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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Great War and How It Arose, by Anonymous
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: The Great War and How It Arose
+
+
+Author: Anonymous
+
+
+
+Release Date: May 14, 2011  [eBook #36100]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer, and
+Distributed Proofreading volunteers (http://www.pgdp.net) for Project
+Gutenberg
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+      Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully
+      as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings and other
+      inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an
+      obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook.
+
+      Many occurrences of mismatched single and double quotation marks
+      remain as they were in the original.
+
+      Text enclosed by equal signs was in bold face in the original
+      (=bold=).
+
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+1915
+
+Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
+12, Downing Street, London, S.W.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+                                                                   PAGE.
+
+  Serbia's Position                                                    3
+
+  Russia's Position                                                    6
+
+  Germany's Position                                                   6
+
+  Italy's Position                                                     8
+
+  Germany's Selected Moment                                            8
+
+  Peace Thwarted by Germany                                           10
+
+      I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian
+         Ultimatum                                                    11
+     II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary
+         and Serbia                                                   11
+    III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers                       12
+     IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between
+         Russia and Austria-Hungary                                   13
+      V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary     14
+     VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace                              15
+
+  German Militarism Wins                                              17
+
+  How France Came In                                                  19
+
+  How Great Britain Came In                                           19
+
+  War with Austria                                                    22
+
+  Japan's Ultimatum to Germany                                        22
+
+  Allies' Declaration of Common Policy                                23
+
+  Turkey Joins Germany                                                24
+
+  More German Intrigues                                               26
+    The Near East                                                     26
+    The Far East                                                      27
+    West Africa                                                       28
+    South Africa                                                      28
+
+  How the Germans Make War                                            29
+
+  Germany's Attempted Bribery                                         36
+
+
+  APPENDIXES.
+
+  A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian
+     Ultimatum                                                        40
+
+  B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary                               46
+
+  C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium                                48
+
+  D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas                            52
+
+  E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on
+     England                                                          52
+
+  F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War            55
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT WAR.
+
+
+
+
+SERBIA'S POSITION.
+
+
+On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess
+were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian
+subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had
+been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
+dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
+authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was
+an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial"
+investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the
+Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually
+conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on
+July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were
+the chief terms[2]:--
+
+     "The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
+     their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
+     declaration:--
+
+     "'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
+     against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the
+     final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
+     territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
+     consequences of these criminal proceedings.
+
+     "'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
+     functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."
+
+     "The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:
+
+     "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
+     of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
+     is directed against its territorial integrity; ...
+
+     "To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
+     as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
+     instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
+     propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
+
+     "To remove from the military service, and from the administration
+     in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
+     against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
+     communicating to the Royal Government;
+
+     "To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
+     movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
+     Monarchy;
+
+     "To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
+     the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
+     relating thereto."
+
+In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which
+was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at
+Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense
+such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words,
+Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all
+these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6
+p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the
+specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of
+Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary
+for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an
+explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the
+participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial
+proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany
+not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
+Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
+the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
+that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so
+drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature
+of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same
+evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general
+mobilisation.
+
+An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an
+hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
+the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented
+itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna
+through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed
+on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the
+British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a
+pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.
+
+As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the
+Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the
+Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there
+were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be
+expected to accept."[5]
+
+During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at
+peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
+extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable
+settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain
+asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that
+Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.
+
+Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
+Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of
+conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself
+ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria
+and Russia became threatening."
+
+Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade
+were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet
+Austria.
+
+But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
+expired.
+
+The British Charg� d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true
+object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--
+
+     "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
+     beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
+     gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
+     here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
+     under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
+     Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
+     with Serbian rule."[6]
+
+So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan
+settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as
+1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan
+peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest
+right down to the �gean Sea.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.
+
+[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.
+
+[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the
+Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--
+
+    "Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria
+    should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war
+    where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant,
+    brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their
+    efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the
+    officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to
+    dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.
+    Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?
+    Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to
+    this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your
+    Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I
+    think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
+    French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am
+    sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another
+    gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult
+    situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a
+    great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the
+    field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by
+    the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."
+
+[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.
+
+[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.
+
+[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.
+
+
+
+
+RUSSIA'S POSITION.
+
+
+Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23,
+1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
+Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that
+any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be
+regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like
+the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great
+War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the
+Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being
+in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated,
+then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a
+question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the
+deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
+people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the
+Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
+Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in
+danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey
+said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a
+commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
+the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
+retested during the last decade.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S POSITION.
+
+
+Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book
+which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case
+prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--
+
+     "=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for
+     our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him
+     (Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with
+     our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
+     attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
+     the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
+     accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our
+     ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity,
+     nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
+     all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
+     continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
+     Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
+     gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
+     under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
+     untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=
+
+     "=A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom
+     we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
+     able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
+     Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=
+
+     "_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
+     action towards Serbia.=_"
+
+Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that
+the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the
+following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to
+Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--
+
+     "=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
+     counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=
+
+     "=But mobilisation means war.=
+
+     "=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
+     mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="
+
+Here, then, we have the plain admission:--
+
+     That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
+     France.
+
+     That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
+     calculated extent of starting a great European war.
+
+     That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
+     "could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
+     Italy in this Official document.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und
+Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)
+
+[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons.
+Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:--
+
+    "Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the
+    Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the
+    success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
+    depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
+    completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
+    might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
+    consequently that of Germany.
+
+    "I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
+    that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if
+    Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
+    being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
+    army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
+    the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not
+    constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"
+
+
+
+
+ITALY'S POSITION.
+
+
+Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above
+machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she
+had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar
+enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian
+Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San
+Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with
+the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval
+of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence
+identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present
+Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to
+be a _casus foederis_ under the Triple Alliance--which is purely a
+treaty of defence--involving Italy's military assistance on the side of
+Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti)
+replied[10]:--
+
+     "If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus
+     foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
+     on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
+     as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
+     declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
+     Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."
+
+Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her
+neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed
+with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained
+neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the
+aggressors--not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the
+subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the
+fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led
+Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th,
+1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[9] See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.
+
+[10] Cd. 7860.
+
+[11] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 152.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.
+
+
+The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at
+her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or
+unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, _Germany and the
+Next Great War_: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us
+as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary
+and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of
+success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and
+Austria chose their moment well.
+
+     (1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
+     Belgrade.
+
+     (2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
+     Ministers were away electioneering.
+
+     (3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
+     Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
+     the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
+     consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
+     (Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."[12]
+
+     (4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister
+     were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La
+     France."
+
+     (5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had
+     left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by
+     the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get
+     things done in time.
+
+The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the
+messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular
+time:--
+
+     (1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be
+     humiliated, whilst Austria--Germany's ally--would be strengthened
+     by the conquest of Serbia; and
+
+     (2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought
+     with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.
+
+The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass
+from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her
+disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of �50,000,000, and had added
+enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a
+pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be
+little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling
+for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary
+the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.[13]
+
+On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and
+France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the
+worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them
+both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth
+as follows:--
+
+     =Russia.=--Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles,
+     which it was thought might end in revolution.
+
+     =France.=--France was passing through a period of political chaos,
+     no Government being able to hold together for more than a few
+     weeks. And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to
+     inquire and report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various
+     defensive preparations.
+
+     =Belgium.=--Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army
+     which would have gradually increased it to almost double its
+     present strength.
+
+     =Britain.=--Germany thought the Irish and general political
+     position in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united
+     front in foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to
+     fight. The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad
+     incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality
+     and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her
+     friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly
+     crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27,
+     1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:--"I have
+     been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
+     circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
+     aside."[14]
+
+Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and
+Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia,
+Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our
+neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually
+declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for
+what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a
+treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great
+Britain _and_ Germany![15] The whole case is put in a nutshell in the
+despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in
+which he says:--
+
+     "=I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
+     the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his
+     action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
+     Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter
+     the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
+     their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
+     approval of Germany.="[16]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[12] Cd. 7717, No. 18.
+
+[13] See Appendix "B."
+
+[14] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 47.
+
+[15] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 80, 99 and 160.
+
+[16] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 141.
+
+
+
+
+PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.
+
+
+The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the
+whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion--that both countries were
+determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As
+showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict,
+they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with
+which they were blocked in Berlin:--
+
+
+_(I.)--Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to
+Serbia._
+
+On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the
+forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Russian Charg� d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had
+been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse
+our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How
+Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made
+plain in the despatch from the Russian Charg� d'Affaires at Berlin on
+the same day:--
+
+     "The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the
+     British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to
+     extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in
+     the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
+     Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time,
+     his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the
+     wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined
+     to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance
+     of Serbia."[18]
+
+
+_(II.)--The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and
+Serbia._
+
+When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was
+refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing
+or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The
+Austrian Ambassador explained that:--
+
+     "the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it
+     should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in
+     the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would
+     be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate
+     departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without,
+     however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]
+
+As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charg� d'Affaires
+at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--
+
+     "The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march
+     into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should
+     march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria
+     not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But
+     none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany
+     would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should
+     inform Secretary of State."[20]
+
+The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British
+Charg� d'Affaires in Berlin:--
+
+     "The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
+     Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be
+     to break off diplomatic relations and commence military
+     preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German
+     Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of
+     mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had
+     urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]
+
+But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be
+seen in the Despatch from the British Charg� d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir
+Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
+     German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
+     Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
+     favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast
+     contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
+     communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
+     associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
+     Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]
+
+
+_(III.)--Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers._
+
+On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador
+that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence
+being effective was:--
+
+     "that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should
+     work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour
+     of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and
+     Russia becoming threatening."[23]
+
+Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to
+our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the
+following effect:--
+
+     "Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct
+     Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and
+     Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the
+     purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?
+     You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
+     this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of
+     the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at
+     Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request
+     that all active military operations should be suspended pending
+     results of conference."[24]
+
+The Powers, _with the exception of Germany_, consented. Germany again
+proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following
+Despatch from the British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated
+July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
+     practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his
+     opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
+     Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
+     desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
+     I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
+     arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
+     directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
+     dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
+     as you proposed was not practicable."[25]
+
+Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:--
+
+     "I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
+     me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government,
+     to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that
+     events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late
+     to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the
+     basis of discussion."[26]
+
+
+_(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia
+and Austria-Hungary might take._
+
+How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the
+four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which
+Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward
+Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--
+
+     "The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of
+     conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations �
+     quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German
+     Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of
+     the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between
+     Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of
+     mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation
+     by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not
+     acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by
+     any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
+     'press the button' in the interests of peace._"[27]
+
+Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from
+the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30,
+1914:--
+
+     "The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the
+     button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he
+     had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
+     been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]
+
+Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His
+appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About
+midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's
+Ambassador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at
+night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in
+a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from
+France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany
+would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained
+passive, no territory would be taken from her.
+
+Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an
+exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace.
+That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If
+Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great
+Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the
+whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the
+scale of peace in years to come.
+
+
+_(V.)--Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary._
+
+Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four
+Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in
+recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State--
+
+     "added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed
+     that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count
+     Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought
+     that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result,
+     and that it would be best before doing anything else to await
+     outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
+     Governments."[30]
+
+It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British
+Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:--
+
+     "I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct
+     between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
+     would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that,
+     but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government
+     have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the
+     Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to
+     discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
+     means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]
+
+Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to
+get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations
+thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the
+following Despatch from the Russian Charg� d'Affaires in Berlin, dated
+July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
+     in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia)
+     "should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of
+     views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which
+     would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign
+     Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal
+     and that he agreed with Pourtal�s" (German Ambassador in Russia)
+     "that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go
+     on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
+     Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
+     insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that _he
+     could not advise Austria to give way_."[32]
+
+The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made
+apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported
+on July 28, 1914:--
+
+     "Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs)
+     "replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and
+     of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg
+     Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
+     Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the
+     energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no
+     longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the
+     Austro-Hungarian note."[33]
+
+
+_(VI.)--Russia's Final Attempt at Peace._
+
+Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is
+indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
+to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome,
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether
+     Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might
+     give--that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of
+     Serbia--and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we
+     would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him
+     the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
+     action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question
+     has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready
+     to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the
+     sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military
+     preparations.'
+
+     "Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
+     Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to
+     do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question,
+     for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order
+     that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military
+     preparations."[34]
+
+And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch
+from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors
+abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:--
+
+     "Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British
+     Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
+     of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in
+     the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I
+     replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send
+     you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:--
+
+          "'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
+          Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between
+          Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest,
+          she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and
+          decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the
+          Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a
+          sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to
+          maintain her waiting attitude."[35]
+
+The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey,
+for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1,
+he says:--
+
+     "I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only
+     a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
+     begins war.
+
+     "The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
+     Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to
+     accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections
+     raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.
+
+     "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
+     ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able
+     to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
+     order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
+     abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]
+
+That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by
+the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1,
+1914:--
+
+     "The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria,
+     far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,
+     was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against
+     Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much
+     exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the
+     French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of
+     'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried
+     out."[37]
+
+Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government
+appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all
+efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is
+given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1,
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the
+     instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by
+     midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only
+     against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government
+     would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my
+     enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the
+     negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]
+
+As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put
+it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward
+Grey:--
+
+     "Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
+     were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
+     ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
+     intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
+     St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
+     only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
+     the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. _A few days' delay
+     might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
+     calamities in history._"[39]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.
+
+[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.
+
+[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.
+
+[20] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
+
+[21] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 25.
+
+[22] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 34.
+
+[23] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
+
+[24] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 36.
+
+[25] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
+
+[26] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 75.
+
+[27] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
+
+[28] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 107.
+
+[29] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 85 and 101.
+
+[30] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
+
+[31] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
+
+[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.
+
+[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.
+
+[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.
+
+[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.
+
+[36] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 131.
+
+[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.
+
+[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.
+
+[39] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 161.
+
+
+
+
+GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.
+
+
+Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by
+Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an
+excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound
+to join with Austria only in case of the latter being _attacked_ by
+Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while
+Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a
+party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna
+on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador
+(at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia _before it
+was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor_. I know from
+the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]
+
+Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia
+knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated
+and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the
+Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.
+
+The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French
+Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the
+Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the
+German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."[41] What has actually
+happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.
+
+The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign
+Office introduction to _Great Britain and the European Crisis_:--
+
+     "At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
+     an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
+     mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for
+     the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
+     overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
+     said is that, _according to the information in the possession of
+     His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time
+     proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general
+     mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next
+     day, the 1st August_. France also began to mobilise on that day.
+     The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal
+     from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy
+     until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the
+     German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.
+     Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great
+     Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the
+     Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her
+     troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a
+     collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday
+     morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small
+     independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the
+     Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.
+     The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had
+     become inevitable."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[40] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
+
+[41] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 105--Enclosure 3.
+
+
+
+
+HOW FRANCE CAME IN.
+
+
+France, by her alliance with Russia, was bound to stand by Russia if she
+was attacked by Germany and Austria. On July 31 the German Ambassador at
+Paris informed the French Government that Russia had ordered a complete
+mobilisation, and that Germany had given Russia twelve hours in which to
+order demobilisation and asking France to define her attitude. France
+was given no time, and war came, when German troops at once crossed the
+French frontier. Germany, by her attitude towards France, plainly
+admitted that she was the aggressor. She made no pretence of any cause
+of quarrel with France, but attacked her because of France's defensive
+alliance with Russia.
+
+
+
+
+HOW GREAT BRITAIN CAME IN.
+
+
+Great Britain was primarily drawn in to save Belgium. We were bound by a
+Treaty (1839) to which Germany and France were also parties,
+guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When Germany attacked France in
+1870, Prince Bismarck gave Belgium a written declaration--which he said
+was superfluous in view of the Treaty in existence--that the German
+Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium,
+provided that neutrality were respected by the other belligerent Powers.
+
+France has been faithful to her Treaty. She even left her Belgian
+frontier unfortified. On August 3, 1914, on the verge of war, our
+position was made plain by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, when
+he said:--
+
+     "When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be
+     a most important element in our policy--a most important subject
+     for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar
+     terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us
+     to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were
+     prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of
+     Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government
+     this reply:--
+
+          "'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality
+          of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other
+          Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
+          under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her
+          security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given
+          several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to
+          the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
+          has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian
+          Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.'
+
+     "From the German Government the reply was:--
+
+          "'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
+          possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the
+          Imperial Chancellor.'
+
+     "Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
+     answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long
+     delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir
+     Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they
+     could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail,
+     in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing,
+     to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign."[42]
+
+This clearly indicated that Germany would not respect the neutrality of
+Belgium, and the day after Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 4, the
+German Army had penetrated Belgium on its way to France after a
+peremptory notice to the Belgian Government to the effect that the
+Imperial Government "will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
+out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered
+indispensable." Thus began the nightmare of German "Kultur," to which
+unoffending Belgium was subjected, and against which she appealed to the
+British Government: "Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and
+Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."[43]
+On August 4 Great Britain asked Germany for a definite assurance by
+midnight that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. Germany's
+attitude is unmistakable in the following report of an interview by our
+Ambassador in Berlin with the German Secretary of State:--
+
+     "Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
+     answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having
+     crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been
+     already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why
+     the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely,
+     that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
+     way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and
+     endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.
+
+     "It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
+     the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
+     paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
+     through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+     time.
+
+     "This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for
+     bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action
+     was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
+     inexhaustible supply of troops....
+
+     "I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
+     might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
+     seeing him.... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency
+     at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
+     said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
+     to a degree; just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war
+     time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great
+     Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.... He held Great
+     Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
+     I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
+     same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
+     strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
+     advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
+     would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
+     'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should
+     keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+     neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
+     or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
+     Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will
+     that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
+     that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
+     of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
+     solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently
+     overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
+     reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
+     argument."[44]
+
+Thus, when midnight struck on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, it found us at
+war with Germany for tearing up the "scrap of paper" which was Britain's
+bond.[45] And earlier in the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. von
+Bethmann Hollweg, in the course of a remarkable speech in the Reichstag,
+admitted the naked doctrine, that German "necessity" overrides every
+consideration of right and wrong, in the following words:--
+
+     "=Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
+     knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps" (as a
+     matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that
+     morning) "are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary
+     to the dictates of international law.... The wrong--I speak
+     openly--that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as
+     soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
+     threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest
+     possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his way
+     through (wie er sich durchhaut)!="[46]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[42] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Part II.
+
+[43] Statements by Prime Minister, House of Commons, August 4 and 5,
+1914.
+
+[44] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 160.
+
+[45] See Appendix E.
+
+[46] The _Times_, August 11, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+WAR WITH AUSTRIA.
+
+
+From now onwards we were definitely allied with France in defence of
+Belgium's neutrality.
+
+At 6 p.m. on August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
+
+On August 12 Sir Edward Grey was compelled to inform Count Mensdorff
+(Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) at the request of the French
+Government, that a complete rupture having occurred between France and
+Austria, a state of war between Great Britain and Austria would be
+declared from midnight of August 12.
+
+
+
+
+JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.
+
+
+On August 17 the text of an ultimatum by Japan to Germany was published
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
+     situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance
+     of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interests as
+     contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
+     Britain.
+
+     "In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
+     establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
+     Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty
+     to give advice to the Imperial German Government, to carry out the
+     following two propositions:--
+
+          "(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
+          the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to
+          disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.
+
+          "(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
+          Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or
+          compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a
+          view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.
+
+     "The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that
+     in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23 an answer
+     from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional
+     acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
+     Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may
+     deem necessary to meet the situation."[47]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47] Under Art. II of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, signed on July 13,
+1911, it was agreed that if the two contracting parties should conduct a
+war in common, they should make peace in mutual agreement, etc.
+
+
+
+
+BRITISH APPROVAL.
+
+
+The Official Press Bureau issued the following on August 17:--
+
+     "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
+     communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary
+     for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far
+     East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially
+     in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for
+     in that Agreement.
+
+     "It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the
+     Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be
+     necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor
+     beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any
+     foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the
+     Continent of Eastern Asia."
+
+
+
+
+_DECLARATION OF COMMON POLICY._
+
+
+On September 5, 1914, the British Official Press Bureau issued the
+following statement from the Foreign Office:--
+
+
+     DECLARATION.
+
+     The undersigned duly authorised thereto by the respective
+     Governments hereby declare as follows:--
+
+     The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to
+     conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
+     Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no
+     one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous
+     agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the
+     undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto
+     their seals.
+
+     Done at London in triplicate, the 5th day of September, 1914.
+
+                    E. Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of
+                         State for Foreign Affairs.
+
+                    Paul Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and
+                         Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.
+
+                    Benckendorff, Ambassador Extraordinary and
+                         Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
+                         Russia.
+
+
+
+
+TURKEY JOINS GERMANY.
+
+
+Directly war broke out the Turkish Army was mobilised, under the supreme
+command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands.[48] Although
+the Turkish Government had declared their intention of preserving their
+neutrality, they took no steps to ensure its maintenance. They forfeited
+their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships, "Goeben"
+and "Breslau," which, fleeing from the Allied Fleets, had entered the
+Dardanelles on August 10.
+
+Instead of interning these war vessels with their crews, as they were
+repeatedly asked to do by the Allied Governments, the Turkish Government
+allowed the German Admiral and his men to remain on board, and while
+this was the case the German Government were in a position to force the
+hand of the Turkish Government whenever it suited them to do so.
+
+In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was
+exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in
+the European War was said to be assured; the perpetual menace to Turkey
+from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by an alliance with
+Germany and Austria; Egypt might be recovered for the Empire; India and
+other Moslem countries would rise against Christian rule, to the great
+advantage of the Caliphate of Constantinople; Turkey would emerge from
+the War the one great power of the East, even as Germany would be the
+one great power of the West. Such was the substance of German
+misrepresentations.
+
+Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, and by the
+conviction of the superiority of German arms, proved a most active agent
+on behalf of Germany.
+
+A strong German element was imported into the remainder of the Turkish
+Fleet, even before the British Naval Mission, which had been reduced to
+impotence by order of the Minister of Marine, was recalled by His
+Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from
+Germany to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
+and at other crucial points.
+
+Numerous German merchant vessels served as bases of communication, and
+as auxiliaries to what had become in effect the German Black Sea Fleet.
+Secret communications with the German General Staff were established by
+means of the "Corcovado," which was anchored opposite the German Embassy
+at Therapia. The German Military Mission in Turkey acted in closest
+touch with the Turkish Militarist Party. They were the main organisers
+of those military preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt.
+
+Emissaries of Enver Pasha bribed and organised the Bedouins on the
+frontier; the Syrian towns were full of German officers, who provided
+large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. The Khedive of
+Egypt, who was in Constantinople, was himself a party to the conspiracy,
+and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his
+presence with a military expedition across the frontier. All the Turkish
+newspapers in Constantinople and most of the provincial papers became
+German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany
+or Austria, and minimised everything favourable to the Allies.
+
+Millions of money were consigned from Germany to the German Embassy in
+Constantinople, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank.
+At one time these sums amounted to �4,000,000. A definite arrangement
+was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Turkish Ministers,
+including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should
+declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a
+stated figure.
+
+The final point was reached when Odessa and other Russian ports in the
+Black Sea were attacked by the Turkish Fleet on October 29, 1914. It is
+now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the
+German Admiral on the evening of October 27.
+
+On October 30 the Russian Ambassador asked for his passports and there
+was nothing left but for the British and French Ambassadors to demand
+theirs on the same day. The Russian Ambassador left Constantinople on
+October 31, while the British and French Ambassadors left the following
+evening.[49]
+
+Thenceforward the Turks, at the instigation of the Germans,
+unsuccessfully endeavoured to raise Mahomedans in all countries against
+Great Britain and her Allies. The Sultan of Turkey, misusing his
+position as Padishah and Titular Head of the Moslems, gave a perverted
+history of the events and proclaimed a Holy War. The Sultan, in his
+speech from the Throne on December 14, 1914 (at which ceremony the
+ex-Khedive of Egypt was present), said:--
+
+     "We were just in the best way to give reforms in the interior a
+     fresh impetus when suddenly the great crisis broke out. While our
+     Government was firmly resolved to observe the strictest neutrality,
+     our Fleet was attacked in the Black Sea by the Russian Fleet.
+     England and France then began actual hostilities by sending troops
+     to our frontiers. Therefore I declared a state of war. These
+     Powers, as a necessity, compelled us to resist by armed force the
+     policy of destruction which at all times was pursued against the
+     Islamic world by England, Russia, and France, and assumed the
+     character of a religious persecution. In conformity with the Fetwas
+     I called all Moslems to a Holy War against these Powers and those
+     who would help them."[50]
+
+What the Moslems of India thought of the situation is succinctly shown
+by a speech delivered on October 1, 1914, by the Agha Khan, the
+spiritual head of the Khoja community of Mahomedans and President of the
+All-India Moslem League.[51] He said he had always been convinced that
+Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Turkey and other Moslem
+countries, for she was the Power most anxious to enter by "peaceful
+penetration" Asia Minor and Southern Persia. But she had been posing for
+years past as a sort of protector of Islam--_though Heaven forbid that
+they should have such an immoral protector_.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[48] Cd. 7716.
+
+[49] Cd. 7628 and Cd. 7716.
+
+[50] A Reuter's Amsterdam telegram of December 15, 1914.
+
+[51] _Times_, October 2, 1914,
+
+
+
+
+MORE GERMAN INTRIGUES.
+
+
+The vastness of German intrigues throughout the world in preparation for
+a great war have come out piece by piece.
+
+=The Near East.=--Taking the Near East first, we find that Germany,
+having suborned the ex-Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi, proceeded weeks
+before the rupture with Turkey to give orders, through the Ottoman
+Empire, to Shukri, the acting Chief of the Turkish Special Mission, to
+prepare public opinion in Egypt for Turkish invasion and to await the
+coming of the German Mors, whose trial was attended by such startling
+disclosures.[52]
+
+Mors had been introduced to Enver Pasha by Dr. Pruefer (Secretary to
+Prince Hatzfeldt when he was German Agent in Egypt) and had held long
+conferences with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Turkish General Staff, who on
+September 6, 1914, worked out a scheme for disturbances in Egypt by
+bands of criminals led by Turkish officers and for an attack on the Suez
+Canal.
+
+In 1908 Prince Hatzfeldt succeeded Count Bernstorff, as German Agent in
+Egypt, and he at once established close relations with the Egyptian
+disloyalists of the extreme faction. In this he appears to have been
+aided by Baron von Oppenheim, and by Dr. Pruefer, the Oriental Secretary
+of the Agency, who was a fine Arabic scholar, and who had travelled a
+great deal in Syria and the Near East. The leaders of the disloyal
+section in Egypt were kept in the closest touch, and visited Prince
+Hatzfeldt at the German Agency, and were in constant communication with
+Dr. Pruefer, who, in Oriental disguise, often visited them, and other
+Panislamic Agents.[53]
+
+=The Far East.=--In India the German merchants joined our Chambers of
+Commerce and were elected as representatives of commercial life, and as
+trustees of port trusts, which gave them a knowledge of our local
+defences. In some instances they appear to have become volunteers, and
+so to have gained knowledge of our forts and armouries. Small German
+merchants and traders in the Punjab and other districts constantly
+endeavoured to undermine the British Raj, and preached sedition wherever
+they went. Such were the agents and spies of the German Government.
+
+Since the Mutiny at Singapore it has been proved that the Germans were
+calling home their reserves from Singapore and the East in May, 1914,
+and even as early as April of last year.[54] The first thing the
+mutineers did was to go to the German Encampment, open the doors, and
+supply those inside with rifles. Sir Evelyn Ellis, member of the
+Singapore Legislative Council, who was President of the Commission
+appointed by the Governor to collect evidence with reference to the
+Mutiny, which took place on February 15, 1915, stated that:--
+
+     "They were not to think that they had been engaged in suppressing a
+     small local disturbance. On the contrary, there was evidence to
+     show that they had assisted in defeating one of the aims of the
+     destroyer of Europe. They had been dealing with work that had been
+     engineered by the agents of our common foes, and they had
+     contributed to the suppression of a most diabolical plot. What had
+     taken place in Singapore was only part of a scheme for the murder
+     of women and children such as they had had instances of on the East
+     Coast of England."[55]
+
+The head of a big German firm in Singapore, after being released on
+parole, was found with a wireless installation in his house, with which
+he was stated to have kept the "Emden" supplied with news.[56]
+
+In Persia and Arabia there is abundant proof of German intrigues, while
+in China few opportunities have been lost by German agents of impugning
+British good faith, and German money appears to have been used for years
+in keeping the Chinese press--in Peking more particularly--as
+anti-British as possible. Since the declaration of war an attempt has
+been made by Captain Pappenheim, Military Attach� of the German Legation
+in Peking, to organise an expedition into Russian Siberia to damage the
+Trans-Siberian railway. His action was, of course, a gross abuse of his
+diplomatic position, and has been disclaimed by the Chinese
+Government.[57]
+
+=West Africa.=--In West Africa the report of Colonel F. C. Bryant on
+operation in Togoland shows how well the Germans were prepared for war
+in that region.[58]
+
+=South Africa.=--In South Africa[59] it has been proved that so far back
+as 1912 the Germans were in communication with Lieut.-Colonel Maritz
+with a view to a rebellion. The latter appears to have brooded over
+schemes for the establishment of a Republic in South Africa. As the Blue
+Book, published in Cape Town on April 28, 1915, states: "One witness,
+Captain Leipold, of the Government Intelligence Department, who was sent
+to find out how things stood with Maritz, describes how the rebel leader
+dramatically threw his cards on the table in the shape of a bundle of
+correspondence with the German Administration at Windhuk, dating as far
+back as August, 1912."[60]
+
+In a speech to his troops on August 9, 1914, Maritz declared that he had
+6,000 Germans ready to help him, and he further stated that Beyers and
+De Wet had been fully informed of his plans long before the war.[61]
+
+Evidence was also given during the trial of De Wet that the rebellion in
+South Africa "was planned a couple of years ago when General Hertzog
+left the Ministry."[62] The Germans, either directly or indirectly,
+suborned, amongst others, Maritz, De Wet, De La Rey, Beyers, Kemp, and
+Kock. But the magnificent services of General Botha and the loyalists
+of South Africa--both British and Dutch--rendered nugatory the
+machinations of the German Government.
+
+The history of German intrigues, both before and since the war, in
+British and French colonies, and in neutral countries throughout the
+world, which are now known and proved to the hilt, may be gauged from
+the examples given in the foregoing brief notes. The German newspaper
+_Der Tag_, which, during the first month of the war, declared: "Herr
+Gott, sind diese Tage sch�n" (O Lord, how beautiful are these days),
+subsequently summarised the German outlook when it naively
+declared:--[63]
+
+     "So many of our calculations have deceived us. We expected that
+     British India would rise when the first shot was fired in Europe,
+     but in reality thousands of Indians came to fight with the British
+     against us. We anticipated that the whole British Empire would be
+     torn to pieces, but the Colonies appear to be closer than ever
+     united with the Mother Country. We expected a triumphant rebellion
+     in South Africa, yet it turned out nothing but a failure. We
+     expected trouble in Ireland, but instead, she sent her best
+     soldiers against us. We anticipated that the party of 'peace at any
+     price' would be dominant in England, but it melted away in the
+     ardour to fight against Germany. We reckoned that England was
+     degenerate and incapable of placing any weight in the scale, yet
+     she seems to be our principal enemy.
+
+     "The same has been the case with France and Russia. We thought that
+     France was depraved and divided and we find that they are
+     formidable opponents. We believed that the Russian people were far
+     too discontented to fight for their Government, and we made our
+     plans on the supposition of a rapid collapse of Russia, but,
+     instead, she mobilised her millions quickly and well, and her
+     people are full of enthusiasm and their power is crushing. Those
+     who led us into all those mistakes and miscalculations have laid
+     upon themselves a heavy responsibility."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[52] _Times_, April 28, 1915.
+
+[53] _Times_, January 6, 1915.
+
+[54] _Times_, April 24, 1915. (Speech by the Bishop of Singapore.)
+
+[55] _Daily News and Leader_, April 27, 1915.
+
+[56] _Morning Post_, March 27, 1915.
+
+[57] Letter from the Chinese Legation to the _Times_, March 13 and 20,
+1915.
+
+[58] _Daily News and Leader_, April 22, 1915.
+
+[59] Cd. 7874.
+
+[60] _Times_, April 30, 1915.
+
+[61] _Times_, March 17, 1915.
+
+[62] _Times_, February 19, 1915.
+
+[63] _Times_, April 26, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+HOW THE GERMANS MAKE WAR.
+
+
+It has often been asked what would happen if savages were armed with the
+products of modern science and with the intelligence to use them.
+Germany has answered the question. Every resource of science lies at the
+German command; the chemist, the physicist, the metallurgist, have all
+worked in this war to place the most effective tools of destruction in
+the Germans' hands, and to satisfy their ambitions they have shut the
+gates of mercy on mankind. The Official Handbook of Instructions issued
+to Officers of the German Army by the German General Staff urges the
+"exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination,
+incendiarism, robbery and the like) to the prejudice of the enemy."
+This Official Handbook says:--
+
+     "A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the
+     combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it
+     will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual
+     and material resources of the latter."[64]
+
+The German Emperor, addressing the troops which he sent to take part in
+the International Expedition in China in 1900, said:--
+
+     "When you come into contact with the enemy strike him down.
+     _Quarter is not to be given. Prisoners are not to be made._ Whoever
+     falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just as a
+     thousand years ago the Huns, under their King Attila, made for
+     themselves a name which still appears imposing in tradition, so may
+     the name of German become known in China in such a way that never
+     again will a Chinaman dare to look askance at a German. The
+     blessing of the Lord be with you. Give proof of your courage and
+     the Divine blessing will be attached to your colours."
+
+At midnight on August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany for
+violating the neutrality of Belgium, and it will be remembered that
+earlier in the day the German Imperial Chancellor had stated that German
+troops "perhaps are already on Belgian soil," and that Germany could
+only have one thought--how she was to "hack her way through."
+Simultaneously with the thought, came action. What was actually taking
+place is described, by Lord Bryce's Committee of Inquiry, in the
+following words[65]:--
+
+     "On August 4th the roads converging upon Li�ge from north-east,
+     east, and south were covered with German Death's Head Hussars and
+     Uhlans pressing forward to seize the passage over the Meuse. From
+     the very beginning of the operations the civilian population of the
+     villages lying upon the line of the German advance were made to
+     experience the extreme horrors of war. 'On the 4th of August,' says
+     one witness, 'at Herve' (a village not far from the frontier), 'I
+     saw at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, near the station, five
+     Uhlans, these were the first German troops I had seen. They were
+     followed by a German officer and some soldiers in a motor car. The
+     men in the car called out to a couple of young fellows who were
+     standing about 30 yards away. The young men, being afraid, ran off,
+     and then the Germans fired and killed one of them named D----.'
+
+     "The murder of this innocent fugitive civilian was a prelude to the
+     burning and pillage of Herve and of other villages in the
+     neighbourhood, to the indiscriminate shooting of civilians of both
+     sexes, and to the organised military execution of batches of
+     selected males. Thus at Herve some 50 men escaping from the burning
+     houses were seized, taken outside the town and shot. At Melen, a
+     hamlet west of Herve, 40 men were shot. In one household alone the
+     father and mother (names given) were shot, the daughter died after
+     being repeatedly outraged, and the son was wounded. Nor were
+     children exempt....
+
+     "The burning of the villages in this neighbourhood and the
+     wholesale slaughter of civilians, such as occurred at Herve,
+     Micheroux, and Soumagne, appear to be connected with the
+     exasperation caused by the resistance of Fort Fl�ron, whose guns
+     barred the main road from Aix la Chapelle to Li�ge. Enraged by the
+     losses which they had sustained, suspicious of the temper of the
+     civilian population, and probably thinking that by exceptional
+     severities at the outset they could cow the spirit of the Belgian
+     nation, the German officers and men speedily accustomed themselves
+     to the slaughter of civilians."
+
+As a German soldier's diary, examined by Lord Bryce's Committee,
+says:--"The inhabitants without exception were brought out and shot.
+This shooting was heart-breaking as they all knelt down and prayed, but
+that was no ground for mercy. A few shots rang out and they fell back
+into the green grass and slept for ever."[66]
+
+During the invasion of Belgium and France, German procedure was almost
+the same in all cases. "They advance along a road, shooting inoffensive
+passers-by--particularly bicyclists--as well as peasants working in the
+fields. In the towns or villages where they stop, they begin by
+requisitioning food and drink, which they consume till intoxicated.
+Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they let off their rifles
+at random, and declare that it was the inhabitants who fired. Then the
+scenes of fire, murder, and especially pillage, begin, accompanied by
+acts of deliberate cruelty, without respect to sex or age. Even where
+they pretend to know the actual person guilty of the acts they allege,
+they do not content themselves with executing him summarily, but they
+seize the opportunity to decimate the population, pillage the houses,
+and then set them on fire. After a preliminary attack and massacre they
+shut up the men in the church, and then order the women to return to
+their houses and to leave their doors open all night."[67]
+
+Innumerable German atrocities are on record and well authenticated. For
+example, Professor Jacobs, at a medical meeting in Edinburgh, stated
+that, as head of the Belgian Red Cross, he "had visited a chateau but
+found the Red Cross had not been respected. It had been completely
+destroyed, and the bodies of six girls, aged from ten to seventeen, were
+lying on the lawn. A convent containing sixty sisters had been entered
+by the German soldiers and every one had been violated. On the evidence
+of the doctor of the institution twenty-five were pregnant. Professor
+Jacobs had operated on the wife of a doctor living near Namur. Three
+weeks after the operation, when convalescing and still in bed, their
+house was entered by German soldiers; she was raped by seven of them and
+died two days after."[68]
+
+1. A few typical examples of the wholesale atrocities of German troops
+are given in Appendix C, but to show that in many cases such atrocities
+were not only countenanced, but ordered by officers in command, we quote
+the following:--
+
+                                             August 22, 1914.
+
+     The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after having protested
+     their peaceful intentions, made a treacherous surprise attack on
+     our troops.
+
+     It was with my consent that the General had the whole place burnt
+     down, and about 100 people shot.
+
+     I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of Li�ge, so that
+     its inhabitants may know the fate with which they are threatened if
+     they take up a similar attitude.
+
+                                   The General Commanding-in-Chief,
+                                             VON BULOW.[69]
+
+2. Here is an order of the day given on August 26 by General Stenger
+commanding the 58th German Brigade:--
+
+     After to-day no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to
+     be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even
+     prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a
+     single living enemy remain behind us.
+
+               Oberlieutenant und Kompagnie-Chef STOY;
+               Oberst und Regiments Kommandeur NEUBAUER;
+               General-Major und Brigade-Kommandeur STENGER.[70]
+
+With reference to the above Order, Professor Joseph B�dier says: "Some
+thirty soldiers of Stenger's Brigade (112th and 142nd Regt. of the Baden
+Infantry), were examined in our prisoners' camps. I have read their
+evidence, which they gave upon oath and signed. All confirm the
+statement that this order of the day was given them on August 26, in one
+unit by Major Mosebach, in another by Lieut. Curtius, &c.; the majority
+did not know whether the order was carried out, but three of them say
+they saw it done in the forest of Thiaville, where ten or twelve wounded
+French soldiers who had already been spared by a battalion were
+despatched. Two others saw the order carried out on the Thiaville road,
+where some wounded found in a ditch by a company were finished off."[71]
+
+3. The following are extracts from a Proclamation posted by the Germans
+at Namur on August 25, 1914:--
+
+     (3) Every street will be occupied by a German Guard, who will take
+     ten hostages from each street, whom they will keep under
+     surveillance. If there is any rising in the street the ten hostages
+     will be shot.
+
+     (4) Doors may not be locked, and at night after eight o'clock there
+     must be lights in three windows in every house.
+
+     (5) It is forbidden to be in the street after eight o'clock. The
+     inhabitants of Namur must understand that there is no greater and
+     more horrible crime than to compromise the existence of the town
+     and the life of its citizens by criminal acts against the German
+     Army.
+
+                                             The Commander of the Town,
+                                                  VON BULOW.[72]
+
+4. On October 5 the following Proclamation was posted in Brussels "and
+probably in most of the Communes of the Kingdom."
+
+     During the evening of September 25, the railway line and the
+     telegraph wires were destroyed on the line Lovenjoul-Vertryck. In
+     consequence of this, these two localities have had to render an
+     account of this, and had to give hostages in the morning of
+     September 30.
+
+     In future, the localities nearest to the place where similar acts
+     take place will be punished without pity; _it matters little if
+     they are accomplices or not_. For this purpose _hostages have been
+     taken_ from all localities near the railway line thus menaced, and
+     at the first attempt to destroy the railway line, or the telephone
+     or telegraph wires, _they will be immediately shot_.
+
+     Further, all the troops charged with the duty of guarding the
+     railway have been ordered to shoot any person who, in a suspicious
+     manner, approaches the line, or the telegraph or telephone wires.
+
+                    The Governor-General of Belgium,
+                         (S.) BARON VON DER GOLTZ, Field-Marshal.[73]
+
+For purposes of record it should be noted that Lord Bryce's Committee
+mention by name three German Generals whose armies have disgraced
+civilisation; they are those of General Alexander von Kluck, General von
+B�low and General von Hausen.[74]
+
+Some of the main heads of the barbarities of Germany and of the way she
+has violated the recognised rules of International Law, may be set out
+as follows:--[75]
+
+(_a_) The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of
+France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments, and
+by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history
+affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the
+defenceless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been
+in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was
+confiscated, until, in Belgium, an International Commission, largely
+influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices,
+came to the relief of the population, and secured from the German
+Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country,
+though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the
+defenceless population for the support of the German Army.
+
+(_b_) We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the
+barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been
+exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to
+German prison camps. Evidence has been received of the hardships to
+which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps,
+contrasting most unfavourably with the treatment of German prisoners in
+this country. The Germans make no attempt to save sailors from British
+war vessels they sink, although we have saved a large number of German
+sailors in spite of great danger to our men.[76]For example, on May 1,
+1915, in the destroyer action in the North Sea, the Germans imprisoned
+two British sailors below and when their vessel was sinking, saved
+themselves, but left their prisoners to sink below because "time was
+short."
+
+As Lord Kitchener said, Germany "has stooped to acts which will surely
+stain indelibly her military history and which would vie with the
+barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan."[77] On the same day,
+in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister declared: "When we come to
+the end of this war, which, please God, we may, we shall not forget--and
+ought not to forget--this horrible record of calculated cruelty and
+crime, and we shall hold it to be our duty to exact such reparation
+against those who are proved to have been guilty agents or actors in the
+matter, as it may be possible for us to exact. I do not think we should
+be doing our duty to these brave and unfortunate men or to the honour of
+our own country and the plain dictates of humanity if we were content
+with anything less than that."[78]
+
+(_c_) At the very outset of war a German mine-layer was discovered
+laying a mine-field on the high seas. Further mine-fields have been laid
+from time to time without warning, and are still being laid on the high
+seas, and many neutral, as well as British vessels, have been sunk by
+them.
+
+(_d_) At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and
+sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant
+vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at
+all, only as an exception; the general rule, to which the British
+Government have adhered, being that merchant vessels, if captured, must
+be taken before a Prize Court. The Germans have also sunk British
+merchant vessels by torpedo without notice, and without any provision
+for the safety of the crew. They have done this in the case of neutral
+as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and
+innocent lives, unarmed and defenceless, have been destroyed in this
+way. The Germans have sunk without warning emigrant vessels, have tried
+to sink an hospital ship, and have themselves used an hospital ship for
+patrol work and wireless. The torpedoeing of the "Lusitania" on May 7,
+1915, involving the murder of hundreds of innocent civilians--British
+and neutral--was acclaimed with great relish in Berlin.
+
+(_e_) Unfortified, open, and defenceless towns, such as Scarborough,
+Yarmouth and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by
+German ships of war, causing, in some cases, considerable loss of
+civilian life, including women and children.
+
+(_f_) German aircraft have dropped bombs on the East Coast of England,
+in places where there were no military or strategic points to be
+attacked.
+
+(_g_) The Germans have used poisonous gases in killing Allied troops at
+the Front, although Germany was a signatory to the following article in
+the Hague Convention:--
+
+     "The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of
+     projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
+     or deleterious gases."[79]
+
+And finally the German troops in South Africa have poisoned drinking
+wells and infected them with disease.[80]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[64] _Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege._ Berlin, 1902, in the series
+"Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation
+of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been published.
+
+[65] Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.
+
+[66] Cd. 7894, page 9.
+
+[67] See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation
+(1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
+reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
+Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
+Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
+Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
+as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
+Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
+
+[68] Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9, 1914.
+_Lancet_, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.
+
+[69] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of War in Belgium.
+
+[70] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ One of the series of
+"Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm. Ernest
+Lavisse, of the Acad�mie fran�aise, Pr�sident; Charles Andler, professor
+of German literature and language in the University of Paris; Joseph
+B�dier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the
+Acad�mie fran�aise; Emile Boutroux, of the Acad�mie fran�aise; Ernest
+Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim,
+professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Acad�mie
+des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the
+University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the
+University of Paris; Andr� Weiss, of the Acad�mie des Sciences morales
+et politiques.
+
+[71] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ See footnote on page 32.
+
+[72] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of War in Belgium.
+
+[73] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of war in Belgium.
+
+[74] Cd. 7894, page 10.
+
+[75] Most of the points referred to in the following record are to be
+found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note--dated March 15.
+
+[76] Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282 men had
+been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single rescue
+had been effected by German men-of-war.
+
+[77] House of Lords, April 27, 1915.
+
+[78] House of Commons, April 27, 1915.
+
+[79] See Appendix D.
+
+[80] Report _re_ Swakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for Colonies.
+_Times_, May 6, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S ATTEMPTED BRIBERY.
+
+We thus see with what an easy conscience Germany tears up her treaties
+and how she repudiates her most solemn pledges. In light of these facts
+let us examine the rush of promises Germany was prepared to give in
+order to ensure our neutrality in the War.
+
+On July 29, 1914, Germany, having decided on the War in conjunction with
+Austria against Russia and France, made what our Ambassador at Berlin
+called "a strong bid for British neutrality," to which reference has
+been made, on page 14. Provided that Britain remained neutral Germany
+stated that every assurance would be given to Great Britain that the
+German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+France in Europe, should they prove victorious. Germany categorically
+stated that she was unable to give a similar undertaking with reference
+to the French colonies. She made a statement with regard to the
+integrity of Holland, and said that it depended upon the action of
+France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,
+but that when the War was over Belgian integrity would be respected if
+she had not sided against Germany. In other words, Great Britain was to
+stand by and
+
+     =See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;=
+
+     =See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;=
+
+     =Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under
+     the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white
+     by a war indemnity when all was over.=
+
+As Sir Edward Grey replied on July 30: "From the material point of view
+such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory
+in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her
+position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
+Altogether, apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this
+bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
+good name of this country would never recover."[81]
+
+That is the "infamous bargain" which Britain spurned and to which the
+Prime Minister referred on August 6 in the House of Commons, in the
+following words:--
+
+     ="What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day ... if
+     we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to
+     get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of
+     our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise--nothing
+     more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain
+     eventualities; a promise, be it observed--I am sorry to have to say
+     it, but it must be put upon record--given by a Power which was at
+     that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty
+     and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied
+     or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves
+     with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this
+     country, of which we are trustees."=[82]
+
+This suggestion of Germany is not the only infamous proposal she has
+made to Great Britain. She has made them with a persistence worthy of a
+better cause. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin on behalf
+of the Cabinet in order to obtain the basis of a friendly understanding
+between the two countries. What transpired is made clear in a speech
+delivered by Mr. Asquith, at Cardiff, on October 2, 1914, when the Prime
+Minister said:--
+
+     "We laid down in terms, carefully approved by the Cabinet, and
+     which I will textually quote, what our relations to Germany ought,
+     in our view, to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German
+     Government:--
+
+          'Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any
+          unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not
+          the subject, and forms no part of any Treaty, understanding,
+          or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she
+          become a party to anything that has such an object.'
+
+     "There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. But that was
+     not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further.
+     They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the
+     event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a
+     time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and
+     defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us--to
+     put it quite plainly--for a free hand, so far as we were concerned,
+     if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate
+     the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and
+     that was the answer we gave."[83]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[81] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 101.
+
+[82] House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
+
+[83] _South Wales Daily News_, October 3, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+IF BRITAIN HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT.
+
+If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what
+would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the
+Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:--
+
+     "But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would
+     have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or
+     through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a
+     paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough
+     to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?
+
+     "Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the
+     whole civilised world to Belgium--a small State which has lived for
+     more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to
+     which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties--and we
+     should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of
+     these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her
+     independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the
+     easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression
+     against France.
+
+     "We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing
+     by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command,
+     while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her
+     vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and
+     overwhelming force.
+
+     "We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of
+     Li�ge, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the
+     occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories,
+     the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native
+     land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by
+     them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil
+     population, and finally the greatest crime committed against
+     civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War--the sack of
+     Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its
+     unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable
+     treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....
+
+     "For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness--which
+     means in effect a willing accomplice--of this tragic triumph of
+     force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this
+     country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."
+
+Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would
+have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner
+Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in
+the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim
+if she had succeeded in crushing Belgium and France and warding off the
+blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:--
+
+     "We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which
+     nations have always held most dear."
+
+The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few
+years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no
+powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had
+lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX A.
+
+GERMANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED BY
+AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA ON JULY 23, 1914.
+
+
+Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no
+knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary
+to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.
+
+Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Charg�
+d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow
+(German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then
+had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow
+protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that
+Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to
+the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.
+Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the
+Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:--
+
+     "Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
+     who stated to him that at Berlin a _d�marche_ of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.
+     Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were
+     endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but
+     that up to the present time they had not been successful in this,
+     and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a
+     _d�marche_ of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky
+     had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did
+     not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the
+     Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension
+     in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]
+
+Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
+London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold
+back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this
+if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which
+Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression
+given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge
+of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have
+been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.
+
+But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its
+own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6
+p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Alliz�, the
+French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:--
+
+     =" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more
+     or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.=
+
+     ="In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day
+     that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him
+     (dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms
+     which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the
+     existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."=[85]
+
+It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew
+the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at
+Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von
+Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French
+Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:--
+
+     "I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had
+     with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that
+     Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with
+     Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.
+
+     "Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
+     Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government
+     having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....
+     _Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
+     entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were
+     communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I
+     showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support
+     claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less
+     striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the
+     officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they
+     were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to
+     Serbia._"[86]
+
+Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his
+Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated
+July 24, 1914:--
+
+     "I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a
+     surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have
+     despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.
+
+     "Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
+     returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
+     pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
+     and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
+     Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and
+     England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
+     of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
+     that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
+     Germany.
+
+     "The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
+     been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
+     from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so,
+     she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]
+
+Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch
+from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French
+Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from
+Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris), at which the latter
+twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--
+
+     "Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of
+     the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.
+     In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the
+     Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the
+     apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply
+     with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried
+     away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The
+     Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to
+     abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no
+     choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the
+     Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using
+     military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to
+     them.... The German Government consider that in the present case
+     there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
+     between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought
+     seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
+     concerned.
+
+     "The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
+     dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
+     to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable
+     consequences...."[88]
+
+A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German
+Ambassador in London.[89]
+
+Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the
+French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the
+morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and
+presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about
+the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the
+contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.
+Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on
+instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to
+argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have
+us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of
+the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered
+together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully
+handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be
+settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly
+instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.
+
+As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British
+Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was
+both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
+unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]
+
+It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only
+to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve
+months before.
+
+On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti
+(ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:--
+
+     "During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year
+     before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I
+     received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late
+     Foreign Minister), the following telegram:--
+
+          "'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention
+          of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as
+          defensive, hoping to bring into operation the _casus foederis_
+          of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to
+          be inapplicable. (_Sensation._)
+
+          "'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with
+          Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it
+          may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider
+          such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that,
+          therefore, we do not consider that the _casus foederis_
+          arises.
+
+          "'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'
+
+     "I replied:--
+
+          "'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a
+          _casus foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she
+          is taking on her own account, since there is no question of
+          defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It
+          is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
+          to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
+          action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this
+          most perilous adventure.' (_Hear, hear._)
+
+     "This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and
+     recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our
+     relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality
+     made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects
+     to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an
+     interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already
+     accepted by the Allies.
+
+     "I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes
+     of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely
+     loyal to the observance of her pledges." (_Loud applause._)[91]
+
+As the _Times_ of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:--
+
+     "In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the
+     German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to
+     take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England,
+     is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for
+     a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia
+     at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor
+     Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of
+     French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers,
+     but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully
+     thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."
+
+On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the
+heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the
+issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.
+
+Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
+Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting
+Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin
+on July 25 wrote:--
+
+     "The English Charg� d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
+     I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
+     Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
+     reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
+     further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
+     the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]
+
+On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to
+his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:--
+
+     "that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite
+     understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved
+     of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once
+     fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by
+     her duties as an ally."[93]
+
+The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris,
+in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the
+German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):--
+
+     "Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
+     Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
+     only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
+     Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
+     forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
+     situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
+     declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
+     reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
+     Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
+     ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]
+
+A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's
+cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian
+Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25,
+1914:--
+
+     "Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
+     that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
+     Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
+     action."[95]
+
+On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at
+Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--
+
+     "We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
+     certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
+     is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
+     text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
+     influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
+     attributed to Germany.
+
+     "Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
+     made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
+     justified."[96]
+
+That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some
+cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French
+Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:--
+
+     "The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
+     events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
+     Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's d�marche.
+
+     "He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
+     Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
+     chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
+     Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]
+
+From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following
+statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--
+
+     "Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
+     of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
+     her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
+     herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
+     which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
+     conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]
+
+Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his
+Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not
+published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had
+been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of
+the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on
+German readers![99]
+
+On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
+Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:--
+
+     "I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
+     he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
+     make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
+     over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
+     which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
+     intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
+     of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
+     preparing."[100]
+
+But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram
+sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--
+
+     "I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
+     'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
+     promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
+     unreliable."[101]
+
+On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--
+
+     "I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
+     Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
+     information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
+     every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
+     Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
+     according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
+     previous arrangement with the Emperor William.
+
+     "The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
+     peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
+     is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
+     would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
+     share this feeling."[102]
+
+Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in
+Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--
+
+     ="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
+     text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
+     and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
+     Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]
+
+Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for
+as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank,
+stated on January 29, 1915:--
+
+     "On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
+     commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
+     sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
+     semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.
+
+[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.
+
+[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.
+
+[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.
+
+[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.
+
+[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.
+
+[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.
+
+[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.
+
+[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.
+
+[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.
+
+[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.
+
+[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.
+
+[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.
+
+[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.
+
+[98] Cd. 7717, No. 83.
+
+[99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.
+
+[100] Cd. 7717, No. 78.
+
+[101] Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.
+
+[102] Cd. 7717, No. 87.
+
+[103] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX B.
+
+HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
+
+
+Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
+     keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
+     resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
+     territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
+     question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
+     public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
+     said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
+     the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
+     Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
+     perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
+     not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
+     which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
+     Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
+     and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
+     too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
+     Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
+     acting as if she made any such claim. _As for Germany, she knew
+     very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
+     matter._"[104]
+
+Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at
+Berlin, on July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
+     at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
+     annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
+     indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
+     would not act if Austria did _not_ annex territory."[105]
+
+The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador
+in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British
+Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:--
+
+     "Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
+     unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
+     war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]
+
+So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the
+Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador
+in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
+     Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
+     Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
+     inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
+     to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
+     Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
+     administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
+     proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
+     prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
+     would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]
+
+Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:--
+
+     "Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
+     Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
+     conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
+     absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
+     disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
+     occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[104] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 32.
+
+[105] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 33.
+
+[106] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 71.
+
+[107] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 41.
+
+[108] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 38.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX C.
+
+SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.
+
+
+In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government
+to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the
+Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:--
+
+     THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
+     Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
+     Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
+     President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
+     the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
+     Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
+     Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).
+
+     THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
+     of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
+     Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
+     1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
+     of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)
+
+     THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).
+
+     SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
+     Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
+     University, 1913-14).
+
+     MR. H. A. L. FISHER (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
+     Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).
+
+     MR. HAROLD COX, M.A. (Editor, _Edinburgh Review_).
+
+     SIR KENELM E. DIGBY, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
+     State at Home Office, 1895-1903).
+
+This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the
+evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave
+conclusions:--
+
+     "(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and
+     systematically organised massacres of the civil population,
+     accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.
+
+     "(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians,
+     both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated,
+     and children murdered.
+
+     "(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of
+     property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the
+     German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic
+     incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings
+     and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be
+     alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.
+
+     "(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken,
+     particularly by the using of civilians, including women and
+     children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a
+     less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the
+     frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.
+
+     "Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the
+     Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty
+     if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence.
+     Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a
+     scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
+     last three centuries."
+
+The Report makes it plain that apart from the first outbreak of outrages
+intended to cow the Belgians into submission, fresh bursts of plunder
+and rapine took place on specific occasions when the Germans suffered
+defeat. Cowardly vengeance was thus wreaked on the innocent Belgian
+civilians for the defeat of German arms. For example, on August 25,
+1914, the Belgian Army, sallying out from Antwerp, drove the enemy from
+Malines. The Germans promptly massacred and burnt at Louvain, "the
+signal for which was provided by shots exchanged between the German Army
+retreating after its repulse at Malines and some members of the German
+garrison of Louvain, who mistook their fellow-countrymen for
+Belgians."[109] Similarly when a successful sortie from Antwerp drove
+the Germans from Aerschot, they retaliated by a blood-vendetta upon the
+civil population.
+
+The Germans have endeavoured to justify their brutal excesses by
+bringing counter-charges against Belgian civilians. For instance, the
+Chancellor of the German Empire, in a communication made to the press on
+September 2, 1914, and printed in the _Nord Deutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung_, of September 21, said: "Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of
+the German wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our
+officers to dinner, and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary
+to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was
+called out, and after having at first shown friendliness carried on in
+the rear of our troops terrible warfare with concealed weapons. Belgian
+women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes
+while they were sleeping."
+
+Upon this Lord Bryce's Committee make the comment: "No evidence whatever
+seems to have been adduced to prove these tales."[110]
+
+Of both individual and concerted acts of barbarity, the report
+teems--for example:--[111]
+
+     "It is clearly shown that many offences were committed against
+     infants and quite young children. On one occasion children were
+     even roped together and used as a military screen against the
+     enemy, on another three soldiers went into action carrying small
+     children to protect themselves from flank fire. A shocking case of
+     the murder of a baby by a drunken soldier at Malines is thus
+     recorded by one eye-witness and confirmed by another:--
+
+     "'One day when the Germans were not actually bombarding the town I
+     left my house to go to my mother's house in High Street. My husband
+     was with me. I saw eight German soldiers, and they were drunk. They
+     were singing and making a lot of noise and dancing about. As the
+     German soldiers came along the street I saw a small child, whether
+     boy or girl I could not see, come out of a house. The child was
+     about two years of age. The child came into the middle of the
+     street so as to be in the way of the soldiers. The soldiers were
+     walking in twos. The first line of two passed the child; one of the
+     second line, the man on the left, stepped aside and drove his
+     bayonet with both hands into the child's stomach, lifting the child
+     into the air on his bayonet and carrying it away on his bayonet, he
+     and his comrades still singing. The child screamed when the soldier
+     struck it with his bayonet, but not afterwards.'"[112]
+
+The following brief extracts of German atrocities are taken from
+Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation:--[113]
+
+     "On the evening of the 22nd" (August, at Tamines) "a group of
+     between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not
+     far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on
+     them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers
+     ordered up a machine gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy
+     peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and,
+     hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet
+     again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay
+     among the corpses," and some of these were bayoneted....
+
+     "Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about 6 o'clock in the morning,
+     another party consisting of prisoners made in the village and the
+     neighbourhood were brought into the square, ... in the square was a
+     mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6
+     yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot.... An officer
+     asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered
+     were set to work and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad and 2
+     deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks.... Actually
+     fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of
+     their fathers.
+
+     "There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were
+     drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they
+     drank.... We buried from 350 to 400 bodies." ... A wounded man was
+     buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his
+     interment....
+
+     "About 9 in the morning" (at Dinant, August 23) "the German
+     soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-end of rifles,
+     men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square,
+     where they were kept prisoners till 6 o'clock in the evening. The
+     guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be
+     shot. About 6 o'clock a captain separated the men from the women
+     and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry
+     soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them
+     were told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A
+     platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in
+     vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons,
+     and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been
+     no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About 20 of the inhabitants
+     were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make
+     sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens
+     escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two
+     hours, remaining motionless among the corpses, and when night fell
+     succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses
+     were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden."
+
+     "On Friday, August 21st, at 4 o'clock in the morning" (at Andenne,
+     between Namur and Huy) "the" (German) "soldiers spread themselves
+     through the town, driving all the population into the streets and
+     forcing men, women, and children to march before them with their
+     hands in the air. Those who did not obey with sufficient
+     promptitude, or did not understand the order given them in German,
+     were promptly knocked down. Those who tried to run away were shot.
+     It was at this moment that Dr. Camus" (the Burgomaster), "against
+     whom the Germans seemed to have some special spite, was wounded by
+     a rifle shot, and then finished off by a blow from an axe. His body
+     was dragged along by the feet for some distance....
+
+     "Subsequently the soldiers, on the order of their officers, picked
+     out of the mass some 40 or 50 men who were led off and all shot,
+     some along the bank of the Meuse, and others in front of the Police
+     Station.
+
+     "The rest of the men were kept for a long time in the Place. Among
+     them lay two persons, one of whom had received a ball in the chest,
+     and the other a bayonet wound. They lay face to the ground with
+     blood from their wounds trickling into the dust, occasionally
+     calling for water. The officers forbade their neighbours to give
+     them any help.... Both died in the course of the day.... In the
+     morning the officers told the women to withdraw, giving them the
+     order to gather together the dead bodies and to wash away the
+     stains of blood which defiled the street and the houses."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[109] Cd. 7894, p. 14.
+
+[110] Cd. 7894, p. 26.
+
+[111] Professor J. H. Morgan, Representative of the Home Office,
+attached to the Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary Force,
+states in a letter to the _Times_, dated May 20, 1915:--
+
+    " ... There has lately come into my hands--unfortunately too late
+    for use by the Committee--evidence which establishes beyond
+    reasonable doubt that the outrages upon combatants in the field are
+    committed by the orders of responsible officers, such as Brigade and
+    Company Commanders, and that British and Belgian soldiers are the
+    objects of peculiar malignancy.... _There is some evidence to show
+    that the East Prussian and Bavarian regiments are the worst
+    offenders. The French military authorities, who have been of great
+    assistance to me in my inquiries, informed me that they have now a
+    very considerable 'black list' of this character. When the time
+    comes to dictate terms of peace and to exact reparation that list
+    will be very useful...._ In the earlier stages of the war there was
+    a widespread disinclination on the part of our officers and men to
+    credit stories of 'atrocities.' Nothing has impressed me more than
+    the complete change of conviction on this point, especially among
+    our officers. As a Staff Officer of the highest eminence said to me
+    lately, 'The Germans have no sense of honour in the field.' Any
+    sense of the freemasonry of arms has practically disappeared among
+    them, and deliberate killing of the wounded is of frequent
+    occurrence."
+
+[112] Cd. 7894. p. 32.
+
+[113] The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
+reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
+Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
+Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
+Antwerp; M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
+as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
+Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX D.
+
+GERMANY'S EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS GAS.
+
+
+The following is a copy of a Report dated May 3, 1915, by Field-Marshal
+Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as
+weapons of warfare:--
+
+     "The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the
+     trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells especially
+     manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under
+     cover of these gases were provided with specially designed
+     respirators, which were issued in sealed pattern covers. This all
+     points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale.
+
+     "A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in
+     their official _communiqu�_ that we were making use of asphyxiating
+     gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this
+     astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was
+     part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature
+     of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and
+     shows that they recognised its illegality and were anxious to
+     forestall neutral, and possibly domestic, criticism.
+
+     "Since the enemy first made use of this method of covering his
+     advance with a cloud of poisoned air he has repeated it both in
+     offence and defence whenever the wind has been favourable.
+
+     "The effect of this poison is not merely disabling, or even
+     painlessly fatal, as suggested in the German Press. Those of its
+     victims who do not succumb on the field, and who can be brought
+     into hospital, suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases
+     die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little
+     better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a
+     permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to
+     their being invalids for life. These effects must be well known to
+     the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the
+     military authorities who have sanctioned its use.
+
+     "I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these
+     gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless."
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX E.
+
+EFFORTS OF GERMAN MINISTERS OF STATE TO LAY BLAME ON BRITAIN.
+
+
+Since the war, both the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von
+Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, have
+endeavoured to explain away the former's phrase: "a scrap of paper,"
+which shocked the diplomatic conscience of the world. Both have
+endeavoured to lay the blame for the conflict at Great Britain's
+door.[114] The German Imperial Chancellor now declares that:--
+
+     "Documents on the Anglo-Belgian Military Agreement which ... we
+     have found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office ... showed
+     that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium
+     without the consent of the Belgian Government."[115]
+
+The true facts of the case are to be seen in the following extract from
+the statement issued by the Belgian Minister in London, on March 17,
+1915:--
+
+     "A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
+     discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which
+     had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military
+     Attach�s and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
+     to transform these reports into documents which would justify
+     Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
+     was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
+     be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a
+     shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German
+     Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium
+     had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own
+     neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on
+     those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the
+     pr�cis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause
+     in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein
+     recorded _did reference only to the situation that would be created
+     if Belgian neutrality had already been violated_. The Belgian
+     Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only
+     answer that they deserve--they are a tissue of lies, all the more
+     shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have
+     studied the original documents.
+
+     "But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to
+     prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:--
+
+     "(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between
+     Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the
+     course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views
+     as to the way in which England could help Belgium _in case the
+     latter were attacked by Germany_. One phrase in the document
+     clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a
+     hypothetical case--viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium
+     would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by
+     Germany.' The translation in the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ of November
+     25 _omits this clause_, the phrase which gives its exact scope and
+     significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General
+     Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke
+     insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.'
+     For the word _conversation_ the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ substitutes
+     the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that
+     'our convention' has been absolutely confidential![116]
+
+     "Such proceedings need no commentary.
+
+     "(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
+     same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
+     and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
+     the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
+     favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression,
+     could only take place with our consent.' The British Military
+     Attach� raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her
+     rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium,
+     without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel
+     Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always
+     held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter
+     was a necessary preliminary.
+
+     "The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no
+     'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
+     Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
+     conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
+     Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
+     behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole
+     Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no
+     conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought
+     before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.
+     The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all
+     this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
+     them is either garbled or suppressed.
+
+     "In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government,
+     faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its
+     duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
+     infamy--his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity
+     of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is
+     obvious, that:--
+
+     "(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
+     smallest size, had entered Belgium.
+
+     "(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
+     offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the
+     declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her
+     guarantors.
+
+     "(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her
+     fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such
+     help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
+     that defence.
+
+     "Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
+     before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She
+     has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the
+     triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
+     serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."
+
+In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement
+authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:--
+
+     "As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the
+     British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and
+     in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical
+     assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality
+     of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other
+     Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
+     territory.'
+
+     "The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated
+     in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did
+     not believe England would take such a step, because he did not
+     think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir
+     Edward Grey actually wrote was:--'I said that I was sure that this
+     Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
+     Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
+     the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of
+     it.'
+
+     "If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
+     conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian
+     officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him,
+     namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of
+     strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
+     frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract--railways
+     deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium,
+     such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough
+     to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on
+     the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality
+     unless it were previously violated by another Power...."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[114] Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the _New York World_, March 28,
+1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the Associated Press,
+in New York papers, January 25, 1915.
+
+[115] No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing reference
+only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912
+"conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole
+foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.
+
+[116] In a letter to the _Morning Post_ of February 8, 1915, Mr. A.
+Hamon, Professor de l'Universit�, Nouville de Bruxelles, writes:--
+
+     "In October and November last (13th and 24th) the _Norddeutsche
+     Allgemeine Zeitung_ published the documents seized by the Germans
+     in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a
+     Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic
+     reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of
+     R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The
+     Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The
+     entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
+     violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely
+     important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also
+     omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through
+     omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning
+     of the document.
+
+     "But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's
+     letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this
+     fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the
+     Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention'
+     (overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely
+     made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is
+     to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX F.
+
+LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.
+
+
+Correspondence respecting the European Crisis. Misc. No. 6 (1914).
+
+Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government. Despatch
+from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 8 (1914).
+
+German Organisation for Influencing the Press of other Countries.
+Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 9 (1914).
+
+Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
+Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Misc. 10 (1914).
+
+Documents respecting Negotiations preceding the War published by the
+Russian Government. Misc. No. 11 (1914).
+
+Papers relating to the Support offered by the Princes and Peoples of
+India to His Majesty in connection with the War. (I.O. paper.)
+
+Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the Belgian
+Government. Misc. No. 12 (1914).
+
+Correspondence respecting Events leading to the Rupture of Relations
+with Turkey. Misc. No. 13 (1914).
+
+Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising
+Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey and Reply. Misc.
+No. 14 (1914).
+
+Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the French
+Government. Misc. No. 15 (1914).
+
+Despatch to Sir H. Howard containing instruction respecting his Mission
+to the Vatican. Misc. No. 1 (1914).
+
+Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the War.
+Despatch from Petrograd enclosing Memo. Misc. No. 2 (1915).
+
+Letter July 31/14 from President of French Republic to the King
+respecting the European Crisis, and His Majesty's Reply. Misc. No. 3
+(1915).
+
+Treatment of German Prisoners in United Kingdom. Correspondence with the
+U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 5 (1915).
+
+Rights of Belligerents: Correspondence with U.S. Government. Misc. No. 6
+(1915).
+
+Treatment of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in the U.K. and
+Germany respectively: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government
+and U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 7 (1915).
+
+Release of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Diplomatic. &c.,
+Officers, and of certain classes of Naval and Military Officers,
+Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Misc.
+No. 8 (1915).
+
+Sinking of German Cruiser "Dresden" in Chilean Territorial Waters: Notes
+exchanged with the Chilean Minister. Misc. No. 9 (1915).
+
+List of certain Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Public
+Questions arising out of the War.
+
+Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas: Report and
+Statistics.
+
+Alleged German Outrages: Report of Committee.
+
+Alleged German Outrages: Appendix to Report of Committee.
+
+Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European
+War. Misc. No. 10 (1915).
+
+Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain
+places of detention in Germany: Report by United States Officials. Misc.
+No. 11 (1915).
+
+Correspondence regarding the Naval and Military Assistance afforded to
+His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions. (Cd. 7607.)
+
+Correspondence relating to Gifts of Food-Stuffs and other Supplies to
+His Majesty's Government from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd.
+7608.)
+
+Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies.
+(Cd. 7646.)
+
+Papers relating to Scales of Pensions and Allowances of Officers and Men
+of the Oversea Contingents and their Dependents. (Cd. 7793.)
+
+Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military
+Expedition against German South-West Africa. (Cd. 7873.)
+
+Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government
+with regard to its suppression. (Cd. 7874.)
+
+Further Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and
+Colonies. (Cd. 7875.)
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+The transcriber made this change to the text to correct an obvious
+error:
+
+  1. p. 34, "appproaches" --> "approaches"
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE***
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+<body>
+<h1 class="pg">The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Great War and How It Arose, by Anonymous</h1>
+<pre class="pg">
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "http://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: The Great War and How It Arose</p>
+<p>Author: Anonymous</p>
+<p>Release Date: May 14, 2011  [eBook #36100]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE***</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<h3 class="pg">E-text prepared by Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer,<br />
+    and Distributed Proofreading volunteers<br />
+    (http://www.pgdp.net)<br />
+    for Project Gutenberg</h3>
+<div class="trans-note">
+<p class="heading">Transcriber's Note</p>
+<p>Every effort has been made to replicate this text as
+faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings and other
+inconsistencies.  Text that has been changed to correct an obvious error
+is noted at the <a href="#END">end</a> of this ebook.</p>
+<p>Many occurrences of mismatched single and double quotation marks remain
+as they were in the original.</p>
+</div>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="pg" />
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+
+<h1>The Great War<br />
+
+<small>and</small><br />
+
+How it arose</h1>
+
+<p><br /></p>
+
+<h4> 1915</h4>
+
+<h4>Parliamentary Recruiting Committee<br />
+12, Downing Street, London, S.W.</h4>
+
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS.</h2>
+
+<div class="center">
+<table class="toc" summary="TOC">
+<tr><td align="left">&nbsp;</td><td align="right"><span class="sc">page.</span></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#SERBIAS_POSITION">Serbia's Position</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_3">3</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#RUSSIAS_POSITION">Russia's Position</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_6">6</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#GERMANYS_POSITION">Germany's Position</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_6">6</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#ITALYS_POSITION">Italy's Position</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#GERMANYS_SELECTED_MOMENT">Germany's Selected Moment</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#PEACE_THWARTED_BY_GERMANY">Peace Thwarted by Germany</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_10">10</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_12">12</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_13">13</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_14">14</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_15">15</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#GERMAN_MILITARISM_WINS">German Militarism Wins</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_17">17</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#HOW_FRANCE_CAME_IN">How France Came In</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#HOW_GREAT_BRITAIN_CAME_IN">How Great Britain Came In</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_19">19</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#WAR_WITH_AUSTRIA">War with Austria</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_22">22</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#JAPANS_ULTIMATUM_TO_GERMANY">Japan's Ultimatum to Germany</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_22">22</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#DECLARATION_OF_COMMON_POLICY">Allies' Declaration of Common Policy</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_23">23</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#TURKEY_JOINS_GERMANY">Turkey Joins Germany</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_24">24</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#MORE_GERMAN_INTRIGUES">More German Intrigues</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_26">26</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">The Near East</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_26">26</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">The Far East</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_27">27</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">West Africa</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_28">28</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td class="left indent">South Africa</td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_28">28</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#HOW_THE_GERMANS_MAKE_WAR">How the Germans Make War</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_29">29</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#GERMANYS_ATTEMPTED_BRIBERY">Germany's Attempted Bribery</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_36">36</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td align="center">APPENDIXES.</td></tr>
+<tr><td>&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_A">A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_B">B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_46">46</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_C">C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_48">48</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_D">D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_E">E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on England</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_52">52</a></td></tr>
+<tr><td align="left"><a href="#APPENDIX_F">F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War</a></td><td align="right"><a href="#Page_55">55</a></td></tr>
+</table></div>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p>
+<h2><a name="THE_GREAT_WAR" id="THE_GREAT_WAR"></a>THE GREAT WAR.</h2>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="SERBIAS_POSITION" id="SERBIAS_POSITION"></a>SERBIA'S POSITION.</h2>
+
+
+<p>On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess
+were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian
+subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had
+been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
+dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
+authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was
+an innocent and harmless individual."<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> After a "magisterial"
+investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the
+Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually
+conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on
+July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were
+the chief terms<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
+their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
+declaration:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
+against Austria-Hungary&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the general tendency of which the
+final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
+territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
+consequences of these criminal proceedings.</p>
+
+<p>"'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
+functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."</p>
+
+<p>"The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:</p>
+
+<p>"To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
+of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
+is directed against its territorial integrity; ...</p>
+
+<p>"To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
+as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
+instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
+propaganda against Austria-Hungary;</p>
+
+<p>"To remove from the military service, and from the administration
+in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
+against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
+Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
+communicating to the Royal Government;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
+movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
+Monarchy;</p>
+
+<p>"To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
+the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
+relating thereto."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (<i>a</i>) to admit a guilt which
+was not hers; (<i>b</i>) to condemn officers in her army without trial at
+Austria's direction<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a>; (<i>c</i>) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense
+such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words,
+Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all
+these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours&mdash;until 6
+p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the
+specified time, sent her reply<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a>, which amounted to an acceptance of
+Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary
+for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an
+explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the
+participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial
+proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power&mdash;Germany
+not excepted&mdash;had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
+Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
+the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
+that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so
+drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature
+of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same
+evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general
+mobilisation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an
+hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
+the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented
+itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna
+through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed
+on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the
+British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a
+pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.</p>
+
+<p>As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the
+Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the
+Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there
+were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be
+expected to accept."<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p>
+
+<p>During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at
+peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
+extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable
+settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain
+asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that
+Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.</p>
+
+<p>Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
+Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of
+conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself
+ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria
+and Russia became threatening."</p>
+
+<p>Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade
+were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet
+Austria.</p>
+
+<p>But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
+expired.</p>
+
+<p>The British Charg� d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true
+object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
+beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
+gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
+here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
+under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
+Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
+with Serbian rule."<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan
+settlement to which she and Germany had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> been parties so recently as
+1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan
+peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest
+right down to the �gean Sea.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 4.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at
+the Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Serbia ...
+must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria should subsequently
+name. Those officers had just emerged from a war where they had added
+lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant, brave and efficient. I
+wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted
+Austria's action! But, mark you, the officers were not named; Serbia was
+to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army, the names to be
+sent in subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would
+have stood that? Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of
+that kind to this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army&mdash;and
+from your Navy&mdash;all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.'
+Well, I think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
+French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am sure
+that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another gallant
+old warrior who would go&mdash;Lord Roberts. It was a difficult situation for
+a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military
+power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the field for every one of
+Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by the greatest military
+Power (Germany) in the world."</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 39.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 46.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 82.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="RUSSIAS_POSITION" id="RUSSIAS_POSITION"></a>RUSSIA'S POSITION.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23,
+1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
+Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that
+any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be
+regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like
+the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great
+War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the
+Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being
+in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated,
+then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a
+question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the
+deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
+people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the
+Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
+Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in
+danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey
+said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a
+commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
+the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
+retested during the last decade.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="GERMANYS_POSITION" id="GERMANYS_POSITION"></a>GERMANY'S POSITION.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book
+which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case
+prior to the outbreak of hostilities,<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> in the following terms:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<b>The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for
+our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him
+(Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with
+our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
+attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
+the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
+accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our
+ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> dignity,
+nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
+all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
+continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
+Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
+gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
+under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
+untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.</b></p>
+
+<p>"<b>A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom
+we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
+able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
+Easterly and Westerly neighbours.</b></p>
+
+<p>"<i><b>We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
+action towards Serbia.</b></i>"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that
+the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the
+following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to
+Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<b>Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
+counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.</b></p>
+
+<p>"<b>But mobilisation means war.</b></p>
+
+<p>"<b>As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
+mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....</b>"</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Here, then, we have the plain admission:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
+France.</p>
+
+<p>That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
+calculated extent of starting a great European war.</p>
+
+<p>That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
+"could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
+Italy in this Official document.</p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span></p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck
+und Verlag: Liebheit &amp; Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30,
+1914, Mons. Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Herr von Jagow then
+spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier; he
+told me that this mobilisation compromised the success of all
+intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added
+that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a
+partial Russian mobilisation, and this might cause as a counter-measure
+complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany.
+</p><p>
+"I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
+that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia
+mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not being done. He
+replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were
+insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German
+army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a
+firm engagement on his part.'"</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="ITALYS_POSITION" id="ITALYS_POSITION"></a>ITALY'S POSITION.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above
+machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she
+had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar
+enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian
+Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San
+Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with
+the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval
+of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence
+identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present
+Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to
+be a <i>casus foederis</i> under the Triple Alliance&mdash;which is purely a
+treaty of defence&mdash;involving Italy's military assistance on the side of
+Austria and Germany.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti)
+replied<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a <i>casus
+foederis</i> cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
+on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
+as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
+declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
+Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her
+neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed
+with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained
+neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the
+aggressors&mdash;not Russia and France.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> By not consulting Italy on the
+subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the
+fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led
+Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th,
+1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th,
+1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Cd. 7860.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 152.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="GERMANYS_SELECTED_MOMENT" id="GERMANYS_SELECTED_MOMENT"></a>GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at
+her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or
+unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, <i>Germany and the
+Next Great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> War</i>: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us
+as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary
+and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of
+success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and
+Austria chose their moment well.</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>(1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
+Belgrade.</p>
+
+<p>(2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
+Ministers were away electioneering.</p>
+
+<p>(3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
+Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
+the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
+consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
+(Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p>
+
+<p>(4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister
+were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La
+France."</p>
+
+<p>(5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had
+left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by
+the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get
+things done in time.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the
+messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular
+time:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>(1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be
+humiliated, whilst Austria&mdash;Germany's ally&mdash;would be strengthened
+by the conquest of Serbia; and</p>
+
+<p>(2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought
+with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass
+from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her
+disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of �50,000,000, and had added
+enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a
+pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be
+little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling
+for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary
+the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and
+France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the
+worst, she and Austria-Hungary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> would be in a position to beat them
+both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth
+as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><b>Russia.</b>&mdash;Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles,
+which it was thought might end in revolution.</p>
+
+<p><b>France.</b>&mdash;France was passing through a period of political chaos, no
+Government being able to hold together for more than a few weeks.
+And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to inquire and
+report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various defensive
+preparations.</p>
+
+<p><b>Belgium.</b>&mdash;Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army which
+would have gradually increased it to almost double its present
+strength.</p>
+
+<p><b>Britain.</b>&mdash;Germany thought the Irish and general political position
+in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united front in
+foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to fight.
+The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad
+incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality
+and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her
+friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly
+crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27,
+1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:&mdash;"I have
+been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
+circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
+aside."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and
+Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia,
+Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our
+neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually
+declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for
+what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a
+treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great
+Britain <i>and</i> Germany!<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> The whole case is put in a nutshell in the
+despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in
+which he says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<b>I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
+the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his
+action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
+Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter
+the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
+their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
+approval of Germany.</b>"<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> See Appendix "B."</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 47.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, Nos. 80, 99 and
+160.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 141.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="PEACE_THWARTED_BY_GERMANY" id="PEACE_THWARTED_BY_GERMANY"></a>PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the
+whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion&mdash;that both countries were
+determined to force their point, even<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> at the risk of a European war. As
+showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict,
+they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with
+which they were blocked in Berlin:&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<p><i>(I.)&mdash;Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to
+Serbia.</i></p>
+
+<p>On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the
+forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Russian Charg� d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had
+been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse
+our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> How
+Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made
+plain in the despatch from the Russian Charg� d'Affaires at Berlin on
+the same day:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the
+British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to
+extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in
+the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time,
+his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the
+wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined
+to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance
+of Serbia."<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<p><i>(II.)&mdash;The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and
+Serbia.</i></p>
+
+<p>When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was
+refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing
+or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The
+Austrian Ambassador explained that:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it
+should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in
+the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would
+be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate
+departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without,
+however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charg� d'Affaires
+at Berlin, July 24, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march
+into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should
+march to help Serbia; it would be very<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> desirable to get Austria
+not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But
+none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany
+would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should
+inform Secretary of State."<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British
+Charg� d'Affaires in Berlin:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
+Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be
+to break off diplomatic relations and commence military
+preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German
+Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of
+mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had
+urged yesterday should be delayed."<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be
+seen in the Despatch from the British Charg� d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir
+Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
+German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
+Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
+favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast
+contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.</p>
+
+<p>"Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
+communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
+associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
+Government do not see their way to going beyond this."<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<p><i>(III.)&mdash;Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers.</i></p>
+
+<p>On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador
+that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence
+being effective was:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should
+work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour
+of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and
+Russia becoming threatening."<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to
+our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the
+following effect:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct
+Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and
+Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the
+purpose of discovering an issue which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span> would prevent complications?
+You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
+this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of
+the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at
+Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request
+that all active military operations should be suspended pending
+results of conference."<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The Powers, <i>with the exception of Germany</i>, consented. Germany again
+proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following
+Despatch from the British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated
+July 27, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
+practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his
+opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
+Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
+desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
+I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
+arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
+directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
+dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
+as you proposed was not practicable."<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
+me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government,
+to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that
+events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late
+to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the
+basis of discussion."<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<p><i>(IV.)&mdash;Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia
+and Austria-Hungary might take.</i></p>
+
+<p>How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the
+four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which
+Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward
+Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of
+conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations �
+quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German
+Government should suggest <i>any method</i> by which the influence of
+the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between
+Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of
+mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation
+by <i>any method that Germany could suggest</i> if mine was not<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>
+acceptable. <i>In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by
+any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
+'press the button' in the interests of peace.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from
+the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30,
+1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the
+button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he
+had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
+been precipitated rather than otherwise."<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His
+appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About
+midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's
+Ambassador at Berlin.<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> The German Chancellor had sent for him late at
+night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in
+a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from
+France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany
+would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained
+passive, no territory would be taken from her.</p>
+
+<p>Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an
+exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace.
+That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If
+Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great
+Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the
+whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the
+scale of peace in years to come.</p>
+
+
+<p><i>(V.)&mdash;Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary.</i></p>
+
+<p>Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four
+Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in
+recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed
+that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count
+Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought
+that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result,
+and that it would be best before doing anything else to await
+outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
+Governments."<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British
+Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct
+between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
+would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that,
+but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government
+have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the
+Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to
+discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
+means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to
+get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations
+thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the
+following Despatch from the Russian Charg� d'Affaires in Berlin, dated
+July 27, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
+in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia)
+"should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of
+views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which
+would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign
+Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal
+and that he agreed with Pourtal�s" (German Ambassador in Russia)
+"that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go
+on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
+Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
+insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that <i>he
+could not advise Austria to give way</i>."<a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made
+apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported
+on July 28, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs)
+"replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and
+of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg
+Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
+Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the
+energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no
+longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the
+Austro-Hungarian note."<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<p><i>(VI.)&mdash;Russia's Final Attempt at Peace.</i></p>
+
+<p>Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is
+indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> for Foreign Affairs
+to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome,
+in the following terms:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether
+Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might
+give&mdash;that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of
+Serbia&mdash;and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we
+would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him
+the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
+action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question
+has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready
+to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the
+sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military
+preparations.'</p>
+
+<p>"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
+Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to
+do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question,
+for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order
+that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military
+preparations."<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch
+from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors
+abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British
+Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
+of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in
+the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I
+replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send
+you the text of the modified formula, which is as  follows:&mdash;</p>
+<blockquote><p>"'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
+Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between
+Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest,
+she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and
+decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the
+Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a
+sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to
+maintain her waiting attitude."<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a></p></blockquote></blockquote>
+
+
+<p>The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey,
+for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1,
+he says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only
+a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
+begins war.</p>
+
+<p>"The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
+Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to
+accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections
+raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.</p>
+
+<p>"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
+ready to converse, and I hope that German Government<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> may be able
+to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
+order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
+abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by
+the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1,
+1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French
+Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria,
+far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,
+was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against
+Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much
+exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the
+French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of
+'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried
+out."<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government
+appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all
+efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is
+given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1,
+in the following terms:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the
+instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by
+midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only
+against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government
+would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my
+enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the
+negative, but added that we were very near it."<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put
+it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward
+Grey:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
+were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
+ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
+intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
+St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
+only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
+the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. <i>A few days' delay
+might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
+calamities in history.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 12.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 16.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 25.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 34.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 11.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 36.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 43.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 75.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 84.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 107.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, Nos. 85 and 101.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 43.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 84.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 38.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 45.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 60.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 67.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 131.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 73.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 70.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 161.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="GERMAN_MILITARISM_WINS" id="GERMAN_MILITARISM_WINS"></a>GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by
+Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an
+excuse. Germany's alliance with<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> Austria was "defensive." She was bound
+to join with Austria only in case of the latter being <i>attacked</i> by
+Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while
+Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a
+party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna
+on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador
+(at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia <i>before it
+was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor</i>. I know from
+the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a></p>
+
+<p>Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia
+knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated
+and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the
+Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.</p>
+
+<p>The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French
+Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the
+Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the
+German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> What has actually
+happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.</p>
+
+<p>The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign
+Office introduction to <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
+an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
+mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for
+the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
+overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
+said is that, <i>according to the information in the possession of
+His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time
+proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general
+mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next
+day, the 1st August</i>. France also began to mobilise on that day.
+The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal
+from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy
+until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the
+German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.
+Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great
+Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the
+Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her
+troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a
+collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday
+morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small
+independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the
+Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.
+The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had
+become inevitable."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 95.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No.
+105&mdash;Enclosure 3.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="HOW_FRANCE_CAME_IN" id="HOW_FRANCE_CAME_IN"></a>HOW FRANCE CAME IN.</h2>
+
+
+<p>France, by her alliance with Russia, was bound to stand by Russia if she
+was attacked by Germany and Austria. On July 31 the German Ambassador at
+Paris informed the French Government that Russia had ordered a complete
+mobilisation, and that Germany had given Russia twelve hours in which to
+order demobilisation and asking France to define her attitude. France
+was given no time, and war came, when German troops at once crossed the
+French frontier. Germany, by her attitude towards France, plainly
+admitted that she was the aggressor. She made no pretence of any cause
+of quarrel with France, but attacked her because of France's defensive
+alliance with Russia.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="HOW_GREAT_BRITAIN_CAME_IN" id="HOW_GREAT_BRITAIN_CAME_IN"></a>HOW GREAT BRITAIN CAME IN.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Great Britain was primarily drawn in to save Belgium. We were bound by a
+Treaty (1839) to which Germany and France were also parties,
+guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When Germany attacked France in
+1870, Prince Bismarck gave Belgium a written declaration&mdash;which he said
+was superfluous in view of the Treaty in existence&mdash;that the German
+Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium,
+provided that neutrality were respected by the other belligerent Powers.</p>
+
+<p>France has been faithful to her Treaty. She even left her Belgian
+frontier unfortified. On August 3, 1914, on the verge of war, our
+position was made plain by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, when
+he said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be
+a most important element in our policy&mdash;a most important subject
+for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar
+terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us
+to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were
+prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of
+Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government
+this  reply:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality
+of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other
+Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
+under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her
+security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given
+several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to
+the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
+has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian
+Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.'</p></blockquote></blockquote>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"From the German Government the reply  was:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
+possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the
+Imperial Chancellor.'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>"Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
+answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long
+delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir
+Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they
+could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail,
+in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing,
+to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign."<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<p>This clearly indicated that Germany would not respect the neutrality of
+Belgium, and the day after Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 4, the
+German Army had penetrated Belgium on its way to France after a
+peremptory notice to the Belgian Government to the effect that the
+Imperial Government "will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
+out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered
+indispensable." Thus began the nightmare of German "Kultur," to which
+unoffending Belgium was subjected, and against which she appealed to the
+British Government: "Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and
+Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a>
+On August 4 Great Britain asked Germany for a definite assurance by
+midnight that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. Germany's
+attitude is unmistakable in the following report of an interview by our
+Ambassador in Berlin with the German Secretary of State:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
+answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having
+crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been
+already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why
+the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely,
+that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
+way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and
+endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.</p>
+
+<p>"It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
+the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
+paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
+through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+time.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for
+bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action
+was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
+inexhaustible supply of troops....</p>
+
+<p>"I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
+might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
+seeing him.... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency
+at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
+said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
+to a degree; just for a word&mdash;'neutrality,' a word which in war
+time had so often been disregarded&mdash;just for a scrap of paper Great
+Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.... He held Great
+Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
+I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
+same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
+strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
+advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
+would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
+'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should
+keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
+or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
+Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will
+that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
+that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
+of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
+solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently
+overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
+reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
+argument."<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Thus, when midnight struck on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, it found us at
+war with Germany for tearing up the "scrap of paper" which was Britain's
+bond.<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> And earlier in the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. von
+Bethmann Hollweg, in the course of a remarkable speech in the Reichstag,
+admitted the naked doctrine, that German "necessity"<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> overrides every
+consideration of right and wrong, in the following words:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"<b>Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows
+no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps" (as a
+matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that
+morning) "are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary
+to the dictates of international law.... The wrong&mdash;I speak
+openly&mdash;that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as
+soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
+threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest
+possessions can have only one thought&mdash;how he is to hack his way
+through (wie er sich durchhaut)!</b>"<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, Part II.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> Statements by Prime Minister, House of Commons, August 4
+and 5, 1914.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 160.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> See Appendix E.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> The <i>Times</i>, August 11, 1914.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="WAR_WITH_AUSTRIA" id="WAR_WITH_AUSTRIA"></a>WAR WITH AUSTRIA.</h2>
+
+
+<p>From now onwards we were definitely allied with France in defence of
+Belgium's neutrality.</p>
+
+<p>At 6 p.m. on August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.</p>
+
+<p>On August 12 Sir Edward Grey was compelled to inform Count Mensdorff
+(Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) at the request of the French
+Government, that a complete rupture having occurred between France and
+Austria, a state of war between Great Britain and Austria would be
+declared from midnight of August 12.</p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="JAPANS_ULTIMATUM_TO_GERMANY" id="JAPANS_ULTIMATUM_TO_GERMANY"></a>JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.</h2>
+
+
+<p>On August 17 the text of an ultimatum by Japan to Germany was published
+in the following terms:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
+situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance
+of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interests as
+contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
+Britain.</p>
+
+<p>"In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
+establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
+Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty
+to give advice to the Imperial German Government, to carry out the
+following two  propositions:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
+the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to
+disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
+Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or
+compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a
+view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>"The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that
+in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23 an answer
+from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional
+acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
+Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may
+deem necessary to meet the situation."<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> Under Art. II of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, signed on
+July 13, 1911, it was agreed that if the two contracting parties should
+conduct a war in common, they should make peace in mutual agreement,
+etc.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="BRITISH_APPROVAL" id="BRITISH_APPROVAL"></a>BRITISH APPROVAL.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The Official Press Bureau issued the following on August 17:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
+communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary
+for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far
+East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially
+in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for
+in that Agreement.</p>
+
+<p>"It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the
+Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be
+necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor
+beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any
+foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the
+Continent of Eastern Asia."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="DECLARATION_OF_COMMON_POLICY" id="DECLARATION_OF_COMMON_POLICY"></a>DECLARATION OF COMMON POLICY.</h2>
+
+
+<p>On September 5, 1914, the British Official Press Bureau issued the
+following statement from the Foreign Office:&mdash;</p>
+
+
+<blockquote><p class="heading">DECLARATION.</p>
+
+<p>The undersigned duly authorised thereto by the respective
+Governments hereby declare as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to
+conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
+Governments<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no
+one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous
+agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the
+undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto
+their seals.</p>
+
+<p>Done at London in triplicate, the 5th day of September, 1914.</p>
+
+<p class="ltr-right1">
+E. Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of<br />
+State for Foreign Affairs.<br />
+<br />
+Paul Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and<br />
+Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.<br />
+<br />
+Benckendorff, Ambassador Extraordinary and<br />
+Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.<br />
+</p></blockquote>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="TURKEY_JOINS_GERMANY" id="TURKEY_JOINS_GERMANY"></a>TURKEY JOINS GERMANY.</h2>
+
+
+<p>Directly war broke out the Turkish Army was mobilised, under the supreme
+command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands.<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> Although
+the Turkish Government had declared their intention of preserving their
+neutrality, they took no steps to ensure its maintenance. They forfeited
+their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships, "Goeben"
+and "Breslau," which, fleeing from the Allied Fleets, had entered the
+Dardanelles on August 10.</p>
+
+<p>Instead of interning these war vessels with their crews, as they were
+repeatedly asked to do by the Allied Governments, the Turkish Government
+allowed the German Admiral and his men to remain on board, and while
+this was the case the German Government were in a position to force the
+hand of the Turkish Government whenever it suited them to do so.</p>
+
+<p>In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was
+exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in
+the European War was said to be assured; the perpetual menace to Turkey
+from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by an alliance with
+Germany and Austria; Egypt might be recovered for the Empire; India and
+other Moslem countries would rise against Christian rule, to the great
+advantage of the Caliphate of Constantinople; Turkey would emerge from
+the War the one great power of the East, even as Germany would be the
+one great power of the West. Such was the substance of German
+misrepresentations.</p>
+
+<p>Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, and by the
+conviction of the superiority of German arms, proved a most active agent
+on behalf of Germany.</p>
+
+<p>A strong German element was imported into the remainder of the Turkish
+Fleet, even before the British Naval Mission, which had been reduced to
+impotence by order of the Minister<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> of Marine, was recalled by His
+Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from
+Germany to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
+and at other crucial points.</p>
+
+<p>Numerous German merchant vessels served as bases of communication, and
+as auxiliaries to what had become in effect the German Black Sea Fleet.
+Secret communications with the German General Staff were established by
+means of the "Corcovado," which was anchored opposite the German Embassy
+at Therapia. The German Military Mission in Turkey acted in closest
+touch with the Turkish Militarist Party. They were the main organisers
+of those military preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt.</p>
+
+<p>Emissaries of Enver Pasha bribed and organised the Bedouins on the
+frontier; the Syrian towns were full of German officers, who provided
+large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. The Khedive of
+Egypt, who was in Constantinople, was himself a party to the conspiracy,
+and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his
+presence with a military expedition across the frontier. All the Turkish
+newspapers in Constantinople and most of the provincial papers became
+German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany
+or Austria, and minimised everything favourable to the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>Millions of money were consigned from Germany to the German Embassy in
+Constantinople, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank.
+At one time these sums amounted to �4,000,000. A definite arrangement
+was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Turkish Ministers,
+including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should
+declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a
+stated figure.</p>
+
+<p>The final point was reached when Odessa and other Russian ports in the
+Black Sea were attacked by the Turkish Fleet on October 29, 1914. It is
+now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the
+German Admiral on the evening of October 27.</p>
+
+<p>On October 30 the Russian Ambassador asked for his passports and there
+was nothing left but for the British and French Ambassadors to demand
+theirs on the same day. The Russian Ambassador left Constantinople on
+October 31, while the British and French Ambassadors left the following
+evening.<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a></p>
+
+<p>Thenceforward the Turks, at the instigation of the Germans,
+unsuccessfully endeavoured to raise Mahomedans in all countries against
+Great Britain and her Allies. The Sultan of Turkey, misusing his
+position as Padishah and Titular<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> Head of the Moslems, gave a perverted
+history of the events and proclaimed a Holy War. The Sultan, in his
+speech from the Throne on December 14, 1914 (at which ceremony the
+ex-Khedive of Egypt was present), said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We were just in the best way to give reforms in the interior a
+fresh impetus when suddenly the great crisis broke out. While our
+Government was firmly resolved to observe the strictest neutrality,
+our Fleet was attacked in the Black Sea by the Russian Fleet.
+England and France then began actual hostilities by sending troops
+to our frontiers. Therefore I declared a state of war. These
+Powers, as a necessity, compelled us to resist by armed force the
+policy of destruction which at all times was pursued against the
+Islamic world by England, Russia, and France, and assumed the
+character of a religious persecution. In conformity with the Fetwas
+I called all Moslems to a Holy War against these Powers and those
+who would help them."<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>What the Moslems of India thought of the situation is succinctly shown
+by a speech delivered on October 1, 1914, by the Agha Khan, the
+spiritual head of the Khoja community of Mahomedans and President of the
+All-India Moslem League.<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> He said he had always been convinced that
+Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Turkey and other Moslem
+countries, for she was the Power most anxious to enter by "peaceful
+penetration" Asia Minor and Southern Persia. But she had been posing for
+years past as a sort of protector of Islam&mdash;<i>though Heaven forbid that
+they should have such an immoral protector</i>.</p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> Cd. 7716.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> Cd. 7628 and Cd. 7716.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> A Reuter's Amsterdam telegram of December 15, 1914.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, October 2, 1914,</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="MORE_GERMAN_INTRIGUES" id="MORE_GERMAN_INTRIGUES"></a>MORE GERMAN INTRIGUES.</h2>
+
+
+<p>The vastness of German intrigues throughout the world in preparation for
+a great war have come out piece by piece.</p>
+
+<p><b>The Near East.</b>&mdash;Taking the Near East first, we find that Germany, having
+suborned the ex-Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi, proceeded weeks before
+the rupture with Turkey to give orders, through the Ottoman Empire, to
+Shukri, the acting Chief of the Turkish Special Mission, to prepare
+public opinion in Egypt for Turkish invasion and to await the coming of
+the German Mors, whose trial was attended by such startling
+disclosures.<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a></p>
+
+<p>Mors had been introduced to Enver Pasha by Dr. Pruefer (Secretary to
+Prince Hatzfeldt when he was German Agent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> in Egypt) and had held long
+conferences with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Turkish General Staff, who on
+September 6, 1914, worked out a scheme for disturbances in Egypt by
+bands of criminals led by Turkish officers and for an attack on the Suez
+Canal.</p>
+
+<p>In 1908 Prince Hatzfeldt succeeded Count Bernstorff, as German Agent in
+Egypt, and he at once established close relations with the Egyptian
+disloyalists of the extreme faction. In this he appears to have been
+aided by Baron von Oppenheim, and by Dr. Pruefer, the Oriental Secretary
+of the Agency, who was a fine Arabic scholar, and who had travelled a
+great deal in Syria and the Near East. The leaders of the disloyal
+section in Egypt were kept in the closest touch, and visited Prince
+Hatzfeldt at the German Agency, and were in constant communication with
+Dr. Pruefer, who, in Oriental disguise, often visited them, and other
+Panislamic Agents.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a></p>
+
+<p><b>The Far East.</b>&mdash;In India the German merchants joined our Chambers of
+Commerce and were elected as representatives of commercial life, and as
+trustees of port trusts, which gave them a knowledge of our local
+defences. In some instances they appear to have become volunteers, and
+so to have gained knowledge of our forts and armouries. Small German
+merchants and traders in the Punjab and other districts constantly
+endeavoured to undermine the British Raj, and preached sedition wherever
+they went. Such were the agents and spies of the German Government.</p>
+
+<p>Since the Mutiny at Singapore it has been proved that the Germans were
+calling home their reserves from Singapore and the East in May, 1914,
+and even as early as April of last year.<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> The first thing the
+mutineers did was to go to the German Encampment, open the doors, and
+supply those inside with rifles. Sir Evelyn Ellis, member of the
+Singapore Legislative Council, who was President of the Commission
+appointed by the Governor to collect evidence with reference to the
+Mutiny, which took place on February 15, 1915, stated that:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"They were not to think that they had been engaged in suppressing a
+small local disturbance. On the contrary, there was evidence to
+show that they had assisted in defeating one of the aims of the
+destroyer of Europe. They had been dealing with work that had been
+engineered by the agents of our common foes, and they had
+contributed to the suppression of a most diabolical plot. What had
+taken place in Singapore was only part of a scheme for the murder
+of women and children such as they had had instances of on the East
+Coast of England."<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a></p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>The head of a big German firm in Singapore, after being released on
+parole, was found with a wireless installation in his house, with which
+he was stated to have kept the "Emden" supplied with news.<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p>
+
+<p>In Persia and Arabia there is abundant proof of German intrigues, while
+in China few opportunities have been lost by German agents of impugning
+British good faith, and German money appears to have been used for years
+in keeping the Chinese press&mdash;in Peking more particularly&mdash;as
+anti-British as possible. Since the declaration of war an attempt has
+been made by Captain Pappenheim, Military Attach� of the German Legation
+in Peking, to organise an expedition into Russian Siberia to damage the
+Trans-Siberian railway. His action was, of course, a gross abuse of his
+diplomatic position, and has been disclaimed by the Chinese
+Government.<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p>
+
+<p><b>West Africa.</b>&mdash;In West Africa the report of Colonel F. C. Bryant on
+operation in Togoland shows how well the Germans were prepared for war
+in that region.<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a></p>
+
+<p><b>South Africa.</b>&mdash;In South Africa<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> it has been proved that so far back
+as 1912 the Germans were in communication with Lieut.-Colonel Maritz
+with a view to a rebellion. The latter appears to have brooded over
+schemes for the establishment of a Republic in South Africa. As the Blue
+Book, published in Cape Town on April 28, 1915, states: "One witness,
+Captain Leipold, of the Government Intelligence Department, who was sent
+to find out how things stood with Maritz, describes how the rebel leader
+dramatically threw his cards on the table in the shape of a bundle of
+correspondence with the German Administration at Windhuk, dating as far
+back as August, 1912."<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a></p>
+
+<p>In a speech to his troops on August 9, 1914, Maritz declared that he had
+6,000 Germans ready to help him, and he further stated that Beyers and
+De Wet had been fully informed of his plans long before the war.<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p>
+
+<p>Evidence was also given during the trial of De Wet that the rebellion in
+South Africa "was planned a couple of years ago when General Hertzog
+left the Ministry."<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> The Germans, either directly or indirectly,
+suborned, amongst others, Maritz, De Wet, De La Rey, Beyers, Kemp, and
+Kock. But the magnificent services of General Botha and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> loyalists
+of South Africa&mdash;both British and Dutch&mdash;rendered nugatory the
+machinations of the German Government.</p>
+
+<p>The history of German intrigues, both before and since the war, in
+British and French colonies, and in neutral countries throughout the
+world, which are now known and proved to the hilt, may be gauged from
+the examples given in the foregoing brief notes. The German newspaper
+<i>Der Tag</i>, which, during the first month of the war, declared: "Herr
+Gott, sind diese Tage sch�n" (O Lord, how beautiful are these days),
+subsequently summarised the German outlook when it naively
+declared:&mdash;<a name="FNanchor_63_63" id="FNanchor_63_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"So many of our calculations have deceived us. We expected that
+British India would rise when the first shot was fired in Europe,
+but in reality thousands of Indians came to fight with the British
+against us. We anticipated that the whole British Empire would be
+torn to pieces, but the Colonies appear to be closer than ever
+united with the Mother Country. We expected a triumphant rebellion
+in South Africa, yet it turned out nothing but a failure. We
+expected trouble in Ireland, but instead, she sent her best
+soldiers against us. We anticipated that the party of 'peace at any
+price' would be dominant in England, but it melted away in the
+ardour to fight against Germany. We reckoned that England was
+degenerate and incapable of placing any weight in the scale, yet
+she seems to be our principal enemy.</p>
+
+<p>"The same has been the case with France and Russia. We thought that
+France was depraved and divided and we find that they are
+formidable opponents. We believed that the Russian people were far
+too discontented to fight for their Government, and we made our
+plans on the supposition of a rapid collapse of Russia, but,
+instead, she mobilised her millions quickly and well, and her
+people are full of enthusiasm and their power is crushing. Those
+who led us into all those mistakes and miscalculations have laid
+upon themselves a heavy responsibility."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, April 28, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, January 6, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, April 24, 1915. (Speech by the Bishop of
+Singapore.)</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> <i>Daily News and Leader</i>, April 27, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>Morning Post</i>, March 27, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> Letter from the Chinese Legation to the <i>Times</i>, March 13
+and 20, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>Daily News and Leader</i>, April 22, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> Cd. 7874.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, April 30, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, March 17, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, February 19, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_63_63" id="Footnote_63_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <i>Times</i>, April 26, 1915.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="HOW_THE_GERMANS_MAKE_WAR" id="HOW_THE_GERMANS_MAKE_WAR"></a>HOW THE GERMANS MAKE WAR.</h2>
+
+
+<p>It has often been asked what would happen if savages were armed with the
+products of modern science and with the intelligence to use them.
+Germany has answered the question. Every resource of science lies at the
+German command; the chemist, the physicist, the metallurgist, have all
+worked in this war to place the most effective tools of destruction in
+the Germans' hands, and to satisfy their ambitions they have shut the
+gates of mercy on mankind. The Official Handbook of Instructions issued
+to Officers of the German Army by the German General Staff urges the
+"exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination,
+incendiarism, robbery and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> like) to the prejudice of the enemy."
+This Official Handbook says:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the
+combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it
+will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual
+and material resources of the latter."<a name="FNanchor_64_64" id="FNanchor_64_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The German Emperor, addressing the troops which he sent to take part in
+the International Expedition in China in 1900, said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"When you come into contact with the enemy strike him down.
+<i>Quarter is not to be given. Prisoners are not to be made.</i> Whoever
+falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just as a
+thousand years ago the Huns, under their King Attila, made for
+themselves a name which still appears imposing in tradition, so may
+the name of German become known in China in such a way that never
+again will a Chinaman dare to look askance at a German. The
+blessing of the Lord be with you. Give proof of your courage and
+the Divine blessing will be attached to your colours."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>At midnight on August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany for
+violating the neutrality of Belgium, and it will be remembered that
+earlier in the day the German Imperial Chancellor had stated that German
+troops "perhaps are already on Belgian soil," and that Germany could
+only have one thought&mdash;how she was to "hack her way through."
+Simultaneously with the thought, came action. What was actually taking
+place is described, by Lord Bryce's Committee of Inquiry, in the
+following words<a name="FNanchor_65_65" id="FNanchor_65_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a>:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"On August 4th the roads converging upon Li�ge from north-east,
+east, and south were covered with German Death's Head Hussars and
+Uhlans pressing forward to seize the passage over the Meuse. From
+the very beginning of the operations the civilian population of the
+villages lying upon the line of the German advance were made to
+experience the extreme horrors of war. 'On the 4th of August,' says
+one witness, 'at Herve' (a village not far from the frontier), 'I
+saw at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, near the station, five
+Uhlans, these were the first German troops I had seen. They were
+followed by a German officer and some soldiers in a motor car. The
+men in the car called out to a couple of young fellows who were
+standing about 30 yards away. The young men, being afraid, ran off,
+and then the Germans fired and killed one of them named D&mdash;&mdash;.'</p>
+
+<p>"The murder of this innocent fugitive civilian was a prelude to the
+burning and pillage of Herve and of other villages in the
+neighbourhood, to the indiscriminate shooting of civilians of both
+sexes, and to the organised military execution of batches of
+selected males. Thus at Herve some 50 men escaping from the burning
+houses were seized, taken outside the town<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> and shot. At Melen, a
+hamlet west of Herve, 40 men were shot. In one household alone the
+father and mother (names given) were shot, the daughter died after
+being repeatedly outraged, and the son was wounded. Nor were
+children exempt....</p>
+
+<p>"The burning of the villages in this neighbourhood and the
+wholesale slaughter of civilians, such as occurred at Herve,
+Micheroux, and Soumagne, appear to be connected with the
+exasperation caused by the resistance of Fort Fl�ron, whose guns
+barred the main road from Aix la Chapelle to Li�ge. Enraged by the
+losses which they had sustained, suspicious of the temper of the
+civilian population, and probably thinking that by exceptional
+severities at the outset they could cow the spirit of the Belgian
+nation, the German officers and men speedily accustomed themselves
+to the slaughter of civilians."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As a German soldier's diary, examined by Lord Bryce's Committee,
+says:&mdash;"The inhabitants without exception were brought out and shot.
+This shooting was heart-breaking as they all knelt down and prayed, but
+that was no ground for mercy. A few shots rang out and they fell back
+into the green grass and slept for ever."<a name="FNanchor_66_66" id="FNanchor_66_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p>
+
+<p>During the invasion of Belgium and France, German procedure was almost
+the same in all cases. "They advance along a road, shooting inoffensive
+passers-by&mdash;particularly bicyclists&mdash;as well as peasants working in the
+fields. In the towns or villages where they stop, they begin by
+requisitioning food and drink, which they consume till intoxicated.
+Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they let off their rifles
+at random, and declare that it was the inhabitants who fired. Then the
+scenes of fire, murder, and especially pillage, begin, accompanied by
+acts of deliberate cruelty, without respect to sex or age. Even where
+they pretend to know the actual person guilty of the acts they allege,
+they do not content themselves with executing him summarily, but they
+seize the opportunity to decimate the population, pillage the houses,
+and then set them on fire. After a preliminary attack and massacre they
+shut up the men in the church, and then order the women to return to
+their houses and to leave their doors open all night."<a name="FNanchor_67_67" id="FNanchor_67_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a></p>
+
+<p>Innumerable German atrocities are on record and well authenticated. For
+example, Professor Jacobs, at a medical meeting in Edinburgh, stated
+that, as head of the Belgian Red Cross, he "had visited a chateau but
+found the Red Cross<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> had not been respected. It had been completely
+destroyed, and the bodies of six girls, aged from ten to seventeen, were
+lying on the lawn. A convent containing sixty sisters had been entered
+by the German soldiers and every one had been violated. On the evidence
+of the doctor of the institution twenty-five were pregnant. Professor
+Jacobs had operated on the wife of a doctor living near Namur. Three
+weeks after the operation, when convalescing and still in bed, their
+house was entered by German soldiers; she was raped by seven of them and
+died two days after."<a name="FNanchor_68_68" id="FNanchor_68_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a></p>
+
+<p>1. A few typical examples of the wholesale atrocities of German troops
+are given in Appendix C, but to show that in many cases such atrocities
+were not only countenanced, but ordered by officers in command, we quote
+the following:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote>
+<p class="ltr-date">August 22, 1914.</p>
+
+<p>The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after having protested
+their peaceful intentions, made a treacherous surprise attack on
+our troops.</p>
+
+<p>It was with my consent that the General had the whole place burnt
+down, and about 100 people shot.</p>
+
+<p>I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of Li�ge, so that
+its inhabitants may know the fate with which they are threatened if
+they take up a similar attitude.</p>
+
+<p class="ltr-right1">
+The General Commanding-in-Chief,
+<span class="smcap">Von Bulow.</span><a name="FNanchor_69_69" id="FNanchor_69_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a>
+</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p class="ltr-clear">2. Here is an order of the day given on August 26 by General Stenger
+commanding the 58th German Brigade:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>After to-day no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to
+be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even
+prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a
+single living enemy remain behind us.</p>
+
+<p class="ltr-right1">
+Oberlieutenant und Kompagnie-Chef <span class="smcap">Stoy</span>;<br />
+Oberst und Regiments Kommandeur <span class="smcap">Neubauer</span>;<br />
+General-Major und Brigade-Kommandeur <span class="smcap">Stenger</span>.<a name="FNanchor_70_70" id="FNanchor_70_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a><br />
+</p>
+
+
+</blockquote><p class="ltr-clear"><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>With reference to the above Order, Professor Joseph B�dier says: "Some
+thirty soldiers of Stenger's Brigade (112th and 142nd Regt. of the Baden
+Infantry), were examined in our prisoners' camps. I have read their
+evidence, which they gave upon oath and signed. All confirm the
+statement that this order of the day was given them on August 26, in one
+unit by Major Mosebach, in another by Lieut. Curtius, &amp;c.; the majority
+did not know whether the order was carried out, but three of them say
+they saw it done in the forest of Thiaville, where ten or twelve wounded
+French soldiers who had already been spared by a battalion were
+despatched. Two others saw the order carried out on the Thiaville road,
+where some wounded found in a ditch by a company were finished off."<a name="FNanchor_71_71" id="FNanchor_71_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a></p>
+
+<p>3. The following are extracts from a Proclamation posted by the Germans
+at Namur on August 25, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>(3) Every street will be occupied by a German Guard, who will take
+ten hostages from each street, whom they will keep under
+surveillance. If there is any rising in the street the ten hostages
+will be shot.</p>
+
+<p>(4) Doors may not be locked, and at night after eight o'clock there
+must be lights in three windows in every house.</p>
+
+<p>(5) It is forbidden to be in the street after eight o'clock. The
+inhabitants of Namur must understand that there is no greater and
+more horrible crime than to compromise the existence of the town
+and the life of its citizens by criminal acts against the German
+Army.</p>
+
+<p class="ltr-right1">
+The Commander of the Town,<br />
+<span class="smcap">Von Bulow</span>.<a name="FNanchor_72_72" id="FNanchor_72_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a><br />
+</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p class="ltr-clear">4. On October 5 the following Proclamation was posted in Brussels "and
+probably in most of the Communes of the Kingdom."</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>During the evening of September 25, the railway line and the
+telegraph wires were destroyed on the line Lovenjoul-Vertryck. In
+consequence of this, these two localities have had to render an
+account of this, and had to give hostages in the morning of
+September 30.</p>
+
+<p>In future, the localities nearest to the place where similar acts
+take place will be punished without pity; <i>it matters little if
+they are accomplices or not</i>. For this purpose <i>hostages have been
+taken</i> from all localities near the railway line thus menaced, and
+at the first attempt to destroy the railway line, or the telephone
+or telegraph wires, <i>they will be immediately shot</i>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Further, all the troops charged with the duty of guarding the
+railway have been ordered to shoot any person who, in a suspicious
+manner, approaches the line, or the telegraph or telephone wires.</p>
+
+<p class="ltr-right1">
+The Governor-General of Belgium,<br />
+(S.) <span class="smcap">Baron von der Goltz</span>, Field-Marshal.<a name="FNanchor_73_73" id="FNanchor_73_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a><br />
+</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+<p class="ltr-clear">For purposes of record it should be noted that Lord Bryce's Committee
+mention by name three German Generals whose armies have disgraced
+civilisation; they are those of General Alexander von Kluck, General von
+B�low and General von Hausen.<a name="FNanchor_74_74" id="FNanchor_74_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p>
+
+<p>Some of the main heads of the barbarities of Germany and of the way she
+has violated the recognised rules of International Law, may be set out
+as follows:&mdash;<a name="FNanchor_75_75" id="FNanchor_75_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a></p>
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of
+France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments, and
+by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history
+affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the
+defenceless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been
+in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was
+confiscated, until, in Belgium, an International Commission, largely
+influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices,
+came to the relief of the population, and secured from the German
+Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country,
+though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the
+defenceless population for the support of the German Army.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the
+barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been
+exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to
+German prison camps. Evidence has been received of the hardships to
+which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps,
+contrasting most unfavourably with the treatment of German prisoners in
+this country. The Germans make no attempt to save sailors from British
+war vessels they sink, although we have saved a large number of German
+sailors in spite of great danger to our men.<a name="FNanchor_76_76" id="FNanchor_76_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a>For example, on May 1,
+1915, in the destroyer action in the North Sea, the Germans imprisoned
+two British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> sailors below and when their vessel was sinking, saved
+themselves, but left their prisoners to sink below because "time was
+short."</p>
+
+<p>As Lord Kitchener said, Germany "has stooped to acts which will surely
+stain indelibly her military history and which would vie with the
+barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan."<a name="FNanchor_77_77" id="FNanchor_77_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> On the same day,
+in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister declared: "When we come to
+the end of this war, which, please God, we may, we shall not forget&mdash;and
+ought not to forget&mdash;this horrible record of calculated cruelty and
+crime, and we shall hold it to be our duty to exact such reparation
+against those who are proved to have been guilty agents or actors in the
+matter, as it may be possible for us to exact. I do not think we should
+be doing our duty to these brave and unfortunate men or to the honour of
+our own country and the plain dictates of humanity if we were content
+with anything less than that."<a name="FNanchor_78_78" id="FNanchor_78_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a></p>
+
+<p>(<i>c</i>) At the very outset of war a German mine-layer was discovered
+laying a mine-field on the high seas. Further mine-fields have been laid
+from time to time without warning, and are still being laid on the high
+seas, and many neutral, as well as British vessels, have been sunk by
+them.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>d</i>) At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and
+sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant
+vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at
+all, only as an exception; the general rule, to which the British
+Government have adhered, being that merchant vessels, if captured, must
+be taken before a Prize Court. The Germans have also sunk British
+merchant vessels by torpedo without notice, and without any provision
+for the safety of the crew. They have done this in the case of neutral
+as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and
+innocent lives, unarmed and defenceless, have been destroyed in this
+way. The Germans have sunk without warning emigrant vessels, have tried
+to sink an hospital ship, and have themselves used an hospital ship for
+patrol work and wireless. The torpedoeing of the "Lusitania" on May 7,
+1915, involving the murder of hundreds of innocent civilians&mdash;British
+and neutral&mdash;was acclaimed with great relish in Berlin.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>e</i>) Unfortified, open, and defenceless towns, such as Scarborough,
+Yarmouth and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by
+German ships of war, causing, in some cases, considerable loss of
+civilian life, including women and children.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>(<i>f</i>) German aircraft have dropped bombs on the East Coast of England,
+in places where there were no military or strategic points to be
+attacked.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>g</i>) The Germans have used poisonous gases in killing Allied troops at
+the Front, although Germany was a signatory to the following article in
+the Hague Convention:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of
+projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
+or deleterious gases."<a name="FNanchor_79_79" id="FNanchor_79_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>And finally the German troops in South Africa have poisoned drinking
+wells and infected them with disease.<a name="FNanchor_80_80" id="FNanchor_80_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_64_64" id="Footnote_64_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege.</i> Berlin, 1902, in the series
+"Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation
+of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been
+published.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_65_65" id="Footnote_65_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_66_66" id="Footnote_66_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> Cd. 7894, page 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_67_67" id="Footnote_67_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian
+Legation (1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official
+Belgian reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State
+(President); Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and
+Vice-President of the Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman
+of the City of Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court
+of Antwerp; and, as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du
+Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of
+Legation.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_68_68" id="Footnote_68_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9,
+1914. <i>Lancet</i>, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_69_69" id="Footnote_69_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of
+the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_70_70" id="Footnote_70_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>German Atrocities from German Evidence.</i> One of the
+series of "Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm.
+Ernest Lavisse, of the Acad�mie fran�aise, Pr�sident; Charles Andler,
+professor of German literature and language in the University of Paris;
+Joseph B�dier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the
+Acad�mie fran�aise; Emile Boutroux, of the Acad�mie fran�aise; Ernest
+Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim,
+professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Acad�mie
+des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the
+University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the
+University of Paris; Andr� Weiss, of the Acad�mie des Sciences morales
+et politiques.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_71_71" id="Footnote_71_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>German Atrocities from German Evidence.</i> See footnote on
+page 32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_72_72" id="Footnote_72_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of
+the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_73_73" id="Footnote_73_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of
+the Laws and Customs of war in Belgium.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_74_74" id="Footnote_74_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> Cd. 7894, page 10.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_75_75" id="Footnote_75_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> Most of the points referred to in the following record are
+to be found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note&mdash;dated March
+15.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_76_76" id="Footnote_76_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282
+men had been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single
+rescue had been effected by German men-of-war.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_77_77" id="Footnote_77_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> House of Lords, April 27, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_78_78" id="Footnote_78_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> House of Commons, April 27, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_79_79" id="Footnote_79_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> See Appendix D.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_80_80" id="Footnote_80_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> Report <i>re</i> Swakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for
+Colonies. <i>Times</i>, May 6, 1915.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="GERMANYS_ATTEMPTED_BRIBERY" id="GERMANYS_ATTEMPTED_BRIBERY"></a>GERMANY'S ATTEMPTED BRIBERY.</h2>
+
+<p>We thus see with what an easy conscience Germany tears up her treaties
+and how she repudiates her most solemn pledges. In light of these facts
+let us examine the rush of promises Germany was prepared to give in
+order to ensure our neutrality in the War.</p>
+
+<p>On July 29, 1914, Germany, having decided on the War in conjunction with
+Austria against Russia and France, made what our Ambassador at Berlin
+called "a strong bid for British neutrality," to which reference has
+been made, on page 14. Provided that Britain remained neutral Germany
+stated that every assurance would be given to Great Britain that the
+German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+France in Europe, should they prove victorious. Germany categorically
+stated that she was unable to give a similar undertaking with reference
+to the French colonies. She made a statement with regard to the
+integrity of Holland, and said that it depended upon the action of
+France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,
+but that when the War was over Belgian integrity would be respected if
+she had not sided against Germany. In other words, Great Britain was to
+stand by and</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><b>See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;</b></p>
+
+<p><b>See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;</b></p>
+
+<p><b>Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under
+the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white
+by a war indemnity when all was over.</b></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As Sir Edward Grey replied on July 30: "From the material point of view
+such a proposal is unacceptable, for France,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> without further territory
+in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her
+position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
+Altogether, apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this
+bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
+good name of this country would never recover."<a name="FNanchor_81_81" id="FNanchor_81_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a></p>
+
+<p>That is the "infamous bargain" which Britain spurned and to which the
+Prime Minister referred on August 6 in the House of Commons, in the
+following words:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><b>"What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day ... if
+we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to
+get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of
+our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise&mdash;nothing
+more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain
+eventualities; a promise, be it observed&mdash;I am sorry to have to say
+it, but it must be put upon record&mdash;given by a Power which was at
+that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty
+and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied
+or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves
+with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this
+country, of which we are trustees."</b><a name="FNanchor_82_82" id="FNanchor_82_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>This suggestion of Germany is not the only infamous proposal she has
+made to Great Britain. She has made them with a persistence worthy of a
+better cause. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin on behalf
+of the Cabinet in order to obtain the basis of a friendly understanding
+between the two countries. What transpired is made clear in a speech
+delivered by Mr. Asquith, at Cardiff, on October 2, 1914, when the Prime
+Minister said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We laid down in terms, carefully approved by the Cabinet, and
+which I will textually quote, what our relations to Germany ought,
+in our view, to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German  Government:&mdash;</p></blockquote>
+
+<blockquote><p>'Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any
+unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not
+the subject, and forms no part of any Treaty, understanding,
+or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she
+become a party to anything that has such an object.'</p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. But that was
+not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further.
+They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the
+event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a
+time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and
+defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us&mdash;to
+put it quite plainly&mdash;for a free hand, so far as we were concerned,
+if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate
+the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and
+that was the answer we gave."<a name="FNanchor_83_83" id="FNanchor_83_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_81_81" id="Footnote_81_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 101.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_82_82" id="Footnote_82_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> House of Commons, August 6, 1914.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_83_83" id="Footnote_83_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> <i>South Wales Daily News</i>, October 3, 1914.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="IF_BRITAIN_HAD_REFUSED_TO_FIGHT" id="IF_BRITAIN_HAD_REFUSED_TO_FIGHT"></a>IF BRITAIN HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT.</h2>
+
+<p>If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what
+would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the
+Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would
+have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or
+through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a
+paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough
+to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?</p>
+
+<p>"Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the
+whole civilised world to Belgium&mdash;a small State which has lived for
+more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to
+which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties&mdash;and we
+should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of
+these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her
+independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the
+easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression
+against France.</p>
+
+<p>"We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing
+by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command,
+while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her
+vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and
+overwhelming force.</p>
+
+<p>"We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of
+Li�ge, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the
+occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories,
+the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native
+land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by
+them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil
+population, and finally the greatest crime committed against
+civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War&mdash;the sack of
+Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its
+unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable
+treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....</p>
+
+<p>"For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness&mdash;which
+means in effect a willing accomplice&mdash;of this tragic triumph of
+force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this
+country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."</p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would
+have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner
+Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in
+the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim
+if she had succeeded in crushing Belgium and France and warding off the
+blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which
+nations have always held most dear."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few
+years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no
+powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had
+lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span></p>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_A" id="APPENDIX_A"></a>APPENDIX A.</h2>
+
+<h3>GERMANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED BY
+AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA ON JULY 23, 1914.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no
+knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary
+to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.</p>
+
+<p>Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Charg�
+d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow
+(German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then
+had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow
+protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that
+Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to
+the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.
+Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the
+Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
+who stated to him that at Berlin a <i>d�marche</i> of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.
+Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were
+endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but
+that up to the present time they had not been successful in this,
+and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a
+<i>d�marche</i> of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky
+had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did
+not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the
+Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension
+in Austro-Serbian relations."<a name="FNanchor_84_84" id="FNanchor_84_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
+London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold
+back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this
+if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which
+Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression
+given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge
+of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have
+been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.</p>
+
+<p>But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its
+own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6
+p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Alliz�, the
+French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><b>" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more
+or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.</b><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span></p>
+
+<p><b>"In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day that
+the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him (dont il
+avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms which
+could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the existing
+situation appeared to him to be very serious."</b><a name="FNanchor_85_85" id="FNanchor_85_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew
+the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at
+Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von
+Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French
+Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had
+with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that
+Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with
+Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.</p>
+
+<p>"Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
+Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government
+having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....
+<i>Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
+entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were
+communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I
+showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support
+claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less
+striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the
+officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they
+were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to
+Serbia.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_86_86" id="FNanchor_86_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his
+Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated
+July 24, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a
+surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have
+despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.</p>
+
+<p>"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
+returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
+pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
+and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
+Capital by the rumours of a naval <i>entente</i> between Russia and
+England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
+of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
+that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>"The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
+been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
+from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so,
+she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."<a name="FNanchor_87_87" id="FNanchor_87_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch
+from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French
+Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from
+Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris),<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> at which the latter
+twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of
+the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.
+In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the
+Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the
+apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply
+with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried
+away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The
+Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to
+abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no
+choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the
+Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using
+military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to
+them.... The German Government consider that in the present case
+there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
+between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought
+seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
+concerned.</p>
+
+<p>"The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
+dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
+to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable
+consequences...."<a name="FNanchor_88_88" id="FNanchor_88_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German
+Ambassador in London.<a name="FNanchor_89_89" id="FNanchor_89_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p>
+
+<p>Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the
+French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the
+morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and
+presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about
+the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the
+contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.
+Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on
+instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to
+argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have
+us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of
+the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered
+together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully
+handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be
+settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly
+instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.</p>
+
+<p>As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British
+Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was
+both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
+unless Germany had first been consulted."<a name="FNanchor_90_90" id="FNanchor_90_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a></p>
+
+<p>It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only
+to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve
+months before.</p>
+
+<p>On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti
+(ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year
+before the present war broke out, during my absence from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> Rome, I
+received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late
+Foreign Minister), the following  telegram:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention
+of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as
+defensive, hoping to bring into operation the <i>casus foederis</i>
+of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to
+be inapplicable. (<i>Sensation.</i>)</p>
+
+<p>"'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with
+Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it
+may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider
+such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that,
+therefore, we do not consider that the <i>casus foederis</i>
+arises.</p>
+
+<p>"'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>"I  replied:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a
+<i>casus foederis</i> cannot be established. It is a step which she
+is taking on her own account, since there is no question of
+defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It
+is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
+to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
+action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this
+most perilous adventure.' (<i>Hear, hear.</i>)</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>"This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and
+recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our
+relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality
+made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects
+to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an
+interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already
+accepted by the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>"I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes
+of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely
+loyal to the observance of her pledges." (<i>Loud applause.</i>)<a name="FNanchor_91_91" id="FNanchor_91_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>As the <i>Times</i> of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the
+German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to
+take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England,
+is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for
+a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia
+at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor
+Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of
+French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers,
+but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully
+thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the
+heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the
+issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.</p>
+
+<p>Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
+Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting
+Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin
+on July 25 wrote:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The English Charg� d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
+I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span> of the
+Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
+reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
+further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
+the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."<a name="FNanchor_92_92" id="FNanchor_92_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to
+his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite
+understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved
+of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once
+fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by
+her duties as an ally."<a name="FNanchor_93_93" id="FNanchor_93_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris,
+in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the
+German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
+Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
+only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
+Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
+forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
+situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
+declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
+reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
+Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
+ill-informed, represented it to be."<a name="FNanchor_94_94" id="FNanchor_94_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's
+cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian
+Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25,
+1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
+that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
+Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
+action."<a name="FNanchor_95_95" id="FNanchor_95_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at
+Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
+certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
+is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
+text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
+influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
+attributed to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
+made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
+justified."<a name="FNanchor_96_96" id="FNanchor_96_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a></p></blockquote><p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some
+cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French
+Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
+events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
+Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's d�marche.</p>
+
+<p>"He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
+Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
+chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
+Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."<a name="FNanchor_97_97" id="FNanchor_97_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following
+statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
+of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
+her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
+herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
+which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
+conditions which have been thoroughly considered."<a name="FNanchor_98_98" id="FNanchor_98_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his
+Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not
+published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had
+been communicated to them; nor had it appeared <i>in extenso</i> in any of
+the local papers&mdash;because of the <i>calming</i> effect it would have had on
+German readers!<a name="FNanchor_99_99" id="FNanchor_99_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p>
+
+<p>On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
+Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
+he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
+make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
+over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
+which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
+intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
+of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
+preparing."<a name="FNanchor_100_100" id="FNanchor_100_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram
+sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
+'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
+promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
+unreliable."<a name="FNanchor_101_101" id="FNanchor_101_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
+Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
+information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
+every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
+Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
+according to a preconceived plan, to a<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> declaration of war, without
+previous arrangement with the Emperor William.</p>
+
+<p>"The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
+peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
+is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
+would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
+share this feeling."<a name="FNanchor_102_102" id="FNanchor_102_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in
+Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><b>"I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
+text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
+and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
+Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."</b><a name="FNanchor_103_103" id="FNanchor_103_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for
+as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank,
+stated on January 29, 1915:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
+commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
+sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
+semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_84_84" id="Footnote_84_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 19.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_85_85" id="Footnote_85_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 21.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_86_86" id="Footnote_86_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 30.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_87_87" id="Footnote_87_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_88_88" id="Footnote_88_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 28.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_89_89" id="Footnote_89_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 9.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_90_90" id="Footnote_90_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 6.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_91_91" id="Footnote_91_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> Cd. 7860, page 401.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_92_92" id="Footnote_92_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 41.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_93_93" id="Footnote_93_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 19.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_94_94" id="Footnote_94_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 57.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_95_95" id="Footnote_95_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 20.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_96_96" id="Footnote_96_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 18.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_97_97" id="Footnote_97_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 35.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_98_98" id="Footnote_98_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 83.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_99_99" id="Footnote_99_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> Cd. 7626, No. 46.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_100_100" id="Footnote_100_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 78.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_101_101" id="Footnote_101_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_102_102" id="Footnote_102_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Cd. 7717, No. 87.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_103_103" id="Footnote_103_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 95.</p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_B" id="APPENDIX_B"></a>APPENDIX B.</h2>
+
+<h3>HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
+keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
+resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
+territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
+question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
+public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
+said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
+the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
+Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
+perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
+not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
+which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
+Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
+and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
+too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
+Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
+acting as if she<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> made any such claim. <i>As for Germany, she knew
+very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
+matter.</i>"<a name="FNanchor_104_104" id="FNanchor_104_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at
+Berlin, on July 26, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
+at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
+annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
+indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
+would not act if Austria did <i>not</i> annex territory."<a name="FNanchor_105_105" id="FNanchor_105_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador
+in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British
+Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
+unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
+war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."<a name="FNanchor_106_106" id="FNanchor_106_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the
+Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador
+in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
+Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
+Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
+inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
+to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
+Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
+administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
+proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
+prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
+would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."<a name="FNanchor_107_107" id="FNanchor_107_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
+Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
+conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
+absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
+disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
+occasioned, to score a definite success."<a name="FNanchor_108_108" id="FNanchor_108_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_104_104" id="Footnote_104_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_105_105" id="Footnote_105_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 33.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_106_106" id="Footnote_106_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 71.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_107_107" id="Footnote_107_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 41.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_108_108" id="Footnote_108_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <i>Great Britain and the European Crisis</i>, No. 38.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_C" id="APPENDIX_C"></a>APPENDIX C.</h2>
+
+<h3>SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.</h3>
+
+
+<p>In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government
+to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the
+Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p><span class="smcap">The Rt. Hon. Viscount Bryce</span>, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
+Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
+Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
+President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
+the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
+Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
+Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">The Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock</span>, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
+of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
+Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
+1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
+of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">The Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Clarke</span>, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Sir Alfred Hopkinson</span>, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
+Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
+University, 1913-14).</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Mr. H. A. L. Fisher</span> (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
+Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Mr. Harold Cox</span>, M.A. (Editor, <i>Edinburgh Review</i>).</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Sir Kenelm E. Digby</span>, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
+State at Home Office, 1895-1903).</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the
+evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave
+conclusions:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and
+systematically organised massacres of the civil population,
+accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.</p>
+
+<p>"(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians,
+both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated,
+and children murdered.</p>
+
+<p>"(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of
+property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the
+German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic
+incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings
+and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be
+alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.</p>
+
+<p>"(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken,
+particularly by the using of civilians, including women and
+children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a
+less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the
+frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.</p>
+
+<p>"Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the
+Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> duty
+if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence.
+Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a
+scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
+last three centuries."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The Report makes it plain that apart from the first outbreak of outrages
+intended to cow the Belgians into submission, fresh bursts of plunder
+and rapine took place on specific occasions when the Germans suffered
+defeat. Cowardly vengeance was thus wreaked on the innocent Belgian
+civilians for the defeat of German arms. For example, on August 25,
+1914, the Belgian Army, sallying out from Antwerp, drove the enemy from
+Malines. The Germans promptly massacred and burnt at Louvain, "the
+signal for which was provided by shots exchanged between the German Army
+retreating after its repulse at Malines and some members of the German
+garrison of Louvain, who mistook their fellow-countrymen for
+Belgians."<a name="FNanchor_109_109" id="FNanchor_109_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a> Similarly when a successful sortie from Antwerp drove
+the Germans from Aerschot, they retaliated by a blood-vendetta upon the
+civil population.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans have endeavoured to justify their brutal excesses by
+bringing counter-charges against Belgian civilians. For instance, the
+Chancellor of the German Empire, in a communication made to the press on
+September 2, 1914, and printed in the <i>Nord Deutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung</i>, of September 21, said: "Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of
+the German wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our
+officers to dinner, and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary
+to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was
+called out, and after having at first shown friendliness carried on in
+the rear of our troops terrible warfare with concealed weapons. Belgian
+women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes
+while they were sleeping."</p>
+
+<p>Upon this Lord Bryce's Committee make the comment: "No evidence whatever
+seems to have been adduced to prove these tales."<a name="FNanchor_110_110" id="FNanchor_110_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a></p>
+
+<p>Of both individual and concerted acts of barbarity, the report
+teems&mdash;for example:&mdash;<a name="FNanchor_111_111" id="FNanchor_111_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"It is clearly shown that many offences were committed against
+infants and quite young children. On one occasion children<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> were
+even roped together and used as a military screen against the
+enemy, on another three soldiers went into action carrying small
+children to protect themselves from flank fire. A shocking case of
+the murder of a baby by a drunken soldier at Malines is thus
+recorded by one eye-witness and confirmed by another:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"'One day when the Germans were not actually bombarding the town I
+left my house to go to my mother's house in High Street. My husband
+was with me. I saw eight German soldiers, and they were drunk. They
+were singing and making a lot of noise and dancing about. As the
+German soldiers came along the street I saw a small child, whether
+boy or girl I could not see, come out of a house. The child was
+about two years of age. The child came into the middle of the
+street so as to be in the way of the soldiers. The soldiers were
+walking in twos. The first line of two passed the child; one of the
+second line, the man on the left, stepped aside and drove his
+bayonet with both hands into the child's stomach, lifting the child
+into the air on his bayonet and carrying it away on his bayonet, he
+and his comrades still singing. The child screamed when the soldier
+struck it with his bayonet, but not afterwards.'"<a name="FNanchor_112_112" id="FNanchor_112_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The following brief extracts of German atrocities are taken from
+Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation:&mdash;<a name="FNanchor_113_113" id="FNanchor_113_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a></p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"On the evening of the 22nd" (August, at Tamines) "a group of
+between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not
+far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on
+them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers
+ordered up a machine gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy
+peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and,
+hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet
+again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay
+among the corpses," and some of these were bayoneted....</p>
+
+<p>"Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about 6 o'clock in the morning,
+another party consisting of prisoners made in the village and the
+neighbourhood were brought into the square, ... in the square was a
+mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6
+yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot.... An officer
+asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered
+were set to work and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad and 2
+deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks.... Actually
+fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of
+their fathers.</p>
+
+<p>"There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were
+drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they
+drank.... We buried from 350 to 400<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span> bodies." ... A wounded man was
+buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his
+interment....</p>
+
+<p>"About 9 in the morning" (at Dinant, August 23) "the German
+soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-end of rifles,
+men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square,
+where they were kept prisoners till 6 o'clock in the evening. The
+guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be
+shot. About 6 o'clock a captain separated the men from the women
+and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry
+soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them
+were told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A
+platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in
+vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons,
+and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been
+no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About 20 of the inhabitants
+were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make
+sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens
+escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two
+hours, remaining motionless among the corpses, and when night fell
+succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses
+were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden."</p>
+
+<p>"On Friday, August 21st, at 4 o'clock in the morning" (at Andenne,
+between Namur and Huy) "the" (German) "soldiers spread themselves
+through the town, driving all the population into the streets and
+forcing men, women, and children to march before them with their
+hands in the air. Those who did not obey with sufficient
+promptitude, or did not understand the order given them in German,
+were promptly knocked down. Those who tried to run away were shot.
+It was at this moment that Dr. Camus" (the Burgomaster), "against
+whom the Germans seemed to have some special spite, was wounded by
+a rifle shot, and then finished off by a blow from an axe. His body
+was dragged along by the feet for some distance....</p>
+
+<p>"Subsequently the soldiers, on the order of their officers, picked
+out of the mass some 40 or 50 men who were led off and all shot,
+some along the bank of the Meuse, and others in front of the Police
+Station.</p>
+
+<p>"The rest of the men were kept for a long time in the Place. Among
+them lay two persons, one of whom had received a ball in the chest,
+and the other a bayonet wound. They lay face to the ground with
+blood from their wounds trickling into the dust, occasionally
+calling for water. The officers forbade their neighbours to give
+them any help.... Both died in the course of the day.... In the
+morning the officers told the women to withdraw, giving them the
+order to gather together the dead bodies and to wash away the
+stains of blood which defiled the street and the houses."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_109_109" id="Footnote_109_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> Cd. 7894, p. 14.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_110_110" id="Footnote_110_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> Cd. 7894, p. 26.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_111_111" id="Footnote_111_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> Professor J. H. Morgan, Representative of the Home
+Office, attached to the Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary
+Force, states in a letter to the <i>Times</i>, dated May 20, 1915:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>" ... There has lately come into my hands&mdash;unfortunately too late for
+use by the Committee&mdash;evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt
+that the outrages upon combatants in the field are committed by the
+orders of responsible officers, such as Brigade and Company Commanders,
+and that British and Belgian soldiers are the objects of peculiar
+malignancy.... <i>There is some evidence to show that the East Prussian
+and Bavarian regiments are the worst offenders. The French military
+authorities, who have been of great assistance to me in my inquiries,
+informed me that they have now a very considerable 'black list' of this
+character. When the time comes to dictate terms of peace and to exact
+reparation that list will be very useful....</i> In the earlier stages of
+the war there was a widespread disinclination on the part of our
+officers and men to credit stories of 'atrocities.' Nothing has
+impressed me more than the complete change of conviction on this point,
+especially among our officers. As a Staff Officer of the highest
+eminence said to me lately, 'The Germans have no sense of honour in the
+field.' Any sense of the freemasonry of arms has practically disappeared
+among them, and deliberate killing of the wounded is of frequent
+occurrence."</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_112_112" id="Footnote_112_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> Cd. 7894. p. 32.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_113_113" id="Footnote_113_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> The Commission chiefly responsible for these official
+Belgian reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State
+(President); Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and
+Vice-President of the Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman
+of the City of Antwerp; M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court
+of Antwerp; and, as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du
+Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of
+Legation.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span></p></div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_D" id="APPENDIX_D"></a>APPENDIX D.</h2>
+
+<h3>GERMANY'S EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS GAS.</h3>
+
+
+<p>The following is a copy of a Report dated May 3, 1915, by Field-Marshal
+Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as
+weapons of warfare:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the
+trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells especially
+manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under
+cover of these gases were provided with specially designed
+respirators, which were issued in sealed pattern covers. This all
+points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale.</p>
+
+<p>"A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in
+their official <i>communiqu�</i> that we were making use of asphyxiating
+gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this
+astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was
+part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature
+of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and
+shows that they recognised its illegality and were anxious to
+forestall neutral, and possibly domestic, criticism.</p>
+
+<p>"Since the enemy first made use of this method of covering his
+advance with a cloud of poisoned air he has repeated it both in
+offence and defence whenever the wind has been favourable.</p>
+
+<p>"The effect of this poison is not merely disabling, or even
+painlessly fatal, as suggested in the German Press. Those of its
+victims who do not succumb on the field, and who can be brought
+into hospital, suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases
+die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little
+better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a
+permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to
+their being invalids for life. These effects must be well known to
+the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the
+military authorities who have sanctioned its use.</p>
+
+<p>"I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these
+gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_E" id="APPENDIX_E"></a>APPENDIX E.</h2>
+
+<h3>EFFORTS OF GERMAN MINISTERS OF STATE TO LAY BLAME ON BRITAIN.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Since the war, both the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von
+Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, have
+endeavoured to explain away the former's phrase: "a scrap of paper,"
+which shocked the diplomatic conscience of the world.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span> Both have
+endeavoured to lay the blame for the conflict at Great Britain's
+door.<a name="FNanchor_114_114" id="FNanchor_114_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> The German Imperial Chancellor now declares that:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"Documents on the Anglo-Belgian Military Agreement which ... we
+have found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office ... showed
+that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium
+without the consent of the Belgian Government."<a name="FNanchor_115_115" id="FNanchor_115_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p></blockquote>
+
+<p>The true facts of the case are to be seen in the following extract from
+the statement issued by the Belgian Minister in London, on March 17,
+1915:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
+discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which
+had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military
+Attach�s and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
+to transform these reports into documents which would justify
+Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
+was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
+be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a
+shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German
+Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium
+had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own
+neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on
+those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the
+pr�cis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause
+in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein
+recorded <i>did reference only to the situation that would be created
+if Belgian neutrality had already been violated</i>. The Belgian
+Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only
+answer that they deserve&mdash;they are a tissue of lies, all the more
+shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have
+studied the original documents.</p>
+
+<p>"But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to
+prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between
+Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the
+course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views
+as to the way in which England could help Belgium <i>in case the
+latter were attacked by Germany</i>. One phrase in the document
+clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a
+hypothetical case&mdash;viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium
+would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by
+Germany.' The translation in the <i>Norddeutsche Zeitung</i> of November
+25 <i>omits this clause</i>, the phrase which gives its exact scope and
+significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General
+Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke
+insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.'
+For the word <i>conversation</i> the <i>Norddeutsche Zeitung</i> substitutes
+the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that
+'our convention' has been absolutely confidential!<a name="FNanchor_116_116" id="FNanchor_116_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Such proceedings need no commentary.</p>
+
+<p>"(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
+same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
+and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
+the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
+favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression,
+could only take place with our consent.' The British Military
+Attach� raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her
+rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium,
+without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel
+Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always
+held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter
+was a necessary preliminary.</p>
+
+<p>"The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no
+'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
+Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
+conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
+Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
+behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole
+Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no
+conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought
+before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.
+The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all
+this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
+them is either garbled or suppressed.</p>
+
+<p>"In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government,
+faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its
+duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
+infamy&mdash;his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity
+of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is
+obvious, that:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>"(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
+smallest size, had entered Belgium.</p>
+
+<p>"(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
+offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the
+declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her
+guarantors.</p>
+
+<p>"(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her
+fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such
+help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
+that defence.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>"Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
+before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She
+has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the
+triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
+serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."</p></blockquote>
+
+<p>In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement
+authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:&mdash;</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the
+British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and
+in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical
+assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality
+of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other
+Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
+territory.'</p>
+
+<p>"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated
+in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did
+not believe England would take such a step, because he did not
+think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir
+Edward Grey actually wrote was:&mdash;'I said that I was sure that this
+Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
+Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
+the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of
+it.'</p>
+
+<p>"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
+conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian
+officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him,
+namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of
+strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
+frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract&mdash;railways
+deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium,
+such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough
+to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on
+the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality
+unless it were previously violated by another Power...."</p></blockquote>
+
+
+<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_114_114" id="Footnote_114_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the <i>New York World</i>,
+March 28, 1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the
+Associated Press, in New York papers, January 25, 1915.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_115_115" id="Footnote_115_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing
+reference only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912
+"conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole
+foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.</p></div>
+
+<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_116_116" id="Footnote_116_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> In a letter to the <i>Morning Post</i> of February 8, 1915,
+Mr. A. Hamon, Professor de l'Universit�, Nouville de Bruxelles,
+writes:&mdash;
+</p>
+
+<blockquote><p>"In October and November last (13th and 24th) the <i>Norddeutsche
+Allgemeine Zeitung</i> published the documents seized by the Germans
+in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a
+Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic
+reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of
+R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The
+Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The
+entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
+violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely
+important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also
+omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through
+omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning
+of the document.
+</p><p>
+"But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's
+letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this
+fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the
+Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention'
+(overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely
+made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is
+to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."</p></blockquote>
+</div>
+</div>
+
+
+<hr />
+<h2><a name="APPENDIX_F" id="APPENDIX_F"></a>APPENDIX F.</h2>
+
+<h3>LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.</h3>
+
+
+<p>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis. Misc. No. 6 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government. Despatch
+from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 8 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>German Organisation for Influencing the Press of other Countries.
+Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 9 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
+Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Misc. 10 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Documents respecting Negotiations preceding the War published by the
+Russian Government. Misc. No. 11 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Papers relating to the Support offered by the Princes and Peoples of
+India to His Majesty in connection with the War. (I.O. paper.)</p>
+
+<p>Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the Belgian
+Government. Misc. No. 12 (1914).<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span></p>
+
+<p>Correspondence respecting Events leading to the Rupture of Relations
+with Turkey. Misc. No. 13 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising
+Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey and Reply. Misc.
+No. 14 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the French
+Government. Misc. No. 15 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Despatch to Sir H. Howard containing instruction respecting his Mission
+to the Vatican. Misc. No. 1 (1914).</p>
+
+<p>Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the War.
+Despatch from Petrograd enclosing Memo. Misc. No. 2 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Letter July 31/14 from President of French Republic to the King
+respecting the European Crisis, and His Majesty's Reply. Misc. No. 3
+(1915).</p>
+
+<p>Treatment of German Prisoners in United Kingdom. Correspondence with the
+U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 5 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Rights of Belligerents: Correspondence with U.S. Government. Misc. No. 6
+(1915).</p>
+
+<p>Treatment of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in the U.K. and
+Germany respectively: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government
+and U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 7 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Release of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Diplomatic. &amp;c.,
+Officers, and of certain classes of Naval and Military Officers,
+Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Misc.
+No. 8 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Sinking of German Cruiser "Dresden" in Chilean Territorial Waters: Notes
+exchanged with the Chilean Minister. Misc. No. 9 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>List of certain Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Public
+Questions arising out of the War.</p>
+
+<p>Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas: Report and
+Statistics.</p>
+
+<p>Alleged German Outrages: Report of Committee.</p>
+
+<p>Alleged German Outrages: Appendix to Report of Committee.</p>
+
+<p>Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European
+War. Misc. No. 10 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain
+places of detention in Germany: Report by United States Officials. Misc.
+No. 11 (1915).</p>
+
+<p>Correspondence regarding the Naval and Military Assistance afforded to
+His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions. (Cd. 7607.)</p>
+
+<p>Correspondence relating to Gifts of Food-Stuffs and other Supplies to
+His Majesty's Government from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd.
+7608.)</p>
+
+<p>Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies.
+(Cd. 7646.)</p>
+
+<p>Papers relating to Scales of Pensions and Allowances of Officers and Men
+of the Oversea Contingents and their Dependents. (Cd. 7793.)</p>
+
+<p>Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military
+Expedition against German South-West Africa. (Cd. 7873.)</p>
+
+<p>Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government
+with regard to its suppression. (Cd. 7874.)</p>
+
+<p>Further Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and
+Colonies. (Cd. 7875.)</p>
+
+<hr class="full" />
+
+<div class="trans-note">
+<a name="END" id="END"></a>
+<p class="heading">Transcriber's Note</p>
+
+<p>The transcriber made this change to the text to correct an obvious error:</p>
+
+<pre class="note">
+ 1. p. 34, "appproaches" --> "approaches"
+</pre>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>&nbsp;</p>
+<hr class="pg" />
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Great War and How It Arose, by Anonymous
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: The Great War and How It Arose
+
+
+Author: Anonymous
+
+
+
+Release Date: May 14, 2011  [eBook #36100]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII)
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Produced by Steven Gibbs, Richard J. Shiffer, and
+Distributed Proofreading volunteers (http://www.pgdp.net) for Project
+Gutenberg
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+      Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully
+      as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings and other
+      inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an
+      obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook.
+
+      Many occurrences of mismatched single and double quotation marks
+      remain as they were in the original.
+
+      Text enclosed by equal signs was in bold face in the original
+      (=bold=).
+
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT WAR AND HOW IT AROSE
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+1915
+
+Parliamentary Recruiting Committee
+12, Downing Street, London, S.W.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS.
+
+
+                                                                   PAGE.
+
+  Serbia's Position                                                    3
+
+  Russia's Position                                                    6
+
+  Germany's Position                                                   6
+
+  Italy's Position                                                     8
+
+  Germany's Selected Moment                                            8
+
+  Peace Thwarted by Germany                                           10
+
+      I. Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian
+         Ultimatum                                                    11
+     II. Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary
+         and Serbia                                                   11
+    III. Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers                       12
+     IV. Germany Asked to State Form of Mediation between
+         Russia and Austria-Hungary                                   13
+      V. Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary     14
+     VI. Russia's Final Attempt at Peace                              15
+
+  German Militarism Wins                                              17
+
+  How France Came In                                                  19
+
+  How Great Britain Came In                                           19
+
+  War with Austria                                                    22
+
+  Japan's Ultimatum to Germany                                        22
+
+  Allies' Declaration of Common Policy                                23
+
+  Turkey Joins Germany                                                24
+
+  More German Intrigues                                               26
+    The Near East                                                     26
+    The Far East                                                      27
+    West Africa                                                       28
+    South Africa                                                      28
+
+  How the Germans Make War                                            29
+
+  Germany's Attempted Bribery                                         36
+
+
+  APPENDIXES.
+
+  A. Germany's Knowledge of Contents of Austro-Hungarian
+     Ultimatum                                                        40
+
+  B. How Germany Misled Austria-Hungary                               46
+
+  C. Some German Atrocities in Belgium                                48
+
+  D. Germany's Employment of Poisonous Gas                            52
+
+  E. Efforts of German Ministers of State to lay Blame on
+     England                                                          52
+
+  F. List of Parliamentary Publications respecting the War            55
+
+
+
+
+THE GREAT WAR.
+
+
+
+
+SERBIA'S POSITION.
+
+
+On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and the Archduchess
+were assassinated on Austrian territory at Serajevo by two Austrian
+subjects, both Bosniaks. On a former occasion one of these assassins had
+been in Serbia and the "Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and
+dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian
+authorities, found that the latter protected him, and said that he was
+an innocent and harmless individual."[1] After a "magisterial"
+investigation, the Austro-Hungarian Government formally fixed upon the
+Serbians the guilt both of assisting the assassins and of continually
+conspiring against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and on
+July 23, 1914, sent an ultimatum to Serbia of which the following were
+the chief terms[2]:--
+
+     "The Royal Serbian Government shall publish on the front page of
+     their 'Official Journal' of the 13-26 July the following
+     declaration:--
+
+     "'The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the propaganda directed
+     against Austria-Hungary--_i.e._, the general tendency of which the
+     final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
+     territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal
+     consequences of these criminal proceedings.
+
+     "'The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers and
+     functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda...."
+
+     "The Royal Serbian Government further undertake:
+
+     "To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt
+     of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which
+     is directed against its territorial integrity; ...
+
+     "To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both
+     as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of
+     instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the
+     propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
+
+     "To remove from the military service, and from the administration
+     in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda
+     against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government reserve to themselves the right of
+     communicating to the Royal Government;
+
+     "To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive
+     movement directed against the territorial integrity of the
+     Monarchy;
+
+     "To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of
+     the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation
+     relating thereto."
+
+In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which
+was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at
+Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense
+such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words,
+Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all
+these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6
+p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the
+specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of
+Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary
+for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an
+explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the
+participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial
+proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany
+not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British
+Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left
+the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported
+that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so
+drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature
+of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same
+evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general
+mobilisation.
+
+An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an
+hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany
+the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented
+itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna
+through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed
+on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the
+British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a
+pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham.
+
+As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the
+Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the
+Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there
+were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be
+expected to accept."[5]
+
+During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at
+peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be
+extended in order to give the requisite time to negotiate an amicable
+settlement. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain
+asked Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that
+Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna.
+
+Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and
+Italy should work together at Vienna and Petrograd in favour of
+conciliation. Italy assented, France assented, Russia declared herself
+ready, Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria
+and Russia became threatening."
+
+Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade
+were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet
+Austria.
+
+But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had
+expired.
+
+The British Charge d'Affaires at Constantinople discovered the true
+object in view when he telegraphed on July 29:--
+
+     "I understand that the designs of Austria may extend considerably
+     beyond the Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian territory. I
+     gathered this from a remark let fall by the Austrian Ambassador
+     here who spoke of the deplorable economic situation of Salonica
+     under Greek administration and of the assistance on which the
+     Austrian Army could count from Mussulman population discontented
+     with Serbian rule."[6]
+
+So Austria contemplated no less than the break-up of the whole Balkan
+settlement to which she and Germany had been parties so recently as
+1913. She was to take advantage of the weakened condition of the Balkan
+peoples (as a result of the Wars of 1912-13) to wage a war of conquest
+right down to the Aegean Sea.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[1] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 30.
+
+[2] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 4.
+
+[3] This demand was pointedly summed up by Mr. Lloyd George at the
+Queen's Hall, London, September 19, 1914, when he said:--
+
+    "Serbia ... must dismiss from her army the officers whom Austria
+    should subsequently name. Those officers had just emerged from a war
+    where they had added lustre to the Serbian arms; they were gallant,
+    brave and efficient. I wonder whether it was their guilt or their
+    efficiency that prompted Austria's action! But, mark you, the
+    officers were not named; Serbia was to undertake in advance to
+    dismiss them from the army, the names to be sent in subsequently.
+    Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that?
+    Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to
+    this country, saying 'You must dismiss from your Army--and from your
+    Navy--all those officers whom we shall subsequently name.' Well, I
+    think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener would go; Sir John
+    French would be sent away; General Smith-Dorrien would go, and I am
+    sure that Sir John Jellicoe would have to go. And there is another
+    gallant old warrior who would go--Lord Roberts. It was a difficult
+    situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a
+    great military power that could have put half-a-dozen men in the
+    field for every one of Serbia's men, and that Power was supported by
+    the greatest military Power (Germany) in the world."
+
+[4] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 39.
+
+[5] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 46.
+
+[6] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 82.
+
+
+
+
+RUSSIA'S POSITION.
+
+
+Russia's interest in the Balkans was well-known. As late as May 23,
+1914, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the
+Duma the policy of the "Balkans for the Balkans" and it was known that
+any attack on a Balkan State by any great European power would be
+regarded as a menace to that policy. The Russians are a Slav people like
+the Serbians. Serbian independence was one of the results of the Great
+War which Russia waged against Turkey in 1877. If Serbia was, as the
+Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on July 29, "regarded as being
+in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Serbia was to be humiliated,
+then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a
+question of the policy of Russian statesmen at Petrograd, but of the
+deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian
+people by more than two centuries of development. It was known to the
+Austrians and to every foreign secretary in Europe, that if the Tsar's
+Government allowed Serbia to be crushed by Austria, they would be in
+danger of a revolution in Russia. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey
+said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan War, "a
+commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of
+the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and
+retested during the last decade.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S POSITION.
+
+
+Since the outbreak of war Germany has issued an Official White Book
+which states concisely and with almost brutal frankness the German case
+prior to the outbreak of hostilities,[7] in the following terms:--
+
+     "=The Imperial and Royal Government (Austria-Hungary) ... asked for
+     our opinion. With all our heart we were able to ... assure him
+     (Austria) that any action considered necessary ... would meet with
+     our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike
+     attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon
+     the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in
+     accordance with our duties as allies. We could not ... advise our
+     ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity,
+     nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this
+     all the less as our own interests were menaced through the
+     continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of
+     Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the
+     gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs
+     under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making
+     untenable the position of the Teutonic Race in Central Europe.=
+
+     "=A morally weakened Austria ... would be no longer an ally on whom
+     we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be
+     able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our
+     Easterly and Westerly neighbours.=
+
+     "_=We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
+     action towards Serbia.=_"
+
+Farther on in the German Official White Book (page 7) it is stated that
+the German Government instructed its Ambassador at Petrograd to make the
+following declaration to the Russian Government, with reference to
+Russian military measures which concerned Austria alone[8]:--
+
+     "=Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
+     counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army.=
+
+     "=But mobilisation means war.=
+
+     "=As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
+     mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France....="
+
+Here, then, we have the plain admission:--
+
+     That the steps subsequently taken were directed against Russia and
+     France.
+
+     That from the first Austria was given a free hand even to the
+     calculated extent of starting a great European war.
+
+     That a morally weakened Austria was not an ally on whom Germany
+     "could count" or "have confidence" though no reference is made to
+     Italy in this Official document.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[7] The German White Book (only authorised translation). Druck und
+Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin, pages 4 and 5. (Price, 40 pf.)
+
+[8] Cd. 7717, No. 109. In a despatch from Berlin, July 30, 1914, Mons.
+Jules Cambon (French Ambassador) says:--
+
+    "Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the
+    Austrian frontier; he told me that this mobilisation compromised the
+    success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything
+    depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise
+    completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisation, and this
+    might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and
+    consequently that of Germany.
+
+    "I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me
+    that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if
+    Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, and that this was not
+    being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the
+    army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for
+    the German army, and 'that the words of which I reminded him did not
+    constitute a firm engagement on his part.'"
+
+
+
+
+ITALY'S POSITION.
+
+
+Italy's position on the eve of the Great War, and while the above
+machinations were in progress, is quite clear for the reason that she
+had been approached twelve months before to take part in a similar
+enterprise and had peremptorily refused. On August 9, 1913, the Italian
+Premier, Signor Giolitti, received a telegram from the Marquis di San
+Guiliano (Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs), acquainting him with
+the fact that Austria had just confided to Italy that, with the approval
+of Germany, she was about to deliver an ultimatum to Serbia, in essence
+identical with that actually sent on July 23, 1914, whereby the present
+Great War was kindled. Austria then asked Italy to consider this move to
+be a _casus foederis_ under the Triple Alliance--which is purely a
+treaty of defence--involving Italy's military assistance on the side of
+Austria and Germany.[9] To this the Italian Premier (Signor Giolitti)
+replied[10]:--
+
+     "If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a _casus
+     foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking
+     on her own account, since there is no question of defence, inasmuch
+     as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a
+     declaration to this effect should be hope for action on the part of
+     Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure."
+
+Italy, having on this occasion made her position clear, maintained her
+neutrality last July (1914) when Germany and Austria decided to proceed
+with the plans arranged over twelve months before. Italy remained
+neutral because she held that Germany and Austria were the
+aggressors--not Russia and France.[11] By not consulting Italy on the
+subject of action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary violated one of the
+fundamental clauses of the Triple Alliance, and eventually this led
+Italy to denounce the Treaty on May 4th, 1915, and finally, on May 24th,
+1915, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[9] See Appendix "A." Italy denounced this treaty May 4th, 1915.
+
+[10] Cd. 7860.
+
+[11] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 152.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S SELECTED MOMENT.
+
+
+The past history of Germany shows that she has always made her wars at
+her own "selected moment," when she thought her victim was isolated or
+unprepared. As General von Bernhardi says in his book, _Germany and the
+Next Great War_: "English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us
+as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary
+and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of
+success." On July 23, 1914, when Austria launched her ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Chancelleries of Europe were taken by surprise. Germany and
+Austria chose their moment well.
+
+     (1) The British representatives were away from both Berlin and
+     Belgrade.
+
+     (2) M. Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, and the other
+     Ministers were away electioneering.
+
+     (3) The Russian Ambassadors were absent from Vienna, Berlin and
+     Paris, and the Russian Minister was absent from Belgrade. Indeed
+     the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had left "for the country in
+     consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at the
+     (Austro-Hungarian) Ministry for Foreign Affairs."[12]
+
+     (4) The President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister
+     were out of France at Reval, on board the French Battleship "La
+     France."
+
+     (5) The Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had
+     left the Capital and his presence at Ischl was constantly used by
+     the Germans and Austrians as an excuse for not being able to get
+     things done in time.
+
+The known facts of the crisis out of which the Great War arose and the
+messages of our Ambassadors suggest that Germany chose this particular
+time:--
+
+     (1) Calculating that Russia, if she did not fight, would be
+     humiliated, whilst Austria--Germany's ally--would be strengthened
+     by the conquest of Serbia; and
+
+     (2) Believing that if Russia chose to fight, even if she fought
+     with France as her ally, still it was a favourable moment.
+
+The deepening of the Kiel Canal to permit German battleships to pass
+from the Baltic to the North Sea was just completed. Germany had at her
+disposal the larger part of a huge war tax of L50,000,000, and had added
+enormously to her land forces. The murder of the Archduke created a
+pretext which roused enthusiasm for war in Austria, and there can be
+little doubt that Germany was ready to use this wave of popular feeling
+for her own ends. Germany appears to have instilled into Austria-Hungary
+the belief that there was small danger in coercing Serbia.[13]
+
+On the other hand, Germany aimed at thoroughly humiliating Russia and
+France, and appears to have calculated that if the worst came to the
+worst, she and Austria-Hungary would be in a position to beat them
+both. The German view of the European situation may be briefly set forth
+as follows:--
+
+     =Russia.=--Russia was passing through serious industrial troubles,
+     which it was thought might end in revolution.
+
+     =France.=--France was passing through a period of political chaos,
+     no Government being able to hold together for more than a few
+     weeks. And on July 13 the French had appointed a Committee to
+     inquire and report immediately on alleged deficiencies in various
+     defensive preparations.
+
+     =Belgium.=--Belgium was beginning a re-organisation of her Army
+     which would have gradually increased it to almost double its
+     present strength.
+
+     =Britain.=--Germany thought the Irish and general political
+     position in Britain made it impossible for her to show a united
+     front in foreign affairs, and that therefore she would be unable to
+     fight. The Germans seem to have assumed that Britain would be glad
+     incidentally to seize the chance of making money through neutrality
+     and would repudiate her treaty obligations to Belgium and her
+     friendship for France, and be content to see Germany ruthlessly
+     crushing the smaller Powers of Europe. Sir Edward Grey, on July 27,
+     1914, telegraphed to the British Ambassador at Petrograd:--"I have
+     been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian
+     circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand
+     aside."[14]
+
+Our Ambassadors at Petrograd, (July 24, 1914), Rome, (July 29, 1914) and
+Paris (July 30, 1914), each stated that the Foreign Offices of Russia,
+Italy and France respectively thought that Germany was counting on our
+neutrality, while the German Foreign Minister, after war was actually
+declared, seemed totally unable to understand how we could go to war for
+what he called "a Scrap of Paper." The "Scrap of Paper" happened to be a
+treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by both Great
+Britain _and_ Germany![15] The whole case is put in a nutshell in the
+despatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna, dated August 1, 1914, in
+which he says:--
+
+     "=I agree ... that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
+     the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his
+     action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
+     Government also desired war from the first.... Nothing can alter
+     the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on
+     their present course, if they have made up their mind with the
+     approval of Germany.="[16]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[12] Cd. 7717, No. 18.
+
+[13] See Appendix "B."
+
+[14] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 47.
+
+[15] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 80, 99 and 160.
+
+[16] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 141.
+
+
+
+
+PEACE THWARTED BY GERMANY.
+
+
+The attitude taken up by Germany and Austria-Hungary throughout the
+whole crisis can only lead to one conclusion--that both countries were
+determined to force their point, even at the risk of a European war. As
+showing the endeavours to devise means of averting a general conflict,
+they should be considered seriatim, together with the persistency with
+which they were blocked in Berlin:--
+
+
+_(I.)--Attempt to Extend Time-Limit of Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to
+Serbia._
+
+On July 25, in reply to the Anglo-Russian efforts, to extend the
+forty-eight hour "time-limit" of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
+Serbia, the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna telegraphed that he had
+been officially informed that "the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse
+our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note."[17] How
+Austria-Hungary was aided and abetted by Germany in this refusal is made
+plain in the despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Berlin on
+the same day:--
+
+     "The (German) Minister for Foreign Affairs ... tells me that the
+     British Government have likewise urged him to advise Vienna to
+     extend the time limit of the ultimatum, ... but he fears that in
+     the absence of Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
+     Affairs) "who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time,
+     his telegrams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the
+     wisdom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined
+     to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance
+     of Serbia."[18]
+
+
+_(II.)--The Question of Delay of Hostilities between Austria-Hungary and
+Serbia._
+
+When the extension of the time-limit of the Ultimatum to Serbia was
+refused by Austria, Sir Edward Grey thought the question of preventing
+or delaying hostilities might serve as a basis for discussion. The
+Austrian Ambassador explained that:--
+
+     "the Austrian Note should not be regarded as an Ultimatum; it
+     should be regarded as a step which, in the event of no reply, or in
+     the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would
+     be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations, and the immediate
+     departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade, without,
+     however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities."[19]
+
+As Sir Edward Grey said in his Despatch to the British Charge d'Affaires
+at Berlin, July 24, 1914:--
+
+     "The immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march
+     into Serbia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should
+     march to help Serbia; it would be very desirable to get Austria
+     not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But
+     none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany
+     would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should
+     inform Secretary of State."[20]
+
+The following day (July 25, 1914), Sir Edward Grey wrote to the British
+Charge d'Affaires in Berlin:--
+
+     "The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the
+     Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time limit would be
+     to break off diplomatic relations and commence military
+     preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German
+     Ambassador of this, I said that it interposed a stage of
+     mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which I had
+     urged yesterday should be delayed."[21]
+
+But here again Germany was lukewarm, to say the least of it, as will be
+seen in the Despatch from the British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin to Sir
+Edward Grey, dated July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that
+     German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to
+     Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a
+     favourable view of Serbian reply if it corresponds to the forecast
+     contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this
+     communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they
+     associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German
+     Government do not see their way to going beyond this."[22]
+
+
+_(III.)--Suggested Mediation by the Four Powers._
+
+On July 24, 1914, Sir Edward Grey suggested to the German Ambassador
+that the only chance he could see of a mediating or moderating influence
+being effective was:--
+
+     "that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France and ourselves should
+     work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour
+     of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and
+     Russia becoming threatening."[23]
+
+Finding that Russia consented to this idea, Sir Edward telegraphed to
+our representatives at Paris, Berlin and Rome on July 26, 1914, to the
+following effect:--
+
+     "Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct
+     Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and
+     Germany, and myself, to meet here in conference immediately for the
+     purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications?
+     You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do
+     this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of
+     the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at
+     Belgrade, Vienna and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request
+     that all active military operations should be suspended pending
+     results of conference."[24]
+
+The Powers, _with the exception of Germany_, consented. Germany again
+proclaimed herself the disturbing element, as is shown in the following
+Despatch from the British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated
+July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
+     practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his
+     opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
+     Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
+     desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
+     I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
+     arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
+     directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
+     dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
+     as you proposed was not practicable."[25]
+
+Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:--
+
+     "I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told
+     me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government,
+     to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that
+     events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late
+     to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the
+     basis of discussion."[26]
+
+
+_(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia
+and Austria-Hungary might take._
+
+How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the
+four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which
+Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward
+Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:--
+
+     "The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of
+     conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations a
+     quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German
+     Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of
+     the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between
+     Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of
+     mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation
+     by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not
+     acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by
+     any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would
+     'press the button' in the interests of peace._"[27]
+
+Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from
+the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30,
+1914:--
+
+     "The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the
+     button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he
+     had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had
+     been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]
+
+Sir Edward Grey's telegram was sent off about 4 p.m. on July 29. His
+appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About
+midnight a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's
+Ambassador at Berlin.[29] The German Chancellor had sent for him late at
+night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in
+a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from
+France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany
+would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained
+passive, no territory would be taken from her.
+
+Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an
+exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace.
+That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If
+Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great
+Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the
+whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the
+scale of peace in years to come.
+
+
+_(V.)--Russia Suggests Direct Negotiations with Austria-Hungary._
+
+Another excuse given by Germany for refusing mediation by the four
+Powers was the possibility of direct negotiations between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary. The British Ambassador in Berlin on July 27, in
+recording Germany's excuses, said that the German Secretary of State--
+
+     "added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed
+     that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof" (Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs) "to exchange views with Count
+     Berchtold" (Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs). "He thought
+     that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result,
+     and that it would be best before doing anything else to await
+     outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian
+     Governments."[30]
+
+It is worth noting that, in reply to this Despatch from the British
+Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Grey wrote on July 29:--
+
+     "I told the German Ambassador that an agreement arrived at direct
+     between Austria and Russia would be the best possible solution. I
+     would press no proposal as long as there was a prospect of that,
+     but my information this morning was that the Austrian Government
+     have declined the suggestion of the Russian Government that the
+     Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be authorised to
+     discuss directly with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
+     means of settling the Austro-Serbian conflict."[31]
+
+Russia had done her best to open these negotiations, and endeavoured to
+get the German Government to advise Austria to continue negotiations
+thus opened. How the proposal was received by Germany is found in the
+following Despatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, dated
+July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal
+     in Vienna that Szapary" (Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Russia)
+     "should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of
+     views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands which
+     would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow" (German Foreign
+     Secretary of State) "answered that he was aware of this proposal
+     and that he agreed with Pourtales" (German Ambassador in Russia)
+     "that as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go
+     on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German
+     Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater
+     insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow answered that _he
+     could not advise Austria to give way_."[32]
+
+The result of Germany's hostile attitude to the plan was at once made
+apparent the next day in Vienna, where the Russian Ambassador reported
+on July 28, 1914:--
+
+     "Count Berchtold" (Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs)
+     "replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and
+     of the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg
+     Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
+     Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the
+     energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no
+     longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the
+     Austro-Hungarian note."[33]
+
+
+_(VI.)--Russia's Final Attempt at Peace._
+
+Finally, on July 30, 1914, another attempt at peace by Russia is
+indicated in the Despatch from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
+to the Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome,
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked whether
+     Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might
+     give--that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of
+     Serbia--and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we
+     would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him
+     the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate
+     action: 'If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question
+     has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready
+     to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the
+     sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military
+     preparations.'
+
+     "Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
+     Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to
+     do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question,
+     for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order
+     that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military
+     preparations."[34]
+
+And subsequently this was amended according to the following Despatch
+from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Russian Ambassadors
+abroad, dated July 31, 1914, Petrograd:--
+
+     "Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. The British
+     Ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me
+     of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications in
+     the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Ambassador. I
+     replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send
+     you the text of the modified formula, which is as follows:--
+
+          "'If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on
+          Serbian territory; if, recognising that the dispute between
+          Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest,
+          she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and
+          decide what satisfaction Serbia could afford to the
+          Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a
+          sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to
+          maintain her waiting attitude."[35]
+
+The possibility of peace was not thought hopeless by Sir Edward Grey,
+for, in a despatch to the British Ambassador at Berlin, dated August 1,
+he says:--
+
+     "I still believe that it might be possible to secure peace if only
+     a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power
+     begins war.
+
+     "The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of
+     Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to
+     accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections
+     raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested.
+
+     "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are
+     ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able
+     to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in
+     order to avoid tension. His Majesty's Government are carefully
+     abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."[36]
+
+That Austria was at last taking a more reasonable attitude is shown by
+the despatch from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, dated August 1,
+1914:--
+
+     "The Austrian Ambassador yesterday visited Viviani" (French
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs), "and declared to him that Austria,
+     far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Serbia,
+     was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against
+     Servia with the other powers. The French Government are much
+     exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the
+     French frontier for they are convinced that under the guise of
+     'Kriegszustand,' mobilisation is, in reality, being carried
+     out."[37]
+
+Unfortunately at this point, when the Austro-Hungarian Government
+appeared ready to debate amicably with Russia, Germany stopped all
+efforts at peace by issuing an Ultimatum to Russia. News of this is
+given in a telegram to the Russian representatives abroad on August 1,
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "At midnight the German Ambassador announced to me, on the
+     instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by
+     midnight on Saturday, we had not begun to demobilise, not only
+     against Germany, but also against Austria, the German Government
+     would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my
+     enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the
+     negative, but added that we were very near it."[38]
+
+As Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, tersely put
+it in his despatch, dated from London, September 1, 1914, to Sir Edward
+Grey:--
+
+     "Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna
+     were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
+     ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
+     intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
+     St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
+     only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
+     the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. _A few days' delay
+     might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
+     calamities in history._"[39]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[17] Cd. 7626, No. 12.
+
+[18] Cd. 7626, No. 14.
+
+[19] Cd. 7626, No. 16.
+
+[20] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
+
+[21] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 25.
+
+[22] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 34.
+
+[23] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 11.
+
+[24] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 36.
+
+[25] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
+
+[26] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 75.
+
+[27] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
+
+[28] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 107.
+
+[29] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Nos. 85 and 101.
+
+[30] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 43.
+
+[31] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 84.
+
+[32] Cd. 7626, No. 38.
+
+[33] Cd. 7626, No. 45.
+
+[34] Cd. 7626, No. 60.
+
+[35] Cd. 7626, No. 67.
+
+[36] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 131.
+
+[37] Cd. 7626, No. 73.
+
+[38] Cd. 7626, No. 70.
+
+[39] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 161.
+
+
+
+
+GERMAN MILITARISM WINS.
+
+
+Thus Germany rejected all suggestions, while Austria, supported by
+Germany, was determined on war. The Serbian episode was clearly an
+excuse. Germany's alliance with Austria was "defensive." She was bound
+to join with Austria only in case of the latter being _attacked_ by
+Russia. Austria claimed that because Russia would not stand idle while
+Serbia was crushed, therefore Russia was the aggressor. Germany was a
+party to the Austrian attack on Serbia. The British Ambassador at Vienna
+on July 30 says: "I have private information that the German Ambassador
+(at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia _before it
+was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor_. I know from
+the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."[40]
+
+Germany, therefore, chose this moment to send a challenge to Russia
+knowing that Russia must fight unless she were willing to be humiliated
+and disgraced in the eyes, not only of men of the Slav race in the
+Balkans, but in the eyes of the whole world.
+
+The French Foreign Minister, telegraphing on July 31 to the French
+Ambassador in London as to Germany's aggressive steps on the
+Franco-German frontier, said: "All my information goes to show that the
+German preparations began on Saturday (July 25)."[41] What has actually
+happened in the war goes to show that this must have been the case.
+
+The precise situation at this point is well shown in the British Foreign
+Office introduction to _Great Britain and the European Crisis_:--
+
+     "At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched
+     an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her
+     mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for
+     the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown,
+     overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be
+     said is that, _according to the information in the possession of
+     His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time
+     proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general
+     mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next
+     day, the 1st August_. France also began to mobilise on that day.
+     The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal
+     from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy
+     until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the
+     German Ambassador at St. Petersburg presented a declaration of war.
+     Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great
+     Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the
+     Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her
+     troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a
+     collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday
+     morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small
+     independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the
+     Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium.
+     The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had
+     become inevitable."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[40] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
+
+[41] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 105--Enclosure 3.
+
+
+
+
+HOW FRANCE CAME IN.
+
+
+France, by her alliance with Russia, was bound to stand by Russia if she
+was attacked by Germany and Austria. On July 31 the German Ambassador at
+Paris informed the French Government that Russia had ordered a complete
+mobilisation, and that Germany had given Russia twelve hours in which to
+order demobilisation and asking France to define her attitude. France
+was given no time, and war came, when German troops at once crossed the
+French frontier. Germany, by her attitude towards France, plainly
+admitted that she was the aggressor. She made no pretence of any cause
+of quarrel with France, but attacked her because of France's defensive
+alliance with Russia.
+
+
+
+
+HOW GREAT BRITAIN CAME IN.
+
+
+Great Britain was primarily drawn in to save Belgium. We were bound by a
+Treaty (1839) to which Germany and France were also parties,
+guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. When Germany attacked France in
+1870, Prince Bismarck gave Belgium a written declaration--which he said
+was superfluous in view of the Treaty in existence--that the German
+Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium,
+provided that neutrality were respected by the other belligerent Powers.
+
+France has been faithful to her Treaty. She even left her Belgian
+frontier unfortified. On August 3, 1914, on the verge of war, our
+position was made plain by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, when
+he said:--
+
+     "When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be
+     a most important element in our policy--a most important subject
+     for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar
+     terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us
+     to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were
+     prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of
+     Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government
+     this reply:--
+
+          "'The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality
+          of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other
+          Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself
+          under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her
+          security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given
+          several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to
+          the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels
+          has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian
+          Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.'
+
+     "From the German Government the reply was:--
+
+          "'The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
+          possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the
+          Imperial Chancellor.'
+
+     "Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an
+     answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long
+     delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir
+     Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they
+     could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail,
+     in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing,
+     to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign."[42]
+
+This clearly indicated that Germany would not respect the neutrality of
+Belgium, and the day after Sir Edward Grey's speech, on August 4, the
+German Army had penetrated Belgium on its way to France after a
+peremptory notice to the Belgian Government to the effect that the
+Imperial Government "will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry
+out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered
+indispensable." Thus began the nightmare of German "Kultur," to which
+unoffending Belgium was subjected, and against which she appealed to the
+British Government: "Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and
+Russia to co-operate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory."[43]
+On August 4 Great Britain asked Germany for a definite assurance by
+midnight that she would not violate Belgian neutrality. Germany's
+attitude is unmistakable in the following report of an interview by our
+Ambassador in Berlin with the German Secretary of State:--
+
+     "Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
+     answer must be 'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having
+     crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been
+     already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why
+     the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely,
+     that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest
+     way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and
+     endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.
+
+     "It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by
+     the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
+     paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
+     through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+     time.
+
+     "This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for
+     bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action
+     was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an
+     inexhaustible supply of troops....
+
+     "I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it
+     might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
+     seeing him.... I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency
+     at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
+     said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible
+     to a degree; just for a word--'neutrality,' a word which in war
+     time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great
+     Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation.... He held Great
+     Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.
+     I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
+     same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
+     strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
+     advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
+     would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
+     'life and death' for the honour of Great Britain that she should
+     keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+     neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
+     or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
+     Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: 'But at what price will
+     that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
+     that?' I hinted to His Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
+     of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
+     solemn engagements, but His Excellency was so excited, so evidently
+     overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
+     reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
+     argument."[44]
+
+Thus, when midnight struck on Tuesday, August 4, 1914, it found us at
+war with Germany for tearing up the "scrap of paper" which was Britain's
+bond.[45] And earlier in the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. von
+Bethmann Hollweg, in the course of a remarkable speech in the Reichstag,
+admitted the naked doctrine, that German "necessity" overrides every
+consideration of right and wrong, in the following words:--
+
+     "=Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity
+     knows no law! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps" (as a
+     matter of fact the speaker knew that Belgium had been invaded that
+     morning) "are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary
+     to the dictates of international law.... The wrong--I speak
+     openly--that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as
+     soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is
+     threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest
+     possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his way
+     through (wie er sich durchhaut)!="[46]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[42] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, Part II.
+
+[43] Statements by Prime Minister, House of Commons, August 4 and 5,
+1914.
+
+[44] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 160.
+
+[45] See Appendix E.
+
+[46] The _Times_, August 11, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+WAR WITH AUSTRIA.
+
+
+From now onwards we were definitely allied with France in defence of
+Belgium's neutrality.
+
+At 6 p.m. on August 6, 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.
+
+On August 12 Sir Edward Grey was compelled to inform Count Mensdorff
+(Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London) at the request of the French
+Government, that a complete rupture having occurred between France and
+Austria, a state of war between Great Britain and Austria would be
+declared from midnight of August 12.
+
+
+
+
+JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.
+
+
+On August 17 the text of an ultimatum by Japan to Germany was published
+in the following terms:--
+
+     "We consider it highly important and necessary in the present
+     situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance
+     of the peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interests as
+     contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great
+     Britain.
+
+     "In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, the
+     establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
+     Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believes it to be its duty
+     to give advice to the Imperial German Government, to carry out the
+     following two propositions:--
+
+          "(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters
+          the German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to
+          disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn.
+
+          "(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15 to the
+          Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or
+          compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a
+          view to the eventual restoration of the same to China.
+
+     "The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that
+     in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23 an answer
+     from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional
+     acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese
+     Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may
+     deem necessary to meet the situation."[47]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[47] Under Art. II of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, signed on July 13,
+1911, it was agreed that if the two contracting parties should conduct a
+war in common, they should make peace in mutual agreement, etc.
+
+
+
+
+BRITISH APPROVAL.
+
+
+The Official Press Bureau issued the following on August 17:--
+
+     "The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, having been in
+     communication with each other, are of opinion that it is necessary
+     for each to take action to protect the general interest in the Far
+     East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, keeping specially
+     in view the independence and integrity of China, and provided for
+     in that Agreement.
+
+     "It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the
+     Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be
+     necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor
+     beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any
+     foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the
+     Continent of Eastern Asia."
+
+
+
+
+_DECLARATION OF COMMON POLICY._
+
+
+On September 5, 1914, the British Official Press Bureau issued the
+following statement from the Foreign Office:--
+
+
+     DECLARATION.
+
+     The undersigned duly authorised thereto by the respective
+     Governments hereby declare as follows:--
+
+     The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to
+     conclude peace separately during the present war. The three
+     Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no
+     one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous
+     agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the
+     undersigned have signed this Declaration and have affixed thereto
+     their seals.
+
+     Done at London in triplicate, the 5th day of September, 1914.
+
+                    E. Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of
+                         State for Foreign Affairs.
+
+                    Paul Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and
+                         Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.
+
+                    Benckendorff, Ambassador Extraordinary and
+                         Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of
+                         Russia.
+
+
+
+
+TURKEY JOINS GERMANY.
+
+
+Directly war broke out the Turkish Army was mobilised, under the supreme
+command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands.[48] Although
+the Turkish Government had declared their intention of preserving their
+neutrality, they took no steps to ensure its maintenance. They forfeited
+their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships, "Goeben"
+and "Breslau," which, fleeing from the Allied Fleets, had entered the
+Dardanelles on August 10.
+
+Instead of interning these war vessels with their crews, as they were
+repeatedly asked to do by the Allied Governments, the Turkish Government
+allowed the German Admiral and his men to remain on board, and while
+this was the case the German Government were in a position to force the
+hand of the Turkish Government whenever it suited them to do so.
+
+In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was
+exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in
+the European War was said to be assured; the perpetual menace to Turkey
+from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by an alliance with
+Germany and Austria; Egypt might be recovered for the Empire; India and
+other Moslem countries would rise against Christian rule, to the great
+advantage of the Caliphate of Constantinople; Turkey would emerge from
+the War the one great power of the East, even as Germany would be the
+one great power of the West. Such was the substance of German
+misrepresentations.
+
+Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, and by the
+conviction of the superiority of German arms, proved a most active agent
+on behalf of Germany.
+
+A strong German element was imported into the remainder of the Turkish
+Fleet, even before the British Naval Mission, which had been reduced to
+impotence by order of the Minister of Marine, was recalled by His
+Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from
+Germany to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus,
+and at other crucial points.
+
+Numerous German merchant vessels served as bases of communication, and
+as auxiliaries to what had become in effect the German Black Sea Fleet.
+Secret communications with the German General Staff were established by
+means of the "Corcovado," which was anchored opposite the German Embassy
+at Therapia. The German Military Mission in Turkey acted in closest
+touch with the Turkish Militarist Party. They were the main organisers
+of those military preparations in Syria which directly menaced Egypt.
+
+Emissaries of Enver Pasha bribed and organised the Bedouins on the
+frontier; the Syrian towns were full of German officers, who provided
+large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. The Khedive of
+Egypt, who was in Constantinople, was himself a party to the conspiracy,
+and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his
+presence with a military expedition across the frontier. All the Turkish
+newspapers in Constantinople and most of the provincial papers became
+German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany
+or Austria, and minimised everything favourable to the Allies.
+
+Millions of money were consigned from Germany to the German Embassy in
+Constantinople, and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank.
+At one time these sums amounted to L4,000,000. A definite arrangement
+was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Turkish Ministers,
+including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should
+declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a
+stated figure.
+
+The final point was reached when Odessa and other Russian ports in the
+Black Sea were attacked by the Turkish Fleet on October 29, 1914. It is
+now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the
+German Admiral on the evening of October 27.
+
+On October 30 the Russian Ambassador asked for his passports and there
+was nothing left but for the British and French Ambassadors to demand
+theirs on the same day. The Russian Ambassador left Constantinople on
+October 31, while the British and French Ambassadors left the following
+evening.[49]
+
+Thenceforward the Turks, at the instigation of the Germans,
+unsuccessfully endeavoured to raise Mahomedans in all countries against
+Great Britain and her Allies. The Sultan of Turkey, misusing his
+position as Padishah and Titular Head of the Moslems, gave a perverted
+history of the events and proclaimed a Holy War. The Sultan, in his
+speech from the Throne on December 14, 1914 (at which ceremony the
+ex-Khedive of Egypt was present), said:--
+
+     "We were just in the best way to give reforms in the interior a
+     fresh impetus when suddenly the great crisis broke out. While our
+     Government was firmly resolved to observe the strictest neutrality,
+     our Fleet was attacked in the Black Sea by the Russian Fleet.
+     England and France then began actual hostilities by sending troops
+     to our frontiers. Therefore I declared a state of war. These
+     Powers, as a necessity, compelled us to resist by armed force the
+     policy of destruction which at all times was pursued against the
+     Islamic world by England, Russia, and France, and assumed the
+     character of a religious persecution. In conformity with the Fetwas
+     I called all Moslems to a Holy War against these Powers and those
+     who would help them."[50]
+
+What the Moslems of India thought of the situation is succinctly shown
+by a speech delivered on October 1, 1914, by the Agha Khan, the
+spiritual head of the Khoja community of Mahomedans and President of the
+All-India Moslem League.[51] He said he had always been convinced that
+Germany was the most dangerous enemy of Turkey and other Moslem
+countries, for she was the Power most anxious to enter by "peaceful
+penetration" Asia Minor and Southern Persia. But she had been posing for
+years past as a sort of protector of Islam--_though Heaven forbid that
+they should have such an immoral protector_.
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[48] Cd. 7716.
+
+[49] Cd. 7628 and Cd. 7716.
+
+[50] A Reuter's Amsterdam telegram of December 15, 1914.
+
+[51] _Times_, October 2, 1914,
+
+
+
+
+MORE GERMAN INTRIGUES.
+
+
+The vastness of German intrigues throughout the world in preparation for
+a great war have come out piece by piece.
+
+=The Near East.=--Taking the Near East first, we find that Germany,
+having suborned the ex-Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi, proceeded weeks
+before the rupture with Turkey to give orders, through the Ottoman
+Empire, to Shukri, the acting Chief of the Turkish Special Mission, to
+prepare public opinion in Egypt for Turkish invasion and to await the
+coming of the German Mors, whose trial was attended by such startling
+disclosures.[52]
+
+Mors had been introduced to Enver Pasha by Dr. Pruefer (Secretary to
+Prince Hatzfeldt when he was German Agent in Egypt) and had held long
+conferences with Omar Fauzi Bey, of the Turkish General Staff, who on
+September 6, 1914, worked out a scheme for disturbances in Egypt by
+bands of criminals led by Turkish officers and for an attack on the Suez
+Canal.
+
+In 1908 Prince Hatzfeldt succeeded Count Bernstorff, as German Agent in
+Egypt, and he at once established close relations with the Egyptian
+disloyalists of the extreme faction. In this he appears to have been
+aided by Baron von Oppenheim, and by Dr. Pruefer, the Oriental Secretary
+of the Agency, who was a fine Arabic scholar, and who had travelled a
+great deal in Syria and the Near East. The leaders of the disloyal
+section in Egypt were kept in the closest touch, and visited Prince
+Hatzfeldt at the German Agency, and were in constant communication with
+Dr. Pruefer, who, in Oriental disguise, often visited them, and other
+Panislamic Agents.[53]
+
+=The Far East.=--In India the German merchants joined our Chambers of
+Commerce and were elected as representatives of commercial life, and as
+trustees of port trusts, which gave them a knowledge of our local
+defences. In some instances they appear to have become volunteers, and
+so to have gained knowledge of our forts and armouries. Small German
+merchants and traders in the Punjab and other districts constantly
+endeavoured to undermine the British Raj, and preached sedition wherever
+they went. Such were the agents and spies of the German Government.
+
+Since the Mutiny at Singapore it has been proved that the Germans were
+calling home their reserves from Singapore and the East in May, 1914,
+and even as early as April of last year.[54] The first thing the
+mutineers did was to go to the German Encampment, open the doors, and
+supply those inside with rifles. Sir Evelyn Ellis, member of the
+Singapore Legislative Council, who was President of the Commission
+appointed by the Governor to collect evidence with reference to the
+Mutiny, which took place on February 15, 1915, stated that:--
+
+     "They were not to think that they had been engaged in suppressing a
+     small local disturbance. On the contrary, there was evidence to
+     show that they had assisted in defeating one of the aims of the
+     destroyer of Europe. They had been dealing with work that had been
+     engineered by the agents of our common foes, and they had
+     contributed to the suppression of a most diabolical plot. What had
+     taken place in Singapore was only part of a scheme for the murder
+     of women and children such as they had had instances of on the East
+     Coast of England."[55]
+
+The head of a big German firm in Singapore, after being released on
+parole, was found with a wireless installation in his house, with which
+he was stated to have kept the "Emden" supplied with news.[56]
+
+In Persia and Arabia there is abundant proof of German intrigues, while
+in China few opportunities have been lost by German agents of impugning
+British good faith, and German money appears to have been used for years
+in keeping the Chinese press--in Peking more particularly--as
+anti-British as possible. Since the declaration of war an attempt has
+been made by Captain Pappenheim, Military Attache of the German Legation
+in Peking, to organise an expedition into Russian Siberia to damage the
+Trans-Siberian railway. His action was, of course, a gross abuse of his
+diplomatic position, and has been disclaimed by the Chinese
+Government.[57]
+
+=West Africa.=--In West Africa the report of Colonel F. C. Bryant on
+operation in Togoland shows how well the Germans were prepared for war
+in that region.[58]
+
+=South Africa.=--In South Africa[59] it has been proved that so far back
+as 1912 the Germans were in communication with Lieut.-Colonel Maritz
+with a view to a rebellion. The latter appears to have brooded over
+schemes for the establishment of a Republic in South Africa. As the Blue
+Book, published in Cape Town on April 28, 1915, states: "One witness,
+Captain Leipold, of the Government Intelligence Department, who was sent
+to find out how things stood with Maritz, describes how the rebel leader
+dramatically threw his cards on the table in the shape of a bundle of
+correspondence with the German Administration at Windhuk, dating as far
+back as August, 1912."[60]
+
+In a speech to his troops on August 9, 1914, Maritz declared that he had
+6,000 Germans ready to help him, and he further stated that Beyers and
+De Wet had been fully informed of his plans long before the war.[61]
+
+Evidence was also given during the trial of De Wet that the rebellion in
+South Africa "was planned a couple of years ago when General Hertzog
+left the Ministry."[62] The Germans, either directly or indirectly,
+suborned, amongst others, Maritz, De Wet, De La Rey, Beyers, Kemp, and
+Kock. But the magnificent services of General Botha and the loyalists
+of South Africa--both British and Dutch--rendered nugatory the
+machinations of the German Government.
+
+The history of German intrigues, both before and since the war, in
+British and French colonies, and in neutral countries throughout the
+world, which are now known and proved to the hilt, may be gauged from
+the examples given in the foregoing brief notes. The German newspaper
+_Der Tag_, which, during the first month of the war, declared: "Herr
+Gott, sind diese Tage schoen" (O Lord, how beautiful are these days),
+subsequently summarised the German outlook when it naively
+declared:--[63]
+
+     "So many of our calculations have deceived us. We expected that
+     British India would rise when the first shot was fired in Europe,
+     but in reality thousands of Indians came to fight with the British
+     against us. We anticipated that the whole British Empire would be
+     torn to pieces, but the Colonies appear to be closer than ever
+     united with the Mother Country. We expected a triumphant rebellion
+     in South Africa, yet it turned out nothing but a failure. We
+     expected trouble in Ireland, but instead, she sent her best
+     soldiers against us. We anticipated that the party of 'peace at any
+     price' would be dominant in England, but it melted away in the
+     ardour to fight against Germany. We reckoned that England was
+     degenerate and incapable of placing any weight in the scale, yet
+     she seems to be our principal enemy.
+
+     "The same has been the case with France and Russia. We thought that
+     France was depraved and divided and we find that they are
+     formidable opponents. We believed that the Russian people were far
+     too discontented to fight for their Government, and we made our
+     plans on the supposition of a rapid collapse of Russia, but,
+     instead, she mobilised her millions quickly and well, and her
+     people are full of enthusiasm and their power is crushing. Those
+     who led us into all those mistakes and miscalculations have laid
+     upon themselves a heavy responsibility."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[52] _Times_, April 28, 1915.
+
+[53] _Times_, January 6, 1915.
+
+[54] _Times_, April 24, 1915. (Speech by the Bishop of Singapore.)
+
+[55] _Daily News and Leader_, April 27, 1915.
+
+[56] _Morning Post_, March 27, 1915.
+
+[57] Letter from the Chinese Legation to the _Times_, March 13 and 20,
+1915.
+
+[58] _Daily News and Leader_, April 22, 1915.
+
+[59] Cd. 7874.
+
+[60] _Times_, April 30, 1915.
+
+[61] _Times_, March 17, 1915.
+
+[62] _Times_, February 19, 1915.
+
+[63] _Times_, April 26, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+HOW THE GERMANS MAKE WAR.
+
+
+It has often been asked what would happen if savages were armed with the
+products of modern science and with the intelligence to use them.
+Germany has answered the question. Every resource of science lies at the
+German command; the chemist, the physicist, the metallurgist, have all
+worked in this war to place the most effective tools of destruction in
+the Germans' hands, and to satisfy their ambitions they have shut the
+gates of mercy on mankind. The Official Handbook of Instructions issued
+to Officers of the German Army by the German General Staff urges the
+"exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination,
+incendiarism, robbery and the like) to the prejudice of the enemy."
+This Official Handbook says:--
+
+     "A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the
+     combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it
+     will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual
+     and material resources of the latter."[64]
+
+The German Emperor, addressing the troops which he sent to take part in
+the International Expedition in China in 1900, said:--
+
+     "When you come into contact with the enemy strike him down.
+     _Quarter is not to be given. Prisoners are not to be made._ Whoever
+     falls into your hands is into your hands delivered. Just as a
+     thousand years ago the Huns, under their King Attila, made for
+     themselves a name which still appears imposing in tradition, so may
+     the name of German become known in China in such a way that never
+     again will a Chinaman dare to look askance at a German. The
+     blessing of the Lord be with you. Give proof of your courage and
+     the Divine blessing will be attached to your colours."
+
+At midnight on August 4, Great Britain declared war on Germany for
+violating the neutrality of Belgium, and it will be remembered that
+earlier in the day the German Imperial Chancellor had stated that German
+troops "perhaps are already on Belgian soil," and that Germany could
+only have one thought--how she was to "hack her way through."
+Simultaneously with the thought, came action. What was actually taking
+place is described, by Lord Bryce's Committee of Inquiry, in the
+following words[65]:--
+
+     "On August 4th the roads converging upon Liege from north-east,
+     east, and south were covered with German Death's Head Hussars and
+     Uhlans pressing forward to seize the passage over the Meuse. From
+     the very beginning of the operations the civilian population of the
+     villages lying upon the line of the German advance were made to
+     experience the extreme horrors of war. 'On the 4th of August,' says
+     one witness, 'at Herve' (a village not far from the frontier), 'I
+     saw at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, near the station, five
+     Uhlans, these were the first German troops I had seen. They were
+     followed by a German officer and some soldiers in a motor car. The
+     men in the car called out to a couple of young fellows who were
+     standing about 30 yards away. The young men, being afraid, ran off,
+     and then the Germans fired and killed one of them named D----.'
+
+     "The murder of this innocent fugitive civilian was a prelude to the
+     burning and pillage of Herve and of other villages in the
+     neighbourhood, to the indiscriminate shooting of civilians of both
+     sexes, and to the organised military execution of batches of
+     selected males. Thus at Herve some 50 men escaping from the burning
+     houses were seized, taken outside the town and shot. At Melen, a
+     hamlet west of Herve, 40 men were shot. In one household alone the
+     father and mother (names given) were shot, the daughter died after
+     being repeatedly outraged, and the son was wounded. Nor were
+     children exempt....
+
+     "The burning of the villages in this neighbourhood and the
+     wholesale slaughter of civilians, such as occurred at Herve,
+     Micheroux, and Soumagne, appear to be connected with the
+     exasperation caused by the resistance of Fort Fleron, whose guns
+     barred the main road from Aix la Chapelle to Liege. Enraged by the
+     losses which they had sustained, suspicious of the temper of the
+     civilian population, and probably thinking that by exceptional
+     severities at the outset they could cow the spirit of the Belgian
+     nation, the German officers and men speedily accustomed themselves
+     to the slaughter of civilians."
+
+As a German soldier's diary, examined by Lord Bryce's Committee,
+says:--"The inhabitants without exception were brought out and shot.
+This shooting was heart-breaking as they all knelt down and prayed, but
+that was no ground for mercy. A few shots rang out and they fell back
+into the green grass and slept for ever."[66]
+
+During the invasion of Belgium and France, German procedure was almost
+the same in all cases. "They advance along a road, shooting inoffensive
+passers-by--particularly bicyclists--as well as peasants working in the
+fields. In the towns or villages where they stop, they begin by
+requisitioning food and drink, which they consume till intoxicated.
+Sometimes from the interior of deserted houses they let off their rifles
+at random, and declare that it was the inhabitants who fired. Then the
+scenes of fire, murder, and especially pillage, begin, accompanied by
+acts of deliberate cruelty, without respect to sex or age. Even where
+they pretend to know the actual person guilty of the acts they allege,
+they do not content themselves with executing him summarily, but they
+seize the opportunity to decimate the population, pillage the houses,
+and then set them on fire. After a preliminary attack and massacre they
+shut up the men in the church, and then order the women to return to
+their houses and to leave their doors open all night."[67]
+
+Innumerable German atrocities are on record and well authenticated. For
+example, Professor Jacobs, at a medical meeting in Edinburgh, stated
+that, as head of the Belgian Red Cross, he "had visited a chateau but
+found the Red Cross had not been respected. It had been completely
+destroyed, and the bodies of six girls, aged from ten to seventeen, were
+lying on the lawn. A convent containing sixty sisters had been entered
+by the German soldiers and every one had been violated. On the evidence
+of the doctor of the institution twenty-five were pregnant. Professor
+Jacobs had operated on the wife of a doctor living near Namur. Three
+weeks after the operation, when convalescing and still in bed, their
+house was entered by German soldiers; she was raped by seven of them and
+died two days after."[68]
+
+1. A few typical examples of the wholesale atrocities of German troops
+are given in Appendix C, but to show that in many cases such atrocities
+were not only countenanced, but ordered by officers in command, we quote
+the following:--
+
+                                             August 22, 1914.
+
+     The inhabitants of the town of Andenne, after having protested
+     their peaceful intentions, made a treacherous surprise attack on
+     our troops.
+
+     It was with my consent that the General had the whole place burnt
+     down, and about 100 people shot.
+
+     I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of Liege, so that
+     its inhabitants may know the fate with which they are threatened if
+     they take up a similar attitude.
+
+                                   The General Commanding-in-Chief,
+                                             VON BULOW.[69]
+
+2. Here is an order of the day given on August 26 by General Stenger
+commanding the 58th German Brigade:--
+
+     After to-day no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to
+     be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even
+     prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a
+     single living enemy remain behind us.
+
+               Oberlieutenant und Kompagnie-Chef STOY;
+               Oberst und Regiments Kommandeur NEUBAUER;
+               General-Major und Brigade-Kommandeur STENGER.[70]
+
+With reference to the above Order, Professor Joseph Bedier says: "Some
+thirty soldiers of Stenger's Brigade (112th and 142nd Regt. of the Baden
+Infantry), were examined in our prisoners' camps. I have read their
+evidence, which they gave upon oath and signed. All confirm the
+statement that this order of the day was given them on August 26, in one
+unit by Major Mosebach, in another by Lieut. Curtius, &c.; the majority
+did not know whether the order was carried out, but three of them say
+they saw it done in the forest of Thiaville, where ten or twelve wounded
+French soldiers who had already been spared by a battalion were
+despatched. Two others saw the order carried out on the Thiaville road,
+where some wounded found in a ditch by a company were finished off."[71]
+
+3. The following are extracts from a Proclamation posted by the Germans
+at Namur on August 25, 1914:--
+
+     (3) Every street will be occupied by a German Guard, who will take
+     ten hostages from each street, whom they will keep under
+     surveillance. If there is any rising in the street the ten hostages
+     will be shot.
+
+     (4) Doors may not be locked, and at night after eight o'clock there
+     must be lights in three windows in every house.
+
+     (5) It is forbidden to be in the street after eight o'clock. The
+     inhabitants of Namur must understand that there is no greater and
+     more horrible crime than to compromise the existence of the town
+     and the life of its citizens by criminal acts against the German
+     Army.
+
+                                             The Commander of the Town,
+                                                  VON BULOW.[72]
+
+4. On October 5 the following Proclamation was posted in Brussels "and
+probably in most of the Communes of the Kingdom."
+
+     During the evening of September 25, the railway line and the
+     telegraph wires were destroyed on the line Lovenjoul-Vertryck. In
+     consequence of this, these two localities have had to render an
+     account of this, and had to give hostages in the morning of
+     September 30.
+
+     In future, the localities nearest to the place where similar acts
+     take place will be punished without pity; _it matters little if
+     they are accomplices or not_. For this purpose _hostages have been
+     taken_ from all localities near the railway line thus menaced, and
+     at the first attempt to destroy the railway line, or the telephone
+     or telegraph wires, _they will be immediately shot_.
+
+     Further, all the troops charged with the duty of guarding the
+     railway have been ordered to shoot any person who, in a suspicious
+     manner, approaches the line, or the telegraph or telephone wires.
+
+                    The Governor-General of Belgium,
+                         (S.) BARON VON DER GOLTZ, Field-Marshal.[73]
+
+For purposes of record it should be noted that Lord Bryce's Committee
+mention by name three German Generals whose armies have disgraced
+civilisation; they are those of General Alexander von Kluck, General von
+Buelow and General von Hausen.[74]
+
+Some of the main heads of the barbarities of Germany and of the way she
+has violated the recognised rules of International Law, may be set out
+as follows:--[75]
+
+(_a_) The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the North of
+France has been made public by the Belgian and French Governments, and
+by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history
+affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the
+defenceless and non-combatant population in the territory that has been
+in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was
+confiscated, until, in Belgium, an International Commission, largely
+influenced by American generosity and conducted under American auspices,
+came to the relief of the population, and secured from the German
+Government a promise to spare what food was still left in the country,
+though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon the
+defenceless population for the support of the German Army.
+
+(_b_) We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the
+barbarous treatment to which British officers and soldiers have been
+exposed after they have been taken prisoner, while being conveyed to
+German prison camps. Evidence has been received of the hardships to
+which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps,
+contrasting most unfavourably with the treatment of German prisoners in
+this country. The Germans make no attempt to save sailors from British
+war vessels they sink, although we have saved a large number of German
+sailors in spite of great danger to our men.[76]For example, on May 1,
+1915, in the destroyer action in the North Sea, the Germans imprisoned
+two British sailors below and when their vessel was sinking, saved
+themselves, but left their prisoners to sink below because "time was
+short."
+
+As Lord Kitchener said, Germany "has stooped to acts which will surely
+stain indelibly her military history and which would vie with the
+barbarous savagery of the Dervishes of the Sudan."[77] On the same day,
+in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister declared: "When we come to
+the end of this war, which, please God, we may, we shall not forget--and
+ought not to forget--this horrible record of calculated cruelty and
+crime, and we shall hold it to be our duty to exact such reparation
+against those who are proved to have been guilty agents or actors in the
+matter, as it may be possible for us to exact. I do not think we should
+be doing our duty to these brave and unfortunate men or to the honour of
+our own country and the plain dictates of humanity if we were content
+with anything less than that."[78]
+
+(_c_) At the very outset of war a German mine-layer was discovered
+laying a mine-field on the high seas. Further mine-fields have been laid
+from time to time without warning, and are still being laid on the high
+seas, and many neutral, as well as British vessels, have been sunk by
+them.
+
+(_d_) At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and
+sunk British merchant vessels, thus making the sinking of merchant
+vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at
+all, only as an exception; the general rule, to which the British
+Government have adhered, being that merchant vessels, if captured, must
+be taken before a Prize Court. The Germans have also sunk British
+merchant vessels by torpedo without notice, and without any provision
+for the safety of the crew. They have done this in the case of neutral
+as well as of British vessels, and a number of non-combatant and
+innocent lives, unarmed and defenceless, have been destroyed in this
+way. The Germans have sunk without warning emigrant vessels, have tried
+to sink an hospital ship, and have themselves used an hospital ship for
+patrol work and wireless. The torpedoeing of the "Lusitania" on May 7,
+1915, involving the murder of hundreds of innocent civilians--British
+and neutral--was acclaimed with great relish in Berlin.
+
+(_e_) Unfortified, open, and defenceless towns, such as Scarborough,
+Yarmouth and Whitby, have been deliberately and wantonly bombarded by
+German ships of war, causing, in some cases, considerable loss of
+civilian life, including women and children.
+
+(_f_) German aircraft have dropped bombs on the East Coast of England,
+in places where there were no military or strategic points to be
+attacked.
+
+(_g_) The Germans have used poisonous gases in killing Allied troops at
+the Front, although Germany was a signatory to the following article in
+the Hague Convention:--
+
+     "The Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of
+     projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating
+     or deleterious gases."[79]
+
+And finally the German troops in South Africa have poisoned drinking
+wells and infected them with disease.[80]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[64] _Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege._ Berlin, 1902, in the series
+"Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften," published in 1905. A translation
+of this monograph by Professor J. H. Morgan has recently been published.
+
+[65] Cd. 7894, page 7, 8.
+
+[66] Cd. 7894, page 9.
+
+[67] See Appendix C. Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation
+(1914). The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
+reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
+Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
+Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
+Antwerp; M. van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
+as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
+Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
+
+[68] Meeting of Edinburgh Obstetrical Society, December 9, 1914.
+_Lancet_, December 19, 1914, page 1, 440.
+
+[69] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of War in Belgium.
+
+[70] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ One of the series of
+"Studies and Documents on the War." Publishing Committee: Mm. Ernest
+Lavisse, of the Academie francaise, President; Charles Andler, professor
+of German literature and language in the University of Paris; Joseph
+Bedier, professor at the College de France; Henri Bergson, of the
+Academie francaise; Emile Boutroux, of the Academie francaise; Ernest
+Denis, professor of history in the University of Paris; Emile Durkheim,
+professor in the University of Paris; Jacques Hadamard, of the Academie
+des Sciences; Gustave Lanson, professor of French literature in the
+University of Paris; Charles Seignobos, professor of history in the
+University of Paris; Andre Weiss, of the Academie des Sciences morales
+et politiques.
+
+[71] _German Atrocities from German Evidence._ See footnote on page 32.
+
+[72] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of War in Belgium.
+
+[73] Reports on the Violation of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws
+and Customs of war in Belgium.
+
+[74] Cd. 7894, page 10.
+
+[75] Most of the points referred to in the following record are to be
+found in Sir Edward Grey's reply to the U.S. Note--dated March 15.
+
+[76] Cd. 7921, issued May 19, 1915, shows that although 1,282 men had
+been rescued by the British from German warships, not a single rescue
+had been effected by German men-of-war.
+
+[77] House of Lords, April 27, 1915.
+
+[78] House of Commons, April 27, 1915.
+
+[79] See Appendix D.
+
+[80] Report _re_ Swakopmund, issued by Secretary of State for Colonies.
+_Times_, May 6, 1915.
+
+
+
+
+GERMANY'S ATTEMPTED BRIBERY.
+
+We thus see with what an easy conscience Germany tears up her treaties
+and how she repudiates her most solemn pledges. In light of these facts
+let us examine the rush of promises Germany was prepared to give in
+order to ensure our neutrality in the War.
+
+On July 29, 1914, Germany, having decided on the War in conjunction with
+Austria against Russia and France, made what our Ambassador at Berlin
+called "a strong bid for British neutrality," to which reference has
+been made, on page 14. Provided that Britain remained neutral Germany
+stated that every assurance would be given to Great Britain that the
+German Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+France in Europe, should they prove victorious. Germany categorically
+stated that she was unable to give a similar undertaking with reference
+to the French colonies. She made a statement with regard to the
+integrity of Holland, and said that it depended upon the action of
+France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium,
+but that when the War was over Belgian integrity would be respected if
+she had not sided against Germany. In other words, Great Britain was to
+stand by and
+
+     =See Belgium invaded and, if she resisted, annexed by Germany;=
+
+     =See all the French Colonies taken by Germany;=
+
+     =Acquiesce in France, our neighbour and friend, being crushed under
+     the iron heel of Germany, and, as Bismarck threatened, bled white
+     by a war indemnity when all was over.=
+
+As Sir Edward Grey replied on July 30: "From the material point of view
+such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory
+in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her
+position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
+Altogether, apart from that it would be a disgrace for us to make this
+bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
+good name of this country would never recover."[81]
+
+That is the "infamous bargain" which Britain spurned and to which the
+Prime Minister referred on August 6 in the House of Commons, in the
+following words:--
+
+     ="What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day ... if
+     we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to
+     get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of
+     our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise--nothing
+     more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain
+     eventualities; a promise, be it observed--I am sorry to have to say
+     it, but it must be put upon record--given by a Power which was at
+     that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty
+     and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied
+     or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves
+     with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this
+     country, of which we are trustees."=[82]
+
+This suggestion of Germany is not the only infamous proposal she has
+made to Great Britain. She has made them with a persistence worthy of a
+better cause. In February, 1912, Lord Haldane went to Berlin on behalf
+of the Cabinet in order to obtain the basis of a friendly understanding
+between the two countries. What transpired is made clear in a speech
+delivered by Mr. Asquith, at Cardiff, on October 2, 1914, when the Prime
+Minister said:--
+
+     "We laid down in terms, carefully approved by the Cabinet, and
+     which I will textually quote, what our relations to Germany ought,
+     in our view, to be. We said, and we communicated this to the German
+     Government:--
+
+          'Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any
+          unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not
+          the subject, and forms no part of any Treaty, understanding,
+          or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she
+          become a party to anything that has such an object.'
+
+     "There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that. But that was
+     not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further.
+     They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality, in the
+     event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a
+     time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and
+     defensive forces, and especially upon the sea. They asked us--to
+     put it quite plainly--for a free hand, so far as we were concerned,
+     if and when they selected the opportunity to overpower and dominate
+     the European world. To such a demand one answer was possible, and
+     that was the answer we gave."[83]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[81] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 101.
+
+[82] House of Commons, August 6, 1914.
+
+[83] _South Wales Daily News_, October 3, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+IF BRITAIN HAD REFUSED TO FIGHT.
+
+If, in view of all this evidence, Britain had refused to fight, what
+would have been her position? The Prime Minister, speaking at the
+Guildhall on September 4, 1914, said:--
+
+     "But let me ask you, and through you the world outside, what would
+     have been our condition as a nation to-day if, through timidity, or
+     through a perverted calculation of self-interest or through a
+     paralysis of the sense of honour and duty, we had been base enough
+     to be false to our word and faithless to our friends?
+
+     "Our eyes would have been turned at this moment with those of the
+     whole civilised world to Belgium--a small State which has lived for
+     more than 70 years under a several and collective guarantee, to
+     which we, in common with Prussia and Austria, were parties--and we
+     should have seen, at the instance, and by the action of two of
+     these guaranteeing Powers, her neutrality violated, her
+     independence strangled, her territory made use of as affording the
+     easiest and most convenient road to a war of unprovoked aggression
+     against France.
+
+     "We, the British people, should have at this moment been standing
+     by with folded arms and with such countenance as we could command,
+     while this small and unprotected State (Belgium), in defence of her
+     vital liberties, made a heroic stand against overweening and
+     overwhelming force.
+
+     "We should have been watching as detached spectators the siege of
+     Liege, the steady and manful resistance of a small Army, the
+     occupation of Brussels with its splendid traditions and memories,
+     the gradual forcing back of the patriotic defenders of their native
+     land to the ramparts of Antwerp, countless outrages suffered by
+     them, and buccaneering levies exacted from the unoffending civil
+     population, and finally the greatest crime committed against
+     civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War--the sack of
+     Louvain, with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its
+     unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable
+     treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance....
+
+     "For my part I say that sooner than be a silent witness--which
+     means in effect a willing accomplice--of this tragic triumph of
+     force over law and of brutality over freedom, I would see this
+     country of ours blotted out of the pages of history."
+
+Further, we need not imagine that the peace we should have gained would
+have been a lasting one. If we had dishonoured our name in the manner
+Mr. Asquith has described, we should have been left without a friend in
+the world. Who can doubt that we should have been Germany's next victim
+if she had succeeded in crushing Belgium and France and warding off the
+blows of Russia? As Mr. Bonar Law said, on the same occasion:--
+
+     "We are fighting for our national existence, for everything which
+     nations have always held most dear."
+
+The fate which has fallen upon Belgium would have been our fate in a few
+years' time, but with this difference, that we should have had no
+powerful friends to give back as far as humanly possible what we had
+lost, as Russia, France and Britain are determined to do for Belgium.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX A.
+
+GERMANY'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED BY
+AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERBIA ON JULY 23, 1914.
+
+
+Germany did her utmost to make the Great Powers believe that she had no
+knowledge of the contents of the Ultimatum delivered by Austria-Hungary
+to Serbia at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, 1914.
+
+Two days before the delivery of the Ultimatum, the Russian Charge
+d'Affaires in Berlin, at the Diplomatic Audience, said to Herr von Jagow
+(German Secretary of State), that he supposed the German Government then
+had full knowledge of the Note prepared by Austria. Herr von Jagow
+protested that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that
+Note, and expressed himself in the same way on that date (July 21) to
+the French Ambassador also. The very next day (July 22), however, M.
+Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in a despatch to the
+Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, stated:--
+
+     "Sir Edward Grey told me that he had seen the German Ambassador,
+     who stated to him that at Berlin a _demarche_ of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government to the Serbian Government was expected.
+     Prince Lichnowsky assured him that the German Government were
+     endeavouring to hold back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna, but
+     that up to the present time they had not been successful in this,
+     and that he was not without anxiety as to the results of a
+     _demarche_ of this kind.... The communications of Prince Lichnowsky
+     had left Sir Edward Grey with an impression of anxiety which he did
+     not conceal from me. The same impression was given me by the
+     Italian Ambassador, who also fears the possibility of fresh tension
+     in Austro-Serbian relations."[84]
+
+Here it will be noticed that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in
+London, stated that the German Government were endeavouring to "hold
+back and moderate the Cabinet of Vienna." How could they have done this
+if they were not aware of the general terms of the Ultimatum which
+Austria-Hungary proposed sending to Serbia. Moreover, the impression
+given by the Italian Ambassador was probably derived from his knowledge
+of what had happened over a year before, when Austria appears to have
+been resolved on provoking war with Serbia on August 9, 1913.
+
+But unfortunately for Germany the statement was refuted by one of its
+own States, Bavaria. The Ultimatum to Serbia was not delivered until 6
+p.m. on the evening of July 23; yet earlier on that day M. Allize, the
+French Minister at Munich, in his Report to Paris, stated:--
+
+     =" ... Official circles have for some time been assuming with more
+     or less sincerity an air of real pessimism.=
+
+     ="In particular, the President of the Council said to me to-day
+     that the Austrian Note, the contents of which were known to him
+     (dont il avait connaissance) was in his opinion drawn up in terms
+     which could be accepted by Serbia, but that none the less the
+     existing situation appeared to him to be very serious."=[85]
+
+It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew
+the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at
+Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von
+Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French
+Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:--
+
+     "I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had
+     with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that
+     Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with
+     Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it.
+
+     "Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the
+     Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government
+     having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria....
+     _Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been
+     entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were
+     communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I
+     showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support
+     claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less
+     striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the
+     officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they
+     were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to
+     Serbia._"[86]
+
+Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his
+Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated
+July 24, 1914:--
+
+     "I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a
+     surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have
+     despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.
+
+     "Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he
+     returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held
+     pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg
+     and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter
+     Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and
+     England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening
+     of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this
+     that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in
+     Germany.
+
+     "The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have
+     been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return
+     from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so,
+     she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87]
+
+Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch
+from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French
+Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from
+Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris), at which the latter
+twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--
+
+     "Under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands of
+     the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified.
+     In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the
+     Government in Serbia have recently adopted does not exclude the
+     apprehension that the Serbian Government might refuse to comply
+     with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried
+     away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The
+     Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to
+     abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no
+     choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the
+     Serbian Government by strong pressure, and, if necessary, by using
+     military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to
+     them.... The German Government consider that in the present case
+     there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively
+     between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the Great Powers ought
+     seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately
+     concerned.
+
+     "The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the
+     dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing
+     to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable
+     consequences...."[88]
+
+A note of similar effect was left with Sir Edward Grey by the German
+Ambassador in London.[89]
+
+Now the details of the Ultimatum to Serbia were only communicated to the
+French and Russian Governments on July 24, 1914, after 10 o'clock in the
+morning (nearly 17 hours after they had been delivered to Serbia), and
+presumably they were communicated to all the other Governments at about
+the same time. Germany would have us believe that she received the
+contents at the same time and on the same day as the other Governments.
+Yet, a few hours later, the German Ambassador in Paris is able, on
+instructions from his Government, to present a detailed note and to
+argue the matter in all its bearings. That is to say, Germany would have
+us believe that the Kaiser and his Ministers received the contents of
+the Ultimatum in the morning, and, almost within a few minutes, gathered
+together and discussed a question which they knew, if not carefully
+handled, must mean a European war; pretend that it was a matter to be
+settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; and promptly
+instruct their Ambassador in Paris to the minutest details.
+
+As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked to the British
+Ambassador in Petrograd on this fateful morning, "Austria's conduct was
+both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action
+unless Germany had first been consulted."[90]
+
+It has since been proved that Germany and Austria were parties not only
+to this, but to an exactly similar conspiracy which took place twelve
+months before.
+
+On December 5, 1914, in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Signor Giolitti
+(ex-Premier of Italy) made the following momentous statement:--
+
+     "During the Balkan War, on the 9th August, 1913, about a year
+     before the present war broke out, during my absence from Rome, I
+     received from my hon. colleague, Signor di San Giuliano (late
+     Foreign Minister), the following telegram:--
+
+          "'Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention
+          of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as
+          defensive, hoping to bring into operation the _casus foederis_
+          of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to
+          be inapplicable. (_Sensation._)
+
+          "'I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with
+          Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it
+          may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider
+          such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that,
+          therefore, we do not consider that the _casus foederis_
+          arises.
+
+          "'Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.'
+
+     "I replied:--
+
+          "'If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a
+          _casus foederis_ cannot be established. It is a step which she
+          is taking on her own account, since there is no question of
+          defence, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It
+          is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made
+          to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for
+          action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this
+          most perilous adventure.' (_Hear, hear._)
+
+     "This course was taken, and our interpretation was upheld and
+     recognised as proper, since our action in no way disturbed our
+     relations with the two Allied Powers. The declaration of neutrality
+     made by the present Government conforms therefore in all respects
+     to the precedents of Italian policy, and conforms also to an
+     interpretation of the Treaty of Alliance which has been already
+     accepted by the Allies.
+
+     "I wish to recall this, because I think it right that in the eyes
+     of all Europe it should appear that Italy has remained completely
+     loyal to the observance of her pledges." (_Loud applause._)[91]
+
+As the _Times_ of December 11, 1914, said in a Leading Article:--
+
+     "In the face of these facts, what becomes of the pretence of the
+     German White Book that it was the murders which forced Austria to
+     take action; what of the contention that Russia, or that England,
+     is answerable for the war? Germany had known Austria's purpose for
+     a year when she granted that Power a free hand to deal with Serbia
+     at her discretion." ... These contemporary telegrams read by Signor
+     Giolitti "prove that the war is no result of Russian arrogance, of
+     French revenge, or of English envy, as the German Chancellor avers,
+     but that it is the consequence of schemes long harboured, carefully
+     thought out, and deliberately adopted by Austria and by Germany."
+
+On the occasion referred to above it was not the murder of the
+heir-apparent at Serajevo which was the pretext for aggression; the
+issue of the moment was the Treaty of Bucharest.
+
+Two days after the delivery of the Ultimatum to Serbia in July, 1914,
+Herr von Jagow issued another denial. In his Report to the Acting
+Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, the French Ambassador at Berlin
+on July 25 wrote:--
+
+     "The English Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as
+     I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the
+     Austrian Note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a
+     reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter
+     further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at
+     the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria."[92]
+
+On the same day (July 25) the Russian representative in Paris reports to
+his Government, that the German Ambassador (Herr von Schoen) said:--
+
+     "that Austria had presented her Note to Serbia without any definite
+     understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved
+     of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly 'the bolt once
+     fired' (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided by
+     her duties as an ally."[93]
+
+The next day the Acting Director of the "Direction Politique" in Paris,
+in a note on the visit to that Office paid by Herr von Schoen, the
+German Ambassador, stated (Paris, Sunday, July 26):--
+
+     "Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that
+     Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian Note, and had
+     only approved it after its delivery; she thought, however, that
+     Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to
+     forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a
+     situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He
+     declared besides that he did not know the text of the Serbian
+     reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied
+     Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often
+     ill-informed, represented it to be."[94]
+
+A denial by the German Ambassador to England of his Government's
+cognisance of the Note is referred to in a despatch from the Russian
+Ambassador in London (Count Benckendorff) to M. Sazonof, dated July 25,
+1914:--
+
+     "Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him
+     that the German Government were not informed of the text of the
+     Austrian Note, but that they entirely supported Austria's
+     action."[95]
+
+On July 25, 1914, a Note was handed by the German Ambassador at
+Petrograd to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:--
+
+     "We learn from an authoritative source that the news spread by
+     certain newspapers, to the effect that the action of the
+     Austro-Hungarian Government at Belgrade was instigated by Germany
+     is absolutely false. The German Government had no knowledge of the
+     text of the Austrian Note before it was presented, and exercised no
+     influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly
+     attributed to Germany.
+
+     "Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims
+     made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers
+     justified."[96]
+
+That this assumed ignorance was received with scepticism, and in some
+cases frank disbelief in other quarters, is apparent. The French
+Ambassador in Berlin reported on July 25:--
+
+     "The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of
+     events.... He does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the
+     Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche.
+
+     "He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the
+     Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly
+     chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the
+     Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation."[97]
+
+From the French Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 came the following
+statement to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris:--
+
+     "Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution
+     of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed
+     her on to aggressive action against Serbia in order to be able
+     herself to enter into war with Russia and France, in circumstances
+     which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under
+     conditions which have been thoroughly considered."[98]
+
+Up to this date, as the Russian Berlin representative reported to his
+Government the Official German Wolff Bureau (News Agency) had not
+published the text of the conciliatory Serbian reply, although it had
+been communicated to them; nor had it appeared _in extenso_ in any of
+the local papers--because of the _calming_ effect it would have had on
+German readers![99]
+
+On the same day (July 28) the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in
+Paris sent the following message to the French Ambassadors abroad:--
+
+     "I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning;
+     he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to
+     make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk
+     over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action
+     which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's
+     intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant
+     of the nature of the means of coercion which she was
+     preparing."[100]
+
+But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram
+sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:--
+
+     "I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
+     'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
+     promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
+     unreliable."[101]
+
+On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:--
+
+     "I report the following impressions of my interview with M.
+     Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact
+     information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies
+     every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian
+     Government would have taken an initiative which would lead,
+     according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without
+     previous arrangement with the Emperor William.
+
+     "The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take
+     peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there
+     is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us
+     would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues
+     share this feeling."[102]
+
+Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in
+Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:--
+
+     ="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the
+     text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched,
+     and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German
+     Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103]
+
+Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for
+as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank,
+stated on January 29, 1915:--
+
+     "On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great
+     commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to
+     sell their securities. This was recognised as the first
+     semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[84] Cd. 7717, No. 19.
+
+[85] Cd. 7717, No. 21.
+
+[86] Cd. 7717, No. 30.
+
+[87] Cd. 7717, No. 32.
+
+[88] Cd. 7717, No. 28.
+
+[89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9.
+
+[90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6.
+
+[91] Cd. 7860, page 401.
+
+[92] Cd. 7717, No. 41.
+
+[93] Cd. 7626, No. 19.
+
+[94] Cd. 7717, No. 57.
+
+[95] Cd. 7626, No. 20.
+
+[96] Cd. 7626, No. 18.
+
+[97] Cd. 7717, No. 35.
+
+[98] Cd. 7717, No. 83.
+
+[99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.
+
+[100] Cd. 7717, No. 78.
+
+[101] Cd. 7717, Appendix 5, No. 3.
+
+[102] Cd. 7717, No. 87.
+
+[103] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 95.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX B.
+
+HOW GERMANY MISLED AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
+
+
+Germany's view is very clearly indicated in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Vienna, dated July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will
+     keep quiet during chastisement of Serbia, which Austria-Hungary is
+     resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Serbian
+     territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my
+     question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by
+     public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he
+     said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose,
+     the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of
+     Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over, and that Moscow was
+     perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would
+     not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step
+     which would probably result in many frontier questions in which
+     Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian
+     and Persian questions, being brought into the melting-pot. France,
+     too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war.... He doubted
+     Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,
+     acting as if she made any such claim. _As for Germany, she knew
+     very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this
+     matter._"[104]
+
+Germany's view is further explained by the British representative at
+Berlin, on July 26, 1914:--
+
+     "Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador
+     at St. Petersburg had reported that, in conversation with Russian
+     Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria
+     annexed bits of Serbian territory Russia would not remain
+     indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia
+     would not act if Austria did _not_ annex territory."[105]
+
+The result of this German influence is shown on the Austrian Ambassador
+in Berlin by the following despatch from Sir Edward Goschen, the British
+Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914:--
+
+     "Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
+     unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
+     war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."[106]
+
+So successful were the Germans in impressing this false view upon the
+Austrians that the position is best described by the British Ambassador
+in Vienna in his despatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 27, 1914:--
+
+     "I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
+     Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
+     Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war (with Serbia)
+     inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved
+     to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a
+     Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been
+     administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to
+     proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the
+     prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention
+     would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."[107]
+
+Added to which we have further proof in a despatch from the British
+Ambassador at Rome, dated July 23, 1914:--
+
+     "Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign
+     Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the
+     conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was
+     absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many
+     disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans has
+     occasioned, to score a definite success."[108]
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[104] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 32.
+
+[105] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 33.
+
+[106] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 71.
+
+[107] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 41.
+
+[108] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 38.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX C.
+
+SOME GERMAN ATROCITIES IN BELGIUM.
+
+
+In December, 1914, a Committee was appointed by the British Government
+to inquire into the German outrages in Belgium and France. Under the
+Chairmanship of Lord Bryce, this Committee was composed of:--
+
+     THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT BRYCE, O.M. (Regius Professor of Civil Law at
+     Oxford, 1870; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1886;
+     Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster (with seat in Cabinet), 1892;
+     President of Board of Trade, 1894; one of the British Members of
+     the International Tribunal at The Hague; Chief Secretary for
+     Ireland, 1905-6; His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and
+     Plenipotentiary at Washington, 1907-12).
+
+     THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, Bt., K.C., LL.D., D.C.L. (Judge
+     of Admiralty Court of Cinque Ports since 1914; Editor of Law
+     Reports since 1895; Chairman, Royal Commission on Public Records,
+     1910; Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1883-1903; Author
+     of The Law of Torts, 1887; History of English Law, 1895.)
+
+     THE RT. HON. SIR EDWARD CLARKE, K.C. (Solicitor-General, 1886-92).
+
+     SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, K.C. (Professor of Law, Owen's College,
+     Manchester (Principal, 1898-1904); Adviser to the Bombay
+     University, 1913-14).
+
+     MR. H. A. L. FISHER (Vice-Chancellor of Sheffield University;
+     Chichele Lecturer in Foreign History, 1911-12).
+
+     MR. HAROLD COX, M.A. (Editor, _Edinburgh Review_).
+
+     SIR KENELM E. DIGBY, K.C., G.C.B. (Permanent Under-Secretary of
+     State at Home Office, 1895-1903).
+
+This eminent and impartial Tribunal, after carefully weighing the
+evidence (Cd. 7894 and Cd. 7895) came to the following grave
+conclusions:--
+
+     "(i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and
+     systematically organised massacres of the civil population,
+     accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.
+
+     "(ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians,
+     both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated,
+     and children murdered.
+
+     "(iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of
+     property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the
+     German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic
+     incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings
+     and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be
+     alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorisation.
+
+     "(iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken,
+     particularly by the using of civilians, including women and
+     children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a
+     less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the
+     frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.
+
+     "Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the
+     Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty
+     if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence.
+     Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a
+     scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the
+     last three centuries."
+
+The Report makes it plain that apart from the first outbreak of outrages
+intended to cow the Belgians into submission, fresh bursts of plunder
+and rapine took place on specific occasions when the Germans suffered
+defeat. Cowardly vengeance was thus wreaked on the innocent Belgian
+civilians for the defeat of German arms. For example, on August 25,
+1914, the Belgian Army, sallying out from Antwerp, drove the enemy from
+Malines. The Germans promptly massacred and burnt at Louvain, "the
+signal for which was provided by shots exchanged between the German Army
+retreating after its repulse at Malines and some members of the German
+garrison of Louvain, who mistook their fellow-countrymen for
+Belgians."[109] Similarly when a successful sortie from Antwerp drove
+the Germans from Aerschot, they retaliated by a blood-vendetta upon the
+civil population.
+
+The Germans have endeavoured to justify their brutal excesses by
+bringing counter-charges against Belgian civilians. For instance, the
+Chancellor of the German Empire, in a communication made to the press on
+September 2, 1914, and printed in the _Nord Deutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung_, of September 21, said: "Belgian girls gouged out the eyes of
+the German wounded. Officials of Belgian cities have invited our
+officers to dinner, and shot and killed them across the table. Contrary
+to all international law, the whole civilian population of Belgium was
+called out, and after having at first shown friendliness carried on in
+the rear of our troops terrible warfare with concealed weapons. Belgian
+women cut the throats of soldiers whom they had quartered in their homes
+while they were sleeping."
+
+Upon this Lord Bryce's Committee make the comment: "No evidence whatever
+seems to have been adduced to prove these tales."[110]
+
+Of both individual and concerted acts of barbarity, the report
+teems--for example:--[111]
+
+     "It is clearly shown that many offences were committed against
+     infants and quite young children. On one occasion children were
+     even roped together and used as a military screen against the
+     enemy, on another three soldiers went into action carrying small
+     children to protect themselves from flank fire. A shocking case of
+     the murder of a baby by a drunken soldier at Malines is thus
+     recorded by one eye-witness and confirmed by another:--
+
+     "'One day when the Germans were not actually bombarding the town I
+     left my house to go to my mother's house in High Street. My husband
+     was with me. I saw eight German soldiers, and they were drunk. They
+     were singing and making a lot of noise and dancing about. As the
+     German soldiers came along the street I saw a small child, whether
+     boy or girl I could not see, come out of a house. The child was
+     about two years of age. The child came into the middle of the
+     street so as to be in the way of the soldiers. The soldiers were
+     walking in twos. The first line of two passed the child; one of the
+     second line, the man on the left, stepped aside and drove his
+     bayonet with both hands into the child's stomach, lifting the child
+     into the air on his bayonet and carrying it away on his bayonet, he
+     and his comrades still singing. The child screamed when the soldier
+     struck it with his bayonet, but not afterwards.'"[112]
+
+The following brief extracts of German atrocities are taken from
+Official Reports issued by the Belgian Legation:--[113]
+
+     "On the evening of the 22nd" (August, at Tamines) "a group of
+     between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not
+     far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on
+     them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers
+     ordered up a machine gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy
+     peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and,
+     hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet
+     again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay
+     among the corpses," and some of these were bayoneted....
+
+     "Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about 6 o'clock in the morning,
+     another party consisting of prisoners made in the village and the
+     neighbourhood were brought into the square, ... in the square was a
+     mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6
+     yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot.... An officer
+     asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered
+     were set to work and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad and 2
+     deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks.... Actually
+     fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of
+     their fathers.
+
+     "There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were
+     drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they
+     drank.... We buried from 350 to 400 bodies." ... A wounded man was
+     buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his
+     interment....
+
+     "About 9 in the morning" (at Dinant, August 23) "the German
+     soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-end of rifles,
+     men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square,
+     where they were kept prisoners till 6 o'clock in the evening. The
+     guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be
+     shot. About 6 o'clock a captain separated the men from the women
+     and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry
+     soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them
+     were told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A
+     platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in
+     vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons,
+     and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been
+     no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About 20 of the inhabitants
+     were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make
+     sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens
+     escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two
+     hours, remaining motionless among the corpses, and when night fell
+     succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses
+     were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden."
+
+     "On Friday, August 21st, at 4 o'clock in the morning" (at Andenne,
+     between Namur and Huy) "the" (German) "soldiers spread themselves
+     through the town, driving all the population into the streets and
+     forcing men, women, and children to march before them with their
+     hands in the air. Those who did not obey with sufficient
+     promptitude, or did not understand the order given them in German,
+     were promptly knocked down. Those who tried to run away were shot.
+     It was at this moment that Dr. Camus" (the Burgomaster), "against
+     whom the Germans seemed to have some special spite, was wounded by
+     a rifle shot, and then finished off by a blow from an axe. His body
+     was dragged along by the feet for some distance....
+
+     "Subsequently the soldiers, on the order of their officers, picked
+     out of the mass some 40 or 50 men who were led off and all shot,
+     some along the bank of the Meuse, and others in front of the Police
+     Station.
+
+     "The rest of the men were kept for a long time in the Place. Among
+     them lay two persons, one of whom had received a ball in the chest,
+     and the other a bayonet wound. They lay face to the ground with
+     blood from their wounds trickling into the dust, occasionally
+     calling for water. The officers forbade their neighbours to give
+     them any help.... Both died in the course of the day.... In the
+     morning the officers told the women to withdraw, giving them the
+     order to gather together the dead bodies and to wash away the
+     stains of blood which defiled the street and the houses."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[109] Cd. 7894, p. 14.
+
+[110] Cd. 7894, p. 26.
+
+[111] Professor J. H. Morgan, Representative of the Home Office,
+attached to the Headquarters Staff of the British Expeditionary Force,
+states in a letter to the _Times_, dated May 20, 1915:--
+
+    " ... There has lately come into my hands--unfortunately too late
+    for use by the Committee--evidence which establishes beyond
+    reasonable doubt that the outrages upon combatants in the field are
+    committed by the orders of responsible officers, such as Brigade and
+    Company Commanders, and that British and Belgian soldiers are the
+    objects of peculiar malignancy.... _There is some evidence to show
+    that the East Prussian and Bavarian regiments are the worst
+    offenders. The French military authorities, who have been of great
+    assistance to me in my inquiries, informed me that they have now a
+    very considerable 'black list' of this character. When the time
+    comes to dictate terms of peace and to exact reparation that list
+    will be very useful...._ In the earlier stages of the war there was
+    a widespread disinclination on the part of our officers and men to
+    credit stories of 'atrocities.' Nothing has impressed me more than
+    the complete change of conviction on this point, especially among
+    our officers. As a Staff Officer of the highest eminence said to me
+    lately, 'The Germans have no sense of honour in the field.' Any
+    sense of the freemasonry of arms has practically disappeared among
+    them, and deliberate killing of the wounded is of frequent
+    occurrence."
+
+[112] Cd. 7894. p. 32.
+
+[113] The Commission chiefly responsible for these official Belgian
+reports was composed of M. Cooreman, Minister of State (President);
+Count Goblet d'Alviella, Minister of State and Vice-President of the
+Senate; M. Ryckmans, Senator; M. Strauss, Alderman of the City of
+Antwerp; M. Van Cutsem, Hon. President of the Law Court of Antwerp; and,
+as Secretaries, Chevalier Ernst de Bunswyck, Chef du Cabinet of the
+Minister of Justice, and M. Orts, Councillor of Legation.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX D.
+
+GERMANY'S EMPLOYMENT OF POISONOUS GAS.
+
+
+The following is a copy of a Report dated May 3, 1915, by Field-Marshal
+Sir John French on the employment by the Germans of poisonous gases as
+weapons of warfare:--
+
+     "The gases employed have been ejected from pipes laid into the
+     trenches, and also produced by the explosion of shells especially
+     manufactured for the purpose. The German troops who attacked under
+     cover of these gases were provided with specially designed
+     respirators, which were issued in sealed pattern covers. This all
+     points to long and methodical preparation on a large scale.
+
+     "A week before the Germans first used this method they announced in
+     their official _communique_ that we were making use of asphyxiating
+     gases. At the time there appeared to be no reason for this
+     astounding falsehood, but now, of course, it is obvious that it was
+     part of the scheme. It is a further proof of the deliberate nature
+     of the introduction by the Germans of a new and illegal weapon, and
+     shows that they recognised its illegality and were anxious to
+     forestall neutral, and possibly domestic, criticism.
+
+     "Since the enemy first made use of this method of covering his
+     advance with a cloud of poisoned air he has repeated it both in
+     offence and defence whenever the wind has been favourable.
+
+     "The effect of this poison is not merely disabling, or even
+     painlessly fatal, as suggested in the German Press. Those of its
+     victims who do not succumb on the field, and who can be brought
+     into hospital, suffer acutely, and in a large proportion of cases
+     die a painful and lingering death. Those who survive are in little
+     better case, as the injury to their lungs appears to be of a
+     permanent character and reduces them to a condition which points to
+     their being invalids for life. These effects must be well known to
+     the German scientists who devised this new weapon and to the
+     military authorities who have sanctioned its use.
+
+     "I am of opinion that the enemy has definitely decided to use these
+     gases as a normal procedure, and that protests will be useless."
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX E.
+
+EFFORTS OF GERMAN MINISTERS OF STATE TO LAY BLAME ON BRITAIN.
+
+
+Since the war, both the German Imperial Chancellor, Herr von
+Bethmann-Hollweg, and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow, have
+endeavoured to explain away the former's phrase: "a scrap of paper,"
+which shocked the diplomatic conscience of the world. Both have
+endeavoured to lay the blame for the conflict at Great Britain's
+door.[114] The German Imperial Chancellor now declares that:--
+
+     "Documents on the Anglo-Belgian Military Agreement which ... we
+     have found in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office ... showed
+     that England in 1911 was determined to throw troops into Belgium
+     without the consent of the Belgian Government."[115]
+
+The true facts of the case are to be seen in the following extract from
+the statement issued by the Belgian Minister in London, on March 17,
+1915:--
+
+     "A month after the declaration of war the German Chancery
+     discovered at Brussels the reports of certain conversations which
+     had taken place in 1906 and in 1912 between two British Military
+     Attaches and two Chiefs of the Staff of the Belgian Army. In order
+     to transform these reports into documents which would justify
+     Germany's conduct it was necessary to garble them and to lie. Such
+     was the only way in which the German action against Belgium could
+     be made to appear decent.... Thus it came to pass that, with a
+     shamelessness for which history shows few parallels, the German
+     Chancery gave out that a 'Convention' had existed, by which Belgium
+     had betrayed her most sacred pledges and violated her own
+     neutrality for the benefit of England. To produce an impression on
+     those ignorant of the facts, 'German honesty' suppressed, when the
+     precis of the above-named conversations was published, the clause
+     in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein
+     recorded _did reference only to the situation that would be created
+     if Belgian neutrality had already been violated_. The Belgian
+     Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only
+     answer that they deserve--they are a tissue of lies, all the more
+     shameless because they are set forth by persons who claim to have
+     studied the original documents.
+
+     "But what are the documents which Germany produces in order to
+     prove Belgium guilty? They are two in number:--
+
+     "(1) The narrative of certain interviews which took place between
+     Lieutenant-General Ducarne and Colonel Barnardiston in 1906. In the
+     course of these interviews the British officer set forth his views
+     as to the way in which England could help Belgium _in case the
+     latter were attacked by Germany_. One phrase in the document
+     clearly proves that Colonel Barnardiston is dealing with a
+     hypothetical case--viz., 'the entry of English troops into Belgium
+     would only take place after a violation of Belgian neutrality by
+     Germany.' The translation in the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ of November
+     25 _omits this clause_, the phrase which gives its exact scope and
+     significance to the document. Moreover, the photograph of General
+     Ducarne's report contains the words, 'The officer with whom I spoke
+     insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential.'
+     For the word _conversation_ the _Norddeutsche Zeitung_ substitutes
+     the word 'convention.' Colonel Barnardiston is made to say that
+     'our convention' has been absolutely confidential![116]
+
+     "Such proceedings need no commentary.
+
+     "(2) The second document is the report of a conversation on the
+     same subject in April, 1912, between Lieutenant-General Jungbluth
+     and Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. In the course of the conversation
+     the former observed to the latter that 'any English intervention in
+     favour of Belgium, if she were the victim of German aggression,
+     could only take place with our consent.' The British Military
+     Attache raised the point that England might perhaps exercise her
+     rights and duties, as one of the Powers guaranteeing Belgium,
+     without waiting for the appeal to be made to her. This was Colonel
+     Bridges' personal opinion only. The British Government has always
+     held, as did the Belgian Government, that the consent of the latter
+     was a necessary preliminary.
+
+     "The Belgian Government declares on its honour that not only was no
+     'Convention' ever made, but also that neither of the two
+     Governments ever made any advances or propositions concerning the
+     conclusion of any such convention. Moreover, the Minister of Great
+     Britain at Brussels, who alone could contract engagements in her
+     behalf, never intervened in these conversations. And the whole
+     Belgian Ministry are ready to pledge themselves on oath that no
+     conclusions arising from these conversations were ever brought
+     before the Cabinet, or even laid before one single member of it.
+     The documents which the Germans discovered give evidence of all
+     this. Their meaning is perfectly clear provided that no part of
+     them is either garbled or suppressed.
+
+     "In face of calumnies repeated again and again, our Government,
+     faithfully reflecting Belgian uprightness, considers that it is its
+     duty to inflict once more on the spoiler of Belgium the brand of
+     infamy--his only legitimate reward. It also takes the opportunity
+     of declaring, in answer to allegations whose malevolence is
+     obvious, that:--
+
+     "(1) Before the declaration of war no French force, even of the
+     smallest size, had entered Belgium.
+
+     "(2) Not only did Belgium never refuse an offer of military help
+     offered by one of the guaranteeing Powers, but after the
+     declaration of war she earnestly solicited the protection of her
+     guarantors.
+
+     "(3) When undertaking, as was her duty, the vigorous defence of her
+     fortresses, Belgium asked for, and received with gratitude, such
+     help as her guarantors were able to place at her disposition for
+     that defence.
+
+     "Belgium the victim of her own loyalty, will not bow her head
+     before any Power. Her honour defies the assaults of falsehood. She
+     has faith in the justice of the world. On the day of judgment the
+     triumph belongs to the people who have sacrificed everything to
+     serve conscientiously the cause of Truth, Right, and Honour."
+
+In the foregoing connection, the following extract from a statement
+authorised by Sir Edward Grey on January 26, 1915, is of interest:--
+
+     "As regards the conversation ... the Belgian officer said to the
+     British: 'You could only land in our country with our consent,' and
+     in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a categorical
+     assurance that no British Government would violate the neutrality
+     of Belgium; and that 'so long as it was not violated by any other
+     Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
+     territory.'
+
+     "The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated
+     in this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying 'he did
+     not believe England would take such a step, because he did not
+     think English public opinion would justify such action.' What Sir
+     Edward Grey actually wrote was:--'I said that I was sure that this
+     Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
+     Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
+     the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of
+     it.'
+
+     "If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were
+     conversations on military subjects between British and Belgian
+     officers, he may find one reason in a fact well known to him,
+     namely, that Germany was establishing an elaborate network of
+     strategical railways, leading from the Rhine to the Belgian
+     frontier, through a barren, thinly-populated tract--railways
+     deliberately constructed to permit of a sudden attack upon Belgium,
+     such as was carried out in August last. This fact alone was enough
+     to justify any communications between Belgium and other Powers on
+     the footing that there would be no violation of Belgian neutrality
+     unless it were previously violated by another Power...."
+
+
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[114] Interview with Herr von Jagow, by the _New York World_, March 28,
+1915; interview with Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, by the Associated Press,
+in New York papers, January 25, 1915.
+
+[115] No such "conversations" took place in 1911. A passing reference
+only to the Morocco situation of 1911 was made in the 1912
+"conversations." This appears to be the German Chancellor's sole
+foundation for his assertion. Cd. 7860, p. 360.
+
+[116] In a letter to the _Morning Post_ of February 8, 1915, Mr. A.
+Hamon, Professor de l'Universite, Nouville de Bruxelles, writes:--
+
+     "In October and November last (13th and 24th) the _Norddeutsche
+     Allgemeine Zeitung_ published the documents seized by the Germans
+     in the Belgian archives. The German Government then published a
+     Dutch edition of these documents, accompanied by a photographic
+     reproduction of the said documents. The pamphlet bears the name of
+     R. W. E. Wijnmalen as publisher, in the town of Den Haag (The
+     Hague). On the photographic document we read in the margin: 'The
+     entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the
+     violation of our neutrality by Germany.' Now, this extremely
+     important note is omitted in the Dutch translation. It was also
+     omitted in the German translation. This is a falsification through
+     omission, a very serious falsification, as it modified the meaning
+     of the document.
+
+     "But we have worse still. On the top of page 2 of General Ducarne's
+     letter to the Minister, he says: 'My interlocutor insisted on this
+     fact that "our conversation was quite confidential...."' In the
+     Dutch translation, instead of 'conversation,' there is 'convention'
+     (overeenkomst)! The mistake is great and cannot be but purposely
+     made. The German Government thus changes into a convention, that is
+     to say, an agreement, what is but a simple conversation."
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX F.
+
+LIST OF PARLIAMENTARY PUBLICATIONS RESPECTING THE WAR.
+
+
+Correspondence respecting the European Crisis. Misc. No. 6 (1914).
+
+Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German Government. Despatch
+from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 8 (1914).
+
+German Organisation for Influencing the Press of other Countries.
+Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. Misc. No. 9 (1914).
+
+Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian Government.
+Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna. Misc. 10 (1914).
+
+Documents respecting Negotiations preceding the War published by the
+Russian Government. Misc. No. 11 (1914).
+
+Papers relating to the Support offered by the Princes and Peoples of
+India to His Majesty in connection with the War. (I.O. paper.)
+
+Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the Belgian
+Government. Misc. No. 12 (1914).
+
+Correspondence respecting Events leading to the Rupture of Relations
+with Turkey. Misc. No. 13 (1914).
+
+Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople summarising
+Events leading up to Rupture of Relations with Turkey and Reply. Misc.
+No. 14 (1914).
+
+Diplomatic Correspondence respecting the War published by the French
+Government. Misc. No. 15 (1914).
+
+Despatch to Sir H. Howard containing instruction respecting his Mission
+to the Vatican. Misc. No. 1 (1914).
+
+Temperance Measures adopted in Russia since the outbreak of the War.
+Despatch from Petrograd enclosing Memo. Misc. No. 2 (1915).
+
+Letter July 31/14 from President of French Republic to the King
+respecting the European Crisis, and His Majesty's Reply. Misc. No. 3
+(1915).
+
+Treatment of German Prisoners in United Kingdom. Correspondence with the
+U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 5 (1915).
+
+Rights of Belligerents: Correspondence with U.S. Government. Misc. No. 6
+(1915).
+
+Treatment of Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians in the U.K. and
+Germany respectively: Correspondence between His Majesty's Government
+and U.S. Ambassador respecting. Misc. No. 7 (1915).
+
+Release of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Diplomatic. &c.,
+Officers, and of certain classes of Naval and Military Officers,
+Prisoners of War in the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Misc.
+No. 8 (1915).
+
+Sinking of German Cruiser "Dresden" in Chilean Territorial Waters: Notes
+exchanged with the Chilean Minister. Misc. No. 9 (1915).
+
+List of certain Commissions and Committees set up to deal with Public
+Questions arising out of the War.
+
+Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas: Report and
+Statistics.
+
+Alleged German Outrages: Report of Committee.
+
+Alleged German Outrages: Appendix to Report of Committee.
+
+Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European
+War. Misc. No. 10 (1915).
+
+Treatment of British Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians at certain
+places of detention in Germany: Report by United States Officials. Misc.
+No. 11 (1915).
+
+Correspondence regarding the Naval and Military Assistance afforded to
+His Majesty's Government by His Majesty's Oversea Dominions. (Cd. 7607.)
+
+Correspondence relating to Gifts of Food-Stuffs and other Supplies to
+His Majesty's Government from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies. (Cd.
+7608.)
+
+Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and Colonies.
+(Cd. 7646.)
+
+Papers relating to Scales of Pensions and Allowances of Officers and Men
+of the Oversea Contingents and their Dependents. (Cd. 7793.)
+
+Correspondence on the subject of the proposed Naval and Military
+Expedition against German South-West Africa. (Cd. 7873.)
+
+Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion and the Policy of the Government
+with regard to its suppression. (Cd. 7874.)
+
+Further Correspondence regarding Gifts from the Oversea Dominions and
+Colonies. (Cd. 7875.)
+
+
+
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's note:
+
+The transcriber made this change to the text to correct an obvious
+error:
+
+  1. p. 34, "appproaches" --> "approaches"
+
+
+
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