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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/30597-h.zip b/30597-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7cbd836 --- /dev/null +++ b/30597-h.zip diff --git a/30597-h/30597-h.htm b/30597-h/30597-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c996042 --- /dev/null +++ b/30597-h/30597-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7270 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Battle of Atlanta and Other Campaigns, Addresses, Etc., by Major-General Grenville M. Dodge. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + + p { margin-top: .75em; text-align: justify; margin-bottom: .75em;} + + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {text-align: center; clear: both;} + + hr { width: 33%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; clear: both;} + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body{margin-left: 12%; margin-right: 12%;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; text-align: right;} + + .blockquot{margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 10%;} + + .poem {margin-left:15%; margin-right:10%;} + + .right {text-align: right;} + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + + .caption {margin-left:15%; margin-right:15%;} + + .figcenter {margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + .bbox {border: solid 2px; padding:.25em; margin: auto; text-align: center;} + + a:link {color:#0000ff; text-decoration:none} + a:visited {color:#6633cc; text-decoration:none} + + .spacer2 {padding-left: 1em; padding-right: 1em;} + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Battle of Atlanta, by Grenville M. Dodge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Battle of Atlanta + and Other Campaigns, Addresses, Etc. + +Author: Grenville M. Dodge + +Release Date: December 4, 2009 [EBook #30597] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Stephanie Eason, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net. + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p> </p><p> <a name="front" id="front"></a></p> +<div class="figcenter"><img src="images/i001.jpg" alt="MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE</b></p> +<p class="center">Commander<br />Department of the Missouri<br />1865.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + + +<h1>THE<br />BATTLE OF ATLANTA</h1> +<h3>AND</h3> +<h2>OTHER CAMPAIGNS,<br />ADDRESSES, Etc.</h2> +<p> </p> +<h3>BY</h3> +<h2>Major-General Grenville M. Dodge</h2> +<p> </p><p> </p> +<h4>COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA<br />THE MONARCH PRINTING COMPANY<br />1911</h4> + + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="5" summary="contents"> +<tr><td> </td><td align="right">Page.</td></tr> +<tr><td>The Southwestern Campaign</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_9">9</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Letter of General Dodge to his Father</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_35">35</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>The Battle of Atlanta</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_39">39</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Letter to General Raum</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>The Indian Campaigns of 1864-65</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_63">63</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>The Indian Campaigns of 1865-66</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_79">79</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Campaign up the Tennessee River Valley</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_111">111</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>The Army of the Tennessee</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_129">129</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>The Campaign in the West</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_137">137</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>A Talk to Old Comrades</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_145">145</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>General Grant</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_151">151</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Use of Block-Houses During the Civil War</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_159">159</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>An Incident of the War</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_165">165</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Gen. G. M. Dodge on the Water Cure</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_173">173</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Misplaced Sympathy</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_177">177</a></td></tr></table> + +<p> </p> +<h2>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2> +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="5" summary="illustrations"> +<tr><td>Major-General Grenville M. Dodge</td><td align="right"><a href="#front">Frontispiece</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Major-General Samuel R. Curtis</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Sylvanus Dodge</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_34">34</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Sixteenth Army Corps in the Battle of Atlanta</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_38">38</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Monument on the Battlefield of Atlanta</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Old Fort Kearney</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_62">62</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>James Bridger, Guide</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_78">78</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Pumpkin Buttes</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_94">94</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge and Staff</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_110">110</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_128">128</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Major-General G. M. Dodge and Staff</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_136">136</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Fort Cottonwood</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_140">140</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Where General McPherson Fell</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_144">144</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Major-General George G. Meade</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_150">150</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Pontoon Bridge Across the Tennessee River</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_158">158</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>To the Memory of Samuel Davis</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_164">164</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Company L, Fifty-First Iowa Infantry</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_172">172</a></td></tr> +<tr><td>Scotts Bluffs</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_176">176</a></td></tr></table> +<p> </p><p> </p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7"></a></p> +<div class="figcenter"><img src="images/i007.jpg" alt="MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL R. CURTIS" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL R. CURTIS</b></p> +<p class="center">Commander of the Army of the Southwest, in the Spring of 1861.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE SOUTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p>The Southwest became prominent before the nation early in the war from the +doubt existing as to the position of Missouri, which was saved by the +energy and determination of Frank P. Blair and Colonel Nathaniel Lyon; the +latter first capturing Camp Jackson, on May 10th, 1861. He then, picking +up what force he could without waiting for them to be disciplined or +drilled, marched rapidly against the Missouri State troops under Price, +who were driven to the southwest through Springfield, where, being joined +by the troops from Arkansas, under Colonel McCullough, they stood and +fought the battle of Wilson's Creek. This would have been a great victory +for the Union forces if Lyon had not divided his forces at the request of +General Siegel and trusted the latter to carry out his plan of attack in +the rear while Lyon attacked in the front. This General Siegel failed to +do, leaving the field when the battle was half over, and allowing Lyon to +fight it out alone. Even then, if Lyon had not been killed at the head of +his Army while fighting the whole force of the enemy, it would have turned +out to be a great victory for the Union forces, and would have held that +country. The death of Lyon caused a return of his troops to Rolla and +Sedalia, and opened up again the whole of Missouri to the Missouri State +troops under General Price.</p> + +<p>One of the notable facts of this battle of Wilson's Creek was that it was +fought by young officers who ranked only as Captains and Lieutenants, all +of whom afterwards became distinguished officers in the war—Schofield, +Sturgis, Totten, DuBois, and Sweeny—and from the fact that in the first +great battle of the Southwest one of the two commanders of Armies falling +at the head of their forces in battle was killed here—General Lyon. The +other was General McPherson, who fell at Atlanta.</p> + +<p>Lyon pursued the tactics of Grant by attacking the enemy wherever to be +found, and not taking into consideration the disparity of forces. The +excitement caused by Lyon's campaigns induced<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> the Government to create +the Western Department, and assign to it on July 25th, 1861, General John +C. Fremont as its commander.</p> + +<p>In August, 1861, I landed in St. Louis with my Regiment, the Fourth Iowa +Infantry, and soon after was sent to Rolla, Mo., which was then the most +important outpost, being the nearest to the enemy's Army. Soon after I +reached there General Fremont commenced formulating his plans for the +campaign in the South, and being the commander of that outpost I was in +daily communication with him. There was a constant stream of reports +coming from the enemy's lines that seemed to give great importance to +their strength and their position, and I was continually ordered to send +out scouts and troops to test the information. I invariably found it wrong +and my telegrams will show my opinion of those reports.</p> + +<p>Soon after arriving at Rolla I was placed in command of the post, and had +quite a force under me, and was ordered to prepare to winter there.</p> + +<p>The battle of Wilson's Creek was fought on August 10th, and soon +thereafter General Price formed his plan of campaign to move north into +north Missouri and endeavor to hold it by the recruits that he could +obtain there. With from five to ten thousand men of the Missouri State +Guards, General Price moved, and as he marched north in September his Army +increased heavily in numbers and enthusiasm. The Federal forces were +scattered all over Missouri—some eighty thousand in all. At least half of +these could have been concentrated to operate against any force of the +enemy, but they were all protecting towns, cities and railways and +endeavoring to make Missouri loyal, while Price concentrated and moved +where he pleased, until, on September 21, 1861, he captured Lexington, +with some 3,000 or more prisoners. The movement of Price on Lexington and +the defeat and capture of our forces there, forced Fremont to concentrate, +and he moved with four Divisions, making an Army of 38,000, on +Springfield, which he reached October 27th. Price was then far south of +that place. Had our forces been concentrated to meet Price's Army we had +enough to defeat him; but the moment Fremont commenced concentrating his +four Divisions to act against him, Price moved back as fast as he had +advanced, and did not stop until he was south of Springfield and near +supports in Arkansas.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>General McCullough, in his letters from Springfield, Mo., August 24th, +says that there were only 3,000 troops in Springfield and all the Arkansas +troops had left the service. Price's total force was about 12,000 men, and +on November 7th he reached and joined McCullough and suggested to General +A. S. Johnston a campaign against St. Louis, offering to raise in Missouri +and Arkansas a force of 25,000 men in such a campaign, and stated he +should wait for Fremont at Pineville, Ark., believing in that rugged +country he could defeat him.</p> + +<p>While at Rolla I was ordered to send a force to take Salem, to the south +of me, and I entrusted the command of the force to Colonel Greusel, of the +Thirteenth Illinois Infantry. I issued to him the following instructions:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>If the men who are away from home are in the rebel Army, or if their +families cannot give a good account of them or their whereabouts, take +their property or that portion of it worth taking; also their slaves. +Be sure that they are aiding the enemy, then take all they have got.</p></div> + +<p>When I wrote these instructions I had not considered for a moment what a +row the order to take the slaves would cause. I simply treated them as +other property. It was written innocently, but made a sensation I never +dreamed of, and I have often since been quoted as one of the first to +liberate and utilize the negro.</p> + +<p>On the return of Lyon's Army to Rolla I was ordered by General Fremont to +report at his headquarters in St. Louis. On my arrival in St. Louis I +reported myself to his Adjutant, who was in the basement of the old home +of Thomas A. Benton, on Choutau Avenue, but was unable to obtain an +interview with the General. I showed my dispatch to his Adjutant-General, +and waited there two days. I met any number of staff officers, and was +handed about from one to another, never reaching or hearing from General +Fremont. After remaining in St. Louis two days I considered it was my duty +to return to my command, and left a note to the Adjutant stating that I +had waited there two days for an interview with General Fremont, and had +left for my command, and that if wanted would return to St. Louis again.</p> + +<p>Evidently no communication was made to Fremont of my presence in the city +or of my note, for soon after I arrived at Rolla I received a sharp note +from him asking why I had not reported as ordered. I answered by wire that +I had reported, had been unable to see him, and would report immediately +again in St. Louis. I was determined to see him this time, and I, +therefore, went directly<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> to Colonel Benton's house, and, taking a sealed +envelope in my hand, marched right up the front steps, passed all the +guards as though I belonged there, and went into his room and reported +myself present. I there learned from him as much of his plans as he +thought best to give me in regard to his movements, and obtained from him +the information that Price's Army was not far from Rolla, and instructions +to be on the alert. I supposed that my command at Rolla was to accompany +his march to Springfield, and on my return to Rolla made every preparation +to do so, but never received the order. Everything in the department was +absolutely chaos. It was impossible to obtain provisions, accouterments, +equipment, or anything else upon a proper requisition. Everything seemed +to require an order from one of General Fremont's staff, and my own +Regiment suffered a long time before I could get for it the necessary +arms, clothing, equipment, etc.</p> + +<p>While I was at Rolla the dispatch sent by the Government to General +Curtis, to be forwarded to Fremont at Springfield, relieving him of the +command, was brought by a staff officer to me with the request that I +should see that the staff officer had an escort and went through promptly +to Springfield. General Curtis, who was from my own state, wrote me a +private note stating the importance of pushing this staff officer through. +President Lincoln sent the order to General Curtis with this peculiar +note:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Washington</span>, October 24, 1861.</p> +<p><i>Brigadier-General S. R. Curtis</i>:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">My Dear Sir</span>:—Herewith is a document, half letter, half order, which, +wishing you to see but not to make public, I send unsealed. Please +read it and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of +the Department of the West at the time it reaches you. I cannot know +now whether Fremont or Hunter will then be in command. Yours truly,</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">A. Lincoln</span>.</p></div> + +<p>In a few days I received a letter from General Hunter, who had relieved +General Fremont, instructing me that thereafter everything in the +department must be carried on in accordance with the orders of the War +Department and the Army Regulations, and I immediately saw a change for +the better. I was soldier enough, although I had not had much experience +then, to know that the methods being pursued under Fremont could bring +nothing but disaster to the service. Every order was signed by somebody +acting as a General, a Colonel, or something else, while in fact many of +them had no rank whatever, and in looking over my own orders I do not know +why I did not sign myself as an Acting General,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> as those who succeeded me +did. Even after General Halleck took command I noticed in the orders of +General Hunter that he assigned persons to the command of a Brigade as +Acting Brigadier-Generals instead of their rank as Colonel Commanding, +etc.</p> + +<p>I remained at Rolla until the return of the troops under General Hunter; +and finally those commanded by Siegel, Asboth and Osterhaus were encamped +at Rolla outside of the post and were reporting directly to the commanding +officer of the department, while I as post commander reported directly to +the same authority.</p> + +<p>General Hunter as soon as he took command wired the War Department that +there was no force of the enemy in his neighborhood, although orders had +been given by Fremont a day or two before to march out and fight Price's +Army. Hunter, therefore, in accordance with his orders from Washington, +abandoned the pursuit, although with the force he had he could have driven +Price and McCullough south of the Arkansas River, and probably have +avoided the later campaign that ended in the Battle of Pea Ridge. Hunter +moved his forces back to Rolla and Sedalia and sent 18,000 of his men to +join General Grant in the campaigns up the Tennessee River.</p> + +<p>This force at Rolla was mostly Germans, and the change of commanders from +Fremont to Hunter, and later to Halleck, was unsatisfactory to them, +though one of the officers, General Osterhaus, took no part in the feeling +and sentiment that seemed to exist that for success it was necessary to +have Fremont or Siegel in command, and my understanding was that the force +at Rolla during the winter of 1861-62 was the nucleus of the force that +was again to march to the Southwest under the orders of General Halleck +and to be commanded by General Siegel. General Halleck, when he assumed +command of the department, in his letters to the War Department and his +orders to the troops showed plainly his disgust at the condition of +matters in that department. He wrote to the War Department:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>One week's experience here is sufficient to prove that everything is +in complete chaos. The most astounding orders and contracts for +supplies of all kinds have been made, and large amounts purported to +have been received, but there is nothing to show that they have ever +been properly issued and they cannot now be found.</p></div> + +<p>Of the condition of the troops he found in his department, he wrote:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>Some of these corps are not only organized in a way entirely contrary +to law, but are by no means reliable, being mostly foreigners, and +officered in many cases by foreign adventurers, or perhaps refugees +from justice; and, having been tampered with by political partizans +for political purposes, they constitute a very dangerous element to +society as well as to the Army itself. Wherever they go they convert +all Union men into bitter enemies. The men, if properly officered, +would make good soldiers, but with their present officers they are +little better than an armed mob.</p></div> + +<p>They were not paid, had not been mustered into our service, and the +commissions emanated from General Fremont, not from the State or +Government.</p> + +<p>General Halleck's plans evidently were to make a campaign against Price as +soon as he could organize the forces concentrated at Rolla. Price's +headquarters were at Springfield, and his northerly line was along the +Osage Valley. His force was estimated anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000. As +outposts General Halleck had Rolla, Jefferson City, and Sedalia. There was +located at Rolla five or six thousand troops; at Sedalia and along that +line about ten or twelve thousand, under General Pope, including Jeff C. +Davis's Division; but these troops Halleck intended to send down the +Mississippi and up the Tennessee.</p> + +<p>General Pope in his letters to General Halleck urged that he be allowed to +move on Price and destroy his Army, which he said he could do with his +force. Rumors of Price's force and their movements were a constant terror +and excitement throughout Missouri. The whole of northern Missouri was +aroused by Price's proximity, and all the counties had recruiting officers +from his Army enrolling and sending it recruits. The numbers of these +recruiting officers and their small squads of recruits were magnified into +thousands, and Price, when he sent a thousand men to Lexington for the +purpose of holding that place and recruiting, brought orders from Halleck +for a movement of all the troops to cut him off. The prompt movement of +Halleck kept him from remaining there very long, but he was enabled to +take about three thousand recruits from there without molestation from us.</p> + +<p>Price's campaign as planned for the winter was to have General +McCullough's Arkansas force, which was lying at Cross Timbers, near +Elkhorn Tavern, and Van Buren in Arkansas, join him. Price complained +bitterly of his inability to obtain any aid from McCullough, stating that +if he could obtain it he could march into northern Missouri and hold the +State, and recruit there an Army of Missourians; which, from my experience +in the State, I have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> no doubt he would have done if he could have moved +there and held his position.</p> + +<p>General Halleck's plan evidently was to move a body from Rolla directly on +Springfield, with the intention of striking and defeating Price before +Price could receive reinforcements, but Halleck had a great disinclination +to move until he had organized the forces in the State of Missouri into +Brigades and Divisions, had them properly mustered and officered, and had +his staff departments so arranged that they could be depended upon to take +care of any moving column. This disinclination of Halleck to move carried +us on to the first of January.</p> + +<p>In December General Siegel was given command of the troops at Rolla, and +Captain Phil Sheridan was sent there as Quartermaster for that Army. His +ability and foresight in organizing the transportation of an Army, feeding +it, and fitting it for a campaign, was shown every day.</p> + +<p>On December 26th General Halleck assigned General S. R. Curtis to the +command of the District of Southwest Missouri. This included the forces +under Siegel at Rolla, and caused very severe comments from them. From the +letters of Halleck, written at the time and afterwards, this placing of +Siegel under Curtis was caused by the letters and opinions—in fact, the +denunciations—of Siegel made by Captains Schofield, Totten, and Sturgis, +when with Lyon in the Wilson's Creek campaign. Evidently Halleck lost all +faith in Siegel as commander of the Southwestern Army, and therefore +assigned Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been stationed at St. +Louis, to the command. But General Siegel was still left in command of two +Divisions of the troops near Rolla, which was a great mistake.</p> + +<p>As soon as General Curtis assumed command General Halleck commenced urging +him to move to the south on Springfield, agreeing to send to him Colonel +Jeff C. Davis's Division to join him before reaching Springfield, which +Division was about 5,000 strong, and was with Pope on the Lamine River +line. Curtis hesitated, and did not feel secure with the forces he had, +although Halleck did not believe Price would stand for a fight, or that +Curtis would need Jeff C. Davis's Division.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Southwest, about seven thousand strong, was organized at +Rolla, and moved from there January 14th, towards Springfield, halting at +Lebanon. From Lebanon it moved on to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> Marshfield, where Colonel Jeff C. +Davis, with his Division, joined it. Great preparations were made there +for the attack upon Price, and we moved out of Marshfield prepared for +battle, General Siegel commanding the First and Second Divisions, one +under General Osterhaus and the other under General Asboth. General Jeff +C. Davis, from General Pope's Army, commanded the Third Division, and +Colonel Eugene A. Carr the Fourth Division, a Brigade of which I +commanded.</p> + +<p>When within about three miles of Springfield we received orders to attack +that town the next morning, and moved at midnight. All the reports we +received were that Price was in Springfield ready for battle. I had the +extreme left, and put out my skirmishers soon after midnight, supposing, +of course, that I was in front of the enemy, although I had seen nothing +of them. In the darkness I lost track of the company of the Fourth Iowa, +who were the skirmishers of my Brigade, and was greatly worried at the +fact, but at daylight I met them on the road mounted upon horses and +dressed in all kinds of costumes. The officer in command, who was an +enterprising one, had started his skirmish-line, and, not meeting any +enemy, had pushed right into Springfield, which he found evacuated except +for a rear guard and a number of horses. They mounted the horses and rode +back to us. All this time our extreme right, under Siegel, was using its +artillery upon the town, not knowing that the enemy had gone.</p> + +<p>General Curtis, in his order of battle, instructed Captain Sheridan to +line up his transportation in the rear of the line of battle, so that it +could be used as a defensive obstruction for the troops to fall back to, +provided they met any check or were driven back. Captain Sheridan looked +on this order as a very singular one, and says that he could, in his +imagination, if anything happened our army, see his transportation flying +over that rough country, knowing that his mule-drivers would be the first +to run, most likely from a false report, not even waiting for an attack. +While this order at the time caused no comment, it now, after our long +experience, looks very ridiculous, though not more so than many others, we +received at the beginning of the war.</p> + +<p>It was not long before we were all on the march through and beyond +Springfield, Price and his Army being in full retreat, with a force, so +far as we could learn, of about ten thousand men. We followed him as +rapidly as possible, he leaving a strong<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> rear guard under Colonel Little +to stop us at every stream. General Siegel had urged upon General Curtis a +detour by his two Divisions to head off Price or stop him, so that he +could attack him in front while we attacked his rear. Curtis had acceded +to this. I had the advance following up Price, and endeavored to hold him, +while Siegel moved by another road, expecting to catch him in flank or get +ahead of him.</p> + +<p>I remember that about noon of each day at some good defensive point, +generally across a creek with a wide, open valley, Price would open out +with his artillery and cavalry and act as though he intended to give +battle. Our cavalry would fall back to give way to our infantry, and we +would go into line, put out our skirmishers, and lose half a day, and as +night came on Price would get out without our accomplishing anything. I +remember distinctly that my Regiment would go into line, strip themselves, +and throw down the chickens, potatoes, apples, and other eatables they had +foraged and taken during the day, and as they would go forward the troops +in our rear would come up and gobble what they had dropped. About the +third time the Regiment went into line I noticed the boys had left nothing +but their knapsacks, and were holding on to their chickens and provisions. +One of the boys saw me looking at them, and thinking I was going to order +them to drop what they had in their hands or on their backs, he appealed +to me, saying, "Colonel, we have fed that damned Thirty-sixth Illinois +Infantry every day and left ourselves without any supper. They put up this +game that is going on to get our chickens. There ain't any Price on that +side of the river, and they can't fool us any longer if they do you."</p> + +<p>At Cane Creek, Flat Creek, Sugar Creek, etc., we had pretty sharp +skirmishes. I soon discovered the plan of Price. It was to leave a strong +rear-guard and make a great show while his trains and the rest of his Army +were pushing to the South as fast as possible; so as soon as I saw him +stop I went at him head-on with the cavalry and infantry, not even waiting +to deploy more than a Regiment. Price's men would line the road and get +one or two volleys at us and then slip off into the woods before we could +deploy or return their fire. They did not get hurt much, but we did; but +at the same time it broke up his game of holding us back, and we kept +close on to his rear. For two or three days we were looking for Siegel to +get in ahead and check Price, when to our astonishment<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> a report came from +our rear that he had turned his column in on our road some eight miles +behind us, and there was a general howl from the force that had been +pounding away at Price's rear.</p> + +<p>Finally we pushed Price back to Fayetteville, Ark., where we landed during +the month of February, and where we were halted by General Halleck's +orders, who stated that he would relieve our front of the enemy by his +movements with the rest of his forces through Southeast Missouri, down the +Mississippi, and up the Tennessee.</p> + +<p>While Price was laying at Springfield, in December, he communicated with +the Confederate Government, and changed all his Missouri State force as +far as practicable into Confederate troops. He also complained to the +Government, and to General Polk, who commanded at Columbus, Ky., of the +impossibility of obtaining the co-operation of the Confederate forces west +of the Mississippi River. From the representations of Polk and Price, the +Confederate Government organized all the country west of the Mississippi +River into a department known as the Trans-Mississippi District, and +placed it under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, who assumed command +early in February, 1862. As soon as he assumed command General Van Dorn +prepared to make an aggressive campaign, using all his forces in Arkansas +and those under Price, estimating that they would reach 30,000 troops. His +plan was to move his forces directly from Arkansas northward, west of Iron +Mountain, by way of Salem, while Price moved from Springfield directly +east and joined his column by way of Salem and Rolla, thence the combined +column to move directly on St. Louis, Van Dorn calculating that he could +strike and capture St. Louis before Halleck could concentrate his troops +or obtain any knowledge of his movements that would enable him to defeat +him before reaching St. Louis. Van Dorn expected to make this move in +February, and his plans and the energy with which he executed them and +concentrated his troops shows him to have been an officer of ability and +great energy. General Halleck's prompt movement of General Curtis's army +from Rolla southwest in January, thus driving Price out of Springfield, +compelled Van Dorn to change his plans, and instead of moving towards St. +Louis he moved his troops by Van Buren and the Boston Mountains, making a +junction with Price's force in the Boston Mountains below Fayetteville, +and while General Curtis's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> Army was laying at Cross Hollows, evidently in +full security, thinking his campaign was over and expecting Price and Van +Dorn to be drawn away from his front by the movement down the Mississippi. +General Curtis was obliged to scatter his forces in that destitute country +over a wide expanse so as to obtain food and forage. Van Dorn, without our +having any knowledge of the fact, marched over the Boston Mountains, and +it was March 3d before General Curtis was aware that Van Dorn was almost +in his front and on his flank. The Union refugees flying before Van Dorn's +movement gave us the first reliable notice of the new combination and the +new movement. General Curtis immediately sent out orders, and, by marching +all night, during heavy snows and severe cold weather, was able to +concentrate most of his force on Sugar Creek, near Bentonville. General +Siegel and his force did not move promptly, as ordered by Curtis, and was +almost cut off before reaching Bentonville. He had to cut his way through +a portion of Van Dorn's Cavalry, which he was able to do without much +loss, and our line was formed on the north side of Sugar Creek, facing to +the south,—a strong position,—expecting to receive Van Dorn's attack on +the main telegraph road from Fayetteville to Springfield. We were on a +plateau with a broad open valley in our front. In the rear of us was what +was known as the Cross Timbers, a deep gorge. To the west of us was much +open ground, over which was a road parallel to the main road, passing down +what was known as Little Cross Timbers, and entering the Springfield and +Fayetteville road about midway between Elkhorn Tavern and Cassville, some +four miles in our rear.</p> + +<p>While I was in command at Rolla I had organized by details from the +Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri Regiments a Corps of scouts who +lived in Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri and were thoroughly +acquainted with that country. During the day of the 6th of March, while +Siegel was joining us and we were preparing for the battle, some of these +scouts came to me and told me that Van Dorn proposed to move to our rear +by this Little Cross Timber road. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I went +to General Curtis and reported these facts to him, and also told him of +this road and of the feasibility of blockading it, supposing, of course, +he would send some of the troops on his extreme right to do it; but he +turned to me and said: "You take a portion of your command and go there +and blockade the road."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>It was after dark before I could reach the Little Cross Timbers, as I had +to march infantry to the place, which was quite a distance away from where +we were. I took six companies of the Fourth Iowa Infantry and one company +of the Third Illinois Cavalry and marched to carry out this order. In the +dark two of my companies crossed the road and got lost, while with the +other five I got into Cross Timbers Hollows and spent about three hours +felling trees all through the gorge, and only left when my cavalry +reported the movement of Van Dorn's Army coming down the road. I returned +to my camp supposing my two companies had been cut off, but upon +discovering that the enemy were coming down the road they managed to get +back across it and reached the camp.</p> + +<p>I reported immediately to General Curtis's headquarters, and informed him +that Van Dorn's Army was moving down that road to his rear. He did not +believe it, and thought that I had mistaken some of his cavalry for Van +Dorn's Army. There were no pickets out on our right flank, and I so +reported to General Curtis, but evidently my report made no impression +upon him, and I returned to camp.</p> + +<p>Early on the morning of the 7th of March I received a request from General +Curtis to report at a schoolhouse that was on the main Fayetteville road a +half mile north of Sugar Creek, where I met all the commanders of +Divisions, and, I think, some of the Brigade commanders, and where a +council of war was being held as to the policy that was to be pursued. I +was so confident that Van Dorn was in our rear that when I went to this +council I took my Brigade and halted it on the road near where the council +was to be held. Generals Siegel, Asboth, and a majority of the officers +present, advised that we should fall back to Cassville towards +Springfield, and not give battle there, but Colonel Jeff C. Davis and +myself protested, and I stated that I believed a portion of Van Dorn's +force was then in our rear. The rear of Curtis's Army was in a great deal +of confusion; its trains were stretched out on the Fayetteville road and +the ground that we were upon was wooded and not very defensible for a +battle, unless they attacked us on the Sugar Creek front.</p> + +<p>While we were in this council, about 8:30 a. m., scattered firing +commenced in our rear near the Elkhorn Tavern, and General Curtis inquired +what it was, and asked what troops those were that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> were out upon the +road. I answered that they were mine, and he ordered Colonel Carr to +immediately send me to the Elkhorn Tavern and ascertain what the firing +meant.</p> + +<p>Colonel Carr evidently was of the same opinion as myself, and accompanied +me as I moved as rapidly as possible to the Elkhorn Tavern, where we went +without being deployed right into battle; in fact, right into the enemy's +skirmishers. The fact is, the first notice I had that the battle was on +was when a shell fell among my drummers and fifers, who were at the head +of my Regiment, and killed and demoralized them, so that we heard no more +of drumming and fifing that day. I immediately deployed a company of the +Fourth Iowa, which had been thoroughly drilled as skirmishers, and pushed +forward toward the White River road, seeing some teams of the enemy +passing that way with forage, and I pushed down the slopes of the Cross +Timber Hollows nearly a mile before I developed the enemy in force.</p> + +<p>The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my movement +satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in my front, and he +immediately sent back word for his other Brigade, Commanded by Colonel +Vandever, of the Ninth Iowa Infantry, to come to the rear, now our front. +They had hardly reached the Elkhorn Tavern and deployed into line before +Price's whole Army moved in on us in line of battle and disabled two of +our batteries. The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades +in line, the strength of both not exceeding three thousand men, was kept +up continuously all day, until dark, with varying success.</p> + +<p>As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of the enemy, +I knew that I could not hold the extended line we were covering, and I +commenced drawing in my right and closing on Vandever until I backed down +through an open field that had been cleared, and where the logs had been +hauled to the lower edge of the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I +placed my Brigade and fought all the afternoon, with the enemy sometimes +around both flanks and sometimes in my rear.</p> + +<p>Colonel Vandever held his line at the Elkhorn Tavern in the edge of thick +timber on the main Fayetteville road until late in the afternoon, fighting +desperately, when the enemy, taking advantage of the timber as a blind, by +largely superior numbers, drove him back across an open field to a line of +woods in his rear and in my rear, which he successfully held. I was not +aware of his movement<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> until the fire in that direction slackened, and I +sent out my adjutant, Lieutenant James A. Williamson (afterwards a Brevet +Major-General), who returned and reported that the enemy were in +possession of that field; in fact, he ran right into them and received +their fire, but got back to me safely. It was then nearly dark. The fire +on my front had slackened, and my Brigade was almost entirely out of +ammunition. I immediately ordered them to form in column and led them +right out from the right, moving in the direction where Vandever's Brigade +had formed in its new position. As I moved out I passed right in sight of +a column of the Confederate forces, who evidently had come out of the +hollow and were forming to again attack Vandever. They probably thought I +was a portion of their force, for they made no demonstration towards me, +and I passed right by them. As I passed out into the open I could see that +General Asboth, who had been brought there by General Curtis, was forming +to attack at the Elkhorn Tavern again; and I met General Curtis, who +seemed astonished to find me with my force intact. He asked me where I was +going. I told him that I was out of ammunition, and that I was bringing +out my force to form it on the new line. Paying the command a high +compliment, he immediately ordered me to fix bayonets and to charge on the +enemy at the same time that Asboth with his reinforcement moved down the +Fayetteville road towards the Elkhorn Tavern. I immediately did this, and +passed right back over the field where I had been fighting, but found no +enemy. They had evidently left my front at the same time I retired, and I +returned and went into line on the right of Vandever's Brigade, probably +500 feet in the rear of the original line, and there we laid all night +under arms.</p> + +<p>Van Dorn's plan of attack was to throw the Arkansas forces under +McCullough and McIntosh on Curtis's right, facing the Little Cross Hollow +road, while at the same time General Price with his force moved around us +by the Little Cross Timber road to our rear and attacked from the Cross +Timbers.</p> + +<p>When passing through Little Cross Timber Hollow Price struck the timber +blockade, and, as he shows in his report, was held there for a long time +before he could clear out the roads and get his forces and artillery +through. This delayed his attack in the rear until nearly 10 o'clock in +the morning. The two forces of McCullough and Price were separated by a +high ridge by the name<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> of Pea Ridge, over which it was impracticable for +them to connect, and, therefore, the two attacks were separate and not in +concert.</p> + +<p>General McCullough, in attacking from the west, struck General Jeff C. +Davis's Division. Davis had a Division of troops that had been thoroughly +drilled. He was a very competent officer and handled them with great +skill, and the attack of McCullough and McIntosh, though desperate, was +without avail, both rebel commanders being killed in the attack, which +took all the fight out of the Arkansas troops and made their attacks +towards evening of very little effect. Davis pursued them so energetically +that after the death of their commanders they straggled off towards +Arkansas and no more fighting occurred on that flank.</p> + +<p>General Siegel's two Divisions had remained facing Sugar Creek. General +Curtis had endeavored to bring them forward, but without avail. A Brigade +of General Osterhaus's Division aided General Davis during the latter part +of the day, but the Brigade from Asboth's Division did not get into line +to help Carr until nearly dark, although General Curtis went in person for +them. Colonel Carr's troops had been marching two nights before the +battle, and on the night of the 7th he asked General Curtis to relieve +them, so they could get some sleep. General Curtis promised they should be +relieved by one of General Siegel's Divisions, but they held the line all +that night right where they were formed, and when we looked for our relief +the next morning we learned that General Siegel and his troops were nearly +a mile in our rear, taking their breakfast.</p> + +<p>The general plan of General Curtis's attack on the morning of the 8th was +for a combined movement on Price's Army by both of General Siegel's +Divisions, and General Davis, who had been brought over to our front, +holding Carr's Division in reserve. We waited a long time for General +Siegel to get into position; and in fact before he got into position +Colonel Carr had been brought out from the reserve and placed on the right +of Davis. The enemy opened out upon us, and my Brigade holding the right I +commenced swinging my line in over the ground I had fought over the day +before, and discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from us; were not +standing and giving battle; and the fighting on the morning of the 8th was +merely a fight of Price's rear-guard to enable him to withdraw by the +Huntsville road, he having received orders that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> morning from Van Dorn to +do so, Van Dorn notifying Price that this was necessary, as the Arkansas +troops, after the death of McCullough and McIntosh, had most of them +retreated to the south, leaving Price's Army the only force intact in our +rear, so that he now had the difficult problem of getting away from us.</p> + +<p>The fighting lasted but a short time, mostly with artillery, and +occasioned very little loss for that day. We soon discovered the rebels +fleeing over the hills and down the White River Road, and being nearest to +that road I immediately started my Brigade after them. I had not proceeded +far when I received an order from General Curtis to return and hold the +battle-field. I was a good deal astonished at this, as I could see the +enemy demoralized in my front, with their baggage-trains and their +artillery, and I had no doubt, (as I knew the country, having had a +detachment stationed at Blackburn's Mills, at the crossing of White River, +supplying our Army with forage and grain before the battle,) that I could +capture this portion of the army before it could make a crossing of White +River.</p> + +<p>When I arrived on the battle-field General Curtis told me that General +Siegel and his Divisions had gone to the rear towards Cassville; in fact, +I myself heard him give one of the Brigades that was passing an order to +halt there, which they did not obey, but kept on. General Siegel wrote +back advising Curtis to form his new line in the rear of Cross Timbers, as +Van Dorn might return to the fight, but Curtis instructed Colonel Carr's +Division to remain on the field and hold it, which it did. General Curtis +afterwards made very severe complaints to General Halleck of the actions +of General Siegel, and in answer General Halleck wrote as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I was by no means surprised at General Siegel's conduct before the +battle of Pea Ridge. It was plainly in keeping with what he did at +Carthage and Wilson's Creek. After your expedition started I received +documentary proof from Captains Sturgis, Schofield, and Totten, and a +number of other officers, in regard to his conduct on those occasions, +which destroyed all confidence in him. It was for that reason that I +telegraphed to you so often not to let Siegel separate from you. I +anticipated that he would try to play you a trick by being absent at +the critical moment. I wished to forewarn you of the snare, but I +could not then give you my reasons. I am glad you prevented his +project and saved your army. I cannot describe to you how much +uneasiness I felt for you. You saved your army and won a glorious +victory by refusing to take his advice.</p></div> + +<p>Captain Kinsman, of Company B, Fourth Iowa, who was holding Pea Ridge, and +witnessed the battle from that point, and could<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> look down upon Carr's +Division, described the battle in the rear as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>At 8:30 o'clock Colonel Dodge opened the ball, and the battle was soon +raging all along the line with a fierceness and obstinacy which omened +a terrific struggle. The weather was splendid, and the smoke instead +of hanging murkily among the trees, rose rapidly and rolled away over +the hills in dense sulphurous masses. The thunder of the artillery was +terrific, and the shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air +like flying devils, while the infantry of both armies, with their +rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, kept a perfect hurricane of death +howling through the woods. The rebels fought well, but generally fired +too high, and their batteries, although getting our range accurately, +missed the elevation much of the time. Their poor shooting was our +salvation. Had they done as well as our men, with the tremendous odds +against us, they must have annihilated us. The enemy were clear around +our right flank, enveloping us, and it looked as though they would +capture Dodge's Brigade, when Colonel Dodge took a battalion of +Colonel Carr's regiment, the Third Illinois cavalry, and charged the +forces that were turning our right flank like a whirlwind. Everything +gave way before them. Every man in that battalion seemed to ride for +his life, and they swept way around our front, routing and +demoralizing that flank of the enemy, and effectually freeing our rear +and flank. Price told some of our boys of the Fourth Iowa who were +captured on the day of the fight and have since escaped, that we +fought more like devils than human beings. The rebel colonels (several +of them) inquired of our boys who those black-coated fellows were, and +who led them. They said there must have been at least 3,000 of them. +When the boys told them there were less than 600 of them, the Colonels +said they needn't tell them any such stuff as that; that they knew it +was a damned lie. But they sent their compliments to Colonel Dodge for +the bravery of himself and his command, and well they might, for +opposed to Colonel Dodge's Brigade of 1,050 men, and two guns of the +First Iowa Battery, were six regiments of Confederate troops, a large +force of Confederate Missouri State troops, and eighteen guns, and +many of these Confederate troops were the men who did the hard +fighting at the Wilson Creek battle. All day, from 8:30 in the morning +till 5:30 at night, Dodge's Brigade held its ground, dealing death +into the rebel ranks, and, when dark came, with ammunition expended, +the Fourth Iowa walked away from the field in good order, with the +sullen savage tread of men who might be driven by main strength, but +could not be conquered. Although this was one of the first battles of +the war, the Northern men showed their desperate fighting qualities; +and on the second day the South met and faced great slaughter.</p></div> + +<p>Fayel, the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat, gives this account of +the part Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Iowa Division took in the battle +at Elk Horn Tavern:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Having given an account of the battle fought by Brigadier-General Jeff +C. Davis's Division, which occurred the same day, on our left, I will +now attempt to give some details of the Elk Horn Battle—the latter +having commenced early in the morning. First in order comes a +description of the locality near Elk Horn Tavern.</p> + +<p>The house is on the Fayetteville and Springfield road, about four +miles north of Sugar Creek, between which two points our camp was +pitched, on the elevated ridge constituting the northern bank of the +creek. Leading north from the tavern, the road drops into the head of +the long gorge running towards Keetsville seven miles, known as the +"Cross Timbers."</p> + +<p>Into the strong fastness north of the Tavern the enemy had obtained a +lodgment from 10,000 to 15,000 strong in the rear of our wing, on the +morning of the 7th. His strength consisted in part of the following +rebel<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> Divisions, as was subsequently ascertained: Frost's, Slack's, +Parson's, and Rains's; and the batteries of Ghebor, Clark (six +pieces), E. McDonald (three pieces), and Wade (four pieces). There was +present also one Regiment of Indians, the whole commanded by General +Van Dorn in person, and General Price, who directs the Missouri +forces.</p> + +<p>Early in the morning, while General Curtis was in consultation with +his officers regarding a change of front, consequent on the approach +of the enemy on the west of us, news came that the enemy were in close +vicinity to the Elk Horn Tavern. The General then immediately ordered +Colonel Carr to proceed to effect a dislodgment of the enemy. The +formidable numbers present at the time not being known, Colonel Carr +directed Colonel Dodge, with the First Brigade of the Fourth Division, +to take a position near the Elkhorn Tavern, Colonel Carr accompanying +the expedition himself. The point indicated was about a mile and a +half distant from our camp, the ground being level and gradually +ascending, with open fields on either side of the road, interspersed +with an occasional belt of timber.</p> + +<p>Colonel Dodge having discovered the enemy in the timber to the right, +opened the First Iowa Battery on them, causing considerable execution; +two rebels on horseback were seen to fall, and the rest fled. The +enemy having fled to the hollow, Colonel Dodge deployed his line, +covering as much ground as possible, the Thirty-fifth Illinois being +on his left. He sent forward a company of skirmishers from the Fourth +Iowa, who soon became sharply engaged with the enemy and the latter +opened on us a perfect tornado of round shot, shell, and grape. The +Thirty-fifth Illinois became engaged, fighting with determined +bravery, and about, this time Colonel Smith was wounded in the head by +a shell, which took off a part of his scalp. He also received a bullet +in his shoulder, and his horse was shot under him, all about the same +time. Just before he was wounded, several ammunition-chests exploded, +one after the other, wounding Captain Jones and Lieutenant Gamble, who +were standing near Colonel Carr, the latter making a fortunate escape. +The explosion of a caisson was terrific.</p> + +<p>There was a short lull in the storm of leaden hail, during which time +the enemy advanced up the hollow through the brush, along the main +road, when Colonel Vandever, who had arrived, ordered forward the +infantry. A desperate conflict with small arms ensued. Back rolled the +tide of battle, the enemy being driven to the foot of the hill, when +he reopened the batteries. Our men fought like heroes; many fell +covered with wounds. The latter, when brought to the rear by their +comrades, encouraged those who were still breasting the fierce +cannonade, by hurrahing for the Union.</p> + +<p>Colonel Vandever, in leading forward his brigade, had his horse hit +twice, and Colonel Phelps, in the van of his own Regiment, had three +horses shot under him. Major Geiger, of the same Regiment, and Captain +Hayden, of the Dubuque Battery, had two horses shot under them. Major +Coyle, of the Ninth Iowa, was wounded in the leg.</p> + +<p>Colonel Dodge having discovered that the enemy were preparing for a +general attack, changed his front to the right, covering his men with +a log fence, thus compelling the enemy to cross an open field to reach +him. Our line was formed and we opened fire with one section of a +battery, the other pieces having left the field for want of +ammunition. The enemy advanced on our right, left, and center, under +cover of a destructive fire, poured in on our works under twelve +pieces of artillery. The fighting now lasted over two hours, during +which time we held our position; only one Brigade contending against +at least six thousand rebel infantry and a heavy bombardment from +their artillery, the latter playing upon us at short range. Our men +fought like heroes without wincing under the galling fire belching +forth from behind trees and rocks, and much of the time from a +concealed foe. At one time we were reinforced by three rifled pieces +from a German battery, which fired four rounds, and then was compelled +to withdraw from the field, being flanked by a Regiment of the enemy.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span>Colonel Dodge, in order to discover the position of the enemy on his +right, directed his firing to cease, when a thousand rebel plush caps +and black broad brims popped up into view from the bushes, and, +forming, they advanced with great confidence to within one hundred +feet of our line. Our men were then ordered to pour in a fire on the +dastardly enemy, taking good aim. They were thrown into confusion by +our murderous volley and fled.</p> + +<p>Their places were filled by a fresh Regiment, and Colonel Dodge, +finding that the enemy were outflanking him on the right and that his +force was too weak to permit an extension of his line, sent for and +soon received a reinforcement of five companies of the Eighth Indiana, +which were posted on the right. The firing now became terrific. The +enemy annoyed us severely by placing a battery on our left, which +completely enfiladed our line. The Fourth Iowa now getting short of +ammunition, and the Thirty-fifth Illinois having been forced to give +way on the left, it was at this critical time that Lieutenant-Colonel +Challenor was ordered to rally his men, who were hurled on the enemy, +driving his left back a short distance. Having advanced too far, the +Lieutenant-Colonel was surrounded and captured with forty of his men. +Our ammunition, as before stated, having given out, we fell back to +the open field, maintaining our line of battle in splendid order. The +enemy rushed forward with their batteries and entire force. The Fourth +Iowa halted, turned on them, and checked for a time their advance +until the last round of ammunition was exhausted. General Curtis +coming up about this stage of the action, was received with a round of +cheers from our boys. The General learning that the ammunition had +given out, ordered the Fourth Iowa to fix bayonets and charge on the +enemy. The men did so briskly, across the field, but found no enemy.</p> + +<p>On Colonel Vandever's front the enemy now commenced swarming up the +road and along the gorge, and out of the brush in front of us. Our +troops fought them bravely, the officers exposing their persons in +leading in front of their men; but we were overwhelmed at this time by +superior numbers. We retreated across the field, but rallied again +along the fence behind our original position. Upon retiring as above +mentioned, reinforcements were seen coming up under General Asboth. In +a gallant attempt to resist the advancing column of the enemy, General +Asboth received a severe wound in the arm. After the terrible conflict +of the day our gallant troops bivouacked in front of the enemy, +awaiting the reopening of the conflict in the morning.</p> + +<p>Colonel Vandever fought Little's Division. Colonel Dodge's Brigade +contended in the morning directly with Rain's and Clark's Divisions, +both immediately under the direction of Sterling Price. The latter had +his position for some time behind young Clarke's battery.</p> + +<p>The enemy fired wagon-nuts, pieces of chain, marble, gravel, and all +sorts of projectiles. The overcoat worn by Colonel Dodge was perfectly +riddled by the jagged holes made by these unusual missiles.</p> + +<p>Colonel Dodge, the day after the battle, received a letter from a +widow lady in Illinois, stating that she had three sons in the field +fighting for the Union; that her youngest son, who was in feeble +health, was in his Brigade, and she asked it as a special favor to her +in her loneliness to have him discharged. The young man whose mother +had such solicitude in his behalf was named Preston Green, and was +killed in the action of the 7th, near Elkhorn, while bravely +performing his duty.</p> + +<p>During the battle, Colonel Dodge's horse was shot under him. An +enlisted man, detailed as clerk in the Adjutant's office, was acting +as orderly for Colonel Dodge. When his horse fell, he ordered the +orderly to dismount and give him his horse. The orderly said, "You +will be killed if you get on another horse; this is the third you have +lost." But the orderly dismounted and stood where the Colonel had +stood when he asked for the horse, and at that moment was instantly +killed by a shot from the enemy. After the battle, the Adjutant, +Lieutenant Williamson, found in the orderly's<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span> desk a note in which he +said he was sure he would be killed in the battle, and in which, also, +he left directions as to the disposal of his effects and whom to write +to.</p></div> + +<p>In General Price's command there was a Regiment or more of Indians +commanded by Colonel Albert B. Pike. They crawled up through the thick +timber and attacked my extreme left. I saw them and turned one of the guns +of my battery on them, and they left. We saw no more of them, but they +scalped and mutilated some of our dead. General Curtis entered a complaint +to General Price, who answered that they were not of his command, and that +they had scalped some of his dead, and he said he did not approve of their +being upon the field. They evidently scalped many of the dead, no matter +what side they belonged to.</p> + +<p>The battle of Pea Ridge being one of the first of the war and one of +unquestioned victory, had a great deal of attention called to it, and for +months—in fact for years, and, I think even now—was considered to have +been won by General Siegel. The proper credit was not given to General +Curtis, while the history and records of the battle show that he was +entitled to all of the credit, and fought the battle in opposition to +Siegel's views. A statement of the losses shows what commands fought the +battle. The total force engaged on our side, according to General Curtis's +report, was 10,500 men, formed in four Divisions, Siegel's two Divisions +being the largest, the Third and Fourth Divisions having less than 2,000 +men each. The losses were:</p> + +<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="5" summary="divisions"> +<tr><td>First Division,* commanded by Osterhaus</td><td><span class="spacer2"> </span></td><td align="right">144</td></tr> +<tr><td>Second Division,* commanded by Asboth</td><td> </td><td align="right">119</td></tr> +<tr><td>Third Division, commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis</td><td> </td><td align="right">329</td></tr> +<tr><td>Fourth Division, commanded by Colonel Carr</td><td> </td><td align="right">701</td></tr> +<tr><td> </td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="3"><span style="margin-left: 3em;">*Divisions were commanded by General Siegel.</span></td></tr></table> + +<p>Van Dorn's and Price's reports of the battle show how great their defeat +was, and why it was, and while for some time General Curtis called +anxiously on Halleck for more reinforcements, demanding that the column +which was marching South in Kansas be sent to him, Van Dorn and Price, +from the time they left the field, never stopped until they landed at +Memphis, Tenn., their first movement being towards Pocahontas, with a view +of attacking Pope in the rear, who was at New Madrid. Finding New Madrid +captured, they turned their forces to Desarc, and were then transported by +boats to Memphis. This relieved Missouri of any Confederate force in or +near its border, and General Halleck immediately<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> gave General Curtis +orders to move on the flank of Van Dorn and keep up with him, but through +that swampy, hilly country it was impossible for him to meet Van Dorn, and +Curtis with his Army finally landed at Helena, Ark., and most of it joined +the Vicksburg siege.</p> + +<p>Captain Phil Sheridan was the Quartermaster and Commissary of General +Curtis's Army. He kept us in flour, meat, and meal, and sometimes had my +whole regiment detailed in running and protecting mills, driving cattle, +etc. He had great difficulty in obtaining details, as at that early day a +good many commanders, and especially General Siegel and his officers, did +not think it the duty of a soldier to be detailed on anything but a +soldier's duty; so Sheridan naturally came to me, as he was my +Quartermaster while I commanded the post at Rolla, and when with the +marching column he camped and tented with me. Sheridan and Curtis had +considerable difficulty, and Curtis relieved him and ordered him to report +to General Halleck, at St. Louis. We who knew Sheridan's ability, and the +necessities of our Army, did all we could to hold him with us. He left us +just before the Battle of Pea Ridge, and our Army saw a great difference +after he was gone. He used to say to me, "Dodge, if I could get into the +line I believe I could do something;" and his ambition was to get as high +a rank as I then had and as large a command—a Colonel commanding a +Brigade. In his memoirs he pays the Fourth Iowa a great compliment, and +says they will have a warm place in his heart during his life.</p> + +<p>During the Battle of Pea Ridge Sheridan was at Springfield, Mo., preparing +to turn over his property to the officer who was to relieve him, and he +there showed his soldierly qualities. The dispatches from Curtis's army +had to be relayed at Springfield. The first dispatches after the battle +were sent all in praise of General Siegel, and by portions of his command, +claiming he had won the battle. Sheridan, knowing this to be untrue, +withheld the Siegel dispatches until the telegrams from General Curtis to +General Halleck were received, and sent them forward first, +notwithstanding the fact that he felt he had been unjustly treated by +General Curtis.</p> + +<p>This Army had no water or rail communication. It was 300 miles from its +nearest supply-depot, and therefore it had to live off of a country that +was sparsely settled by poor people; but Sheridan showed that dominant +combination of enterprise and energy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> by running every mill and using +every means of supply within fifty miles of us, that he developed so fully +later in the war. He kept us and our stock fairly well supplied; as I +remember, there were no complaints. When General Curtis concluded to +relieve him, I went with others and endeavored to induce him to change his +mind. I had had experience and knew what it was to have an Army well fed a +long ways from its base, and I felt that if we lost Sheridan we would +suffer, which later proved to be the case; but General Curtis did not +listen to us. In fact, he was angry at our appeal, and his Adjutant, +General McKinney, came to see us afterwards and urged us not to press the +matter; if we did, he said, we might go to the rear with Sheridan.</p> + +<p>At the Battle of Pea Ridge and during the campaign we were very destitute +of all hospital appliances for the care of the wounded, and the ability +and ingenuity of our medical staff in supplying our wants was inestimable. +The day after the battle, when we had all our own wounded and so many of +the enemy's with us, Mrs. Governor Phelps, the wife of Governor Phelps, of +Missouri, who commanded the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, arrived on the +field with a general supply of sanitary goods, a part of which had been +sent to my Regiment from Philadelphia by the father and mother of Captain +Ford, who was then a Lieutenant in Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. These +were a great relief, as fully one-third of my command were killed and +wounded, and were suffering for want of this class of goods. Mrs. Phelps +spent her time day and night on the field aiding the surgeons and +succoring the wounded.</p> + +<p>General Curtis endeavored to send all the wounded to the rear who could +stand the trip. I was hauled 250 miles over a rough road in an ambulance, +and if any of you have had the same experience you can judge what I +suffered. Captain Burton, of my Regiment, who was severely wounded in the +arm, sat on the front seat of that ambulance the whole distance, and never +murmured, although he came near losing his arm from the exposure. It was +during this ambulance trip, while lying on my back, that I received a +telegraphic dispatch from General Halleck notifying me of my promotion for +services in this battle. It was thought, and was also stated in the +papers, that I could not live, and I told General Halleck afterwards that +they expected to have the credit of making a Brigadier-General and at the +same time to have a vacancy,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> too, but that on the vacancy I fooled them, +for the promotion insured my getting well.</p> + +<p>This campaign demonstrated early in the war what could be accomplished by +a small Army 300 miles away from any rail or water communication, in a +rugged, mountainous, sparsely settled county, marching in winter, and +virtually subsisting upon the country. Nothing escaped that Army that was +eatable.</p> + +<p>The Battle of Pea Ridge was fought by the two Divisions commanded by Carr +and Davis, not exceeding 6,000 men, and it is a lesson in war that is very +seldom appreciated: that no one can tell what the result of a battle may +be, and that even where forces are very wide apart in numbers it is not +always the larger force that wins. In this battle Van Dorn had put twice +as many men into the fight as Curtis did, and still was defeated. His +dividing his force and attacking our Army at two different points was +fatal to his success, as General Curtis had the inside line and could move +from one part of his command to another within an hour, while for Van Dorn +to move from one portion of his Army to the other would have taken at +least half a day, and therefore he was whipped in detail. If he had thrown +his whole force upon Curtis's right flank at the point where McCullough +fought and was overwhelmed by Davis's Division, there would have been +great danger of our Army being defeated, or at least forced to the rear.</p> + +<p>There was no strategy nor tactics in this battle; it was simply men +standing up and giving and taking, and the one that stood the longest won +the battle. The only strategy or tactics was the movement of Van Dorn +attacking on the right flank and in the rear, and these moves were fatal +to his success. Curtis's Army fought each man for himself. Every commander +fought his own part of the battle to the best of his ability, and I think +the feeling of all was that unless they won they would have to go to +Richmond, as the enemy was in the rear, which fact made us desperate in +meeting and defeating the continued attacks of the enemy. I sent for +reinforcements once when the enemy was clear around my right flank and in +my rear, and they sent me a part of the Eighth Indiana, two companies of +the Third Illinois Cavalry, and a section of a battery. The battery fought +ten minutes under a heavy fire. The four companies of the Eighth Indiana +lined up alongside the Fourth Iowa, and stayed there fighting bravely +until the end. The Third Illinois held my right flank. The officer who +brought this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> force to me was Lieutenant Shields, of my own Regiment, who +was acting as aid on Colonel Carr's staff. As he rode up to me to report +the Eighth Indiana he halted alongside of me, and at the same instant both +of our horses fell dead without a struggle—something very unusual. I was +quick, and jumped clear of my horse, but Shields's horse fell upon him. I +walked away, not thinking of Shields; but he called back to me and said, +"Colonel, you are not going to leave me this way are you?" and I returned +and helped him from under his horse. An examination of the two horses made +the next day, showed that they must have been killed by the same bullet, +which passed through their necks at the same place, killing them +instantly.</p> + +<p>A log house was used by us early in the morning as a temporary hospital. +When my skirmishers fell back this log house was left in the lines of the +enemy, and Hospital Steward Baker, of the Fourth Iowa, was left in charge +of the wounded there. When General Price came up he asked him who those +black-coated devils were, and when Baker told him there were only six +hundred he did not believe him. He said no six hundred men could stand +such attacks, and paid the Brigade a very high compliment for their +fighting, and told Baker to give them his compliments.</p> + +<p>I never returned to this Army, but many of the troops who fought so +gallantly fought afterwards in Corps and Armies that I was connected with. +My own Regiment went into battle with 548 rank and file present. Company B +was on detailed service holding Pea Ridge, and had no casualties in line +of battle. My Regiment was greatly reduced from sickness and men on +furlough, but the bravery and steadiness with which those with me fought +was a surprise and a great satisfaction to me. One-third of them fell, and +not a straggler left the field. I had drilled the Regiment to most all +kinds of conditions—in the open, in the woods—and many complained, and +thought I was too severe, as many Regiments at the posts where they were +stationed only had the usual exercises; but after this, their first +battle, they saw what drilling, maneuvers, and discipline meant, and they +had nothing but praise for the severe drilling I had given them. They +never fell under my command again, but on every field that they fought +they won the praise of their commanders, and General Grant ordered that +they should place on their banners, "First at Chickasaw Bayou."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>I have never thought that General Curtis has received the credit he was +entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 men he traversed +Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, and showing good judgment +in concentrating to meet Van Dorn and refusing to retreat when urged to do +so at the conference at the log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. The +night of the 7th I know some officers thought we ought to try to cut +ourselves out to the East, Price being in our rear; but Curtis said he +would fight where we were. He then had no knowledge of the condition of +the enemy. On the morning of the 8th he brought General Siegel's two +Divisions into the fight and concentrated on Price, whose fighting was +simply to cover his retreat. General Curtis failed to reap the full +benefit of the battle because Siegel went to Cassville, leaving only +Davis's and Carr's Divisions on the field. We who took part in this +campaign appreciate the difficulties and obstacles Curtis had to overcome, +and how bravely and efficiently he commanded, and we honor him for it. So +did General Halleck; but the Government, for some reason, failed to give +him another command in the field, though they retained him in command of +departments to the end of the war.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p> +<div class="figcenter"><img src="images/i034.jpg" alt="SYLVANUS DODGE" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>SYLVANUS DODGE</b></p> +<p class="center">Father of Major-General G. M. Dodge.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span></p> +<h2>Letter of General Grenville M. Dodge to his Father on the Battle of Pea Ridge</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">St. Louis</span>, <span class="smcap">Mo.</span>, April 2, 1862.</p> + +<p>DEAR FATHER:—I know there is no one who would like to have a word +from me more than you. I write but little—am very weak from my +wounds; do not sit up much; but I hope ere long to be all right again. +Nothing now but the battle will interest you. It was a terrible three +days to me; how I got through God only knows. I got off a sick bed to +go to the fight, and I never got a wink of sleep for three days and +three nights. The engagement was so long and with us so hot that it +did not appear possible for us to hold our ground. We lacked sadly in +numbers and artillery, but with good judgment and good grit we made it +win. My officers were very brave. Little Captain Taylor would stand +and clap his hands as the balls grew thick. Captain Burton was as cool +as a cucumber, and liked to have bled to death; then the men, as they +crawled back wounded, would cheer me; cheer for the Union; and always +say, "Don't give up Colonel, hang to em;" and many who were too badly +wounded to leave the field stuck to their places, sitting on the +ground, loading and firing. I have heard of brave acts, but such +determined pluck I never before dreamed of. My flag-bearer, after +having been wounded so he could not hold up the colors, would not +leave them. I had to peremptorily order him off. One time when the +enemy charged through my lines the boys drove them back in confusion. +Price fought bravely; his men deserved a better fate, but although two +to one they could not gain much. Their artillery was served +splendidly—they had great advantage over us in this. Mine run out of +ammunition long before night and left me to the mercy of their grape +and canister. Had I have had my full battery at night I could have +whipped them badly. After the Fourth Iowa's ammunition gave out or +before this all the other Regiments and Brigades had given way, +leaving me without support, and when I found my ammunition gone I<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span> +never felt such a chilling in my life. It is terrible right in the +midst of a hot contest to have your cartridges give out. We had fired +forty-two rounds, and had but a few left. I saved them and ceased +firing, falling back to my supports. The enemy charged me in full +force. I halted and they came within fifty feet. We opened on them +such a terrible fire they fled. General Curtis rode into the field +then and asked me to charge. This would have blanched anybody but an +Iowa soldier. No ammunition and to charge! We fixed bayonets, and as I +gave the order the boys cheered and cheered, swinging their hats in +every direction. CHARGE! and such a yell as they crossed that field +with, you never heard—it was unearthly and scared the rebels so bad +they never stopped to fire at us or to let us reach them. As we +marched back, now dark, nearly one-half the entire Army had got on the +ground and the black-coats (Fourth Iowa) had got their fame up. The +charge without ammunition took them all, and as we passed down the +line the whole Army cheered us. General Curtis complimented us on the +field, and what was left of the Fourth Iowa held their heads high that +night, though a gloomy one for those who knew our situation. The next +morning it fell to my lot to open the battle with my artillery again, +and for one hour we poured it into them hot and heavy. We opened with +thirty-two guns; they answered with as many, and such a roar you never +heard. The enemy could not stand it and fled. Our whole army deployed +in sight that morning and it was a grand sight with the artillery +playing in open view. I had read of such things, but they were beyond +my conception. This closed the battle and we breathed free. I escaped +most miraculously. A shell burst right in front of me, and, tearing +away my saddle holsters and taking off a large piece of my pants, +never even scratched me. My clothes were riddled and I got a hit in +the side that is serious, but did not think of it at the time.<span class="spacer2">Yours, etc.,</span><span class="spacer2">G. M.</span></p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 878px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i038.jpg" alt="SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS IN THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS IN THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA</b></p> +<p class="caption">Painting by James E. Taylor for General William T. Sherman. This shows the +time when Hardee's Corps, four Divisions, attacked the Sixteenth Army +Corps in the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, and were defeated. General +Dodge on horse in foreground ordering Colonel Mersey's brigade to charge +one of the columns of the enemy in flank. Extreme right of picture, +General Fuller's Division fighting General Walker's Division of the Confederate Army.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA</h2> +<h3><span class="smcap">Fought July</span> 22, 1864</h3> +<h3><span class="smcap">A Paper Read Before New York Commandery</span><br />M. O. L. L.</h3> +<h3><span class="smcap">By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p><i>Companions</i>:</p> + +<p>On the 17th day of July, 1864, General John B. Hood relieved General +Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate Army in front of Atlanta, +and on the 20th Hood opened an attack upon Sherman's right, commanded by +General Thomas. The attack was a failure, and resulted in a great defeat +to Hood's Army and the disarrangement of all his plans.</p> + +<p>On the evening of the 21st of July, General Sherman's Army had closed up +to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's Brigade of +Leggett's Division of Blair's Seventeenth Army Corps carried a prominent +hill, known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, that gave us a clear view of +Atlanta, and placed that city within range of our guns. It was a strategic +point, and unless the swing of our left was stopped it would dangerously +interfere with Hood's communications towards the south. Hood fully +appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of +General Sherman's Army.</p> + +<p>On the 22d of July, the Army of the Tennessee was occupying the rebel +intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard House, north of the +Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, which had been carried by +Force's assault on the evening of the 21st. From this hill Giles A. +Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Army Corps stretched out southward on +a road that occupied this ridge, with a weak flank in air. To strengthen +this flank, by order of General McPherson I sent on the evening of the +21st one Brigade of Fuller's Division, the other being left at Decatur to +protect our<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> parked trains. Fuller camped his Brigade about half a mile in +the rear of the extreme left and at right angles to Blair's lines and +commanding the open ground and valley of the forks of Sugar Creek, a +position that proved very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go into +line; simply bivouacked ready to respond to any call.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 22d of July, General McPherson called at my +headquarters and gave me verbal orders in relation to the movement of the +Second (Sweeney's) Division of my command, the Sixteenth Corps, which had +been crowded out of the line by the contraction of our lines as we neared +Atlanta, and told me that I was to take position on the left of the line +that Blair had been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning, and +cautioned me about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently +thought that there would be trouble on that flank, for he rode out to +examine it himself.</p> + +<p>I moved Sweeney in the rear of our Army, on the road leading from the +Augusta Railway down the east branch of Sugar Creek to near where it +forks; then, turning west, the road crosses the west branch of Sugar Creek +just back of where Fuller was camped, and passed up through a strip of +woods and through Blair's lines near where his left was refused. Up this +road Sweeney marched until he reached Fuller, when he halted, waiting +until the line I had selected on Blair's proposed new left could be +intrenched, so that at mid-day, July 22d, the position of the Army of the +Tennessee was as follows: One Division of the Fifteenth across and north +of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta; the balance of the Fifteenth and +all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the +railway along a gentle ridge with a gentle slope and clear valley facing +Atlanta in front, and another clear valley in the rear. The Sixteenth +Corps was resting on the road described, entirely in the rear of the +Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and facing from Atlanta. To the left and +left-rear the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was +enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our +lines.</p> + +<p>On the night of July 21st Hood had transferred Hardee's Corps and two +Divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry to our rear, going around our left flank, +Wheeler attacking Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth Army Corps at +Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight, Stewart's and +Cheatham's Corps and the Georgia Militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta, +and placed in a position<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the plan +thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it +in rear and front and the capturing of all its trains corraled at Decatur. +Hardee's was the largest Corps in Hood's Army, and according to Hood there +were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee about 40,000 troops.</p> + +<p>Hood's order of attack was for Hardee to form entirely in the rear of the +Army of the Tennessee, but Hardee claims that he met Hood on the night of +the 21st; that he was so late in moving his Corps that they changed the +plan of attack so that his left was to strike the Seventeenth Corps. He +was to swing his right until he enveloped and attacked the rear of the +Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps.</p> + +<p>Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta, where he could see Blair's +left and the front line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. He says he +was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's left instead of his rear, +and charges his defeat to that fact; but Hardee, when he swung his right +and came out in the open, found the Sixteenth Corps in line in the rear of +our Army, and he was as much surprised to find us there as our Army was at +the sudden attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of +Hardee's Corps made the latter drift to the left and against Blair,—not +only to Blair's left, but into his rear,—so that what Hood declares was +the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault, as his attacks on the +Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined and fierce enough to relieve him +from all blame in that matter.</p> + +<p>Historians and others who have written of the Battle of Atlanta have been +misled by being governed in their data by the first dispatches of General +Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as he afterwards corrected his +dispatches. He stated in the first dispatch that the attack was at 11 +a. m., and on Blair's Corps, and also that General McPherson was killed +about 11 a. m. The fact is, Blair was not attacked until half an hour +after the attack upon the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2 +p. m. General Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from +the scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first +comprehend the terrific fighting that was in progress, and the serious +results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded.</p> + +<p>The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock (noon) and +lasted until midnight, and covered the ground from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> the Howard House along +the entire front of the Fifteenth (Logan's) Corps, the Seventeenth +(Blair's) on the front of the Sixteenth (which was formed in the rear of +the Army), and on to Decatur, where Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth +Army Corps met and defeated Wheeler's Cavalry—a distance of about seven +miles.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Tennessee had present on that day at Atlanta and Decatur +about 26,000 men; there were 10,000 in the Fifteenth Army Corps, 9,000 in +the Sixteenth Corps, and 7,000 in the Seventeenth. About 21,000 of these +were in line of battle. Three Brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent, +the Sixteenth Corps having 5,000 men in a single line which received the +attack of the four Divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburn's +Division lapping the extreme left of Blair and joining Cheatham's Corps +which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front; and, according to Hood, they +were joined by the Georgia Militia under General Smith. Extending down the +line in front of the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland, Stewart's +Corps occupied the works and held the lines in front of the Army of the +Cumberland. The Sixteenth Army Corps fought in the open ground; the +Fifteenth and Seventeenth behind intrenchments.</p> + +<p>Where I stood just at the rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps, I could see +the entire line of that corps, and could look up and see the enemy's +entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I quickly saw that both +of my flanks were overlapped by the enemy. Knowing General McPherson was +some two miles away, I sent a staff officer to General Giles A. Smith, +requesting him to refuse his left and protect the gap between the +Seventeenth Corps and my right, which he sent word he would do. Later, as +the battle progressed, and I saw no movement on the part of General Smith, +I sent another officer to inform him that the enemy were passing my right +flank, which was nearly opposite his center, and requested him to refuse +his left immediately, or he would be cut off. This officer (Lieutenant D. +Sheffly, who belonged to the Signal Corps, and acted as my aide only for +the time being) found, on reaching Smith, that he was just becoming +engaged; that he had received orders to hold his line, with a promise that +other troops would be thrown into the gap.</p> + +<p>My second messenger, Lieutenant Sheffly, returning over the road upon +which McPherson was a few minutes later shot dead,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> met the General on the +road with a very few attendants, and turned to warn him of his dangerous +position, assuring him that the enemy held the woods and were advancing. +The General paying no heed to the warning and moving on, my aide turned +and followed him. They had proceeded but a short distance into the woods +when a sharp command, "Halt," was heard from the skirmish-line of the +rebels. Without heeding the command, General McPherson and his party +wheeled their horses, and at that moment a heavy volley was poured in, +killing McPherson and so frightening the horses that they became +unmanageable and plunged into the underbrush in different directions. My +aide became separated from the General and the rest of the party, and was +knocked from his horse by coming in contact with a tree, and lay for some +time in an unconscious condition on the ground. As soon as he was +sufficiently recovered he returned on foot to me, having lost his horse +and equipments. Of General McPherson he saw nothing after his fall. His +watch, crushed by contact with the tree, was stopped at two minutes past 2 +o'clock, which fixed the time of General McPherson's death.</p> + +<p>General McPherson could not have left his point of observation more than a +few minutes when I detected the enemy's advance in the woods some distance +to my right, and between that flank and General Blair's rear. Fuller +quickly changed front with a portion of his brigade to confront them, and +pushing promptly to the attack captured their skirmish-line and drove back +their main force. Upon the persons of some of these prisoners we found +McPherson's papers, field-glass, etc., which conveyed to me the first +knowledge I had of his death; or, rather, as I then supposed, of his +capture by the enemy; and seeing that the papers were important I sent +them by my Chief of Staff with all haste to General Sherman.</p> + +<p>General McPherson, it seems, had just witnessed the decisive grapple of +the Sixteenth Corps with the charging columns of the enemy, and, as +probably conveying his own reflections at that moment, I quote the +language of General Strong, the only staff officer present with him at +that critical time:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The General and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode on and +took positions on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the +desperate assaults of Hood's army.</p> + +<p>The Divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney were formed in a single +line of battle in the open fields, without cover of any kind (Fuller's +Division on the right,) and were warmly engaged. The enemy, massed in +columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber +several hundred yards from General Dodge's position, and after gaining +fairly the open fields, halted and opened a rapid fire upon the +Sixteenth Corps. They, however,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> seemed surprised to find our infantry +in line of battle, prepared for attack, and after facing for a few +minutes the destructive fire from the Divisions of Generals Fuller and +Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here, +however, their lines were quickly reformed, and they again advanced, +evidently determined to carry the position.</p> + +<p>The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us that +every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front +of, or on the right or left of, the first line of battle. The +regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not +a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although the movement was +covered by a heavy and well-directed fire from artillery, which was +posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns +to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell, firing over the +attacking column.</p> + +<p>It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, +deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's Divisions, and the guns of the +Fourteenth Ohio and Welker's Batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly +mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great +steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their alignments; but +the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for +flesh and blood to stand, and, before reaching the center of the open +field, the columns were broken up and thrown into great confusion. +Taking advantage of this, General Dodge, with portions of General +Fuller's and General Sweeney's Divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged +the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners.</p> + +<p>General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined +bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. General Dodge held the +key to the position.</p> + +<p>Had the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in +the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept +like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army +of the Tennessee would have been very critical, although, without +doubt, the result of the battle would have been in our favor, because +the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio were close at hand, and the +enemy would have been checked and routed further on.</p></div> + +<p>General Blair, in his official report of the battle, says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, +and its prompt and gallant repulse. It was a fortunate circumstance +for that whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the +position I have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack; +and although it does not become me to comment upon the brave conduct +of the officers and men of that Corps, still I can not refrain from +expressing my admiration for the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps +met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy.</p></div> + +<p>The Sixteenth Corps has a record in that battle which we seldom see in the +annals of war. It met the shock of battle and fired the last shot late +that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded its grasp on Bald Hill. It +fought on four parts of the field, and everywhere with equal success. It +lost no gun that it took into the engagement, and its losses were almost +entirely in killed and wounded—the missing having been captured at +Decatur through getting mired in a swamp.</p> + +<p>At no time during the Atlanta campaign was there present in the Sixteenth +Corps more than two small Divisions of three Brigades<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> each, and at this +time these two Divisions were widely scattered; on the Atlanta field only +ten Regiments and two Batteries were present, three entire Brigades being +absent from the Corps. It was called upon to meet the assault of at least +three Divisions or nine Brigades, or at the least forty-nine Regiments, +all full to the utmost that a desperate emergency could swell them, +impelled by the motive of the preconcerted surprise, and orders from their +commander at all hazards to sweep over any and all obstructions; while, on +the other hand, the force attacked and surprised was fighting without +orders, guided only by the exigency of the moment. Their captures +represented forty-nine different Regiments of the enemy. How many more +Regiments were included in those nine Brigades I have never been able to +learn. The fact that this small force, technically, if not actually, in +march, in a perfectly open field, with this enormously superior force +leaping upon them from the cover of dense woods, was able to hold its +ground and drive its assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods +again, proves that when a great battle is in progress, or a great +emergency occurs, no officer can tell what the result may be when he +throws in his forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to +be impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate +officer to use his own judgment in engaging an enemy when a great battle +is within his hearing.</p> + +<p>Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least +three times their number in their front, should have retreated, instead of +standing and fighting as it did: What would have been the result? I say +that in all my experience in life, until the two forces struck and the +Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never passed more anxious moments.</p> + +<p>Sprague's Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same time within +hearing, but on a different field,—at Decatur,—fighting and stubbornly +holding that place, knowing that if he failed the trains massed there and +<i>en route</i> from Roswell would be captured. His fight was a gallant and +sometimes seemingly almost hopeless one—giving ground inch by inch, +until, finally, he obtained a position that he could not be driven from, +and one that protected the entire trains of the Army.</p> + +<p>As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his left Division +(Cleburn's) lapped over and beyond Blair's left, and swung around his left +front; they poured down through the gap<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> between the left of the +Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front, +flank, and rear. Cheatham's Corps moved out of Atlanta and attacked in +Blair's front. General Giles A. Smith commanded Blair's left Division, his +right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett's Division held +the line until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this +front the battle raged with great fury.</p> + +<p>As Cleburn advanced along the open space between the Sixteenth and +Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair's left and captured a portion of +two Regiments of his command, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new +lines, utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting +first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from +Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3:30 p. m., when, +evidently after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to +wipe out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the enemy +approaching under cover of the woods until they were within fifty yards of +Smith's temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight +became a hand-to-hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the +troops using bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack +failed; it was no doubt timed to occur at the same time that Cheatham's +Corps attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brunt of +Cheatham's attack was against Leggett's Hill, the key to the position of +that portion of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith's +Division had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at +right angles with Leggett's Division, Leggett's Hill being the apex of the +formation; and around this position for three-quarters of an hour more +desperate fighting was done that I can describe. Up to midnight the enemy +occupied one side of the works while we occupied the other, neither side +giving way until Hood saw that the whole attack was a failure, when those +who were on the outside of the works finally surrendered to us. Their +attack at this angle was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to +our breastworks on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side +with ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing +could be seen but the flash of guns from the opposite sides of the works. +The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn with the dead of +both sides. The loss of Blair's Corps was 1,801 killed, wounded, and +missing. Blair's left struck in the rear flank,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> and the front gave way +slowly, gradually, fighting for every inch of ground, until their left was +opposite the right flank of the Sixteenth Corps; then they halted, and +held the enemy, refusing to give another inch.</p> + +<p>It would be difficult in all the annals of war to find a parallel to the +fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of its works and +then from the other, one incident of which was that of Colonel Belknap, of +the Union side, who, reaching over the works, seized the Colonel of the +Forty-fifth Alabama, and, drawing him over the breastworks, made him a +prisoner of war.</p> + +<p>About 4 p. m. Cheatham's Corps was ordered by Hood to again attack; they +directed their assault this time to the front of the Fifteenth Corps, +using the Decatur wagon-road and railway as a guide, and came forward in +solid masses, meeting no success until they slipped through to the rear of +the Fifteenth Corps by a deep cut used by the railway passing through our +intrenchments.</p> + +<p>As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn's Division of the Fifteenth +Corps became partially panic-stricken, and fell back, giving up the +intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, the enemy capturing +the celebrated Degress Battery of 20-pounders and two guns in advance of +our lines. The officers of Lightburn's Division rallied it in the line of +intrenchments, just in the rear of the position they had in the morning.</p> + +<p>General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Tennessee. He rode +over to my position, and I sent Mersey's Brigade of the Second Division, +under the guidance of Major Edward Jonas, my Aide-de-camp, to the aid of +the Fifteenth Corps. Of the performance of that Brigade on that occasion, +I quote the words of that staff officer, Major Jonas:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I conducted Mersey's Brigade to the point where needed; arrived at the +railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth +Corps at hand joining with him. Mersey's Brigade recaptured the works +and the guns. Old Colonel Mersey was slightly wounded, and his +celebrated horse, "Billy," killed. By your direction I said to General +Morgan L. Smith (temporarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps): +"General Dodge requests that you return this Brigade at the earliest +practicable moment, as there is every indication of renewed assault on +our own line," and, after saying that your request would be respected, +General Smith added: "Tell General Dodge that his Brigade (Mersey's) +has done magnificently, and that it shall have full credit in my +report."</p></div> + +<p>Afterwards one of Mersey's officers—Captain Boyd, I think—in trying his +skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured guns. At the same +moment of Mersey's attack in front, General<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> Wood's Division of the +Fifteenth Army Corps, under the eye of General Sherman, attacked the +Confederates occupying our intrenchments in flank, and Williamson's +Brigade joined Mersey's in recapturing our line and the batteries—the +Fourth Iowa Infantry taking a conspicuous part.</p> + +<p>Colonel Mersey and many of his men whom he so gallantly led had served +their time before this battle occurred, and were awaiting transportation +home. Eloquent words have been written and spoken all over the land in +behalf of the honor and the bravery of the soldier; but where is the word +spoken or written that can say more for the soldier than the action of +these men on that field? They were out of service; they had written that +they were coming home, and their eyes and hearts were toward the North. +Many an anxious eye was looking for the boy who voluntarily laid down his +life that day, and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had untold +trouble to obtain recognition in the War Department because the soldier's +time had expired. He was mustered out; waiting to go home; and was not +known on the records; but on that day he fought on three different parts +of the field, without a thought except for his cause and his country.</p> + +<p>The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression on the line. +Our men were behind the intrenchments and the slaughter of the enemy was +something fearful. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate +Division that broke through our line, told me that after breaking through +it was impossible to force his men forward; the fire on their flanks and +front was so terrific that when driven out of the works one-half of his +command was killed, wounded, or missing. The Confederate records sustain +this, and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to +within 100 to 300 feet of us, where our fire would drive them back in +spite of the efforts of their officers, a great many of whom fell in these +attacks.</p> + +<p>I could see the terrific fighting at Leggett's Hill, but of that along the +line of the Fifteenth Corps I can only speak from the records and as told +me by General John C. Brown, of the Confederate Army. The stubbornness and +coolness with which they contested every inch of the ground won his +admiration, and the manner and method with which the line was retaken must +have been seen to be appreciated.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>When darkness fell upon us the enemy had retired, except around the angle +in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett's or Bald Hill. Here there was +a continuous fire, desultory and at close quarters, the enemy in places +occupying ground close up to our intrenchments. To relieve these men of +the Seventeenth Army Corps holding this angle, who were worn out, at the +request of General Blair I sent two Regiments of Mersey's Brigade. They +crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from that front.</p> + +<p>The whole of Hood's Army, except Stewart's Corps, was thrown into our +rear, upon the flank and the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and after +fighting from mid-day until dark were repulsed and driven back. That Army +held or commanded the entire battle-field, demonstrating the fact that the +Army of the Tennessee alone was able and competent to meet and defeat +Hood's entire Army. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and +Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three Brigades +of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy was made along this +line some seven times, and they were seven times repulsed.</p> + +<p>We captured eighteen stands of colors, 5,000 stands of arms, and 2,017 +prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men and ten pieces of +artillery, and over 1,800 men, mostly from Blair's Corps, were taken +prisoners. The enemy's dead reported as buried in front of the different +Corps was over 2,000, and the enemy's total loss in killed, wounded and +prisoners was 8,000.</p> + +<p>The criticism has often been made of this battle that with two Armies idle +that day, one the Army of the Ohio (two-thirds as large as the Army of the +Tennessee) and the other the Army of the Cumberland (the largest of all +Sherman's Armies), why we did not enter Atlanta. General Sherman urged +Thomas to make the attack; Thomas's answer was that the enemy were in full +force behind his intrenchments. The fact was that Stewart's Corps was +guarding that front, but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow him to +throw his Army upon Cheatham's flank, in an endeavor to roll up the +Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and Cheatham's Corps, +which was so persistently attacking the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps +from the Atlanta front. Sherman, whose anxiety had been very great, seeing +how successfully we were meeting the attack, his face relaxing into a +pleasant smile, said to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> Schofield, "Let the Army of the Tennessee fight +it out this time." This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have +no doubt cleared our front facing the Atlanta intrenchments, but Stewart +was ready with his three Divisions and the Militia to hold them.</p> + +<p>General Sherman, in speaking of this battle, always regretted that he did +not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested, and also force the fighting +on Thomas's front; but no doubt the loss of McPherson really took his +attention from everything except the Army of the Tennessee.</p> + +<p>At about 10 o'clock on the night of the 22d, the three Corps commanders of +the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the Army) met in the +rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road, under an oak +tree, and there discussed the results of the day. Blair's men were at the +time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the +other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but +tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's +fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won. +It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, +which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair, +and Dodge, being the junior Corps commander, was dispatched by General +Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General +Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said +that he had his headquarters in a house. When I met him he seemed rather +surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss of +McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said, "Dodge, +you whipped them today, didn't you?" I said, "Yes, sir." Then he said: +"Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes, sir"; bade him +good-night, and went back to my command, determined never to go upon +another such errand. As he explained it afterward, he wanted it said that +the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day, +needing no help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had +whipped the whole of Hood's Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position +and our line, knowing that Hood would not dare attack us after the +"thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that in this, the +greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the Tennessee met the +entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on its flank, and upon its +advance center, with its idolized commander<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> killed in the first shock of +battle, and at nightfall found the enemy's dead and wounded on its front, +we see that no disaster—no temporary rebuff—could discourage this Army. +Every man was at his post; every man doing a hero's duty. They proved they +might be wiped out but never made to run. They were invincible.</p> + +<p>Companions, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, with such +loss, the question has often been asked me—and I know it has come to the +mind of all of us—why it was that this battle was never put forth ahead +of many others inferior to it, but better known to the world and causing +much greater comment?</p> + +<p>The answer comes to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as it was that +night. We had lost our best friend,—that superb soldier, our commander, +General McPherson; his death counted so much more to us than victory that +we spoke of our battle, our great success, with our loss uppermost in our +minds.</p> + + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 1100px; height: 353px;"><img src="images/i052.jpg" alt="MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ATLANTA" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ATLANTA</b></p> +<p class="caption">This monument was erected by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on +the spot where Major-General James B. McPherson was killed, July 22, 1864.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span></p> +<h2>LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Correcting Some Statements<br /> +In<br /> +General Green B. Raum's<br /> +Description of the Battle of Atlanta<br /> +Published<br /> +In the National Tribune, Washington, D. C.<br /> +September</span> 25, 1902</h3> + +<p> </p> +<p><i>My Dear General</i>:</p> + +<p>Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to +aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of +Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up.</p> + +<p>I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the +Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from +which I think you can get a good deal of information.</p> + +<p>I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced +about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps +fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can +verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle, +which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page +242.</p> + +<p>It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters. +Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop +and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I +had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller +said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had +been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to +select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody +had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the +moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but +before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so +you can see how sudden the attack was.</p> + +<p>In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, +in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time +of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer +was sent with an order to me from McPherson:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard +to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a +rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell +came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and +incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer +sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think, +was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock.</p></div> + +<p>Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page 243:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>After the <i>two</i> attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed, +General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition +of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles +A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy +the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying +as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was +(a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode +rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found +General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the +Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade).</p></div> + +<p>This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two +attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack +upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps +was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By +reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and +everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and +that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as +to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made +of record on the spot.</p> + +<p>On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee +records, General Leggett says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly +engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high +ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent +Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson +the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our +line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George +W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and +the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to +antagonize any force seeking<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> entrance there.... The enemy in front of +the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first +attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and +bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no +appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when +the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the +Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was +simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division, +which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.</p></div> + +<p>You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an +aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was +detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had +gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth +Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my +right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who +returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that +he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got +between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent +word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold +his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap +between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier +and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right +immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of +between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person +on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third +attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to +Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got +right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that +was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before +Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of +but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through +fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect +with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and +before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.</p> + +<p>After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between +Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force +to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement +captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his +field-glass, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's +body; and later in the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> day I sent these to General Sherman. See report +Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's +maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought, +and where we had to intrench.</p> + +<p>Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all +of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene, +as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant +act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got +there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own +regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off +his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with +them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and +they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw +Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from +his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of +Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the +painting in my room.</p> + +<p>Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he +watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his +report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault +made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse +by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole +army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have +attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does +not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the +officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression +of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed +the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our +flank was made by the whole of Hardee's Corps.</p></div> + +<p>I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three parts of the +field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right +in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When +Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help +to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade +there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and +relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even +then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still +lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report +of this battle. You will see by my paper that he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> was virtually out of the +service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment +the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I +do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a +short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow +it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I +think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these +facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second +Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page +450.</p> + +<p>In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of +this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give +you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the +others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and +well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the +left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the +Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.</p> + +<p>Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part +of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front—that is, his front that was +towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left +Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney's +(Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and Walker's. Walker was the next to +Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's +Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and +he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair +was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to +attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in +accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because +Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when +Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division, +and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had +been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third +attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they +did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, +just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but +it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and +when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> them in force. Between 3 and +4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.</p> + +<p>There have also been many statements that in the first attack two +Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the +Seventeenth, Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my +Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his +left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was +sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day, +about 4 p. m., upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had +been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and +reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all +accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding +the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This +line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until +about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments +until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to +support that line.</p> + +<p>Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the +battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General +Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original +intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham +from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from +being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the +Atlanta front.</p> + +<p>There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that +is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in +his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In +fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got +in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right +angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that +Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. +Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in +behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair's men had +to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated, +Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank. +Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two +regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the +Signal Corps, says, and my records<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span> show, captured that skirmish-line that +killed McPherson, and brought it in.</p> + +<p>To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's +command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who +felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air; but +Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the +Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped +about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme +left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them +in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his +front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, +coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same +skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and +captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the +limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four +pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, +unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the +way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It +was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or +fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.</p> + +<p>In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps +and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him +as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through +on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 +o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any +force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's +Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade +of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See +his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and +it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got +there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back, but holding their line +behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and +as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's +Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, +and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got +hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois)<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> and turned +them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two +Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they +got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded +the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the +Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, +and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank +by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse +killed under him.</p> + +<p>Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much +after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came +to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of +Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with +him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every +man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting. +Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the +two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very +strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not +have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution +done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible +effect.</p> + +<p>To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a +battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in +something—at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground +afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond—that exposed the flank of +Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this, I rode down to +Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he +did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I +soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had +that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners +out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second +Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records. +That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and +with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, +I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble; +but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate +enough<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's +front they were right up to it when Walker fell.</p> + +<p>There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to +the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the +morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get +there before he did—a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached +the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart +had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army +of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor +in some way.</p> + +<p>I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed—it was just +about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds +of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal +officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, +is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, +records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, +because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as +Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to +ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three +miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the +report Blair made—also the address of Strong—I think you will come to +the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General +McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the +Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some +time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time +and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line +that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are +misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can +judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when +they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.</p> + +<p>When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very +glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible +for me to do so.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 12em;">Truly and cordially yours,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 3em;"><span class="smcap">General Green B. Raum.</span></span><span class="spacer2"> </span><span class="smcap">Grenville M. Dodge.</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 10em;"><i>Chicago, Ill.</i></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 895px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i062.jpg" alt="OLD FORT KEARNEY, NEBRASKA" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>OLD FORT KEARNEY, NEBRASKA</b></p> +<p class="center">In the Indian Campaign of 1865.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS<br />1864 AND 1865</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Written in 1874<br /> +By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge<br /> +and Read to the<br /> +Colorado Commandery of the Loyal Legion<br /> +of the United States, at Denver<br /> +<br /> +April 21, 1907.</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p>In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the Department of the +Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant +asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I +answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac +the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant +ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas +was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command +Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all +the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland +mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific.</p> + +<p>On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former +commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the +winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by +the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people +living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas +were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed +along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having +in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into +hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas +on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable +combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations +to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> had destroyed over +one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country +between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers.</p> + +<p>The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was +impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the +winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two +Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication +with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed +a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be +stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and +fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared.</p> + +<p>I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to +change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the +citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of +the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and +superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I +selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the +trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district +commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it? +What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do +their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What +action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all +particulars.</p> + +<p>2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route. +Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or +small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the +Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of +cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all +the Indians in the way.</p></div> + +<p>I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had +permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians, +both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I +immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all +traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also +immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the +Pawnee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom +had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most +trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of +the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> settlements, +or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of +communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we +stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military +post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and +place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army +trains.</p> + +<p>Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage- +and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line. +At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort +Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they +were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge +Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines +here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie, +thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to Utah. The +stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre +to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah. +I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort +Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known +as the South Platte Route.</p> + +<p>The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent +had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines +were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a +few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the +road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular +commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great +mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and +Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter +these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during +the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each. +They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking +care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a +great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had +been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops +occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail, +and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great +consternation in that country<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands +upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent.</p> + +<p>At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to +reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the +posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian +character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of +communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against +the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with +the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them.</p> + +<p>Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas +River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and +Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and +traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern +lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along +these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living +from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them +up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly +women and children, the men being generally massacred when captured.</p> + +<p>I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth +Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them <i>en route</i> +for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, +forage, and ammunition. The three-months' Regiments enlisted in Colorado +for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and +there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was +to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to +take their places.</p> + +<p>I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in +the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at +Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but +I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick +results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to +march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the +companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them +report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran +officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the +hardship. The next morning I received a report from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span> Fort Kiley that the +troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort +Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe, +and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect +themselves from the weather.</p> + +<p>On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of +the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called +upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages. +I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to +replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both +of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press" +at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the +plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it +necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests, +as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the +"press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I +found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort +Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry.</p> + +<p>When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight +us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were +depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of +their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the +stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together +and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that +an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how +large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they +must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did +not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to +retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy.</p> + +<p>The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated +upon the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The reports showed that they +held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and +held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000 +head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many +trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children, +and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I +give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte +Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all +commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at +Fort Kearney.</p> + +<p>General Robert Mitchell, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge +Pole, replied as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to +Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut +down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first +fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are +compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power +is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my +disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons +at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only +extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route +fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have +no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last +outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence +of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly +on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four +months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary, +mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road +through my district.</p> + +<p>This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and +drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and +telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both +companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can +provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where +overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage +company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian +villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe +them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large +village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my +knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes, +Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet, +and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the +same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From +3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians. +One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are +willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong +each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines, +well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile +Indians, if done before grass comes. After that time, in my judgment, +it will take twice that number of men.</p> + +<p>In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to +hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed +by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the +Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites. +Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux.</p></div> + +<p>Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the +early part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians +moving westward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain +information of their movements. On January 7th they had crossed South +Fork of Platte River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped +with their families, forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight +warriors each, many lodges being<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> thirty robes in size. They commenced +the work of destruction along the road west as far as Junction +Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in this fight were not less +than 2,000, well armed with breech-loading carbines and rifles. A +desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage station +near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the +gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry. +Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is +burned, and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to escape +tells of the brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam +H. Elbert, acting Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state +of things. The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley, +fifty miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around Denver. The +telegraph-lines to Salt Lake and the Denver branch lines are destroyed +for a distance of nearly ten miles on the northern route, and in +different points throughout 100 miles along the Denver route.</p> + +<p>I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endurance holds out we +will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the +west.</p> + +<p>The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes, Ogallalas, and +Brule Sioux. They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort +Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in +marching, feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the +small body of troops in this district. I saw their signals today, +probably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You will +hear of continued murders and robberies as long as the road is so +poorly protected by troops. No spies can be used now, owing to +numerous small war parties being met everywhere in this country. I +predict that if more troops are not sent into this district +immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white man +on it. Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take +the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite +mischief will result to the settlers. What we need are troops, +supplies for them, and a vigorous campaign against these hostile +Indians. They must be put on the defensive instead of us. No +difficulty can arise in finding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany +them.</p></div> + +<p> </p> +<div class="blockquot"><p><span style="margin-left: 6em;"><span class="smcap">Headquarters, District Colorado.</span></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 8em;"><span class="smcap">Denver, Colorado Territory</span>, Feb. 2, 1865.</span></p> + +<p>The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch +between Julesburg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at +latter place; driven off all stock, both public and private. These +Indians are led by white men, and have complete control of all the +country outside my district, so that I am hemmed in.</p> + +<p>The weather has been very severe here for nearly three weeks; the +thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall of snow on the +ground. I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers for +three months' State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to +the factional spirit existing in the community.</p> + +<p>The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion, +appropriating so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a +bounty and purchase horses to mount them on, as I have none; but the +members cannot agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue +from such a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed +the Speaker of the House yesterday, informing him that unless +something was done within forty-eight hours I would be compelled, much +against my will, to proclaim martial law and stop all business, +forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the line of +communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men +organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would +have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a +great deal of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert of +action, every man suspecting his fellow of some chicanery.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men can defend it +against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over +the settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into +service) to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but +get a Regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim until +the arrival of a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are +now determined to make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of +5,000 men can make it extermination for them.</p> + +<p>Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors were on +the headwaters of the Smoky Hill and intended attacking all the +settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the +transportation-line being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well +as labor and forage.</p> + +<p>Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise +companies, which could be easily done, for one year?</p> + +<p>The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the +Indians. Should such be the case, then all is cut off.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 4em;">Respectfully, your obedient servant,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 10em;"><span class="smcap">Thomas Moonlight</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 6em;"><i>Colonel Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, Commanding</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>Colonel Chivington, from Fort Rankin, reported:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, with 200 men of the Eleventh Ohio, and +Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4th to the +9th inst., at Mud Springs. The Indians at one time charged our forces +in the face of artillery and were nearly successful. Two thousand +warriors were engaged in the fight. It is supposed forty Indians were +killed. Beaure's and Craighten's herds were driven off. The Indians +crossed at Bush Creek, going north. The telegraph poles were gone and +wires so inextricably tangled as to be useless. Seven hundred lodges +crossed Pole Creek, six miles below Pole Creek crossing.</p></div> + +<p>These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph-lines retaken without +severe fighting and loss of many soldiers. Within two weeks the troops +drove these Indians north, where a detachment of troops from Fort Laramie +attacked them and drove them across the Platte. Finally the Indians saw +that a different warfare was being made against them, and they fled to +their villages on the Powder River and in the Black Hills country.</p> + +<p>There was such energy and such spirit displayed by the troops, that after +two weeks' work they had the telegraph-lines replaced between Omaha and +Denver, a distance of 600 miles, and this without any additional force to +aid them. The progress made in putting up the wires is shown by this +report:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>My troop is at Moore's ranch; passed there at 2 o'clock. We ran twelve +miles of wire and set eight miles of poles, had two severe fights, and +marched fifty-five miles in fifty-two hours. Operators furnished +valuable service.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 12em;"><span class="smcap">E. B. Murphy</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 10em;"><i>Captain Seventh Iowa Cavalry</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>The thermometers all this time were from 5 to 10 degrees below zero. On +February 13th telegraphic communication was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> resumed through to +California, and Mr. Craighten notified the Government of the fact.</p> + +<p>An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as to where I was located +(Craighten being a personal friend of mine who was most skeptical at the +start of my accomplishing anything with the material I had, was overjoyed +at our success), was answered, "Nobody knows where he is, but everybody +knows where he has been."</p> + +<p>From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted man on that line was in +the saddle, either assisting the operators or chasing real or imaginary +Indians. The moment a scout came in, instructions were given to the +officers to send them out and not allow any mounted troops in the stockade +until the lines were opened and the Indians driven at least 100 miles away +from the line of telegraph, and the only dashes the Indians made after we +got fairly at them was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at +unguarded ranches, and at those stage-stations where only a few soldiers +were located; but in every attack the soldiers stood their ground and +fought, and when driven they only backed far enough to get a secure place. +The troops knew better than to go back to the fortified posts, as they had +instructions to keep to the hills, but in nearly every case they were +successful, and the daring that some of the troops showed in these fights +was remarkable.</p> + +<p>Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalping the men alive and +abusing the women. This caused the troops to stand and fight, preferring +to die rather than to fall into their hands. Wherever a fight was +successfully made, no matter whether commissioned or non-commissioned +officers commanded, I telegraphed him in person thanking him, and to the +commanding officer of his Regiment, requesting that he be given the first +promotion, and wrote to the Governor of his State.</p> + +<p>As soon as this stage-line was opened we concentrated about 500 mounted +men, intending to catch the Indians before they left the North Platte; but +the Indians fled as soon as they heard of this, and did not stop until +they reached Powder River, too far north for us to follow until +arrangements were made for supplies for troops and stock, as everything +had to be teamed from Fort Leavenworth.</p> + +<p>The storms during March were very severe. Snow lay two feet on the level +and was crusted so hard that for weeks it was almost impossible to force +animals through it. As soon as we heard from my scouts of the departure of +the Indians and found they had no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> intention of molesting the citizens of +Nebraska, and had placed themselves on Powder River too far north to +return until the return of the grass in May, I distributed the troops +along the stage- and telegraph-lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open +the South Route to New Mexico.</p> + +<p>My experience on the North Route, with the reports from the troops and +from my Indians, soon satisfied me that every Indian tribe of any +importance from the British Possessions in the north to the Red River in +the south, were preparing to engage in open hostilities. These tribes +often pretended to be friendly, deceiving the Government and the Indian +agent, a crafty trick that was impossible to make the Government +understand. For instance, they would go to the Indian agent for +provisions, and would make him believe that they were for peace, and would +promise to bring to the agency their tribe. Probably by the time the +report of the Indian agent reached the Government, this same tribe would +be off on the warpath and have captured a train or murdered some settlers, +and the troops in return had attacked and destroyed them, and we were +called to account for it, as it was claimed by the agents we were +attacking peaceable Indians. This went so far that it prevented me from +opening the southern emigrant trail several weeks. Finally I took the +matter in my own hands, regardless of the action or report of the agents.</p> + +<p>While these parleys were going on the Indians suddenly appeared all along +the southern emigrant trail in the Arkansas River Valley, attacking +trains, posts, and escorts. I threw my troops against the bands of +Southern Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, and Kiowas that were in the +vicinity of the trail. The troops had caught on to the severe fighting on +the Platte, had heard of the new methods of warfare and victories, and +they in all cases stood their ground and defeated the Indians, although +they suffered severely in some instances. This was a reception that the +Indians did not expect and they fled to the Wichita Mountains, suing for +peace, which I knew was simply to prevent us attacking them there, but +accomplished its purpose with the Government and finally brought about the +treaties that were not worth the paper they were written on, and later on +forced the campaigns that Sheridan afterwards made, while if we had been +allowed to have followed them up and punish them as we did the northern +tribes, we would have conquered a peace that would have been a lasting +one.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span>The Indians of the plains are the best skirmishers in the world. In +rapidity of movements, in perfect horsemanship, sudden whirling, +protecting the body by clinging to the side of the horse, and rapid +movements in open and difficult ground, no trained cavalry in the world +can equal them. On foot their ability to hide behind any obstruction, in +ravine, along creeks, and under creek and river banks, and in fighting in +the open plains or level ground, the faculty to disappear is beyond one's +belief except he has experienced it. In skulking and sharpshooting they +are adepts, but troops properly instructed are a match for them on foot, +and never fail to drive and route them, if they will stand and fight and +never retreat except slowly with their faces to them. I have seen several +times, when caught in a tight place, bands of Indians held by a few men by +holding to ridges and slowly retreating, always using our rifles at every +opportunity when an Indian was in range, never wasting a shot on them +unless there was a probability of hitting them. The Indians have a mortal +fear of such tactics.</p> + +<p>In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick out quickly any +vantage ground, and sometimes as high as 200 will concentrate at such a +point where we could not concentrate twenty men without exposing them, and +from this vantage ground they will pour a deadly fire on the troops, and +we cannot see an Indian—only puffs of smoke. By such tactics as this they +harass and defeat our troops. Many a fight occurred between Indians and +soldiers both watching the smoke to show each other's position. You can +watch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless some one is hit +and exposes himself, when it is nearly always a sure death. The Indian +character is such that he will not stand continual following, pounding, +and attacking. Their life and methods are not accustomed to it, and the +Indians can be driven by very inferior forces by continually watching, +attacking, and following. None of our campaigns have been successful that +have not been prepared to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them +at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded, or forced to +surrender, which is the sure result of such a campaign.</p> + +<p>The Indians during the months they had been hostile, and especially in +their attacks on the stage-stations and ranches, had captured a large +number of men, women, and children. These prisoners had made known to the +troops, by dropping notes along the trail and through the reports of +friendly Indians, their terrible<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> condition and the usage that was being +made of them. Their appeals to us to rescue them were pitiful.</p> + +<p>I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the villages, and their +winter quarters out of our reach; that these villages were unprotected +because every brave and dog-soldier had his warpaint on and was joining +the hostile forces attacking along our lines, which were increasing every +day. I also knew it would be impossible for any of our troops to reach +them or to rescue them by following them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort +Kearney I asked authority of the Government to enlist and muster into +service two companies of Pawnee Indians, to be under the command of their +old interpreter, Major North, who I knew to be a brave, level-headed +leader. This authority was immediately given me, and Major North was given +confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux country, apparently on +scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and rescue these prisoners, while +their braves were down fighting us. He started, but storms of snow came +down so heavy that his ponies could get nothing to eat, and during the +latter part of February and all of March these storms were continuous, the +snow falling to the depth of two feet over the entire plains. Major North +was compelled to seek shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his stock +on cottonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the summer and winter +of 1865 and 1866 Major North, with his two enlisted companies, to which I +added two more, made some wonderful marches, scouts, battles, and +captures, and during that campaign we recaptured and had surrendered to us +many of these women and children prisoners.</p> + +<p>After the war Major North became manager of the Indians in Buffalo Bill's +Wild West Show, and died in that service. He was a noted man on the +plains. My acquaintance with him commenced in 1856, and together we had +seen and endured many hardships. It was seldom one met his equal in any of +the different phases of plains life. Although he had led an eventful +career, still I never heard him refer to what he had done or accomplished, +or the part he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever more +worshiped than he was by the two tribes of Pawnee Indians; and his death +was virtually their destruction, for during his life among them he held +them under good discipline and kept them away from vice, diseases, and +war.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>A great many amusing reports came to me from my scouts and the captured +Indians. When on the plains in the 50's I was known among the Indians by +the name, in their language, that signified "Long Eye," "Sharp Eye," and +"Hawk Eye." This came from the fact that when I first went among them it +was as an engineer making surveys through their country. With my +engineering instruments I could set a head-flag two or three miles away, +even further than an Indian could see, and it is their custom to give a +practical name to everything. Of course I was not many days on the plains +until it reached the Indians that "Long Eye" was there, and in every fight +that occurred they had me present. They said I could shoot as far as I +could see. The scouts said the Indian chiefs laid their defeats to that +fact. Then again they were very superstitious about my power in other +matters. When the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect +it and not destroy it. They were made to believe that it was a Great +Medicine. This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by +stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and +others at Fort Kearney, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and then +having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and +received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as +they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge +Pole, this being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of course +this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could +often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening +to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and +through the insulators. It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought and +said it was "Big Medicine" talking. I never could convince them that I +could not go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them +what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, as they +had often seen me use my traveling-instrument and cut into the line, +sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the noted scouts of +the plains who had married into the different tribes had been guides for +me, and many of these men were half-breeds, and were with these hostile +Indians. Some of them took part with them, but more of them had tried to +pacify and bring them to terms, and they gave me information about those +who were not engaged in the depredations.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the plains, a person of great +power and great moment. These half-breeds worked upon their superstitions, +endeavoring to convince them it was useless to fight "Long Eye." No doubt +my appearing on the plains the time I did, and the fact that from the time +I appeared until the time I left, the troops had nothing but success, +carried great weight with them, and seemed to confirm what the old +voyageurs and guides told them, and had much influence in causing their +abandonment of the Platte country and returning to their villages.</p> + +<p>My own experience on the plains led me to be just as watchful and just as +vigilant when I knew the Indians were not near me as I was when they were +in sight. In all my travels I never allowed them to camp near or occupy my +camps even in the time of peace, when they were friendly, and I never +allowed myself to knowingly do them an injustice, making it a point never +to lie to them in any of my councils and treaties, or never allow, if I +knew it, the interpreter to deceive them. That brought me respect in all +my dealings with them, and I treated them with respect, courtesy, and +consideration, and demanded the same from them. This, no doubt, was one of +the principal reasons that in fifteen years, more or less, of intercourse +with them, traveling through their country both during the times they were +hostile and at peace, that I escaped many of the misfortunes that befell +others.</p> + +<p>Although this short campaign was not remarkable for great battles or large +loss by killed and wounded, still it required great fortitude from the +troops, and often great personal courage, and its success was of great +moment to the Government and to the people of the plains and the Pacific +Coast, for over these three great overland routes were carried the mails, +telegrams, and traffic during the entire war of the rebellion, which did +much to hold these people loyal to our Government. A long stoppage was a +destruction to business, and would bring starvation and untold misery; and +when, with only thirteen days and nights of untiring energy on the part of +the troops in a winter of unheard-of severity, California, Utah and +Colorado were put in communication with the rest of the world, there was +great rejoicing. In seventeen days the stages were started and overland +travel was again safe, after being interrupted for two months, and by +March 1st the commercial<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> trains were all <i>en route</i> to their destinations +and I had returned to my duties at the headquarters of the Department, in +St. Louis.</p> + +<p>It was with no little satisfaction that I answered a personal letter +General Grant had written me, when he assigned me to this duty, and which +I found awaiting me on my return to Fort Leavenworth. In his letter he +outlined what it was necessary to do and why he had asked me to take the +field. He judged rightly of the condition of affairs and the necessity of +immediate action. I wrote him how promptly the troops responded to my +call. They had opened the overland routes; they had made them secure and +were then guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after grass +came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly chastised, they would +certainly and successfully attack them and prevent safe travel overland, +and from my letter the order soon came for me to prepare for the extensive +campaign of the next summer and winter that followed these Indians to the +Yellowstone on the north and the Cimarron on the south, and conquered a +peace with every hostile tribe.</p> + + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="figcenter"><img src="images/i078.jpg" alt="JAMES BRIDGER" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>JAMES BRIDGER</b></p> +<p class="center">Chief Guide to Indian Campaign, 1865-6.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS<br />1865 AND 1866</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p>During the Indian campaigns of the winter and spring of 1864-65, against +the Indians that were holding all the overland roads, stations, telegraph +and emigrant routes over the plains, my command reopened them in a short +campaign of sixty days in which many fights occurred in which the troops +were uniformly successful. The telegraph-lines were rebuilt, the stages +re-established, the mails transported regularly, and protection given. +Although we were able to drive the Indians off of all of these routes and +open them successfully and hold them open, my experience convinced me that +as soon as grass started on the plains these Indians would again come down +on the routes, and that the only possible way of settling the Indian +question was to make a well-planned and continuous campaign against them +on the Arkansas, the Smoky Hill, the Republican, and the North and South +Platte Valley routes, and to keep them off the traveled roads. To do this +we would be obliged to get our troops into their country as soon as +possible and go for their villages.</p> + +<p>In my report to the Government, in April, 1865, I set forth the necessity +for this and outlined the plans. Upon the receipt of that report I +received authority from General Grant and General Pope to go forward and +carry out the plans that I had suggested. This plan contemplated placing +upon the plains about 5,000 men to protect the stations and +telegraph-lines, furnish escort to emigrants and Government trains of +supplies that were necessary to supply the wants of that vast country with +provisions and outfit five movable columns of soldiers, a total of 6,000 +or 7,000 men. Contracts were immediately made for the supplies for this +number of men; for horses for the cavalry, and for the supplying of the +posts on the plains with a surplus at each, so that if the campaign +extended into the winter it would not have to stop for want of provisions. +The campaign in the spring had to be made on supplies moved there in the +middle of winter, at great cost and suffering.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> The Quartermaster and +Commissary at Fort Leavenworth made contracts for supplies to be delivered +in June, and General Grant sent to Fort Leavenworth something like 10,000 +troops, very few of whom got into the campaigns from the fact that the +troops would no sooner reach Fort Leavenworth than they would protest, +claiming that the Civil War was ended and saying they had not enlisted to +fight Indians. The Governors of their States, Congressmen, and other +influential men, would bring such pressure to bear that the War Department +would order them mustered out. While the Government was at great expense +in moving these troops to the plains, some even reaching as far as +Julesburg, we never got any service from them; they were a great +detriment, and caused much delay in our plans, so that the overland routes +had to be protected by about one-half of the troops that it was at first +thought necessary to accomplish the work. Three Regiments of infantry, +eleven Regiments of cavalry, and three Batteries of artillery, that +reported to me under the order of General Grant, were mustered out on the +march between Fort Leavenworth and Julesburg.</p> + +<p>There was enlisted for the Indian campaign, five Regiments of United +States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, who, desiring to be +at liberty, were willing to enlist under the United States flag to fight +Indians, and these five Regiments had to be depended upon mostly for +taking care of all the country west of the Lakes,—the overland routes on +the plains, to man the posts on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, +and for escorts for surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move +all five columns I had less than 7,000 officers and men in my department. +The Indians commenced their depredations on all the routes in April, +especially on the Arkansas route, where we had to contend with the South +Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and Arapahoe tribes. This district +was under the command of Brigadier-General Ford, a very efficient officer, +and it was planned that he should make a campaign in May and June into the +Indian country, crossing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, +which we knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had a +compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before crossing the +Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross the Arkansas the +Government sent west a peace commission composed of Senator Doolittle, +General Alex McD. McCook, and others. The Indian agent for these tribes +was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> They no sooner reached the Indian country +than they protested against the movement of any troops into the territory +south of the Arkansas River. In fact, General McCook issued an order, +using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's movement. +He had no authority to do this, but General Ford obeyed, as the +information came to him that these chiefs were assembling at the mouth of +the Little Arkansas to make peace. After parleying with the Indians, the +commission accomplished nothing, and the Indians all the time were +committing their depredations on the emigrant trains that were passing up +the Arkansas Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and +appeals of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in +relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians had +murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their property +and their stock, and our scouts who went among them saw their captures in +plenty. As soon as we would start out to punish them, even those that had +crossed north of the Arkansas River, protests were sent to Washington and +came back to us, so that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition +of matters became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views +of the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military +Division of the Missouri, as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span style="margin-left: 6em;"><span class="smcap">Headquarters Department of the Missouri.</span></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 12em;"><span class="smcap">Fort Leavenworth</span>, June 6, 1865.</span></p> + +<p><i>Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri</i>:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">General:</span> You have been notified of the action of Major-General McCook, +under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the +expedition of General Ford south of the Arkansas, that they might +confer, and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, +Comanches, Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth started south a week ago +to bring the chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are +endeavoring to make terms with them, their warriors are strung along +the route from Zarah to Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find +off its guard. They are in parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide +in the valleys and ravines. These Indians now have their villages at +Fort Cobb, and have driven out all friendly Indians and traders, +declaring that they mean war and nothing else. They are composed of +one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover; one small band of +Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of Comanches, also the +Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they have no respect for +our authority or power, and I have no faith in any peace made by them +until they are made to feel our strength. I do not believe it will be +a month before we hear of large trains being captured or attacked by +them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent in by +General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major +Morrison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared +to me bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among +them to trade. Not one of them will act as guide to take a force +toward them.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>Colonel Leavenworth satisfied the committee, and I think General +McCook also, that the Comanches and others had not committed any +depredations. There is not an officer or trader who has been on the +plains but knows they have been in all or nearly all the outrages +committed. I desire very much to have peace with the Indians, but I do +think we should punish them for what they have done, and that they +should feel our power and have respect for us. My plan to reach them +is to start in three columns for Fort Cobb; viz., First, by Major +Merrill's route; second, by Captain Booner's route; third, from the +mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. Make the parties about 400 +or 500 strong, and march direct for their villages. This will draw +every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route free. When we get +down there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they will have an +opportunity to show it, and we can make an agreement with them that +will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities +conclude a lasting peace. I have attempted to get these expeditions +off twice. The first time they were stopped by General Halleck, on +Colonel Leavenworth's representations. He started to make peace; the +Indians stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp. He came +back for fight and wished to whip them, but has now changed again, and +it is possible he may get the chiefs together, but I very much doubt +it; and, even if he does, they will only represent a portion of each +tribe. I have concluded, by representations of the Congressional +Committee made to General Ford, to wait and see the effects of Colonel +Leavenworth's mission. I will have my troops at the designated points. +If he should fail I will go forward and make the campaign as +originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not a leading +officer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians who has +faith in peace made with any of these Indians unless they are punished +for the murders, robberies and outrages they have committed for over a +year; and unless we have a settled policy, either fight and allow the +commanding officer of the department to dictate terms of peace to +them, or else it be decided that we are not to fight, but make some +kind of peace at all hazards, we will squander the summer without +result. Indians will rob and murder, and some Indian agents will +defend them, and when fall comes I will be held responsible for not +having protected the route or punished them for what they may have +done. It must be evident to the Government that I cannot be making war +on the Indians while other parties are at the same time making peace, +as has been the case so far. Whatever may be the desire of the +Government, I will lend all my energies to carry it out and make every +officer and man under me do the same. I cannot approve the manner in +which the Indians have been treated, and have no faith in them, nor +will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy fight. If peace +is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made at safe +distances from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be +made to keep away from them.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 2em;">I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>The Government, after receiving General Pope's and my own views, sent out +Inspector-General D. B. Sackett, of the Regular Army, to investigate the +conditions in that country and to report to the Government the actual +facts. In the meantime the peace commission that had been endeavoring to +negotiate with these Indians had gone on to Denver, still protesting +against any movement against the Indians, believing that peace could be +brought about. General Sackett, upon reaching the Indian country, sent<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span> +the following dispatch, on June 14, 1865, to the commanding officer at +Fort Larned, Kas.:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>For the last few days the Indians along the route have been very +active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals +have been stolen, Fort Dodge has lost every animal. The force can now +do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under +a good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number +of trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured.</p></div> + +<p>Upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately gave orders to the +commanding officer to go out and concentrate our forces north of the +Arkansas, and to protect the trains, but not to go south of the river. +This they accomplished very effectively, and drove all the Indians south +of the Arkansas, killing and capturing a good many. On June 14th, General +Pope wrote a long letter to General U. S. Grant, enclosing my letter to +him, reiterating what I had said, and insisting for very strong reasons +that the Indians should be left entirely to the military; that there +should be no peace commission sent until the military had met these +Indians and brought them to terms, either by fighting or negotiations; and +afterwards for the commission to go there and make such arrangements as +they saw proper. In the mustering out of troops General Ford was relieved +of the command and Major-General John B. Sanborn, a very efficient +officer, was sent to take his place. It was now agreed that after the +failure of the peace commission to accomplish anything with these Indians +that I should make the campaigns south of the Arkansas, and General +Sanborn concentrated his troops and moved to the Arkansas. Before I +reached there I received a communication from Colonel Leavenworth stating +that all the chiefs of the Indians were then on Cow Creek, anxious to meet +him. At the same time, a dispatch came from Washington to General Pope, +stopping Sanborn's movement. General Pope immediately arranged to have an +interview with these Indians, and General Sanborn went there with +instructions to make an agreement with them that they should keep off of +the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to meet them, +later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with the chiefs of the +Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on the part of the Government, +to suspend all actions of hostility towards any of the tribes above +mentioned and to remain at peace until the fourth day of October, 1865, +when they were to meet the Government commissioners at Bluffs Creek about +forty miles south<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> of the Little Arkansas. This agreement did not take in +the South Cheyennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, +but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock they +captured, and none of them were punished for the murders they committed. +It was a business matter on their part to remain at peace only until the +troops moved out of that country and to prevent Sanborn with his organized +forces from going south to their villages and punishing them. The effect +of this agreement was that the Indians continued their depredations +through the following years,—not so much by killing but by +stealing,—until finally they became so hostile that in the campaign +against them by General Sheridan, in 1868, an agreement was made with them +forcing all the tribes to move into the Indian Territory. If General Ford +or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish these Indians +as they deserved, they would have been able to make not only a peace, but +could have forced them to go on the reservation in the Indian territories, +and thus have saved the murders and crimes that they committed for so many +years afterwards; however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the +emigration to go forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and +guarded, and it was not molested during the rest of that year.</p> + +<p>To show the conditions on the overland routes up the two forks of the +Platte River at the time, I sent this dispatch:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span style="margin-left: 6em;"><span class="smcap">Headquarters Department of the Missouri.</span></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 12em;"><span class="smcap">St. Louis, Mo.</span>, June 17, 1865.</span></p> + +<p><i>Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis</i>:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">General:</span> There is no doubt but that all, or nearly all, the tribes of +Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on +the north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open +hostilities against the Government. It is possible that in a few of +the tribes there are some chiefs and warriors who desire to be +friendly, but each day reduces the number of these, and they even are +used by the hostile tribes to deceive us as to their intentions and +keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear to be friendly, but +everything indicates that they too are ready to join in the +hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being +concerned in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion +there is but one way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles; +viz., to push our cavalry into the heart of their country from all +directions, to punish them whenever and wherever we find them, and +force them to respect our power and to sue for peace. Then let the +military authorities make informal treaties with them for a cessation +of hostilities. This we can accomplish successfully, for the Indians +will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and have confidence in +their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian agents, or +others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians in all +the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for +them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are +made<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will +readily and in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any +demands we may make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from +among them we can, I am confident, settle the matter this season, and +when settled I am clearly of the opinion that these Indians should be +dealt with entirely by competent commissioned officers of the Army, +whom they will respect and who will not only have the power to make +them comply with the terms of the agreements made, but will also have +the power and authority to compel troops, citizens and others to +respect implicitly and to comply strictly with the obligations assumed +on our part. The cavalry now moving into the Indian country will, I +doubt not, if allowed to proceed and carry out the instructions given +them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about an effectual +peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 2em;">I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>The campaign to the north was planned with a view of going after all the +northern Indians then at war—the Arapahoes, North Cheyennes, and the +different bands of the Sioux. Their depredations had extended east to the +Missouri River, and General Pope sent General Sully with a force up that +river to take care of the hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been +fighting the troops at Forts Rice, Berthoud, and other points. Before +reaching these posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after +the Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minnesota, but +after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they having fled to +the British Possessions. He returned to the Missouri River and endeavored +to make terms with the tribes concentrated on it, but only partially +succeeded. We knew that there were from two to three thousand of the +Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes concentrated at or near Bear Butte, near +the north end of the Black Hills, and it was the intention of General +Sully with his force to go after this band, but, being turned to the east, +I organized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Nelson Cole, who went +up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders were to move from +Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its head and thence across the +Niobrara to the White Earth River and then to Bear Butte. Failing to find +the Indians there, he was to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he +was to join Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this +district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's column of about 500 men of +the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from Fort Laramie along the +west base of the Black Hills and join Colonel Cole, and later join General +Connor on the Tongue River; while General Connor, with a small command of +about 500 men,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span> was moving north along the Platte to the head of Salt +Creek down the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and +supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base of the Big +Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in that vicinity. These +columns should have moved in May or June, but it was July and August +before they got started, on account of the failure of the contractors to +deliver the supplies to them on the plains at the different supply-depots; +but when they started they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have +accomplished the purpose of the campaign had it not been for the fact that +they were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Laramie by +October 15th.</p> + +<p>During May, June, and July the Indians were very aggressive all along the +South Platte and North Platte routes. Every Government train had to go +guarded; every emigrant train had to be organized into trains of 50 or 100 +wagons, with the teamsters armed and placed under an officer, and even +then a great many of their people were killed and a great deal of stock +run off. The commanding officer at Fort Laramie, during June, had +concentrated at his post about 2,000 of what was considered friendly +Indians. Most of these Indians had been captured during the spring +campaign. They had brought in with them most of the prisoners that had +been captured on their raids upon the stage-lines and the ranches. General +Connor, desiring to get these Indians removed as far as possible from the +hostile Indians, under my order moved them south toward the Republican +River, in charge of two companies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, commanded +by Captain Fouts. These Indians did not take kindly to this movement, and +the escort sent with them was not as large as it ought to have been. When +they were sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they were communicated with by +a band of hostile Indians who followed down the opposite side of the +Platte River, and early in the morning they attacked their escort, killing +Captain Fouts and four soldiers, and wounding seven others. In the fight +there were a great many Indians killed and wounded, but these Indians were +allowed to go south with their arms, to convince them that we put +confidence in them and did not treat them as prisoners. With the aid of +the other Indians on the north side of the Platte, they forced the escort +to intrench itself, by doing which the train and the women and others who +had been rescued from the Sioux Indians were saved, as word was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> gotten to +Fort Laramie and relief was sent. The Indians after this fight crossed the +North Platte River and moved north toward the Black Hills.</p> + +<p>Colonel Moonlight, in command of Fort Laramie, as soon as he heard of this +revolt, went to relieve the intrenched party. The Indians, however, had +crossed the Platte River. He followed them. When within ten or fifteen +miles of the band, through carelessness in taking care of his horses, the +Indians turned upon him, stampeded his stock, and, in fact, drove off 200 +or 300 head of it, leaving his command on foot. The attack of the hostiles +frightened the horses so that they could not be controlled, and they ran +towards the Indians. Moonlight and his command had to march back to +Laramie, a long distance, without food or transportation, as they had +started out with only one or two days' rations. Colonel Moonlight was +immediately relieved of his command, but the damage had been done, which +gave the hostile Indians great encouragement. General Connor sent this +dispatch:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Julesburg</span>, June 15, 1865.<br /> +(Received 9:50 p. m.)</p> + +<p><i>Major-General Dodge</i>:</p> + +<p>I ordered the Indians who surrendered at Laramie to be sent to +Kearney. Colonel Moonlight sent them without first dismounting them, +under charge of two companies of Seventh Iowa Cavalry. They revolted +sixty miles this side of Laramie, killing Captain Fouts, who was in +command, and four soldiers, and wounding seven; also killed four of +their own chiefs who refused to join them; fifteen Indians were +killed; the Indians fled north with their ponies, women, and children, +leaving all their camp equipage. Troops are in pursuit. Mail-stages +have stopped west of Camp Collins. Everything appears to work +unfavorably owing to failure of corn contractors and incompetency of +some of my subordinates. I will overcome all obstacles, however, in a +short time. Have you sent me cavalry yet? J. D. Doty, Governor of +Utah, was buried at Camp Douglas Cemetery this morning. Died of heart disease.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 12em;"><span class="smcap">P. E. Connor</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 16em;"><i>Brigadier-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>During July, a band of the Arapahoes raided the South Platte River +stage-line between Fort Collins and Fort Halleck, drove off most of the +stock from the stations, and committed other depredations. Colonel Porter, +who was in command of that district, concentrated his force and went after +the Indians, and in a very few days restored the stage stations and gave +the Indians sound whippings, which kept that line clear nearly all summer. +The Indians that had done this work had gone into Fort Collins claiming to +be friendly and wishing to make a treaty, and after being fed there for +some time, left one night and committed the depredations before troops +could stop them. From here they moved immediately<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> north to join the +hostile Indians north of the North Platte. I had received notice from +Washington that the Interior Department had information that these Indians +were peaceable and would not join in the campaigns; but, being on the +ground, I knew better, because we were capturing them in nearly all of the +attacks that they made. With them was a portion of one of the bands of the +Sioux.</p> + +<p>On July 27, ten miles west of the North Platte Bridge station, a Mormon +train coming east was attacked by the Indians and Lieutenant Casper W. +Collins, of the Eleventh Ohio, and twenty-five men of the Eleventh Kansas, +went out to relieve it, when about one thousand Indians attacked him. +While he saved the train he lost his own life, and twenty-five of his men +were scalped and their bodies horribly mutilated; but while the Indians +had heavy losses in the fight, they were able to divide up and scatter +before any of the troops sent to attack them could reach them. I named the +post at Platte Bridge Fort Casper, and it is now known as the town of +Casper, on the North-Western railroad.</p> + +<p>On August 16th a large band of Sioux Indians attacked a military station +on the South Platte route. They were overtaken by the Pawnee Indian +Battalion of our forces, who gave them a good whipping. They killed a +large number and took their stock and scattered them. This was a band of +Sioux Indians that had been lying on the North Platte and made this dash +to the South Platte stage-line, thinking we had withdrawn the troops from +it to the northern expedition. Very few of them ever got back to their +tribes.</p> + +<p>The battalion of Pawnees with General Conner had made a great capture of a +band of Cheyennes who had been down on the Fort Halleck route. The latter +had there captured a part of a company of a Michigan Regiment who were +escorting a few wagons, the captives having been tied to the wagons and +burned. By some means, General Conner got word of this, and knew the trail +they would take to get back to the main command, and on this trail he +placed Major North and his battalion of Pawnees. Major North, in +describing to me what followed, said that when the Indians came back and +discovered that they were surrounded, one, an old man, moved up towards +him and placed his hand up to his mouth, telling him to come on; that they +were ready to die; that they were full of white men up to that,—meaning +up to his mouth.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> The Pawnees killed every one of this band and scalped +them. On one of them was found a diary of one of the Michigan soldiers who +had been killed, and one of the Cheyennes had used the book to give an +account of their travels, their camps and fights, and what they had done +on this raid. From this diary our guides could tell just exactly where the +party had been, where they had camped, where they had captured the +Michigan soldiers, and their route on their return. A half-breed had +written in the book a defiance of the troops, telling what the Indians +demanded. Among other things they demanded that before they would make +peace we should give up all their prisoners; that we should abandon the +country north of the Platte River, etc.</p> + +<p>As soon as General Connor reached Powder River he established his post and +named it Fort Connor. (It was afterward named Fort Reno by me.) Connor +immediately pushed on to the Crazy Woman Mountain fork of Powder River and +then to the east base of the Big Horn Mountains, following that to the +Tongue River and down the Tongue until James Bridger, the chief scout and +guide of the expedition, claimed to have seen the smoke a long distance +away, of an Indian camp. No one else could see it, but, as a precaution, +Connor sent out the Pawnee scouts, and on August 27th they discovered +about 2,000 Indians camped on the Tongue River, near the mouth of Wolf +Creek. It is a singular fact that in this vicinity General Crook fought +his great battle on the Rosebud, the Custer massacre occurred, and it was +not very far away that the Phil Kearney disaster occurred, when Lieutenant +Fetterman and his whole command was slaughtered. General Connor +immediately corralled the trains and took his available forces, about 250 +men, and marched all night and struck this band at daylight, giving them a +complete surprise. They were Arapahoes under Black Bear and Old David, +with several other noted chiefs. The band was just breaking up their camp, +but the Indian soldiers rallied and fought desperately. Captain H. E. +Palmer, A. A. G., with General Connor, gives this description of the +attack:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The word was passed back for the men to close up and follow the +General and not to fire a shot until he fired in advance. General +Conner then took the lead, riding his horse up the steep bank of the +ravine and dashing out across the mesa as if there were no Indians +just to his left. Every man followed as close as possible. At the +first sight of the General the Indian ponies grazing on the table-land +in front of us sent up a tremendous whinnying, and galloped down +toward the Indian village. More<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> than 1,000 dogs began to bark, and +more than 700 Indians made the air ring with their fearful yelling. It +appeared that the Indians were in the act of breaking camp. The most +of their tepees were down and packed for the march. The ponies, more +than 3,000, had been gathered in and most of the squaws and children +were mounted, some of them having taken the line of march up the +stream to the new camp. The General watched the movements of his men +until he saw the last man emerge from the ravine, when he wheeled on +the left into line. The whole line then fired a volley into the +village without stopping their horses, and the bugles sounded a +charge. Not a man but realized that the charge into the village +without a moment's hesitation was our only salvation. We already saw +that we were greatly outnumbered, and that only desperate fighting +would save our scalps. We were in the village in the midst of a +hand-to-hand fight with the warriors and squaws, for many of the +squaws did as brave fighting as their savage lords. Unfortunately for +the squaws and children, our men had no time to direct their aim, and +bullets from both sides and murderous arrows filled the air. Women and +children fell among the killed and wounded. The scene was +indescribable. Each man seemed an army by himself. Near the sweathouse +I emptied my revolver into the carcasses of three warriors. One of our +men, a member of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, a fine-looking soldier +with as handsome a face as I ever saw on a man, grabbed me by the +shoulder and turned me about that I might assist him in drawing an +arrow from his mouth. Having no surgeon of a higher grade than a +hospital steward, it was decided that in order to get the arrow out of +his mouth the tongue would have to be cut out, which was done. The +Indians made a brave stand trying to save their families, and +succeeded in getting away with a large majority of their women and +children, leaving behind nearly all of their plunder.</p> + +<p>We now went up a stream called Wolf Creek, General Connor in close +pursuit. Soon after we left the village General Connor advised me to +instruct Captain North to take his battalion of Indians and get all +the stock he could possibly gather. General Connor pursued the savages +fully ten miles from camp, when he found himself accompanied by only +fourteen men. Our horses were so worn out that it was impossible for +the men to keep up. The Indians noticed his movements and turned upon +him and his soldiers. They fell back as fast as possible. Captain +North and myself had succeeded in coralling about a thousand ponies. +Scores of buffalo-robes, blankets, and furs were heaped up on +lodge-poles, and on these we placed our dead, and burned their bodies +to keep the Indians from mutilating them. Our attack on the village +began at 9 a. m. We remained until 2:30 and had destroyed a great deal +of Indian property. At 2:30 we took up the line of march for the +corralled train. Captain North with his eighty Indians undertook to +drive the captured stock. They were soon a great ways ahead, while the +rest of the force was engaged in beating back the Indians. The Indians +pressed on every side. They seemed to have plenty of ammunition, but +they did most of their fighting with arrows. Before dark we were +reduced to forty men, and had only a little ammunition. The Indians +showed no signs of stopping the fight, but kept on charging on us, +dashing away at the stock, and keeping us constantly on the move until +fifteen minutes of twelve, when the last shot was fired by our +pursuers. The incidents of this fight would make very interesting +reading. Every man was a general. Not a man in the company but +realized that his life was in the balance. We must either whip the +Indians and whip them badly or be whipped ourselves. We could see that +the Indians greatly outnumbered us, but we were better armed than +they. As for fighting qualities the savages proved themselves as brave +as any of our men. We had accomplished a great deal; 250 Indian lodges +and their contents had been burned, with the entire winter's supplies; +the son of Black Bear was killed: sixty-three Indians were killed, +1,100 ponies were captured, and a lot of women and children were taken +prisoners.</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>General Connor's report of this battle was burned in Utah, and +consequently was never forwarded to me or to the Government, so we do not +know what the loss on his part was; but it was severe.</p> + +<p>General Connor now moved down the Tongue River to make a connection with +Colonel Walker and Colonel Cole, at the appointed rendezvous. His scouts +discovered that Colonel Cole in moving north had endeavored to reach the +mouth of Powder River and had failed, and after six days' fighting had +marched south, expecting to go to Port Laramie, not knowing that there +were supplies at Fort Connor.</p> + +<p>Colonel Cole, who with his column had started from Omaha, had made +reasonable progress, following out the routes laid down, and did not +discover any Indians until he reached the Little Missouri River, on a +branch of the Piney that he was coming down. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of +the center column, visited his camp and was two days behind him. He should +have immediately joined him, to carry out his instructions. Cole was +headed toward the Tongue River, near the Wolf Mountains. When he got into +the brakes of the Powder River, he discovered many signs of Indians. This +is a very rough country, and he had great difficulty in getting his long +trains through it; however, he dropped into the valley about fifty miles +above the mouth of Powder River and sent a detachment with his best guide +fifty miles across to Tongue River and Panther Mountains and discovered +nothing of Connor. In Cole's instructions he was told that there would be +a supply-depot at Panther or Wolf Mountains, but General Connor had +changed this and made the supply-depot at what was known as Camp Connor, +on Powder River, and he did not notify either Cole or Walker of this +change, which he should have done, as had he done so it would have avoided +all the trouble that these two columns encountered. Cole's detachment of +cavalry discovered no signs of Connor on Tongue River and so followed down +the river, while they should have gone up; and failing to find any sign of +any depot at Panther Mountains, reported back to Cole. Cole's rations were +now exhausted, or nearly so, as he had not been as careful of them as he +should have been, expecting as he did to find a depot where he could get +plenty at the end of his sixty days' march. It shows that he was not up to +the woodcraft of the country. In examining Powder River towards its mouth +he found it destitute of grass and full of canyons. He, therefore, made +up his mind to move south up the Powder<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> River valley, with a view to +either meeting Connor or making for Fort Laramie. The Indians, seeing this +retreat, became very bold. There were at least 2,000 of them, Cheyennes +and Sioux, and without making an attack they simply harassed him, +sometimes forcing a fight; but very few were hurt. Colonel Cole should +have parked his train, placed it in a defensive position under a good +guard, and then mobilized the rest of his force, and, with what rations he +had, gone after the Indians, giving them battle and forcing the fight with +them. He had plenty of men.</p> + +<p>Cole had not advanced very far towards Port Connor when, on September 6th, +Colonel Walker and his command joined him. Then he had plenty of men to +meet all the Indians in the country, if his force was properly handled. +When this fighting commenced he was not over thirty miles from where +Connor fought his battle, and Captain Palmer states that they heard a +cannon, but could not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, +hearing nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian +scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder River +country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat up the Powder +there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals having marched so far without +grain, were already very much exhausted, and the storm lasting three days, +they became so weak that they were not fit to use, and they were therefore +shot, just as they stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling +into the Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning +of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North struck, +and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that Cole had met +with great disaster, and immediately reported to General Connor, who at +once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two Pawnees with dispatches to +Colonel Cole to march on up Powder River to Fort Connor, where he would +find supplies. Cole's troops seem to have started out not fully prepared +for such a trip, especially in the line of shoes and leggings, although +they were carefully instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I +knew the country. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, +the Quartermaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he had +to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have kept up +their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever they met the +Indians they always whipped them; but they were on the retreat, which gave +every advantage to the Indians. When<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> Cole's troops reached Port Connor +they were in a deplorable condition—ragged, barefooted, and almost +without rations and ammunition.</p> + +<p>The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had become so numerous +that the commanding officer thought it prudent to intrench the post, which +shows good judgment; but Colonel Cole complains in his report that the +troops were made to help do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange but +most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the +command must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching +this post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second +Missouri Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up +around the place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to +force its principles through insubordination or rebellion, it was +disappointed. What a sight was here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed +men, emaciated with fatigue, who had met and worsted the enemy on +three several occasions, marched up in the face of a garrison of 2,000 +or more.</p></div> + +<p>I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops when he +reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cavalry, General Connor +then not having reached that post; and when he did, all told there were +not 2,000 troops there. Cole's loss was very light,—nine killed,—while +he claims to have killed from 200 to 500 of the Indians.</p> + +<p>It was very evident to me that there was no very severe fighting here; it +was simply a skirmish on a retreat.</p> + +<p>Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort Laramie on +August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Hills, and struck Cole's +column on August 20th on what was known as Piney Creek. After striking +Cole's trail he followed it a short distance, and then left it and struck +Powder River, much farther south than Cole had, and on reaching the river +he fell right into the same band of Indians that were gathered along the +Powder River to harass Cole. He, too, was short of provisions, although he +was equipped to travel very rapidly, having all his supplies on +pack-mules. As soon as he got in touch with Cole he joined him and +followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to make up a +rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the pack-mules of Walker, +and then combine his and Cole's troops to move on a line farther to the +west and follow these Indians to the British Possessions if necessary. He +had the ammunition, equipment and everything at Fort Connor to fit out +these columns with. As near as they could estimate there were about 6,000 +Indians all told.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 894px; height: 350px;"><img src="images/i094.jpg" alt="PUMPKIN BUTTES" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>PUMPKIN BUTTES</b></p> +<p class="caption">Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians +in September, 1865, on Powder River.</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span>The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's +engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer +Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to +open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route +to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and +then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant +route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this +expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to +travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black +Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the +Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into +Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue +River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel +Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original +route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from +where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he +ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther +in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the +second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the +Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. +These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting +through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities +at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being +killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's +trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer +marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he +took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept +it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was +through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the +whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would +communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of +trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held +prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But +they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span>situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and +he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his +men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, +in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the +Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the +Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, +when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again +attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General +Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue. +They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove +off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety.</p> + +<p>Early in September I reached Fort Connor—before General Cole and Colonel +Walker had concentrated there—and gave instructions under the direction +of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to +withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations +against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, +and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all +hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from +General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span style="margin-left: 12em;"><span class="smcap">Headquarters U. S. Forces.</span></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 6em;"><span class="smcap">Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory</span>, August 31, 1865.</span></p> + +<p><i>Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.</i>:</p> + +<p>I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing +no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I +desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will +allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000 +men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to +garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties +before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a +peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may +be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of +that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage, +etc., to support them are here and <i>en route</i>. As soon as we settle +with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our +posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder +River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow +him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back +by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes +will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more +too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor +gets back he can go right there.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's and Walker's +forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> with a view of taking +command of Cole's and Walker's forces and organizing them into two +columns—one a light column with pack-mules, and the other with the +trains,—and then to follow and attack the Indians that had been fighting +Cole and Walker. When he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, +which, of course, changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the +Indians were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled +lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time—weeks +or months—before we would have conquered a peace that the Indians would +have recognized.</p> + +<p>The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an answer from +General Grant to the effect that the authorities at Washington were +determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. They had been made +to believe by the Interior Department that all they had to do was to +withdraw the troops and the Indians would come in and make peace. On my +return from Fort Connor, when I reached the North Platte I sent this +dispatch:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Horseshoe</span>, September 15, 1865.</p> + +<p><i>Major-General John Pope, St. Louis</i>:</p> + +<p>Arrived here today on my return from Powder River. That post is well +located, right in heart of Indian country, and is an important post. +The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good +effect hereafter in holding in check Indians. Have not heard from +General Connor since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have +done a good deal of work on Powder River; got up stockade and +commenced Quartermaster buildings; well under way. Great lack of +Quartermaster's stores up there, the Powder River stores not having +reached Laramie yet. From Laramie to Powder River, then to Virginia +City, is an excellent wagon-road; good grass, water, and wood all the +way, and the most direct road that can be got. The travel over it in +another season will be immense; it saves at least 450 miles in +distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's wagon-road party +and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel Bent's sons, +George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and Colonel +Sawyer gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed, +Captain Williford, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians +accepted proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods +they attacked party; killed three men. Bent said that there was one +condition on which the Cheyennes would treat; viz., the hanging by +Government of Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians +considered that they were strong enough to fight the Government; +preferred to do it; that they knew the Government would withdraw +troops in fall; then they would have it all their own way again. +Expressed great fear about Connor, and said they were concentrating +everything to meet him, which is true. Since he left no Indians have +troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all moving north, +stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them as they +pass every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine Bow +Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache La +Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was at +Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow; see General Wheaton; +thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to +make peace on Missouri River, but they were doing this to keep us +from<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span> sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St. +Louis. One has been with Price in the rebel Army; was captured. His +father got him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas +River, when he joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He +was dressed in one of our staff officer's uniforms.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the results of the +campaign and protested strenuously against the order stopping it, saying +he was then in condition and position to close it, conquer the Indians, +and force a lasting peace. On receipt of his report I sent this dispatch:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Central City, Colo.</span>, September 27, 1865.</p> + +<p><i>Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.</i>:</p> + +<p>On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of +Indians on Tongue River; killed fifty; captured village, all winter +provisions, and 600 horses—all the stock they had. On the 1st of +September the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the +Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On +the evening of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them +down Powder River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again, +fight lasting until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of +200 killed. They fled in every direction, losing large number of +horses, camp equipage, provisions, etc. On 8th instant, Colonel +Walker, commanding center column, who was in advance of Colonel Cole, +met Indians in large force. Colonel Cole came up and after a short but +spirited engagement they totally routed Indians, driving them in every +direction with great loss, several of principal chiefs being killed in +this fight. On the night of the 9th of September a severe snow-storm +raged, in which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. I was in that +storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several animals. +Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and +wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not +communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this +time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General +Connor's column was.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south from Fort +Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had been assigned, +the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon as he started south to +Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and swarmed immediately on the +overland routes, both the North and South Platte, reaching even as far as +the Arkansas, and committed great depredations. The troops along those +lines had been mustered out, and the regular-army force that was to take +their places had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my +absence General Pope had assigned to the different districts regular-army +officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of the +volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word to the Indians +to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span>consultation. To accomplish +this I sent out the best-posted guides (using chiefs, sub-chiefs, +half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on the plains, to each of the +hostile tribes asking them to come into Fort Laramie. I instructed the +messengers to tell them that if any of their people had gone to the +Missouri River for peaceable purposes to let them go, but to bring in all +that were left, providing they felt disposed to settle without delay. I +sent them word that if they did not come in and settle they would find +that our summer campaign was only a taste of what they would get this +winter, for we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders +thoroughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle with the Indians +before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I told +them they might say, also, that all of the Indians south of the Arkansas +had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told about the battle +with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder and Tongue Rivers. I sent the +district commanders word to show Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the +forces at their posts, and to impress upon him our power. The effect of +this appeal to the different tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 +we got together at Fort Laramie the principal chiefs and the head men of +the North Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tribes of the Sioux, +when a council was held.</p> + +<p>I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded at Fort Laramie, +that we would agree to almost anything to bring a permanent peace except +to allow the Indians to come down to the North Platte and occupy the +country through which the new military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont. +Our troops, in passing up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered +gold. There were Colorado and California Regiments in the commands, and I +knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, as soon as a +treaty was made, to go back into that country and prospect it, and I gave +that reason to the Indians for holding them north of the Belle Fourche +Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that country was their best +hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing to give up all the country +south of the Platte River, and not to interfere with the building of the +Union Pacific road or with any of the overland routes up the North or +South Platte; but they would not consent to give up the Black Hills north +of the North Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they +should occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to negotiate +a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to tell them that if the +white men went into their territory and we did not keep them out, they +were at liberty to do so. I knew that would deter any white man going in +there, and as long as they kept the peace, we would. Red Cloud, who had +then come to the head of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a +prominent part in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as +Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Ribs, and the Bent boys on +behalf of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their +country north of the Platte. "You may take my country," said Red Cloud, +"but I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail from the North Platte to +Yellowstone with the bodies of your soldiers;" and this he pretty nearly +accomplished. This agreement, made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing. +During the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines +agreed upon and occupied the country, especially along the Union Pacific, +which was then being constructed through that country. The Government had +to send in additional troops, and all the military posts over the country +had to be re-occupied the same as they had been before. The Government +endeavored to again reach these Indians through a peace commission in +1868. General W. T. Sherman was at the head of it, and it was composed of +General Harney and others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, Wyo., before +they went to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons +for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told General +Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams heading in the +Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that as soon as he allowed +those Indians to come to the North Platte under a treaty of peace, he +would not be across the Missouri River on his return before that country +would be covered by prospectors from California and Colorado. General +Sherman answered that their instructions were to make such a peace and +they were sent there to do it, and, sure enough, they did; and as soon as +the treaty was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first +mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sitting Bull, +who had taken part in this treaty and whose country was the Black Hills, +sent in protest after protest, demanding that the Government live up to +the terms of the treaty and drive the miners out, but no attention was +paid to them. The miners and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> settlers poured into the Black Hills country +and drove the Indians out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had +with some of the Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not +protect their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; +and they started to do it. The massacres of that year came from his band, +the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer Regiment in +1876. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, under the treaty, were +fully justified in it. During this same time Red Cloud occupied the +Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, besides murdering Captain Fetterman +and his company at Fort Phil Kearney, and other troops located at the +posts that we established along there in 1866, such as Forts Reno, +McKinney, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer +massacre that these Indians were brought to time and put on reservations; +since then peace has prevailed.</p> + +<p>The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas River route that we +had on the Platte routes in the summer of 1866, 1867, and 1868. The +Indians that had made the agreement with Colonel Leavenworth were all +committing depredations until finally the Government sent General Sheridan +there with instructions to punish them. They tried to play the same game +with Sheridan that they had played with us, but he would have none of it. +There was no one in Washington who would force him to listen to the +appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under Colonels Custer, Evans, +and others, fought three battles south of the Arkansas, noticeably wiping +out some bands, and making them give up their prisoners, stop their +murders, and go on reservations in the Indians' territory. From that time +on they have been peaceable.</p> + +<p>We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on the Arkansas +and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. We had got up to their +villages and had plenty of troops, plenty of provisions, and plenty of +clothing, and could carry on the campaign through the winter, if +necessary; and so, if we had allowed General Ford or General Sanborn to +have gone forward with the columns and punish those southern Indians, they +would have made a permanent peace. But the fact is the Indians did not +give up until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the +power and authority of the Government.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>The policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian problem is +beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They were treated the same +as foreign nations; and while they made treaties they never carried out +their part of them, breaking them whenever the trend of civilization +westward interfered with them in any way. The Government attempted to deal +with and govern the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried +to enforce peace through the military authorities. This caused friction; +and deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their +contractors and civil agents brought untold complaints. If the Government +had treated the Indians as a ward that they were bound to protect, as the +English did, they would have had very little trouble in handling them. The +military force would have held all conferences with them; fed them when +they needed it; located them in an early day on unoccupied good +hunting-grounds; and finally, as civilization moved into their territories +and as their tribes wasted away, would have given them reservations where +the Government from the money they received from the lands the Indians +claimed, could have kept and fed them without any great burden or cost. In +all the days of Indian warfare and treaties, there never was such a farce, +or failure to comprehend the frontier situation, as in the years 1865 and +1866, and the failure of the Government to take advantage of the +comprehensive plans instituted by the military authorities, as well as of +the great expenditures made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, +brought, in after years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than +ever.</p> + +<p>Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known his views to the +Government, he requested me to write fully mine to the Secretary of the +Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, and who was from my state, and +I sent him this letter:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span style="margin-left: 8em;"><span class="smcap">Headquarters Department of the Missouri.</span></span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 14em;"><span class="smcap">St. Louis, Mo.</span>, June 22, 1865.</span></p> + +<p><i>Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.</i>:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">My Dear Sir</span>: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's +letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My +acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to +get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods +for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter +refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook" +and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and +if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of +how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to +terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying +that if I am allowed to carry out the policy<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span> now being pursued toward +them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the +plains. When I assumed command of the former Department of Kansas I +found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility +against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian, +the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from +Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines, +captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children +indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken +lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done; +pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with +the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs +existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started +expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth, +Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we +were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to +give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for +their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped +with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to +attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders +of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just +got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle +is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel +Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The +grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then +aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was +moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and +punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of +by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains. +They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern +Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace.</p> + +<p>Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left +Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get +my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all +along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering +men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all +hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent +out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie +I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace +to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded +by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and +feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie +Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly +Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away +from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they +attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon +five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them, +and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now +we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British +Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with +us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to +me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and +Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have +no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected +with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the +Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I assumed command. +I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be +tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought +wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be +committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle +these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their +country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at +the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> peace with +them—not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and +plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they +will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that +neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to +swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will +enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them +to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep +citizens out of their country. The class of men sent among them as +agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole +purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so +long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes.</p> + +<p>Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians, +was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold" +with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to +Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things +to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they +mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be +dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by +others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these +Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to +me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all +of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect +civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived +and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have +given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they +have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an +opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for +a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to +strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I +shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an +interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable +settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty +that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires +them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think +them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee, +powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get +us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them +fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live +strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to +effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of +every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for +bringing it about.</p> + +<p>Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years, +and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my +own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience +and observations since I have commanded here, but also with +intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to +the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe +east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you +will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace +is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among +them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you +desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I +believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep +these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in +their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and +that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be +subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations. +In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own +country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe. +Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety +without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect +and guard. The<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first +Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the +Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed +the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to +defend themselves.</p> + +<p>The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that +we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our +overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly +erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven +different columns of troops penetrating their country in all +directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes. +This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show +them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards +to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they +will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them +for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our +fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war +with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had +we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and +the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their +country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to +suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally +have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have +written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at +the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that +when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I +shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in +my possession that you may desire, and I assure you I shall bend all +my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so +much desired—a lasting and just peace with these Indians.</p> + +<p>I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Major-General Commanding</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>Since writing this report of the Indian campaign of 1865 and 1866, I have +seen Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells's diary of the reconstruction +period, from which the following extracts are taken:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right">Tuesday, August 8, 1865.</p> + +<p>Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of +some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of army +movements on the plains came up, and Stanton said there were three +columns of twenty-two thousand troops moving into the Indian country, +with a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and +authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the War Secretary. +He said he knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was +such a movement, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had +been written to for information, but Grant was away and he knew not +when he should have a reply. The expenses of this movement could not, +he said, be less than $50,000,000. But he knew nothing about it.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p class="right">Friday, August 11, 1865.</p> + +<p>The question of the Indian war on the plains was again brought +forward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The +Secretary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to +General Grant, and General Grant says he has not ordered it. McCulloch +wanted to know the probable expense—the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton +thought McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged—said +General Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper +man—was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead +of twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number.</p> + +<p>This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p class="right"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>Tuesday, August 15, 1865.</p> + +<p>Stanton says there is to be a large reduction of the force which is +moving against the Indians. That by the 1st of October the force will +be about 6,000. That large supplies have gone on, but they can be +divided or deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will +not be lost.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p class="right">Friday, August 18, 1865.</p> + +<p>Senator Doolittle and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the +plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the +President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in +relation to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and +wickedness of the expedition which has been gotten up by somebody +without authority or the knowledge of the Government.</p> + +<p>Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement +of the means which they had taken to prevent it, came in very +opportunely. Stanton said General Grant had already written to +restrict operations; he had also sent to General Meigs. I have no +doubt a check has been put on a very extraordinary and unaccountable +proceeding, but I doubt if an active stop is yet put to war expenses.</p></div> + +<p>It is no wonder that with such ignorance in the Cabinet as to the +condition of the country, that the administration at Washington was so +incompetent in the Civil War. No person can read Secretary Wells's diary +of the daily doings at Washington of the Cabinet during President +Lincoln's administration and see how little appreciation and support he +got from his Cabinet. Dissensions among themselves and hardly ever +agreeing on any important question, brings to view the great +responsibility of the President and the fact that in all the important +matters he was dependent upon his own judgment. The Cabinet knew nothing +of the Indian depredations that for three months held all the lines of +travel, mail, and telegraph crossing the plains to California, with every +State and Territory west of the Missouri River appealing for protection, +until President Lincoln wrote to General Grant to try and have something +done to protect that country. General Grant instructed me to make the +campaign in the winter of 1864-65, which was so successful that in forty +days all the overland routes were opened, and the stage, telegraph, and +mails replaced, as shown in my reports, though at the beginning of the +campaign every tribe of Indians from the British Possessions to the Indian +Territory was at war, with captures and murders of settlers along all the +overland routes, in all the frontier States, every-day occurrences; with +women and children captured and outrages committed that cannot be +mentioned. And yet this Cabinet had no knowledge of the conditions, and +concluded from the report of the Doolittle Peace Commission that the +Indian expedition was a complete failure, notwithstanding that this +commission failed to make ponce with a single tribe of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span> Indians and failed +to stop the depredations of any band of Indians; and, upon its report, +declaring that the Indian expeditions were a folly and wickedness gotten +up by some one without the authority or knowledge of the Government.</p> + +<p>There never were 22,000 troops on the plains, nor one-half of that number. +The War Department may have sent that number out, but, as I have shown, +they were all mustered out before they reached their work; and the cost of +the campaign with a year's supplies at the posts for all the troops on the +plains or engaged in the campaign was not more than $10,000,000, a very +small amount compared with the trouble and cost of fighting these Indians +for ten years thereafter. Secretary Harlan says that 2,200 troops were +sufficient. When I took command, in January, 1865, there were not to +exceed 5,000 troops guarding trains, stages, and telegraph-lines, and +protecting all the routes of travel across the plains, and they had +utterly failed. All travel had been stopped and no expeditions against the +Indians had been made. The Indians had held the overland routes for three +months in spite of these troops. It shows how little knowledge Secretary +Harlan had of the condition of Indian affairs in his department. From the +statements of Secretary Wells it is evident where the order came from to +stop all operations on the plains and withdraw all troops by October 15th. +When Secretary Stanton states that by October 1st the troops on the plains +would be reduced to 6,000, it shows how little knowledge he had of affairs +in his department, for at that time there were not 6,000 troops on the +plains or in my command.</p> + +<p>It is well that no one knew the condition of affairs; that no one was +aware of the ignorance of the group of statesmen at Washington who were +supposed to be responsible for our nation and its preservation. They did +not seem to know where to ascertain the facts. It would seem that +Secretary Stanton purposely wished to place a reflection on General Grant, +for he must have known that he was responsible for the Army and for all of +its movements. It seems that General Grant was away at the time the +dispatches of General Pope and myself were sent showing the necessity of +continuing the campaign and punishing these savages. When he returned he +tried to stop this Cabinet panic, but his dispatches in answer to those +from Pope and myself show that he could not do it, and the fatal mistake +was made of stopping the campaign just<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> as it was accomplishing and +successfully ending a year's work. It seems to have all come about through +the misrepresentation of the Doolittle Peace Commission and the lack of +proper information on the part of the Cabinet.</p> + +<p>In the years 1863, 1864 and 1865 the Indians deliberately made war, +believing that the Civil War had so crippled us that we could not +effectively contend with them; but just as we had spent millions of +dollars, sent thousands of troops into their country, and commenced +fighting and capturing them, we were forced to lay down our arms almost in +sight of the line of battle and beg for peace, and the Indians believed +they had defeated us and that we could not conquer them, and for from +three to ten years afterward we had to spend great sums, make winter +campaigns, and suffer great losses of life and property, before we +obtained the lasting peace which was in sight in 1865 and 1866 if we had +been allowed to carry out our campaigns and plans to a legitimate end.</p> + +<p>Upon the close of my campaigns on the plains the Legislature of the State +of Iowa passed and sent me these commendations of my services:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><i>Resolved</i>, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of +Iowa, That the thanks of the people of this State are due and are +hereby extended to Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, for his able and +efficient management of Indian affairs on the plains, in protecting +the Great Overland Routes, and our western borders from the +depredations and incursions of hostile Indians, as also for his +distinguished services as a commander in the field, and his able +administration of the Department of the Missouri.</p></div> + +<p>During this campaigning on the plains I had as my escort Company A, +Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. They belonged to one of the Regiments +that was sent from the East to take part in the Indian campaigns, and did +not ask to be mustered out until after the campaign. I was greatly +indebted to this company for the close attention they gave to me and the +intelligence they showed during the whole trip. They had served faithfully +in the Civil War, and their veteran experience there was a great benefit +in the work they had to do on the plains, often in taking messages and +performing other duties where only two or three of them could be detailed +at a time. It has always been a great pleasure to me to have had an +invitation, ever since they organized their society, to attend their +reunions, but, unfortunately, I have been so far away that I could not go; +and to the surviving members I with great pleasure extend my thanks for +their good services to me.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 884px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i110.jpg" alt="BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF AT CORINTH, MISS." /></div> +<p class="center">BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF AT CORINTH, MISS., IN THE SPRING OF 1862</p> +<p class="caption">Model of fortified town on the table. Left to right—Lieutenant J. W. +Barnes, A. D. C.; Captain O. J. Dodds, D. Q. M.; Captain C. C. Carpenter, +Com. of Sub.; Captain J. K. King, A. Q. M.; Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. +Barnhill, D. P. M.; Major N. B. Howard, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant J. H. +Hogan, Ordnance Officer; Major W. R. Marsh, Medical Director; Captain B. +P. Chenoweth, A. A. I. G.; Captain Henry Horn, Chief of Grand Guards.</p> + +<p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span></p> +<h2>CAMPAIGN UP THE TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">General Dodge<br /> +In the Rear of General Bragg's Army<br /> +And<br /> +Colonel Streight's Raid<br /> +Spring of 1863</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p>When General Grant planned the second campaign against Vicksburg he +notified me, then in command of the District of Corinth, with about eight +thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, that he intended to take my +command with him; but a few days before starting he sent one of his staff +officers to me stating that he had concluded to leave me with my command +and some additional troops to hold that flank while he moved on Vicksburg. +This dispatch was a great disappointment to myself and my command. When +the officer returned to General Grant he no doubt told him of our +disappointment, as General Grant wrote me a letter stating that my command +was of much more importance than a command directly under him, and said he +had fears that General Bragg, who was then facing General Rosecrans in +Middle Tennessee, might detach a portion of his force, cross the Tennessee +River, and endeavor to make a lodgment on the Mississippi River at some +point and break up his communications with the North, with a view of +forcing him to abandon the campaign. He said he had left me to take care +of that flank, as he knew I would stay there. I read between the lines and +learned what was expected of me.</p> + +<p>General Grant, in discussing this order of his afterwards, said that he +had learned from my services under him that I was peculiarly fitted for +such a command, where I had to rely on my own judgment, and that I acted +promptly without waiting for orders, and that it came, he thought, from my +experience before the war,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span> when I was always in charge of engineering +parties in the field and often in a hostile Indian country where I had to +act promptly in any emergency. There was, at that time, quite a large +force in my front and between me and General Bragg, commanded by General +Earl Van Dorn, General N. B. Forrest, and General P. D. Roddey. This force +was collecting supplies and storing them along the Memphis and Charleston +Railroad from Bear River to Decatur, Ala. The Tennessee Valley in this +territory was twenty miles wide, and full of all kinds of supplies. I +wrote to General Grant about this storage of supplies for General Bragg's +Army, and suggested that I move up the Tennessee Valley with my force to +destroy these stores and whatever there was in the valley that Bragg's +Army could utilize; but General Grant made no response then to my +suggestion. In February I discovered a movement of the force in my front +towards General Rosecrans's Army and notified him in the following +dispatch:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Corinth, Miss.</span>, February 10, 1863.</p> + +<p><i>Major-General Rosecrans</i>:</p> + +<p>One of my scouts left Van Dorn Sunday night. He then had two regiments +and one battery across the Tombigbee, at Cotton-Gin Port; was crossing +slowly, and all his forces had not got to him. His men and officers +said he was going to Bragg. His stock is not in good condition. He +appears to be going the Pikevill and Russellville road. Streams are +high, and roads bad. We captured mail from Bragg's Army yesterday. All +the officers' and privates' letters express a belief that Bragg is +fixing to fall back; some say to Huntsville, some to Bridgeport. You +can judge how reliable such suspicions are. I have endeavored to get a +gunboat up to Florence, and if one could go there it could destroy all +the forces, and check Van Dorn materially. I will co-operate with it +in any way to benefit the service.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Brigadier-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>On February 16th General Van Dorn's command commenced crossing the +Tennessee to join General Bragg's Army. I sent my cavalry to attack him. I +wired General Rosecrans that we had attacked Van Dorn's rear guard and +took some fifty prisoners from him. He had with him General Roddey, +commander of some fifteen hundred men, of which we captured about two +hundred. These prisoners said they were ordered to join General Bragg's +Army. General Rosecrans, in answer to my dispatch, sent me this message:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Murfreesborough</span>, February 16, 1863.</p> + +<p><i>Brigadier-General Dodge, Corinth, Miss.</i>:</p> + +<p>Hurlbut's request and my own coincide. Hope you will be able to cut +off some of Van Dorn's command. Will give you all our news in your +direction. Accept my thanks for your promptness and energy.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">W. S. Rosecrans</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p></div> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span>Soon after this General Rosecrans conceived the idea of sending Colonel A. +D. Streight with two thousand mounted cavalry and infantry from Nashville +by boat to Eastport, Miss., to go from there east to Georgia, destroying +the railroads and supplies Bragg's army was depending on, and then move +south and west, finally landing in Corinth, Miss. General Rosecrans +proposed that I should send two brigades to Iuka in support of this +movement, which General Grant acceded to, and said in making this movement +for me to go on and carry out the plan I had suggested in destroying the +Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the supplies gathered along it. I sent +this dispatch, giving my plan of the movement:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Hdqrs. Dist. of Corinth, Deprt. of the Tennessee,<br /> +Corinth</span>, April 4, 1863.</p> + +<p><i>Henry Binmore, Assistant Adjutant-General</i>:</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Captain</span>:—In accordance with Major-General Hurlbut's dispatch, I +submit the plan of operations east of here. General Rosecrans proposes +to land a force at Florence, attack and take that place, while, with a +heavy body of cavalry, he penetrates Alabama north of Tennessee River, +and gets into Johnson's rear. At the same time I am to strike and take +Tuscumbia, and, if practicable, push my cavalry to Decatur, destroy +the saltpeter works, and the Tuscumbia and Decatur Railroad, which +they have just finished, and take all the horses and mules in that +country, to prevent them from raising any large crops. To do this, I +propose to move simultaneously with General Rosecrans, throw all my +cavalry suddenly across Bear Creek, capture the ferries, and hold them +until my infantry and artillery arrive, and then immediately force my +cavalry as far toward Tuscumbia as possible, and secure the crossings +of Little Bear, on which creek the enemy will concentrate. To +accomplish this I shall move light, taking nothing but ammunition and +provisions, and march twenty miles per day, with infantry and +artillery. I shall take such a force as to render certain the success +of the expedition, and propose to take command in person. The movement +is to be made next week, or as soon as General Rosecrans notifies me +he is ready. I trust this will meet the view of the General +commanding.</p> + +<p>I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Brigadier-General Commanding</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>To ascertain what enemy I would have to meet, I sent my chief of staff, +Captain George E. Spencer, a very competent officer who was a genius in +getting inside of the enemy's lines, with a communication to General P. D. +Roddey, who had returned to Tuscumbia, and was in command of the rebel +forces south of the Tennessee River. I told Captain Spencer that the +communication was an important one and he must not deliver it to any one +except General Roddey; that he must impress upon the officer on the +enemy's picket-line that he must take him to General Roddey and in that +way he would be able to determine very closely what forces I would have to +meet. Captain Spencer went prepared to do this. He met<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> the picket +officer; they became very chummy, and the officer took Captain Spencer +right through all of the enemy's forces between Bear River and Tuscumbia, +and he delivered the message to General Roddey, who was in great anger at +his officer; but they made the best of it. After the war, Captain Spencer +and General Roddey were great friends and I believe partners in some +business. The result of Captain Spencer's trip I set forth in the +following dispatch to General Oglesby:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Corinth.</span> <i>April</i> 17, 1863.</p> + +<p><i>Major-General Oglesby, Jackson</i>:</p> + +<p>My A. A. G., Captain George E. Spencer, has just returned from +Tuscumbia; succeeded in getting through all the enemy's camps and +obtaining valuable information. The forces are posted as follows: +Colonel Dibrell, 900 men, at Tuscumbia Landing; Colonel Josiah +Patterson, 1,000, at Florence; Colonel M. W. Hannon, 1,800, at +Tuscumbia; Colonel Roddey's old regiment, 800, at Tuscumbia Landing; +Baxter Smith, 350, ten miles this side; Colonel Hampton, 300 at same +place; W. R. Julian, 300, at Grey's, six miles this side; and Smith, +100, at Big Bear. The above all cavalry. Between Courtland and +Tuscumbia, one brigade of infantry, under Colonel Wood, as follows: +Colonel A. H. Helvenston, 300; Colonel J. B. Bibb, 500; Colonel W. B. +Wood, Sixteenth Alabama, 400. The last brigade, and one brigade of +cavalry, under General Roddey, arrived at Tuscumbia last week. This +more than doubles their force. They have also five pieces of artillery +at Florence and six pieces at Tuscumbia.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Brigadier-General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>Upon notification of General Rosecrans of the movement of Colonel +Streight, I moved out to carry out the combined plan, engaging the enemy +at Little Bear and Tuscumbia, and defeated them as my report shows. +Colonel Streight was greatly delayed in starting from Nashville, and was +only partially mounted, his intention being to complete the mount of his +force as he traveled through the enemy's country—a fatal mistake. His +delay in reaching me and my movement caused Bragg to send General Forrest +to join General Roddey; and so by the time General Streight reached +Eastport, April 21st, the force before me had been doubled and the best +cavalry officer in the rebel force had arrived to take command in my +front.</p> + +<p>Colonel Streight lost part of his horses and mules while unloading at +Eastport, and, although I made an effort to mount him, stripping my own +transportation and scouring the country in my vicinity, still he left us +after I captured Tuscumbia the second time, on May 26th, with two hundred +of his men dismounted and one-half of the rest on mules, illy prepared for +such a trip. I told Colonel Streight that I would hold the enemy in my +front as long<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> as possible, but the moment Colonel Forrest got word of his +movement he would go after him and follow him to death. His only salvation +was to get three or four days' start by long marches before Forrest +learned of his movement. Colonel Streight was an officer peculiarly fitted +for such a raid. He was active, clearheaded, determined, and of excellent +judgment, and his many fights with Forrest showed him full of resources; +but his two-days' halt at Moulton, the heavy rains, and the condition of +his stock, were fatal to him.</p> + +<p>On the morning of May 27th I felt carefully of the enemy and found them in +my front, and commenced immediately to force them back, trying to make +them believe, if they discovered Colonel Streight, that it was only a side +movement into the loyal part of Alabama, where we had many friends and +where we enlisted a Regiment of loyal Alabamians, which was afterwards +known as the First Alabama Cavalry, commanded by Colonel George E. +Spencer, whose Regiment became noted for its valuable service throughout +the war. General Sherman selected it as his headquarters escort in his +march to the sea.</p> + +<p>Generals Forrest and Roddey, on May 28th, made a determined stand to halt +my advance on Town Creek. The high water delayed my crossing, but on the +morning of the 29th, after my force had crossed and driven the enemy from +the heights beyond, I discovered that I had only General Roddey and his +force in my front and I forced my cavalry out towards Decatur until the +enemy disappeared from the front. The evening of the 28th I notified +Colonel Streight that Forrest was still with me, and I was greatly alarmed +to find that Colonel Streight was still directly south of me, when I hoped +he would be well on the road. When General Bragg found that I was +continuing my advance up the Tennessee, destroying his stores, he +despatched General Van Dorn with his cavalry command to cross the +Tennessee at Florence and get in my rear, but as soon as the enemy +disappeared in my front, I turned immediately and marched rapidly back to +Bear River, so that, if General Van Dorn succeeded in crossing the +Tennessee River, I would have him in my front. My troops destroyed all the +supplies in the whole Valley of the Tennessee, burnt the railroad +stations, and destroyed the railroad so that it was never rebuilt until +after the war. There followed me back to Corinth almost the entire negro +population of that valley. They came in every conceivable conveyance from +their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> masters' private carriage to a wheelbarrow, and they had hitched to +the conveyances sometimes a cow and horse and sometimes a fine team of +horses, or a cow and an ox. Hundreds were on foot, with their household +goods packed on a mule, a horse, or a cow. They made a picturesque column, +much longer than my command. At night their camps spread over a large +territory, the camp-fires surrounded by the most motley and poorly-dressed +crowd I ever saw, and it was a problem to me what I could do with them or +what would become of them if the enemy's forces should happen to get into +my rear. However, we all arrived safely at Corinth, where I established +the great contraband camp and guarded it by two companies of Negro +soldiers that I uniformed, armed, and equipped without any authority, and +which came near giving me trouble. Many of the Negro men afterwards joined +the First Alabama Colored Infantry and other Negro Regiments that I raised +and mustered into the service.</p> + +<p>In my advance up the Valley of the Tennessee, after I had passed Beaver +Creek the enemy got into my rear, committing depredations and picking up +stragglers, and all kinds of reports went back to Corinth of our fighting, +capture, and other calamities too numerous to mention. These reports were +all repeated to General Grant, who said, after being surfeited with them, +"Well, if Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do, we can afford +to lose him." General Grant said afterwards in discussing this movement +that he knew they could not capture or destroy the kind of troops I had +with me without my being heard from; that they might defeat me, but they +could not capture me; and the boys used to use this saying in rounding up +what value I was to the service. As my own report and that of Colonel +Streight gives more and better detail of the movements of both, and the +results, I submit them here:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I moved from Corinth with the Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, +Wednesday, April 15. Camped at Burnsville. The next day moved to +Cook's, two and a half miles west of Great Bear Creek, and made my +preparations to cross, the rebels holding the opposite side.</p> + +<p>Friday morning, April 17, I made a feint at Jackson and Bailings +Fords, and, under the cover of my artillery, threw the most of my +force across at Steminine's Ford.</p> + +<p>The cavalry, under Colonel Cornyn, and mounted infantry, under +Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, made the crossing and pushed forward. My +instructions were for them to go forward three and a half miles, and +await my coming. Colonel Cornyn, meeting the enemy about a mile out, +commenced fighting them, they falling back rapidly. Hearing of Colonel +Roddey commanding a force of the enemy on my left flank, I sent +orders<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> forward for the command to halt; but before the messenger got +to him Colonel Roddey had got between the cavalry and infantry. The +Third Brigade was in advance, commanded by Colonel Bane, who, +ascertaining this fact, pushed forward and fell upon their rear, but +not until Colonel Roddey had taken two pieces of artillery, twenty-two +men, and one company of mounted infantry, who were guarding it, which, +through neglect, had been allowed to fall three miles in the rear of +the advance.</p> + +<p>Colonel Cornyn, hearing firing in the rear, immediately fell back, and +with the First Alabama Cavalry charged the rebels and retook the +artillery and caissons, with the exception of one gun, which the enemy +succeeded in getting off with.</p> + +<p>The charge of the Alabamians with muskets only, and those not loaded, +is creditable, especially as they are all new recruits and poorly +drilled. In this charge, Captain Cameron, the commanding officer of +the Alabama Cavalry, a deserving and much-lamented officer, was +killed.</p> + +<p>Colonel Bane, on his arrival, disposed of his troops admirably. +Colonel Cornyn advanced with his cavalry as a feint, and the rebels +advanced to meet him. He fell back to the rear of the infantry, which +was posted under cover and out of sight on both flanks of the cavalry. +On the appearance of the enemy, the infantry opened a heavy and +destructive fire, which caused the rebels to fall back in confusion, +utterly routed. This day's work brought us thirteen miles in advance +of the main force.</p> + +<p>Colonel Streight not arriving, I fell back with the advance to Great +Bear Creek, where the rest of the command was posted, to await his +coming.</p> + +<p>Sunday afternoon, Colonel Streight commenced landing his force at +Eastport, but came poorly prepared for his contemplated movement. He +had two thousand infantry and about one thousand mules. At least four +hundred of them were unserviceable, and in unloading them, through the +carelessness of one of his officers, two hundred strayed away. He was +under the impression that he would find plenty of stock in the valley +to mount the rest and replace those broken down. During Monday and +Tuesday we scoured the country, and found all we could.</p> + +<p>Tuesday night Colonel Fuller's Brigade, from Corinth, joined me.</p> + +<p>Wednesday morning I advanced with all the force, and came up with the +enemy at Rock Cut, five miles west of Tuscumbia; planted my batteries, +and drove them out of it, taking the line of Little Bear Creek that +night. The enemy's position was a very strong one, and there was but +one way to flank it. The enemy fell back as soon as I brought the +infantry to bear upon them.</p> + +<p>Thursday we moved, crossing at three places, throwing my cavalry by +the Frankfort and Tuscumbia road, into the enemy's rear; but during +the night, anticipating this movement, the enemy fell back. We reached +Tuscumbia about noon, and after slight skirmishing took possession of +the city. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, with +two squadrons of mounted infantry, two squadrons of the Fifteenth +Illinois Cavalry, and a section of Welker's battery, to take Florence. +They refused to surrender, when Colonel Phillips immediately opened on +the town. A few shell brought them to terms, and we occupied the +place. At the same time I ordered Colonel Cornyn forward toward +Courtland, to feel the enemy. He came up with their rear some two +miles beyond Leighton. The command consisted on our part of the Tenth +Missouri and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, about eight hundred in all, and +drove the enemy eight miles. The rebel force was thirty-five hundred, +besides one battery. The fighting of the cavalry against such odds is +beyond all praise.</p> + +<p>The next morning the cavalry fell back to Tuscumbia, to await the +advance of the main column.</p> + +<p>Finding it impossible to obtain stock to mount Colonel Streight's +command, I took horses and mules from my teams and mounted infantry, +and furnished him some six hundred head, mounting all but two hundred<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +of his men. I also turned over all my hard bread, some ten thousand +rations, and he left me at midnight on the 26th instant, with the +intention of going through Russellville, Moulton, and Blountsville, to +Gadsden, then divide, one force to strike Rome and the other Etowah +Bridge.</p> + +<p>I moved forward Monday morning, and drove the enemy across Town Greek +that night, and ascertained that they were in force, under Forrest, on +the opposite bank. That night I communicated with Colonel Streight, at +Mount Hope, and ascertained that he was all right.</p> + +<p>Tuesday morning the creek rose ten feet, and the current was so swift +that neither horse nor man could cross. I immediately made disposition +to cross at three points, to cover the railroad bridge and throw +across foot-bridges.</p> + +<p>The resistance of the enemy was very strong, and their sharpshooters +very annoying. The artillery duel was very fine, parts of Welker's, +Tannrath's, Richardson's, and Robinson's batteries taking part in it. +The practice on both sides was excellent. The Parrott guns drove the +enemy away from their pieces, disabling and keeping them away for two +hours, but the fact of my being unable to cross infantry prevented our +securing them.</p> + +<p>About noon I crossed the railroad bridge with the Eighty-first Ohio +and Ninth Illinois Infantry, and soon after crossed the rest of my +force, except the artillery, on foot-bridges, and drove the enemy +within three miles of Courtland, when they, hearing of the force at +Moulton, fled to Decatur. I followed up, and then returned to camp at +Town Creek that night, being unable to cross any of my artillery.</p> + +<p>Colonel Streight reached Moulton Tuesday night, and commenced crossing +the mountains Wednesday, having got nearly two days' start of them. +They supposed he was making for Decatur, and only discovered Wednesday +that he was crossing the mountains toward Georgia.</p> + +<p>Having accomplished fully the object of the expedition, and driving +the enemy, which was 5,500 strong, to Decatur, and having been on half +rations for a week, I fell back to Tuscumbia, in order to communicate +with transports, to obtain rations and ammunition. On arriving there I +received information that the gunboats had gone down the river, taking +the transports with them, a part of Van Dorn's force having made their +appearance on the north side of the Tennessee River and shelled South +Florence that day at 4 p. m. They also planted a battery at Savannah +and Duck River; but my precaution in destroying all means of crossing +the river on my advance, prevented him getting in my rear, and the +gunboats, to save the transports, left the day before, having a short +engagement at Savannah and Duck River. Van Dorn's force then moved +toward Decatur. That was the last we heard of them.</p> + +<p>On my return I burned all provisions, produce, and forage, all mills +and tan-yards, and destroyed everything that would in any way aid the +enemy. I took stock of all kinds that I could find, and rendered the +valley so destitute that it cannot be occupied by the Confederates, +except provisions and forage are transported to them. I also destroyed +telegraph and railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and all the +ferries between Savannah and Courtland.</p> + +<p>I have no doubt but that Colonel Streight would have succeeded had he +been properly equipped and joined me at the time agreed upon. The +great delay in an enemy's country necessary to fit him out gave them +time to throw a large force in our front. Although Colonel Streight +had two days' start, they can harass him, and perhaps check his +movements long enough for them to secure all their important bridges. +If he could have started from Bear Creek the day I arrived there, then +my movements would have been so quick and strong that the enemy could +not have got their forces together.</p> + +<p>The animals furnished him were very poor at the start. Four hundred of +them were used up before leaving me, and those furnished him by me<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +were about all the serviceable stock he had, though I hear he got two +hundred good mules the day he left me, in Moulton Valley.</p> + +<p>On my return, I sent Colonel Cornyn, with the Tenth Missouri, Seventh +Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted +Infantry, to attack the force congregated at Tupelo and Okolona. He +came up with the enemy on Wednesday, and immediately attacked them, +they being some three thousand strong, under Major-General S. J. +Gholson and Brigadier-General Ruggles. Brigadier-General Chalmers, +with thirty-five hundred men, was at Pontotoc, but failed to come to +Gholson's aid, though ordered to.</p> + +<p>Colonel Cornyn fought so determinedly and so fast that he soon routed +the force in his front, driving them in all directions, killing and +wounding a large number and taking one hundred prisoners, including +some seven officers; also a large number of arms and one hundred and +fifty horses, saddles, etc.</p> + +<p>The enemy fled toward Okolona and Pontotoc, and Colonel Cornyn +returned to Corinth.</p> + +<p>The expedition so far can be summed up as having accomplished the +object for which it started, the infantry having marched two hundred +and fifty miles and the cavalry some four hundred, and fought six +successful engagements, driving the enemy, three thousand strong, from +Bear Creek to Decatur, taking the towns of Tuscumbia and Florence, +with a loss not to exceed one hundred, including three officers. +Destroyed a million and a half bushels of corn, besides large +quantities of oats, rye, and fodder, and five hundred thousand pounds +of bacon. Captured one hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand head +of horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, hogs, and sheep; +also one hundred bales of cotton, besides keeping the whole command in +meat for three weeks. Destroyed the railroad from Tuscumbia to +Decatur; also some sixty flat-boats and ferries in the Tennessee +River, thereby preventing Van Dorn, in his move, from crossing to my +rear; also destroyed five tan-yards and six flouring-mills.</p> + +<p>It has rendered desolate one of the best granaries of the South, +preventing them from raising another crop this year, and taking away +from them some fifteen hundred negroes.</p> + +<p>We found large quantities of shelled corn, all ready for shipment, +also bacon, and gave it to the flames.</p> + +<p>I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 18em;"><i>Brigadier-General U. S. A.</i></span></p></div> + +<p>The following is Colonel A. D. Streight's report:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>General Dodge informed me that there was no doubt but Forrest had +crossed the Tennessee River, and was in the vicinity of Town Creek; +hence, he agreed to advance as far as Courtland, on the Decatur road, +and, if possible, drive the enemy in that direction, but if they (the +enemy) turned toward Moulton, our cavalry, under General Dodge, was to +be sent in pursuit.</p> + +<p>With this understanding, I marched from Tuscumbia at 11 p. m. on the +night of the 26th instant in the direction of Moulton, via +Russellville. It was raining very hard, and the mud and darkness of +the night made our progress very slow. One hundred and fifty of my men +had neither horses nor mules, and fully as many more had such as were +unable to carry more than the saddles; hence fully three hundred of +the men were on foot.</p> + +<p>It was expected when I left General Dodge that the greater part of my +command would be able to reach Moulton, some forty miles distant, by +the next night, but, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad +condition of the roads, it was impossible; consequently I dispatched a +messenger to General Dodge, stating that I would halt at Mount Hope +and wait for the portion of my command who were on foot to come up.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>We continued to scour the country for horses and mules, but so many of +those drawn at Nashville were continually failing, that, although we +were successful in collecting a large number, still, many of the men +were without anything to ride.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 27th, at Mount Hope, I received word from General +Dodge, stating that he had driven the enemy, and that I should push +on. My command had not all come up yet, nor did they until about 10 +a. m. the next day, when we proceeded to Moulton, where we arrived +about dark. Up to this time we had been skirmishing occasionally with +small squads of the enemy, but I could hear of no force of consequence +in the country. All of the command but about fifty men were now +mounted.</p> + +<p>We started from Moulton, in the direction of Blountsville, via Day's +Gap, about midnight on April 28. The two previous days it had been +raining most of the time, and the roads were terrible, though on the +evening of the 28th it bid fair for dry weather, which gave us strong +hopes of better times.</p> + +<p>We marched the next day (the 29th) to Day's Gap, about thirty-five +miles, and bivouacked for the night. Every man now was mounted, and +although many of the animals were very poor, nevertheless we had +strong hopes that we could easily supply all future demands. We +destroyed during the day a large number of wagons belonging to the +enemy, laden with provisions, arms, tents, etc., which had been sent +to the mountains to avoid us, but, luckily, they fell into our hands. +We were now in the midst of devoted Union people. Many of Captain +Smith's men (Alabamians) were recruited near this place, and many were +the happy greetings between them and their friends and relations. I +could learn nothing of the enemy in the country, with the exception of +small squads of scouting-parties, who were hunting conscripts. We +moved out the next morning before daylight. I will here remark that my +men had been worked very hard in scouring so much of the country, and, +unaccustomed as they were to riding, made it still worse; +consequently, they were illy prepared for the trying ordeal through +which they were to pass. I had not proceeded more than two miles, at +the head of the column, before I was informed that the rear guard had +been attacked, and just at that moment I heard the boom of artillery +in the rear of the column. I had previously learned that the gap +through which we were passing was easily flanked by gaps through the +mountains, both above and below; consequently, I sent orders to the +rear to hold the enemy in check until we could prepare for action. The +head of the column was at the time on the top of the mountain. The +column was moving through the gap; consequently the enemy was easily +held in check.</p> + +<p>I soon learned that the enemy had moved through the gaps on my right +and left, and were endeavoring to form a junction in my advance; +consequently I moved ahead rapidly until we passed the intersecting +roads on either flank with the one we occupied. The country was open +sand ridges, very thinly wooded, and afforded fine defensive +positions. As soon as we passed the point above designated (about +three miles from the top of the mountains), we dismounted and formed a +line of battle on a ridge circling to the rear. Our right rested on a +precipitous ravine and the left was protected by a marshy run that was +easily held against the enemy. The mules were sent into a ravine to +the rear of our right, where they were protected from the enemy's +bullets. I also deployed a line of skirmishers, resting on our right +and left flanks encircling our rear, in order to prevent a surprise +from any detached force of the enemy that might approach us from that +direction and to prevent any straggling of either stray animals or +cowardly men.</p> + +<p>In the meantime I had instructed Captain Smith, who had command of our +rear guard (now changed to our front), to hold his position until the +enemy pressed him closely, when he should retreat rapidly, and, if +possible, draw them onto our lines, which were concealed by the men +lying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> down immediately back of the top of the ridge. The lines were +left sufficiently open to permit Captain Smith's command to pass +through near the center. I had two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers, +which were stationed near the road (the center). They were also +concealed. We had hardly completed our arrangements when the enemy +charged Captain Smith in large force, following him closely, and no +sooner had he passed our lines than our whole line rose up and +delivered a volley at short range. We continued to pour a rapid fire +into their ranks, which soon caused them to give way in confusion; but +their reinforcements soon came up, when they dismounted, formed, and +made a determined and vigorous attack. Our skirmishers were soon +driven in, and about the same time the enemy opened upon us with a +battery of artillery.</p> + +<p>The enemy soon attempted to carry our lines, but were handsomely +repulsed. During their advance they had run their artillery to within +three hundred yards of our lines, and as soon as they began to waver I +prepared for a charge. I ordered Colonel Hathaway, Seventy-third +Indiana, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana, on the +left, to make a charge, in order to draw the attention of the battery, +and immediately threw the Third Ohio, Colonel Lawson, and the +Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Rodgers, forward rapidly, +hoping to capture the battery. The enemy, after a short but stubborn +resistance, fled in confusion, leaving two pieces of artillery, two +caissons, and about forty prisoners, representing seven different +regiments, a larger number of wounded, and about thirty dead on the +field. Among the former was Captain William H. Forrest, a brother of +General Forrest. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, among +the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana (mortally), +a brave and gallant officer and one that we were illy prepared to +lose, and Lieutenant Pavey, Eightieth Illinois (on my staff), +severely.</p> + +<p>It was now about 11 o'clock, fighting having continued since about 6 +o'clock in the morning. I had learned, in the meantime, that the enemy +were in heavy force, fully three times our number, with twelve pieces +of artillery, under General Forrest in person; consequently I was +fearful that they were making an effort to get around us and attack in +the rear of our position; hence I decided to resume the march. +Everything was soon in readiness, and we moved out, leaving a strong +guard (dismounted) in the rear, to check any immediate advance the +enemy might make previous to the column getting in motion. We were not +too soon in our movements, for the column had hardly passed a +cross-road some six miles from our first battle-ground when the enemy +were discovered advancing on our left. Sharp skirmishing commenced at +Crooked Creek, which is about ten miles south of Day's Gap, and +finally the enemy pressed our rear so hard that I was compelled to +prepare for battle. I selected a strong position about a mile south of +the crossing of the creek, on a ridge called Hog Mountain. The whole +force soon became engaged (about one hour before dark). The enemy +strove first to carry our right; then charged the left; but with the +help of the two pieces of artillery captured in the morning and the +two mountain howitzers, all of which were handled with good effect by +Major Vananda, of the Third Ohio, we were able to repulse them.</p> + +<p>Fighting continued until about 10 p. m. when the enemy were driven +from our front, leaving a large number of killed and wounded on the +field. I determined at once to resume our march, and as soon as +possible we moved out. The ammunition which we had captured with the +two guns was exhausted, and being very short of horses, I ordered the +guns spiked and the carriages destroyed. I had ordered the +Seventy-third Indiana (Colonel Hathaway) to act as rear guard, and I +remained in the rear in person, for the purpose of being at hand in +case the enemy should attempt to press us as we were moving out. We +had but fairly got under way when I received information of the +enemy's advance.</p> + +<p>The moon shone very brightly, and the country was an open woodland,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +with an occasional spot of thick undergrowth. In one of these thickets +I placed the Seventy-third Indiana, lying down, and not more than +twenty paces from the road, which was in plain view. The enemy +approached. The head of his column passed without discovering our +position. At this moment the whole regiment opened a most destructive +fire, causing a complete stampede of the enemy. I will here remark +that the country from Day's Gap to Blountsville (about forty miles) is +mostly uninhabited; consequently there is nothing in the country for +man or beast. I had hopes that by pushing ahead we could reach a place +where we could feed before the enemy would come up with us, and, by +holding him back where there was no feed, compel him to lay over a day +at least to recuperate. I had learned that they had been on a forced +march from Town Creek, Ala., a day and two nights previous to their +attacking us. We were not again disturbed until we had marched several +miles, when they attacked our rear guard vigorously. I again succeeded +in ambuscading them, which caused them to give up the pursuit for the +night. We continued our march, and reached Blountsville about 10 +o'clock in the morning. Many of our mules had given out, leaving their +riders on foot, but there was very little straggling behind the rear +guard.</p> + +<p>At Blountsville we found sufficient corn to feed our tired and hungry +animals. Ammunition and rations were hastily distributed to the men, +and the remaining ammunition was put on pack-mules and the wagons +burned, as it was now understood that it would be impossible to take +them over the roads before us. After resting about two hours, we +resumed our march in the direction of Gadsden.</p> + +<p>The column had not got fairly under motion before our pickets were +driven in, and a sharp skirmish ensued between Forrest's advance and +our rear guard, under Captain Smith, in the town of Blountsville. The +enemy followed closely for several miles, continually skirmishing with +the rear guard, but were badly handled by small parties of our men +stopping in the thick bushes by the side of the road and firing at +them at short range, and when we reached the East Branch of the Black +Warrior River the ford was very deep and the enemy pressed so closely +that I was compelled to halt and offer him battle before we could +cross. After some maneuvering, I advanced a heavy line of skirmishers, +who drove the enemy out of sight of my main line, when I ordered the +troops, except the skirmishers, to cross the river as rapidly as +possible. After all had crossed except the skirmishers, they were +rapidly withdrawn, under cover of our artillery, and a heavy line of +skirmishers thrown out on the opposite bank for that purpose. It was +about 5 p. m. when the last of the command crossed the East Branch of +the Black Warrior. We proceeded in the direction of Gadsden without +further interruption, with the exception of small parties who were +continually harassing the rear of the column, until about 9 o'clock +the next morning, May 2, when the rear guard was fiercely attacked at +the crossing of Black Creek, near Gadsden. After a sharp fight the +enemy was repulsed.</p> + +<p>I had learned in the meantime, through my scouts, that a large column +of the enemy was moving on our left, parallel with our route, +evidently with the intention of getting in our front, which made it +necessary for us to march all night, though the command was in no +condition to do so, and, to add still more to my embarrassment, a +portion of our ammunition had become damaged in crossing Will's Creek, +which, at the time, was very deep fording. I only halted at Gadsden +sufficiently long to destroy a quantity of arms and commissary stores +found there, and proceeded on. Many of our animals and men were +entirely worn out and unable to keep up with the column; consequently +they fell behind the rear guard and were captured.</p> + +<p>It now became evident to me that our only hope was in crossing the +river at Rome and destroying the bridge, which would delay Forrest a +day<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> or two and give us time to collect horses and mules, and allow +the command a little time to sleep, without which it was impossible to +proceed.</p> + +<p>The enemy followed closely, and kept up a continuous skirmish with the +rear of the column until about 4 p. m., at which time we reached +Blount's plantation, about fifteen miles from Gadsden, where we could +procure forage for our animals. Here I decided to halt, as it was +impossible to continue the march through the night without feeding and +resting, although to do so was to bring on a general engagement. +Accordingly, the command was dismounted, and a detail made to feed the +horses and mules, while the balance of the command formed in line of +battle on a ridge southwest of the plantation.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile the rear guard, in holding the enemy in check, had become +severely engaged and was driven in. The enemy at once attacked our +main line, and tried hard to carry the center, but were gallantly met +and repulsed by the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, assisted by +Major Vananda, with two mountain howitzers. They then made a +determined effort to turn our right, but were met by the gallant +Eightieth Illinois, assisted by two companies of the Third Ohio.</p> + +<p>The enemy, with the exception of a few skirmishers, then fell back to +a ridge some half a mile distant, and commenced massing his force, as +if preparing for a more determined attack. It was becoming dark, and I +decided to withdraw unobserved, if possible, and conceal my command in +a thicket some half a mile to our rear, there to lie in ambush and +await his advance. In the meantime I had ordered Captain Milton +Russell (Fifty-first Indiana) to take two hundred of the best-mounted +men, selected from the whole command, and proceed to Rome, and hold +the bridge until the main command could come up.</p> + +<p>The engagement at Blount's plantation revealed the fact that nearly +all of our remaining ammunition was worthless, on account of having +been wet. Much of that carried by the men had become useless by the +paper wearing out and the powder sifting away. It was in this +engagement that the gallant Colonel Hathaway (Seventy-third Indiana) +fell, mortally wounded, and in a few moments expired. Our country has +seldom been called upon to mourn the loss of so brave and valuable an +officer. His loss to me was irreparable. His men had almost worshiped +him, and when he fell it cast a deep gloom of despondency over his +regiment which was hard to overcome.</p> + +<p>We remained in ambush but a short time when the enemy, who by some +means had learned of our whereabouts, commenced a flank movement, +which we discovered in time to check. I then decided to withdraw as +silently as possible, and push on in the direction of Rome, but as a +large number of the men were dismounted, their animals having given +out, and the remainder of the stock was so jaded, tender-footed, and +worn down, our progress was necessarily slow; yet, as everything +depended on our reaching Rome before the enemy could throw a +sufficient force there to prevent our crossing the bridge, every +possible effort was made to urge the command forward. We proceeded +without interruption until we reached the vicinity of Centre, when one +of my scouts informed me that a force of the enemy was posted in +ambush but a short distance in our front. I immediately threw forward +a line of skirmishers, with orders to proceed until they were fired +upon, when they should open a brisk fire on the enemy, and hold their +position until the command had time to pass.</p> + +<p>The plan worked admirably, for, while my skirmishers were amusing the +enemy, the main column made a detour to the right, and struck the main +road some three miles to the rear of the enemy. As soon as our main +force had passed, the skirmishers withdrew and fell in the rear of the +column. I was then hopeful that we could reach Rome before the enemy +could overtake us. My principal guide had thus far proved reliable, +and I had made particular inquiries of him as to the character of the +road<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> and the country the evening before, and he assured me that there +were no difficult streams to cross and that the road was good; hence +we approached the Chattanooga River at the ferry without any +information as to the real condition of things. Captain Russell had +managed to ferry the last of his command across about one hour +previous to my arrival, but the enemy had seized and run off the boat +before we reached there.</p> + +<p>I then ascertained that there was a bridge some seven or eight miles +up the river, near Gaylesville, and procured new guides and pushed on +as rapidly as possible in order to reach the bridge before the enemy +should take possession of it. We had to pass over an old coal-chopping +for several miles, where the timber had been cut and hauled off for +charcoal, leaving innumerable wagon-roads running in every direction, +and the command was so worn out and exhausted that many were asleep, +and in spite of every exertion I could make, with the aid of such of +my officers as were able for duty, the command became separated and +scattered into several squads, traveling in different directions, and +it was not until near daylight that the last of the command had +crossed the river. The bridge was burned, and we proceeded on and +passed Cedar Bluff just after daylight. It now became evident that the +horses and mules could not reach Rome without halting to rest and +feed. Large numbers of the mules were continually giving out. In fact, +I do not think that at that time we had a score of the mules drawn at +Nashville left, and nearly all of those taken in the country were +barefooted, and many of them had such sore backs and tender feet that +it was impossible to ride them; but, in order to get as near as +possible to the force I had sent ahead, we struggled on until about 9 +a. m. when we halted and fed our animals. The men, being unaccustomed +to riding, had become so exhausted from fatigue and loss of sleep that +it was almost impossible to keep them awake long enough to feed. We +had halted but a short time, when I was informed that a heavy force of +the enemy was moving on our left, on a route parallel with the one we +were marching on, and was then nearer Rome than we were. About the +same time I received this information our pickets were driven in. The +command was immediately ordered into line, and every effort made to +rally the men for action, but nature was exhausted, and a large +portion of my best troops actually went to sleep while lying in line +of battle under a severe skirmish-fire. After some maneuvering, +Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of my forces. +Most of my regimental commanders had already expressed the opinion +that, unless we could reach Rome and cross the river before the enemy +came up with us again, we should be compelled to surrender. +Consequently, I called a council of war. I had learned, however, in +the meantime that Captain Russell had been unable to take the bridge +at Rome. Our condition was fully canvassed. As I have remarked before, +our ammunition was worthless, our horses and mules in a desperate +condition, the men were overcome with fatigue and loss of sleep, and +we were confronted by fully three times our number, in the heart of +the enemy's country, and, although personally opposed to surrender, +and so expressed myself at the time, yet I yielded to the unanimous +voice of my regimental commanders, and at once entered into +negotiations with Forrest to obtain the best possible terms I could +for my command, and at about noon, May 3, we surrendered as prisoners +of war.</p> + +<p>We were taken to Richmond, Va. The men were soon sent through the +lines and exchanged. My officers and myself were confined in Libby +Prison, where we remained until the night of February 9 last, when +four of my officers and myself, together with several other prisoners, +succeeded in making our escape, and reached Washington in safety about +March 1. The balance of my officers, or nearly all of them, are still +confined as prisoners or have died of disease the result of long +confinement, insufficient food, and cruel treatment at the hands of +the enemy.</p> + +<p>I am unable to report the exact number of casualties in the command,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span> +but from the best information I have been able to obtain there were +fifteen officers and about one hundred and thirty enlisted men killed +and wounded. It was a matter of astonishment to all that so much +fighting should occur with so few casualties on our side; but we acted +purely on the defensive, and took advantage of the nature of the +country as best we could. From actual personal observation where we +had driven the enemy from the field, and from what my surgeons, left +with our wounded, learned in relation to the loss of the enemy, I am +convinced that we killed more of his men than we lost in both killed +and wounded.</p> + +<p>Previous to the surrender, we had captured and paroled about two +hundred prisoners, and had lost about the same number in consequence +of the animals giving out, and the men, unable to keep up, broke down +from exhaustion, and were necessarily picked up by the enemy; but in +no case was the enemy able to capture a single man in any skirmish or +battle within my knowledge.</p> + +<p>I deem it proper to mention the barbarous treatment my wounded +received at the hands of the enemy. Owing to the nature of the service +we were performing, we were compelled to leave our wounded behind. I +provided for them as best I could by leaving them blankets and such +rations as we had, and two of my surgeons remained behind to attend +them; but no sooner did the enemy get possession of our hospitals than +they robbed both officers and men of their blankets, coats, hats, +boots, shoes, rations, and money. The medical stores and instruments +were taken from the surgeons, and my wounded left in a semi-naked and +starving condition, in some instances many miles from any inhabitants, +to perish.</p> + +<p>Many thanks to the Union ladies of that country, for they saved many a +brave soldier from a horrible death.</p> + +<p>In reviewing the history of this ill-fated expedition, I am convinced +that had we been furnished at Nashville with 800 good horses, instead +of poor, young mules, we would have been successful, in spite of all +other drawbacks; or if General Dodge had succeeded in detaining +Forrest one day longer, we would have been successful even with our +poor outfit.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">A. D. Streight</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;"><i>Colonel Fifty-first Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>On my return, I dispatched Colonel Cornyn with his Brigade to the attack +of the force of the enemy that I had located near Tupelo, Miss. He tells +the story of his battle better than I can, in his official report, which +follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>We arrived at Tupelo on Tuesday, May 5, and here we fought the +best-contested fight of the whole expedition. Just before entering the +town of Tupelo, and to the east of the railroad, it is necessary to +cross a dense and almost impassable swamp, on the western edge of +which runs Old Town Creek. We had almost reached the western edge, and +were approaching, as well as the nature of the swamp would permit, the +bridge over this creek, when the enemy, entirely unseen by us, opened +upon us with musketry. I immediately threw out to my right and left +several squadrons of the Tenth Missouri, who succeeded in dislodging +the enemy, and securing an easy passage of the bridge for the balance +of the command. Still keeping my skirmishers out to my right and left, +and an advance guard in front, I moved down a lane to the left and +south of the town and massed my command in an open field, about six +hundred yards from the southern border of Tupelo. Here word was +brought me from one of my skirmishing squadrons that the enemy were +drawn up in line on their front, to the number of six hundred. I +ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were armed with +Colt's revolving rifles, to dismount and attack them on foot, +supporting them with two squadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted),<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span> +under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, with orders to charge with the saber +as soon as the enemy's line should break. This order, I am proud to +say, was well obeyed and gallantly executed by both the mounted and +dismounted soldiers, for the enemy retired, and for a few minutes all +was silent along the lines. In about half an hour from the first +attack, sharp firing was heard on my front, and the enemy was +advancing toward us with yells. I immediately moved my whole force to +the rear and west of the village, and, placing my mountain howitzers +upon the brow of a hill, I sent forward all the cavalry except one +squadron of the Fifteenth Illinois, which I ordered to dismount and +support the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding the Ninth +Illinois Mounted Infantry, having been detailed for that purpose early +in the morning, acted as the rear guard and guard for the train, and, +knowing that the rear was in such good hands, I felt no anxiety on +that account; and this important trust was well sustained. As soon as +my front had become fully engaged with the enemy, who fought with +considerable determination, I ordered the battery to shell the woods +from which the enemy was emerging. This fire was effective, and from +that moment the battle became general. At one time two regiments of +mounted infantry, commanded by the rebel General Ruggles, forced their +way between my fighting column and my reserve, but were suddenly +induced to retire much more rapidly than they came. My left at one +time fell back toward the battery, which then poured charge after +charge of canister into the rebel ranks, with considerable effect, +forcing them to retreat, rapidly followed by the cavalry. The enemy +had scarcely begun to waver when his whole force fled in dismay, +throwing away their arms, coats, and hats. We took from the enemy +eighty-one prisoners, including three commissioned officers. On the +field, the scene of the battle, immense quantities of arms, coats, and +blankets were found and destroyed by us. I had no means of +ascertaining the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, but from the +evidence of the battle-field it must have been heavy.</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">Florence M. Cornyn</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 4em;"><i>Colonel Tenth Missouri Cavalry, Commanding Cavalry Brigade</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>Colonel Cornyn was a very efficient cavalry officer and always +accomplished whatever he was sent to do. He was an aggressive fighter, +always attacking, no matter what the force before him, and had won a +deserved standing as a Brigade commander. When he was killed, by his +Lieutenant-Colonel, Bowen, during the latter's trial before a +court-martial on charges preferred by Colonel Cornyn, there was a bitter +personal dispute and enmity between them which came to this sad ending.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 880px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i128.jpg" alt="ARMY AND CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>ARMY AND CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE</b></p> +<p class="caption">Left to Right—Front Row, Major-General W. T. Sherman, Major-General U. S. +Grant, Major-General James B. McPherson, Major-General O. O. Howard. Rear +row, Major-General John A. Logan, Major-General G. M. Dodge, Major-General +Frank P. Blair. Extreme right, Brigadier-General John A. Fuller, leading +Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. Copy of painting by James E. Taylor +for Major-General W. T. Sherman.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span></p> +<h2>THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Address to the Army of the Tennessee</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Delivered at the National Encampment, G. A. R.</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Washington, D. C., October, 1902</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">By Major-general Grenville M. Dodge</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p><i>Comrades of the Army of the Tennessee</i>:</p> + +<p>On the 28th of August, 1861, General U. S. Grant was assigned to duty in +command of the District of Southeast Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo, +Ill., and here commenced the organization and growth of the Army of the +Tennessee. It remained under his personal command, or as a unit of his +great Army, from the beginning until the end of the war, except for two +short intervals, one after the great Battle of Donelson, and the other +after the greater Battle of Shiloh, both of which he won, and gave the +first great light and hope to our country; and it is hard now, after +reading all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved. +It appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no +intention of doing injustice to General Grant.</p> + +<p>Following General Grant as commander came General Sherman, a member of the +Army almost as long as General Grant. General Sherman was in direct +command, or the Army served under him as a unit of his greater Army, from +the time he assumed command until the end of the war.</p> + +<p>After General Sherman came General McPherson, that ideal soldier, who +commanded the Army until he fell in the great Battle of Atlanta, on the +22d of July. Upon his death, General Logan took command of the Army, as +the senior officer present, and at the end of the battle of July 22d he +could say that he had met and defeated Hood's whole Army in the greatest +battle of that campaign.</p> + +<p>Following General Logan came General O. O. Howard, the only General taken +from another Army to command it in all the history of the Army of the +Tennessee, or even any of its Corps.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> The next day after assuming command +General Howard led the Army into the great battle of the 28th of July, +which the Confederates said was not a battle, but a simple killing and +slaughtering of their forces. He remained in command until the end of the +Rebellion, and at the end of the war generously gave way to General Logan, +so that one of its original members might command it at the great review +here in Washington—an act that could come only from such a just and +thoughtful soldier as Howard.</p> + +<p>I speak of our Army's commanders first, as an Army takes its habits and +character from its head; and probably no other Army in the world was so +fortunate as to have always at its head great soldiers and great +commanders, recognized as such the world over—two of them the peers of +any commander that ever stood up in a great conflict.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Tennessee covered more ground in its campaigns than all +the other Armies combined, and all its campaigns were marked by some great +struggle, battle, or movement that challenged the admiration of the world. +First came Fort Donelson, next Vicksburg, and following that Chattanooga, +where it fought on both flanks in that great battle, one Division taking +the point of Lookout Mountain above the clouds. Then came the Atlanta +campaign; following that the strategical march to the sea; and, finally, +that bold movement from Savannah to Goldsboro, which is considered by the +best critics as one of the boldest and best-planned campaigns of +history—one in which every chance was taken, and every opportunity given +the enemy to concentrate upon an inferior force.</p> + +<p>The record of this Army is probably the most satisfactory of any that ever +existed, as it was harmonious in all its parts and had no jealousies, each +of its units to the best of its ability helping the others. Again, it was +modest; it struck blow after blow, and let the world sing its praises. All +its campaigns were great successes, and it never lost a battle. All its +Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade commanders were exceptionally able men, +and were seldom relieved except to assume more important commands. Its +experiences were more varied than any other Army, for in its campaigns, +battles, and marches, reaching from the Missouri River to the Atlantic, at +Washington, over a territory two thousand miles long and five hundred +miles wide, it opened the Mississippi, it forced its way to the sea, it +was reviewed by the Government of the nation here in this city, and it +disbanded and the men went to their homes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span> without causing an unpleasant +comment or a painful thought in all this broad land.</p> + +<p>The Society of the Army of the Tennessee is endeavoring to perpetuate its +history and memories by erecting here in this capital of our great nation +monuments to the memory of its dead commanders which will place before the +world not only their deeds, but the great events in which our Army took so +important a part. First came General McPherson, as he was the first to +fall, in the great Battle of Atlanta. He fell just after watching the +attack in the rear on the Sixteenth Army Corps, which held the key to the +situation. He was a dear friend of mine; and the last words he spoke were +in praise of the fighting of that Corps. General Sherman, in reporting his +death, spoke of him as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant +and heroic gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, +and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of +one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and +ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had +called into existence to vindicate her honor and integrity. History +tells of but few who so blended the grace and the gentleness of the +friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. +His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, never +spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect. Those +whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and +commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great +worth.</p></div> + +<p>General McPherson was so dear to our old Army that the great victory at +the Battle of Atlanta was never spoken of by our Army except to express +our great grief at the loss of our commander. His faith in what he could +accomplish with our Army was unbounded. He spoke of us on July 4, 1863, as +follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>With tireless energy, with sleepless vigilance, by night and by day, +with battery and with rifle-pits, with trench and mine, you made your +sure approaches, until, overcome by fatigue and driven to despair in +the attempt to oppose your irresistible progress, the whole garrison +of over 30,000 men, with all their arms and munitions of war, have, on +this, the anniversary of our National Independence, surrendered to the +invincible troops of the Army of the Tennessee. The achievements of +this hour will give a new meaning to this memorable day, and Vicksburg +will brighten the glow of the patriot's heart which kindles at the +mention of Bunker Hill and Yorktown. This is indeed an auspicious day +for you. The God of Battle is with you. The dawn of a conquered peace +is breaking upon you. The plaudits of an admiring world will hail you +wherever you go, and it will be an ennobling heritage, surpassing all +riches, to have been of the Army of the Tennessee on the Fourth of +July, 1863.</p></div> + +<p>Next we erected the statue, facing Pennsylvania Avenue, of General John A. +Rawlins, who, above all, represented the organization and spirit of our +great Army, and who shared its fortunes<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span> from beginning to end as Chief of +Staff of its first and greatest commander. In 1873, upon the death of +General Rawlins, General John A. Logan spoke of him thus:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>But there is one whose tongue is now still in death whose name I +cannot forbear to mention; one who, though gone from our midst, is +with us in memory: for who can forget John A. Rawlins? Faithful in +every duty, true in every trust, though dead he is not forgotten; +though gone forever, yet he will ever live in affectionate remembrance +in the hearts of all who knew him. His name is woven in indelible +colors in the history of our country, and is linked with a fame that +is undying.</p></div> + +<p>General Rawlins, in giving a history of the Army of the Tennessee, paid +this tribute to it:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>In no army did the soldier enjoy greater liberty, consistent with +military discipline, than in the Army of the Tennessee, and in none +were his rights and his life more carefully guarded.</p> + +<p>The subordination of the Army of the Tennessee to the policies and +acts of the Government affecting the institution of slavery in the +prosecution of the war, is worthy of the highest commendation. It had +no policy of its own to propose, but went forth, as expressed by the +legislative branch of the Government, to do battle in no spirit of +oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose +of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established +institutions of the States in rebellion; but to defend and maintain +the supremacy of the constitution, and to preserve the Union with all +the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Tennessee did great deeds in all the departments of +the States' service, and individually and collectively illustrated in +a peculiar manner the qualities of noble American character which +gained success in the field, preserved its fruits by subsequent +statesmanship, and by exalted virtue crowned victory with the +attributes of peace and justice.</p></div> + +<p>In April, 1900, we unveiled the beautiful and life-like monument to +General John A. Logan, that brilliant, magnetic soldier, our comrade from +Cairo to Louisville. Of him, at the unveiling, President McKinley spoke as +follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Logan's career was unique. His distinction does not rest upon his +military achievements alone. His services in the Legislature of his +own State, in the National House of Representatives, and in the Senate +of the United States, would have given him an equally conspicuous +place in the annals of the country. He was great in the forum and in +the field.</p> + +<p>He came out of the war with the highest military honors of the +volunteer soldier. Brilliant in battle and strong in military council, +his was also the true American spirit, for when the war was ended he +was quick and eager to return to the peaceful pursuits of civil life.</p></div> + +<p>General Logan's love and devotion to us only ended with his life, and at +one of our reunions he characterized our work thus:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>The Army of the Tennessee was not limited in its scope; the theater of +its operations and the extent of its marches, comprehending within +their bounds an area greater than Greece and Macedonia in their +palmiest days, and greater than most of the leading kingdoms of Europe +at the present day, reached from the Missouri River on the north +nearly to the Gulf of Mexico on the south, and from the Red River of +Louisiana to the Atlantic Ocean.</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>The friendship and loyalty of Sherman to Grant was the first great cause +of the success of both, and for the harmony that existed in the Army of +the Tennessee. Sherman fell under the command of Grant at Paducah, in the +spring of 1862, holding a small command. He was the ideal soldier, as he +dropped from a Department and Army commander to that of a post, and later +a Division, without a murmur. Sherman's first words to Grant, on February +15, 1862, were these:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I should like to hear from you, and will do everything in my power to +hurry forward to you reinforcements and supplies, and if I could be of +service myself would gladly come without making any question of rank +with you or General Smith, whose commissions are of the same date.</p></div> + +<p>On the same date he wrote again:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Command me in any way. I feel anxious about you, as I know the great +facilities they [the enemy] have of concentration, by means of the +river and railroads, but have faith in you.</p></div> + +<p>The monument to our old commander, General Sherman, is nearly complete. It +is upon these grounds we expect to unveil it next October, and, as +President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and as President of +the Commission which has in charge the erection of the monument, I give +you a cordial invitation to be present. You will receive due notice, and +proper arrangements will be made for the occasion, and you will meet here +your comrades of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac, and the Ohio, +who have already signified their intention of being present to honor the +memory of our old commander.</p> + +<p>And now, my comrades, it is with the greatest satisfaction that I say to +you that after seven years' continued effort, this year we obtained an +appropriation from Congress of $250,000 to be used in the erection of a +monument upon these grounds to General U. S. Grant, (and the model for it +will soon be selected,) to this modest, charitable, and just soldier and +statesman. The whole world has given its tribute. From those whom we +fought and defeated have come the most gallant words of praise and +touching sympathy. President Lincoln, above all others, recognized his +power and ability when he handed him his commission and gave him command +of all the Armies, and assured him that he should not in any way interfere +with him,—armed him with all the powers of the President, with <i>carte +blanche</i> to use them as he saw fit. Grant made his answer at Appomattox, +bringing peace to our nation and gratitude to the conquered. General Grant +was a man of few words, and when<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> called upon to speak of the Army of the +Tennessee, paid it this tribute:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>As an Army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat +during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed +surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, +captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of +that Army who had afterwards to be relieved from it, or to be reduced +to another command. Such a history is not accident.</p></div> + +<p>And now, my comrades, one of our number who has left us by an assassin's +hand, whose heart, words and acts were ever for us, who from a Major in +our Army became the best-loved President of our nation, Comrade William +McKinley, at one of our gatherings paid this tribute to you:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>It is recorded that in eighteen months' service the Army of the +Tennessee captured 80,000 men, with flags and arms, including 600 +guns—a greater force than was engaged on either side in the terrible +battle of Chickamauga. From the fields of triumph in the Mississippi +Valley it turned its footsteps towards the eastern seaboard, brought +relief to the forces at Chattanooga and Nashville, pursued that +peerless campaign from Atlanta to the seaboard under the leadership of +the glorious Sherman, and planted the banners of final victory on the +parapets of Fort McAllister.</p> + +<p>It is said that the old Army of the Tennessee never lost a battle and +never surrendered a flag. Its Corps badges—"forty rounds" of the +Fifteenth Corps; the fleeting arrow of the Seventeenth Corps; the +disc, from which four bullets have been cut, of the Sixteenth +Corps—are all significant of the awful business of cruel war, all of +them suggestive of the missiles of death.</p> + +<p>It gave the Federal Army Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan; McPherson, +Howard, Blair, Logan, Hazen, John E. Smith, C. F. Smith, Halleck, +Rawlins, Prentiss, Wallace, Porter, Force, Leggett, Noyes, +Hickenlooper, C. C. Walcutt, and your distinguished President, who +flamed out the very incarnation of soldierly valor before the eyes of +the American people; all have a secure place in history and a secure +one in the hearts of their countrymen.</p></div> + +<p>On this anniversary, as my closing words to you, two verses of General +John Tilson's tribute are most appropriate:</p> + +<p class="poem">Ho! comrades of the brave old band, we gather here once more,<br /> +With smiling eye and clasping hand, to fight our battles o'er.<br /> +To quaff from out the brimming cup of old-time memory,<br /> +And bright relight the pathway of our old Tennessee.<br /> +As myriad sparks of war's romance our meetings warm inspire;<br /> +The heady fight, the anxious march, the jolly bivouac fire;<br /> +The days of doubt, of hope, of care, of danger, and of glee;<br /> +Oh, what a world of racy thought illumines Tennessee!<br /> +<br /> +Our roster thins; as years pass on we drop off one by one;<br /> +Ere long, too soon, to yearly call, there will be answer—none;<br /> +Then as along the record page these mourning columns creep,<br /> +The whisper comes to closer still our living friendships keep.<br /> +Another thought we forward cast to that not distant day,<br /> +When left of all our gallant band will be one veteran gray,<br /> +And here's to him who meets alone—wherever he may be,<br /> +The last, the lone survivor of the grand old Tennessee.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></p> +<p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 640px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i136.jpg" alt="MAJOR-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>MAJOR-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF</b></p> +<p class="center">Commanding the Army and Department of the Missouri.</p> +<p class="caption">Front Row—Colonel T. J. Haines, U. S. A., C. S.; Major-General G. M. +Dodge; Colonel William Myers, U. S. A., Q. M.; Colonel James H. Baker, +Tenth Minnesota, P. M. G. Back Row—Colonel Benjamin L. W. Bonneville, U. +S. A. (retired), C. S. of Musters, age 72; Captain William Holcke, A. D. +C, Chief of Engineers; Major J. F. Randolph, U. S. A., Surgeon; Captain +Frank Enos A. A. G.; Colonel John V. Dubois, A. D. C, Inspector-General; +Lieutenant Edward Jonas, Fiftieth Illinois, A. D. C.; Major John W. +Barnes, A. A. G.; Major Lucien Eaton, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant George C. Tichenor, A. D. C.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span></p> + + +<h2>THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Address to the Army of the South-West</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">at National Encampment, G. A. R.</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Washington, D. C.</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">October, 1902</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p>My connection with the United States forces west of the Mississippi River +commenced at the beginning of the war, when I took my Regiment, the Fourth +Iowa, to St. Louis, and fell under the command of Fremont. I took part in +the campaigns of that Department until after the Battle of Pea Ridge, when +I left the command and went to the Army of the Tennessee. After the +Atlanta campaign, in November, 1864, I returned to Missouri as commander +of that Department and Army.</p> + +<p>Of the transactions of the troops south of Missouri I have very little +knowledge; but I know that the troops which served west of the Mississippi +never had credit for the amount of work, hardships and exposures they +endured. Owing to the fact of there having been fought there but two great +battles, Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge, and two minor ones, what they did +was swallowed up in the great events that occurred east of the +Mississippi. Even Pope's campaign opening up a portion of the Mississippi +is hardly ever spoken of.</p> + +<p>The Battle of Wilson's Creek, the first signal contest west of the +Mississippi, was fought before my command reached St. Louis. The history +of that battle, and the credit that is due to the commander of that Army, +General Lyon, and his men, are well known. There participated in the +battle many officers who were afterwards greatly distinguished; among them +Schofield, Sturgis, Hunter, and others. It was the first battle that +called attention to the West, and to the troops west of the Mississippi. +That battle was lost because a portion of the command did not comprehend +and fulfill General Lyon's orders. This mistake would have been overcome +if<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span> it had not been for the loss in the battle of its commander, General +Lyon. But the fighting of the troops and the boldness of the movement +immediately attracted the attention of the country, and held it until +after the battle of Pea Ridge.</p> + +<p>The Army of the Southwest, which General Curtis commanded, and which +traveled three hundred miles from its base without water or rail +communication, and lived off a barren country, and which fought that +decisive Battle of Pea Ridge and cleared the country until nearly the end +of the war of any organized force of the enemy, had more marching and +endured more suffering than the great Armies I was connected with east of +the Mississippi, and its three days' fighting at Pea Ridge compared +favorably with any of our battles, when the numbers engaged are +considered.</p> + +<p>Then again, at the end of the war, the sufferings of the troops that I +took onto the plains in the Indian campaigns in the winters of 1864-5, +1865-6, were far beyond any of the sufferings of any of our Armies during +the Civil War. Their exposures through the cold weather, and the +brutalities and butcheries of the Indians, which it was impossible for +them to avenge or retaliate, were beyond description.</p> + +<p>Our early campaign in Missouri was without previous experience. It was +simply one soldier standing up against another in battle, and we had to +learn all the tricks of camp life, and from experience how to take care of +our soldiers.</p> + +<p>There were a great many funny incidents in the Pea Ridge campaign. The +Southwestern Army was organized at Rolla, Missouri, of which post I was in +command. My quartermaster was Captain Philip H. Sheridan, and my +commissary, Captain M. P. Small. No one who knew or saw Sheridan then +thought of the great position he was to occupy in our Army, but when he +took hold of that Army and stripped it and fed it, three hundred miles +away from rail or water communication, we all knew that his was a +master-mind. When he came to me at Rolla, the first order he gave was to +take away about three-quarters of our transportation. I think we had about +two wagons to the company, and he brought us down to about four to a +regiment. You can all appreciate the rebellion I had on my hands when I +undertook to enforce his order. I know he stood by and watched to see what +I was going to do. Every Regiment and Command entered a protest, and said +some very unkind things of him, denouncing him as a regular officer who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span> +had no mercy upon a volunteer; but I had then had experience enough to +appreciate our necessities, and started in by stripping my own Regiment, +and then enforcing the orders upon the others. We were not long on that +march before they appreciated the foresight of Sheridan. He had great +energy and great resources. He had to run all the mills along our line of +march; he had to forage in every direction, and the punishment that he +gave to some of the people to make them tell where their horses, forage +and sweet potatoes were hidden would astonish those of our people who have +been so horrified at the mild persuasions used for similar purposes in the +Philippines.</p> + +<p>To show you how little we knew of war on our first march, in January, +1862, from Rolla to Springfield, Missouri, all the reports we had obtained +were that Price and his Army were in Springfield. The troops of our Army +were divided into two commands, those under Siegel, composed of two +Divisions, commanded by Osterhaus and Asboth, mostly Germans, and two +Divisions of Americans commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis and Colonel E. +A. Carr. I commanded a Brigade on the extreme left in Carr's Division, +and, in accordance with instructions, put out a company in front of me as +skirmishers. It was dark, and impossible for us to see much, and the first +thing I knew I had lost my skirmishers, and was in great distress until +about daylight in the morning, when, while Siegel's guns and our own were +booming away at Springfield, my company came back mounted on Confederate +horses and mules—old hacks that the enemy had left behind them—and +brought us news that there was no enemy in Springfield, and had not been +for two or three days.</p> + +<p>As we marched along towards Pea Ridge through the country, Price's Army +faced us with a rear guard only, his main body keeping a long distance +ahead of us. At every stream they would halt our advance, and move out a +couple of pieces of their artillery, and put out a strong skirmish-line, +which would force our Army into line, thinking we were going to have a +battle. My Brigade led the advance most of the time on that march, and as +soon as they would line up the officers would have the boys strip. They +would throw down their chickens, sweet potatoes, and everything they had +gathered, and by the time they had gone forward, and the enemy had run, +the Thirty-sixth Illinois, or some other Regiment, would come up and +gobble what they had left. About the third time we lined up I discovered +that every boy was hanging on to his chickens, sweet potatoes, and +provender, and when I gave orders to the Colonels to have them throw them +aside, the boys made answer: "No you don't, Colonel! You can't fool us any +more; we have fed those Thirty-sixth Illinois fellows as long as we +propose to."</p> + +<p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 880px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i140.jpg" alt="FORT COTTONWOOD" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>FORT COTTONWOOD</b></p> +<p class="caption">Afterwards Fort McPherson, in the Indian Campaign, 1865. The fort was one +hundred miles west of Fort Kearney, and was originally occupied as a +trading post by Sylvanus Dodge, father of General Dodge.</p> +<p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span>At Pea Ridge we were surrounded by Van Dorn, who placed Price's two +Divisions in our rear, and he himself on our right flank with McCullough +and McIntosh's Divisions. The great Pea Ridge divided his Army, so it was +impossible for one part to support the other. His Army was twice as large +as that of Curtis, and the fact that it was divided enabled Curtis to whip +his Army in detail, so that Van Dorn's Army was virtually whipped before +Curtis got his entire force into the field, Siegel only coming into battle +after Van Dorn's Arkansas force had left for the South, Jeff C. Davis's +Division having killed its two Division commanders, and Van Dorn had given +Price orders to get out the best way he could, which forced him to retreat +to the east towards White River.</p> + +<p>After the Pea Ridge campaign the Battle of Prairie Grove was fought, under +the command of General F. C. Herring, who was Lieutenant-Colonel of the +Ninth Iowa Infantry in the Battle of Pea Ridge. As it was not in my +command I have no knowledge of the detail of it; but from the reports it +evidently was a sharp fight.</p> + +<p>In the spring of 1865 Jeff C. Thompson and his command surrendered to me +on the Arkansas line. His command consisted of six thousand men, but he +found he could not gather them, and claimed that not half of his command +was present. When I asked him how it was possible to get them all +together, he suggested that I should send them rations. I therefore loaded +two steamers from St. Louis, and sent them around by the White River, and +Thompson issued his celebrated order bringing the men all in, and there +was gathered about twice the number he had present when he surrendered to +my forces. When asked for his transportation he said that he would show it +to me, and out of the rivers and bayous he run down about one hundred +canoes and flats, as the transportation he had to move his army with. It +was at this time that he made that celebrated speech. When his soldiers +came in without bringing their guns, as he had instructed them to do, +bringing along old shot-guns and muskets that were of no use, he said if +they were not satisfied with the generosity of this Government they should +emigrate to Mexico, and he denounced more than half of them as being<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span> +soldiers whom he had never seen, stating that they had stayed in the brush +and along the river-banks in Arkansas until the moss had grown upon their +heads and backs. From this speech of his came the celebrated saying of +"moss-backs."</p> + +<p>A part of my Corps fought under that gallant General, A. J. Smith, in the +Banks campaign up the Red River, and there is no doubt but that his +generalship and the fighting of the two Divisions of the Sixteenth Corps +saved that Army from a great defeat. The commander of one of his +Divisions, General T. E. G. Ransom, was a school-mate of mine, and +afterwards came to me in the Atlanta campaign and commanded a Division +under me in the Sixteenth Corps.</p> + +<p>When I look at the history of all of the operations west of the +Mississippi River, and see their results, it is a great gratification to +me to know that all the campaigns, except possibly the one of Banks, were +victories for our side.</p> + +<p>When I returned to the command of the Department of the Missouri, in +November, 1864, I found all the Indian tribes on the plains at war, +occupying all the lines of communication through to the Pacific, and there +was a great demand from the people upon the Government that those lines +should be opened. General Grant sent a dispatch, asking if a campaign upon +the plains could be made in the winter. Having spent eight or ten years of +my life upon the plains before the war, I answered that it could, if the +troops were properly fed and clothed. His answer to that was to place all +the plains and Indian tribes within my command, instructing me to make an +immediate campaign against them, and I had, therefore, to move the troops +that were at Leavenworth, Fort Riley, and other points, onto the plains in +mid-winter, and I think it was the Eleventh Kansas that had thirteen men +frozen to death on the march to Fort Kearney. Those troops on that winter +march up and down those stage- and telegraph-lines, in forty days opened +them up, repaired the telegraph, and had the stages running. Then came the +longer campaign of the next summer and next fall, where General Cole's +command suffered so much, and also where General Conner fought the Battle +of Tongue River. I remember of the Indians capturing a company of Michigan +troops that were guarding a train that was going to Fort Halleck, loaded +with rations and bacon. They tied some of the soldiers to the wheels of +the wagons, piled the bacon around the wagons, and burned them up. A band +of this<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span> party of Indians was captured by a battalion of Pawnees, who were +far north of them and got on their trail and surrounded the band that had +committed these atrocities. The chief of them, an old man, came forward +and spoke to Major North, who commanded the Pawnees, and holding his hand +up to his mouth he said that he was full of white men up to here, and was +ready to die. The Indians virtually cleaned out the white people along the +stage-lines they captured. I took from them a great many of their +prisoners in the fall of 1865, when they came into Laramie to make peace, +and the stories of the suffering of the women were such that it would be +impossible to relate them.</p> + +<p>In connection with this campaign on the plains, it is a singular fact that +nearly three thousand Confederates took part. When I took command at St. +Louis I found the prisons full of Confederate prisoners. The war was then +virtually at its end, and they were very anxious to be relieved from +prison life, and as we needed forces on the plains, I obtained authority +from the War Department to organize what was known as the United States +Volunteers, and filled the regiments with these Confederate soldiers, +placing over them as officers, men and officers selected from our own +command, and thus organized a very effective force, which did excellent +service on the plains, three-quarters of which remained in that country +after the war was over.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 448px; height: 768px;"><img src="images/i144.jpg" alt="WHERE GENERAL MCPHERSON FELL" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>WHERE GENERAL MCPHERSON FELL</b></p> +<p class="caption">Place on the Battlefield of Atlanta, on the right of the battle line of +the Sixteenth Army Corps, where Major-General James B. McPherson, +commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was killed, July 22, 1864. The +wheels are portions of Murray's Second U. S. Battery, which was captured +by the Confederate skirmish-line while passing from the Seventeenth to the Sixteenth Corps.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span></p> + +<h2>A TALK TO OLD COMRADES</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Address to Sixteenth Army Corps</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Delivered at the National Encampment, G. A. R.</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Washington, D. C., October, 1902</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p><i>Comrades of the Sixteenth Army Corps</i>:</p> + +<p>The Sixteenth Army Corps was organized December 18th, 1862, and formed +into two wings. General A. J. Smith commanded the right wing, and General +G. M. Dodge the left wing of the Corps. The left wing was organized with +the Corps, the right wing a year or more afterwards. The Corps, as a body, +was never together, though it probably took part in more widely separated +fields than any other Corps in the Army of the Tennessee. The right wing, +under General Smith, was in the Vicksburg campaign, and after that it went +to the Department of the Gulf, and was with General Banks in his movement +up Red River, and saved that Army from defeat; of this there is no doubt. +After that, it was sent after Forrest, and it was the only command that I +know of that caught and whipped him. The left wing overtook General +Forrest at Town Creek, in 1863, in its march to Decatur in the rear of +Bragg's Army, but he did not stay long enough for us to get a good fight +out of him.</p> + +<p>From the campaign after Forrest, General Smith's command was sent to the +Department of the Missouri to drive out Price. There I found them, in +December, 1864, when I took command of that Department, in a deplorable +condition,—without clothing, shoes, or camp equipage. Under an order from +General Grant, I sent them to Nashville, with all the force in my +department, some twenty thousand men all told, to help General Thomas, and +I sent them everything they needed to clothe and equip them. You all +remember how you were frozen in on the Mississippi, and had to take the +cars. One of the pleasantest recollections of my life is<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span> that I received +a letter from General Smith, thanking me for appreciating their condition, +and having in Nashville when they arrived, everything they needed. He said +that it was the first time they had been treated decently, and they were +thankful they had fallen into the hands of some one who appreciated them.</p> + +<p>At the Battle of Nashville it was General Smith, with the right wing of +the Sixteenth Corps, and the troops of the Department of the Missouri, +that turned the left flank of Hood's Army, and was practically in his rear +when stopped; and I have heard many officers who were there say that if he +had been let alone he would have captured or destroyed that wing of the +Army. Thus ended the eventful career of the right wing, and its fortunes +were cast with the Army of the Cumberland in its chase after Hood.</p> + +<p>The left wing was organized from the troops I commanded in the District of +Corinth, and had in it the old Second Division of the Army of the +Tennessee that Grant organized at Cairo, that fought at Belmont, Henry and +Donelson, Shiloh, and the two Corinths. It had on its banners, "First at +Donelson." I took command right after the Battle of Corinth, where it had +been censured by Rosecrans and praised by Grant for the part it took in +the Battle of Corinth. General Grant held us at Corinth as a protection to +his communications while the campaign against Vicksburg was going on. In a +letter to me he said he had left us there to protect that flank, for he +knew that if Bragg endeavored to break that line we would stay; so you see +he still had faith in his old Division. From Corinth we marched with +Sherman in his celebrated trip from Memphis to Chattanooga. We wintered on +the line, and rebuilt the Nashville and Decatur Road, and in his Memoirs +General Grant, after describing the condition of the Army, and the +necessity for rebuilding the railway from Nashville to Decatur, speaks +thus of the work of the Sixteenth Army Corps:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>General Dodge had no tools to work with except those of the +pioneer—axes, picks, and spades. With these he was enabled to +intrench his men, and protect them against surprise from small parties +of the enemy, and, as he had no base of supplies until the road could +be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider, after +protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the +surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain +they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and +such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the +ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. Where they were not +near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and +moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron +and steel found in them, were used up in like manner. Blacksmiths<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span> +were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad +and bridge building. Axemen were at work getting out timber for +bridges, and cutting fuel for locomotives and cars. Thus every branch +of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the +workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a +mechanic or workman except what the command itself furnished. General +Dodge had the work assigned to him finished within forty days after +receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many +of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 102 +miles.</p></div> + +<p>I only quote a small part of what General Grant says in this connection, +to show you that while the Sixteenth Corps had its share of fighting, and +praise for it, still it was a Corps that Grant called upon in an +emergency, and when he wanted great deeds done; and proves not only what +they could turn their hands to when necessary, but is also a sample of +what our great army was made of.</p> + +<p>In the spring of 1864 we became a part of the great Army in the Atlanta +campaign. When we arrived at Chattanooga, on the 5th of May, I called at +General Sherman's headquarters. General McPherson, our Army Commander, was +there. Sherman said to him: "You had better send Dodge to take Ship's +Gap." "Why, General," replied McPherson, "that is thirty miles away, and +Dodge's troops are not yet unloaded, and he has no transportation with +him." Sherman said: "Let him try it, and have the transportation follow." +We struck out, and that night at midnight Sprague's Brigade of the Fourth +Division of the Sixteenth Corps had gained the Gap. The enemy appeared the +next morning. This opened the way through Snake Creek Gap, planting us in +the rear of Johnston's Army, and forcing him to abandon his impregnable +position at Dalton.</p> + +<p>Our battles in the Atlanta campaign were those of the Army of the +Tennessee. The left wing received continual commendation until the great +battle of the 22d, when it happened to be in the rear of our Army, and +received and defeated the celebrated movement of Hood to our rear. +Sprague's Brigade fought all day at Decatur, and saved our trains. In the +battle of the 22d of July we had only five thousand men in line, but met +and repulsed three Divisions of Hardee's Corps, and McPherson, who stood +on our right and witnessed the fight, watching the charge of Fuller and +Mersey, and the breaking of two of the enemy's columns, spoke of us in the +highest terms, and five minutes later was dead. Our Army, who knew and +loved him, never could reconcile ourselves to his great loss.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span>The Battle of Atlanta was one of the few battles of the war where the +attack on the Sixteenth Army Corps caught it on the march in the rear of +the Army, without intrenchments or protection of any kind, both sides +fighting in the open.</p> + +<p>In his address describing the battle of the 22d of July, General Strong, +of General McPherson's staff, says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>General McPherson and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode +out and took position on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the +desperate assaults of Hood's army. General McPherson's admiration for +the steadiness and bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. Had +the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in the +rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept like +an avalanche over our supply-trains, and the position of the Army of +the Tennessee would have been very critical.</p></div> + +<p>General Frank P. Blair pays this tribute to the fighting of the Sixteenth +Army Corps, in his official report of the Battle of Atlanta:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I started to go back to my command, and witnessed the fearful assault +made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse +by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole +army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have +attempted to describe at the moment of attack; and, although it does +not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the +officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression +of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed +the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our +flank and rear was made by the whole of Hardee's corps.</p></div> + +<p>Under General Howard, a part of the left wing took part in the battle of +the 28th of July. On August 19th I was given a Confederate leave, when +that <i>beau-ideal</i> of a soldier, my old schoolmate and comrade, General T. +E. G. Ransom, took command of the Corps. The right wing knew him, for he +was with you in the Red River campaign. He died on a stretcher in command +of the Corps in the chase after Hood. The old Second Division had its +innings with General Corse, at Altoona, where the fighting has been +immortalized in verse and song. My fortunes took me away to the command of +the Army and Department of the Missouri, and the two Divisions of the left +wing were merged one into the Fifteenth and the other into the Seventeenth +Corps, and, so far as the campaigns were concerned, the Corps fought in +two units, the right and left wings, and each was a Corps command.</p> + +<p>The grave of that remarkable soldier, General A. J. Smith, whose +distinguished services were so often recognized by Generals Grant and +Sherman, has not a stone to designate it. The Society<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span> of the Army of the +Tennessee is aiding in raising the funds to commemorate his memory and +deeds by erecting a monument in his home in St. Louis.</p> + +<p>The Sixteenth Army Corps had great opportunities in the campaigns it took +part in, and never failed to make the most of them. They went cheerfully +to any work assigned to them. They have left in the war records a history +that they may well be proud of, and every work they have undertaken has +received the strong commendation of their superior officers.</p> + + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="figcenter"><img src="images/i150.jpg" alt="MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE</b></p> +<p class="center">Commander<br />Army of the Potomac<br />1864</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span></p> +<h2>GENERAL GRANT</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Remarks at Army of Potomac Reunion</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">Niagara Falls, N. Y.</span></h3> + + +<p>When you consider that it is now thirty-three years after the war, that +the Government has published every report, letter and order that was of +any moment, you will agree with me that it is difficult to interest an +Army audience in talking about another Army, and I shall not detain you +long on that subject. There are, however, some incidents of General +Grant's first visit to your Army, his return to ours, and the planning of +the grand campaign that was to end the war, that may interest you.</p> + +<p>In December, 1863, after the Battle of Chattanooga, the Army of the +Tennessee camped along the railway from Columbia, Tenn., to Decatur and +Huntsville, Ala. After the Battle of Chattanooga General Grant returned to +Nashville and called there to meet him several Corps Commanders of the +Army of the Tennessee, and General Sheridan of the Army of the Cumberland. +If I remember rightly, there were present Generals Grant, Sherman, +Sheridan, Granger, Logan, Rawlins, and myself. All of us of the Army of +the Tennessee were a hard-looking crowd. None of us had seen Nashville or +any base of supplies since we had marched from the Mississippi River to +Chattanooga, and we had been hard at work building railways and foraging. +We arrived in Nashville late in the afternoon, and General Sherman took us +to General Grant's headquarters. General Grant suggested that we should +call upon the Military Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and pay our +respects to him. We, of course, followed General Grant, and were +introduced to Governor Johnson. I remember that our uniforms were greatly +worn, one or two of us wearing blouses with Army overcoats, and he looked +at us with a very quizzical eye, until General Grant said to excuse us +that he had not given us time since we reached the city to change our +suits; but Grant knew we had no<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span> others. Governor Johnson was then a very +radical man, and was very emphatic in informing us that while he was +Military Governor of Tennessee no rebel would receive much consideration +from him, and brought his fist down on a piano in the room with such force +that the sound from it startled us all, and we left there with the idea +that rebels in Tennessee had better get out; but we soon found that his +words were much stronger than his acts, for I hardly ever got my hands on +rebel stock or supplies that I did not find Johnson trying to pull them +off.</p> + +<p>After our visit, General Sherman suggested that we should all go to the +theater that evening, and under his lead we went to the principal opera +house to hear the play of Hamlet. We were all strangers in Nashville; even +General Grant was not well known. We paid our way in and found the theater +crowded with soldiers going to and returning from veteran furloughs. +General Sherman, who you all know was a great lover of the theater, sat +alongside of me and soon commenced criticising the play, earnestly +protesting that it was being murdered. I had to check him several times +and tell him unless he kept quiet the soldiers in the audience would +recognize him and there would be a scene. We had entered late, and there +soon came on the scene where Hamlet soliloquizes over the skull of Yorick. +The audience was perfectly still, endeavoring to comprehend the actor's +words, when a soldier far back in the audience rose up and in a clear +voice called out, as the actor held up the skull, "Say, pard, what is it, +Yank or Reb?" The house appreciated the point and was instantly in an +uproar, and General Grant said we had better leave, so we went quietly +out, no one discovering Grant's or Sherman's presence. Sherman immediately +suggested that we should find an oyster-house and get something to eat, +and General Rawlins was put forward as guide and spokesman. He led us to a +very inviting place. We went in and found there was but one large table in +the place. There was one man sitting at it, and Rawlins, in his modest +way, without informing the man who his party was, asked him if he would +change to a smaller table and let us have that one. The man said the table +was good enough for him and kept on eating, and Rawlins backed out into +the street again. Sherman said if we depended on Rawlins we would get +nothing to eat, and said he would see what could be done. He hailed a man +who pointed out another saloon kept by a woman, and to this Sherman took +us, and she served us what we then <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>considered a very nice oyster stew. As +we sat around the table, we talked more than we ate, and by the time we +had half finished our supper the woman came in and asked for the pay and +said we must leave, as under the military rules her house must close at 12 +midnight and it was then a few minutes after that hour; so out we got and +took our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down the best we +could during the night. Some of the staff heard of our evening's adventure +and gave the news to the press, and the next morning before breakfast all +the parties were present to apologize to Grant that they did not recognize +him, as we were out of our own jurisdiction and in that of the Army of the +Cumberland; but Grant in his modest way satisfied them that he had no +complaint. However, there poured in on him for all of us complimentary +tickets and invitations to almost everything in Nashville.</p> + +<p>After breakfast we all assembled in a large room at headquarters to hear +what General Grant had to say to us. He took up with us the plan for a +winter campaign. He proposed himself to take about 30,000 of the troops +concentrated at Chattanooga and transport them by the Ohio and Mississippi +Rivers to New Orleans, and there take with him the troops of General Canby +and go thence to Mobile and attack that place. General Sherman was to go +to Memphis, gather up all the forces along the Mississippi River, +including the troops at Vicksburg and Natchez, together with the +Seventeenth Corps, and march from Vicksburg to Meridian and thence join +Grant at Mobile. I was to take the Sixteenth Corps, which was then located +on the line of the Nashville and Decatur road, together with about 10,000 +cavalry that General William Sooy Smith had concentrated near Nashville, +and sweep down through Alabama, Northern Mississippi, and Western +Tennessee, attacking any forces of the enemy that might be met, and +destroying all the railroads and provisions that had been stored in that +country, this with a view of making it difficult for any of the +confederate armies to again occupy the territory, so as to enable Sherman +and Grant, when the spring and summer campaign came on, to utilize all the +Union troops that had been occupying that country. After the plans were +all made and all the arrangements agreed upon, General Grant reported them +to Washington, but President Lincoln objected because he was afraid, if we +took so many troops from Chattanooga, that Longstreet, who was occupying +Eastern Tennessee with his Army, would return to Chattanooga or Middle +Tennessee<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span> and undo all we had accomplished in the Battle of Chattanooga. +Grant had no fear of this, but he made up his mind to go immediately to +East Tennessee and take the forces there under General Foster, attack and +defeat Longstreet, and then come back and carry out his plans. He found +after reaching Knoxville that General Foster's forces could not be used, +so he abandoned the campaign, only sending Sherman to Vicksburg, who +marched out to Meridian and returned, while the 7,000 cavalry under +General William Sooy Smith, who was to join Sherman overland, moved south, +fighting and driving the enemy until he reached West Point, where he met a +superior force of the enemy and returned to Memphis.</p> + +<p>In March, 1864, General Grant was called to Washington to be given his +commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army and command of all the +forces. On his return to Nashville, on March 17th, we were again called to +meet him. General Grant told us of his visit to Washington, his reception +by the President, and all the courtesies that had been paid him. He told +us that he accepted the commission of Lieutenant-General and Commander of +all the Armies on condition that his plans should not be interfered with +at Washington and that he should have the command of the staff departments +of the armies. Those departments had always considered themselves +independent of the Commander in the field; in fact, in the beginning of +the war the officers of Commissary Quarter-Master and Ordnance Departments +declined to obey the orders of the commanders they were serving under, +except upon the order of their chief in Washington. General Grant settled +this. A Commissary of Subsistence declined to carry out one of his orders, +and General Grant said to him that while he could not force him to obey +the order, he could relieve him and put in his place one of the line +officers who would obey all orders. This officer reported this to +Washington and it changed their orders so that they were ordered to obey +the orders of the officer in the field and to report their orders to their +chiefs in Washington. General Grant said that President Lincoln said in +reply to his request for the command of the staff departments that he +could not give him that legally; but, he said, "There is no one but myself +that can interfere with your orders; and you can rest assured that I will +not do it." We were all anxious to hear of his visit to the Army of the +Potomac, and his opinion of it, and Sherman soon got him to talking about +it.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span> He said it was the finest Army he had ever seen; far superior to any +of ours in equipment, supplies, and transportation. He said, however, that +the officers he talked with considered he would have a much more difficult +problem on his hands than he had had in the West, and he said to Sherman +that some officer who both of them knew, but whose name I have forgotten, +told him, "You have not faced Bobby Lee yet;" and as he said it, I could +see that twinkle in Grant's eye that we often saw there when he meant +mischief. Grant, after discussing the Army of the Potomac and having +nothing but praise for it, informed us that he should make his +headquarters with that Army and leave Sherman to command the Armies of the +West, also informing us that he proposed to take several of us East with +him. Sherman protested strongly against this, and it was finally +compromised by his taking Sheridan and leaving the rest of us with +Sherman. During the two or three days we were with Grant he outlined in a +general way his plan of campaign that every Army should move as early as +possible in the spring, all on the same day against the enemy, so that Lee +and Johnston could not detach any of their commands to reinforce the +others. He said, "I will try to keep Lee from sending any force to +Johnston, but," he said to Sherman, "if he does, I will send you two men +where he sends one." He also informed us of the necessity of closing the +war with this campaign.</p> + +<p>Our visit with Grant ended, he took Sherman as far as Cincinnati with him, +to talk over and complete their plans, while we returned to our commands +to fit them out for the campaign. General Sherman has since pointed out to +me in the Burnett House, at Cincinnati, the room they occupied the night +before they parted, and where over their maps the final orders were given +him and final arrangements made that inaugurated the two great campaigns +of Richmond and Petersburg in the East, and Atlanta in the West. After the +Atlanta campaign I paid General Grant a visit at City Point. I reached his +headquarters in October, and spent two weeks with him, and saw the Armies +of the James and the Potomac. Evenings we would sit around his camp-fire, +and in his genial, comprehensive way, he told us of his campaign and the +great battles you had fought, and brought out fully to me what a great +Army you were. I asked him what he claimed for the Battle of the +Wilderness. There had been great discussion, as you know, about it, and +Grant, with the same twinkle of the eye that I had seen at<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span> Nashville, +said, "I only claim that after that battle, (and I took the initiative on +the march towards Richmond,) that the Army of the Potomac was no longer +afraid of Bobby Lee." He had not forgotten his talk with us at Nashville.</p> + +<p>Now you have had Grant's opinion of your great Army, and as my toast is +the Army of the Tennessee, I will close by giving you General Grant's +description of that Army when called upon to respond to the same toast at +one of our reunions. He said, "As an Army, the Army of the Tennessee never +sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification +which it assailed surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either +defeated, captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the +command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or to be +reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 785px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i158.jpg" alt="PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE TENNESSEE RIVER AT DECATUR, ALA." /></div> +<p class="center"><b>PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE TENNESSEE RIVER AT DECATUR, ALA.</b></p> +<p class="caption">Built by the Sixteenth Army Corps in the spring of 1864, Major-General G. +M. Dodge commanding. Copy of painting made at the time by an enlisted man +and presented to General Dodge.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span></p> +<h2>USE OF BLOCK-HOUSES DURING THE CIVIL WAR</h2> + +<p> </p> +<p><i>To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal</i>:</p> + +<p>I was greatly interested in the communication of Captain Joubert Reitz, +published in your journal March 21, 1903, giving a description of the +block-house system inaugurated by General Kitchener in the Transvaal War. +It was a continuous line of block-houses connected by barbed wire, to +prevent the Boers crossing the railway lines, and virtually corralling +their forces in certain districts until want of food forced them to +surrender. Captain Reitz asserts that the block-house system did more to +end the war than the whole British Army.</p> + +<p>In the Civil War our block-house system was just as effective, but in +another direction. We used it for the purpose of protecting our lines of +communication, not as a trocha, or a line connected with wire fencing and +other obstructions, as used by the British and by the Spaniards in the +Cuban War. The British built theirs of bags filled with earth. The +Spaniards erected neat structures of two stories, built of concrete, with +wooden roofs and openings for two lines of fire, one above the other. +These were erected not more than half a mile apart. In the Civil War our +block-houses were usually erected of logs, one and two stories high. The +face of the upper story had an angle of forty-five degrees to the face of +the first story, thus concentrating a direct fire upon an enemy +approaching from any point of the compass. The first block-houses in the +West that I know of were built by my command in July and August, 1862, +when it rebuilt the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Columbus to Humbolt. There +were many important bridges on this line, and we built block-houses at the +most important ones, and stockades at the others.</p> + +<p>In the fall of 1862, when Forrest and Jackson made the noted raids into +West Tennessee, the forces at all these structures that my command had +erected held their positions, and defeated the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span> enemy when attacked, while +at the bridges between Jackson, Tennessee, and Grand Junction, where they +had only earth defenses, the forces were driven away or captured and the +bridges destroyed. The result of this was that General Grant issued an +order commending the action of the detachments that were successful, +stating that wherever they stood success followed, and the enemy suffered +a loss in killed and wounded greater than the garrisons of the +block-houses and stockades. This result also caused General Grant to issue +an order to build block-houses and stockades on the line of the Memphis & +Charleston Railway at all important bridges from Memphis to Corinth, and +they protected this line of communication until it was abandoned.</p> + +<p>The block-houses held about a company, but sometimes stockades or earth +intrenchments were added to hold two companies, and our orders were +imperative to all forces occupying them never to leave them or surrender, +no matter how large the attacking force. My first order stated that a +company in a block-house or stockade was equal to a Regiment attacking, +and I do not remember the enemy, in their numerous raids, ever capturing +one that was defended, up to the time I left Corinth in the summer of +1863. After the Battle of Chattanooga, when our Armies were lying along +the line of the railway from Nashville to Decatur and Nashville to +Stevenson, I rebuilt the Nashville & Decatur Railway, on which there were +at least thirty important bridges, at each of which we built strong +block-houses and stockades, and the enemy never captured one of them, +though in two instances they were attacked with a brigade, and often with +two Regiments and batteries. We protected against artillery fire by +throwing up earthworks to the height of the first line of fire, taking the +chance of any damage being done above that. Our orders here were when +Forest, Roddy, and Hannan attacked this line to hold the posts under any +and all circumstances, stating that if they stayed in the block-houses and +stockades nothing could defeat them, and so it proved. Where these forces +struck a Regiment, and captured it in earth-works, they went twelve miles +north to the Sulphur Trestle, a bridge one hundred and twenty-five feet +high, defended by two companies in a block-house and stockade, and were +signally defeated. The Army of the Cumberland protected the line from +Nashville to Stevenson, and on to Chattanooga, with block-houses at all +bridges and important points, and when on the 5th of May, 1864, General +Sherman<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span> started on the Atlanta campaign, General Hooker reports on April +23, 1864, that he detailed 1,460 men to occupy block-houses from Nashville +to Chattanooga, and this force held that line of road throughout the +campaign, though many attempts were made to destroy it. During the Atlanta +campaign as we advanced the railway was rebuilt, and all bridges and +stations had block-houses or stockades to protect them.</p> + +<p>General Green B. Raum's Brigade was located at some of the most important +structures. General Wheeler, with all of Johnston's Cavalry force and +several batteries, endeavored to destroy this, our only line of +communication for transporting supplies. General Raum's story is so to the +point that I quote it almost entire. He says:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>My experiences with block-houses extended from May to November, 1864, +on the Memphis & Charleston railroad, and the Chattanooga & Atlanta +railroad. Block-houses were built along these railroads exclusively +for the protection of bridges. They were built of heavy square +timbers, sometimes with two or three thicknesses of timber, and were +of various sizes. I had a two-story block-house built at Mud Creek, +east of Scottsboro, Ala.; it would easily hold 100 men. These houses +were carefully pierced with loop-holes, so that the garrison could +cover every approach. My garrisons were usually too large for the +block-houses. In these cases I threw up an earth-work, and protected +it with abatis. The Confederate forces soon learned to respect a +block-house. I found it to be an absolute defense against musketry.</p> + +<p>During the Atlanta campaign our block-houses were constantly attacked +by raiding parties; small and great trains would be thrown from the +track and burned, and small sections of the track destroyed. About +July 5, 1864, an enterprising Confederate cavalryman with about 300 +men made a rapid march up Dirt Town Valley, crossed the Chattanooga +range by a bridle-path, threw a train of fifteen loaded cars off the +track, burned them, and destroyed a small section of the track, but he +did not attempt to destroy the bridge near by at Tilton—it was +defended by a block-house with a capacity for seventy men.</p> + +<p>When General Wheeler made his great raid north in August, 1864, he +struck the railroad at various places. He destroyed two miles of track +immediately south of Tilton, Ga., but did not come within range of the +block-house, and did not attempt to destroy the bridge defended by the +block-house. During this raid General Wheeler, without hesitation, +attacked and carried a part of the works at Dalton. During the Atlanta +campaign there was not a bridge destroyed by the Confederates between +Nashville and Atlanta which was protected by a block-house.</p> + +<p>After the fall of Atlanta, General Hood moved with his entire army +against the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, destroying thirty-seven +miles of track. On October 12 he struck the railroad at Resaca and +Tilton. Tilton was garrisoned by the Seventeenth Iowa. +Lieutenant-Colonel Archer commanding. He had about 350 men—no +artillery. An Army Corps was in his front. Colonel Archer held the +enemy off seven hours, fighting from his rifle-pits and block-house. +At last the Confederate commander placed several batteries in +position, and opened upon the devoted garrison. In a short time the +block-house was rendered untenable, and Colonel Archer was forced to +surrender. This was the first and only success against our block-house +system. On December 4, 1814, Bates's division of Cheatham's Corps +attacked the block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek, +five miles<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span> north of Murfreesborough, Tenn. The enemy used artillery +to reduce the block-house, and although seventy-four shots were fired +at it, no material injury was done; the garrison held out until +relieved by General Milroy from Murfreesborough.</p></div> + +<p>After the Atlanta campaign, in the Department of the Missouri, every +important bridge and town where detachments of troops were stationed was +protected by block-houses and stockades, and during the Indian campaigns +of 1864-5-6 our lines of communication, stage and telegraph, were all held +successfully by small detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades, +and were never captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked +them, and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not properly +constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their stations, if +they had remained they would have successfully held them. After I took +command on the plains and issued positive orders for detachments to stay +by their posts and never leave them, not a single detachment that I +remember of was captured in its block-house or stockade. With the small +force we had it would have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph +and overland routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of +block-houses and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the +overland routes. It is evident from our experience in the West that our +block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of communication +was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but from +attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large force for +the field. I left on the line of the railway from Nashville to Athens +during the Atlanta campaign only two Regiments of negroes, taking with me +my entire Corps, and without the block-houses to defend the lines from +Nashville to Stevenson and Stevenson to Atlanta, it would have taken a +thousand men without block-house protection for every hundred required +with it.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Grenville M. Dodge.</span></p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 439px; height: 768px;"><img src="images/i164.jpg" alt="TO THE MEMORY OF SAMUEL DAVIS" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>TO THE MEMORY OF SAMUEL DAVIS</b></p> +<p class="caption">Monument erected in Nashville, Tenn., to Samuel Davis, Confederate Spy +executed by order of General Dodge, at Pulaski, Tenn., in 1864.</p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span></p> +<h2>AN INCIDENT OF THE WAR</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Execution of the Confederate Spy, Samuel Davis</span><br /> +<span class="smcap">at Pulaski, Tenn., November, 1863</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">New York</span>, June 15th, 1897.</p> + +<p><i>To the Editor of The Confederate Veteran</i>:</p> + +<p>In fulfillment of my promise to give you my recollections of Sam Davis, +(who was hung as a spy in November, 1863, at Pulaski, Tenn.,) I desire to +say that in writing of matters which occurred thirty-four years ago one is +apt to make mistakes as to minor details; but the principal facts were +such that they impressed themselves upon my mind so that I can speak of +them with some certainty.</p> + +<p>When General Grant ordered General Sherman (whose head of column was near +Eastport, on the Tennessee River) to drop everything and bring his army to +Chattanooga, my Corps (the Sixteenth) was then located at Corinth, Miss., +and I brought up the rear.</p> + +<p>General Grant's anxiety to attack Bragg's command before Longstreet could +return from East Tennessee brought on the battle before I could reach +Chattanooga. General Grant, therefore, instructed General Sherman to halt +my command in Middle Tennessee and to instruct me to rebuild the railway +from Nashville to Decatur. The fulfilling of the above order is fully set +forth by General Grant in his Memoirs.</p> + +<p>When I reached the line of the Nashville and Decatur railroad, I +distributed my troops from Columbia south towards Athens, Alabama. I had +about 10,000 men and 8,000 animals, and was without provisions, with no +railroad or water communication to any base of supply, and was obliged to +draw subsistence for my command from the adjacent country until I could +rebuild the railroad and receive my supplies from Nashville.</p> + +<p>My command was a part of the Army of the Tennessee, occupying<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span> temporarily +a portion of the territory of the Department of the Cumberland, but not +reporting or subject to the commander of that department.</p> + +<p>Upon an examination of the country, I found that there was an abundance of +everything needed to supply my command, except where Sherman's forces had +swept across it along Elk River. He wrote me, "I do not think that my +forces have left a chicken for you." I also found that I was in a country +where the sentiment of the people was almost unanimously against us. I had +very little faith in converting them by the taking of the oath of +allegiance; I therefore issued an order stating that I required the +products of the country to supply my command, and that to all who had +these products, regardless of their sentiments, who would bring them to +the stations where my troops were located, I would pay a fair price for +them; but that, if I had to send and bring the supplies myself, I should +take them without making payment, giving them only receipts; and also +issued instructions that every train going for supplies should be +accompanied by an officer and receipt given for what he took. This had a +good effect, the citizens generally bringing in their supplies to my +command and receiving the proper voucher; but it also gave an opportunity +for straggling bands to rob and charge up their depredations to my +command. This caused many complaints to be filed with the military +governor of Tennessee and the Department Commander of the Army of the +Cumberland.</p> + +<p>Upon investigation I found most of those depredations were committed by +irresponsible parties of both sides, and I also discovered that there was +a well-organized and disciplined Corps of scouts and spies within my +lines, one force operating to the east of the line, under Captain Coleman, +and another force operating to the west, having its headquarters in the +vicinity of Florence, Alabama. I issued orders to my own spies to locate +these parties, sending out scouting parties to wipe them out or drive them +across the Tennessee River.</p> + +<p>My cavalry had had considerable experience in this work in and around +Corinth, and they were very successful and brought in many prisoners, most +of whom could only be treated as prisoners of war.</p> + +<p>The Seventh Kansas Cavalry was very efficient in this service, and they +captured Samuel Davis, Joshua Brown, Smith, and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>General Bragg's Chief of +Scouts and Secret Service Colonel S. Shaw, all about the same time. We did +not know of the importance of the capture of Shaw, or that he was the +Captain Coleman commanding Bragg's secret-service force. Nothing was found +on any of the prisoners of importance, except upon Davis, who evidently +had been selected to carry the information they had all obtained through +to General Bragg. Upon Davis were found letters from Captain Coleman, the +commander of the scouts to the east of us, and many others. I was very +anxious to capture Coleman and break up his command, as my own scouts and +spies within the Confederate lines were continually reporting to us the +news sent south from and the movements of Coleman within my lines.</p> + +<p>Davis was brought immediately to me, as his captors knew his importance. +They believed he was an officer and also knew he was a member of Coleman's +command.</p> + +<p>When brought to my office I met him pleasantly. I knew what had been found +upon him and I desired to locate Coleman and his command and ascertain, if +possible, who was furnishing the information, which I saw was accurate and +valuable, to General Bragg.</p> + +<p>Davis met me modestly. He was a fine, soldierly-looking young man, dressed +in a faded Federal soldier's coat, one of our army soft hats, and top +boots. He had a frank, open face, which was inclined to brightness. I +tried to impress upon him the danger he was in, and that I knew he was +only a messenger, and held out to him the hope of lenient treatment if he +would answer truthfully, as far as he could, my questions.</p> + +<p>He listened attentively and respectfully to me, but, as I recollect, made +no definite answer, and I had him returned to the prison. My recollection +is that Captain Armstrong, my Provost Marshal, placed in the prison with +him and the other prisoners one of our own spies, who claimed to them to +be one of the Confederate scouting parties operating within my lines, and +I think the man More, whom the other prisoners speak of as having been +captured with them and escaping, was this man. However, they all kept +their own counsel and we obtained no information of value from them.</p> + +<p>The reason of this reticence was the fact that they all knew Colonel Shaw +was one of our captives, and that if his importance<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> was made known to us +he would certainly be hung; and they did not think that Davis would be +executed.</p> + +<p>Upon Davis was found a large mail of value. Much of it was letters from +the friends and relatives of soldiers in the Confederate Army. There were +many small presents—one or two, I remember, to General Bragg—and much +accurate information of my forces, of our defenses, our intentions, +substance of my orders, criticisms as to my treatment of the citizens, and +a general approval of my payment for supplies, while a few denounced +severely some of the parties who had hauled in supplies under the orders. +Captain Coleman mentioned this in one of his letters.</p> + +<p>There were also intimations of the endeavor that would be made to +interrupt my work, and plans for the capture of single soldiers and small +parties of the command out after forage.</p> + +<p>I had Davis brought before me again, after my Provost Marshal had reported +his inability to obtain anything of value from him. I then informed him +that he would be tried as a spy; that the evidence against him would +surely convict him; and made a direct appeal to him to give me the +information I knew he had. He very quietly, but firmly, refused to do it. +I therefore let him be tried and suffer the consequences. Considerable +interest was taken in young Davis by the Provost Marshal and Chaplain +Young, and considerable pressure was brought to bear upon them by some of +the citizens of Pulaski; and I am under the impression that some of them +saw Davis and endeavored to induce him to save himself, but they failed. +Mrs. John A. Jackson, I remember, made a personal appeal in his behalf +directly to me. Davis was convicted upon trial and sentenced. Then one of +my noted scouts, known as "Chickasaw," believed that he could prevail upon +Davis to give the information we asked.</p> + +<p>He took him in hand and never gave it up until the last moment, going to +the scaffold with a promise of pardon a few moments before his execution.</p> + +<p>Davis died to save his own chief, Colonel Shaw, who was in prison with him +and was captured the same day.</p> + +<p>The parties who were prisoners with Davis have informed me that it was +Shaw who had selected Davis as the messenger to General Bragg, and had +given to him part of his mail and papers.</p> + +<p>I did not know this certainly until a long time after the war. I first +learned of it by rumor and what some of my own scouts have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span> told me since +the war, and it has since been confirmed confidentially to me by one of +the prisoners who was captured about the same time that Davis was and who +was imprisoned with him up to the time he was convicted and sentenced, and +knew Colonel Shaw, as well as all the facts in the case.</p> + +<p>The statement made to me is, that Colonel S. Shaw was the chief or an +important officer in General Bragg's Secret-Service Corps; that Shaw had +furnished the important documents to Davis; and that their captors did not +know Shaw and his importance.</p> + +<p>Colonel Shaw I sent with the other prisoners North, as prisoners of war. I +also learned that Shaw was greatly alarmed when he was informed I was +trying to induce Davis to give me the information he had.</p> + +<p>This is where Davis showed himself a true soldier. He had been entrusted +with an important commission by an important officer, who was imprisoned +with him, and died rather than betray him. He knew to a certainty, if he +informed me of the facts, that Shaw would be executed, for he was a far +more important person to us than was Davis.</p> + +<p>During the war I had many spies captured; some executed who were captured +within the Confederate lines and who were equally brave in meeting their +fate.</p> + +<p>By an extraordinary effort I saved the life of one who was captured by +Forrest. Through my efforts this man escaped, though General Forrest sized +him up correctly. He was one of the most important men we ever had within +the Confederate lines.</p> + +<p>Forrest was determined to hang him, but Major-General Polk believed him +innocent and desired to save him.</p> + +<p>Great interest was taken in Davis at the time, because it was known by all +of the command that I desired to save him.</p> + +<p>Your publication bears many evidences of this fact. It is not, therefore, +necessary for me to state that I regretted to see sentence executed; but +it was one of the fates of war, which is cruelty itself, and there is no +refining it.</p> + +<p>I find this letter bearing upon the case; it may be of interest. It is my +first report to Major B. M. Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of +the Tennessee, notifying him of the capture of Davis. It is dated, +Pulaski, Tenn., November 20th, 1863, and is as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span>I herewith inclose a copy of dispatches taken from one of Bragg's +spies. He had a heavy mail, papers, etc., and shows Captain Coleman is +pretty well posted.</p> + +<p>We have broken up several bands of mounted robbers and Confederate +cavalry in the last week, capturing some five commissioned officers +and one hundred enlisted men, who have been forwarded.</p> + +<p>I also forward a few of the most important letters found in the mail. +The tooth-brushes and blank-books I was greatly in need of and +therefore appropriated them. I am,</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 6em;">Very respectfully, your obedient servant,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 16em;"><span class="smcap">G. M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 20em;"><i>Brigadier General</i>.</span></p></div> + +<p>The severe penalty of death, where a spy is captured, is not because there +is anything dishonorable in the fact of the person being a spy, as only +men of peculiar gifts for such service, men of courage and cool judgment +and undoubted patriotism, are selected. The fact that the information they +obtain is found within their enemy's lines, and the probability of great +danger to an Army, is what causes the penalty to be so very severe. A +soldier caught in the uniform, or a part of the uniform, of his enemy, +within his enemy's lines, establishes the fact that he is a spy and is +there in violation of the Articles of War and for no good purpose. This +alone will prohibit his being treated as a prisoner of war, when caught, +as Davis was, in our uniform, with valuable documents upon him, and seals +his fate.</p> + +<p>I appreciate fully that the people of Tennessee and Davis's comrades +understand his soldierly qualities and propose to honor his memory. I take +pleasure in aiding in raising the monument to his memory, although the +services he performed were for the purpose of injuring my command, but +given in faithfully performing the duties he was assigned to. I am</p> + +<p><span style="margin-left: 6em;">Truly and respectfully,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 10em;"><span class="smcap">Grenville M. Dodge</span>,</span><br /> +<span style="margin-left: 14em;"><i>Major-General</i>.</span></p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 822px; height: 500px;"><img src="images/i172.jpg" alt="COMPANY L, FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, 1898, IN PHILIPPINES" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>COMPANY L, FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, 1898, IN PHILIPPINES</b></p> +<p class="caption">Organized in 1856, as Council Bluffs Guards; Captain, G. M. Dodge; entered +Civil War as Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. Now Company L, Fifty-first +Iowa Infantry. Known locally as Dodge Light Guards.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span></p> +<h2>GEN. G. M. DODGE ON THE "WATER CURE"</h2> +<p>[The following is a reprint of an article that appeared originally in the New York Evening Post.—G. M. D.]</p> + +<p> </p> +<p>The New York Evening Post has thus been "called down" by General Grenville +M. Dodge, who is well known throughout Iowa and the Nation as one of the +leading Corps Commanders of the Union Army during the Civil War:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><i>To the Editor of the Evening Post</i>:</p> + +<p>As one who has had some experience in the necessities, usages, and +cruelties of war, which always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's +country, I am surprised at the position of your journal, and its +bitterness against the alleged action of Major Glenn, Lieutenant +Conger, and Assistant Surgeon Lyon.</p> + +<p>The testimony of Sergeant Riley, upon which you base your attack on +these officers, goes to prove that they gave the water cure to a +Filipino who had been made presidente in one of the provinces by our +Government, who had taken the oath of allegiance to our country, and +then used his official position to cover his acts as captain of an +insurgent company which was acting in arms against our Army and within +our lines. Therefore, he was a traitor and a spy, and his every act +was a violation of the laws of war, and branded him an outlaw and +guerilla. If these are the facts, under the usages of war these +officers were justified in what they did; in fact, if they had shot +the traitor they would never have been called to account, and in all +probability this is what would have happened to him in the Civil War.</p> + +<p>An officer has great latitude under such circumstances, and it is not +safe or fair to condemn one for almost any act that detects a traitor +and spy in arms against the Government which he has sworn to protect, +and which has put him in a position of trust. You ignore entirely this +side of the question, and only treat Major Glenn's acts as cruelties +to peaceable Filipino citizens. I can remember when the journals of +this country upheld and applauded an officer who, in the Civil War, +ordered a man shot if he attempted to haul down the American flag, and +cannot understand the present hysterics of some journals over the +terrible violation of the laws of war in punishing a traitor, caught +in the act, with the water cure only. The treatment may have been +severe, but it is not permanently harmful.</p> + +<p>I am astonished that these fearfully wrought-up journals have no word +of commendation for our soldiers in the Philippines, who have suffered +untold cruelties, assassinations, burning by slow fires, burial alive, +mutilations, and atrocities; who have submitted to every indignity +without resentment or complaint; and I have been greatly gratified +over their excellent behavior under such trying circumstances. In +their comments these journals are very careful not to say why these +punishments are given to such traitors, knowing well if they did our +people would look upon the acts as one of the necessities of war, and +would wonder at the leniency of Major Glenn and his command.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Grenville M. Dodge.</span></p> +<p><span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>New York, April</i> 17.</span></p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>There can be no doubt that "war is hell," no matter whether it be on the +Philippine Islands or any other place in the world. There has been much +howling over the administration of "the water cure" in the Philippines, +but every man who has had one year's experience in real war will admit +that that "cure" is not so severe as killing or wounding captured enemies +who have knowledge of hidden arms or other Army supplies. Every one of the +"water-cured" Filipinos was given the opportunity to escape that +punishment, but refused to tell what he knew and was therefore rightly +punished until he was willing to tell the truth. General Dodge's letter +proves that the punishment was justified, and his opinion will be +sustained by every person who has knowledge of "the necessities, usages, +and cruelties of war," which "always prevail during a campaign in an +enemy's country." The truth is that the armies of the United States have +been too lenient in the Philippines. That is the reason why the war has +been so long continued, and the only reason why the final peace will be +still further delayed. War is never a picnic, but should at all times be +made terrible in order that peace and safety may be speedily gained. "The +water cure" is inclined to be slightly irritating to the throats of the +traitors in the Philippines, it is true, but it is not so bad or so cruel +as maiming them for life, or killing them. The yellow journals may +continue to howl, but the loyal American people will sustain the soldiers +of the Nation in every effort to compel peace that comes within the rules +of war.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span></p> + +<p> </p><p> </p> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span></p><p> </p> +<div class="bbox" style="width: 886px; height: 450px;"><img src="images/i176.jpg" alt="SCOTTS BLUFFS" /></div> +<p class="center"><b>SCOTTS BLUFFS</b></p> +<p class="caption">Major-General G. M. Dodge and train on march from Julesburg to Fort +Laramie, in the Indian Campaign, August, 1865.</p> +<p> </p><p> </p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span></p> +<h2>MISPLACED SYMPATHY</h2> + +<h3><span class="smcap">Address to The<br /> +New York Commandery, Military Order of Loyal<br /> +Legion, on Cruelties in the Philippines</span></h3> + +<p> </p> +<p>I desire to enter my protest and call the attention of the companions to +the position of a portion of the public press, and some people, towards +our Army in the Philippines, and what they assert are cruelties +perpetrated there.</p> + +<p>There is a certain portion of the press, and also of the people, who are +and always have been absolutely opposed to the operations of our army in +the Philippines. They were very anxious to push us into a war which we +were all opposed to, but after getting us there they refused to accept the +results, and have persistently opposed everything done that was not in +exact accordance with their views. In order to work upon the sympathies of +the people, some of the papers are publishing pictures showing our +soldiers in the very act of committing great outrages; the pictures were +manufactured in their own offices, as were also most of the outrages +complained of. You have not, however, seen in these papers any pictures +portraying the cruelties perpetrated upon our soldiers, which have been +worse than any acts ever committed by the savages in our wars with them; +they are, in fact, too revolting to relate. I have had much to do with +Indian warfare, but have never seen any cruelties to be compared with +those inflicted upon our soldiers by the Filipinos, and these occurrences +were not rare, but general,—happening all the time. Very little has been +said on this subject, for it was not the policy of the Government to have +the stories of these atrocities printed, or brought before the people; but +now that our army is being so bitterly attacked, it is time that, the +soldiers' side of the question should be presented, and we are learning of +the soldiers who have been assassinated, their feet burned, buried alive, +killed by slow-burning fires, their bowels cut open and wound around<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span> +trees. The Filipinos indulged in every torture and indignity that was +possible, and, as a general thing, our soldiers did not retaliate. How +they managed to refrain from taking vengeance is beyond my comprehension, +but their action is greatly to their credit and honor.</p> + +<p>The questions I wish to bring before you, however, are, What are the +rights of an officer in such matters? What are his duties and privileges +in war in an enemy's country that is under martial law? Take, for +instance, General Smith's position when he was sent to Samar, with +instructions to wipe out the insurrection there. He is said to have issued +instructions to kill everybody found in arms that was over ten years of +age, and to burn the country, if it was necessary to wipe out the +insurrection, and the result is that in ninety days or less he did wipe +out the insurrection, and without any great loss on our side or on the +part of the enemy. Now they are denouncing him for a threat,—not an act. +The temptation to retaliate must have been very great, for the treatment +the Ninth Infantry received from those savages was nothing short of +murder, followed by the most horrible mutilation, by a people who +pretended to be their friends and at peace. In the ninety days he was +operating there General Smith brought the island to peace, everybody in it +had surrendered, and it is quiet. If he had made war under the methods +advocated, allowing no one to be hurt, in all probability the subjugation +of the island would have required a year's time, and there would have been +ten times the suffering and loss of life than actually occurred. He simply +followed the plan of war that was pursued by Grant, Sherman, and other +commanders in the Civil War; that is, made it just as effective and short +as possible. You know Sherman's position was that after a certain length +of time when an enemy had been whipped, it was their duty to cease making +war, and if they did not do so, he considered that any means were +justifiable in order to bring it to an end. He stated this very clearly in +his St. Louis speech. He stated the case as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I claim that when we took Vicksburg, by all the rules of civilized +warfare the Confederates should have surrendered, and allowed us to +restore peace in the land. I claim also that when we took Atlanta they +were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their +cause, which was then hopeless, and it was clear as daylight that they +were bound to surrender and return to civil life; but they continued +the war, and then we had a right under the rules of civilized warfare +to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the +Government, and make them succumb. I had to go through Georgia to let +them see what war meant. I had a right to destroy, which I did, and I +made them feel the consequences of war so fully they will never again +invite an invading Army.</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>You all know of the troubles that occurred in the border states during the +Civil War, and of the cruelties to the families of Union men who entered +our Army. It was father against son, brother against brother, and, as +General Sherman said, "It was cruelty, and there was no refining it." We +know what severe orders were given for treatment of enemies within our +lines, when their acts were in violation of the laws of war. In one case +torpedoes were placed under a road over which our troops were marching, +and several soldiers were killed. Sherman happened to come along just at +that time, and said to the Colonel of the First Alabama Cavalry, which was +his escort, "Burn the country within fifteen miles surrounding this spot." +You all know what that meant; it was a license under which other things +besides burning was done. An eye-witness describes Sherman's march to the +sea and through the Carolinas as a "cloud of smoke by day and a pillar of +fire by night." Who ever made the suggestion that Sherman's uniform should +be stripped off for this, or that he should be shot, as some of our +representatives in Congress and our press now demand should be done in the +Philippines for making war in earnest?</p> + +<p>Take another case, where Captain Anderson captured a train of convalescent +unarmed Union soldiers in North Missouri, and placed them in line and shot +every one of them. Shortly afterwards Colonel Johnson, of the Missouri +State Militia, who was following Anderson, came up. Anderson attacked, +this militia command of 160 men and killed 143, only seventeen getting +away. Only one man was taken alive, and he saved himself by giving a +Masonic sign. The war records are full of cases of individual acts, and I +select one of which I had personal knowledge. It is found in volume 38, of +the War Records. The orders in Missouri at that time were that any person +who harbored a guerilla, and did not report the fact to the nearest +commanding Union officer, should receive the same treatment as the +guerilla. A man by the name of McReynolds violated these orders, and +harbored Quantrell, the guerilla, and the officer who detected it, after +stating all the facts and evidence, reported to me as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>On consultation with the squadron commanders, Captain Hamblin and +Lieutenant Grain, it was decided to execute McReynolds, which was +carried out under my orders.</p> + +<p class="right"><span class="smcap">R. M. Box.</span><br /> +<i>Captain Company H, Seventh Cavalry, Missouri State Militia</i>.</p></div> + +<p>In reporting this case to the Adjutant General in Washington I did not +approve it, as my investigation showed that the statements<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span> of +McReynolds's acts were true. I did not censure the officers, but issued an +order that officers should follow more closely the orders of the +Department, and ended that order as follows: "Hereafter men caught in arms +will have no mercy shown them." General John McNeill, of Missouri, took +twelve citizens out and shot them, it being claimed they were connected +with guerillas that shot a Union man. In some histories it is known as the +Palmyra massacre. It is claimed that the Union man turned up alive. If the +reports of the numbers of robbers, guerillas and outlaws who were shot on +sight in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and elsewhere, by both sides in +1864 and 1865, could be gathered up they would furnish retaliations and +cruelties enough for these water-cure journals for years.</p> + +<p>Consider this matter in a broader sense. Take the order of General Grant +to General Sheridan to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste; it was +absolutely destroyed so the enemy could not again occupy it. I can see no +difference between an order to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste +and Smith's order to make Samar a "howling wilderness." Take the order I +received to go to the rear of Bragg's Army and destroy the Valley of the +Tennessee, and all the supplies gathered there for the use of his Army, +which valley was burned from Bear River to Decatur. These were orders from +principal officers in our Army, and I only quote them to show the contrast +between that time and the present. Senators in the halls of Congress find +it necessary in these days to take up the question. Senator Rawlins, of +Utah, made an attack upon our officers, and especially upon General +Chaffee, which was nothing short of disgraceful, and should not be allowed +to go without vigorous condemnation. He represents a state and people +under whose orders Lieutenant Gunnison and his party were massacred by +Mormons disguised as Indians. Some one should get up in the Senate and +call him to account for these things, and ask him, in consideration of +these facts, why he is so deeply outraged by the orders of General +Chaffee, a gallant soldier and gentleman, a humane man, and one who, in my +opinion, has done nothing in the Philippines but what was perfectly +justified, and will in time be considered to have been humane.</p> + +<p>The two Senators from Colorado have taken it upon themselves to denounce +in bitter terms what they call unheard-of acts and cruelties of our Army. +I would point them to a case in their<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span> own state, which was more severe +than any act in the Philippines has been. A regiment of Colorado cavalry +under Colonel J. M. Chivington, a minister by profession, attacked and +destroyed a band of Indians encamped on the Big Sandy, near Camp Lyon, who +claimed to be under the protection of the officers at Fort Lyon. This was +a massacre of men, women and children of a friendly band of Indians, and +was one of the main causes of bringing into arms against the United States +every tribe of Indians south of the Yellowstone. When an investigation of +this affair was ordered the State of Colorado almost unanimously protested +against it, upholding the act, and quoted that old saying, "There is no +good Indian except a dead one." Think of our wars with the Indians in +which whole bands were wiped out, even the women and children being +destroyed; think of the wars in which we employed Indians against Indians; +they not only killed but scalped. I do not know of a single treaty ever +made with the Indians that the United States has not violated, and when an +Indian had the hardihood to object the Government started in to wipe him +out. This has been the treatment of the Indians from the Atlantic to the +Pacific, until at the present time there is not a wild Indian living in +the entire country; yet I cannot remember that this press has ever been +aroused; it was too near home.</p> + +<p>Take the case of Major Glenn, who is about to be courtmartialed for giving +the water cure to the presidente in one of the Provinces of Luzon, as the +testimony goes to show. This presidente had been appointed to office by +our Government, had taken the oath of allegiance, and was there to +represent us. While he was occupying this position, it was discovered that +he was the captain of an insurgent company, giving active assistance to +the enemy, and he was, therefore, a traitor and a spy, and under the laws +of war deserved to be shot; but instead they proposed to courtmartial +Glenn for simply giving him the water cure; and this, in my opinion, is a +great wrong.</p> + +<p>Order 100, which is often quoted, was issued in the Civil War to govern +officers. It was prepared by Professor Lieber, and was considered and +adopted, I believe, by a board of officers; anyhow, it was very carefully +drawn. I am told it has been considered and used by nearly all the +nations. It gives an officer great latitude, and where an officer meets a +savage enemy, or one that is violating the laws of war, those laws are +suspended and it virtually is left<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span> to his own judgment as to how far he +should go in inflicting punishment, and under this order there is no doubt +both Smith and Glenn were protected in their actions. It may seem harsh, +but you are all aware how many harsh orders were given in the Civil War +for the purpose of forcing the enemy to obey our orders, and how often +those orders and threats accomplished the purpose without any other act. +When the colored troops were first organized, on several occasions +Confederate officers sent in demands for them to surrender, coupled with +the threat that if they refused the place would be taken and no quarter +granted. I know of one instance where an officer believed this threat and +surrendered a Regiment of colored infantry for the purpose of having them +protected. Then there is the case of Fort Pillow; whether or not Forest +gave the order it is claimed he gave, I do not know; but the fact that no +quarter was shown there has been amply verified.</p> + +<p>Within the past week there has been appointed a committee of distinguished +citizens, most of whom are well-known opponents of our Government in its +policies and acts during the Spanish War. They propose to hunt up and lay +before Congress all cases of cruelty on the part of our Army, with the +avowed purpose of sustaining the national honor. I must say this is the +first time I ever heard of national honor being sustained by such methods. +Have you, or any one else, ever heard a single word of protest from these +people or any one connected with them against the revolting cruelties of +the enemy in the Philippines? They evidently have no desire to learn about +these things, but want some excuse for attacking our Army, hoping thereby +to bring dishonor upon our country before the world. The national honor +never has, never can, and never will be protected by such methods. It is +upheld and maintained today, as it always has been, by the patriotism of +our people as represented by our Army in the Civil War, in Cuba, the +Philippines, and China.</p> + +<p>These attacks upon the Army are for a double purpose, and you should not +forget it. Every time they make this great hubbub about cruelties they are +hitting back at those that were in the Civil War. There is an element in +this country that already has no use for the soldier of the Civil War. +They are continually crying about the pension he is getting; that he is +favored in the Government service; etc., etc. They do not dare attack him +openly, as yet, but do it covertly. There is no officer listening to me +who<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span> did not see cruelties in the Civil War. Many of you have had to order +them, but you know you were never brought to account for them when they +were acts of necessity. We were always careful that no cruelties were +committed by enlisted men, but whatever was done was by the order of an +officer. It was the practice of the War Department never to interfere in +these matters, leaving them to the officer who was in charge of the forces +in the field. None of these things occurred without his knowledge; he was +on the spot and knew the necessity for them, and if he did not take action +it was considered that none was necessary, and they were seldom called to +account for it afterwards; but in the Philippines they are bringing +officers to account simply because of the outcry of people who care +nothing for the merits of the case, except to make capital against our +country's policy in maintaining itself in the Philippines. In view of all +the facts, I must doubt the sincerity of those who are seeking to bring +discredit upon our little Army, the marvellous efficiency of which has won +the admiration of the world. Under the regulations, it is impossible for +the Army to defend itself and make answer to these attacks, except through +their own officers, and their reports do not reach the public, for the +press seems to use only that which reflects upon the Army, and omits that +which is in its favor. It is the duty of every companion here, as well as +of every good citizen, to enter his protest against these unjust attacks. +The right side is beginning to get a hearing, and when the facts and +causes for the action of the Army are generally known, it will be found +that our Army is as humane and well-behaved a body of troops as ever went +into a foreign country, and we must all assist in seeing that it receives +justice.</p> + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle of Atlanta, by Grenville M. 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Dodge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Battle of Atlanta + and Other Campaigns, Addresses, Etc. + +Author: Grenville M. Dodge + +Release Date: December 4, 2009 [EBook #30597] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA *** + + + + +Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Stephanie Eason, +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net. + + + + + + + + + + +[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE + Commander + Department of the Missouri + 1865.] + + + + + THE + BATTLE OF ATLANTA + AND + OTHER CAMPAIGNS, + ADDRESSES, Etc. + + + BY + Major-General Grenville M. Dodge + + + COUNCIL BLUFFS, IOWA + THE MONARCH PRINTING COMPANY + 1911 + + + + +CONTENTS + + Page. + + The Southwestern Campaign 9 + Letter of General Dodge to his Father 35 + The Battle of Atlanta 39 + Letter to General Raum 53 + The Indian Campaigns of 1864-65 63 + The Indian Campaigns of 1865-66 79 + Campaign up the Tennessee River Valley 111 + The Army of the Tennessee 129 + The Campaign in the West 137 + A Talk to Old Comrades 145 + General Grant 151 + Use of Block-Houses During the Civil War 159 + An Incident of the War 165 + Gen. G. M. Dodge on the Water Cure 173 + Misplaced Sympathy 177 + + + +LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS + + Major-General Grenville M. Dodge Frontispiece + Major-General Samuel R. Curtis 7 + Sylvanus Dodge 34 + Sixteenth Army Corps in the Battle of Atlanta 38 + Monument on the Battlefield of Atlanta 52 + Old Fort Kearney 62 + James Bridger, Guide 78 + Pumpkin Buttes 94 + Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge and Staff 110 + Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee 128 + Major-General G. M. Dodge and Staff 136 + Fort Cottonwood 140 + Where General McPherson Fell 144 + Major-General George G. Meade 150 + Pontoon Bridge Across the Tennessee River 158 + To the Memory of Samuel Davis 164 + Company L, Fifty-First Iowa Infantry 172 + Scotts Bluffs 176 + + + + +[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL R. CURTIS + +Commander of the Army of the Southwest, in the Spring of 1861.] + + + + +THE SOUTHWESTERN CAMPAIGN + + +The Southwest became prominent before the nation early in the war from the +doubt existing as to the position of Missouri, which was saved by the +energy and determination of Frank P. Blair and Colonel Nathaniel Lyon; the +latter first capturing Camp Jackson, on May 10th, 1861. He then, picking +up what force he could without waiting for them to be disciplined or +drilled, marched rapidly against the Missouri State troops under Price, +who were driven to the southwest through Springfield, where, being joined +by the troops from Arkansas, under Colonel McCullough, they stood and +fought the battle of Wilson's Creek. This would have been a great victory +for the Union forces if Lyon had not divided his forces at the request of +General Siegel and trusted the latter to carry out his plan of attack in +the rear while Lyon attacked in the front. This General Siegel failed to +do, leaving the field when the battle was half over, and allowing Lyon to +fight it out alone. Even then, if Lyon had not been killed at the head of +his Army while fighting the whole force of the enemy, it would have turned +out to be a great victory for the Union forces, and would have held that +country. The death of Lyon caused a return of his troops to Rolla and +Sedalia, and opened up again the whole of Missouri to the Missouri State +troops under General Price. + +One of the notable facts of this battle of Wilson's Creek was that it was +fought by young officers who ranked only as Captains and Lieutenants, all +of whom afterwards became distinguished officers in the war--Schofield, +Sturgis, Totten, DuBois, and Sweeny--and from the fact that in the first +great battle of the Southwest one of the two commanders of Armies falling +at the head of their forces in battle was killed here--General Lyon. The +other was General McPherson, who fell at Atlanta. + +Lyon pursued the tactics of Grant by attacking the enemy wherever to be +found, and not taking into consideration the disparity of forces. The +excitement caused by Lyon's campaigns induced the Government to create +the Western Department, and assign to it on July 25th, 1861, General John +C. Fremont as its commander. + +In August, 1861, I landed in St. Louis with my Regiment, the Fourth Iowa +Infantry, and soon after was sent to Rolla, Mo., which was then the most +important outpost, being the nearest to the enemy's Army. Soon after I +reached there General Fremont commenced formulating his plans for the +campaign in the South, and being the commander of that outpost I was in +daily communication with him. There was a constant stream of reports +coming from the enemy's lines that seemed to give great importance to +their strength and their position, and I was continually ordered to send +out scouts and troops to test the information. I invariably found it wrong +and my telegrams will show my opinion of those reports. + +Soon after arriving at Rolla I was placed in command of the post, and had +quite a force under me, and was ordered to prepare to winter there. + +The battle of Wilson's Creek was fought on August 10th, and soon +thereafter General Price formed his plan of campaign to move north into +north Missouri and endeavor to hold it by the recruits that he could +obtain there. With from five to ten thousand men of the Missouri State +Guards, General Price moved, and as he marched north in September his Army +increased heavily in numbers and enthusiasm. The Federal forces were +scattered all over Missouri--some eighty thousand in all. At least half of +these could have been concentrated to operate against any force of the +enemy, but they were all protecting towns, cities and railways and +endeavoring to make Missouri loyal, while Price concentrated and moved +where he pleased, until, on September 21, 1861, he captured Lexington, +with some 3,000 or more prisoners. The movement of Price on Lexington and +the defeat and capture of our forces there, forced Fremont to concentrate, +and he moved with four Divisions, making an Army of 38,000, on +Springfield, which he reached October 27th. Price was then far south of +that place. Had our forces been concentrated to meet Price's Army we had +enough to defeat him; but the moment Fremont commenced concentrating his +four Divisions to act against him, Price moved back as fast as he had +advanced, and did not stop until he was south of Springfield and near +supports in Arkansas. + +General McCullough, in his letters from Springfield, Mo., August 24th, +says that there were only 3,000 troops in Springfield and all the Arkansas +troops had left the service. Price's total force was about 12,000 men, and +on November 7th he reached and joined McCullough and suggested to General +A. S. Johnston a campaign against St. Louis, offering to raise in Missouri +and Arkansas a force of 25,000 men in such a campaign, and stated he +should wait for Fremont at Pineville, Ark., believing in that rugged +country he could defeat him. + +While at Rolla I was ordered to send a force to take Salem, to the south +of me, and I entrusted the command of the force to Colonel Greusel, of the +Thirteenth Illinois Infantry. I issued to him the following instructions: + + If the men who are away from home are in the rebel Army, or if their + families cannot give a good account of them or their whereabouts, take + their property or that portion of it worth taking; also their slaves. + Be sure that they are aiding the enemy, then take all they have got. + +When I wrote these instructions I had not considered for a moment what a +row the order to take the slaves would cause. I simply treated them as +other property. It was written innocently, but made a sensation I never +dreamed of, and I have often since been quoted as one of the first to +liberate and utilize the negro. + +On the return of Lyon's Army to Rolla I was ordered by General Fremont to +report at his headquarters in St. Louis. On my arrival in St. Louis I +reported myself to his Adjutant, who was in the basement of the old home +of Thomas A. Benton, on Choutau Avenue, but was unable to obtain an +interview with the General. I showed my dispatch to his Adjutant-General, +and waited there two days. I met any number of staff officers, and was +handed about from one to another, never reaching or hearing from General +Fremont. After remaining in St. Louis two days I considered it was my duty +to return to my command, and left a note to the Adjutant stating that I +had waited there two days for an interview with General Fremont, and had +left for my command, and that if wanted would return to St. Louis again. + +Evidently no communication was made to Fremont of my presence in the city +or of my note, for soon after I arrived at Rolla I received a sharp note +from him asking why I had not reported as ordered. I answered by wire that +I had reported, had been unable to see him, and would report immediately +again in St. Louis. I was determined to see him this time, and I, +therefore, went directly to Colonel Benton's house, and, taking a sealed +envelope in my hand, marched right up the front steps, passed all the +guards as though I belonged there, and went into his room and reported +myself present. I there learned from him as much of his plans as he +thought best to give me in regard to his movements, and obtained from him +the information that Price's Army was not far from Rolla, and instructions +to be on the alert. I supposed that my command at Rolla was to accompany +his march to Springfield, and on my return to Rolla made every preparation +to do so, but never received the order. Everything in the department was +absolutely chaos. It was impossible to obtain provisions, accouterments, +equipment, or anything else upon a proper requisition. Everything seemed +to require an order from one of General Fremont's staff, and my own +Regiment suffered a long time before I could get for it the necessary +arms, clothing, equipment, etc. + +While I was at Rolla the dispatch sent by the Government to General +Curtis, to be forwarded to Fremont at Springfield, relieving him of the +command, was brought by a staff officer to me with the request that I +should see that the staff officer had an escort and went through promptly +to Springfield. General Curtis, who was from my own state, wrote me a +private note stating the importance of pushing this staff officer through. +President Lincoln sent the order to General Curtis with this peculiar +note: + + WASHINGTON, October 24, 1861. + + _Brigadier-General S. R. Curtis_: + + MY DEAR SIR:--Herewith is a document, half letter, half order, which, + wishing you to see but not to make public, I send unsealed. Please + read it and then inclose it to the officer who may be in command of + the Department of the West at the time it reaches you. I cannot know + now whether Fremont or Hunter will then be in command. Yours truly, + + A. LINCOLN. + +In a few days I received a letter from General Hunter, who had relieved +General Fremont, instructing me that thereafter everything in the +department must be carried on in accordance with the orders of the War +Department and the Army Regulations, and I immediately saw a change for +the better. I was soldier enough, although I had not had much experience +then, to know that the methods being pursued under Fremont could bring +nothing but disaster to the service. Every order was signed by somebody +acting as a General, a Colonel, or something else, while in fact many of +them had no rank whatever, and in looking over my own orders I do not know +why I did not sign myself as an Acting General, as those who succeeded me +did. Even after General Halleck took command I noticed in the orders of +General Hunter that he assigned persons to the command of a Brigade as +Acting Brigadier-Generals instead of their rank as Colonel Commanding, +etc. + +I remained at Rolla until the return of the troops under General Hunter; +and finally those commanded by Siegel, Asboth and Osterhaus were encamped +at Rolla outside of the post and were reporting directly to the commanding +officer of the department, while I as post commander reported directly to +the same authority. + +General Hunter as soon as he took command wired the War Department that +there was no force of the enemy in his neighborhood, although orders had +been given by Fremont a day or two before to march out and fight Price's +Army. Hunter, therefore, in accordance with his orders from Washington, +abandoned the pursuit, although with the force he had he could have driven +Price and McCullough south of the Arkansas River, and probably have +avoided the later campaign that ended in the Battle of Pea Ridge. Hunter +moved his forces back to Rolla and Sedalia and sent 18,000 of his men to +join General Grant in the campaigns up the Tennessee River. + +This force at Rolla was mostly Germans, and the change of commanders from +Fremont to Hunter, and later to Halleck, was unsatisfactory to them, +though one of the officers, General Osterhaus, took no part in the feeling +and sentiment that seemed to exist that for success it was necessary to +have Fremont or Siegel in command, and my understanding was that the force +at Rolla during the winter of 1861-62 was the nucleus of the force that +was again to march to the Southwest under the orders of General Halleck +and to be commanded by General Siegel. General Halleck, when he assumed +command of the department, in his letters to the War Department and his +orders to the troops showed plainly his disgust at the condition of +matters in that department. He wrote to the War Department: + + One week's experience here is sufficient to prove that everything is + in complete chaos. The most astounding orders and contracts for + supplies of all kinds have been made, and large amounts purported to + have been received, but there is nothing to show that they have ever + been properly issued and they cannot now be found. + +Of the condition of the troops he found in his department, he wrote: + + Some of these corps are not only organized in a way entirely contrary + to law, but are by no means reliable, being mostly foreigners, and + officered in many cases by foreign adventurers, or perhaps refugees + from justice; and, having been tampered with by political partizans + for political purposes, they constitute a very dangerous element to + society as well as to the Army itself. Wherever they go they convert + all Union men into bitter enemies. The men, if properly officered, + would make good soldiers, but with their present officers they are + little better than an armed mob. + +They were not paid, had not been mustered into our service, and the +commissions emanated from General Fremont, not from the State or +Government. + +General Halleck's plans evidently were to make a campaign against Price as +soon as he could organize the forces concentrated at Rolla. Price's +headquarters were at Springfield, and his northerly line was along the +Osage Valley. His force was estimated anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000. As +outposts General Halleck had Rolla, Jefferson City, and Sedalia. There was +located at Rolla five or six thousand troops; at Sedalia and along that +line about ten or twelve thousand, under General Pope, including Jeff C. +Davis's Division; but these troops Halleck intended to send down the +Mississippi and up the Tennessee. + +General Pope in his letters to General Halleck urged that he be allowed to +move on Price and destroy his Army, which he said he could do with his +force. Rumors of Price's force and their movements were a constant terror +and excitement throughout Missouri. The whole of northern Missouri was +aroused by Price's proximity, and all the counties had recruiting officers +from his Army enrolling and sending it recruits. The numbers of these +recruiting officers and their small squads of recruits were magnified into +thousands, and Price, when he sent a thousand men to Lexington for the +purpose of holding that place and recruiting, brought orders from Halleck +for a movement of all the troops to cut him off. The prompt movement of +Halleck kept him from remaining there very long, but he was enabled to +take about three thousand recruits from there without molestation from us. + +Price's campaign as planned for the winter was to have General +McCullough's Arkansas force, which was lying at Cross Timbers, near +Elkhorn Tavern, and Van Buren in Arkansas, join him. Price complained +bitterly of his inability to obtain any aid from McCullough, stating that +if he could obtain it he could march into northern Missouri and hold the +State, and recruit there an Army of Missourians; which, from my experience +in the State, I have no doubt he would have done if he could have moved +there and held his position. + +General Halleck's plan evidently was to move a body from Rolla directly on +Springfield, with the intention of striking and defeating Price before +Price could receive reinforcements, but Halleck had a great disinclination +to move until he had organized the forces in the State of Missouri into +Brigades and Divisions, had them properly mustered and officered, and had +his staff departments so arranged that they could be depended upon to take +care of any moving column. This disinclination of Halleck to move carried +us on to the first of January. + +In December General Siegel was given command of the troops at Rolla, and +Captain Phil Sheridan was sent there as Quartermaster for that Army. His +ability and foresight in organizing the transportation of an Army, feeding +it, and fitting it for a campaign, was shown every day. + +On December 26th General Halleck assigned General S. R. Curtis to the +command of the District of Southwest Missouri. This included the forces +under Siegel at Rolla, and caused very severe comments from them. From the +letters of Halleck, written at the time and afterwards, this placing of +Siegel under Curtis was caused by the letters and opinions--in fact, the +denunciations--of Siegel made by Captains Schofield, Totten, and Sturgis, +when with Lyon in the Wilson's Creek campaign. Evidently Halleck lost all +faith in Siegel as commander of the Southwestern Army, and therefore +assigned Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis, who had been stationed at St. +Louis, to the command. But General Siegel was still left in command of two +Divisions of the troops near Rolla, which was a great mistake. + +As soon as General Curtis assumed command General Halleck commenced urging +him to move to the south on Springfield, agreeing to send to him Colonel +Jeff C. Davis's Division to join him before reaching Springfield, which +Division was about 5,000 strong, and was with Pope on the Lamine River +line. Curtis hesitated, and did not feel secure with the forces he had, +although Halleck did not believe Price would stand for a fight, or that +Curtis would need Jeff C. Davis's Division. + +The Army of the Southwest, about seven thousand strong, was organized at +Rolla, and moved from there January 14th, towards Springfield, halting at +Lebanon. From Lebanon it moved on to Marshfield, where Colonel Jeff C. +Davis, with his Division, joined it. Great preparations were made there +for the attack upon Price, and we moved out of Marshfield prepared for +battle, General Siegel commanding the First and Second Divisions, one +under General Osterhaus and the other under General Asboth. General Jeff +C. Davis, from General Pope's Army, commanded the Third Division, and +Colonel Eugene A. Carr the Fourth Division, a Brigade of which I +commanded. + +When within about three miles of Springfield we received orders to attack +that town the next morning, and moved at midnight. All the reports we +received were that Price was in Springfield ready for battle. I had the +extreme left, and put out my skirmishers soon after midnight, supposing, +of course, that I was in front of the enemy, although I had seen nothing +of them. In the darkness I lost track of the company of the Fourth Iowa, +who were the skirmishers of my Brigade, and was greatly worried at the +fact, but at daylight I met them on the road mounted upon horses and +dressed in all kinds of costumes. The officer in command, who was an +enterprising one, had started his skirmish-line, and, not meeting any +enemy, had pushed right into Springfield, which he found evacuated except +for a rear guard and a number of horses. They mounted the horses and rode +back to us. All this time our extreme right, under Siegel, was using its +artillery upon the town, not knowing that the enemy had gone. + +General Curtis, in his order of battle, instructed Captain Sheridan to +line up his transportation in the rear of the line of battle, so that it +could be used as a defensive obstruction for the troops to fall back to, +provided they met any check or were driven back. Captain Sheridan looked +on this order as a very singular one, and says that he could, in his +imagination, if anything happened our army, see his transportation flying +over that rough country, knowing that his mule-drivers would be the first +to run, most likely from a false report, not even waiting for an attack. +While this order at the time caused no comment, it now, after our long +experience, looks very ridiculous, though not more so than many others, we +received at the beginning of the war. + +It was not long before we were all on the march through and beyond +Springfield, Price and his Army being in full retreat, with a force, so +far as we could learn, of about ten thousand men. We followed him as +rapidly as possible, he leaving a strong rear guard under Colonel Little +to stop us at every stream. General Siegel had urged upon General Curtis a +detour by his two Divisions to head off Price or stop him, so that he +could attack him in front while we attacked his rear. Curtis had acceded +to this. I had the advance following up Price, and endeavored to hold him, +while Siegel moved by another road, expecting to catch him in flank or get +ahead of him. + +I remember that about noon of each day at some good defensive point, +generally across a creek with a wide, open valley, Price would open out +with his artillery and cavalry and act as though he intended to give +battle. Our cavalry would fall back to give way to our infantry, and we +would go into line, put out our skirmishers, and lose half a day, and as +night came on Price would get out without our accomplishing anything. I +remember distinctly that my Regiment would go into line, strip themselves, +and throw down the chickens, potatoes, apples, and other eatables they had +foraged and taken during the day, and as they would go forward the troops +in our rear would come up and gobble what they had dropped. About the +third time the Regiment went into line I noticed the boys had left nothing +but their knapsacks, and were holding on to their chickens and provisions. +One of the boys saw me looking at them, and thinking I was going to order +them to drop what they had in their hands or on their backs, he appealed +to me, saying, "Colonel, we have fed that damned Thirty-sixth Illinois +Infantry every day and left ourselves without any supper. They put up this +game that is going on to get our chickens. There ain't any Price on that +side of the river, and they can't fool us any longer if they do you." + +At Cane Creek, Flat Creek, Sugar Creek, etc., we had pretty sharp +skirmishes. I soon discovered the plan of Price. It was to leave a strong +rear-guard and make a great show while his trains and the rest of his Army +were pushing to the South as fast as possible; so as soon as I saw him +stop I went at him head-on with the cavalry and infantry, not even waiting +to deploy more than a Regiment. Price's men would line the road and get +one or two volleys at us and then slip off into the woods before we could +deploy or return their fire. They did not get hurt much, but we did; but +at the same time it broke up his game of holding us back, and we kept +close on to his rear. For two or three days we were looking for Siegel to +get in ahead and check Price, when to our astonishment a report came from +our rear that he had turned his column in on our road some eight miles +behind us, and there was a general howl from the force that had been +pounding away at Price's rear. + +Finally we pushed Price back to Fayetteville, Ark., where we landed during +the month of February, and where we were halted by General Halleck's +orders, who stated that he would relieve our front of the enemy by his +movements with the rest of his forces through Southeast Missouri, down the +Mississippi, and up the Tennessee. + +While Price was laying at Springfield, in December, he communicated with +the Confederate Government, and changed all his Missouri State force as +far as practicable into Confederate troops. He also complained to the +Government, and to General Polk, who commanded at Columbus, Ky., of the +impossibility of obtaining the co-operation of the Confederate forces west +of the Mississippi River. From the representations of Polk and Price, the +Confederate Government organized all the country west of the Mississippi +River into a department known as the Trans-Mississippi District, and +placed it under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, who assumed command +early in February, 1862. As soon as he assumed command General Van Dorn +prepared to make an aggressive campaign, using all his forces in Arkansas +and those under Price, estimating that they would reach 30,000 troops. His +plan was to move his forces directly from Arkansas northward, west of Iron +Mountain, by way of Salem, while Price moved from Springfield directly +east and joined his column by way of Salem and Rolla, thence the combined +column to move directly on St. Louis, Van Dorn calculating that he could +strike and capture St. Louis before Halleck could concentrate his troops +or obtain any knowledge of his movements that would enable him to defeat +him before reaching St. Louis. Van Dorn expected to make this move in +February, and his plans and the energy with which he executed them and +concentrated his troops shows him to have been an officer of ability and +great energy. General Halleck's prompt movement of General Curtis's army +from Rolla southwest in January, thus driving Price out of Springfield, +compelled Van Dorn to change his plans, and instead of moving towards St. +Louis he moved his troops by Van Buren and the Boston Mountains, making a +junction with Price's force in the Boston Mountains below Fayetteville, +and while General Curtis's Army was laying at Cross Hollows, evidently in +full security, thinking his campaign was over and expecting Price and Van +Dorn to be drawn away from his front by the movement down the Mississippi. +General Curtis was obliged to scatter his forces in that destitute country +over a wide expanse so as to obtain food and forage. Van Dorn, without our +having any knowledge of the fact, marched over the Boston Mountains, and +it was March 3d before General Curtis was aware that Van Dorn was almost +in his front and on his flank. The Union refugees flying before Van Dorn's +movement gave us the first reliable notice of the new combination and the +new movement. General Curtis immediately sent out orders, and, by marching +all night, during heavy snows and severe cold weather, was able to +concentrate most of his force on Sugar Creek, near Bentonville. General +Siegel and his force did not move promptly, as ordered by Curtis, and was +almost cut off before reaching Bentonville. He had to cut his way through +a portion of Van Dorn's Cavalry, which he was able to do without much +loss, and our line was formed on the north side of Sugar Creek, facing to +the south,--a strong position,--expecting to receive Van Dorn's attack on +the main telegraph road from Fayetteville to Springfield. We were on a +plateau with a broad open valley in our front. In the rear of us was what +was known as the Cross Timbers, a deep gorge. To the west of us was much +open ground, over which was a road parallel to the main road, passing down +what was known as Little Cross Timbers, and entering the Springfield and +Fayetteville road about midway between Elkhorn Tavern and Cassville, some +four miles in our rear. + +While I was in command at Rolla I had organized by details from the +Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Missouri Regiments a Corps of scouts who +lived in Northern Arkansas and Southern Missouri and were thoroughly +acquainted with that country. During the day of the 6th of March, while +Siegel was joining us and we were preparing for the battle, some of these +scouts came to me and told me that Van Dorn proposed to move to our rear +by this Little Cross Timber road. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I went +to General Curtis and reported these facts to him, and also told him of +this road and of the feasibility of blockading it, supposing, of course, +he would send some of the troops on his extreme right to do it; but he +turned to me and said: "You take a portion of your command and go there +and blockade the road." + +It was after dark before I could reach the Little Cross Timbers, as I had +to march infantry to the place, which was quite a distance away from where +we were. I took six companies of the Fourth Iowa Infantry and one company +of the Third Illinois Cavalry and marched to carry out this order. In the +dark two of my companies crossed the road and got lost, while with the +other five I got into Cross Timbers Hollows and spent about three hours +felling trees all through the gorge, and only left when my cavalry +reported the movement of Van Dorn's Army coming down the road. I returned +to my camp supposing my two companies had been cut off, but upon +discovering that the enemy were coming down the road they managed to get +back across it and reached the camp. + +I reported immediately to General Curtis's headquarters, and informed him +that Van Dorn's Army was moving down that road to his rear. He did not +believe it, and thought that I had mistaken some of his cavalry for Van +Dorn's Army. There were no pickets out on our right flank, and I so +reported to General Curtis, but evidently my report made no impression +upon him, and I returned to camp. + +Early on the morning of the 7th of March I received a request from General +Curtis to report at a schoolhouse that was on the main Fayetteville road a +half mile north of Sugar Creek, where I met all the commanders of +Divisions, and, I think, some of the Brigade commanders, and where a +council of war was being held as to the policy that was to be pursued. I +was so confident that Van Dorn was in our rear that when I went to this +council I took my Brigade and halted it on the road near where the council +was to be held. Generals Siegel, Asboth, and a majority of the officers +present, advised that we should fall back to Cassville towards +Springfield, and not give battle there, but Colonel Jeff C. Davis and +myself protested, and I stated that I believed a portion of Van Dorn's +force was then in our rear. The rear of Curtis's Army was in a great deal +of confusion; its trains were stretched out on the Fayetteville road and +the ground that we were upon was wooded and not very defensible for a +battle, unless they attacked us on the Sugar Creek front. + +While we were in this council, about 8:30 a. m., scattered firing +commenced in our rear near the Elkhorn Tavern, and General Curtis inquired +what it was, and asked what troops those were that were out upon the +road. I answered that they were mine, and he ordered Colonel Carr to +immediately send me to the Elkhorn Tavern and ascertain what the firing +meant. + +Colonel Carr evidently was of the same opinion as myself, and accompanied +me as I moved as rapidly as possible to the Elkhorn Tavern, where we went +without being deployed right into battle; in fact, right into the enemy's +skirmishers. The fact is, the first notice I had that the battle was on +was when a shell fell among my drummers and fifers, who were at the head +of my Regiment, and killed and demoralized them, so that we heard no more +of drumming and fifing that day. I immediately deployed a company of the +Fourth Iowa, which had been thoroughly drilled as skirmishers, and pushed +forward toward the White River road, seeing some teams of the enemy +passing that way with forage, and I pushed down the slopes of the Cross +Timber Hollows nearly a mile before I developed the enemy in force. + +The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my movement +satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in my front, and he +immediately sent back word for his other Brigade, Commanded by Colonel +Vandever, of the Ninth Iowa Infantry, to come to the rear, now our front. +They had hardly reached the Elkhorn Tavern and deployed into line before +Price's whole Army moved in on us in line of battle and disabled two of +our batteries. The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades +in line, the strength of both not exceeding three thousand men, was kept +up continuously all day, until dark, with varying success. + +As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of the enemy, +I knew that I could not hold the extended line we were covering, and I +commenced drawing in my right and closing on Vandever until I backed down +through an open field that had been cleared, and where the logs had been +hauled to the lower edge of the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I +placed my Brigade and fought all the afternoon, with the enemy sometimes +around both flanks and sometimes in my rear. + +Colonel Vandever held his line at the Elkhorn Tavern in the edge of thick +timber on the main Fayetteville road until late in the afternoon, fighting +desperately, when the enemy, taking advantage of the timber as a blind, by +largely superior numbers, drove him back across an open field to a line of +woods in his rear and in my rear, which he successfully held. I was not +aware of his movement until the fire in that direction slackened, and I +sent out my adjutant, Lieutenant James A. Williamson (afterwards a Brevet +Major-General), who returned and reported that the enemy were in +possession of that field; in fact, he ran right into them and received +their fire, but got back to me safely. It was then nearly dark. The fire +on my front had slackened, and my Brigade was almost entirely out of +ammunition. I immediately ordered them to form in column and led them +right out from the right, moving in the direction where Vandever's Brigade +had formed in its new position. As I moved out I passed right in sight of +a column of the Confederate forces, who evidently had come out of the +hollow and were forming to again attack Vandever. They probably thought I +was a portion of their force, for they made no demonstration towards me, +and I passed right by them. As I passed out into the open I could see that +General Asboth, who had been brought there by General Curtis, was forming +to attack at the Elkhorn Tavern again; and I met General Curtis, who +seemed astonished to find me with my force intact. He asked me where I was +going. I told him that I was out of ammunition, and that I was bringing +out my force to form it on the new line. Paying the command a high +compliment, he immediately ordered me to fix bayonets and to charge on the +enemy at the same time that Asboth with his reinforcement moved down the +Fayetteville road towards the Elkhorn Tavern. I immediately did this, and +passed right back over the field where I had been fighting, but found no +enemy. They had evidently left my front at the same time I retired, and I +returned and went into line on the right of Vandever's Brigade, probably +500 feet in the rear of the original line, and there we laid all night +under arms. + +Van Dorn's plan of attack was to throw the Arkansas forces under +McCullough and McIntosh on Curtis's right, facing the Little Cross Hollow +road, while at the same time General Price with his force moved around us +by the Little Cross Timber road to our rear and attacked from the Cross +Timbers. + +When passing through Little Cross Timber Hollow Price struck the timber +blockade, and, as he shows in his report, was held there for a long time +before he could clear out the roads and get his forces and artillery +through. This delayed his attack in the rear until nearly 10 o'clock in +the morning. The two forces of McCullough and Price were separated by a +high ridge by the name of Pea Ridge, over which it was impracticable for +them to connect, and, therefore, the two attacks were separate and not in +concert. + +General McCullough, in attacking from the west, struck General Jeff C. +Davis's Division. Davis had a Division of troops that had been thoroughly +drilled. He was a very competent officer and handled them with great +skill, and the attack of McCullough and McIntosh, though desperate, was +without avail, both rebel commanders being killed in the attack, which +took all the fight out of the Arkansas troops and made their attacks +towards evening of very little effect. Davis pursued them so energetically +that after the death of their commanders they straggled off towards +Arkansas and no more fighting occurred on that flank. + +General Siegel's two Divisions had remained facing Sugar Creek. General +Curtis had endeavored to bring them forward, but without avail. A Brigade +of General Osterhaus's Division aided General Davis during the latter part +of the day, but the Brigade from Asboth's Division did not get into line +to help Carr until nearly dark, although General Curtis went in person for +them. Colonel Carr's troops had been marching two nights before the +battle, and on the night of the 7th he asked General Curtis to relieve +them, so they could get some sleep. General Curtis promised they should be +relieved by one of General Siegel's Divisions, but they held the line all +that night right where they were formed, and when we looked for our relief +the next morning we learned that General Siegel and his troops were nearly +a mile in our rear, taking their breakfast. + +The general plan of General Curtis's attack on the morning of the 8th was +for a combined movement on Price's Army by both of General Siegel's +Divisions, and General Davis, who had been brought over to our front, +holding Carr's Division in reserve. We waited a long time for General +Siegel to get into position; and in fact before he got into position +Colonel Carr had been brought out from the reserve and placed on the right +of Davis. The enemy opened out upon us, and my Brigade holding the right I +commenced swinging my line in over the ground I had fought over the day +before, and discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from us; were not +standing and giving battle; and the fighting on the morning of the 8th was +merely a fight of Price's rear-guard to enable him to withdraw by the +Huntsville road, he having received orders that morning from Van Dorn to +do so, Van Dorn notifying Price that this was necessary, as the Arkansas +troops, after the death of McCullough and McIntosh, had most of them +retreated to the south, leaving Price's Army the only force intact in our +rear, so that he now had the difficult problem of getting away from us. + +The fighting lasted but a short time, mostly with artillery, and +occasioned very little loss for that day. We soon discovered the rebels +fleeing over the hills and down the White River Road, and being nearest to +that road I immediately started my Brigade after them. I had not proceeded +far when I received an order from General Curtis to return and hold the +battle-field. I was a good deal astonished at this, as I could see the +enemy demoralized in my front, with their baggage-trains and their +artillery, and I had no doubt, (as I knew the country, having had a +detachment stationed at Blackburn's Mills, at the crossing of White River, +supplying our Army with forage and grain before the battle,) that I could +capture this portion of the army before it could make a crossing of White +River. + +When I arrived on the battle-field General Curtis told me that General +Siegel and his Divisions had gone to the rear towards Cassville; in fact, +I myself heard him give one of the Brigades that was passing an order to +halt there, which they did not obey, but kept on. General Siegel wrote +back advising Curtis to form his new line in the rear of Cross Timbers, as +Van Dorn might return to the fight, but Curtis instructed Colonel Carr's +Division to remain on the field and hold it, which it did. General Curtis +afterwards made very severe complaints to General Halleck of the actions +of General Siegel, and in answer General Halleck wrote as follows: + + I was by no means surprised at General Siegel's conduct before the + battle of Pea Ridge. It was plainly in keeping with what he did at + Carthage and Wilson's Creek. After your expedition started I received + documentary proof from Captains Sturgis, Schofield, and Totten, and a + number of other officers, in regard to his conduct on those occasions, + which destroyed all confidence in him. It was for that reason that I + telegraphed to you so often not to let Siegel separate from you. I + anticipated that he would try to play you a trick by being absent at + the critical moment. I wished to forewarn you of the snare, but I + could not then give you my reasons. I am glad you prevented his + project and saved your army. I cannot describe to you how much + uneasiness I felt for you. You saved your army and won a glorious + victory by refusing to take his advice. + +Captain Kinsman, of Company B, Fourth Iowa, who was holding Pea Ridge, and +witnessed the battle from that point, and could look down upon Carr's +Division, described the battle in the rear as follows: + + At 8:30 o'clock Colonel Dodge opened the ball, and the battle was soon + raging all along the line with a fierceness and obstinacy which omened + a terrific struggle. The weather was splendid, and the smoke instead + of hanging murkily among the trees, rose rapidly and rolled away over + the hills in dense sulphurous masses. The thunder of the artillery was + terrific, and the shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air + like flying devils, while the infantry of both armies, with their + rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, kept a perfect hurricane of death + howling through the woods. The rebels fought well, but generally fired + too high, and their batteries, although getting our range accurately, + missed the elevation much of the time. Their poor shooting was our + salvation. Had they done as well as our men, with the tremendous odds + against us, they must have annihilated us. The enemy were clear around + our right flank, enveloping us, and it looked as though they would + capture Dodge's Brigade, when Colonel Dodge took a battalion of + Colonel Carr's regiment, the Third Illinois cavalry, and charged the + forces that were turning our right flank like a whirlwind. Everything + gave way before them. Every man in that battalion seemed to ride for + his life, and they swept way around our front, routing and + demoralizing that flank of the enemy, and effectually freeing our rear + and flank. Price told some of our boys of the Fourth Iowa who were + captured on the day of the fight and have since escaped, that we + fought more like devils than human beings. The rebel colonels (several + of them) inquired of our boys who those black-coated fellows were, and + who led them. They said there must have been at least 3,000 of them. + When the boys told them there were less than 600 of them, the Colonels + said they needn't tell them any such stuff as that; that they knew it + was a damned lie. But they sent their compliments to Colonel Dodge for + the bravery of himself and his command, and well they might, for + opposed to Colonel Dodge's Brigade of 1,050 men, and two guns of the + First Iowa Battery, were six regiments of Confederate troops, a large + force of Confederate Missouri State troops, and eighteen guns, and + many of these Confederate troops were the men who did the hard + fighting at the Wilson Creek battle. All day, from 8:30 in the morning + till 5:30 at night, Dodge's Brigade held its ground, dealing death + into the rebel ranks, and, when dark came, with ammunition expended, + the Fourth Iowa walked away from the field in good order, with the + sullen savage tread of men who might be driven by main strength, but + could not be conquered. Although this was one of the first battles of + the war, the Northern men showed their desperate fighting qualities; + and on the second day the South met and faced great slaughter. + +Fayel, the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat, gives this account of +the part Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Iowa Division took in the battle +at Elk Horn Tavern: + + Having given an account of the battle fought by Brigadier-General Jeff + C. Davis's Division, which occurred the same day, on our left, I will + now attempt to give some details of the Elk Horn Battle--the latter + having commenced early in the morning. First in order comes a + description of the locality near Elk Horn Tavern. + + The house is on the Fayetteville and Springfield road, about four + miles north of Sugar Creek, between which two points our camp was + pitched, on the elevated ridge constituting the northern bank of the + creek. Leading north from the tavern, the road drops into the head of + the long gorge running towards Keetsville seven miles, known as the + "Cross Timbers." + + Into the strong fastness north of the Tavern the enemy had obtained a + lodgment from 10,000 to 15,000 strong in the rear of our wing, on the + morning of the 7th. His strength consisted in part of the following + rebel Divisions, as was subsequently ascertained: Frost's, Slack's, + Parson's, and Rains's; and the batteries of Ghebor, Clark (six + pieces), E. McDonald (three pieces), and Wade (four pieces). There was + present also one Regiment of Indians, the whole commanded by General + Van Dorn in person, and General Price, who directs the Missouri + forces. + + Early in the morning, while General Curtis was in consultation with + his officers regarding a change of front, consequent on the approach + of the enemy on the west of us, news came that the enemy were in close + vicinity to the Elk Horn Tavern. The General then immediately ordered + Colonel Carr to proceed to effect a dislodgment of the enemy. The + formidable numbers present at the time not being known, Colonel Carr + directed Colonel Dodge, with the First Brigade of the Fourth Division, + to take a position near the Elkhorn Tavern, Colonel Carr accompanying + the expedition himself. The point indicated was about a mile and a + half distant from our camp, the ground being level and gradually + ascending, with open fields on either side of the road, interspersed + with an occasional belt of timber. + + Colonel Dodge having discovered the enemy in the timber to the right, + opened the First Iowa Battery on them, causing considerable execution; + two rebels on horseback were seen to fall, and the rest fled. The + enemy having fled to the hollow, Colonel Dodge deployed his line, + covering as much ground as possible, the Thirty-fifth Illinois being + on his left. He sent forward a company of skirmishers from the Fourth + Iowa, who soon became sharply engaged with the enemy and the latter + opened on us a perfect tornado of round shot, shell, and grape. The + Thirty-fifth Illinois became engaged, fighting with determined + bravery, and about, this time Colonel Smith was wounded in the head by + a shell, which took off a part of his scalp. He also received a bullet + in his shoulder, and his horse was shot under him, all about the same + time. Just before he was wounded, several ammunition-chests exploded, + one after the other, wounding Captain Jones and Lieutenant Gamble, who + were standing near Colonel Carr, the latter making a fortunate escape. + The explosion of a caisson was terrific. + + There was a short lull in the storm of leaden hail, during which time + the enemy advanced up the hollow through the brush, along the main + road, when Colonel Vandever, who had arrived, ordered forward the + infantry. A desperate conflict with small arms ensued. Back rolled the + tide of battle, the enemy being driven to the foot of the hill, when + he reopened the batteries. Our men fought like heroes; many fell + covered with wounds. The latter, when brought to the rear by their + comrades, encouraged those who were still breasting the fierce + cannonade, by hurrahing for the Union. + + Colonel Vandever, in leading forward his brigade, had his horse hit + twice, and Colonel Phelps, in the van of his own Regiment, had three + horses shot under him. Major Geiger, of the same Regiment, and Captain + Hayden, of the Dubuque Battery, had two horses shot under them. Major + Coyle, of the Ninth Iowa, was wounded in the leg. + + Colonel Dodge having discovered that the enemy were preparing for a + general attack, changed his front to the right, covering his men with + a log fence, thus compelling the enemy to cross an open field to reach + him. Our line was formed and we opened fire with one section of a + battery, the other pieces having left the field for want of + ammunition. The enemy advanced on our right, left, and center, under + cover of a destructive fire, poured in on our works under twelve + pieces of artillery. The fighting now lasted over two hours, during + which time we held our position; only one Brigade contending against + at least six thousand rebel infantry and a heavy bombardment from + their artillery, the latter playing upon us at short range. Our men + fought like heroes without wincing under the galling fire belching + forth from behind trees and rocks, and much of the time from a + concealed foe. At one time we were reinforced by three rifled pieces + from a German battery, which fired four rounds, and then was compelled + to withdraw from the field, being flanked by a Regiment of the enemy. + + + Colonel Dodge, in order to discover the position of the enemy on his + right, directed his firing to cease, when a thousand rebel plush caps + and black broad brims popped up into view from the bushes, and, + forming, they advanced with great confidence to within one hundred + feet of our line. Our men were then ordered to pour in a fire on the + dastardly enemy, taking good aim. They were thrown into confusion by + our murderous volley and fled. + + Their places were filled by a fresh Regiment, and Colonel Dodge, + finding that the enemy were outflanking him on the right and that his + force was too weak to permit an extension of his line, sent for and + soon received a reinforcement of five companies of the Eighth Indiana, + which were posted on the right. The firing now became terrific. The + enemy annoyed us severely by placing a battery on our left, which + completely enfiladed our line. The Fourth Iowa now getting short of + ammunition, and the Thirty-fifth Illinois having been forced to give + way on the left, it was at this critical time that Lieutenant-Colonel + Challenor was ordered to rally his men, who were hurled on the enemy, + driving his left back a short distance. Having advanced too far, the + Lieutenant-Colonel was surrounded and captured with forty of his men. + Our ammunition, as before stated, having given out, we fell back to + the open field, maintaining our line of battle in splendid order. The + enemy rushed forward with their batteries and entire force. The Fourth + Iowa halted, turned on them, and checked for a time their advance + until the last round of ammunition was exhausted. General Curtis + coming up about this stage of the action, was received with a round of + cheers from our boys. The General learning that the ammunition had + given out, ordered the Fourth Iowa to fix bayonets and charge on the + enemy. The men did so briskly, across the field, but found no enemy. + + On Colonel Vandever's front the enemy now commenced swarming up the + road and along the gorge, and out of the brush in front of us. Our + troops fought them bravely, the officers exposing their persons in + leading in front of their men; but we were overwhelmed at this time by + superior numbers. We retreated across the field, but rallied again + along the fence behind our original position. Upon retiring as above + mentioned, reinforcements were seen coming up under General Asboth. In + a gallant attempt to resist the advancing column of the enemy, General + Asboth received a severe wound in the arm. After the terrible conflict + of the day our gallant troops bivouacked in front of the enemy, + awaiting the reopening of the conflict in the morning. + + Colonel Vandever fought Little's Division. Colonel Dodge's Brigade + contended in the morning directly with Rain's and Clark's Divisions, + both immediately under the direction of Sterling Price. The latter had + his position for some time behind young Clarke's battery. + + The enemy fired wagon-nuts, pieces of chain, marble, gravel, and all + sorts of projectiles. The overcoat worn by Colonel Dodge was perfectly + riddled by the jagged holes made by these unusual missiles. + + Colonel Dodge, the day after the battle, received a letter from a + widow lady in Illinois, stating that she had three sons in the field + fighting for the Union; that her youngest son, who was in feeble + health, was in his Brigade, and she asked it as a special favor to her + in her loneliness to have him discharged. The young man whose mother + had such solicitude in his behalf was named Preston Green, and was + killed in the action of the 7th, near Elkhorn, while bravely + performing his duty. + + During the battle, Colonel Dodge's horse was shot under him. An + enlisted man, detailed as clerk in the Adjutant's office, was acting + as orderly for Colonel Dodge. When his horse fell, he ordered the + orderly to dismount and give him his horse. The orderly said, "You + will be killed if you get on another horse; this is the third you have + lost." But the orderly dismounted and stood where the Colonel had + stood when he asked for the horse, and at that moment was instantly + killed by a shot from the enemy. After the battle, the Adjutant, + Lieutenant Williamson, found in the orderly's desk a note in which he + said he was sure he would be killed in the battle, and in which, also, + he left directions as to the disposal of his effects and whom to write + to. + +In General Price's command there was a Regiment or more of Indians +commanded by Colonel Albert B. Pike. They crawled up through the thick +timber and attacked my extreme left. I saw them and turned one of the guns +of my battery on them, and they left. We saw no more of them, but they +scalped and mutilated some of our dead. General Curtis entered a complaint +to General Price, who answered that they were not of his command, and that +they had scalped some of his dead, and he said he did not approve of their +being upon the field. They evidently scalped many of the dead, no matter +what side they belonged to. + +The battle of Pea Ridge being one of the first of the war and one of +unquestioned victory, had a great deal of attention called to it, and for +months--in fact for years, and, I think even now--was considered to have +been won by General Siegel. The proper credit was not given to General +Curtis, while the history and records of the battle show that he was +entitled to all of the credit, and fought the battle in opposition to +Siegel's views. A statement of the losses shows what commands fought the +battle. The total force engaged on our side, according to General Curtis's +report, was 10,500 men, formed in four Divisions, Siegel's two Divisions +being the largest, the Third and Fourth Divisions having less than 2,000 +men each. The losses were: + + First Division,* commanded by Osterhaus 144 + Second Division,* commanded by Asboth 119 + Third Division, commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis 329 + Fourth Division, commanded by Colonel Carr 701 + *Divisions were commanded by General Siegel. + +Van Dorn's and Price's reports of the battle show how great their defeat +was, and why it was, and while for some time General Curtis called +anxiously on Halleck for more reinforcements, demanding that the column +which was marching South in Kansas be sent to him, Van Dorn and Price, +from the time they left the field, never stopped until they landed at +Memphis, Tenn., their first movement being towards Pocahontas, with a view +of attacking Pope in the rear, who was at New Madrid. Finding New Madrid +captured, they turned their forces to Desarc, and were then transported by +boats to Memphis. This relieved Missouri of any Confederate force in or +near its border, and General Halleck immediately gave General Curtis +orders to move on the flank of Van Dorn and keep up with him, but through +that swampy, hilly country it was impossible for him to meet Van Dorn, and +Curtis with his Army finally landed at Helena, Ark., and most of it joined +the Vicksburg siege. + +Captain Phil Sheridan was the Quartermaster and Commissary of General +Curtis's Army. He kept us in flour, meat, and meal, and sometimes had my +whole regiment detailed in running and protecting mills, driving cattle, +etc. He had great difficulty in obtaining details, as at that early day a +good many commanders, and especially General Siegel and his officers, did +not think it the duty of a soldier to be detailed on anything but a +soldier's duty; so Sheridan naturally came to me, as he was my +Quartermaster while I commanded the post at Rolla, and when with the +marching column he camped and tented with me. Sheridan and Curtis had +considerable difficulty, and Curtis relieved him and ordered him to report +to General Halleck, at St. Louis. We who knew Sheridan's ability, and the +necessities of our Army, did all we could to hold him with us. He left us +just before the Battle of Pea Ridge, and our Army saw a great difference +after he was gone. He used to say to me, "Dodge, if I could get into the +line I believe I could do something;" and his ambition was to get as high +a rank as I then had and as large a command--a Colonel commanding a +Brigade. In his memoirs he pays the Fourth Iowa a great compliment, and +says they will have a warm place in his heart during his life. + +During the Battle of Pea Ridge Sheridan was at Springfield, Mo., preparing +to turn over his property to the officer who was to relieve him, and he +there showed his soldierly qualities. The dispatches from Curtis's army +had to be relayed at Springfield. The first dispatches after the battle +were sent all in praise of General Siegel, and by portions of his command, +claiming he had won the battle. Sheridan, knowing this to be untrue, +withheld the Siegel dispatches until the telegrams from General Curtis to +General Halleck were received, and sent them forward first, +notwithstanding the fact that he felt he had been unjustly treated by +General Curtis. + +This Army had no water or rail communication. It was 300 miles from its +nearest supply-depot, and therefore it had to live off of a country that +was sparsely settled by poor people; but Sheridan showed that dominant +combination of enterprise and energy, by running every mill and using +every means of supply within fifty miles of us, that he developed so fully +later in the war. He kept us and our stock fairly well supplied; as I +remember, there were no complaints. When General Curtis concluded to +relieve him, I went with others and endeavored to induce him to change his +mind. I had had experience and knew what it was to have an Army well fed a +long ways from its base, and I felt that if we lost Sheridan we would +suffer, which later proved to be the case; but General Curtis did not +listen to us. In fact, he was angry at our appeal, and his Adjutant, +General McKinney, came to see us afterwards and urged us not to press the +matter; if we did, he said, we might go to the rear with Sheridan. + +At the Battle of Pea Ridge and during the campaign we were very destitute +of all hospital appliances for the care of the wounded, and the ability +and ingenuity of our medical staff in supplying our wants was inestimable. +The day after the battle, when we had all our own wounded and so many of +the enemy's with us, Mrs. Governor Phelps, the wife of Governor Phelps, of +Missouri, who commanded the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, arrived on the +field with a general supply of sanitary goods, a part of which had been +sent to my Regiment from Philadelphia by the father and mother of Captain +Ford, who was then a Lieutenant in Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. These +were a great relief, as fully one-third of my command were killed and +wounded, and were suffering for want of this class of goods. Mrs. Phelps +spent her time day and night on the field aiding the surgeons and +succoring the wounded. + +General Curtis endeavored to send all the wounded to the rear who could +stand the trip. I was hauled 250 miles over a rough road in an ambulance, +and if any of you have had the same experience you can judge what I +suffered. Captain Burton, of my Regiment, who was severely wounded in the +arm, sat on the front seat of that ambulance the whole distance, and never +murmured, although he came near losing his arm from the exposure. It was +during this ambulance trip, while lying on my back, that I received a +telegraphic dispatch from General Halleck notifying me of my promotion for +services in this battle. It was thought, and was also stated in the +papers, that I could not live, and I told General Halleck afterwards that +they expected to have the credit of making a Brigadier-General and at the +same time to have a vacancy, too, but that on the vacancy I fooled them, +for the promotion insured my getting well. + +This campaign demonstrated early in the war what could be accomplished by +a small Army 300 miles away from any rail or water communication, in a +rugged, mountainous, sparsely settled county, marching in winter, and +virtually subsisting upon the country. Nothing escaped that Army that was +eatable. + +The Battle of Pea Ridge was fought by the two Divisions commanded by Carr +and Davis, not exceeding 6,000 men, and it is a lesson in war that is very +seldom appreciated: that no one can tell what the result of a battle may +be, and that even where forces are very wide apart in numbers it is not +always the larger force that wins. In this battle Van Dorn had put twice +as many men into the fight as Curtis did, and still was defeated. His +dividing his force and attacking our Army at two different points was +fatal to his success, as General Curtis had the inside line and could move +from one part of his command to another within an hour, while for Van Dorn +to move from one portion of his Army to the other would have taken at +least half a day, and therefore he was whipped in detail. If he had thrown +his whole force upon Curtis's right flank at the point where McCullough +fought and was overwhelmed by Davis's Division, there would have been +great danger of our Army being defeated, or at least forced to the rear. + +There was no strategy nor tactics in this battle; it was simply men +standing up and giving and taking, and the one that stood the longest won +the battle. The only strategy or tactics was the movement of Van Dorn +attacking on the right flank and in the rear, and these moves were fatal +to his success. Curtis's Army fought each man for himself. Every commander +fought his own part of the battle to the best of his ability, and I think +the feeling of all was that unless they won they would have to go to +Richmond, as the enemy was in the rear, which fact made us desperate in +meeting and defeating the continued attacks of the enemy. I sent for +reinforcements once when the enemy was clear around my right flank and in +my rear, and they sent me a part of the Eighth Indiana, two companies of +the Third Illinois Cavalry, and a section of a battery. The battery fought +ten minutes under a heavy fire. The four companies of the Eighth Indiana +lined up alongside the Fourth Iowa, and stayed there fighting bravely +until the end. The Third Illinois held my right flank. The officer who +brought this force to me was Lieutenant Shields, of my own Regiment, who +was acting as aid on Colonel Carr's staff. As he rode up to me to report +the Eighth Indiana he halted alongside of me, and at the same instant both +of our horses fell dead without a struggle--something very unusual. I was +quick, and jumped clear of my horse, but Shields's horse fell upon him. I +walked away, not thinking of Shields; but he called back to me and said, +"Colonel, you are not going to leave me this way are you?" and I returned +and helped him from under his horse. An examination of the two horses made +the next day, showed that they must have been killed by the same bullet, +which passed through their necks at the same place, killing them +instantly. + +A log house was used by us early in the morning as a temporary hospital. +When my skirmishers fell back this log house was left in the lines of the +enemy, and Hospital Steward Baker, of the Fourth Iowa, was left in charge +of the wounded there. When General Price came up he asked him who those +black-coated devils were, and when Baker told him there were only six +hundred he did not believe him. He said no six hundred men could stand +such attacks, and paid the Brigade a very high compliment for their +fighting, and told Baker to give them his compliments. + +I never returned to this Army, but many of the troops who fought so +gallantly fought afterwards in Corps and Armies that I was connected with. +My own Regiment went into battle with 548 rank and file present. Company B +was on detailed service holding Pea Ridge, and had no casualties in line +of battle. My Regiment was greatly reduced from sickness and men on +furlough, but the bravery and steadiness with which those with me fought +was a surprise and a great satisfaction to me. One-third of them fell, and +not a straggler left the field. I had drilled the Regiment to most all +kinds of conditions--in the open, in the woods--and many complained, and +thought I was too severe, as many Regiments at the posts where they were +stationed only had the usual exercises; but after this, their first +battle, they saw what drilling, maneuvers, and discipline meant, and they +had nothing but praise for the severe drilling I had given them. They +never fell under my command again, but on every field that they fought +they won the praise of their commanders, and General Grant ordered that +they should place on their banners, "First at Chickasaw Bayou." + +I have never thought that General Curtis has received the credit he was +entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 men he traversed +Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, and showing good judgment +in concentrating to meet Van Dorn and refusing to retreat when urged to do +so at the conference at the log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. The +night of the 7th I know some officers thought we ought to try to cut +ourselves out to the East, Price being in our rear; but Curtis said he +would fight where we were. He then had no knowledge of the condition of +the enemy. On the morning of the 8th he brought General Siegel's two +Divisions into the fight and concentrated on Price, whose fighting was +simply to cover his retreat. General Curtis failed to reap the full +benefit of the battle because Siegel went to Cassville, leaving only +Davis's and Carr's Divisions on the field. We who took part in this +campaign appreciate the difficulties and obstacles Curtis had to overcome, +and how bravely and efficiently he commanded, and we honor him for it. So +did General Halleck; but the Government, for some reason, failed to give +him another command in the field, though they retained him in command of +departments to the end of the war. + + + + +[Illustration: SYLVANUS DODGE + +Father of Major-General G. M. Dodge.] + + +Letter of General Grenville M. Dodge to his Father on the Battle of Pea +Ridge + + + ST. LOUIS, MO., April 2, 1862. + + DEAR FATHER:--I know there is no one who would like to have a word + from me more than you. I write but little--am very weak from my + wounds; do not sit up much; but I hope ere long to be all right again. + Nothing now but the battle will interest you. It was a terrible three + days to me; how I got through God only knows. I got off a sick bed to + go to the fight, and I never got a wink of sleep for three days and + three nights. The engagement was so long and with us so hot that it + did not appear possible for us to hold our ground. We lacked sadly in + numbers and artillery, but with good judgment and good grit we made it + win. My officers were very brave. Little Captain Taylor would stand + and clap his hands as the balls grew thick. Captain Burton was as cool + as a cucumber, and liked to have bled to death; then the men, as they + crawled back wounded, would cheer me; cheer for the Union; and always + say, "Don't give up Colonel, hang to em;" and many who were too badly + wounded to leave the field stuck to their places, sitting on the + ground, loading and firing. I have heard of brave acts, but such + determined pluck I never before dreamed of. My flag-bearer, after + having been wounded so he could not hold up the colors, would not + leave them. I had to peremptorily order him off. One time when the + enemy charged through my lines the boys drove them back in confusion. + Price fought bravely; his men deserved a better fate, but although two + to one they could not gain much. Their artillery was served + splendidly--they had great advantage over us in this. Mine run out of + ammunition long before night and left me to the mercy of their grape + and canister. Had I have had my full battery at night I could have + whipped them badly. After the Fourth Iowa's ammunition gave out or + before this all the other Regiments and Brigades had given way, + leaving me without support, and when I found my ammunition gone I + never felt such a chilling in my life. It is terrible right in the + midst of a hot contest to have your cartridges give out. We had fired + forty-two rounds, and had but a few left. I saved them and ceased + firing, falling back to my supports. The enemy charged me in full + force. I halted and they came within fifty feet. We opened on them + such a terrible fire they fled. General Curtis rode into the field + then and asked me to charge. This would have blanched anybody but an + Iowa soldier. No ammunition and to charge! We fixed bayonets, and as I + gave the order the boys cheered and cheered, swinging their hats in + every direction. CHARGE! and such a yell as they crossed that field + with, you never heard--it was unearthly and scared the rebels so bad + they never stopped to fire at us or to let us reach them. As we + marched back, now dark, nearly one-half the entire Army had got on the + ground and the black-coats (Fourth Iowa) had got their fame up. The + charge without ammunition took them all, and as we passed down the + line the whole Army cheered us. General Curtis complimented us on the + field, and what was left of the Fourth Iowa held their heads high that + night, though a gloomy one for those who knew our situation. The next + morning it fell to my lot to open the battle with my artillery again, + and for one hour we poured it into them hot and heavy. We opened with + thirty-two guns; they answered with as many, and such a roar you never + heard. The enemy could not stand it and fled. Our whole army deployed + in sight that morning and it was a grand sight with the artillery + playing in open view. I had read of such things, but they were beyond + my conception. This closed the battle and we breathed free. I escaped + most miraculously. A shell burst right in front of me, and, tearing + away my saddle holsters and taking off a large piece of my pants, + never even scratched me. My clothes were riddled and I got a hit in + the side that is serious, but did not think of it at the time. + + Yours, etc., G. M. + + + + +[Illustration: SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS IN THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA + +Painting by James E. Taylor for General William T. Sherman. This shows the +time when Hardee's Corps, four Divisions, attacked the Sixteenth Army +Corps in the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, and were defeated. General +Dodge on horse in foreground ordering Colonel Mersey's brigade to charge +one of the columns of the enemy in flank. Extreme right of picture, +General Fuller's Division fighting General Walker's Division of the +Confederate Army.] + + +THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA + +FOUGHT JULY 22, 1864 + + +A PAPER READ BEFORE NEW YORK COMMANDERY + +M. O. L. L. + +BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE + + +_Companions_: + +On the 17th day of July, 1864, General John B. Hood relieved General +Joseph E. Johnston in command of the Confederate Army in front of Atlanta, +and on the 20th Hood opened an attack upon Sherman's right, commanded by +General Thomas. The attack was a failure, and resulted in a great defeat +to Hood's Army and the disarrangement of all his plans. + +On the evening of the 21st of July, General Sherman's Army had closed up +to within two miles of Atlanta, and on that day Force's Brigade of +Leggett's Division of Blair's Seventeenth Army Corps carried a prominent +hill, known as Bald or Leggett's Hill, that gave us a clear view of +Atlanta, and placed that city within range of our guns. It was a strategic +point, and unless the swing of our left was stopped it would dangerously +interfere with Hood's communications towards the south. Hood fully +appreciated this, and determined upon his celebrated attack in the rear of +General Sherman's Army. + +On the 22d of July, the Army of the Tennessee was occupying the rebel +intrenchments, its right resting very near the Howard House, north of the +Augusta Railroad, thence to Leggett's Hill, which had been carried by +Force's assault on the evening of the 21st. From this hill Giles A. +Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Army Corps stretched out southward on +a road that occupied this ridge, with a weak flank in air. To strengthen +this flank, by order of General McPherson I sent on the evening of the +21st one Brigade of Fuller's Division, the other being left at Decatur to +protect our parked trains. Fuller camped his Brigade about half a mile in +the rear of the extreme left and at right angles to Blair's lines and +commanding the open ground and valley of the forks of Sugar Creek, a +position that proved very strong in the battle. Fuller did not go into +line; simply bivouacked ready to respond to any call. + +On the morning of the 22d of July, General McPherson called at my +headquarters and gave me verbal orders in relation to the movement of the +Second (Sweeney's) Division of my command, the Sixteenth Corps, which had +been crowded out of the line by the contraction of our lines as we neared +Atlanta, and told me that I was to take position on the left of the line +that Blair had been instructed to occupy and intrench that morning, and +cautioned me about protecting my flank very strongly. McPherson evidently +thought that there would be trouble on that flank, for he rode out to +examine it himself. + +I moved Sweeney in the rear of our Army, on the road leading from the +Augusta Railway down the east branch of Sugar Creek to near where it +forks; then, turning west, the road crosses the west branch of Sugar Creek +just back of where Fuller was camped, and passed up through a strip of +woods and through Blair's lines near where his left was refused. Up this +road Sweeney marched until he reached Fuller, when he halted, waiting +until the line I had selected on Blair's proposed new left could be +intrenched, so that at mid-day, July 22d, the position of the Army of the +Tennessee was as follows: One Division of the Fifteenth across and north +of the Augusta Railway facing Atlanta; the balance of the Fifteenth and +all of the Seventeenth Corps behind intrenchments running south of the +railway along a gentle ridge with a gentle slope and clear valley facing +Atlanta in front, and another clear valley in the rear. The Sixteenth +Corps was resting on the road described, entirely in the rear of the +Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and facing from Atlanta. To the left and +left-rear the country was heavily wooded. The enemy, therefore, was +enabled, under cover of the forest, to approach close to the rear of our +lines. + +On the night of July 21st Hood had transferred Hardee's Corps and two +Divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry to our rear, going around our left flank, +Wheeler attacking Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth Army Corps at +Decatur, where our trains were parked. At daylight, Stewart's and +Cheatham's Corps and the Georgia Militia were withdrawn closer to Atlanta, +and placed in a position to attack simultaneously with Hardee, the plan +thus involving the destroying of the Army of the Tennessee by attacking it +in rear and front and the capturing of all its trains corraled at Decatur. +Hardee's was the largest Corps in Hood's Army, and according to Hood there +were thus to move upon the Army of the Tennessee about 40,000 troops. + +Hood's order of attack was for Hardee to form entirely in the rear of the +Army of the Tennessee, but Hardee claims that he met Hood on the night of +the 21st; that he was so late in moving his Corps that they changed the +plan of attack so that his left was to strike the Seventeenth Corps. He +was to swing his right until he enveloped and attacked the rear of the +Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps. + +Hood stood in one of the batteries of Atlanta, where he could see Blair's +left and the front line of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. He says he +was astonished to see the attack come on Blair's left instead of his rear, +and charges his defeat to that fact; but Hardee, when he swung his right +and came out in the open, found the Sixteenth Corps in line in the rear of +our Army, and he was as much surprised to find us there as our Army was at +the sudden attack in our rear. The driving back by the Sixteenth Corps of +Hardee's Corps made the latter drift to the left and against Blair,--not +only to Blair's left, but into his rear,--so that what Hood declares was +the cause of his failure was not Hardee's fault, as his attacks on the +Sixteenth Corps were evidently determined and fierce enough to relieve him +from all blame in that matter. + +Historians and others who have written of the Battle of Atlanta have been +misled by being governed in their data by the first dispatches of General +Sherman, who was evidently misinformed, as he afterwards corrected his +dispatches. He stated in the first dispatch that the attack was at 11 +a. m., and on Blair's Corps, and also that General McPherson was killed +about 11 a. m. The fact is, Blair was not attacked until half an hour +after the attack upon the Sixteenth Corps, and McPherson fell at about 2 +p. m. General Sherman was at the Howard House, which was miles away from +the scene of Hardee's attack in the rear, and evidently did not at first +comprehend the terrific fighting that was in progress, and the serious +results that would have been effected had the attack succeeded. + +The battle began within fifteen or twenty minutes of 12 o'clock (noon) and +lasted until midnight, and covered the ground from the Howard House along +the entire front of the Fifteenth (Logan's) Corps, the Seventeenth +(Blair's) on the front of the Sixteenth (which was formed in the rear of +the Army), and on to Decatur, where Sprague's Brigade of the Sixteenth +Army Corps met and defeated Wheeler's Cavalry--a distance of about seven +miles. + +The Army of the Tennessee had present on that day at Atlanta and Decatur +about 26,000 men; there were 10,000 in the Fifteenth Army Corps, 9,000 in +the Sixteenth Corps, and 7,000 in the Seventeenth. About 21,000 of these +were in line of battle. Three Brigades of the Sixteenth Corps were absent, +the Sixteenth Corps having 5,000 men in a single line which received the +attack of the four Divisions of Hardee's Corps, Hardee's left, Cleburn's +Division lapping the extreme left of Blair and joining Cheatham's Corps +which attacked Blair from the Atlanta front; and, according to Hood, they +were joined by the Georgia Militia under General Smith. Extending down the +line in front of the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland, Stewart's +Corps occupied the works and held the lines in front of the Army of the +Cumberland. The Sixteenth Army Corps fought in the open ground; the +Fifteenth and Seventeenth behind intrenchments. + +Where I stood just at the rear of the Sixteenth Army Corps, I could see +the entire line of that corps, and could look up and see the enemy's +entire front as they emerged from the woods, and I quickly saw that both +of my flanks were overlapped by the enemy. Knowing General McPherson was +some two miles away, I sent a staff officer to General Giles A. Smith, +requesting him to refuse his left and protect the gap between the +Seventeenth Corps and my right, which he sent word he would do. Later, as +the battle progressed, and I saw no movement on the part of General Smith, +I sent another officer to inform him that the enemy were passing my right +flank, which was nearly opposite his center, and requested him to refuse +his left immediately, or he would be cut off. This officer (Lieutenant D. +Sheffly, who belonged to the Signal Corps, and acted as my aide only for +the time being) found, on reaching Smith, that he was just becoming +engaged; that he had received orders to hold his line, with a promise that +other troops would be thrown into the gap. + +My second messenger, Lieutenant Sheffly, returning over the road upon +which McPherson was a few minutes later shot dead, met the General on the +road with a very few attendants, and turned to warn him of his dangerous +position, assuring him that the enemy held the woods and were advancing. +The General paying no heed to the warning and moving on, my aide turned +and followed him. They had proceeded but a short distance into the woods +when a sharp command, "Halt," was heard from the skirmish-line of the +rebels. Without heeding the command, General McPherson and his party +wheeled their horses, and at that moment a heavy volley was poured in, +killing McPherson and so frightening the horses that they became +unmanageable and plunged into the underbrush in different directions. My +aide became separated from the General and the rest of the party, and was +knocked from his horse by coming in contact with a tree, and lay for some +time in an unconscious condition on the ground. As soon as he was +sufficiently recovered he returned on foot to me, having lost his horse +and equipments. Of General McPherson he saw nothing after his fall. His +watch, crushed by contact with the tree, was stopped at two minutes past 2 +o'clock, which fixed the time of General McPherson's death. + +General McPherson could not have left his point of observation more than a +few minutes when I detected the enemy's advance in the woods some distance +to my right, and between that flank and General Blair's rear. Fuller +quickly changed front with a portion of his brigade to confront them, and +pushing promptly to the attack captured their skirmish-line and drove back +their main force. Upon the persons of some of these prisoners we found +McPherson's papers, field-glass, etc., which conveyed to me the first +knowledge I had of his death; or, rather, as I then supposed, of his +capture by the enemy; and seeing that the papers were important I sent +them by my Chief of Staff with all haste to General Sherman. + +General McPherson, it seems, had just witnessed the decisive grapple of +the Sixteenth Corps with the charging columns of the enemy, and, as +probably conveying his own reflections at that moment, I quote the +language of General Strong, the only staff officer present with him at +that critical time: + + The General and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode on and + took positions on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the + desperate assaults of Hood's army. + + The Divisions of Generals Fuller and Sweeney were formed in a single + line of battle in the open fields, without cover of any kind (Fuller's + Division on the right,) and were warmly engaged. The enemy, massed in + columns three or four lines deep, moved out of the dense timber + several hundred yards from General Dodge's position, and after gaining + fairly the open fields, halted and opened a rapid fire upon the + Sixteenth Corps. They, however, seemed surprised to find our infantry + in line of battle, prepared for attack, and after facing for a few + minutes the destructive fire from the Divisions of Generals Fuller and + Sweeney, fell back in disorder to the cover of the woods. Here, + however, their lines were quickly reformed, and they again advanced, + evidently determined to carry the position. + + The scene at this time was grand and impressive. It seemed to us that + every mounted officer of the attacking column was riding at the front + of, or on the right or left of, the first line of battle. The + regimental colors waved and fluttered in advance of the lines, and not + a shot was fired by the rebel infantry, although the movement was + covered by a heavy and well-directed fire from artillery, which was + posted in the woods and on higher ground, and which enabled the guns + to bear upon our troops with solid shot and shell, firing over the + attacking column. + + It seemed impossible, however, for the enemy to face the sweeping, + deadly fire from Fuller's and Sweeney's Divisions, and the guns of the + Fourteenth Ohio and Welker's Batteries of the Sixteenth Corps fairly + mowed great swaths in the advancing columns. They showed great + steadiness, and closed up the gaps and preserved their alignments; but + the iron and leaden hail which was poured upon them was too much for + flesh and blood to stand, and, before reaching the center of the open + field, the columns were broken up and thrown into great confusion. + Taking advantage of this, General Dodge, with portions of General + Fuller's and General Sweeney's Divisions, with bayonets fixed, charged + the enemy and drove them back to the woods, taking many prisoners. + + General McPherson's admiration for the steadiness and determined + bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. General Dodge held the + key to the position. + + Had the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in + the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept + like an avalanche over our supply trains, and the position of the Army + of the Tennessee would have been very critical, although, without + doubt, the result of the battle would have been in our favor, because + the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio were close at hand, and the + enemy would have been checked and routed further on. + +General Blair, in his official report of the battle, says: + + I witnessed the first furious assault upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, + and its prompt and gallant repulse. It was a fortunate circumstance + for that whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the + position I have attempted to describe, at the moment of the attack; + and although it does not become me to comment upon the brave conduct + of the officers and men of that Corps, still I can not refrain from + expressing my admiration for the manner in which the Sixteenth Corps + met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. + +The Sixteenth Corps has a record in that battle which we seldom see in the +annals of war. It met the shock of battle and fired the last shot late +that night, as the enemy stubbornly yielded its grasp on Bald Hill. It +fought on four parts of the field, and everywhere with equal success. It +lost no gun that it took into the engagement, and its losses were almost +entirely in killed and wounded--the missing having been captured at +Decatur through getting mired in a swamp. + +At no time during the Atlanta campaign was there present in the Sixteenth +Corps more than two small Divisions of three Brigades each, and at this +time these two Divisions were widely scattered; on the Atlanta field only +ten Regiments and two Batteries were present, three entire Brigades being +absent from the Corps. It was called upon to meet the assault of at least +three Divisions or nine Brigades, or at the least forty-nine Regiments, +all full to the utmost that a desperate emergency could swell them, +impelled by the motive of the preconcerted surprise, and orders from their +commander at all hazards to sweep over any and all obstructions; while, on +the other hand, the force attacked and surprised was fighting without +orders, guided only by the exigency of the moment. Their captures +represented forty-nine different Regiments of the enemy. How many more +Regiments were included in those nine Brigades I have never been able to +learn. The fact that this small force, technically, if not actually, in +march, in a perfectly open field, with this enormously superior force +leaping upon them from the cover of dense woods, was able to hold its +ground and drive its assailants, pell-mell, back to the cover of the woods +again, proves that when a great battle is in progress, or a great +emergency occurs, no officer can tell what the result may be when he +throws in his forces, be they 5,000 or 20,000 men; and it seems to me to +be impossible to draw the line that gives the right to a subordinate +officer to use his own judgment in engaging an enemy when a great battle +is within his hearing. + +Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least +three times their number in their front, should have retreated, instead of +standing and fighting as it did: What would have been the result? I say +that in all my experience in life, until the two forces struck and the +Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never passed more anxious moments. + +Sprague's Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same time within +hearing, but on a different field,--at Decatur,--fighting and stubbornly +holding that place, knowing that if he failed the trains massed there and +_en route_ from Roswell would be captured. His fight was a gallant and +sometimes seemingly almost hopeless one--giving ground inch by inch, +until, finally, he obtained a position that he could not be driven from, +and one that protected the entire trains of the Army. + +As Hardee's attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his left Division +(Cleburn's) lapped over and beyond Blair's left, and swung around his left +front; they poured down through the gap between the left of the +Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front, +flank, and rear. Cheatham's Corps moved out of Atlanta and attacked in +Blair's front. General Giles A. Smith commanded Blair's left Division, his +right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett's Division held +the line until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this +front the battle raged with great fury. + +As Cleburn advanced along the open space between the Sixteenth and +Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair's left and captured a portion of +two Regiments of his command, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new +lines, utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting +first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from +Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3:30 p. m., when, +evidently after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to +wipe out Giles A. Smith's Division and capture Leggett's Hill, the enemy +approaching under cover of the woods until they were within fifty yards of +Smith's temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight +became a hand-to-hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the +troops using bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack +failed; it was no doubt timed to occur at the same time that Cheatham's +Corps attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brunt of +Cheatham's attack was against Leggett's Hill, the key to the position of +that portion of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith's +Division had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at +right angles with Leggett's Division, Leggett's Hill being the apex of the +formation; and around this position for three-quarters of an hour more +desperate fighting was done that I can describe. Up to midnight the enemy +occupied one side of the works while we occupied the other, neither side +giving way until Hood saw that the whole attack was a failure, when those +who were on the outside of the works finally surrendered to us. Their +attack at this angle was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to +our breastworks on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side +with ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing +could be seen but the flash of guns from the opposite sides of the works. +The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn with the dead of +both sides. The loss of Blair's Corps was 1,801 killed, wounded, and +missing. Blair's left struck in the rear flank, and the front gave way +slowly, gradually, fighting for every inch of ground, until their left was +opposite the right flank of the Sixteenth Corps; then they halted, and +held the enemy, refusing to give another inch. + +It would be difficult in all the annals of war to find a parallel to the +fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of its works and +then from the other, one incident of which was that of Colonel Belknap, of +the Union side, who, reaching over the works, seized the Colonel of the +Forty-fifth Alabama, and, drawing him over the breastworks, made him a +prisoner of war. + +About 4 p. m. Cheatham's Corps was ordered by Hood to again attack; they +directed their assault this time to the front of the Fifteenth Corps, +using the Decatur wagon-road and railway as a guide, and came forward in +solid masses, meeting no success until they slipped through to the rear of +the Fifteenth Corps by a deep cut used by the railway passing through our +intrenchments. + +As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn's Division of the Fifteenth +Corps became partially panic-stricken, and fell back, giving up the +intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, the enemy capturing +the celebrated Degress Battery of 20-pounders and two guns in advance of +our lines. The officers of Lightburn's Division rallied it in the line of +intrenchments, just in the rear of the position they had in the morning. + +General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Tennessee. He rode +over to my position, and I sent Mersey's Brigade of the Second Division, +under the guidance of Major Edward Jonas, my Aide-de-camp, to the aid of +the Fifteenth Corps. Of the performance of that Brigade on that occasion, +I quote the words of that staff officer, Major Jonas: + + I conducted Mersey's Brigade to the point where needed; arrived at the + railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth + Corps at hand joining with him. Mersey's Brigade recaptured the works + and the guns. Old Colonel Mersey was slightly wounded, and his + celebrated horse, "Billy," killed. By your direction I said to General + Morgan L. Smith (temporarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps): + "General Dodge requests that you return this Brigade at the earliest + practicable moment, as there is every indication of renewed assault on + our own line," and, after saying that your request would be respected, + General Smith added: "Tell General Dodge that his Brigade (Mersey's) + has done magnificently, and that it shall have full credit in my + report." + +Afterwards one of Mersey's officers--Captain Boyd, I think--in trying his +skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured guns. At the same +moment of Mersey's attack in front, General Wood's Division of the +Fifteenth Army Corps, under the eye of General Sherman, attacked the +Confederates occupying our intrenchments in flank, and Williamson's +Brigade joined Mersey's in recapturing our line and the batteries--the +Fourth Iowa Infantry taking a conspicuous part. + +Colonel Mersey and many of his men whom he so gallantly led had served +their time before this battle occurred, and were awaiting transportation +home. Eloquent words have been written and spoken all over the land in +behalf of the honor and the bravery of the soldier; but where is the word +spoken or written that can say more for the soldier than the action of +these men on that field? They were out of service; they had written that +they were coming home, and their eyes and hearts were toward the North. +Many an anxious eye was looking for the boy who voluntarily laid down his +life that day, and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had untold +trouble to obtain recognition in the War Department because the soldier's +time had expired. He was mustered out; waiting to go home; and was not +known on the records; but on that day he fought on three different parts +of the field, without a thought except for his cause and his country. + +The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression on the line. +Our men were behind the intrenchments and the slaughter of the enemy was +something fearful. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate +Division that broke through our line, told me that after breaking through +it was impossible to force his men forward; the fire on their flanks and +front was so terrific that when driven out of the works one-half of his +command was killed, wounded, or missing. The Confederate records sustain +this, and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to +within 100 to 300 feet of us, where our fire would drive them back in +spite of the efforts of their officers, a great many of whom fell in these +attacks. + +I could see the terrific fighting at Leggett's Hill, but of that along the +line of the Fifteenth Corps I can only speak from the records and as told +me by General John C. Brown, of the Confederate Army. The stubbornness and +coolness with which they contested every inch of the ground won his +admiration, and the manner and method with which the line was retaken must +have been seen to be appreciated. + +When darkness fell upon us the enemy had retired, except around the angle +in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett's or Bald Hill. Here there was +a continuous fire, desultory and at close quarters, the enemy in places +occupying ground close up to our intrenchments. To relieve these men of +the Seventeenth Army Corps holding this angle, who were worn out, at the +request of General Blair I sent two Regiments of Mersey's Brigade. They +crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from that front. + +The whole of Hood's Army, except Stewart's Corps, was thrown into our +rear, upon the flank and the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and after +fighting from mid-day until dark were repulsed and driven back. That Army +held or commanded the entire battle-field, demonstrating the fact that the +Army of the Tennessee alone was able and competent to meet and defeat +Hood's entire Army. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and +Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three Brigades +of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy was made along this +line some seven times, and they were seven times repulsed. + +We captured eighteen stands of colors, 5,000 stands of arms, and 2,017 +prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men and ten pieces of +artillery, and over 1,800 men, mostly from Blair's Corps, were taken +prisoners. The enemy's dead reported as buried in front of the different +Corps was over 2,000, and the enemy's total loss in killed, wounded and +prisoners was 8,000. + +The criticism has often been made of this battle that with two Armies idle +that day, one the Army of the Ohio (two-thirds as large as the Army of the +Tennessee) and the other the Army of the Cumberland (the largest of all +Sherman's Armies), why we did not enter Atlanta. General Sherman urged +Thomas to make the attack; Thomas's answer was that the enemy were in full +force behind his intrenchments. The fact was that Stewart's Corps was +guarding that front, but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow him to +throw his Army upon Cheatham's flank, in an endeavor to roll up the +Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and Cheatham's Corps, +which was so persistently attacking the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps +from the Atlanta front. Sherman, whose anxiety had been very great, seeing +how successfully we were meeting the attack, his face relaxing into a +pleasant smile, said to Schofield, "Let the Army of the Tennessee fight +it out this time." This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have +no doubt cleared our front facing the Atlanta intrenchments, but Stewart +was ready with his three Divisions and the Militia to hold them. + +General Sherman, in speaking of this battle, always regretted that he did +not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested, and also force the fighting +on Thomas's front; but no doubt the loss of McPherson really took his +attention from everything except the Army of the Tennessee. + +At about 10 o'clock on the night of the 22d, the three Corps commanders of +the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the Army) met in the +rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road, under an oak +tree, and there discussed the results of the day. Blair's men were at the +time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the +other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but +tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day's +fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won. +It was thought that the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio, +which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair, +and Dodge, being the junior Corps commander, was dispatched by General +Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General +Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said +that he had his headquarters in a house. When I met him he seemed rather +surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss of +McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said, "Dodge, +you whipped them today, didn't you?" I said, "Yes, sir." Then he said: +"Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes, sir"; bade him +good-night, and went back to my command, determined never to go upon +another such errand. As he explained it afterward, he wanted it said that +the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day, +needing no help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had +whipped the whole of Hood's Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position +and our line, knowing that Hood would not dare attack us after the +"thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that in this, the +greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the Tennessee met the +entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on its flank, and upon its +advance center, with its idolized commander killed in the first shock of +battle, and at nightfall found the enemy's dead and wounded on its front, +we see that no disaster--no temporary rebuff--could discourage this Army. +Every man was at his post; every man doing a hero's duty. They proved they +might be wiped out but never made to run. They were invincible. + +Companions, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, with such +loss, the question has often been asked me--and I know it has come to the +mind of all of us--why it was that this battle was never put forth ahead +of many others inferior to it, but better known to the world and causing +much greater comment? + +The answer comes to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as it was that +night. We had lost our best friend,--that superb soldier, our commander, +General McPherson; his death counted so much more to us than victory that +we spoke of our battle, our great success, with our loss uppermost in our +minds. + + + + +[Illustration: MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ATLANTA + +This monument was erected by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on +the spot where Major-General James B. McPherson was killed, July 22, +1864.] + + +LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM + + CORRECTING SOME STATEMENTS + IN + GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM'S + DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA + PUBLISHED + IN THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, WASHINGTON, D. C. + SEPTEMBER 25, 1902 + + +_My Dear General_: + +Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to +aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of +Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up. + +I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the +Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from +which I think you can get a good deal of information. + +I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced +about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps +fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can +verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle, +which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page +242. + +It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters. +Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop +and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I +had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller +said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had +been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to +select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody +had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the +moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told +Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but +before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so +you can see how sudden the attack was. + +In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, +in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time +of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer +was sent with an order to me from McPherson: + + The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard + to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a + rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell + came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and + incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer + sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think, + was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock. + +Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page +243: + + After the _two_ attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed, + General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition + of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles + A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy + the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying + as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was + (a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode + rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found + General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the + Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade). + +This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two +attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack +upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps +was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By +reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and +everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and +that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as +to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made +of record on the spot. + +On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee +records, General Leggett says: + + Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly + engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high + ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent + Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson + the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our + line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George + W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and + the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to + antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of + the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first + attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and + bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no + appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when + the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the + Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was + simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division, + which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps. + +You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an +aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was +detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had +gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth +Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my +right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who +returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that +he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got +between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent +word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold +his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap +between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier +and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right +immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of +between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person +on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third +attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to +Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got +right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that +was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before +Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of +but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through +fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect +with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and +before he was halted was way in the rear of my right. + +After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between +Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force +to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement +captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his +field-glass, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's +body; and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report +Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's +maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought, +and where we had to intrench. + +Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all +of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene, +as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant +act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got +there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own +regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off +his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with +them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and +they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw +Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from +his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of +Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the +painting in my room. + +Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he +watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his +report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full: + + I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault + made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse + by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole + army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have + attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does + not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the + officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression + of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed + the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our + flank was made by the whole of Hardee's Corps. + +I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three parts of the +field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right +in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When +Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help +to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade +there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and +relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even +then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still +lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report +of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the +service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment +the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I +do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a +short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow +it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I +think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these +facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second +Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page +450. + +In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of +this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give +you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the +others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and +well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the +left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the +Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign. + +Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part +of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front--that is, his front that was +towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left +Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney's +(Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and Walker's. Walker was the next to +Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's +Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and +he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair +was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to +attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in +accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because +Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when +Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division, +and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had +been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third +attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they +did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, +just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but +it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and +when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and +4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn. + +There have also been many statements that in the first attack two +Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the +Seventeenth, Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my +Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his +left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was +sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day, +about 4 p. m., upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had +been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and +reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all +accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding +the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This +line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until +about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments +until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to +support that line. + +Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the +battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General +Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original +intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham +from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from +being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the +Atlanta front. + +There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that +is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in +his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In +fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got +in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right +angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that +Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. +Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in +behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair's men had +to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated, +Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank. +Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two +regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the +Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish-line that +killed McPherson, and brought it in. + +To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's +command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who +felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air; but +Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the +Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped +about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme +left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them +in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his +front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, +coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same +skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and +captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the +limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four +pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, +unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the +way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It +was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or +fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case. + +In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps +and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him +as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through +on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 +o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any +force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's +Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade +of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See +his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and +it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got +there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back, but holding their line +behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and +as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's +Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, +and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got +hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois) and turned +them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two +Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they +got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded +the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the +Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, +and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank +by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse +killed under him. + +Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much +after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came +to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of +Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with +him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every +man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting. +Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the +two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very +strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not +have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution +done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible +effect. + +To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a +battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in +something--at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground +afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond--that exposed the flank of +Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this, I rode down to +Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he +did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I +soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had +that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners +out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second +Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records. +That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and +with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, +I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble; +but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate +enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's +front they were right up to it when Walker fell. + +There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to +the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the +morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get +there before he did--a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached +the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart +had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army +of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor +in some way. + +I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed--it was just +about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds +of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal +officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, +is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, +records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, +because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as +Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to +ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three +miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the +report Blair made--also the address of Strong--I think you will come to +the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General +McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the +Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some +time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time +and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line +that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are +misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can +judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when +they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery. + +When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very +glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible +for me to do so. + +Truly and cordially yours, + +GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM. GRENVILLE M. DODGE. + +_Chicago, Ill._ + + + + +[Illustration: OLD FORT KEARNEY, NEBRASKA + +In the Indian Campaign of 1865.] + + +THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 1864 AND 1865 + + WRITTEN IN 1874 + BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE + AND READ TO THE + COLORADO COMMANDERY OF THE LOYAL LEGION + OF THE UNITED STATES, AT DENVER + + APRIL 21, 1907. + + +In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the Department of the +Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant +asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I +answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac +the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant +ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas +was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command +Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all +the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland +mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific. + +On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former +commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the +winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by +the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people +living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas +were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed +along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having +in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into +hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas +on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable +combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations +to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed over +one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country +between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers. + +The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was +impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the +winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two +Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication +with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed +a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be +stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and +fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared. + +I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to +change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the +citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of +the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and +superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I +selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the +trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district +commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches: + + 1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it? + What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do + their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What + action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all + particulars. + + 2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route. + Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or + small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the + Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of + cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all + the Indians in the way. + +I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had +permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians, +both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I +immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all +traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also +immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the +Pawnee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom +had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most +trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of +the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the settlements, +or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of +communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we +stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military +post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and +place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army +trains. + +Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage- +and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line. +At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort +Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they +were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge +Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines +here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie, +thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to Utah. The +stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre +to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah. +I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort +Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known +as the South Platte Route. + +The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent +had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines +were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a +few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the +road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular +commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great +mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and +Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter +these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during +the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each. +They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking +care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a +great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had +been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops +occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail, +and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great +consternation in that country and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands +upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent. + +At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to +reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the +posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian +character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of +communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against +the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with +the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them. + +Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas +River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and +Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and +traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern +lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along +these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living +from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them +up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly +women and children, the men being generally massacred when captured. + +I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth +Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them _en route_ +for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, +forage, and ammunition. The three-months' Regiments enlisted in Colorado +for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and +there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was +to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to +take their places. + +I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in +the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at +Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but +I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick +results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to +march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the +companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them +report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran +officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the +hardship. The next morning I received a report from Fort Kiley that the +troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort +Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe, +and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect +themselves from the weather. + +On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of +the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called +upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages. +I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to +replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both +of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press" +at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the +plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it +necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests, +as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the +"press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I +found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort +Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry. + +When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight +us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were +depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of +their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the +stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together +and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that +an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how +large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they +must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did +not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to +retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy. + +The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated +upon the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The reports showed that they +held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and +held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000 +head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many +trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children, +and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph. + +To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I +give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte +Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all +commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at +Fort Kearney. + +General Robert Mitchell, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge +Pole, replied as follows: + + The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to + Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut + down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first + fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are + compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power + is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my + disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons + at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only + extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route + fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have + no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last + outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence + of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly + on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four + months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary, + mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road + through my district. + + This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and + drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and + telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both + companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can + provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where + overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage + company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian + villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe + them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large + village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my + knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes, + Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet, + and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the + same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From + 3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians. + One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are + willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong + each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines, + well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile + Indians, if done before grass comes. After that time, in my judgment, + it will take twice that number of men. + + In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to + hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed + by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the + Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites. + Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux. + +Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows: + + In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the + early part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians + moving westward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain + information of their movements. On January 7th they had crossed South + Fork of Platte River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped + with their families, forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight + warriors each, many lodges being thirty robes in size. They commenced + the work of destruction along the road west as far as Junction + Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in this fight were not less + than 2,000, well armed with breech-loading carbines and rifles. A + desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage station + near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the + gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry. + Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is + burned, and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to escape + tells of the brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam + H. Elbert, acting Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state + of things. The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley, + fifty miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around Denver. The + telegraph-lines to Salt Lake and the Denver branch lines are destroyed + for a distance of nearly ten miles on the northern route, and in + different points throughout 100 miles along the Denver route. + + I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endurance holds out we + will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the + west. + + The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes, Ogallalas, and + Brule Sioux. They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort + Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in + marching, feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the + small body of troops in this district. I saw their signals today, + probably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You will + hear of continued murders and robberies as long as the road is so + poorly protected by troops. No spies can be used now, owing to + numerous small war parties being met everywhere in this country. I + predict that if more troops are not sent into this district + immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white man + on it. Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take + the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite + mischief will result to the settlers. What we need are troops, + supplies for them, and a vigorous campaign against these hostile + Indians. They must be put on the defensive instead of us. No + difficulty can arise in finding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany + them. + + + HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT COLORADO. + DENVER, COLORADO TERRITORY, Feb. 2, 1865. + + The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch + between Julesburg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at + latter place; driven off all stock, both public and private. These + Indians are led by white men, and have complete control of all the + country outside my district, so that I am hemmed in. + + The weather has been very severe here for nearly three weeks; the + thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall of snow on the + ground. I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers for + three months' State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to + the factional spirit existing in the community. + + The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion, + appropriating so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a + bounty and purchase horses to mount them on, as I have none; but the + members cannot agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue + from such a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed + the Speaker of the House yesterday, informing him that unless + something was done within forty-eight hours I would be compelled, much + against my will, to proclaim martial law and stop all business, + forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the line of + communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men + organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would + have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a + great deal of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert of + action, every man suspecting his fellow of some chicanery. + + Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men can defend it + against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over + the settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into + service) to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but + get a Regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim until + the arrival of a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are + now determined to make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of + 5,000 men can make it extermination for them. + + Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors were on + the headwaters of the Smoky Hill and intended attacking all the + settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the + transportation-line being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well + as labor and forage. + + Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise + companies, which could be easily done, for one year? + + The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the + Indians. Should such be the case, then all is cut off. + + Respectfully, your obedient servant, + + THOMAS MOONLIGHT, + + _Colonel Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, Commanding_. + +Colonel Chivington, from Fort Rankin, reported: + + Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, with 200 men of the Eleventh Ohio, and + Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4th to the + 9th inst., at Mud Springs. The Indians at one time charged our forces + in the face of artillery and were nearly successful. Two thousand + warriors were engaged in the fight. It is supposed forty Indians were + killed. Beaure's and Craighten's herds were driven off. The Indians + crossed at Bush Creek, going north. The telegraph poles were gone and + wires so inextricably tangled as to be useless. Seven hundred lodges + crossed Pole Creek, six miles below Pole Creek crossing. + +These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph-lines retaken without +severe fighting and loss of many soldiers. Within two weeks the troops +drove these Indians north, where a detachment of troops from Fort Laramie +attacked them and drove them across the Platte. Finally the Indians saw +that a different warfare was being made against them, and they fled to +their villages on the Powder River and in the Black Hills country. + +There was such energy and such spirit displayed by the troops, that after +two weeks' work they had the telegraph-lines replaced between Omaha and +Denver, a distance of 600 miles, and this without any additional force to +aid them. The progress made in putting up the wires is shown by this +report: + + My troop is at Moore's ranch; passed there at 2 o'clock. We ran twelve + miles of wire and set eight miles of poles, had two severe fights, and + marched fifty-five miles in fifty-two hours. Operators furnished + valuable service. + + E. B. MURPHY, + + _Captain Seventh Iowa Cavalry_. + +The thermometers all this time were from 5 to 10 degrees below zero. On +February 13th telegraphic communication was resumed through to +California, and Mr. Craighten notified the Government of the fact. + +An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as to where I was located +(Craighten being a personal friend of mine who was most skeptical at the +start of my accomplishing anything with the material I had, was overjoyed +at our success), was answered, "Nobody knows where he is, but everybody +knows where he has been." + +From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted man on that line was in +the saddle, either assisting the operators or chasing real or imaginary +Indians. The moment a scout came in, instructions were given to the +officers to send them out and not allow any mounted troops in the stockade +until the lines were opened and the Indians driven at least 100 miles away +from the line of telegraph, and the only dashes the Indians made after we +got fairly at them was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at +unguarded ranches, and at those stage-stations where only a few soldiers +were located; but in every attack the soldiers stood their ground and +fought, and when driven they only backed far enough to get a secure place. +The troops knew better than to go back to the fortified posts, as they had +instructions to keep to the hills, but in nearly every case they were +successful, and the daring that some of the troops showed in these fights +was remarkable. + +Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalping the men alive and +abusing the women. This caused the troops to stand and fight, preferring +to die rather than to fall into their hands. Wherever a fight was +successfully made, no matter whether commissioned or non-commissioned +officers commanded, I telegraphed him in person thanking him, and to the +commanding officer of his Regiment, requesting that he be given the first +promotion, and wrote to the Governor of his State. + +As soon as this stage-line was opened we concentrated about 500 mounted +men, intending to catch the Indians before they left the North Platte; but +the Indians fled as soon as they heard of this, and did not stop until +they reached Powder River, too far north for us to follow until +arrangements were made for supplies for troops and stock, as everything +had to be teamed from Fort Leavenworth. + +The storms during March were very severe. Snow lay two feet on the level +and was crusted so hard that for weeks it was almost impossible to force +animals through it. As soon as we heard from my scouts of the departure of +the Indians and found they had no intention of molesting the citizens of +Nebraska, and had placed themselves on Powder River too far north to +return until the return of the grass in May, I distributed the troops +along the stage- and telegraph-lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open +the South Route to New Mexico. + +My experience on the North Route, with the reports from the troops and +from my Indians, soon satisfied me that every Indian tribe of any +importance from the British Possessions in the north to the Red River in +the south, were preparing to engage in open hostilities. These tribes +often pretended to be friendly, deceiving the Government and the Indian +agent, a crafty trick that was impossible to make the Government +understand. For instance, they would go to the Indian agent for +provisions, and would make him believe that they were for peace, and would +promise to bring to the agency their tribe. Probably by the time the +report of the Indian agent reached the Government, this same tribe would +be off on the warpath and have captured a train or murdered some settlers, +and the troops in return had attacked and destroyed them, and we were +called to account for it, as it was claimed by the agents we were +attacking peaceable Indians. This went so far that it prevented me from +opening the southern emigrant trail several weeks. Finally I took the +matter in my own hands, regardless of the action or report of the agents. + +While these parleys were going on the Indians suddenly appeared all along +the southern emigrant trail in the Arkansas River Valley, attacking +trains, posts, and escorts. I threw my troops against the bands of +Southern Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, and Kiowas that were in the +vicinity of the trail. The troops had caught on to the severe fighting on +the Platte, had heard of the new methods of warfare and victories, and +they in all cases stood their ground and defeated the Indians, although +they suffered severely in some instances. This was a reception that the +Indians did not expect and they fled to the Wichita Mountains, suing for +peace, which I knew was simply to prevent us attacking them there, but +accomplished its purpose with the Government and finally brought about the +treaties that were not worth the paper they were written on, and later on +forced the campaigns that Sheridan afterwards made, while if we had been +allowed to have followed them up and punish them as we did the northern +tribes, we would have conquered a peace that would have been a lasting +one. + +The Indians of the plains are the best skirmishers in the world. In +rapidity of movements, in perfect horsemanship, sudden whirling, +protecting the body by clinging to the side of the horse, and rapid +movements in open and difficult ground, no trained cavalry in the world +can equal them. On foot their ability to hide behind any obstruction, in +ravine, along creeks, and under creek and river banks, and in fighting in +the open plains or level ground, the faculty to disappear is beyond one's +belief except he has experienced it. In skulking and sharpshooting they +are adepts, but troops properly instructed are a match for them on foot, +and never fail to drive and route them, if they will stand and fight and +never retreat except slowly with their faces to them. I have seen several +times, when caught in a tight place, bands of Indians held by a few men by +holding to ridges and slowly retreating, always using our rifles at every +opportunity when an Indian was in range, never wasting a shot on them +unless there was a probability of hitting them. The Indians have a mortal +fear of such tactics. + +In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick out quickly any +vantage ground, and sometimes as high as 200 will concentrate at such a +point where we could not concentrate twenty men without exposing them, and +from this vantage ground they will pour a deadly fire on the troops, and +we cannot see an Indian--only puffs of smoke. By such tactics as this they +harass and defeat our troops. Many a fight occurred between Indians and +soldiers both watching the smoke to show each other's position. You can +watch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless some one is hit +and exposes himself, when it is nearly always a sure death. The Indian +character is such that he will not stand continual following, pounding, +and attacking. Their life and methods are not accustomed to it, and the +Indians can be driven by very inferior forces by continually watching, +attacking, and following. None of our campaigns have been successful that +have not been prepared to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them +at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded, or forced to +surrender, which is the sure result of such a campaign. + +The Indians during the months they had been hostile, and especially in +their attacks on the stage-stations and ranches, had captured a large +number of men, women, and children. These prisoners had made known to the +troops, by dropping notes along the trail and through the reports of +friendly Indians, their terrible condition and the usage that was being +made of them. Their appeals to us to rescue them were pitiful. + +I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the villages, and their +winter quarters out of our reach; that these villages were unprotected +because every brave and dog-soldier had his warpaint on and was joining +the hostile forces attacking along our lines, which were increasing every +day. I also knew it would be impossible for any of our troops to reach +them or to rescue them by following them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort +Kearney I asked authority of the Government to enlist and muster into +service two companies of Pawnee Indians, to be under the command of their +old interpreter, Major North, who I knew to be a brave, level-headed +leader. This authority was immediately given me, and Major North was given +confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux country, apparently on +scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and rescue these prisoners, while +their braves were down fighting us. He started, but storms of snow came +down so heavy that his ponies could get nothing to eat, and during the +latter part of February and all of March these storms were continuous, the +snow falling to the depth of two feet over the entire plains. Major North +was compelled to seek shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his stock +on cottonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the summer and winter +of 1865 and 1866 Major North, with his two enlisted companies, to which I +added two more, made some wonderful marches, scouts, battles, and +captures, and during that campaign we recaptured and had surrendered to us +many of these women and children prisoners. + +After the war Major North became manager of the Indians in Buffalo Bill's +Wild West Show, and died in that service. He was a noted man on the +plains. My acquaintance with him commenced in 1856, and together we had +seen and endured many hardships. It was seldom one met his equal in any of +the different phases of plains life. Although he had led an eventful +career, still I never heard him refer to what he had done or accomplished, +or the part he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever more +worshiped than he was by the two tribes of Pawnee Indians; and his death +was virtually their destruction, for during his life among them he held +them under good discipline and kept them away from vice, diseases, and +war. + +A great many amusing reports came to me from my scouts and the captured +Indians. When on the plains in the 50's I was known among the Indians by +the name, in their language, that signified "Long Eye," "Sharp Eye," and +"Hawk Eye." This came from the fact that when I first went among them it +was as an engineer making surveys through their country. With my +engineering instruments I could set a head-flag two or three miles away, +even further than an Indian could see, and it is their custom to give a +practical name to everything. Of course I was not many days on the plains +until it reached the Indians that "Long Eye" was there, and in every fight +that occurred they had me present. They said I could shoot as far as I +could see. The scouts said the Indian chiefs laid their defeats to that +fact. Then again they were very superstitious about my power in other +matters. When the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect +it and not destroy it. They were made to believe that it was a Great +Medicine. This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by +stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and +others at Fort Kearney, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and then +having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and +received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as +they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge +Pole, this being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of course +this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could +often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening +to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and +through the insulators. It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought and +said it was "Big Medicine" talking. I never could convince them that I +could not go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them +what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, as they +had often seen me use my traveling-instrument and cut into the line, +sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the noted scouts of +the plains who had married into the different tribes had been guides for +me, and many of these men were half-breeds, and were with these hostile +Indians. Some of them took part with them, but more of them had tried to +pacify and bring them to terms, and they gave me information about those +who were not engaged in the depredations. + +I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the plains, a person of great +power and great moment. These half-breeds worked upon their superstitions, +endeavoring to convince them it was useless to fight "Long Eye." No doubt +my appearing on the plains the time I did, and the fact that from the time +I appeared until the time I left, the troops had nothing but success, +carried great weight with them, and seemed to confirm what the old +voyageurs and guides told them, and had much influence in causing their +abandonment of the Platte country and returning to their villages. + +My own experience on the plains led me to be just as watchful and just as +vigilant when I knew the Indians were not near me as I was when they were +in sight. In all my travels I never allowed them to camp near or occupy my +camps even in the time of peace, when they were friendly, and I never +allowed myself to knowingly do them an injustice, making it a point never +to lie to them in any of my councils and treaties, or never allow, if I +knew it, the interpreter to deceive them. That brought me respect in all +my dealings with them, and I treated them with respect, courtesy, and +consideration, and demanded the same from them. This, no doubt, was one of +the principal reasons that in fifteen years, more or less, of intercourse +with them, traveling through their country both during the times they were +hostile and at peace, that I escaped many of the misfortunes that befell +others. + +Although this short campaign was not remarkable for great battles or large +loss by killed and wounded, still it required great fortitude from the +troops, and often great personal courage, and its success was of great +moment to the Government and to the people of the plains and the Pacific +Coast, for over these three great overland routes were carried the mails, +telegrams, and traffic during the entire war of the rebellion, which did +much to hold these people loyal to our Government. A long stoppage was a +destruction to business, and would bring starvation and untold misery; and +when, with only thirteen days and nights of untiring energy on the part of +the troops in a winter of unheard-of severity, California, Utah and +Colorado were put in communication with the rest of the world, there was +great rejoicing. In seventeen days the stages were started and overland +travel was again safe, after being interrupted for two months, and by +March 1st the commercial trains were all _en route_ to their destinations +and I had returned to my duties at the headquarters of the Department, in +St. Louis. + +It was with no little satisfaction that I answered a personal letter +General Grant had written me, when he assigned me to this duty, and which +I found awaiting me on my return to Fort Leavenworth. In his letter he +outlined what it was necessary to do and why he had asked me to take the +field. He judged rightly of the condition of affairs and the necessity of +immediate action. I wrote him how promptly the troops responded to my +call. They had opened the overland routes; they had made them secure and +were then guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after grass +came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly chastised, they would +certainly and successfully attack them and prevent safe travel overland, +and from my letter the order soon came for me to prepare for the extensive +campaign of the next summer and winter that followed these Indians to the +Yellowstone on the north and the Cimarron on the south, and conquered a +peace with every hostile tribe. + + + + +[Illustration: JAMES BRIDGER + +Chief Guide to Indian Campaign, 1865-6.] + + +THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS 1865 AND 1866 + + +During the Indian campaigns of the winter and spring of 1864-65, against +the Indians that were holding all the overland roads, stations, telegraph +and emigrant routes over the plains, my command reopened them in a short +campaign of sixty days in which many fights occurred in which the troops +were uniformly successful. The telegraph-lines were rebuilt, the stages +re-established, the mails transported regularly, and protection given. +Although we were able to drive the Indians off of all of these routes and +open them successfully and hold them open, my experience convinced me that +as soon as grass started on the plains these Indians would again come down +on the routes, and that the only possible way of settling the Indian +question was to make a well-planned and continuous campaign against them +on the Arkansas, the Smoky Hill, the Republican, and the North and South +Platte Valley routes, and to keep them off the traveled roads. To do this +we would be obliged to get our troops into their country as soon as +possible and go for their villages. + +In my report to the Government, in April, 1865, I set forth the necessity +for this and outlined the plans. Upon the receipt of that report I +received authority from General Grant and General Pope to go forward and +carry out the plans that I had suggested. This plan contemplated placing +upon the plains about 5,000 men to protect the stations and +telegraph-lines, furnish escort to emigrants and Government trains of +supplies that were necessary to supply the wants of that vast country with +provisions and outfit five movable columns of soldiers, a total of 6,000 +or 7,000 men. Contracts were immediately made for the supplies for this +number of men; for horses for the cavalry, and for the supplying of the +posts on the plains with a surplus at each, so that if the campaign +extended into the winter it would not have to stop for want of provisions. +The campaign in the spring had to be made on supplies moved there in the +middle of winter, at great cost and suffering. The Quartermaster and +Commissary at Fort Leavenworth made contracts for supplies to be delivered +in June, and General Grant sent to Fort Leavenworth something like 10,000 +troops, very few of whom got into the campaigns from the fact that the +troops would no sooner reach Fort Leavenworth than they would protest, +claiming that the Civil War was ended and saying they had not enlisted to +fight Indians. The Governors of their States, Congressmen, and other +influential men, would bring such pressure to bear that the War Department +would order them mustered out. While the Government was at great expense +in moving these troops to the plains, some even reaching as far as +Julesburg, we never got any service from them; they were a great +detriment, and caused much delay in our plans, so that the overland routes +had to be protected by about one-half of the troops that it was at first +thought necessary to accomplish the work. Three Regiments of infantry, +eleven Regiments of cavalry, and three Batteries of artillery, that +reported to me under the order of General Grant, were mustered out on the +march between Fort Leavenworth and Julesburg. + +There was enlisted for the Indian campaign, five Regiments of United +States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, who, desiring to be +at liberty, were willing to enlist under the United States flag to fight +Indians, and these five Regiments had to be depended upon mostly for +taking care of all the country west of the Lakes,--the overland routes on +the plains, to man the posts on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, +and for escorts for surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move +all five columns I had less than 7,000 officers and men in my department. +The Indians commenced their depredations on all the routes in April, +especially on the Arkansas route, where we had to contend with the South +Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and Arapahoe tribes. This district +was under the command of Brigadier-General Ford, a very efficient officer, +and it was planned that he should make a campaign in May and June into the +Indian country, crossing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, +which we knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had a +compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before crossing the +Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross the Arkansas the +Government sent west a peace commission composed of Senator Doolittle, +General Alex McD. McCook, and others. The Indian agent for these tribes +was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth. They no sooner reached the Indian country +than they protested against the movement of any troops into the territory +south of the Arkansas River. In fact, General McCook issued an order, +using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's movement. +He had no authority to do this, but General Ford obeyed, as the +information came to him that these chiefs were assembling at the mouth of +the Little Arkansas to make peace. After parleying with the Indians, the +commission accomplished nothing, and the Indians all the time were +committing their depredations on the emigrant trains that were passing up +the Arkansas Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and +appeals of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in +relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians had +murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their property +and their stock, and our scouts who went among them saw their captures in +plenty. As soon as we would start out to punish them, even those that had +crossed north of the Arkansas River, protests were sent to Washington and +came back to us, so that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition +of matters became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views +of the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military +Division of the Missouri, as follows: + + HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. + + FORT LEAVENWORTH, June 6, 1865. + + _Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the + Missouri_: + + GENERAL: You have been notified of the action of Major-General McCook, + under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the + expedition of General Ford south of the Arkansas, that they might + confer, and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, + Comanches, Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth started south a week ago + to bring the chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are + endeavoring to make terms with them, their warriors are strung along + the route from Zarah to Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find + off its guard. They are in parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide + in the valleys and ravines. These Indians now have their villages at + Fort Cobb, and have driven out all friendly Indians and traders, + declaring that they mean war and nothing else. They are composed of + one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover; one small band of + Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of Comanches, also the + Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they have no respect for + our authority or power, and I have no faith in any peace made by them + until they are made to feel our strength. I do not believe it will be + a month before we hear of large trains being captured or attacked by + them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent in by + General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major + Morrison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared + to me bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among + them to trade. Not one of them will act as guide to take a force + toward them. + + Colonel Leavenworth satisfied the committee, and I think General + McCook also, that the Comanches and others had not committed any + depredations. There is not an officer or trader who has been on the + plains but knows they have been in all or nearly all the outrages + committed. I desire very much to have peace with the Indians, but I do + think we should punish them for what they have done, and that they + should feel our power and have respect for us. My plan to reach them + is to start in three columns for Fort Cobb; viz., First, by Major + Merrill's route; second, by Captain Booner's route; third, from the + mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. Make the parties about 400 + or 500 strong, and march direct for their villages. This will draw + every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route free. When we get + down there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they will have an + opportunity to show it, and we can make an agreement with them that + will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities + conclude a lasting peace. I have attempted to get these expeditions + off twice. The first time they were stopped by General Halleck, on + Colonel Leavenworth's representations. He started to make peace; the + Indians stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp. He came + back for fight and wished to whip them, but has now changed again, and + it is possible he may get the chiefs together, but I very much doubt + it; and, even if he does, they will only represent a portion of each + tribe. I have concluded, by representations of the Congressional + Committee made to General Ford, to wait and see the effects of Colonel + Leavenworth's mission. I will have my troops at the designated points. + If he should fail I will go forward and make the campaign as + originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not a leading + officer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians who has + faith in peace made with any of these Indians unless they are punished + for the murders, robberies and outrages they have committed for over a + year; and unless we have a settled policy, either fight and allow the + commanding officer of the department to dictate terms of peace to + them, or else it be decided that we are not to fight, but make some + kind of peace at all hazards, we will squander the summer without + result. Indians will rob and murder, and some Indian agents will + defend them, and when fall comes I will be held responsible for not + having protected the route or punished them for what they may have + done. It must be evident to the Government that I cannot be making war + on the Indians while other parties are at the same time making peace, + as has been the case so far. Whatever may be the desire of the + Government, I will lend all my energies to carry it out and make every + officer and man under me do the same. I cannot approve the manner in + which the Indians have been treated, and have no faith in them, nor + will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy fight. If peace + is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made at safe + distances from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be + made to keep away from them. + + I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General_. + +The Government, after receiving General Pope's and my own views, sent out +Inspector-General D. B. Sackett, of the Regular Army, to investigate the +conditions in that country and to report to the Government the actual +facts. In the meantime the peace commission that had been endeavoring to +negotiate with these Indians had gone on to Denver, still protesting +against any movement against the Indians, believing that peace could be +brought about. General Sackett, upon reaching the Indian country, sent +the following dispatch, on June 14, 1865, to the commanding officer at +Fort Larned, Kas.: + + For the last few days the Indians along the route have been very + active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals + have been stolen, Fort Dodge has lost every animal. The force can now + do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under + a good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number + of trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured. + +Upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately gave orders to the +commanding officer to go out and concentrate our forces north of the +Arkansas, and to protect the trains, but not to go south of the river. +This they accomplished very effectively, and drove all the Indians south +of the Arkansas, killing and capturing a good many. On June 14th, General +Pope wrote a long letter to General U. S. Grant, enclosing my letter to +him, reiterating what I had said, and insisting for very strong reasons +that the Indians should be left entirely to the military; that there +should be no peace commission sent until the military had met these +Indians and brought them to terms, either by fighting or negotiations; and +afterwards for the commission to go there and make such arrangements as +they saw proper. In the mustering out of troops General Ford was relieved +of the command and Major-General John B. Sanborn, a very efficient +officer, was sent to take his place. It was now agreed that after the +failure of the peace commission to accomplish anything with these Indians +that I should make the campaigns south of the Arkansas, and General +Sanborn concentrated his troops and moved to the Arkansas. Before I +reached there I received a communication from Colonel Leavenworth stating +that all the chiefs of the Indians were then on Cow Creek, anxious to meet +him. At the same time, a dispatch came from Washington to General Pope, +stopping Sanborn's movement. General Pope immediately arranged to have an +interview with these Indians, and General Sanborn went there with +instructions to make an agreement with them that they should keep off of +the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to meet them, +later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with the chiefs of the +Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on the part of the Government, +to suspend all actions of hostility towards any of the tribes above +mentioned and to remain at peace until the fourth day of October, 1865, +when they were to meet the Government commissioners at Bluffs Creek about +forty miles south of the Little Arkansas. This agreement did not take in +the South Cheyennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, +but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock they +captured, and none of them were punished for the murders they committed. +It was a business matter on their part to remain at peace only until the +troops moved out of that country and to prevent Sanborn with his organized +forces from going south to their villages and punishing them. The effect +of this agreement was that the Indians continued their depredations +through the following years,--not so much by killing but by +stealing,--until finally they became so hostile that in the campaign +against them by General Sheridan, in 1868, an agreement was made with them +forcing all the tribes to move into the Indian Territory. If General Ford +or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish these Indians +as they deserved, they would have been able to make not only a peace, but +could have forced them to go on the reservation in the Indian territories, +and thus have saved the murders and crimes that they committed for so many +years afterwards; however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the +emigration to go forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and +guarded, and it was not molested during the rest of that year. + +To show the conditions on the overland routes up the two forks of the +Platte River at the time, I sent this dispatch: + + HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. + + ST. LOUIS, MO., June 17, 1865. + + _Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, + St. Louis_: + + GENERAL: There is no doubt but that all, or nearly all, the tribes of + Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on + the north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open + hostilities against the Government. It is possible that in a few of + the tribes there are some chiefs and warriors who desire to be + friendly, but each day reduces the number of these, and they even are + used by the hostile tribes to deceive us as to their intentions and + keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear to be friendly, but + everything indicates that they too are ready to join in the + hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being + concerned in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion + there is but one way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles; + viz., to push our cavalry into the heart of their country from all + directions, to punish them whenever and wherever we find them, and + force them to respect our power and to sue for peace. Then let the + military authorities make informal treaties with them for a cessation + of hostilities. This we can accomplish successfully, for the Indians + will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and have confidence in + their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian agents, or + others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians in all + the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for + them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are + made aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will + readily and in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any + demands we may make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from + among them we can, I am confident, settle the matter this season, and + when settled I am clearly of the opinion that these Indians should be + dealt with entirely by competent commissioned officers of the Army, + whom they will respect and who will not only have the power to make + them comply with the terms of the agreements made, but will also have + the power and authority to compel troops, citizens and others to + respect implicitly and to comply strictly with the obligations assumed + on our part. The cavalry now moving into the Indian country will, I + doubt not, if allowed to proceed and carry out the instructions given + them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about an effectual + peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties. + + I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General_. + +The campaign to the north was planned with a view of going after all the +northern Indians then at war--the Arapahoes, North Cheyennes, and the +different bands of the Sioux. Their depredations had extended east to the +Missouri River, and General Pope sent General Sully with a force up that +river to take care of the hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been +fighting the troops at Forts Rice, Berthoud, and other points. Before +reaching these posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after +the Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minnesota, but +after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they having fled to +the British Possessions. He returned to the Missouri River and endeavored +to make terms with the tribes concentrated on it, but only partially +succeeded. We knew that there were from two to three thousand of the +Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes concentrated at or near Bear Butte, near +the north end of the Black Hills, and it was the intention of General +Sully with his force to go after this band, but, being turned to the east, +I organized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Nelson Cole, who went +up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders were to move from +Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its head and thence across the +Niobrara to the White Earth River and then to Bear Butte. Failing to find +the Indians there, he was to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he +was to join Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this +district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's column of about 500 men of +the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from Fort Laramie along the +west base of the Black Hills and join Colonel Cole, and later join General +Connor on the Tongue River; while General Connor, with a small command of +about 500 men, was moving north along the Platte to the head of Salt +Creek down the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and +supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base of the Big +Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in that vicinity. These +columns should have moved in May or June, but it was July and August +before they got started, on account of the failure of the contractors to +deliver the supplies to them on the plains at the different supply-depots; +but when they started they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have +accomplished the purpose of the campaign had it not been for the fact that +they were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Laramie by +October 15th. + +During May, June, and July the Indians were very aggressive all along the +South Platte and North Platte routes. Every Government train had to go +guarded; every emigrant train had to be organized into trains of 50 or 100 +wagons, with the teamsters armed and placed under an officer, and even +then a great many of their people were killed and a great deal of stock +run off. The commanding officer at Fort Laramie, during June, had +concentrated at his post about 2,000 of what was considered friendly +Indians. Most of these Indians had been captured during the spring +campaign. They had brought in with them most of the prisoners that had +been captured on their raids upon the stage-lines and the ranches. General +Connor, desiring to get these Indians removed as far as possible from the +hostile Indians, under my order moved them south toward the Republican +River, in charge of two companies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, commanded +by Captain Fouts. These Indians did not take kindly to this movement, and +the escort sent with them was not as large as it ought to have been. When +they were sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they were communicated with by +a band of hostile Indians who followed down the opposite side of the +Platte River, and early in the morning they attacked their escort, killing +Captain Fouts and four soldiers, and wounding seven others. In the fight +there were a great many Indians killed and wounded, but these Indians were +allowed to go south with their arms, to convince them that we put +confidence in them and did not treat them as prisoners. With the aid of +the other Indians on the north side of the Platte, they forced the escort +to intrench itself, by doing which the train and the women and others who +had been rescued from the Sioux Indians were saved, as word was gotten to +Fort Laramie and relief was sent. The Indians after this fight crossed the +North Platte River and moved north toward the Black Hills. + +Colonel Moonlight, in command of Fort Laramie, as soon as he heard of this +revolt, went to relieve the intrenched party. The Indians, however, had +crossed the Platte River. He followed them. When within ten or fifteen +miles of the band, through carelessness in taking care of his horses, the +Indians turned upon him, stampeded his stock, and, in fact, drove off 200 +or 300 head of it, leaving his command on foot. The attack of the hostiles +frightened the horses so that they could not be controlled, and they ran +towards the Indians. Moonlight and his command had to march back to +Laramie, a long distance, without food or transportation, as they had +started out with only one or two days' rations. Colonel Moonlight was +immediately relieved of his command, but the damage had been done, which +gave the hostile Indians great encouragement. General Connor sent this +dispatch: + + JULESBURG, June 15, 1865. + + (Received 9:50 p. m.) + + _Major-General Dodge_: + + I ordered the Indians who surrendered at Laramie to be sent to + Kearney. Colonel Moonlight sent them without first dismounting them, + under charge of two companies of Seventh Iowa Cavalry. They revolted + sixty miles this side of Laramie, killing Captain Fouts, who was in + command, and four soldiers, and wounding seven; also killed four of + their own chiefs who refused to join them; fifteen Indians were + killed; the Indians fled north with their ponies, women, and children, + leaving all their camp equipage. Troops are in pursuit. Mail-stages + have stopped west of Camp Collins. Everything appears to work + unfavorably owing to failure of corn contractors and incompetency of + some of my subordinates. I will overcome all obstacles, however, in a + short time. Have you sent me cavalry yet? J. D. Doty, Governor of + Utah, was buried at Camp Douglas Cemetery this morning. Died of heart + disease. + + P. E. CONNOR, + _Brigadier-General_. + +During July, a band of the Arapahoes raided the South Platte River +stage-line between Fort Collins and Fort Halleck, drove off most of the +stock from the stations, and committed other depredations. Colonel Porter, +who was in command of that district, concentrated his force and went after +the Indians, and in a very few days restored the stage stations and gave +the Indians sound whippings, which kept that line clear nearly all summer. +The Indians that had done this work had gone into Fort Collins claiming to +be friendly and wishing to make a treaty, and after being fed there for +some time, left one night and committed the depredations before troops +could stop them. From here they moved immediately north to join the +hostile Indians north of the North Platte. I had received notice from +Washington that the Interior Department had information that these Indians +were peaceable and would not join in the campaigns; but, being on the +ground, I knew better, because we were capturing them in nearly all of the +attacks that they made. With them was a portion of one of the bands of the +Sioux. + +On July 27, ten miles west of the North Platte Bridge station, a Mormon +train coming east was attacked by the Indians and Lieutenant Casper W. +Collins, of the Eleventh Ohio, and twenty-five men of the Eleventh Kansas, +went out to relieve it, when about one thousand Indians attacked him. +While he saved the train he lost his own life, and twenty-five of his men +were scalped and their bodies horribly mutilated; but while the Indians +had heavy losses in the fight, they were able to divide up and scatter +before any of the troops sent to attack them could reach them. I named the +post at Platte Bridge Fort Casper, and it is now known as the town of +Casper, on the North-Western railroad. + +On August 16th a large band of Sioux Indians attacked a military station +on the South Platte route. They were overtaken by the Pawnee Indian +Battalion of our forces, who gave them a good whipping. They killed a +large number and took their stock and scattered them. This was a band of +Sioux Indians that had been lying on the North Platte and made this dash +to the South Platte stage-line, thinking we had withdrawn the troops from +it to the northern expedition. Very few of them ever got back to their +tribes. + +The battalion of Pawnees with General Conner had made a great capture of a +band of Cheyennes who had been down on the Fort Halleck route. The latter +had there captured a part of a company of a Michigan Regiment who were +escorting a few wagons, the captives having been tied to the wagons and +burned. By some means, General Conner got word of this, and knew the trail +they would take to get back to the main command, and on this trail he +placed Major North and his battalion of Pawnees. Major North, in +describing to me what followed, said that when the Indians came back and +discovered that they were surrounded, one, an old man, moved up towards +him and placed his hand up to his mouth, telling him to come on; that they +were ready to die; that they were full of white men up to that,--meaning +up to his mouth. The Pawnees killed every one of this band and scalped +them. On one of them was found a diary of one of the Michigan soldiers who +had been killed, and one of the Cheyennes had used the book to give an +account of their travels, their camps and fights, and what they had done +on this raid. From this diary our guides could tell just exactly where the +party had been, where they had camped, where they had captured the +Michigan soldiers, and their route on their return. A half-breed had +written in the book a defiance of the troops, telling what the Indians +demanded. Among other things they demanded that before they would make +peace we should give up all their prisoners; that we should abandon the +country north of the Platte River, etc. + +As soon as General Connor reached Powder River he established his post and +named it Fort Connor. (It was afterward named Fort Reno by me.) Connor +immediately pushed on to the Crazy Woman Mountain fork of Powder River and +then to the east base of the Big Horn Mountains, following that to the +Tongue River and down the Tongue until James Bridger, the chief scout and +guide of the expedition, claimed to have seen the smoke a long distance +away, of an Indian camp. No one else could see it, but, as a precaution, +Connor sent out the Pawnee scouts, and on August 27th they discovered +about 2,000 Indians camped on the Tongue River, near the mouth of Wolf +Creek. It is a singular fact that in this vicinity General Crook fought +his great battle on the Rosebud, the Custer massacre occurred, and it was +not very far away that the Phil Kearney disaster occurred, when Lieutenant +Fetterman and his whole command was slaughtered. General Connor +immediately corralled the trains and took his available forces, about 250 +men, and marched all night and struck this band at daylight, giving them a +complete surprise. They were Arapahoes under Black Bear and Old David, +with several other noted chiefs. The band was just breaking up their camp, +but the Indian soldiers rallied and fought desperately. Captain H. E. +Palmer, A. A. G., with General Connor, gives this description of the +attack: + + The word was passed back for the men to close up and follow the + General and not to fire a shot until he fired in advance. General + Conner then took the lead, riding his horse up the steep bank of the + ravine and dashing out across the mesa as if there were no Indians + just to his left. Every man followed as close as possible. At the + first sight of the General the Indian ponies grazing on the table-land + in front of us sent up a tremendous whinnying, and galloped down + toward the Indian village. More than 1,000 dogs began to bark, and + more than 700 Indians made the air ring with their fearful yelling. It + appeared that the Indians were in the act of breaking camp. The most + of their tepees were down and packed for the march. The ponies, more + than 3,000, had been gathered in and most of the squaws and children + were mounted, some of them having taken the line of march up the + stream to the new camp. The General watched the movements of his men + until he saw the last man emerge from the ravine, when he wheeled on + the left into line. The whole line then fired a volley into the + village without stopping their horses, and the bugles sounded a + charge. Not a man but realized that the charge into the village + without a moment's hesitation was our only salvation. We already saw + that we were greatly outnumbered, and that only desperate fighting + would save our scalps. We were in the village in the midst of a + hand-to-hand fight with the warriors and squaws, for many of the + squaws did as brave fighting as their savage lords. Unfortunately for + the squaws and children, our men had no time to direct their aim, and + bullets from both sides and murderous arrows filled the air. Women and + children fell among the killed and wounded. The scene was + indescribable. Each man seemed an army by himself. Near the sweathouse + I emptied my revolver into the carcasses of three warriors. One of our + men, a member of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, a fine-looking soldier + with as handsome a face as I ever saw on a man, grabbed me by the + shoulder and turned me about that I might assist him in drawing an + arrow from his mouth. Having no surgeon of a higher grade than a + hospital steward, it was decided that in order to get the arrow out of + his mouth the tongue would have to be cut out, which was done. The + Indians made a brave stand trying to save their families, and + succeeded in getting away with a large majority of their women and + children, leaving behind nearly all of their plunder. + + We now went up a stream called Wolf Creek, General Connor in close + pursuit. Soon after we left the village General Connor advised me to + instruct Captain North to take his battalion of Indians and get all + the stock he could possibly gather. General Connor pursued the savages + fully ten miles from camp, when he found himself accompanied by only + fourteen men. Our horses were so worn out that it was impossible for + the men to keep up. The Indians noticed his movements and turned upon + him and his soldiers. They fell back as fast as possible. Captain + North and myself had succeeded in coralling about a thousand ponies. + Scores of buffalo-robes, blankets, and furs were heaped up on + lodge-poles, and on these we placed our dead, and burned their bodies + to keep the Indians from mutilating them. Our attack on the village + began at 9 a. m. We remained until 2:30 and had destroyed a great deal + of Indian property. At 2:30 we took up the line of march for the + corralled train. Captain North with his eighty Indians undertook to + drive the captured stock. They were soon a great ways ahead, while the + rest of the force was engaged in beating back the Indians. The Indians + pressed on every side. They seemed to have plenty of ammunition, but + they did most of their fighting with arrows. Before dark we were + reduced to forty men, and had only a little ammunition. The Indians + showed no signs of stopping the fight, but kept on charging on us, + dashing away at the stock, and keeping us constantly on the move until + fifteen minutes of twelve, when the last shot was fired by our + pursuers. The incidents of this fight would make very interesting + reading. Every man was a general. Not a man in the company but + realized that his life was in the balance. We must either whip the + Indians and whip them badly or be whipped ourselves. We could see that + the Indians greatly outnumbered us, but we were better armed than + they. As for fighting qualities the savages proved themselves as brave + as any of our men. We had accomplished a great deal; 250 Indian lodges + and their contents had been burned, with the entire winter's supplies; + the son of Black Bear was killed: sixty-three Indians were killed, + 1,100 ponies were captured, and a lot of women and children were taken + prisoners. + +General Connor's report of this battle was burned in Utah, and +consequently was never forwarded to me or to the Government, so we do not +know what the loss on his part was; but it was severe. + +General Connor now moved down the Tongue River to make a connection with +Colonel Walker and Colonel Cole, at the appointed rendezvous. His scouts +discovered that Colonel Cole in moving north had endeavored to reach the +mouth of Powder River and had failed, and after six days' fighting had +marched south, expecting to go to Port Laramie, not knowing that there +were supplies at Fort Connor. + +Colonel Cole, who with his column had started from Omaha, had made +reasonable progress, following out the routes laid down, and did not +discover any Indians until he reached the Little Missouri River, on a +branch of the Piney that he was coming down. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of +the center column, visited his camp and was two days behind him. He should +have immediately joined him, to carry out his instructions. Cole was +headed toward the Tongue River, near the Wolf Mountains. When he got into +the brakes of the Powder River, he discovered many signs of Indians. This +is a very rough country, and he had great difficulty in getting his long +trains through it; however, he dropped into the valley about fifty miles +above the mouth of Powder River and sent a detachment with his best guide +fifty miles across to Tongue River and Panther Mountains and discovered +nothing of Connor. In Cole's instructions he was told that there would be +a supply-depot at Panther or Wolf Mountains, but General Connor had +changed this and made the supply-depot at what was known as Camp Connor, +on Powder River, and he did not notify either Cole or Walker of this +change, which he should have done, as had he done so it would have avoided +all the trouble that these two columns encountered. Cole's detachment of +cavalry discovered no signs of Connor on Tongue River and so followed down +the river, while they should have gone up; and failing to find any sign of +any depot at Panther Mountains, reported back to Cole. Cole's rations were +now exhausted, or nearly so, as he had not been as careful of them as he +should have been, expecting as he did to find a depot where he could get +plenty at the end of his sixty days' march. It shows that he was not up to +the woodcraft of the country. In examining Powder River towards its mouth +he found it destitute of grass and full of canyons. He, therefore, made +up his mind to move south up the Powder River valley, with a view to +either meeting Connor or making for Fort Laramie. The Indians, seeing this +retreat, became very bold. There were at least 2,000 of them, Cheyennes +and Sioux, and without making an attack they simply harassed him, +sometimes forcing a fight; but very few were hurt. Colonel Cole should +have parked his train, placed it in a defensive position under a good +guard, and then mobilized the rest of his force, and, with what rations he +had, gone after the Indians, giving them battle and forcing the fight with +them. He had plenty of men. + +Cole had not advanced very far towards Port Connor when, on September 6th, +Colonel Walker and his command joined him. Then he had plenty of men to +meet all the Indians in the country, if his force was properly handled. +When this fighting commenced he was not over thirty miles from where +Connor fought his battle, and Captain Palmer states that they heard a +cannon, but could not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, +hearing nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian +scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder River +country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat up the Powder +there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals having marched so far without +grain, were already very much exhausted, and the storm lasting three days, +they became so weak that they were not fit to use, and they were therefore +shot, just as they stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling +into the Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning +of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North struck, +and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that Cole had met +with great disaster, and immediately reported to General Connor, who at +once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two Pawnees with dispatches to +Colonel Cole to march on up Powder River to Fort Connor, where he would +find supplies. Cole's troops seem to have started out not fully prepared +for such a trip, especially in the line of shoes and leggings, although +they were carefully instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I +knew the country. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, +the Quartermaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he had +to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have kept up +their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever they met the +Indians they always whipped them; but they were on the retreat, which gave +every advantage to the Indians. When Cole's troops reached Port Connor +they were in a deplorable condition--ragged, barefooted, and almost +without rations and ammunition. + +The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had become so numerous +that the commanding officer thought it prudent to intrench the post, which +shows good judgment; but Colonel Cole complains in his report that the +troops were made to help do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says: + + While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange but + most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the + command must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching + this post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second + Missouri Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up + around the place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to + force its principles through insubordination or rebellion, it was + disappointed. What a sight was here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed + men, emaciated with fatigue, who had met and worsted the enemy on + three several occasions, marched up in the face of a garrison of 2,000 + or more. + +I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops when he +reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cavalry, General Connor +then not having reached that post; and when he did, all told there were +not 2,000 troops there. Cole's loss was very light,--nine killed,--while +he claims to have killed from 200 to 500 of the Indians. + +It was very evident to me that there was no very severe fighting here; it +was simply a skirmish on a retreat. + +Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort Laramie on +August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Hills, and struck Cole's +column on August 20th on what was known as Piney Creek. After striking +Cole's trail he followed it a short distance, and then left it and struck +Powder River, much farther south than Cole had, and on reaching the river +he fell right into the same band of Indians that were gathered along the +Powder River to harass Cole. He, too, was short of provisions, although he +was equipped to travel very rapidly, having all his supplies on +pack-mules. As soon as he got in touch with Cole he joined him and +followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to make up a +rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the pack-mules of Walker, +and then combine his and Cole's troops to move on a line farther to the +west and follow these Indians to the British Possessions if necessary. He +had the ammunition, equipment and everything at Fort Connor to fit out +these columns with. As near as they could estimate there were about 6,000 +Indians all told. + + +[Illustration: PUMPKIN BUTTES + +Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians +in September, 1865, on Powder River.] + + +The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's +engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer +Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to +open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route +to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and +then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant +route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this +expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to +travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black +Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the +Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into +Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue +River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel +Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original +route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from +where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he +ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther +in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the +second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the +Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. +These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting +through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities +at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being +killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's +trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer +marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he +took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept +it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was +through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the +whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would +communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of +trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held +prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But +they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the +situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and +he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his +men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, +in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the +Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the +Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, +when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again +attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General +Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue. +They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove +off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety. + +Early in September I reached Fort Connor--before General Cole and Colonel +Walker had concentrated there--and gave instructions under the direction +of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to +withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations +against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, +and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all +hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from +General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him: + + HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES. + + FORT LARAMIE, DAKOTA TERRITORY, August 31, 1865. + + _Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._: + + I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing + no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I + desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will + allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000 + men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to + garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties + before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a + peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may + be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of + that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage, + etc., to support them are here and _en route_. As soon as we settle + with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our + posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder + River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow + him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back + by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes + will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more + too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor + gets back he can go right there. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General_. + +General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's and Walker's +forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor, with a view of taking +command of Cole's and Walker's forces and organizing them into two +columns--one a light column with pack-mules, and the other with the +trains,--and then to follow and attack the Indians that had been fighting +Cole and Walker. When he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, +which, of course, changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the +Indians were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled +lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time--weeks +or months--before we would have conquered a peace that the Indians would +have recognized. + +The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an answer from +General Grant to the effect that the authorities at Washington were +determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. They had been made +to believe by the Interior Department that all they had to do was to +withdraw the troops and the Indians would come in and make peace. On my +return from Fort Connor, when I reached the North Platte I sent this +dispatch: + + HORSESHOE, September 15, 1865. + + _Major-General John Pope, St. Louis_: + + Arrived here today on my return from Powder River. That post is well + located, right in heart of Indian country, and is an important post. + The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good + effect hereafter in holding in check Indians. Have not heard from + General Connor since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have + done a good deal of work on Powder River; got up stockade and + commenced Quartermaster buildings; well under way. Great lack of + Quartermaster's stores up there, the Powder River stores not having + reached Laramie yet. From Laramie to Powder River, then to Virginia + City, is an excellent wagon-road; good grass, water, and wood all the + way, and the most direct road that can be got. The travel over it in + another season will be immense; it saves at least 450 miles in + distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's wagon-road party + and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel Bent's sons, + George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and Colonel + Sawyer gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed, + Captain Williford, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians + accepted proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods + they attacked party; killed three men. Bent said that there was one + condition on which the Cheyennes would treat; viz., the hanging by + Government of Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians + considered that they were strong enough to fight the Government; + preferred to do it; that they knew the Government would withdraw + troops in fall; then they would have it all their own way again. + Expressed great fear about Connor, and said they were concentrating + everything to meet him, which is true. Since he left no Indians have + troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all moving north, + stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them as they + pass every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine Bow + Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache La + Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was at + Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow; see General Wheaton; + thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to + make peace on Missouri River, but they were doing this to keep us + from sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St. + Louis. One has been with Price in the rebel Army; was captured. His + father got him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas + River, when he joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He + was dressed in one of our staff officer's uniforms. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General_. + +On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the results of the +campaign and protested strenuously against the order stopping it, saying +he was then in condition and position to close it, conquer the Indians, +and force a lasting peace. On receipt of his report I sent this dispatch: + + CENTRAL CITY, COLO., September 27, 1865. + + _Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo._: + + On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of + Indians on Tongue River; killed fifty; captured village, all winter + provisions, and 600 horses--all the stock they had. On the 1st of + September the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the + Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On + the evening of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them + down Powder River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again, + fight lasting until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of + 200 killed. They fled in every direction, losing large number of + horses, camp equipage, provisions, etc. On 8th instant, Colonel + Walker, commanding center column, who was in advance of Colonel Cole, + met Indians in large force. Colonel Cole came up and after a short but + spirited engagement they totally routed Indians, driving them in every + direction with great loss, several of principal chiefs being killed in + this fight. On the night of the 9th of September a severe snow-storm + raged, in which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. I was in that + storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several animals. + Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and + wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not + communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this + time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General + Connor's column was. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General_. + +General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south from Fort +Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had been assigned, +the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon as he started south to +Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and swarmed immediately on the +overland routes, both the North and South Platte, reaching even as far as +the Arkansas, and committed great depredations. The troops along those +lines had been mustered out, and the regular-army force that was to take +their places had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my +absence General Pope had assigned to the different districts regular-army +officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of the +volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word to the Indians +to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a consultation. To accomplish +this I sent out the best-posted guides (using chiefs, sub-chiefs, +half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on the plains, to each of the +hostile tribes asking them to come into Fort Laramie. I instructed the +messengers to tell them that if any of their people had gone to the +Missouri River for peaceable purposes to let them go, but to bring in all +that were left, providing they felt disposed to settle without delay. I +sent them word that if they did not come in and settle they would find +that our summer campaign was only a taste of what they would get this +winter, for we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders +thoroughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle with the Indians +before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I told +them they might say, also, that all of the Indians south of the Arkansas +had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told about the battle +with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder and Tongue Rivers. I sent the +district commanders word to show Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the +forces at their posts, and to impress upon him our power. The effect of +this appeal to the different tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 +we got together at Fort Laramie the principal chiefs and the head men of +the North Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tribes of the Sioux, +when a council was held. + +I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded at Fort Laramie, +that we would agree to almost anything to bring a permanent peace except +to allow the Indians to come down to the North Platte and occupy the +country through which the new military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont. +Our troops, in passing up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered +gold. There were Colorado and California Regiments in the commands, and I +knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, as soon as a +treaty was made, to go back into that country and prospect it, and I gave +that reason to the Indians for holding them north of the Belle Fourche +Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that country was their best +hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing to give up all the country +south of the Platte River, and not to interfere with the building of the +Union Pacific road or with any of the overland routes up the North or +South Platte; but they would not consent to give up the Black Hills north +of the North Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they +should occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time +as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to negotiate +a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to tell them that if the +white men went into their territory and we did not keep them out, they +were at liberty to do so. I knew that would deter any white man going in +there, and as long as they kept the peace, we would. Red Cloud, who had +then come to the head of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a +prominent part in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as +Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Ribs, and the Bent boys on +behalf of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their +country north of the Platte. "You may take my country," said Red Cloud, +"but I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail from the North Platte to +Yellowstone with the bodies of your soldiers;" and this he pretty nearly +accomplished. This agreement, made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing. +During the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines +agreed upon and occupied the country, especially along the Union Pacific, +which was then being constructed through that country. The Government had +to send in additional troops, and all the military posts over the country +had to be re-occupied the same as they had been before. The Government +endeavored to again reach these Indians through a peace commission in +1868. General W. T. Sherman was at the head of it, and it was composed of +General Harney and others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, Wyo., before +they went to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons +for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told General +Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams heading in the +Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that as soon as he allowed +those Indians to come to the North Platte under a treaty of peace, he +would not be across the Missouri River on his return before that country +would be covered by prospectors from California and Colorado. General +Sherman answered that their instructions were to make such a peace and +they were sent there to do it, and, sure enough, they did; and as soon as +the treaty was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first +mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sitting Bull, +who had taken part in this treaty and whose country was the Black Hills, +sent in protest after protest, demanding that the Government live up to +the terms of the treaty and drive the miners out, but no attention was +paid to them. The miners and settlers poured into the Black Hills country +and drove the Indians out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had +with some of the Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not +protect their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; +and they started to do it. The massacres of that year came from his band, +the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer Regiment in +1876. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, under the treaty, were +fully justified in it. During this same time Red Cloud occupied the +Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, besides murdering Captain Fetterman +and his company at Fort Phil Kearney, and other troops located at the +posts that we established along there in 1866, such as Forts Reno, +McKinney, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer +massacre that these Indians were brought to time and put on reservations; +since then peace has prevailed. + +The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas River route that we +had on the Platte routes in the summer of 1866, 1867, and 1868. The +Indians that had made the agreement with Colonel Leavenworth were all +committing depredations until finally the Government sent General Sheridan +there with instructions to punish them. They tried to play the same game +with Sheridan that they had played with us, but he would have none of it. +There was no one in Washington who would force him to listen to the +appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under Colonels Custer, Evans, +and others, fought three battles south of the Arkansas, noticeably wiping +out some bands, and making them give up their prisoners, stop their +murders, and go on reservations in the Indians' territory. From that time +on they have been peaceable. + +We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on the Arkansas +and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. We had got up to their +villages and had plenty of troops, plenty of provisions, and plenty of +clothing, and could carry on the campaign through the winter, if +necessary; and so, if we had allowed General Ford or General Sanborn to +have gone forward with the columns and punish those southern Indians, they +would have made a permanent peace. But the fact is the Indians did not +give up until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the +power and authority of the Government. + +The policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian problem is +beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They were treated the same +as foreign nations; and while they made treaties they never carried out +their part of them, breaking them whenever the trend of civilization +westward interfered with them in any way. The Government attempted to deal +with and govern the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried +to enforce peace through the military authorities. This caused friction; +and deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their +contractors and civil agents brought untold complaints. If the Government +had treated the Indians as a ward that they were bound to protect, as the +English did, they would have had very little trouble in handling them. The +military force would have held all conferences with them; fed them when +they needed it; located them in an early day on unoccupied good +hunting-grounds; and finally, as civilization moved into their territories +and as their tribes wasted away, would have given them reservations where +the Government from the money they received from the lands the Indians +claimed, could have kept and fed them without any great burden or cost. In +all the days of Indian warfare and treaties, there never was such a farce, +or failure to comprehend the frontier situation, as in the years 1865 and +1866, and the failure of the Government to take advantage of the +comprehensive plans instituted by the military authorities, as well as of +the great expenditures made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, +brought, in after years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than +ever. + +Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known his views to the +Government, he requested me to write fully mine to the Secretary of the +Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, and who was from my state, and +I sent him this letter: + + HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. + + ST. LOUIS, MO., June 22, 1865. + + _Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C._: + + MY DEAR SIR: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's + letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My + acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to + get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods + for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter + refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook" + and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and + if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of + how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to + terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying + that if I am allowed to carry out the policy now being pursued toward + them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the + plains. When I assumed command of the former Department of Kansas I + found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility + against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian, + the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from + Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines, + captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children + indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken + lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done; + pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with + the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs + existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started + expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth, + Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we + were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to + give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for + their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped + with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to + attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders + of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just + got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle + is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel + Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The + grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then + aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was + moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and + punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of + by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains. + They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern + Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace. + + Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left + Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get + my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all + along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering + men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all + hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent + out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie + I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace + to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded + by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and + feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie + Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly + Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away + from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they + attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon + five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them, + and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now + we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British + Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with + us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to + me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and + Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have + no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected + with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the + Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I assumed command. + I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be + tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought + wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be + committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle + these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their + country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at + the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make peace with + them--not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and + plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they + will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that + neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to + swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will + enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them + to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep + citizens out of their country. The class of men sent among them as + agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole + purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so + long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes. + + Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians, + was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold" + with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to + Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things + to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they + mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be + dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by + others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these + Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to + me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all + of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect + civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived + and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have + given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they + have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an + opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for + a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to + strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I + shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an + interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable + settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty + that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires + them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think + them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee, + powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get + us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them + fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live + strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to + effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of + every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for + bringing it about. + + Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years, + and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my + own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience + and observations since I have commanded here, but also with + intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to + the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe + east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you + will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace + is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among + them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you + desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I + believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep + these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in + their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and + that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be + subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations. + In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own + country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe. + Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety + without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect + and guard. The statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first + Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the + Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed + the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to + defend themselves. + + The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that + we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our + overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly + erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven + different columns of troops penetrating their country in all + directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes. + This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show + them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards + to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they + will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them + for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our + fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war + with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had + we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and + the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their + country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to + suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally + have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have + written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at + the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that + when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I + shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in + my possession that you may desire, and I assure you I shall bend all + my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so + much desired--a lasting and just peace with these Indians. + + I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Major-General Commanding_. + +Since writing this report of the Indian campaign of 1865 and 1866, I have +seen Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells's diary of the reconstruction +period, from which the following extracts are taken: + + Tuesday, August 8, 1865. + + Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of + some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of army + movements on the plains came up, and Stanton said there were three + columns of twenty-two thousand troops moving into the Indian country, + with a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and + authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the War Secretary. + He said he knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was + such a movement, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had + been written to for information, but Grant was away and he knew not + when he should have a reply. The expenses of this movement could not, + he said, be less than $50,000,000. But he knew nothing about it. + + + Friday, August 11, 1865. + + The question of the Indian war on the plains was again brought + forward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The + Secretary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to + General Grant, and General Grant says he has not ordered it. McCulloch + wanted to know the probable expense--the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton + thought McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged--said + General Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper + man--was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead + of twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number. + + This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department. + + + Tuesday, August 15, 1865. + + Stanton says there is to be a large reduction of the force which is + moving against the Indians. That by the 1st of October the force will + be about 6,000. That large supplies have gone on, but they can be + divided or deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will + not be lost. + + + Friday, August 18, 1865. + + Senator Doolittle and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the + plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the + President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in + relation to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and + wickedness of the expedition which has been gotten up by somebody + without authority or the knowledge of the Government. + + Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement + of the means which they had taken to prevent it, came in very + opportunely. Stanton said General Grant had already written to + restrict operations; he had also sent to General Meigs. I have no + doubt a check has been put on a very extraordinary and unaccountable + proceeding, but I doubt if an active stop is yet put to war expenses. + +It is no wonder that with such ignorance in the Cabinet as to the +condition of the country, that the administration at Washington was so +incompetent in the Civil War. No person can read Secretary Wells's diary +of the daily doings at Washington of the Cabinet during President +Lincoln's administration and see how little appreciation and support he +got from his Cabinet. Dissensions among themselves and hardly ever +agreeing on any important question, brings to view the great +responsibility of the President and the fact that in all the important +matters he was dependent upon his own judgment. The Cabinet knew nothing +of the Indian depredations that for three months held all the lines of +travel, mail, and telegraph crossing the plains to California, with every +State and Territory west of the Missouri River appealing for protection, +until President Lincoln wrote to General Grant to try and have something +done to protect that country. General Grant instructed me to make the +campaign in the winter of 1864-65, which was so successful that in forty +days all the overland routes were opened, and the stage, telegraph, and +mails replaced, as shown in my reports, though at the beginning of the +campaign every tribe of Indians from the British Possessions to the Indian +Territory was at war, with captures and murders of settlers along all the +overland routes, in all the frontier States, every-day occurrences; with +women and children captured and outrages committed that cannot be +mentioned. And yet this Cabinet had no knowledge of the conditions, and +concluded from the report of the Doolittle Peace Commission that the +Indian expedition was a complete failure, notwithstanding that this +commission failed to make ponce with a single tribe of Indians and failed +to stop the depredations of any band of Indians; and, upon its report, +declaring that the Indian expeditions were a folly and wickedness gotten +up by some one without the authority or knowledge of the Government. + +There never were 22,000 troops on the plains, nor one-half of that number. +The War Department may have sent that number out, but, as I have shown, +they were all mustered out before they reached their work; and the cost of +the campaign with a year's supplies at the posts for all the troops on the +plains or engaged in the campaign was not more than $10,000,000, a very +small amount compared with the trouble and cost of fighting these Indians +for ten years thereafter. Secretary Harlan says that 2,200 troops were +sufficient. When I took command, in January, 1865, there were not to +exceed 5,000 troops guarding trains, stages, and telegraph-lines, and +protecting all the routes of travel across the plains, and they had +utterly failed. All travel had been stopped and no expeditions against the +Indians had been made. The Indians had held the overland routes for three +months in spite of these troops. It shows how little knowledge Secretary +Harlan had of the condition of Indian affairs in his department. From the +statements of Secretary Wells it is evident where the order came from to +stop all operations on the plains and withdraw all troops by October 15th. +When Secretary Stanton states that by October 1st the troops on the plains +would be reduced to 6,000, it shows how little knowledge he had of affairs +in his department, for at that time there were not 6,000 troops on the +plains or in my command. + +It is well that no one knew the condition of affairs; that no one was +aware of the ignorance of the group of statesmen at Washington who were +supposed to be responsible for our nation and its preservation. They did +not seem to know where to ascertain the facts. It would seem that +Secretary Stanton purposely wished to place a reflection on General Grant, +for he must have known that he was responsible for the Army and for all of +its movements. It seems that General Grant was away at the time the +dispatches of General Pope and myself were sent showing the necessity of +continuing the campaign and punishing these savages. When he returned he +tried to stop this Cabinet panic, but his dispatches in answer to those +from Pope and myself show that he could not do it, and the fatal mistake +was made of stopping the campaign just as it was accomplishing and +successfully ending a year's work. It seems to have all come about through +the misrepresentation of the Doolittle Peace Commission and the lack of +proper information on the part of the Cabinet. + +In the years 1863, 1864 and 1865 the Indians deliberately made war, +believing that the Civil War had so crippled us that we could not +effectively contend with them; but just as we had spent millions of +dollars, sent thousands of troops into their country, and commenced +fighting and capturing them, we were forced to lay down our arms almost in +sight of the line of battle and beg for peace, and the Indians believed +they had defeated us and that we could not conquer them, and for from +three to ten years afterward we had to spend great sums, make winter +campaigns, and suffer great losses of life and property, before we +obtained the lasting peace which was in sight in 1865 and 1866 if we had +been allowed to carry out our campaigns and plans to a legitimate end. + +Upon the close of my campaigns on the plains the Legislature of the State +of Iowa passed and sent me these commendations of my services: + + _Resolved_, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of + Iowa, That the thanks of the people of this State are due and are + hereby extended to Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, for his able and + efficient management of Indian affairs on the plains, in protecting + the Great Overland Routes, and our western borders from the + depredations and incursions of hostile Indians, as also for his + distinguished services as a commander in the field, and his able + administration of the Department of the Missouri. + +During this campaigning on the plains I had as my escort Company A, +Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. They belonged to one of the Regiments +that was sent from the East to take part in the Indian campaigns, and did +not ask to be mustered out until after the campaign. I was greatly +indebted to this company for the close attention they gave to me and the +intelligence they showed during the whole trip. They had served faithfully +in the Civil War, and their veteran experience there was a great benefit +in the work they had to do on the plains, often in taking messages and +performing other duties where only two or three of them could be detailed +at a time. It has always been a great pleasure to me to have had an +invitation, ever since they organized their society, to attend their +reunions, but, unfortunately, I have been so far away that I could not go; +and to the surviving members I with great pleasure extend my thanks for +their good services to me. + + + + +[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF AT CORINTH, MISS., +IN THE SPRING OF 1862 + +Model of fortified town on the table. Left to right--Lieutenant J. W. +Barnes, A. D. C.; Captain O. J. Dodds, D. Q. M.; Captain C. C. Carpenter, +Com. of Sub.; Captain J. K. King, A. Q. M.; Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. +Barnhill, D. P. M.; Major N. B. Howard, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant J. H. +Hogan, Ordnance Officer; Major W. R. Marsh, Medical Director; Captain B. +P. Chenoweth, A. A. I. G.; Captain Henry Horn, Chief of Grand Guards.] + + +CAMPAIGN UP THE TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY + + GENERAL DODGE + IN THE REAR OF GENERAL BRAGG'S ARMY + AND + COLONEL STREIGHT'S RAID + SPRING OF 1863 + +When General Grant planned the second campaign against Vicksburg he +notified me, then in command of the District of Corinth, with about eight +thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, that he intended to take my +command with him; but a few days before starting he sent one of his staff +officers to me stating that he had concluded to leave me with my command +and some additional troops to hold that flank while he moved on Vicksburg. +This dispatch was a great disappointment to myself and my command. When +the officer returned to General Grant he no doubt told him of our +disappointment, as General Grant wrote me a letter stating that my command +was of much more importance than a command directly under him, and said he +had fears that General Bragg, who was then facing General Rosecrans in +Middle Tennessee, might detach a portion of his force, cross the Tennessee +River, and endeavor to make a lodgment on the Mississippi River at some +point and break up his communications with the North, with a view of +forcing him to abandon the campaign. He said he had left me to take care +of that flank, as he knew I would stay there. I read between the lines and +learned what was expected of me. + +General Grant, in discussing this order of his afterwards, said that he +had learned from my services under him that I was peculiarly fitted for +such a command, where I had to rely on my own judgment, and that I acted +promptly without waiting for orders, and that it came, he thought, from my +experience before the war, when I was always in charge of engineering +parties in the field and often in a hostile Indian country where I had to +act promptly in any emergency. There was, at that time, quite a large +force in my front and between me and General Bragg, commanded by General +Earl Van Dorn, General N. B. Forrest, and General P. D. Roddey. This force +was collecting supplies and storing them along the Memphis and Charleston +Railroad from Bear River to Decatur, Ala. The Tennessee Valley in this +territory was twenty miles wide, and full of all kinds of supplies. I +wrote to General Grant about this storage of supplies for General Bragg's +Army, and suggested that I move up the Tennessee Valley with my force to +destroy these stores and whatever there was in the valley that Bragg's +Army could utilize; but General Grant made no response then to my +suggestion. In February I discovered a movement of the force in my front +towards General Rosecrans's Army and notified him in the following +dispatch: + + CORINTH, MISS., February 10, 1863. + + _Major-General Rosecrans_: + + One of my scouts left Van Dorn Sunday night. He then had two regiments + and one battery across the Tombigbee, at Cotton-Gin Port; was crossing + slowly, and all his forces had not got to him. His men and officers + said he was going to Bragg. His stock is not in good condition. He + appears to be going the Pikevill and Russellville road. Streams are + high, and roads bad. We captured mail from Bragg's Army yesterday. All + the officers' and privates' letters express a belief that Bragg is + fixing to fall back; some say to Huntsville, some to Bridgeport. You + can judge how reliable such suspicions are. I have endeavored to get a + gunboat up to Florence, and if one could go there it could destroy all + the forces, and check Van Dorn materially. I will co-operate with it + in any way to benefit the service. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Brigadier-General_. + +On February 16th General Van Dorn's command commenced crossing the +Tennessee to join General Bragg's Army. I sent my cavalry to attack him. I +wired General Rosecrans that we had attacked Van Dorn's rear guard and +took some fifty prisoners from him. He had with him General Roddey, +commander of some fifteen hundred men, of which we captured about two +hundred. These prisoners said they were ordered to join General Bragg's +Army. General Rosecrans, in answer to my dispatch, sent me this message: + + MURFREESBOROUGH, February 16, 1863. + + _Brigadier-General Dodge, Corinth, Miss._: + + Hurlbut's request and my own coincide. Hope you will be able to cut + off some of Van Dorn's command. Will give you all our news in your + direction. Accept my thanks for your promptness and energy. + + W. S. ROSECRANS, + + _Major-General_. + +Soon after this General Rosecrans conceived the idea of sending Colonel A. +D. Streight with two thousand mounted cavalry and infantry from Nashville +by boat to Eastport, Miss., to go from there east to Georgia, destroying +the railroads and supplies Bragg's army was depending on, and then move +south and west, finally landing in Corinth, Miss. General Rosecrans +proposed that I should send two brigades to Iuka in support of this +movement, which General Grant acceded to, and said in making this movement +for me to go on and carry out the plan I had suggested in destroying the +Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the supplies gathered along it. I sent +this dispatch, giving my plan of the movement: + + HDQRS. DIST. OF CORINTH, DEPRT. OF THE TENNESSEE, + + CORINTH, April 4, 1863. + + _Henry Binmore, Assistant Adjutant-General_: + + CAPTAIN:--In accordance with Major-General Hurlbut's dispatch, I + submit the plan of operations east of here. General Rosecrans proposes + to land a force at Florence, attack and take that place, while, with a + heavy body of cavalry, he penetrates Alabama north of Tennessee River, + and gets into Johnson's rear. At the same time I am to strike and take + Tuscumbia, and, if practicable, push my cavalry to Decatur, destroy + the saltpeter works, and the Tuscumbia and Decatur Railroad, which + they have just finished, and take all the horses and mules in that + country, to prevent them from raising any large crops. To do this, I + propose to move simultaneously with General Rosecrans, throw all my + cavalry suddenly across Bear Creek, capture the ferries, and hold them + until my infantry and artillery arrive, and then immediately force my + cavalry as far toward Tuscumbia as possible, and secure the crossings + of Little Bear, on which creek the enemy will concentrate. To + accomplish this I shall move light, taking nothing but ammunition and + provisions, and march twenty miles per day, with infantry and + artillery. I shall take such a force as to render certain the success + of the expedition, and propose to take command in person. The movement + is to be made next week, or as soon as General Rosecrans notifies me + he is ready. I trust this will meet the view of the General + commanding. + + I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Brigadier-General Commanding_. + +To ascertain what enemy I would have to meet, I sent my chief of staff, +Captain George E. Spencer, a very competent officer who was a genius in +getting inside of the enemy's lines, with a communication to General P. D. +Roddey, who had returned to Tuscumbia, and was in command of the rebel +forces south of the Tennessee River. I told Captain Spencer that the +communication was an important one and he must not deliver it to any one +except General Roddey; that he must impress upon the officer on the +enemy's picket-line that he must take him to General Roddey and in that +way he would be able to determine very closely what forces I would have to +meet. Captain Spencer went prepared to do this. He met the picket +officer; they became very chummy, and the officer took Captain Spencer +right through all of the enemy's forces between Bear River and Tuscumbia, +and he delivered the message to General Roddey, who was in great anger at +his officer; but they made the best of it. After the war, Captain Spencer +and General Roddey were great friends and I believe partners in some +business. The result of Captain Spencer's trip I set forth in the +following dispatch to General Oglesby: + + CORINTH. _April_ 17, 1863. + + _Major-General Oglesby, Jackson_: + + My A. A. G., Captain George E. Spencer, has just returned from + Tuscumbia; succeeded in getting through all the enemy's camps and + obtaining valuable information. The forces are posted as follows: + Colonel Dibrell, 900 men, at Tuscumbia Landing; Colonel Josiah + Patterson, 1,000, at Florence; Colonel M. W. Hannon, 1,800, at + Tuscumbia; Colonel Roddey's old regiment, 800, at Tuscumbia Landing; + Baxter Smith, 350, ten miles this side; Colonel Hampton, 300 at same + place; W. R. Julian, 300, at Grey's, six miles this side; and Smith, + 100, at Big Bear. The above all cavalry. Between Courtland and + Tuscumbia, one brigade of infantry, under Colonel Wood, as follows: + Colonel A. H. Helvenston, 300; Colonel J. B. Bibb, 500; Colonel W. B. + Wood, Sixteenth Alabama, 400. The last brigade, and one brigade of + cavalry, under General Roddey, arrived at Tuscumbia last week. This + more than doubles their force. They have also five pieces of artillery + at Florence and six pieces at Tuscumbia. + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Brigadier-General_. + +Upon notification of General Rosecrans of the movement of Colonel +Streight, I moved out to carry out the combined plan, engaging the enemy +at Little Bear and Tuscumbia, and defeated them as my report shows. +Colonel Streight was greatly delayed in starting from Nashville, and was +only partially mounted, his intention being to complete the mount of his +force as he traveled through the enemy's country--a fatal mistake. His +delay in reaching me and my movement caused Bragg to send General Forrest +to join General Roddey; and so by the time General Streight reached +Eastport, April 21st, the force before me had been doubled and the best +cavalry officer in the rebel force had arrived to take command in my +front. + +Colonel Streight lost part of his horses and mules while unloading at +Eastport, and, although I made an effort to mount him, stripping my own +transportation and scouring the country in my vicinity, still he left us +after I captured Tuscumbia the second time, on May 26th, with two hundred +of his men dismounted and one-half of the rest on mules, illy prepared for +such a trip. I told Colonel Streight that I would hold the enemy in my +front as long as possible, but the moment Colonel Forrest got word of his +movement he would go after him and follow him to death. His only salvation +was to get three or four days' start by long marches before Forrest +learned of his movement. Colonel Streight was an officer peculiarly fitted +for such a raid. He was active, clearheaded, determined, and of excellent +judgment, and his many fights with Forrest showed him full of resources; +but his two-days' halt at Moulton, the heavy rains, and the condition of +his stock, were fatal to him. + +On the morning of May 27th I felt carefully of the enemy and found them in +my front, and commenced immediately to force them back, trying to make +them believe, if they discovered Colonel Streight, that it was only a side +movement into the loyal part of Alabama, where we had many friends and +where we enlisted a Regiment of loyal Alabamians, which was afterwards +known as the First Alabama Cavalry, commanded by Colonel George E. +Spencer, whose Regiment became noted for its valuable service throughout +the war. General Sherman selected it as his headquarters escort in his +march to the sea. + +Generals Forrest and Roddey, on May 28th, made a determined stand to halt +my advance on Town Creek. The high water delayed my crossing, but on the +morning of the 29th, after my force had crossed and driven the enemy from +the heights beyond, I discovered that I had only General Roddey and his +force in my front and I forced my cavalry out towards Decatur until the +enemy disappeared from the front. The evening of the 28th I notified +Colonel Streight that Forrest was still with me, and I was greatly alarmed +to find that Colonel Streight was still directly south of me, when I hoped +he would be well on the road. When General Bragg found that I was +continuing my advance up the Tennessee, destroying his stores, he +despatched General Van Dorn with his cavalry command to cross the +Tennessee at Florence and get in my rear, but as soon as the enemy +disappeared in my front, I turned immediately and marched rapidly back to +Bear River, so that, if General Van Dorn succeeded in crossing the +Tennessee River, I would have him in my front. My troops destroyed all the +supplies in the whole Valley of the Tennessee, burnt the railroad +stations, and destroyed the railroad so that it was never rebuilt until +after the war. There followed me back to Corinth almost the entire negro +population of that valley. They came in every conceivable conveyance from +their masters' private carriage to a wheelbarrow, and they had hitched to +the conveyances sometimes a cow and horse and sometimes a fine team of +horses, or a cow and an ox. Hundreds were on foot, with their household +goods packed on a mule, a horse, or a cow. They made a picturesque column, +much longer than my command. At night their camps spread over a large +territory, the camp-fires surrounded by the most motley and poorly-dressed +crowd I ever saw, and it was a problem to me what I could do with them or +what would become of them if the enemy's forces should happen to get into +my rear. However, we all arrived safely at Corinth, where I established +the great contraband camp and guarded it by two companies of Negro +soldiers that I uniformed, armed, and equipped without any authority, and +which came near giving me trouble. Many of the Negro men afterwards joined +the First Alabama Colored Infantry and other Negro Regiments that I raised +and mustered into the service. + +In my advance up the Valley of the Tennessee, after I had passed Beaver +Creek the enemy got into my rear, committing depredations and picking up +stragglers, and all kinds of reports went back to Corinth of our fighting, +capture, and other calamities too numerous to mention. These reports were +all repeated to General Grant, who said, after being surfeited with them, +"Well, if Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do, we can afford +to lose him." General Grant said afterwards in discussing this movement +that he knew they could not capture or destroy the kind of troops I had +with me without my being heard from; that they might defeat me, but they +could not capture me; and the boys used to use this saying in rounding up +what value I was to the service. As my own report and that of Colonel +Streight gives more and better detail of the movements of both, and the +results, I submit them here: + + I moved from Corinth with the Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, + Wednesday, April 15. Camped at Burnsville. The next day moved to + Cook's, two and a half miles west of Great Bear Creek, and made my + preparations to cross, the rebels holding the opposite side. + + Friday morning, April 17, I made a feint at Jackson and Bailings + Fords, and, under the cover of my artillery, threw the most of my + force across at Steminine's Ford. + + The cavalry, under Colonel Cornyn, and mounted infantry, under + Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, made the crossing and pushed forward. My + instructions were for them to go forward three and a half miles, and + await my coming. Colonel Cornyn, meeting the enemy about a mile out, + commenced fighting them, they falling back rapidly. Hearing of Colonel + Roddey commanding a force of the enemy on my left flank, I sent + orders forward for the command to halt; but before the messenger got + to him Colonel Roddey had got between the cavalry and infantry. The + Third Brigade was in advance, commanded by Colonel Bane, who, + ascertaining this fact, pushed forward and fell upon their rear, but + not until Colonel Roddey had taken two pieces of artillery, twenty-two + men, and one company of mounted infantry, who were guarding it, which, + through neglect, had been allowed to fall three miles in the rear of + the advance. + + Colonel Cornyn, hearing firing in the rear, immediately fell back, and + with the First Alabama Cavalry charged the rebels and retook the + artillery and caissons, with the exception of one gun, which the enemy + succeeded in getting off with. + + The charge of the Alabamians with muskets only, and those not loaded, + is creditable, especially as they are all new recruits and poorly + drilled. In this charge, Captain Cameron, the commanding officer of + the Alabama Cavalry, a deserving and much-lamented officer, was + killed. + + Colonel Bane, on his arrival, disposed of his troops admirably. + Colonel Cornyn advanced with his cavalry as a feint, and the rebels + advanced to meet him. He fell back to the rear of the infantry, which + was posted under cover and out of sight on both flanks of the cavalry. + On the appearance of the enemy, the infantry opened a heavy and + destructive fire, which caused the rebels to fall back in confusion, + utterly routed. This day's work brought us thirteen miles in advance + of the main force. + + Colonel Streight not arriving, I fell back with the advance to Great + Bear Creek, where the rest of the command was posted, to await his + coming. + + Sunday afternoon, Colonel Streight commenced landing his force at + Eastport, but came poorly prepared for his contemplated movement. He + had two thousand infantry and about one thousand mules. At least four + hundred of them were unserviceable, and in unloading them, through the + carelessness of one of his officers, two hundred strayed away. He was + under the impression that he would find plenty of stock in the valley + to mount the rest and replace those broken down. During Monday and + Tuesday we scoured the country, and found all we could. + + Tuesday night Colonel Fuller's Brigade, from Corinth, joined me. + + Wednesday morning I advanced with all the force, and came up with the + enemy at Rock Cut, five miles west of Tuscumbia; planted my batteries, + and drove them out of it, taking the line of Little Bear Creek that + night. The enemy's position was a very strong one, and there was but + one way to flank it. The enemy fell back as soon as I brought the + infantry to bear upon them. + + Thursday we moved, crossing at three places, throwing my cavalry by + the Frankfort and Tuscumbia road, into the enemy's rear; but during + the night, anticipating this movement, the enemy fell back. We reached + Tuscumbia about noon, and after slight skirmishing took possession of + the city. I immediately dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, with + two squadrons of mounted infantry, two squadrons of the Fifteenth + Illinois Cavalry, and a section of Welker's battery, to take Florence. + They refused to surrender, when Colonel Phillips immediately opened on + the town. A few shell brought them to terms, and we occupied the + place. At the same time I ordered Colonel Cornyn forward toward + Courtland, to feel the enemy. He came up with their rear some two + miles beyond Leighton. The command consisted on our part of the Tenth + Missouri and Seventh Kansas Cavalry, about eight hundred in all, and + drove the enemy eight miles. The rebel force was thirty-five hundred, + besides one battery. The fighting of the cavalry against such odds is + beyond all praise. + + The next morning the cavalry fell back to Tuscumbia, to await the + advance of the main column. + + Finding it impossible to obtain stock to mount Colonel Streight's + command, I took horses and mules from my teams and mounted infantry, + and furnished him some six hundred head, mounting all but two hundred + of his men. I also turned over all my hard bread, some ten thousand + rations, and he left me at midnight on the 26th instant, with the + intention of going through Russellville, Moulton, and Blountsville, to + Gadsden, then divide, one force to strike Rome and the other Etowah + Bridge. + + I moved forward Monday morning, and drove the enemy across Town Greek + that night, and ascertained that they were in force, under Forrest, on + the opposite bank. That night I communicated with Colonel Streight, at + Mount Hope, and ascertained that he was all right. + + Tuesday morning the creek rose ten feet, and the current was so swift + that neither horse nor man could cross. I immediately made disposition + to cross at three points, to cover the railroad bridge and throw + across foot-bridges. + + The resistance of the enemy was very strong, and their sharpshooters + very annoying. The artillery duel was very fine, parts of Welker's, + Tannrath's, Richardson's, and Robinson's batteries taking part in it. + The practice on both sides was excellent. The Parrott guns drove the + enemy away from their pieces, disabling and keeping them away for two + hours, but the fact of my being unable to cross infantry prevented our + securing them. + + About noon I crossed the railroad bridge with the Eighty-first Ohio + and Ninth Illinois Infantry, and soon after crossed the rest of my + force, except the artillery, on foot-bridges, and drove the enemy + within three miles of Courtland, when they, hearing of the force at + Moulton, fled to Decatur. I followed up, and then returned to camp at + Town Creek that night, being unable to cross any of my artillery. + + Colonel Streight reached Moulton Tuesday night, and commenced crossing + the mountains Wednesday, having got nearly two days' start of them. + They supposed he was making for Decatur, and only discovered Wednesday + that he was crossing the mountains toward Georgia. + + Having accomplished fully the object of the expedition, and driving + the enemy, which was 5,500 strong, to Decatur, and having been on half + rations for a week, I fell back to Tuscumbia, in order to communicate + with transports, to obtain rations and ammunition. On arriving there I + received information that the gunboats had gone down the river, taking + the transports with them, a part of Van Dorn's force having made their + appearance on the north side of the Tennessee River and shelled South + Florence that day at 4 p. m. They also planted a battery at Savannah + and Duck River; but my precaution in destroying all means of crossing + the river on my advance, prevented him getting in my rear, and the + gunboats, to save the transports, left the day before, having a short + engagement at Savannah and Duck River. Van Dorn's force then moved + toward Decatur. That was the last we heard of them. + + On my return I burned all provisions, produce, and forage, all mills + and tan-yards, and destroyed everything that would in any way aid the + enemy. I took stock of all kinds that I could find, and rendered the + valley so destitute that it cannot be occupied by the Confederates, + except provisions and forage are transported to them. I also destroyed + telegraph and railroad between Tuscumbia and Decatur, and all the + ferries between Savannah and Courtland. + + I have no doubt but that Colonel Streight would have succeeded had he + been properly equipped and joined me at the time agreed upon. The + great delay in an enemy's country necessary to fit him out gave them + time to throw a large force in our front. Although Colonel Streight + had two days' start, they can harass him, and perhaps check his + movements long enough for them to secure all their important bridges. + If he could have started from Bear Creek the day I arrived there, then + my movements would have been so quick and strong that the enemy could + not have got their forces together. + + The animals furnished him were very poor at the start. Four hundred of + them were used up before leaving me, and those furnished him by me + were about all the serviceable stock he had, though I hear he got two + hundred good mules the day he left me, in Moulton Valley. + + On my return, I sent Colonel Cornyn, with the Tenth Missouri, Seventh + Kansas, Fifteenth Illinois Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted + Infantry, to attack the force congregated at Tupelo and Okolona. He + came up with the enemy on Wednesday, and immediately attacked them, + they being some three thousand strong, under Major-General S. J. + Gholson and Brigadier-General Ruggles. Brigadier-General Chalmers, + with thirty-five hundred men, was at Pontotoc, but failed to come to + Gholson's aid, though ordered to. + + Colonel Cornyn fought so determinedly and so fast that he soon routed + the force in his front, driving them in all directions, killing and + wounding a large number and taking one hundred prisoners, including + some seven officers; also a large number of arms and one hundred and + fifty horses, saddles, etc. + + The enemy fled toward Okolona and Pontotoc, and Colonel Cornyn + returned to Corinth. + + The expedition so far can be summed up as having accomplished the + object for which it started, the infantry having marched two hundred + and fifty miles and the cavalry some four hundred, and fought six + successful engagements, driving the enemy, three thousand strong, from + Bear Creek to Decatur, taking the towns of Tuscumbia and Florence, + with a loss not to exceed one hundred, including three officers. + Destroyed a million and a half bushels of corn, besides large + quantities of oats, rye, and fodder, and five hundred thousand pounds + of bacon. Captured one hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand head + of horses and mules, and an equal number of cattle, hogs, and sheep; + also one hundred bales of cotton, besides keeping the whole command in + meat for three weeks. Destroyed the railroad from Tuscumbia to + Decatur; also some sixty flat-boats and ferries in the Tennessee + River, thereby preventing Van Dorn, in his move, from crossing to my + rear; also destroyed five tan-yards and six flouring-mills. + + It has rendered desolate one of the best granaries of the South, + preventing them from raising another crop this year, and taking away + from them some fifteen hundred negroes. + + We found large quantities of shelled corn, all ready for shipment, + also bacon, and gave it to the flames. + + I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Brigadier-General U. S. A._ + +The following is Colonel A. D. Streight's report: + + General Dodge informed me that there was no doubt but Forrest had + crossed the Tennessee River, and was in the vicinity of Town Creek; + hence, he agreed to advance as far as Courtland, on the Decatur road, + and, if possible, drive the enemy in that direction, but if they (the + enemy) turned toward Moulton, our cavalry, under General Dodge, was to + be sent in pursuit. + + With this understanding, I marched from Tuscumbia at 11 p. m. on the + night of the 26th instant in the direction of Moulton, via + Russellville. It was raining very hard, and the mud and darkness of + the night made our progress very slow. One hundred and fifty of my men + had neither horses nor mules, and fully as many more had such as were + unable to carry more than the saddles; hence fully three hundred of + the men were on foot. + + It was expected when I left General Dodge that the greater part of my + command would be able to reach Moulton, some forty miles distant, by + the next night, but, owing to the heavy rains and consequent bad + condition of the roads, it was impossible; consequently I dispatched a + messenger to General Dodge, stating that I would halt at Mount Hope + and wait for the portion of my command who were on foot to come up. + + We continued to scour the country for horses and mules, but so many of + those drawn at Nashville were continually failing, that, although we + were successful in collecting a large number, still, many of the men + were without anything to ride. + + On the night of the 27th, at Mount Hope, I received word from General + Dodge, stating that he had driven the enemy, and that I should push + on. My command had not all come up yet, nor did they until about 10 + a. m. the next day, when we proceeded to Moulton, where we arrived + about dark. Up to this time we had been skirmishing occasionally with + small squads of the enemy, but I could hear of no force of consequence + in the country. All of the command but about fifty men were now + mounted. + + We started from Moulton, in the direction of Blountsville, via Day's + Gap, about midnight on April 28. The two previous days it had been + raining most of the time, and the roads were terrible, though on the + evening of the 28th it bid fair for dry weather, which gave us strong + hopes of better times. + + We marched the next day (the 29th) to Day's Gap, about thirty-five + miles, and bivouacked for the night. Every man now was mounted, and + although many of the animals were very poor, nevertheless we had + strong hopes that we could easily supply all future demands. We + destroyed during the day a large number of wagons belonging to the + enemy, laden with provisions, arms, tents, etc., which had been sent + to the mountains to avoid us, but, luckily, they fell into our hands. + We were now in the midst of devoted Union people. Many of Captain + Smith's men (Alabamians) were recruited near this place, and many were + the happy greetings between them and their friends and relations. I + could learn nothing of the enemy in the country, with the exception of + small squads of scouting-parties, who were hunting conscripts. We + moved out the next morning before daylight. I will here remark that my + men had been worked very hard in scouring so much of the country, and, + unaccustomed as they were to riding, made it still worse; + consequently, they were illy prepared for the trying ordeal through + which they were to pass. I had not proceeded more than two miles, at + the head of the column, before I was informed that the rear guard had + been attacked, and just at that moment I heard the boom of artillery + in the rear of the column. I had previously learned that the gap + through which we were passing was easily flanked by gaps through the + mountains, both above and below; consequently, I sent orders to the + rear to hold the enemy in check until we could prepare for action. The + head of the column was at the time on the top of the mountain. The + column was moving through the gap; consequently the enemy was easily + held in check. + + I soon learned that the enemy had moved through the gaps on my right + and left, and were endeavoring to form a junction in my advance; + consequently I moved ahead rapidly until we passed the intersecting + roads on either flank with the one we occupied. The country was open + sand ridges, very thinly wooded, and afforded fine defensive + positions. As soon as we passed the point above designated (about + three miles from the top of the mountains), we dismounted and formed a + line of battle on a ridge circling to the rear. Our right rested on a + precipitous ravine and the left was protected by a marshy run that was + easily held against the enemy. The mules were sent into a ravine to + the rear of our right, where they were protected from the enemy's + bullets. I also deployed a line of skirmishers, resting on our right + and left flanks encircling our rear, in order to prevent a surprise + from any detached force of the enemy that might approach us from that + direction and to prevent any straggling of either stray animals or + cowardly men. + + In the meantime I had instructed Captain Smith, who had command of our + rear guard (now changed to our front), to hold his position until the + enemy pressed him closely, when he should retreat rapidly, and, if + possible, draw them onto our lines, which were concealed by the men + lying down immediately back of the top of the ridge. The lines were + left sufficiently open to permit Captain Smith's command to pass + through near the center. I had two twelve-pounder mountain howitzers, + which were stationed near the road (the center). They were also + concealed. We had hardly completed our arrangements when the enemy + charged Captain Smith in large force, following him closely, and no + sooner had he passed our lines than our whole line rose up and + delivered a volley at short range. We continued to pour a rapid fire + into their ranks, which soon caused them to give way in confusion; but + their reinforcements soon came up, when they dismounted, formed, and + made a determined and vigorous attack. Our skirmishers were soon + driven in, and about the same time the enemy opened upon us with a + battery of artillery. + + The enemy soon attempted to carry our lines, but were handsomely + repulsed. During their advance they had run their artillery to within + three hundred yards of our lines, and as soon as they began to waver I + prepared for a charge. I ordered Colonel Hathaway, Seventy-third + Indiana, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana, on the + left, to make a charge, in order to draw the attention of the battery, + and immediately threw the Third Ohio, Colonel Lawson, and the + Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Rodgers, forward rapidly, + hoping to capture the battery. The enemy, after a short but stubborn + resistance, fled in confusion, leaving two pieces of artillery, two + caissons, and about forty prisoners, representing seven different + regiments, a larger number of wounded, and about thirty dead on the + field. Among the former was Captain William H. Forrest, a brother of + General Forrest. Our loss was about thirty killed and wounded, among + the latter Lieutenant-Colonel Sheets, Fifty-first Indiana (mortally), + a brave and gallant officer and one that we were illy prepared to + lose, and Lieutenant Pavey, Eightieth Illinois (on my staff), + severely. + + It was now about 11 o'clock, fighting having continued since about 6 + o'clock in the morning. I had learned, in the meantime, that the enemy + were in heavy force, fully three times our number, with twelve pieces + of artillery, under General Forrest in person; consequently I was + fearful that they were making an effort to get around us and attack in + the rear of our position; hence I decided to resume the march. + Everything was soon in readiness, and we moved out, leaving a strong + guard (dismounted) in the rear, to check any immediate advance the + enemy might make previous to the column getting in motion. We were not + too soon in our movements, for the column had hardly passed a + cross-road some six miles from our first battle-ground when the enemy + were discovered advancing on our left. Sharp skirmishing commenced at + Crooked Creek, which is about ten miles south of Day's Gap, and + finally the enemy pressed our rear so hard that I was compelled to + prepare for battle. I selected a strong position about a mile south of + the crossing of the creek, on a ridge called Hog Mountain. The whole + force soon became engaged (about one hour before dark). The enemy + strove first to carry our right; then charged the left; but with the + help of the two pieces of artillery captured in the morning and the + two mountain howitzers, all of which were handled with good effect by + Major Vananda, of the Third Ohio, we were able to repulse them. + + Fighting continued until about 10 p. m. when the enemy were driven + from our front, leaving a large number of killed and wounded on the + field. I determined at once to resume our march, and as soon as + possible we moved out. The ammunition which we had captured with the + two guns was exhausted, and being very short of horses, I ordered the + guns spiked and the carriages destroyed. I had ordered the + Seventy-third Indiana (Colonel Hathaway) to act as rear guard, and I + remained in the rear in person, for the purpose of being at hand in + case the enemy should attempt to press us as we were moving out. We + had but fairly got under way when I received information of the + enemy's advance. + + The moon shone very brightly, and the country was an open woodland, + with an occasional spot of thick undergrowth. In one of these thickets + I placed the Seventy-third Indiana, lying down, and not more than + twenty paces from the road, which was in plain view. The enemy + approached. The head of his column passed without discovering our + position. At this moment the whole regiment opened a most destructive + fire, causing a complete stampede of the enemy. I will here remark + that the country from Day's Gap to Blountsville (about forty miles) is + mostly uninhabited; consequently there is nothing in the country for + man or beast. I had hopes that by pushing ahead we could reach a place + where we could feed before the enemy would come up with us, and, by + holding him back where there was no feed, compel him to lay over a day + at least to recuperate. I had learned that they had been on a forced + march from Town Creek, Ala., a day and two nights previous to their + attacking us. We were not again disturbed until we had marched several + miles, when they attacked our rear guard vigorously. I again succeeded + in ambuscading them, which caused them to give up the pursuit for the + night. We continued our march, and reached Blountsville about 10 + o'clock in the morning. Many of our mules had given out, leaving their + riders on foot, but there was very little straggling behind the rear + guard. + + At Blountsville we found sufficient corn to feed our tired and hungry + animals. Ammunition and rations were hastily distributed to the men, + and the remaining ammunition was put on pack-mules and the wagons + burned, as it was now understood that it would be impossible to take + them over the roads before us. After resting about two hours, we + resumed our march in the direction of Gadsden. + + The column had not got fairly under motion before our pickets were + driven in, and a sharp skirmish ensued between Forrest's advance and + our rear guard, under Captain Smith, in the town of Blountsville. The + enemy followed closely for several miles, continually skirmishing with + the rear guard, but were badly handled by small parties of our men + stopping in the thick bushes by the side of the road and firing at + them at short range, and when we reached the East Branch of the Black + Warrior River the ford was very deep and the enemy pressed so closely + that I was compelled to halt and offer him battle before we could + cross. After some maneuvering, I advanced a heavy line of skirmishers, + who drove the enemy out of sight of my main line, when I ordered the + troops, except the skirmishers, to cross the river as rapidly as + possible. After all had crossed except the skirmishers, they were + rapidly withdrawn, under cover of our artillery, and a heavy line of + skirmishers thrown out on the opposite bank for that purpose. It was + about 5 p. m. when the last of the command crossed the East Branch of + the Black Warrior. We proceeded in the direction of Gadsden without + further interruption, with the exception of small parties who were + continually harassing the rear of the column, until about 9 o'clock + the next morning, May 2, when the rear guard was fiercely attacked at + the crossing of Black Creek, near Gadsden. After a sharp fight the + enemy was repulsed. + + I had learned in the meantime, through my scouts, that a large column + of the enemy was moving on our left, parallel with our route, + evidently with the intention of getting in our front, which made it + necessary for us to march all night, though the command was in no + condition to do so, and, to add still more to my embarrassment, a + portion of our ammunition had become damaged in crossing Will's Creek, + which, at the time, was very deep fording. I only halted at Gadsden + sufficiently long to destroy a quantity of arms and commissary stores + found there, and proceeded on. Many of our animals and men were + entirely worn out and unable to keep up with the column; consequently + they fell behind the rear guard and were captured. + + It now became evident to me that our only hope was in crossing the + river at Rome and destroying the bridge, which would delay Forrest a + day or two and give us time to collect horses and mules, and allow + the command a little time to sleep, without which it was impossible to + proceed. + + The enemy followed closely, and kept up a continuous skirmish with the + rear of the column until about 4 p. m., at which time we reached + Blount's plantation, about fifteen miles from Gadsden, where we could + procure forage for our animals. Here I decided to halt, as it was + impossible to continue the march through the night without feeding and + resting, although to do so was to bring on a general engagement. + Accordingly, the command was dismounted, and a detail made to feed the + horses and mules, while the balance of the command formed in line of + battle on a ridge southwest of the plantation. + + Meanwhile the rear guard, in holding the enemy in check, had become + severely engaged and was driven in. The enemy at once attacked our + main line, and tried hard to carry the center, but were gallantly met + and repulsed by the Fifty-first and Seventy-third Indiana, assisted by + Major Vananda, with two mountain howitzers. They then made a + determined effort to turn our right, but were met by the gallant + Eightieth Illinois, assisted by two companies of the Third Ohio. + + The enemy, with the exception of a few skirmishers, then fell back to + a ridge some half a mile distant, and commenced massing his force, as + if preparing for a more determined attack. It was becoming dark, and I + decided to withdraw unobserved, if possible, and conceal my command in + a thicket some half a mile to our rear, there to lie in ambush and + await his advance. In the meantime I had ordered Captain Milton + Russell (Fifty-first Indiana) to take two hundred of the best-mounted + men, selected from the whole command, and proceed to Rome, and hold + the bridge until the main command could come up. + + The engagement at Blount's plantation revealed the fact that nearly + all of our remaining ammunition was worthless, on account of having + been wet. Much of that carried by the men had become useless by the + paper wearing out and the powder sifting away. It was in this + engagement that the gallant Colonel Hathaway (Seventy-third Indiana) + fell, mortally wounded, and in a few moments expired. Our country has + seldom been called upon to mourn the loss of so brave and valuable an + officer. His loss to me was irreparable. His men had almost worshiped + him, and when he fell it cast a deep gloom of despondency over his + regiment which was hard to overcome. + + We remained in ambush but a short time when the enemy, who by some + means had learned of our whereabouts, commenced a flank movement, + which we discovered in time to check. I then decided to withdraw as + silently as possible, and push on in the direction of Rome, but as a + large number of the men were dismounted, their animals having given + out, and the remainder of the stock was so jaded, tender-footed, and + worn down, our progress was necessarily slow; yet, as everything + depended on our reaching Rome before the enemy could throw a + sufficient force there to prevent our crossing the bridge, every + possible effort was made to urge the command forward. We proceeded + without interruption until we reached the vicinity of Centre, when one + of my scouts informed me that a force of the enemy was posted in + ambush but a short distance in our front. I immediately threw forward + a line of skirmishers, with orders to proceed until they were fired + upon, when they should open a brisk fire on the enemy, and hold their + position until the command had time to pass. + + The plan worked admirably, for, while my skirmishers were amusing the + enemy, the main column made a detour to the right, and struck the main + road some three miles to the rear of the enemy. As soon as our main + force had passed, the skirmishers withdrew and fell in the rear of the + column. I was then hopeful that we could reach Rome before the enemy + could overtake us. My principal guide had thus far proved reliable, + and I had made particular inquiries of him as to the character of the + road and the country the evening before, and he assured me that there + were no difficult streams to cross and that the road was good; hence + we approached the Chattanooga River at the ferry without any + information as to the real condition of things. Captain Russell had + managed to ferry the last of his command across about one hour + previous to my arrival, but the enemy had seized and run off the boat + before we reached there. + + I then ascertained that there was a bridge some seven or eight miles + up the river, near Gaylesville, and procured new guides and pushed on + as rapidly as possible in order to reach the bridge before the enemy + should take possession of it. We had to pass over an old coal-chopping + for several miles, where the timber had been cut and hauled off for + charcoal, leaving innumerable wagon-roads running in every direction, + and the command was so worn out and exhausted that many were asleep, + and in spite of every exertion I could make, with the aid of such of + my officers as were able for duty, the command became separated and + scattered into several squads, traveling in different directions, and + it was not until near daylight that the last of the command had + crossed the river. The bridge was burned, and we proceeded on and + passed Cedar Bluff just after daylight. It now became evident that the + horses and mules could not reach Rome without halting to rest and + feed. Large numbers of the mules were continually giving out. In fact, + I do not think that at that time we had a score of the mules drawn at + Nashville left, and nearly all of those taken in the country were + barefooted, and many of them had such sore backs and tender feet that + it was impossible to ride them; but, in order to get as near as + possible to the force I had sent ahead, we struggled on until about 9 + a. m. when we halted and fed our animals. The men, being unaccustomed + to riding, had become so exhausted from fatigue and loss of sleep that + it was almost impossible to keep them awake long enough to feed. We + had halted but a short time, when I was informed that a heavy force of + the enemy was moving on our left, on a route parallel with the one we + were marching on, and was then nearer Rome than we were. About the + same time I received this information our pickets were driven in. The + command was immediately ordered into line, and every effort made to + rally the men for action, but nature was exhausted, and a large + portion of my best troops actually went to sleep while lying in line + of battle under a severe skirmish-fire. After some maneuvering, + Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of my forces. + Most of my regimental commanders had already expressed the opinion + that, unless we could reach Rome and cross the river before the enemy + came up with us again, we should be compelled to surrender. + Consequently, I called a council of war. I had learned, however, in + the meantime that Captain Russell had been unable to take the bridge + at Rome. Our condition was fully canvassed. As I have remarked before, + our ammunition was worthless, our horses and mules in a desperate + condition, the men were overcome with fatigue and loss of sleep, and + we were confronted by fully three times our number, in the heart of + the enemy's country, and, although personally opposed to surrender, + and so expressed myself at the time, yet I yielded to the unanimous + voice of my regimental commanders, and at once entered into + negotiations with Forrest to obtain the best possible terms I could + for my command, and at about noon, May 3, we surrendered as prisoners + of war. + + We were taken to Richmond, Va. The men were soon sent through the + lines and exchanged. My officers and myself were confined in Libby + Prison, where we remained until the night of February 9 last, when + four of my officers and myself, together with several other prisoners, + succeeded in making our escape, and reached Washington in safety about + March 1. The balance of my officers, or nearly all of them, are still + confined as prisoners or have died of disease the result of long + confinement, insufficient food, and cruel treatment at the hands of + the enemy. + + I am unable to report the exact number of casualties in the command, + but from the best information I have been able to obtain there were + fifteen officers and about one hundred and thirty enlisted men killed + and wounded. It was a matter of astonishment to all that so much + fighting should occur with so few casualties on our side; but we acted + purely on the defensive, and took advantage of the nature of the + country as best we could. From actual personal observation where we + had driven the enemy from the field, and from what my surgeons, left + with our wounded, learned in relation to the loss of the enemy, I am + convinced that we killed more of his men than we lost in both killed + and wounded. + + Previous to the surrender, we had captured and paroled about two + hundred prisoners, and had lost about the same number in consequence + of the animals giving out, and the men, unable to keep up, broke down + from exhaustion, and were necessarily picked up by the enemy; but in + no case was the enemy able to capture a single man in any skirmish or + battle within my knowledge. + + I deem it proper to mention the barbarous treatment my wounded + received at the hands of the enemy. Owing to the nature of the service + we were performing, we were compelled to leave our wounded behind. I + provided for them as best I could by leaving them blankets and such + rations as we had, and two of my surgeons remained behind to attend + them; but no sooner did the enemy get possession of our hospitals than + they robbed both officers and men of their blankets, coats, hats, + boots, shoes, rations, and money. The medical stores and instruments + were taken from the surgeons, and my wounded left in a semi-naked and + starving condition, in some instances many miles from any inhabitants, + to perish. + + Many thanks to the Union ladies of that country, for they saved many a + brave soldier from a horrible death. + + In reviewing the history of this ill-fated expedition, I am convinced + that had we been furnished at Nashville with 800 good horses, instead + of poor, young mules, we would have been successful, in spite of all + other drawbacks; or if General Dodge had succeeded in detaining + Forrest one day longer, we would have been successful even with our + poor outfit. + + A. D. STREIGHT, + + _Colonel Fifty-first Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry_. + +On my return, I dispatched Colonel Cornyn with his Brigade to the attack +of the force of the enemy that I had located near Tupelo, Miss. He tells +the story of his battle better than I can, in his official report, which +follows: + + We arrived at Tupelo on Tuesday, May 5, and here we fought the + best-contested fight of the whole expedition. Just before entering the + town of Tupelo, and to the east of the railroad, it is necessary to + cross a dense and almost impassable swamp, on the western edge of + which runs Old Town Creek. We had almost reached the western edge, and + were approaching, as well as the nature of the swamp would permit, the + bridge over this creek, when the enemy, entirely unseen by us, opened + upon us with musketry. I immediately threw out to my right and left + several squadrons of the Tenth Missouri, who succeeded in dislodging + the enemy, and securing an easy passage of the bridge for the balance + of the command. Still keeping my skirmishers out to my right and left, + and an advance guard in front, I moved down a lane to the left and + south of the town and massed my command in an open field, about six + hundred yards from the southern border of Tupelo. Here word was + brought me from one of my skirmishing squadrons that the enemy were + drawn up in line on their front, to the number of six hundred. I + ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were armed with + Colt's revolving rifles, to dismount and attack them on foot, + supporting them with two squadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted), + under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, with orders to charge with the saber + as soon as the enemy's line should break. This order, I am proud to + say, was well obeyed and gallantly executed by both the mounted and + dismounted soldiers, for the enemy retired, and for a few minutes all + was silent along the lines. In about half an hour from the first + attack, sharp firing was heard on my front, and the enemy was + advancing toward us with yells. I immediately moved my whole force to + the rear and west of the village, and, placing my mountain howitzers + upon the brow of a hill, I sent forward all the cavalry except one + squadron of the Fifteenth Illinois, which I ordered to dismount and + support the battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding the Ninth + Illinois Mounted Infantry, having been detailed for that purpose early + in the morning, acted as the rear guard and guard for the train, and, + knowing that the rear was in such good hands, I felt no anxiety on + that account; and this important trust was well sustained. As soon as + my front had become fully engaged with the enemy, who fought with + considerable determination, I ordered the battery to shell the woods + from which the enemy was emerging. This fire was effective, and from + that moment the battle became general. At one time two regiments of + mounted infantry, commanded by the rebel General Ruggles, forced their + way between my fighting column and my reserve, but were suddenly + induced to retire much more rapidly than they came. My left at one + time fell back toward the battery, which then poured charge after + charge of canister into the rebel ranks, with considerable effect, + forcing them to retreat, rapidly followed by the cavalry. The enemy + had scarcely begun to waver when his whole force fled in dismay, + throwing away their arms, coats, and hats. We took from the enemy + eighty-one prisoners, including three commissioned officers. On the + field, the scene of the battle, immense quantities of arms, coats, and + blankets were found and destroyed by us. I had no means of + ascertaining the enemy's loss in killed and wounded, but from the + evidence of the battle-field it must have been heavy. + + FLORENCE M. CORNYN, + + _Colonel Tenth Missouri Cavalry, Commanding Cavalry Brigade_. + +Colonel Cornyn was a very efficient cavalry officer and always +accomplished whatever he was sent to do. He was an aggressive fighter, +always attacking, no matter what the force before him, and had won a +deserved standing as a Brigade commander. When he was killed, by his +Lieutenant-Colonel, Bowen, during the latter's trial before a +court-martial on charges preferred by Colonel Cornyn, there was a bitter +personal dispute and enmity between them which came to this sad ending. + + + + +[Illustration: ARMY AND CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE + +Left to Right--Front Row, Major-General W. T. Sherman, Major-General U. S. +Grant, Major-General James B. McPherson, Major-General O. O. Howard. Rear +row, Major-General John A. Logan, Major-General G. M. Dodge, Major-General +Frank P. Blair. Extreme right, Brigadier-General John A. Fuller, leading +Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps. Copy of painting by James E. Taylor +for Major-General W. T. Sherman.] + + +THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE + + ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE + DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT, G. A. R. + WASHINGTON, D. C., OCTOBER, 1902 + BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE + + +_Comrades of the Army of the Tennessee_: + +On the 28th of August, 1861, General U. S. Grant was assigned to duty in +command of the District of Southeast Missouri, with headquarters at Cairo, +Ill., and here commenced the organization and growth of the Army of the +Tennessee. It remained under his personal command, or as a unit of his +great Army, from the beginning until the end of the war, except for two +short intervals, one after the great Battle of Donelson, and the other +after the greater Battle of Shiloh, both of which he won, and gave the +first great light and hope to our country; and it is hard now, after +reading all the records, to understand the reasons for his being relieved. +It appears to have been done through a misunderstanding, and with no +intention of doing injustice to General Grant. + +Following General Grant as commander came General Sherman, a member of the +Army almost as long as General Grant. General Sherman was in direct +command, or the Army served under him as a unit of his greater Army, from +the time he assumed command until the end of the war. + +After General Sherman came General McPherson, that ideal soldier, who +commanded the Army until he fell in the great Battle of Atlanta, on the +22d of July. Upon his death, General Logan took command of the Army, as +the senior officer present, and at the end of the battle of July 22d he +could say that he had met and defeated Hood's whole Army in the greatest +battle of that campaign. + +Following General Logan came General O. O. Howard, the only General taken +from another Army to command it in all the history of the Army of the +Tennessee, or even any of its Corps. The next day after assuming command +General Howard led the Army into the great battle of the 28th of July, +which the Confederates said was not a battle, but a simple killing and +slaughtering of their forces. He remained in command until the end of the +Rebellion, and at the end of the war generously gave way to General Logan, +so that one of its original members might command it at the great review +here in Washington--an act that could come only from such a just and +thoughtful soldier as Howard. + +I speak of our Army's commanders first, as an Army takes its habits and +character from its head; and probably no other Army in the world was so +fortunate as to have always at its head great soldiers and great +commanders, recognized as such the world over--two of them the peers of +any commander that ever stood up in a great conflict. + +The Army of the Tennessee covered more ground in its campaigns than all +the other Armies combined, and all its campaigns were marked by some great +struggle, battle, or movement that challenged the admiration of the world. +First came Fort Donelson, next Vicksburg, and following that Chattanooga, +where it fought on both flanks in that great battle, one Division taking +the point of Lookout Mountain above the clouds. Then came the Atlanta +campaign; following that the strategical march to the sea; and, finally, +that bold movement from Savannah to Goldsboro, which is considered by the +best critics as one of the boldest and best-planned campaigns of +history--one in which every chance was taken, and every opportunity given +the enemy to concentrate upon an inferior force. + +The record of this Army is probably the most satisfactory of any that ever +existed, as it was harmonious in all its parts and had no jealousies, each +of its units to the best of its ability helping the others. Again, it was +modest; it struck blow after blow, and let the world sing its praises. All +its campaigns were great successes, and it never lost a battle. All its +Army, Corps, Division, and Brigade commanders were exceptionally able men, +and were seldom relieved except to assume more important commands. Its +experiences were more varied than any other Army, for in its campaigns, +battles, and marches, reaching from the Missouri River to the Atlantic, at +Washington, over a territory two thousand miles long and five hundred +miles wide, it opened the Mississippi, it forced its way to the sea, it +was reviewed by the Government of the nation here in this city, and it +disbanded and the men went to their homes without causing an unpleasant +comment or a painful thought in all this broad land. + +The Society of the Army of the Tennessee is endeavoring to perpetuate its +history and memories by erecting here in this capital of our great nation +monuments to the memory of its dead commanders which will place before the +world not only their deeds, but the great events in which our Army took so +important a part. First came General McPherson, as he was the first to +fall, in the great Battle of Atlanta. He fell just after watching the +attack in the rear on the Sixteenth Army Corps, which held the key to the +situation. He was a dear friend of mine; and the last words he spoke were +in praise of the fighting of that Corps. General Sherman, in reporting his +death, spoke of him as follows: + + General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant + and heroic gentleman should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, + and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of + one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and + ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had + called into existence to vindicate her honor and integrity. History + tells of but few who so blended the grace and the gentleness of the + friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. + His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, never + spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect. Those + whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and + commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great + worth. + +General McPherson was so dear to our old Army that the great victory at +the Battle of Atlanta was never spoken of by our Army except to express +our great grief at the loss of our commander. His faith in what he could +accomplish with our Army was unbounded. He spoke of us on July 4, 1863, as +follows: + + With tireless energy, with sleepless vigilance, by night and by day, + with battery and with rifle-pits, with trench and mine, you made your + sure approaches, until, overcome by fatigue and driven to despair in + the attempt to oppose your irresistible progress, the whole garrison + of over 30,000 men, with all their arms and munitions of war, have, on + this, the anniversary of our National Independence, surrendered to the + invincible troops of the Army of the Tennessee. The achievements of + this hour will give a new meaning to this memorable day, and Vicksburg + will brighten the glow of the patriot's heart which kindles at the + mention of Bunker Hill and Yorktown. This is indeed an auspicious day + for you. The God of Battle is with you. The dawn of a conquered peace + is breaking upon you. The plaudits of an admiring world will hail you + wherever you go, and it will be an ennobling heritage, surpassing all + riches, to have been of the Army of the Tennessee on the Fourth of + July, 1863. + +Next we erected the statue, facing Pennsylvania Avenue, of General John A. +Rawlins, who, above all, represented the organization and spirit of our +great Army, and who shared its fortunes from beginning to end as Chief of +Staff of its first and greatest commander. In 1873, upon the death of +General Rawlins, General John A. Logan spoke of him thus: + + But there is one whose tongue is now still in death whose name I + cannot forbear to mention; one who, though gone from our midst, is + with us in memory: for who can forget John A. Rawlins? Faithful in + every duty, true in every trust, though dead he is not forgotten; + though gone forever, yet he will ever live in affectionate remembrance + in the hearts of all who knew him. His name is woven in indelible + colors in the history of our country, and is linked with a fame that + is undying. + +General Rawlins, in giving a history of the Army of the Tennessee, paid +this tribute to it: + + In no army did the soldier enjoy greater liberty, consistent with + military discipline, than in the Army of the Tennessee, and in none + were his rights and his life more carefully guarded. + + The subordination of the Army of the Tennessee to the policies and + acts of the Government affecting the institution of slavery in the + prosecution of the war, is worthy of the highest commendation. It had + no policy of its own to propose, but went forth, as expressed by the + legislative branch of the Government, to do battle in no spirit of + oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose + of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established + institutions of the States in rebellion; but to defend and maintain + the supremacy of the constitution, and to preserve the Union with all + the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired. + + The Army of the Tennessee did great deeds in all the departments of + the States' service, and individually and collectively illustrated in + a peculiar manner the qualities of noble American character which + gained success in the field, preserved its fruits by subsequent + statesmanship, and by exalted virtue crowned victory with the + attributes of peace and justice. + +In April, 1900, we unveiled the beautiful and life-like monument to +General John A. Logan, that brilliant, magnetic soldier, our comrade from +Cairo to Louisville. Of him, at the unveiling, President McKinley spoke as +follows: + + Logan's career was unique. His distinction does not rest upon his + military achievements alone. His services in the Legislature of his + own State, in the National House of Representatives, and in the Senate + of the United States, would have given him an equally conspicuous + place in the annals of the country. He was great in the forum and in + the field. + + He came out of the war with the highest military honors of the + volunteer soldier. Brilliant in battle and strong in military council, + his was also the true American spirit, for when the war was ended he + was quick and eager to return to the peaceful pursuits of civil life. + +General Logan's love and devotion to us only ended with his life, and at +one of our reunions he characterized our work thus: + + The Army of the Tennessee was not limited in its scope; the theater of + its operations and the extent of its marches, comprehending within + their bounds an area greater than Greece and Macedonia in their + palmiest days, and greater than most of the leading kingdoms of Europe + at the present day, reached from the Missouri River on the north + nearly to the Gulf of Mexico on the south, and from the Red River of + Louisiana to the Atlantic Ocean. + +The friendship and loyalty of Sherman to Grant was the first great cause +of the success of both, and for the harmony that existed in the Army of +the Tennessee. Sherman fell under the command of Grant at Paducah, in the +spring of 1862, holding a small command. He was the ideal soldier, as he +dropped from a Department and Army commander to that of a post, and later +a Division, without a murmur. Sherman's first words to Grant, on February +15, 1862, were these: + + I should like to hear from you, and will do everything in my power to + hurry forward to you reinforcements and supplies, and if I could be of + service myself would gladly come without making any question of rank + with you or General Smith, whose commissions are of the same date. + +On the same date he wrote again: + + Command me in any way. I feel anxious about you, as I know the great + facilities they [the enemy] have of concentration, by means of the + river and railroads, but have faith in you. + +The monument to our old commander, General Sherman, is nearly complete. It +is upon these grounds we expect to unveil it next October, and, as +President of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, and as President of +the Commission which has in charge the erection of the monument, I give +you a cordial invitation to be present. You will receive due notice, and +proper arrangements will be made for the occasion, and you will meet here +your comrades of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac, and the Ohio, +who have already signified their intention of being present to honor the +memory of our old commander. + +And now, my comrades, it is with the greatest satisfaction that I say to +you that after seven years' continued effort, this year we obtained an +appropriation from Congress of $250,000 to be used in the erection of a +monument upon these grounds to General U. S. Grant, (and the model for it +will soon be selected,) to this modest, charitable, and just soldier and +statesman. The whole world has given its tribute. From those whom we +fought and defeated have come the most gallant words of praise and +touching sympathy. President Lincoln, above all others, recognized his +power and ability when he handed him his commission and gave him command +of all the Armies, and assured him that he should not in any way interfere +with him,--armed him with all the powers of the President, with _carte +blanche_ to use them as he saw fit. Grant made his answer at Appomattox, +bringing peace to our nation and gratitude to the conquered. General Grant +was a man of few words, and when called upon to speak of the Army of the +Tennessee, paid it this tribute: + + As an Army, the Army of the Tennessee never sustained a single defeat + during four years of war. Every fortification which it assailed + surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either defeated, + captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the command of + that Army who had afterwards to be relieved from it, or to be reduced + to another command. Such a history is not accident. + +And now, my comrades, one of our number who has left us by an assassin's +hand, whose heart, words and acts were ever for us, who from a Major in +our Army became the best-loved President of our nation, Comrade William +McKinley, at one of our gatherings paid this tribute to you: + + It is recorded that in eighteen months' service the Army of the + Tennessee captured 80,000 men, with flags and arms, including 600 + guns--a greater force than was engaged on either side in the terrible + battle of Chickamauga. From the fields of triumph in the Mississippi + Valley it turned its footsteps towards the eastern seaboard, brought + relief to the forces at Chattanooga and Nashville, pursued that + peerless campaign from Atlanta to the seaboard under the leadership of + the glorious Sherman, and planted the banners of final victory on the + parapets of Fort McAllister. + + It is said that the old Army of the Tennessee never lost a battle and + never surrendered a flag. Its Corps badges--"forty rounds" of the + Fifteenth Corps; the fleeting arrow of the Seventeenth Corps; the + disc, from which four bullets have been cut, of the Sixteenth + Corps--are all significant of the awful business of cruel war, all of + them suggestive of the missiles of death. + + It gave the Federal Army Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan; McPherson, + Howard, Blair, Logan, Hazen, John E. Smith, C. F. Smith, Halleck, + Rawlins, Prentiss, Wallace, Porter, Force, Leggett, Noyes, + Hickenlooper, C. C. Walcutt, and your distinguished President, who + flamed out the very incarnation of soldierly valor before the eyes of + the American people; all have a secure place in history and a secure + one in the hearts of their countrymen. + +On this anniversary, as my closing words to you, two verses of General +John Tilson's tribute are most appropriate: + + Ho! comrades of the brave old band, we gather here once more, + With smiling eye and clasping hand, to fight our battles o'er. + To quaff from out the brimming cup of old-time memory, + And bright relight the pathway of our old Tennessee. + As myriad sparks of war's romance our meetings warm inspire; + The heady fight, the anxious march, the jolly bivouac fire; + The days of doubt, of hope, of care, of danger, and of glee; + Oh, what a world of racy thought illumines Tennessee! + + Our roster thins; as years pass on we drop off one by one; + Ere long, too soon, to yearly call, there will be answer--none; + Then as along the record page these mourning columns creep, + The whisper comes to closer still our living friendships keep. + Another thought we forward cast to that not distant day, + When left of all our gallant band will be one veteran gray, + And here's to him who meets alone--wherever he may be, + The last, the lone survivor of the grand old Tennessee. + + + + +[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF + +Commanding the Army and Department of the Missouri. + +Front Row--Colonel T. J. Haines, U. S. A., C. S.; Major-General G. M. +Dodge; Colonel William Myers, U. S. A., Q. M.; Colonel James H. Baker, +Tenth Minnesota, P. M. G. Back Row--Colonel Benjamin L. W. Bonneville, U. +S. A. (retired), C. S. of Musters, age 72; Captain William Holcke, A. D. +C, Chief of Engineers; Major J. F. Randolph, U. S. A., Surgeon; Captain +Frank Enos A. A. G.; Colonel John V. Dubois, A. D. C, Inspector-General; +Lieutenant Edward Jonas, Fiftieth Illinois, A. D. C.; Major John W. +Barnes, A. A. G.; Major Lucien Eaton, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant George C. +Tichenor, A. D. C.] + + +THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST + + ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH-WEST + AT NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT, G. A. R. + WASHINGTON, D. C. + OCTOBER, 1902 + + +My connection with the United States forces west of the Mississippi River +commenced at the beginning of the war, when I took my Regiment, the Fourth +Iowa, to St. Louis, and fell under the command of Fremont. I took part in +the campaigns of that Department until after the Battle of Pea Ridge, when +I left the command and went to the Army of the Tennessee. After the +Atlanta campaign, in November, 1864, I returned to Missouri as commander +of that Department and Army. + +Of the transactions of the troops south of Missouri I have very little +knowledge; but I know that the troops which served west of the Mississippi +never had credit for the amount of work, hardships and exposures they +endured. Owing to the fact of there having been fought there but two great +battles, Wilson's Creek and Pea Ridge, and two minor ones, what they did +was swallowed up in the great events that occurred east of the +Mississippi. Even Pope's campaign opening up a portion of the Mississippi +is hardly ever spoken of. + +The Battle of Wilson's Creek, the first signal contest west of the +Mississippi, was fought before my command reached St. Louis. The history +of that battle, and the credit that is due to the commander of that Army, +General Lyon, and his men, are well known. There participated in the +battle many officers who were afterwards greatly distinguished; among them +Schofield, Sturgis, Hunter, and others. It was the first battle that +called attention to the West, and to the troops west of the Mississippi. +That battle was lost because a portion of the command did not comprehend +and fulfill General Lyon's orders. This mistake would have been overcome +if it had not been for the loss in the battle of its commander, General +Lyon. But the fighting of the troops and the boldness of the movement +immediately attracted the attention of the country, and held it until +after the battle of Pea Ridge. + +The Army of the Southwest, which General Curtis commanded, and which +traveled three hundred miles from its base without water or rail +communication, and lived off a barren country, and which fought that +decisive Battle of Pea Ridge and cleared the country until nearly the end +of the war of any organized force of the enemy, had more marching and +endured more suffering than the great Armies I was connected with east of +the Mississippi, and its three days' fighting at Pea Ridge compared +favorably with any of our battles, when the numbers engaged are +considered. + +Then again, at the end of the war, the sufferings of the troops that I +took onto the plains in the Indian campaigns in the winters of 1864-5, +1865-6, were far beyond any of the sufferings of any of our Armies during +the Civil War. Their exposures through the cold weather, and the +brutalities and butcheries of the Indians, which it was impossible for +them to avenge or retaliate, were beyond description. + +Our early campaign in Missouri was without previous experience. It was +simply one soldier standing up against another in battle, and we had to +learn all the tricks of camp life, and from experience how to take care of +our soldiers. + +There were a great many funny incidents in the Pea Ridge campaign. The +Southwestern Army was organized at Rolla, Missouri, of which post I was in +command. My quartermaster was Captain Philip H. Sheridan, and my +commissary, Captain M. P. Small. No one who knew or saw Sheridan then +thought of the great position he was to occupy in our Army, but when he +took hold of that Army and stripped it and fed it, three hundred miles +away from rail or water communication, we all knew that his was a +master-mind. When he came to me at Rolla, the first order he gave was to +take away about three-quarters of our transportation. I think we had about +two wagons to the company, and he brought us down to about four to a +regiment. You can all appreciate the rebellion I had on my hands when I +undertook to enforce his order. I know he stood by and watched to see what +I was going to do. Every Regiment and Command entered a protest, and said +some very unkind things of him, denouncing him as a regular officer who +had no mercy upon a volunteer; but I had then had experience enough to +appreciate our necessities, and started in by stripping my own Regiment, +and then enforcing the orders upon the others. We were not long on that +march before they appreciated the foresight of Sheridan. He had great +energy and great resources. He had to run all the mills along our line of +march; he had to forage in every direction, and the punishment that he +gave to some of the people to make them tell where their horses, forage +and sweet potatoes were hidden would astonish those of our people who have +been so horrified at the mild persuasions used for similar purposes in the +Philippines. + +To show you how little we knew of war on our first march, in January, +1862, from Rolla to Springfield, Missouri, all the reports we had obtained +were that Price and his Army were in Springfield. The troops of our Army +were divided into two commands, those under Siegel, composed of two +Divisions, commanded by Osterhaus and Asboth, mostly Germans, and two +Divisions of Americans commanded by Colonel Jeff C. Davis and Colonel E. +A. Carr. I commanded a Brigade on the extreme left in Carr's Division, +and, in accordance with instructions, put out a company in front of me as +skirmishers. It was dark, and impossible for us to see much, and the first +thing I knew I had lost my skirmishers, and was in great distress until +about daylight in the morning, when, while Siegel's guns and our own were +booming away at Springfield, my company came back mounted on Confederate +horses and mules--old hacks that the enemy had left behind them--and +brought us news that there was no enemy in Springfield, and had not been +for two or three days. + +As we marched along towards Pea Ridge through the country, Price's Army +faced us with a rear guard only, his main body keeping a long distance +ahead of us. At every stream they would halt our advance, and move out a +couple of pieces of their artillery, and put out a strong skirmish-line, +which would force our Army into line, thinking we were going to have a +battle. My Brigade led the advance most of the time on that march, and as +soon as they would line up the officers would have the boys strip. They +would throw down their chickens, sweet potatoes, and everything they had +gathered, and by the time they had gone forward, and the enemy had run, +the Thirty-sixth Illinois, or some other Regiment, would come up and +gobble what they had left. About the third time we lined up I discovered +that every boy was hanging on to his chickens, sweet potatoes, and +provender, and when I gave orders to the Colonels to have them throw them +aside, the boys made answer: "No you don't, Colonel! You can't fool us any +more; we have fed those Thirty-sixth Illinois fellows as long as we +propose to." + + +[Illustration: FORT COTTONWOOD + +Afterwards Fort McPherson, in the Indian Campaign, 1865. The fort was one +hundred miles west of Fort Kearney, and was originally occupied as a +trading post by Sylvanus Dodge, father of General Dodge.] + + +At Pea Ridge we were surrounded by Van Dorn, who placed Price's two +Divisions in our rear, and he himself on our right flank with McCullough +and McIntosh's Divisions. The great Pea Ridge divided his Army, so it was +impossible for one part to support the other. His Army was twice as large +as that of Curtis, and the fact that it was divided enabled Curtis to whip +his Army in detail, so that Van Dorn's Army was virtually whipped before +Curtis got his entire force into the field, Siegel only coming into battle +after Van Dorn's Arkansas force had left for the South, Jeff C. Davis's +Division having killed its two Division commanders, and Van Dorn had given +Price orders to get out the best way he could, which forced him to retreat +to the east towards White River. + +After the Pea Ridge campaign the Battle of Prairie Grove was fought, under +the command of General F. C. Herring, who was Lieutenant-Colonel of the +Ninth Iowa Infantry in the Battle of Pea Ridge. As it was not in my +command I have no knowledge of the detail of it; but from the reports it +evidently was a sharp fight. + +In the spring of 1865 Jeff C. Thompson and his command surrendered to me +on the Arkansas line. His command consisted of six thousand men, but he +found he could not gather them, and claimed that not half of his command +was present. When I asked him how it was possible to get them all +together, he suggested that I should send them rations. I therefore loaded +two steamers from St. Louis, and sent them around by the White River, and +Thompson issued his celebrated order bringing the men all in, and there +was gathered about twice the number he had present when he surrendered to +my forces. When asked for his transportation he said that he would show it +to me, and out of the rivers and bayous he run down about one hundred +canoes and flats, as the transportation he had to move his army with. It +was at this time that he made that celebrated speech. When his soldiers +came in without bringing their guns, as he had instructed them to do, +bringing along old shot-guns and muskets that were of no use, he said if +they were not satisfied with the generosity of this Government they should +emigrate to Mexico, and he denounced more than half of them as being +soldiers whom he had never seen, stating that they had stayed in the brush +and along the river-banks in Arkansas until the moss had grown upon their +heads and backs. From this speech of his came the celebrated saying of +"moss-backs." + +A part of my Corps fought under that gallant General, A. J. Smith, in the +Banks campaign up the Red River, and there is no doubt but that his +generalship and the fighting of the two Divisions of the Sixteenth Corps +saved that Army from a great defeat. The commander of one of his +Divisions, General T. E. G. Ransom, was a school-mate of mine, and +afterwards came to me in the Atlanta campaign and commanded a Division +under me in the Sixteenth Corps. + +When I look at the history of all of the operations west of the +Mississippi River, and see their results, it is a great gratification to +me to know that all the campaigns, except possibly the one of Banks, were +victories for our side. + +When I returned to the command of the Department of the Missouri, in +November, 1864, I found all the Indian tribes on the plains at war, +occupying all the lines of communication through to the Pacific, and there +was a great demand from the people upon the Government that those lines +should be opened. General Grant sent a dispatch, asking if a campaign upon +the plains could be made in the winter. Having spent eight or ten years of +my life upon the plains before the war, I answered that it could, if the +troops were properly fed and clothed. His answer to that was to place all +the plains and Indian tribes within my command, instructing me to make an +immediate campaign against them, and I had, therefore, to move the troops +that were at Leavenworth, Fort Riley, and other points, onto the plains in +mid-winter, and I think it was the Eleventh Kansas that had thirteen men +frozen to death on the march to Fort Kearney. Those troops on that winter +march up and down those stage- and telegraph-lines, in forty days opened +them up, repaired the telegraph, and had the stages running. Then came the +longer campaign of the next summer and next fall, where General Cole's +command suffered so much, and also where General Conner fought the Battle +of Tongue River. I remember of the Indians capturing a company of Michigan +troops that were guarding a train that was going to Fort Halleck, loaded +with rations and bacon. They tied some of the soldiers to the wheels of +the wagons, piled the bacon around the wagons, and burned them up. A band +of this party of Indians was captured by a battalion of Pawnees, who were +far north of them and got on their trail and surrounded the band that had +committed these atrocities. The chief of them, an old man, came forward +and spoke to Major North, who commanded the Pawnees, and holding his hand +up to his mouth he said that he was full of white men up to here, and was +ready to die. The Indians virtually cleaned out the white people along the +stage-lines they captured. I took from them a great many of their +prisoners in the fall of 1865, when they came into Laramie to make peace, +and the stories of the suffering of the women were such that it would be +impossible to relate them. + +In connection with this campaign on the plains, it is a singular fact that +nearly three thousand Confederates took part. When I took command at St. +Louis I found the prisons full of Confederate prisoners. The war was then +virtually at its end, and they were very anxious to be relieved from +prison life, and as we needed forces on the plains, I obtained authority +from the War Department to organize what was known as the United States +Volunteers, and filled the regiments with these Confederate soldiers, +placing over them as officers, men and officers selected from our own +command, and thus organized a very effective force, which did excellent +service on the plains, three-quarters of which remained in that country +after the war was over. + + + + +[Illustration: WHERE GENERAL MCPHERSON FELL + +Place on the Battlefield of Atlanta, on the right of the battle line of +the Sixteenth Army Corps, where Major-General James B. McPherson, +commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was killed, July 22, 1864. The +wheels are portions of Murray's Second U. S. Battery, which was captured +by the Confederate skirmish-line while passing from the Seventeenth to the +Sixteenth Corps.] + + +A TALK TO OLD COMRADES + + ADDRESS TO SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS + DELIVERED AT THE NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT, G. A. R. + WASHINGTON, D. C., OCTOBER, 1902 + BY MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE + + +_Comrades of the Sixteenth Army Corps_: + +The Sixteenth Army Corps was organized December 18th, 1862, and formed +into two wings. General A. J. Smith commanded the right wing, and General +G. M. Dodge the left wing of the Corps. The left wing was organized with +the Corps, the right wing a year or more afterwards. The Corps, as a body, +was never together, though it probably took part in more widely separated +fields than any other Corps in the Army of the Tennessee. The right wing, +under General Smith, was in the Vicksburg campaign, and after that it went +to the Department of the Gulf, and was with General Banks in his movement +up Red River, and saved that Army from defeat; of this there is no doubt. +After that, it was sent after Forrest, and it was the only command that I +know of that caught and whipped him. The left wing overtook General +Forrest at Town Creek, in 1863, in its march to Decatur in the rear of +Bragg's Army, but he did not stay long enough for us to get a good fight +out of him. + +From the campaign after Forrest, General Smith's command was sent to the +Department of the Missouri to drive out Price. There I found them, in +December, 1864, when I took command of that Department, in a deplorable +condition,--without clothing, shoes, or camp equipage. Under an order from +General Grant, I sent them to Nashville, with all the force in my +department, some twenty thousand men all told, to help General Thomas, and +I sent them everything they needed to clothe and equip them. You all +remember how you were frozen in on the Mississippi, and had to take the +cars. One of the pleasantest recollections of my life is that I received +a letter from General Smith, thanking me for appreciating their condition, +and having in Nashville when they arrived, everything they needed. He said +that it was the first time they had been treated decently, and they were +thankful they had fallen into the hands of some one who appreciated them. + +At the Battle of Nashville it was General Smith, with the right wing of +the Sixteenth Corps, and the troops of the Department of the Missouri, +that turned the left flank of Hood's Army, and was practically in his rear +when stopped; and I have heard many officers who were there say that if he +had been let alone he would have captured or destroyed that wing of the +Army. Thus ended the eventful career of the right wing, and its fortunes +were cast with the Army of the Cumberland in its chase after Hood. + +The left wing was organized from the troops I commanded in the District of +Corinth, and had in it the old Second Division of the Army of the +Tennessee that Grant organized at Cairo, that fought at Belmont, Henry and +Donelson, Shiloh, and the two Corinths. It had on its banners, "First at +Donelson." I took command right after the Battle of Corinth, where it had +been censured by Rosecrans and praised by Grant for the part it took in +the Battle of Corinth. General Grant held us at Corinth as a protection to +his communications while the campaign against Vicksburg was going on. In a +letter to me he said he had left us there to protect that flank, for he +knew that if Bragg endeavored to break that line we would stay; so you see +he still had faith in his old Division. From Corinth we marched with +Sherman in his celebrated trip from Memphis to Chattanooga. We wintered on +the line, and rebuilt the Nashville and Decatur Road, and in his Memoirs +General Grant, after describing the condition of the Army, and the +necessity for rebuilding the railway from Nashville to Decatur, speaks +thus of the work of the Sixteenth Army Corps: + + General Dodge had no tools to work with except those of the + pioneer--axes, picks, and spades. With these he was enabled to + intrench his men, and protect them against surprise from small parties + of the enemy, and, as he had no base of supplies until the road could + be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider, after + protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the + surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain + they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and + such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the + ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. Where they were not + near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and + moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron + and steel found in them, were used up in like manner. Blacksmiths + were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad + and bridge building. Axemen were at work getting out timber for + bridges, and cutting fuel for locomotives and cars. Thus every branch + of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the + workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a + mechanic or workman except what the command itself furnished. General + Dodge had the work assigned to him finished within forty days after + receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was 182, many + of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was 102 + miles. + +I only quote a small part of what General Grant says in this connection, +to show you that while the Sixteenth Corps had its share of fighting, and +praise for it, still it was a Corps that Grant called upon in an +emergency, and when he wanted great deeds done; and proves not only what +they could turn their hands to when necessary, but is also a sample of +what our great army was made of. + +In the spring of 1864 we became a part of the great Army in the Atlanta +campaign. When we arrived at Chattanooga, on the 5th of May, I called at +General Sherman's headquarters. General McPherson, our Army Commander, was +there. Sherman said to him: "You had better send Dodge to take Ship's +Gap." "Why, General," replied McPherson, "that is thirty miles away, and +Dodge's troops are not yet unloaded, and he has no transportation with +him." Sherman said: "Let him try it, and have the transportation follow." +We struck out, and that night at midnight Sprague's Brigade of the Fourth +Division of the Sixteenth Corps had gained the Gap. The enemy appeared the +next morning. This opened the way through Snake Creek Gap, planting us in +the rear of Johnston's Army, and forcing him to abandon his impregnable +position at Dalton. + +Our battles in the Atlanta campaign were those of the Army of the +Tennessee. The left wing received continual commendation until the great +battle of the 22d, when it happened to be in the rear of our Army, and +received and defeated the celebrated movement of Hood to our rear. +Sprague's Brigade fought all day at Decatur, and saved our trains. In the +battle of the 22d of July we had only five thousand men in line, but met +and repulsed three Divisions of Hardee's Corps, and McPherson, who stood +on our right and witnessed the fight, watching the charge of Fuller and +Mersey, and the breaking of two of the enemy's columns, spoke of us in the +highest terms, and five minutes later was dead. Our Army, who knew and +loved him, never could reconcile ourselves to his great loss. + +The Battle of Atlanta was one of the few battles of the war where the +attack on the Sixteenth Army Corps caught it on the march in the rear of +the Army, without intrenchments or protection of any kind, both sides +fighting in the open. + +In his address describing the battle of the 22d of July, General Strong, +of General McPherson's staff, says: + + General McPherson and myself, accompanied only by our orderlies, rode + out and took position on the right of Dodge's line, and witnessed the + desperate assaults of Hood's army. General McPherson's admiration for + the steadiness and bravery of the Sixteenth Corps was unbounded. Had + the Sixteenth Corps given way the rebel army would have been in the + rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and would have swept like + an avalanche over our supply-trains, and the position of the Army of + the Tennessee would have been very critical. + +General Frank P. Blair pays this tribute to the fighting of the Sixteenth +Army Corps, in his official report of the Battle of Atlanta: + + I started to go back to my command, and witnessed the fearful assault + made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse + by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole + army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have + attempted to describe at the moment of attack; and, although it does + not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the + officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression + of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed + the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our + flank and rear was made by the whole of Hardee's corps. + +Under General Howard, a part of the left wing took part in the battle of +the 28th of July. On August 19th I was given a Confederate leave, when +that _beau-ideal_ of a soldier, my old schoolmate and comrade, General T. +E. G. Ransom, took command of the Corps. The right wing knew him, for he +was with you in the Red River campaign. He died on a stretcher in command +of the Corps in the chase after Hood. The old Second Division had its +innings with General Corse, at Altoona, where the fighting has been +immortalized in verse and song. My fortunes took me away to the command of +the Army and Department of the Missouri, and the two Divisions of the left +wing were merged one into the Fifteenth and the other into the Seventeenth +Corps, and, so far as the campaigns were concerned, the Corps fought in +two units, the right and left wings, and each was a Corps command. + +The grave of that remarkable soldier, General A. J. Smith, whose +distinguished services were so often recognized by Generals Grant and +Sherman, has not a stone to designate it. The Society of the Army of the +Tennessee is aiding in raising the funds to commemorate his memory and +deeds by erecting a monument in his home in St. Louis. + +The Sixteenth Army Corps had great opportunities in the campaigns it took +part in, and never failed to make the most of them. They went cheerfully +to any work assigned to them. They have left in the war records a history +that they may well be proud of, and every work they have undertaken has +received the strong commendation of their superior officers. + + + + +[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE + Commander + Army of the Potomac + 1864] + + +GENERAL GRANT + + REMARKS AT ARMY OF POTOMAC REUNION + NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y. + + +When you consider that it is now thirty-three years after the war, that +the Government has published every report, letter and order that was of +any moment, you will agree with me that it is difficult to interest an +Army audience in talking about another Army, and I shall not detain you +long on that subject. There are, however, some incidents of General +Grant's first visit to your Army, his return to ours, and the planning of +the grand campaign that was to end the war, that may interest you. + +In December, 1863, after the Battle of Chattanooga, the Army of the +Tennessee camped along the railway from Columbia, Tenn., to Decatur and +Huntsville, Ala. After the Battle of Chattanooga General Grant returned to +Nashville and called there to meet him several Corps Commanders of the +Army of the Tennessee, and General Sheridan of the Army of the Cumberland. +If I remember rightly, there were present Generals Grant, Sherman, +Sheridan, Granger, Logan, Rawlins, and myself. All of us of the Army of +the Tennessee were a hard-looking crowd. None of us had seen Nashville or +any base of supplies since we had marched from the Mississippi River to +Chattanooga, and we had been hard at work building railways and foraging. +We arrived in Nashville late in the afternoon, and General Sherman took us +to General Grant's headquarters. General Grant suggested that we should +call upon the Military Governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson, and pay our +respects to him. We, of course, followed General Grant, and were +introduced to Governor Johnson. I remember that our uniforms were greatly +worn, one or two of us wearing blouses with Army overcoats, and he looked +at us with a very quizzical eye, until General Grant said to excuse us +that he had not given us time since we reached the city to change our +suits; but Grant knew we had no others. Governor Johnson was then a very +radical man, and was very emphatic in informing us that while he was +Military Governor of Tennessee no rebel would receive much consideration +from him, and brought his fist down on a piano in the room with such force +that the sound from it startled us all, and we left there with the idea +that rebels in Tennessee had better get out; but we soon found that his +words were much stronger than his acts, for I hardly ever got my hands on +rebel stock or supplies that I did not find Johnson trying to pull them +off. + +After our visit, General Sherman suggested that we should all go to the +theater that evening, and under his lead we went to the principal opera +house to hear the play of Hamlet. We were all strangers in Nashville; even +General Grant was not well known. We paid our way in and found the theater +crowded with soldiers going to and returning from veteran furloughs. +General Sherman, who you all know was a great lover of the theater, sat +alongside of me and soon commenced criticising the play, earnestly +protesting that it was being murdered. I had to check him several times +and tell him unless he kept quiet the soldiers in the audience would +recognize him and there would be a scene. We had entered late, and there +soon came on the scene where Hamlet soliloquizes over the skull of Yorick. +The audience was perfectly still, endeavoring to comprehend the actor's +words, when a soldier far back in the audience rose up and in a clear +voice called out, as the actor held up the skull, "Say, pard, what is it, +Yank or Reb?" The house appreciated the point and was instantly in an +uproar, and General Grant said we had better leave, so we went quietly +out, no one discovering Grant's or Sherman's presence. Sherman immediately +suggested that we should find an oyster-house and get something to eat, +and General Rawlins was put forward as guide and spokesman. He led us to a +very inviting place. We went in and found there was but one large table in +the place. There was one man sitting at it, and Rawlins, in his modest +way, without informing the man who his party was, asked him if he would +change to a smaller table and let us have that one. The man said the table +was good enough for him and kept on eating, and Rawlins backed out into +the street again. Sherman said if we depended on Rawlins we would get +nothing to eat, and said he would see what could be done. He hailed a man +who pointed out another saloon kept by a woman, and to this Sherman took +us, and she served us what we then considered a very nice oyster stew. As +we sat around the table, we talked more than we ate, and by the time we +had half finished our supper the woman came in and asked for the pay and +said we must leave, as under the military rules her house must close at 12 +midnight and it was then a few minutes after that hour; so out we got and +took our way to Grant's headquarters, where we bunked down the best we +could during the night. Some of the staff heard of our evening's adventure +and gave the news to the press, and the next morning before breakfast all +the parties were present to apologize to Grant that they did not recognize +him, as we were out of our own jurisdiction and in that of the Army of the +Cumberland; but Grant in his modest way satisfied them that he had no +complaint. However, there poured in on him for all of us complimentary +tickets and invitations to almost everything in Nashville. + +After breakfast we all assembled in a large room at headquarters to hear +what General Grant had to say to us. He took up with us the plan for a +winter campaign. He proposed himself to take about 30,000 of the troops +concentrated at Chattanooga and transport them by the Ohio and Mississippi +Rivers to New Orleans, and there take with him the troops of General Canby +and go thence to Mobile and attack that place. General Sherman was to go +to Memphis, gather up all the forces along the Mississippi River, +including the troops at Vicksburg and Natchez, together with the +Seventeenth Corps, and march from Vicksburg to Meridian and thence join +Grant at Mobile. I was to take the Sixteenth Corps, which was then located +on the line of the Nashville and Decatur road, together with about 10,000 +cavalry that General William Sooy Smith had concentrated near Nashville, +and sweep down through Alabama, Northern Mississippi, and Western +Tennessee, attacking any forces of the enemy that might be met, and +destroying all the railroads and provisions that had been stored in that +country, this with a view of making it difficult for any of the +confederate armies to again occupy the territory, so as to enable Sherman +and Grant, when the spring and summer campaign came on, to utilize all the +Union troops that had been occupying that country. After the plans were +all made and all the arrangements agreed upon, General Grant reported them +to Washington, but President Lincoln objected because he was afraid, if we +took so many troops from Chattanooga, that Longstreet, who was occupying +Eastern Tennessee with his Army, would return to Chattanooga or Middle +Tennessee and undo all we had accomplished in the Battle of Chattanooga. +Grant had no fear of this, but he made up his mind to go immediately to +East Tennessee and take the forces there under General Foster, attack and +defeat Longstreet, and then come back and carry out his plans. He found +after reaching Knoxville that General Foster's forces could not be used, +so he abandoned the campaign, only sending Sherman to Vicksburg, who +marched out to Meridian and returned, while the 7,000 cavalry under +General William Sooy Smith, who was to join Sherman overland, moved south, +fighting and driving the enemy until he reached West Point, where he met a +superior force of the enemy and returned to Memphis. + +In March, 1864, General Grant was called to Washington to be given his +commission as Lieutenant-General of the Army and command of all the +forces. On his return to Nashville, on March 17th, we were again called to +meet him. General Grant told us of his visit to Washington, his reception +by the President, and all the courtesies that had been paid him. He told +us that he accepted the commission of Lieutenant-General and Commander of +all the Armies on condition that his plans should not be interfered with +at Washington and that he should have the command of the staff departments +of the armies. Those departments had always considered themselves +independent of the Commander in the field; in fact, in the beginning of +the war the officers of Commissary Quarter-Master and Ordnance Departments +declined to obey the orders of the commanders they were serving under, +except upon the order of their chief in Washington. General Grant settled +this. A Commissary of Subsistence declined to carry out one of his orders, +and General Grant said to him that while he could not force him to obey +the order, he could relieve him and put in his place one of the line +officers who would obey all orders. This officer reported this to +Washington and it changed their orders so that they were ordered to obey +the orders of the officer in the field and to report their orders to their +chiefs in Washington. General Grant said that President Lincoln said in +reply to his request for the command of the staff departments that he +could not give him that legally; but, he said, "There is no one but myself +that can interfere with your orders; and you can rest assured that I will +not do it." We were all anxious to hear of his visit to the Army of the +Potomac, and his opinion of it, and Sherman soon got him to talking about +it. He said it was the finest Army he had ever seen; far superior to any +of ours in equipment, supplies, and transportation. He said, however, that +the officers he talked with considered he would have a much more difficult +problem on his hands than he had had in the West, and he said to Sherman +that some officer who both of them knew, but whose name I have forgotten, +told him, "You have not faced Bobby Lee yet;" and as he said it, I could +see that twinkle in Grant's eye that we often saw there when he meant +mischief. Grant, after discussing the Army of the Potomac and having +nothing but praise for it, informed us that he should make his +headquarters with that Army and leave Sherman to command the Armies of the +West, also informing us that he proposed to take several of us East with +him. Sherman protested strongly against this, and it was finally +compromised by his taking Sheridan and leaving the rest of us with +Sherman. During the two or three days we were with Grant he outlined in a +general way his plan of campaign that every Army should move as early as +possible in the spring, all on the same day against the enemy, so that Lee +and Johnston could not detach any of their commands to reinforce the +others. He said, "I will try to keep Lee from sending any force to +Johnston, but," he said to Sherman, "if he does, I will send you two men +where he sends one." He also informed us of the necessity of closing the +war with this campaign. + +Our visit with Grant ended, he took Sherman as far as Cincinnati with him, +to talk over and complete their plans, while we returned to our commands +to fit them out for the campaign. General Sherman has since pointed out to +me in the Burnett House, at Cincinnati, the room they occupied the night +before they parted, and where over their maps the final orders were given +him and final arrangements made that inaugurated the two great campaigns +of Richmond and Petersburg in the East, and Atlanta in the West. After the +Atlanta campaign I paid General Grant a visit at City Point. I reached his +headquarters in October, and spent two weeks with him, and saw the Armies +of the James and the Potomac. Evenings we would sit around his camp-fire, +and in his genial, comprehensive way, he told us of his campaign and the +great battles you had fought, and brought out fully to me what a great +Army you were. I asked him what he claimed for the Battle of the +Wilderness. There had been great discussion, as you know, about it, and +Grant, with the same twinkle of the eye that I had seen at Nashville, +said, "I only claim that after that battle, (and I took the initiative on +the march towards Richmond,) that the Army of the Potomac was no longer +afraid of Bobby Lee." He had not forgotten his talk with us at Nashville. + +Now you have had Grant's opinion of your great Army, and as my toast is +the Army of the Tennessee, I will close by giving you General Grant's +description of that Army when called upon to respond to the same toast at +one of our reunions. He said, "As an Army, the Army of the Tennessee never +sustained a single defeat during four years of war. Every fortification +which it assailed surrendered. Every force arrayed against it was either +defeated, captured, or destroyed. No officer was ever assigned to the +command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from it or to be +reduced to another command. Such a history is not accident." + + + + +[Illustration: PONTOON BRIDGE ACROSS THE TENNESSEE RIVER AT DECATUR, ALA. + +Built by the Sixteenth Army Corps in the spring of 1864, Major-General G. +M. Dodge commanding. Copy of painting made at the time by an enlisted man +and presented to General Dodge.] + + +USE OF BLOCK-HOUSES DURING THE CIVIL WAR + + +_To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal_: + +I was greatly interested in the communication of Captain Joubert Reitz, +published in your journal March 21, 1903, giving a description of the +block-house system inaugurated by General Kitchener in the Transvaal War. +It was a continuous line of block-houses connected by barbed wire, to +prevent the Boers crossing the railway lines, and virtually corralling +their forces in certain districts until want of food forced them to +surrender. Captain Reitz asserts that the block-house system did more to +end the war than the whole British Army. + +In the Civil War our block-house system was just as effective, but in +another direction. We used it for the purpose of protecting our lines of +communication, not as a trocha, or a line connected with wire fencing and +other obstructions, as used by the British and by the Spaniards in the +Cuban War. The British built theirs of bags filled with earth. The +Spaniards erected neat structures of two stories, built of concrete, with +wooden roofs and openings for two lines of fire, one above the other. +These were erected not more than half a mile apart. In the Civil War our +block-houses were usually erected of logs, one and two stories high. The +face of the upper story had an angle of forty-five degrees to the face of +the first story, thus concentrating a direct fire upon an enemy +approaching from any point of the compass. The first block-houses in the +West that I know of were built by my command in July and August, 1862, +when it rebuilt the Mobile & Ohio Railroad from Columbus to Humbolt. There +were many important bridges on this line, and we built block-houses at the +most important ones, and stockades at the others. + +In the fall of 1862, when Forrest and Jackson made the noted raids into +West Tennessee, the forces at all these structures that my command had +erected held their positions, and defeated the enemy when attacked, while +at the bridges between Jackson, Tennessee, and Grand Junction, where they +had only earth defenses, the forces were driven away or captured and the +bridges destroyed. The result of this was that General Grant issued an +order commending the action of the detachments that were successful, +stating that wherever they stood success followed, and the enemy suffered +a loss in killed and wounded greater than the garrisons of the +block-houses and stockades. This result also caused General Grant to issue +an order to build block-houses and stockades on the line of the Memphis & +Charleston Railway at all important bridges from Memphis to Corinth, and +they protected this line of communication until it was abandoned. + +The block-houses held about a company, but sometimes stockades or earth +intrenchments were added to hold two companies, and our orders were +imperative to all forces occupying them never to leave them or surrender, +no matter how large the attacking force. My first order stated that a +company in a block-house or stockade was equal to a Regiment attacking, +and I do not remember the enemy, in their numerous raids, ever capturing +one that was defended, up to the time I left Corinth in the summer of +1863. After the Battle of Chattanooga, when our Armies were lying along +the line of the railway from Nashville to Decatur and Nashville to +Stevenson, I rebuilt the Nashville & Decatur Railway, on which there were +at least thirty important bridges, at each of which we built strong +block-houses and stockades, and the enemy never captured one of them, +though in two instances they were attacked with a brigade, and often with +two Regiments and batteries. We protected against artillery fire by +throwing up earthworks to the height of the first line of fire, taking the +chance of any damage being done above that. Our orders here were when +Forest, Roddy, and Hannan attacked this line to hold the posts under any +and all circumstances, stating that if they stayed in the block-houses and +stockades nothing could defeat them, and so it proved. Where these forces +struck a Regiment, and captured it in earth-works, they went twelve miles +north to the Sulphur Trestle, a bridge one hundred and twenty-five feet +high, defended by two companies in a block-house and stockade, and were +signally defeated. The Army of the Cumberland protected the line from +Nashville to Stevenson, and on to Chattanooga, with block-houses at all +bridges and important points, and when on the 5th of May, 1864, General +Sherman started on the Atlanta campaign, General Hooker reports on April +23, 1864, that he detailed 1,460 men to occupy block-houses from Nashville +to Chattanooga, and this force held that line of road throughout the +campaign, though many attempts were made to destroy it. During the Atlanta +campaign as we advanced the railway was rebuilt, and all bridges and +stations had block-houses or stockades to protect them. + +General Green B. Raum's Brigade was located at some of the most important +structures. General Wheeler, with all of Johnston's Cavalry force and +several batteries, endeavored to destroy this, our only line of +communication for transporting supplies. General Raum's story is so to the +point that I quote it almost entire. He says: + + My experiences with block-houses extended from May to November, 1864, + on the Memphis & Charleston railroad, and the Chattanooga & Atlanta + railroad. Block-houses were built along these railroads exclusively + for the protection of bridges. They were built of heavy square + timbers, sometimes with two or three thicknesses of timber, and were + of various sizes. I had a two-story block-house built at Mud Creek, + east of Scottsboro, Ala.; it would easily hold 100 men. These houses + were carefully pierced with loop-holes, so that the garrison could + cover every approach. My garrisons were usually too large for the + block-houses. In these cases I threw up an earth-work, and protected + it with abatis. The Confederate forces soon learned to respect a + block-house. I found it to be an absolute defense against musketry. + + During the Atlanta campaign our block-houses were constantly attacked + by raiding parties; small and great trains would be thrown from the + track and burned, and small sections of the track destroyed. About + July 5, 1864, an enterprising Confederate cavalryman with about 300 + men made a rapid march up Dirt Town Valley, crossed the Chattanooga + range by a bridle-path, threw a train of fifteen loaded cars off the + track, burned them, and destroyed a small section of the track, but he + did not attempt to destroy the bridge near by at Tilton--it was + defended by a block-house with a capacity for seventy men. + + When General Wheeler made his great raid north in August, 1864, he + struck the railroad at various places. He destroyed two miles of track + immediately south of Tilton, Ga., but did not come within range of the + block-house, and did not attempt to destroy the bridge defended by the + block-house. During this raid General Wheeler, without hesitation, + attacked and carried a part of the works at Dalton. During the Atlanta + campaign there was not a bridge destroyed by the Confederates between + Nashville and Atlanta which was protected by a block-house. + + After the fall of Atlanta, General Hood moved with his entire army + against the Chattanooga and Atlanta railroad, destroying thirty-seven + miles of track. On October 12 he struck the railroad at Resaca and + Tilton. Tilton was garrisoned by the Seventeenth Iowa. + Lieutenant-Colonel Archer commanding. He had about 350 men--no + artillery. An Army Corps was in his front. Colonel Archer held the + enemy off seven hours, fighting from his rifle-pits and block-house. + At last the Confederate commander placed several batteries in + position, and opened upon the devoted garrison. In a short time the + block-house was rendered untenable, and Colonel Archer was forced to + surrender. This was the first and only success against our block-house + system. On December 4, 1814, Bates's division of Cheatham's Corps + attacked the block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's Creek, + five miles north of Murfreesborough, Tenn. The enemy used artillery + to reduce the block-house, and although seventy-four shots were fired + at it, no material injury was done; the garrison held out until + relieved by General Milroy from Murfreesborough. + +After the Atlanta campaign, in the Department of the Missouri, every +important bridge and town where detachments of troops were stationed was +protected by block-houses and stockades, and during the Indian campaigns +of 1864-5-6 our lines of communication, stage and telegraph, were all held +successfully by small detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades, +and were never captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked +them, and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not properly +constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their stations, if +they had remained they would have successfully held them. After I took +command on the plains and issued positive orders for detachments to stay +by their posts and never leave them, not a single detachment that I +remember of was captured in its block-house or stockade. With the small +force we had it would have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph +and overland routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of +block-houses and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the +overland routes. It is evident from our experience in the West that our +block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of communication +was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but from +attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large force for +the field. I left on the line of the railway from Nashville to Athens +during the Atlanta campaign only two Regiments of negroes, taking with me +my entire Corps, and without the block-houses to defend the lines from +Nashville to Stevenson and Stevenson to Atlanta, it would have taken a +thousand men without block-house protection for every hundred required +with it. + +GRENVILLE M. DODGE. + + + + +[Illustration: TO THE MEMORY OF SAMUEL DAVIS + +Monument erected in Nashville, Tenn., to Samuel Davis, Confederate Spy +executed by order of General Dodge, at Pulaski, Tenn., in 1864.] + + +AN INCIDENT OF THE WAR + + EXECUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE SPY, SAMUEL DAVIS + AT PULASKI, TENN., NOVEMBER, 1863 + + +NEW YORK, June 15th, 1897. + +_To the Editor of The Confederate Veteran_: + +In fulfillment of my promise to give you my recollections of Sam Davis, +(who was hung as a spy in November, 1863, at Pulaski, Tenn.,) I desire to +say that in writing of matters which occurred thirty-four years ago one is +apt to make mistakes as to minor details; but the principal facts were +such that they impressed themselves upon my mind so that I can speak of +them with some certainty. + +When General Grant ordered General Sherman (whose head of column was near +Eastport, on the Tennessee River) to drop everything and bring his army to +Chattanooga, my Corps (the Sixteenth) was then located at Corinth, Miss., +and I brought up the rear. + +General Grant's anxiety to attack Bragg's command before Longstreet could +return from East Tennessee brought on the battle before I could reach +Chattanooga. General Grant, therefore, instructed General Sherman to halt +my command in Middle Tennessee and to instruct me to rebuild the railway +from Nashville to Decatur. The fulfilling of the above order is fully set +forth by General Grant in his Memoirs. + +When I reached the line of the Nashville and Decatur railroad, I +distributed my troops from Columbia south towards Athens, Alabama. I had +about 10,000 men and 8,000 animals, and was without provisions, with no +railroad or water communication to any base of supply, and was obliged to +draw subsistence for my command from the adjacent country until I could +rebuild the railroad and receive my supplies from Nashville. + +My command was a part of the Army of the Tennessee, occupying temporarily +a portion of the territory of the Department of the Cumberland, but not +reporting or subject to the commander of that department. + +Upon an examination of the country, I found that there was an abundance of +everything needed to supply my command, except where Sherman's forces had +swept across it along Elk River. He wrote me, "I do not think that my +forces have left a chicken for you." I also found that I was in a country +where the sentiment of the people was almost unanimously against us. I had +very little faith in converting them by the taking of the oath of +allegiance; I therefore issued an order stating that I required the +products of the country to supply my command, and that to all who had +these products, regardless of their sentiments, who would bring them to +the stations where my troops were located, I would pay a fair price for +them; but that, if I had to send and bring the supplies myself, I should +take them without making payment, giving them only receipts; and also +issued instructions that every train going for supplies should be +accompanied by an officer and receipt given for what he took. This had a +good effect, the citizens generally bringing in their supplies to my +command and receiving the proper voucher; but it also gave an opportunity +for straggling bands to rob and charge up their depredations to my +command. This caused many complaints to be filed with the military +governor of Tennessee and the Department Commander of the Army of the +Cumberland. + +Upon investigation I found most of those depredations were committed by +irresponsible parties of both sides, and I also discovered that there was +a well-organized and disciplined Corps of scouts and spies within my +lines, one force operating to the east of the line, under Captain Coleman, +and another force operating to the west, having its headquarters in the +vicinity of Florence, Alabama. I issued orders to my own spies to locate +these parties, sending out scouting parties to wipe them out or drive them +across the Tennessee River. + +My cavalry had had considerable experience in this work in and around +Corinth, and they were very successful and brought in many prisoners, most +of whom could only be treated as prisoners of war. + +The Seventh Kansas Cavalry was very efficient in this service, and they +captured Samuel Davis, Joshua Brown, Smith, and General Bragg's Chief of +Scouts and Secret Service Colonel S. Shaw, all about the same time. We did +not know of the importance of the capture of Shaw, or that he was the +Captain Coleman commanding Bragg's secret-service force. Nothing was found +on any of the prisoners of importance, except upon Davis, who evidently +had been selected to carry the information they had all obtained through +to General Bragg. Upon Davis were found letters from Captain Coleman, the +commander of the scouts to the east of us, and many others. I was very +anxious to capture Coleman and break up his command, as my own scouts and +spies within the Confederate lines were continually reporting to us the +news sent south from and the movements of Coleman within my lines. + +Davis was brought immediately to me, as his captors knew his importance. +They believed he was an officer and also knew he was a member of Coleman's +command. + +When brought to my office I met him pleasantly. I knew what had been found +upon him and I desired to locate Coleman and his command and ascertain, if +possible, who was furnishing the information, which I saw was accurate and +valuable, to General Bragg. + +Davis met me modestly. He was a fine, soldierly-looking young man, dressed +in a faded Federal soldier's coat, one of our army soft hats, and top +boots. He had a frank, open face, which was inclined to brightness. I +tried to impress upon him the danger he was in, and that I knew he was +only a messenger, and held out to him the hope of lenient treatment if he +would answer truthfully, as far as he could, my questions. + +He listened attentively and respectfully to me, but, as I recollect, made +no definite answer, and I had him returned to the prison. My recollection +is that Captain Armstrong, my Provost Marshal, placed in the prison with +him and the other prisoners one of our own spies, who claimed to them to +be one of the Confederate scouting parties operating within my lines, and +I think the man More, whom the other prisoners speak of as having been +captured with them and escaping, was this man. However, they all kept +their own counsel and we obtained no information of value from them. + +The reason of this reticence was the fact that they all knew Colonel Shaw +was one of our captives, and that if his importance was made known to us +he would certainly be hung; and they did not think that Davis would be +executed. + +Upon Davis was found a large mail of value. Much of it was letters from +the friends and relatives of soldiers in the Confederate Army. There were +many small presents--one or two, I remember, to General Bragg--and much +accurate information of my forces, of our defenses, our intentions, +substance of my orders, criticisms as to my treatment of the citizens, and +a general approval of my payment for supplies, while a few denounced +severely some of the parties who had hauled in supplies under the orders. +Captain Coleman mentioned this in one of his letters. + +There were also intimations of the endeavor that would be made to +interrupt my work, and plans for the capture of single soldiers and small +parties of the command out after forage. + +I had Davis brought before me again, after my Provost Marshal had reported +his inability to obtain anything of value from him. I then informed him +that he would be tried as a spy; that the evidence against him would +surely convict him; and made a direct appeal to him to give me the +information I knew he had. He very quietly, but firmly, refused to do it. +I therefore let him be tried and suffer the consequences. Considerable +interest was taken in young Davis by the Provost Marshal and Chaplain +Young, and considerable pressure was brought to bear upon them by some of +the citizens of Pulaski; and I am under the impression that some of them +saw Davis and endeavored to induce him to save himself, but they failed. +Mrs. John A. Jackson, I remember, made a personal appeal in his behalf +directly to me. Davis was convicted upon trial and sentenced. Then one of +my noted scouts, known as "Chickasaw," believed that he could prevail upon +Davis to give the information we asked. + +He took him in hand and never gave it up until the last moment, going to +the scaffold with a promise of pardon a few moments before his execution. + +Davis died to save his own chief, Colonel Shaw, who was in prison with him +and was captured the same day. + +The parties who were prisoners with Davis have informed me that it was +Shaw who had selected Davis as the messenger to General Bragg, and had +given to him part of his mail and papers. + +I did not know this certainly until a long time after the war. I first +learned of it by rumor and what some of my own scouts have told me since +the war, and it has since been confirmed confidentially to me by one of +the prisoners who was captured about the same time that Davis was and who +was imprisoned with him up to the time he was convicted and sentenced, and +knew Colonel Shaw, as well as all the facts in the case. + +The statement made to me is, that Colonel S. Shaw was the chief or an +important officer in General Bragg's Secret-Service Corps; that Shaw had +furnished the important documents to Davis; and that their captors did not +know Shaw and his importance. + +Colonel Shaw I sent with the other prisoners North, as prisoners of war. I +also learned that Shaw was greatly alarmed when he was informed I was +trying to induce Davis to give me the information he had. + +This is where Davis showed himself a true soldier. He had been entrusted +with an important commission by an important officer, who was imprisoned +with him, and died rather than betray him. He knew to a certainty, if he +informed me of the facts, that Shaw would be executed, for he was a far +more important person to us than was Davis. + +During the war I had many spies captured; some executed who were captured +within the Confederate lines and who were equally brave in meeting their +fate. + +By an extraordinary effort I saved the life of one who was captured by +Forrest. Through my efforts this man escaped, though General Forrest sized +him up correctly. He was one of the most important men we ever had within +the Confederate lines. + +Forrest was determined to hang him, but Major-General Polk believed him +innocent and desired to save him. + +Great interest was taken in Davis at the time, because it was known by all +of the command that I desired to save him. + +Your publication bears many evidences of this fact. It is not, therefore, +necessary for me to state that I regretted to see sentence executed; but +it was one of the fates of war, which is cruelty itself, and there is no +refining it. + +I find this letter bearing upon the case; it may be of interest. It is my +first report to Major B. M. Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of +the Tennessee, notifying him of the capture of Davis. It is dated, +Pulaski, Tenn., November 20th, 1863, and is as follows: + + I herewith inclose a copy of dispatches taken from one of Bragg's + spies. He had a heavy mail, papers, etc., and shows Captain Coleman is + pretty well posted. + + We have broken up several bands of mounted robbers and Confederate + cavalry in the last week, capturing some five commissioned officers + and one hundred enlisted men, who have been forwarded. + + I also forward a few of the most important letters found in the mail. + The tooth-brushes and blank-books I was greatly in need of and + therefore appropriated them. I am, + + Very respectfully, your obedient servant, + + G. M. DODGE, + + _Brigadier General_. + +The severe penalty of death, where a spy is captured, is not because there +is anything dishonorable in the fact of the person being a spy, as only +men of peculiar gifts for such service, men of courage and cool judgment +and undoubted patriotism, are selected. The fact that the information they +obtain is found within their enemy's lines, and the probability of great +danger to an Army, is what causes the penalty to be so very severe. A +soldier caught in the uniform, or a part of the uniform, of his enemy, +within his enemy's lines, establishes the fact that he is a spy and is +there in violation of the Articles of War and for no good purpose. This +alone will prohibit his being treated as a prisoner of war, when caught, +as Davis was, in our uniform, with valuable documents upon him, and seals +his fate. + +I appreciate fully that the people of Tennessee and Davis's comrades +understand his soldierly qualities and propose to honor his memory. I take +pleasure in aiding in raising the monument to his memory, although the +services he performed were for the purpose of injuring my command, but +given in faithfully performing the duties he was assigned to. I am + +Truly and respectfully, + +GRENVILLE M. DODGE, + +_Major-General_. + + + + +[Illustration: COMPANY L, FIFTY-FIRST IOWA INFANTRY, 1898, IN PHILIPPINES + +Organized in 1856, as Council Bluffs Guards; Captain, G. M. Dodge; entered +Civil War as Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. Now Company L, Fifty-first +Iowa Infantry. Known locally as Dodge Light Guards.] + + +GEN. G. M. DODGE ON THE "WATER CURE" + +[The following is a reprint of an article that appeared originally in the +New York Evening Post.--G. M. D.] + + +The New York Evening Post has thus been "called down" by General Grenville +M. Dodge, who is well known throughout Iowa and the Nation as one of the +leading Corps Commanders of the Union Army during the Civil War: + + _To the Editor of the Evening Post_: + + As one who has had some experience in the necessities, usages, and + cruelties of war, which always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's + country, I am surprised at the position of your journal, and its + bitterness against the alleged action of Major Glenn, Lieutenant + Conger, and Assistant Surgeon Lyon. + + The testimony of Sergeant Riley, upon which you base your attack on + these officers, goes to prove that they gave the water cure to a + Filipino who had been made presidente in one of the provinces by our + Government, who had taken the oath of allegiance to our country, and + then used his official position to cover his acts as captain of an + insurgent company which was acting in arms against our Army and within + our lines. Therefore, he was a traitor and a spy, and his every act + was a violation of the laws of war, and branded him an outlaw and + guerilla. If these are the facts, under the usages of war these + officers were justified in what they did; in fact, if they had shot + the traitor they would never have been called to account, and in all + probability this is what would have happened to him in the Civil War. + + An officer has great latitude under such circumstances, and it is not + safe or fair to condemn one for almost any act that detects a traitor + and spy in arms against the Government which he has sworn to protect, + and which has put him in a position of trust. You ignore entirely this + side of the question, and only treat Major Glenn's acts as cruelties + to peaceable Filipino citizens. I can remember when the journals of + this country upheld and applauded an officer who, in the Civil War, + ordered a man shot if he attempted to haul down the American flag, and + cannot understand the present hysterics of some journals over the + terrible violation of the laws of war in punishing a traitor, caught + in the act, with the water cure only. The treatment may have been + severe, but it is not permanently harmful. + + I am astonished that these fearfully wrought-up journals have no word + of commendation for our soldiers in the Philippines, who have suffered + untold cruelties, assassinations, burning by slow fires, burial alive, + mutilations, and atrocities; who have submitted to every indignity + without resentment or complaint; and I have been greatly gratified + over their excellent behavior under such trying circumstances. In + their comments these journals are very careful not to say why these + punishments are given to such traitors, knowing well if they did our + people would look upon the acts as one of the necessities of war, and + would wonder at the leniency of Major Glenn and his command. + + GRENVILLE M. DODGE. + + _New York, April_ 17. + +There can be no doubt that "war is hell," no matter whether it be on the +Philippine Islands or any other place in the world. There has been much +howling over the administration of "the water cure" in the Philippines, +but every man who has had one year's experience in real war will admit +that that "cure" is not so severe as killing or wounding captured enemies +who have knowledge of hidden arms or other Army supplies. Every one of the +"water-cured" Filipinos was given the opportunity to escape that +punishment, but refused to tell what he knew and was therefore rightly +punished until he was willing to tell the truth. General Dodge's letter +proves that the punishment was justified, and his opinion will be +sustained by every person who has knowledge of "the necessities, usages, +and cruelties of war," which "always prevail during a campaign in an +enemy's country." The truth is that the armies of the United States have +been too lenient in the Philippines. That is the reason why the war has +been so long continued, and the only reason why the final peace will be +still further delayed. War is never a picnic, but should at all times be +made terrible in order that peace and safety may be speedily gained. "The +water cure" is inclined to be slightly irritating to the throats of the +traitors in the Philippines, it is true, but it is not so bad or so cruel +as maiming them for life, or killing them. The yellow journals may +continue to howl, but the loyal American people will sustain the soldiers +of the Nation in every effort to compel peace that comes within the rules +of war. + + + + +[Illustration: SCOTTS BLUFFS + +Major-General G. M. Dodge and train on march from Julesburg to Fort +Laramie, in the Indian Campaign, August, 1865.] + + +MISPLACED SYMPATHY + + ADDRESS TO THE + NEW YORK COMMANDERY, MILITARY ORDER OF LOYAL + LEGION, ON CRUELTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES + + +I desire to enter my protest and call the attention of the companions to +the position of a portion of the public press, and some people, towards +our Army in the Philippines, and what they assert are cruelties +perpetrated there. + +There is a certain portion of the press, and also of the people, who are +and always have been absolutely opposed to the operations of our army in +the Philippines. They were very anxious to push us into a war which we +were all opposed to, but after getting us there they refused to accept the +results, and have persistently opposed everything done that was not in +exact accordance with their views. In order to work upon the sympathies of +the people, some of the papers are publishing pictures showing our +soldiers in the very act of committing great outrages; the pictures were +manufactured in their own offices, as were also most of the outrages +complained of. You have not, however, seen in these papers any pictures +portraying the cruelties perpetrated upon our soldiers, which have been +worse than any acts ever committed by the savages in our wars with them; +they are, in fact, too revolting to relate. I have had much to do with +Indian warfare, but have never seen any cruelties to be compared with +those inflicted upon our soldiers by the Filipinos, and these occurrences +were not rare, but general,--happening all the time. Very little has been +said on this subject, for it was not the policy of the Government to have +the stories of these atrocities printed, or brought before the people; but +now that our army is being so bitterly attacked, it is time that, the +soldiers' side of the question should be presented, and we are learning of +the soldiers who have been assassinated, their feet burned, buried alive, +killed by slow-burning fires, their bowels cut open and wound around +trees. The Filipinos indulged in every torture and indignity that was +possible, and, as a general thing, our soldiers did not retaliate. How +they managed to refrain from taking vengeance is beyond my comprehension, +but their action is greatly to their credit and honor. + +The questions I wish to bring before you, however, are, What are the +rights of an officer in such matters? What are his duties and privileges +in war in an enemy's country that is under martial law? Take, for +instance, General Smith's position when he was sent to Samar, with +instructions to wipe out the insurrection there. He is said to have issued +instructions to kill everybody found in arms that was over ten years of +age, and to burn the country, if it was necessary to wipe out the +insurrection, and the result is that in ninety days or less he did wipe +out the insurrection, and without any great loss on our side or on the +part of the enemy. Now they are denouncing him for a threat,--not an act. +The temptation to retaliate must have been very great, for the treatment +the Ninth Infantry received from those savages was nothing short of +murder, followed by the most horrible mutilation, by a people who +pretended to be their friends and at peace. In the ninety days he was +operating there General Smith brought the island to peace, everybody in it +had surrendered, and it is quiet. If he had made war under the methods +advocated, allowing no one to be hurt, in all probability the subjugation +of the island would have required a year's time, and there would have been +ten times the suffering and loss of life than actually occurred. He simply +followed the plan of war that was pursued by Grant, Sherman, and other +commanders in the Civil War; that is, made it just as effective and short +as possible. You know Sherman's position was that after a certain length +of time when an enemy had been whipped, it was their duty to cease making +war, and if they did not do so, he considered that any means were +justifiable in order to bring it to an end. He stated this very clearly in +his St. Louis speech. He stated the case as follows: + + I claim that when we took Vicksburg, by all the rules of civilized + warfare the Confederates should have surrendered, and allowed us to + restore peace in the land. I claim also that when we took Atlanta they + were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their + cause, which was then hopeless, and it was clear as daylight that they + were bound to surrender and return to civil life; but they continued + the war, and then we had a right under the rules of civilized warfare + to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the + Government, and make them succumb. I had to go through Georgia to let + them see what war meant. I had a right to destroy, which I did, and I + made them feel the consequences of war so fully they will never again + invite an invading Army. + +You all know of the troubles that occurred in the border states during the +Civil War, and of the cruelties to the families of Union men who entered +our Army. It was father against son, brother against brother, and, as +General Sherman said, "It was cruelty, and there was no refining it." We +know what severe orders were given for treatment of enemies within our +lines, when their acts were in violation of the laws of war. In one case +torpedoes were placed under a road over which our troops were marching, +and several soldiers were killed. Sherman happened to come along just at +that time, and said to the Colonel of the First Alabama Cavalry, which was +his escort, "Burn the country within fifteen miles surrounding this spot." +You all know what that meant; it was a license under which other things +besides burning was done. An eye-witness describes Sherman's march to the +sea and through the Carolinas as a "cloud of smoke by day and a pillar of +fire by night." Who ever made the suggestion that Sherman's uniform should +be stripped off for this, or that he should be shot, as some of our +representatives in Congress and our press now demand should be done in the +Philippines for making war in earnest? + +Take another case, where Captain Anderson captured a train of convalescent +unarmed Union soldiers in North Missouri, and placed them in line and shot +every one of them. Shortly afterwards Colonel Johnson, of the Missouri +State Militia, who was following Anderson, came up. Anderson attacked, +this militia command of 160 men and killed 143, only seventeen getting +away. Only one man was taken alive, and he saved himself by giving a +Masonic sign. The war records are full of cases of individual acts, and I +select one of which I had personal knowledge. It is found in volume 38, of +the War Records. The orders in Missouri at that time were that any person +who harbored a guerilla, and did not report the fact to the nearest +commanding Union officer, should receive the same treatment as the +guerilla. A man by the name of McReynolds violated these orders, and +harbored Quantrell, the guerilla, and the officer who detected it, after +stating all the facts and evidence, reported to me as follows: + + On consultation with the squadron commanders, Captain Hamblin and + Lieutenant Grain, it was decided to execute McReynolds, which was + carried out under my orders. + + R. M. BOX. + + _Captain Company H, Seventh Cavalry, Missouri State Militia_. + +In reporting this case to the Adjutant General in Washington I did not +approve it, as my investigation showed that the statements of +McReynolds's acts were true. I did not censure the officers, but issued an +order that officers should follow more closely the orders of the +Department, and ended that order as follows: "Hereafter men caught in arms +will have no mercy shown them." General John McNeill, of Missouri, took +twelve citizens out and shot them, it being claimed they were connected +with guerillas that shot a Union man. In some histories it is known as the +Palmyra massacre. It is claimed that the Union man turned up alive. If the +reports of the numbers of robbers, guerillas and outlaws who were shot on +sight in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and elsewhere, by both sides in +1864 and 1865, could be gathered up they would furnish retaliations and +cruelties enough for these water-cure journals for years. + +Consider this matter in a broader sense. Take the order of General Grant +to General Sheridan to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste; it was +absolutely destroyed so the enemy could not again occupy it. I can see no +difference between an order to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste +and Smith's order to make Samar a "howling wilderness." Take the order I +received to go to the rear of Bragg's Army and destroy the Valley of the +Tennessee, and all the supplies gathered there for the use of his Army, +which valley was burned from Bear River to Decatur. These were orders from +principal officers in our Army, and I only quote them to show the contrast +between that time and the present. Senators in the halls of Congress find +it necessary in these days to take up the question. Senator Rawlins, of +Utah, made an attack upon our officers, and especially upon General +Chaffee, which was nothing short of disgraceful, and should not be allowed +to go without vigorous condemnation. He represents a state and people +under whose orders Lieutenant Gunnison and his party were massacred by +Mormons disguised as Indians. Some one should get up in the Senate and +call him to account for these things, and ask him, in consideration of +these facts, why he is so deeply outraged by the orders of General +Chaffee, a gallant soldier and gentleman, a humane man, and one who, in my +opinion, has done nothing in the Philippines but what was perfectly +justified, and will in time be considered to have been humane. + +The two Senators from Colorado have taken it upon themselves to denounce +in bitter terms what they call unheard-of acts and cruelties of our Army. +I would point them to a case in their own state, which was more severe +than any act in the Philippines has been. A regiment of Colorado cavalry +under Colonel J. M. Chivington, a minister by profession, attacked and +destroyed a band of Indians encamped on the Big Sandy, near Camp Lyon, who +claimed to be under the protection of the officers at Fort Lyon. This was +a massacre of men, women and children of a friendly band of Indians, and +was one of the main causes of bringing into arms against the United States +every tribe of Indians south of the Yellowstone. When an investigation of +this affair was ordered the State of Colorado almost unanimously protested +against it, upholding the act, and quoted that old saying, "There is no +good Indian except a dead one." Think of our wars with the Indians in +which whole bands were wiped out, even the women and children being +destroyed; think of the wars in which we employed Indians against Indians; +they not only killed but scalped. I do not know of a single treaty ever +made with the Indians that the United States has not violated, and when an +Indian had the hardihood to object the Government started in to wipe him +out. This has been the treatment of the Indians from the Atlantic to the +Pacific, until at the present time there is not a wild Indian living in +the entire country; yet I cannot remember that this press has ever been +aroused; it was too near home. + +Take the case of Major Glenn, who is about to be courtmartialed for giving +the water cure to the presidente in one of the Provinces of Luzon, as the +testimony goes to show. This presidente had been appointed to office by +our Government, had taken the oath of allegiance, and was there to +represent us. While he was occupying this position, it was discovered that +he was the captain of an insurgent company, giving active assistance to +the enemy, and he was, therefore, a traitor and a spy, and under the laws +of war deserved to be shot; but instead they proposed to courtmartial +Glenn for simply giving him the water cure; and this, in my opinion, is a +great wrong. + +Order 100, which is often quoted, was issued in the Civil War to govern +officers. It was prepared by Professor Lieber, and was considered and +adopted, I believe, by a board of officers; anyhow, it was very carefully +drawn. I am told it has been considered and used by nearly all the +nations. It gives an officer great latitude, and where an officer meets a +savage enemy, or one that is violating the laws of war, those laws are +suspended and it virtually is left to his own judgment as to how far he +should go in inflicting punishment, and under this order there is no doubt +both Smith and Glenn were protected in their actions. It may seem harsh, +but you are all aware how many harsh orders were given in the Civil War +for the purpose of forcing the enemy to obey our orders, and how often +those orders and threats accomplished the purpose without any other act. +When the colored troops were first organized, on several occasions +Confederate officers sent in demands for them to surrender, coupled with +the threat that if they refused the place would be taken and no quarter +granted. I know of one instance where an officer believed this threat and +surrendered a Regiment of colored infantry for the purpose of having them +protected. Then there is the case of Fort Pillow; whether or not Forest +gave the order it is claimed he gave, I do not know; but the fact that no +quarter was shown there has been amply verified. + +Within the past week there has been appointed a committee of distinguished +citizens, most of whom are well-known opponents of our Government in its +policies and acts during the Spanish War. They propose to hunt up and lay +before Congress all cases of cruelty on the part of our Army, with the +avowed purpose of sustaining the national honor. I must say this is the +first time I ever heard of national honor being sustained by such methods. +Have you, or any one else, ever heard a single word of protest from these +people or any one connected with them against the revolting cruelties of +the enemy in the Philippines? They evidently have no desire to learn about +these things, but want some excuse for attacking our Army, hoping thereby +to bring dishonor upon our country before the world. The national honor +never has, never can, and never will be protected by such methods. It is +upheld and maintained today, as it always has been, by the patriotism of +our people as represented by our Army in the Civil War, in Cuba, the +Philippines, and China. + +These attacks upon the Army are for a double purpose, and you should not +forget it. Every time they make this great hubbub about cruelties they are +hitting back at those that were in the Civil War. There is an element in +this country that already has no use for the soldier of the Civil War. +They are continually crying about the pension he is getting; that he is +favored in the Government service; etc., etc. They do not dare attack him +openly, as yet, but do it covertly. There is no officer listening to me +who did not see cruelties in the Civil War. Many of you have had to order +them, but you know you were never brought to account for them when they +were acts of necessity. We were always careful that no cruelties were +committed by enlisted men, but whatever was done was by the order of an +officer. It was the practice of the War Department never to interfere in +these matters, leaving them to the officer who was in charge of the forces +in the field. None of these things occurred without his knowledge; he was +on the spot and knew the necessity for them, and if he did not take action +it was considered that none was necessary, and they were seldom called to +account for it afterwards; but in the Philippines they are bringing +officers to account simply because of the outcry of people who care +nothing for the merits of the case, except to make capital against our +country's policy in maintaining itself in the Philippines. In view of all +the facts, I must doubt the sincerity of those who are seeking to bring +discredit upon our little Army, the marvellous efficiency of which has won +the admiration of the world. Under the regulations, it is impossible for +the Army to defend itself and make answer to these attacks, except through +their own officers, and their reports do not reach the public, for the +press seems to use only that which reflects upon the Army, and omits that +which is in its favor. It is the duty of every companion here, as well as +of every good citizen, to enter his protest against these unjust attacks. +The right side is beginning to get a hearing, and when the facts and +causes for the action of the Army are generally known, it will be found +that our Army is as humane and well-behaved a body of troops as ever went +into a foreign country, and we must all assist in seeing that it receives +justice. + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle of Atlanta, by Grenville M. 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