
+and the detached work at Omdurman on the left bank of the White Nile
+in a proper state of defence, and he especially supervised the
+establishment of telegraphic communication between the Palace and the
+many outworks, so that at a moment's notice he might receive word of
+what was happening. His own favourite position became the flat roof of
+this building, whence with his glass he could see round for many
+miles. He also laid in considerable stores of provisions by means of
+his steamers, in which he placed the greatest faith. In all<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span> these
+matters he was ably and energetically assisted by Colonel Stewart; and
+beyond doubt the other Europeans took some slight share in the
+incessant work of putting Khartoum in a proper state of defence; but
+even with this relief, the strain, increased by constant alarms of the
+Mahdi's hostile approach, was intense, and Mr Power speaks of Gordon
+as nearly worn out with work before he had been there a month.</p>
+
+<p>When Gordon went to the Soudan his principal object was to effect the
+evacuation of the country, and to establish there some administration
+which would be answerable for good order and good neighbourship. If
+the Mahdi had been a purely secular potentate, and not a fanatical
+religious propagandist, it would have been a natural and feasible
+arrangement to have come to terms with him as the conqueror of the
+country. But the basis of the Mahdi's power forbade his being on terms
+with anyone. If he had admitted the equal rights of Egypt and the
+Khedive at any point, there would have been an end to his heavenly
+mission, and the forces he had created out of the simple but
+deep-rooted religious feelings of the Mahommedan clans of the Soudan
+would soon have vanished. It is quite possible that General Gordon had
+in his first views on the Mahdist movement somewhat undervalued the
+forces created by that fanaticism, and that the hopes and opinions he
+first expressed were unduly optimistic. If so, it must be allowed that
+he lost not a moment in correcting them, and within a week of his
+arrival at Khartoum he officially telegraphed to Cairo, that "if Egypt
+is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed up."</p>
+
+<p>When the British Government received that message, as they did in a
+few days, with, moreover, the expression of supporting views by Sir
+Evelyn Baring, they ought to have reconsidered the whole question of
+the Gordon mission, and to have defined their own policy. The
+representative they had sent on an exceptional errand to relieve and
+bring back a certain number of distressed troops, and to arrange if he
+could for the formation of a new government through the notabilities
+and ancient families, reports at an early stage of his mission that in
+his opinion there is no solution of the difficulty, save by resorting
+to offensive measures against the Mahdi as the disturber of the peace,
+not merely for that moment, but as long as he had to discharge the
+divine task implied by his title. As it was of course obvious that
+Gordon single-handed could not take the field, the conclusion
+necessarily followed that he would require troops, and the whole
+character of his task would thus have been changed. In face of that
+absolute <i>volte-face</i>, from a policy of evacuation and retreat to one
+of retention and advance, for that is what it signified, the
+Government would have been<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> justified in recalling Gordon, but as they
+did not do so, they cannot plead ignorance of his changed opinion, or
+deny that, at the very moment he became acquainted with the real state
+of things at Khartoum, he hastened to convey to them his decided
+conviction that the only way out of the difficulty was to "smash up
+the Mahdi."</p>
+
+<p>All his early messages show that there had been a change, or at least
+a marked modification, in his opinions. At Khartoum he saw more
+clearly than in Cairo or in London the extreme gravity of the
+situation, and the consequences to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt
+that would follow from the abandonment of Khartoum to the Mahdi. He
+therefore telegraphed on the day of his arrival these words: "To
+withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be
+the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though
+all Egyptian element were withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and
+inhuman." In the same message he repeated his demand for the services
+of Zebehr, through whom, as has been shown, he thought he might be
+able to cope with the Mahdi. Yet their very refusal to comply with
+that reiterated request should have made the authorities more willing
+and eager to meet the other applications and suggestion of a man who
+had thrust himself into a most perilous situation at their bidding,
+and for the sake of the reputation of his country. It must be recorded
+with feelings of shame that it had no such effect, and that apathy and
+indifference to the fate of its gallant agent were during the first
+few months the only characteristics of the Government policy.</p>
+
+<p>At the same period all Gordon's telegrams and despatches showed that
+he wanted reinforcements to some small extent, and at least military
+demonstrations along his line of communication with Egypt to prove
+that he possessed the support of his Government, and that he had only
+to call upon it to send troops, and they were there to come. He,
+naturally enough, treated as ridiculous the suggestion that he had
+bound himself to do the whole work without any support; and fully
+convinced that he had only to summon troops for them to be sent him in
+the moderate strength he alone cared for, he issued a proclamation in
+Khartoum, stating that "British troops are now on their way, and in a
+few days will reach Khartoum." He therefore begged for the despatch of
+a small force to Wady Halfa, and he went on to declare that it would
+be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi" if 200 British troops
+were sent to Wady Halfa, and if the Souakim-Berber route were opened
+up by Indian-Moslem troops. Failing the adoption of these measures, he
+asked leave to raise a sum, by appealing to philanthropists,
+sufficient to pay a small Turkish force and carry on a contest for
+supremacy with the Mahdi on his own behoof. All these suggestions<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>
+were more or less supported by Sir Evelyn Baring, who at last
+suggested in an important despatch, dated 28th February, that the
+British Government should withdraw altogether from the matter, and
+"give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
+Government to do what seems best to them."</p>
+
+<p>Well would it have been for Gordon and everyone whose reputation was
+concerned if this step had been taken, for the Egyptian Government,
+the Khedive, his ministers Nubar and Cherif, were opposed to all
+surrender, and desired to hold on to Khartoum and the Souakim-Berber
+route. But without the courage and resolution to discharge it, the
+Government saw the obligation that lay on them to provide for the
+security and good government of Egypt, and that if they shirked
+responsibility in the Soudan, the independence of Egypt might be
+accomplished by its own effort and success. They perceived the
+objections to giving Egypt a free hand, but they none the less
+abstained from taking the other course of definite and decisive action
+on their own initiative. As Gordon quickly saw and tersely expressed:
+"You will not let Egypt keep the Soudan, you will not take it
+yourself, and you will not permit any other country to occupy it."</p>
+
+<p>As if to give emphasis to General Gordon's successive
+requests&mdash;Zebehr, 200 men to Wady Halfa, opening of route from Souakim
+to Berber, presence of English officers at Dongola, and of Indian
+cavalry at Berber&mdash;telegraphic communication with Khartoum was
+interrupted early in March, less than a fortnight after Gordon's
+arrival in the town. There was consequently no possible excuse for
+anyone ignoring the dangerous position in which General Gordon was
+placed. He had gone to face incalculable dangers, but now the success
+of Osman Digma and the rising of the riparian tribes threatened him
+with that complete isolation which no one had quite expected at so
+early a stage after his arrival. It ought, and one would have expected
+it, to have produced an instantaneous effect, to have braced the
+Government to the task of deciding what its policy should be when
+challenged by its own representative to declare it. Gordon himself
+soon realised his own position, for he wrote: "I shall be caught in
+Khartoum; and even if I was mean enough to escape I have not the power
+to do so." After a month's interruption he succeeded in getting the
+following message, dated 8th April, through, which is significant as
+showing that he had abandoned all hope of being supported by his own
+Government:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to
+British and American millionaires to give me &pound;300,000 to engage
+3000 Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This
+would settle the Soudan and Mahdi for ever. For my part, I think<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>
+you (Baring) will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being
+caught here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with
+sandalled feet. Not that (<i>D.V.</i>) I will ever be taken alive. It
+would be the climax of meanness after I had borrowed money from
+the people here, had called on them to sell their grain at a low
+price, etc., to go and abandon them without using every effort to
+relieve them, whether those efforts are diplomatically correct or
+not; and I feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomatically, I
+have your support, and that of every man professing himself a
+gentleman, in private."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Eight days later he succeeded in getting another message through, to
+the following effect:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"As far as I can understand, the situation is this. You state
+your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber,
+and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according
+to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I
+can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall
+retire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of
+abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola,
+with the <i>certainty</i> that you will eventually be forced to smash
+up the Mahdi under greater difficulties if you wish to maintain
+peace in, and, indeed, to retain Egypt."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Before a silence of five and a half months fell over Khartoum, Gordon
+had been able to make three things clear, and of these only one could
+be described as having a personal signification, and that was that the
+Government, by rejecting all his propositions, had practically
+abandoned him to his fate. The two others were that any settlement
+would be a work of time, and that no permanent tranquillity could be
+attained without overcoming the Mahdi.</p>
+
+<p>Immediately on arriving at Khartoum he perceived that the evacuation
+of the Soudan, with safety to the garrison and officials, as well as
+the preservation of the honour of England and Egypt, would necessarily
+be a work of time, and only feasible if certain measures were taken in
+his support, which, considerable as they may have appeared at the
+moment, were small and costless in comparison with those that had
+subsequently to be sanctioned. Six weeks sufficed to show Gordon that
+he would get no material help from the Government, and he then began
+to look elsewhere for support, and to propound schemes for pacifying
+the Soudan and crushing the Mahdi in which England and the Government
+would have had no part. Hence his proposal to appeal to wealthy
+philanthropists to employ Turkish troops, and in the last resort to
+force his way to the Equator and the Congo. Even that avenue of safety
+was closed to him by the illusory prospect of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> rescue held out to him
+by the Government at the eleventh hour, when success was hardly
+attainable.</p>
+
+<p>For the sake of clearness it will be well to give here a brief summary
+of the siege during the six months that followed the arrival of
+General Gordon and the departure of Colonel Stewart on 10th September.
+The full and detailed narrative is contained in Colonel Stewart's
+Journal, which was captured on board his steamer. This interesting
+diary was taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and is said to be carefully
+preserved in the Treasury. The statement rests on no very sure
+foundation, but if true the work may yet thrill the audience of the
+English-speaking world. But even without its aid the main facts of the
+siege of Khartoum, down at all events to the 14th December, when
+Gordon's own diary stops, are sufficiently well known for all the
+purposes of history.</p>
+
+<p>At a very early stage of the siege General Gordon determined to try
+the metal of his troops, and the experiment succeeded to such a
+perfect extent that there was never any necessity to repeat it. On
+16th March, when only irregular levies and detached bodies of
+tribesmen were in the vicinity of Khartoum, he sent out a force of
+nearly 1000 men, chiefly Bashi-Bazouks, but also some regulars, with a
+fieldpiece and supported by two steamers. The force started at eight
+in the morning, under the command of Colonel Stewart, and landed at
+Halfiyeh, some miles down the stream on the right bank of the Nile.
+Here the rebels had established a sort of fortified position, which it
+was desirable to destroy, if it could be done without too much loss.
+The troops were accordingly drawn up for the attack, and the gun and
+infantry fire commenced to cover the advance. At this moment about
+sixty rebel horsemen came out from behind the stockade and charged the
+Bashi-Bazouks, who fired one volley and fled. The horsemen then
+charged the infantry drawn up in square, which they broke, and the
+retreat to the river began at a run. Discouraging as this was for a
+force of all arms to retire before a few horsemen one-twentieth its
+number, the disaster was rendered worse and more disheartening by the
+conduct of the men, who absolutely refused to fight, marching along
+with shouldered arms without firing a shot, while the horsemen picked
+off all who straggled from the column. The gun, a considerable
+quantity of ammunition, and about sixty men represented the loss of
+Gordon's force; the rebels are not supposed to have lost a single man.
+"Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men
+even on camels, pursuing close to troops who with shouldered arms
+plodded their way back." Thus wrote Gordon of the men to whom he had
+to trust for a successful defence of Khartoum.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> His most recent
+experience confirmed his old opinion, that the Egyptian and Arab
+troops were useless even when fighting to save their own lives, and he
+could only rely on the very small body left of black Soudanese, who
+fought as gallantly for him as any troops could, and whose loyalty and
+devotion to him surpassed all praise. Treachery, it was assumed, had
+something to do with the easy overthrow of this force, and two Pashas
+were shot for misconduct on return to Khartoum.</p>
+
+<p>Having no confidence in the bulk of his force, it is not surprising
+that Gordon resorted to every artifice within engineering science to
+compensate for the shortcomings of his army. He surrounded
+Khartoum&mdash;which on one side was adequately defended by the Nile and
+his steamers&mdash;on the remaining three sides with a triple line of land
+mines connected by wires. Often during the siege the Mahdists
+attempted to break through this ring, but only to meet with repulse,
+accompanied by heavy loss; and to the very last day of the siege they
+never succeeded in getting behind the third of these lines. Their
+efficacy roused Gordon's professional enthusiasm, and in one passage
+he exclaims that these will be the general form of defence in the
+future. During the first months of the siege, which began rather in
+the form of a loose investment, the Nile was too low to allow of his
+using the nine steamers he possessed, but he employed the time in
+making two new ones, and in strengthening them all with bulwarks of
+iron plates and soft wood, which were certainly bullet-proof. Each of
+these steamers he valued as the equivalent of 2000 men. When it is
+seen how he employed them the value will not be deemed excessive, and
+certainly without them he could not have held Khartoum and baffled all
+the assaults of the Mahdi for the greater part of a year.</p>
+
+<p>After this experience Gordon would risk no more combats on land, and
+on 25th March he dismissed 250 of the Bashi-Bazouks who had behaved so
+badly. Absolutely trustworthy statistics are not available as to the
+exact number of troops in Khartoum or as to the proportion the Black
+Soudanese bore to the Egyptians, but it approximates to the truth to
+say that there were about 1000 of the former to 3000 of the latter,
+and with other levies during the siege he doubled this total. For
+these and a civilian population of nearly 40,000 Gordon computed that
+he had provisions for five months from March, and that for at least
+two months he would be as safe as in Cairo. By carefully husbanding
+the corn and biscuit he was able to make the supply last much longer,
+and even to the very end he succeeded in partially replenishing the
+depleted granaries of the town. There is no necessity to repeat the
+details of the siege during the summer of 1884. They<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> are made up of
+almost daily interchanges of artillery fire from the town, and of
+rifle fire in reply from the Arab lines. That this was not merely
+child's play may be gathered from two of Gordon's protected ships
+showing nearly a thousand bullet-marks apiece. Whenever the rebels
+attempted to force their way through the lines they were repulsed by
+the mines; and the steamers not only inflicted loss on their fighting
+men, but often succeeded in picking up useful supplies of food and
+grain. No further reverses were reported, because Gordon was most
+careful to avoid all risk, and the only misfortunes occurred in
+Gordon's rear, when first Berber, through the treachery of the Greek
+Cuzzi, and then Shendy passed into the hands of the Mahdists, thus, as
+Gordon said, "completely hemming him in." In April a detached force up
+the Blue Nile went over to the Mahdi, taking with them a small
+steamer, but this loss was of no great importance, as the men were of
+what Gordon called "the Arabi hen or hero type," and the steamer could
+not force its way past Khartoum and its powerful flotilla. In the four
+months from 16th March to 30th July Gordon stated that the total loss
+of the garrison was only thirty killed and fifty or sixty wounded,
+while half a million cartridges had been fired against the enemy. The
+conduct of both the people and garrison had been excellent, and this
+was the more creditable, because Gordon was obliged from the very
+beginning, owing to the capture of the bullion sent him at Berber, to
+make all payments in paper money bearing his signature and seal.
+During that period the total reinforcement to the garrison numbered
+seven men, including Gordon himself, while over 2600 persons had been
+sent out of it in safety as far as Berber.</p>
+
+<p>The reader will be interested in the following extracts from a letter
+written by Colonel Duncan, R.A., M.P., showing the remarkable way in
+which General Gordon organised the despatch of these refugees from
+Khartoum. The letter is dated 29th November 1886, and addressed to
+Miss Gordon:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"When your brother, on reaching Khartoum, found that he could
+commence sending refugees to Egypt, I was sent on the 3rd March
+1884 to Assouan and Korosko to receive those whom he sent down.
+As an instance of your brother's thoughtfulness, I may mention
+that he requested that, if possible, some motherly European woman
+might also be sent, as many of the refugees whom he had to send
+had never been out of the Soudan before, and might feel strange
+on reaching Egypt. A German, Giegler Pasha, who had been in
+Khartoum with your brother before, and who had a German wife, was
+accordingly placed at my disposal, and I stationed them at
+Korosko, where almost all the refugees arrived. I may mention
+that I saw and spoke to every one of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span> refugees who came down,
+and to many of the women and children. Their references to your
+brother were invariably couched in language of affection and
+gratitude, and the adjective most frequently applied to him was
+'just.' In sending away the people from Khartoum, he sent away
+the Governor and some of the other leading Egyptian officials
+first. I think he suspected they would intrigue; he always had
+more confidence in the people than in the ruling Turks or
+Egyptians. The oldest soldiers, the very infirm, the wounded
+(from Hicks's battles) were sent next, and a ghastly crew they
+were. But the precautions he took for their comfort were very
+complete, and although immediately before reaching me they had to
+cross a very bad part of the desert between Abou Hamed and
+Korosko, they reached me in wonderful spirits. It was touching to
+see the perfect confidence they had that the promises of Gordon
+Pasha would be fulfilled. After the fall of Khartoum, and your
+brother's death, a good many of the Egyptian officers who had
+been with your brother managed to escape, and to come down the
+river disguised in many cases as beggars. I had an opportunity of
+talking to most of them, and there was no collusion, for they
+arrived at different times and by different roads. I remember
+having a talk with one, and when we alluded to your brother's
+death he burst out crying like a child, and said that though he
+had lost his wives and children when Khartoum was taken, he felt
+it as nothing to the loss of 'that just man.'"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The letters written at the end of July at Khartoum reached Cairo at
+the end of September, and their substance was at once telegraphed to
+England. They showed that, while his success had made him think that
+after all there might be some satisfactory issue of the siege, he
+foresaw that the real ordeal was yet to come. "In four months (that is
+end of November) river begins to fall; before that time you <i>must</i>
+settle the Soudan question." So wrote the heroic defender of Khartoum
+in words that could not be misunderstood, and those words were in the
+hands of the British Ministers when half the period had expired. At
+the same time Mr Power wrote: "We can at best hold out but two months
+longer." Gordon at least never doubted what their effect would be, for
+after what seemed to him a reasonable time had elapsed to enable this
+message to reach its destination, he took the necessary steps to
+recover Berber, and to send his steamers half-way to meet and assist
+the advance of the reinforcement on which he thought from the
+beginning he might surely rely.</p>
+
+<p>On 10th September all his plans were completed, and Colonel Stewart,
+accompanied by a strong force of Bashi-Bazouks and some black
+soldiers, with Mr Power and M. Herbin, the French consul, sailed
+northwards on five steamers. The first task of this expedition was if<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>
+possible, to retake Berber, or, failing that, to escort the <i>Abbas</i>
+past the point of greatest danger; the second, to convey the most
+recent news about Khartoum affairs to Lower Egypt; and the third was
+to lend a helping hand to any force that might be coming up the Nile
+or across the desert from the Red Sea. Five days after its departure
+Gordon knew through a spy that Stewart's flotilla had passed Shendy in
+safety, and had captured a valuable Arab convoy. It was not till
+November that the truth was known how the ships bombarded Berber, and
+passed that place not only in safety, but after causing the rebels
+much loss and greater alarm, and then how Stewart and his European
+companions went on in the small steamer <i>Abbas</i> to bear the tale of
+the wonderful defence of Khartoum to the outer world&mdash;a defence which,
+wonderful as it was, really only reached the stage of the miraculous
+after they had gone and had no further part in it. So far as Gordon's
+military skill and prevision could arrange for their safety, he did
+so, and with success. When the warships had to return he gave them the
+best advice against treachery or ambuscade:&mdash;"Do not anchor near the
+bank, do not collect wood at isolated spots, trust nobody." What more
+could Gordon say? If they had paid strict heed to his advice, there
+would have been no catastrophe at Dar Djumna. These reflections invest
+with much force Gordon's own view of the matter:&mdash;"If <i>Abbas</i> was
+captured by treachery, then I am not to blame; neither am I to blame
+if she struck a rock, for she drew under two feet of water; if they
+were attacked and overpowered, then I am to blame." So perfect were
+his arrangements that only treachery, aided by Stewart's
+over-confidence, baffled them.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the wisdom of the course pursued in thus sending away
+all his European colleagues&mdash;the Austrian consul Hensall alone
+refusing to quit Gordon and his place of duty&mdash;opinions will differ to
+the end of time, but one is almost inclined to say that they could not
+have been of much service to Gordon once their uppermost thought
+became to quit Khartoum. The whole story is told very graphically in a
+passage of Gordon's own diary:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I determined to send the <i>Abbas</i> down with an Arab captain.
+Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then
+Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting
+me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I cannot go; but if you go you
+do great service.' I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to
+write him an order. I said 'No; for, though I fear not
+responsibility, I will not put you in any danger in which I am
+not myself.' I wrote them a letter couched thus:&mdash;'<i>Abbas</i> is
+going down; you say you are willing to go in her if I think you
+can do so in honour. You can go in honour, for<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> you can do
+nothing here; and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my
+views.'"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>There are two points in this matter to which I must draw marked
+attention. The suggestion for any European leaving Khartoum came from
+M. Herbin, and when Gordon willingly acquiesced, Colonel Stewart asked
+leave to do likewise. Mr Power, whose calculation was that provisions
+would be exhausted before the end of September, then followed suit,
+and not one of these three of the five Europeans in Khartoum seem to
+have thought for a moment what would be the position of Gordon left
+alone to cope with the danger from which they ran away. The suggestion
+as to their going came in every case from themselves. Gordon, in his
+thought for others, not merely threw no obstacle in their way, but as
+far as he could provided for their safety as if they were a parcel of
+women. But he declined all responsibility for their fate, as they went
+not by his order but of their own free-will. He gave them his ships,
+soldiers, and best counsel. They neglected the last, and were taken in
+in a manner that showed less than a child's suspicion, and were
+massacred at the very moment they felt sure of safety. It was a cruel
+fate, and a harsh Nemesis speedily befell them for doing perhaps the
+one unworthy thing of their lives&mdash;leaving their solitary companion to
+face the tenfold dangers by which he would be beset. But it cannot be
+allowed any longer that the onus of this matter should rest in any way
+on Gordon. They went because they wanted to go, and he, knowing well
+that men with such thoughts would be of no use to him ("you can do
+nothing here") let them go, and even encouraged them to do so. Under
+the circumstances he preferred to be alone. Colonel Donald Stewart was
+a personal friend of mine, and a man whose courage in the ordinary
+sense of the word could not be aspersed, but there cannot be two
+opinions that he above all the others should not have left his
+brother-in-arms alone in Khartoum.</p>
+
+<p>After their departure Gordon had to superintend everything himself,
+and to resort to every means of husbanding the limited supply of
+provisions he had left. He had also to anticipate a more vigorous
+attack, for the Mahdi must quickly learn of the departure of the
+steamers, the bombardment of Berber, and the favourable chance thus
+provided for the capture of Khartoum. Nor was this the worst, for on
+the occurrence of the disaster the Mahdi was promptly informed of the
+loss of the <i>Abbas</i> and the murder of the Europeans, and it was he
+himself who sent in to Gordon the news of the catastrophe, with so
+complete a list of the papers on the <i>Abbas</i> as left no ground for
+hope or disbelief. Unfortunately, before this bad news reached Gordon,
+he had again, on 30th September, sent down to Shendy three
+steamers&mdash;the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> <i>Talataween</i>, the <i>Mansourah</i>, and <i>Saphia</i>, with
+troops on board, and the gallant Cassim-el-Mousse, there to await the
+arrival of the relieving force. He somewhat later reinforced this
+squadron with the <i>Bordeen</i>; and although one or two of these boats
+returned occasionally to Khartoum, the rest remained permanently at
+Shendy, and when the English troops reached the Nile opposite that
+place all five were waiting them. Without entering too closely into
+details, it is consequently correct to say that during the most
+critical part of the siege Gordon deprived himself of the co-operation
+of these vessels, each of which he valued at 2000 men, simply and
+solely because he believed that reinforcements were close at hand, and
+that some troops at the latest would arrive before the end of November
+1884. As Gordon himself repeatedly said, it would have been far more
+just if the Government had told him in March, when he first demanded
+reinforcements as a right, that he must shift for himself. Then he
+would have kept these boats by him, and triumphantly fought his way in
+them to the Equator. But his trust in the Government, notwithstanding
+all his experience, led him to weaken his own position in the hope of
+facilitating their movements, and he found their aid a broken reed. In
+only one passage of his journal does Gordon give expression to this
+view, although it was always present to his mind:&mdash;"Truly the
+indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view,
+a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was
+always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us." But in
+the telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr Egerton, which the
+Government never dared to publish, and which are still an official
+secret, he laid great stress on this point, and on Sir Evelyn Baring's
+message forbidding him to retire to the Equator, so that, if he sought
+safety in that direction, he would be indictable on a charge of
+desertion.</p>
+
+<p>The various positions at Khartoum held by Gordon's force may be
+briefly described. First, the town itself, on the left bank of the
+Blue Nile, but stretching almost across to the right bank of the White
+Nile, protected on the land side by a wall, in front of which was the
+triple line of mines, and on the water side by the river and the
+steamers. On the right bank of the Blue Nile was the small North Fort.
+Between the two stretched the island of Tuti, and at each end of the
+wall, on the White Nile as well as the Blue, Gordon had stationed a
+<i>santal</i> or heavy-armed barge, carrying a gun. Unfortunately, a large
+part of the western end of the Khartoum wall had been washed away by
+an inundation of the Nile, but the mines supplied a substitute, and so
+long as Omdurman Fort was held this weakness in the defences of
+Khartoum did not greatly signify. That fort itself lay on the left
+bank of the White Nile.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span> It was well built and fairly strong, but the
+position was faulty. It lay in a hollow, and the trench of the
+extensive camp formed for Hicks's force furnished the enemy with
+cover. It was also 1200 yards from the river bank, and when the enemy
+became more enterprising it was impossible to keep up communication
+with it. In Omdurman Fort was a specially selected garrison of 240
+men, commanded by a gallant black officer, Ferratch or Faragalla
+Pasha, who had been raised from a subordinate capacity to the
+principal command under him by Gordon. Gordon's point of observation
+was the flat roof of the Palace, whence he could see everything with
+his telescope, and where he placed his best shots to bear on any point
+that might seem hard pressed. Still more useful was it for the purpose
+of detecting the remissness of his own troops and officers, and often
+his telescope showed him sentries asleep at their posts, and officers
+absent from the points they were supposed to guard.</p>
+
+<p>From the end of March until the close of the siege scarcely a day
+passed without the exchange of artillery and rifle fire on one side or
+the other of the beleaguered town. On special occasions the Khedive's
+garrison would fire as many as forty or even fifty thousand rounds of
+Remington cartridges, and the Arab fire was sometimes heavier. This
+incessant fire, as the heroic defender wrote in his journal, murdered
+sleep, and at last he became so accustomed to it that he could tell by
+the sound where the firing was taking place. The most distant points
+of the defence, such as the <i>santal</i> on the White Nile and Fort
+Omdurman, were two miles from the Palace; and although telegraphic
+communication existed with them during the greater part of the siege,
+the oral evidence as to the point of attack was often found the most
+rapid means of obtaining information. This was still more advantageous
+after the 12th of November, for on that day communications were cut
+between Khartoum and Omdurman, and it was found impossible to restore
+them. The only communications possible after that date were by bugle
+and flag. At the time of this severance Gordon estimated that the
+garrison of Omdurman had enough water and biscuit for six weeks, and
+that there were 250,000 cartridges in the arsenal. Gordon did
+everything in his power to aid Ferratch in the defence, and his
+remaining steamer, the <i>Ismailia</i>, after the grounding of the
+<i>Husseinyeh</i> on the very day Omdurman was cut off, was engaged in
+almost daily encounters with the Mahdists for that purpose. Owing to
+Gordon's incessant efforts, and the gallantry of the garrison led by
+Ferratch, Omdurman held out more than two months. It was not until
+15th January that Ferratch, with Gordon's leave, surrendered, and then
+when the Mahdists occupied the place, General Gordon had the
+satisfaction of shelling them out of it, and showing that it was
+untenable.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The severance of Omdurman from Khartoum was the prelude to fiercer
+fighting than had taken place at any time during the earlier stages of
+the siege, and although particulars are not obtainable for the last
+month of the period, there is no doubt that the struggle was
+incessant, and that the fighting was renewed from day to day. It was
+then that Gordon missed the ships lying idle at Shendy. If he had had
+them Omdurman would not have fallen, nor would it have been so easy
+for the Mahdi to transport the bulk of his force from the left to the
+right bank of the White Nile, as he did for the final assault on the
+fatal 26th January.</p>
+
+<p>At the end of October the Mahdi, accompanied by a far more numerous
+force than Gordon thought he could raise, described by Slatin as
+countless, pitched his camp a few miles south of Omdurman. On 8th
+November his arrival was celebrated by a direct attack on the lines
+south of Khartoum. The rebels in their fear of the hidden mines, which
+was far greater than it need have been, as it was found they had been
+buried too deep, resorted to the artifice of driving forward cows, and
+by throwing rockets among them Gordon had the satisfaction of
+spreading confusion in their ranks, repulsing the attack, and
+capturing twenty of the animals. Four days later the rebels made the
+desperate attack on Omdurman, when, as stated, communications were
+cut, and the <i>Husseinyeh</i> ran aground. In attempting to carry her off
+and to check the further progress of the rebels the <i>Ismailia</i> was
+badly hit, and the incident was one of those only too frequent at all
+stages of the siege, when Gordon wrote: "Every time I hear the gun
+fire I have a twitch of the heart of gnawing anxiety for my penny
+steamers." At the very moment that these fights were in progress he
+wrote, 10th November: "To-day is the day I expected we should have had
+some one of the Expedition here;" and he also recorded that we "have
+enough biscuit for a month or so"&mdash;meaning at the outside six weeks.
+Throughout the whole of November rumours of a coming British
+Expedition were prevalent, but they were of the vaguest and most
+contradictory character. On 25th November Gordon learnt that it was
+still at Ambukol, 185 miles further away from Khartoum than he had
+expected, and his only comment under this acute disappointment was,
+"This is lively!"</p>
+
+<p>Up to the arrival of the Mahdi daily desertions of his Arab and other
+soldiers to Gordon took place, and by these and levies among the
+townspeople all gaps in the garrison were more than filled up. Such
+was the confidence in Gordon that it more than neutralised all the
+intrigues of the Mahdi's agents in the besieged town, and scarcely a
+man during the first seven months of the siege deserted him; but after
+the arrival of the Mahdi there was a complete change in this respect.
+In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span> the first place there were no more desertions to Gordon, and then
+men began to leave him, partly, no doubt, from fear of the Mahdi, or
+awakened fanaticism, but chiefly through the non-arrival of the
+British Expedition, which had been so much talked about, yet which
+never came. Still to all the enemy's invitations to surrender on the
+most honourable terms Gordon gave defiant answers. "I am here like
+iron, and I hope to see the newly-arrived English;" and when the
+situation had become little short of desperate, at the end of the
+year, he still, with bitter agony at his heart, proudly rejected all
+overtures, and sent the haughty message: "Can hold Khartoum for twelve
+years." Unfortunately the Mahdi knew better. He had read the truth in
+all the papers captured on Stewart's steamer, and he knew that
+Gordon's resources were nearly spent. Even some of the messages Gordon
+sent out by spies for Lord Wolseley's information fell into his hands,
+and on one of these Slatin says it was written: "Can hold Khartoum at
+the outside till the end of January." Although Gordon may be
+considered to have more than held his own against all the power of the
+Mahdi down to the capture of Omdurman Fort on 15th January, the Mahdi
+knew that his straits must be desperate, and that unless the
+expedition arrived he could not hold out much longer. The first
+advance of the English troops on 3rd January across the desert towards
+the Nile probably warned the enemy that now was the time to renew the
+attack with greater vigour, but it does not seem that there is any
+justification for the entirely hypothetical view that at any point the
+Mahdi could have seized the unhappy town. Omdurman Fort itself fell,
+not to the desperate onset of his Ghazis, but from the want of food
+and ammunition, and with Gordon's expressed permission to the
+commandant to surrender. Unfortunately the details of the most tragic
+part of the siege are missing, but Gordon himself well summed up what
+he had done up to the end of October when his position was secure, and
+aid, as he thought, was close at hand:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The news of Hicks's defeat was known in Cairo three weeks after
+the event occurred; since that date up to this (29th October
+1884) nine people have come up as reinforcements&mdash;myself,
+Stewart, Herbin, Hussein, Tongi, Ruckdi, and three servants, and
+not one penny of money. Of those who came up two, Stewart and
+Herbin, have gone down, Hussein is dead; so six alone remain,
+while we must have sent down over 1500 and 700 soldiers, total
+2200, including the two Pashas, Coetlogon, etc. The regulars, who
+were in arrears of pay for three months when I came, are now only
+owed half a month, while the Bashi-Bazouks are owed only a
+quarter month, and we have some &pound;500 in the Treasury. It is quite
+a miracle. We have lost two battles, suffering severe losses in
+these actions of men and arms, and may have said to have
+scrambled through, for I cannot say we can lay claim to any great
+success during the whole time. I believe we have more ammunition<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>
+(Remington) and more soldiers now than when I came up. We have
+&pound;40,000 in Treasury <i>in paper</i> and &pound;500. When I came up there was
+&pound;5000 in Treasury. We have &pound;15,000 out in the town in paper
+money."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>At the point (14th December) when the authentic history of the
+protracted siege and gallant defence of Khartoum stops, a pause may be
+made to turn back and describe what the Government and country which
+sent General Gordon on his most perilous mission, and made use of his
+extraordinary devotion to the call of duty to extricate themselves
+from a responsibility they had not the courage to face, had been doing
+not merely to support their envoy, but to vindicate their own honour.
+The several messages which General Gordon had succeeded in getting
+through had shown how necessary some reinforcement and support were at
+the very commencement of the siege. The lapse of time, rendered the
+more expressive by the long period of silence that fell over what was
+taking place in the besieged town, showed, beyond need of
+demonstration, the gravity of the case and the desperate nature of the
+situation. But a very little of the knowledge at the command of the
+Government from a number of competent sources would have enabled it to
+foresee what was certain to happen, and to have provided some remedy
+for the peril long before the following despairing message from Gordon
+showed that the hour when any aid would be useful had almost expired.
+This was the passage, dated 13th December, in the last (sixth) volume
+of the Journal, but the substance of which reached Lord Wolseley by
+one of Gordon's messengers at Korti on 31st December:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We are going to send down the <i>Bordeen</i> the day after to-morrow,
+and with her I shall send this Journal. <i>If some effort is not
+made before ten days' time the town will fall.</i> It is
+inexplicable this delay. If the Expeditionary forces have reached
+the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we
+require just to show themselves.... Even if the town falls under
+the nose of the Expeditionary forces it will not in my opinion
+justify the abandonment of Senaar and Kassala, or of the
+Equatorial Province by H.M.'s Government. All that is absolutely
+necessary is for fifty of the Expeditionary force to get on board
+a steamer and come up to Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be
+felt. This is not asking much, but it must happen <i>at once</i>, or
+it will (as usual) be too late."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The motives which induced Mr Gladstone's Government to send General
+Gordon to the Soudan in January 1884 were, as has been clearly shown,
+the selfish desire to appease public opinion, and to shirk in the
+easiest possible manner a great responsibility. They had no policy at
+all, but they had one supreme wish, viz. to cut off the Soudan from
+Egypt; and if the Mahdi had only known their wishes and pressed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> on,
+and treated the Khartoum force as he had treated that under Hicks,
+there would have been no garrisons to rescue, and that British
+Government would have done nothing. It recked nothing of the grave
+dangers that would have accrued from the complete triumph of the
+Mahdi, or of the outbreak that must have followed in Lower Egypt if
+his tide of success had not been checked as it was single-handed by
+General Gordon, through the twelve months' defence of Khartoum. Still
+it could not quite stoop to the dishonour of abandoning these
+garrisons, and of making itself an accomplice to the Mahdi's
+butcheries, nor could it altogether turn a deaf ear to the
+representations and remonstrances of even such a puppet prince as the
+Khedive Tewfik. England was then far more mistress of the situation at
+Cairo than she is now, but a helpless refusal to discharge her duty
+might have provoked Europe into action at the Porte that would have
+proved inconvenient and damaging to her position and reputation.
+Therefore the Government fell back on General Gordon, and the hope was
+even indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation
+of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his
+success might induce the public and the world to accept that
+abnegation of policy as the acme of wisdom. In all this they were
+destined to a complete awakening, and the only matter of surprise is
+that they should have sent so well-known a character as General
+Gordon, whose independence and contempt for official etiquette and
+restraint were no secrets at the Foreign and War Offices, on a mission
+in which they required him not only to be as indifferent to the
+national honour as they were, but also to be tied and restrained by
+the shifts and requirements of an embarrassed executive.</p>
+
+<p>At a very early stage of the mission the Government obtained evidence
+that Gordon's views on the subject were widely different from theirs.
+They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's
+policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out
+that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he
+thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, "if Egypt
+is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up." The hopes that had
+been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of
+representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus
+dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool,
+was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the
+evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to
+be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to
+the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum.
+While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief
+part of his task, viz.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span> the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all
+the Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and
+the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that
+should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress.
+All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole
+matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase
+he revealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes,
+however repressed his charge might keep them, really were.</p>
+
+<p>Having told them that "the Mahdi must be smashed up," he went on to
+say that "we cannot hurry over this affair" (the future of the Soudan)
+"if we do we shall incur disaster," and again that, although "it is a
+miserable country it is joined to Egypt, and it would be difficult to
+divorce the two." Within a very few weeks, therefore, the Government
+learnt that its own agent was the most forcible and damaging critic of
+the policy of evacuation, and that the worries of the Soudan question
+for an administration not resolute enough to solve the difficulty in a
+thorough manner were increased and not diminished by Gordon's mission.
+At that point the proposition was made and supported by several
+members of the Cabinet that Gordon should be recalled. There is no
+doubt that this step would have been taken but for the fear that it
+would aggravate the difficulties of the English expedition sent to
+Souakim under the command of General Gerald Graham to retrieve the
+defeat of Baker Pasha. Failing the adoption of that extreme measure,
+which would at least have been straightforward and honest, and
+ignoring what candour seemed to demand if a decision had been come to
+to render Gordon no support, and to bid him shift for himself, the
+Government resorted to the third and least justifiable course of all,
+viz. of showing indifference to the legitimate requests of their
+emissary, and of putting off definite action until the very last
+moment.</p>
+
+<p>We have seen that Gordon made several specific demands in the first
+six weeks of his stay at Khartoum&mdash;that is, in the short period before
+communication was cut off. He wanted Zebehr, 200 troops at Berber, or
+even at Wady Halfa, and the opening of the route from Souakim to the
+Nile. To these requests not one favourable answer was given, and the
+not wholly unnatural rejection of the first rendered it more than ever
+necessary to comply with the others. They were such as ought to have
+been granted, and in anticipation they had been suggested and
+discussed before Gordon felt bound to urge them as necessary for the
+security of his position at Khartoum. Even Sir Evelyn Baring had
+recommended in February the despatch of 200 men to Assouan for the
+moral effect, and that was the very<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> reason why Gordon asked, in the
+first place, for the despatch of a small British force to at least
+Wady Halfa. It is possible that one of the chief reasons for the
+Government rejecting all these suggestions, and also, it must be
+remembered, doing nothing in their place towards the relief and
+support of their representative, may have been the hope that this
+treatment would have led him to resign and throw up his mission. They
+would then have been able to declare that, as the task was beyond the
+powers of General Gordon, they were only coming to the prudent and
+logical conclusion in saying that nothing could be done, and that the
+garrisons had better come to terms with the Mahdi. Unfortunately for
+those who favoured the evasion of trouble as the easiest and best way
+out of the difficulty, Gordon had high notions as to what duty
+required. No difficulty had terrors for him, and while left at the
+post of power and responsibility he would endeavour to show himself
+equal to the charge.</p>
+
+<p>Yet there can be no doubt that those who sent him would have rejoiced
+if he had formally asked to be relieved of the task he had accepted,
+and Mr Gladstone stated on the 3rd April that "Gordon was under no
+orders and no restraint to stay at Khartoum." A significant answer to
+the fact represented in that statement was supplied, when, ten days
+later, silence fell on Khartoum, and remained unbroken for more than
+five months. But at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that
+statement as to Gordon's liberty of movement, the Government knew of
+the candid views which he had expressed as to the proper policy for
+the Soudan. It should have been apparent that, unless they and their
+author were promptly repudiated, and unless the latter was stripped of
+his official authority, the Government would, however tardily and
+reluctantly, be drawn after its representative into a policy of
+intervention in the Soudan, which it, above everything else, wished to
+avoid. Gordon concealed nothing. He told them "time,"
+"reinforcements," and a very considerable expenditure was necessary to
+honourably carry out their policy of evacuation. They were not
+prepared to concede any of these save the last, and even the money
+they sent him was lost because they would send it by Berber instead of
+Kassala. But they knew that "the order and restraint" which kept
+Gordon at Khartoum was the duty he had contracted towards them when he
+accepted his mission, and which was binding on a man of his principles
+until they chose to relieve him of the task. The fear of public
+opinion had more to do with their abstaining from the step of ordering
+his recall than the hope that his splendid energy and administrative
+power might yet provide some satisfactory issue from the dilemma, for
+at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> the very beginning it was freely given out that "General Gordon
+was exceeding his instructions."</p>
+
+<p>The interruption of communications with Khartoum at least suspended
+Gordon's constant representations as to what he thought the right
+policy, as well as his demands for the fulfilment by the Government of
+their side of the contract. It was then that Lord Granville seemed to
+pluck up heart of grace, and to challenge Gordon's right to remain at
+Khartoum. On 23rd April Lord Granville asked for explanation of "cause
+of detention." Unfortunately it was not till months later that the
+country knew of Gordon's terse and humorous reply, "cause of
+detention, these horribly plucky Arabs." Lord Granville, thinking this
+despatch not clear enough, followed it up on 17th May by instructing
+Mr Egerton, then acting for Sir Evelyn Baring, to send the following
+remonstrance to Gordon:</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been
+dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with
+the countenance of H.M.'s Government, General Gordon is enjoined
+to consider, and either to report upon, or, if possible, to adopt
+at the first proper moment measures for his own removal and for
+that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him, or
+who have served him faithfully, including their wives and
+children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial
+regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Then followed suggestions and authority to pay so much a head for
+refugees safely escorted to Korosko. The comment Gordon made on that,
+and similar despatches, to save himself and any part of the garrison
+he could, was that he was not so mean as to desert those who had nobly
+stood by him and committed themselves on the strength of his word.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible to go behind the collective responsibility of the
+Government and to attempt to fix any special responsibility or blame
+on any individual member of that Government. The facts as I read them
+show plainly that there was a complete abnegation of policy or purpose
+on the part of the British Government, that Gordon was then sent as a
+sort of stop-gap, and that when it was revealed that he had strong
+views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him,
+it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall
+him, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post
+and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless
+he would execute a <i>sauve qui peut</i> sort of retreat to the frontier.
+Very harsh things have been said of Mr Gladstone and his Cabinet on
+this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so
+very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and
+displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>
+question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but
+that they had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the
+decision, as Gordon wrote, "to abandon altogether and not care what
+happens."</p>
+
+<p>But all these minor points were merged in a great common national
+anxiety when month after month passed during the spring and summer of
+1884, and not a single word issued from the tomb-like silence of
+Khartoum. People might argue that the worst could not have happened,
+as the Mahdi would have been only too anxious to proclaim his triumph
+far and wide if Khartoum had fallen. Anxiety may be diminished, but is
+not banished, by a calculation of probabilities, and the military
+spirit and capacity exhibited by the Mahdi's forces under Osman Digma
+in the fighting with General Graham's well-equipped British force at
+Teb and Tamanieb revealed the greatness of the peril with which Gordon
+had to deal at Khartoum where he had only the inadequate and
+untrustworthy garrison described by Colonel de Coetlogon. During the
+summer of 1884 there was therefore a growing fear, not only that the
+worst news might come at any moment, but that in the most favourable
+event any news would reveal the desperate situation to which Gordon
+had been reduced, and with that conviction came the thought, not
+whether he had exactly carried out what Ministers had expected him to
+do, but solely of his extraordinary courage and devotion to his
+country, which had led him to take up a thankless task without the
+least regard for his comfort or advantage, and without counting the
+odds. There was at least one Minister in the Cabinet who was struck by
+that single-minded conduct; and as early as April, when his colleagues
+were asking the formal question why Gordon did not leave Khartoum, the
+Marquis of Hartington, then Minister of War, and now Duke of
+Devonshire, began to inquire as to the steps necessary to rescue the
+emissary, while still adhering to the policy of the Administration of
+which he formed part. During the whole of that summer the present Duke
+of Devonshire advocated the special claim of General Gordon on the
+Government, whose mandate he had so readily accepted, and urged the
+necessity of special measures being taken at the earliest moment to
+save the gallant envoy from what seemed the too probable penalty of
+his own temerity and devotion. But for his energetic and consistent
+representations the steps that were taken&mdash;all too late as they
+proved&mdash;never would have been taken at all, or deferred to such a date
+as to let the public see by the event that there was no use in
+throwing away money and precious lives on a lost cause.</p>
+
+<p>If the first place among those in power&mdash;for of my own and other
+journalists' efforts in the Press to arouse public opinion and to urge
+the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span> Government to timely action it is unnecessary to speak&mdash;is due to
+the Duke of Devonshire, the second may reasonably be claimed by Lord
+Wolseley. This recognition is the more called for here, because the
+most careful consideration of the facts has led me to the conclusion,
+which I would gladly avoid the necessity of expressing if it were
+possible, that Lord Wolseley was responsible for the failure of the
+relief expedition. This stage of responsibility has not yet been
+reached, and it must be duly set forth that on 24th July Lord
+Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, wrote a noble letter, stating that,
+as he "did not wish to share the responsibility of leaving Charley
+Gordon to his fate," he recommended "immediate action," and "the
+despatch of a small brigade of between three and four thousand British
+soldiers to Dongola, so that they might reach that place about 15th
+October." But even that date was later than it ought to have been,
+especially when the necessity of getting the English troops back as
+early in the New Year as possible was considered, and in the
+subsequent recriminations that ensued, the blame for being late from
+the start was sought to be thrown on the badness of the Nile flood
+that year. General Gordon himself cruelly disposed of that theory or
+excuse when he wrote, "It was not a bad Nile; quite an average one.
+You were too late, that was all." Still, Lord Wolseley must not be
+robbed of the credit of having said on 24th July that an expedition
+was necessary to save Gordon, "his old friend and Crimean comrade,"
+towards whom Wolseley himself had contracted a special moral
+obligation for his prominent share in inducing him to accept the very
+mission that had already proved so full of peril. In short, if the
+plain truth must be told, Lord Wolseley was far more responsible for
+the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum than Mr Gladstone.</p>
+
+<p>The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and
+the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, was that the Government gave
+in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of
+Khartoum, and acquiesced in the despatch of an expedition to relieve
+General Gordon. Having once made the concession, it must be allowed
+that they showed no niggard spirit in sanctioning the expedition and
+the proposals of the military authorities. The sum of ten millions was
+devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had
+rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that total. Ten
+thousand men selected from the <i>&eacute;lite</i> of the British army were
+assigned to the task for which he had begged two hundred men in vain.
+It is impossible here to enter closely into the causes which led to
+the expansion of the three or four thousand British infantry into a
+special corps of ten thousand fighting men, picked from the crack
+regiments of the army, and composed of every arm of the service
+compelled to fight under unaccustomed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span> conditions. The local
+authorities&mdash;in particular Major Kitchener, now the Sirdar of the
+Egyptian army, who is slowly recovering from the Mahdi the provinces
+which should never have been left in his possession&mdash;protested that
+the expedition should be a small one, and if their advice had been
+taken the cost would have been about one-fourth that incurred, and the
+force would have reached Khartoum by that 11th November on which
+Gordon expected to see the first man of it. But Major Kitchener,
+although, as Gordon wrote, "one of the few really first-class officers
+in the British army," was only an individual, and his word did not
+possess a feather's weight before the influence of the Pall Mall band
+of warriors who have farmed out our little wars&mdash;India, of course,
+excepted&mdash;of the last thirty years for their own glorification. So
+great a chance of fame as "the rescue of Gordon" was not to be left to
+some unknown brigadiers, or to the few line regiments, the proximity
+of whose stations entitled them to the task. That would be neglecting
+the favours of Providence. For so noble a task the control of the most
+experienced commander in the British army would alone suffice, and
+when he took the field his staff had to be on the extensive scale that
+suited his dignity and position. As there would be some reasonable
+excuse for the dispensation of orders and crosses from a campaign
+against a religious leader who had not yet known defeat, any friend
+might justly complain if he was left behind. To justify so brilliant a
+staff, no ordinary British force would suffice. Therefore our
+household brigade, our heavy cavalry, and our light cavalry were
+requisitioned for their best men, and these splendid troops were
+drafted and amalgamated into special corps&mdash;heavy and light
+camelry&mdash;for work that would have been done far better and more
+efficiently by two regiments of Bengal Lancers. If all this effort and
+expenditure had resulted in success, it would be possible to keep
+silent and shrug one's shoulders; but when the mode of undertaking
+this expedition can be clearly shown to have been the direct cause of
+its failure, silence would be a crime. When Lord Wolseley told the
+soldiers at Korti on their return from Metemmah, "It was not <i>your</i>
+fault that Gordon has perished and Khartoum fallen," the positiveness
+of his assurance may have been derived from the inner conviction of
+his own stupendous error.</p>
+
+<p>The expedition was finally sanctioned in August, and the news of its
+coming was known to General Gordon in September, before, indeed, his
+own despatches of 31st July were received in London, and broke the
+suspense of nearly half a year. He thought that only a small force was
+coming, under the command of Major-General Earle, and he at once, as
+already described, sent his steamers back to Shendy, there to await
+the troops and convey them to Khartoum. He seems to have calculated
+that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span> three months from the date of the message informing him of the
+expedition would suffice for the conveyance of the troops as far as
+Berber or Metemmah, and at that rate General Earle would have arrived
+where his steamers awaited him early in November. Gordon's views as to
+the object of the expedition, which somebody called the Gordon Relief
+Expedition, were thus clearly expressed:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
+expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our
+National honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a
+position in which our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons.
+I was Relief Expedition No. 1; they are Relief Expedition No. 2.
+As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment, if I
+wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief
+expedition was to bolt, and the steamers fell into the hands of
+the Mahdi. This second relief expedition (for the honour of
+England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat
+hampered. We, the first and second expeditions, are equally
+engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up
+to extricate the garrison, and failed. Earle comes up to
+extricate garrisons, and I hope succeeds. Earle does not come to
+extricate me. The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to
+affect our "National honour." If Earle succeeds, the "National
+honour" thanks him, and I hope recommends him, but it is
+altogether independent of me, who, for failing, incurs its blame.
+I am not <i>the rescued lamb</i>, and I will not be."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an
+expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of
+supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried
+out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and
+less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only
+arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions
+reached him in the following form:&mdash;"The primary object of your
+expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and
+you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that
+object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations
+of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and
+clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had,
+however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the
+National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned
+an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its
+long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With
+extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its
+purpose, and wrote:&mdash;"I very much doubt what is really going to be the
+policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola,"
+and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond
+Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."</p>
+
+<p>The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> that
+there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four
+months, which would have carried the garrison on till the end of
+November. As the greater part of that period had expired when these
+documents reached Lord Wolseley's hands, it was quite impossible to
+doubt that time had become the most important factor of all in the
+situation. The chance of being too late would even then have presented
+itself to a prudent commander, and, above all, to a friend hastening
+to the rescue of a friend. The news that Colonel Stewart and some
+other Europeans had been entrapped and murdered near Merowe, which
+reached the English commander from different sources before Gordon
+confirmed it in his letters, was also calculated to stimulate, by
+showing that Gordon was alone, and had single-handed to conduct the
+defence of a populous city. Hard on the heels of that intelligence
+came Gordon's letter of 4th November to Lord Wolseley, who received it
+at Dongola on 14th of the same month. The letter was a long one, but
+only two passages need be quoted:&mdash;"At Metemmah, waiting your orders,
+are five steamers with nine guns." Did it not occur to anyone how
+greatly, at the worst stage of the siege, Gordon had thus weakened
+himself to assist the relieving expedition? Even for that reason there
+was not a day or an hour to be lost.</p>
+
+<p>But the letter contained a worse and more alarming passage:&mdash;"We can
+hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." Forty
+days would have meant till 14th December, one month ahead of the day
+Lord Wolseley received the news, but the message was really more
+alarming than the form in which it was published, for there is no
+doubt that the word "difficult" is the official rendering of Gordon's,
+a little indistinctly written, word "desperate." In face of that
+alarming message, which only stated facts that ought to have been
+surmised, if not known, it was no longer possible to pursue the
+leisurely promenade up the Nile, which was timed so as to bring the
+whole force to Khartoum in the first week of March. Rescue by the most
+prominent general and swell troops of England at Easter would hardly
+gratify the commandant and garrison starved into surrender the
+previous Christmas, and that was the exact relationship between
+Wolseley's plans and Gordon's necessities.</p>
+
+<p>The date at which Gordon's supplies would be exhausted varied not from
+any miscalculation, but because on two successive occasions he
+discovered large stores of grain and biscuits, which had been stolen
+from the public granaries before his arrival. The supplies that would
+all have disappeared in November were thus eked out, first till the
+middle of December, and then finally till the end of January, but
+there is no doubt that they would not have lasted as long as they did
+if in the last<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> month of the siege he had not given the civil
+population permission to leave the doomed town. From any and from
+every point of view, there was not the shadow of an excuse for a
+moment's delay after the receipt of that letter on 14th November.</p>
+
+<p>With the British Exchequer at a commander's back, it is easy to
+organise an expedition on an elaborate scale, and to carry it out with
+the nicety of perfection, but for the realisation of these ponderous
+plans there is one thing more necessary, and that is time. I have no
+doubt if Gordon's letter had said "granaries full, can hold out till
+Easter," that Lord Wolseley's deliberate march&mdash;Cairo, September 27;
+Wady Halfa, October 8; Dongola, November 14; Korti, December 30;
+Metemmah any day in February, and Khartoum, March 3, and those were
+the approximate dates of his grand plan of campaign&mdash;would have been
+fully successful, and held up for admiration as a model of skill.
+Unfortunately, it would not do for the occasion, as Gordon was on the
+verge of starvation and in desperate straits when the rescuing force
+reached Dongola. It is not easy to alter the plan of any campaign, nor
+to adapt a heavy moving machine to the work suitable for a light one.
+To feed 10,000 British soldiers on the middle Nile was alone a feat of
+organisation such as no other country could have attempted, but the
+effort was exhausting, and left no reserve energy to despatch that
+quick-moving battalion which could have reached Gordon's steamers
+early in December, and would have reinforced the Khartoum garrison,
+just as Havelock and Outram did the Lucknow Residency.</p>
+
+<p>Dongola is only 100 miles below Debbeh, where the intelligence
+officers and a small force were on that 14th November; Ambukol,
+specially recommended by Gordon as the best starting-point, is less
+than fifty miles, and Korti, the point selected by Lord Wolseley, is
+exactly that distance above Debbeh. The Bayuda desert route by the
+Jakdul Wells to Metemmah is 170 miles. At Metemmah were the five
+steamers with nine guns to convoy the desperately needed succour to
+Khartoum. The energy expended on the despatch of 10,000 men up 150
+miles of river, if concentrated on 1000 men, must have given a
+speedier result, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the
+year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to
+make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.</p>
+
+<p>The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking
+six weeks to do what&mdash;the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not
+of the main force, but of 1000 men&mdash;ought to have been done in one
+week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel
+corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's
+power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> movement of
+the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was
+effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy
+in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not
+forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this
+difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud
+Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the
+camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and
+the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The
+last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi
+with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining
+reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would
+have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly
+expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of
+contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of
+the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as
+far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at
+home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a
+line of communication of over 1200 miles.</p>
+
+<p>Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a
+well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave
+Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well
+known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places,
+and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The
+officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert
+Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others
+impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the
+view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was
+trammelled by his instructions, which were to this effect&mdash;he was to
+establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water
+there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be
+determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and
+so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his
+1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full,
+he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish
+the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case
+when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but
+even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.</p>
+
+<p>The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January
+1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss,
+unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British
+relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be
+a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span> reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart
+had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would
+undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops
+would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it
+must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the
+required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord
+Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.</p>
+
+<p>General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with
+him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more
+urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid
+did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might
+fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who
+brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart
+left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him
+orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but
+the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a
+preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole
+expedition.</p>
+
+<p>The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a
+surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the
+subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume
+the offensive.</p>
+
+<p>On 12th January&mdash;that is, nine days after his first arrival at
+Jakdul&mdash;General Stewart reached the place a second time with the
+second detachment of another 1000 men&mdash;the total fighting strength of
+the column being raised to about 2300 men. For whatever errors had
+been committed, and their consequences, the band of soldiers assembled
+at Jakdul on that 12th of January could in no sense be held
+responsible. Without making any invidious comparisons, it may be
+truthfully said that such a splendid fighting force was never
+assembled in any other cause, and the temper of the men was strung to
+a high point of enthusiasm by the thought that at last they had
+reached the final stage of the long journey to rescue Gordon. A number
+of causes, principally the fatigue of the camels from the treble
+journey between Korti and Jakdul, made the advance very slow, and five
+days were occupied in traversing the forty-five miles between Jakdul
+and the wells at Abou Klea, themselves distant twenty miles from
+Metemmah. On the morning of 17th January it became clear that the
+column was in presence of an enemy.</p>
+
+<p>At the time of Stewart's first arrival at Jakdul there were no hostile
+forces in the Bayuda desert. At Berber was a considerable body of the
+Mahdi's followers, and both Metemmah and Shendy were held in his name.
+At the latter place a battery or small fort had been erected, and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span> in
+an encounter between it and Gordon's steamers one of the latter had
+been sunk, thus reducing their total to four. But there were none of
+the warrior tribes of Kordofan and Darfour at any of these places, or
+nearer than the six camps which had been established round Khartoum.
+The news of the English advance made the Mahdi bestir himself, and as
+it was known that the garrison of Omdurman was reduced to the lowest
+straits, and could not hold out many days, the Mahdi despatched some
+of his best warriors of the Jaalin, Degheim, and Kenana tribes to
+oppose the British troops in the Bayuda desert. It was these men who
+opposed the further advance of Sir Herbert Stewart's column at Abou
+Klea. It is unnecessary to describe the desperate assault these
+gallant warriors made on the somewhat cumbrous and ill-arranged square
+of the British force, or the ease and tremendous loss with which these
+fanatics were beaten off, and never allowed to come to close quarters,
+save at one point. The infantry soldiers, who formed two sides of the
+square, signally repulsed the onset, not a Ghazi succeeded in getting
+within a range of 300 yards; but on another side, cavalrymen, doing
+infantry soldiers' unaccustomed work, did not adhere to the strict
+formation necessary, and trained for the close <i>mel&eacute;e</i>, and with the
+<i>gaudia certaminis</i> firing their blood, they recklessly allowed the
+Ghazis to come to close quarters, and their line of the square was
+impinged upon. In that close fighting, with the Heavy Camel Corps men
+and the Naval Brigade, the Blacks suffered terribly, but they also
+inflicted loss in return. Of a total loss on the British side of
+sixty-five killed and sixty-one wounded, the Heavy Camel Corps lost
+fifty-two, and the Sussex Regiment, performing work to which it was
+thoroughly trained, inflicted immense loss on the enemy at hardly any
+cost to itself. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Fred. Burnaby,
+one of the noblest and gentlest, as he was physically the strongest,
+officers in the British army. There is no doubt that signal as was
+this success, it shook the confidence of the force. The men were
+resolute to a point of ferocity, but the leaders' confidence in
+themselves and their task had been rudely tried; and yet the breaking
+of the square had been clearly due to a tactical blunder, and the
+inability of the cavalry to adapt themselves to a strange position.</p>
+
+<p>On the 18th January the march, rendered slower by the conveyance of
+the wounded, was resumed, but no fighting took place on that day,
+although it was clear that the enemy had not been dispersed. On the
+19th, when the force had reached the last wells at Abou Kru or Gubat,
+it became clear that another battle was to be fought. One of the first
+shots seriously wounded Sir Herbert Stewart, and during the whole of
+the affair many of our men were carried off by the heavy rifle fire of
+the enemy.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span> Notwithstanding that our force fought under many
+disadvantages and was not skilfully handled, the Mahdists were driven
+off with terrible loss, while our force had thirty-six killed and one
+hundred and seven wounded. Notwithstanding these two defeats, the
+enemy were not cowed, and held on to Metemmah, in which no doubt those
+who had taken part in the battles were assisted by a force from
+Berber. The 20th January was wasted in inaction, caused by the large
+number of wounded, and when on 21st January Metemmah was attacked, the
+Mahdists showed so bold a front that Sir Charles Wilson, who succeeded
+to the command on Sir Herbert Stewart being incapacitated by his, as
+it proved, mortal wound, drew off his force. This was the more
+disappointing, because Gordon's four steamers arrived during the
+action and took a gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the
+effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly
+unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the
+gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming.
+He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid
+did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be
+desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir
+Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement&mdash;the very last entry
+under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the
+Expeditionary Force&mdash;and I ask for no more than 200 men&mdash;does not come
+in ten days, <i>the town may fall</i>, and I have done my best for the
+honour of our country. Good-bye."</p>
+
+<p>The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the
+view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch
+of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his
+sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence,
+have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel
+Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and
+Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after
+ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our
+people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their
+movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents,
+which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is
+impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to
+Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum
+was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute,
+had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been
+destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of
+reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body
+under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> think
+that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last
+moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the
+earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when
+I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any
+suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and
+untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a
+sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at daybreak
+on the 26th, for the theory that the Mahdi could have entered the town
+one hour before he did was never a serious argument, while the
+evidence of Slatin Pasha strengthens the view that Gordon was at the
+last moment only overcome by the Khalifa's resorting to a surprise. On
+one point of fact Sir Charles Wilson seems also to have been in error.
+He fixes the fall of Omdurman at 6th January, whereas Slatin, whose
+information on the point ought to be unimpeachable, states that it did
+not occur until the 15th of that month.</p>
+
+<p>When Sir Herbert Stewart had fought and won the battle of Abou Klea,
+it was his intention on reaching the Nile, as he expected to do the
+next day, to put Sir Charles Wilson on board one of Gordon's own
+steamers and send him off at once to Khartoum. The second battle and
+Sir Herbert Stewart's fatal wound destroyed that project. But this
+plan might have been adhered to so far as the altered circumstances
+would allow. Sir Charles Wilson had succeeded to the command, and many
+matters affecting the position of the force had to be settled before
+he was free to devote himself to the main object of the dash forward,
+viz. the establishment of communications with Gordon and Khartoum. As
+the consequence of that change in his own position, it would have been
+natural that he should have delegated the task to someone else, and in
+Lord Charles Beresford, as brave a sailor as ever led a cutting-out
+party, there was the very man for the occasion. Unfortunately, Sir
+Charles Wilson did not take this step for, as I believe, the sole
+reason that he was the bearer of an important official letter to
+General Gordon, which he did not think could be entrusted to any other
+hands. But for that circumstance it is permissible to say that one
+steamer&mdash;there was more than enough wood on the other three steamers
+to fit one out for the journey to Khartoum&mdash;would have sailed on the
+morning of the 22nd, the day after the force sheered off from
+Metemmah, and, at the latest, it would have reached Khartoum on
+Sunday, the 25th, just in time to avert the catastrophe.</p>
+
+<p>But as it was done, the whole of the 22nd and 23rd were taken up in
+preparing two steamers for the voyage, and in collecting scarlet coats
+for the troops, so that the effect of real British soldiers coming up
+the Nile might be made more considerable. At 8 <span class="smcap">a.m.</span> on Saturday,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span> the
+24th, Sir Charles Wilson at last sailed with the two steamers,
+<i>Bordeen</i> and <i>Talataween</i>, and it was then quite impossible for the
+steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover,
+the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that
+navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka
+cataract was passed at 3 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> on the afternoon of Sunday; then the
+<i>Bordeen</i> ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 <span class="smcap">p.m.</span> on the
+fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was
+reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was
+killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past
+Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in
+the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream
+under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black
+gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the
+<i>Talataween</i> ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the
+<i>Bordeen</i>. Two days later the <i>Bordeen</i> shared the same fate, but the
+whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer,
+brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the
+subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously
+failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to
+accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it
+must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and
+spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning
+their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon
+himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main
+fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its
+capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so
+long defied.</p>
+
+<p>I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of
+which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been
+published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not
+been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's
+intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command
+at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it
+been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's
+strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English
+soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would
+have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against
+orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sole object of the
+Expedition have been attained without regard for the national honour,
+and without the discovery of that policy, the want of which was the
+only cause of the calamities associated with the Soudan.</p>
+
+<p>After the 14th of December there is no trustworthy, or at least,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span>
+complete evidence, as to what took place in Khartoum. A copy of one of
+the defiant messages Gordon used to circulate for the special purpose
+of letting them fall into the hands of the Mahdi was dated 29th of
+that month, and ran to the effect, "Can hold Khartoum for years."
+There was also the final message to the Sovereigns of the Powers,
+undated, and probably written, if at all, by Gordon, during the final
+agony of the last few weeks, perhaps when Omdurman had fallen. It was
+worded as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"After salutations, I would at once, calling to mind what I have
+gone through, inform their Majesties, the Sovereigns, of the
+action of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me
+as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing
+the rebellion in that country.</p>
+
+<p>"During the twelve months that I have been here, these two
+Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth, and the other for her
+military force, have remained unaffected by my situation&mdash;perhaps
+relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who
+surrendered of his own accord.</p>
+
+<p>"Although I, personally, am too insignificant to be taken into
+account, the Powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the
+engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield
+the honour of the Governments.</p>
+
+<p>"What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God
+will help me."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Although this copy was not in Gordon's own writing, it was brought
+down by one of his clerks, who escaped from Khartoum, and he declared
+that the original had been sent in a cartridge case to Dongola. The
+style is certainly the style of Gordon, and there was no one in the
+Soudan who could imitate it. It seems safe, as Sir Henry Gordon did,
+to accept it as the farewell message of his brother.</p>
+
+<p>Until fresh evidence comes to light, that of Slatin Pasha, then a
+chained captive in the Mahdi's camp, is alone entitled to the
+slightest credence, and it is extremely graphic. We can well believe
+that up to the last moment Gordon continued to send out
+messages&mdash;false, to deceive the Mahdi, and true to impress Lord
+Wolseley. The note of 29th December was one of the former; the little
+French note on half a cigarette paper, brought by Abdullah Khalifa to
+Slatin to translate early in January, may have been one of the latter.
+It said:&mdash;"Can hold Khartoum at the outside till the end of January."
+Slatin then describes the fall of Omdurman on 15th January, with
+Gordon's acquiescence, which entirely disposes of the assertion that
+Ferratch, the gallant defender of that place during two months, was a
+traitor, and of how, on its surrender, Gordon's fire from the western
+wall of Khartoum prevented the Mahdists occupying it. He also comments
+on the alarm caused by the first advance of the British force into the
+Bayuda desert,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> and of the despatch of thousands of the Mahdi's best
+warriors to oppose it. Those forces quitted the camp at Omdurman
+between 10th and 15th January, and this step entirely disposes of the
+theory that the Mahdi held Khartoum in the hollow of his hand, and
+could at any moment take it. As late as the 15th of January, Gordon's
+fire was so vigorous and successful that the Mahdi was unable to
+retain possession of the fort which he had just captured.</p>
+
+<p>The story had best be continued in the words used by the witness. Six
+days after the fall of Omdurman loud weeping and wailing filled the
+Mahdi's camp. As the Mahdi forbade the display of sorrow and grief it
+was clear that something most unusual had taken place. Then it came
+out that the British troops had met and utterly defeated the tribes,
+with a loss to the Mahdists of several thousands. Within the next two
+or three days came news of the other defeat at Abou Kru, and the loud
+lamentations of the women and children could not be checked. The Mahdi
+and his chief emirs, the present Khalifa Abdullah prominent among
+them, then held a consultation, and it was decided, sooner than lose
+all the fruits of the hitherto unchecked triumph of their cause, to
+risk an assault on Khartoum. At night on the 24th, and again on the
+25th, the bulk of the rebel force was conveyed across the river to the
+right bank of the White Nile; the Mahdi preached them a sermon,
+promising them victory, and they were enjoined to receive his remarks
+in silence, so that no noise was heard in the beleaguered city. By
+this time their terror of the mines laid in front of the south wall
+had become much diminished, because the mines had been placed too low
+in the earth, and they also knew that Gordon and his diminished force
+were in the last stages of exhaustion. Finally, the Mahdi or his
+energetic lieutenant decided on one more arrangement, which was
+probably the true cause of their success. The Mahdists had always
+delivered their attack half an hour after sunrise; on this occasion
+they decided to attack half an hour before dawn, when the whole scene
+was covered in darkness. Slatin knew all these plans, and as he
+listened anxiously in his place of confinement he was startled, when
+just dropping off to sleep, by "the deafening discharge of thousands
+of rifles and guns; this lasted for a few minutes, then only
+occasional rifle shots were heard, and now all was quiet again. Could
+this possibly be the great attack on Khartoum? A wild discharge of
+firearms and cannon, and in a few minutes complete silence!" He was
+not left long in doubt. Some hours afterwards three black soldiers
+approached, carrying in a bloody cloth the head of General Gordon,
+which he identified. It is unnecessary to add the gruesome details
+which Slatin picked up as to his manner of death from the gossip of
+the camp. In this terrible tragedy ended that noble defence of
+Khartoum,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span> which, wherever considered or discussed, and for all time,
+will excite the pity and admiration of the world.</p>
+
+<p>There is no need to dwell further on the terrible end of one of the
+purest heroes our country has ever produced, whose loss was national,
+but most deeply felt as an irreparable shock, and as a void that can
+never be filled up by that small circle of men and women who might
+call themselves his friends. Ten years elapsed after the eventful
+morning when Slatin pronounced over his remains the appropriate
+epitaph, "A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have
+fallen; his sufferings are over!" before the exact manner of Gordon's
+death was known, and some even clung to the chance that after all he
+might have escaped to the Equator, and indeed it was not till long
+after the expedition had returned that the remarkable details of his
+single-handed defence of Khartoum became known. Had all these
+particulars come out at the moment when the public learnt that
+Khartoum had fallen, and that the expedition was to return without
+accomplishing anything, it is possible that there would have been a
+demand that no Minister could have resisted to avenge his fate; but it
+was not till the publication of the journals that the exact character
+of his magnificent defence and of the manner in which he was treated
+by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the
+nation.</p>
+
+<p>The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment
+being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I
+have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have
+been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with
+impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the
+following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the
+Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to
+accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General
+Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and
+accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest
+the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not
+require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government,
+for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made
+upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some
+against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No
+incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite
+arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the
+precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of
+him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind.
+Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really
+as far as the poles asunder.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>There then comes the second phase of the question&mdash;the alleged
+abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his
+services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and
+difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond
+dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard
+to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and
+success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take
+the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does
+not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It
+rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by
+rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and
+an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to
+its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the
+cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This
+decision, too late as it was to assist in the formation of a new
+administration for the Soudan, or to bring back the garrisons, was
+taken in ample time to ensure the personal safety and rescue of
+General Gordon. In the literal sense of the charge, history will
+therefore acquit Mr Gladstone and his colleagues of the abandonment of
+General Gordon personally.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to the third phase of the question&mdash;viz. the failure of
+the attempt to rescue General Gordon, which was essentially a
+military, and not a political question&mdash;the responsibility passes from
+the Prime Minister to the military authorities who decided the scope
+of the campaign, and the commander who carried it out. In this case,
+the individual responsible was the same. Lord Wolseley not only had
+his own way in the route to be followed by the expedition, and the
+size and importance attached to it, but he was also entrusted with its
+personal direction. There is consequently no question of the
+sub-division of the responsibility for its failure, just as there
+could have been none of the credit for its success. Lord Wolseley
+decided that the route should be the long one by the Nile Valley, not
+the short one from Souakim to Berber. Lord Wolseley decreed that there
+should be no Indian troops, and that the force, instead of being an
+ordinary one, should be a picked special corps from the <i>&eacute;lite</i> of the
+British army; and finally Lord Wolseley insisted that there should be
+no dash to the rescue of Gordon by a small part of his force, but a
+slow, impressive, and overpoweringly scientific advance of the whole
+body. The extremity of Gordon's distress necessitated a slight
+modification of his plan, when, with qualified instructions, which
+practically tied his hands, Sir Herbert Stewart made his first
+appearance at Jakdul.</p>
+
+<p>It was then known to Lord Wolseley that Gordon was in extremities,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>
+yet when a fighting force of 1100 English troops, of special physique
+and spirit, was moved forward with sufficient transport to enable it
+to reach the Nile and Gordon's steamers, the commander's instructions
+were such as confined him to inaction, unless he disobeyed his orders,
+which only Nelsons and Gordons can do with impunity. It is impossible
+to explain this extraordinary timidity. Sir Herbert Stewart reached
+Jakdul on 3rd January with a force small in numbers, but in every
+other respect of remarkable efficiency, and with the camels
+sufficiently fresh to have reached the Nile on 7th or 8th January had
+it pressed on. The more urgent news that reached Lord Wolseley after
+its departure would have justified the despatch of a messenger to urge
+it to press on at all costs to Metemmah. In such a manner would a
+Havelock or Outram have acted, yet the garrison of the Lucknow
+Residency was in no more desperate case than Gordon at Khartoum.</p>
+
+<p>It does not need to be a professor of a military academy to declare
+that, unless something is risked in war, and especially wars such as
+England has had to wage against superior numbers in the East, there
+will never be any successful rescues of distressed garrisons. Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the advance from Korti to Metemmah,
+whence his advance guard did not reach the latter place till the 20th,
+instead of the 7th of January. His lieutenant and representative, Sir
+Charles Wilson, would not risk anything on the 21st January, whence
+none of the steamers appeared at Khartoum until late on the 27th, when
+all was over. Each of these statements cannot be impeached, and if so,
+the conclusion seems inevitable that in the first and highest degree
+Lord Wolseley was alone responsible for the failure to reach Khartoum
+in time, and that in a very minor degree Sir Charles Wilson might be
+considered blameworthy for not having sent off one of the steamers
+with a small reinforcement to Khartoum on the 21st January, before
+even he allowed Cassim el Mousse to take any part in the attack on
+Metemmah. He could not have done this himself, but he would have had
+no difficulty in finding a substitute. When, however, there were
+others far more blameworthy, it seems almost unjust to a gallant
+officer to say that by a desperate effort he might at the very last
+moment have snatched the chestnuts out of the fire, and converted the
+most ignominious failure in the military annals of this country into a
+creditable success.</p>
+
+<hr class="short" />
+
+<p>The tragic end at Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the
+career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the
+ordinary experiences of mankind. No man who ever lived was called upon
+to deal with a greater number of difficult military and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span>
+administrative problems, and to find the solution for them with such
+inadequate means and inferior troops and subordinates. In the Crimea
+he showed as a very young man the spirit, discernment, energy, and
+regard for detail which were his characteristics through life. Those
+qualities enabled him to achieve in China military exploits which in
+their way have never been surpassed. The marvellous skill, confidence,
+and vigilance with which he supplied the shortcomings of his troops,
+and provided for the wants of a large population at Khartoum for the
+better part of a year, showed that, as a military leader, he was still
+the same gifted captain who had crushed the Taeping rebellion twenty
+years before. What he did for the Soudan and its people during six
+years' residence, at a personal sacrifice that never can be
+appreciated, has been told at length; but pages of rhetoric would not
+give as perfect a picture as the spontaneous cry of the blacks: "If we
+only had a governor like Gordon Pasha, then the country would indeed
+be contented."</p>
+
+<p>"Such examples are fruitful in the future," said Mr Gladstone in the
+House of Commons; and it is as a perfect model of all that was good,
+brave, and true that Gordon will be enshrined in the memory of the
+great English nation which he really died for, and whose honour was
+dearer to him than his life. England may well feel proud of having
+produced so noble and so unapproachable a hero. She has had, and she
+will have again, soldiers as brave, as thoughtful, as prudent, and as
+successful as Gordon. She has had, and she will have again, servants
+of the same public spirit, with the same intense desire that not a
+spot should sully the national honour. But although this breed is not
+extinct, there will never be another Gordon. The circumstances that
+produced him were exceptional; the opportunities that offered
+themselves for the demonstration of his greatness can never fall to
+the lot of another; and even if by some miraculous combination the man
+and the occasions arose, the hero, unlike Gordon, would be spoilt by
+his own success and public applause. But the qualities which made
+Gordon superior not only to all his contemporaries, but to all the
+temptations and weaknesses of success, are attainable; and the student
+of his life will find that the guiding star he always kept before him
+was the duty he owed his country. In that respect, above all others,
+he has left future generations of his countrymen a great example.</p>
+
+
+<p class="heading">THE END.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX"></a>INDEX.</h2>
+
+<div class="center">
+<table style="width:75%;" border="1" summary="index">
+	<tr>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_A">A</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_B">B</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_C">C</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_D">D</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_E">E</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_F">F</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_G">G</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_H">H</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_I">I</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_J">J</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_K">K</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_L">L</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_M">M</a></td>
+	</tr>
+	<tr>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_N">N</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_O">O</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_P">P</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_Q">Q</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_R">R</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_S">S</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_T">T</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_U">U</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_V">V</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_W">W</a></td>
+		<td>  X</td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_Y">Y</a></td>
+		<td>  <a href="#IX_Z">Z</a></td>
+	</tr>
+</table>
+</div>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_A" name="IX_A"></a><i>Abbas</i>, steamer, ii. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>loss of, <a href="#Page_145">145-6</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Abd-el-Kader, ii. <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Abdulgassin, ii. <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Abdullah, the present Khalifa, ii. <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Abdurrahman, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Abou Hamid, ii. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</li>
+<li>Abou Klea, ii. <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>battle of, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li>
+  <li>loss at, <i>ibid.</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Abouna, an, ii. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Abou Kru, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>battle of, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Abou Sammat, ii. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li>
+<li>Abou Saoud, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_149">149</a>.</li>
+<li>Abyssinia, the expedition to, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_131">131</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a> <i>passim</i>.</li>
+<li>Academy, Royal Military, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>.</li>
+<li>Adye, Sir John, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_137">137</a>.</li>
+<li>Afghanistan, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Alagos, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_40">40</a>.</li>
+<li>Albert Lake, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Alexandropol, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_35">35</a>.</li>
+<li>Alla-ed-Din, ii. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Alma, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>.</li>
+<li>Amoy, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>.</li>
+<li>Anderson, W. C., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_41">41</a>.</li>
+<li>Anfina, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_158">158</a>.</li>
+<li>Ani, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_38">38</a>.</li>
+<li>Arabi Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_97">97</a>.</li>
+<li>Arabs as soldiers, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_150">150</a>.</li>
+<li>Ararat, Mount, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_39">39</a>.</li>
+<li>Aras, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Arendrup, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Arokol Bey, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Army and Navy Gazette</i>, ii. <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Ashantee Expedition, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_138">138</a>.</li>
+<li>Assiout, ii. <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li>
+<li>Assouan, ii. <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+<li>Athens, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>.</li>
+<li>Ayoob, ii. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_B" name="IX_B"></a><span class="sc">Bahr Arab</span>, ii. <a href="#Page_27">27</a>.</li>
+<li>Bahr Gazelle, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li>
+<li>Baker, Sir S., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li>Baker Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.</li>
+<li>Balaclava, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>.</li>
+<li>Bara, ii. <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li>
+<li>Bari tribe, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+<li>Baring, Sir Evelyn, <i>see</i> Lord Cromer.</li>
+<li>Bashi-Bazouks, ii. <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>.</li>
+<li>Basutoland and its question, ii. <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a> <i>et seq.</i>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>description of, <a href="#Page_77">77-82</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Basutos, as cavalry, ii. <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.</li>
+<li>Bayuda desert, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</li>
+<li>Bedden, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+<li>Beechy, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>.</li>
+<li>Bellal Bey, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_143">143</a>.</li>
+<li>Berber, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>.</li>
+<li>Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>rescues Sir C. Wilson, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Berzati Bey, ii. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</li>
+<li>Bessarabia, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Bismarck, Prince, ii. <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.</li>
+<li>Bisson, General, ii. <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</li>
+<li>Blignières, M. de, ii. <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</li>
+<li>Bogos, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Bolgrad, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Boma Sola, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Bombay, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Bonham, Sir G., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_76">76</a>.</li>
+<li>Bonnefoy, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Bordeen, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+<li>Borgu, ii. <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Brandt, Herr von, ii. <a href="#Page_54">54-55</a>.</li>
+<li>Brocklehurst, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_95">95-96</a>.</li>
+<li>Brown, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>.</li>
+<li>Brown, Major, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+<li>Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+<li>Brussels, ii. <a href="#Page_92">92-95</a>.</li>
+<li>Burgevine, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54-59</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92-93</a>.</li>
+<li>Burgoyne, Sir John, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>.</li>
+<li>Burnaby, Colonel Fred., ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_C" name="IX_C"></a><span class="sc">Cairo</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>affairs at, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145-6</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Cambridge, Duke of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_112">112</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>.</li>
+<li>Camel, the, ii. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>.</li>
+<li>Camel Corps, the, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+<li>Campbell, Mr J. D., ii. <a href="#Page_49">49</a>.</li>
+<li>Campbell, Major, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Candahar, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68-69</a>.</li>
+<li>Cape Government, ii. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_75">75-76</a>.</li>
+<li>Cape Town, ii. <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>opinion at, <a href="#Page_88">88-89</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Cardew, Lieut., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47</a>.</li>
+<li>Cassim el Mousse, ii. <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+<li>Cathcart, Sir George, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</li>
+<li>Cave, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li>
+<li>Cere, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>.</li>
+<li>Chagos Group, ii. <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</li>
+<li>Chamberlaine, Sir N., ii. <a href="#Page_48">48</a>.</li>
+<li>Chan-chia-wan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Changchufu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_118">118</a>.</li>
+<li>Chang Kwoliang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Changsha, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>.</li>
+<li>Chanzu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_79">79-81</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>Chatham, Engineers' Headquarters, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Cherif Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li>Chesney, Sir George, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+<li>China, scenery of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_60">60-64</a>.</li>
+<li>Ching, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_88">88-89</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91-93</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_96">96-103</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>.</li>
+<li>Chinkiangfoo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li>Chippendall, Lieut., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+<li>Cholin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_51">51</a>.</li>
+<li>Chung How, ii. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+<li>Chung Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_55">55-56</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_71">71-76</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92-99</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+<li>Chunye, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84-87</a>.</li>
+<li>Clarke, Miss A. M., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Clayton, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>.</li>
+<li>Coetlogon, Colonel de, ii. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134-136</a>.</li>
+<li>Congo, the, ii. <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91-95</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>.</li>
+<li>Constantinople, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_33">33-41</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li>Cookesley, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>.</li>
+<li>Corfu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Courbash</i>, the, abolished in Soudan, ii. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li>
+<li>Crimea, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8-9</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_138">138</a>.</li>
+<li>Cromer, Lord, ii. <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>Gordon's scene with, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>opposes Gordon, <a href="#Page_118">118-122</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</li>
+  <li>his suggestion, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Culloden, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Cumberland, Duke of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Cuzzi, ii. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</li>
+<li>Cyprus, ii. <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_D" name="IX_D"></a><span class="sc">Danube</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_136">136-7</a>.</li>
+<li>Dara, ii. <a href="#Page_10">10-12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li>
+<li>Dar Djumna, ii. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</li>
+<li>Dardanelles, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>.</li>
+<li>Darfour, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_143">143-4</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_9">9-11</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_30">30-31</a>, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li>
+<li>Davidson, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>.</li>
+<li>De Norman, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Debbeh, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+<li>Debra Tabor, ii. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Dem Idris, ii. <a href="#Page_27">27</a>.</li>
+<li>Dem Suleiman, ii. <a href="#Page_28">28</a>.</li>
+<li>Dent, Mr H., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>.</li>
+<li>Derby, Earl of, ii. <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li>
+<li>Devonshire, Duke of, first moves to render Gordon assistance, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his preparations for an expedition, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156-7</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Dilke, Sir C., ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+<li>Dongola, ii. <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+<li>Donnelly, General J., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_66">66</a>.</li>
+<li>Dubaga, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_160">160</a>.</li>
+<li>Duem, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>.</li>
+<li>Duncan, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_143">143-4</a>.</li>
+<li>Durand, Sir M., ii. <a href="#Page_47">47</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_E" name="IX_E"></a><span class="sc">Earle</span>, Major-General, ii. <a href="#Page_158">158-9</a>.</li>
+<li>Eastern Question, the, ii. <a href="#Page_40">40-42</a>.</li>
+<li>Eden, Garden of, ii. <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Egerton, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>El Obeid, ii. <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>.</li>
+<li>Elphinstone, Sir Howard, ii. <a href="#Page_72">72</a>.</li>
+<li>Empress-Regents, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_133">133</a>.</li>
+<li>Enderby, Elizabeth, Gordon's mot <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3-4</a>.
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li><i>See</i> also Mrs Gordon.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Enderby, Mr George, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>England, her hesitating policy, ii. <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>power of, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Equator, the, ii. <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Equatorial Province, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_151">151</a>.</li>
+<li>Eristaw, Prince, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_42">42</a>.</li>
+<li>Erivan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_38">38</a>.</li>
+<li>Erzeroum, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Etchmiazin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_40">40</a>.</li>
+<li>Ever-Victorious Army, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_58">58-60</a>.</li>
+<li>Expedition, the Relief, ii. <a href="#Page_157">157-8</a>.</li>
+<li>Eyre, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_F" name="IX_F"></a><span class="sc">Fascher</span>, ii. <a href="#Page_10">10-11</a>.</li>
+<li>Fashoda, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+<li>Ferratch Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Firefly</i>, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>.</li>
+<li>Fisher, Corporal, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_39">39-40</a>.</li>
+<li>Forrester, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>.</li>
+<li>Forster, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>.</li>
+<li>Foweira, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>France, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_62">62</a>.</li>
+<li>Franco-Chinese, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>French soldiers, Gordon's opinion of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_17">17-8</a>.</li>
+<li>Fusaiquan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>.</li>
+<li>Fusham, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80-81</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_G" name="IX_G"></a><span class="sc">Gagarin, Prince</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_42">42</a>.</li>
+<li>Galatz, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_136">136-8</a>.</li>
+<li>Gandamak, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Gara, ii. <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li>
+<li>Gebra, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>.</li>
+<li>Geographical Society, Royal, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Gessi Romulus, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155-7</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_26">26-31</a>.</li>
+<li>Gezireh, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>.</li>
+<li>Giegler Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</li>
+<li>Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>Gladstone and his Government, ii. <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+  <li>how they came to employ Gordon, ii. <a href="#Page_151">151-2</a>;</li>
+  <li>undeceived as to Gordon's views, ii. <a href="#Page_152">152-3</a>;</li>
+  <li>their indecision, ii. <a href="#Page_153">153</a>;</li>
+  <li>statement in House, ii. <a href="#Page_154">154</a>;</li>
+  <li>dismayed by Gordon's boldness, ii. <a href="#Page_155">155</a>;</li>
+  <li>their radical fault, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</li>
+  <li>degree of responsibility, ii. <a href="#Page_170">170</a>;</li>
+  <li>acquittal of personal abandonment of Gordon, ii. <a href="#Page_171">171</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Golden Fleece, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>.</li>
+<li>Gondar, ii. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Gondokoro, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_146">146</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, derivation of name, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_1">1</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Charles George:
+    <ul class="IX">
+    <li>birth, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_1">1</a>;</li>
+    <li>family history, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_1">1-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>childhood, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>;</li>
+    <li>enters Woolwich Academy, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>;</li>
+    <li>early escapades, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>put back six months and elects for Engineers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+    <li>his spirit, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_7">7</a>;</li>
+    <li>his examinations, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>gets commission, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his work at Pembroke, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+    <li>his brothers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>;</li>
+    <li>his sisters, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>;</li>
+    <li>his brother-in-law, Dr Moffitt, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>personal appearance of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_11">11-14</a>;</li>
+    <li>his height, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+    <li>his voice, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>;</li>
+    <li>ordered to Corfu, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>;</li>
+    <li>changed to Crimea, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>passes Constantinople, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>;</li>
+    <li>views on the Dardanelles' forts, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>reaches Balaclava, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16</a>;</li>
+    <li>opinion of French soldiers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_18">18</a>;</li>
+    <li>his first night in the trenches, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_18">18-19</a>;</li>
+    <li>his topographical knowledge, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>;</li>
+    <li>his special aptitude for war, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>account of the capture of the Quarries, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_21">21-22</a>;</li>
+    <li>of the first assault on Redan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22-24</a>;</li>
+    <li>Kinglake's opinion of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>;</li>
+    <li>on the second assault on Redan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_26">26-28</a>;</li>
+    <li>praises the Russians, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>;</li>
+    <li>joins Kimburn expedition, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>destroying Sebastopol, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_29">29-31</a>;</li>
+    <li>his warlike instincts, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointed to Bessarabian Commission, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>;</li>
+    <li>his letters on the delimitation work, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+    <li>ordered to Armenia, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>journey from Trebizonde, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>;</li>
+    <li>describes Kars, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34-35</a>;</li>
+    <li>his other letters from Armenia, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_35">35-39</a>;</li>
+    <li>ascends Ararat, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_39">39-40</a>;</li>
+    <li>returns home, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_41">41</a>;</li>
+    <li>again ordered to the Caucasus, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_42">42</a>;</li>
+    <li>some personal idiosyncrasies, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_44">44</a>;</li>
+    <li>gazetted captain, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointment at Chatham, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>;</li>
+    <li>sails for China, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>too late for fighting, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>describes sack of Summer Palace, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_46">46</a>;</li>
+    <li>buys the Chinese throne, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his work at Tientsin, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47</a>;</li>
+    <li>a trip to the Great Wall, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47-49</a>;</li>
+    <li>arrives at Shanghai, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>;</li>
+    <li>distinguishes himself in the field, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>;</li>
+    <li>his daring, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_51">51</a>;</li>
+    <li>gets his coat spoiled, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_52">52</a>;</li>
+    <li>raised to rank of major, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>surveys country round Shanghai, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+    <li>describes Taepings, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+    <li>nominated for Chinese service, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54</a>;</li>
+    <li>reaches Sungkiang, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_60">60</a>;</li>
+    <li>qualifications for the command, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>;</li>
+    <li>describes his force, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_79">79</a>;</li>
+    <li>inspects it, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>first action, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_79">79</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>;</li>
+    <li>impresses Chinese, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>;</li>
+    <li>described by Li Hung Chang, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>made Tsungping, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>forbids plunder, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>;</li>
+    <li>his flotilla, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his strategy, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>captures Taitsan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>;</li>
+    <li>difficulty with his officers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>;</li>
+    <li>besieges Quinsan, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>reconnoitres it, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li>
+    <li>attacks and takes it, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_85">85-87</a>;</li>
+    <li>removes to Quinsan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_87">87</a>;</li>
+    <li>deals with a mutiny, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>;</li>
+    <li>incident with General Ching, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+    <li>resigns and withdraws resignation, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>contends with greater difficulties, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>;</li>
+    <li>undertakes siege of Soochow, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91</a>;</li>
+    <li>negotiates with Burgevine, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>;</li>
+    <li>relieves garrison, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>;</li>
+    <li>great victory, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>describes the position round Soochow, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>;</li>
+    <li>his hands tied by the Chinese, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_96">96</a>;</li>
+    <li>his main plan of campaign, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+    <li>his first repulse, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>captures the stockades, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_98">98</a>;</li>
+    <li>his officers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+    <li>his share in negotiations with Taepings, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>difficulty about pay, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_100">100</a>;</li>
+    <li>resigns command, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>guards Li Hung Chang's tent, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>enters Soochow, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_101">101</a>;</li>
+    <li>scene with Ching, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>asks Dr Macartney to go to Lar Wang, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>questions interpreter, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>detained by Taepings, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>and then by Imperialists, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>;</li>
+    <li>scene with Ching, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>identifies the bodies of the Wangs, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>what he would have done, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>the fresh evidence relating to the Wangs, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a> <i>et seq.</i>;</li>
+    <li>conversation with Ching, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>;</li>
+    <li>and Macartney, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>relations with Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_104">104</a>;</li>
+    <li>offers him succession to command, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li>
+    <li>letter to Li Hung Chang, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_106">106</a>;</li>
+    <li>Li sends Macartney to Gordon, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>contents of Gordon's letter, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>;</li>
+    <li>possesses the head of the Lar Wang, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>;</li>
+    <li>frenzied state of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>;</li>
+    <li>scene with Macartney at Quinsan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>;</li>
+    <li>his threats, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>;</li>
+    <li>his grave reflection on Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>;</li>
+    <li>writes to Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>;</li>
+    <li>makes public retractation, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>;</li>
+    <li>other expressions of regret, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+    <li>refuses Chinese presents, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>suspension in active command, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>retakes the field, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>;</li>
+    <li>"the destiny of China in his hands," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>attacks places west of Taiho Lake, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_114">114-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>enrolls Taepings, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_115">115</a>;</li>
+    <li>severely wounded, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>;</li>
+    <li>second reverse, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>receives bad news, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>alters his plans, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his force severely defeated, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_117">117</a>;</li>
+    <li>retrieves misfortune, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>describes the rebellion, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_118">118</a>;</li>
+    <li>made Lieut.-Colonel, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his further successes, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>;</li>
+    <li>another reverse, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his final victory, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;</li>
+    <li>what he thought he had done, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>visits Nanking, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>drills Chinese troops, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointed Ti-Tu and Yellow Jacket Order, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>;</li>
+    <li>his mandarin dresses, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>;</li>
+    <li>his relations with Li Hung Chang, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>the Gold Medal, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his diary destroyed, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_124">124</a>;</li>
+    <li>returns home, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>view of his achievements, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_125">125-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>a quiet six months, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_128">128</a>;</li>
+    <li>his excessive modesty, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>pride in his profession, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_129">129</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointment at Gravesend, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his view of the Thames Forts, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_130">130</a>;</li>
+    <li>his work there, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his mode of living, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_131">131</a>;</li>
+    <li>supposed <i>angina pectoris</i>, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>wish to join Abyssinian Expedition, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_132">132</a>;</li>
+    <li>described as a modern Jesus Christ, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his mission work, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_132">132-3</a>;</li>
+    <li>his boys, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_133">133</a>;</li>
+    <li>sends his medal to Lancashire fund, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his love for boys, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_134">134</a>;</li>
+    <li>his kings, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>some incidents, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his pensioners, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_135">135</a>;</li>
+    <li>his coat stolen, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his walks, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_136">136</a>;</li>
+    <li>the Snake flags, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>leaves Gravesend, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>at Galatz, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_137">137</a>;</li>
+    <li>no place like England, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Crimea, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_138">138</a>;</li>
+    <li>attends Napoleon's funeral, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>casual meeting with Nubar, and its important consequences, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_139">139-40</a>;</li>
+    <li>"Gold and Silver Idols," <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_140">140</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointed Governor of the Equatorial Province, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145</a>;</li>
+    <li>reasons for it, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>leaves Cairo, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_146">146</a>;</li>
+    <li>describes the "sudd," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his steamers, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>;</li>
+    <li>his facetiousness, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>reaches Gondokoro, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his firman, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his staff, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>;</li>
+    <li>his energy, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>establishes line of forts, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>collapse of his staff, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+    <li>his Botany Bay, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his policy and justice, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+    <li>his poor troops, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>organises a black corps, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+    <li>his sound finance, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>deals with slave trade, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_152">152</a>;</li>
+    <li>incidents with slaves, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>makes friends everywhere, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_153">153</a>;</li>
+    <li>his goodness a tradition, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_153">153-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>his character misrepresented, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_154">154</a>;</li>
+    <li>his line of forts, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>;</li>
+    <li>the ulterior objects of his task, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>the control of the Nile, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>;</li>
+    <li>shrinks from notoriety, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>describes the Lakes, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>;</li>
+    <li>the question with Uganda, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a> <i>et seq.</i>;</li>
+    <li>proceeds against Kaba Rega, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_158">158-60</a>;</li>
+    <li>his extraordinary energy, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_161">161</a>;</li>
+    <li>does his own work, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_161">161</a>;</li>
+    <li>incident of his courage, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_161">161-2</a>;</li>
+    <li>views of Khedive, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_163">163</a>;</li>
+    <li>returns to Cairo, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_163">163</a>;</li>
+    <li>and home, <i>ibid.</i></li>
+    <li><br />Decision about Egyptian employment, ii. <a href="#Page_1">1</a>;</li>
+    <li>receives letter from Khedive, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li>
+    <li>consults Duke of Cambridge, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>returns to Cairo, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, <a href="#Page_2">2-3</a>;</li>
+    <li>appointed Muchir, or Marshal, etc., <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li>
+    <li>sums up his work, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li>
+    <li>his first treatment of Abyssinian Question, <a href="#Page_5">5-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>his entry into Khartoum, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+    <li>public address, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li>
+    <li>first acts of Administration, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>proposes Slavery Regulations, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li>
+    <li>receives contradictory orders on subject, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+    <li>his decision about them, <a href="#Page_8">8-9</a>;</li>
+    <li>disbands the Bashi-Bazouks, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Darfour, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>relieves garrisons, <a href="#Page_10">10-11</a>;</li>
+    <li>enters Fascher, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+    <li>recalled by alarming news in his rear, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his camel described, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>reaches Dara without troops, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>;</li>
+    <li>his interview with Suleiman, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Slatin's account of scene, <a href="#Page_12">12-13</a>;</li>
+    <li>his views on the Slave Question, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>;</li>
+    <li>follows Suleiman to Shaka, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li>
+    <li>indignant letter of, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li>
+    <li>his decision about capital punishment, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his views thereupon, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li>
+    <li>some characteristic incidents, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>what the people thought of him, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>"Send us another Governor like Gordon," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his regular payments, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</li>
+    <li>his thoughtfulness, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>summoned to Cairo, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>appointed President of Financial Inquiry, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li>
+    <li>his views of money, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>acts with Lesseps, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li>
+    <li>meets with foreign opposition, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li>
+    <li>scene with Lesseps, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>;</li>
+    <li>scene with Major Evelyn Baring, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Gordon's financial proposal, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li>
+    <li>last scenes with Khedive, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</li>
+    <li>Gordon's bold offer, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>financial episode cost Gordon £800, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>;</li>
+    <li>his way of living, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>leaves Cairo and visits Harrar, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li>
+    <li>his finance in the Soudan, <a href="#Page_25">25-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>deals with Suleiman, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> <i>et seq.</i>;</li>
+    <li>takes the field in person, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>;</li>
+    <li>clears out Shaka, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li>
+    <li>again summoned to Cairo, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>proclaims Tewfik, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>returns to Cairo, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;</li>
+    <li>entrusted with mission to Abyssinia, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>receives letter from King John, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+    <li>called "Sultan of the Soudan," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>enters Abyssinia, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Debra Tabor, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>interview with King John, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>prevented returning to Soudan, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li>
+    <li>his opinion of Abyssinia, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Khedive's neglect of, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>;</li>
+    <li>called "mad," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his work in the Soudan, <a href="#Page_36">36-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Switzerland, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li>
+    <li>his opinion of wives, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li>
+    <li>first meeting with King of the Belgians, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>;</li>
+    <li>offered Cape command, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li>
+    <li>his memorandum on Eastern Question, <a href="#Page_40">40-2</a>;</li>
+    <li>accepts Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li>
+    <li>regrets it, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li>
+    <li>interview with Prince of Wales, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his letters about it, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li>
+    <li>views on Indian topics, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>sudden resignation, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>the Yakoob Khan incident, <a href="#Page_45">45-8</a>;</li>
+    <li>invited to China, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li>
+    <li>full history of that invitation, <a href="#Page_49">49-50</a>;</li>
+    <li>letter from Li Hung Chang, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li>
+    <li>his telegrams to War Office, <a href="#Page_50">50-1</a>;</li>
+    <li>leaves for China, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li>
+    <li>announces his intentions, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li>
+    <li>what he discovered on arrival in China, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+    <li>ignores British Minister, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>stays with Li Hung Chang, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li>
+    <li>his reply to German Minister, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>;</li>
+    <li>his letter on Li, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li>
+    <li>his advice to China, <a href="#Page_58">58-61</a>;</li>
+    <li>baffles intrigues and secures peace, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li>
+    <li>further passages with War Office, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li>
+    <li>on the Franco-Chinese war, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li>
+    <li>on the Opium Question, <a href="#Page_63">63-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>arrives at Aden, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li>
+    <li>his Central African letters, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>visits Ireland, <a href="#Page_65">65-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>letter on Irish Question in <i>Times</i>, <a href="#Page_66">66-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>letter on Candahar, <a href="#Page_68">68-70</a>;</li>
+    <li>opinion of Abyssinians, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>;</li>
+    <li>his article on irregular warfare, <a href="#Page_70">70-1</a>;</li>
+    <li>offers Cape Government his services for Basutoland, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>;</li>
+    <li>takes Sir Howard Elphinstone's place in the Mauritius, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li>
+    <li>his work there, <a href="#Page_72">72-3</a>;</li>
+    <li>views of England's power, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li>
+    <li>views on coaling stations, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>visits Seychelles, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>;</li>
+    <li>views on Malta and Mediterranean, <a href="#Page_74">74-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>attains rank of Major-General, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li>
+    <li>summoned to the Cape, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>leaves in a sailing ship, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li>
+    <li>financial arrangement with Cape Government, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his pecuniary loss by Cape employment, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his memorandum on Basutoland, <a href="#Page_77">77-9</a>;</li>
+    <li>accepts temporarily post of Commandant-General, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>;</li>
+    <li>drafts a Basuto Convention, <a href="#Page_80">80-1</a>;</li>
+    <li>requested by Mr Sauer to go to Basutoland, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li>
+    <li>relations with Masupha, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>visits Masupha, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</li>
+    <li>betrayed by Sauer, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>peril of, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his account of the affair, <a href="#Page_84">84-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>memorandum on the Native Question, <a href="#Page_85">85-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>his project of military reform, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li>
+    <li>his resignation of Cape command, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>corresponds with King of the Belgians, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+    <li>goes to the Holy Land, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his view of Russian Convent at Jerusalem, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li>
+    <li>advocates Palestine Canal, <a href="#Page_90">90-1</a>;</li>
+    <li>summoned to Belgium, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li>
+    <li>telegraphs for leave, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li>
+    <li>the mistake in the telegram, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>decides to retire, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>King Leopold's arrangement, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his plans on the Congo, <a href="#Page_93">93-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>public opinion aroused by his Soudan policy, <a href="#Page_93">93-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>visit to War Office, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>;</li>
+    <li>makes his will, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Brussels, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Soudan not the Congo, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li>
+    <li>leaves Charing Cross, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li>
+    <li>final letters to his sister, <a href="#Page_95">95-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>interview with ministers, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li>
+    <li>loses clothes and orders, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his predictions about the Soudan, <a href="#Page_97">97-8</a>;</li>
+    <li>the task imposed on him, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>;</li>
+    <li>why he accepted it, <a href="#Page_106">106-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>memorandum on Egyptian affairs, <a href="#Page_107">107-9</a>;</li>
+    <li>opinions on Hicks's Expedition, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>;</li>
+    <li>on English policy, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>;</li>
+    <li>on the Mahdi, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his interview with Mr Stead of <i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, <a href="#Page_111">111-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>his eagerness to go to the Soudan, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>;</li>
+    <li>suggestions by the Press of his fitness for the post, <a href="#Page_116">116-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>"generally considered to be mad," <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li>
+    <li>Sir Charles Dilke puts his name forward, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Lord Granville's despatch, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>Lord Cromer opposes his appointment, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <i>et seq.</i>;</li>
+    <li>consequences of that opposition, and the delay it caused, <a href="#Page_118">118-21</a>;</li>
+    <li>the arrangement with King Leopold, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>;</li>
+    <li>went to Soudan at request of Government, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>;</li>
+    <li>his departure, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his instructions, <a href="#Page_123">123-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>doubts about them, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</li>
+    <li>his views about Zebehr, <a href="#Page_124">124</a> <i>et seq.</i>;</li>
+    <li>suggests his being sent to Cyprus, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>;</li>
+    <li>change in his route, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>goes to Cairo, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>changed view towards Zebehr, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>;</li>
+    <li>his memorandum on their relations, <a href="#Page_126">126-8</a>;</li>
+    <li>wishes to take him, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li>
+    <li>a "mystic feeling," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>interview with Zebehr, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>final demands for Zebehr, <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a>;</li>
+    <li>leaves Cairo, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li>
+    <li>the task before him, <a href="#Page_134">134-5</a>;</li>
+    <li>hastens to Khartoum, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</li>
+    <li>reception by inhabitants, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his first steps of defence, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his conclusion that "Mahdi must be smashed up," <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</li>
+    <li>his demands, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li>
+    <li>on our "dog in the manger" policy, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li>
+    <li>"caught in Khartoum," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>appeal to philanthropists, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>"you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi," <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li>
+    <li>his lost diary, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>;</li>
+    <li>his first fight, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>bad conduct of his troops, <a href="#Page_141">141-2</a>;</li>
+    <li>lays down three lines of mines, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li>
+    <li>his steamers, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>their value, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>force at his disposal, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>loses a steamer, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>;</li>
+    <li>sends down 2600 refugees, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his care for them, <a href="#Page_143">143-4</a>;</li>
+    <li>Soudan Question <i>must</i> be</li>
+    <li>settled by November, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;</li>
+    <li>sends down <i>Abbas</i>, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>;</li>
+    <li>full history of that incident, <a href="#Page_144">144-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>left alone at Khartoum, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</li>
+    <li>sends away his steamers to help the Expedition, <a href="#Page_146">146-7</a>;</li>
+    <li>hampered by indecision of Government, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</li>
+    <li>his telegrams never published, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>position at Khartoum, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his point of observation, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li>
+    <li>cut off from Omdurman, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>anxiety for his steamers, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+    <li>"To-day I expected one of the Expedition here," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>the confidence felt in Gordon, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his defiance of the Mahdi, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+    <li>his position, <a href="#Page_150">150-1</a>;</li>
+    <li>his last Journal, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+    <li>views on Soudan Question, <a href="#Page_152">152-3</a>;</li>
+    <li>his relations with the Government, <a href="#Page_152">152-6</a>;</li>
+    <li>effect of silence from Khartoum, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>;</li>
+    <li>his view of the Relief Expedition, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li>
+    <li>his shrewdness, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his last messages, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li>
+    <li>situation desperate, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>"the town may fall in ten days," <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li>
+    <li>"quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>"spilt milk," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+    <li>his last message of all, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>;</li>
+    <li>death of, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</li>
+    <li>details supplied by Slatin, <a href="#Page_169">169-70</a>;</li>
+    <li>a great national loss, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</li>
+    <li>his example, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>.</li>
+    </ul></li>
+<li>Gordon, David, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, General Enderby, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Fred, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_138">138</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Sir Henry W., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4-6</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8-10</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_134">134</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Miss Mary Augusta, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>correspondence with Zebehr, <a href="#Page_130">130-2</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Gordon, General Peter, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, William Augustus, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, William Augustus, junior, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Mrs, mother of Charles Gordon, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_128">128</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>death of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_138">138</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Gordon, William Henry, Lieut.-General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Sir William, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_131">131</a>.</li>
+<li>Gordon, Sir William, of Park, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>.</li>
+<li>Goschen, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>.</li>
+<li>Graham, Sir G., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li>
+<li>Grand Canal, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li>Grant, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_51">51</a>.</li>
+<li>Granville, Earl, ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117-123</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Gravesend, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_136">136</a>.</li>
+<li>Gresswell, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_83">83</a>.</li>
+<li>Griffin, Sir Lepel, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+<li>Gubat, <i>see</i> Abou Kru, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+<li>Gura, ii. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Gura plateau, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Guyon, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_H" name="IX_H"></a><span class="sc">Hake</span>, Mr Egmont, revives Gordon's retracted libel on Sir Halliday Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>.</li>
+<li>Halfiyeh, ii. <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+<li>Hamaçem, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Hangchow, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+<li>Hankow, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li>Hanyang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Harcourt, Sir W., ii. <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.</li>
+<li>Harrar, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.</li>
+<li>Haroun Sultan, ii. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Hart, Sir Robert, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>.</li>
+<li>Hartington, Marquis of, ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>.
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li><i>See</i> Devonshire.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Hassan Helmi, ii. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.</li>
+<li>Havelock, reference to, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+<li>Heang Yung, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_71">71</a>.</li>
+<li>Hensall, M., ii. <a href="#Page_145">145</a>.</li>
+<li>Herbin, M., ii. <a href="#Page_144">144-46</a>.</li>
+<li>Hicks, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_109">109</a>.</li>
+<li>Hienfung, Emperor, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47</a>.</li>
+<li>Hill, Dr Birkbeck, ii. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</li>
+<li>Holland, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57-60</a>.</li>
+<li>Holy Land, the, ii. <a href="#Page_89">89-91</a>.</li>
+<li>Hoo Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Hoonan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Hope, Admiral, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>.</li>
+<li>Hukumdaria, the, ii. <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.</li>
+<li>Hung-tsiuen, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_62">62</a>,
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li><i>see</i> Tien Wang.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Huntly family, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Husseinyeh</i>, ii. <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>.</li>
+<li>Hwaiking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li>Hwangho, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Hyson</i>, steamer, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_83">83-87</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90-92</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_I" name="IX_I"></a><span class="sc">Ibrahim Pasha</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_141">141</a>.</li>
+<li>Idris Ebter, ii. <a href="#Page_128">128</a>.</li>
+<li>Inkerman, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16-7</a>.</li>
+<li>Ireland, ii. <a href="#Page_65">65-8</a>.</li>
+<li>Ismail, Khedive, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_140">140</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his alarm, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_143">143-4</a>;</li>
+  <li>why he appointed Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145-7</a>, ii. <a href="#Page_1">1-3</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li>
+  <li>Gordon's opinion of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, and <i>passim</i>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Ismail Yakoob Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146-8</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Ismailia</i>, steamer, ii. <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148-9</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_J" name="IX_J"></a><span class="sc">Jaalin</span> tribe, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+<li>Jaffa, ii. <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</li>
+<li>Jakdul, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161-3</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>splendid force at, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>James, Sir H., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Jebel Gedir, ii. <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li>
+<li>Jebel Masa, ii. <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li>
+<li>Jefferies, Mr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>.</li>
+<li>Jerusalem, ii. <a href="#Page_89">89</a>.</li>
+<li>John, King of Abyssinia, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5-6</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33-4</a>.</li>
+<li>Jones, Captain, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_92">92</a>.</li>
+<li>Jones, Sir Harry, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>.</li>
+<li>Joubert, M., ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li>
+<li>Journal, the, ii. <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_K" name="IX_K"></a><span class="sc">Kaba Rega</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157-9</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>.</li>
+<li>Kabbabish tribe, the, ii. <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li>
+<li>Kachiaou, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>.</li>
+<li>Kahding, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50-2</a>.</li>
+<li>Kahpoo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91</a>.</li>
+<li>Kaifong, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Kajow</i>, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90-2</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>Kalgan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_48">48</a>.</li>
+<li>Kanghi, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>.</li>
+<li>Kars, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_36">36</a>.</li>
+<li>Kassala, ii. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</li>
+<li>Katamori, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Kawa, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_98">98</a>.</li>
+<li>Kemp, Mr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+<li>Kemp Terrace, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_1">1</a>.</li>
+<li>Khalifa Abdullah, ii. <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</li>
+<li>Khartoum, advantageous position of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_141">141-2</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101-3</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>panic at, ii. <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li>
+  <li>position at, ii. <a href="#Page_134">134-5</a>;</li>
+  <li>scene at, ii. <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</li>
+  <li>distance from Cairo, ii. <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li>
+  <li>position of, <a href="#Page_147">147-8</a>;</li>
+  <li>the only relieving force to, ii. <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+  <li>anxiety in England about, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Kherson, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>.</li>
+<li>Kimberley, Earl of, ii. <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80-1</a>.</li>
+<li>Kimburn, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>.</li>
+<li>King William's Town, ii. <a href="#Page_82">82</a>.</li>
+<li>Kinglake, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_24">24</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>opinion of Gordon, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Kintang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_115">115-6</a>.</li>
+<li>Kirkham, Major, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>Kitchener, Sir H., Gordon's opinion of, ii. <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his suggestion, <i>ibid.</i></li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Kiukiang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68-9</a>.</li>
+<li>Kolkol, ii. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.</li>
+<li>Kongyin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116-8</a>.</li>
+<li>Kordofan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Korosko Desert, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_154">154</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Korti, ii. <a href="#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161-3</a>.</li>
+<li>Kuldja, ii. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+<li>Kung Prince, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>.</li>
+<li>Kurds, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_36">36</a>.</li>
+<li>Kuyukdere, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_36">36</a>.</li>
+<li>Kweiling, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_L" name="IX_L"></a><span class="sc">Laguerre</span>, Admiral, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>.</li>
+<li>Laing, Mr Samuel, ii. <a href="#Page_22">22</a>.</li>
+<li>Lar Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_98">98-9-100-2</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>.</li>
+<li>Lardo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Lausanne, ii. <a href="#Page_38">38-39</a>.</li>
+<li>Lazes, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_37">37</a>.</li>
+<li>Leeku, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>.</li>
+<li>Leopard tribe, ii. <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.</li>
+<li>Leopold, King of the Belgians, ii. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>agrees to compensate Gordon, <i>ibid.</i>; <a href="#Page_93">93-95</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Lerothodi, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83-85</a>.</li>
+<li>Lesseps, M. de, ii. <a href="#Page_19">19-23</a>.</li>
+<li>Letsea, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>.</li>
+<li>Li Hung Chang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_58">58</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>admires Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>;</li>
+  <li>reconnoitres Quinsan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84</a>;</li>
+  <li>opposes Burgevine, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+  <li>relations with Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>;</li>
+  <li>energy of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>;</li>
+  <li>statement about Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+  <li>withholds pay, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_100">100</a>;</li>
+  <li>protected by Gordon, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>seeks shelter in Macartney's camp, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_106">106</a>;</li>
+  <li>exonerates Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>;</li>
+  <li>sends Macartney as envoy to Quinsan, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>;</li>
+  <li>gives a breakfast to Gordon and Macartney, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>;</li>
+  <li>summons Gordon to return, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>;</li>
+  <li>solicitude for Gordon, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>supports Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>;</li>
+  <li>lays wreath on Gordon's monument, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_123">123</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53-59</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Lilley, Mr W. E., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_135">135</a>.</li>
+<li>Limming Pass, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Linant, M., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_150">150</a>.</li>
+<li>Liprandi, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>.</li>
+<li>Livadia, ii. <a href="#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+<li>Liyang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_114">114-116</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Long, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>.</li>
+<li>Loring, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li>
+<li>Low Mun, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_98">98</a>.</li>
+<li>Lucknow Residency, resemblance between its siege and Khartoum, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+<li>Lupton Bey, ii. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>.</li>
+<li>Lytton, Lord, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_M" name="IX_M"></a><span class="sc">Macartney, Sir Halliday</span>: sent to Gordon on a mission, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_88">88-9</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his work described by Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_89">89-90</a>;</li>
+  <li>with Gordon on the wall of Soochow, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_101">101</a>;</li>
+  <li>scene there, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_103">103</a>;</li>
+  <li>requested by Gordon to go to Lar Wang's palace, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>his earlier relation with Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_104">104</a>;</li>
+  <li>offered and accepts succession to command of army, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_104">104-5</a>;</li>
+  <li>what he learnt at the palace, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_105">105</a>;</li>
+  <li>tries to find Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_106">106</a>;</li>
+  <li>and Li Hung Chang, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>discovers latter in his own camp, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>declines to translate Gordon's letter, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>sent to Quinsan by Li, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>;</li>
+  <li>Gordon shows him the head of Lar Wang, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>scene at the breakfast-table, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>;</li>
+  <li>his advice, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108-9</a>;</li>
+  <li>hastens back to Soochow, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>;</li>
+  <li>Gordon's libel on, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>;</li>
+  <li>explains facts to Sir Harry Parkes and Sir F. Bruce, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_110">110-11</a>;</li>
+  <li>receives letter from Gordon, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>;</li>
+  <li>Gordon's public apology and retractation, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111-12</a>;</li>
+  <li>a full <i>amende</i>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_112">112</a>;</li>
+  <li>happy termination of incident, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Mackinnon, Sir W., ii. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>.</li>
+<li>Macmahon, Marshal, ii. <a href="#Page_137">137</a>.</li>
+<li>Magungo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>.</li>
+<li>Mahdi, the (or Mahomed Ahmed), ii. <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his first appearance, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>defies Egyptian Government, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+  <li>meaning of name, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>his first victory, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li>
+  <li>defeats Rashed, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>further victories, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>;</li>
+  <li>captures El Obeid, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>;</li>
+  <li>annihilates Hicks's expedition, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li>
+  <li>height of his power, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>;</li>
+  <li>basis of his influence, <a href="#Page_105">105-6</a>;</li>
+  <li>Zebehr on, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>;</li>
+  <li>salaams Gordon, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</li>
+  <li>basis of his power, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>;</li>
+  <li>learns of loss of <i>Abbas</i>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</li>
+  <li>arrives before Khartoum, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+  <li>knowledge as to state of Khartoum, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+  <li>exaggerated fear of, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li>
+  <li>aroused by Stewart's advance, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</li>
+  <li>sends his best warriors to Bayuda, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li>
+  <li>captures Khartoum, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li>
+  <li>mode of that capture, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Mahe, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Mahmoud Khalifa, ii. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>.</li>
+<li>Maida, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Maiwand, ii. <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Majuba Hill, ii. <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Malakoff, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_21">21-23</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_26">26</a>.</li>
+<li>Malta, ii. <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Mamelon, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>.</li>
+<li>Mansourah, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Markham, Mr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80</a>.</li>
+<li>Marseilles, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_15">15</a>.</li>
+<li>Masindi, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_159">159</a>.</li>
+<li>Massowah, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32-35</a>.</li>
+<li>Masupha, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>character of, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85-89</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Mauritius, the, ii. <a href="#Page_72">72-75</a>.</li>
+<li>Mediterranean, the, ii. <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Medjidieh Order, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_160">160</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Mehemet Ali, conquers Soudan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_154">154</a>.</li>
+<li>Menelik, ii. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Merowe, ii. <a href="#Page_160">160</a>.</li>
+<li>Merriman, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>.</li>
+<li>Metemmah, ii. <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161-166</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>delay at, <a href="#Page_166">166-7</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Moffitt, Dr Andrew, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>.</li>
+<li>Moffitt, Mrs, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_10">10</a>.</li>
+<li>Molappo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_82">82</a>.</li>
+<li>Mombasa, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Monding, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>Mow Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_98">98-100</a>.</li>
+<li>Mrooli, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_158">158</a>.</li>
+<li>Mtesa, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157-60</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>.</li>
+<li>Muchir or Marshal, ii. <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</li>
+<li>Munzinger Bey, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Murchison Falls, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_N" name="IX_N"></a><span class="sc">Najao</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_51">51</a>.</li>
+<li>Nanking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_76">76</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>capture of, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Nanning, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_64">64</a>.</li>
+<li>Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_132">132</a>.</li>
+<li>Naval Brigade, the, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+<li>Negus, the, ii. <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Nelson, references to, ii. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+<li><i>New York Herald</i>, ii. <a href="#Page_62">62</a>.</li>
+<li>Niam Niam, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_151">151</a>.</li>
+<li>Nile, the, ii. <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li>
+<li>"not a bad Nile," <a href="#Page_157">157</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Nineteenth Century, The</i>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_129">129</a>.</li>
+<li>Ningpo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>.</li>
+<li>Northbrook, Earl of, ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li>
+<li><i>North China Herald</i>, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_111">111</a>.</li>
+<li>North Fort, the, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Nubar Pasha, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_140">140</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_145">145</a>; ii. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_109">109</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li>Nuehr Agha, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_158">158</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_159">159</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_O" name="IX_O"></a><span class="sc">O'Donovan</span>, Edmond, ii. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Omdurman, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_141">141</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>fort of, <a href="#Page_147">147-8</a>;</li>
+  <li>isolated, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+  <li>capture of, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li>
+  <li>scene at, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>;</li>
+  <li>date of fall, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Opium, ii. <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li>
+<li>Orpen, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>.</li>
+<li>Osman Bey, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_35">35</a>.</li>
+<li>Osman Digma, ii. <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Outram, reference to, ii. <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_P" name="IX_P"></a><span class="sc">Palestine Canal</span>, the, ii. <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Pall Mall Gazette</i>, the, ii. <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>.</li>
+<li>Paoting-fu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>.</li>
+<li>Parkes, Sir H., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_110">110</a>.</li>
+<li>Paskievitch, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Patachiaou, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>.</li>
+<li>Pattison, Mr A., ii. <a href="#Page_83">83</a>.</li>
+<li>Peking, ii. <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Pelissier, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>.</li>
+<li>Pelissier, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Pembroke Dock, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>.</li>
+<li>Perry, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_99">99</a>.</li>
+<li>Pitso, A., ii. <a href="#Page_79">79</a>.</li>
+<li>Power, Mr Frank, ii. <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>leaves on <i>Abbas</i>, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>death of, <a href="#Page_145">145-6</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Prestonpans, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_2">2</a>.</li>
+<li>Protet, Admiral, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_52">52</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_Q" name="IX_Q"></a>Quarries, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_21">21</a>.</li>
+<li>Quinsan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_82">82-88</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_107">107</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_108">108</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_R" name="IX_R"></a>Rabi, ii. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Raglan, Lord, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_25">25</a>.</li>
+<li>Ragouf Pasha, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Raouf Bey, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_149">149</a>.</li>
+<li>Raouf Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98-100</a>.</li>
+<li>Ras Alula, ii. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Ras Arya, ii. <a href="#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Rashed Bey, ii. <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li>
+<li>Ratib Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li>
+<li>Redan, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_21">21-2</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>attack on, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_22">22-4</a>;</li>
+  <li>second attack, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_26">26-7</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Redout, Kaleh, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_41">41</a>.</li>
+<li>Revenue, the, of Soudan, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25-26</a>.</li>
+<li>Riaz Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</li>
+<li>Rionga, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157-158</a>.</li>
+<li>Ripon, Marquis of, ii. <a href="#Page_42">42-44</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47-49</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Rivers Wilson, Mr, now Sir Charles, ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>.</li>
+<li>Roberts, Lord, ii. <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. <a href="#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>.</li>
+<li>Rockstone Place, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_127">127</a>.</li>
+<li>Rogers, Mr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>.</li>
+<li>Russia, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54-55</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_62">62</a>.</li>
+<li>Russian Army, Gordon's opinion of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_28">28</a>.</li>
+<li>Russian Convent at Jerusalem, ii. <a href="#Page_90">90</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_S" name="IX_S"></a><span class="sc">Said Pasha</span>, ii. <a href="#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>San Diego, ii. <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>San Tajin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_81">81-82</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95-97</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+<li>Sankolinsin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Santals</i>, the, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147-148</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Saphia</i>, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>.</li>
+<li>Saubat, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+<li>Sauer, Mr, ii. <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>betrays Gordon, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</li>
+  <li>his treachery, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>his misrepresentation, <a href="#Page_84">84-85</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Scanlan, Mr T., ii. <a href="#Page_81">81-82</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>.</li>
+<li>Schweinfurth, Dr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_142">142-143</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Scotia, ii. <a href="#Page_76">76</a>.</li>
+<li>Sebastopol, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_16">16-17</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_28">28-30</a>.</li>
+<li>Sennaar, ii. <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</li>
+<li>Seton, Sir Bruce, ii. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</li>
+<li>Seward, Mr, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_93">93</a>.</li>
+<li>Seychelles, ii. <a href="#Page_72">72</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Shabloka, ii. <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+<li>Shaka, ii. <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>.</li>
+<li>Shanghai, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49-50-55</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>Triad rising at, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72</a>;</li>
+  <li>loss of Chinese city, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_73">73</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Shekan, ii. <a href="#Page_104">104</a>.</li>
+<li>Shendy, ii. <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_145">145-147</a>, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>.</li>
+<li>Shereef Said Hakim, ii. <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li>
+<li>Siaon Edin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_85">85-86</a>.</li>
+<li>Simmons, Sir Lintorn, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_33">33</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_41">41</a>.</li>
+<li>Siuen-hoa, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_48">48</a>.</li>
+<li>Slatin Pasha, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_162">162</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_12">12-13</a>, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104-105</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168-169</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his epitaph on Gordon, ii. <a href="#Page_170">170</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Slave Trade, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148-149</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_152">152-153</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>proposed regulations, ii. <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li>
+  <li>Convention, ii. <a href="#Page_8">8</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Smith, Sir Harry, ii. <a href="#Page_86">86</a>.</li>
+<li>Snake flags, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_136">136</a>.</li>
+<li>Soady, Captain, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_5">5</a>.</li>
+<li>Soochow, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74-75</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_84">84-87</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94-98</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_100">100-102</a>.</li>
+<li>Souakim, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_146">146</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>.</li>
+<li>Soudan, meaning of name, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_141">141</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>easily conquered, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_142">142</a>;</li>
+  <li>slave trade in, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>situation in, ii. <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+  <li>the, Gordon's views on, ii. <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <i>et seq.</i> <i>passim</i>;</li>
+  <li>people of, ii. <a href="#Page_114">114</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Southampton, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_127">127</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>the home at, ii. <a href="#Page_93">93</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Speke, Captain, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_142">142</a>.</li>
+<li>Stanley, Mr H. M., ii. <a href="#Page_93">93</a>.</li>
+<li>Stannard, Mr Arthur, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_129">129-130</a>.</li>
+<li>Stanton, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32-33</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_21">21</a>.</li>
+<li>Staveley, Sir Charles, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50-52</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_58">58-60</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_132">132</a>.</li>
+<li>Stead, Mr W. T., ii. <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li>
+<li>Steamers, the penny, ii. <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>bullet marks on, ii. <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Stewart, Colonel Donald, ii. <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>leaves on <i>Abbas</i>, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>fate of, ii. <a href="#Page_144">144-146</a>;</li>
+  <li>should not have left Gordon, ii. <a href="#Page_146">146</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>trammelled by his instructions, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>returns to Jakdul, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>;</li>
+  <li>wounded, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li>
+  <li>death of, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li>
+  <li>his intention, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Stokes, Colonel, ii. <a href="#Page_19">19</a>.</li>
+<li>Strangeways, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_9">9</a>.</li>
+<li>"Sudd," the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_146">146</a>.</li>
+<li>Suders, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_31">31</a>.</li>
+<li>Suleiman, Zebehr's son, ii. <a href="#Page_10">10-14</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25-29</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>execution of, ii. <a href="#Page_30">30</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_126">126-128</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Sulina, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_137">137</a>.</li>
+<li>Sultan, proposal to surrender Soudan to the, ii. <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+<li>Sultan Idris, ii. <a href="#Page_29">29</a>.</li>
+<li>Summer Palace at Peking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45-46</a>.</li>
+<li>Sungkiang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54-55</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_78">78-80</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_90">90</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_121">121</a>.</li>
+<li>Sussex Regiment, the, ii. <a href="#Page_164">164</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_T" name="IX_T"></a><span class="sc">Ta</span> Edin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_85">85</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_91">91</a>.</li>
+<li>Taeping, meaning of name, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_65">65</a>.</li>
+<li>Taepings, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_53">53-54</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_59">59</a> (<i>see</i> Chapter IV.);
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>capture Nanking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>;</li>
+  <li>march on Peking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69-70</a>;</li>
+  <li>their military strength, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_75">75</a>;</li>
+  <li>and the missionaries, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_76">76</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Taiho Lake, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_101">101-102</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>.</li>
+<li>Taitong, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_48">48</a>.</li>
+<li>Taitsan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_59">59</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_80">80-83</a>.</li>
+<li>Taiyuen, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>.</li>
+<li>Takee, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56-58</a>.</li>
+<li>Taku Forts, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</li>
+<li><i>Talataween</i>, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+<li>Tamanieb, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Taoukwang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_61">61</a>.</li>
+<li>Tapp, Colonel, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Taunton, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_4">4</a>.</li>
+<li>Tayan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Tchad, Lake, ii. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>.</li>
+<li>Tchernaya, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_26">26</a>.</li>
+<li>Teb, ii. <a href="#Page_156">156</a>.</li>
+<li>Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), ii. <a href="#Page_31">31-32</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106-109</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>.</li>
+<li>Thaba Bosigo, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.</li>
+<li>Thames Forts, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_129">129-130</a>.</li>
+<li>Theodore, ii. <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Tientsin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_45">45-47</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Tien Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_49">49</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_65">65</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>occupies Nanking, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>;</li>
+  <li>retires into his palace, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_71">71-72</a>;</li>
+  <li>death of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_120">120-121</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li><i>Times, The</i>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_124">124</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116-117</a>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>.</li>
+<li>Ti-Tu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>.</li>
+<li>Todleben, General, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_17">17</a>.</li>
+<li>Tokar, ii. <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>.</li>
+<li>Transkei, the, ii. <a href="#Page_77">77</a>.</li>
+<li>Travers, Colonel John, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_6">6</a>.</li>
+<li>Trebizonde, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_34">34</a>.</li>
+<li>Triads, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>.</li>
+<li>Tseedong, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>.</li>
+<li>Tseki, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>.</li>
+<li>Tseng Marquis, ii. <a href="#Page_59">59</a>.</li>
+<li>Tseng Kwofan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_67">67-68</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_72">72-73</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_120">120</a>.</li>
+<li>Tseng Kwotsiuen, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_74">74</a>.</li>
+<li>Tsing, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Tsinghai, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_70">70</a>.</li>
+<li>Tsingpu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50-52</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54-55</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>.</li>
+<li>Tsipu, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>.</li>
+<li>Tung Wang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_71">71</a>.</li>
+<li>Tunting, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>.</li>
+<li>Tuti Island, ii. <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_U" name="IX_U"></a><span class="sc">Uganda</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_159">159</a>.</li>
+<li>Unyoro, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_157">157</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_V" name="IX_V"></a><span class="sc">Victoria Lake</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155-156</a>.</li>
+<li>Vivian, Mr (afterwards Lord), ii. <a href="#Page_1">1-2</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>.</li>
+<li>Vivian, Mrs, ii. <a href="#Page_39">39</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_W" name="IX_W"></a><span class="sc">Wadelai</span>, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_155">155</a>.</li>
+<li>Wade, Sir Thomas, ii. <a href="#Page_53">53-55</a>.</li>
+<li>Wady Halfa, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_144">144</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_138">138-139</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>.</li>
+<li>Waiquaidong, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_85">85-86</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>.</li>
+<li>Waisso, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_119">119</a>.</li>
+<li>Walad el Michael, ii. <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>.</li>
+<li>Wales, Prince of, ii. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</li>
+<li>Wales, Princess of, ii. <a href="#Page_43">43</a>.</li>
+<li>Wall, the Great, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_47">47-9</a>.</li>
+<li>Wangchi, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_101">101</a>.</li>
+<li>Wangs, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_65">65</a>.</li>
+<li>Wangs, execution of, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Wanti, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>.</li>
+<li>War Office, ii. <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a> <i>passim</i>.</li>
+<li>Ward, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_54">54-57</a>.</li>
+<li>Watson, Colonel Charles, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_148">148</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128-30</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li>
+<li>Watson, Mrs, ii. <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>.</li>
+<li>Willes, Capt., i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_52">52</a>.</li>
+<li>Wilson, Sir Charles, succeeds to the command, ii. <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>his book "Korti to Khartoum," <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>not to be made a scapegoat, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li>
+  <li>the letter in his charge, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>sails for Khartoum, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>;</li>
+  <li>under hot fire, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>wrecked, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>rescued by Lord C. Beresford, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>the letter in his charge, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>comparatively small measure of his responsibility, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Wittgenstein, Prince F. von, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_102">102</a>.</li>
+<li>Wokong, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>.</li>
+<li>Wolseley, Lord, ii. <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_121">121</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>receives message from Gordon, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+  <li>his letter of 24th July, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li>
+  <li>largely responsible for Khartoum mission, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>his address to the soldiers, <a href="#Page_158">158</a>;</li>
+  <li>his view of the expedition, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>;</li>
+  <li>receives full news of Gordon's desperate situation, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>;</li>
+  <li>his grand and deliberate plan, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>;</li>
+  <li>perfect but for--Time, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>will risk nothing, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>;</li>
+  <li>his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>sole responsibility of, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>;</li>
+  <li>ties Stewart's hands, <i>ibid.</i>;</li>
+  <li>the real person responsible for death of Gordon and failure of expedition, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Wongepoo, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_57">57</a>.</li>
+<li>Wongkadza, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_56">56</a>.</li>
+<li>Wood, Sir Evelyn, ii. <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li>
+<li>Woolwich Common, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_1">1</a>.</li>
+<li>Wouchang, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Wou Sankwei, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_67">67</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>.</li>
+<li>Wuliungchow, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>.</li>
+<li>Wurantai, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_64">64</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>.</li>
+<li>Wusieh, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_95">95</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_113">113</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_116">116</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_Y" name="IX_Y"></a><span class="sc">Yakoob Khan</span>, ii. <a href="#Page_44">44-49</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>.</li>
+<li>Yalpukh, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_32">32</a>.</li>
+<li>Yangchow, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_69">69</a>.</li>
+<li>Yellow Jacket Order, its origin, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_122">122</a>.</li>
+<li>Yesing, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_115">115</a>.</li>
+<li>Yungan, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_66">66</a>.</li>
+<li>Yusuf Pasha, ii. <a href="#Page_101">101</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="IX">
+<li><a id="IX_Z" name="IX_Z"></a><span class="sc">Zanzibar</span>, ii. <a href="#Page_65">65</a>.</li>
+<li>Zebehr Rahama, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_144">144</a>; ii. <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124-26</a>
+  <ul class="IX">
+  <li>interview with Gordon, <a href="#Page_128">128-29</a>;</li>
+  <li>doubts as to his real attitude, <a href="#Page_129">129-30</a>;</li>
+  <li>letters to Miss Gordon, <a href="#Page_130">130-32</a>;</li>
+  <li>to Sir Henry Gordon, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>;</li>
+  <li>his power, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li>
+  </ul></li>
+<li>Zeila, ii. <a href="#Page_25">25</a>.</li>
+<li>Zouaves, the, i. <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/2/6/4/1/26419/26419-h/26419-h.htm#Page_20">20</a>.</li>
+</ul>
+
+
+<a name="END" id="END"></a>
+<div class="trans-note">
+<p class="heading">Transcriber's Notes</p>
+<p>The transcriber made the following changes to the text to correct obvious errors:</p>
+
+<pre class="note">
+  1. p. 110, Madhi's --> Mahdi's
+  2. p. 137, opinons -->opinions
+  3. p. 142, trooops --> troops
+  4. p. 144, beween --> between
+  5. p. 149, Thoughout --> Throughout
+  6. p. 153, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  7. p. 166, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  8. p. 175, Burnaby, ... i. 164. --> Burnaby, ... ii. 164.
+  9. p. 178, returns to Cairo, 164; --> returns to Cairo, 163;
+ 10. p. 180, Hicks, Colonel, 102 --> Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102
+ 11. p. 182, Outram, ... i. 161, 172. --> Outram, ... ii. 161, 172.
+ 12. p. 183, Suleiman ... 25-19 --> Suleiman ... 25-29
+</pre>
+</div>
+
+<hr class="full" />
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Life of Gordon, Volume II, by 
+Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
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+</body>
+</html>
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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Life of Gordon, Volume II, by
+Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The Life of Gordon, Volume II
+
+Author: Demetrius Charles Boulger
+
+Release Date: August 30, 2008 [EBook #26493]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF GORDON, VOLUME II ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer and the Project
+Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+[Transcriber's Note: Every effort has been made to replicate this text
+as faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings
+and other inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an
+obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook.]
+
+
+
+
+  THE LIFE OF GORDON
+
+  MAJOR-GENERAL, R.E., C.B.; TURKISH FIELD-MARSHAL, GRAND
+  CORDON MEDJIDIEH, AND PASHA; CHINESE TITU (FIELD-MARSHAL),
+  YELLOW JACKET ORDER.
+
+
+  "_'Tis a name which ne'er hath been dishonour'd,
+  And never will, I trust--most surely never
+  By such a youth as thou._"
+
+                            --SWINTON ON ADAM GORDON.
+
+
+  BY
+
+  DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER
+
+  AUTHOR OF "THE HISTORY OF CHINA;" "ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL
+  ASIA;" "LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK," ETC., ETC.
+
+
+  WITH PORTRAIT
+
+
+  VOLUME II
+
+
+  LONDON
+  T. FISHER UNWIN
+  PATERNOSTER SQUARE
+
+  MDCCCXCVI
+
+  [_All rights reserved._]
+
+
+[Illustration: Portrait of C. G. Gordon with signature.]
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+VOLUME II.
+
+  CHAP.                                           PAGE
+
+  VIII. GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN               1
+
+    IX. MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA             38
+
+     X. THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO      65
+
+    XI. THE LAST NILE MISSION                       97
+
+   XII. KHARTOUM                                   136
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SOUDAN.
+
+
+When General Gordon left Egypt for England in December 1876 it was
+with the expressed determination not to return; but the real state of
+his mind was not bitterness at any personal grievance, or even desire
+for rest, although he avowed his intention of taking six months'
+leave, so much as disinclination to leave half done a piece of work in
+which he had felt much interest, and with which he had identified
+himself. Another consideration presented itself to him, and several of
+his friends pressed the view on him with all the weight they
+possessed, that no signal success could be achieved unless he were
+placed in a position of supreme authority, not merely at the Equator,
+but throughout the vast province of the Soudan. Such was the decision
+Gordon himself, influenced no doubt by the views of two friends whose
+names need not be mentioned, but who were well known for their zeal in
+the anti-slavery cause, had come to a few weeks after his arrival in
+England; and not thinking that there was any reasonable probability of
+the Khedive appointing him to any such post, he telegraphed to the
+British Consul-General, Mr Vivian, his determination not to return to
+Egypt. This communication was placed before the Khedive Ismail, who
+had a genuine admiration for Gordon, and who appreciated the value of
+his services. He at once took the matter into his own hands, and wrote
+the following letter, which shows that he thoroughly understood the
+arguments that would carry weight with the person to whom they were
+addressed:--
+
+     "MY DEAR GORDON,--I was astonished yesterday to learn of the
+     despatch you had sent to Mr Vivian, in which you inform me that
+     you will not return; all the more so when I recall your interview
+     at Abdin, during which you promised me to return, and complete
+     the work we had commenced together. I must therefore attribute
+     your telegram to the very natural feelings which influenced you
+     on finding yourself at home and among your friends. But I cannot,
+     my dear Gordon Pasha, think that a gentleman like Gordon can be
+     found wanting with regard to his solemn promise, and thus, my
+     dear Gordon, I await your return according to that promise.--Your
+     affectionate
+
+                                             "ISMAIL."
+
+To such a letter as this a negative reply was difficult, if not
+impossible; and when General Gordon placed the matter in the hands of
+the Duke of Cambridge, as head of the army, he was told that he was
+bound to return. He accordingly telegraphed to the Khedive that he was
+willing to go back to the Soudan if appointed Governor-General, and
+also that he would leave at once for Cairo to discuss the matter. On
+his arrival there, early in February 1877, the discussion of the terms
+and conditions on which Gordon would consent to return to the Upper
+Nile was resumed. He explained his views at length to the Minister,
+Cherif Pasha, who had succeeded Nubar as responsible adviser to the
+Khedive, concluding with the ultimatum: "Either give me the Soudan, or
+I will not go." The only compromise that Gordon would listen to was
+that the Khedive's eldest son should be sent as Viceroy to Khartoum,
+when he, for his part, would be willing to resume his old post at the
+Equator. The Egyptian Ministers and high officials were not in favour
+of any European being entrusted with such a high post, and they were
+especially averse to the delegation of powers to a Christian, which
+would leave him independent of everyone except the Khedive. But for
+the personal intervention of the Khedive, Gordon would not have
+revisited Cairo; and but for the same intervention he would never have
+been made Governor-General, as, after a week's negotiation with
+Cherif, an agreement was farther off than ever, and Gordon's patience
+was nearly exhausted. The Khedive, really solicitous for Gordon's
+help, and suspecting that there was something he did not know, asked
+Mr Vivian to explain the matter fully to him. On hearing the cause of
+the difficulty, Ismail at once said: "I will give Gordon the Soudan,"
+and two days later he saw and told General Gordon the same thing,
+which found formal expression in the following letter, written on 17th
+February 1877, the day before Gordon left for Massowah:--
+
+     "MY DEAR GORDON PASHA,--Appreciating your honourable character,
+     your energy, and the great services that you have already
+     rendered to my Government, I have decided to unite in one great
+     Governor-Generalship the whole of the Soudan, Darfour, and the
+     Equatorial Provinces, and to entrust to you the important mission
+     of directing it. I am about to issue a Decree to this effect.
+
+     "The territories to be included in this Government being very
+     vast, it is necessary for good administration that you should
+     have under your orders three Vakils--one for the Soudan properly
+     so called and the Provinces of the Equator, another for Darfour,
+     and the third for the Red Sea coast and the Eastern Soudan.
+
+     "In the event of your deeming any changes necessary, you will
+     make your observations to me.
+
+     "The Governor-Generalship of the Soudan is completely independent
+     of the Ministry of Finance.
+
+     "I direct your attention to two points, viz.--the suppression of
+     slavery, and the improvement of the means of communication.
+
+     "Abyssinia extends along a great part of the frontiers of the
+     Soudan. I beg of you, when you are on the spot, to carefully
+     examine into the situation of affairs, and I authorise you, if
+     you deem it expedient, to enter into negotiations with the
+     Abyssinian authorities with the view of arriving at a settlement
+     of pending questions.
+
+     "I end by thanking you, my dear Gordon Pasha, for your kindness
+     in continuing to Egypt your precious services, and I am fully
+     persuaded that, with the aid of your great experience and your
+     devotion, we shall bring to a happy end the work we are pursuing
+     together.
+
+     "Believe, my dear Gordon Pasha, in my sentiments of high esteem
+     and sincere friendship.--Your affectionate
+
+                                             ISMAIL."
+
+Nothing could be more gracious than this letter, which made General
+Gordon independent of the men who he feared would thwart him, and
+responsible to the Khedive alone. It was followed up a few weeks
+later--that is to say, after the new Governor-General had left for his
+destination--by the conferring of the military rank of Muchir or
+Marshal. At the same time the Khedive sent him a handsome uniform,
+with L150 worth of gold lace on the coat, and the Grand Cordon of the
+Medjidieh Order, which, it may be worth noting here, General Gordon
+only wore when in Egyptian uniform. These acts on the part of the
+Khedive Ismail show that, whatever may have been his reasons for
+taking up the slavery question, he was really sincere in his desire to
+support Gordon, who fully realised and appreciated the good-will and
+friendly intentions of this Egyptian ruler. When an unfavourable
+judgment is passed on Ismail Pasha, his consistent support of General
+Gordon may be cited to show that neither his judgment nor his heart
+was as bad as his numerous detractors would have the world believe.
+
+Having settled the character of the administration he was to conduct,
+General Gordon did not waste a day at Cairo. The holiday and rest to
+which he was fully entitled, and of which there can be no doubt that
+he stood greatly in need, were reduced to the smallest limits. Only
+two months intervened between his departure from Cairo for London on
+coming down from the Equator, and his second departure from Cairo to
+the Soudan. Much of that period had been passed in travelling, much
+more in exhausting and uncongenial negotiation in the Egyptian
+capital. All the brief space over enabled him to do was to pass the
+Christmas with several members of his family, to which he was so
+deeply attached, to visit his sisters in the old home at Southampton,
+and to run down for a day to Gravesend, the scene of his philanthropic
+labours a few years before. Yet, with his extraordinary recuperative
+force, he hastened with fresh strength and spirit to take up a more
+arduous and more responsible task than that he had felt compelled to
+relinquish so short a period before. With almost boyish energy,
+tempered by a profound belief in the workings of the Divine will, he
+turned his face once more to that torrid region, where at that time
+and since scenes of cruelty and human suffering have been enacted
+rarely surpassed in the history of the world.
+
+Having thus described the circumstances and conditions under which
+General Gordon consented to take up the Soudan question, it is
+desirable to explain clearly what were the objects he had in his own
+mind, and what was the practical task he set himself to accomplish.
+Fortunately, this description need not be based on surmise or
+individual conjecture. General Gordon set forth his task in the
+plainest language, and he held the clearest, and, as the result
+showed, the most correct views as to what had to be done, and the
+difficulties that stood in the way of its accomplishment. He wrote on
+the very threshold of his undertaking these memorable sentences:--
+
+     "I have to contend with many vested interests, with fanaticism,
+     with the abolition of hundreds of Arnauts, Turks, etc., now
+     acting as Bashi-Bazouks, with inefficient governors, with wild
+     independent tribes of Bedouins, and with a large semi-independent
+     province lately under Zebehr Pasha at Bahr Gazelle.... With
+     terrific exertion, in two or three years' time I may, with God's
+     administration, make a good province, with a good army, and a
+     fair revenue and peace, and an increased trade, and also have
+     suppressed slave raids."
+
+No one can dispute either the Titanic magnitude of the task to be
+accomplished or the benefit its accomplishment would confer on a
+miserably unhappy population. How completely the project was carried
+out by one man, where powerful Governments and large armies have
+failed both before and since, has now to be demonstrated.
+
+General Gordon proceeded direct from Cairo to Massowah, which route he
+selected because he hoped to settle the Abyssinian dispute before he
+commenced operations in the Soudan. Both the Khedive and the British
+Government wished a termination to be put to the troubles that had for
+some time prevailed in the border lands of Abyssinia and the Eastern
+Soudan, and it was hoped that Gordon's reputation and energy would
+facilitate the removal of all difficulties with King John, who, after
+the death of Theodore, had succeeded in obtaining the coveted title of
+"Negus."
+
+In order to understand the position, a few historical facts must be
+recorded. By the year 1874 King John's authority was established over
+every province except in the south, Shoa, where Menelik retained his
+independence, and in the north, Bogos, which was seized in the year
+stated by Munzinger Bey, a Swiss holding the post of Governor of
+Massowah under the Khedive. In seizing Bogos, Munzinger had
+dispossessed its hereditary chief, Walad el Michael, who retired to
+Hamacem, also part of his patrimony, where he raised forces in
+self-defence. Munzinger proposed to annex Hamacem, and the Khedive
+assented; but he entrusted the command of the expedition to Arokol
+Bey, and a Danish officer named Arendrup as military adviser, and
+Munzinger was forced to be content with a minor command at Tajoura,
+where he was killed some months later. The Egyptian expedition
+meantime advanced with equal confidence and carelessness upon Hamacem,
+Michael attacked it in several detachments, and had the double
+satisfaction of destroying the troops and capturing their arms and
+ammunition. Such was the disastrous commencement of those pending
+questions to which the Khedive Ismail referred in his letter to
+General Gordon.
+
+The Khedive decided to retrieve this reverse, and to continue his
+original design. With this object a considerable number of troops were
+sent to Massowah, and the conduct of the affair was entrusted to Ratib
+Pasha and an American soldier of fortune, Colonel Loring Pasha. By
+this time--1876--Michael had quarrelled with King John, who had
+compelled him to give up the weapons he had captured from the
+Egyptians, and, anxious for revenge, he threw in his lot with his
+recent adversaries. The Egyptian leaders showed they had not profited
+by the experience of their predecessors. They advanced in the same
+bold and incautious manner, and after they had built two strong forts
+on the Gura plateau they were induced, by jealousy of each other or
+contempt for their enemy when he appeared, to leave the shelter of
+their forts, and to fight in the open. The Egyptian Ratib had the good
+sense to advise, "Stay in the forts," but Loring exclaimed: "No! march
+out of them. You are afraid!" and thus a taunt once again sufficed to
+banish prudence. The result of this action, which lasted only an hour,
+was the loss of over 10,000 Egyptian troops, of 25 cannon, and 10,000
+Remington rifles. The survivors took refuge in the forts, and
+succeeded in holding them. Negotiations then followed, and King John
+showed an unexpected moderation and desire for peace with Egypt, but
+only on the condition of the surrender of his recalcitrant vassal
+Michael. Michael retaliated by carrying raids into King John's
+territory, thus keeping the whole border in a state of disorder, which
+precluded all idea of a stable peace.
+
+Such was the position with which General Gordon had to deal. He had to
+encourage the weakened and disheartened Egyptian garrison, to muzzle
+Michael without exposing the Khedive to the charge of deserting his
+ally, and to conclude a peace with Abyssinia without surrendering
+either Bogos or Michael. At this stage we are only called upon to
+describe the first brief phase of this delicate question, which at
+recurring intervals occupied Gordon's attention during the whole of
+his stay in the Soudan. His first step was to inform Michael that the
+subsidy of money and provisions would only be paid him on condition
+that he abstained from attacking the Abyssinian frontier; his next to
+write a letter to King John, offering him fair terms, and enclosing
+the draft of a treaty of amity. There was good reason to think that
+these overtures would have produced a favourable result if it had been
+possible for General Gordon to have seen King John at that time, but
+unfortunately a fresh war had just broken out with Menelik, and King
+John had to proceed in all haste to Shoa. He did not reply to Gordon's
+letter for six months, and by that time Gordon was too thoroughly
+engaged in the Soudan to take up the Abyssinian question until the
+force of events, as will be seen, again compelled him to do so.
+
+Having decided that the Abyssinian dispute must wait, General Gordon
+proceeded by Kassala on his journey to Khartoum. Travelling not less
+than thirty miles a day, in great heat, organising the administration
+on his way, and granting personal audience to everyone who wished to
+see him, from the lowest miserable and naked peasant to the highest
+official or religious personage, like the Shereef Said Hakim, he
+reached Khartoum on the 3rd May. He did not delay an hour in the
+commencement of his task. His first public announcement was to abolish
+the _courbash_, to remit arrears of taxation, and to sanction a
+scheme for pumping the river water into the town. The _Kadi_ or mayor
+read this address in the public square; the people hailed it with
+manifestations of pleasure, and Gordon himself, carried away by his
+enthusiasm for his work, compresses the long harangue into a brief
+text: "With the help of God, I will hold the balance level."
+
+But the measures named were not attended by any great difficulty in
+their inception or execution. They were merely the preliminaries to
+the serious and risky disbandment of the Bashi-Bazouks, and the steps
+necessary to restrict and control, not merely the trade in, but the
+possession of, slaves. As General Gordon repeatedly pointed out, his
+policy and proceedings were a direct attack on the only property that
+existed in the Soudan, and justice to the slave could not be equitably
+dispensed by injustice to the slave-owner. The third class of slave
+raider stood in a separate category, and in dealing with him Gordon
+never felt a trace of compunction. He had terminated the career of
+those ruthless scourges of the African races at the Equator, and with
+God's help he was determined to end it throughout the Soudan. But the
+slave question in Egypt was many-sided, and bristled with difficulties
+to anyone who understood it, and wished to mete out a fair and equable
+treatment to all concerned.
+
+It was with the special object of maintaining the rights of the owners
+as well as of the slaves that Gordon proposed a set of regulations,
+making the immediate registration of slaves compulsory, and thus
+paving the way for the promulgation of the Slave Convention already
+under negotiation. His propositions were only four in number, and read
+as follows:--
+
+     1. Enforce the law compelling runaway slaves to return to their
+     masters, except when cruelly treated.
+
+     2. Require masters to register their slaves before 1st January
+     1878.
+
+     3. If the masters neglect to register them, then Regulation 1 not
+     to be enforced in their favour.
+
+     4. No registration to be allowed after 1st January 1878.
+
+By these simple but practical arrangements General Gordon would have
+upheld the rights of the slave-owners, and thus disarmed their
+hostility, at the same time that he stopped the imposition of
+servitude on any fresh persons. In the course of time, and without
+imposing on the Exchequer the burden of the compensation, which he saw
+the owners were in equity entitled to, he would thus have put an end
+to the slave trade throughout the Soudan.
+
+The Anglo-Egyptian Convention on the subject of the slave trade,
+signed on 4th August 1877, was neither so simple nor so practical,
+while there was a glaring inconsistency between its provisions and the
+Khedivial Decree that accompanied it.
+
+The second article of the Convention reads: "Any person engaged in
+traffic of slaves, either directly or indirectly, shall be considered
+guilty of stealing with murder (_vol avec meurtre_)," and consequently
+punishable, as General Gordon assumed, with death.
+
+But the first and second clauses of the Khedive's Decree were to a
+different effect. They ran as follows:--
+
+     "The sale of slaves from family to family will be prohibited.
+     This prohibition will take effect in seven years in Cairo, and in
+     twelve years in the Soudan.
+
+     "After the lapse of this term of years any infraction of this
+     prohibition will be punished by an imprisonment of from five
+     months to five years."
+
+The literal interpretation of this decree would have left Gordon
+helpless to do anything for the curtailment of the slave trade until
+the year 1889, and then only permitted to inflict a quite insufficient
+punishment on those who broke the law. General Gordon pointed out the
+contradiction between the Convention and the Decree, and the
+impossibility of carrying out his original instructions if he were
+deprived of the power of allotting adequate punishment for offences;
+and he reverted to his original proposition of registration, for which
+the Slave Convention made no provision, although the negotiators at
+Cairo were fully aware of his views and recommendations expressed in
+an official despatch three months before that Convention was signed.
+To these representations Gordon never received any reply. He was left
+to work out the problem for himself, to carry on the suppression of
+the slave trade as best he could, and to take the risk of official
+censure and repudiation for following one set of instructions in the
+Convention in preference to those recorded in the Decree. The outside
+public blamed the Khedive, and Gordon himself blamed Nubar Pasha and
+the Egyptian Ministry; but the real fault lay at the doors of the
+British Government, which knew of Gordon's representations and the
+discrepancy between the orders of the Khedive and the Convention they
+had signed together, and yet did nothing to enforce the precise
+fulfilment of the provisions it had thought it worth while to resort
+to diplomacy to obtain. The same hesitation and inability to grasp the
+real issues has characterised British policy in Egypt down to the
+present hour.
+
+If Gordon had not been a man fearless of responsibility, and resolved
+that some result should ensue from his labours, he would no doubt have
+expended his patience and strength in futile efforts to obtain clearer
+and more consistent instructions from Cairo, and, harassed by
+official tergiversation and delay, he would have been driven to give
+up his task in disgust if not despair. But being what he was--a man of
+the greatest determination and the highest spirit--he abandoned any
+useless effort to negotiate with either the English or the Egyptian
+authorities in the Delta, and he turned to the work in hand with the
+resolve to govern the Soudan in the name of the Khedive, but as a
+practical Dictator. It was then that broke from him the characteristic
+and courageous phrase: "I will carry things with a high hand to the
+last."
+
+The first and most pressing task to which Gordon had to address
+himself was the supersession of the Turkish and Arab irregulars, who,
+under the name of "Bashi-Bazouks," constituted a large part of the
+provincial garrison. Not merely were they inefficient from a military
+point of view, but their practice, confirmed by long immunity, had
+been to prey on the unoffending population. They thus brought the
+Government into disrepute, at the same time that they were an element
+of weakness in its position. Gordon saw that if the Khedive had no
+better support than their services, his authority in the Soudan was
+liable at any moment to be overthrown. It had been the practice of the
+Cairo authorities to send up, whenever reinforcements were asked for,
+Arnaut and Arab loafers in that city, and these men were expected to
+pay themselves without troubling the Government. This they did to
+their own satisfaction, until Gordon resolved to put an end to their
+misdeeds at all cost, for he found that not merely did they pillage
+the people, but that they were active abettors of the slave trade. Yet
+as he possessed no military force, while there were not fewer than
+6000 Bashi-Bazouks scattered throughout the provinces, he had to
+proceed with caution. His method of breaking up this body is a
+striking illustration of his thorough grasp of detail, and of the
+prudence, as well as daring, with which he applied what he conceived
+to be the most sensible means of removing a grave difficulty. This
+considerable force was scattered in numerous small garrisons
+throughout the province. From a military point of view this
+arrangement was bad, but it enabled each separate garrison to do a
+little surreptitious slave-hunting on its own account. General Gordon
+called in these garrisons, confined the Bashi-Bazouks to three or four
+places, peremptorily stopped the arrival of recruits, and gradually
+replaced them with trustworthy black Soudanese soldiers. Before he
+laid down the reins of power, at the end of 1879, he had completely
+broken up this body, and as effectually relieved the Soudanese from
+their military tyrants as he had freed them from the whip.
+
+Having put all these matters in trim, Gordon left Khartoum in the
+middle of the summer of 1877 for the western province of Darfour,
+where a number of matters claimed his pressing attention. In that
+province there were several large Egyptian garrisons confined in two
+or three towns, and unable--through fear, as it proved, but on account
+of formidable enemies, as was alleged--to move outside them. The
+reports of trouble and hostility were no doubt exaggerated, but still
+there was a simmering of disturbance below the surface that portended
+peril in the future; and read by the light of after events, it seems
+little short of miraculous that General Gordon was able to keep it
+under by his own personal energy and the magic of his name. When on
+the point of starting to relieve these garrisons, he found himself
+compelled to disband a regiment of 500 Bashi-Bazouks, who constituted
+the only force at his immediate disposal. He had then to organise a
+nondescript body, after the same fashion as he had adopted at the
+Equator, and with 500 followers of this kind--of whom he said only 150
+were any good--he started on his march for the districts which lie
+several hundred miles west of the White Nile, and approach most nearly
+of the Khedive's possessions to Lake Tchad.
+
+The enemies with whom General Gordon had to deal were two. There was
+first Haroun, who claimed, as the principal survivor after Zebehr's
+invasion of Darfour, already described, to be the true Sultan of that
+State; and secondly, Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, and the nominal
+leader of the slave-dealers. While the former was in open revolt, the
+latter's covert hostility was the more to be dreaded, although
+Suleiman might naturally hesitate to throw off the mask lest his
+revolt might be the signal for his father's execution at Cairo--Zebehr
+having been detained there after his too confiding visit a few years
+before. It was therefore both prudent and necessary to ignore Suleiman
+until Haroun had been brought into subjection, or in some other way
+compelled to desist from acts of hostility.
+
+General Gordon's plan was simple in the extreme. Leaving the Nile with
+500 men, he determined to collect _en route_ the efficient part of the
+scattered garrisons, sending those who were not efficient to the river
+for transport to Khartoum, and with this force to relieve the garrison
+at Fascher, the most distant of the large towns or stations in
+Darfour. It will be understood that these garrisons numbered several
+thousand men each, while Gordon's relieving body was only a few
+hundreds; but their _morale_ had sunk so low that they dared not take
+the field against an enemy whom their own terror, and not the reality,
+painted as formidable. Even before he began his advance, Gordon had
+taken a fair measure of the revolt, which he expressed himself
+confident of suppressing without firing a shot. At Dara, the place
+which in the Mahdist war was well defended by Slatin Pasha, he
+released 1800 troops; but he was kept in inactivity for some weeks
+owing to the necessity of organising his force and of ascertaining how
+far Suleiman, with his robber confederacy of 10,000 fighting men at
+Shaka--only 150 miles south-east of Dara--might be counted on to
+remain quiet. During this period of suspense he was compelled to take
+the field against a formidable tribe called by the name of the
+Leopard, which threatened his rear. It is unnecessary to enter upon
+the details of this expedition, which was completely successful,
+notwithstanding the cowardice of his troops, and which ended with the
+abject submission of the offending clan.
+
+Having assembled a force of a kind of 3,500 men, he resolved to make a
+forced march to Fascher, and then with the same promptitude to descend
+on Shaka, and settle the pending dispute with Suleiman. These plans he
+kept locked in his own bosom, for his camp was full of spies, and his
+own surroundings were not to be trusted.
+
+Leaving the main portion of his troops at Dara, he advanced on Fascher
+at the head of less than 1000 men, taking the lead himself with the
+small bodyguard he had organised of 150 picked Soudanese. With these
+he entered Fascher, where there were 3000 troops, and the Pasha,
+Hassan Helmi, had 10,000 more at Kolkol, three days' journey away.
+Gordon found the garrison quite demoralised, and afraid to move
+outside the walls. He at once ordered Hassan Pasha to come to him,
+with the intention of punishing him by dismissal for his negligence
+and cowardice in commanding a force that, properly led, might have
+coerced the whole province, when the alarming news reached the
+Governor-General that Suleiman and his band had quitted Shaka, and
+were plundering in the neighbourhood of Dara itself. The gravity of
+this danger admitted of no delay. Not a moment could be spared to
+either punish an incapable lieutenant or to crush the foe Haroun,
+whose proceedings were the alleged main cause of trouble in Darfour.
+Gordon returned with his bodyguard as fast as possible, and, leaving
+even it behind, traversed the last eighty-five miles alone on his
+camel in a day and a half. Here may be introduced what he wrote
+himself on the subject of these rapid and often solitary camel
+journeys:--
+
+     "I have a splendid camel--none like it; it flies along, and quite
+     astonishes even the Arabs. I came flying into this station in
+     Marshal's uniform, and before the men had had time to unpile
+     their arms, I had arrived, with only one man with me. I could not
+     help it; the escort did not come in for an hour and a half
+     afterwards. The Arab chief who came with me said it was the
+     telegraph. The Gordons and the camels are of the same race--let
+     them take an idea into their heads, and nothing will take it
+     out.... It is fearful to see the Governor-General arrayed in
+     gold clothes, flying along like a madman, with only a guide, as
+     if he were pursued.... If I were fastidious, I should be as many
+     weeks as I now am days on the road; I gain a great deal of
+     prestige by these unheard-of marches. It makes the people fear me
+     much more than if I were slow."
+
+The situation was in every way as serious as was represented. The Dara
+garrison as a fighting force was valueless, and with the exception of
+his small bodyguard, still on the road from Fascher, Gordon had not a
+man on whom he could count. Suleiman and his whole force were encamped
+not three miles from the town. Gordon quite realised the position; he
+saw that his own life, and, what he valued more, the whole work on
+which he had been so long engaged, were at stake, and that a moment's
+hesitation would mean ruin. He rose to the crisis. At daybreak,
+attired in his official costume, with the Medjidieh gleaming on his
+breast, he mounted his horse and rode off to Suleiman's camp. Suleiman
+meditated treachery, and a trifle would have decided him to take the
+step of seizing Gordon, and holding him as hostage for his father. Had
+Gordon delayed even a few hours, there is no doubt that the
+slave-hunters would have executed their original design; but his
+extraordinary promptitude and self-confidence disconcerted them, and
+probably saved his own life. Gordon rode down the brigand lines;
+Suleiman, described as "a nice-looking lad of twenty-two," received
+him with marks of respect, and the Governor-General, without giving
+them a moment to think, at once summoned him and his chief lieutenants
+to an audience in the tent placed at his disposal. Here Gordon went
+straight to the point, accusing them of meditated rebellion, and
+telling them that he meant to break up their confederacy. After
+listening to this indictment, they all made him submission very
+abjectly; but Gordon saw that Suleiman had not forgiven him, and when
+the truth came afterwards to be known, it was found that he did not
+carry out his project only because his principal lieutenants had
+deserted him. When the negotiations were over, Suleiman retired with
+1500 men to Shaka, where we shall hear of him again, and Gordon took
+into his pay the other half of the brigand force. In this remarkable
+manner did he stave off the greatest peril which had yet threatened
+him in the Soudan.
+
+The following corroborative account of this incident was furnished
+long afterwards by Slatin Pasha:--
+
+     "In the midst of all this discussion and difference of opinion,
+     Gordon, travelling by Keriut and Shieria, had halted at a spot
+     about four hours' march from Dara; and having instructed his
+     escort to follow him as usual, he and his two secretaries started
+     in advance on camels. Hearing of his approach, Suleiman had
+     given orders to his troops to deploy in three lines between the
+     camp and the fort, and while this operation was being carried
+     out, Gordon, coming from the rear of the troops, passed rapidly
+     through the lines, riding at a smart trot, and, saluting the
+     troops right and left, reached the fort. The suddenness of
+     Gordon's arrival left the leaders no time to make their plans.
+     They therefore ordered the general salute; but even before the
+     thunder of the guns was heard, Gordon had already sent orders to
+     Suleiman and his chiefs to appear instantly before him.... Thus
+     had Gordon, by his amazing rapidity and quick grasp of the
+     situation, arrived in two days at the settlement of a question
+     which literally bristled with dangers and difficulties. Had
+     Suleiman offered resistance at a time when Darfour was in a
+     disturbed state, Gordon's position and the maintenance of
+     Egyptian authority in these districts would have been precarious
+     in the extreme."
+
+What Gordon's own opinion of this affair was is revealed in the
+following extremely characteristic letter written to one of those
+anti-slavery enthusiasts, who seemed to think that the whole
+difficulty could be settled by a proclamation or two, and a rigid
+enforcement of a strict law sentencing every one connected with the
+slave trade without discrimination to death:--
+
+     "There are some 6000 more slave-dealers in the interior who will
+     obey me now they have heard that Zebehr's son and the other
+     chiefs have given in. You can imagine what a difficulty there is
+     in dealing with all these armed men. I have separated them here
+     and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass.
+     Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be
+     considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our Government
+     once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came
+     into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? I would have
+     given L500 to have had you and the Anti-Slavery Society in Dara
+     during the three days of doubt whether the slave-dealers would
+     fight or not. A bad fort, a coward garrison, and not one who did
+     not tremble--on the other side a strong, determined set of men
+     accustomed to war, good shots, with two field-pieces. I would
+     have liked to hear what you would all have said then. I do not
+     say this in brag, for God knows what my anxiety was."
+
+The drama, of which the first act took place in Suleiman's camp
+outside Dara, was not then ended. Gordon knew that to leave a thing
+half done was only to invite the danger to reappear. Suleiman had
+retired with his 1500 men to Shaka, the followers of Zebehr from all
+sides throughout the province would flock to his standard, and in a
+little time he would be more formidable and hostile than before. Four
+days after Suleiman left Dara, Gordon set out for the same place, at
+the head of four companies, and after a six days' march through
+terrible heat he reached Shaka. The slave-hunters had had no time to
+recover their spirits, they were all completely cowed and very
+submissive; and Suleiman craved favour at the hands of the man against
+whose life he had only a few days before been plotting. Unfortunately
+Gordon could not remain at Shaka, to attend in person to the
+dispersion of Suleiman's band, and after his departure that young
+leader regained his confidence, and resorted to his hostile and
+ambitious designs; but the success of General Gordon's plans in the
+summer of 1877 was complete, and sufficed to greatly diminish the
+gravity of the peril when, twelve months later, Suleiman broke out
+afresh, and fell by the hands of Gessi.
+
+While General Gordon was facing these personal dangers, and coping
+with difficulties in a manner that has never been surpassed, and that
+will stand as an example to all time of how the energy, courage, and
+attention to detail of an individual will compensate for bad troops
+and deficient resources, he was experiencing the bitter truth that no
+one can escape calumny. The arm-chair reformers of London were not at
+all pleased with his methods, and they were quite shocked when they
+heard that General Gordon, whom they affected to regard as the nominee
+of the Anti-Slavery Society, and not as the responsible lieutenant of
+a foreign potentate, was in the habit, not merely of restoring
+fugitive slaves to their lawful owners, but even of purchasing slaves
+with his own and the Government money, in order to convert them into
+soldiers. From their narrow point of view, it seemed to them that
+these steps were a direct encouragement of the slave-trade, and they
+denounced Gordon's action with an extraordinary, but none the less
+bitter, ignorance of the fact that he was employing the only practical
+means of carrying out the mission which, in addition to his
+administrative duties, had been practically imposed on him as the
+representative of civilization. These good but misinformed persons
+must have believed that the Egyptian garrison in the Soudan was
+efficient, that communications were easy, and the climate not
+unpleasant, and that Gordon, supported by zealous lieutenants, had
+only to hold up his hand or pass a resolution, in the fashion of
+Exeter Hall, for the chains, real and metaphysical, to fall from the
+limbs of the negro population of Inner Africa. That was their dream.
+The reality was a worthless and craven army, a climate that killed
+most Europeans, and which the vigour and abstemiousness of Gordon
+scarcely enabled him to endure, communications only maintained and
+represented by the wearying flight of the camel across the desert,
+treachery and hostility to his plans, if not his person, among his
+colleagues--all these difficulties and dangers overcome and rendered
+nugatory by the earnestness and energy of one man alone. Well might
+his indignation find vent in such a grand outburst as this:--
+
+     "I do not believe in you all. You say this and that, and you do
+     not do it; you give your money, and you have done your duty; you
+     praise one another, etc. I do not wonder at it. God has given you
+     ties and anchors to this earth; you have wives and families. I,
+     thank God, have none of them, and am free. Now understand me. If
+     it suit me, I will buy slaves. I will let captured slaves go down
+     to Egypt and not molest them, and I will do what I like, and what
+     God, in His mercy, may direct me to do about domestic slaves; but
+     I will break the neck of slave raids, even if it cost me my life.
+     I will buy slaves for my army; for this purpose I will make
+     soldiers against their will, to enable me to prevent raids. I
+     will do this in the light of day, and defy your resolutions and
+     your actions. Would my heart be broken if I was ousted from this
+     command? Should I regret the eternal camel-riding, the heat, the
+     misery I am forced to witness, the discomforts of everything
+     around my domestic life? Look at my travels in seven months.
+     Thousands of miles on camels, and no hope of rest for another
+     year. You are only called on at intervals to rely on your God;
+     with me I am obliged continually to do so. Find me the man and I
+     will take him as my help who utterly despises money, name, glory,
+     honour; one who never wishes to see his home again; one who looks
+     to God as the Source of good and Controller of evil; one who has
+     a healthy body and energetic spirit, and one who looks on death
+     as a release from misery; and if you cannot find him, then leave
+     me alone. To carry myself is enough for me; I want no other
+     baggage."
+
+Gordon's troubles were not only with English visionaries. The Egyptian
+officials had always regarded the delegation of supreme powers to him
+with dislike, and this sentiment became unqualified apprehension when
+they saw how resolute he was in exercising them. Ismail Pasha was
+disposed to place unlimited trust in his energetic Governor-General,
+but he could not but be somewhat influenced by those around him while
+Gordon was far away. When, therefore, Gordon took into his own hands
+the power of life and death, and sentenced men to be hanged and shot,
+he roused that opposition to the highest point of activity, and
+received repeated remonstrances by telegraph from Cairo. To these he
+replied firmly, but quietly, that on no other condition could the
+administration be carried on, and that his authority as Viceroy would
+be undermined if he could not dispense prompt justice. Notwithstanding
+all his representations, he never obtained the ratification of his
+right to pass death sentences; but with that strong will that he
+showed in every crisis, he announced his determination to act on his
+own responsibility. On at least two occasions he expresses a feeling
+of gratification at having caused murderers to be hung.
+
+This is a suitable moment to lay stress on the true views Gordon held
+on the subject of bloodshed. While averse to all warfare by
+disposition, and without the smallest trace of what might be called
+the military spirit, General Gordon had none of that timid and
+unreasoning shrinking from taking life, which is often cruel and
+always cowardly. He punished the guilty without the least false
+compunction, even with a death sentence, and if necessity left no
+choice, he would have executed that sentence himself, provided he was
+quite convinced of its justice. As a rule, he went unarmed in the
+Soudan, as in China; but there were exceptions, and on at least one
+occasion he took an active and decisive part in a conflict. He was
+being attacked by one of the tribes, and his men were firing wildly
+and without result. Then Gordon snatched a rifle from one of his men,
+and firing at the hostile leader, killed him. There are at least two
+other incidents that will show him in a light that many of his
+admirers would keep suppressed, but that bring out his human nature. A
+clumsy servant fired off his heavy duck-gun close to his head, and
+Gordon very naturally gave him a smart box on the ears which the
+fellow would remember for a week. Excited by the misery of a
+slave-gang, he asked the boy in charge of them to whom they belonged,
+and as he hesitated, he struck him across the face with his whip.
+Gordon's comment on this act is that it was "cruel and cowardly, but
+he was enraged, and could not help it." One feels on reading this that
+one would have done so oneself, and that, after all, Gordon was a man,
+and not a spiritual abstraction.
+
+Thus ended the first eventful year of General Gordon's tenure of the
+post of Governor-General of the Soudan. Some idea of the magnitude of
+the task he had performed may be gathered from the fact that during
+this period he rode nearly 4000 miles on his camel through the desert.
+He put before himself the solution of eight burning questions, and by
+the end of 1877 he had settled five of them more or less permanently.
+He had also effected many reforms in the military and civil branches
+of the administration, and had formed the nucleus of a force in which
+he could put some confidence. By the people he was respected and
+feared, and far more liked than he imagined. "Send us another Governor
+like Gordon" was the burden of the Soudanese cry to Slatin when the
+shadow of the Mahdi's power had already fallen over the land. He had
+respected their religion and prejudices. When their Mahommedan
+co-religionists had ground them down to the dust, even desecrating
+their mosques by turning them into powder magazines, General Gordon
+showed them justice and merciful consideration, restored and endowed
+their mosques, and exhorted them in every way to be faithful to the
+observance of their religion. He was always most exact in payment for
+services rendered. This became known; and when some of the Egyptian
+officials--a Pasha among others--seized camels for his service without
+paying for them, the owners threw themselves on the ground, kissing
+Gordon's camel's feet, told their tale, and obtained prompt redress.
+What more striking testimony to his thoughtfulness for others could be
+given than in the following anecdote? One of his native lieutenants, a
+confirmed drunkard, but of which Gordon was ignorant, became ill, and
+the Governor-General went to see and sit by him in his tent. All the
+man asked for was brandy, and General Gordon, somewhat shocked at the
+repeated request, expostulated with him that he, a believer in the
+Koran, should drink the strong waters so expressly forbidden by that
+holy book. But the man readily replied, "This is as medicine, and the
+Prophet does not forbid us to save life." Gordon said nothing, but
+left the tent, and some hours later he sent the man two bottles of
+brandy from his own small store. Even the Soudanese, who were afraid
+of him in his terrible mood, knew the many soft corners he kept in his
+heart, and easily learnt the way to them. For misfortune and suffering
+of every kind his sympathy was quickly won, and with his sympathy went
+his support, to the utmost limit of his power.
+
+After the campaign in Darfour, Gordon returned to Khartoum, where he
+was preparing for fresh exertions, as well as for a settlement of the
+Abyssinian difficulty, when a sudden and unexpected summons reached
+him to come down to Cairo and help the Khedive to arrange his
+financial affairs. The Khedive's telegram stated that the Egyptian
+creditors were trying to interfere with his sovereign prerogative, and
+that His Highness knew no one but Gordon who could assist him out of
+this position. The precise date on which this telegram reached Gordon
+was 25th January 1878, when he was passing Shendy--the place on the
+Nile opposite Metammeh, where the British Expedition encamped in
+January 1885--but as he had to return to Khartoum to arrange for the
+conduct of the administration during his absence, he did not arrive at
+Dongola on his way to the capital until the 20th of the following
+month. He reached Cairo on 7th March, was at once carried off to dine
+with the Khedive, who had waited more than an hour over the appointed
+time for him because his train was late, and, when it was over, was
+conveyed to one of the finest palaces, which had been specially
+prepared in his honour. The meaning of this extraordinary reception
+was that the Khedive Ismail thought he had found a deliverer from his
+own troubles in the man who had done such wonders in the Soudan. That
+ruler had reached a stage in his affairs when extrication was
+impossible, if the creditors of Egypt were to receive their dues. He
+was very astute, and he probably saw that the only chance of saving
+himself was for some high authority to declare that the interests of
+himself and his people must be pronounced paramount to those of the
+foreign investors. There was only one man in the world likely to come
+to that conclusion, with a spotless reputation and a voice to which
+public opinion might be expected to pay heed. That man was Gordon.
+Therefore he was sent for in post haste, and found the post of
+President of "An Inquiry into the State of the Finances of the
+Country" thrust upon him before he had shaken off the dust of his long
+journey to Cairo.
+
+The motives which induced the Khedive to send for General Gordon
+cannot be mistaken; nor is there any obscurity as to those which led
+General Gordon to accept a task in which he was bound to run counter
+to the views of every other European authority, and still more to the
+fixed policy of his and other Governments. In the first place, Gordon
+being the servant of the Khedive, it would have been impossible for
+him to have said no to a request which was entitled to be regarded as
+a command. In the second place, Gordon did not know all the currents
+of intrigue working between Cairo and the capitals of Europe, and he
+convinced himself that a sound workable plan for the benefit of Egypt
+and her people would command such general approval that "the financial
+cormorants," as he termed the bondholders, or rather their leaders,
+would have to retire beaten from the field. He had no doubt that he
+could draw up such a plan, based on a suspension and permanent
+reduction of interest, and the result will convince any disinterested
+person of the fact, but Gordon was destined to find that all persons
+cannot be guided by such disinterestedness as his, of which the way he
+treated his Egyptian salary furnished such a striking instance. When
+sent to the Equator, he was offered L10,000 a year, and accepted
+L2000; as Governor-General, he was nominated at L12,000 a year, and
+cut it down to a half; and when, during this very Cairo visit, a new
+and unnecessary official was appointed under the Soudan
+Administration, he insisted that his own salary should be further
+reduced to L3000, to compensate for this further charge. Such an
+example as this did not arouse enthusiasm or inspire emulation in the
+Delta. General Gordon never dealt with a question in which abstract
+justice was deemed more out of place, or had less chance of carrying
+the day.
+
+As the matter was very important, and interested persons might easily
+have misrepresented his part in it, General Gordon drew up a
+memorandum explaining every incident in the course of the affair.
+This document was published by his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, in 1886,
+and the following description merely summarises its contents.
+
+As far back as the year 1875 the Khedive Ismail began to discover that
+the financial position of his Government was bad, and that it would be
+impossible to keep up the payment of the interest on the debt at the
+high rate of seven per cent., which Egypt had bound itself to pay. He
+therefore applied to the British Government for advice and assistance.
+In response to his representations, a Financial Commission, composed
+of three members--Mr Cave, Colonel Stokes, and Mr Rivers Wilson--was
+sent to Egypt for the purpose of inquiring into the financial position
+of that country. They had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion
+that it was unsound, and that the uneasiness of Ismail Pasha had not
+been expressed a day too soon. They recommended that an arrangement
+should be come to with the bondholders by which all the loans were to
+be placed on the same footing, and the rate of interest reduced to
+some figure that might be agreed upon. It then became necessary to
+negotiate with the bondholders, who appointed Mr Goschen for the
+English section, and M. Joubert for the French, to look after their
+rights. The result of their efforts in 1876 was that they united the
+loans into one, bearing a uniform rate of six per cent, instead of
+seven, and that four Commissioners were appointed to look after the
+debt in the interests of the bondholders, while two other European
+officials were nominated--one to control the receipts, the other the
+expenditure. In less than two years Ismail Pasha discovered that this
+arrangement had not remedied the evil, and that the Government was
+again on the verge of bankruptcy. It was at this juncture that the
+Khedive applied to General Gordon, in the hope that his ability and
+reputation would provide an easy escape from his dilemma.
+
+General Gordon agreed to accept the post of President of this
+Commission of Inquiry, and he also fell in with the Khedive's own wish
+and suggestion that the Commissioners of the Debt should not be
+members of the Commission. This point must be carefully borne in mind,
+as the whole negotiation failed because of the Khedive's weakness in
+waiving the very point he rightly deemed vital for success. Having
+laid down the only principle to which he attached importance, the
+Khedive went on to say that M. de Lesseps would act in conjunction
+with General Gordon, and that these two, with some vague assistance
+from financial experts, were to form the Commission. It soon became
+evident that M. de Lesseps had no serious views on the subject, and
+that he was only too much disposed to yield to external influences.
+
+On the very threshold of his task, which he took up with his usual
+thoroughness and honest desire to get at the truth, General Gordon
+received a warning that the greatest difficulties were not those
+inherent to the subject, but those arising from the selfish designs of
+interested persons. As soon as it became known that General Gordon had
+accepted this task, and that he had agreed to the Khedive's suggestion
+that the Debt Commissioners were not to sit on the Commission, there
+was a loud outburst of disapproval and dismay in diplomatic and
+financial circles. This part of the story must be given in his own
+words:--
+
+     "Mr Vivian, the English Consul-General, said to me, 'I wonder you
+     could accept the Presidency of the Commission of Inquiry without
+     the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'I was free to accept or
+     refuse.'
+
+     "I then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the
+     French and Austrian Consuls-General, and also Vivian, came in,
+     and attacked me for having accepted the post of President. I said
+     'I was free.' And then they said, 'I was risking his Highness his
+     throne; that he ran a very serious risk personally, if he formed
+     the Commission of Inquiry without the creditors' representatives,
+     viz. the Commissioners of the Debt.' I said, 'Why do you not tell
+     him so?' They said, 'You ought to do so.' I said, 'Well, will you
+     commission me to do so, from you, with any remarks I like to make
+     as to the futility of your words?' They all said, 'Yes, we
+     authorise you to do so--in our names.'"
+
+General Gordon went that evening to the Abdin Palace, where he was
+engaged to dine with the Khedive; and having asked permission to make
+an important communication, saw Ismail before dinner, when words to
+this effect were exchanged:--
+
+Gordon said: "I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they
+told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious
+personal risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the
+Commissioners of Debt being upon it."
+
+The Khedive replied as follows: "I do not care a bit. I am only afraid
+of England, and I feel sure she will not move. You will see Lesseps
+to-morrow, and arrange the _enquete_ with him." Encouraged by the
+Khedive's firmness, and fully convinced that no good result would
+follow if the Debt Commissioners, who only considered the bondholders'
+interests, were on this inquiry, Gordon met Lesseps the next morning
+in the full expectation that business would now be begun. The further
+ramifications of the intrigue, for it soon became one, for the
+discomfiture and discrediting of Gordon, must be told in his own
+words:
+
+     "The next day Lesseps came to my Palace with Stanton (Stokes's
+     old Danube Secretary, now Resident-Commissioner for the British
+     Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of mine).
+     Lesseps began, 'We must have the Commissioners of the Debt on the
+     _enquete_.'
+
+     "I said, 'It is a _sine qua non_ that they are not to be upon
+     it.' Lesseps replied, 'They must be upon it.'
+
+     "Then in came Cherif Pasha (the Premier), and said, 'Are you
+     agreed?' I left Lesseps to speak, and he said, 'Yes,' at which I
+     stared and said, 'I fear not.' Then Lesseps and Cherif discussed
+     it, and Lesseps gave in, and agreed to serve on the Commission
+     without the Commissioners of the Debt, but with the proviso that
+     he would ask permission to do so from Paris. Cherif Pasha was
+     pleased.
+
+     "But I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so I asked
+     Cherif to stop a moment, and said to Stanton, 'Now, see that
+     Lesseps does not make a mess of it. Let him say at once, Will he
+     act without the Commissioners of Debt or not? Do this for my
+     sake; take him into that corner and speak to him.' Stanton did
+     so, while I took Cherif into the other corner, much against his
+     will, for he thought I was a bore, raising obstacles. I told him
+     that Lesseps had declared before he came that he would not act
+     unless with the Commissioners of the Debt. Cherif was huffed with
+     me, and turned to Lesseps, whom Stanton had already dosed in his
+     corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation
+     again for some time; and then Cherif came to me and said,
+     'Lesseps has accepted without the Commissioners of the Debt.'
+
+     "I disgusted Cherif as I went downstairs with him by saying, 'He
+     will never stick to it.'"
+
+If Gordon was not a diplomatist, he was at least very clear-sighted.
+He saw clearly through M. de Lesseps, who had no views on the subject,
+and who was quite content to play the part his Government assigned
+him. A few minutes after the interview described he obtained further
+evidence of the hostility the projected inquiry without the
+Commissioners had aroused. He met Major Evelyn Baring, then beginning
+the Egyptian career which he still pursues as Lord Cromer, who was
+desirous of knowing what decision had been arrived at. On hearing that
+the Commissioners were to be excluded, Major Baring remarked, "It was
+unfair to the creditors," which seems to have drawn from Gordon some
+angry retort. There is no doubt that at this moment Gordon lost all
+control over himself, and employed personalities that left a sore
+feeling behind them. That they did so in this case was, as I am
+compelled to show later on, amply demonstrated in December 1883 and
+January 1884. The direct and immediate significance of the occurrence
+lay in its furnishing fresh evidence of the unanimity of hostility
+with which all the European officials in the Delta regarded the
+Khedive's proposal, and his attempt to make use of General Gordon's
+exceptional character and reputation. It is a reflection on no
+particular individual to assert that they were all resolved that
+General Gordon's appeal to the abstract sense of justice of the world
+should never be promulgated.
+
+The first practical proposal made was to telegraph for Mr Samuel
+Laing, a trained financier, who had acted in India at the head of the
+finances of that country; but General Gordon refused to do this,
+because he knew that he would be held responsible for the terms he
+came on; and instead he drew up several propositions, one of them
+being that the services of Mr Laing should be secured on conditions to
+be fixed by the Khedive. During this discussion, it should be noted,
+Lesseps paid no attention to business, talking of trivial and
+extraneous matters. Then Gordon, with the view of clinching the
+matter, said:
+
+     "There are two questions to decide:
+
+     "_First_, How to alleviate the present sufferings of the unpaid
+     civil employes and of the army, as well as the pressing claims of
+     the floating debt.
+
+     "_Second_, And afterwards to inquire into the real state of the
+     revenue by a Commission."
+
+This was the exact opposite of the bondholders' view, for the
+settlement of the grievances of the public and military service and of
+the floating debt would _then_ have left nothing for the payment of
+the coupons on the permanent external debt of a hundred millions. In
+fact, General Gordon boldly suggested that the funds immediately
+wanted must be provided by the non-payment of the next coupon due.
+
+It is impossible to resist the conclusion that if General Gordon had
+had his way, the Arabi revolt would have been averted; the Khedive
+Ismail, the ablest member of his house, would not have been deposed;
+and an English occupation of Egypt, hampered by financial and
+diplomatic shackles that neutralise the value of its temporary
+possession, need never have been undertaken. But _dis aliter visum_.
+It is equally impossible to resist the conclusion that the forces
+arrayed against Gordon on this occasion were such as he could not
+expect to conquer.
+
+The concluding scenes of the affair need only be briefly described. M.
+de Lesseps had never swerved from his original purpose to refer the
+matter to Paris, but even Gordon was not prepared for the duplicity he
+showed in the matter, and in which he was no doubt encouraged by the
+prevalent feeling among the foreigners at Cairo. The first point in
+all tortuous diplomacy, Eastern or Western, is to gain time; and when
+General Gordon, intent on business, called on Lesseps the next
+day--that is to say, two days after his arrival from Khartoum--the
+French engineer met him with the smiling observation that he was off
+for a day in the country, and that he had just sent a telegram to
+Paris. He handed Gordon a copy, which was to this effect: "His
+Highness the Khedive has begged me to join with M. Gordon and _the
+Commissioners of the Debt_ in making an inquiry into the finances of
+Egypt; I ask permission." Gordon's astonished ejaculation "This will
+never do" was met with the light-hearted Frenchman's remark, "I must
+go, and it must go."
+
+Then General Gordon hastened with the news and the draft of the
+telegram to the Khedive. The copy was sent in to Ismail Pasha in his
+private apartments. On mastering its contents, he rushed out, threw
+himself on a sofa, and exclaimed, "I am quite upset by this telegram
+of Lesseps; some one must go after him and tell him not to send it."
+Then turning to Gordon, he said, "I put the whole affair into your
+hands." Gordon, anxious to help the Khedive, and also hoping to find
+an ally out of Egypt, telegraphed at great length to Mr Goschen, in
+accordance with the Khedive's suggestion. Unfortunately, Mr Goschen
+replied with equal brevity and authority, "I will not look at you; the
+matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government." When we remember
+that Gordon was the properly-appointed representative of an
+independent Prince, or at least of a Prince independent of England, we
+cannot wonder at his terming this a "rude answer." Mr Goschen may have
+had some after-qualms himself, for he telegraphed some days later in a
+milder tone, but Gordon would not take an affront from any man, and
+left it unanswered.
+
+At this crisis Gordon, nothing daunted, made a proposal which, if the
+Khedive had had the courage to carry it out, might have left the
+victory with them. He proposed to the Khedive to issue a decree
+suspending the payment of the coupon, paying all pressing claims, and
+stating that he did all this on the advice of Gordon. Failing that,
+Gordon offered to telegraph himself to Lord Derby, the Foreign
+Secretary, and accept the full responsibility for the measure. Ismail
+was not equal to the occasion. He shut himself up in his harem for two
+days, and, as Gordon said, "the game was lost."
+
+General Gordon was now to experience the illimitable extent of human
+ingratitude. Even those who disagreed with the views he expressed on
+this subject cannot deny his loyalty to the Khedive, or the magnitude
+of the efforts he made on his behalf. To carry out the wishes of the
+Prince in whose service he was for the time being, he was prepared to
+accept every responsibility, and to show an unswerving devotion in a
+way that excited the opposition and hostility even of those whom he
+might otherwise have termed his friends and well-wishers. By an
+extreme expedient, which would either have ruined himself or thwarted
+the plans of powerful statesmen, and financiers not less powerful, he
+would have sealed his devotion to Ismail Pasha; but the moral or
+physical weakness of the Oriental prevented the attempt being made.
+The delay mentioned allowed of fresh pressure being brought to bear on
+the Khedive; and while Gordon emphatically declared, partly from a
+sense of consistency, and partly because he hoped to stiffen the
+Khedive's resolution that he would not act with the Debt Commissioners
+on the Inquiry, Ismail Pasha was coerced or induced into surrendering
+all he had been fighting for. He gave his assent to the Commissioners
+being on the Inquiry, and he turned his back on the man who had come
+from the heart of Africa to his assistance. When Gordon learnt these
+facts, he resolved to return to the Soudan, and he was allowed to do
+so without the least mark of honour or word of thanks from the
+Khedive. His financial episode cost him L800 out of his own pocket,
+and even if we consider that the financial situation in the Delta,
+with all its cross-currents of shady intrigue and selfish designs, was
+one that he was not quite qualified to deal with, we cannot dispute
+that his propositions were full of all his habitual nobility of
+purpose, and that they were practical, if they could ever have been
+put into effect.
+
+This incident serves to bring out some of the limitations of Gordon's
+ability. His own convictions, strengthened by the solitary life he had
+led for years in the Soudan, did not make him well adapted for any
+form of diplomacy. His methods were too simple, and his remedies too
+exclusively based on a radical treatment, to suit every complaint in a
+complicated state of society; nor is it possible for the majority of
+men to be influenced by his extraordinary self-abnegation and
+disregard for money. During this very mission he boasted that he was
+able to get to bed at eight o'clock, because he never dined out, and
+that he did not care at everyone laughing at him, and saying he was in
+the sulks. This mode of living was due, not to any peculiarity about
+General Gordon--although I trace to this period the opinion that he
+was mad--but mainly to his honest wish not to be biassed by any
+European's judgment, and to be able to give the Khedive absolutely
+independent advice, as if he himself were an Egyptian, speaking and
+acting for Egypt. Enough has been said to explain why he failed to
+accomplish a really impossible task. Nor is it necessary to assume
+that because they differed from him and strenuously opposed his
+project, the other Englishmen in authority in the Delta were
+influenced by any unworthy motives or pursued a policy that was either
+reprehensible or unsound.
+
+From this uncongenial task General Gordon returned to the work which
+he thoroughly understood, and with regard to which he had to apprehend
+no serious outside interference, for the attraction of the flesh-pots
+of Egypt did not extend into the Soudan. Still, he felt that his
+"outspokenness," as he termed it, had not strengthened his position.
+He travelled on this occasion by the Red Sea route to Aden, thence to
+Zeila, with the view of inspecting Harrar, which formed part of his
+extensive Government. During this tour Gordon saw much that disquieted
+him--a large strip of country held by fanatical Mahommedans, the slave
+trade in unchecked progress where he had not thought it to exist--and
+he wrote these memorable words: "Our English Government lives on a
+hand-to-mouth policy. They are very ignorant of these lands, yet some
+day or other they or some other Government will have to know them, for
+things at Cairo cannot stay as they are. His Highness will be curbed
+in, and will no longer be absolute sovereign; then will come the
+question of these countries."
+
+At Harrar, Gordon dismissed the Governor Raouf, whom he describes as a
+regular tyrant, but who, none the less for his misdeeds, was
+proclaimed Governor-General of the Soudan when Gordon left it less
+than two years after this visit to Harrar. When this affair was
+settled, General Gordon proceeded _via_ Massowah and Souakim to
+Khartoum, where he arrived about the middle of June. On his way he had
+felt bound to remove eight high military officers from their commands
+for various offences, from which may be gathered some idea of the
+colleagues on whom he had to depend. He reached Khartoum not a moment
+too soon, for the first news that greeted him was that Suleiman had
+broken out in open revolt, and was practically master of the Province
+of Bahr Gazelle, which lies between Darfour and the Equatorial
+Province.
+
+But before describing the steps he took to suppress this formidable
+revolt, which resembled the rising under the Mahdi in every point
+except its non-religious character, some notice may be given of the
+financial difficulties with which he had to cope, and which were much
+increased by the Khedive's practice of giving appointments in a
+promiscuous manner that were to be chargeable on the scanty and
+inadequate revenues of the Soudan.
+
+In the year 1877 the expenditure of the Soudan exceeded the revenue by
+over a quarter of a million sterling; in 1878 Gordon had reduced this
+deficit to L70,000. In the return given by the Khedive of his
+resources when foreign intervention first took place, it was stated
+that the Soudan furnished a tribute of L143,000. This was untrue; it
+had always been a drain on the Cairo exchequer until in 1879 General
+Gordon had the satisfaction, by reducing expenditure in every possible
+direction and abolishing sinecures, of securing an exact balance. The
+most formidable adversary Gordon had to meet in the course of this
+financial struggle was the Khedive himself, and it was only by
+sustained effort that he succeeded in averting the imposition of
+various expenses on his shoulders which would have rendered success
+impossible. First it was two steamers, which would have cost L20,000;
+then it was the so-called Soudan railway, with a liability of not less
+than three quarters of a million with which the Khedive wished to
+saddle the Soudan, but Gordon would have neither, and his firmness
+carried the day. When the Cairo authorities, in want of money, claimed
+that the Soudan owed L30,000, he went into the items, and showed that,
+instead, Cairo owed it L9000. He never got it, but by this he proved
+that, while he was the servant of the Khedive, he would not be
+subservient to him in matters that affected the successful discharge
+of his task as that Prince's deputy in the Soudan.
+
+We must now return to the revolt of Suleiman, the most serious
+military peril Gordon had to deal with in Africa, which was in its
+main features similar to the later uprising under the Mahdi. At the
+first collision with that young leader of the slave-dealers, Gordon
+had triumphed by his quickness and daring; but he had seen that
+Suleiman was not thoroughly cowed, and he had warned him that if he
+revolted again the result would inevitably be his ruin. Suleiman had
+not taken the warning to heart, and was now in open revolt. His most
+powerful supporters were the Arab colonies, long settled in interior
+Africa, who, proud of their descent, were always willing to take part
+against the Turco-Egyptian Government. These men rallied to a certain
+extent to Suleiman, just as some years later they attached themselves
+to the Mahdi. As General Gordon wrote in 1878: "They were ready, and
+are still ready, to seize the first chance of shaking off the yoke of
+Egypt." It was during Gordon's absence at Cairo that Suleiman's plans
+matured, and he began the campaign by seizing the province of Bahr
+Gazelle. Immediately on receiving this intelligence, General Gordon
+fitted out an expedition; and as he could not take the command
+himself, he intrusted it to his best lieutenant, Romolo Gessi, an
+Italian of proved merit.
+
+Natural difficulties retarded the advance of the expedition. Heavy
+floods kept Gessi confined in his camp during three months, and the
+lukewarm supporters of the Government regarded this inaction as proof
+of inferiority. They consequently rallied to Suleiman, who soon found
+himself at the head of a force of 6000 men, while Gessi had only 300
+regulars, two cannon, and 700 almost useless irregulars. It was as
+difficult for him to let the Governor-General know that he needed
+reinforcements as it was for General Gordon to send them. Some of his
+subordinates, in command of outlying detachments, refused to obey his
+summons, preferring to carry on a little slave-hunting on their own
+account. His troops were on the verge of mutiny: he had to shoot one
+ringleader with his own hand.
+
+At last the floods fell, and he began his forward movement, fighting
+his way against detached bodies of slave-hunters, but after each
+success receiving the welcome of the unfortunate natives, of whom
+Suleiman had consigned not fewer than 10,000 in the six previous
+months to slavery. At last Gessi was himself compelled to halt at a
+place called Dem Idris, fifty miles north of the fort which Suleiman
+had constructed for his final stand, and named after himself. These
+places are about 200 miles south of both Dara and Shaka, while between
+them runs the considerable stream called Bahr Arab. Gessi was now in
+close proximity to the main force under Suleiman, but he had to halt
+for five months before he felt in any way equal to the task of
+attacking it. During that period he had to stand on the defensive, and
+sustain several attacks from Suleiman, who had made all his plans for
+invading Darfour, and adding that province to the Bahr Gazelle.
+
+The first of these engagements was that fought on 28th December 1878,
+when Suleiman, at the head of 10,000 men, attacked Gessi's camp at Dem
+Idris. Fortunately, he had neglected no precaution, and his regulars,
+supported by a strong force of friendly natives, nobly seconded his
+efforts. Suleiman's force was repulsed in four assaults, and had to
+retire with a loss of 1000 men. But Gessi's difficulties were far from
+removed by this victory. Suleiman's losses were easily repaired, while
+those of Gessi could not be replaced. His men were also suffering from
+fever, and the strain on himself, through the absence of any
+subordinates to assist him, was terrible. It was a relief to him when
+Suleiman delivered his second attack, fifteen days after the first. On
+this occasion Suleiman appealed to the religious fanaticism of his
+followers, and made them swear on the Koran to conquer or die; and the
+black troops, as the less trustworthy, were placed in the van of
+battle and driven to the assault by the Arabs. Gessi made an excellent
+disposition of his troops, repulsing the two main attacks with heavy
+loss; and when the attack was resumed the next day, his success was
+equally complete. Unfortunately, Gessi was unable to follow up this
+advantage, because his powder was almost exhausted, and his men were
+reduced to pick up bullets from the field of combat. Tidings of his
+position reached Suleiman, who made a final attack on the 28th of
+January 1879, but owing to the fortunate arrival of a small supply of
+powder, Gessi was able to fight and win another battle.
+
+It was not until the 11th March, however, that Gessi received a
+sufficient supply of ammunition to enable him to assume the offensive.
+Suleiman's camp or fort was a strongly barricaded enclosure,
+surrounded by a double row of trunks of trees. The centre of the
+enclosure was occupied by an inner fort, which was Suleiman's own
+residence. On Gessi attacking it, his first shell set fire to one of
+the huts, and as the wood was dry, the whole encampment was soon in a
+blaze. Driven to desperation, the brigands sallied forth, only to be
+driven back by the steady fire of Gessi's troops, who by this time
+were full of confidence in their leader. Then the former broke into
+flight, escaping wherever they could. Suleiman was among those who
+escaped, although eleven of his chiefs were slain, and the unfortunate
+exhaustion of Gessi's powder again provided him with the respite to
+rally his followers and make another bid for power.
+
+This further period of enforced inaction terminated at the end of
+April, when the arrival of a full supply of powder and cartridges
+enabled Gessi to take the field for the last time. On the 1st May the
+Egyptian commander started to attack the slave robber in his last
+stronghold, Dem Suleiman. Three days later he fought the first of
+these final battles outside that fort, and succeeded in cutting off
+the retreat of the vanquished Arabs into that place of shelter. He
+then broke into the fort itself, where there were only a few men, and
+he almost succeeded in capturing Suleiman, who fled through one gate
+as Gessi entered by another. Thanks to the fleetness of his horse,
+Suleiman succeeded in making good his escape. Before his hurried
+flight Suleiman murdered four prisoners sooner than allow of their
+recapture, and throughout the long pursuit that now began all slaves
+or black troops who could not keep up were killed. These were not the
+only crimes perpetrated by these brigands. Superstition, or the mere
+pleasure of cruelty, had induced them when their fortunes were getting
+low to consecrate a new banner by bathing it in the blood of a
+murdered child. For these iniquities the hour of expiation had now
+arrived.
+
+After the capture of Dem Suleiman, Gessi began a pursuit which,
+considering the difficulties of the route owing to heavy rain,
+topographical ignorance, and the deficiency of supplies, may be
+characterised as remarkable. Gessi took with him only 600 men, armed
+with Remington rifles; but they could carry no more than three or four
+days' provisions, which were exhausted before he came up with even the
+rearmost of the fugitive Arabs. There the troops turned sulky, and it
+was only by promising them as spoil everything taken that he restored
+them to something like good temper. Six days after the start Gessi
+overwhelmed one band under Abou Sammat, one of the most active of the
+slave-hunters, and learnt that Suleiman himself was only twenty-four
+hours ahead. But the difficulties were such that Gessi was almost
+reduced to despair of the capture of that leader, and as long as he
+remained at large the rebellion could not be considered suppressed.
+
+Fortune played the game into his hand at the very moment that the
+result seemed hopeless. In the middle of the night several men came to
+his camp from Sultan Idris, one of the Arab chiefs, thinking it was
+that of Rabi, the chief of Suleiman's lieutenants. Gessi sent one of
+them back to invite him to approach, and at once laid his own plans.
+He resolved to destroy Rabi's force, which lay encamped close by,
+before the other band could come up; and by a sudden assault at
+daybreak he succeeded in his object. The whole band was exterminated,
+with the exception of Rabi himself, who escaped on a fast horse. Then
+Gessi laid his ambuscade for Sultan Idris, who marched into the trap
+prepared for him. This band also was nearly annihilated, but Sultan
+Idris escaped, leaving, however, an immense spoil, which put the
+Egyptian soldiers in good humour. For the disposal of this booty, and
+for other reasons, Gessi resolved to return to Dem Suleiman.
+
+At this point it was alone possible to criticise the action of the
+energetic Gessi during the whole course of the campaign, and General
+Gordon no doubt thought that if he had paid no attention to the spoil
+captured from Rabi and Sultan Idris, but pressed the pursuit against
+Suleiman, he might then and there have concluded the campaign. On the
+other hand, it is only fair to state that Gessi had to consider the
+sentiment of his own troops, while he was also ill from the mental
+strain and physical exertion of conducting the campaign virtually by
+himself. The spoil, moreover, did not benefit him in the least. It
+went into the coffers of the Government, or the pockets of the
+soldiers, not into his. So little reward did he receive that Gordon
+intended at first to give him L1000 out of his own pocket, and
+eventually found himself able to increase it to a sum of L2000 out of
+the Soudan exchequer.
+
+But Suleiman was still at large, and the slave-dealers were fully
+determined to preserve their profitable monopoly, if by any means they
+could baffle the Government. The Egyptian officials were also inclined
+to assist their efforts, and while Gessi was recovering his strength,
+he had the mortification of seeing the fruits of his earlier success
+lost by the inaction or more culpable proceedings of his lieutenants.
+It was not until July 1879 that Gessi felt able to take the field in
+person, and then with less than 300 men, while Suleiman's band alone
+numbered 900. But there was no time to wait for reinforcements if
+Suleiman, who had advanced to within a short distance of Gessi's camp,
+was to be captured. Owing to the promptitude of his measures, Gessi
+came up with Suleiman in three days' time at the village of Gara,
+which he reached at daybreak on 16th of July. His measures were prompt
+and decisive. Concealing his troops in a wood, so that the smallness
+of their numbers might not be detected, he sent in a summons to
+Suleiman to surrender within ten minutes. Surprised, and ignorant of
+the strength of the Egyptian force, he and his followers agreed to lay
+down their arms: but when Suleiman saw the mere handful of men to whom
+he had yielded, he burst out crying. The situation suggested to him
+the hope of escape. Gessi learnt that when night came Suleiman and his
+men had arranged to break their way through. He therefore resolved to
+anticipate them. He held in his hands the ringleaders of the
+rebellion. If they escaped, all his work was lost; a summary act of
+justice would conclude the affair, and secure the Government against
+fresh attacks for a long time. To use his own words, Gessi "saw that
+the time had come to have done with these people once for all."
+
+He divided the captives into three bands. The first, composed of the
+black soldiers, little better than slaves, he released on the
+condition that they left at once and promised to settle down to a
+peaceful life. This they agreed to joyfully. Having got rid of these,
+the larger number of Suleiman's band, he seized the smaller body of
+slave-dealers--157 in number--and having chained them, sent them under
+a guard as prisoners to his own camp. Then he seized Suleiman and ten
+of his chief supporters, and shot them on the spot. Thus perished
+Suleiman, the son of Zebehr, in whose name and for whose safety he had
+gone into revolt, in the very way that Gordon had predicted two years
+before in the midst of his brigand power at Shaka; and thus, with a
+remarkable combination of skill and courage, did Gessi bring his
+arduous campaign of twelve months' duration to a victorious
+conclusion.
+
+Although the credit of these successful operations was entirely due to
+Gessi, it must not be supposed that General Gordon took no part in
+controlling them; but, for the sake of clearness, it seemed advisable
+to narrate the history of the campaign against Suleiman without a
+break. Early in 1879, when Gessi, after obtaining some successes, had
+been reduced to inaction from the want of ammunition, Gordon's anxiety
+became so great on his account that he determined to assume the
+command in person. His main object was to afford relief to Gessi by
+taking the field in Darfour, and putting down the rebels in that
+province, who were on the point of throwing in their lot with
+Suleiman. Gordon determined therefore to march on Shaka, the old
+headquarters of Zebehr and his son. On his march he rescued several
+slave caravans, but he saw that the suppression of the slave trade was
+not popular, and the contradictory character of the law and his
+instructions placed him in much embarrassment. Still, he saw clearly
+that Darfour was the true heart of the slave trade, as the supply from
+Inner Africa had to pass through it to Egypt, and he thought that a
+solution might be found for the difficulty by requiring every one of
+the inhabitants to have a permission of residence, and every traveller
+a passport for himself and his followers. But neither time nor the
+conditions of his post allowed of his carrying out this suggestion. It
+remains, however, a simple practical measure to be borne in mind when
+the solution of the slave difficulty is taken finally in hand by a
+Government in earnest on the subject, and powerful enough to see its
+orders enforced.
+
+General Gordon reached Shaka on 7th April, and at once issued a notice
+to the slave-dealers to quit that advantageous station. He also sent
+forward reinforcements of men and stores to Gessi, but in a few days
+they returned, with a message from Gessi that he had received enough
+powder from his own base on the Nile to renew the attack on Suleiman.
+Within one week of Gordon's arrival not a slave-dealer remained in
+Shaka, and when envoys arrived from Suleiman, bearing protestations
+that he had never been hostile to the Egyptian Government, he promptly
+arrested them and sent them for trial by court-martial. Their guilt as
+conspirers against the Khedive was easily proved, and they were shot.
+Their fate was fully deserved, but Gordon would have spared their
+lives if Suleiman had not himself slain so many hostages and helpless
+captives.
+
+Gordon's final operations for the suppression of the slave trade in
+Darfour, carried on while Gessi was engaged in his last struggle with
+Suleiman, resulted in the release of several thousand slaves, and the
+dispersal and disarmament of nearly 500 slave-dealers. In one week he
+rescued as many as 500 slaves, and he began to feel, as he said, that
+he had at last reached the heart of the evil.
+
+But while these final successes were being achieved, he was recalled
+by telegraph to Cairo, where events had reached a crisis, and the days
+of Ismail as Khedive were numbered. It may have been the instinct of
+despair that led that Prince to appeal again to Gordon, but the
+Darfour rebellion was too grave to allow of his departure before it
+had been suppressed; and on the 1st July he received a telegram from
+the Minister Cherif, calling on him to proclaim throughout the Soudan
+Tewfik Pasha as Khedive. The change did not affect him in the least,
+he wrote, for not merely had his personal feelings towards Ismail
+changed after he threw him over at Cairo, but he had found out the
+futility of writing to him on any subject connected with the Soudan,
+and with this knowledge had come a feeling of personal indifference.
+
+On his return to Khartoum, he received tidings of the execution of
+Suleiman, and also of the death of the Darfourian Sultan, Haroun, so
+that he felt justified in assuming that complete tranquillity had
+settled down on the scene of war. The subsequent capture and execution
+of Abdulgassin proved this view to be well founded, for, with the
+exception of Rabi, who escaped to Borgu, he was the last of Zebehr's
+chief lieutenants. The shot that killed that brigand, the very man who
+shed the child's blood to consecrate the standard, was the last fired
+under Gordon's orders in the Soudan. If the slave trade was then not
+absolutely dead, it was doomed so long as the Egyptian authorities
+pursued an active repressive policy such as their great English
+representative had enforced. The military confederacy of Zebehr, which
+had at one time alarmed the Khedive in his palace at Cairo, had been
+broken up. The authority of the Khartoum Governor-General had been
+made supreme. As Gordon said, on travelling down from Khartoum in
+August 1879, "Not a man could lift his hand without my leave
+throughout the whole extent of the Soudan."
+
+General Gordon reached Cairo on 23rd August, with the full intention
+of retiring from the Egyptian service; but before he could do so there
+remained the still unsolved Abyssinian difficulty, which had formed
+part of his original mission. He therefore yielded to the request of
+the Khedive to proceed on a special mission to the Court of King John,
+then ruling that inaccessible and mysterious kingdom, and one week
+after his arrival at Cairo he was steaming down the Red Sea to
+Massowah. His instructions were contained in a letter from Tewfik
+Pasha to himself. After proclaiming his pacific intentions, the
+Khedive exhorted him "to maintain the rights of Egypt, to preserve
+intact the frontiers of the State, without being compelled to make any
+restitution to Abyssinia, and to prevent henceforth every encroachment
+or other act of aggression in the interests of both countries."
+
+In order to explain the exact position of affairs in Abyssinia at this
+period, a brief summary must be given of events between Gordon's first
+overtures to King John in March 1877, and his taking up the matter
+finally in August 1879. As explained at the beginning of this chapter,
+those overtures came to nothing, because King John was called away to
+engage in hostilities with Menelik, King of Shoa, and now himself
+Negus, or Emperor of Abyssinia. In the autumn of the earlier year King
+John wrote Gordon a very civil letter, calling him a Christian and a
+brother, but containing nothing definite, and ending with the
+assertion that "all the world knows the Abyssinian frontier." Soon
+after this Walad el Michael recommenced his raids on the border, and
+when he obtained some success, which he owed to the assistance of one
+of Gordon's own subordinates, given while Gordon was making himself
+responsible for his good conduct, he was congratulated by the Egyptian
+War Minister, and urged to prosecute the conquest of Abyssinia.
+Instead of attempting the impossible, he very wisely came to terms
+with King John, who, influenced perhaps by Gordon's advice, or more
+probably by his own necessities through the war with Menelik, accepted
+Michael's promises to respect the frontier. Michael went to the King's
+camp to make his submission in due form, and in the spring of 1879 it
+became known that he and the Abyssinian General (Ras Alula) were
+planning an invasion of Egyptian territory. Fortunately King John was
+more peacefully disposed, and still seemed anxious to come to an
+arrangement with General Gordon.
+
+In January 1879 the King wrote Gordon a letter, saying that he hoped
+to see him soon, and he also sent an envoy to discuss matters. The
+Abyssinian stated very clearly that his master would not treat with
+the Khedive, on account of the way he had subjected his envoys at
+Cairo to insult and injury; but that he would negotiate with Gordon,
+whom he persisted in styling the "Sultan of the Soudan." King John
+wanted a port, the restoration of Bogos, and an Abouna or Coptic
+Archbishop from Alexandria, to crown him in full accordance with
+Abyssinian ritual. Gordon replied a port was impossible, but that he
+should have a Consul and facilities for traffic at Massowah; that the
+territory claimed was of no value, and that he certainly should have
+an Abouna. He also undertook to do his best to induce the British
+Government to restore to King John the crown of King Theodore, which
+had been carried off after the fall of Magdala. The envoy then
+returned to Abyssinia, and nothing further took place until Gordon's
+departure for Massowah in August, when the rumoured plans of Michael
+and Ras Alula were causing some alarm.
+
+On reaching Massowah on 6th September, Gordon found that the
+Abyssinians were in virtual possession of Bogos, and that if the
+Egyptian claims were to be asserted, it would be necessary to retake
+it. The situation had, however, been slightly improved by the downfall
+of Michael, whose treachery and covert hostility towards General
+Gordon would probably have led to an act of violence. But he and Ras
+Alula had had some quarrel, and the Abyssinian General had seized the
+occasion to send Michael and his officers as prisoners to the camp of
+King John. The chief obstacle to a satisfactory arrangement being
+thus removed, General Gordon hastened to have an interview with Ras
+Alula, and with this intention crossed the Abyssinian frontier, and
+proceeded to his camp at Gura. After an interview and the presentation
+of the Khedive's letter and his credentials, Gordon found that he was
+practically a prisoner, and that nothing could be accomplished save by
+direct negotiation with King John. He therefore offered to go to his
+capital at Debra Tabor, near Gondar, if Ras Alula would promise to
+refrain from attacking Egypt during his absence. This promise was
+promptly given, and in a few days it was expanded into an armistice
+for four months.
+
+After six weeks' journey accomplished on mules, and by the worst roads
+in the country, as Ras Alula had expressly ordered, so that the
+inaccessibility of the country might be made more evident, General
+Gordon reached Debra Tabor on 27th October. He was at once received by
+King John, but this first reception was of only a brief and formal
+character. Two days later the chief audience was given at daybreak,
+King John reciting his wrongs, and Gordon referring him to the
+Khedive's letters, which had not been read. After looking at them, the
+King burst out with a list of demands, culminating in the sum of
+L2,000,000 or the port of Massowah. When he had finished, Gordon asked
+him to put these demands on paper, to sign them with his seal, and to
+give the Khedive six months to consider them and make a reply. This
+King John promised to do on his return from some baths, whither he was
+proceeding for the sake of his health.
+
+After a week's absence the King returned, and the negotiations were
+resumed. But the King would not draw up his demands, which he realised
+were excessive, and when he found that Gordon remained firm in his
+intention to uphold the rights of the Khedive, the Abyssinian became
+offended and rude, and told Gordon to go. Gordon did not require to be
+told this twice, and an hour afterwards had begun his march, intending
+to proceed by Galabat to Khartoum. A messenger was sent after him with
+a letter from the King to the Khedive, which on translating read as
+follows: "I have received the letters you sent me by _that man_ (a
+term of contempt). I will not make a secret peace with you. If you
+want peace, ask the Sultans of Europe." With a potentate so vague and
+so exacting it was impossible to attain any satisfactory result, and
+therefore Gordon was not sorry to depart. After nearly a fortnight's
+travelling, he and his small party had reached the very borders of the
+Soudan, their Abyssinian escort having returned, when a band of
+Abyssinians, owning allegiance to Ras Arya, swooped down on them, and
+carried them off to the village of that chief, who was the King's
+uncle.
+
+The motive of this step is not clear, for Ras Arya declared that he
+was at feud with the King, and that he would willingly help the
+Egyptians to conquer the country. He however went on to explain that
+the seizure of Gordon's party was due to the King's order that it
+should not be allowed to return to Egypt by any other route than that
+through Massowah.
+
+Unfortunately, the step seemed so full of menace that as a precaution
+Gordon felt compelled to destroy the private journal he had kept
+during his visit, as well as some valuable maps and plans. After
+leaving the district of this prince, Gordon and his small party had to
+make their way as best they could to get out of the country, only
+making their way at all by a lavish payment of money--this journey
+alone costing L1400--and by submitting to be bullied and insulted by
+every one with the least shadow of authority. At last Massowah was
+reached in safety, and every one was glad, because reports had become
+rife as to King John's changed attitude towards Gordon, and the danger
+to which he was exposed. But the Khedive was too much occupied to
+attend to these matters, or to comply with Gordon's request to send a
+regiment and a man-of-war to Massowah, as soon as the Abyssinian
+despot made him to all intents and purposes a prisoner. The neglect to
+make that demonstration not only increased the very considerable
+personal danger in which Gordon was placed during the whole of his
+mission, but it also exposed Massowah to the risk of capture if the
+Abyssinians had resolved to attack it.
+
+The impressions General Gordon formed of the country were extremely
+unfavourable. The King was cruel and avaricious beyond all belief, and
+in his opinion fast going mad. The country was far less advanced than
+he had thought. The people were greedy, unattractive, and quarrelsome.
+But he detected their military qualities, and some of the merits of
+their organisation. "They are," he wrote, "a race of warriors, hardy,
+and, though utterly undisciplined, religious fanatics. I have seen
+many peoples, but I never met with a more fierce, savage set than
+these. The King said he could beat united Europe, except Russia."
+
+The closing incidents of Gordon's tenure of the post of
+Governor-General of the Soudan have now to be given, and they were not
+characterised by that spirit of justice, to say nothing of generosity,
+which his splendid services and complete loyalty to the Khedive's
+Government demanded. During his mission into Abyssinia his natural
+demands for support were completely ignored, and he was left to
+whatever fate might befall him. When he succeeded in extricating
+himself from that perilous position, he found that the Khedive was so
+annoyed at his inability to exact from his truculent neighbour a
+treaty without any accompanying concessions, that he paid no
+attention to him, and seized the opportunity to hasten the close of
+his appointment by wilfully perverting the sense of several
+confidential suggestions made to his Government. The plain explanation
+of these miserable intrigues was that the official class at Cairo,
+seeing that Gordon had alienated the sympathy and support of the
+British Foreign Office and its representatives by his staunch and
+outspoken defence of Ismail in 1878, realised that the moment had come
+to terminate his, to them, always hateful Dictatorship in the Soudan.
+While the Cairo papers were allowed to couple the term "mad" with his
+name, the Ministers went so far as to denounce his propositions as
+inconsistent. One of these Ministers had been Gordon's enemy for
+years; another had been banished by him from Khartoum for cruelty;
+they were one and all sympathetic to the very order of things which
+Gordon had destroyed, and which, as long as he retained power, would
+never be revived. What wonder that they should snatch the favourable
+opportunity of precipitating the downfall of the man they had so long
+feared! But it was neither creditable nor politic for the
+representatives of England to stand by while these schemes were
+executed to the detraction of the man who had then given six years'
+disinterested and laborious effort to the regeneration of the Soudan
+and the suppression of the slave trade.
+
+When Gordon discovered that his secret representations, sent in cipher
+for the information of the Government, were given to the Press with a
+perverted meaning and hostile criticism, he hastened to Cairo. He
+requested an immediate interview with Tewfik, who excused himself for
+what had been done by his Ministers on the ground of his youth; but
+General Gordon read the whole situation at a glance, and at once sent
+in his resignation, which was accepted. It is not probable that, under
+any circumstances, he would have been induced to return to the Soudan,
+where his work seemed done, but he certainly was willing to make
+another attempt to settle the Abyssinian difficulty. Without the
+Khedive's support, and looked at askance by his own countrymen in the
+Delta, called mad on this side and denounced as inconsistent on the
+other, no good result could have ensued, and therefore he turned his
+back on the scene of his long labours without a sigh, and this time
+even without regret.
+
+The state of his health was such that rest, change of scene, and the
+discontinuance of all mental effort were imperatively necessary, in
+the opinion of his doctor, if a complete collapse of mental and
+physical power was to be avoided. He was quite a wreck, and was
+showing all the effects of protracted labour, the climate, and
+improper food. Humanly speaking, his departure from Egypt was only
+made in time to save his life, and therefore there was some
+compensation in the fact that it was hastened by official jealousy and
+animosity.
+
+But it seems very extraordinary that, considering the magnitude of the
+task he had performed single-handed in the Soudan, and the way he had
+done it with a complete disregard of all selfish interest, he should
+have been allowed to lay down his appointment without any
+manifestation of honour or respect from those he had served so long
+and so well. Nor was this indifference confined to Egyptians. It was
+reflected among the English and other European officials, who
+pronounced Gordon unpractical and peculiar, while in their hearts they
+only feared his candour and bluntness. But even public opinion at
+home, as reflected in the Press, seemed singularly blind to the fresh
+claim he had established on the admiration of the world. His China
+campaigns had earned him ungrudging praise, and a fame which, but for
+his own diffidence, would have carried him to the highest positions in
+the British army. But his achievements in the Soudan, not less
+remarkable in themselves, and obtained with far less help from others
+than his triumph over the Taepings, roused no enthusiasm, and received
+but scanty notice. The explanation of this difference is not far to
+seek, and reveals the baser side of human nature. In Egypt he had hurt
+many susceptibilities, and criticised the existing order of things.
+His propositions were drastic, and based on the exclusion of a costly
+European _regime_ and the substitution of a native administration.
+Even his mode of suppressing the slave trade had been as original as
+it was fearless. Exeter Hall could not resound with cheers for a man
+who declared that he had bought slaves himself, and recognised the
+rights of others in what are called human chattels, even although that
+man had done more than any individual or any government to kill the
+slave trade at its root. It was not until his remarkable mission to
+Khartoum, only four years after he left Egypt, that public opinion
+woke up to a sense of all he had done before, and realised, in its
+full extent, the magnitude and the splendour of his work as
+Governor-General of the Soudan.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+MINOR MISSIONS--INDIA AND CHINA.
+
+
+General Gordon arrived in London at the end of January 1880--having
+lingered on his home journey in order to visit Rome--resolved as far
+as he possibly could to take that period of rest which he had
+thoroughly earned, and which he so much needed. But during these last
+few years of his life he was to discover that the world would not
+leave him undisturbed in the tranquillity he desired and sought.
+Everyone wished to see him usefully and prominently employed for his
+country's good, and offers, suitable and not suitable to his character
+and genius, were either made to him direct, or put forward in the
+public Press as suggestions for the utilization of his experience and
+energy in the treatment of various burning questions. His numerous
+friends also wished to do him honour, and he found himself threatened
+with being drawn into the vortex of London Society, for which he had
+little inclination, and, at that time, not even the strength and
+health.
+
+After this incident he left London on 29th February for Switzerland,
+where he took up his residence at Lausanne, visiting _en route_ at
+Brussels, Mr, afterwards Lord, Vivian, then Minister at the Belgian
+Court, who had been Consul-General in Egypt during the financial
+crisis episode. It is pleasant to find that that passage had, in this
+case, left no ill-feeling behind it on either side, and that Gordon
+promised to think over the advice Mrs Vivian gave him to get married
+while he was staying at the Legation. His reply must not be taken as
+of any serious import, and was meant to turn the subject. About the
+same time he wrote in a private letter, "Wives! wives! what a trial
+you are to your husbands! From my experience married men have more or
+less a cowed look."
+
+It was on this occasion that Gordon was first brought into contact
+with the King of the Belgians, and had his attention drawn to the
+prospect of suppressing the slave trade from the side of the Congo,
+somewhat analogous to his own project of crushing it from Zanzibar.
+The following unpublished letter gives an amusing account of the
+circumstances under which he first met King Leopold:--
+
+
+                                   "HOTEL DE BELLE-VUE, BRUXELLES,
+                                   "_Tuesday, 2nd March 1880_.
+
+     "I arrived here yesterday at 6 P.M., and found my baggage had not
+     come on when I got to the hotel (having given orders about my
+     boxes which were to arrive to-day at 9 A.M.). I found I was
+     _detected_, and a huge card of His Majesty awaited me, inviting
+     to dinner at 6.30 P.M. It was then 6.20 P.M. I wrote my excuses,
+     telling the truth. Then I waited. It is now 9.30 A.M., and no
+     baggage. King has just sent to say he will receive me at 11 A.M.
+     I am obliged to say I cannot come if my baggage does not arrive.
+
+     "I picked up a small book here, the 'Souvenirs of Congress of
+     Vienna,' in 1814 and 1815. It is a sad account of the festivities
+     of that time. It shows how great people fought for invitations to
+     the various parties, and how like a bomb fell the news of
+     Napoleon's descent from Elba, and relates the end of some of the
+     great men. The English great man, Castlereagh, cut his throat
+     near Chislehurst; Alexander died mad, etc., etc. They are all in
+     their 6 feet by 2 feet 6 inches.... Horrors, it is now 10.20
+     A.M., and no baggage! King sent to say he will see me at 11 A.M.;
+     remember, too, I have to dress, shave, etc., etc. 10.30 A.M.--No
+     baggage!!! It is getting painful. His Majesty will be furious.
+     10.48 A.M.--No baggage! Indirectly Mackinnon (late Sir William)
+     is the sinner, for he evidently told the King I was coming.
+     Napoleon said, 'The smallest trifles produce the greatest
+     results.' 12.30 P.M.--Got enclosed note from palace, and went to
+     see the King--a very tall man with black beard. He was very
+     civil, and I stayed with him for one and a half hours. He is
+     quite at sea with his expedition (Congo), and I have to try and
+     get him out of it. I have to go there to-morrow at 11.30 A.M. My
+     baggage has come."
+
+During his stay at Lausanne his health improved, and he lost the
+numbed feeling in his arms which had strengthened the impression that
+he suffered from _angina pectoris_. This apprehension, although
+retained until a very short period before his final departure from
+England in 1884, was ultimately discovered to be baseless. With
+restored health returned the old feeling of restlessness. After five
+weeks he found it impossible to remain any longer in Lausanne. Again
+he exclaims in his letters: "Inaction is terrible to me!" and on 9th
+April he left that place for London.
+
+Yet, notwithstanding his desire to return to work, or rather his
+feeling that he could not live in a state of inactivity, he refused
+the first definite suggestion that was made to him of employment.
+While he was still at Lausanne, the Governor of Cape Colony sent the
+following telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies:--"My
+Ministers wish that the post of Commandant of the Colonial Forces
+should be offered to Chinese Gordon." The reply to this telegram read
+as follows:--"The command of the Colonial Forces would probably be
+accepted by Chinese Gordon in the event of your Ministers desiring
+that the offer of it should be made to him." The Cape authorities
+requested that this offer might be made, and the War Office
+accordingly telegraphed to him as follows: "Cape Government offer
+command of Colonial Forces; supposed salary, L1500; your services
+required early." Everyone seems to have taken it as a matter of course
+that he would accept; but Gordon's reply was in the negative: "Thanks
+for telegram just received; I do not feel inclined to accept an
+appointment." His reasons for not accepting what seemed a desirable
+post are not known. They were probably due to considerations of
+health, although the doubt may have presented itself to his mind
+whether he was qualified by character to work in harmony with the
+Governor and Cabinet of any colony. He knew very well that all his
+good work had been done in an independent and unfettered capacity, and
+at the Cape he must have felt that, as nominal head of the forces, he
+would have been fettered by red tape and local jealousies, and
+rendered incapable of doing any good in an anomalous position. But
+after events make it desirable to state and recollect the precise
+circumstances of this first offer to him from the Cape Government.
+
+While at Lausanne, General Gordon's attention was much given to the
+study of the Eastern Question, and I am not at all sure that the real
+reason of his declining the Cape offer was not the hope and
+expectation that he might be employed in connection with a subject
+which he thoroughly understood and had very much at heart. He drew up
+a memorandum on the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, which, for
+clearness of statement, perfect grasp of a vital international
+question, and prophetic vision, has never been surpassed among State
+papers. Although written in March 1880, and in my possession a very
+short time afterwards, I was not permitted to publish it until
+September 1885, when it appeared in the _Times_ of the 24th of that
+month. Its remarkable character was at once appreciated by public men,
+and Sir William Harcourt, speaking in the House four days later,
+testified to the extraordinary foresight with which "poor Gordon"
+diagnosed the case of Europe's sick man. I quote here this memorandum
+in its integrity:--
+
+     "The Powers of Europe assembled at Constantinople, and
+     recommended certain reforms to Turkey. Turkey refused to accede
+     to these terms, the Powers withdrew, and deliberated. Not being
+     able to come to a decision, Russia undertook, on her own
+     responsibility, to enforce them. England acquiesced, provided
+     that her own interests were not interfered with. The
+     Russo-Turkish War occurred, during which time England, in various
+     ways, gave the Turks reason to believe that she would eventually
+     come to their assistance. This may be disputed, but I refer to
+     the authorities in Constantinople whether the Turks were not
+     under the impression during the war _that England would help
+     them, and also save them, from any serious loss eventually_.
+     England, therefore, provided this is true, did encourage Turkey
+     in her resistance.
+
+     "Then came the Treaty of San Stephano. It was drawn up with the
+     intention of finishing off the rule of Turkey in Europe--there
+     was no disguise about it; but I think that, looking at that
+     treaty from a Russian point of view, it was a very bad one for
+     Russia. Russia, by her own act, had trapped herself.
+
+     "By it (the Treaty of San Stephano) Russia had created a huge
+     kingdom, or State, south of the Danube, with a port. This new
+     Bulgarian State, being fully satisfied, would have nothing more
+     to desire from Russia, but would have sought, by alliance with
+     other Powers, to keep what she (Bulgaria) possessed, and would
+     have feared Russia more than any other Power. Having a seaport,
+     she would have leant on England and France. Being independent of
+     Turkey, she would wish to be on good terms with her.
+
+     "Therefore I maintain, that _once_ the Russo-Turkish War had been
+     permitted, no greater obstacle could have been presented to
+     Russia than the maintenance of this united Bulgarian State, and I
+     believe that the Russians felt this as well.
+
+     "I do not go into the question of the Asia Minor acquisitions by
+     Russia, for, to all intents and purposes, the two treaties are
+     alike. By both treaties Russia possesses the strategical points
+     of the country, and though by the Berlin Treaty Russia gave up
+     the strip south of Ararat, and thus does not hold the road to
+     Persia, yet she stretches along this strip, and is only distant
+     two days' march from the road, the value of which is merely
+     commercial.
+
+     "By both treaties Russia obtained Batoum and the war-like tribes
+     around it. Though the _only port_ on the Black Sea between Kertch
+     and Sinope, a distance of 1000 miles, its acquisition by Russia
+     was never contested. It was said to be a worthless
+     possession--'grapes were sour.'
+
+     "I now come to the changes made in the San Stephano Treaty (which
+     was undoubtedly, and was intended to be, the _coup de grace_ to
+     Turkish rule in Europe) by the Treaty of Berlin.
+
+     "By the division of the two Bulgarias we prolonged, without
+     alleviating, the agony of Turkey in Europe; we repaired the great
+     mistake of Russia, from a Russian point of view, in making one
+     great State of Bulgaria. We stipulated that Turkish troops, with
+     a hostile Bulgaria to the north, and a hostile Roumelia to the
+     south, should occupy the Balkans. I leave military men, or any
+     men of sense, to consider this step. We restored Russia to her
+     place, as the protector of these lands, which she had by the
+     Treaty of San Stephano given up. We have left the wishes of
+     Bulgarians unsatisfied, and the countries unquiet. We have forced
+     them to look to Russia more than to us and France, and we have
+     lost their sympathies. And for what? It is not doubted that ere
+     long the two States will be united. If Moldavia and Wallachia
+     laughed at the Congress of Paris, and united while it (the
+     Congress) was in session at Paris, is it likely Bulgaria will
+     wait long, or hesitate to unite with Roumelia, because Europe
+     does not wish it?
+
+     "Therefore the union of the two States is certain, only it is to
+     be regretted that this union will give just the chance Russia
+     wants to interfere again; and though, when the union takes place,
+     I believe Russia will repent it, still it will always be to
+     Russia that they will look till the union is accomplished.
+
+     "I suppose the Turks are capable of appreciating what they gained
+     by the Treaty of Berlin. _They were fully aware that the Treaty
+     of San Stephano was their_ coup de grace. But the Treaty of
+     Berlin was supposed to be beneficial to them. Why? By it Turkey
+     lost _not only Bulgaria_ and _Roumelia_ (for she has virtually
+     lost it), but _Bosnia_ and _Herzegovina_, while she gained the
+     utterly impossible advantage of occupying the Balkans, with a
+     hostile nation to north and south.
+
+     "I therefore maintain that the Treaty of Berlin did no good to
+     Turkey, but infinite harm to Europe.
+
+     "I will now go on to the Cyprus convention, and say a few words
+     on the bag-and-baggage policy. Turkey and Egypt are governed by a
+     ring of Pashas, most of them Circassians, and who are perfect
+     foreigners in Turkey. They are, for the greater part, men who,
+     when boys, have been bought at prices varying from L50 to L70,
+     and who, brought up in the harems, have been pushed on by their
+     purchasers from one grade to another. Some have been dancing boys
+     and drummers, like Riaz and Ismail Eyoub of Egypt. I understand
+     by bag-and-baggage policy the getting rid of, say, two hundred
+     Pashas of this sort in Turkey, and sixty Pashas in Egypt. These
+     men have not the least interest in the welfare of the countries;
+     they are aliens and adventurers, they are hated by the
+     respectable inhabitants of Turkey and Egypt, and they must be got
+     rid of.
+
+     "Armenia is lost; it is no use thinking of reforms in it. The
+     Russians virtually possess it; the sooner we recognise this fact
+     the better. Why undertake the impossible?
+
+     "What should be done? Study existing facts, and decide on a
+     definite line of policy, and follow it through. Russia, having a
+     definite line of policy, is strong; we have not one, and are weak
+     and vacillating. 'A double-minded man is unstable in all his
+     ways.'
+
+     "Supposing such a line of policy as follows was decided upon and
+     followed up, it would be better than the worries of the last four
+     years:--
+
+     "1. The complete purchase of Cyprus.
+
+     "2. The abandonment of the Asia Minor reforms.
+
+     "3. The union of Bulgaria and Roumelia, with a port.
+
+     "4. The increase of Greece.
+
+     "5. Constantinople, a State, under European guarantees.
+
+     "6. Increase of Montenegro, and Italy, on that coast.
+
+     "7. Annexation of Egypt by England, _either directly or by having
+     paramount and entire authority_.
+
+     "8. Annexation of Syria by France--ditto--ditto--ditto. (By this
+     means France would be as interested in stopping Russian progress
+     as England is.)
+
+     "9. Italy to be allowed to extend towards Abyssinia.
+
+     "10. Re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, and the
+     establishment of a similar one in Egypt (these Constitutions, if
+     not interfered with, would soon rid Turkey and Egypt of their
+     parasite Pashas).
+
+     "I daresay this programme could be improved, but it has the
+     advantage of being _definite_, and a definite policy, however
+     imperfect, is better than an unstable or hand-to-mouth policy.
+
+     "I would not press these points at once; I would keep them in
+     view, and let events work themselves out.
+
+     "I believe, in time, this programme could be worked out without a
+     shot being fired.
+
+     "I believe it would be quite possible to come to terms with
+     Russia on these questions; I do not think she has sailed under
+     false colours when her acts and words are generally considered.
+     She is the avowed enemy of Turkey, she has not disguised it. Have
+     _we_ been the friend of Turkey? How many years have elapsed
+     between the Crimean war and the Russo-Turkish war? What did we do
+     to press Turkey to carry out reforms (as promised by the Treaty
+     of 1856) in those years? _Absolutely nothing._
+
+     "What has to be done to prevent the inevitable crash of the
+     Turkish Empire which is impending, imperilling the peace of the
+     world, is _the re-establishment of the Constitution of Midhat,
+     and its maintenance, in spite of the Sultan_. By this means, when
+     the Sultan and the ring of Pashas fall, there would still exist
+     the chambers of representatives of the provinces, who would carry
+     on the Government for a time, and at any rate prevent the foreign
+     occupation of Constantinople, or any disorders there, incident on
+     the exit of the Sultan and his Pashas."
+
+Having partially explained how General Gordon declined one post for
+which he appeared to be well suited, I have to describe how it was
+that he accepted another for which neither by training nor by
+character was he in the least degree fitted. The exact train of
+trifling circumstances that led up to the proposal that Gordon should
+accompany the newly-appointed Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, to India
+cannot be traced, because it is impossible to assign to each its
+correct importance. But it may be said generally, that the prevalent
+idea was that Lord Ripon was going out to the East on a great mission
+of reform, and some one suggested that the character of that mission
+would be raised in the eyes of the public if so well known a
+philanthropist as Gordon, whose views on all subjects were free from
+official bias, could be associated with it. I do not know whether the
+idea originated with Sir Bruce Seton, Lord Ripon's secretary, while at
+the War Office, but in any case that gentleman first broached the
+proposition to Sir Henry Gordon, the eldest brother of General Gordon.
+Sir Henry not merely did not repel the suggestion, but he consented to
+put it before his brother and to support it. For his responsibility in
+this affair Sir Henry afterwards took the fullest and frankest blame
+on himself for his "bad advice." When the matter was put before
+General Gordon he did not reject it, as might have been expected, but
+whether from his desire to return to active employment, or biassed by
+his brother's views in favour of the project, or merely from coming to
+a decision without reflection, he made up his mind at once to accept
+the offer, and the official announcement of the appointment was made
+on 1st May, with the additional statement that his departure would
+take place without delay, as he was to sail with Lord Ripon on the
+14th of that month.
+
+It was after his acceptance of this post, and not some months before,
+as has been erroneously stated, that General Gordon had an interview
+with the Prince of Wales under circumstances that may be described.
+The Prince gave a large dinner-party to Lord Ripon before his
+departure for India, and Gordon was invited. He declined the
+invitation, and also declined to give any reason for doing so. The
+Prince of Wales, with his unfailing tact and the genuine kindness with
+which he always makes allowance for such little breaches of what ought
+to be done, at least in the cases of exceptional persons like Gordon,
+sent him a message: "If you won't dine with me, will you come and see
+me next Sunday afternoon?" Gordon went, and had a very interesting
+conversation with the Prince, and in the middle of it the Princess
+came into the room, and then the Princesses, her daughters, who said
+they would "like to shake hands with Colonel Gordon."
+
+Before even the departure Gordon realised he had made a mistake, and
+if there had been any way out of the dilemma he would not have been
+slow to take it. As there was not, he fell back on the hope that he
+might be able to discharge his uncongenial duties for a brief period,
+and then seek some convenient opportunity of retiring. But as to his
+own real views of his mistake, and of his unfitness for the post,
+there never was any doubt, and they found expression when, in the
+midst of a family gathering, he exclaimed: "Up to this I have been an
+independent comet, now I shall be a chained satellite."
+
+The same opinion found expression in a letter he wrote to Sir Halliday
+Macartney an hour before he went to Charing Cross:--
+
+     "MY DEAR MACARTNEY,--You will be surprised to hear that I have
+     accepted the Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, and that I am
+     just off to Charing Cross. I am afraid that I have decided in
+     haste, to repent at leisure. Good-bye.--Yours,
+
+                                             C. G. GORDON."
+
+His own views on this affair were set forth in the following words:--
+
+"Men at times, owing to the mysteries of Providence, form judgments
+which they afterwards repent of. This is my case. Nothing could have
+exceeded the kindness and consideration with which Lord Ripon has
+treated me. I have never met anyone with whom I could have felt
+greater sympathy in the arduous task he has undertaken."
+
+And again, writing at greater length to his brother, he explains what
+took place in the following letter:--
+
+     "In a moment of weakness I took the appointment of Private
+     Secretary to Lord Ripon, the new Governor-General of India. No
+     sooner had I landed at Bombay than I saw that in my irresponsible
+     position I could not hope to do anything really to the purpose in
+     the face of the vested interests out there. Seeing this, and
+     seeing, moreover, that my views were so diametrically opposed to
+     those of the official classes, I resigned. Lord Ripon's position
+     was certainly a great consideration with me. It was assumed by
+     some that my views of the state of affairs were the Viceroy's,
+     and thus I felt that I should do him harm by staying with him. We
+     parted perfect friends. The brusqueness of my leaving was
+     unavoidable, inasmuch as my stay would have put me into the
+     possession of secrets of State that--considering my decision
+     eventually to leave--I ought not to know. Certainly I might have
+     stayed a month or two, had a pain in the hand, and gone quietly;
+     but the whole duties were so distasteful that I felt, being
+     pretty callous as to what the world says, that it was better to
+     go at once."
+
+If a full explanation is sought of the reasons why Gordon repented of
+his decision, and determined to leave an uncongenial position without
+delay, it may be found in a consideration of the two following
+circumstances. His views as to what he held to be the excessive
+payment of English and other European servants in Asiatic countries
+were not new, and had been often expressed. They were crystallised in
+the phrase, "Why pay a man more at Simla than at Hongkong?" and had
+formed the basis of his projected financial reform in Egypt in 1878,
+and they often found expression in his correspondence. For instance,
+in a letter to the present writer, he proposed that the loss accruing
+from the abolition of the opium trade might be made good by reducing
+officers' pay from Indian to Colonial allowances. With Gordon's
+contempt for money, and the special circumstances that led to his not
+wanting any considerable sum for his own moderate requirements and few
+responsibilities, it is not surprising that he held these views; but
+no practical statesman could have attempted to carry them out. During
+the voyage to India the perception that it would be impossible for
+Lord Ripon to institute any special reorganisation on these lines led
+him to decide that it would be best to give up a post he did not like,
+and he wrote to his sister to this effect while at sea, with the
+statement that it was arranged that he should leave in the following
+September or October.
+
+He reached Bombay on the 28th of May, and his resignation was received
+and accepted on the night of the 2nd June. What had happened in that
+brief interval of a few days to make him precipitate matters? There is
+absolutely no doubt, quite apart from the personal explanation given
+by General Gordon, both verbally and in writing, to myself, that the
+determining cause was the incident relating to Yakoob Khan.
+
+That Afghan chief had been proclaimed and accepted as Ameer after the
+death of his father, the Ameer Shere Ali. In that capacity he had
+signed the Treaty of Gandamak, and received Sir Louis Cavagnari as
+British agent at his capital. When the outbreak occurred at Cabul, on
+1st September, and Cavagnari and the whole of the mission were
+murdered, it was generally believed that the most guilty person was
+Yakoob Khan. On the advance of General Roberts, Yakoob Khan took the
+first opportunity of making his escape from his compatriots and
+joining the English camp. This voluntary act seemed to justify a doubt
+as to his guilt, but a Court of Inquiry was appointed to ascertain the
+facts. The bias of the leading members of that Court was
+unquestionably hostile to Yakoob, or rather it would be more accurate
+to say that they were bent on finding the highest possible personage
+guilty. They were appointed to inquire, not to sentence. Yet they
+found Yakoob guilty, and they sent a vast mass of evidence to the
+Foreign Department then at Calcutta. The experts of the Foreign
+Department examined that evidence. They pronounced it "rubbish," and
+Lord Lytton was obliged to send Mr (afterwards Sir) Lepel Griffin, an
+able member of the Indian Civil Service, specially versed in frontier
+politics, to act as Political Officer with the force in Afghanistan,
+so that no blunders of this kind might be re-enacted.
+
+But nothing was done either to rehabilitate Yakoob's character or to
+negotiate with him for the restoration of a central authority in
+Afghanistan. Any other suitable candidate for the Ameership failing to
+present himself, the present ruler, Abdurrahman, being then, and
+indeed until the eve of the catastrophe at Maiwand, on 27th July 1880,
+an adventurous pretender without any strong following, Lord Lytton had
+been negotiating on the lines of a division of Afghanistan into three
+or more provinces. That policy, of which the inner history has still
+to be written, had a great deal more to be said in its favour than
+would now be admitted, and only the unexpected genius and success of
+Abdurrahman has made the contrary policy that was pursued appear the
+acme of sound sense and high statesmanship. When Lord Ripon reached
+Bombay at the end of May, the fate of Afghanistan was still in the
+crucible. Even Abdurrahman, who had received kind treatment in the
+persons of his imprisoned family at Candahar from the English, was not
+regarded as a factor of any great importance; while Ayoob, the least
+known of all the chiefs, was deemed harmless only a few weeks before
+he crossed the Helmund and defeated our troops in the only battle lost
+during the war. But if none of the candidates inspired our authorities
+with any confidence, they were resolute in excluding Yakoob Khan.
+Having been relieved from the heavier charge of murdering Cavagnari,
+he was silently cast on the not less fatal one of being a madman.
+
+Such was the position of the question when Lord Ripon and his
+secretary landed at Bombay. It was known that they would alter the
+Afghan policy of the Conservative Government, and that, as far as
+possible, they would revert to the Lawrentian policy of ignoring the
+region beyond the passes. But it was not known that they had any
+designs about Yakoob Khan, and this was the bomb they fired on arrival
+into the camp of Indian officialdom.
+
+The first despatch written by the new secretary was to the Foreign
+Department, to the effect that Lord Ripon intended to commence
+negotiations with the captive Yakoob, and Mr (now Sir) Mortimer
+Durand, then assistant secretary in that branch of the service, was at
+once sent from Simla to remonstrate against a proceeding which "would
+stagger every one in India." Lord Ripon was influenced by these
+representations, and agreed to at least suspend his overtures to
+Yakoob Khan, but his secretary was not convinced by either the
+arguments or the facts of the Indian Foreign Department. He still
+considered that Afghan prince the victim of political injustice, and
+also that he was the best candidate for the throne of Cabul. But he
+also saw very clearly from this passage of arms with the official
+classes that he would never be able to work in harmony with men who
+were above and before all bureaucrats, and with commendable promptness
+he seized the opportunity to resign a post which he thoroughly
+detested. What he thought on the subject of Yakoob Khan is fully set
+forth in the following memorandum drawn up as a note to my biography
+of that interesting and ill-starred prince in "Central Asian
+Portraits." Whether Gordon was right or wrong in his views about
+Yakoob Khan is a matter of no very great importance. The incident is
+only noteworthy as marking the conclusion of his brief secretarial
+experience, and as showing the hopefulness of a man who thought that
+he could make the all-powerful administrative system of India decide a
+political question on principles of abstract justice. The practical
+comment on such sanguine theories was furnished by Mr Durand being
+appointed acting private secretary on Gordon's resignation.
+
+General Gordon's memorandum read as follows:--
+
+     "Yacoob was accused of concealing letters from the Russian
+     Government, and of entering into an alliance with the Rajah of
+     Cashmere to form a Triple Alliance. Where are these letters or
+     proof of this intention? They do not exist.
+
+     "Yacoob came out to Roberts of his own free will. He was
+     imprisoned. It was nothing remarkable that he was visited by an
+     Afghan leader, although it was deemed evidence of a treacherous
+     intention. Roberts and Cavagnari made the Treaty of Gandamak. It
+     is absurd to say Yacoob wanted an European Resident. It is
+     against all reason to say he did. He was coerced into taking
+     one. He was imprisoned, and a Court of Enquiry was held on him,
+     composed of the President Macgregor, who was chief of the staff
+     to the man who made the Treaty, by which Cavagnari went to Cabul,
+     and who had imprisoned Yacoob. This Court of Enquiry asked for
+     evidence concerning a man in prison, which is in eyes of Asiatics
+     equivalent to being already condemned. This Court accumulated
+     evidence, utterly worthless in any court of justice, as will be
+     seen if ever published. This Court of _Enquiry_ found him guilty
+     and sentenced him to exile. Was that their function? If the
+     secret papers are published, it would be seen that the despatches
+     from the Cabulese chiefs were couched in fair terms. They did not
+     want to fight the English. They wanted their Ameer. Yacoob's
+     defence is splendid. He says in it: 'If I had been guilty, would
+     I not have escaped to Herat, whereas I put myself in your hands?'
+     The following questions arise from this Court of Enquiry. Who
+     fired first shot from the Residency? Was the conduct of Cavagnari
+     and his people discreet in a fanatical city? Were not those who
+     forced Cavagnari on Yacoob against his protest equally
+     responsible with him? Yacoob was weak and timid in a critical
+     moment, and he failed, but he did not incite this revolt. It was
+     altogether against his interests to do so. What was the
+     consequence of his unjust exile? Why, all the trouble which
+     happened since that date. Afghanistan was quiet till we took her
+     ruler away. It was an united Afghanistan. This mistake has cost
+     L10,000,000, all from efforts to go on with an injustice. The
+     Romans before their wars invoked all misery on themselves before
+     the Goddess Nemesis if their war was unjust. We did not invoke
+     her, but she followed us. Between the time that the Tory
+     Government went out, and the new Viceroy Ripon had landed at
+     Bombay, Lytton forced the hand of the Liberal Government by
+     entering into negotiations with Abdurrahman, and appointing the
+     Vali at Candahar, so endeavouring to prevent justice to Yacoob.
+     Stokes, Arbuthnot, and another member of Supreme Council all
+     protested against the deposition of Yacoob, also Sir Neville
+     Chamberlaine."
+
+Lest it should be thought that Gordon was alone in these opinions, I
+append this statement, drawn up at the time by Sir Neville
+Chamberlaine:--
+
+     "An unprejudiced review of the circumstances surrounding the
+     _emeute_ of September 1879 clearly indicates that the spontaneous
+     and unpremeditated action of a discontented, undisciplined, and
+     unpaid soldiery had not been planned, directed, or countenanced
+     by the Ameer, his ministers, or his advisers. There is no
+     evidence to prove or even to suspect that the mutiny of his
+     soldiers was in any way not deplored by the Ameer, but was
+     regarded by him with regret, dismay, and even terror. Fully
+     conscious of the very grave misapprehensions and possible
+     accusation of timidity and weakness on our part, I entertain,
+     myself, very strong convictions that we should have first
+     permitted and encouraged the Ameer to punish the mutinous
+     soldiers and rioters implicated in the outrage before we
+     ourselves interfered. The omission to adopt this course
+     inevitably led to the action forced on the Ameer, which
+     culminated in the forced resignation of his power and the total
+     annihilation of the national government. The Ameer in thus
+     resigning reserved to himself the right of seeking, when occasion
+     offered, restoration to his heritage and its reversion to his
+     heir. Nothing has occurred to justify the ignoring of these
+     undeniable rights."
+
+Gordon's resignation was handed in to Lord Ripon on the night of the
+2nd of June, the news appeared in the London papers of the 4th, and it
+had one immediate consequence which no one could have foreseen. But
+before referring to that matter I must make clear the heavy pecuniary
+sacrifice his resignation of this post entailed upon Gordon. He repaid
+every farthing of his expenses as to passage money, etc., to Lord
+Ripon, which left him very much out of pocket. He wrote himself on the
+subject: "All this Private Secretaryship and its consequent expenses
+are all due to my not acting on my _own_ instinct. However, for the
+future I will be wiser.... It was a living crucifixion.... I nearly
+burst with the trammels.... A L100,000 a year would not have kept me
+there. I resigned on 2 June, and never unpacked my official dress."
+
+The immediate consequence referred to was as follows: In the drawer of
+Mr J. D. Campbell, at the office at Storey's Gate of the Chinese
+Imperial Customs, had been lying for some little time the
+following telegram for Colonel Gordon from Sir Robert Hart, the
+Inspector-General of the Department in China:--
+
+     "I am directed to invite you here (Peking). Please come and see
+     for yourself. The opportunity of doing really useful work on a
+     large scale ought not to be lost. Work, position, conditions, can
+     all be arranged with yourself here to your satisfaction. Do take
+     six months' leave and come."
+
+As Mr Campbell was aware of Gordon's absence in India, he had thought
+it useless to forward the message, and it was not until the
+resignation was announced that he did so. In dealing with this
+intricate matter, which was complicated by extraneous considerations,
+it is necessary to clear up point by point. When Gordon received the
+message he at once concluded that the invitation came from his old
+colleague Li Hung Chang, and accepted it on that assumption, which in
+the end proved erroneous. It is desirable to state that since Gordon's
+departure from China in 1865 at least one communication had passed
+between these former associates in a great enterprise. The following
+characteristic letter, dated Tientsin, 22nd March 1879, reached Gordon
+while he was at Khartoum:--
+
+     "DEAR SIR,--I am instructed by His Excellency the Grand
+     Secretary, Li, to answer your esteemed favour, dated the 27th
+     October 1878, from Khartoum, which was duly received. I am right
+     glad to hear from you. It is now over fourteen years since we
+     parted from each other. Although I have not written to you, but I
+     often speak of you, and remember you with very great interest.
+     The benefit you have conferred on China does not disappear with
+     your person, but is felt throughout the regions in which you
+     played so important and active a part. All those people bless you
+     for the blessings of peace and prosperity which they now enjoy.
+
+     "Your achievements in Egypt are well known throughout the
+     civilized world. I see often in the papers of your noble works on
+     the Upper Nile. You are a man of ample resources, with which you
+     suit yourself to any kind of emergency. My hope is that you may
+     long be spared to improve the conditions of the people amongst
+     whom your lot is cast. I am striving hard to advance my people to
+     a higher state of development, and to unite both this and all
+     other nations within the 'Four Seas' under one common
+     brotherhood. To the several questions put in your note the
+     following are the answers:--Kwoh Sung-Ling has retired from
+     official life, and is now living at home. Yang Ta Jen died a
+     great many years ago. Na Wang's adopted son is doing well, and is
+     the colonel of a regiment, with 500 men under him. The Pa to'
+     Chiaow Bridge, which you destroyed, was rebuilt very soon after
+     you left China, and it is now in very good condition.
+
+     "Kwoh Ta jen, the Chinese Minister, wrote to me that he had the
+     pleasure of seeing you in London. I wished I had been there also
+     to see you; but the responsibilities of life are so distributed
+     to different individuals in different parts of the world, that it
+     is a wise economy of Providence that we are not all in the same
+     spot.
+
+     "I wish you all manner of happiness and prosperity. With my
+     highest regards,--I remain, yours very truly
+
+               "(For LI HUNG CHANG),        TSENG LAISUN."
+
+Under the belief that Hart's telegram emanated from Li Hung Chang, and
+inspired by loyalty to a friend in a difficulty, as well as by
+affection for the Chinese people, whom in his own words he "liked best
+next after his own," Gordon replied to this telegram in the following
+message: "Inform Hart Gordon will leave for Shanghai first
+opportunity. As for conditions, Gordon indifferent."
+
+At that moment China seemed on the verge of war with Russia, in
+consequence of the disinclination of the latter power to restore the
+province of Kuldja, which she had occupied at the time of the
+Mahommedan uprising in Central Asia. The Chinese official, Chung How,
+who had signed an unpopular treaty at Livadia, had been sentenced to
+death--the treaty itself had been repudiated--and hostilities were
+even said to have commenced. The announcement that the Chinese
+Government had invited Gordon to Peking, and that he had promptly
+replied that he would come, was also interpreted as signifying the
+resolve to carry matters with a high hand, and to show the world that
+China was determined to obtain what she was entitled to. Those persons
+who have a contemptuous disregard for dates went so far even as to
+assert that Gordon had resigned because of the Chinese invitation.
+Never was there a clearer case of _post hoc, propter hoc_; but even
+the officials at the War Office were suspicious in the matter, and
+their attitude towards Gordon went near to precipitate the very
+catastrophe they wanted to avoid.
+
+On the same day (8th June) as he telegraphed his reply to the Chinese
+invitation, he telegraphed to Colonel Grant, Deputy Adjutant-General
+for the Royal Engineers at the Horse Guards: "Obtain me leave until
+end of the year; am invited to China; will not involve Government."
+Considering the position between China and Russia, and the concern of
+the Russian press and Government at the report about Gordon, it is not
+surprising that this request was not granted a ready approval. The
+official reply came back: "Must state more specifically purpose and
+position for and in which you go to China." To this Gordon sent the
+following characteristic answer: "Am ignorant; will write from China
+before the expiration of my leave." An answer like this savoured of
+insubordination, and shows how deeply Gordon was hurt by the want of
+confidence reposed in him. In saying this I disclaim all intention of
+criticising the authorities, for whose view there was some reasonable
+justification; but the line they took, while right enough for an
+ordinary Colonel of Engineers, was not quite a considerate one in the
+case of an officer of such an exceptional position and well-known
+idiosyncrasies as "Chinese" Gordon. On that ground alone may it be
+suggested that the blunt decision thus given in the final official
+telegram--"Reasons insufficient; your going to China is not approved,"
+was somewhat harsh.
+
+It was also impotent, for it rather made Gordon persist in carrying
+out his resolve than deterred him from doing so. His reply was thus
+worded: "Arrange retirement, commutation, or resignation of service;
+ask Campbell reasons. My counsel, if asked, would be for peace, not
+war. I return by America." Gordon's mind was fully made up to go, even
+if he had to sacrifice his commission. Without waiting for any further
+communication he left Bombay. As he had insisted on repaying Lord
+Ripon his passage-money from England to India which, owing to his
+resignation, the Viceroy would otherwise have had to pay out of his
+own pocket, Gordon was quite without funds, and he had to borrow the
+sum required to defray his passage to China. But having made up his
+mind, such trifling difficulties were not likely to deter him. He
+sailed from Bombay, not merely under the displeasure of his superiors
+and uncertain as to his own status, but also in that penniless
+condition, which was not wholly out of place in his character of
+knight-errant. But with that solid good sense, which so often
+retrieved his reputation in the eyes of the world, he left behind him
+the following public proclamation as to his mission and intentions. It
+was at once a public explanation of his proceedings, and a declaration
+of a pacific policy calculated to appease both official and Russian
+irritation:
+
+     "My fixed desire is to persuade the Chinese not to go to war with
+     Russia, both in their own interests and for the sake of those of
+     the world, especially those of England. In the event of war
+     breaking out I cannot answer how I should act for the present,
+     but I should ardently desire a speedy peace. It is my fixed
+     desire, as I have said, to persuade the Chinese not to go to war
+     with Russia. To me it appears that the question in dispute cannot
+     be of such vital importance that an arrangement could not be come
+     to by concessions upon both sides. Whether I succeed in being
+     heard or not is not in my hands. I protest, however, at being
+     regarded as one who wishes for war in any country, still less in
+     China. Inclined as I am, with only a small degree of admiration
+     for military exploits, I esteem it a far greater honour to
+     promote peace than to gain any paltry honours in a wretched war."
+
+With that message to his official superiors, as well as to the world,
+Gordon left Bombay on 13th June. His message of the day before saying,
+"Consult Campbell," had induced the authorities at the Horse Guards to
+make inquiries of that gentleman, who had no difficulty in satisfying
+them that the course of events was exactly as has here been set forth,
+and coupling that with Gordon's own declaration that he was for peace
+not war, permission was granted to Gordon to do that which at all cost
+he had determined to do. When he reached Ceylon he found this
+telegram: "Leave granted on your engaging to take no military service
+in China," and he somewhat too comprehensively, and it may even be
+feared rashly if events had turned out otherwise, replied: "I will
+take no military service in China: I would never embarrass the British
+Government."
+
+Having thus got clear of the difficulties which beset him on the
+threshold of his mission, Gordon had to prepare himself for those that
+were inherent to the task he had taken up. He knew of old how averse
+the Chinese are to take advice from any one, how they waste time in
+fathoming motives, and how when they say a thing shall be done it is
+never performed. Yet the memory of his former disinterested and
+splendid service afforded a guarantee that if they would take advice
+and listen to unflattering criticism from any one, that man was
+Gordon. Still, from the most favourable point of view, the mission was
+fraught with difficulty, and circumstances over which he had no
+control, and of which he was even ignorant, added immensely to it.
+There is no doubt that Peking was at that moment the centre of
+intrigues, not only between the different Chinese leaders, but also
+among the representatives of the Foreign Powers. The secret history of
+these transactions has still to be revealed, and as our Foreign Office
+never gives up the private instructions it transmits to its
+representatives, the full truth may never be recorded. But so far as
+the British Government was concerned, its action was limited to giving
+the Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, instructions to muzzle Gordon and
+prevent his doing anything that wasn't strictly in accordance with
+official etiquette and quite safe, or, in a word, to make him do
+nothing. The late Sir Thomas Wade was a most excellent Chinese scholar
+and estimable person in every way, but when he tried to do what the
+British Government and the whole arrayed body of the Horse Guards,
+from the Commander-in-Chief down to the Deputy-Adjutant General, had
+failed to do, viz. to keep Gordon in leading strings, he egregiously
+failed. Sir Thomas Wade went so far as to order Gordon to stay in the
+British Legation, and to visit no one without his express permission.
+Gordon's reply was to ignore the British Legation and to never enter
+its portals during the whole of his stay in China.
+
+That was one difficulty in the situation apart from the Russian
+question, but it was not the greatest, and as it was the first
+occasion on which European politics re-acted in a marked way on the
+situation in China, such details as are ascertainable are well worth
+recording at some length.
+
+There is no doubt that the Russian Government was very much disturbed
+at what seemed an inevitable hostile collision with China. The
+uncertain result of such a contest along an enormous land-frontier,
+with which, at that time, Russia had very imperfect means of
+communication, was the least cause of its disquietude. A war with
+China signified to Russia something much more serious than this, viz.,
+a breach of the policy of friendship to its vast neighbour, which it
+had consistently pursued for two centuries, and which it will pursue
+until it is ready to absorb, and then in the same friendly guise, its
+share of China. Under these circumstances the Russian Government
+looked round for every means of averting the catastrophe. It is
+necessary to guard oneself from seeming to imply that Russia was in
+any sense afraid, or doubtful as to the result of a war with China;
+her sole motives were those of astute and far-seeing policy. Whether
+the Russian Ambassador at Berlin mooted the matter to Prince
+Bismarck, or whether that statesman, without inspiration, saw his
+chance of doing Russia a good turn at no cost to himself is not
+certain, but instructions were sent to Herr von Brandt, the German
+Minister at Peking, a man of great energy, and in favour of bold
+measures, to support the Peace Party in every way. He was exactly a
+man after Prince Bismarck's own heart, prepared to go to any lengths
+to attain his object, and fully persuaded that the end justifies the
+means. His plan was startlingly simple and bold. Li Hung Chang, the
+only prominent advocate of peace, was to rebel, march on Peking with
+his Black Flag army, and establish a Government of his own. There is
+no doubt whatever that this scheme was formed and impressed on Li Hung
+Chang as the acme of wisdom. More than that, it was supported by two
+other Foreign Ministers at Peking, with greater or less warmth, and
+one of them was Sir Thomas Wade. These plots were dispelled by the
+sound sense and candid but firm representations of Gordon. But for
+him, as will be seen, there would have been a rebellion in the
+country, and Li Hung Chang would now be either Emperor of China or a
+mere instance of a subject who had lost his head in trying to be
+supreme.
+
+Having thus explained the situation that awaited Gordon, it is
+necessary to briefly trace his movements after leaving Ceylon. He
+reached Hongkong on 2nd July, and not only stayed there for a day or
+two as the guest of the Governor, Sir T. Pope Hennessey, but found
+sufficient time to pay a flying visit to the Chinese city of Canton.
+Thence he proceeded to Shanghai and Chefoo. At the latter place he
+found news, which opened his eyes to part of the situation, in a
+letter from Sir Robert Hart, begging him to come direct to him at
+Peking, and not to stop _en route_ to visit Li Hung Chang at Tientsin.
+As has been explained, Gordon went to China in the full belief that,
+whatever names were used, it was his old colleague Li Hung Chang who
+sent for him, and the very first definite information he received on
+approaching the Chinese capital was that not Li, but persons whom by
+inference were inimical to Li, had sent for him. The first question
+that arises then was who was the real author of the invitation to
+Gordon that bore the name of Hart. It cannot be answered, for Gordon
+assured me that he himself did not know; but there is no doubt that it
+formed part of the plot and counter-plot originated by the German
+Minister, and responded to by those who were resolved, in the event of
+Li's rebellion, to uphold the Dragon Throne. Sir Robert Hart was a man
+of long-proved ability and address, who has rendered the Chinese
+almost as signal service as did Gordon himself, and on this occasion
+he was actuated by the highest possible motives, but it must be
+recorded that his letter led to a temporary estrangement between
+himself and Gordon, who I am happy to be able to state positively did
+realise long afterwards that he and Hart were fighting in the same
+camp, and had the same objects in view--only this was not apparent at
+the time. Gordon went to China only because he thought Li Hung Chang
+sent for him, but when he found that powerful persons were inciting
+him to revolt, he became the first and most strenuous in his advice
+against so imprudent and unpatriotic a measure. Sir Robert Hart knew
+exactly what was being done by the German Minister. He wished to save
+Gordon from being drawn into a dangerous and discreditable plot, and
+also in the extreme eventuality to deprive any rebellion of the
+support of Gordon's military genius.
+
+But without this perfect information, and for the best, as in the end
+it proved, Gordon, hot with disappointment that the original summons
+was not from Li Hung Chang, went straight to that statesman's yamen at
+Tientsin, ignored Hart, and proclaimed that he had come as the friend
+of the only man who had given any sign of an inclination to regenerate
+China. He resided as long as he was in Northern China with Li Hung
+Chang, whom he found being goaded towards high treason by persons who
+had no regard for China's interests, and who thought only of the
+attainment of their own selfish designs. The German Minister, thinking
+that he had obtained an ally who would render the success of his own
+plan certain, proposed that Gordon should put himself at the head of
+Li's army, march on Peking, and depose the Emperor. Gordon's droll
+comment on this is: "I told him I was equal to a good deal of
+filibustering, but that this was beyond me, and that I did not think
+there was the slightest chance of such a project succeeding, as Li had
+not a sufficient following to give it any chance of success." He
+recorded his views of the situation in the following note: "The only
+thing that keeps me in China is Li Hung Chang's safety--if he were
+safe I would not care--but some people are egging him on to rebel,
+some to this, and some to that, and all appears in a helpless drift.
+There are parties at Peking who would drive the Chinese into war for
+their own ends." Having measured the position and found it bristling
+with unexpected difficulties and dangers, Gordon at once regretted the
+promise he had given his own Government in the message from Ceylon. He
+thought it was above all things necessary for him to have a free hand,
+and he consequently sent the following telegram to the Horse Guards:
+"I have seen Li Hung Chang, and he wishes me to stay with him. I
+cannot desert China in her present crisis, and would be free to act
+as I think fit. I therefore beg to resign my commission in Her
+Majesty's Service." Having thus relieved, as he thought, his
+Government of all responsibility for his acts--although they responded
+to this message by accusing him of insubordination, and by instructing
+Sir Thomas Wade to place him under moral arrest--Gordon threw himself
+into the China difficulty with his usual ardour. Nothing more remained
+to be done at Tientsin, where he had effectually checked the
+pernicious counsel pressed on Li Hung Chang most strongly by the
+German Minister, and in a minor degree by the representatives of
+France and England. In order to influence the Central Government it
+was necessary for him to proceed to Peking, and the following
+unpublished letter graphically describes his views at the particular
+moment:--
+
+     "I am on my way to Peking. There are three parties--Li Hung Chang
+     (1), the Court (2), the Literary Class (3). The two first are for
+     peace, but dare not say it for fear of the third party. I have
+     told Li that he, in alliance with the Court, must coerce the
+     third party, and have written this to Li and to the Court Party.
+     By so doing I put my head in jeopardy in going to Peking. I do
+     not wish Li to act alone. It is not good he should do anything
+     except support the Court Party morally. God will overrule for the
+     best. If neither the Court Party nor Li can act, if these two
+     remain and let things drift, then there will be a disastrous war,
+     of which I shall not see the end. You know I do not mourn this.
+     Having given up my commission, I have nothing to look for, and
+     indeed I long for the quiet of the future.... If the third party
+     hear of my recommendation before the Court Party acts, then I may
+     be doomed to a quick exit at Peking. Li Hung Chang is a noble
+     fellow, and worth giving one's life for; but he must not rebel
+     and lose his good name. It is a sort of general election which is
+     going on, but where heads are in gage."
+
+Writing to me some months later, General Gordon entered into various
+matters relating to this period, and as the letter indirectly throws
+light on what may be called the Li Hung Chang episode, I quote it
+here, although somewhat out of its proper place:--
+
+     "Thanks for your kind note. I send you the two papers which were
+     made public in China, and through the Shen-pao some of it was
+     sent over. Another paper of fifty-two articles I gave Li Hung
+     Chang, but I purposely kept no copy of it, for it went into--
+
+     "1. The contraband of salt and opium at Hongkong.
+
+     "2. The advantages of telegraphs and canals, not railways, which
+     have ruined Egypt and Turkey by adding to the financial
+     difficulties.
+
+     "3. The effeteness of the Chinese representatives abroad, etc.,
+     etc., etc.
+
+     "I wrote as a Chinaman for the Chinese. I recommended Chinese
+     merchants to do away with middle-men, and to have Government aid
+     and encouragement to create houses or firms in London, etc.; to
+     make their own cotton goods, etc. In fact, I wrote as a Chinaman.
+     I see now and then symptoms that they are awake to the situation,
+     for my object has been always to put myself into the skin of
+     those I may be with, and I like these people as much--well, say
+     nearly as much--as I like my countrymen.
+
+     "There are a lot of people in China who would egg on revolts of A
+     and B. All this is wrong. China must _fara da se_. I painted this
+     picture to the Chinese of 1900: 'Who are those people hanging
+     about with jinrickshas?' 'The sons of the European merchants.'
+     'What are those ruins?' 'The Hongs of the European merchants,'
+     etc., etc.
+
+     "People have asked me what I thought of the advance of China
+     during the sixteen years I was absent. They looked superficially
+     at the power military of China. I said they are unchanged. You
+     come, I must go; but I go on to say that the stride China has
+     made in commerce is immense, and commerce and wealth are the
+     power of nations, not the troops. Like the Chinese, I have a
+     great contempt for military prowess. It is ephemeral. I admire
+     administrators, not generals. A military Red-Button mandarin has
+     to bow low to a Blue-Button civil mandarin, and rightly so to my
+     mind.
+
+     "I wrote the other day to Li Hung Chang to protest against the
+     railway from Ichang to Peking along the Grand Canal. In making it
+     they would enter into no end of expenses, the coin would leave
+     the country and they would not understand it, and would be
+     fleeced by the financial cormorants of Great Britain. They can
+     understand canals. Let them repair the Grand Canal."
+
+Having arrived at Peking, Gordon was received in several councils by
+Prince Chun, the father of the young Emperor and the recognised leader
+of the War Party. The leading members of the Grand Council were also
+present, and Gordon explained his views to them at length. In the
+first place, he said, if there were war he would only stay to help
+them on condition that they destroyed the suburbs of Peking, allowed
+him to place the city in a proper state of defence, and removed the
+Emperor and Court to a place of safety. When they expressed their
+opinion that the Taku forts were impregnable, Gordon laughed, and said
+they could be taken from the rear. The whole gist of his remarks was
+that "they could not go to war," and when they still argued in the
+opposite sense, and the interpreter refused to translate the harsh
+epithets he applied to such august personages, he took the dictionary,
+looked out the Chinese equivalent for "idiocy," and with his finger on
+the word, placed it under the eyes of each member of the Council. The
+end of this scene may be described in Gordon's own words: "I said make
+peace, and wrote out the terms. They were, in all, five articles; the
+only one they boggled at was the fifth, about the indemnity. They said
+this was too hard and unjust. I said that might be, but what was the
+use of talking about it? If a man demanded your money or your life,
+you have only three courses open. You must either fight, call for
+help, or give up your money. Now, as you cannot fight, it is useless
+to call for help, since neither England nor France would stir a finger
+to assist you. I believe these are the articles now under discussion
+at St Petersburg, and the only one on which there is any question is
+the fifth." This latter statement I may add, without going into the
+question of the Marquis Tseng's negotiations in the Russian capital,
+was perfectly correct.
+
+Gordon drew up several notes or memorandums for the information of the
+Chinese Government. The first of these was mainly military, and the
+following extracts will suffice:--
+
+     "China's power lies in her numbers, in the quick moving of her
+     troops, in the little baggage they require, and in their few
+     wants. It is known that men armed with sword and spear can
+     overcome the best regular troops equipped with breech-loading
+     rifles, if the country is at all difficult and if the men with
+     spears and swords outnumber their foe ten to one. If this is the
+     case where men are armed with spears and swords, it will be much
+     truer when those men are themselves armed with breech loaders.
+     China should never engage in pitched battles. Her strength is in
+     quiet movements, in cutting off trains of baggage, and in night
+     attacks _not pushed home_--in a continuous worrying of her
+     enemies. Rockets should be used instead of cannon. No artillery
+     should be moved with the troops; it delays and impedes them.
+     Infantry fire is the most fatal fire; guns make a noise far out
+     of proportion to their value in war. If guns are taken into the
+     field, troops cannot march faster than these guns. The degree of
+     speed at which the guns can be carried dictates the speed at
+     which the troops can march. As long as Peking is the centre of
+     the Government of China, China can never go to war with any
+     first-class power; it is too near the sea."
+
+The second memorandum was of greater importance and more general
+application. In it he compressed the main heads of his advice into the
+smallest possible space, and so far as it was at all feasible to treat
+a vast and complicated subject within the limits of a simple and
+practical scheme, he therein shows with the greatest clearness how the
+regeneration of China might be brought about.
+
+     "In spite of the opinion of some foreigners, it will be generally
+     acknowledged that the Chinese are contented and happy, that the
+     country is rich and prosperous, and that the people are _au fond_
+     united in their sentiments, and ardently desire to remain a
+     nation. At constant intervals, however, the whole of this human
+     hive is stirred by some dispute between the Pekin Government and
+     some foreign Power; the Chinese people, proud of their ancient
+     prestige, applaud the high tone taken up by the Pekin Government,
+     crediting the Government with the power to support their strong
+     words. This goes on for a time, when the Government gives in, and
+     corresponding vexation is felt by the people. The recurrence of
+     these disputes, the inevitable surrender ultimately of the Pekin
+     Government, has the tendency of shaking the Chinese people's
+     confidence in the Central Government. The Central Government
+     appreciates the fact that, little by little, this prestige is
+     being destroyed by their own actions among the Chinese people,
+     each crisis then becomes more accentuated or difficult to
+     surmount, as the Central Government know each concession is
+     another nail in their coffin. The Central Government fear that
+     the taking up of a spirited position by any pre-eminent Chinese
+     would carry the Chinese people with him, and therefore the
+     Central Government endeavour to keep up appearances, and to skirt
+     the precipice of war as near as they possibly can, while never
+     intending to enter into war.
+
+     "The Central Government residing in the extremity of the Middle
+     Kingdom, away from the great influences which are now working in
+     China, can never alter one iota from what they were years ago:
+     they are being steadily left behind by the people they govern.
+     They know this, and endeavour to stem these influences in all
+     ways in their power, hoping to keep the people backward and in
+     ignorance, and to retard their progress to the same pace they
+     themselves go, if it can be called a pace at all.
+
+     "It is therefore a maxim that 'no progress can be made by the
+     Pekin Government.' To them any progress, whether slow or quick,
+     is synonymous to slow or quick extinction, for they will never
+     move.
+
+     "The term 'Pekin Government' is used advisedly, for if the
+     Central Government were moved from Pekin into some province where
+     the pulsations and aspirations of the Chinese people could have
+     their legitimate effect, then the Central Government and the
+     Chinese people, having a unison of thought, would work together.
+
+     "From what has been said above, it is maintained that, so long as
+     the Central Government of China isolates itself from the Chinese
+     people by residing aloof at Pekin, so long will the Chinese
+     people have to remain passive under the humiliations which come
+     upon them through the non-progressive and destructive disposition
+     of their Government. These humiliations will be the chronic state
+     of the Chinese people until the Central Government moves from
+     Pekin and reunites itself to its subjects. No army, no purchases
+     of ironclad vessels will enable China to withstand a first-class
+     Power so long as China keeps her queen bee at the entrance of her
+     hive. There is, however, the probability that a proud people like
+     the Chinese may sicken at this continual eating of humble pie,
+     that the Pekin Government at some time, by skirting too closely
+     the precipice of war may fall into it, and then that sequence may
+     be anarchy and rebellion throughout the Middle Kingdom which may
+     last for years and cause endless misery.
+
+     "It may be asked--How can the present state of things be altered?
+     How can China maintain the high position that the wealth,
+     industry, and innate goodness of the Chinese people entitle her
+     to have among the nations of the world? Some may say by the
+     revolt of this Chinaman or of that Chinaman. To me this seems
+     most undesirable, for, in the first place, such action would not
+     have the blessing of God, and, in the second, it would result in
+     the country being plunged into civil war. The fair, upright, and
+     open course for the Chinese people to take is to work, through
+     the Press and by petitions, on the Central Government, and to
+     request them to move from Pekin, and bring themselves thus more
+     into unison with the Chinese people, and thus save that people
+     the constant humiliations they have to put up with, owing to the
+     seat of the Central Government being at Pekin. This
+     recommendation would need no secret societies, no rebellion, no
+     treason; if taken up and persevered in it must succeed, and not
+     one life need be lost.
+
+     "The Central Government at Pekin could not answer the Chinese
+     people except in the affirmative when the Chinese people say to
+     the Central Government--'By your residing aloof from us in Pekin,
+     where you are exposed to danger, you separate our interests from
+     yours, and you bring on us humiliation, which we would never have
+     to bear if you resided in the interior. Take our application into
+     consideration, and grant our wishes.'
+
+     "I have been kindly treated by the Central Pekin Government and
+     by the Chinese people; it is for the welfare of both parties that
+     I have written and signed this paper. I may have expressed myself
+     too strongly with respect to the non-progressive nature of the
+     Pekin Government, who may desire the welfare of the Middle
+     Kingdom as ardently as any other Chinese, but as long as the
+     Pekin Government allow themselves to be led and directed by those
+     drones of the hive, the Censors, so long must the Pekin
+     Government bear the blame earned by those drones in plunging
+     China into difficulties. In the insect world the bees get rid of
+     the drones in winter."
+
+There was yet a third memorandum of a confidential nature written to
+Li Hung Chang himself, of which Gordon did not keep a copy, but he
+referred to it in the letter written to myself which I have already
+quoted.
+
+Having thus accomplished his double task, viz.: the prevention of war
+between Russia and China, and of a rebellion on the part of Li Hung
+Chang under European advice and encouragement, Gordon left China
+without any delay. When he reached Shanghai on 16th August he found
+another official telegram awaiting him: "Leave cancelled, resignation
+not accepted." As he had already taken his passage home he did not
+reply, but when he reached Aden he telegraphed as follows: "You might
+have trusted me. My passage from China was taken days before the
+arrival of your telegram which states 'leave cancelled.' Do you insist
+on rescinding the same?" The next day he received a reply granting him
+nearly six months' leave, and with that message the question of his
+alleged insubordination may be treated as finally settled. There can
+be no doubt that among his many remarkable achievements not the least
+creditable was this mission to China, when by downright candour, and
+unswerving resolution in doing the right thing, he not merely
+preserved peace, but baffled the intrigues of unscrupulous
+diplomatists and selfish governments.
+
+With that incident closed Gordon's connection with China, the country
+associated with his most brilliant feats of arms, but in concluding
+this chapter it seems to me that I should do well to record some later
+expressions of opinion on that subject. The following interesting
+letter, written on the eve of the war between France and China in
+1882, was published by the _New York Herald_:--
+
+     "The Chinese in their affairs with foreign nations are fully
+     aware of their peculiar position, and count with reason that a
+     war with either France or another Power will bring them perforce
+     allies outside of England. The only Power that could go to war
+     with them with impunity is Russia, who can attack them by land. I
+     used the following argument to them when I was there:--The
+     present dynasty of China is a usurping one--the Mantchou. We may
+     say that it exists by sufferance at Pekin, and nowhere else in
+     the Empire. If you look at the map of China Pekin is at the
+     extremity of the Empire and not a week's marching from the
+     Russian frontier. A war with Russia would imply the capture of
+     Pekin and the fall of the Mantchou dynasty, which would never
+     dare to leave it, for if they did the Chinamen in the south would
+     smite them. I said, 'If you go to war then move the Queen
+     Bee--_i.e._ the Emperor--into the centre of China and then fight;
+     if not, you must make peace.' The two Powers who can coerce China
+     are Russia and England. Russia could march without much
+     difficulty on Pekin. This much would not hurt trade, so England
+     would not interfere. England could march to Taku and Pekin and no
+     one would object, for she would occupy the Treaty Ports. But if
+     France tried to do so England would object. Thus it is that China
+     will only listen to Russia and England, and eventually she must
+     fear Russia the most of all Powers, for she can never get over
+     the danger of the land journey, but she might, by a great
+     increase of her fleet, get over the fear of England. I say China,
+     but I mean the Mantchou dynasty, for the Mantchous are despised
+     by the Chinese. Any war with China would be for France expensive
+     and dangerous, not from the Chinese forces, which would be soon
+     mastered, but from the certainty of complications with England.
+     As for the European population in China, write them down as
+     identical with those in Egypt in all affairs. Their sole idea is,
+     without any distinction of nationality, an increased power over
+     China for their own trade and for opening up the country as they
+     call it, and any war would be popular with them; so they will egg
+     on any Power to make it. My idea is that no colonial or foreign
+     community in a foreign land can properly, and for the general
+     benefit of the world, consider the questions of that foreign
+     State. The leading idea is how they will benefit themselves. The
+     Isle of Bourbon or Reunion is the cause of the Madagascar war. It
+     is egged on by the planters there, and to my idea they (the
+     planters) want slaves for Madagascar. I have a very mean opinion
+     of the views of any colonial or foreign community: though I own
+     that they are powerful for evil. Who would dare to oppose the
+     European colony in Egypt or China, and remain in those
+     countries?"
+
+In a letter to myself, written about this time, very much the same
+views are expressed:--
+
+     "I do not think I could enlighten _you_ about China. Her game is
+     and will be to wait events, and she will try and work so as to
+     embroil us with France if she does go to war. For this there
+     would be plenty of elements in the Treaty Ports. One may say,
+     humanly speaking, China going to war with France must entail our
+     following suit. It would be a bad thing in some ways for
+     civilization, for the Chinese are naturally so bumptious that any
+     success would make them more so, and if allied to us, and they
+     had success, it would be a bad look-out afterwards. This in
+     private. Li Hung Chang as Emperor, if such a thing came to pass,
+     would be worse than the present Emperor, for he is sharp and
+     clever, would unite China under a Chinese dynasty, and be much
+     more troublesome to deal with. Altogether, I cannot think that
+     the world would gain if China went to war with France. Also I
+     think it would be eventually bad for China. China being a queer
+     country, we might expect queer things, and I believe if she did
+     go to war she would contract with Americans for the destruction
+     of French fleet, and she would let loose a horde of adventurers
+     with dynamite. This is essentially her style of action, and Li
+     Hung Chang would take it up, but do not say I think so."
+
+In a further letter from Jaffa, dated 17th November 1883, he wrote
+finally on this branch of the subject:--
+
+     "I fear I can write nothing of any import, so I will not attempt
+     it. To you I can remark that if I were the Government I would
+     consider the part that should be taken when the inevitable fall
+     of the Mantchou dynasty takes place, what steps they would take,
+     and how they would act in the break-up, which, however, will only
+     end in a fresh cohesion of China, for we, or no other Power,
+     could never for long hold the country. At Penang, Singapore,
+     etc., the Chinese will eventually oust us in another generation."
+
+There was one other question about China upon which Gordon felt very
+strongly, viz., the opium question, and as he expressed views which I
+combated, I feel bound to end this chapter by quoting what he wrote on
+this much-discussed topic. On one point he agrees with myself and his
+other opponents in admitting that the main object with the Chinese
+authorities was increased revenue, not morality. They have since
+attained their object not only by an increased import duty, but also
+in the far more extensive cultivation of the native drug, to which the
+Emperor, by Imperial Edict, has given his formal sanction:--
+
+                                   "PORT LOUIS, _3rd February 1882_.
+
+     "About the opium article, I think your article--'History of the
+     Opium Traffic,' _Times_, 4th January 1884--reads well. But the
+     question is this. The Chinese _amour propre_ as a nation is hurt
+     by the enforced entry of the drug. This irritation is connected
+     with the remembrance of the wars which led to the Treaties about
+     opium. Had eggs or apples been the cause of the wars, _i.e._ had
+     the Chinese objected to the import of eggs, and we had insisted
+     on their being imported, and carried out such importation in
+     spite of the Chinese wish by force of war, it would be to my own
+     mind the same thing as opium now is to Chinese. We do not give
+     the Chinese credit for being so sensitive as they are. As Black
+     Sea Treaty was to Russia so opium trade is to China.
+
+     "I take the root of the question to be as above. I do not mean to
+     say that all that they urge is fictitious about morality; and I
+     would go further than you, and say I think they would willingly
+     give up their revenue from opium, indeed I am sure of it, if they
+     could get rid of the forced importation by treaty, but their
+     action in so doing would be simply one of satisfying their _amour
+     propre_. The opium importation is a constant reminder of their
+     defeats, and I feel sure China will never be good friends with us
+     till it is abolished. It is for that reason I would give it up,
+     for I think the only two alliances worth having are France and
+     China.
+
+     "I have never, when I have written on it, said anything further
+     than this, _i.e. the Chinese Government will not have it_, let us
+     say it is a good drug or not. I also say that it is not fair to
+     force anything on your neighbour, and, therefore, morally, it is
+     wrong, even if it was eggs.
+
+     "Further, I say that through our thrusting these eggs on China,
+     this opium, we caused the wars with China which shook the
+     prestige of the Pekin Government, and the outcome of this war of
+     1842 was the Taeping Rebellion, with its deaths of 13,000,000.
+     The military prestige of the Mantchous was shaken by these
+     defeats, the heavy contributions for war led to thousands of
+     soldiers being disbanded, to a general impoverishment of the
+     people, and this gave the rebel chief, Hung-tsew-tsiuen, his
+     chance.
+
+     "A wants B to let him import eggs, B refuses, A coerces him;
+     therefore I say it is wrong, and that it is useless discussing
+     whether eggs are good or not.
+
+     "Can anyone doubt but that, if the Chinese Government had the
+     power, they would stop importation to-morrow? If so, why keep a
+     pressure like this on China whom we need as a friend, and with
+     whom this importation is and ever will be the sole point about
+     which we could be at variance? I know this is the point with Li
+     Hung Chang.
+
+     "People may laugh at _amour propre_ of China. It is a positive
+     fact, they are most-pigheaded on those points. China is the only
+     nation in the world which is forced to take a thing she does not
+     want. England is the only nation which forces another nation to
+     do this, in order to benefit India by this act. Put like this it
+     is outrageous.
+
+     "Note this, only certain classes of vessels are subject to the
+     Foreign Customs Office at Canton. By putting all vessels under
+     that Office the Chinese Government would make L2,000,000 a year
+     more revenue. The Chinese Government will not do this however,
+     because it would put power in hands of foreigners, so they lose
+     it. Did you ever read the letters of the Ambassador before
+     Marquis Tseng? His name, I think, was Coh or Kwoh. He wrote home
+     to Pekin about Manchester, telling its wonders, but adding,
+     'These people are wonderful, but the masses are miserable far
+     beyond Chinese. They think only of money and not of the welfare
+     of the people.'
+
+     "Any foreign nation can raise the bile of Chinese by saying,
+     'Look at the English, they forced you to take their opium.'
+
+     "I should not be a bit surprised did I hear that Li Hung Chang
+     smoked opium himself. I know a lot of the princes do, so they
+     say. I have no doubt myself that what I have said is the true and
+     only reason, or rather root reason. Put our nation in the same
+     position of having been defeated and forced to accept some
+     article which theory used to consider bad for the health, like
+     tea used to be, we would rebel as soon as we could against it,
+     though our people drink tea. The opium trade is a standing,
+     ever-present memento of defeat and heavy payments; and the
+     Chinese cleverly take advantage of the fact that it is a
+     deleterious drug.
+
+     "The opium wars were not about opium--opium was only a _cheval de
+     bataille_. They were against the introduction of foreigners, a
+     political question, and so the question of opium import is now.
+     As for the loss to India by giving it up, it is quite another
+     affair. On one hand you have gain, an embittered feeling and an
+     injustice; on the other you have loss, friendly nations and
+     justice. Cut down pay of all officers in India to Colonial
+     allowances _above_ rank of captains. Do not give them Indian
+     allowances, and you will cover nearly the loss, I expect. Why
+     should officers in India have more than officers in Hongkong?"
+
+In a subsequent letter, dated from the Cape, 20th July 1882, General
+Gordon replied to some objections I had raised as follows:--
+
+     "As for the opium, to which you say the same objection applies as
+     to tea, etc., it is not so, for opium has for ages been a tabooed
+     article among Chinese respectable people. I own reluctance to
+     foreign intercourse applies to what I said, but the Chinese know
+     that the intercourse with foreigners cannot be stopped, and it,
+     as well as the forced introduction of opium, are signs of defeat;
+     yet one, that of intercourse, cannot be stopped or wiped away
+     while the opium question can be. I am writing in a hurry, so am
+     not very clear.
+
+     "What I mean is that no one country forces another country to
+     take a drug like opium, and therefore the Chinese feel the
+     forced introduction of opium as an intrusion and injustice;
+     thence their feelings in the matter. This, I feel sure, is the
+     case.
+
+     "What could our Government do _in re_ opium? Well, I should say,
+     let the clause of treaty lapse about it, and let the smuggling be
+     renewed. Hongkong is a nest of smugglers.
+
+     "Pekin would, or rather could, never succeed in cutting off
+     foreign intercourse. The Chinese are too much mixed up (and are
+     increasingly so every year) with foreigners for Pekin even to try
+     it. Also I do not think China would wish to stop its importation
+     altogether. All they ask is an increased duty on it."
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+THE MAURITIUS, THE CAPE, AND THE CONGO.
+
+
+There was a moment of hesitation in Gordon's mind as to whether he
+would come home or not. His first project on laying down the Indian
+Secretaryship had been to go to Zanzibar and attack the slave trade
+from that side. Before his plans were matured the China offer came,
+and turned his thoughts in a different channel. On his arrival at
+Aden, on the way back, he found that the late Sir William Mackinnon, a
+truly great English patriot of the type of the merchant adventurers of
+the Elizabethan age, had sent instructions that the ships of the
+British India Steam Packet Company were at his disposal to convey him
+whereever he liked, and for a moment the thought occurred to him to
+turn aside to Zanzibar. But a little reflection led him to think that,
+as he had been accused of insubordination, it would be better for him
+to return home and report himself at headquarters. When he arrived in
+London at the end of October 1880, he found that his letters, written
+chiefly to his sister during his long sojourn in the Soudan, were on
+the eve of publication by Dr Birkbeck Hill. That exceedingly
+interesting volume placed at the disposal of the public the evidence
+as to his great work in Africa, which might otherwise have been buried
+in oblivion. It was written under considerable difficulties, for
+Gordon would not see Dr Hill, and made a stringent proviso that he was
+not to be praised, and that nothing unkind was to be said about
+anyone. He did, however, stipulate for a special tribute of praise to
+be given to his Arab secretary, Berzati Bey, "my only companion for
+these years--my adviser and my counsellor." Berzati was among those
+who perished with the ill-fated expedition of Hicks Pasha at the end
+of 1883. To the publication of this work must be attributed the
+establishment of Gordon's reputation as the authority on the Soudan,
+and the prophetic character of many of his statements became clear
+when events confirmed them.
+
+After a stay at Southampton and in London of a few weeks, Gordon was
+at last induced to give himself a short holiday, and, strangely
+enough, he selected Ireland as his recreation ground. I have been told
+that Gordon had a strain of Irish blood in him, but I have failed to
+discover it genealogically, nor was there any trace of its influence
+on his character. He was not fortunate in the season of the year he
+selected, nor in the particular part of the country he chose for his
+visit. There is scenery in the south-west division of Ireland, quite
+apart from the admitted beauty of the Killarney district, that will
+vie with better known and more highly lauded places in Scotland and
+Switzerland, but no one would recommend a stranger to visit that
+quarter of Ireland at the end of November, and the absence of
+cultivation, seen under the depressing conditions of Nature, would
+strike a visitor with all the effect of absolute sterility. Gordon was
+so impressed, and it seemed to him that the Irish peasants of a whole
+province were existing in a state of wretchedness exceeding anything
+he had seen in either China or the Soudan. If he had seen the same
+places six months earlier, he would have formed a less extreme view of
+their situation. It was just the condition of things that appealed to
+his sympathy, and with characteristic promptitude he put his views on
+paper, making one definite offer on his own part, and sent them to a
+friend, the present General James Donnelly, a distinguished engineer
+officer and old comrade, and moreover a member of a well-known Irish
+family. Considering the contents of the letter, and the form in which
+Gordon threw out his suggestions, it is not very surprising that
+General Donnelly sent it to _The Times_, in which it was published on
+3rd December 1880; but Gordon himself was annoyed at this step being
+taken, because he realised that he had written somewhat hastily on a
+subject with which he could scarcely be deemed thoroughly acquainted.
+The following is its text:--
+
+     "You are aware how interested I am in the welfare of this
+     country, and, having known you for twenty-six years, I am sure I
+     may say the same of you.
+
+     "I have lately been over to the south-west of Ireland in the hope
+     of discovering how some settlement could be made of the Irish
+     question, which, like a fretting cancer, eats away our vitals as
+     a nation.
+
+     "I have come to the conclusion that--
+
+     "1. A gulf of antipathy exists between the landlords and tenants
+     of the north-west, west, and south-west of Ireland. It is a gulf
+     which is not caused alone by the question of rent; there is a
+     complete lack of sympathy between these two classes. It is
+     useless to inquire how such a state of things has come to pass. I
+     call your attention to the pamphlets, letters, and speeches of
+     the landlord class, as a proof of how little sympathy or kindness
+     there exists among them for the tenantry, and I am sure that the
+     tenantry feel in the same way towards the landlords.
+
+     "2. No half-measured Acts which left the landlords with any say
+     to the tenantry of these portions of Ireland will be of any use.
+     They would be rendered--as past Land Acts in Ireland have
+     been--quite abortive, for the landlords will insert clauses to do
+     away with their force. Any half-measures will only place the
+     Government face to face with the people of Ireland as the
+     champions of the landlord interest. The Government would be bound
+     to enforce their decision, and with a result which none can
+     foresee, but which certainly would be disastrous to the common
+     weal.
+
+     "3. My idea is that, seeing--through this cause or that, it is
+     immaterial to examine--a deadlock has occurred between the
+     present landlords and tenants, the Government should purchase up
+     the rights of the landlords over the whole or the greater part of
+     Longford, Westmeath, Clare, Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Leitrim,
+     Sligo, Mayo, Cavan, and Donegal. The yearly rental of these
+     districts is some four millions; if the Government give the
+     landlords twenty years' purchase, it would cost eighty millions,
+     which at three and a half per cent. would give a yearly interest
+     of L2,800,000, of which L2,500,000 could be recovered; the lands
+     would be Crown lands; they would be administered by a Land
+     Commission, who would be supplemented by an Emigration
+     Commission, which might for a short time need L100,000. This
+     would not injure the landlords, and, so far as it is an
+     interference with proprietary rights, it is as just as is the law
+     which forces Lord A. to allow a railway through his park for the
+     public benefit. I would restrain the landlords from any power or
+     control in these Crown land districts. Poor-law, roads, schools,
+     etc., should be under the Land Commission.
+
+     "4. For the rest of Ireland, I would pass an Act allowing free
+     sale of leases, fair rents, and a Government valuation.
+
+     "In conclusion, I must say, from all accounts and my own
+     observation, that the state of our fellow-countrymen in the parts
+     I have named is worse than that of any people in the world, let
+     alone Europe. I believe that these people are made as we are,
+     that they are patient beyond belief, loyal, but, at the same
+     time, broken-spirited and desperate, living on the verge of
+     starvation in places in which we would not keep our cattle.
+
+     "The Bulgarians, Anatolians, Chinese, and Indians are better off
+     than many of them are. The priests alone have any sympathy with
+     their sufferings, and naturally alone have a hold over them. In
+     these days, in common justice, if we endow a Protestant
+     University, why should we not endow a Catholic University in a
+     Catholic country? Is it not as difficult to get a L5 note from a
+     Protestant as from a Catholic or Jew? Read the letters of ----
+     and of ----, and tell me if you see in them any particle of kind
+     feeling towards the tenantry; and if you have any doubts about
+     this, investigate the manner in which the Relief Fund was
+     administered, and in which the sums of money for improvements of
+     estates by landlords were expended.
+
+     "In 1833 England gave freedom to the West Indian slaves at a cost
+     of twenty millions--worth now thirty millions. This money left
+     the country. England got nothing for it. By an expenditure of
+     eighty millions she may free her own people. She would have the
+     hold over the land, and she would cure a cancer. I am not well
+     off, but I would offer ---- or his agent L1000, if either of them
+     would live one week in one of these poor devil's places, and feed
+     as these people do. Our comic prints do an infinity of harm by
+     their caricatures--firstly, the caricatures are not true, for the
+     crime in Ireland is not greater than that in England; and,
+     secondly, they exasperate the people on both sides of the
+     Channel, and they do no good.
+
+     "It is ill to laugh and scoff at a question which affects our
+     existence."
+
+This heroic mode of dealing with an old and very complicated
+difficulty scarcely came within the range of practical achievement.
+The Irish question is not to be solved by any such simple
+cut-and-dried procedure. It will take time, sympathy, and good-will.
+When the English people have eradicated their opinion that the Irish
+are an inferior race, and when the Irish realise that the old
+prejudice has vanished, the root-difficulty will be removed. At least
+Gordon deserves the credit of having seen that much from his brief
+observation on the spot, and his plea for them as "patient beyond
+belief and loyal," may eventually carry conviction to the hearts of
+the more powerful and prosperous kingdom.
+
+The Irish question was not the only one on which he recorded a written
+opinion. The question of retaining Candahar was very much discussed
+during the winter of 1880-81, and as the Liberal Government was very
+much put to it to get high military opinion to support their proposal
+of abandonment, they were very glad when Gordon wrote to _The Times_
+expressing a strong opinion on their side. I think the writing of that
+letter was mainly due to a sense of obligation to Lord Ripon, although
+the argument used as to the necessity of Candahar being held by any
+_single_ ruler of Afghanistan was, and is always, unanswerable. But
+the question at that time was this: Could any such single ruler be
+found, and was Abdurrahman, recognised in the August of 1880 as Ameer
+of Cabul, the man?
+
+On 27th July 1880, less than eight weeks after Gordon's resignation of
+his Indian appointment, occurred the disastrous battle of Maiwand,
+when Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, gained a decisive victory over a
+British force. That disaster was retrieved six weeks later by Lord
+Roberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of
+the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry
+between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched
+up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment
+there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than
+of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left
+Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its
+possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to
+the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even
+able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been
+eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the
+extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer
+Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,
+it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has
+proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well
+have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the
+probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other
+supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that
+Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had
+been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest
+administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.
+
+     "Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
+     the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
+     advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
+     in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
+     evacuation.
+
+     "I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
+     of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
+     thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
+     otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
+     exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
+     alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
+     would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
+     predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
+     natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
+     latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
+     likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
+     plunder of India to give up their secure, independent position
+     and our alliance for that plunder, and to put their country at
+     the mercy of Russia, whom they hate as cordially as they do us?
+     If we evacuate Candahar, Afghanistan can only have this small
+     inducement of the plunder of India for Russia to offer her. Some
+     say that the people of Candahar desire our rule. I cannot think
+     that any people like being governed by aliens in race or
+     religion. They prefer their own bad native governments to a
+     stiff, civilized government, in spite of the increased worldly
+     prosperity the latter may give.
+
+     "We may be sure that at Candahar the spirit which induced
+     children to kill, or to attempt to kill our soldiers in 1879,
+     etc., still exists, though it may be cowed. We have trouble
+     enough with the fanatics of India; why should we go out of our
+     way to add to their numbers?
+
+     "From a military point of view, by the retention we should
+     increase the line we have to defend by twice the distance of
+     Candahar to the present frontier, and place an objective point to
+     be attacked. Naturally we should make good roads to Candahar,
+     which on the loss of a battle there--and such things must be
+     always calculated as within possibility--would aid the advance of
+     the enemy to the Indus. The _debouche_ of the defiles, with good
+     lateral communications between them, is the proper line of
+     defence for India, not the entry into those defiles, which cannot
+     have secure lateral communications. If the entries of the defiles
+     are held, good roads are made through them; and these aid the
+     enemy, if you lose the entries or have them turned. This does not
+     prevent the passage of the defiles being disputed.
+
+     "The retention of Candahar would tend to foment rebellion in
+     India, and not prevent it; for thereby we should obtain an
+     additional number of fanatical malcontents, who as British
+     subjects would have the greatest facility of passing to and fro
+     in India, which they would not have if we did not hold it.
+
+     "That our prestige would suffer in India by the evacuation I
+     doubt; it certainly would suffer if we kept it and forsook our
+     word--_i.e._ that we made war against Shere Ali, and not against
+     his people. The native peoples of India would willingly part with
+     any amount of prestige if they obtained less taxation.
+
+     "India should be able, by a proper defence of her present
+     frontier and by the proper government of her peoples, to look
+     after herself. If the latter is wanting, no advance of frontier
+     will aid her.
+
+     "I am not anxious about Russia; but, were I so, I would care much
+     more to see precautions taken for the defence of our Eastern
+     colonies, now that Russia has moved her Black Sea naval
+     establishment to the China Sea, than to push forward an
+     outstretched arm to Candahar. The interests of the Empire claim
+     as much attention as India, and one cannot help seeing that they
+     are much more imperilled by this last move of Russia than by
+     anything she can do in Central Asia.
+
+     "Politically, militarily, and morally, Candahar ought not to be
+     retained. It would oblige us to keep up an interference with the
+     internal affairs of Afghanistan, would increase the expenditure
+     of impoverished India, and expose us chronically to the reception
+     of those painfully sensational telegrams of which we have had a
+     surfeit of late."
+
+During these few months Gordon wrote on several other subjects--the
+Abyssinian question, in connection with which he curiously enough
+styled "the Abyssinians the best of mountaineers," a fact not
+appreciated until their success over the Italians many years later,
+the registration of slaves in Egypt, and the best way of carrying on
+irregular warfare in difficult country and against brave and active
+races. His remarks on the last subject were called forth by our
+experiences in the field against the Zulus in the first place, and the
+Boers in the second, and quite exceptional force was given to them by
+the occurrence of the defeat at Majuba Hill one day after they
+appeared in the _Army and Navy Gazette_. For this reason I quote the
+article in its entirety:--
+
+     "The individual man of any country in which active outdoor life,
+     abstinence, hunting of wild game, and exposure to all weathers
+     are the habits of life, is more than a match for the private
+     soldier of a regular army, who is taken from the plough or from
+     cities, and this is the case doubly as much when the field of
+     operations is a difficult country, and when the former is, and
+     the latter is not, acclimatised. On the one hand, the former is
+     accustomed to the climate, knows the country, and is trained to
+     long marches and difficulties of all sorts inseparable from his
+     daily life; the latter is unacclimatised, knows nothing of the
+     country, and, accustomed to have his every want supplied, is at a
+     loss when any extraordinary hardships or difficulties are
+     encountered; he has only his skill in his arms and discipline in
+     his favour, and sometimes that skill may be also possessed by his
+     foe. The native of the country has to contend with a difficulty
+     in maintaining a long contest, owing to want of means and want of
+     discipline, being unaccustomed to any yoke interfering with
+     individual freedom. The resources of a regular army, in
+     comparison to those of the natives of the country, are infinite,
+     but it is accustomed to discipline. In a difficult country, when
+     the numbers are equal, and when the natives are of the
+     description above stated, the regular forces are certainly at a
+     very great disadvantage, until, by bitter experience in the
+     field, they are taught to fight in the same irregular way as
+     their foes, and this lesson may be learnt at a great cost. I
+     therefore think that when regular forces enter into a campaign
+     under these conditions, the former ought to avoid any unnecessary
+     haste, for time does not press with them, while every day
+     increases the burden on a country without resources and
+     unaccustomed to discipline, and as the forces of the country,
+     unprovided with artillery, never ought to be able to attack
+     fortified posts, any advance should be made by the establishment
+     of such posts. All engagements in the field ought, if possible,
+     to be avoided, except by corps raised from people who in their
+     habits resemble those in arms, or else by irregular corps raised
+     for the purpose, apart from the routine and red-tape inseparable
+     from regular armies. The regular forces will act as the back-bone
+     of the expedition, but the rock and cover fighting will be done
+     better by levies of such specially raised irregulars. For war
+     with native countries, I think that, except for the defence of
+     posts, artillery is a great incumbrance, far beyond its value. It
+     is a continual source of anxiety. Its transport regulates the
+     speed of the march, and it forms a target for the enemy, while
+     its effects on the scattered enemy is almost _nil_. An advance of
+     regular troops, as at present organised, is just the sort of
+     march that suits an active native foe. The regulars' column must
+     be heaped together, covering its transport and artillery. The
+     enemy knows the probable point of its destination on a particular
+     day, and then, knowing that the regulars cannot halt definitely
+     where it may be chosen to attack, it hovers round the column like
+     wasps. The regulars cannot, from not being accustomed to the
+     work, go clambering over rocks, or beating covers after their
+     foes. Therefore I conclude that in these wars[1] regular troops
+     should only act as a reserve; that the real fighting should be
+     done either by native allies or by special irregular corps,
+     commanded by special men, who would be untrammelled by
+     regulations; that, except for the defence of posts, artillery
+     should be abandoned. It may seem egotistical, but I may state
+     that I should never have succeeded against native foes had I not
+     had flanks, and front, and rear covered by irregular forces.
+     Whenever either the flanks, or rear, or front auxiliaries were
+     barred in their advance, we turned the regular forces on that
+     point, and thus strengthening the hindered auxiliaries, drove
+     back the enemy. We owed defeats, when they occurred, to the
+     absence of these auxiliaries, and on two occasions to having
+     cannon with the troops, which lost us 1600 men. The Abyssinians,
+     who are the best of mountaineers, though they have them, utterly
+     despise cannon, as they hinder their movements. I could give
+     instance after instance where, in native wars, regular troops
+     could not hold their own against an active guerilla, and where,
+     in some cases, the disasters of the regulars were brought about
+     by being hampered by cannon. No one can deny artillery may be
+     most efficient in the contention of two regular armies, but it is
+     quite the reverse in guerilla warfare. The inordinate haste which
+     exists to finish off these wars throws away many valuable aids
+     which would inevitably accrue to the regular army if time was
+     taken to do the work, and far greater expense is caused by this
+     hurry than otherwise would be necessary. All is done on the
+     '_Veni, vidi, vici_' principle. It may be very fine, but it is
+     bloody and expensive, and not scientific. I am sure it will occur
+     to many, the times we have advanced, without proper breaches,
+     bridges, etc., and with what loss, assaulted. It would seem that
+     military science should be entirely thrown away when combating
+     native tribes. I think I am correct in saying that the Romans
+     always fought with large auxiliary forces of the invaded country
+     or its neighbours, and I know it was the rule of the Russians in
+     Circassia."
+
+          [1] In allusion more particularly to the Cape and China.
+
+Perhaps Gordon was influenced by the catastrophes in South Africa when
+he sent the following telegram at his own expense to the Cape
+authorities on 7th April 1881: "Gordon offers his services for two
+years at L700 per annum to assist in terminating war and administering
+Basutoland." To this telegram he was never accorded even the courtesy
+of a negative reply. It will be remembered that twelve months earlier
+the Cape Government had offered him the command of the forces, and
+that his reply had been to refuse. The incident is of some interest as
+showing that his attention had been directed to the Basuto question,
+and also that he was again anxious for active employment. His wish for
+the latter was to be realised in an unexpected manner.
+
+He was staying in London when, on visiting the War Office, he casually
+met the late Colonel Sir Howard Elphinstone, an officer of his own
+corps, who began by complaining of his hard luck in its just having
+fallen to his turn to fill the post of Engineer officer in command at
+the Mauritius, and such was the distastefulness of the prospect of
+service in such a remote and unattractive spot, that Sir Howard went
+on to say that he thought he would sooner retire from the service. In
+his impulsive manner Gordon at once exclaimed: "Oh, don't worry
+yourself, I will go for you; Mauritius is as good for me as anywhere
+else." The exact manner in which this exchange was brought about has
+been variously described, but this is the literal version given me by
+General Gordon himself, and there is no doubt that, as far as he could
+regret anything that had happened, he bitterly regretted the accident
+that caused him to become acquainted with the Mauritius. In a letter
+to myself on the subject from Port Louis he said: "It was not over
+cheerful to go out to this place, nor is it so to find a deadly sleep
+over all my military friends here." In making the arrangements which
+were necessary to effect the official substitution of himself for
+Colonel Elphinstone, Gordon insisted on only two points: first, that
+Elphinstone should himself arrange the exchange; and secondly that no
+payment was to be made to him as was usual--in this case about
+L800--on an exchange being effected. Sir Howard Elphinstone was thus
+saved by Gordon's peculiarities a disagreeable experience and a
+considerable sum of money. Some years after Gordon's death Sir Howard
+met with a tragic fate, being washed overboard while taking a trip
+during illness to Madeira.
+
+Like everything else he undertook, Gordon determined to make his
+Mauritius appointment a reality, and although he was only in the
+island twelve months, and during that period took a trip to the
+interesting group of the Seychelles, he managed to compress an immense
+amount of work into that short space, and to leave on record some
+valuable reports on matters of high importance. He found at Mauritius
+the same dislike for posts that were outside the ken of headquarters,
+and the same indifference to the dry details of professional work that
+drove officers of high ability and attainments to think of resigning
+the service sooner than fill them, and, when they did take them, to
+pass their period of exile away from the charms of Pall Mall in a
+state of inaction that verged on suspended animation. In a passage
+already quoted, he refers to the deadly sleep of his military friends,
+and then he goes on to say in a sentence, which cannot be too much
+taken to heart by those who have to support this mighty empire, with
+enemies on every hand--"We are in a perfect Fools' Paradise about our
+power. We have plenty of power if we would pay attention to our work,
+but the fault is, to my mind, the military power of the country is
+eaten up by selfishness and idleness, and we are trading on the
+reputation of our forefathers. When one sees by the newspapers the
+Emperor of Germany sitting, old as he is, for two long hours
+inspecting his troops, and officers here grudging two hours a week for
+their duties, one has reason to fear the future."
+
+During his stay at Mauritius he wrote three papers of first-rate
+importance. One of them on Egyptian affairs after the deposition of
+Ismail may be left for the next chapter, and the two others, one on
+coaling stations in the Indian Ocean, and the second on the
+comparative merits of the Cape and Mediterranean routes come within
+the scope of this chapter, and are, moreover, deserving of special
+consideration. With regard to the former of these two important
+subjects, Gordon wrote as follows, but I cannot discover that anything
+has been done to give practical effect to his recommendations:--
+
+     "I spoke to you concerning Borneo and the necessity for coaling
+     stations in the Eastern seas. Taking Mauritius with its large
+     French population, the Cape with its conflicting elements, and
+     Hongkong, Singapore, and Penang with their vast Chinese
+     populations, who may be with or against us, but who are at any
+     time a nuisance, I would select such places where no temptation
+     would induce colonists to come, and I would use them as maritime
+     fortresses. For instance, the only good coaling place between
+     Suez and Adelaide would be in the Chagos group, which contain a
+     beautiful harbour at San Diego. My object is to secure this for
+     the strengthening of our maritime power. These islands are of
+     great strategical importance _vis a vis_ with India, Suez, and
+     Singapore. Remember Aden has no harbour to speak of, and has the
+     need of a garrison, while Chagos could be kept by a company of
+     soldiers. It is wonderful our people do not take the views of our
+     forefathers. They took up their positions at all the salient
+     points of the routes. We can certainly hold these places, but
+     from the colonial feelings they have almost ceased to be our own.
+     By establishing these coaling stations no diplomatic
+     complications could arise, while by their means we could unite
+     all our colonies with us, for we could give them effective
+     support. The spirit of no colony would bear up for long against
+     the cutting off of its trade, which would happen if we kept
+     watching the Mediterranean and neglected the great ocean routes.
+     The cost would not be more than these places cost now, if the
+     principle of heavily-armed, light-draught, swift gunboats with
+     suitable arsenals, properly (not over) defended, were followed."
+
+Chagos as well as Seychelles forms part of the administrative group of
+the Mauritius. The former with, as Gordon states, an admirable port in
+San Diego, lies in the direct route to Australia from the Red Sea, and
+the latter contains an equally good harbour in Port Victoria Mahe. The
+Seychelles are remarkably healthy islands--thirty in number--and
+Gordon recommended them as a good place for "a man with a little money
+to settle in." He also advanced the speculative and somewhat
+imaginative theory that in them was to be found the true site of the
+Garden of Eden.
+
+The views Gordon expressed in 1881 as to the diminished importance of
+the Mediterranean as an English interest, and the relative superiority
+of the Cape over the Canal route, on the ground of its security, were
+less commonly held then than they have since become. Whether they are
+sound is not to be taken on the trust of even the greatest of
+reputations; and in so complicated and many-sided a problem it will be
+well to consider all contingencies, and to remember that there is no
+reason why England should not be able in war-time to control them
+both, until at least the remote epoch when Palestine shall be a
+Russian possession.
+
+     "I think Malta has very much lost its importance. The
+     Mediterranean now differs much from what it was in 1815. Other
+     nations besides France possess in it great dockyards and
+     arsenals, and its shores are backed by united peoples. Any war
+     with Great Britain in the Mediterranean with any one Power would
+     inevitably lead to complications with neutral nations. Steam has
+     changed the state of affairs, and has brought the Mediterranean
+     close to every nation of Europe. War in the Mediterranean is _war
+     in a basin_, the borders of which are in the hands of other
+     nations, all pretty powerful and interested in trade, and all
+     likely to be affected by any turmoil in that basin, and to be
+     against the makers of such turmoil. In fact, the Mediterranean
+     trade is so diverted by the railroads of Europe, that it is but
+     of small importance. The trade which is of value is the trade
+     east of Suez, which, passing through the Canal, depends upon its
+     being kept open. If the entrance to the Mediterranean were
+     blocked at Gibraltar by a heavy fleet, I cannot see any advantage
+     to be gained against us by the fleets blocked up in it--at any
+     rate I would say, let our _first care_ be for the Cape route, and
+     secondly for the Mediterranean and Canal. The former route
+     entails no complications, the latter endless ones, coupled with a
+     precarious tenure. Look at the Mediterranean, and see how small
+     is that sea on which we are apparently devoting the greater part
+     of our attention. Aden should be made a Crown colony. The
+     Resident, according to existing orders, reports to Bombay, and
+     Bombay to _that_ Simla Council, which knows and cares nothing
+     for the question. A special regiment should be raised for its
+     protection."
+
+While stationed in the Mauritius, Gordon attained the rank of
+Major-General in the army, and another colonel of Engineers was sent
+out to take his place. During the last three months of his residence
+he filled, in addition to his own special post, that of the command of
+all the troops on the station, and at one time it seemed as if he
+might have been confirmed in the appointment. But this was not done,
+owing, as he suggested, to the "determination not to appoint officers
+of the Royal Artillery or Engineers to any command;" but a more
+probable reason was that Gordon had been inquiring about and had
+discovered that the colonists were not only a little discontented, but
+had some ground for their discontent. By this time Gordon's
+uncompromising sense of justice was beginning to be known in high
+official quarters, and the then responsible Government had far too
+many cares on its shoulders that could not be shirked to invite others
+from so remote and unimportant a possession as the Mauritius.
+
+Even before any official decision could have been arrived at in this
+matter, fate had provided him with another destination.
+
+Two passages have already been cited, showing the overtures first made
+by the Cape Government, and then by Gordon himself, for his employment
+in South Africa. Nothing came of those communications. On 23rd
+February 1882, when an announcement was made by myself that Gordon
+would vacate his command in a few weeks' time, the Cape Government
+again expressed its desire to obtain the use of his services, and
+moreover recollected the telegram to which no reply had been sent. Sir
+Hercules Robinson, then Governor of the Cape, sent the following
+telegram to the Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Kimberley:--
+
+     "Ministers request me to inquire whether H.M.'s Government would
+     permit them to obtain the services of Colonel Charles Gordon.
+     Ministers desire to invite Colonel Gordon to come to this Colony
+     for the purpose of consultation as to the best measures to be
+     adopted with reference to Basutoland, in the event of Parliament
+     sanctioning their proposals as to that territory, and to engage
+     his services, should he be willing to renew the offer made to
+     their predecessors in April 1881, to assist in terminating the
+     war and administering Basutoland."
+
+Lord Kimberley then sent instructions by telegraph to Durban, and
+thence by steamer, sanctioning Gordon's employment and his immediate
+departure from the Mauritius. The increasing urgency of the Basuto
+question induced the Cape Government to send a message by telegraph to
+Aden, and thence by steamer direct to Gordon. In this message they
+stated that "the services of some one of proved ability, firmness, and
+energy," were required; that they did not expect Gordon to be bound by
+the salary named in his own telegram, and that they begged him to
+visit the Colony "at once"--repeating the phrase twice. All these
+messages reached Gordon's hands on 2nd April. Two days later he
+started in the sailing vessel _Scotia_, no other ship being
+obtainable.
+
+The Cape authorities had therefore no ground to complain of the
+dilatoriness of the man to whom they appealed in their difficulty,
+although their telegram was despatched 3rd of March, and Gordon did
+not reach Cape Town before the 3rd of May. It will be quite understood
+that Gordon had offered in the first place, and been specially invited
+in the second place, to proceed to the Cape, for the purpose of
+dealing with the difficulty in Basutoland. He was to find that, just
+as his mission to China had been complicated by extraneous
+circumstances, so was his visit to the Cape to be rendered more
+difficult by Party rivalries, and by work being thrust upon him which
+he had several times refused to accept, and for the efficient
+discharge of which, in his own way, he knew he would never obtain the
+requisite authority.
+
+Before entering upon this matter a few words may be given to the
+financial agreement between himself and the Cape Government. The first
+office in 1880 had carried with it a salary of L1500; in 1881 Gordon
+had offered to go for L700; in 1882 the salary was to be a matter of
+arrangement, and on arrival at Cape Town he was offered L1200 a year.
+He refused to accept more than L800 a year; but as he required and
+insisted on having a secretary, the other L400 was assigned for that
+purpose. In naming such a small and inadequate salary Gordon was under
+the mistaken belief that his imperial pay of L500 a year would
+continue, but, unfortunately for him, a new regulation, 25th June
+1881, had come into force while he was buried away in the Mauritius,
+and he was disqualified from the receipt of the income he had earned.
+Gordon was very indignant, more especially because it was clear that
+he was doing public service at the Cape, while, as he said with some
+bitterness, if he had started an hotel or become director of a
+company, his pay would have gone on all the same. The only suggestion
+the War Office made was that he should ask the Cape Government to
+compensate him, but this he indignantly refused. In the result all his
+savings during the Mauritius command were swallowed up, and I believe
+I understate the amount when I say that his Cape experience cost him
+out of his own pocket from first to last five hundred pounds. That sum
+was a very considerable one to a man who never inherited any money,
+and who went through life scorning all opportunities of making it.
+But on this occasion he vindicated a principle, and showed that
+"money was not his object."
+
+As Gordon went to the Cape specially for the purpose of treating the
+Basutoland question, it may be well to describe briefly what that
+question was. Basutoland is a mountainous country, difficult of
+access, but in resources self-sufficing, on the eastern side of the
+Orange Free State, and separated from Natal and Kaffraria, or the
+Transkei division of Cape Colony, by the sufficiently formidable
+Drakensberg range. Its population consisted of 150,000 stalwart and
+freedom-loving Highlanders, ruled by four chiefs--Letsea, Masupha,
+Molappo, and Lerothodi, with only the three first of whom had Gordon
+in any way to deal. Notwithstanding their numbers, courage, and the
+natural strength of their country, they owed their safety from
+absorption by the Boers to British protection, especially in 1868, and
+they were taken over by us as British subjects without any formality
+three years later. They do not seem to have objected so long as the
+tie was indefinite, but when in 1880 it was attempted to enforce the
+regulations of the Peace Preservation Act by disarming these clans,
+then the Basutos began a pronounced and systematic opposition. Letsea
+and Lerothodi kept up the pretence of friendliness, but Masupha
+fortified his chief residence at Thaba Bosigo, and openly prepared for
+war. That war had gone on for two years without result, and the total
+cost of the Basuto question had been four millions sterling when
+Gordon was summoned to the scene. Having given this general
+description of the question, it will be well to state the details of
+the matters in dispute, as set forth by Gordon after he had examined
+all the papers and heard the evidence of the most competent and
+well-informed witnesses.
+
+His memorandum, dated 26th May 1882, read as follows:--
+
+     "In 1843 the Basuto chiefs entered into a treaty with Her
+     Majesty's Government, by which the limits of Basutoland were
+     recognised roughly in 1845. The Basuto chiefs agreed by
+     convention with Her Majesty's Government to a concession of land
+     on terminable leases, on the condition that Her Majesty's
+     Government should protect them from Her Majesty's subjects.
+
+     "In 1848 the Basuto chiefs agreed to accept the Sovereignty of
+     Her Majesty the Queen, on the understanding that Her Majesty's
+     Government would restrain Her Majesty's subjects in the
+     territories they possessed.
+
+     "Between 1848 and 1852, notwithstanding the above treaties, a
+     large portion of Basutoland was annexed by the proclamation of
+     Her Majesty's Government, and this annexation was accompanied by
+     hostilities, which were afterwards decided by Sir George Cathcart
+     as being undertaken in support of unjustifiable aggression.
+
+     "In 1853, notwithstanding the treaties, Basutoland was abandoned,
+     leaving its chiefs to settle as they could with the Europeans of
+     the Free State who were settled in Basutoland and were mixed up
+     with the Basuto people.
+
+     "In 1857, the Basutos asked Her Majesty's Government to arbitrate
+     and settle their quarrels. This request was refused.
+
+     "In 1858 the Free State interfered to protect their settlers, and
+     a war ensued, and the Free State was reduced to great
+     extremities, and asked Her Majesty's Government to mediate. This
+     was agreed to, and a frontier line was fixed by Her Majesty's
+     Government.
+
+     "In 1865 another war broke out between the Free State and the
+     Basutos, at the close of which the Basutos lost territory, and
+     were accepted as British subjects by Her Majesty's Government for
+     the second time, being placed under the direct government of Her
+     Majesty's High Commissioner.
+
+     "In 1871 Basutoland was annexed to the _Crown_ Colony of the Cape
+     of Good Hope, without the Basutos having been consulted.
+
+     "In 1872 the _Crown_ Colony became a colony with a responsible
+     Government, and the Basutos were placed virtually under another
+     power. The Basutos asked for representation in the Colonial
+     Parliament, which was refused, and to my mind here was the
+     mistake committed which led to these troubles.
+
+     "Then came constant disputes, the Disarmament Act, the Basuto
+     War, and present state of affairs.
+
+     "From this chronology there are four points that stand out in
+     relief:--
+
+     "1. That the Basuto people, who date back generations, made
+     treaties with the British Government, which treaties are equally
+     binding, whether between two powerful states, or between a
+     powerful state and a weak one.
+
+     "2. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos lost land.
+
+     "3. That, in defiance of the treaties, the Basutos, without being
+     consulted or having their rights safeguarded, were handed over to
+     another power--the Colonial Government.
+
+     "4. That that other power proceeded to enact their disarmament, a
+     process which could only be carried out with a servile race, like
+     the Hindoos of the plains of India, and which any one of
+     understanding must see would be resisted to the utmost by any
+     people worth the name; the more so in the case of the Basutos,
+     who realised the constant contraction of their frontiers in
+     defiance of the treaties made with the British Government, and
+     who could not possibly avoid the conclusion that this disarmament
+     was only a prelude to their extinction.
+
+     "The necessary and inevitable result of the four deductions was
+     that the Basutos resisted, and remain passively resisting to this
+     day.
+
+     "The fault lay in the British Government not having consulted the
+     Basutos, their co-treaty power, when they handed them over to the
+     Colonial Government. They should have called together a national
+     assembly of the Basuto people, in which the terms of the transfer
+     could have been quietly arranged, and this I consider is the root
+     of all the troubles, and expenses, and miseries which have sprung
+     up; and therefore, as it is always best to go to the root of any
+     malady, I think it would be as well to let bygones be bygones,
+     and to commence afresh by calling together by proclamation a
+     Pitso of the whole tribe, in order to discuss the best means of
+     sooner securing the settlement of the country. I think that some
+     such proclamation should be issued. By this Pitso we would know
+     the exact position of affairs, and the real point in which the
+     Basutos are injured or considered themselves to be injured.
+
+     "To those who wish for the total abandonment of Basutoland, this
+     course must be palatable; to those who wish the Basutos well, and
+     desire not to see them exterminated, it must also be palatable;
+     and to those who hate the name of Basutoland it must be
+     palatable, for it offers a solution which will prevent them ever
+     hearing the name again.
+
+     "This Pitso ought to be called at once. All Colonial officials
+     ought to be absent, for what the colony wants is to know what is
+     the matter; and the colony wishes to know it from the Basuto
+     people, irrespective of the political parties of the Government.
+
+     "Such a course would certainly recommend itself to the British
+     Government, and to its masters--the British people.
+
+     "Provided the demands of the Basutos--who will, for their own
+     sakes, never be for a severing of their connection with the
+     colony, in order to be eventually devoured by the Orange Free
+     State--are such as will secure the repayment to the colony of all
+     expenses incurred by the Colonial Government in the maintenance
+     of this connection, and I consider that the Colonial Government
+     should accept them.
+
+     "With respect to the Loyals, there are some 800 families, the
+     cost of keeping whom is on an average one shilling per diem each
+     family, that is L40 per diem, or L1200 per month, and they have
+     been rationed during six months at cost of L7200. Their claims
+     may therefore be said to be some L80,000. Now, if these 800
+     families (some say half) have claims amounting to L30 each
+     individually (say 400 families at L30), L12,000 paid at once
+     would rid the colony of the cost of subsistence of these
+     families, viz. L600 a month (the retention of them would only add
+     to the colonial expenditure, and tend to pauperise them).
+
+     "I believe that L30,000 paid at once to the Loyals would reduce
+     their numbers to one-fourth what they are now. It is proposed to
+     send up a Commission to examine into their claims; the Commission
+     will not report under two months, and there will be the delay of
+     administration at Cape Town, during all which time L1200 a month
+     are being uselessly expended by the colony, detrimentally to the
+     Loyals. Therefore I recommend (1) that the sum of L30,000 should
+     be at once applied to satisfy the minor claims of the Loyals; (2)
+     that this should be done at once, at same time as the meeting of
+     the National Pitso.
+
+     "The effect of this measure in connection with the meeting of the
+     National Pitso would be very great, for it would be a positive
+     proof of the good disposition of the Colonial Government. The
+     greater claims could, if necessary, wait for the Parliamentary
+     Commission, but I would deprecate even this delay, and though for
+     the distribution of the L30,000 I would select those on whom the
+     responsibility of such distribution could be put, without
+     reference to the Colonial Government, for any larger sums perhaps
+     the colonial sanction should be taken.
+
+     "I urge that this measure of satisfying the Loyals is one that
+     presses and cannot well wait months to be settled.
+
+     "In conclusion, I recommend (1) that a National Pitso be held;
+     (2) that the Loyals should at once be paid off.
+
+     "I feel confident that by the recommendation No. 1 nothing could
+     be asked for detrimental to colonial interests, whose Government
+     would always have the right of amending or refusing any demands,
+     and that by recommendation No. 2 a great moral effect would be
+     produced at once, and some heavy expenses saved."
+
+Attached to this memorandum was the draft of a proclamation to the
+chiefs, etc., of Basutoland, calling on them to meet in Pitso or
+National Assembly without any agent of the Colonial Government being
+present. It was not very surprising that such a policy of fairness and
+consideration for Basuto opinion, because so diametrically opposite to
+everything that Government had been doing, should have completely
+taken the Cape authorities aback, nor were its chances of being
+accepted increased by Gordon entrusting it to Mr Orpen, whose policy
+in the matter had been something more than criticised by the Ministers
+at that moment in power at the Cape. Gordon's despatch was in the
+hands of the Cape Premier early in June, and the embarrassment he felt
+at the ability and force with which the Basuto side of the question
+was put by the officer, who was to settle the matter for the Cape
+Government, was so great that, instead of making any reply, he passed
+it on to Lord Kimberley and the Colonial Office for solution. It was
+not until the 7th of August that an answer was vouchsafed to Gordon on
+what was, after all, the main portion of his task in South Africa. In
+the interval Gordon was employed on different military and
+administrative matters, for he had had thrust on him as a temporary
+charge the functions of Commandant-General of the Cape forces, which
+he had never wished to accept, but it will be clearer to the reader to
+follow to the end the course of his Basuto mission, which was the
+essential cause of his presence in South Africa.
+
+On the 18th July the Ministers requested Gordon to go up to
+Basutoland. At that moment, and indeed for more than three weeks
+later, Gordon had received no reply to the detailed memorandum already
+quoted. He responded to this request with the draft of a convention
+that would "save the susceptibilities of Mr Orpen between whom and
+Masupha any _entente_ would seem impossible." The basis of that
+convention was to be the semi-independence of the Basutos, but its
+full text must be given in order to show the consistency, as well as
+the simplicity, of Gordon's proposed remedy of a question that had
+gone on for years without any prospect of termination.
+
+     CONVENTION BETWEEN COLONY, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, AND THE CHIEF AND
+                            PEOPLE OF BASUTOLAND.
+
+     "The Colonial Government having nominated as their
+     representatives, Colonel C. Griffiths and Dr J. W. Matthews, the
+     Basuto nation having nominated the Chief Letsea Moshesh and
+     Masupha Moshesh as their representatives, the following
+     convention has been agreed upon between these representatives:--
+
+     "Art. 1. There shall be a complete amnesty on both sides to all
+     who have taken part in the late hostilities.
+
+     "Art. 2. The question of the succession to Molappo Moshesh's
+     chieftainship shall be decided by the Chief of the Basuto Nation.
+
+     "Art. 3. The Colonial Government engages to respect the integrity
+     of the Basuto nation within the limits to be hereafter decided
+     upon, and also to use its best endeavours to have these limits
+     respected by the Orange Free State.
+
+     "Art. 4. The Colonial Government will appoint a Resident to the
+     Basuto nation, with two sub-residents. The Resident will consult
+     with the leading Chief of the Basuto Nation on all measures
+     concerning the welfare of that country, but the government of the
+     Basutos in all internal affairs will remain under the
+     jurisdiction of the chiefs.
+
+     "Art. 5. The Supreme Council of Basutoland will consist of the
+     leading chiefs and the Resident; the minor chiefs of Basutoland
+     will form a council with the sub-residents. These minor councils
+     can be appealed against by any non-content to the Supreme
+     Council.
+
+     "Art. 6. A hut-tax will be collected of 10s. per hut by the
+     chiefs, and will be paid to the Resident and sub-resident. The
+     sum thus collected will be used in paying the Resident L2000 a
+     year, all included: the sub-residents L1200 a year, all included;
+     in providing for the education of people (now costing L3320 a
+     year); in making roads, etc.
+
+     "Art. 7. The chiefs collecting hut-tax will be paid 10 per cent.
+     of the sums they collect.
+
+     "Art. 8. The frontier line will be placed under headmen, who will
+     be responsible that no thieving be permitted, that spoors are
+     followed up. For this these headmen will be paid at the rate of
+     L20 to L60 per annum, according to the length of frontier they
+     are responsible for.
+
+     "Art. 9. All passes must be signed by Residents or sub-residents
+     for the Orange Free State, or for the Cape Colony.
+
+     "_Query_--Would it be advisable to add chiefs and missionaries
+     after sub-residents?
+
+     "Art. 10. Colonial warrants will be valid in Basutoland, the
+     chiefs being responsible that prisoners are given up to Resident
+     or sub-residents.
+
+     "Art. 11. All communications between Basutoland and the Orange
+     Free State to be by and through the Resident.
+
+     "Art. 12. This Convention to be in quadruplicate, two copies
+     being in possession of the Colonial Government, and two copies in
+     possession of the Basuto chiefs.
+
+     "Art. 13. On signature of this Convention, and on the fulfilment
+     of Art. 1, amnesty clause, the Colonial Government agrees to
+     withdraw the military forces and the present magisterial
+     administration."
+
+To this important communication no answer was ever vouchsafed, but on
+7th August, long after it was in the hands of Ministers, Mr Thomas
+Scanlan, the Premier, wrote a long reply to the earlier memorandum of
+26th May. The writer began by quoting Lord Kimberley's remarks on that
+memorandum, which were as follows:--
+
+     "I have received the memorandum on the Basuto question by
+     Major-General Gordon. I do not think it necessary to enter upon a
+     discussion of the policy suggested in this memorandum, but it
+     will doubtless be borne in mind by your Ministers that, as I
+     informed you by my telegram of the 6th of May last, H.M.'s
+     Government cannot hold out any expectation that steps will be
+     taken by them to relieve the colony of its responsibilities in
+     Basutoland."
+
+The interpretation placed, and no doubt correctly placed, on that
+declaration of Government policy was that under no circumstances was
+it prepared to do anything in the matter, and that it had quite a
+sufficient number of troubles and worries without the addition of one
+in remote and unimportant Basutoland. Having thus got out of the
+necessity of discussing this important memorandum, under the cloak of
+the Colonial Office's decision in favour of inaction, the Premier went
+on to say that he was "most anxious to avoid the resumption of
+hostilities on the one hand or the abandonment of the territory on the
+other." There was an absolute ignoring in this statement of Gordon's
+deliberate opinion that the only way to solve the difficulty was by
+granting Basutoland semi-independence on the terms of a Convention
+providing for the presence of a British Resident, through whom all
+external matters were to be conducted. At the same time Mr Scanlan
+informed Gordon that he was sending up Mr Sauer, then Secretary for
+Native Affairs, who was a nominee of Mr Orpen, the politician whose
+policy was directly impugned.
+
+On Mr Sauer reaching King William's Town, where Gordon was in
+residence at the Grand Depot of the Cape forces, he at once asked him
+to accompany him to Basutoland. Gordon at first declined to do this on
+two grounds, viz. that he saw no good could ensue unless the
+convention were granted, and also that he did not wish Mr Sauer, or
+any other representative of the Cape Government, as a companion,
+because he had learnt that "Masupha would only accept his proposed
+visit as a private one, and then only with his private secretary and
+two servants."
+
+After some weeks' hesitation Gordon was induced by Mr Sauer to so far
+waive his objection as to consent to accompany him to Letsea's
+territory. This Basuto chief kept up the fiction of friendly relations
+with the Cape, but after Gordon had personally interviewed him, he
+became more than ever convinced that all the Basuto chiefs were in
+league. Mr Sauer was of opinion that Letsea and the other chiefs might
+be trusted to attack and able to conquer Masupha. There was no
+possibility of reconciling these clashing views, but Gordon also
+accompanied Mr Sauer to Leribe, the chief town of Molappo's territory,
+north of, and immediately adjoining that of, Masupha. Here Gordon
+found fresh evidence as to the correctness of his view, that all the
+Basuto leaders were practically united, and he wrote a memorandum,
+dated 16th September, which has not been published, showing the
+hopelessness of getting one chief to coerce the others.
+Notwithstanding the way he had been treated by the Cape Government,
+which had ignored all his suggestions, Gordon, in his intense desire
+to do good, and his excessive trust in the honour of other persons,
+yielded to Mr Sauer's request to visit Masupha, and not only yielded
+but went without any instructions or any prior agreement that his
+views were to prevail. The consequence was that Mr Sauer deliberately
+resolved to destroy Gordon's reputation as a statesman, and to ensure
+the triumph of his own policy by an act of treachery that has never
+been surpassed.
+
+While Gordon went as a private visitor at the special invitation of
+Masupha to that chief's territory, Mr Sauer, who was well acquainted
+with Gordon's views, and also the direct author of Gordon's visit at
+that particular moment, incited Letsea to induce Lerothodi to attack
+Masupha. At the moment that the news of this act of treachery reached
+Masupha's ears, Gordon was a guest in Masupha's camp, and the first
+construction placed upon events by that chief was, that Gordon had
+been sent up to hoodwink and keep him quiet, while a formidable
+invasion was plotted of his territory. When Masupha reported this news
+to Gordon, he asked what he advised him to do, and it has been
+established that the object of the question was to ascertain how far
+Gordon was privy to the plot. Gordon's candid reply--"Refuse to have
+any dealings with the Government until the forces are withdrawn," and
+his general demeanour, which showed unaffected indignation, convinced
+Masupha of his good faith and innocence of all participation in the
+plot.
+
+A very competent witness, Mr Arthur Pattison (letter in _The Times_,
+20th August 1885), bears this testimony: "Gordon divined his character
+marvellously, and was the only man Masupha had the slightest regard
+for. Masupha, if you treat him straightforwardly, is as nice a man as
+possible, and even kind and thoughtful; but, if you treat him the
+other way, he is a fiend incarnate."
+
+Had Masupha not been thus convinced, Gordon's death was decided on,
+and never in the whole course of his career, not even when among the
+Taepings on the day of the Wangs' murder in Soochow, nor among
+Suleiman's slave-hunters at Shaka, was he in greater peril than when
+exposed by the treacherous proceedings of Sauer and Orpen to the wrath
+of Masupha. On his return in safety he at once sent in his
+resignation, but those who played him false not merely never received
+their deserts for an unpardonable breach of faith to a loyal
+colleague, but have been permitted by a lax public opinion at the Cape
+to remain in the public service, and are now discharging high and
+responsible duties.
+
+Gordon's mission to the leading Basuto chief, and the policy of
+conciliation which he consistently and ably advocated from the
+beginning to the end of his stay at the Cape, were thus failures, but
+they failed, as an impartial writer like Mr Gresswell says, solely
+because "of Mr Sauer's intrigues behind his back." It is only
+necessary to add what Gordon himself wrote on this subject on his
+return, and to record that practically the very policy he advocated
+was carried into force, not by the Cape Government, but over its head
+by the British Government, two years later, in the separation of
+Basutoland from the Cape Colony, and by placing it in its old direct
+dependence under the British Crown.
+
+     "I have looked over the Cape papers; the only thing that is
+     misrepresented, so far as I could see in a ten minutes' glance at
+     them, is that Sauer says I knew of his intentions of sending an
+     expedition against Masupha. He puts it thus: 'Gordon knew that an
+     expedition was being organised against Masupha.' He gives
+     apparently three witnesses that I knew well. It is quite true;
+     but read the words. _I knew Sauer was going_ to try the useless
+     expedient of an expedition against Masupha, and _before he did
+     so_ we _agreed I should go and try and make peace_. While
+     carrying on this peace mission, Sauer sends the expedition. So
+     you see he is verbally correct; yet the deduction is false; in
+     fact, who would ever go up with peace overtures to a man who was
+     to be attacked during those overtures, as Masupha was? Garcia
+     knew well enough what a surprise it was to him and me when we
+     heard Sauer was sending the expedition. Garcia was with me at the
+     time."
+
+And again, when at Jaffa, General Gordon adds further, on the 27th of
+July 1883:--
+
+     "I saw Masupha one day at 10 A.M., and spoke to him; Sauer was
+     twenty miles away. At 1 P.M. I came back, and wrote to Sauer an
+     account of what had passed; before I sent it off I received a
+     letter from Sauer. I believe it is wished to be made out that
+     Sauer wrote this letter after he had heard what had passed
+     between Masupha and me. This is not the case, for Sauer, having
+     let me go to Masupha, changed his mind and wrote the letter, but
+     this letter had nothing to do with my interview with Masupha."
+
+With this further quotation of Gordon's own words I may conclude the
+description of the Basuto mission, which, although deemed a failure at
+the time, was eventually the direct cause of the present
+administrative arrangement in that important district of South Africa.
+
+     "In order you should understand the position of affairs, I recall
+     to your memory the fact that Scanlan, Merriman, and yourself all
+     implied to me doubts of Orpen's policy and your desire to remove
+     him; that I deprecated any such change in my favour; that I
+     accepted the post of Commandant-General on Merriman's statement
+     that the Government desired me to eradicate the red-tape system
+     of the colonial forces; that I made certain reports to the
+     Government upon the settlement of the Basuto question in May and
+     July, showing my views; that the Government were aware of the
+     great difference between my views and those of Orpen, both by
+     letter and verbally to Merriman; also to my objections to go up.
+     Sauer was told by me the same thing. I conversed with him _en
+     route_, and I told him if I visited Masupha I could not
+     afterwards fight him, for I would not go and spy upon his
+     defences. Sauer asked me to go to Masupha; he knew my views; yet
+     when I was there negotiating, he, or rather Orpen, moved
+     Lerothodi to attack Masupha, who would, I believe, have come to
+     terms respecting the acceptance of magistrates, a modified
+     hut-tax, and border police. The reported movement of Lerothodi
+     prevented my coming to any arrangement. I told Masupha, when he
+     sent and told me of Lerothodi's advance, not to answer the
+     Government until the hostile movements had ceased. The Government
+     sent me up, knowing my views, and against my wish, and knowing I
+     was not likely to mince matters. There are not more than two
+     Europeans in Basutoland who believe in Orpen or his policy, while
+     the natives have lost all confidence in him. Sauer shut his eyes
+     to all this, and has thrown in his lot with Orpen. Masupha is a
+     sincere man, and he does not care to have placed with him
+     magistrates, against whom are complaints, which Sauer ignores. To
+     show you I was in earnest, I offered to remain as magistrate with
+     Masupha for two years, so much did I desire a settlement of the
+     Basuto question. I did not want nor would I have taken the post
+     of Governor's Agent. The chiefs and people desire peace, but not
+     at any price. They have intelligence enough to see through
+     wretched magistrates like some of those sent up into the native
+     territories. They will accept a convention like the one I sent
+     down to the Colonial Secretary on the 19th of July, and no other.
+     I do not write this to escape being a scapegoat--in fact, I like
+     the altar--only that you may know my views. As long as the
+     present magistrates stay there, no chance exists for any
+     arrangement. As to the Premier's remark that I would not fight
+     against Masupha, is it likely I could fight against a man with
+     whom I am life and soul? Would I fight against him because he
+     would not be controlled by some men like ---- and ----? Even
+     suppose I could sink my conscience to do so, what issue would
+     result from the action of undisciplined and insubordinate troops,
+     who are difficult to keep in order during peace-time, and about
+     whom, when I would have made an example of one officer, a
+     Minister telegraphs to me to let him down easy. I beg to recall
+     to you that Her Majesty's Government disapproved of the former
+     Basuto war; therefore, why should I, who am an outsider to the
+     colony, even pretend I could make war against a noble people, who
+     resist magistrates of no capacity? The Government were well
+     warned by me, and they cannot, therefore, plead being led
+     astray."
+
+Intimately connected with the Basuto question was the larger one of
+the right treatment to be generally extended to the natives, and on
+that subject General Gordon drew up, on 19th October 1882, the
+following masterly note, which elicited the admiration of one of the
+Cape Premiers, Mr Merriman, who said--"As a Colony we must try to
+follow out the ideas sketched by General Gordon."
+
+The following is the full text of this interesting and valuable state
+paper:--
+
+                           THE NATIVE QUESTION.
+
+     "1. The native question of South Africa is not a difficult one to
+     an outsider. The difficulty lies in procuring a body of men who
+     will have strength of purpose to carry out a definite policy with
+     respect to the natives.
+
+     "2. The strained relations which exist between the colonist and
+     the native are the outcome of employing, as a rule, magistrates
+     lacking in tact, sympathy, and capacity to deal with the natives,
+     in the Government not supervising the action of these
+     magistrates, and in condoning their conduct, while acknowledging
+     those faults which come to their cognisance.
+
+     "3. The Colonial Government act in the nomination of native
+     magistrates as if their duties were such as any one could
+     fulfil, instead of being, as they are, duties requiring the
+     greatest tact and judgment. There can be no doubt but that in a
+     great measure, indeed one may say entirely, disturbances among
+     the natives are caused by the lack of judgment, or of honesty, or
+     of tact, on the part of the magistrates in the native
+     territories. There may be here and there good magistrates, but
+     the defects of the bad ones re-act on the good ones. Revolt is
+     contagious and spreads rapidly among the natives.
+
+     "4. One may say no supervision, in the full sense of the term,
+     exists over the actions of magistrates in native territories.
+     They report to headquarters what suits them, but unless some very
+     flagrant injustice is brought to light, which is often condoned,
+     the Government know nothing. The consequence is that a continual
+     series of petty injustices rankle in the minds of the natives,
+     eventually breaking out into a revolt, in the midst of which
+     Government does not trouble to investigate the causes of such
+     revolt, but is occupied in its suppression. The history of the
+     South African wars is essentially, as Sir G. Cathcart puts it,
+     "Wars undertaken in support of unjustifiable acts." Sir Harry
+     Smith was recalled for supporting an inefficient official of the
+     now Free State Territory. Any one who chooses can investigate the
+     causes of the late wars, and will find out that they arose in a
+     great measure from the ignorance of the Government, their support
+     of incapable officials, and their weakness in not investigating
+     causes before they proceeded to coercion.
+
+     "5. Government by coercion is essentially rotten. The Duke of
+     Wellington said that any fool could govern by that means. And it
+     is still more rotten when Government governs by the rule of
+     coercion without the power of coercion except at great expense.
+
+     "6. A properly constituted Commission of independent men
+     proceeding to the native territories, not accepting the
+     hospitality of those whose conduct they _go_ to investigate, not
+     driving through the territories in hot haste, as is the manner of
+     some Ministers, but a Commission who would patiently and
+     fearlessly inquire into every detail of administration, into
+     every grievance, is the _sine qua non_ of any quiet in the native
+     territories. This Commission should detail on brass plates the
+     _modus vivendi_, the limits of territory of each district chief,
+     and a body of trustees should be appointed to watch over any
+     infraction of such charter.
+
+     "7. It must be borne in mind that these native territories cost
+     the Colony for administration some L9000 per annum for
+     administration of magistracies; the receipts are some L3000,
+     leaving a deficit of some L6000 per annum. To this deficit has to
+     be added some L150,000 for regular troops. The last rebellion of
+     Transkei ended in capture of some L60,000 worth of cattle, and
+     that from natives of Colony driven into rebellion, and cost
+     Government of Colony with Basuto war nearly L4,000,000. It is
+     surely worth while, from a financial point of view, to
+     investigate the administration of the Transkei.
+
+     "8. The present state of the Transkei is one of seething
+     discontent and distrust which the rivalry of the tribes alone
+     prevents breaking out into action, to be quelled again at great
+     expense and by the ruin of the people, and upset of all
+     enterprise to open up the country. Throughout the Transkei is one
+     general clamour against the Government for broken promises, for
+     promises made and never kept. Magistrates complain no answers are
+     given to their questions; things are allowed to drift along as
+     best they can. A fair open policy towards the Pondos would obtain
+     from them all the Colony could require, but as things are now,
+     the Pondos are full of distrust, and only want the chance to turn
+     against the Colony. There are in Transkei 399,000 natives, and
+     2800 Europeans. Therefore, for the benefit of these 2800
+     Europeans, 399,000 natives are made miserable, and an expenditure
+     of L210,000 is incurred by the Colony with the probability of
+     periodical troubles.
+
+     "9. However disagreeable it might be, the Commission of
+     Investigation should inquire into the antecedents of each
+     magistrate, and also his capabilities.
+
+     "10. With respect to Basutoland, it is understood that no revenue
+     from that country is to go to the Colony, therefore it can be no
+     object to Colony to insist on the installation of magistrates in
+     that country. If the magistrates of Transkei are the cause of
+     discontent among the natives, then what object is there in
+     insisting on their installation in Basutoland? The Pondos, a far
+     inferior people, are happy under their own chiefs--far happier
+     than the natives of Transkei. Why should the Colony insist on
+     sending men who are more likely to goad the Basutos into
+     rebellion than anything else? The administration of Basutoland is
+     on a scale costing L30,000 per annum.
+
+     "11. It is argued that should the Colony go to war with Masupha
+     the other chiefs would hold aloof. This is quite erroneous. A war
+     with Masupha means a war with the Basuto nation, with a rising in
+     the Transkei, and perhaps in Pondoland, and would affect Natal
+     and Her Majesty's Government.
+
+     "12. The only remedy is the sending up of his Excellency the
+     Governor, or of some high neutral officer, to Basutoland, and the
+     calling together of the people to decide on their future
+     government and connection with Colony. Or, should the British
+     Government refuse this small concession, which could not involve
+     it, then the Colony should send up an independent Commission to
+     meet the Basuto people, and arrange a _modus vivendi_. Whichever
+     course is followed it is a _sine qua non_ that the present
+     officials in Basutoland should be relieved at once, as they have
+     lost the confidence both of Europeans and natives. The Basutos
+     desire peace, and it is an error to describe their demeanour as
+     aggressive. It is not unnatural that after what they have
+     suffered from the hands of Colonial Government they should desire
+     at least as nearly as much self-government as the Pondos enjoy.
+     Certainly the present magisterial administration of the Transkei
+     is very far from being a blessing, or conducive to peace.
+
+     "13. Nothing can possibly be worse than the present state of
+     affairs in native administration, and the interests of the Colony
+     demand a vertebrate government of some sort, whoever it may be
+     composed of, instead of the invertebrate formation that is now
+     called a government, and which drifts into and creates its own
+     difficulties.
+
+                                             C. G. GORDON.
+
+     "October 19, 1882.
+
+     "_P.S._--Should Her Majesty's Government manage to arrange with
+     Basutos in a satisfactory manner, 10,000 splendid cavalry could
+     be counted on as allies in any contingencies in Natal, etc."
+
+The vital part of Gordon's Cape experiences was the Basuto mission,
+and as it is desirable that it should not be obscured by other
+matters, I will only touch briefly on his work as Commandant-General,
+apart from that he performed as Adviser to the Cape Government in the
+Basuto difficulty. The post of Commandant-General was forced upon him
+in the first weeks of his arrival from the Mauritius by the combined
+urgency of Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor, and Mr Merriman, then
+Premier. Much against his inclination, Gordon agreed to fill the post
+thus thrust upon him, but only for a time. It entailed an infinity of
+work and worry. His instructions were to break up a red-tape system,
+and such a task converted every place-holder into his enemy. Still
+that opposition rather made his task attractive than otherwise, but in
+a little time he found that this opposition would not stop short of
+insubordination, and that to achieve success it would be necessary to
+cashier a good many officers as a wholesome example. It was while
+matters were in this preliminary stage that Mr Merriman's ministry
+went out of office, and was succeeded by another under Mr Scanlan. The
+measures which were favoured by the one were opposed by the other, and
+Gordon soon saw that the desire for a thorough reorganisation of the
+Cape forces, which, if properly supported, he could have carried out,
+was no longer prevalent among the responsible Ministers. Still he drew
+up an elaborate programme for the improvement of the Colonial Regular
+forces, by which they might be increased in numbers and improved in
+efficiency, at the same time that the annual expenditure was reduced.
+This document shows that mastery of detail which was one of his most
+striking characteristics, and if his advice had been taken, the Cape
+would have acquired nearly 4000 troops at no greater cost than it
+already expended on 1600. In a second memorandum, he not only showed
+the necessity existing for that larger force, but also how, by
+administrative alterations in the Transkeian provinces, its cost might
+be diminished and most conveniently discharged. Although I do not
+quote these two documents, I cannot help saying that Gordon, in the
+whole course of his life, never wrote anything more convincing than
+the advice he gave the Cape Government, which, owing to local
+jealousies and the invincible bulwark of vested interests, was never
+carried into effect, although the Basuto question was subsequently
+composed on Gordon's lines by the Imperial Government, and there has
+been peace there during all the other South African troubles.
+
+The closing passages between Gordon and the Cape Ministers need only
+be briefly referred to. Gordon resigned because he saw he could do no
+good in Basutoland; the Cape Premier accepted his resignation because
+Gordon "would not fight the Basutos." The intercommunications were
+much more numerous, but that is their pith. Gordon came down to Cape
+Town and sailed for England on 14th October, after having been five
+and a half months in South Africa. He had been treated by the Cape
+authorities without any regard for justice, and little for courtesy.
+The leading paper even admitted this much when it observed that "at
+least General Gordon was entitled to the treatment of a gentleman."
+But the plain truth was that Gordon was summoned to South Africa and
+employed by the Government, not as was ostentatiously proclaimed, and
+as he himself believed, for the attainment of a just solution of the
+Basuto difficulty, and for the execution of much-needed military
+reforms, but in order that his military experience and genius might be
+invoked for the purpose of overthrowing Masupha and of annexing
+Basutoland, which two years of war and five millions of money had
+failed to conquer. Hence their disappointment and resentment when
+Gordon proclaimed that justice was on the side of Masupha; that under
+no circumstances would he wage war with him; and that the whole origin
+of the trouble lay in the bad policy, the incompetent magistrates, and
+the insubordinate military officers of the Cape Government. The
+indictment was a terrible one; it was also true in every line and
+every particular.
+
+Having thus vindicated his own character, as well as the highest
+principles of Government, Gordon left the Cape a poorer and a wiser
+man than he was on his arrival. I have explained the personal loss he
+incurred through the inadequacy of his pay and the cutting-off of his
+army allowance. It has been stated that when he had taken his passage
+for England he was without any money in his pocket, and that he
+quaintly said to a friend: "Do you think it is right for a
+Major-General of the British Army to set out on a journey like this
+without sixpence in his pocket?" There is nothing improbable in such
+an occurrence, and it was matched only sixteen months later, when he
+was on the point of starting for Khartoum in the same impecunious
+condition.
+
+Gordon arrived in England on 8th November, and after some
+correspondence with the King of the Belgians, which will be referred
+to later in connection with the Congo mission, he again left England
+on 26th December. On this occasion he was going to carry out a
+long-cherished desire to visit and reside in the Holy Land, so that he
+might study on the spot the scenes with which his perfect knowledge of
+the Bible--his inseparable companion--had made him in an extraordinary
+degree familiar. In the best sense of the word, he was going to take a
+holiday. There was to be absolute quiet and rest, and at the same time
+a congenial occupation. He sailed for Jaffa as a guest on one of Sir
+William Mackinnon's steamers, but he at once proceeded to Jerusalem,
+where he lived alone, refusing to see any one, with his books as
+companions, and "mystifying people as to what he was doing." During
+his stay at Jerusalem he entered with much zest and at great length
+into the questions of the various sites in the old Jewish capital. I
+do not propose to follow the course of his labours in that pursuit, as
+several works contain between them, I should say, every line he wrote
+on the subject, and the general reader cannot be expected to take any
+interest in abstruse and much-debated theological and topographical
+questions. But even in the midst of these pursuits he did not lose his
+quickness of military perception. After a brief inspection he at once
+declared that the Russian Convent commanded the whole city, and was in
+itself a strong fortress, capable of holding a formidable garrison,
+which Russia could despatch in the guise of priests without any one
+being the wiser. From Jerusalem, when the heat became great, he
+returned to Jaffa, and his interest aroused in worldly matters by the
+progress of events in Egypt, and the development of the Soudan danger,
+which he had all along seen coming, was evoked by a project that was
+brought under his notice for the construction across Palestine of a
+canal to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. In a letter to myself he thus
+dilates upon the scheme:--
+
+     "Here is the subject which I am interested in if it could be
+     done. The reasons are:--
+
+     "1. We are in Egypt supporting an unpopular sovereign, whose
+     tenure ends with departure of our troops. We offer no hope to the
+     people of any solace by this support, and by the supporting of
+     the Turco-Circassian Pashas, who I know by experience are
+     _hopeless_. We neither govern nor take responsibility; yet we
+     support these vampires.
+
+     "2. We are getting mixed up with the question of whether the
+     interest of L90,000,000 will be paid or not.
+
+     "3. We are mixed up with the Soudan, where we provoked the
+     rebellion, and of the responsibility of which government we
+     cannot rid ourselves.
+
+     "4. We are in constant and increasing hot water with the French,
+     and we gain no benefit from it, for the Canal will remain theirs.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+     "On the other hand, if we get a Firman from Sultan for the
+     Palestine Canal--
+
+     "1. We lose the sacred sites of Jordan River, Capernaum,
+     Bethsaida, and Tiberias, Jericho, not Engedi.
+
+     "2. We swamp a notoriously unhealthy valley, where there are no
+     missions.
+
+     "3. We cut off the pest of the country of Palestine, the
+     Bedouins.
+
+     "4. We are free of all four objections _in re_ occupation of
+     Egypt.
+
+     "5. We gain the fertile lands of Moab and Ammon.
+
+     "6. Cyprus is 150 miles from the Mediterranean _debouche_.
+
+     "7. We get a waterway for large ships to within fifty miles of
+     Damascus.
+
+     "8. We can never be bothered by any internal commotion, except
+     for the twenty-five miles from Haifa to Tiberias, for the
+     waterway of the Canal would be ten miles wide, except in Arabah
+     Valley, where there are on both sides wastes and deserts.
+
+     "9. We get rid of unhealthiness of a narrow cut with no current,
+     which is the case with Suez Canal now, where the mud is
+     pestilential from ships' refuse and no current.
+
+     "10. It would isolate Palestine, render it quiet from Bedouins;
+     it would pave the way to its being like Belgium, under no Great
+     Power, for religious views would be against Palestine ever being
+     owned by a Great Power.
+
+     "11. Up the ladder of Tyre to Gaza would be 10,000 square miles;
+     population 130,000, quite a small country.
+
+     "Do not quote me if you write this. Oddly enough, Ezekiel xlvii.
+     10 seems to say the Dead Sea shall have fish like the great Sea
+     (_i.e._ Mediterranean). Zechariah xiv. speaks of two rivers, one
+     going to Dead Sea, the other to Mediterranean.
+
+     "The cost would be--
+
+          Canal from Haifa to Jordan,            L2,000,000
+          Compensation to Jordan peoples,         1,000,000
+          Canal through Akabah,                   6,000,000
+          Ports at Haifa,                         1,000,000
+          Ports at Akabah,                          500,000
+                                                ___________
+
+                                                L10,500,000
+                                                ===========
+
+     say, twelve to fifteen millions, and what a comfort to be free of
+     Egypt and Soudan for ever!
+
+     "Revenue, Palestine, L120,000, of which L80,000 goes to Sultan.
+     Do not quote _me_, for I have written part of this to Mr W. (the
+     late Sir William) Mackinnon of B.I.S.N.C., besides which H.M.
+     Government may object. You may say you had a letter from a
+     correspondent."
+
+He wrote in a similar strain to other correspondents, but I have never
+succeeded in discovering whether, from an engineering point of view,
+the scheme was at all feasible. It seems to me that its suggestion is
+somewhat destructive of Gordon's own declarations as to the superior
+merits of the Cape route, nor does Sir Henry Gordon much strengthen
+the case when, perceiving the inconsistency, he goes out of his way to
+declare that Gordon only meant the Palestine canal to be a commercial
+route. Any attempt to limit its usefulness could not destroy the
+character claimed for it by its promoters, as an equally short and
+more secure route than that by Suez. Yet it needs no gift of second
+sight to predict that when any project of rivalry to the masterpiece
+of Lesseps is carried out, it will be by rail to the Persian Gulf,
+whether the starting-point be the Bosphorus or the Levant.
+
+In the midst of his interesting researches near Mount Carmel, a
+summons from the outer world reached Gordon in the form of a letter
+from Sir William Mackinnon, telling him that the King of the Belgians
+now called on him to fulfil a promise he had made some years before.
+
+When Gordon first returned from the Cape the King of the Belgians
+wrote, reminding him of his old promise, dating from 1880, to enter
+into his service on the Congo, and stating that the difficulty of
+having an internationally recognised Congo flag, which Gordon had made
+a _sine qua non_ of his appointment, could be most speedily solved by
+Gordon joining him as counsellor at once. This Gordon could not agree
+to, and he went to Palestine, there to await the King's summons,
+which came by Sir William Mackinnon's note in October 1883. It then
+became necessary for Gordon to obtain the official permission of his
+Government to take up this post, of the exact nature of which the
+Foreign Office had been already informed, both by General Gordon and
+King Leopold.
+
+Gordon at once telegraphed to the War Office for the leave rendered
+necessary by his being on the active list, and that Department
+replied, asking for particulars. When these were furnished through the
+Foreign Office the decision was announced that "the Secretary of State
+declines to sanction your employment on the Congo." The telegraph
+clerk, more discerning or considerate than Her Majesty's Government,
+altered "declines" into "decides," and Gordon, in happy ignorance of
+the truth, proceeded with all possible despatch _via_ Acre and Genoa
+to Brussels, which he reached on New Year's Day, 1884. That very night
+he wrote me a short note saying, "I go (_D.V._) next month to the
+Congo, but keep it secret." Such things cannot be kept secret, and
+four days later a leading article in _The Times_ informed his
+countrymen of Gordon's new mission.
+
+On reaching Brussels the mistake in the telegram was discovered, and
+Gordon here learnt that his Congo mission was vetoed. Then came the
+difficulty to know what was to be done. Without leave he could not go
+anywhere without resigning his commission; he was not qualified for a
+pension, and there were engagements he had voluntarily contracted that
+he would not see broken, and persons who would suffer by his death,
+whose interests he was in every way bound to safeguard. Therefore, if
+he was to carry out his engagement with the King of the Belgians, it
+was obviously necessary that he should resign the British Army, and
+that the King should compensate him for his loss. The King said at
+once: "Retire from the army and I will compensate you," but in a
+matter of such importance to others Gordon felt nothing should be left
+to chance, and that a definite contract should be made. For this he
+had neither the patience nor the business knowledge, and he delegated
+the task of arranging the matter to his brother, Sir Henry Gordon, who
+negotiated with the late Sir William Mackinnon as representing the
+King. They agreed that the value of Gordon's pension if commuted would
+be L7288, and the King of the Belgians was to provide that sum, which
+was to be paid into a trust fund. In this and every other matter the
+King behaved towards Gordon in the most generous and cordial manner,
+furnishing a marked contrast with the grudging and parsimonious spirit
+of the British Government towards Gordon in China, at the Cape, and
+now again when destined for the Congo.
+
+All the arrangements connected with this subject were made in three
+days, and while Gordon gave instructions for his will to be prepared
+for the disposal of the trust fund after his death, he wrote the same
+day (6th January) to Mr H. M. Stanley, then acting for the King on the
+Congo, announcing his own appointment, offering to "serve willingly
+with or under him," and fixing his own departure from Lisbon for 5th
+of February. _Dis aliter visum._ For the moment he worked up some
+enthusiasm in his task. "We will kill the slave-traders in their
+haunts"; and again, "No such efficacious means of cutting at root of
+slave trade ever was presented as that which God has, I trust, opened
+out to us through the kind disinterestedness of His Majesty," are
+passages in the same letter, yet all the time there is no doubt his
+heart and his thoughts were elsewhere. They were in the Soudan, not on
+the Congo.
+
+The night of this letter he crossed from Brussels, and went straight
+to his sister's house, long the residence, and, practically speaking,
+the home of his family, 5 Rockstone Place, Southampton. On the 7th of
+the month--that is, the same day as he arrived--he wrote the formal
+letter requesting leave to resign his commission in the Queen's army,
+and also stating, with his usual candour, that King Leopold II. had
+guaranteed him against any pecuniary loss. To that letter it may at
+once be stated that no reply was ever sent. Even the least sympathetic
+official could not feel altogether callous to a voluntary proposition
+to remove the name of "Chinese" Gordon from the British army list, and
+the sudden awakening of the public to the extraordinary claims of
+General Gordon on national gratitude, and his special fitness to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty warned the authorities that a too rigid
+application of office rules would not in his case be allowed. By no
+individual effort, as has been too lightly granted by some writers,
+but by the voice of the British people was it decided that not only
+should Gordon have leave to go to the Congo, without resigning his
+commission, but also that he should be held entitled to draw his pay
+as a British general while thus employed. But this was not the whole
+truth, although I have no doubt that the arrangement would have been
+carried out in any case. In their dilemma the Government saw a chance
+of extrication in the person of Gordon, the one man recognised by the
+public and the press as capable of coping with a difficulty which
+seemed too much for them. The whole truth, therefore, was that the
+Congo mission was to wait until after Gordon had been sent to, and
+returned from, the Soudan. He was then to be placed by the British
+Government entirely at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. As
+this new arrangement turned on the assent of the King, it was vital to
+keep it secret during the remainder of the 15th and the whole of the
+16th of that eventful January.
+
+When Gordon arrived at Waterloo Station, at a little before two
+o'clock on 15th January, and was met there by myself, I do not think
+that he knew definitely what was coming, but he was a man of
+extraordinary shrewdness, and although essentially unworldly, could
+see as clearly and as far through a transaction as the keenest man of
+business. What he did know was that the army authorities were going to
+treat him well, but his one topic of conversation the whole way to
+Pall Mall was not the Congo but the Soudan. To the direct question
+whether he was not really going, as I suspected, to the Nile instead
+of the Congo, he declared he had no information that would warrant
+such an idea, but still, if the King of the Belgians would grant the
+permission, he would certainly not be disinclined to go there first. I
+have no doubt that those who acted in the name of the Ministry in a
+few minutes discovered the true state of his mind, and that Gordon
+then and there agreed, on the express request of the Government of Mr
+Gladstone, to go and see the King, and beg him to suspend the
+execution of his promise until he had gone to the Soudan to arrest the
+Mahdi's career, or to relieve the Egyptian garrisons, if the phrase be
+preferred. It should also be stated that Gordon's arrangement with the
+King of the Belgians was always coupled with this proviso, "provided
+the Government of my own country does not require my services." The
+generosity of that sovereign in the matter of the compensation for his
+Commission did not render that condition void, and however irritating
+the King may have found the circumstances, Gordon broke neither the
+spirit nor the letter of his engagement with his Majesty by obeying
+the orders of his own Government.
+
+Late the same evening I was present at his brother's house to receive
+an account for publication of his plans on the Congo, but surrounded
+by so large a number of his relatives summoned to see their hero, many
+of them for the last time, it was neither convenient nor possible to
+carry out this task, which was accordingly postponed till the
+following morning, when I was to see him at the Charing Cross Hotel,
+and accompany him by the early boat train to Dover. On that night his
+last will was signed and witnessed by his uncle, Mr George Enderby,
+and myself. The next morning I was at the hotel before seven, but
+instead of travelling by this early train, he postponed his departure
+till ten o'clock, and the greater part of those three hours were given
+to an explanation, map in hand, of his plans on the Congo. The
+article, based on his information, appeared in _The Times_ of 17th
+January 1884, but several times during our conversation he exclaimed,
+"There may be a respite," but he refused to be more definite. Thus he
+set out for Brussels, whether he was accompanied by his friend
+Captain (now Colonel) F. Brocklehurst, who was undoubtedly acting as
+the representative of the authorities. I believe I may say with
+confidence that if he did not actually see the King of the Belgians on
+the evening of the same day, some communication passed indirectly,
+which showed the object of his errand, for although his own letter
+communicating the event is dated 17th, from Brussels, it is a fact
+within my own knowledge that late in the evening of the 16th a
+telegram was received--"Gordon goes to the Soudan."
+
+The first intimation of something having happened that his brother Sir
+Henry Gordon received, was in a hurried letter, dated 17th January,
+which arrived by the early post on Friday, 18th, asking him to "get
+his uniform ready and some patent leather boots," but adding, "I saw
+King Leopold to-day; he is furious." Even then Sir Henry, although he
+guessed his destination, did not know that his departure would be so
+sudden, for Gordon crossed the same night, and was kept at
+Knightsbridge Barracks in a sort of honourable custody by Captain
+Brocklehurst, so that the new scheme might not be prematurely
+revealed. Sir Henry, a busy man, went about his own work, having seen
+to his brother's commission, and it was not until his return at five
+o'clock that he learnt all, and that Gordon was close at hand. He at
+once hurried off to see him, and on meeting, Gordon, in a high state
+of exhilaration, exclaimed, "I am off to the Soudan." Sir Henry asked
+"When?" and back came the reply, "To-night!" He had got his respite.
+
+To him at that moment it meant congenial work and the chance of
+carrying out the thoughts that had been surging through his mind ever
+since Egyptian affairs became troubled and the Mahdi's power rose on
+the horizon of the Soudan. The reality was to prove far different. He
+was to learn in his own person the weakness and falseness of his
+Government, and to find himself betrayed by the very persons who had
+only sought his assistance in the belief that by a miracle--and
+nothing less would have sufficed--he might relieve them from
+responsibilities to which they were not equal. Far better would it
+have been, not only for Gordon's sake, but even for the reputation of
+England, if he had carried out his original project on the Congo,
+where, on a less conspicuous scene than the Nile, he might still have
+fought and won the battle of humanity.
+
+I am placed in a position to state that on the morning of the 17th, at
+10 A.M., he wrote to his sister from Brussels, as follows--"Do not
+mention it, but there is just a chance I may have to go to Soudan for
+two months, and then go to Congo," and again in a second letter at two
+o'clock, "Just got a telegram from Wolseley saying, 'Come back to
+London by evening train,' so when you get this I shall be in town,
+_but keep it a dead secret_, for I hope to leave it again the same
+evening. I will not take Governor-Generalship again, I will only
+report on situation." After this came a post-card--18th January, 6
+A.M. "Left B., am now in London; I hope to go back again to-night."
+That very night he left for Egypt.
+
+That he was not detained the whole day in the Barracks is shown in the
+following letter, now published for the first time, which gives the
+only account of his interview with the members of the Government that
+sent him out:--
+
+                                                       "19. 1, 1884.
+
+     "MY DEAR AUGUSTA,--I arrived in town very tired, at 6 A.M.
+     yesterday, went with Brocklehurst to Barracks, washed, and went
+     to Wolseley. He said Ministers would see me at 3 P.M. I went back
+     to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 P.M. Wolseley came for me. I
+     went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke, and
+     Northbrook. They said, 'Had I seen Wolseley, and did I understand
+     their ideas?' I said 'Yes,' and repeated what Wolseley had said
+     to me as to their ideas, which was '_they would evacuate
+     Soudan_.' They were pleased, and said 'That was their idea; would
+     I go?' I said 'Yes.' They said 'When?' I said 'To-night,' and it
+     was over. I started at 8 P.M. H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and
+     Lord Wolseley came to see me off. I saw Henry and Bob (R. F.
+     Gordon); no one else except Stokes--all very kind. I have taken
+     Stewart with me, a nice fellow. We are now in train near Mont
+     Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Lord
+     Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I
+     was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King of the Belgians at
+     once, and told him 'Wait a few months.' Kindest love to
+     all.--Your affectionate brother,
+
+                                             "C. G. GORDON."
+
+As further evidence of the haste of his departure, I should like to
+mention that he had hardly any clothes with him, and that Mrs Watson,
+wife of his friend Colonel Watson, procured him all he required--in
+fact, fitted him out--during the two days he stayed at Cairo. These
+kindly efforts on his behalf were thrown away, for all his
+baggage--clothes, uniforms, orders, etc.--was captured with the money
+at Berber and never reached him. His only insignia of office at
+Khartoum was the Fez, and the writer who described him as putting on
+his uniform when the Mahdists broke into the town was gifted with more
+imagination than love of truth.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+THE LAST NILE MISSION.
+
+
+When Gordon left Egypt, at the end of the year 1879, he was able to
+truthfully declare in the words of his favourite book: "No man could
+lift his hand or his foot in the land of the Soudan without me." Yet
+he was fully alive to the dangers of the future, although then they
+were no more than a little cloud on the horizon, for he wrote in 1878:
+"Our English Government lives on a hand-to-mouth policy. They are very
+ignorant of these lands, yet some day or other, they or some other
+Government, will have to know them, for things at Cairo cannot stay as
+they are. The Khedive will be curbed in, and will no longer be
+absolute Sovereign. Then will come the question of these countries....
+There is no doubt that if the Governments of France and England do not
+pay more attention to the Soudan--if they do not establish at Khartoum
+a branch of the mixed tribunals, and see that justice is done--the
+disruption of the Soudan from Cairo is only a question of time. This
+disruption, moreover, will not end the troubles, for the Soudanese
+through their allies in Lower Egypt--the black soldiers I mean--will
+carry on their efforts in Cairo itself. Now these black soldiers are
+the only troops in the Egyptian service that are worth anything." The
+gift of prophecy could scarcely have been demonstrated in a more
+remarkable degree, yet the Egyptian Government and everybody else went
+on acting as if there was no danger in the Soudan, and treated it like
+a thoroughly conquered province inhabited by a satisfied, or at least
+a thoroughly subjected population. From this dream there was to be a
+rude and startling awakening.
+
+It is impossible to say whether there was any connection direct or
+indirect between the revolt of Arabi Pasha and the military leaders at
+Cairo and the rebellion in the Soudan, which began under the auspices
+of the so-called Mahdi. At the very least it may be asserted that the
+spectacle of successful insubordination in the Delta--for it was
+completely successful, and would have continued so but for the
+intervention of British arms--was calculated to encourage those who
+entertained a desire to upset the Khedive's authority in the upper
+regions of the Nile. That Gordon held that the authors of the Arabi
+rising and of the Mahdist movement were the same in sympathy, if not
+in person, cannot be doubted, and in February 1882, when the Mahdi had
+scarcely begun his career, he wrote: "If they send the Black regiment
+to the Soudan to quell the revolt, they will inoculate all the troops
+up there, and the Soudan will revolt against Cairo, whom they all
+hate." It will be noted that that letter was written more than twenty
+months before the destruction of the Hicks Expedition made the Mahdi
+master of the Soudan.
+
+It was in the year 1880 that the movements of a Mahommedan dervish,
+named Mahomed Ahmed, first began to attract the attention of the
+Egyptian officials. He had quarrelled with and repudiated the
+authority of the head of his religious order, because he tolerated
+such frivolous practices as dancing and singing. His boldness in this
+matter, and his originality in others, showed that he was pursuing a
+course of his own, and to provide for his personal security, as well
+as for convenience in keeping up his communications with Khartoum and
+other places, he fixed his residence on an islet in the White Nile
+near Kawa. Mahomed Ahmed was a native of the lower province of
+Dongola, and as such was looked upon with a certain amount of contempt
+by the other races of the Soudan. When he quarrelled with his
+religious leader he was given the opprobrious name of "a wretched
+Dongolawi," but the courage with which he defied and exposed an
+arch-priest for not rigidly abiding by the tenets of the Koran,
+redounded so much to his credit that the people began to talk of this
+wonderful dervish quite as much as of the Khedive's Governor-General.
+Many earnest and energetic Mahommedans flocked to him, and among these
+was the present Khalifa Abdullah, whose life had been spared by
+Zebehr, and who in return had wished to proclaim that leader of the
+slave-hunters Mahdi. To his instigation was probably due not merely
+the assumption of that title by Mahomed Ahmed, but the addition of a
+worldly policy to what was to have been a strictly religious
+propaganda.
+
+Little as he deemed there was to fear from this ascetic, the Egyptian
+Governor-General Raouf, Gordon's successor, and stigmatised by him as
+the Tyrant of Harrar, became curious about him, and sent someone to
+interview and report upon this new religious teacher. The report
+brought back was that he was "a madman," and it was at once considered
+safe to treat him with indifference. Such was the position in the year
+1880, and the official view was only modified a year later by the
+receipt of information that the gathering on the island of Abba had
+considerably increased, and that Mahomed Ahmed was attended by an
+armed escort, who stood in his presence with drawn swords. It was at
+this time too that he began to declare that he had a divine mission,
+and took unto himself the style of Mahdi--the long-expected messenger
+who was to raise up Islam--at first secretly among his chosen friends,
+but not so secretly that news of his bold step did not reach the ears
+of Raouf. The assumption of such a title, which placed its holder
+above and beyond the reach of such ordinary commands as are conveyed
+in the edicts of a Khedive or a Sultan, convinced Raouf that the time
+had come to put an end to these pretensions. That conviction was not
+diminished when Mahomed Ahmed made a tour through Kordofan, spreading
+a knowledge of his name and intentions, and undoubtedly winning over
+many adherents to his cause. On his return to Abba he found a summons
+from the Governor-General to come to Khartoum. That summons was
+followed by the arrival of a steamer, the captain of which had orders
+to capture the False Mahdi alive or dead.
+
+Mahomed Ahmed received warning from his friends and sympathisers that
+if he went to Khartoum he might consider himself a dead man. He
+probably never had the least intention of going there, and what he had
+seen of the state of feeling in the Soudan, where the authority of the
+Khedive was neither popular nor firmly established, rendered him more
+inclined to defy the Egyptians. When the delegate of Raouf Pasha
+therefore appeared before him, Mahomed Ahmed was surrounded by such an
+armed force as precluded the possibility of a violent seizure of his
+person, and when he resorted to argument to induce him to come to
+Khartoum, Mahomed Ahmed, throwing off the mask, and standing forth in
+the self-imposed character of Mahdi, exclaimed: "By the grace of God
+and His Prophet I am the master of this country, and never shall I go
+to Khartoum to justify myself."
+
+After this picturesque defiance it only remained for him and the
+Egyptians to prove which was the stronger.
+
+It must be admitted that Raouf at once recognised the gravity of the
+affair, and without delay he sent a small force on Gordon's old
+steamer, the _Ismailia_, to bring Mahomed Ahmed to reason. This was in
+August 1881. By its numbers and the superior armament of the troops
+this expedition should have proved a complete success, and a competent
+commander would have strangled the Mahdist phenomenon at its birth.
+Unfortunately the Egyptian officers were grossly incompetent, and
+divided among themselves. They attempted a night attack, and as they
+were quite ignorant of the locality, it is not surprising that they
+fell into the very trap they thought to set for their opponents.
+
+In the confusion the divided Egyptian forces fired upon each other,
+and the Mahdists with their swords and short stabbing spears completed
+the rest. Of two whole companies of troops only a handful escaped by
+swimming to the steamer, which returned to Khartoum with the news of
+this defeat. Even this reverse was very far from ensuring the triumph
+of Mahomed Ahmed, or the downfall of the Egyptian power; and, indeed,
+the possession of steamers and the consequent command of the Nile
+navigation rendered it extremely doubtful whether he could long hold
+his own on the island of Abba. He thought so himself, and, gathering
+his forces together, marched to the western districts of Kordofan,
+where, at Jebel Gedir, he established his headquarters. A special
+reason made him select that place, for it is believed by Mahommedans
+that the Mahdi will first appear at Jebel Masa in North Africa, and
+Mahomed Ahmed had no scruple in declaring that the two places were the
+same. To complete the resemblance he changed with autocratic pleasure
+the name Jebel Gedir into Jebel Masa.
+
+During this march several attempts were made to capture him by the
+local garrisons, but they were all undertaken in such a half-hearted
+manner, and so badly carried out, that the Mahdi was never in any
+danger, and his reputation was raised by the failure of the
+Government.
+
+Once established at Jebel Gedir the Mahdi began to organise his forces
+on a larger scale, and to formulate a policy that would be likely to
+bring all the tribes of the Soudan to his side. While thus employed
+Rashed Bey, Governor of Fashoda, resolved to attack him. Rashed is
+entitled to the credit of seeing that the time demanded a signal, and
+if possible, a decisive blow, but he is to be censured for the
+carelessness and over-confidence he displayed in carrying out his
+scheme. Although he had a strong force he should have known that the
+Mahdi's followers were now numbered by the thousand, and that he was
+an active and enterprising foe. But he neglected the most simple
+precautions, and showed that he had no military skill. The Mahdi fell
+upon him during his march, killed him, his chief officers, and 1400
+men, and the small body that escaped bore testimony to the formidable
+character of the victor's fighting power. This battle was fought on
+9th December 1881, and the end of that year therefore beheld the firm
+establishment of the Mahdi's power in a considerable part of the
+Soudan; but even then the superiority of the Egyptian resources was so
+marked and incontestable that, properly handled, they should have
+sufficed to speedily overwhelm him.
+
+At this juncture Raouf was succeeded as Governor-General by
+Abd-el-Kader Pasha, who had held the same post before Gordon, and who
+had gained something of a reputation from the conquest of Darfour, in
+conjunction with Zebehr. At least he ought to have known the Soudan,
+but the dangers which had been clear to the eye of Gordon were
+concealed from him and his colleagues. Still, the first task
+he set himself--and indeed it was the justification of his
+re-appointment--was to retrieve the disaster to Rashed, and to destroy
+the Mahdi's power. He therefore collected a force of not less than
+4000 men, chiefly trained infantry, and he entrusted the command to
+Yusuf Pasha, a brave officer, who had distinguished himself under
+Gessi in the war with Suleiman. This force left Khartoum in March
+1882, but it did not begin its inland march from the Nile until the
+end of May, when it had been increased by at least 2000 irregular
+levies raised in Kordofan. Unfortunately, Yusuf was just as
+over-confident as Rashed had been. He neglected all precautions, and
+derided the counsel of those who warned him that the Mahdi's followers
+might prove a match for his well-armed and well-drilled troops. After
+a ten days' march he reached the neighbourhood of the Mahdi's
+position, and he was already counting on a great victory, when, at
+dawn of day on 7th June, he was himself surprised by his opponent in a
+camp that he had ostentatiously refused to fortify in the smallest
+degree. The Egyptian force was annihilated. Some of the local
+irregulars escaped, but of the regular troops and their commanders not
+one. This decisive victory not merely confirmed the reputation of the
+Mahdi, and made most people in the Soudan believe that he was really a
+heaven-sent champion, but it also exposed the inferiority of the
+Government troops and the Khedive's commanders.
+
+The defeat of Yusuf may be said to have been decisive so far as the
+active forces of the Khedive in the field were concerned, but the
+towns held out, and El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in particular
+defied all the Mahdi's efforts to take it. The possession of this and
+other strong places furnished the supporters of the Government with a
+reasonable hope that on the arrival of fresh troops the ground lost
+might be recovered, and an end put to what threatened to become a
+formidable rebellion. A lull consequently ensued in the struggle.
+Unfortunately, it was one that the Mahdi turned to the best advantage
+by drilling and arming his troops, and summoning levies from the more
+distant parts of the provinces, while the Khedive's Government,
+engrossed in troubles nearer home--the Arabi revolt and the
+intervention of England in the internal administration--seemed
+paralysed in its efforts to restore its authority over the Soudan,
+which at that moment would have been comparatively easy. The only
+direct result of Yusuf's defeat in June 1882 was that two of the Black
+regiments were sent up to Khartoum, and as their allegiance to the
+Government was already shaken, their presence, as Gordon apprehended,
+was calculated to aggravate rather than to improve the situation.
+
+Matters remained very much in this state until the Mahdi's capture of
+the important town of El Obeid. Notwithstanding the presence within
+the walls of an element favourable to the Mahdi, the Commandant, Said
+Pasha, made a valiant and protracted defence. He successfully repelled
+all the Mahdi's attempts to take the place by storm, but he had to
+succumb to famine after all the privations of a five months' siege. If
+there had been other men like Said Pasha, especially at Khartoum, the
+power of the Mahdi would never have risen to the height it attained.
+The capture of an important place like El Obeid did more for the
+spread of the Mahdi's reputation and power than the several victories
+he had gained in the field. This important event took place in January
+1883. Abd-el-Kader was then removed from the Governor-Generalship, and
+a successor found in Alla-ed-din, a man of supposed energy and
+resource. More than that, an English officer--Colonel Hicks--was given
+the military command, and it was decided to despatch an expedition of
+sufficient strength, as it was thought, to crush the Mahdi at one
+blow.
+
+The preparations for this fresh advance against the Mahdi were made
+with care, and on an extensive scale. Several regiments were sent from
+Egypt, and in the spring of the year a permanent camp was established
+for their accommodation at Omdurman, on the western bank of the Nile,
+opposite Khartoum. Here, by the end of June 1883, was assembled a
+force officially computed to number 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers,
+300 irregular cavalry, and not fewer than 30 pieces of artillery,
+including rockets and mortars. Colonel Hicks was given the nominal
+command, several English and other European officers were appointed
+to serve under him, and the Khedive specially ordered the
+Governor-General to accompany the expedition that was to put an end to
+the Mahdi's triumph. Such was the interest, and, it may be added,
+confidence, felt in the expedition, that two special correspondents,
+one of whom was Edmond O'Donovan, who had made himself famous a few
+years earlier by reaching the Turcoman stronghold of Merv, were
+ordered to accompany it, and report its achievements.
+
+The Mahdi learnt in good time of the extensive preparations being made
+for this expedition, but he was not dismayed, because all the fighting
+tribes of Kordofan, Bahr Gazelle, and Darfour were now at his back,
+and he knew that he could count on the devotion of 100,000 fanatical
+warriors. Still, he and his henchman Abdullah, who supplied the
+military brains to the cause, were not disposed to throw away a
+chance, and the threatening appearance of the Egyptian military
+preparations led them to conceive the really brilliant idea of
+stirring up trouble in the rear of Khartoum. For this purpose a man
+of extraordinary energy and influence was ready to their hand in Osman
+Digma, a slave-dealer of Souakim, who might truly be called the Zebehr
+of the Eastern Soudan. This man hastened to Souakim as the delegate of
+the Mahdi, from whom he brought special proclamations, calling on the
+tribes to rise for a Holy War. Although this move subsequently
+aggravated the Egyptian position and extended the military triumphs of
+the Mahdi, it did not attain the immediate object for which it was
+conceived, as the Hicks Expedition set out on its ill-omened march
+before Osman had struck a blow.
+
+The power of the Mahdi was at this moment so firmly established, and
+his reputation based on the double claim of a divine mission and
+military success so high that it may be doubted whether the 10,000
+men, of which the Hicks force consisted when the irregulars raised by
+the Governor-General had joined it at Duem, would have sufficed to
+overcome him even if they had been ably led, and escaped all the
+untoward circumstances that first retarded their progress and then
+sealed their fate. The plan of campaign was based on a misconception
+of the Mahdi's power, and was carried out with utter disregard of
+prudence and of the local difficulties to be encountered between the
+Nile and El Obeid. But the radical fault of the whole enterprise was a
+strategical one. The situation made it prudent and even necessary for
+the Government to stand on the defensive, and to abstain from military
+expeditions, while the course pursued was to undertake offensive
+measures in the manner most calculated to favour the chances of the
+Mahdi, and to attack him at the very point where his superiority could
+be most certainly shown.
+
+But quite apart from any original error as to the inception of the
+campaign, which may fairly be deemed a matter of opinion, there can be
+no difference between any two persons who have studied the facts that
+the execution of it was completely mismanaged. In the first place the
+start of the expedition was delayed, so that the Mahdi got ample
+warning of the coming attack. The troops were all in the camp at
+Omdurman in June, but they did not reach Duem till September, and a
+further delay of two months occurred there before they began their
+march towards El Obeid. That interval was chiefly taken up with
+disputes between Hicks and his Egyptian colleagues, and it is even
+believed that there was much friction between Hicks and his European
+lieutenants.
+
+The first radical error committed was the decision to advance on El
+Obeid from Duem, because there were no wells on that route, whereas
+had the northern route _via_ Gebra and Bara been taken, a certain
+supply of water could have been counted on, and still more important,
+the co-operation of the powerful Kabbabish tribe, the only one still
+hostile to the Mahdi, might have been secured. The second important
+error was not less fatal. When the force marched it was accompanied by
+6000 camels and a large number of women. Encumbered in its movements
+by these useless impedimenta, the force never had any prospect of
+success with its active enemy. As it slowly advanced from the Nile it
+became with each day's march more hopelessly involved in its own
+difficulties, and the astute Mahdi expressly forbade any premature
+attack to be made upon an army which he clearly saw was marching to
+its doom.
+
+On the 1st November 1883, when the Egyptians were already disheartened
+by the want of water, the non-arrival of reinforcements from the
+garrisons near the Equator, which the Governor-General had rashly
+promised to bring up, and the exhausting nature of their march through
+a difficult country, the Mahdi's forces began their attack. Concealed
+in the high grass, they were able to pour in a heavy fire on the
+conspicuous body of the Egyptians at short range without exposing
+themselves. But notwithstanding his heavy losses, Hicks pressed on,
+because he knew that his only chance of safety lay in getting out of
+the dense cover in which he was at such a hopeless disadvantage. But
+this the Mahdi would never permit, and on 4th November, when Hicks had
+reached a place called Shekan, he gave the order to his impatient
+followers to go in and finish the work they had so well begun. The
+Egyptian soldiers seem to have been butchered without resistance. The
+Europeans and the Turkish cavalry fought well for a short time, but in
+a few minutes they were overpowered by superior numbers. Of the whole
+force of 10,000 men, only a few individuals escaped by some special
+stroke of fortune, for nearly the whole of the 300 prisoners taken
+were subsequently executed. Such was the complete and appalling
+character of the destruction of Hicks's army, which seemed to shatter
+at a single blow the whole fabric of the Khedive's power in the
+Soudan, and rivetted the attention of Europe on that particular
+quarter of the Dark Continent.
+
+The consequences of that decisive success, which became known in
+London three weeks after it happened, were immediate throughout the
+region wherein it occurred. Many Egyptian garrisons, which had been
+holding out in the hope of succour through the force that Hicks Pasha
+was bringing from Khartoum, abandoned hope after its destruction at
+Shekan, and thought only of coming to terms with the conqueror. Among
+these was the force at Dara in Darfour under the command of Slatin
+Pasha. That able officer had held the place for months under the
+greatest difficulty, and had even obtained some slight successes in
+the field, but the fate of the Hicks expedition convinced him that the
+situation was hopeless, and that his duty to the brave troops under
+him required the acceptance of the honourable terms which his tact and
+reputation enabled him to secure at the hands of the conqueror. Slatin
+surrendered on 23rd December 1883; Lupton Bey, commander in the Bahr
+Gazelle, about the same time, and these successes were enhanced and
+extended by those achieved by Osman Digma in the Eastern Soudan,
+where, early in February 1884, while Gordon was on his way to
+Khartoum, that leader inflicted on Baker Pasha at Tokar a defeat
+scarcely less crushing than that of Shekan.
+
+By New Year's Day, 1884, therefore, the power of the Mahdi was
+triumphantly established over the whole extent of the Soudan, from the
+Equator to Souakim, with the exception of Khartoum and the middle
+course of the Nile from that place to Dongola. There were also some
+outlying garrisons, such as that at Kassala, but the principal
+Egyptian force remaining was the body of 4000 so-called troops, the
+less efficient part, we may be sure, of those available, left behind
+at Khartoum, under Colonel de Coetlogon, by Hicks Pasha, when he set
+out on his unfortunate expedition. If the power of the Mahdi at this
+moment were merely to be measured by comparison with the collapse of
+authority, courage, and confidence of the titular upholders of the
+Khedive's Government, it might be pronounced formidable. It had
+sufficed to defeat every hostile effort made against it, and to
+practically annihilate all the armies that Egypt could bring into the
+field. Its extraordinary success was no doubt due to the incompetency,
+over-confidence, and deficient military spirit and knowledge of the
+Khedive's commanders and troops. But, while making the fullest
+admission on these points, it cannot be disputed that some of the
+elements in the Mahdi's power would have made it formidable, even if
+the cause of the Government had been more worthily and efficiently
+sustained. There is no doubt that, in the first place, he appealed to
+races which thought they were overtaxed, and to classes whose only
+tangible property had been assailed and diminished by the Anti-Slavery
+policy of the Government. Even if it would be going too far to say
+that Mahomed Ahmed, the long-looked-for Mahdi, was only a tool in the
+hands of secret conspirators pledged to avenge Suleiman, to restore
+Zebehr, and to bring back the good old times, when a fortune lay in
+the easy acquisition of human ivory, there is no doubt that the
+backbone of his power was provided by those followers of Suleiman,
+whom Gordon had broken up at Shaka and driven from Dara. But the
+Mahdi had supplied them in religious fanaticism with a more powerful
+incentive than pecuniary gain, and when he showed them how easily they
+might triumph over their opponents, he inspired them with a confidence
+which has not yet lost its efficacy.
+
+In 1884 all these inducements for the tribes of the Soudan to believe
+in their religious leader were in their pristine strength. He had
+succeeded in every thing he undertook, he had armed his countless
+warriors with the weapons taken from the armies he had destroyed, and
+he had placed at the disposal of his supporters an immense and
+easily-acquired spoil. The later experiences of the Mahdists were to
+be neither so pleasant nor so profitable, but at the end of 1883 they
+were at the height of their confidence and power. It was at such a
+moment and against such a powerful adversary that the British
+Government thought it right to take advantage of the devotion and
+gallantry of a single man, to send him alone to grapple with a
+difficulty which several armies had, by their own failure and
+destruction, rendered more grave, at the same time that they
+established the formidable nature of the rebellion in the Soudan as an
+unimpeachable fact instead of a disputable opinion. I do not think his
+own countrymen have yet quite appreciated the extraordinary heroism
+and devotion to his country which Gordon showed when he rushed off
+single-handed to oppose the ever-victorious Mahdi at the very zenith
+of his power.
+
+In unrolling the scroll of events connected with an intricate history,
+it next becomes necessary to explain why Gordon voluntarily, and it
+may even be admitted, enthusiastically, undertook a mission that, to
+any man in his senses, must have seemed at the moment at which it was
+undertaken little short of insanity. Whatever else may be said against
+the Government and the military authorities who suggested his going,
+and availed themselves of his readiness to go, to Khartoum, I do not
+think there is the shadow of a justification for the allegation that
+they forced him to proceed on that romantic errand, although of course
+it is equally clear that he insisted as the condition of his going at
+all that he should be ordered by his Government to proceed on this
+mission. Beyond this vital principle, which he held to all his life in
+never volunteering, he was far too eager to go himself to require any
+real stirring-up or compulsion. It was even a secret and unexpressed
+grievance that he should not be called upon to hasten to the spot,
+which had always been in his thoughts since the time he had left it.
+He could think of nothing else; in the midst of other work he would
+turn aside to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the Soudan as paramount
+to every other consideration; and when a great mission, like that to
+the Congo, which he could have made a turning-point in African
+history, was placed in his hands, he could only ask for "a respite,"
+and, with the charm of the Sphinx strong upon him, rushed on his fate
+in a chivalrous determination to essay the impossible. But was it
+right or justifiable that wise politicians and experienced generals
+should take advantage of such enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, and let
+one man go unaided to achieve what thousands had failed to do?
+
+It is necessary to establish clearly in the first place, and beyond
+dispute, the frame of mind which induced Gordon to take up his last
+Nile mission in precisely the confiding manner that he did. Gordon
+left Egypt at the end of 1879. Although events there in 1880 were of
+interest and importance, Gordon was too much occupied in India and
+China to say anything, but in October 1881 he drew up an important
+memorandum on affairs in Egypt since the deposition of Ismail. Gordon
+gave it to me specially for publication, and it duly appeared in _The
+Times_, but its historical interest is that it shows how Gordon's
+thoughts were still running on the affairs of the country in which he
+had served so long. The following is the full text:--
+
+     "On the 16th of August 1879, the Firman installing Tewfik as
+     Khedive was published in Cairo. From the 26th of June 1879, when
+     Ismail was deposed, to this date, Cherif Pasha remained Prime
+     Minister; he had been appointed on the dismissal of the
+     Rivers-Wilson and de Blignieres Ministry in May. Between June and
+     August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the
+     country a representative form of government, and had only a short
+     time before August 16 laid his proposition before Tewfik.
+     Cherif's idea was that, the representation being in the hands of
+     the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her
+     independence than if the Government was a personal one. It will
+     be remembered that, though many states have repudiated their
+     debts, no other ruler of those states was considered responsible
+     except in the case of Ismail of Egypt. Europe considered Ismail
+     responsible personally. She did not consider the rulers of
+     Turkey, Greece, Spain, etc., responsible, so that Cherif was
+     quite justified in his proposition. Cherif has been unjustly
+     considered opposed to any reform. This is not so. Certainly he
+     had shown his independence in refusing to acknowledge
+     Rivers-Wilson as his superior, preferring to give up his position
+     to doing so, but he knew well that reform was necessary, and had
+     always advised it. Cherif is perhaps the only Egyptian Minister
+     whose character for strict integrity is unimpeachable.
+
+     "A thoroughly independent man, caring but little for office or
+     its emoluments, of a good family, with antecedents which would
+     bear any investigation, he was not inclined to be questioned by
+     men whose social position was inferior to his own, and whose
+     _parti pris_ was against him. In the Council Chamber he was in a
+     minority because he spoke his mind; but this was not so with
+     other Ministers, whose antecedents were dubious. Had his advice
+     been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt. Any one
+     who knows Cherif will agree to this account of him, and will rate
+     him as infinitely superior to his other colleagues. He is
+     essentially not an intriguer.
+
+     "To return, immediately after the promulgation of the Firman on
+     August 16, Tewfik dismisses suddenly Cherif, and the European
+     Press considers he has done a bold thing, and, misjudging Cherif,
+     praise him for having broken with the advisers who caused the
+     ruin of Ismail. My opinion is that Tewfik feared Cherif's
+     proposition as being likely to curtail his power as absolute
+     ruler, and that he judged that he would by this dismissal gain
+     _kudos_ in Europe, and protect his absolute power.
+
+     "After a time Riaz is appointed in Cherif's place, and then
+     Tewfik begins his career. He concedes this and that to European
+     desires, but in so doing claims for his youth and inexperience
+     exemption from any reform which would take from his absolute
+     power. Knowing that it was the bondholders who upset his father
+     he conciliates them; they in their turn leave him to act as he
+     wished with regard to the internal government of the country.
+     Riaz was so placed as to be between two influences--one, the
+     bondholders seeking their advantages; the other, Tewfik, seeking
+     to retain all power. Riaz of course wavers. Knowing better than
+     Tewfik the feeling of Europe, he inclines more to the bondholders
+     than to Tewfik, to whom, however, he is bound to give some sops,
+     such as the Universal Military Service Bill, which the
+     bondholders let pass without a word, and which is the root of the
+     present troubles. After a time Tewfik finds that Riaz will give
+     no more sops, for the simple reason he dares not. Then Tewfik
+     finds him _de trop_, and by working up the military element
+     endeavours to counterbalance him. The European Powers manage to
+     keep the peace for a time, but eventually the military become too
+     strong for even Tewfik, who had conjured them up, and taking
+     things into their own hands upset Riaz, which Tewfik is glad of,
+     and demand a Constitution, which Tewfik is not glad of. Cherif
+     then returns, and it is to be hoped will get for the people what
+     he demanded before his dismissal.
+
+     "It is against all reason to expect any straightforward dealings
+     in any Sultan, Khedive, or Ameer; the only hope is in the people
+     they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object.
+
+     "There is no real loyalty towards the descendants of the Sandjak
+     of Salonica in Egypt; the people are Arabs, they are Greeks. The
+     people care for themselves. It is reiterated over and over again
+     that Egypt is prosperous and contented. I do not think it has
+     altered at all, except in improving its finances for the benefit
+     of the bondholders. The army may be paid regularly, but the lot
+     of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the Soudan is the same
+     oppressed lot as before. The prisons are as full of unfortunates
+     as ever they were, the local tribunals are as corrupt, and Tewfik
+     will always oppose their being affiliated to the mixed tribunals
+     of Alexandria, and thus afford protection to the judges of the
+     local tribunals, should they adjudicate justly. Tewfik is
+     essentially one of the Ameer class. I believe he would be willing
+     to act uprightly, if by so doing he could maintain his absolute
+     power. He has played a difficult game, making stock of his fear
+     of his father and of Halim, the legitimate heir according to the
+     Moslem, to induce the European Governments to be gentle with him,
+     at the same time resisting all measures which would benefit his
+     people should these measures touch his absolute power. He is
+     liberal only in measures which do not interfere with his
+     prerogative.
+
+     "It was inevitable that the present sort of trouble should arise.
+     The Controllers had got the finances in good order, and were
+     bound to look to the welfare of the people, which could only be
+     done by the curtailment of Tewfik's power. The present
+     arrangement of Controllers and Consul-Generals is defective. The
+     Consul-Generals are charged with the duty of seeing that the
+     country is quiet and the people well treated. They are
+     responsible to their Foreign Offices. The Controllers are charged
+     with the finances and the welfare of the country, but to whom
+     are they responsible? Not to Tewfik; though he pays them, he
+     cannot remove them; yet they must get on well with him. Not to
+     the Foreign Office, for it is repeatedly said that they are
+     Egyptian officials, yet they have to keep on good terms with
+     these Foreign Offices. Not to the bondholders, though they are
+     bound, considering their power, to be on good terms with them.
+     Not to the inhabitants of Egypt, though these latter are taught
+     to believe that every unpopular act is done by the Controllers'
+     advice.
+
+     "The only remedy is by the formation of a Council of Notables,
+     having direct access to Tewfik, and independent of his or of the
+     Ministers' goodwill, and the subjection of the Controllers to the
+     Consul-Generals responsible to the Foreign Office--in fact,
+     Residents at the Court. This would be no innovation, for the
+     supervision exists now, except under the Controllers and
+     Consul-Generals. It is simply proposed to amalgamate Controllers
+     with Consul-Generals, and to give these latter the position of
+     Residents. By this means the continual change of French
+     Consul-Generals would be avoided, and the consequent ill-feeling
+     between France and England would disappear. Should the Residents
+     fall out, the matter would be easily settled by the Governments.
+     As it is at present, a quadruple combat goes on; sometimes it is
+     one Consul-General against the other Consul-General, aided by the
+     two Controllers, or a Consul-General and one Controller against
+     the other Consul-General and the other Controller, in all of
+     which combats Tewfik gains and the people lose.
+
+     "One thing should certainly be done--the giving of concessions
+     ought not to be in the power of Controllers, nor if
+     Consul-Generals are amalgamated with Controllers as Residents
+     should these Residents have this power. It ought to be exercised
+     by the Council of Notables, who would look to the welfare of the
+     people."
+
+The progress of events in Lower Egypt during 1881 and 1882 was watched
+with great care, whether he was vegetating in the Mauritius or
+absorbed in the anxieties and labours of his South African mission.
+Commenting on the downfall of Arabi, he explained how the despatch of
+troops to the Soudan, composed of regiments tainted with a spirit of
+insubordination, would inevitably aggravate the situation there. Later
+on, in 1883, when he heard of Hicks being sent to take the command and
+repair the defeat of Yusuf, he wrote:--"Unless Hicks is given supreme
+command he is lost; it can never work putting him in a subordinate
+position. Hicks must be made Governor-General, otherwise he will never
+end things satisfactorily." At the same time, he came to the
+conclusion that there was only one man who could save Egypt, and that
+was Nubar Pasha. He wrote:--"If they do not make Nubar Pasha Prime
+Minister or Regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only
+man who can rule that country." This testimony to Nubar's capacity is
+the more remarkable and creditable, as in earlier days Gordon had not
+appreciated the merit of a statesman who has done more for Egypt than
+any other of his generation. But at a very early stage of the Soudan
+troubles Gordon convinced himself that the radical cause of these
+difficulties and misfortunes was not the shortcomings and errors of
+any particular subordinate, but the complete want of a definite policy
+on the part, not of the Khedive and his advisers, but of the British
+Government itself. He wrote on this point to a friend (2nd September
+1883), almost the day that Hicks was to march from Khartoum:--
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government, right or wrong, will not take a
+     decided step _in re_ Egypt and the Soudan; they drift, but at the
+     same time cannot avoid the _onus_ of being the real power in
+     Egypt, with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is
+     undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in
+     power against the will of the people; this alone is insufferable
+     from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government
+     have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their
+     present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over
+     the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with
+     France, and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act
+     in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further
+     than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the
+     odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt
+     fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her
+     Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for
+     the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on
+     in a ruined country at a cost of half a million per annum at
+     least. I say therefore to avoid all this, _if Her Majesty's
+     Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country_
+     (which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get
+     the Palestine Canal made, and quit Egypt to work out its own
+     salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This
+     anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the
+     travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy
+     now; therefore better leave the country, and thus avoid a
+     responsibility which gives no advantage, and is mean and
+     dangerous."
+
+In a letter to myself, dated 3rd January 1884, from Brussels, he
+enters into some detail on matters that had been forgotten or were
+insufficiently appreciated, to which the reported appointment of
+Zebehr to proceed to the Soudan and stem the Mahdi's advance lent
+special interest:--
+
+     "I send you a small note which you can make use of, but I beg you
+     will not let my name appear under any circumstances. When in
+     London I had printed a pamphlet in Arabic, with all the papers
+     (official) concerning Zebehr Pasha and his action in pushing his
+     son to rebel. It is in Arabic. My brother has it. It is not long,
+     and would repay translating and publishing. It has all the
+     history and the authentic letters found in the divan of Zebehr's
+     son when Gessi took his stockade. It is in a cover, blue and
+     gold. It was my address to people of Soudan--Apologia. Isaiah
+     XIX. 19, 20, 21 has a wonderful prophecy about Egypt and the
+     saviour who will come from the frontier."
+
+The note enclosed was published in _The Times_ of 5th January, and
+read as follows:--
+
+     "A correspondent writes that it may seem inexplicable why the
+     Mahdi's troops attacked Gezireh, which, as its name signifies, is
+     an isle near Berber, but there is an old tradition that the
+     future ruler of the Soudan will be from that isle. Zebehr Rahama
+     knew this, but he fell on leaving his boat at this isle, and so,
+     though the Soudan people looked on him as a likely saviour, this
+     omen shook their confidence in him. He was then on his way to
+     Cairo after swearing his people to rebel (if he was retained
+     there), under a tree at Shaka. Zebehr will most probably be taken
+     prisoner by the Mahdi, and will then take the command of the
+     Mahdi's forces. The peoples of the Soudan are very superstitious,
+     and the fall of the flag by a gust of wind, on the proclamation
+     of Tewfik at Khartoum, was looked on as an omen of the end of
+     Mehemet Ali's dynasty. There is an old tree opposite Cook's
+     office at Jerusalem in Toppet, belonging to an old family, and
+     protected by Sultan's Firman, which the Arabs consider will fall
+     when the Sultan's rule ends. It lost a large limb during the
+     Turco-Russian war, and is now in a decayed state. There can be no
+     doubt but that the movement will spread into Palestine, Syria,
+     and Hedjaz. At Damascus already proclamations have been posted
+     up, denouncing Turks and Circassians, and this was before Hicks
+     was defeated. It is the beginning of the end of Turkey. Austria
+     backed by Germany will go to Salonica, quieting Russia by letting
+     her go into Armenia--England and France neutralising one another.
+
+     "If not too late, the return of the ex-Khedive Ismail to Egypt,
+     and the union of England and France to support and control the
+     Arab movement, appears the only chance. Ismail would soon come to
+     terms with the Soudan, the rebellion of which countries was
+     entirely due to the oppression of the Turks and Circassians."
+
+These expressions of opinion about Egypt and the Soudan may be said to
+have culminated in the remarkable pronouncement Gordon made to Mr W.
+T. Stead, the brilliant editor of the _Pall Mall Gazette_, on 8th
+January 1884, which appeared in his paper on the following day. The
+substance of that statement is as follows:--
+
+     "So you would abandon the Soudan? But the Eastern Soudan is
+     indispensable to Egypt. It will cost you far more to retain your
+     hold upon Egypt proper if you abandon your hold of the Eastern
+     Soudan to the Mahdi or to the Turk than what it would to retain
+     your hold upon Eastern Soudan by the aid of such material as
+     exists in the provinces. Darfour and Kordofan must be abandoned.
+     That I admit; but the provinces lying to the east of the White
+     Nile should be retained, and north of Sennaar. The danger to be
+     feared is not that the Mahdi will march northward through Wady
+     Halfa; on the contrary, it is very improbable that he will ever
+     go so far north. The danger is altogether of a different nature.
+     It arises from the influence which the spectacle of a conquering
+     Mahommedan Power established close to your frontiers will
+     exercise upon the population which you govern. In all the cities
+     in Egypt it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may
+     do; and, as he has driven out the intruder and the infidel, they
+     may do the same. Nor is it only England that has to face this
+     danger. The success of the Mahdi has already excited dangerous
+     fermentation in Arabia and Syria. Placards have been posted in
+     Damascus calling upon the population to rise and drive out the
+     Turks. If the whole of the Eastern Soudan is surrendered to the
+     Mahdi, the Arab tribes on both sides of the Red Sea will take
+     fire. In self-defence the Turks are bound to do something to cope
+     with so formidable a danger, for it is quite possible that if
+     nothing is done the whole of the Eastern Question may be reopened
+     by the triumph of the Mahdi. I see it is proposed to fortify Wady
+     Halfa, and prepare there to resist the Mahdi's attack. You might
+     as well fortify against a fever. Contagion of that kind cannot be
+     kept out by fortifications and garrisons. But that it is real,
+     and that it does exist, will be denied by no one cognisant with
+     Egypt and the East. In self-defence the policy of evacuation
+     cannot possibly be justified.
+
+     "There is another aspect of the question. You have 6000 men in
+     Khartoum. What are you going to do with them? You have garrisons
+     in Darfour, in Bahr el Gazelle, and Gondokoro. Are they to be
+     sacrificed? Their only offence is their loyalty to their
+     Sovereign. For their fidelity you are going to abandon them to
+     their fate. You say they are to retire upon Wady Halfa. But
+     Gondokoro is 1500 miles from Khartoum, and Khartoum is only 350
+     from Wady Halfa. How will you move your 6000 men from
+     Khartoum--to say nothing of other places--and all the Europeans
+     in that city through the desert to Wady Halfa? Where are you
+     going to get the camels to take them away? Will the Mahdi supply
+     them? If they are to escape with their lives, the garrison will
+     not be allowed to leave with a coat on their backs. They will be
+     plundered to the skin, and even then their lives may not be
+     spared. Whatever you may decide about evacuation, you cannot
+     evacuate, because your army cannot be moved. You must either
+     surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all
+     hazards. The latter is the only course which ought to be
+     entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it. The Mahdi's
+     forces will fall to pieces of themselves; but if in a moment of
+     panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the
+     Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against the security of
+     Egypt and the peace of the East, which may have fatal
+     consequences.
+
+     "The great evil is not at Khartoum, but at Cairo. It is the
+     weakness of Cairo which produces disaster in the Soudan. It is
+     because Hicks was not adequately supported at the first, but was
+     thrust forward upon an impossible enterprise by the men who had
+     refused him supplies when a decisive blow might have been struck,
+     that the Western Soudan has been sacrificed. The Eastern Soudan
+     may, however, be saved if there is a firm hand placed at the helm
+     in Egypt. Everything depends on that.
+
+     "What then, you ask, should be done? I reply, Place Nubar in
+     power! Nubar is the one supremely able man among Egyptian
+     Ministers. He is proof against foreign intrigue, and he
+     thoroughly understands the situation. Place him in power; support
+     him through thick and thin; give him a free hand; and let it be
+     distinctly understood that no intrigues, either on the part of
+     Tewfik or any of Nubar's rivals, will be allowed for a moment to
+     interfere with the execution of his plans. You are sure to find
+     that the energetic support of Nubar will, sooner or later, bring
+     you into collision with the Khedive; but if that Sovereign really
+     desires, as he says, the welfare of his country, it will be
+     necessary for you to protect Nubar's Administration from any
+     direct or indirect interference on his part. Nubar can be
+     depended upon: that I can guarantee. He will not take office
+     without knowing that he is to have his own way; but if he takes
+     office, it is the best security that you can have for the
+     restoration of order to the country. Especially is this the case
+     with the Soudan. Nubar should be left untrammelled by any
+     stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum. There is no
+     hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present. Let them
+     continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have
+     worked their natural results in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar
+     should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he
+     will deal with the Soudan, of course, I cannot profess to say;
+     but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at
+     Khartoum, with full powers, and furnish him with two millions
+     sterling--a large sum, no doubt, but a sum which had much better
+     be spent now than wasted in a vain attempt to avert the
+     consequences of an ill-timed surrender. Sir Samuel Baker, who
+     possesses the essential energy and single tongue requisite for
+     the office, might be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan,
+     and he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief.
+
+     "It should be proclaimed in the hearing of all the Soudanese, and
+     engraved on tablets of brass, that a permanent Constitution was
+     granted to the Soudanese, by which no Turk or Circassian would
+     ever be allowed to enter the province to plunder its inhabitants
+     in order to fill his own pockets, and that no immediate
+     emancipation of slaves would be attempted. Immediate emancipation
+     was denounced in 1833 as confiscation in England, and it is no
+     less confiscation in the Soudan to-day. Whatever is done in that
+     direction should be done gradually, and by a process of
+     registration. Mixed tribunals might be established, if Nubar
+     thought fit, in which European judges would co-operate with the
+     natives in the administration of justice. Police inspectors also
+     might be appointed, and adequate measures taken to root out the
+     abuses which prevail in the prisons.
+
+     "With regard to Darfour, I should think that Nubar would probably
+     send back the family and the heir of the Sultan of Darfour. If
+     subsidized by the Government, and sent back with Sir Samuel
+     Baker, he would not have much difficulty in regaining possession
+     of the kingdom of Darfour, which was formerly one of the best
+     governed of African countries. As regards Abyssinia, the old
+     warning should not be lost sight of--"Put not your trust in
+     princes"; and place no reliance upon the King of Abyssinia, at
+     least outside his own country. Zeylah and Bogos might be ceded to
+     him with advantage, and the free right of entry by the port of
+     Massowah might be added; but it would be a mistake to give him
+     possession of Massowah which he would ruin. A Commission might
+     also be sent down with advantage to examine the state of things
+     in Harrar, opposite Aden, and see what iniquities are going on
+     there, as also at Berbera and Zeylah. By these means, and by the
+     adoption of a steady, consistent policy at headquarters, it would
+     be possible--not to say easy--to re-establish the authority of
+     the Khedive between the Red Sea and Sennaar.
+
+     "As to the cost of the Soudan, it is a mistake to suppose that it
+     will necessarily be a charge on the Egyptian Exchequer. It will
+     cost two millions to relieve the garrisons and to quell the
+     revolt; but that expenditure must be incurred any way; and in all
+     probability, if the garrisons are handed over to be massacred and
+     the country evacuated, the ultimate expenditure would exceed that
+     sum. At first, until the country is pacified, the Soudan will
+     need a subsidy of L200,000 a year from Egypt. That, however,
+     would be temporary. During the last years of my administration
+     the Soudan involved no charge upon the Egyptian Exchequer. The
+     bad provinces were balanced against the good, and an equilibrium
+     was established. The Soudan will never be a source of revenue to
+     Egypt, but it need not be a source of expense. That deficits have
+     arisen, and that the present disaster has occurred, is entirely
+     attributable to a single cause, and that is, the grossest
+     misgovernment.
+
+     "The cause of the rising in the Soudan is the cause of all
+     popular risings against Turkish rule, wherever they have
+     occurred. No one who has been in a Turkish province, and has
+     witnessed the results of the Bashi-Bazouk system, which excited
+     so much indignation some time ago in Bulgaria, will need to be
+     told why the people of the Soudan have risen in revolt against
+     the Khedive. The Turks, the Circassians, and the Bashi-Bazouks
+     have plundered and oppressed the people in the Soudan, as they
+     plundered and oppressed them in the Balkan peninsula. Oppression
+     begat discontent; discontent necessitated an increase of the
+     armed force at the disposal of the authorities; this increase of
+     the army force involved an increase of expenditure, which again
+     was attempted to be met by increasing taxation, and that still
+     further increased the discontent. And so things went on in a
+     dismal circle, until they culminated, after repeated deficits, in
+     a disastrous rebellion. That the people were justified in
+     rebelling, nobody who knows the treatment to which they were
+     subjected will attempt to deny. Their cries were absolutely
+     unheeded at Cairo. In despair, they had recourse to the only
+     method by which they could make their wrongs known; and, on the
+     same principle that Absalom fired the corn of Joab, so they
+     rallied round the Mahdi, who exhorted them to revolt against the
+     Turkish yoke. I am convinced that it is an entire mistake to
+     regard the Mahdi as in any sense a religious leader: he
+     personifies popular discontent. All the Soudanese are potential
+     Mahdis, just as all the Egyptians are potential Arabis. The
+     movement is not religious, but an outbreak of despair. Three
+     times over I warned the late Khedive that it would be impossible
+     to govern the Soudan on the old system, after my appointment to
+     the Governor-Generalship. During the three years that I wielded
+     full powers in the Soudan, I taught the natives that they had a
+     right to exist. I waged war against the Turks and Circassians,
+     who had harried the population. I had taught them something of
+     the meaning of liberty and justice, and accustomed them to a
+     higher ideal of government than that with which they had
+     previously been acquainted. As soon as I had gone, the Turks and
+     Circassians returned in full force; the old Bashi-Bazouk system
+     was re-established; my old _employes_ were persecuted; and a
+     population which had begun to appreciate something like decent
+     government was flung back to suffer the worst excesses of Turkish
+     rule. The inevitable result followed; and thus it may be said
+     that the egg of the present rebellion was laid in the three years
+     during which I was allowed to govern the Soudan on other than
+     Turkish principles.
+
+     "The Soudanese are a very nice people. They deserve the sincere
+     compassion and sympathy of all civilised men. I got on very well
+     with them, and I am sincerely sorry at the prospect of seeing
+     them handed over to be ground down once more by their Turkish and
+     Circassian oppressors. Yet, unless an attempt is made to hold on
+     to the present garrisons, it is inevitable that the Turks, for
+     the sake of self-preservation, must attempt to crush them. They
+     deserve a better fate. It ought not to be impossible to come to
+     terms with them, to grant them a free amnesty for the past, to
+     offer them security for decent government in the future. If this
+     were done, and the government entrusted to a man whose word was
+     truth, all might yet be re-established. So far from believing it
+     impossible to make an arrangement with the Mahdi, I strongly
+     suspect that he is a mere puppet, put forward by Elias, Zebehr's
+     father-in-law, and the largest slave-owner in Obeid, and that he
+     had assumed a religious title to give colour to his defence of
+     the popular rights.
+
+     "There is one subject on which I cannot imagine any one can
+     differ about. That is the impolicy of announcing our intention to
+     evacuate Khartoum. Even if we were bound to do so we should have
+     said nothing about it. The moment it is known that we have given
+     up the game, every man will go over to the Mahdi. All men worship
+     the rising sun. The difficulties of evacuation will be enormously
+     increased, if, indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not
+     rendered impossible.
+
+     "The late Khedive, who is one of the ablest and worst-used men in
+     Europe, would not have made such a mistake, and under him the
+     condition of Egypt proper was much better than it is to-day. Now,
+     with regard to Egypt, the same principle should be observed that
+     must be acted upon in the Soudan. Let your foundations be broad
+     and firm, and based upon the contentment and welfare of the
+     people. Hitherto, both in the Soudan and in Egypt, instead of
+     constructing the social edifice like a pyramid, upon its base, we
+     have been rearing an obelisk which a single push may overturn.
+     Our safety in Egypt is to do something for the people. That is to
+     say, you must reduce their rent, rescue them from the usurers,
+     and retrench expenditure. Nine-tenths of the European _employes_
+     might probably be weeded out with advantage. The remaining
+     tenth--thoroughly efficient--should be retained; but, whatever
+     you do, do not break up Sir Evelyn Wood's army, which is destined
+     to do good work. Stiffen it as much as you please, but with
+     Englishmen, not with Circassians. Circassians are as much
+     foreigners in Egypt as Englishmen are, and certainly not more
+     popular. As for the European population, let them have charters
+     for the formation of municipal councils, for raising volunteer
+     corps, and for organising in their own defence. Anything more
+     shameful than the flight from Egypt in 1882 I never read. Let
+     them take an example from Shanghai, where the European settlement
+     provides for its own defence and its own government. I should
+     like to see a competent special Commissioner of the highest
+     standing--such a man, for instance, as the Right Honourable W. E.
+     Forster, who is free at once from traditions of the elders and of
+     the Foreign Office and of the bondholders, sent out to put Nubar
+     in the saddle, sift out unnecessary _employes_, and warn
+     evil-doers in the highest places that they will not be allowed to
+     play any tricks. If that were done, it would give confidence
+     everywhere, and I see no reason why the last British soldier
+     should not be withdrawn from Egypt in six months' time."
+
+A perusal of these passages will suffice to show the reader what
+thoughts were uppermost in Gordon's mind at the very moment when he
+was negotiating about his new task for the King of the Belgians on the
+Congo, and those thoughts, inspired by the enthusiasm derived from his
+noble spirit, and the perfect self-sacrifice with which he would have
+thrown himself into what he conceived to be a good and necessary work,
+made him the ready victim of a Government which absolutely did not
+know what course to pursue, and which was delighted to find that the
+very man, whom the public designated as the right man for the
+situation, was ready--nay, eager--to take all the burden on his
+shoulders whenever his own Government called on him to do so, and to
+proceed straight to the scene of danger without so much as asking for
+precise instructions, or insisting on guarantees for his own proper
+treatment. There is no doubt that from his own individual point of
+view, and as affecting any selfish or personal consideration he had at
+heart, this mode of action was very unwise and reprehensible, and a
+worldly censure would be the more severe on Gordon, because he acted
+with his eyes open, and knew that the gravity of the trouble really
+arose from the drifting policy and want of purpose of the very
+Ministers for whom he was about to dare a danger that Gordon himself,
+in a cooler moment, would very likely have deemed it unnecessary to
+face.
+
+Into the motives that filled him with a belief that he might inspire a
+Government, which had no policy, with one created by his own courage,
+confidence, and success, it would be impossible to enter, but it can
+be confidently asserted that, although they were drawn after him _sed
+pede claudo_ to expend millions of treasure and thousands of lives,
+they were never inspired by his exhortations and example to form a
+definite policy as to the main point in the situation, viz., the
+defence of the Egyptian possessions. In the flush of the moment,
+carried along by an irresistible inclination to do the things which he
+saw could be done, he overlooked all the other points of the case, and
+especially that he was dealing with politicians tied by their party
+principles, and thinking more of the passage through the House of some
+domestic measure of fifth-rate importance than of the maintenance of
+an Imperial interest and the arrest of an outbreak of Mahommedan
+fanaticism which, if not checked, might call for a crusade. Gordon
+overlooked all these considerations. He never thought but that he was
+dealing with other Englishmen equally mindful with himself of their
+country's fame.
+
+If Gordon, long before he took up the task, had been engrossed in the
+development of the Soudan difficulty and the Mahdi's power, those who
+had studied the question and knew his special qualifications for the
+task, had, at a very early stage of the trouble, called upon the
+Government to avail themselves of his services, and there is no doubt
+that if that advice had been promptly taken instead of slowly,
+reluctantly, and only when matters were desperate, there is no doubt,
+I repeat, remembering what he did later on, that Gordon would have
+been able, without a single English regiment, to have strangled the
+Mahdi's power in its infancy, and to have won back the Soudan for the
+Khedive.
+
+But it may be said, where was it ever prominently suggested that
+General Gordon should be despatched to the Soudan at a time before the
+Mahdi had become supreme in that region, as he undoubtedly did by the
+overthrow of Hicks and his force?
+
+I reply by the following quotations from prominent articles written by
+myself in _The Times_ of January and February 1883. Until the capture
+of El Obeid at that period the movement of the Mahdi was a local
+affair of the importance of which no one, at a distance, could attempt
+to judge, but that signal success made it the immediate concern of
+those responsible in Egypt. On 9th January 1883, in an article in _The
+Times_ on "The Soudan," occurs this passage:--
+
+     "It is a misfortune, in the interests of Egypt, of civilisation,
+     and of the mass of the Soudanese, that we cannot send General
+     Gordon back to the region of the Upper Nile to complete there the
+     good work he began eight years ago. With full powers, and with
+     the assurance that the good fruits of his labours shall not be
+     lost by the subsequent acts of corrupt Pashas, there need be
+     little doubt of his attaining rapid success, while the memory of
+     his achievements, when working for a half-hearted Government,
+     and with incapable colleagues, yet lives in the hearts of the
+     black people of the Soudan, and fills one of the most creditable
+     pages in the history of recent administration of alien races by
+     Englishmen."
+
+Again, on 17th February, in another article on the same subject:--
+
+     "The authority of the Mahdi could scarcely be preserved save by
+     constant activity and a policy of aggression, which would
+     constitute a standing danger to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt.
+     On the other hand, the preservation of the Khedive's sovereign
+     rights through our instrumentality will carry with it the
+     responsibility of providing the unhappy peoples of Darfour,
+     Dongola, Kordofan, and the adjacent provinces with an equitable
+     administration and immunity from heavy taxation. The obligation
+     cannot be avoided under these, or perhaps under any
+     circumstances, but the acceptance of it is not a matter to be
+     entertained with an easy mind. The one thing that would reconcile
+     us to the idea would be the assurance that General Gordon would
+     be sent back with plenary powers to the old scene of his labours,
+     and that he would accept the charge."
+
+As Gordon was not resorted to when the fall of El Obeid in the early
+part of the year 1883 showed that the situation demanded some decisive
+step, it is not surprising that he was left in inglorious inaction in
+Palestine, while, as I and others knew well, his uppermost thought was
+to be grappling with the Mahdi during the long lull of preparing
+Hicks's expedition, and of its marching to its fate. The catastrophe
+to that force on 4th November was known in London on 22nd November.
+
+I urged in every possible way the prompt employment of General Gordon,
+who could have reached Egypt in a very short time from his place of
+exile at Jaffa. But on this occasion I was snubbed, being told by one
+of the ablest editors I have known, now dead, that "Gordon was
+generally considered to be mad." However, at this moment the
+Government seem to have come to the conclusion that General Gordon had
+some qualifications to undertake the task in the Soudan, for at the
+end of November 1883, Sir Charles Dilke, then a member of the Cabinet
+as President of the Local Government Board, but whose special
+knowledge and experience of foreign affairs often led to his assisting
+Lord Granville at the Foreign Office, offered the Egyptian Government
+Gordon's services. They were declined, and when, on 1st December 1883,
+Lord Granville proposed the same measure in a more formal manner, and
+asked in an interrogatory form whether General Charles Gordon would be
+of any use, and if so in what capacity, Sir Evelyn Baring, now Lord
+Cromer, threw cold water on the project, and stated on 2nd December
+that "the Egyptian Government were very much averse to employing him."
+Subsequent events make it desirable to call special attention to the
+fact that when, however tardily, the British Government did propose
+the employment of General Gordon, the suggestion was rejected, not on
+public grounds, but on private. Major Baring did not need to be
+informed as to the work Gordon had done in the Soudan, and as to the
+incomparable manner in which it had been performed. No one knew better
+than he that, with the single exception of Sir Samuel Baker, who was
+far too prudent to take up a thankless task, and to remove the
+mountain of blunders others had committed, there was no man living who
+had the smallest pretension to say that he could cope with the Soudan
+difficulty, save Charles Gordon. Yet, when his name is suggested, he
+treats the matter as one that cannot be entertained. There is not a
+word as to the obvious propriety of suggesting Gordon's name, but the
+objection of a puppet-prince like Tewfik is reported as fatal to the
+course. Yet six weeks, with the mighty lever of an aroused public
+opinion, sufficed to make him withdraw the opposition he advanced to
+the appointment, not on public grounds, which was simply impossible,
+but, I fear, from private feelings, for he had not forgotten the scene
+in Cairo in 1878, when he attempted to control the action of Gordon on
+the financial question. There would be no necessity to refer to this
+matter, but for its consequences. Had Sir Evelyn Baring done his duty,
+and given the only honest answer on 2nd December 1883, that if any one
+man could save the situation, that man was Charles Gordon, Gordon
+could have reached Khartoum early in January instead of late in
+February, and that difference of six weeks might well have sufficed to
+completely alter the course of subsequent events, and certainly to
+save Gordon's life, seeing that, after all, the Nile Expedition was
+only a few days too late. The delay was also attended with fatal
+results to the civil population of Khartoum. Had Gordon reached there
+early in January he could have saved them all, for as it was he sent
+down 2600 refugees, i.e. merchants, old men, women, and children,
+making all arrangements for their comfort in the very brief period of
+open communication after his arrival, when the greater part of
+February had been spent.
+
+The conviction that Gordon's appointment and departure were retarded
+by personal _animus_ and an old difference is certainly strengthened
+by all that follows. Sir Evelyn Baring and the Egyptian Government
+would not have Charles Gordon, but they were quite content to entrust
+the part of Saviour of the Soudan to Zebehr, the king of the
+slave-hunters. On 13th December Lord Granville curtly informed our
+representative at Cairo that the employment of Zebehr was inexpedient,
+and Gordon in his own forcible way summed the matter up thus: "Zebehr
+will manage to get taken prisoner, and will then head the revolt."
+
+But while Sir Evelyn Baring would not have Gordon and the British
+Cabinet withheld its approval from Zebehr, it was felt that the
+situation required that something should be done as soon as possible,
+for the Mahdi was master of the Soudan, and at any moment tidings
+might come of his advance on Khartoum, where there was only a small
+and disheartened garrison, and a considerable defenceless population.
+The responsible Egyptian Ministers made several suggestions for
+dealing with the situation, but they one and all deprecated ceding
+territory to the Mahdi, as it would further alienate the tribes still
+loyal or wavering and create graver trouble in the future. What they
+chiefly contended for was the opening of the Berber-Souakim route with
+10,000 troops, who should be Turks, as English troops were not
+available. It is important to note that this suggestion did not shock
+the Liberal Government, and on 13th December 1883 Lord Granville
+replied that the Government had no objection to offer to the
+employment of Turkish troops at Souakim for service in the Soudan. In
+the following month the Foreign Secretary went one step further, and
+"concurred in the surrender of the Soudan to the Sultan." In fact the
+British Government were only anxious about one thing, and that was to
+get rid of the Soudan, and to be saved any further worry in the
+matter. No doubt, if the Sultan had had the money to pay for the
+despatch of the expedition, this last suggestion would have been
+adopted, but as he had not, the only way to get rid of the
+responsibility was to thrust it on Gordon, who was soon discovered to
+be ready to accept it without delay or conditions.
+
+On 22nd December 1883 Sir Evelyn Baring wrote: "It would be necessary
+to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full
+powers to withdraw the garrisons, and to make the best arrangements
+possible for the future government of the country." News from Khartoum
+showed that everything there was in a state verging on panic, that the
+people thought they were abandoned by the Government, and that the
+enemy had only to advance for the place to fall without a blow. Lastly
+Colonel de Coetlogon, the governor after Hicks's death, recommended on
+9th January the immediate withdrawal of the garrison from Khartoum,
+which he thought could be accomplished if carried out with the
+greatest promptitude, but which involved the desertion of the other
+garrisons. Abd-el-Kader, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan and
+Minister of War, offered to proceed to Khartoum, but when he
+discovered that the abandonment of the Soudan was to be proclaimed, he
+absolutely refused on any consideration to carry out what he termed a
+hopeless errand.
+
+All these circumstances gave special point to Sir Evelyn Baring's
+recommendation on 22nd December that "an English officer of high
+authority should be sent to Khartoum," and the urgency of a decision
+was again impressed on the Government in his telegram of 1st January,
+because Egypt is on the point of losing the Soudan, and moreover
+possesses no force with which to defend the valley of the Nile
+downwards. But in the many messages that were sent on this subject
+during the last fortnight of the year 1883, the name of the one
+"English officer of high authority" specially suited for the task
+finds no mention. As this omission cannot be attributed to ignorance,
+some different motive must be discovered. At last, on 10th January,
+Lord Granville renews his suggestion to send General Gordon, and asks
+whether he would not be of some assistance under the altered
+circumstances. The "altered circumstances" must have been inserted for
+the purpose of letting down Sir Evelyn Baring as lightly as possible,
+for the only alteration in the circumstances was that six weeks had
+been wasted in coming to any decision at all. On 11th January Sir
+Evelyn Baring replied that he and Nubar Pasha did not think Gordon's
+services could be utilised, and yet three weeks before he had
+recommended that "an English officer of high authority" should be
+sent, and he had even complained because prompter measures were not
+taken to give effect to his recommendation. The only possible
+conclusion is that, in Sir Evelyn Baring's opinion, General Gordon was
+not "an English officer of high authority." As if to make his views
+more emphatic, Sir Evelyn Baring on 15th January again telegraphed for
+an English officer with the intentional and conspicuous omission of
+Gordon's name, which had been three times urged upon him by his own
+Government. But determined as Sir Evelyn Baring was that by no act or
+word of his should General Gordon be appointed to the Soudan, there
+were more powerful influences at work than even his strong will.
+
+The publication of General Gordon's views in the _Pall Mall Gazette_
+of 9th January 1884 had roused public opinion to the importance and
+urgency of the matter. It had also revealed that there was at least
+one man who was not in terror of the Mahdi's power, and who thought
+that the situation might still be saved. There is no doubt that that
+publication was the direct and immediate cause of Lord Granville's
+telegram of 10th January; but Sir Evelyn Baring, unmoved by what
+people thought or said at home, coldly replied on 11th January that
+Gordon is not the man he wants. If there had been no other
+considerations in the matter, I have no doubt that Sir Evelyn Baring
+would have beaten public opinion, and carried matters in the high,
+dictatorial spirit he had shown since the first mention of Gordon's
+name. But he had not made allowance for an embarrassed and purposeless
+Government, asking only to be relieved of the whole trouble, and
+willing to adopt any suggestion--even to resign its place to "the
+unspeakable Turk"--so long as it was no longer worried in the matter.
+
+At that moment Gordon appears on the scene, ready and anxious to
+undertake single-handed a task for which others prescribe armies and
+millions of money. Public opinion greets him as the man for the
+occasion, and certainly he is the man to suit "that" Government. The
+only obstruction is Sir Evelyn Baring. Against any other array of
+forces his views would have prevailed, but even for him these are too
+strong.
+
+On 15th January Gordon saw Lord Wolseley, as described in the last
+chapter, and then and there it is discovered and arranged that he will
+go to the Soudan, but only at the Government's request, provided the
+King of the Belgians will consent to his postponing the fulfilment of
+his promise, as Gordon knows he cannot help but do, for it was given
+on the express stipulation that the claim of his own country should
+always come first. King Leopold, who has behaved throughout with
+generosity, and the most kind consideration towards Gordon, is
+naturally displeased and upset, but he feels that he cannot restrain
+Gordon or insist on the letter of his bond. The Congo Mission is
+therefore broken off or suspended, as described in the last chapter.
+In the evening of the 15th Lord Granville despatched a telegram to Sir
+Evelyn Baring, no longer asking his opinion or advice, but stating
+that the Government have determined to send General Gordon to the
+Soudan, and that he will start without delay. To that telegram the
+British representative could make no demur short of resigning his
+post, but at last the grudging admission was wrung from him that
+"Gordon would be the best man." This conclusion, to which anyone
+conversant with the facts, as Sir Evelyn Baring was, would have come
+at once, was therefore only arrived at seven weeks after Sir Charles
+Dilke first brought forward Gordon's name as the right person to deal
+with the Soudan difficulty. That loss of time was irreparable, and in
+the end proved fatal to Gordon himself.
+
+In describing the last mission, betrayal, and death of Gordon, the
+heavy responsibility of assigning the just blame to those individuals
+who were in a special degree the cause of that hero's fate cannot be
+shirked by any writer pretending to record history. Lord Cromer has
+filled a difficult post in Egypt for many years with advantage to his
+country, but in the matter of General Gordon's last Nile mission he
+allowed his personal feelings to obscure his judgment. He knew that
+Gordon was a difficult, let it be granted an impossible, colleague;
+that he would do things in his own way in defiance of diplomatic
+timidity and official rigidity; and that, instead of there being in
+the Egyptian firmament the one planet Baring, there would be only the
+single sun of Gordon. All these considerations were human, but they
+none the less show that he allowed his private feelings, his
+resentment at Gordon's treatment of him in 1878, to bias his judgment
+in a matter of public moment. It was his opposition alone that
+retarded Gordon's departure by seven weeks, and indeed the delay was
+longer, as Gordon was then at Jaffa, and that delay, I repeat it
+solemnly, cost Gordon his life. Whoever else was to blame afterwards,
+the first against whom a verdict of Guilty must be entered, without
+any hope of reprieve at the bar of history, was Sir Evelyn Baring, now
+Lord Cromer.
+
+Mr Gladstone and his Government are certainly clear of any reflection
+in this stage of the matter. They did their best to put forward
+General Gordon immediately on the news coming of the Hicks disaster,
+and although they might have shown greater determination in compelling
+the adoption of their plan, which they were eventually obliged to do,
+this was a very venial fault, and not in any serious way blameworthy.
+Nor did they ever seek to repudiate their responsibility for sending
+Gordon to the Soudan, although a somewhat craven statement by Lord
+Granville, in a speech at Shrewsbury in September 1885, to the effect
+that "Gordon went to Khartoum at his own request," might seem to infer
+that they did. This remark may have been a slip, or an incorrect mode
+of saying that Gordon willingly accepted the task given him by the
+Government, but Mr Gladstone placed the matter in its true light when
+he wrote that "General Gordon went to the Soudan at the request of
+H.M.'s Government."
+
+Gordon, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Stewart, an officer
+who had visited the Soudan in 1883, and written an able report on it,
+left London by the Indian mail of 18th January 1884. The decision to
+send Colonel Stewart with him was arrived at only at the very last
+moment, and on the platform at Charing Cross Station the acquaintance
+of the two men bound together in such a desperate partnership
+practically began. It is worth recalling that in that hurried and
+stirring scene, when the War Office, with the Duke of Cambridge, had
+assembled to see him off, Gordon found time to say to one of Stewart's
+nearest relations, "Be sure that he will not go into any danger which
+I do not share, and I am sure that when I am in danger he will not be
+far behind."
+
+Gordon's journey to Egypt was uneventful, but after the exciting
+events that preceded his departure he found the leisure of his
+sea-trip from Brindisi beneficial and advantageous, for the purpose of
+considering his position and taking stock of the situation he had to
+face. By habit and temperament Gordon was a bad emissary to carry out
+cut-and-dried instructions, more especially when they related to a
+subject upon which he felt very strongly and held pronounced views.
+The instructions which the Government gave him were as follows, and I
+quote the full text. They were probably not drawn up and in Gordon's
+hands more than two hours before he left Charing Cross, and personally
+I do not suppose that he had looked through them, much less studied
+them. His view of the matter never varied. He went to the Soudan to
+rescue the garrisons, and to carry out the evacuation of the province
+after providing for its administration. The letter given in the
+previous chapter shows how vague and incomplete was the agreement
+between himself and Ministers. It was nothing more than the expression
+of an idea that the Soudan should be evacuated, but how and under what
+conditions was left altogether to the chapter of accidents. At the
+start the Government's view of the matter and his presented no glaring
+difference. They sent General Gordon to rescue and withdraw the
+garrisons if he could do so, and they were also not averse to his
+establishing any administration that he chose. But the main point on
+which they laid stress was that they were to be no longer troubled in
+the affair. Gordon's marvellous qualities were to extricate them from
+the difficult position in which the shortcomings of the Egyptian
+Government had placed them, and beyond that they had no definite
+thought or care as to how the remedy was to be discovered and applied.
+The following instructions should be read by the light of these
+reflections, which show that, while they nominally started from the
+same point, Gordon and the Government were never really in touch, and
+had widely different goals in view:--
+
+                              "FOREIGN OFFICE, _January 18th, 1884_.
+
+     "Her Majesty's Government are desirous that you should proceed at
+     once to Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the
+     Soudan, and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
+     the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in
+     that country, and for the safety of the European population in
+     Khartoum.
+
+     "You are also desired to consider and report upon the best mode
+     of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan, and
+     upon the manner in which the safety and the good administration
+     by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the sea-coast can best
+     be secured.
+
+     "In connection with this subject, you should pay especial
+     consideration to the question of the steps that may usefully be
+     taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possibly
+     be given to the Slave Trade by the present insurrectionary
+     movement and by the withdrawal of the Egyptian authority from the
+     interior.
+
+     "You will be under the instructions of Her Majesty's Agent and
+     Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your Reports to Her
+     Majesty's Government should be sent, under flying seal.
+
+     "You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform
+     such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to
+     entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E.
+     Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will
+     assist you in the duties thus confided to you.
+
+     "On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir
+     E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you, and will settle with you
+     whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go
+     yourself or despatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _via_ the Nile."
+
+General Gordon had not got very far on his journey before he began to
+see that there were points on which it would be better for him to know
+the Government's mind and to state his own. Neither at this time nor
+throughout the whole term of his stay at Khartoum did Gordon attempt
+to override the main decision of the Government policy, viz. to
+evacuate the Soudan, although he left plenty of documentary evidence
+to show that this was not his policy or opinion. Moreover, his own
+policy had been well set forth in the _Pall Mall Gazette_, and might
+be summed up in the necessity to keep the Eastern Soudan, and the
+impossibility of fortifying Lower Egypt against the advance of the
+Mahdi. But he had none the less consented to give his services to a
+Government which had decided on evacuation, and he remained loyal to
+that purpose, although in a little time it was made clear that there
+was a wide and impassable gulf between the views of the British
+Government and its too brilliant agent.
+
+The first doubt that flashed through his mind, strangely enough, was
+about Zebehr. He knew, of course, that it had been proposed to employ
+him, and that Mr Gladstone had not altogether unnaturally decided
+against it. But Gordon knew the man's ability, his influence, and the
+close connection he still maintained with the Soudan, where his
+father-in-law Elias was the Mahdi's chief supporter, and the paymaster
+of his forces. I believe that Gordon was in his heart of the opinion
+that the Mahdi was only a lay figure, and that the real author of the
+whole movement in the Soudan was Zebehr, but that the Mahdi, carried
+away by his exceptional success, had somewhat altered the scope of the
+project, and given it an exclusively religious or fanatical character.
+It is somewhat difficult to follow all the workings of Gordon's mind
+on this point, nor is it necessary to do so, but the fact that should
+not be overlooked is Gordon's conviction in the great power for good
+or evil of Zebehr. Thinking this matter over in the train, he
+telegraphed from Brindisi to Lord Granville on 30th January, begging
+that Zebehr might be removed from Cairo to Cyprus. There is no doubt
+as to the wisdom of this suggestion, and had it been adopted the lives
+of Colonel Stewart and his companions would probably have been spared,
+for, as will be seen, there is good ground to think that they were
+murdered by men of his tribe. In Cyprus Zebehr would have been
+incapable of mischief, but no regard was paid to Gordon's wish, and
+thus commenced what proved to be a long course of indifference.
+
+During the voyage from Brindisi to Port-Said Gordon drew up a
+memorandum on his instructions, correcting some of the errors that had
+crept into them, and explaining what, more or less, would be the best
+course to follow. One part of his instructions had to go by the
+board--that enjoining him to restore to the ancient families of the
+Soudan their long-lost possessions, for there were no such families in
+existence. One paragraph in that memorandum was almost pathetic, when
+he begged the Government to take the most favourable view of his
+shortcomings if he found himself compelled by necessity to deviate
+from his instructions. Colonel Stewart supported that view in a very
+sensible letter, when he advised the Government, "as the wisest
+course, to rely on the discretion of General Gordon and his knowledge
+of the country."
+
+General Gordon's original plan was to proceed straight to Souakim, and
+to travel thence by Berber to Khartoum, leaving the Foreign Office to
+arrange at Cairo what his status should be, but this mode of
+proceeding would have been both irregular and inconvenient, and it was
+rightly felt that he ought to hold some definite position assigned by
+the Khedive, as the ruler of Egypt. On arriving at Port-Said he was
+met by Sir Evelyn Wood, who was the bearer of a private letter from
+his old Academy and Crimean chum, Sir Gerald Graham, begging him to
+"throw over all personal feelings" and come to Cairo. The appeal could
+not have come from a quarter that would carry more weight with Gordon,
+who had a feeling of affection as well as respect for General Graham;
+and, moreover, the course suggested was so unmistakably the right one,
+that he could not, and did not, feel any hesitation in taking it,
+although he was well aware of Sir Evelyn Baring's opposition, which
+showed that the sore of six years before still rankled. Gordon
+accordingly accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood to Cairo, where he arrived on
+the evening of 24th January. On the following day he was received by
+Tewfik, who conferred on him for the second time the high office of
+Governor-General of the Soudan. It is unnecessary to lay stress on any
+minor point in the recital of the human drama which began with the
+interview with Lord Wolseley on 15th January, and thence went on
+without a pause to the tragedy of 26th January in the following year;
+but it does seem strange, if the British Government were resolved to
+stand firm to its evacuation policy, that it should have allowed its
+emissary to accept the title of Governor-General of a province which
+it had decided should cease to exist.
+
+This was not the only nor even the most important consequence of his
+turning aside to go to Cairo. When there, those who were interested
+for various reasons in the proposal to send Zebehr to the Soudan, made
+a last effort to carry their project by arranging an interview between
+that person and Gordon, in the hope that all matters in dispute
+between them might be discussed, and, if possible, settled. Gordon,
+whose enmity to his worst foe was never deep, and whose temperament
+would have made him delight in a discussion with the arch-fiend, said
+at once that he had no objection to meeting Zebehr, and would discuss
+any matter with him or any one else. The penalty of this magnanimity
+was that he was led to depart from the uncompromising but safe
+attitude of opposition and hostility he had up to this observed
+towards Zebehr, and to record opinions that were inconsistent with
+those he had expressed on the same subject only a few weeks and even
+days before. But even in what follows I believe it is safe to discern
+his extraordinary perspicuity; for when he saw that the Government
+would not send Zebehr to Cyprus, he promptly concluded that it would
+be far safer to take or have him with him in the Soudan, where he
+could personally watch and control his movements, than to allow him to
+remain at Cairo, guiding hostile plots with his money and influence in
+the very region whither Gordon was proceeding.
+
+This view is supported by the following Memorandum, drawn up by
+General Gordon on 25th January 1884, the day before the interview, and
+entitled by him "Zebehr Pasha _v._ General Gordon":--
+
+     "Zebehr Pasha's first connection with me began in 1877, when I
+     was named Governor-General of Soudan. Zebehr was then at Cairo,
+     being in litigation with Ismail Pasha Eyoub, my predecessor in
+     Soudan. Zebehr had left his son Suleiman in charge of his forces
+     in the Bahr Gazelle. Darfour was in complete rebellion, and I
+     called on Suleiman to aid the Egyptian army in May 1877. He never
+     moved. In June 1877 I went to Darfour, and was engaged with the
+     rebels when Suleiman moved up his men, some 6000, to Dara. It was
+     in August 1877. He and his men assumed an hostile attitude to the
+     Government of Dara. I came down to Dara and went out to
+     Suleiman's camp, and asked them to come and see me at Dara.
+     Suleiman and his chiefs did so, and I told them I felt sure that
+     they meditated rebellion, but if they rebelled they would perish.
+     I offered them certain conditions, appointing certain chiefs to
+     be governors of certain districts, but refusing to let Suleiman
+     be Governor of Bahr Gazelle. After some days' parleying, some of
+     Suleiman's chiefs came over to my side, and these chiefs warned
+     me that, if I did not take care, Suleiman would attack me. I
+     therefore ordered Suleiman to go to Shaka, and ordered those
+     chiefs who were inclined to accept my terms in another
+     direction, so as to separate them. On this Suleiman accepted my
+     terms, and he and others were made Beys. He left for Shaka with
+     some 4000 men. He looted the country from Dara to Shaka, and did
+     not show any respect to my orders. The rebellion in Darfour being
+     settled, I went down to Shaka with 200 men. Suleiman was there
+     with 4000. Then he came to me and begged me to let him have the
+     sole command in Bahr Gazelle. I refused, and I put him, Suleiman,
+     under another chief, and sent up to Bahr Gazelle 200 regular
+     troops. Things remained quiet in Bahr Gazelle till I was ordered
+     to Cairo in April 1878, about the finances. I then saw Zebehr
+     Pasha, who wished to go up to Soudan, and I refused. I left for
+     Aden in May, and in June 1878 Suleiman broke out in revolt, and
+     killed the 200 regular troops at Bahr Gazelle. I sent Gessi
+     against him in August 1878, and Gessi crushed him in the course
+     of 1879. Gessi captured a lot of letters in the divan of
+     Suleiman, one of which was from Zebehr Pasha inciting him to
+     revolt. The original of this letter was given by me to H.H. the
+     Khedive, and I also had printed a brochure containing it and a
+     sort of _expose_ to the people of Soudan why the revolt had been
+     put down--viz. that it was not a question of slave-hunting, but
+     one of revolt against the Khedive's authority. Copies of this
+     must exist. On the production of this letter of Zebehr to
+     Suleiman, I ordered the confiscation of Zebehr's property in
+     Soudan, and a court martial to sit on Zebehr's case. This court
+     martial was held under Hassan Pasha Halmi; the court condemned
+     Zebehr to death; its proceedings were printed in the brochure I
+     alluded to. Gessi afterwards caught Suleiman and shot him. With
+     details of that event I am not acquainted, and I never saw the
+     papers, for I went to Abyssinia. Gessi's orders were to try him,
+     and if guilty to shoot him. This is all I have to say about
+     Zebehr and myself.
+
+     "Zebehr, without doubt, was the greatest slave-hunter who ever
+     existed. Zebehr is the most able man in the Soudan; he is a
+     capital general, and has been wounded several times. Zebehr has a
+     capacity of government far beyond any statesman in the Soudan.
+     All the followers of the Mahdi would, I believe, leave the Mahdi
+     on Zebehr's approach, for they are ex-chiefs of Zebehr.
+     Personally, I have a great admiration for Zebehr, for he is a
+     man, and is infinitely superior to those poor fellows who have
+     been governors of Soudan; but I question in my mind, 'Will Zebehr
+     ever forgive me the death of his son?' and that question has
+     regulated my action respecting him, for I have been told he bears
+     me the greatest malice, and one cannot wonder at it if one is a
+     father.
+
+     "I would even now risk taking Zebehr, and would willingly bear
+     the responsibility of doing so, convinced, as I am, that Zebehr's
+     approach ends the Mahdi, which is a question which has its pulse
+     in Syria, the Hedjaz, and Palestine.
+
+     "It cannot be the wish of H.M.'s Government, or of the Egyptian
+     Government, to have an intestine war in the Soudan on its
+     evacuation, yet such is sure to ensue, and the only way which
+     could prevent it is the restoration of Zebehr, who would be
+     accepted on all sides, and who would end the Mahdi in a couple of
+     months. My duty is to obey orders of H.M.'s Government, _i.e._ to
+     evacuate the Soudan as quickly as possible, _vis-a-vis_ the
+     safety of the Egyptian employes.
+
+     "To do this I count on Zebehr; but if the addenda is made that I
+     leave a satisfactory settlement of affairs, then Zebehr becomes a
+     _sine qua non_.
+
+     "Therefore the question resolves itself into this. Does H.M.'s
+     Government or Egyptian Government desire a settled state of
+     affairs in Soudan after the evacuation? Do these Governments want
+     to be free of this religious fanatic? If they do, then Zebehr
+     should be sent; and if the two Governments are indifferent, then
+     do not send him, and I have confidence one will (_D.V._) get out
+     the Egyptian employes in three or four months, and will leave a
+     cockpit behind us. It is not my duty to dictate what should be
+     done. I will only say, first, I was justified in my action
+     against Zebehr; second, that if Zebehr has no malice personally
+     against me, I should take him at once as a humanly certain
+     settler of the Mahdi and of those in revolt. I have written this
+     Minute, and Zebehr's story may be heard. I only wish that after
+     he has been interrogated, I may be questioned on such subjects as
+     his statements are at variance with mine. I would wish this
+     inquiry to be official, and in such a way that, whatever may be
+     the decision come to, it may be come to in my absence.
+
+     "With respect to the slave-trade, I think nothing of it, for
+     there will always be slave-trade as long as Turkey and Egypt buy
+     the slaves, and it may be Zebehr will or might in his interest
+     stop it in some manner. I will therefore sum up my opinion, viz.
+     that I would willingly take the responsibility of taking Zebehr
+     up with me if, after an interview with Sir E. Baring and Nubar
+     Pasha, they tell 'the mystic feeling' I could trust him, and
+     which 'mystic feeling' I felt I had for him to-night when I met
+     him at Cherif Pasha's house. Zebehr would have nothing to gain in
+     hunting me, and I would have no fear. In this affair my desire, I
+     own, would be to take Zebehr. I cannot exactly say why I feel
+     towards him thus, and I feel sure that his going would settle the
+     Soudan affair to the benefit of H.M.'s Government, and I would
+     bear the responsibility of recommending it.
+
+                                   "C. G. GORDON, Major-General."
+
+An interview between Gordon and Zebehr was therefore arranged for 26th
+January, the day after this memorandum was written. On 25th it should
+also be remembered that the Khedive had again made Gordon
+Governor-General of the Soudan. Besides the two principals, there were
+present at this interview Sir Evelyn Baring, Sir Gerald Graham,
+Colonel Watson, and Nubar Pasha. Zebehr protested his innocence of the
+charges made against him; and when Gordon reminded him of his letter,
+signed with his hand and bearing his seal, found in the divan of his
+son Suleiman, he called upon Gordon to produce this letter, which, of
+course, he could not do, because it was sent with the other
+incriminating documents to the Khedive in 1879. The passage in that
+letter establishing the guilt of Zebehr may, however, be cited, it
+being first explained that Idris Ebter was Gordon's governor of the
+Bahr Gazelle province, and that Suleiman did carry out his father's
+instructions to attack him.
+
+     "Now since this same Idris Ebter has not appreciated our kindness
+     towards him, nor shown regard for his duty towards God, therefore
+     do you accomplish his ejection by compulsory force, threats, and
+     menaces, without personal hurt, but with absolute expulsion and
+     deprivation from the Bahr-el-Gazelle, leaving no remnant of him
+     in that region, no son, and no relation. For he is a
+     mischief-maker, and God loveth not them who make mischief."
+
+It is highly probable, from the air of confidence with which Zebehr
+called for the production of the letter, that, either during the Arabi
+rising or in some other way, he had recovered possession of the
+original; but Gordon had had all the documents copied in 1879, and
+bound in the little volume mentioned in the preceding Memorandum, as
+well as in several of his letters, and the evidence as to Zebehr's
+complicity and guilt seems quite conclusive.
+
+In his Memorandum Gordon makes two conditions: first, "if Zebehr bears
+no malice personally against me, I will take him to the Soudan at
+once," and this condition is given further force later on in reference
+to "the mystic feeling." The second condition was that Zebehr was only
+to be sent if the Government desired a settled state of affairs after
+the evacuation. From the beginning of the interview it was clear to
+those present that no good would come of it, as Zebehr could scarcely
+control his feelings, and showed what they deemed a personal
+resentment towards Gordon that at any moment might have found
+expression in acts. After a brief discussion it was decided to adjourn
+the meeting, on the pretence of having search made for the
+incriminating document, but really to avert a worse scene. General
+Graham, in the after-discussion on Gordon's renewed desire to take
+Zebehr with him, declared that it would be dangerous to acquiesce; and
+Colonel Watson plainly stated that it would mean the death of one or
+both of them. Gordon, indifferent to all considerations of personal
+danger, did not take the same view of Zebehr's attitude towards him
+personally, and would still have taken him with him, if only on the
+ground that he would be less dangerous in the Soudan than at Cairo;
+but the authorities would not acquiesce in a proposition that they
+considered would inevitably entail the murder of Gordon at an early
+stage of the journey. They cannot, from any point of view, be greatly
+blamed in this matter; and when Gordon complains later on, as he
+frequently did complain, about the matter, the decision must be with
+his friends at Cairo, for they strictly conformed with the first
+condition specified in his own Memorandum. At the same time, he was
+perfectly correct in his views as to Zebehr's power and capacity for
+mischief, and it was certainly very unfortunate and wrong that his
+earlier suggestion of removing him to Cyprus or some other place of
+safety was not adopted.
+
+The following new correspondence will at least suggest a doubt whether
+Gordon was not more correct in his view of Zebehr's attitude towards
+himself than his friends. What they deemed strong resentment and a
+bitter personal feeling towards Gordon on the part of Zebehr, he
+considered merely the passing excitement from discussing a matter of
+great moment and interest. He would still have taken Zebehr with him,
+and for many weeks after his arrival at Khartoum he expected that, in
+reply to his frequently reiterated messages, "Send me Zebehr," the
+ex-Dictator of the Soudan would be sent up from Cairo. In one of the
+last letters to his sister, dated Khartoum, 5th March 1884, he wrote:
+"I hope _much_ from Zebehr's coming up, for he is so well known to all
+up here." I come now to the correspondence referred to.
+
+Some time after communications were broken off with Khartoum, Miss
+Gordon wrote to Zebehr, begging him to use his influence with the
+Mahdi to get letters for his family to and from General Gordon. To
+that Zebehr replied as follows:--
+
+     "TO HER EXCELLENCY MISS GORDON,--I am very grateful to you for
+     having had the honour of receiving your letter of the 13th, and
+     am very sorry to say that I am not able to write to the Mahdi,
+     because he is new, and has appeared lately in the Soudan. I do
+     not know him. He is not of my tribe nor of my relations, nor of
+     the tribes with which I was on friendly terms; and for these
+     reasons I do not see the way in which I could carry out your
+     wish. I am ready to serve you in all that is possible all my life
+     through, but please accept my excuse in this matter.
+
+     "Please accept my best respects.
+
+                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH, Pasha.
+
+     "CAIRO, _22nd January 1885_."
+
+Some time after the fall of Khartoum, Miss Gordon made a further
+communication to Zebehr, but, owing to his having been exiled to
+Gibraltar, it was not until October 1887 that she received the
+following reply, which is certainly curious; and I believe that this
+letter and personal conversations with Zebehr induced one of the
+officers present at the interview on 26th January 1884 to change his
+original opinion, and to conclude that it would have been safe for
+General Gordon to have taken Zebehr with him:--
+
+                              "CAIRO [_received by Miss Gordon
+                                  about 12th October 1887_].
+
+     "HONOURABLE LADY,--I most respectfully beg to acknowledge the
+     receipt of your letter, enclosed to that addressed to me by His
+     Excellency Watson Pasha.
+
+     "This letter has caused me a great satisfaction, as it speaks of
+     the friendly relations that existed between me and the late
+     Gordon Pasha, your brother, whom you have replaced in my heart,
+     and this has been ascertained to me by your inquiring about me
+     and your congratulating me for my return to Cairo" [that is,
+     after his banishment to Gibraltar].
+
+     "I consider that your poor brother is still alive in you, and for
+     the whole run of my life I put myself at your disposal, and beg
+     that you will count upon me as a true and faithful friend to you.
+
+     "You will also kindly pay my respects to the whole family of
+     Gordon Pasha, and may you not deprive me of your good news at any
+     time.
+
+     "My children and all my family join themselves to me, and pay you
+     their best respects.
+
+     "Further, I beg to inform you that the messenger who had been
+     previously sent through me, carrying Government correspondence to
+     your brother, Gordon Pasha, has reached him, and remitted the
+     letter he had in his own hands, and without the interference of
+     any other person. The details of his history are mentioned in the
+     enclosed report, which I hope you will kindly read.--Believe me,
+     honourable Lady, to remain yours most faithfully,
+
+                                             ZEBEHR RAHAMAH."
+
+                            REPORT ENCLOSED.
+
+     "When I came to Cairo and resided in it as I was before, I kept
+     myself aside of all political questions connected with the Soudan
+     or others, according to the orders given me by the Government to
+     that effect. But as a great rumour was spread over by the high
+     Government officials who arrived from the Soudan, and were with
+     H.E. General Gordon Pasha at Khartoum before and after it fell,
+     that all my properties in that country had been looted, and my
+     relations ill-treated, I have been bound, by a hearty feeling of
+     compassion, to ask the above said officials what they knew about
+     it, and whether the messenger sent by me with the despatches
+     addressed by the Government to General Gordon Pasha had reached
+     Khartoum and remitted what he had.
+
+     "These officials informed me verbally that on the 25th Ramadan
+     1301 (March 1884), at the time they were sitting at Khartoum with
+     General Gordon, my messenger, named Fadhalla Kabileblos, arrived
+     there, and remitted to the General in his proper hands, and
+     without the interference of anyone, all the despatches he had on
+     him. After that the General expressed his greatest content for
+     the receipt of the correspondence, and immediately gave orders to
+     the artillery to fire twenty-five guns, in sign of rejoicing, and
+     in order to show to the enemy his satisfaction for the news of
+     the arrival of British troops. General Gordon then treated my
+     messenger cordially, and requested the Government to pay him a
+     sum of L500 on his return to Cairo, as a gratuity for all the
+     dangers he had run in accomplishing his faithful mission. Besides
+     that, the General gave him, when he embarked with Colonel
+     Stewart, L13 to meet his expenses on the journey. A few days
+     after the arrival of my messenger at Khartoum, H.E. General
+     Gordon thought it proper to appoint Colonel Stewart for coming to
+     Cairo on board a man-of-war with a secret mission, and several
+     letters, written by the General in English and Arabic, were put
+     in two envelopes, one addressed to the British and the other to
+     the Egyptian Government, and were handed over to my messenger,
+     with the order to return to Cairo with Colonel Stewart on board a
+     special steamer.
+
+     "But when Khartoum fell, and the rebels got into it, making all
+     the inhabitants prisoners, the Government officials above
+     referred to were informed that my messenger had been arrested,
+     and all the correspondence that he had on him, addressed by
+     General Gordon to the Government, was seized; for when the
+     steamer on board of which they were arrived at Abou Kamar she
+     went on rocks, and having been broken, the rebels made a massacre
+     of all those who were on board; and as, on seeing the letters
+     carried by my messenger, they found amongst them a private letter
+     addressed to me by H.E. Gordon Pasha, expressing his thanks for
+     my faithfulness to him, the rebels declared me an infidel, and
+     decided to seize all my goods and properties, comprising them in
+     their _Beit-el-Mal_ (that is, Treasury) as it happened in fact.
+
+     "Moreover, the members of my family who were in the Soudan were
+     treated most despotically, and their existence was rendered most
+     difficult.
+
+     "Such a state of things being incompatible with the suspicion
+     thrown upon me as regards my faithfulness to the Government, I
+     have requested the high Government officials referred to above to
+     give me an official certificate to that effect, which they all
+     gave; and the enclosed copies will make known to those who take
+     the trouble to read them that I have been honest and faithful in
+     all what has been entrusted to me. This is the summary of the
+     information I have obtained from persons I have reason to
+     believe."
+
+Some further evidence of Zebehr's feelings is given in the following
+letter from him to Sir Henry Gordon, dated in October 1884:--
+
+     "Your favour of 3rd September has been duly received, for which I
+     thank you. I herewith enclose my photograph, and hope that you
+     will kindly send me yours.
+
+     "The letter that you wished me to send H.E. General Gordon was
+     sent on the 18th August last, registered. I hope that you will
+     excuse me in delaying to reply, for when your letter arrived I
+     was absent, and when I returned I was very sorry that they had
+     not forwarded the letter to me; otherwise I should have replied
+     at once.
+
+     "I had closed this letter with the photograph when I received
+     fresh news, to the effect that the messengers we sent to H.E.
+     Gordon Pasha were on their way back. I therefore kept back the
+     letter and photograph till they arrived, and I should see what
+     tidings they brought.... You have told me that Lord Northbrook
+     knows what has passed between us. I endeavoured and devised to
+     see His Excellency, but I did not succeed, as he was very busy. I
+     presented a petition to him that he should help to recover the
+     property of which I was robbed unjustly, and which H.E. your
+     brother ordered to be restored, and at the same time to right me
+     for the oppression I had suffered. I have had no answer up to
+     this present moment.
+
+     "Hoping that H.E. Gordon Pasha will return in safety, accept my
+     best regards, dear Sir, and present my compliments to your
+     sister.
+
+                                                   "ZEBEHR.
+     "_28th Oct. 1884._"
+
+To sum up on this important matter. There never was any doubt that the
+authorities in the Delta took on themselves a grave responsibility
+when they remained deaf to all Gordon's requests for the co-operation
+of Zebehr. They would justify themselves by saying that they had a
+tender regard for Gordon's own safety. At least this was the only
+point on which they showed it, and they would not like to be deprived
+of the small credit attached to it; but the evidence I have now
+adduced renders even this plea of doubtful force. As to the value of
+Zebehr's co-operation, if Gordon could have obtained it there cannot
+be two opinions. Gordon did not exaggerate in the least degree when he
+said that on the approach of Zebehr the star of the Mahdi would at
+once begin to wane, or, in other words, that he looked to Zebehr's
+ability and influence as the sure way to make his own mission a
+success.
+
+On the very night of his interview with Zebehr, and within forty-eight
+hours of his arrival in Cairo, General Gordon and his English
+companion, with four Egyptian officers, left by train for Assiout, _en
+route_ to Khartoum.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+KHARTOUM.
+
+
+Before entering on the events of this crowning passage in the career
+of this hero, I think the reader might well consider on its threshold
+the exact nature of the adventure undertaken by Gordon as if it were a
+sort of everyday experience and duty. At the commencement of the year
+1884 the military triumph of the Mahdi was as complete as it could be
+throughout the Soudan. Khartoum was still held by a force of between
+4000 and 6000 men. Although not known, all the other garrisons in the
+Nile Valley, except Kassala and Sennaar, both near the Abyssinian
+frontier, had capitulated, and the force at Khartoum would certainly
+have offered no resistance if the Mahdi had advanced immediately after
+the defeat of Hicks. Even if he had reached Khartoum before the
+arrival of Gordon, it is scarcely doubtful that the place would have
+fallen without fighting. Colonel de Coetlogon was in command, but the
+troops had no faith in him, and he had no confidence in them. That
+officer, on 9th January, "telegraphed to the Khedive, strongly urging
+an immediate withdrawal from Khartoum. He said that one-third of the
+garrison are unreliable, and that even if it were twice as strong as
+it is, it would not hold Khartoum against the whole country." In
+several subsequent telegrams Colonel de Coetlogon importuned the Cairo
+authorities to send him authority to leave with the garrison, and on
+the very day that the Government finally decided to despatch Gordon he
+telegraphed that there was only just enough time left to escape to
+Berber. While the commandant held and expressed these views, it is not
+surprising that the garrison and inhabitants were disheartened and
+decidedly unfit to make any resolute opposition to a confident and
+daring foe. There is excellent independent testimony as to the state
+of public feeling in the town.
+
+Mr Frank Power had been residing in Khartoum as correspondent of _The
+Times_ from August 1883, and in December, after the Hicks catastrophe,
+he was appointed Acting British Consul. In a letter written on 12th
+January he said: "They have done nothing for us yet from Cairo. They
+are leaving it all to fate, and the rebels around us are growing
+stronger!" Such was the general situation at Khartoum when General
+Gordon was ordered, almost single-handed, to save it; and not merely
+to rescue its garrison, pronounced by its commander to be partly
+unreliable and wholly inadequate, but other garrisons scattered
+throughout the regions held by the Mahdi and his victorious legions. A
+courageous man could not have been charged with cowardice if he had
+shrunk back from such a forlorn hope, and declined to take on his
+shoulders the responsibility that properly devolved on the commander
+on the spot. A prudent man would at least have insisted that his
+instructions should be clear, and that the part his Government and
+country were to play was to be as strictly defined and as obligatory
+on them as his own. But while Gordon's courage was of such a quality
+that I believe no calculation of odds or difficulties ever entered
+into his view, his prudence never possessed the requisite amount of
+suspicion to make him provide against the contingencies of absolute
+betrayal by those who sent him, or of that change in party convenience
+and tactics which induced those who first thought his mission most
+advantageous as solving a difficulty, or at least putting off a
+trouble, to veer round to the conclusion that his remaining at
+Khartoum, his honourable but rigid resolve not to return without the
+people he went to save, was a distinct breach of contract, and a
+serious offence.
+
+The state of feeling at Khartoum was one verging on panic. The richest
+townsmen had removed their property and families to Berber. Colonel de
+Coetlogon had the river boats with steam up ready to commence the
+evacuation, and while everyone thought that the place was doomed, the
+telegraph instrument was eagerly watched for the signal to begin the
+flight. The tension could not have lasted much longer--without the
+signal the flight would have begun--when on 24th January the brief
+message arrived: "General Gordon is coming to Khartoum." The effect of
+that message was electrical. The panic ceased, confidence was
+restored, the apathy of the Cairo authorities became a matter of no
+importance, for England had sent her greatest name as a pledge of her
+intended action, and the unreliable and insufficient garrison pulled
+itself together for one of the most honourable and brilliant defences
+in the annals of military sieges. Yet it was full time. Two months had
+been wasted, and, as Mr Power said, "the fellows in Lucknow did not
+look more anxiously for Colin Campbell than we are looking for
+Gordon." Gordon, ever mindful of the importance of time, and fully
+impressed with the sense of how much had been lost by delay, did not
+let the grass grow under his feet, and after his two days' delay at
+Cairo sent a message that he hoped to reach Khartoum in eighteen days.
+Mr Power's comment on that message is as follows: "Twenty-four days
+is the shortest time from Cairo to Khartoum on record; Gordon says he
+will be here in eighteen days; but he travels like a whirlwind." As a
+matter of fact, Gordon took twenty days' travelling, besides the two
+days he passed at Berber. He thus reached Khartoum on 18th February,
+and four days later Colonel de Coetlogon started for Cairo.
+
+The entry of Gordon into Khartoum was marked by a scene of
+indescribable enthusiasm and public confidence. The whole population,
+men, women, and children, turned out to welcome him as a conqueror and
+a deliverer, although he really came in his own person merely to cope
+with a desperate situation. The women threw themselves on the ground
+and struggled to kiss his feet; in the confusion Gordon was several
+times pushed down; and this remarkable demonstration of popular
+confidence and affection was continued the whole way from the
+landing-place to the _Hukumdaria_ or Palace. This greeting was the
+more remarkable because it was clear that Gordon had brought no
+troops--only one white officer--and it soon became known that he had
+brought no money. Even the Mahdi himself made his contribution to the
+general tribute, by sending General Gordon on his arrival a formal
+_salaam_ or message of respect. Thus hailed on all hands as the one
+pre-eminently good man who had been associated with the Soudan, Gordon
+addressed himself to the hard task he had undertaken, which had been
+rendered almost hopeless of achievement by the lapse of time, past
+errors, and the blindness of those who should have supported him.
+
+Difficult as it had been all along, it was rendered still more
+difficult by the decisive defeat of Baker Pasha and an Egyptian force
+of 4000 men at Tokar, near Souakim. This victory was won by Osman
+Digma, who had been sent by the Mahdi to rouse up the Eastern Soudan
+at the time of the threatened Hicks expedition. The result showed that
+the Mahdi had discovered a new lieutenant of great military capacity
+and energy, and that the Eastern Soudan was for the time as hopelessly
+lost to Egypt as Kordofan and Darfour.
+
+The first task to which Gordon addressed himself was to place Khartoum
+and the detached work at Omdurman on the left bank of the White Nile
+in a proper state of defence, and he especially supervised the
+establishment of telegraphic communication between the Palace and the
+many outworks, so that at a moment's notice he might receive word of
+what was happening. His own favourite position became the flat roof of
+this building, whence with his glass he could see round for many
+miles. He also laid in considerable stores of provisions by means of
+his steamers, in which he placed the greatest faith. In all these
+matters he was ably and energetically assisted by Colonel Stewart; and
+beyond doubt the other Europeans took some slight share in the
+incessant work of putting Khartoum in a proper state of defence; but
+even with this relief, the strain, increased by constant alarms of the
+Mahdi's hostile approach, was intense, and Mr Power speaks of Gordon
+as nearly worn out with work before he had been there a month.
+
+When Gordon went to the Soudan his principal object was to effect the
+evacuation of the country, and to establish there some administration
+which would be answerable for good order and good neighbourship. If
+the Mahdi had been a purely secular potentate, and not a fanatical
+religious propagandist, it would have been a natural and feasible
+arrangement to have come to terms with him as the conqueror of the
+country. But the basis of the Mahdi's power forbade his being on terms
+with anyone. If he had admitted the equal rights of Egypt and the
+Khedive at any point, there would have been an end to his heavenly
+mission, and the forces he had created out of the simple but
+deep-rooted religious feelings of the Mahommedan clans of the Soudan
+would soon have vanished. It is quite possible that General Gordon had
+in his first views on the Mahdist movement somewhat undervalued the
+forces created by that fanaticism, and that the hopes and opinions he
+first expressed were unduly optimistic. If so, it must be allowed that
+he lost not a moment in correcting them, and within a week of his
+arrival at Khartoum he officially telegraphed to Cairo, that "if Egypt
+is to be quiet the Mahdi must be smashed up."
+
+When the British Government received that message, as they did in a
+few days, with, moreover, the expression of supporting views by Sir
+Evelyn Baring, they ought to have reconsidered the whole question of
+the Gordon mission, and to have defined their own policy. The
+representative they had sent on an exceptional errand to relieve and
+bring back a certain number of distressed troops, and to arrange if he
+could for the formation of a new government through the notabilities
+and ancient families, reports at an early stage of his mission that in
+his opinion there is no solution of the difficulty, save by resorting
+to offensive measures against the Mahdi as the disturber of the peace,
+not merely for that moment, but as long as he had to discharge the
+divine task implied by his title. As it was of course obvious that
+Gordon single-handed could not take the field, the conclusion
+necessarily followed that he would require troops, and the whole
+character of his task would thus have been changed. In face of that
+absolute _volte-face_, from a policy of evacuation and retreat to one
+of retention and advance, for that is what it signified, the
+Government would have been justified in recalling Gordon, but as they
+did not do so, they cannot plead ignorance of his changed opinion, or
+deny that, at the very moment he became acquainted with the real state
+of things at Khartoum, he hastened to convey to them his decided
+conviction that the only way out of the difficulty was to "smash up
+the Mahdi."
+
+All his early messages show that there had been a change, or at least
+a marked modification, in his opinions. At Khartoum he saw more
+clearly than in Cairo or in London the extreme gravity of the
+situation, and the consequences to the tranquillity of Lower Egypt
+that would follow from the abandonment of Khartoum to the Mahdi. He
+therefore telegraphed on the day of his arrival these words: "To
+withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be
+the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though
+all Egyptian element were withdrawn, would be a misfortune, and
+inhuman." In the same message he repeated his demand for the services
+of Zebehr, through whom, as has been shown, he thought he might be
+able to cope with the Mahdi. Yet their very refusal to comply with
+that reiterated request should have made the authorities more willing
+and eager to meet the other applications and suggestion of a man who
+had thrust himself into a most perilous situation at their bidding,
+and for the sake of the reputation of his country. It must be recorded
+with feelings of shame that it had no such effect, and that apathy and
+indifference to the fate of its gallant agent were during the first
+few months the only characteristics of the Government policy.
+
+At the same period all Gordon's telegrams and despatches showed that
+he wanted reinforcements to some small extent, and at least military
+demonstrations along his line of communication with Egypt to prove
+that he possessed the support of his Government, and that he had only
+to call upon it to send troops, and they were there to come. He,
+naturally enough, treated as ridiculous the suggestion that he had
+bound himself to do the whole work without any support; and fully
+convinced that he had only to summon troops for them to be sent him in
+the moderate strength he alone cared for, he issued a proclamation in
+Khartoum, stating that "British troops are now on their way, and in a
+few days will reach Khartoum." He therefore begged for the despatch of
+a small force to Wady Halfa, and he went on to declare that it would
+be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi" if 200 British troops
+were sent to Wady Halfa, and if the Souakim-Berber route were opened
+up by Indian-Moslem troops. Failing the adoption of these measures, he
+asked leave to raise a sum, by appealing to philanthropists,
+sufficient to pay a small Turkish force and carry on a contest for
+supremacy with the Mahdi on his own behoof. All these suggestions
+were more or less supported by Sir Evelyn Baring, who at last
+suggested in an important despatch, dated 28th February, that the
+British Government should withdraw altogether from the matter, and
+"give full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive's
+Government to do what seems best to them."
+
+Well would it have been for Gordon and everyone whose reputation was
+concerned if this step had been taken, for the Egyptian Government,
+the Khedive, his ministers Nubar and Cherif, were opposed to all
+surrender, and desired to hold on to Khartoum and the Souakim-Berber
+route. But without the courage and resolution to discharge it, the
+Government saw the obligation that lay on them to provide for the
+security and good government of Egypt, and that if they shirked
+responsibility in the Soudan, the independence of Egypt might be
+accomplished by its own effort and success. They perceived the
+objections to giving Egypt a free hand, but they none the less
+abstained from taking the other course of definite and decisive action
+on their own initiative. As Gordon quickly saw and tersely expressed:
+"You will not let Egypt keep the Soudan, you will not take it
+yourself, and you will not permit any other country to occupy it."
+
+As if to give emphasis to General Gordon's successive
+requests--Zebehr, 200 men to Wady Halfa, opening of route from Souakim
+to Berber, presence of English officers at Dongola, and of Indian
+cavalry at Berber--telegraphic communication with Khartoum was
+interrupted early in March, less than a fortnight after Gordon's
+arrival in the town. There was consequently no possible excuse for
+anyone ignoring the dangerous position in which General Gordon was
+placed. He had gone to face incalculable dangers, but now the success
+of Osman Digma and the rising of the riparian tribes threatened him
+with that complete isolation which no one had quite expected at so
+early a stage after his arrival. It ought, and one would have expected
+it, to have produced an instantaneous effect, to have braced the
+Government to the task of deciding what its policy should be when
+challenged by its own representative to declare it. Gordon himself
+soon realised his own position, for he wrote: "I shall be caught in
+Khartoum; and even if I was mean enough to escape I have not the power
+to do so." After a month's interruption he succeeded in getting the
+following message, dated 8th April, through, which is significant as
+showing that he had abandoned all hope of being supported by his own
+Government:--
+
+     "I have telegraphed to Sir Samuel Baker to make an appeal to
+     British and American millionaires to give me L300,000 to engage
+     3000 Turkish troops from the Sultan and send them here. This
+     would settle the Soudan and Mahdi for ever. For my part, I think
+     you (Baring) will agree with me. I do not see the fun of being
+     caught here to walk about the streets for years as a dervish with
+     sandalled feet. Not that (_D.V._) I will ever be taken alive. It
+     would be the climax of meanness after I had borrowed money from
+     the people here, had called on them to sell their grain at a low
+     price, etc., to go and abandon them without using every effort to
+     relieve them, whether those efforts are diplomatically correct or
+     not; and I feel sure, whatever you may feel diplomatically, I
+     have your support, and that of every man professing himself a
+     gentleman, in private."
+
+Eight days later he succeeded in getting another message through, to
+the following effect:--
+
+     "As far as I can understand, the situation is this. You state
+     your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber,
+     and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according
+     to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I
+     can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall
+     retire to the Equator and leave you the indelible disgrace of
+     abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola,
+     with the _certainty_ that you will eventually be forced to smash
+     up the Mahdi under greater difficulties if you wish to maintain
+     peace in, and, indeed, to retain Egypt."
+
+Before a silence of five and a half months fell over Khartoum, Gordon
+had been able to make three things clear, and of these only one could
+be described as having a personal signification, and that was that the
+Government, by rejecting all his propositions, had practically
+abandoned him to his fate. The two others were that any settlement
+would be a work of time, and that no permanent tranquillity could be
+attained without overcoming the Mahdi.
+
+Immediately on arriving at Khartoum he perceived that the evacuation
+of the Soudan, with safety to the garrison and officials, as well as
+the preservation of the honour of England and Egypt, would necessarily
+be a work of time, and only feasible if certain measures were taken in
+his support, which, considerable as they may have appeared at the
+moment, were small and costless in comparison with those that had
+subsequently to be sanctioned. Six weeks sufficed to show Gordon that
+he would get no material help from the Government, and he then began
+to look elsewhere for support, and to propound schemes for pacifying
+the Soudan and crushing the Mahdi in which England and the Government
+would have had no part. Hence his proposal to appeal to wealthy
+philanthropists to employ Turkish troops, and in the last resort to
+force his way to the Equator and the Congo. Even that avenue of safety
+was closed to him by the illusory prospect of rescue held out to him
+by the Government at the eleventh hour, when success was hardly
+attainable.
+
+For the sake of clearness it will be well to give here a brief summary
+of the siege during the six months that followed the arrival of
+General Gordon and the departure of Colonel Stewart on 10th September.
+The full and detailed narrative is contained in Colonel Stewart's
+Journal, which was captured on board his steamer. This interesting
+diary was taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and is said to be carefully
+preserved in the Treasury. The statement rests on no very sure
+foundation, but if true the work may yet thrill the audience of the
+English-speaking world. But even without its aid the main facts of the
+siege of Khartoum, down at all events to the 14th December, when
+Gordon's own diary stops, are sufficiently well known for all the
+purposes of history.
+
+At a very early stage of the siege General Gordon determined to try
+the metal of his troops, and the experiment succeeded to such a
+perfect extent that there was never any necessity to repeat it. On
+16th March, when only irregular levies and detached bodies of
+tribesmen were in the vicinity of Khartoum, he sent out a force of
+nearly 1000 men, chiefly Bashi-Bazouks, but also some regulars, with a
+fieldpiece and supported by two steamers. The force started at eight
+in the morning, under the command of Colonel Stewart, and landed at
+Halfiyeh, some miles down the stream on the right bank of the Nile.
+Here the rebels had established a sort of fortified position, which it
+was desirable to destroy, if it could be done without too much loss.
+The troops were accordingly drawn up for the attack, and the gun and
+infantry fire commenced to cover the advance. At this moment about
+sixty rebel horsemen came out from behind the stockade and charged the
+Bashi-Bazouks, who fired one volley and fled. The horsemen then
+charged the infantry drawn up in square, which they broke, and the
+retreat to the river began at a run. Discouraging as this was for a
+force of all arms to retire before a few horsemen one-twentieth its
+number, the disaster was rendered worse and more disheartening by the
+conduct of the men, who absolutely refused to fight, marching along
+with shouldered arms without firing a shot, while the horsemen picked
+off all who straggled from the column. The gun, a considerable
+quantity of ammunition, and about sixty men represented the loss of
+Gordon's force; the rebels are not supposed to have lost a single man.
+"Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men
+even on camels, pursuing close to troops who with shouldered arms
+plodded their way back." Thus wrote Gordon of the men to whom he had
+to trust for a successful defence of Khartoum. His most recent
+experience confirmed his old opinion, that the Egyptian and Arab
+troops were useless even when fighting to save their own lives, and he
+could only rely on the very small body left of black Soudanese, who
+fought as gallantly for him as any troops could, and whose loyalty and
+devotion to him surpassed all praise. Treachery, it was assumed, had
+something to do with the easy overthrow of this force, and two Pashas
+were shot for misconduct on return to Khartoum.
+
+Having no confidence in the bulk of his force, it is not surprising
+that Gordon resorted to every artifice within engineering science to
+compensate for the shortcomings of his army. He surrounded
+Khartoum--which on one side was adequately defended by the Nile and
+his steamers--on the remaining three sides with a triple line of land
+mines connected by wires. Often during the siege the Mahdists
+attempted to break through this ring, but only to meet with repulse,
+accompanied by heavy loss; and to the very last day of the siege they
+never succeeded in getting behind the third of these lines. Their
+efficacy roused Gordon's professional enthusiasm, and in one passage
+he exclaims that these will be the general form of defence in the
+future. During the first months of the siege, which began rather in
+the form of a loose investment, the Nile was too low to allow of his
+using the nine steamers he possessed, but he employed the time in
+making two new ones, and in strengthening them all with bulwarks of
+iron plates and soft wood, which were certainly bullet-proof. Each of
+these steamers he valued as the equivalent of 2000 men. When it is
+seen how he employed them the value will not be deemed excessive, and
+certainly without them he could not have held Khartoum and baffled all
+the assaults of the Mahdi for the greater part of a year.
+
+After this experience Gordon would risk no more combats on land, and
+on 25th March he dismissed 250 of the Bashi-Bazouks who had behaved so
+badly. Absolutely trustworthy statistics are not available as to the
+exact number of troops in Khartoum or as to the proportion the Black
+Soudanese bore to the Egyptians, but it approximates to the truth to
+say that there were about 1000 of the former to 3000 of the latter,
+and with other levies during the siege he doubled this total. For
+these and a civilian population of nearly 40,000 Gordon computed that
+he had provisions for five months from March, and that for at least
+two months he would be as safe as in Cairo. By carefully husbanding
+the corn and biscuit he was able to make the supply last much longer,
+and even to the very end he succeeded in partially replenishing the
+depleted granaries of the town. There is no necessity to repeat the
+details of the siege during the summer of 1884. They are made up of
+almost daily interchanges of artillery fire from the town, and of
+rifle fire in reply from the Arab lines. That this was not merely
+child's play may be gathered from two of Gordon's protected ships
+showing nearly a thousand bullet-marks apiece. Whenever the rebels
+attempted to force their way through the lines they were repulsed by
+the mines; and the steamers not only inflicted loss on their fighting
+men, but often succeeded in picking up useful supplies of food and
+grain. No further reverses were reported, because Gordon was most
+careful to avoid all risk, and the only misfortunes occurred in
+Gordon's rear, when first Berber, through the treachery of the Greek
+Cuzzi, and then Shendy passed into the hands of the Mahdists, thus, as
+Gordon said, "completely hemming him in." In April a detached force up
+the Blue Nile went over to the Mahdi, taking with them a small
+steamer, but this loss was of no great importance, as the men were of
+what Gordon called "the Arabi hen or hero type," and the steamer could
+not force its way past Khartoum and its powerful flotilla. In the four
+months from 16th March to 30th July Gordon stated that the total loss
+of the garrison was only thirty killed and fifty or sixty wounded,
+while half a million cartridges had been fired against the enemy. The
+conduct of both the people and garrison had been excellent, and this
+was the more creditable, because Gordon was obliged from the very
+beginning, owing to the capture of the bullion sent him at Berber, to
+make all payments in paper money bearing his signature and seal.
+During that period the total reinforcement to the garrison numbered
+seven men, including Gordon himself, while over 2600 persons had been
+sent out of it in safety as far as Berber.
+
+The reader will be interested in the following extracts from a letter
+written by Colonel Duncan, R.A., M.P., showing the remarkable way in
+which General Gordon organised the despatch of these refugees from
+Khartoum. The letter is dated 29th November 1886, and addressed to
+Miss Gordon:--
+
+     "When your brother, on reaching Khartoum, found that he could
+     commence sending refugees to Egypt, I was sent on the 3rd March
+     1884 to Assouan and Korosko to receive those whom he sent down.
+     As an instance of your brother's thoughtfulness, I may mention
+     that he requested that, if possible, some motherly European woman
+     might also be sent, as many of the refugees whom he had to send
+     had never been out of the Soudan before, and might feel strange
+     on reaching Egypt. A German, Giegler Pasha, who had been in
+     Khartoum with your brother before, and who had a German wife, was
+     accordingly placed at my disposal, and I stationed them at
+     Korosko, where almost all the refugees arrived. I may mention
+     that I saw and spoke to every one of the refugees who came down,
+     and to many of the women and children. Their references to your
+     brother were invariably couched in language of affection and
+     gratitude, and the adjective most frequently applied to him was
+     'just.' In sending away the people from Khartoum, he sent away
+     the Governor and some of the other leading Egyptian officials
+     first. I think he suspected they would intrigue; he always had
+     more confidence in the people than in the ruling Turks or
+     Egyptians. The oldest soldiers, the very infirm, the wounded
+     (from Hicks's battles) were sent next, and a ghastly crew they
+     were. But the precautions he took for their comfort were very
+     complete, and although immediately before reaching me they had to
+     cross a very bad part of the desert between Abou Hamed and
+     Korosko, they reached me in wonderful spirits. It was touching to
+     see the perfect confidence they had that the promises of Gordon
+     Pasha would be fulfilled. After the fall of Khartoum, and your
+     brother's death, a good many of the Egyptian officers who had
+     been with your brother managed to escape, and to come down the
+     river disguised in many cases as beggars. I had an opportunity of
+     talking to most of them, and there was no collusion, for they
+     arrived at different times and by different roads. I remember
+     having a talk with one, and when we alluded to your brother's
+     death he burst out crying like a child, and said that though he
+     had lost his wives and children when Khartoum was taken, he felt
+     it as nothing to the loss of 'that just man.'"
+
+The letters written at the end of July at Khartoum reached Cairo at
+the end of September, and their substance was at once telegraphed to
+England. They showed that, while his success had made him think that
+after all there might be some satisfactory issue of the siege, he
+foresaw that the real ordeal was yet to come. "In four months (that is
+end of November) river begins to fall; before that time you _must_
+settle the Soudan question." So wrote the heroic defender of Khartoum
+in words that could not be misunderstood, and those words were in the
+hands of the British Ministers when half the period had expired. At
+the same time Mr Power wrote: "We can at best hold out but two months
+longer." Gordon at least never doubted what their effect would be, for
+after what seemed to him a reasonable time had elapsed to enable this
+message to reach its destination, he took the necessary steps to
+recover Berber, and to send his steamers half-way to meet and assist
+the advance of the reinforcement on which he thought from the
+beginning he might surely rely.
+
+On 10th September all his plans were completed, and Colonel Stewart,
+accompanied by a strong force of Bashi-Bazouks and some black
+soldiers, with Mr Power and M. Herbin, the French consul, sailed
+northwards on five steamers. The first task of this expedition was if
+possible, to retake Berber, or, failing that, to escort the _Abbas_
+past the point of greatest danger; the second, to convey the most
+recent news about Khartoum affairs to Lower Egypt; and the third was
+to lend a helping hand to any force that might be coming up the Nile
+or across the desert from the Red Sea. Five days after its departure
+Gordon knew through a spy that Stewart's flotilla had passed Shendy in
+safety, and had captured a valuable Arab convoy. It was not till
+November that the truth was known how the ships bombarded Berber, and
+passed that place not only in safety, but after causing the rebels
+much loss and greater alarm, and then how Stewart and his European
+companions went on in the small steamer _Abbas_ to bear the tale of
+the wonderful defence of Khartoum to the outer world--a defence which,
+wonderful as it was, really only reached the stage of the miraculous
+after they had gone and had no further part in it. So far as Gordon's
+military skill and prevision could arrange for their safety, he did
+so, and with success. When the warships had to return he gave them the
+best advice against treachery or ambuscade:--"Do not anchor near the
+bank, do not collect wood at isolated spots, trust nobody." What more
+could Gordon say? If they had paid strict heed to his advice, there
+would have been no catastrophe at Dar Djumna. These reflections invest
+with much force Gordon's own view of the matter:--"If _Abbas_ was
+captured by treachery, then I am not to blame; neither am I to blame
+if she struck a rock, for she drew under two feet of water; if they
+were attacked and overpowered, then I am to blame." So perfect were
+his arrangements that only treachery, aided by Stewart's
+over-confidence, baffled them.
+
+With regard to the wisdom of the course pursued in thus sending away
+all his European colleagues--the Austrian consul Hensall alone
+refusing to quit Gordon and his place of duty--opinions will differ to
+the end of time, but one is almost inclined to say that they could not
+have been of much service to Gordon once their uppermost thought
+became to quit Khartoum. The whole story is told very graphically in a
+passage of Gordon's own diary:--
+
+     "I determined to send the _Abbas_ down with an Arab captain.
+     Herbin asked to be allowed to go. I jumped at his offer. Then
+     Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting
+     me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I cannot go; but if you go you
+     do great service.' I then wrote him an official; he wanted me to
+     write him an order. I said 'No; for, though I fear not
+     responsibility, I will not put you in any danger in which I am
+     not myself.' I wrote them a letter couched thus:--'_Abbas_ is
+     going down; you say you are willing to go in her if I think you
+     can do so in honour. You can go in honour, for you can do
+     nothing here; and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my
+     views.'"
+
+There are two points in this matter to which I must draw marked
+attention. The suggestion for any European leaving Khartoum came from
+M. Herbin, and when Gordon willingly acquiesced, Colonel Stewart asked
+leave to do likewise. Mr Power, whose calculation was that provisions
+would be exhausted before the end of September, then followed suit,
+and not one of these three of the five Europeans in Khartoum seem to
+have thought for a moment what would be the position of Gordon left
+alone to cope with the danger from which they ran away. The suggestion
+as to their going came in every case from themselves. Gordon, in his
+thought for others, not merely threw no obstacle in their way, but as
+far as he could provided for their safety as if they were a parcel of
+women. But he declined all responsibility for their fate, as they went
+not by his order but of their own free-will. He gave them his ships,
+soldiers, and best counsel. They neglected the last, and were taken in
+in a manner that showed less than a child's suspicion, and were
+massacred at the very moment they felt sure of safety. It was a cruel
+fate, and a harsh Nemesis speedily befell them for doing perhaps the
+one unworthy thing of their lives--leaving their solitary companion to
+face the tenfold dangers by which he would be beset. But it cannot be
+allowed any longer that the onus of this matter should rest in any way
+on Gordon. They went because they wanted to go, and he, knowing well
+that men with such thoughts would be of no use to him ("you can do
+nothing here") let them go, and even encouraged them to do so. Under
+the circumstances he preferred to be alone. Colonel Donald Stewart was
+a personal friend of mine, and a man whose courage in the ordinary
+sense of the word could not be aspersed, but there cannot be two
+opinions that he above all the others should not have left his
+brother-in-arms alone in Khartoum.
+
+After their departure Gordon had to superintend everything himself,
+and to resort to every means of husbanding the limited supply of
+provisions he had left. He had also to anticipate a more vigorous
+attack, for the Mahdi must quickly learn of the departure of the
+steamers, the bombardment of Berber, and the favourable chance thus
+provided for the capture of Khartoum. Nor was this the worst, for on
+the occurrence of the disaster the Mahdi was promptly informed of the
+loss of the _Abbas_ and the murder of the Europeans, and it was he
+himself who sent in to Gordon the news of the catastrophe, with so
+complete a list of the papers on the _Abbas_ as left no ground for
+hope or disbelief. Unfortunately, before this bad news reached Gordon,
+he had again, on 30th September, sent down to Shendy three
+steamers--the _Talataween_, the _Mansourah_, and _Saphia_, with
+troops on board, and the gallant Cassim-el-Mousse, there to await the
+arrival of the relieving force. He somewhat later reinforced this
+squadron with the _Bordeen_; and although one or two of these boats
+returned occasionally to Khartoum, the rest remained permanently at
+Shendy, and when the English troops reached the Nile opposite that
+place all five were waiting them. Without entering too closely into
+details, it is consequently correct to say that during the most
+critical part of the siege Gordon deprived himself of the co-operation
+of these vessels, each of which he valued at 2000 men, simply and
+solely because he believed that reinforcements were close at hand, and
+that some troops at the latest would arrive before the end of November
+1884. As Gordon himself repeatedly said, it would have been far more
+just if the Government had told him in March, when he first demanded
+reinforcements as a right, that he must shift for himself. Then he
+would have kept these boats by him, and triumphantly fought his way in
+them to the Equator. But his trust in the Government, notwithstanding
+all his experience, led him to weaken his own position in the hope of
+facilitating their movements, and he found their aid a broken reed. In
+only one passage of his journal does Gordon give expression to this
+view, although it was always present to his mind:--"Truly the
+indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view,
+a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was
+always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us." But in
+the telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr Egerton, which the
+Government never dared to publish, and which are still an official
+secret, he laid great stress on this point, and on Sir Evelyn Baring's
+message forbidding him to retire to the Equator, so that, if he sought
+safety in that direction, he would be indictable on a charge of
+desertion.
+
+The various positions at Khartoum held by Gordon's force may be
+briefly described. First, the town itself, on the left bank of the
+Blue Nile, but stretching almost across to the right bank of the White
+Nile, protected on the land side by a wall, in front of which was the
+triple line of mines, and on the water side by the river and the
+steamers. On the right bank of the Blue Nile was the small North Fort.
+Between the two stretched the island of Tuti, and at each end of the
+wall, on the White Nile as well as the Blue, Gordon had stationed a
+_santal_ or heavy-armed barge, carrying a gun. Unfortunately, a large
+part of the western end of the Khartoum wall had been washed away by
+an inundation of the Nile, but the mines supplied a substitute, and so
+long as Omdurman Fort was held this weakness in the defences of
+Khartoum did not greatly signify. That fort itself lay on the left
+bank of the White Nile. It was well built and fairly strong, but the
+position was faulty. It lay in a hollow, and the trench of the
+extensive camp formed for Hicks's force furnished the enemy with
+cover. It was also 1200 yards from the river bank, and when the enemy
+became more enterprising it was impossible to keep up communication
+with it. In Omdurman Fort was a specially selected garrison of 240
+men, commanded by a gallant black officer, Ferratch or Faragalla
+Pasha, who had been raised from a subordinate capacity to the
+principal command under him by Gordon. Gordon's point of observation
+was the flat roof of the Palace, whence he could see everything with
+his telescope, and where he placed his best shots to bear on any point
+that might seem hard pressed. Still more useful was it for the purpose
+of detecting the remissness of his own troops and officers, and often
+his telescope showed him sentries asleep at their posts, and officers
+absent from the points they were supposed to guard.
+
+From the end of March until the close of the siege scarcely a day
+passed without the exchange of artillery and rifle fire on one side or
+the other of the beleaguered town. On special occasions the Khedive's
+garrison would fire as many as forty or even fifty thousand rounds of
+Remington cartridges, and the Arab fire was sometimes heavier. This
+incessant fire, as the heroic defender wrote in his journal, murdered
+sleep, and at last he became so accustomed to it that he could tell by
+the sound where the firing was taking place. The most distant points
+of the defence, such as the _santal_ on the White Nile and Fort
+Omdurman, were two miles from the Palace; and although telegraphic
+communication existed with them during the greater part of the siege,
+the oral evidence as to the point of attack was often found the most
+rapid means of obtaining information. This was still more advantageous
+after the 12th of November, for on that day communications were cut
+between Khartoum and Omdurman, and it was found impossible to restore
+them. The only communications possible after that date were by bugle
+and flag. At the time of this severance Gordon estimated that the
+garrison of Omdurman had enough water and biscuit for six weeks, and
+that there were 250,000 cartridges in the arsenal. Gordon did
+everything in his power to aid Ferratch in the defence, and his
+remaining steamer, the _Ismailia_, after the grounding of the
+_Husseinyeh_ on the very day Omdurman was cut off, was engaged in
+almost daily encounters with the Mahdists for that purpose. Owing to
+Gordon's incessant efforts, and the gallantry of the garrison led by
+Ferratch, Omdurman held out more than two months. It was not until
+15th January that Ferratch, with Gordon's leave, surrendered, and then
+when the Mahdists occupied the place, General Gordon had the
+satisfaction of shelling them out of it, and showing that it was
+untenable.
+
+The severance of Omdurman from Khartoum was the prelude to fiercer
+fighting than had taken place at any time during the earlier stages of
+the siege, and although particulars are not obtainable for the last
+month of the period, there is no doubt that the struggle was
+incessant, and that the fighting was renewed from day to day. It was
+then that Gordon missed the ships lying idle at Shendy. If he had had
+them Omdurman would not have fallen, nor would it have been so easy
+for the Mahdi to transport the bulk of his force from the left to the
+right bank of the White Nile, as he did for the final assault on the
+fatal 26th January.
+
+At the end of October the Mahdi, accompanied by a far more numerous
+force than Gordon thought he could raise, described by Slatin as
+countless, pitched his camp a few miles south of Omdurman. On 8th
+November his arrival was celebrated by a direct attack on the lines
+south of Khartoum. The rebels in their fear of the hidden mines, which
+was far greater than it need have been, as it was found they had been
+buried too deep, resorted to the artifice of driving forward cows, and
+by throwing rockets among them Gordon had the satisfaction of
+spreading confusion in their ranks, repulsing the attack, and
+capturing twenty of the animals. Four days later the rebels made the
+desperate attack on Omdurman, when, as stated, communications were
+cut, and the _Husseinyeh_ ran aground. In attempting to carry her off
+and to check the further progress of the rebels the _Ismailia_ was
+badly hit, and the incident was one of those only too frequent at all
+stages of the siege, when Gordon wrote: "Every time I hear the gun
+fire I have a twitch of the heart of gnawing anxiety for my penny
+steamers." At the very moment that these fights were in progress he
+wrote, 10th November: "To-day is the day I expected we should have had
+some one of the Expedition here;" and he also recorded that we "have
+enough biscuit for a month or so"--meaning at the outside six weeks.
+Throughout the whole of November rumours of a coming British
+Expedition were prevalent, but they were of the vaguest and most
+contradictory character. On 25th November Gordon learnt that it was
+still at Ambukol, 185 miles further away from Khartoum than he had
+expected, and his only comment under this acute disappointment was,
+"This is lively!"
+
+Up to the arrival of the Mahdi daily desertions of his Arab and other
+soldiers to Gordon took place, and by these and levies among the
+townspeople all gaps in the garrison were more than filled up. Such
+was the confidence in Gordon that it more than neutralised all the
+intrigues of the Mahdi's agents in the besieged town, and scarcely a
+man during the first seven months of the siege deserted him; but after
+the arrival of the Mahdi there was a complete change in this respect.
+In the first place there were no more desertions to Gordon, and then
+men began to leave him, partly, no doubt, from fear of the Mahdi, or
+awakened fanaticism, but chiefly through the non-arrival of the
+British Expedition, which had been so much talked about, yet which
+never came. Still to all the enemy's invitations to surrender on the
+most honourable terms Gordon gave defiant answers. "I am here like
+iron, and I hope to see the newly-arrived English;" and when the
+situation had become little short of desperate, at the end of the
+year, he still, with bitter agony at his heart, proudly rejected all
+overtures, and sent the haughty message: "Can hold Khartoum for twelve
+years." Unfortunately the Mahdi knew better. He had read the truth in
+all the papers captured on Stewart's steamer, and he knew that
+Gordon's resources were nearly spent. Even some of the messages Gordon
+sent out by spies for Lord Wolseley's information fell into his hands,
+and on one of these Slatin says it was written: "Can hold Khartoum at
+the outside till the end of January." Although Gordon may be
+considered to have more than held his own against all the power of the
+Mahdi down to the capture of Omdurman Fort on 15th January, the Mahdi
+knew that his straits must be desperate, and that unless the
+expedition arrived he could not hold out much longer. The first
+advance of the English troops on 3rd January across the desert towards
+the Nile probably warned the enemy that now was the time to renew the
+attack with greater vigour, but it does not seem that there is any
+justification for the entirely hypothetical view that at any point the
+Mahdi could have seized the unhappy town. Omdurman Fort itself fell,
+not to the desperate onset of his Ghazis, but from the want of food
+and ammunition, and with Gordon's expressed permission to the
+commandant to surrender. Unfortunately the details of the most tragic
+part of the siege are missing, but Gordon himself well summed up what
+he had done up to the end of October when his position was secure, and
+aid, as he thought, was close at hand:--
+
+     "The news of Hicks's defeat was known in Cairo three weeks after
+     the event occurred; since that date up to this (29th October
+     1884) nine people have come up as reinforcements--myself,
+     Stewart, Herbin, Hussein, Tongi, Ruckdi, and three servants, and
+     not one penny of money. Of those who came up two, Stewart and
+     Herbin, have gone down, Hussein is dead; so six alone remain,
+     while we must have sent down over 1500 and 700 soldiers, total
+     2200, including the two Pashas, Coetlogon, etc. The regulars, who
+     were in arrears of pay for three months when I came, are now only
+     owed half a month, while the Bashi-Bazouks are owed only a
+     quarter month, and we have some L500 in the Treasury. It is quite
+     a miracle. We have lost two battles, suffering severe losses in
+     these actions of men and arms, and may have said to have
+     scrambled through, for I cannot say we can lay claim to any great
+     success during the whole time. I believe we have more ammunition
+     (Remington) and more soldiers now than when I came up. We have
+     L40,000 in Treasury _in paper_ and L500. When I came up there was
+     L5000 in Treasury. We have L15,000 out in the town in paper
+     money."
+
+At the point (14th December) when the authentic history of the
+protracted siege and gallant defence of Khartoum stops, a pause may be
+made to turn back and describe what the Government and country which
+sent General Gordon on his most perilous mission, and made use of his
+extraordinary devotion to the call of duty to extricate themselves
+from a responsibility they had not the courage to face, had been doing
+not merely to support their envoy, but to vindicate their own honour.
+The several messages which General Gordon had succeeded in getting
+through had shown how necessary some reinforcement and support were at
+the very commencement of the siege. The lapse of time, rendered the
+more expressive by the long period of silence that fell over what was
+taking place in the besieged town, showed, beyond need of
+demonstration, the gravity of the case and the desperate nature of the
+situation. But a very little of the knowledge at the command of the
+Government from a number of competent sources would have enabled it to
+foresee what was certain to happen, and to have provided some remedy
+for the peril long before the following despairing message from Gordon
+showed that the hour when any aid would be useful had almost expired.
+This was the passage, dated 13th December, in the last (sixth) volume
+of the Journal, but the substance of which reached Lord Wolseley by
+one of Gordon's messengers at Korti on 31st December:--
+
+     "We are going to send down the _Bordeen_ the day after to-morrow,
+     and with her I shall send this Journal. _If some effort is not
+     made before ten days' time the town will fall._ It is
+     inexplicable this delay. If the Expeditionary forces have reached
+     the river and met my steamers, one hundred men are all that we
+     require just to show themselves.... Even if the town falls under
+     the nose of the Expeditionary forces it will not in my opinion
+     justify the abandonment of Senaar and Kassala, or of the
+     Equatorial Province by H.M.'s Government. All that is absolutely
+     necessary is for fifty of the Expeditionary force to get on board
+     a steamer and come up to Halfiyeh, and thus let their presence be
+     felt. This is not asking much, but it must happen _at once_, or
+     it will (as usual) be too late."
+
+The motives which induced Mr Gladstone's Government to send General
+Gordon to the Soudan in January 1884 were, as has been clearly shown,
+the selfish desire to appease public opinion, and to shirk in the
+easiest possible manner a great responsibility. They had no policy at
+all, but they had one supreme wish, viz. to cut off the Soudan from
+Egypt; and if the Mahdi had only known their wishes and pressed on,
+and treated the Khartoum force as he had treated that under Hicks,
+there would have been no garrisons to rescue, and that British
+Government would have done nothing. It recked nothing of the grave
+dangers that would have accrued from the complete triumph of the
+Mahdi, or of the outbreak that must have followed in Lower Egypt if
+his tide of success had not been checked as it was single-handed by
+General Gordon, through the twelve months' defence of Khartoum. Still
+it could not quite stoop to the dishonour of abandoning these
+garrisons, and of making itself an accomplice to the Mahdi's
+butcheries, nor could it altogether turn a deaf ear to the
+representations and remonstrances of even such a puppet prince as the
+Khedive Tewfik. England was then far more mistress of the situation at
+Cairo than she is now, but a helpless refusal to discharge her duty
+might have provoked Europe into action at the Porte that would have
+proved inconvenient and damaging to her position and reputation.
+Therefore the Government fell back on General Gordon, and the hope was
+even indulged that, under his exceptional reputation, the evacuation
+of the Soudan might not only be successfully carried out, but that his
+success might induce the public and the world to accept that
+abnegation of policy as the acme of wisdom. In all this they were
+destined to a complete awakening, and the only matter of surprise is
+that they should have sent so well-known a character as General
+Gordon, whose independence and contempt for official etiquette and
+restraint were no secrets at the Foreign and War Offices, on a mission
+in which they required him not only to be as indifferent to the
+national honour as they were, but also to be tied and restrained by
+the shifts and requirements of an embarrassed executive.
+
+At a very early stage of the mission the Government obtained evidence
+that Gordon's views on the subject were widely different from theirs.
+They had evidently persuaded themselves that their policy was Gordon's
+policy; and before he was in Khartoum a week he not merely points out
+that the evacuation policy is not his but theirs, and that although he
+thinks its execution is still possible, the true policy is, "if Egypt
+is to be quiet, that the Mahdi must be smashed up." The hopes that had
+been based on Gordon's supposed complaisance in the post of
+representative on the Nile of the Government policy were thus
+dispelled, and it became evident that Gordon, instead of being a tool,
+was resolved to be master, so far as the mode of carrying out the
+evacuation policy with full regard for the dictates of honour was to
+be decided. Nor was this all, or the worst of the revelations made to
+the Government in the first few weeks after his arrival at Khartoum.
+While expressing his willingness and intention to discharge the chief
+part of his task, viz. the withdrawal of the garrisons, which was all
+the Government cared about, he also descanted on the moral duty and
+the inevitable necessity of setting up a provisional government that
+should avert anarchy and impose some barrier to the Mahdi's progress.
+All this was trying to those who only wished to be rid of the whole
+matter, but Gordon did not spare their feelings, and phrase by phrase
+he revealed what his own policy would be and what his inner wishes,
+however repressed his charge might keep them, really were.
+
+Having told them that "the Mahdi must be smashed up," he went on to
+say that "we cannot hurry over this affair" (the future of the Soudan)
+"if we do we shall incur disaster," and again that, although "it is a
+miserable country it is joined to Egypt, and it would be difficult to
+divorce the two." Within a very few weeks, therefore, the Government
+learnt that its own agent was the most forcible and damaging critic of
+the policy of evacuation, and that the worries of the Soudan question
+for an administration not resolute enough to solve the difficulty in a
+thorough manner were increased and not diminished by Gordon's mission.
+At that point the proposition was made and supported by several
+members of the Cabinet that Gordon should be recalled. There is no
+doubt that this step would have been taken but for the fear that it
+would aggravate the difficulties of the English expedition sent to
+Souakim under the command of General Gerald Graham to retrieve the
+defeat of Baker Pasha. Failing the adoption of that extreme measure,
+which would at least have been straightforward and honest, and
+ignoring what candour seemed to demand if a decision had been come to
+to render Gordon no support, and to bid him shift for himself, the
+Government resorted to the third and least justifiable course of all,
+viz. of showing indifference to the legitimate requests of their
+emissary, and of putting off definite action until the very last
+moment.
+
+We have seen that Gordon made several specific demands in the first
+six weeks of his stay at Khartoum--that is, in the short period before
+communication was cut off. He wanted Zebehr, 200 troops at Berber, or
+even at Wady Halfa, and the opening of the route from Souakim to the
+Nile. To these requests not one favourable answer was given, and the
+not wholly unnatural rejection of the first rendered it more than ever
+necessary to comply with the others. They were such as ought to have
+been granted, and in anticipation they had been suggested and
+discussed before Gordon felt bound to urge them as necessary for the
+security of his position at Khartoum. Even Sir Evelyn Baring had
+recommended in February the despatch of 200 men to Assouan for the
+moral effect, and that was the very reason why Gordon asked, in the
+first place, for the despatch of a small British force to at least
+Wady Halfa. It is possible that one of the chief reasons for the
+Government rejecting all these suggestions, and also, it must be
+remembered, doing nothing in their place towards the relief and
+support of their representative, may have been the hope that this
+treatment would have led him to resign and throw up his mission. They
+would then have been able to declare that, as the task was beyond the
+powers of General Gordon, they were only coming to the prudent and
+logical conclusion in saying that nothing could be done, and that the
+garrisons had better come to terms with the Mahdi. Unfortunately for
+those who favoured the evasion of trouble as the easiest and best way
+out of the difficulty, Gordon had high notions as to what duty
+required. No difficulty had terrors for him, and while left at the
+post of power and responsibility he would endeavour to show himself
+equal to the charge.
+
+Yet there can be no doubt that those who sent him would have rejoiced
+if he had formally asked to be relieved of the task he had accepted,
+and Mr Gladstone stated on the 3rd April that "Gordon was under no
+orders and no restraint to stay at Khartoum." A significant answer to
+the fact represented in that statement was supplied, when, ten days
+later, silence fell on Khartoum, and remained unbroken for more than
+five months. But at the very moment that the Prime Minister made that
+statement as to Gordon's liberty of movement, the Government knew of
+the candid views which he had expressed as to the proper policy for
+the Soudan. It should have been apparent that, unless they and their
+author were promptly repudiated, and unless the latter was stripped of
+his official authority, the Government would, however tardily and
+reluctantly, be drawn after its representative into a policy of
+intervention in the Soudan, which it, above everything else,
+wished to avoid. Gordon concealed nothing. He told them "time,"
+"reinforcements," and a very considerable expenditure was necessary to
+honourably carry out their policy of evacuation. They were not
+prepared to concede any of these save the last, and even the money
+they sent him was lost because they would send it by Berber instead of
+Kassala. But they knew that "the order and restraint" which kept
+Gordon at Khartoum was the duty he had contracted towards them when he
+accepted his mission, and which was binding on a man of his principles
+until they chose to relieve him of the task. The fear of public
+opinion had more to do with their abstaining from the step of ordering
+his recall than the hope that his splendid energy and administrative
+power might yet provide some satisfactory issue from the dilemma, for
+at the very beginning it was freely given out that "General Gordon
+was exceeding his instructions."
+
+The interruption of communications with Khartoum at least suspended
+Gordon's constant representations as to what he thought the right
+policy, as well as his demands for the fulfilment by the Government of
+their side of the contract. It was then that Lord Granville seemed to
+pluck up heart of grace, and to challenge Gordon's right to remain at
+Khartoum. On 23rd April Lord Granville asked for explanation of "cause
+of detention." Unfortunately it was not till months later that the
+country knew of Gordon's terse and humorous reply, "cause of
+detention, these horribly plucky Arabs." Lord Granville, thinking this
+despatch not clear enough, followed it up on 17th May by instructing
+Mr Egerton, then acting for Sir Evelyn Baring, to send the following
+remonstrance to Gordon:
+
+     "As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been
+     dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with
+     the countenance of H.M.'s Government, General Gordon is enjoined
+     to consider, and either to report upon, or, if possible, to adopt
+     at the first proper moment measures for his own removal and for
+     that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him, or
+     who have served him faithfully, including their wives and
+     children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial
+     regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects."
+
+Then followed suggestions and authority to pay so much a head for
+refugees safely escorted to Korosko. The comment Gordon made on that,
+and similar despatches, to save himself and any part of the garrison
+he could, was that he was not so mean as to desert those who had nobly
+stood by him and committed themselves on the strength of his word.
+
+It is impossible to go behind the collective responsibility of the
+Government and to attempt to fix any special responsibility or blame
+on any individual member of that Government. The facts as I read them
+show plainly that there was a complete abnegation of policy or purpose
+on the part of the British Government, that Gordon was then sent as a
+sort of stop-gap, and that when it was revealed that he had strong
+views and clear plans, not at all in harmony with those who sent him,
+it was thought, by the Ministers who had not the courage to recall
+him, very inconsiderate and insubordinate of him to remain at his post
+and to refuse all the hints given him, that he ought to resign unless
+he would execute a _sauve qui peut_ sort of retreat to the frontier.
+Very harsh things have been said of Mr Gladstone and his Cabinet on
+this point, but considering their views and declarations, it is not so
+very surprising that Gordon's boldness and originality alarmed and
+displeased them. Their radical fault in these early stages of the
+question was not that they were indifferent to Gordon's demands, but
+that they had absolutely no policy. They could not even come to the
+decision, as Gordon wrote, "to abandon altogether and not care what
+happens."
+
+But all these minor points were merged in a great common national
+anxiety when month after month passed during the spring and summer of
+1884, and not a single word issued from the tomb-like silence of
+Khartoum. People might argue that the worst could not have happened,
+as the Mahdi would have been only too anxious to proclaim his triumph
+far and wide if Khartoum had fallen. Anxiety may be diminished, but is
+not banished, by a calculation of probabilities, and the military
+spirit and capacity exhibited by the Mahdi's forces under Osman Digma
+in the fighting with General Graham's well-equipped British force at
+Teb and Tamanieb revealed the greatness of the peril with which Gordon
+had to deal at Khartoum where he had only the inadequate and
+untrustworthy garrison described by Colonel de Coetlogon. During the
+summer of 1884 there was therefore a growing fear, not only that the
+worst news might come at any moment, but that in the most favourable
+event any news would reveal the desperate situation to which Gordon
+had been reduced, and with that conviction came the thought, not
+whether he had exactly carried out what Ministers had expected him to
+do, but solely of his extraordinary courage and devotion to his
+country, which had led him to take up a thankless task without the
+least regard for his comfort or advantage, and without counting the
+odds. There was at least one Minister in the Cabinet who was struck by
+that single-minded conduct; and as early as April, when his colleagues
+were asking the formal question why Gordon did not leave Khartoum, the
+Marquis of Hartington, then Minister of War, and now Duke of
+Devonshire, began to inquire as to the steps necessary to rescue the
+emissary, while still adhering to the policy of the Administration of
+which he formed part. During the whole of that summer the present Duke
+of Devonshire advocated the special claim of General Gordon on the
+Government, whose mandate he had so readily accepted, and urged the
+necessity of special measures being taken at the earliest moment to
+save the gallant envoy from what seemed the too probable penalty of
+his own temerity and devotion. But for his energetic and consistent
+representations the steps that were taken--all too late as they
+proved--never would have been taken at all, or deferred to such a date
+as to let the public see by the event that there was no use in
+throwing away money and precious lives on a lost cause.
+
+If the first place among those in power--for of my own and other
+journalists' efforts in the Press to arouse public opinion and to urge
+the Government to timely action it is unnecessary to speak--is due to
+the Duke of Devonshire, the second may reasonably be claimed by Lord
+Wolseley. This recognition is the more called for here, because the
+most careful consideration of the facts has led me to the conclusion,
+which I would gladly avoid the necessity of expressing if it were
+possible, that Lord Wolseley was responsible for the failure of the
+relief expedition. This stage of responsibility has not yet been
+reached, and it must be duly set forth that on 24th July Lord
+Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, wrote a noble letter, stating that,
+as he "did not wish to share the responsibility of leaving Charley
+Gordon to his fate," he recommended "immediate action," and "the
+despatch of a small brigade of between three and four thousand British
+soldiers to Dongola, so that they might reach that place about 15th
+October." But even that date was later than it ought to have been,
+especially when the necessity of getting the English troops back as
+early in the New Year as possible was considered, and in the
+subsequent recriminations that ensued, the blame for being late from
+the start was sought to be thrown on the badness of the Nile flood
+that year. General Gordon himself cruelly disposed of that theory or
+excuse when he wrote, "It was not a bad Nile; quite an average one.
+You were too late, that was all." Still, Lord Wolseley must not be
+robbed of the credit of having said on 24th July that an expedition
+was necessary to save Gordon, "his old friend and Crimean comrade,"
+towards whom Wolseley himself had contracted a special moral
+obligation for his prominent share in inducing him to accept the very
+mission that had already proved so full of peril. In short, if the
+plain truth must be told, Lord Wolseley was far more responsible for
+the despatch of General Gordon to Khartoum than Mr Gladstone.
+
+The result of the early representations of the Duke of Devonshire, and
+the definite suggestion of Lord Wolseley, was that the Government gave
+in when the public anxiety became so great at the continued silence of
+Khartoum, and acquiesced in the despatch of an expedition to relieve
+General Gordon. Having once made the concession, it must be allowed
+that they showed no niggard spirit in sanctioning the expedition and
+the proposals of the military authorities. The sum of ten millions was
+devoted to the work of rescuing Gordon by the very persons who had
+rejected his demands for the hundredth part of that total. Ten
+thousand men selected from the _elite_ of the British army were
+assigned to the task for which he had begged two hundred men in vain.
+It is impossible here to enter closely into the causes which led to
+the expansion of the three or four thousand British infantry into a
+special corps of ten thousand fighting men, picked from the crack
+regiments of the army, and composed of every arm of the service
+compelled to fight under unaccustomed conditions. The local
+authorities--in particular Major Kitchener, now the Sirdar of the
+Egyptian army, who is slowly recovering from the Mahdi the provinces
+which should never have been left in his possession--protested that
+the expedition should be a small one, and if their advice had been
+taken the cost would have been about one-fourth that incurred, and the
+force would have reached Khartoum by that 11th November on which
+Gordon expected to see the first man of it. But Major Kitchener,
+although, as Gordon wrote, "one of the few really first-class officers
+in the British army," was only an individual, and his word did not
+possess a feather's weight before the influence of the Pall Mall band
+of warriors who have farmed out our little wars--India, of course,
+excepted--of the last thirty years for their own glorification. So
+great a chance of fame as "the rescue of Gordon" was not to be left to
+some unknown brigadiers, or to the few line regiments, the proximity
+of whose stations entitled them to the task. That would be neglecting
+the favours of Providence. For so noble a task the control of the most
+experienced commander in the British army would alone suffice, and
+when he took the field his staff had to be on the extensive scale that
+suited his dignity and position. As there would be some reasonable
+excuse for the dispensation of orders and crosses from a campaign
+against a religious leader who had not yet known defeat, any friend
+might justly complain if he was left behind. To justify so brilliant a
+staff, no ordinary British force would suffice. Therefore our
+household brigade, our heavy cavalry, and our light cavalry were
+requisitioned for their best men, and these splendid troops were
+drafted and amalgamated into special corps--heavy and light
+camelry--for work that would have been done far better and more
+efficiently by two regiments of Bengal Lancers. If all this effort and
+expenditure had resulted in success, it would be possible to keep
+silent and shrug one's shoulders; but when the mode of undertaking
+this expedition can be clearly shown to have been the direct cause of
+its failure, silence would be a crime. When Lord Wolseley told the
+soldiers at Korti on their return from Metemmah, "It was not _your_
+fault that Gordon has perished and Khartoum fallen," the positiveness
+of his assurance may have been derived from the inner conviction of
+his own stupendous error.
+
+The expedition was finally sanctioned in August, and the news of its
+coming was known to General Gordon in September, before, indeed, his
+own despatches of 31st July were received in London, and broke the
+suspense of nearly half a year. He thought that only a small force was
+coming, under the command of Major-General Earle, and he at once, as
+already described, sent his steamers back to Shendy, there to await
+the troops and convey them to Khartoum. He seems to have calculated
+that three months from the date of the message informing him of the
+expedition would suffice for the conveyance of the troops as far as
+Berber or Metemmah, and at that rate General Earle would have arrived
+where his steamers awaited him early in November. Gordon's views as to
+the object of the expedition, which somebody called the Gordon Relief
+Expedition, were thus clearly expressed:--
+
+     "I altogether decline the imputation that the projected
+     expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our
+     National honour in extricating the garrisons, etc., from a
+     position in which our action in Egypt has placed these garrisons.
+     I was Relief Expedition No. 1; they are Relief Expedition No. 2.
+     As for myself, I could make good my retreat at any moment, if I
+     wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief
+     expedition was to bolt, and the steamers fell into the hands of
+     the Mahdi. This second relief expedition (for the honour of
+     England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat
+     hampered. We, the first and second expeditions, are equally
+     engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. I came up
+     to extricate the garrison, and failed. Earle comes up to
+     extricate garrisons, and I hope succeeds. Earle does not come to
+     extricate me. The extrication of the garrisons was supposed to
+     affect our "National honour." If Earle succeeds, the "National
+     honour" thanks him, and I hope recommends him, but it is
+     altogether independent of me, who, for failing, incurs its blame.
+     I am not _the rescued lamb_, and I will not be."
+
+Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an
+expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of
+supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried
+out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and
+less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only
+arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions
+reached him in the following form:--"The primary object of your
+expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and
+you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that
+object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations
+of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and
+clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had,
+however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the
+National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned
+an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its
+long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With
+extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its
+purpose, and wrote:--"I very much doubt what is really going to be the
+policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola,"
+and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond
+Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."
+
+The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed that
+there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four
+months, which would have carried the garrison on till the end of
+November. As the greater part of that period had expired when these
+documents reached Lord Wolseley's hands, it was quite impossible to
+doubt that time had become the most important factor of all in the
+situation. The chance of being too late would even then have presented
+itself to a prudent commander, and, above all, to a friend hastening
+to the rescue of a friend. The news that Colonel Stewart and some
+other Europeans had been entrapped and murdered near Merowe, which
+reached the English commander from different sources before Gordon
+confirmed it in his letters, was also calculated to stimulate, by
+showing that Gordon was alone, and had single-handed to conduct the
+defence of a populous city. Hard on the heels of that intelligence
+came Gordon's letter of 4th November to Lord Wolseley, who received it
+at Dongola on 14th of the same month. The letter was a long one, but
+only two passages need be quoted:--"At Metemmah, waiting your orders,
+are five steamers with nine guns." Did it not occur to anyone how
+greatly, at the worst stage of the siege, Gordon had thus weakened
+himself to assist the relieving expedition? Even for that reason there
+was not a day or an hour to be lost.
+
+But the letter contained a worse and more alarming passage:--"We can
+hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." Forty
+days would have meant till 14th December, one month ahead of the day
+Lord Wolseley received the news, but the message was really more
+alarming than the form in which it was published, for there is no
+doubt that the word "difficult" is the official rendering of Gordon's,
+a little indistinctly written, word "desperate." In face of that
+alarming message, which only stated facts that ought to have been
+surmised, if not known, it was no longer possible to pursue the
+leisurely promenade up the Nile, which was timed so as to bring the
+whole force to Khartoum in the first week of March. Rescue by the most
+prominent general and swell troops of England at Easter would hardly
+gratify the commandant and garrison starved into surrender the
+previous Christmas, and that was the exact relationship between
+Wolseley's plans and Gordon's necessities.
+
+The date at which Gordon's supplies would be exhausted varied not from
+any miscalculation, but because on two successive occasions he
+discovered large stores of grain and biscuits, which had been stolen
+from the public granaries before his arrival. The supplies that would
+all have disappeared in November were thus eked out, first till the
+middle of December, and then finally till the end of January, but
+there is no doubt that they would not have lasted as long as they did
+if in the last month of the siege he had not given the civil
+population permission to leave the doomed town. From any and from
+every point of view, there was not the shadow of an excuse for a
+moment's delay after the receipt of that letter on 14th November.
+
+With the British Exchequer at a commander's back, it is easy to
+organise an expedition on an elaborate scale, and to carry it out with
+the nicety of perfection, but for the realisation of these ponderous
+plans there is one thing more necessary, and that is time. I have no
+doubt if Gordon's letter had said "granaries full, can hold out till
+Easter," that Lord Wolseley's deliberate march--Cairo, September 27;
+Wady Halfa, October 8; Dongola, November 14; Korti, December 30;
+Metemmah any day in February, and Khartoum, March 3, and those were
+the approximate dates of his grand plan of campaign--would have been
+fully successful, and held up for admiration as a model of skill.
+Unfortunately, it would not do for the occasion, as Gordon was on the
+verge of starvation and in desperate straits when the rescuing force
+reached Dongola. It is not easy to alter the plan of any campaign, nor
+to adapt a heavy moving machine to the work suitable for a light one.
+To feed 10,000 British soldiers on the middle Nile was alone a feat of
+organisation such as no other country could have attempted, but the
+effort was exhausting, and left no reserve energy to despatch that
+quick-moving battalion which could have reached Gordon's steamers
+early in December, and would have reinforced the Khartoum garrison,
+just as Havelock and Outram did the Lucknow Residency.
+
+Dongola is only 100 miles below Debbeh, where the intelligence
+officers and a small force were on that 14th November; Ambukol,
+specially recommended by Gordon as the best starting-point, is less
+than fifty miles, and Korti, the point selected by Lord Wolseley, is
+exactly that distance above Debbeh. The Bayuda desert route by the
+Jakdul Wells to Metemmah is 170 miles. At Metemmah were the five
+steamers with nine guns to convoy the desperately needed succour to
+Khartoum. The energy expended on the despatch of 10,000 men up 150
+miles of river, if concentrated on 1000 men, must have given a
+speedier result, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the
+year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to
+make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.
+
+The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking
+six weeks to do what--the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not
+of the main force, but of 1000 men--ought to have been done in one
+week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel
+corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's
+power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward movement of
+the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was
+effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy
+in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not
+forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this
+difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud
+Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the
+camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and
+the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The
+last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi
+with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining
+reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would
+have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly
+expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of
+contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of
+the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as
+far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at
+home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a
+line of communication of over 1200 miles.
+
+Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a
+well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave
+Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well
+known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places,
+and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The
+officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert
+Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others
+impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the
+view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was
+trammelled by his instructions, which were to this effect--he was to
+establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water
+there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be
+determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and
+so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his
+1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full,
+he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish
+the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case
+when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but
+even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.
+
+The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January
+1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss,
+unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British
+relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be
+a reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart
+had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would
+undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops
+would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it
+must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the
+required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord
+Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.
+
+General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with
+him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more
+urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid
+did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might
+fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who
+brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart
+left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him
+orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but
+the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a
+preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole
+expedition.
+
+The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a
+surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the
+subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume
+the offensive.
+
+On 12th January--that is, nine days after his first arrival at
+Jakdul--General Stewart reached the place a second time with the
+second detachment of another 1000 men--the total fighting strength of
+the column being raised to about 2300 men. For whatever errors had
+been committed, and their consequences, the band of soldiers assembled
+at Jakdul on that 12th of January could in no sense be held
+responsible. Without making any invidious comparisons, it may be
+truthfully said that such a splendid fighting force was never
+assembled in any other cause, and the temper of the men was strung to
+a high point of enthusiasm by the thought that at last they had
+reached the final stage of the long journey to rescue Gordon. A number
+of causes, principally the fatigue of the camels from the treble
+journey between Korti and Jakdul, made the advance very slow, and five
+days were occupied in traversing the forty-five miles between Jakdul
+and the wells at Abou Klea, themselves distant twenty miles from
+Metemmah. On the morning of 17th January it became clear that the
+column was in presence of an enemy.
+
+At the time of Stewart's first arrival at Jakdul there were no hostile
+forces in the Bayuda desert. At Berber was a considerable body of the
+Mahdi's followers, and both Metemmah and Shendy were held in his name.
+At the latter place a battery or small fort had been erected, and in
+an encounter between it and Gordon's steamers one of the latter had
+been sunk, thus reducing their total to four. But there were none of
+the warrior tribes of Kordofan and Darfour at any of these places, or
+nearer than the six camps which had been established round Khartoum.
+The news of the English advance made the Mahdi bestir himself, and as
+it was known that the garrison of Omdurman was reduced to the lowest
+straits, and could not hold out many days, the Mahdi despatched some
+of his best warriors of the Jaalin, Degheim, and Kenana tribes to
+oppose the British troops in the Bayuda desert. It was these men who
+opposed the further advance of Sir Herbert Stewart's column at Abou
+Klea. It is unnecessary to describe the desperate assault these
+gallant warriors made on the somewhat cumbrous and ill-arranged square
+of the British force, or the ease and tremendous loss with which these
+fanatics were beaten off, and never allowed to come to close quarters,
+save at one point. The infantry soldiers, who formed two sides of the
+square, signally repulsed the onset, not a Ghazi succeeded in getting
+within a range of 300 yards; but on another side, cavalrymen, doing
+infantry soldiers' unaccustomed work, did not adhere to the strict
+formation necessary, and trained for the close _melee_, and with the
+_gaudia certaminis_ firing their blood, they recklessly allowed the
+Ghazis to come to close quarters, and their line of the square was
+impinged upon. In that close fighting, with the Heavy Camel Corps men
+and the Naval Brigade, the Blacks suffered terribly, but they also
+inflicted loss in return. Of a total loss on the British side of
+sixty-five killed and sixty-one wounded, the Heavy Camel Corps lost
+fifty-two, and the Sussex Regiment, performing work to which it was
+thoroughly trained, inflicted immense loss on the enemy at hardly any
+cost to itself. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Fred. Burnaby,
+one of the noblest and gentlest, as he was physically the strongest,
+officers in the British army. There is no doubt that signal as was
+this success, it shook the confidence of the force. The men were
+resolute to a point of ferocity, but the leaders' confidence in
+themselves and their task had been rudely tried; and yet the breaking
+of the square had been clearly due to a tactical blunder, and the
+inability of the cavalry to adapt themselves to a strange position.
+
+On the 18th January the march, rendered slower by the conveyance of
+the wounded, was resumed, but no fighting took place on that day,
+although it was clear that the enemy had not been dispersed. On the
+19th, when the force had reached the last wells at Abou Kru or Gubat,
+it became clear that another battle was to be fought. One of the first
+shots seriously wounded Sir Herbert Stewart, and during the whole of
+the affair many of our men were carried off by the heavy rifle fire of
+the enemy. Notwithstanding that our force fought under many
+disadvantages and was not skilfully handled, the Mahdists were driven
+off with terrible loss, while our force had thirty-six killed and one
+hundred and seven wounded. Notwithstanding these two defeats, the
+enemy were not cowed, and held on to Metemmah, in which no doubt those
+who had taken part in the battles were assisted by a force from
+Berber. The 20th January was wasted in inaction, caused by the large
+number of wounded, and when on 21st January Metemmah was attacked, the
+Mahdists showed so bold a front that Sir Charles Wilson, who succeeded
+to the command on Sir Herbert Stewart being incapacitated by his, as
+it proved, mortal wound, drew off his force. This was the more
+disappointing, because Gordon's four steamers arrived during the
+action and took a gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the
+effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly
+unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the
+gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming.
+He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid
+did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be
+desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir
+Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement--the very last entry
+under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the
+Expeditionary Force--and I ask for no more than 200 men--does not come
+in ten days, _the town may fall_, and I have done my best for the
+honour of our country. Good-bye."
+
+The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the
+view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch
+of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his
+sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence,
+have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel
+Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and
+Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after
+ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our
+people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their
+movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents,
+which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is
+impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to
+Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum
+was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute,
+had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been
+destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of
+reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body
+under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who think
+that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last
+moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the
+earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when
+I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any
+suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and
+untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a
+sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at daybreak
+on the 26th, for the theory that the Mahdi could have entered the town
+one hour before he did was never a serious argument, while the
+evidence of Slatin Pasha strengthens the view that Gordon was at the
+last moment only overcome by the Khalifa's resorting to a surprise. On
+one point of fact Sir Charles Wilson seems also to have been in error.
+He fixes the fall of Omdurman at 6th January, whereas Slatin, whose
+information on the point ought to be unimpeachable, states that it did
+not occur until the 15th of that month.
+
+When Sir Herbert Stewart had fought and won the battle of Abou Klea,
+it was his intention on reaching the Nile, as he expected to do the
+next day, to put Sir Charles Wilson on board one of Gordon's own
+steamers and send him off at once to Khartoum. The second battle and
+Sir Herbert Stewart's fatal wound destroyed that project. But this
+plan might have been adhered to so far as the altered circumstances
+would allow. Sir Charles Wilson had succeeded to the command, and many
+matters affecting the position of the force had to be settled before
+he was free to devote himself to the main object of the dash forward,
+viz. the establishment of communications with Gordon and Khartoum. As
+the consequence of that change in his own position, it would have been
+natural that he should have delegated the task to someone else, and in
+Lord Charles Beresford, as brave a sailor as ever led a cutting-out
+party, there was the very man for the occasion. Unfortunately, Sir
+Charles Wilson did not take this step for, as I believe, the sole
+reason that he was the bearer of an important official letter to
+General Gordon, which he did not think could be entrusted to any other
+hands. But for that circumstance it is permissible to say that one
+steamer--there was more than enough wood on the other three steamers
+to fit one out for the journey to Khartoum--would have sailed on the
+morning of the 22nd, the day after the force sheered off from
+Metemmah, and, at the latest, it would have reached Khartoum on
+Sunday, the 25th, just in time to avert the catastrophe.
+
+But as it was done, the whole of the 22nd and 23rd were taken up in
+preparing two steamers for the voyage, and in collecting scarlet coats
+for the troops, so that the effect of real British soldiers coming up
+the Nile might be made more considerable. At 8 A.M. on Saturday, the
+24th, Sir Charles Wilson at last sailed with the two steamers,
+_Bordeen_ and _Talataween_, and it was then quite impossible for the
+steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover,
+the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that
+navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka
+cataract was passed at 3 P.M. on the afternoon of Sunday; then the
+_Bordeen_ ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 P.M. on the
+fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was
+reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was
+killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past
+Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in
+the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream
+under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black
+gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the
+_Talataween_ ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the
+_Bordeen_. Two days later the _Bordeen_ shared the same fate, but the
+whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer,
+brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the
+subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously
+failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to
+accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it
+must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and
+spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning
+their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon
+himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main
+fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its
+capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so
+long defied.
+
+I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of
+which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been
+published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not
+been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's
+intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command
+at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it
+been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's
+strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English
+soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would
+have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against
+orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sole object of the
+Expedition have been attained without regard for the national honour,
+and without the discovery of that policy, the want of which was the
+only cause of the calamities associated with the Soudan.
+
+After the 14th of December there is no trustworthy, or at least,
+complete evidence, as to what took place in Khartoum. A copy of one of
+the defiant messages Gordon used to circulate for the special purpose
+of letting them fall into the hands of the Mahdi was dated 29th of
+that month, and ran to the effect, "Can hold Khartoum for years."
+There was also the final message to the Sovereigns of the Powers,
+undated, and probably written, if at all, by Gordon, during the final
+agony of the last few weeks, perhaps when Omdurman had fallen. It was
+worded as follows:--
+
+     "After salutations, I would at once, calling to mind what I have
+     gone through, inform their Majesties, the Sovereigns, of the
+     action of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me
+     as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing
+     the rebellion in that country.
+
+     "During the twelve months that I have been here, these two
+     Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth, and the other for her
+     military force, have remained unaffected by my situation--perhaps
+     relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who
+     surrendered of his own accord.
+
+     "Although I, personally, am too insignificant to be taken into
+     account, the Powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the
+     engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield
+     the honour of the Governments.
+
+     "What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God
+     will help me."
+
+Although this copy was not in Gordon's own writing, it was brought
+down by one of his clerks, who escaped from Khartoum, and he declared
+that the original had been sent in a cartridge case to Dongola. The
+style is certainly the style of Gordon, and there was no one in the
+Soudan who could imitate it. It seems safe, as Sir Henry Gordon did,
+to accept it as the farewell message of his brother.
+
+Until fresh evidence comes to light, that of Slatin Pasha, then a
+chained captive in the Mahdi's camp, is alone entitled to the
+slightest credence, and it is extremely graphic. We can well believe
+that up to the last moment Gordon continued to send out
+messages--false, to deceive the Mahdi, and true to impress Lord
+Wolseley. The note of 29th December was one of the former; the little
+French note on half a cigarette paper, brought by Abdullah Khalifa to
+Slatin to translate early in January, may have been one of the latter.
+It said:--"Can hold Khartoum at the outside till the end of January."
+Slatin then describes the fall of Omdurman on 15th January, with
+Gordon's acquiescence, which entirely disposes of the assertion that
+Ferratch, the gallant defender of that place during two months, was a
+traitor, and of how, on its surrender, Gordon's fire from the western
+wall of Khartoum prevented the Mahdists occupying it. He also comments
+on the alarm caused by the first advance of the British force into the
+Bayuda desert, and of the despatch of thousands of the Mahdi's best
+warriors to oppose it. Those forces quitted the camp at Omdurman
+between 10th and 15th January, and this step entirely disposes of the
+theory that the Mahdi held Khartoum in the hollow of his hand, and
+could at any moment take it. As late as the 15th of January, Gordon's
+fire was so vigorous and successful that the Mahdi was unable to
+retain possession of the fort which he had just captured.
+
+The story had best be continued in the words used by the witness. Six
+days after the fall of Omdurman loud weeping and wailing filled the
+Mahdi's camp. As the Mahdi forbade the display of sorrow and grief it
+was clear that something most unusual had taken place. Then it came
+out that the British troops had met and utterly defeated the tribes,
+with a loss to the Mahdists of several thousands. Within the next two
+or three days came news of the other defeat at Abou Kru, and the loud
+lamentations of the women and children could not be checked. The Mahdi
+and his chief emirs, the present Khalifa Abdullah prominent among
+them, then held a consultation, and it was decided, sooner than lose
+all the fruits of the hitherto unchecked triumph of their cause, to
+risk an assault on Khartoum. At night on the 24th, and again on the
+25th, the bulk of the rebel force was conveyed across the river to the
+right bank of the White Nile; the Mahdi preached them a sermon,
+promising them victory, and they were enjoined to receive his remarks
+in silence, so that no noise was heard in the beleaguered city. By
+this time their terror of the mines laid in front of the south wall
+had become much diminished, because the mines had been placed too low
+in the earth, and they also knew that Gordon and his diminished force
+were in the last stages of exhaustion. Finally, the Mahdi or his
+energetic lieutenant decided on one more arrangement, which was
+probably the true cause of their success. The Mahdists had always
+delivered their attack half an hour after sunrise; on this occasion
+they decided to attack half an hour before dawn, when the whole scene
+was covered in darkness. Slatin knew all these plans, and as he
+listened anxiously in his place of confinement he was startled, when
+just dropping off to sleep, by "the deafening discharge of thousands
+of rifles and guns; this lasted for a few minutes, then only
+occasional rifle shots were heard, and now all was quiet again. Could
+this possibly be the great attack on Khartoum? A wild discharge of
+firearms and cannon, and in a few minutes complete silence!" He was
+not left long in doubt. Some hours afterwards three black soldiers
+approached, carrying in a bloody cloth the head of General Gordon,
+which he identified. It is unnecessary to add the gruesome details
+which Slatin picked up as to his manner of death from the gossip of
+the camp. In this terrible tragedy ended that noble defence of
+Khartoum, which, wherever considered or discussed, and for all time,
+will excite the pity and admiration of the world.
+
+There is no need to dwell further on the terrible end of one of the
+purest heroes our country has ever produced, whose loss was national,
+but most deeply felt as an irreparable shock, and as a void that can
+never be filled up by that small circle of men and women who might
+call themselves his friends. Ten years elapsed after the eventful
+morning when Slatin pronounced over his remains the appropriate
+epitaph, "A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have
+fallen; his sufferings are over!" before the exact manner of Gordon's
+death was known, and some even clung to the chance that after all he
+might have escaped to the Equator, and indeed it was not till long
+after the expedition had returned that the remarkable details of his
+single-handed defence of Khartoum became known. Had all these
+particulars come out at the moment when the public learnt that
+Khartoum had fallen, and that the expedition was to return without
+accomplishing anything, it is possible that there would have been a
+demand that no Minister could have resisted to avenge his fate; but it
+was not till the publication of the journals that the exact character
+of his magnificent defence and of the manner in which he was treated
+by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the
+nation.
+
+The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment
+being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I
+have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have
+been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with
+impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the
+following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the
+Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to
+accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General
+Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and
+accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest
+the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not
+require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government,
+for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made
+upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some
+against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No
+incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite
+arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the
+precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of
+him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind.
+Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really
+as far as the poles asunder.
+
+There then comes the second phase of the question--the alleged
+abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his
+services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and
+difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond
+dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard
+to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and
+success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take
+the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does
+not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It
+rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by
+rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and
+an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to
+its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the
+cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This
+decision, too late as it was to assist in the formation of a new
+administration for the Soudan, or to bring back the garrisons, was
+taken in ample time to ensure the personal safety and rescue of
+General Gordon. In the literal sense of the charge, history will
+therefore acquit Mr Gladstone and his colleagues of the abandonment of
+General Gordon personally.
+
+With regard to the third phase of the question--viz. the failure of
+the attempt to rescue General Gordon, which was essentially a
+military, and not a political question--the responsibility passes from
+the Prime Minister to the military authorities who decided the scope
+of the campaign, and the commander who carried it out. In this case,
+the individual responsible was the same. Lord Wolseley not only had
+his own way in the route to be followed by the expedition, and the
+size and importance attached to it, but he was also entrusted with its
+personal direction. There is consequently no question of the
+sub-division of the responsibility for its failure, just as there
+could have been none of the credit for its success. Lord Wolseley
+decided that the route should be the long one by the Nile Valley, not
+the short one from Souakim to Berber. Lord Wolseley decreed that there
+should be no Indian troops, and that the force, instead of being an
+ordinary one, should be a picked special corps from the _elite_ of the
+British army; and finally Lord Wolseley insisted that there should be
+no dash to the rescue of Gordon by a small part of his force, but a
+slow, impressive, and overpoweringly scientific advance of the whole
+body. The extremity of Gordon's distress necessitated a slight
+modification of his plan, when, with qualified instructions, which
+practically tied his hands, Sir Herbert Stewart made his first
+appearance at Jakdul.
+
+It was then known to Lord Wolseley that Gordon was in extremities,
+yet when a fighting force of 1100 English troops, of special physique
+and spirit, was moved forward with sufficient transport to enable it
+to reach the Nile and Gordon's steamers, the commander's instructions
+were such as confined him to inaction, unless he disobeyed his orders,
+which only Nelsons and Gordons can do with impunity. It is impossible
+to explain this extraordinary timidity. Sir Herbert Stewart reached
+Jakdul on 3rd January with a force small in numbers, but in every
+other respect of remarkable efficiency, and with the camels
+sufficiently fresh to have reached the Nile on 7th or 8th January had
+it pressed on. The more urgent news that reached Lord Wolseley after
+its departure would have justified the despatch of a messenger to urge
+it to press on at all costs to Metemmah. In such a manner would a
+Havelock or Outram have acted, yet the garrison of the Lucknow
+Residency was in no more desperate case than Gordon at Khartoum.
+
+It does not need to be a professor of a military academy to declare
+that, unless something is risked in war, and especially wars such as
+England has had to wage against superior numbers in the East, there
+will never be any successful rescues of distressed garrisons. Lord
+Wolseley would risk nothing in the advance from Korti to Metemmah,
+whence his advance guard did not reach the latter place till the 20th,
+instead of the 7th of January. His lieutenant and representative, Sir
+Charles Wilson, would not risk anything on the 21st January, whence
+none of the steamers appeared at Khartoum until late on the 27th, when
+all was over. Each of these statements cannot be impeached, and if so,
+the conclusion seems inevitable that in the first and highest degree
+Lord Wolseley was alone responsible for the failure to reach Khartoum
+in time, and that in a very minor degree Sir Charles Wilson might be
+considered blameworthy for not having sent off one of the steamers
+with a small reinforcement to Khartoum on the 21st January, before
+even he allowed Cassim el Mousse to take any part in the attack on
+Metemmah. He could not have done this himself, but he would have had
+no difficulty in finding a substitute. When, however, there were
+others far more blameworthy, it seems almost unjust to a gallant
+officer to say that by a desperate effort he might at the very last
+moment have snatched the chestnuts out of the fire, and converted the
+most ignominious failure in the military annals of this country into a
+creditable success.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The tragic end at Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the
+career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the
+ordinary experiences of mankind. No man who ever lived was called upon
+to deal with a greater number of difficult military and
+administrative problems, and to find the solution for them with such
+inadequate means and inferior troops and subordinates. In the Crimea
+he showed as a very young man the spirit, discernment, energy, and
+regard for detail which were his characteristics through life. Those
+qualities enabled him to achieve in China military exploits which in
+their way have never been surpassed. The marvellous skill, confidence,
+and vigilance with which he supplied the shortcomings of his troops,
+and provided for the wants of a large population at Khartoum for the
+better part of a year, showed that, as a military leader, he was still
+the same gifted captain who had crushed the Taeping rebellion twenty
+years before. What he did for the Soudan and its people during six
+years' residence, at a personal sacrifice that never can be
+appreciated, has been told at length; but pages of rhetoric would not
+give as perfect a picture as the spontaneous cry of the blacks: "If we
+only had a governor like Gordon Pasha, then the country would indeed
+be contented."
+
+"Such examples are fruitful in the future," said Mr Gladstone in the
+House of Commons; and it is as a perfect model of all that was good,
+brave, and true that Gordon will be enshrined in the memory of the
+great English nation which he really died for, and whose honour was
+dearer to him than his life. England may well feel proud of having
+produced so noble and so unapproachable a hero. She has had, and she
+will have again, soldiers as brave, as thoughtful, as prudent, and as
+successful as Gordon. She has had, and she will have again, servants
+of the same public spirit, with the same intense desire that not a
+spot should sully the national honour. But although this breed is not
+extinct, there will never be another Gordon. The circumstances that
+produced him were exceptional; the opportunities that offered
+themselves for the demonstration of his greatness can never fall to
+the lot of another; and even if by some miraculous combination the man
+and the occasions arose, the hero, unlike Gordon, would be spoilt by
+his own success and public applause. But the qualities which made
+Gordon superior not only to all his contemporaries, but to all the
+temptations and weaknesses of success, are attainable; and the student
+of his life will find that the guiding star he always kept before him
+was the duty he owed his country. In that respect, above all others,
+he has left future generations of his countrymen a great example.
+
+
+THE END.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX.
+
+
+  _Abbas_, steamer, ii. 144;
+    loss of, 145-6.
+  Abd-el-Kader, ii. 100, 102, 119.
+  Abdulgassin, ii. 32.
+  Abdullah, the present Khalifa, ii. 98, 102.
+  Abdurrahman, ii. 45, 68.
+  Abou Hamid, ii. 144.
+  Abou Klea, ii. 163;
+    battle of, 164;
+    loss at, _ibid._, 166.
+  Abouna, an, ii. 33.
+  Abou Kru, ii. 164;
+    battle of, 165, 169.
+  Abou Sammat, ii. 29.
+  Abou Saoud, i. 149.
+  Abyssinia, the expedition to, i. 131-2; ii. 5, 32, 35, 70 _passim_.
+  Academy, Royal Military, i. 5, 6, 7.
+  Adye, Sir John, i. 137.
+  Afghanistan, ii. 45, 68, 69, 70.
+  Alagos, i. 40.
+  Albert Lake, i. 155, 156.
+  Alexandropol, i. 35.
+  Alla-ed-Din, ii. 102.
+  Alma, i. 8, 16.
+  Amoy, i. 72.
+  Anderson, W. C., i. 41.
+  Anfina, i. 158.
+  Ani, i. 37, 38.
+  Arabi Pasha, ii. 97.
+  Arabs as soldiers, i. 150.
+  Ararat, Mount, i. 38, 39.
+  Aras, i. 33.
+  Arendrup, ii. 5.
+  Arokol Bey, ii. 5.
+  _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 70.
+  Ashantee Expedition, i. 138.
+  Assiout, ii. 133.
+  Assouan, ii. 153.
+  Athens, i. 15.
+  Ayoob, ii. 68.
+
+  Bahr Arab, ii. 27.
+  Bahr Gazelle, ii. 25, 105, 128.
+  Baker, Sir S., i. 142, 143, 145, 149, 157; ii. 113, 118, 139.
+  Baker Pasha, ii. 105, 136.
+  Balaclava, i. 15, 16.
+  Bara, ii. 103.
+  Bari tribe, i. 150, 151, 153.
+  Baring, Sir Evelyn, _see_ Lord Cromer.
+  Bashi-Bazouks, ii. 4, 9, 10, 141, 142, 144.
+  Basutoland and its question, ii. 71, 72, 75 _et seq._;
+    description of, 77-82.
+  Basutos, as cavalry, ii. 87.
+  Bayuda desert, ii. 161, 162, 163.
+  Bedden, i. 153.
+  Beechy, i. 90.
+  Bellal Bey, i. 143.
+  Berber, i. 147; ii. 96, 139, 140, 143, 145, 159, 163.
+  Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. 166;
+    rescues Sir C. Wilson, 167.
+  Berzati Bey, ii. 65.
+  Bessarabia, i. 32.
+  Bismarck, Prince, ii. 54, 55.
+  Bisson, General, ii. 137.
+  Blignieres, M. de, ii. 107.
+  Bogos, ii. 5, 33.
+  Bolgrad, i. 32, 33.
+  Boma Sola, i. 32.
+  Bombay, ii. 45.
+  Bonham, Sir G., i. 76.
+  Bonnefoy, Capt., i. 92, 102.
+  Bordeen, ii. 147, 151, 167.
+  Borgu, ii. 32.
+  Brandt, Herr von, ii. 54-55.
+  Brocklehurst, Colonel, ii. 95-96.
+  Brown, General, i. 90.
+  Brown, Major, i. 116.
+  Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 47, 110, 121.
+  Brussels, ii. 92-95.
+  Burgevine, i. 54-59, 78, 81, 89, 90, 92-93.
+  Burgoyne, Sir John, i. 14.
+  Burnaby, Colonel Fred., ii. 164.
+
+  Cairo, i. 145;
+    affairs at, 145-6; ii. 159, 161.
+  Cambridge, Duke of, i. 112, 123; ii. 96, 122.
+  Camel, the, ii. 11, 16.
+  Camel Corps, the, ii. 164.
+  Campbell, Mr J. D., ii. 49.
+  Campbell, Major, i. 147.
+  Candahar, ii. 45, 68-69.
+  Cape Government, ii. 39, 75-76.
+  Cape Town, ii. 76;
+    opinion at, 88-89.
+  Cardew, Lieut., i. 47.
+  Cassim el Mousse, ii. 165, 172.
+  Cathcart, Sir George, ii. 77, 86.
+  Cave, Mr, ii. 19.
+  Cere, Colonel, i. 20.
+  Chagos Group, ii. 73.
+  Chamberlaine, Sir N., ii. 48.
+  Chan-chia-wan, i. 45.
+  Changchufu, i. 113, 118.
+  Chang Kwoliang, i. 66, 72, 74.
+  Changsha, i. 67.
+  Chanzu, i. 79-81, 93, 94.
+  Chatham, Engineers' Headquarters, i. 7, 45.
+  Cherif Pasha, ii. 2, 21, 31, 107, 139.
+  Chesney, Sir George, i. 19, 116.
+  China, scenery of, i. 53, 60-64.
+  Ching, General, i. 57, 82, 84, 88-89, 91-93, 96-103, 113.
+  Chinkiangfoo, i. 69.
+  Chippendall, Lieut., i. 148.
+  Cholin, i. 51.
+  Chung How, ii. 50.
+  Chung Wang, i. 50, 55-56, 71-76, 92-99, 113, 116, 118, 121.
+  Chunye, i. 84-87.
+  Clarke, Miss A. M., i. 3.
+  Clayton, Capt., i. 84.
+  Coetlogon, Colonel de, ii. 105, 119, 134-136.
+  Congo, the, ii. 89, 91-95, 140.
+  Constantinople, i. 33-41, 139.
+  Cookesley, Colonel, i. 83.
+  Corfu, i. 14.
+  _Courbash_, the, abolished in Soudan, ii. 6.
+  Crimea, i. 8-9, 14, 16, 138.
+  Cromer, Lord, ii. 21;
+    Gordon's scene with, _ibid._;
+    opposes Gordon, 118-122, 125, 128, 137;
+    his suggestion, 139, 140, 147, 153.
+  Culloden, i. 3.
+  Cumberland, Duke of, i. 3.
+  Cuzzi, ii. 143.
+  Cyprus, ii. 125.
+
+  Danube, i. 136-7.
+  Dara, ii. 10-12, 14, 27, 104.
+  Dar Djumna, ii. 145.
+  Dardanelles, i. 15.
+  Darfour, i. 143-4; ii. 9-11, 17, 30-31, 113.
+  Davidson, Capt., i. 85.
+  De Norman, i. 45.
+  Debbeh, ii. 161.
+  Debra Tabor, ii. 34.
+  Dem Idris, ii. 27.
+  Dem Suleiman, ii. 28.
+  Dent, Mr H., i. 108.
+  Derby, Earl of, ii. 23.
+  Devonshire, Duke of, first moves to render Gordon assistance, ii. 156;
+    his preparations for an expedition, ii. 156-7.
+  Dilke, Sir C., ii. 96, 117, 121.
+  Dongola, ii. 98, 139, 157, 159, 160, 161.
+  Donnelly, General J., i. 22; ii. 66.
+  Dubaga, i. 160.
+  Duem, i. 103.
+  Duncan, Colonel, ii. 143-4.
+  Durand, Sir M., ii. 47.
+
+  Earle, Major-General, ii. 158-9.
+  Eastern Question, the, ii. 40-42.
+  Eden, Garden of, ii. 74.
+  Egerton, Mr, ii. 147, 155.
+  El Obeid, ii. 101, 103.
+  Elphinstone, Sir Howard, ii. 72.
+  Empress-Regents, the, i. 123, 133.
+  Enderby, Elizabeth, Gordon's mot 3-4.
+    _See_ also Mrs Gordon.
+  Enderby, Mr George, i. 94.
+  England, her hesitating policy, ii. 8;
+    power of, 73.
+  Equator, the, ii. 140, 147.
+  Equatorial Province, the, i. 147, 151.
+  Eristaw, Prince, i. 42.
+  Erivan, i. 38.
+  Erzeroum, i. 34.
+  Etchmiazin, i. 40.
+  Ever-Victorious Army, i. 56, 58-60.
+  Expedition, the Relief, ii. 157-8.
+  Eyre, General, i. 24.
+
+  Fascher, ii. 10-11.
+  Fashoda, i. 148.
+  Ferratch Pasha, ii. 148.
+  _Firefly_, the, i. 113.
+  Fisher, Corporal, i. 39-40.
+  Forrester, Colonel, i. 57.
+  Forster, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii, 115.
+  Foweira, i. 156.
+  France, i. 62.
+  Franco-Chinese, the, i. 92, 102.
+  French soldiers, Gordon's opinion of, i. 17-8.
+  Fusaiquan, i. 97.
+  Fusham, i. 80-81, 116.
+
+  Gagarin, Prince, i. 42.
+  Galatz, i. 32, 136-8.
+  Gandamak, i. 45.
+  Gara, ii. 30.
+  Gebra, i. 103.
+  Geographical Society, Royal, i. 156.
+  Gessi Romulus, i. 148, 155-7; ii. 26-31.
+  Gezireh, i. 111.
+  Giegler Pasha, ii. 143.
+  Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. 94, 122;
+    Gladstone and his Government, ii. 151;
+    how they came to employ Gordon, ii. 151-2;
+    undeceived as to Gordon's views, ii. 152-3;
+    their indecision, ii. 153;
+    statement in House, ii. 154;
+    dismayed by Gordon's boldness, ii. 155;
+    their radical fault, ii. 156;
+    degree of responsibility, ii. 170;
+    acquittal of personal abandonment of Gordon, ii. 171.
+  Golden Fleece, the, i. 15.
+  Gondar, ii. 34.
+  Gondokoro, i. 146, 147, 155.
+  Gordon, derivation of name, i. 1, 2.
+  Gordon, Charles George:
+      birth, i. 1;
+      family history, 1-4;
+      childhood, 4;
+      enters Woolwich Academy, 5;
+      early escapades, 5-6;
+      put back six months and elects for Engineers, 6;
+      his spirit, 7;
+      his examinations, _ibid._;
+      gets commission, _ibid._;
+      his work at Pembroke, 8;
+      his brothers, 9;
+      his sisters, 10;
+      his brother-in-law, Dr Moffitt, _ibid._;
+      personal appearance of, 11-14;
+      his height, 11;
+      his voice, 12;
+      ordered to Corfu, 14;
+      changed to Crimea, _ibid._;
+      passes Constantinople, 15;
+      views on the Dardanelles' forts, _ibid._;
+      reaches Balaclava, 16;
+      opinion of French soldiers, 17, 18;
+      his first night in the trenches, 18-19;
+      his topographical knowledge, 19;
+      his special aptitude for war, _ibid._;
+      account of the capture of the Quarries, 21-22;
+      of the first assault on Redan, 22-24;
+      Kinglake's opinion of, 25;
+      on the second assault on Redan, 26-28;
+      praises the Russians, 28;
+      joins Kimburn expedition, _ibid._;
+      destroying Sebastopol, 29-31;
+      his warlike instincts, 31;
+      appointed to Bessarabian Commission, 32;
+      his letters on the delimitation work, 33;
+      ordered to Armenia, _ibid._;
+      journey from Trebizonde, 34;
+      describes Kars, 34-35;
+      his other letters from Armenia, 35-39;
+      ascends Ararat, 39-40;
+      returns home, 41;
+      again ordered to the Caucasus, 41, 42;
+      some personal idiosyncrasies, 43, 44;
+      gazetted captain, 45;
+      appointment at Chatham, 45;
+      sails for China, _ibid._;
+      too late for fighting, _ibid._;
+      describes sack of Summer Palace, 46;
+      buys the Chinese throne, _ibid._;
+      his work at Tientsin, 47;
+      a trip to the Great Wall, 47-49;
+      arrives at Shanghai, 49;
+      distinguishes himself in the field, 50;
+      his daring, 51;
+      gets his coat spoiled, 52;
+      raised to rank of major, _ibid._;
+      surveys country round Shanghai, 52, 53;
+      describes Taepings, 53;
+      nominated for Chinese service, 54;
+      reaches Sungkiang, 60;
+      qualifications for the command, 78;
+      describes his force, 79;
+      inspects it, _ibid._;
+      first action, 79, 80;
+      impresses Chinese, 80;
+      described by Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+      made Tsungping, _ibid._;
+      forbids plunder, 81;
+      his flotilla, _ibid._;
+      his strategy, _ibid._;
+      captures Taitsan, 82;
+      difficulty with his officers, 83;
+      besieges Quinsan, _ibid._;
+      reconnoitres it, 84;
+      attacks and takes it, 85-87;
+      removes to Quinsan, 87;
+      deals with a mutiny, 88;
+      incident with General Ching, 89;
+      resigns and withdraws resignation, _ibid._;
+      contends with greater difficulties, 90;
+      undertakes siege of Soochow, 91;
+      negotiates with Burgevine, 92, 93;
+      relieves garrison, 94;
+      great victory, _ibid._;
+      describes the position round Soochow, 95;
+      his hands tied by the Chinese, 96;
+      his main plan of campaign, 97;
+      his first repulse, _ibid._;
+      captures the stockades, 98;
+      his officers, 99;
+      his share in negotiations with Taepings, _ibid._;
+      difficulty about pay, 100;
+      resigns command, _ibid._;
+      guards Li Hung Chang's tent, _ibid._;
+      enters Soochow, 101;
+      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
+      asks Dr Macartney to go to Lar Wang, _ibid._;
+      questions interpreter, _ibid._;
+      detained by Taepings, _ibid._;
+      and then by Imperialists, 102;
+      scene with Ching, _ibid._;
+      identifies the bodies of the Wangs, _ibid._;
+      what he would have done, _ibid._;
+      the fresh evidence relating to the Wangs, 103 _et seq._;
+      conversation with Ching, 103;
+      and Macartney, _ibid._;
+      relations with Macartney, 103, 104;
+      offers him succession to command, 104, 105;
+      letter to Li Hung Chang, 106;
+      Li sends Macartney to Gordon, _ibid._;
+      contents of Gordon's letter, 107;
+      possesses the head of the Lar Wang, 107, 108;
+      frenzied state of, 108;
+      scene with Macartney at Quinsan, 108, 109;
+      his threats, 109;
+      his grave reflection on Macartney, 109, 110;
+      writes to Macartney, 111;
+      makes public retractation, 111;
+      other expressions of regret, 112;
+      refuses Chinese presents, _ibid._;
+      suspension in active command, _ibid._;
+      retakes the field, 113;
+      "the destiny of China in his hands," _ibid._;
+      attacks places west of Taiho Lake, 114-5;
+      enrolls Taepings, 115;
+      severely wounded, 116;
+      second reverse, _ibid._;
+      receives bad news, _ibid._;
+      alters his plans, _ibid._;
+      his force severely defeated, 117;
+      retrieves misfortune, _ibid._;
+      describes the rebellion, 118;
+      made Lieut.-Colonel, _ibid._;
+      his further successes, 119;
+      another reverse, _ibid._;
+      his final victory, 120;
+      what he thought he had done, _ibid._;
+      visits Nanking, _ibid._;
+      drills Chinese troops, 121;
+      appointed Ti-Tu and Yellow Jacket Order, 122;
+      his mandarin dresses, 123;
+      his relations with Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+      the Gold Medal, _ibid._;
+      his diary destroyed, 124;
+      returns home, _ibid._;
+      view of his achievements, 125-6;
+      a quiet six months, 128;
+      his excessive modesty, _ibid._;
+      pride in his profession, 129;
+      appointment at Gravesend, _ibid._;
+      his view of the Thames Forts, 130;
+      his work there, _ibid._;
+      his mode of living, 131;
+      supposed _angina pectoris_, _ibid._;
+      wish to join Abyssinian Expedition, 132;
+      described as a modern Jesus Christ, _ibid._;
+      his mission work, 132-3;
+      his boys, 133;
+      sends his medal to Lancashire fund, _ibid._;
+      his love for boys, 134;
+      his kings, _ibid._;
+      some incidents, _ibid._;
+      his pensioners, 135;
+      his coat stolen, _ibid._;
+      his walks, 136;
+      the Snake flags, _ibid._;
+      leaves Gravesend, _ibid._;
+      at Galatz, 137;
+      no place like England, _ibid._;
+      goes to Crimea, 138;
+      attends Napoleon's funeral, _ibid._;
+      casual meeting with Nubar, and its important consequences, 139-40;
+      "Gold and Silver Idols," 140;
+      appointed Governor of the Equatorial Province, 145;
+      reasons for it, _ibid._;
+      leaves Cairo, 146;
+      describes the "sudd," _ibid._;
+      his steamers, 147;
+      his facetiousness, _ibid._;
+      reaches Gondokoro, _ibid._;
+      his firman, _ibid._;
+      his staff, 148;
+      his energy, _ibid._;
+      establishes line of forts, _ibid._;
+      collapse of his staff, 149;
+      his Botany Bay, _ibid._;
+      his policy and justice, 150;
+      his poor troops, _ibid._;
+      organises a black corps, 151;
+      his sound finance, _ibid._;
+      deals with slave trade, 152;
+      incidents with slaves, _ibid._;
+      makes friends everywhere, 153;
+      his goodness a tradition, 153-4;
+      his character misrepresented, 154;
+      his line of forts, 155;
+      the ulterior objects of his task, _ibid._;
+      the control of the Nile, 156;
+      shrinks from notoriety, _ibid._;
+      describes the Lakes, 157;
+      the question with Uganda, 157 _et seq._;
+      proceeds against Kaba Rega, 158-60;
+      his extraordinary energy, 161;
+      does his own work, 161;
+      incident of his courage, 161-2;
+      views of Khedive, 163;
+      returns to Cairo, 163;
+      and home, _ibid._
+      Decision about Egyptian employment, ii. 1;
+      receives letter from Khedive, 2;
+      consults Duke of Cambridge, _ibid._;
+      returns to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, 2-3;
+      appointed Muchir, or Marshal, etc., 3;
+      sums up his work, 4;
+      his first treatment of Abyssinian Question, 5-6;
+      his entry into Khartoum, 6;
+      public address, 7;
+      first acts of Administration, _ibid._;
+      proposes Slavery Regulations, 7;
+      receives contradictory orders on subject, 8;
+      his decision about them, 8-9;
+      disbands the Bashi-Bazouks, 9;
+      goes to Darfour, _ibid._;
+      relieves garrisons, 10-11;
+      enters Fascher, 11;
+      recalled by alarming news in his rear, _ibid._;
+      his camel described, _ibid._;
+      reaches Dara without troops, 12;
+      his interview with Suleiman, _ibid._;
+      Slatin's account of scene, 12-13;
+      his views on the Slave Question, 13;
+      follows Suleiman to Shaka, 14;
+      indignant letter of, 15;
+      his decision about capital punishment, _ibid._;
+      his views thereupon, 16;
+      some characteristic incidents, _ibid._;
+      what the people thought of him, _ibid._;
+      "Send us another Governor like Gordon," _ibid._;
+      his regular payments, 17;
+      his thoughtfulness, _ibid._;
+      summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      appointed President of Financial Inquiry, 18;
+      his views of money, _ibid._;
+      acts with Lesseps, 19;
+      meets with foreign opposition, 20;
+      scene with Lesseps, 21;
+      scene with Major Evelyn Baring, _ibid._;
+      Gordon's financial proposal, 22;
+      last scenes with Khedive, 23;
+      Gordon's bold offer, _ibid._;
+      financial episode cost Gordon L800, 24;
+      his way of living, _ibid._;
+      leaves Cairo and visits Harrar, 25;
+      his finance in the Soudan, 25-6;
+      deals with Suleiman, 26 _et seq._;
+      takes the field in person, 30;
+      clears out Shaka, 31;
+      again summoned to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      proclaims Tewfik, _ibid._;
+      returns to Cairo, 32;
+      entrusted with mission to Abyssinia, _ibid._;
+      receives letter from King John, 33;
+      called "Sultan of the Soudan," _ibid._;
+      enters Abyssinia, 34;
+      goes to Debra Tabor, _ibid._;
+      interview with King John, _ibid._;
+      prevented returning to Soudan, 35;
+      his opinion of Abyssinia, _ibid._;
+      Khedive's neglect of, 36;
+      called "mad," _ibid._;
+      his work in the Soudan, 36-7;
+      goes to Switzerland, 38;
+      his opinion of wives, 38;
+      first meeting with King of the Belgians, 39;
+      offered Cape command, 40;
+      his memorandum on Eastern Question, 40-2;
+      accepts Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, 42;
+      regrets it, 43;
+      interview with Prince of Wales, _ibid._;
+      his letters about it, 44;
+      views on Indian topics, _ibid._;
+      sudden resignation, _ibid._;
+      the Yakoob Khan incident, 45-8;
+      invited to China, 49;
+      full history of that invitation, 49-50;
+      letter from Li Hung Chang, 49;
+      his telegrams to War Office, 50-1;
+      leaves for China, 51;
+      announces his intentions, 52;
+      what he discovered on arrival in China, 53;
+      ignores British Minister, _ibid._;
+      stays with Li Hung Chang, 55;
+      his reply to German Minister, 56;
+      his letter on Li, 57;
+      his advice to China, 58-61;
+      baffles intrigues and secures peace, 59;
+      further passages with War Office, 60;
+      on the Franco-Chinese war, 61, 62;
+      on the Opium Question, 63-4;
+      arrives at Aden, 65;
+      his Central African letters, _ibid._;
+      visits Ireland, 65-6;
+      letter on Irish Question in _Times_, 66-7;
+      letter on Candahar, 68-70;
+      opinion of Abyssinians, 70;
+      his article on irregular warfare, 70-1;
+      offers Cape Government his services for Basutoland, 71;
+      takes Sir Howard Elphinstone's place in the Mauritius, 72;
+      his work there, 72-3;
+      views of England's power, 73;
+      views on coaling stations, _ibid._;
+      visits Seychelles, 74;
+      views on Malta and Mediterranean, 74-5;
+      attains rank of Major-General, 75;
+      summoned to the Cape, _ibid._;
+      leaves in a sailing ship, 76;
+      financial arrangement with Cape Government, _ibid._;
+      his pecuniary loss by Cape employment, _ibid._;
+      his memorandum on Basutoland, 77-9;
+      accepts temporarily post of Commandant-General, 80;
+      drafts a Basuto Convention, 80-1;
+      requested by Mr Sauer to go to Basutoland, 82;
+      relations with Masupha, _ibid._;
+      visits Masupha, 83;
+      betrayed by Sauer, _ibid._;
+      peril of, _ibid._;
+      his account of the affair, 84-5;
+      memorandum on the Native Question, 85-7;
+      his project of military reform, 88;
+      his resignation of Cape command, _ibid._;
+      corresponds with King of the Belgians, 89;
+      goes to the Holy Land, _ibid._;
+      his view of Russian Convent at Jerusalem, 90;
+      advocates Palestine Canal, 90-1;
+      summoned to Belgium, 91;
+      telegraphs for leave, 92;
+      the mistake in the telegram, _ibid._;
+      decides to retire, _ibid._;
+      King Leopold's arrangement, _ibid._;
+      his plans on the Congo, 93-4;
+      public opinion aroused by his Soudan policy, 93-5;
+      visit to War Office, 94;
+      makes his will, _ibid._;
+      goes to Brussels, _ibid._;
+      Soudan not the Congo, 95;
+      leaves Charing Cross, 95;
+      final letters to his sister, 95-6;
+      interview with ministers, 96;
+      loses clothes and orders, _ibid._;
+      his predictions about the Soudan, 97-8;
+      the task imposed on him, 106;
+      why he accepted it, 106-7;
+      memorandum on Egyptian affairs, 107-9;
+      opinions on Hicks's Expedition, 109;
+      on English policy, 110;
+      on the Mahdi, _ibid._;
+      his interview with Mr Stead of _Pall Mall Gazette_, 111-5;
+      his eagerness to go to the Soudan, 115;
+      suggestions by the Press of his fitness for the post, 116-7;
+      "generally considered to be mad," 117;
+      Sir Charles Dilke puts his name forward, _ibid._;
+      Lord Granville's despatch, _ibid._;
+      Lord Cromer opposes his appointment, 118, _et seq._;
+      consequences of that opposition, and the delay it caused, 118-21;
+      the arrangement with King Leopold, 121;
+      went to Soudan at request of Government, 122;
+      his departure, _ibid._;
+      his instructions, 123-4;
+      doubts about them, 124;
+      his views about Zebehr, 124 _et seq._;
+      suggests his being sent to Cyprus, 125;
+      change in his route, _ibid._;
+      goes to Cairo, _ibid._;
+      changed view towards Zebehr, 126;
+      his memorandum on their relations, 126-8;
+      wishes to take him, 128;
+      a "mystic feeling," _ibid._;
+      interview with Zebehr, _ibid._;
+      final demands for Zebehr, 129-30;
+      leaves Cairo, 133;
+      the task before him, 134-5;
+      hastens to Khartoum, 136;
+      reception by inhabitants, _ibid._;
+      his first steps of defence, _ibid._;
+      his conclusion that "Mahdi must be smashed up," 137;
+      his demands, 138;
+      on our "dog in the manger" policy, 139;
+      "caught in Khartoum," _ibid._;
+      appeal to philanthropists, _ibid._;
+      "you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi," 140;
+      his lost diary, 141;
+      his first fight, _ibid._;
+      bad conduct of his troops, 141-2;
+      lays down three lines of mines, 142;
+      his steamers, _ibid._;
+      their value, _ibid._;
+      force at his disposal, _ibid._;
+      loses a steamer, 143;
+      sends down 2600 refugees, _ibid._;
+      his care for them, 143-4;
+      Soudan Question _must_ be
+      settled by November, 144;
+      sends down _Abbas_, 145;
+      full history of that incident, 144-6;
+      left alone at Khartoum, 146;
+      sends away his steamers to help the Expedition, 146-7;
+      hampered by indecision of Government, 147;
+      his telegrams never published, _ibid._;
+      position at Khartoum, _ibid._;
+      his point of observation, 148;
+      cut off from Omdurman, _ibid._;
+      anxiety for his steamers, 149;
+      "To-day I expected one of the Expedition here," _ibid._;
+      the confidence felt in Gordon, _ibid._;
+      his defiance of the Mahdi, 150;
+      his position, 150-1;
+      his last Journal, 151;
+      views on Soudan Question, 152-3;
+      his relations with the Government, 152-6;
+      effect of silence from Khartoum, 156;
+      his view of the Relief Expedition, 159;
+      his shrewdness, _ibid._;
+      his last messages, 160;
+      situation desperate, _ibid._;
+      "the town may fall in ten days," 165;
+      "quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty,"
+        _ibid._;
+      "spilt milk," _ibid._;
+      his last message of all, 168;
+      death of, 169;
+      details supplied by Slatin, 169-70;
+      a great national loss, 173;
+      his example, 173.
+  Gordon, David, i. 2.
+  Gordon, General Enderby, i. 8, 9.
+  Gordon, Fred, i. 5, 138.
+  Gordon, Sir Henry W., i. 4-6, 8-10, 60, 102, 134; ii. 19, 43, 91,
+     92, 95, 132.
+  Gordon, Miss Mary Augusta, i. 10; ii. 130;
+    correspondence with Zebehr, 130-2, 143.
+  Gordon, General Peter, i. 2.
+  Gordon, William Augustus, i. 3.
+  Gordon, William Augustus, junior, i. 5.
+  Gordon, Mrs, mother of Charles Gordon, i. 127, 128;
+    death of, 138.
+  Gordon, William Henry, Lieut.-General, i. 3, 4.
+  Gordon, Sir William, i. 131.
+  Gordon, Sir William, of Park, i. 2.
+  Goschen, Mr, ii. 19, 23.
+  Graham, Sir G., i. 12, 13, 22, 24, 25; ii. 125, 128, 129, 153,
+    156, 165.
+  Grand Canal, the, i. 69.
+  Grant, Colonel, ii. 51.
+  Granville, Earl, ii. 96, 117-123, 155.
+  Gravesend, i. 129, 132, 136.
+  Gresswell, Mr, ii. 83.
+  Griffin, Sir Lepel, ii. 45.
+  Gubat, _see_ Abou Kru, ii. 164.
+  Gura, ii. 34.
+  Gura plateau, ii. 5.
+  Guyon, General, i. 34.
+
+  Hake, Mr Egmont, revives Gordon's retracted libel on Sir Halliday
+    Macartney, 109.
+  Halfiyeh, ii. 141, 167.
+  Hamacem, ii. 5.
+  Hangchow, i. 116.
+  Hankow, i. 68, 69.
+  Hanyang, i. 68.
+  Harcourt, Sir W., ii. 40.
+  Harrar, ii. 25.
+  Haroun Sultan, ii. 10, 32.
+  Hart, Sir Robert, i. 113; ii. 49, 54, 55.
+  Hartington, Marquis of, ii. 96.
+    _See_ Devonshire.
+  Hassan Helmi, ii. 11.
+  Havelock, reference to, ii. 161, 172.
+  Heang Yung, i. 71.
+  Hensall, M., ii. 145.
+  Herbin, M., ii. 144-46.
+  Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102, 103, 109.
+  Hienfung, Emperor, i. 47.
+  Hill, Dr Birkbeck, ii. 11, 47, 65.
+  Holland, Capt., i. 57-60.
+  Holy Land, the, ii. 89-91.
+  Hoo Wang, i. 74, 119.
+  Hoonan, i. 67, 68.
+  Hope, Admiral, i. 45, 49, 57.
+  Hukumdaria, the, ii. 136.
+  Hung-tsiuen, i. 62,
+    _see_ Tien Wang.
+  Huntly family, the, i. 2, 3.
+  _Husseinyeh_, ii. 148, 149.
+  Hwaiking, i. 69.
+  Hwangho, the, i. 69.
+  _Hyson_, steamer, i. 81, 83-87, 90-92, 94, 95.
+
+  Ibrahim Pasha, i. 141.
+  Idris Ebter, ii. 128.
+  Inkerman, i. 16-7.
+  Ireland, ii. 65-8.
+  Ismail, Khedive, i. 106, 140;
+    his alarm, 143-4;
+    why he appointed Gordon, 145-7, ii. 1-3, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
+      24, 31;
+    Gordon's opinion of, 114, and _passim_.
+  Ismail Yakoob Pasha, ii. 144, 146-8.
+  _Ismailia_, steamer, ii. 99, 148-9.
+
+  Jaalin tribe, ii. 164.
+  Jaffa, ii. 89.
+  Jakdul, ii. 161-3;
+    splendid force at, 163, 172.
+  James, Sir H., i. 32.
+  Jebel Gedir, ii. 100.
+  Jebel Masa, ii. 100.
+  Jefferies, Mr, i. 4.
+  Jerusalem, ii. 89.
+  John, King of Abyssinia, ii. 5-6, 32, 33-4.
+  Jones, Captain, i. 92.
+  Jones, Sir Harry, i. 31.
+  Joubert, M., ii. 19.
+  Journal, the, ii. 165.
+
+  Kaba Rega, i. 155, 157-9, 162.
+  Kabbabish tribe, the, ii. 104.
+  Kachiaou, i. 56.
+  Kahding, i. 50-2.
+  Kahpoo, i. 91.
+  Kaifong, i. 69.
+  _Kajow_, the, i. 90-2, 94.
+  Kalgan, i. 48.
+  Kanghi, i. 122.
+  Kars, i. 34, 36.
+  Kassala, ii. 105, 134, 151.
+  Katamori, i. 32.
+  Kawa, i. 98.
+  Kemp, Mr, i. 148.
+  Kemp Terrace, i. 1.
+  Khalifa Abdullah, ii. 169.
+  Khartoum, advantageous position of, i. 141-2; ii. 6, 101-3, 105;
+    panic at, ii. 119;
+    position at, ii. 134-5;
+    scene at, ii. 136;
+    distance from Cairo, ii. 136, 140;
+    position of, 147-8;
+    the only relieving force to, ii. 150;
+    anxiety in England about, ii. 156.
+  Kherson, i. 28.
+  Kimberley, Earl of, ii. 75, 80-1.
+  Kimburn, i. 28.
+  King William's Town, ii. 82.
+  Kinglake, i. 9, 20, 22, 24;
+    opinion of Gordon, i. 25.
+  Kintang, i. 115-6.
+  Kirkham, Major, i. 94.
+  Kitchener, Sir H., Gordon's opinion of, ii. 158;
+    his suggestion, _ibid._
+  Kiukiang, i. 68-9.
+  Kolkol, ii. 11.
+  Kongyin, i. 116-8.
+  Kordofan, i. 99, 102.
+  Korosko Desert, i. 154; ii. 143, 155.
+  Korti, ii. 158, 161-3.
+  Kuldja, ii. 50.
+  Kung Prince, i. 123.
+  Kurds, the, i. 36.
+  Kuyukdere, i. 34, 36.
+  Kweiling, i. 66.
+
+  Laguerre, Admiral, i. 72.
+  Laing, Mr Samuel, ii. 22.
+  Lar Wang, i. 98-9-100-2, 105, 108.
+  Lardo, i. 155.
+  Lausanne, ii. 38-39.
+  Lazes, the, i. 37.
+  Leeku, i. 97.
+  Leopard tribe, ii. 11.
+  Leopold, King of the Belgians, ii. 39, 89, 91, 92;
+    agrees to compensate Gordon, _ibid._; 93-95, 121.
+  Lerothodi, ii. 77, 83-85.
+  Lesseps, M. de, ii. 19-23.
+  Letsea, ii. 77, 82, 83, 85.
+  Li Hung Chang, i. 57, 58;
+    admires Gordon, 80;
+    reconnoitres Quinsan, 84;
+    opposes Burgevine, 89;
+    relations with Macartney, 89, 90;
+    energy of, 95;
+    statement about Gordon, 99;
+    withholds pay, 100;
+    protected by Gordon, _ibid._;
+    seeks shelter in Macartney's camp, 106;
+    exonerates Gordon, 107;
+    sends Macartney as envoy to Quinsan, 107;
+    gives a breakfast to Gordon and Macartney, 111;
+    summons Gordon to return, 116;
+    solicitude for Gordon, _ibid._;
+    supports Gordon, 119;
+    lays wreath on Gordon's monument, 123; ii. 50, 53-59, 61, 63.
+  Lilley, Mr W. E., i. 13, 135.
+  Limming Pass, i. 70.
+  Linant, M., i. 147, 150.
+  Liprandi, General, i. 17.
+  Livadia, ii. 50.
+  Liyang, i. 114-116, 119.
+  Long, Colonel, i. 147, 157.
+  Loring, Colonel, ii. 5, 6.
+  Low Mun, the, i. 97, 98.
+  Lucknow Residency, resemblance between its siege and Khartoum,
+    ii. 161, 172.
+  Lupton Bey, ii. 105.
+  Lytton, Lord, ii. 45.
+
+  Macartney, Sir Halliday: sent to Gordon on a mission, i. 88-9;
+    his work described by Gordon, 89-90;
+    with Gordon on the wall of Soochow, 101;
+    scene there, 103;
+    requested by Gordon to go to Lar Wang's palace, _ibid._;
+    his earlier relation with Gordon, 104;
+    offered and accepts succession to command of army, 104-5;
+    what he learnt at the palace, 105;
+    tries to find Gordon, 106;
+    and Li Hung Chang, _ibid._;
+    discovers latter in his own camp, _ibid._;
+    declines to translate Gordon's letter, _ibid._;
+    sent to Quinsan by Li, 107;
+    Gordon shows him the head of Lar Wang, _ibid._;
+    scene at the breakfast-table, 108;
+    his advice, 108-9;
+    hastens back to Soochow, 109;
+    Gordon's libel on, 110;
+    explains facts to Sir Harry Parkes and Sir F. Bruce, 110-11;
+    receives letter from Gordon, 111;
+    Gordon's public apology and retractation, 111-12;
+    a full _amende_, 112;
+    happy termination of incident, 113; ii. 43.
+  Mackinnon, Sir W., ii. 65, 89, 91, 92.
+  Macmahon, Marshal, ii. 137.
+  Magungo, i. 156, 157.
+  Mahdi, the (or Mahomed Ahmed), ii. 98;
+    his first appearance, _ibid._;
+    defies Egyptian Government, 99;
+    meaning of name, _ibid._;
+    his first victory, 100;
+    defeats Rashed, _ibid._;
+    further victories, 101;
+    captures El Obeid, 102;
+    annihilates Hicks's expedition, 104;
+    height of his power, 105;
+    basis of his influence, 105-6;
+    Zebehr on, 130, 135;
+    salaams Gordon, 136;
+    basis of his power, 137;
+    learns of loss of _Abbas_, 146;
+    arrives before Khartoum, 149;
+    knowledge as to state of Khartoum, 150;
+    exaggerated fear of, 161;
+    aroused by Stewart's advance, 163;
+    sends his best warriors to Bayuda, 164;
+    captures Khartoum, 167;
+    mode of that capture, 169.
+  Mahe, i. 74.
+  Mahmoud Khalifa, ii. 162.
+  Maida, i. 3.
+  Maiwand, ii. 45, 68.
+  Majuba Hill, ii. 70.
+  Malakoff, the, i. 21-23, 26.
+  Malta, ii. 74.
+  Mamelon, the, i. 21, 22.
+  Mansourah, ii. 147.
+  Markham, Mr, i. 80.
+  Marseilles, i. 14, 15.
+  Masindi, i. 157, 159.
+  Massowah, ii. 25, 32-35.
+  Masupha, ii. 77, 80, 82;
+    character of, 83, 85-89.
+  Mauritius, the, ii. 72-75.
+  Mediterranean, the, ii. 74.
+  Medjidieh Order, i. 160; ii. 3.
+  Mehemet Ali, conquers Soudan, i. 141, 154.
+  Menelik, ii. 6, 32.
+  Merowe, ii. 160.
+  Merriman, Mr, ii. 84, 85, 87, 88.
+  Metemmah, ii. 17, 161-166;
+    delay at, 166-7.
+  Moffitt, Dr Andrew, i. 10.
+  Moffitt, Mrs, i. 10.
+  Molappo, i. 77, 82.
+  Mombasa, i. 155.
+  Monding, i. 94.
+  Mow Wang, i. 75, 90, 93, 98-100.
+  Mrooli, i. 158.
+  Mtesa, i. 155, 157-60, 162.
+  Muchir or Marshal, ii. 3.
+  Munzinger Bey, ii. 5.
+  Murchison Falls, i. 157.
+
+  Najao, i. 51.
+  Nanking, i. 49, 58, 68, 69, 72, 76, 120;
+    capture of, 121.
+  Nanning, i. 64.
+  Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. 132.
+  Naval Brigade, the, ii. 164.
+  Negus, the, ii. 32.
+  Nelson, references to, ii. 162, 172.
+  _New York Herald_, ii. 62.
+  Niam Niam, i. 151.
+  Nile, the, ii. 142;
+    "not a bad Nile," 157.
+  _Nineteenth Century, The_, i. 14; ii. 129.
+  Ningpo, i. 74, 81.
+  Northbrook, Earl of, ii. 96, 132.
+  _North China Herald_, the, i. 111.
+  North Fort, the, ii. 147.
+  Nubar Pasha, i. 139, 140, 145; ii. 109, 120, 128, 139.
+  Nuehr Agha, i. 158, 159.
+
+  O'Donovan, Edmond, ii. 102.
+  Omdurman, i. 141; ii. 102, 103, 136;
+    fort of, 147-8;
+    isolated, 149;
+    capture of, 149, 150, 163, 164;
+    scene at, 169;
+    date of fall, 166.
+  Opium, ii. 63, 64.
+  Orpen, Mr, ii. 80, 84, 85.
+  Osman Bey, i. 35.
+  Osman Digma, ii. 103, 105, 136, 139, 156.
+  Outram, reference to, ii. 161, 172.
+
+  Palestine Canal, the, ii. 90, 91.
+  _Pall Mall Gazette_, the, ii. 111, 120, 124.
+  Paoting-fu, i. 49.
+  Parkes, Sir H., i. 110.
+  Paskievitch, i. 34.
+  Patachiaou, i. 91, 93.
+  Pattison, Mr A., ii. 83.
+  Peking, ii. 46, 47, 56, 70.
+  Pelissier, General, i. 20, 22, 25.
+  Pelissier, Colonel, i. 34.
+  Pembroke Dock, i. 8, 14.
+  Perry, Capt., i. 99.
+  Pitso, A., ii. 79.
+  Power, Mr Frank, ii. 134, 135, 137, 144;
+    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
+    death of, 145-6.
+  Prestonpans, i. 2.
+  Protet, Admiral, i. 50, 52.
+
+  Quarries, the, i. 21.
+  Quinsan, i. 78, 81, 82-88, 90, 107, 108.
+
+  Rabi, ii. 29, 32.
+  Raglan, Lord, i. 22, 23, 25.
+  Ragouf Pasha, i. 147.
+  Raouf Bey, i. 149.
+  Raouf Pasha, ii. 25, 98-100.
+  Ras Alula, ii. 33, 34.
+  Ras Arya, ii. 34.
+  Rashed Bey, ii. 100.
+  Ratib Pasha, ii. 5, 6.
+  Redan, the, i. 21-2;
+    attack on, 22-4;
+    second attack, 26-7.
+  Redout, Kaleh, i. 41.
+  Revenue, the, of Soudan, ii. 25-26.
+  Riaz Pasha, ii. 108.
+  Rionga, i. 157-158.
+  Ripon, Marquis of, ii. 42-44, 47-49, 68.
+  Rivers Wilson, Mr, now Sir Charles, ii. 19, 107.
+  Roberts, Lord, ii. 68.
+  Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. 75, 87.
+  Rockstone Place, i. 127.
+  Rogers, Mr, i. 4.
+  Russia, i. 54-55, 62.
+  Russian Army, Gordon's opinion of, i. 28.
+  Russian Convent at Jerusalem, ii. 90.
+
+  Said Pasha, ii. 102.
+  San Diego, ii. 74.
+  San Tajin, i. 81-82, 95-97, 113, 116.
+  Sankolinsin, i. 70.
+  _Santals_, the, ii. 147-148.
+  _Saphia_, ii. 147.
+  Saubat, i. 148.
+  Sauer, Mr, ii. 82;
+    betrays Gordon, 83;
+    his treachery, _ibid._;
+    his misrepresentation, 84-85.
+  Scanlan, Mr T., ii. 81-82, 88.
+  Schweinfurth, Dr, i. 142-143, 156.
+  Scotia, ii. 76.
+  Sebastopol, i. 16-17, 28-30.
+  Sennaar, ii. 134, 151.
+  Seton, Sir Bruce, ii. 43.
+  Seward, Mr, i. 93.
+  Seychelles, ii. 72, 74.
+  Shabloka, ii. 167.
+  Shaka, ii. 12, 14, 27, 31.
+  Shanghai, i. 49-50-55;
+    Triad rising at, i. 72;
+    loss of Chinese city, i. 73.
+  Shekan, ii. 104.
+  Shendy, ii. 17, 143, 145-147, 158.
+  Shereef Said Hakim, ii. 6.
+  Siaon Edin, i. 85-86.
+  Simmons, Sir Lintorn, i. 33, 41.
+  Siuen-hoa, i. 48.
+  Slatin Pasha, i. 162; ii. 12-13, 16, 104-105, 166, 168-169;
+    his epitaph on Gordon, ii. 170.
+  Slave Trade, i. 148-149, 152-153;
+    proposed regulations, ii. 7;
+    Convention, ii. 8.
+  Smith, Sir Harry, ii. 86.
+  Snake flags, the, i. 136.
+  Soady, Captain, i. 5.
+  Soochow, i. 74-75, 78, 84-87, 91, 94-98, 100-102.
+  Souakim, i. 146; ii. 25, 153.
+  Soudan, meaning of name, i. 141;
+    easily conquered, i. 142;
+    slave trade in, _ibid._;
+    situation in, ii. 97;
+    the, Gordon's views on, ii. 111, _et seq._ _passim_;
+    people of, ii. 114.
+  Southampton, i. 127;
+    the home at, ii. 93.
+  Speke, Captain, i. 142.
+  Stanley, Mr H. M., ii. 93.
+  Stannard, Mr Arthur, i. 14, 129-130.
+  Stanton, Colonel, i. 32-33; ii. 21.
+  Staveley, Sir Charles, i. 19, 50-52, 54, 56, 58-60, 78, 132.
+  Stead, Mr W. T., ii. 111.
+  Steamers, the penny, ii. 142;
+    bullet marks on, ii. 143, 147, 151.
+  Stewart, Colonel Donald, ii. 122, 125, 137, 141, 144;
+    leaves on _Abbas_, _ibid._;
+    fate of, ii. 144-146;
+    should not have left Gordon, ii. 146.
+  Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. 162;
+    trammelled by his instructions, _ibid._;
+    returns to Jakdul, 163;
+    wounded, 164;
+    death of, 165;
+    his intention, 166.
+  Stokes, Colonel, ii. 19.
+  Strangeways, General, i. 9.
+  "Sudd," the, i. 146.
+  Suders, General, i. 31.
+  Suleiman, Zebehr's son, ii. 10-14, 25-29;
+    execution of, ii. 30; ii. 126-128.
+  Sulina, i. 137.
+  Sultan, proposal to surrender Soudan to the, ii. 119, 121.
+  Sultan Idris, ii. 29.
+  Summer Palace at Peking, i. 45-46.
+  Sungkiang, i. 54-55, 60, 78-80, 83, 88, 90, 121.
+  Sussex Regiment, the, ii. 164.
+
+  Ta Edin, i. 85, 91.
+  Taeping, meaning of name, i. 65.
+  Taepings, the, i. 50, 53-54, 59 (_see_ Chapter IV.);
+    capture Nanking, i. 68;
+    march on Peking, i. 69-70;
+    their military strength, i. 75;
+    and the missionaries, i. 76.
+  Taiho Lake, i. 95, 101-102, 113.
+  Taitong, i. 48.
+  Taitsan, i. 52, 59, 80-83.
+  Taiyuen, i. 49.
+  Takee, i. 54, 56-58.
+  Taku Forts, i. 45, 47; ii. 59.
+  _Talataween_, ii. 147, 167.
+  Tamanieb, ii. 156.
+  Taoukwang, i. 61.
+  Tapp, Colonel, i. 119.
+  Taunton, i. 4.
+  Tayan, i. 119.
+  Tchad, Lake, ii. 10.
+  Tchernaya, i. 17, 26.
+  Teb, ii. 156.
+  Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), ii. 31-32, 36, 106-109, 118, 125, 139.
+  Thaba Bosigo, ii. 77.
+  Thames Forts, i. 129-130.
+  Theodore, ii. 33.
+  Tientsin, i. 45-47, 70.
+  Tien Wang, i. 49, 62, 65;
+    occupies Nanking, i. 68;
+    retires into his palace, i. 71-72;
+    death of, i. 120-121.
+  _Times, The_, i. 124; ii. 40, 66, 68, 92, 94, 110, 116-117, 134.
+  Ti-Tu, i. 122.
+  Todleben, General, i. 17.
+  Tokar, ii. 105, 136.
+  Transkei, the, ii. 77.
+  Travers, Colonel John, i. 6.
+  Trebizonde, i. 34.
+  Triads, the, i. 61, 66.
+  Tseedong, i. 56.
+  Tseki, i. 57.
+  Tseng Marquis, ii. 59.
+  Tseng Kwofan, i. 67-68, 72-73, 120.
+  Tseng Kwotsiuen, i. 74.
+  Tsing, i. 70.
+  Tsinghai, i. 70.
+  Tsingpu, i. 50-52, 54-55, 57.
+  Tsipu, i. 50.
+  Tung Wang, i. 71.
+  Tunting, i. 67.
+  Tuti Island, ii. 147, 167.
+
+  Uganda, i. 155, 159.
+  Unyoro, i. 155, 157.
+
+  Victoria Lake, i. 155-156.
+  Vivian, Mr (afterwards Lord), ii. 1-2, 20, 38.
+  Vivian, Mrs, ii. 39.
+
+  Wadelai, i. 155.
+  Wade, Sir Thomas, ii. 53-55.
+  Wady Halfa, i. 144; ii. 138-139, 154, 159, 161.
+  Waiquaidong, i. 85-86, 95.
+  Waisso, i. 117, 119.
+  Walad el Michael, ii. 5, 6, 33.
+  Wales, Prince of, ii. 43.
+  Wales, Princess of, ii. 43.
+  Wall, the Great, i. 47-9.
+  Wangchi, i. 101.
+  Wangs, the, i. 65.
+  Wangs, execution of, i. 102.
+  Wanti, i. 95.
+  War Office, ii. 92, 93 _passim_.
+  Ward, i. 54-57.
+  Watson, Colonel Charles, i. 148; ii. 96, 128-30, 165.
+  Watson, Mrs, ii. 96, 165.
+  Willes, Capt., i. 51, 52.
+  Wilson, Sir Charles, succeeds to the command, ii. 165;
+    his book "Korti to Khartoum," _ibid._;
+    not to be made a scapegoat, 166;
+    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
+    sails for Khartoum, 167;
+    under hot fire, _ibid._;
+    wrecked, _ibid._;
+    rescued by Lord C. Beresford, _ibid._;
+    the letter in his charge, _ibid._;
+    comparatively small measure of his responsibility, 172.
+  Wittgenstein, Prince F. von, i. 102.
+  Wokong, i. 94.
+  Wolseley, Lord, ii. 95, 96, 121, 125, 138;
+    receives message from Gordon, 151;
+    his letter of 24th July, 157;
+    largely responsible for Khartoum mission, _ibid._;
+    his address to the soldiers, 158;
+    his view of the expedition, 159;
+    receives full news of Gordon's desperate situation, 160;
+    his grand and deliberate plan, 161;
+    perfect but for--Time, _ibid._;
+    will risk nothing, 162;
+    his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart, _ibid._;
+    sole responsibility of, 171;
+    ties Stewart's hands, _ibid._;
+    the real person responsible for death of Gordon and failure of
+      expedition, 172.
+  Wongepoo, i. 57.
+  Wongkadza, i. 50, 56.
+  Wood, Sir Evelyn, ii. 125.
+  Woolwich Common, i. 1.
+  Wouchang, i. 68.
+  Wou Sankwei, i. 67, 122.
+  Wuliungchow, i. 94, 95.
+  Wurantai, i. 64, 66.
+  Wusieh, i. 94, 95, 113, 116.
+
+  Yakoob Khan, ii. 44-49, 68.
+  Yalpukh, i. 32.
+  Yangchow, i. 69.
+  Yellow Jacket Order, its origin, i. 122.
+  Yesing, i. 114, 115.
+  Yungan, i. 66.
+  Yusuf Pasha, ii. 101.
+
+  Zanzibar, ii. 65.
+  Zebehr Rahama, i. 143, 144; ii. 10, 13, 32, 98, 101, 105, 110, 111,
+    118, 119, 124-26;
+    interview with Gordon, 128-29;
+    doubts as to his real attitude, 129-30;
+    letters to Miss Gordon, 130-32;
+    to Sir Henry Gordon, 132;
+    his power, 133.
+  Zeila, ii. 25.
+  Zouaves, the, i. 20.
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+[Transcriber's Notes:
+
+The transcriber made the following changes to the text to
+correct obvious errors:
+
+  1. p. 110, Madhi's --> Mahdi's
+  2. p. 137, opinons -->opinions
+  3. p. 142, trooops --> troops
+  4. p. 144, beween --> between
+  5. p. 149, Thoughout --> Throughout
+  6. p. 153, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  7. p. 166, Madhi --> Mahdi
+  8. p. 175, Burnaby, ... i. 164. --> Burnaby, ... ii. 164.
+  9. p. 178, returns to Cairo, 164; --> returns to Cairo, 163;
+ 10. p. 180, Hicks, Colonel, 102 --> Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102
+ 11. p. 182, Outram, ... i. 161, 172. --> Outram, ... ii. 161, 172.
+ 12. p. 183, Suleiman ... 25-19 --> Suleiman ... 25-29
+
+End of Transcriber's Notes]
+
+
+
+
+
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