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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/37864-8.txt b/37864-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f36bd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/37864-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7882 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the +Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. Jones + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation + +Author: Jesse H. Jones + +Release Date: October 27, 2011 [EBook #37864] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KNOW THE TRUTH; A CRITIQUE *** + + + + +Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, +Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from +images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia +Center, Michigan State University Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + + KNOW THE TRUTH; + + A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION, + + INCLUDING + + SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND + MR. HERBERT SPENCER + + BY JESSE H. JONES + + + "Give me to see, that I may know where to strike." + + + NEW YORK: + PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON. + BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES + 1865. + + + Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE + H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the + Southern District of New York. + + RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: + STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY + H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. + + + Dedication. + + TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL + SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS, + + This Little Treatise + + IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY + + _THE AUTHOR_. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +This book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was +because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be +dangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was +undertaken. + +Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of +philosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or +Atheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed +from different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the +schools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is +to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held +responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and +every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the +presence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of +philosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two +classes of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's +"Rational Psychology" will be in point: + +"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and +beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no +possibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and +honest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of +space and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the +deluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive +understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an +all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a +deity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The +Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its +conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it +will be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed +connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in +neither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity, +circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but +nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality, +is no God." + +The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity +cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What +the mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man +cannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a +rational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind +credulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such +knowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be +_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is +_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no +Reason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and +denies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held +that God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in +asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was +right in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one +error, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by +which to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind +credulity as the basis of Religion. + +The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too +strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little +treatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but +scanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has +written he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound +thinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles +developed by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be +judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied. + +After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the +author was committing it to paper, the essays on "Space and Time," and +on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," in the numbers of the "North +American Review" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his +notice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which +he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost +wholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out +in his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his +country. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand +as thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results +he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those +essays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the +topics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to +be reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment. +If the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that +of quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found +to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is +maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more +than one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and +indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the +commonly used terms infinite and absolute. + +A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the +following discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than +the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so +far as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little +attention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the +distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so +repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the +apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in +the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of the world, even the best +Christian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious +distinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole +human being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper +analysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements. +_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged +as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on +the globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly +understood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could +never have been constructed. + +An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First, +the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately +defined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated. +Second, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and +third, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon +each other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is +to be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of +these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is +doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and +inter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one +mind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the +above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon +circumstances beyond control of the writer. + +As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the +great, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the +Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man +has a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he +has such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled, +and that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge, +except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged +by the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it +would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish +first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a +superstructure. + +The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the +presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it +involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one +point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet +the main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be +thoroughly accomplished in no other way. + +The author has in each case used American editions of the works named. + + + + +KNOW THE TRUTH. + + + + +PART I. + +THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING. + + +In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print, +a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought Examined," &c., "by +Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D." + +The high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian +gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either +devoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being +marked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the +religious community; the recommendations with which its advent was +heralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme +announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental +activity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive +circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and +especially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching +on certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the +boundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in +its upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say, +"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves +be stayed." And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of +religion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein +sought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and +destroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the +Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of +lectures delivered upon what is known as "The Bampton Foundation;"--a +bequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he +directed should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ, +by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by +such a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive +the almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an +era in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England, +the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful +and studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over +its pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially, +and theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who +search for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to +say that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place +among religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive +knowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the +Unknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative +value, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside +where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is +inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be found." + +The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to +public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this +country, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the +lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the +metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which +dissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were +pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or expressed in any +extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors +of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they +attained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous +and deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and +pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest +nature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received. + +Something more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind, +resting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous +interests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors +appeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled "The Philosophy +of Herbert Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the +foundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the +confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages. +Avowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this +writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which +being corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from +it as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal +Science. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his +predecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity +demonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to +examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still +so widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers +above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is +found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his +teachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas, +scarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery +is made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an +unpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books +just mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system +of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly +seems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received +none. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little. + +In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological +Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational Psychology," in which he +professed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if +true, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the +difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being +comparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the +attention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry +and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient +thinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness. + +Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term +Limitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the +American metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be +convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it +becomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work +in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each +of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may "_know +the truth_;" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed +sway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith. + +The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single +fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He +who would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with +all his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys +that, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as +the Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their +scheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot +prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own +tenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and +examine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the +former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great +American teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this +shall be our especial province. + +The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded, +was originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following +terms. "The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion +being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be +positively known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive, +and consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally +limited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the +unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed +to the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or +abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is +realized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only +negative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one +hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a +whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a +still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small, +that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into +smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or +realize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination +coincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the +infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself +require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same +reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of +parts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the +conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of +positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is +_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the +possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the mean between two +extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of +which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of +contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_." + +This theory may be epitomized as follows:--"The Unconditioned denotes +the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." This +genus is inconceivable, is "negative of the conceivable itself." Hence +both the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable, +they may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond all +limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond all conditions:" +or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other, +unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be "mutually +repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be +absolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being +is included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only +one. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the +conditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a +being--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed +to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally +satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are +cognizable--the conditioned. + +It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the +philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural +course, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose +of placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which +has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the +Limitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a +question of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's +metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his +system is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then, +which demands our attention. He has presented this in the following +passage:-- + +"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into +conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the +'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as +the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of +understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, +therefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the +supreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary +to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop +these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of +preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws +of the understanding from a questionable division of logical +proposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding +(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or +rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently +apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the +conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In +the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both +seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) +sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which +has 'overleaped itself.'" + +Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that "both +faculties," _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, "perform the same +function," we are to notice the two leading points which are made, +viz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the +Reason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is +claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A +generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may +be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest +faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of +thinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and +assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a +substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that +the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity +in the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and +Platonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the +former school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their +fundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure +Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such +establishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of +philosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its +tendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the +whole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false +to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to +achieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode +heretofore indicated. + +It is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to +the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding; +a faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have +commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby +to establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name. + +Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an +exact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following +points be noted:-- + +_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the +Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the +laws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either +material, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or +imaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it +is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding, +though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits +of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of +the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it +can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It +can construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a +relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of +another and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object +except such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received +from without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can +have no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover, +but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in +one, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a +priori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional +ideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their +necessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and +acquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects +which belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness +qualifies. We observe, therefore, + +_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind +from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the +Sense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and +the discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such +a Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_, +or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why +conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations, +compose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore, +constitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the +validity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnĉus constructed a system +of botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in +a flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding. +Later students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_ +extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once +seen, throw back the Linnĉan system into company with the Ptolemaic +Astronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible. +That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason. + +To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity, +diverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and +faculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an +_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all +objects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide +thereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of +principles, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated +_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies, +declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding, +and it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed +to inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved. + +The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the +logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective; +what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and, +finally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that +stated. + +1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially +defective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the +highest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us +examine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of +thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a +conclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts +of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone +have long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so +have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the +temperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in +the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has +to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at +one period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes, +were warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and +the judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact +here brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger +experience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to +fall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the +air, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit. +Other like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it +is found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our +planet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the +distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is +the highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a +subsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all +the facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was +once here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so +distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even, +of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called +gravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only +accept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions +of to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right. +The Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable +changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for +new studies. + +From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself, +crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" when suddenly, as +if frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly "The truth! +the truth! I see the eternal truth." + +The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is +both defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to +perceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most +men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false, +in that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain +perceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental +faculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a +part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both +generalizes and intuits. + +It is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind +nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it +unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is, +that these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching +examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance. +The mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. "Not so," +says the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but +it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two +must make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it +so, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much +about it as he does." In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be +said,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly +mendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are +four, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL +_intellect_." Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often +unconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In +society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of +the body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle; +which, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole +fabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it +could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be +left,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, "All this +seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be +sure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration +that, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and +Infinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and +conditioned thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect +unreservedly asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance +is true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see +it so." + +Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which +the human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been +adduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and +necessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus +pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is +required to state: + +2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein. + +In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of +the mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as +universal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir +William Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the +_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present +undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be +secured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples +under each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place +here, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without +question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest +and every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of +Williams College, Mass. + +"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into, +first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the +abstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second +division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon +these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations. +The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at +the foundation of ĉsthetical science. In the fourth division are those +which pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is +the sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in +connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and +with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that."--_Moral +Science_, p. 161. + +First.--Mathematical ideas and axioms. + +Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a +Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_; +that a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven +now make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to +make forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or +again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are +equal to one another." Will some one say, that the intellectual beings +in the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as +to affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same +thing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a +triangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties +are a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might +have been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the +syllogism. Was its law constructed? + + All M is X; + All Z is M; + All Z is X. + +Will any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so +made, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or +will the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an +assertion, "All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it +could be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined +in such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to +assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider +scope? Perhaps they see things differently." _Perhaps_ they do; but if +they do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_, +nothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and +_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are +absolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of +_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man. +Feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its +affirmation, "Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by +any possibility of effort make any other product_;" and every intellect, +_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue. +From this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is +_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's +knowledge. + +Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its +relations. + +Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the +Universe without standing in some relation to all the other material +bodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not. +If it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents +itself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see +more relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must +be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse, +or any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A +material body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to +some of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will +hesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it +could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of +thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind. + +Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring, +in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class +they belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation +for themselves; and, "after their kind," they are under bonds to their +young. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon +them. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater, +and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle, +or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling +lion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be +the races of man who are examined, the relations established by +parentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this +might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a +judgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first, +but was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no +necessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might, +for aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage +which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the +ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient +being? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the +Limitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued +respecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is +evident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that +they accord with an a priori principle in the mind_. + +Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of +beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive +an illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established +for our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is +said that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian +era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and +constructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at +the time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story +true, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the +mind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a +perfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very +fact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own +ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an +ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a +perfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a +perfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect +ideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is +true, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence +this instinctive affirmation springs, is true. + +Take another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have +failed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base, +is too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly +affirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden +mean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of +this proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with +tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and +promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that +can differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has +not been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive +affirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than +the fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw +the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing +that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell. + +Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these +assertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of +probabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men, +however positive in their temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain +to-morrow," but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here +the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the +extreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not +true, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in +highest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro, +except the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of +their admirers. + +Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion. + +We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility +ever guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate; +there is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are +impertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and +obligations. An understanding cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because +such a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has +no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other +classes, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in +this. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it +imposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All +these, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the +Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe +is one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of +judgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no +conclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an +affirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that +the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a +free moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it +was optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will +any one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it +was optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or +not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent +therein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that +the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to +God's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot +hesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his +obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable. + +Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet +man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words +"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and +thy neighbor as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought, +deny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the +Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees +the law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his +rebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if +there were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No +power can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a +Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority; +it imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori +law of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as +well as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct +intuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a +necessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he +acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for +Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary +acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival. + +It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any +cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class. +This is because the Sense can gather no material over which the +Understanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the +Sense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced +from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied + +_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the +Universe. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such +conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of +Society, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he +appears to the Sense. + +_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there? +_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and +Understanding return no shadow of answer. + +But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas +and beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are +absolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are +conditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just +what the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that +the truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both. + +Although the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by +the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it +has been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great +wight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_ +terms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in +asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and +Understanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere +presence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive +evidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains +positive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in +this matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that +these words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite and +absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction +of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; +consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative +of the conceivable itself." But, if this is true, how came these words +in the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions. +Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another +case in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a +_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall +recur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense +can be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a +positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We +find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such +positive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth +sense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why +is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in +metaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are +simple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may +rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in +mathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of +ĉsthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to +morals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental +affirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as +necessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that +there must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and +Understanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be +ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in +language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most +valuable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty +which qualifies all the products of its activity with the +characteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may +therefore be deemed established. + +The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to +show the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing +the _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not +thoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is +evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in, +and by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be +compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be +ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and +necessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the +following circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and +must be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in +such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate +the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to +be both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral +elements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in +that it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The +mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct, +immediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very +centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing +pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it +may be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to +the Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and +intuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of +expression regarding these departments of the mind. + +Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of +a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to +declare the function of that faculty. + +The function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate +perception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all +being; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those +principles, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the +conditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by +another immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others, +the fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a +priori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into +a perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God. + +To illustrate. + +1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and that it is +_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will, +can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is +criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man. + +2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space +and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former +case. + +3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_ +argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however, +be so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the +existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the +existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no +more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine +degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned. +Answer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points. + +1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which +means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his +own control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_ +elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all. + +2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has +entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_. +Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but +the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and +infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very +opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead +of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in +_kind_ from God as do his conditions. + +Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to +solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers; +and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand. + +Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended +every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the +definitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by +implication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved; +and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term. + +By way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the +Limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the +Pure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent +to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and +the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the +sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error +are sufficient to illustrate the criticism. + +1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For +instance, "_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name +for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." +"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally +self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."--_Limits of Religious +Thought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will +you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would +reply--No! no possible answer can be given by man. + +Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can +represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the +use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere +fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite +and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract +Infinite. + +2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in +their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity. +Take a few examples from many. + +"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, +that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative +part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so +small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible +into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, +or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and +imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by +the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself +require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same +reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of +parts."--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20. + +"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite, +must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, +amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."--_Limits of +Religious Thought_, p. 76. + +"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause +as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited, +necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is +absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving +a region surrounding its boundaries."--_Spencer's First Principles_, p. +37. + +The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the +north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person +reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these: +"infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series," +by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material +amount. + +Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and +absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or +of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number. +There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and +limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as +to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words +without knowledge." + +Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in +any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but +only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following +extract:-- + +"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be +conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it +cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; +it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by +the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the +Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the +Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike +incomprehensible."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79. + +The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of +such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on +that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that +such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is +a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of +thought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of +operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable +Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a +Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where +is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries, +we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to +be obtained. + +By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in, +and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms +the Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final +Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and +sustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions +from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found +either within the Universe, or without the Universe. + +Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions +must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence +of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the +first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the +very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than +a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point, +would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie +not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject +Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a +class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have +attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All +that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by +observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast +system of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws +conclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With +reference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A +watch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to +each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being +asked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself +wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the +hands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within +itself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world +laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among +the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the +reason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would +exclaim,--"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only +intelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made +the watch." And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a +bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The Universe is an evidence of +intelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the +Universe." And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last +position; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy. + +THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE +FOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE. + +From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching +the goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing +a fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims, +"The watch is an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is +necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the +one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think +of matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These +two, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not +only cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no +other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What +mind? + +By examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the +Universe, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion +to be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself, +he finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his +faculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper +scrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most +secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent +in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature; +but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is +only a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for +a time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the +Spirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central +self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he +instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and +diamonds;" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not +only of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in +Nature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme? + +Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible +existence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in +man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further +been determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme +Spirit. + +Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most +egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to +do this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is +presented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this +animal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally +acknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and +the Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe +then their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they +reject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they +confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the +existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual +person--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly +would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose. + +The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention. + +_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT. + +To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his +spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have +further found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing +this investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would +complete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no +eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can +never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed. +Through Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone, +can we gaze on the Immutable. + +Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as +spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a +priori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for +activity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to +the call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells +central, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny. +Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause. + +The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very +likeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow +forth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he +is dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to +his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly +independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without +himself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit +some first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who +necessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in +all possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man +stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but +more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds +written on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is +perfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a +priori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent +for existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek +will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and +who sets his own bounds to his activity. + +That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that +the result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded, +receives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives +that malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A +similar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws. +Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill +of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows, +calmly and forever, through the bosom of the "Everlasting Father." For +his own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the +likeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible +form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore, +Philosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful +unanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, "GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN +IMAGE." + +We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of +our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith +Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." THAT +SPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE +ULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE. + +The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of +the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of +Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries. + +It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must +be, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying +abstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the +Universe. But what their true significance is, stands out with +unmistakable clearness and precision. + +1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the +necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself, +and as complete_. + +2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and +the other the negative term expressive of the same idea. + +3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary +Being which gives to Him universality_. + +Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the +self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons, +constitute Him unique and supreme. + +It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that +whenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set +forth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that +is logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both +acknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical +development of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is +capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found +therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain, +and important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will +be noted. + +In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being +and continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its +Cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected +beings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly +independent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other +absolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person, +and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong; +while the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute, +and infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and +infinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are +incommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings; +and which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all +possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations +and conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited, +conditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations, +conditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness +and infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the +Universe. + +The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure +self-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his +own being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and +exhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect, +sensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable +limitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and +will; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure +Delight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act, +Omnipotence. + +1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius. + +Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is +possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" or, in other +words, "The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason +conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must +be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth." +These _a priori_ "pure ideals" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They +are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as +they are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with +them. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and +definite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In +fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact, +that the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of +activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to +him; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself +to be so. + +2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight. + +Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by +the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his +entire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and +displeased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And +if two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than +the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his +own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness. + +3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in +act, Omnipotence. + +_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self +activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction. +Some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be +very small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his +place in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which +spontaneously prompts to all good acts. But + +_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be, +limited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the "pure +ideals," in which "must be found the rules after which the creative +agency must go forth." In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact +that he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act +which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a +rational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should +attempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite +Person performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and +definite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an +unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words +unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are +contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even +if possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the +construction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of +an infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of +himself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being +the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only +possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But, +should it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power +would be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No +other infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable. + +The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and +definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of +its Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its +boundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the +outline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The +questions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are +pertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and +definite. + +The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of +thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and +self-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily +involves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of +this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are +conditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an +inability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists, +our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the +completion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground +upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly +consistent. + +In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and +unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that +they apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of +course, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or +that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act +is conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated +to puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental, +and all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the +minds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever +all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The +truth is this. + +That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly +subjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and +who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations, +conditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses, +therefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds +the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the +consciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all +other possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated, +unconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by +Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in +kind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical +things. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their +possessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render +it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency. + +The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth +we have attained. + +_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish +the fulness of the possessor's endowments._ + +An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some +reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. "What we need +is not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment +of any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine +the end itself"... + +Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and +control the pure spontaneity in its action. + + * * * * * + +"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify, +with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional +craving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own +behest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the +round worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly +as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient +beings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the +Supreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we +are altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment +by what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the +highest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal +rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and +precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes +to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner. +Here is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds +himself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving +of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of +this craving is _the highest good_." + +We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the +undiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary +result of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is +the distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments +which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark +of the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and +absoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon +this plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok +speaks further, as follows:-- + +"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for +benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his +beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature +craving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which, +as kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others, +itself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic +autonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which +obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything +very analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some +generalized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law +in the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there +be found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and +self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above +want; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things, +but not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic +excellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire +artistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or +accusing. + +"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the +ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing +higher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby +in all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective +archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is +befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which +must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which +should be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created +all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'" + +In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division +of conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper, +comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom +they lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class, +comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the +being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect +plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is +seen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the +very construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this +distinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of +the operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what +the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not +only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no +possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the +mind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature, +_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those +conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and +spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined +critically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the +same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions +inhere. + +The actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense, +possessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in +_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely +conditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The +relation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory, +and the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are +fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms, +it is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving +impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can +never be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what +is received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have +no possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the +testimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should +be found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it +is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light +was. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This +position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the +failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense. +Every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the +effort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a +patchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new +sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must +transcend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the +Understanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits. +It can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces +it from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to +those in its associate faculty. + +It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may +construct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange, +classify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in +nature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law +can be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such +classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the +flower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as +good as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which, +overlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature, +which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a +science which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further, +that those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie +upon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with +the Limitists. + +It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was +proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so +comprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign +to said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of +nature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions +of, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the +conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an +entirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the +Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense, +under the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread +like a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and +appreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it +full in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other +land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all +their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never +approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural +conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere +and cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and +fulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person. + +It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the +doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par +with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The +objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness +in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the +finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius; +the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same +light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and +the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the +circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite +Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason +is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the +finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ +in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with +nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of +growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to +a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure +spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a +spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore +independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of +all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite +and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore +_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance, +must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight +just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral +government is _possible_. + +In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the +two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more +clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how +the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised. +In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication +of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the +terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of +restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack +or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in +expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his +activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable +limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may +freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one; +but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of +his Self he _will not_, violate. + +That point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion +in hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an +examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has +been attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a +radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by +the Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially +defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to +certain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas +were named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was +established. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated; +and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by +this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final +cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was +then seen that + + That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and + infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the + Universe. + +Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a +position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the +result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the +general principles and their special applications which the Limitists +maintain, and this will occupy our future pages. + + + + +PART II. + +AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF +CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES UNDER IT. + + +It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final +basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul, +and afford it a sure rest. In the fact that God made man in his own +image, and that thus there is, _to a certain extent_, a community of +faculties, a community of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a +community of interests, have we found such a basis. We have hereby +learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final; in other +words, that he can know the truth, and be sure that his knowledge is +correct. If the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the Pure +Reason, and the statements which have been made of the mode of its +activity and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of the +Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have been +satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider the +analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental proposition, which was +promised on an early page. We there gave, it was thought, sufficiently +full extracts for a fair presentation of his theory, and followed them +with a candid epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the +purpose named, we are constrained at the outset to make an +acknowledgment. + +It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in silence the +masterly article on this subject in the "North American Review" for +October, 1864, and after it to pretend to offer anything new. Whatever +the author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop,--and his +work was far less able than what is there given,--that article has left +nothing to be said. He has therefore been tempted to one of two courses: +either to transfer it to these pages, or pass by the subject entirely. +Either course may, perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which +is, while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few short +extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in this, which is, +that some persons may see this volume, who have no access to the Review, +and to whom, therefore, these pages will be valuable. To save needless +repetition, this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned +back and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to. + +Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, one is met +by a logical _faux pas_ which is truly amazing. Immediately after the +assertion that "the mind can know only the _limited and the +conditionally limited_," and in the very sentence in which he denies the +possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, _he proceeds to +define those words in definite and known terms_! The Infinite he defines +as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute as "the +unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say that the +defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, then! "The Infinite," an +unknown term, may be represented by _x_; and the unconditionally +unlimited, a compound unknown term, by _ab_. Now, who has the right to +say, either in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that +_x_=_ab_? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy of the +Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. Either the +terms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable, or they are +unknown terms and undefinable. Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and +definable. Which does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are +unknown; then all else that he has written about them are batches of +meaningless words. If he is held to the latter, they are definable; +then are they known, and his system is denied in the assertion of it. +Since his words are so contradictory, he must be judged by his deeds; +and in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the +infinite and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; for +there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis of his theory, +then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis. + +Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted, and +read the last sentence. Is his utterance a "principle," or is it a +judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a guess. The logician asserts that we +know only the conditioned, and yet bases his assertion upon "the +principles," &c. What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is +axiom, then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in +which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in saying, is just +what he did. He blindly assumed certain "fundamental laws of +thought,"--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence +of the mind to know those laws _as fundamental_. Again, if his +philosophy is valid, the words "must," "necessary," and the like are +entirely out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned +there is, can be, no must, no necessity. + +From these excursions about the principle let us now return to the +principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: There are two +extremes,--"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." These include all being. +They are contradictories, that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the +other. But the mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the +logical conclusion? _That the mind cannot conceive of anything._ What is +his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of something between the +infinite and the absolute, which is neither the one nor the other, but a +_tertium quid_--the conditioned. Where did this _tertium quid_ come +from, when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes? +If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, then +"excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter at all. + +To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated, Hamilton +erected the subterfuge of _mental imbecility_. To deny any knowledge to +man, was to expose himself to ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers +after him, drew a line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the +hither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in +the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions which +appeared in the mind, when one examined those questions which lie on the +further side of that line, resulted from the impotency of the mind to +comprehend the questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How +satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will show. But +strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are cognizable; and then +let us proceed with our reasoning. The essayist in the North American +presents the theory under four heads, as follows:-- + +"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory and +exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true. + +"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible. + +"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of each is referable +to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility. + +"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between +them." + +The first and fourth points require our especial attention. + +1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is _as defined_, that the +terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, turns upon the +definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous; but in order to +see wherein, the following general reflections may be made:-- + +The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, have two +distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and one to God. Such +definitions as are suitable to the latter application, and +self-consistent, have already been given. Though reluctant to admit into +a philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings, we shall +waive for a little our scruples,--though choosing, for ourselves, to +use the equivalent rather than the term. + +Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space and Time shall +not be contradictory to infinite Space and Time. Let us first observe +Hamilton's theory. According to it, Space, for instance, is either +unconditional illimitation, or it is unconditional limitation; in other +words, it is illimitable, or it is a limited whole. The first part of +the assertion is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a +self-evident truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject will see +not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, but that the +attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two +and two five. The last part is a psychological blunder, has no +pertinence to the question, and is not what Hamilton was groping for. He +was searching for the truth, that _there is no absolute unit in +Space_. A limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in +hand--absoluteness--at all. The illimitability of Space, which has just +been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, then, is the +opposite pole of thought? We have just declared it. There is no absolute +unit of Space; or, in other words, all division is in Space, but Space +is indivisible. This, also, is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain, +then, two poles of thought, and definitions of the two terms given, +which are exhaustive and consistent. + + "Space is illimitable. + Space is indivisible." + +The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness of +Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is _in_ Space, and all +division is _in_ Space; but Space is neither limited or divided. One of +the logician's extremes is seen, then, to have no foundation in fact; +and that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with, +nay, essential to, what should have been the other. + +Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find +out God through the forms of Space and Time, a repetition will not be +needed here. God is only to be sought for, found, and studied, by such +methods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the +attempts of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal +difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are simply +absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time are to be discussed by +themselves. And the questions respecting God are to be discussed by +themselves. He who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less +absurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the +multiplication table. + +In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that there is just +a modicum of truth underlying his theory,--just enough to give it a +degree of plausibility. The Sense, as faculty for the perception of +physical objects, or their images, and the Understanding as discursive +faculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials +gathered by the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one +he stated. The Sense was made _incapable_ of perceiving an ultimate atom +or of comprehending the universe. From the fact that the Sense never has +perceived these objects, the Understanding concludes that it never will. +Only by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure +Reason, do we come to know that it never _can_. It was because those +lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space and Time, +and are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions, +and because, in considering them, he failed to see the other mental +powers, that Sir William Hamilton constructed his Philosophy of the +Unconditioned. + +2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible. + +Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies strictly to the +work of the Understanding; and that faculty can never have any notion of +the Infinite or Absolute. But, assuming that "conceive" is a general +term for cognize, the conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If +all being is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can +be known. + +3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. If man can know +nothing because of mental imbecility, why suppose that he has a mental +faculty at all? Why not enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's +theory, the assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically +consistent. The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He must confess +that men know something. By a false psychology he had ruled the Reason +out of the mind, and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any +notion of absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust +themselves before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he constructed +a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent if he had said, There +is no absolute and infinite. The conditioned is the whole of existence; +and this the mind knows. + +"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between +them." + +What the essayist in the North American says upon this point is so apt, +and so accords with our own previous reflections, that we will not +forbear making an extract. "The last of the four theses will best be +re-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned +is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each +other, neither of which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on +the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be +admitted as necessary_.' This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To +mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two +contradictions with a mean between them, requires a hardihood +unparalleled in the history of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two +contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a +cogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either +extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is +wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if the mean +exists, that may be true, and both the contradictories false. But if a +mean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd, +(and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,) +Hamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes." + +Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, is found to be +but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, further criticism would +appear to be unnecessary. + +Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William Hamilton's +psychological error,--the rejection of the Reason as the intellectual +faculty of the spiritual person,--and having, with him, used the terms +limit, condition, and the like, in such significations as are pertinent +to the Sense and Understanding only, the Limitists proceed to present in +a paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning "the +Infinite." They take the ground that, to our view, he can be neither +person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of these implies +limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him, +except as such. Then having, as they think, completely confused the +mind, they draw hence new support for their conclusion, that we can +attain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following +extracts selected from many will show this. + +"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in +whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction +between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of +something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by +being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is +necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from +another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, +or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious +that the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by +the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence +would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence +of an attribute which the Finite has not; for as no finite part can be a +constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must +itself be infinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common +with the finite.... + +"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition +which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. +Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination +of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the +Infinite, if it is conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially +everything, and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general +which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything +in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being +any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually +everything, and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is +likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it +is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a +higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no +characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything +else, and discerned as an object of consciousness.... + +"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to +attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which +we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the perception of +one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others. To +he always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be +conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no +conception of what consciousness is."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, +pp. 93-95. + +"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the +conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of +positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is +to _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the +possibility of thought.... + +"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible +under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought; known only in +correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of +this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or +matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of +the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the +consequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy, if viewed as more than +a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the +particular, we admit that we can never, in out highest generalizations, +rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, +can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of +an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as +beyond the reach of philosophy." + +"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially +agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only +that a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for +man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a +knowledge even in the Deity himself, without contradicting our human +conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself."--_Sir William +Hamilton's Essays_, pp. 21, 22, 38. + +"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God--Benevolence, +Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example--can be conceived by us only as +existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not +identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them +all; in one word, a _Person_. But Personality, as we conceive it, is +essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality is presented +to us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all +our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is +presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various +modes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought +without a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of +thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the +thinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the various +modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation +likewise...."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 102. + +"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the +absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating, +more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in +which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite and +Personal conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest +of all existence of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness alone +that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any +service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can +stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form +such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual +wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual +curiosity."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 104. + +The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows:-- + +"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive +of each other as equally possible; _but only as unable to understand_ as +possible two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their +mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a +wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our +inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with +a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere +of all comprehensive reality."--_Sir William Hamilton's Essays_, p. 22. + +"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the +Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side we view it, appears +encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing +such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; +and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a +contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in +conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as +personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. +It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without +equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived +as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only +of that sum."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, pp. 84, 85. + +We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists should speak +for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not simply in these passages, +but throughout their writings, may be briefly summed up as follows. + +The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest +subjects which come before it, and which it is goaded to examine, finds +itself in an inextricable maze of contradictions; and, after vainly +struggling for a while to get out, becomes nonplussed, confused, +confounded, dazed; and, falling down helpless and effortless in the +maze, and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds +that the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the +light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark, +and therefore _blind_ faith. + +But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of the errors +of the Limitists, that a perception and confession of mental impotence +is _not_ the logical deduction from their premises. Lustrous as may be +their names in logic,--and Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the +logical firmament,--no one of them ever saw, or else dared to +acknowledge, the logical sequence from their principles. They have +climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their verge; and +there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like naked men on Alpine +precipices, with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the +Eternal Truth; and not daring to take the awful plunge before them. +Behold the gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:-- + +"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty +to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile +these two representations with each other, as our conception of +personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion +of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists +anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any +impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction, +in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary +consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend +the boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits +to man's power of thought; and it proves no more."--_Limits of Religious +Thought_, p. 106. + +Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable English. "It +is our duty to think of God as personal," when to think of Him as +personal is to think a lie; "to believe that He is infinite," when so to +believe is to believe the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie +is to incur the penalty decreed by the Bible--God's book--upon all who +believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of a professed +Christian minister in one of the first Universities in the world. Not +that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. By no means. But it logically +follows from his premises. In his philosophy the mind instinctively, +necessarily, and with equal authority in each case, asserts + +That there must be an infinite Being; + +That that Being must be Self-conscious, + +Must be unlimited; and that + +Consciousness is a limitation. + +These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What follows +then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows that the mind is a +deceiver! We learn again the lesson we have learned before. It is not +weakness, it is falsehood: it is not want of capacity, it is want of +integrity that is proved by this contradiction. Man is worse than a +hopeless, mental imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat. + +But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its might the mind +revolts from it, as nature does from a vacuum? True that the human mind +is an incorrigible falsifier? With the indignation of outraged honesty, +man's soul rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own +integrity and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate +or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have within myself +the ultimate standard of truth." + +It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. The +ground of all their difficulties is simple and plain. While denying to +the human mind the faculty of the Pure Reason, they have, _by the (to +them) undistinguished use of that faculty_, raised questions which the +Understanding by no possibility could raise, which the Reason alone is +capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone can solve; and have +attempted to solve them solely by the assistance, and in the forms of, +the Sense and the Understanding. Their problems belong to a spiritual +person; and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an +animal nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. All their +processes are developed on the vicious assumption, that the highest form +of knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the +Understanding, upon facts given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which +is always one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be a +peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among a million. The +meagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine, to account for all +the phenomena of the human mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall +therefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their +fundamental error. + +As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine +of the Limitists, that the Understanding is man's highest faculty of +knowledge, and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of +thought and consciousness vitiate their whole system. One of their most +important errors is thus expressed:--"To be conscious, we must be +conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that +which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." "Thought +cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the +antithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation, +and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that +we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a +knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of +the modified, of the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible +form of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish its +qualities among themselves, and discriminate between them and the +qualities of the apple. And Sir William Hamilton fairly and truly +acknowledges that, as a consequence, science, except as a system of +objects of sense, is impossible. + +The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, that the +diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous. +Their dictum, that all knowledge must be attained through "relation, +plurality, and difference," is not true. There is a kind of knowledge +which we obtain by a direct and immediate _sight_; and that, too, under +such conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought. For +instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, "Malice is +criminal." It also affirms that this is an eternal, immutable, universal +law, conditional for all possibility of moral beings. This direct and +immediate sight, and the consciousness attending it, are _full_ of that +one object, and so are occupied only with it; and it does NOT come under +any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is it with all _a +priori_ laws. The mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct +opposite of that of the Understanding and the Sense. + +Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance +cannot be overstated. It is one which involves the very possibility of +God's existence as a self-conscious person. To present it, we recur +again to the extracts made just above from Sir William Hamilton. +"Consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and +object of thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each +other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment as logically following +from this: "that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such +knowledge," _i. e._ of the absolute, "even in the Deity himself." That +is, God can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the +human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this assertion of +the logician--a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, but which has, +perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be +concisely stated thus. In every correlation of subject and object,--in +every instance where they are to be contrasted,--the subject must be +one, and the object must be _another and different_. Hamilton, in +another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into yourselves, +and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble +consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one +perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first; in +this consists self-knowledge," &c. Mark the "several terms," and that +the one can only see the other, never itself. + +This position is both a logical and psychological error. It is a logical +error because it _assumes_, without argument, that there is involved in +the terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and +contradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself. This +assumption is groundless. As a matter of fact, it is _generally_ true +that, so far as man is concerned, the subject is one, and the object +another and different. But this by no means proves that it is _always_ +so; it only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And when +one comes to examine the question in itself, there is absolutely no +logical ground for the assumption. It is found to be a question upon +which no decision from logical considerations can have any validity, +because _it is purely psychological_, and can only be decided by +evidence upon a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological +error, because a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the +opposite is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject and +object are identical. + +This fact that the subject and object are often identical in the +searching eye of human reason, and _always_ so under the eye of +Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be +passed with a mere allusion. It seems amazing that a truth which, the +instant it is stated, solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy +has raised, should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great +spiritual-eyed thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only +to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal +reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came to see this truth +during a process of thought, having for its object the solution of the +problem, How can the infinite Person be self-comprehending, and still +infinite? While considering this, and without ever having received a +hint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned +on a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a heaven +full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably profounder +question: How can any soul, not God only, but any soul, be a +self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain and explain this? It +was only years after that he met the negative statement in Herbert +Spencer's book. The difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented +to their minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous +image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, have concluded +that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always dangerous to argue from +an illustration; and, in this instance, it has been fatal. If man was +only an animal nature, and so only a _receiver_ of impressions, with a +capacity to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of +the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is also a +spiritual _person_, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate +intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. The Reason is not +receptivity merely, or mainly; it is originator. In its own light it +gives to itself _a priori_ truth, and itself as seeing that truth; and +so the subject and object are identical. This is one of the +differentiating qualities of the spiritual person. + +Our position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated +and sustained as follows: + +_Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in the +self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the subject +and object are_ IDENTICAL. + +1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject and object are +identical. The question is a question of fact. In illustrating the fact, +it will be proved. When a man looks at his hands, he sees they are +instruments for _his_ use. When he considers his physical sense, he +still perceives it to be instrument for _his_ use. In all his +conclusions, judgments, he still finds, not himself, but _his_ +instrument. Even in the Pure Reason he finds only _his_ faculty; though +it be the highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches +for the _I am_; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties and +capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar to American +Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, which leads us directly to +the goal we seek. It is the phrase, "self-examination." In all thorough, +religious self-examination the subject and object are identical. In the +ordinary labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or +that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. But +in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion is not, "I can do this +or that." It is, "I am this or that." The person stands unveiled before +itself, in the awful sanctuary of God's presence. The decision to be +made is not upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end +for which all labor shall be performed. The character of the person is +under consideration, and is to be determined. The selfhood, with all its +wondrous mysteries, is at once subject and object. The I am in man, +alike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of +"the everlasting Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn +duty. How shall the finite I am accord _itself_ to the pure purpose of +the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that some persons have never +been conscious of this experience. To some, from a natural inaptitude, +and to others, from a perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some +have so little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are +never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, but they +never know it. Their impressions ever come from without. Another class +of persons shun such an experience as Balshazzar would have shunned, if +he could, the handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in +the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with sensuous +gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of +self-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread; and they +shudder, turn away, and by every effort avoid it. Sometimes they +succeed; and through the gates of death rush headlong into the +spirit-land, only to be tortured forever there with the experience they +so successfully eluded here. For the many thousands, who know by +experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination is, now that +their attention has been drawn to its full psychological import, no +further word is necessary. They know that in that supreme insight there +was seen and known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and +simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as one, as +identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, that the wonder is +that it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in +philosophy. + +2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, spiritual +Person, the subject and object are identical. This question, though one +of fact, cannot be determined _by us_, by our experience; it must be +shown to follow logically from certain _a priori_ first principles. This +may be done as follows. Eternity, independence, universality, are +qualities of God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent, +he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom he is necessarily +related. Being universal, he possesses all possible endowment, and is +ground for all possible existence; so that no being can exist but by his +will. As Universal Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or +intellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this +is a _permanent state_. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending all +others; and therefore he _exhaustively_ knows himself. He distinguishes +his Self as object, from no what else, because there is no else to +distinguish his Self from; but having an exhaustive self-comprehension, +he distinguishes within that Self all possible forms of being each from +each. + +He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is nothing to learn +and nothing to change to, except to a wicked state; and for this there +_can be to him no temptation_. He is ever the same, and hence there can +be no instant in time when he does not _exhaustively_ know himself. Thus +always in him are the subject and object identical. + +These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason sees _a priori_ +truth _immediately_, and out of all relation, plurality and difference, +and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, the subject and object +are identical, by their simple statement explode, as a Pythagorean +system, the mental astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and +the Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the +circumvolving planets. + +The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as their processes +of thought, and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error. We +will note one in the following sentence. "Consciousness, in the only +form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the +perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object +with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, it is usable only +with regard to things in Nature, and can have no relevancy to such +subjects as are now under consideration. It is a word which expresses +_only_ such operations as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The +following definition explains this: "The concept refers to all the +things whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives +(con-cepis), or _grasps together_ into one class and one act of +mind."--_Bowen's Logic_, p. 7. This is not the mode of the Reason's +action at all. It does not run over a variety of objects and select out +from them the points of similarity, and grasp these together into one +act of mind. It sees one object in its unity as pure law, or first +truth; and examines that in its own light. Hence, the proper word is, +_intuits_. Seen from this standpoint, consciousness does _not_ imply +limitation and change. A first truth we always see as _absolute_,--we +are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither consciousness +nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. We would paraphrase the +sentence thus: Consciousness, in the highest form in which we know it, +implies and possesses _permanence_; and is the light in which pure truth +is seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same. + +It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the Pure Reason run +along side by side in the same sentence; the inferior faculty +encumbering and defeating the efforts of the other. Take the following +for example. + +"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very +possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher +perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic +feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and +discerned as an object of consciousness." The presence in language of +the word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence +of a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation. +This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for consideration, +the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den, and +says, "can be that which it is not." This she says, because she cannot +act, except to conceive, and cannot conceive, except to distinguish +this from something else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance +of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The Understanding +conceives the finite as one and independent, and the infinite as one and +independent. Then the Reason steps in, and says the infinite is +all-comprehending. This conflicts with the Understanding's _conception_, +and so the puzzle comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's +affirmation is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is +actually everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in its blind, +impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic feature by which +it can be distinguished from anything else." _There is nothing else from +which to distinguish it._ The perception of the Reason is as follows. +The infinite Person comprehends intellectually, and is ground for +potentially and actually, all that is possible and real; and so there +can be no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all +fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature of +completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, which is all there +is, (if no-thing--void--can be said to _be_,) beside him; and from any +part, which there is within him. Thus is he object to himself in his own +consciousness. + +This vicious working of the Understanding against the Reason, in the +same sentences, can be more fully illustrated from the following +extracts. "God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence +to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either _from the better +to the worse, or from the worse to the better_. A third possibility that +both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted +by our author, it is not necessary to consider."--_Sir William +Hamilton's Essays_, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be conceived as +coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it +must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to +conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for +that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that +conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but if we +think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at +one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it +as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the +progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very +thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems +forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the +condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is +conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the +Creator."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 81. + +"God," a word which has _no significance_ except to the Reason: "as +necessarily determined,"--a phrase which belongs only to the +Understanding. The opposite is the truth: "to pass from absolute +essence." This can have no meaning except to the Pure Reason: "to +relative manifestation." This belongs to the Understanding. It +contradicts the other; and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the +attempt to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing +from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The words imply that +God, in passing from the state of absolute essence, ceased to be +absolute essence, and became "relative manifestation." All this is +absurd; and is in the Understanding and Sense. God never _became_. The +Creator is still absolute essence, as before creation; and the +logician's this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not +a contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be thus stated. +The infinite Person, freely according his will to the behest of his +worth, and yet equally free to not so accord his will, put forth from +himself the creative energy; and this under such modes, that he neither +lost nor gained by the act; but that, though the latter state was +diverse from the first, still neither was better than the other, but +both were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute plenitude +of endowments. All possible ideals were present before his eye. All +possible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility. His will, +as choice, was absolute benevolence; and, as act, was competent to all +possible effort. To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing +to, and subtracted nothing from, his fulness. + +The fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure +spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration +of the superior. A change in a pure spirit, which neither adds nor +subtracts, leaves the good unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person +created, he passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to +better; but the two states, though diverse, were equally good. + +We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can the relative," etc. +"If the Relative is a distinct reality from the absolute," then each is +_self-existent_, and independent. The sentence annihilates itself. "It +must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence." The +image here is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is, +that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, existence +come, without there being any cause for that existence coming. This +would be the phenomenon to the Sense. And the Sense is utterly unable to +account for the phenomenon. The object in the Sense must appear as +_form_; but in the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well +be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands before his +audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms of his hands to the +spectators, apparently empty. He then closes his right hand, and then +opening it again, appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers, which +he hands about to the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from +nothing, _i. e._ to have no cause. It appears "to pass from +non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the cheating +seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause for the coming of the +bunch of flowers, though we cannot see it." Precisely similar is +creation. Could there have been a Sense present at that instant, +creation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing +something would have seemed to come. But under the correcting guide of +the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before creation, the +infinite Person did not manifest himself; and so was actually alone. At +creation his power, which before was immanent, he now made emanent; and +put it forth in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the +requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. That which was +ideal he now made actual. The form as Idea was one, the power as +Potentiality was another, and each was in him by itself. He put forth +the power into the form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the +Universe was. Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the +same manner it might be shown how, all along through the writings of the +Limitists, the Understanding runs along by the Reason, and vitiates her +efforts to solve her problems. We shall have occasion to do something of +this farther on. + +The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an +examination of the celebrated dictum, "To think is to condition." Those +who have held this to be universally true, have also received its +logical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear +self-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not +a universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to +circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon +this labor by answering the question, What is thinking? + +First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking. +Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this +head we notice two points. _a._ That act of the Understanding in which +an object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and +generic elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations +determined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I +distinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is +carnivorous. _b._ That act of the finite spiritual person by which he +compares the judgments of the Understanding with the _a priori_ laws of +the Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or +error. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought +to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The +standard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found +to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of +the reason. These, in the finite person, come _after_ a process of +reflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in +another faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such, +that by no process of reflection _alone_ could they be. Thinking, in the +Universal Genius, is the _sight_, at once and forever, of all possible +object of mental effort. It is necessary and _spontaneous_, and so is an +endowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are +prepared now to entertain the following statements:-- + +A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, _i. e._ causative +ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of +the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The +condition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be, +must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's +self, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for _all_ +conditions. Yet men think of an object _in its conditions_. This is +because the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions, +constructed also man as thinker, _correlated to those conditions_, so +that he should think upon things _as they are_. In this view, to think +is not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already +imposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking, +as above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in _a_, +of the second general definition. It follows, therefore, + +B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere +of conditions proper,--observing the distinction of conditions into two +classes heretofore made,--the finite intellect must act under them, and +see those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,--as, for instance, +a geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,--so far it is true, +and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under +all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as +seeing. But when men intuit the _a priori_ truth, Malice is criminal, +they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute +and universal. We perceive, then, + +C. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and +ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not +true. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term; +yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they +are not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the +principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that +necessarily. + +Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant, +not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions, +but that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the +object thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,--the following +statements will define the province of this dictum. + +1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the +discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it. + +2. Created spiritual persons, _as constituted beings,_ also lie wholly +within it. _But it extends no farther._ On the other hand, + +3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws, +and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly +without it. + +4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms +inhere. Or, in general terms, + +When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the +thinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that, +To think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is +such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be +conditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose +objects are unconditioned. + +The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which Mr. Spencer opens +his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," introduces a subject common +to all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this +part of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in +the "North American Review" for October 1864, applies with equal force +here in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding +July number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded. +He has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and +difficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought +at least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the +Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do. + +In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are _a priori_ +conditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. "Pure +Space, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for +any possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is +given in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and +universal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological +order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience, +nor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all +experience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any +experience of outer object should be." "Pure Time, as given in the +intuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible +period, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily +continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."--_Rational +Psychology_, pp. 125, 128. + +Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as +conditions. Space is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being. +Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its +material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold +no communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he +could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation +to Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition +of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case +just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a +consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no +standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes, +and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time. +Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to time has no +significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the +internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The +inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length, +breadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, +may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may +be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any +outer or inner side."--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135. + +Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space has three +dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in +space,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid +room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can +enter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. Space +and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical," +illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be +defined as follows: + +"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter. + +"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence." + +Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and +illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come +into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a +final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all +periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are +without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the +subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows. + +The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that +Space and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best +consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two +general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time +have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind. +Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and +one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the +Universe. + +First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense. +"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and +void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor +period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure +diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and +periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure, +_a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense +as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no +figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an +external agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a +necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words, +the fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the +province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than +it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In +our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the +actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with +ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical +sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of +the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or +mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal +law of Space and Time must lie. + +Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form, +if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could +be. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time. +But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another +object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground +by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a +unity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space, +and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may +determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of +all space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their +space and time in an objective experience." The operation of the +Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular +spaces and times; _i. e._ the space and time of each phenomenon in the +Sense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all +phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not +only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all +phenomena must be seen in _one_ Space and Time. This connection of the +manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An +examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a +general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law +given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space, +and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law: + +_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under +the conditions of Space and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _Space +and Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty +in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This +will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However +that may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest +will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made +to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law +lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is +made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as +unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an +earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law +of Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a +house out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make +two and two five. + +Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the +Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the +questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the +fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It +was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as +pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure +become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the +condition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects +and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the +Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those +faculties. + +We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a +sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is +complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of +"immeasurable void"--Space--has been occupied. Where there was nothing, +something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our +having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the +Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, +all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the +Universe, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept +except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In +other words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept. +Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of +events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is +left. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of +vacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be +perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a +space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to +us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then, +that is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept, +therefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the +totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space. +Again; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One +event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is +a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events +proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the +procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the +events of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time. +Thus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration; +and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume +for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the +result. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is +conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because +matter, substance, "a space-filling force," is the underlying notional +upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly +illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism, +logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration +is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From +this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our +concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and +all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding +matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be +illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within +it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during +event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may +have duration in it. This brings us to the + +Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have +been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used +therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to +consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can +therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure +Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and +all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will +be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in +it are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will +its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon +which would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions +are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain. +When we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration, +there is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to +say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was +void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or, +void is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space +and Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event +may be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may +become. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the +Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being +for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental +activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics +exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of +thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to +what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must +be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is +an _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar +is the relation between Space and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and +object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its +characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and +Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and +event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a +priori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being +that God has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are +pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The +idea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be +assigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot +go. + +The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions +stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth, +and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised +is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to +this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have +failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall +be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it +certain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them, +and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, +however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most +blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those +pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth." + +The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is +that primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out +of all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby +having limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation +to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible +objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn +nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no +event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is +equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time, +just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future +examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever +conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a +subject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and +Space and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with +and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be +able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as +those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore +alluded to. + +"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in +impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to +Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such +timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought +necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion +that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this +result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept +of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join +in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But +a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by +anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite, +Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation +is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be +two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while +infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds +may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; +when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space +and Time will limit the infinite God. _But not before._ Time exists +ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and +eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so +long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and +absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or +mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is +irreverent." + + + + +PART III. + +AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS +OF THE LIMITISTS. + +ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON. + + +It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended +examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice +it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the +refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated +essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has +generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof; +and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments +adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of +the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and +attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, +an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as +sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and +the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as +Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark +will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred +to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of +criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention +is now called. + +In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is +manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the +proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is +immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality, +and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism, +that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when +used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The +fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates +every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus +stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in +that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by +difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the +Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the +Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not +known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before +that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality, +because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated, +with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen +to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little +below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, +thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of +intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of +philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact +that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately +intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first +principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the +condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy. + +These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated +"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the +Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The +four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are +too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to +afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is +believed, the true opinion, which is as follows. + +The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is +known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all +this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the +spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to +be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and +plurality. + +"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force +except with regard to things in nature. + +Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an +_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But +equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive, +_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under +his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the +expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not +love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him. +If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to +the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true +that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which +the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our +whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is +possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we +ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him +and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of +affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; +and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable +mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does +such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer +sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a +conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made +the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It +is impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love +is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and +his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as +follows. + +_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common +with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to +which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him +negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._ + +That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir +William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the +Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination. +He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same +function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the +Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the +Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the +remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends +the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any +accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes +judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than +his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the +Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in +the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are +exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and +gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason +sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up +as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts +in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty +of a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue +is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether +"both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither +side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to +revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the +truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this +primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which +conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to +be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its +letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it +spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true +experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an +idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and, +by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in +consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one +principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the +many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was +seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All +religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of +agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men, +produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more +subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form, +is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How +shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first +human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable +objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then +there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant +people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the +rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by +their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple +agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one +of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said +they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact, +that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people, +either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the +least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point, +none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the +idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or +Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem +that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, +were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now +and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above, +respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come +directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its +form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual +takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of +nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not +peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the +illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions. +These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length, +showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are +accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is +cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by +an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and +therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following +distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, +only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what +may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and +experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is +made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir +William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely +mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the +actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind. +In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that, +whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that +the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is +impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective +reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important +"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, +unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a +fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends +all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant] +appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these +negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of +_Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the +Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they +hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative +answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly, +and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of +thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is +_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient +expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not +thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the +operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are +a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The +phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction, +we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of +the human race affirms this. + +The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who, +with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and +real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who +consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_, +as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively +bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes +both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we +suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The +above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute, +therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, +and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as +applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since +we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the +definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found +consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found +irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is +the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space +and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The +terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to +him, have entirely different significations from what they will when +applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in +this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former. +The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as +must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the +Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as +qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been +done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here. + +Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton +quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is +difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists +a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues +from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the +condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; +consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which +it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of +knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable, +it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or, +second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of +both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis, +on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_; +for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of +terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is +therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at +all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of +plurality and difference." + +In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author +is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician +presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, +if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign +plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of +Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them +those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The +error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely +psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed +out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the +Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about, +things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with +an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject +this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if +the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an +act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of +terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he +should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is +revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of +mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not +satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as +a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is +so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked +it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will +give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle +that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and +hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is +true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic +will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A +plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but +objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by +an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference, +and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense +and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the +Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are +_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions. +Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under +the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for +"mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple, +unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a +direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and +likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so +belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined +only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural. + +Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given +by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for +example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that +many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, +skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also, +that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as +well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One +color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover, +relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is +distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of +likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different +flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and +possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among +themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a +commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This +distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and +connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and +Understanding. + +2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws, +of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the +Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental +difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's +attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and +_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take +the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a +Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr +Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea." +This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the +author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be +distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it +cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If +known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous +insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason, +and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the +doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in +subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and +difference." + +Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states +certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is +nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should +have so presented them. Following the passage--which is here +quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions. + +"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be +conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a +knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by +preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final +causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without +operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be +founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking +refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his +works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve." + +1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a +plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A +faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot +determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can +have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence. +Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be +influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and +only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a +liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;" +and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as +possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the +Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment +both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and +qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is +thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to +answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The +infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, +and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of +personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint +in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a +multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which +enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring +accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure +the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put +in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides +that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is +_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not +person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then +this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his +dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is +efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He +is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him +to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under +chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain +the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity, +which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in +the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for +answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or +chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's +philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his +followers. + + + + +REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT." + + +This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid +and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is +manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety, +and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom +its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him +to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever +inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the +intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but +desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems +inscrutable. + +In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly +noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found +plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the +Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the +consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge. +The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the +mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word +and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies +them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak +of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of +"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon +the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process, +based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any +knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the +ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain +respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly +declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man +in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot +know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, +man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a +moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must +know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will +do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is +_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees +it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And +such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an +agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of +society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be +assumed as granted. + +Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in +his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First +Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and +that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to +Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him, +not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute +Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these +last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause +expresses "an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive +understanding-conception." Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the +term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He +defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by itself, having +no necessary relation to any other Being," when it is rather the +exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines "the +Infinite" to be "that which is free from all possible limitation; that +than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can +receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not +from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, for which is +neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ "is +free from all possible limitation." How can that be when the Being he +thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one +of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some +light may be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the +subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is free from all +possible limitation" is "that than which a greater is inconceivable." +Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible +"attributes," and is in every possible "mode of existence" "from all +eternity." Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is +inconceivable," two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a +thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may +be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the +latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This +Being must be in every "mode of existence" "from all eternity." +Personality is a "mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever +have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence, +therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again +these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this +Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually +exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show +that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the +understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore, +utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without +limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It +becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which +we have already given to the terms he uses. + +Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being. + +Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is +endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other +words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being; +and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being +is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all +possible beings must depend. + +Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him +universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses +all possible endowments in perfection. + +Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external +restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his +very constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these +qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, +Power, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession +of them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the +entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the +_undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his +perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the +fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper +limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper +limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence; +and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of +as belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are +necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection +which constitutes him the Ultimate. + +In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." It is not that +God has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the +number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he +possesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is, +further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be +"conceived." No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence; +because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and +Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an +intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can +be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a +contradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because +there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, as cognate +or opposite modes of consciousness." Without doubt it is, in a certain +sense, true, that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as +absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest +metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of +all reality." This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and +from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by +no means follows, in which he says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is +that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil +included." This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a +Being _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do; +and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be +admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he +sees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so, +how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of +words to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil. + +The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in +the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the +knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation. +On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth +of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by +those persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being +perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons +sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of +things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not +direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon +him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition +of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit +only for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of +all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the +definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it +may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite +person, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's +blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and +absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The +form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and +absoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The +quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is +the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the +possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the +ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as +Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he +is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it +means--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that God must be the +efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must +produce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been +uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the +Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true +nature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of God. From the +above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the +Reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the +Universe--are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent. + +The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire +approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their +author's indefensible assumption, that cause is "indispensable" to our +idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is +incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall +decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not. +Hence we may freely admit that "the cause, as such, exists only in +relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the +effect is an effect of the cause." It is also true that "the +conception"--idea--"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of +all relation." The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we +say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing, +then, not "the idea of succession in time," but the idea of the logical +order, we rightly say, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and +afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor are we here "checked by the third +conception, that of the Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of +existence," and yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How +is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment. +Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort +of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every +possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to +create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that +act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no +_essential_ change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and +in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally +perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This: +that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he +should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an +actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the +infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "if +Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without +causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond +its former limits," his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic +understanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that +was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is +_actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to +fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies, +possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in +himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his +remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus +establishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his +essential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all +possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this +view, "creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the only +possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a +_Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the +Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the +first moment of time. No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be, +presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that +scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd. + +One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says, +that, "supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it +operates by means of free will and consciousness." But the difficulties +which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained +thus. Always in God's consciousness _the subject and object are +identical_. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all +relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it +is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation +which falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will, +is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute, +being identical; and yet there is no contradiction. + +The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute +Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of +attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the +term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents +no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and +interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of +another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality +which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the +consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the almost unanimous +voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and +simple," uses the term "simple" in the same sense that it would have +when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is +unanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice +of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; +and is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no +weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every +man may have within himself. We land, then, in no "inextricable +dilemma." The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess +complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition +we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and +likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe, +which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and +with which he is not identified. + +Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite, +must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is +potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and +an unrealized potentiality is a limitation." With our interpretation the +assertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the +Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon every one of its +"possible objects" _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual. +Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them +just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does +as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized potentialities"; +and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence, +as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to +convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception +that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as +_quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows +that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity. +The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being +cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the +reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power +and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as +quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect +harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of +the spheres. Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of" +this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall be; neither +does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be, +and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; but only on such a hypothesis +can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall +be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are, +like him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who +in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He +made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and +so evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the +conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to +prevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection +in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the +consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very +best possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the +Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not +wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better +to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a +wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is +essential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was +better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If +any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there +remains no ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful +looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the +adversary." + +Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further +remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties +are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established +on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling +this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining +how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the +finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that +of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or +involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection +to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally +perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of +quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original +perfection." On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore +adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not +belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God _is_, as ground for +what God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it +will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity +in no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and +perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and +perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point +of departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete +blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and, +further, that while these two states are equal, there is not "complete +indifference," because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine +mind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was, +and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his +conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the +one from the other. + +"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?" It +cannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms +a concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what +cannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be +concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to +be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must +be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process +as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be +an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above +question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_ +organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect +harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at +once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus +constituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently +named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent +upon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative +activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into +systems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler, +and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated, +possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the +possibility of there being any "_other_" power. This power is adequate +to do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the +province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his +power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply +power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and +organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In +all this the Person, "of his own will," freely establishes whatever his +unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the +actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or +restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a +manifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word, +Creation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his +power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the +organization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now +ask, "How could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the +question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's animal +nature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can +be furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ God is, or does anything, +but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem +are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all +fulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other +beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_ +upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the +understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out +of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the +Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts +with the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is +"before all things, and by whom all things consist,"--who organizes his +own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the +Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness. + +On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," Mr. +Mansel makes use of the following language: "A limit is itself a +relation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge +the existence of a correlative on the other side of it." Upon reading +this sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense. +Some object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But +let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation +within himself, and for whom there is no "other side," nor any +"correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account +for sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need +to form a concept of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of +space," nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty +which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization. +What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing +personality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby +contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and +antithetical to whom is only negation. + +From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary +Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious +consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and +infinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a +Being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant +in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit +of religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of +this lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views +the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it +is to turn from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to +anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'" The +wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout +spirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, "I will accept this +as final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest +revelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done +so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful +would have been the conclusions he would have given us. + +In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the +human nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding "some explanation +of the singular phenomenon of human thought," which he has just +developed. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of +consciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in +the following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception of +Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily +implies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we +must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as +that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In +this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very +question at issue; for, the position maintained by one class of writers +is, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the +mind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself, +and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is +unquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense, +and the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come +into consciousness without implying a "distinction between one object +and another." But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as +such, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known +to have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it +a first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been +aware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving, +doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory +tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that +men have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be +admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing +them from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves +to be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of +consciousness which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The +subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If +the author means that "the Infinite" cannot be infinite without he is +also finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both +pantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if +it is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly +Pantheism. Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" as +independent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing +some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then +there can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his +idea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears +inconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his +infinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and +possessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality, +then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the +capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires +is, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite +Person; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such +as that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish +his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "A +consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a +self-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and +difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and +indifferent," it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express +the understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant +here, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not +contradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite. +There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no +knowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that +the Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already +been abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its +objects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or +likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," and using the +concrete and proper form, we may say: + +We are conscious of infinity, _i. e._ we are conscious that we see with +the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, _a priori_ idea; and that it is +quality of the Deity. + +2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are conscious, +that we see with the eye of Reason the complex _a priori_ idea of a +perfect Person possessing independence and universality as qualities of +his Self. But we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively +comprehend him. As is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a +certain extent, but not wholly what he is. + +In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of another grave +psychological error. He says, "Consciousness is essentially a +limitation, for it is the determination to one actual out of many +possible modifications." There is no truth in this sentence. +Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not a determination; it is not +a modification. It may be well to state here certain conclusions on this +assertion, which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it, +when we come to speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is _one_, and +retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in the +unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless Dr. Hickok's +illustration is the best possible. Consciousness is the _light_ in which +a spiritual person sees the modifications of himself, _i. e._ the +activity of his faculties and capacities. Like Space, only in a +different sphere, it is an illimitable indivisible unity, which is, that +all limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it. If, then, +only one modification--object--comes into it at a time, this is because +the faculties which see in its light are thus organized;--the being to +whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining to +consciousness _as such_, which constitutes a limit,--which could bar the +infinite Person from seeing all things at once in its light. This +Person, then, so far as known, must be known as an actual absolute, +infinite Spirit, and hence no "thing"; and further as the originator and +sustainer of all "_things_,"--which, though dependent on him, in no way +take aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially everything, in +the sense that all possible combinations, or forms of objects, must ever +stand as ideals in his Reason; and he can, at his will, organize his +power in accordance therewith. But he must also be known as free to +create or not to create; and that the fact that many potential forms +remain such, in no way detracts from his infinity. + +Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions which, we feel +assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If all thought is +limitation,--if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, +regarded as finite,--the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely +a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is +possible." "From a human point of view," and _we_, at least, can take no +other, what follows? That the Deity _can have no thoughts_; cannot know +what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three suppositions can be +made. Either he has no thoughts, is destitute of an intellect; or his +intellect is Universal Genius, and he sees all possible objects at once; +or there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the Reason, +of which we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged +by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically following from +the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so abhorrent to the soul that it +must be unhesitatingly rejected. The second is the position advocated in +this treatise. The third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject +this third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and because, +being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed. To +advocate a position of which, in the very terms of it, the intellect can +have no possible shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of +the work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" not +"distinction" in the understanding-conception of that term. So +consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits when cognized are +seen in the light of consciousness. According to the philosophy we +advocate, God is a particular being, and is so known; yet he is not +known as "one thing out of many," but is known in himself, as being such +and such, and yet being _unique_. When Mr. Mansel says, "In assuming the +possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore, +that it is at the same time limited and unlimited," he evidently uses +those terms with a signification pertinent only to the Understanding. He +is thinking of _amount_ under the forms of Space and Time; and so his +remark has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will think of him +as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; and will define infinity +and absoluteness in accordance therewith. + +If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a consistent +rationalism _must_ attribute "consciousness to God." _We_ are always +conscious of "limitation and change," because partiality and growth are +organic with us. But we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness, +which should produce such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a +person has little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no +more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding +information, he is conscious of just so much. Whence, it appears, that +the "limitation and change" spring from the nature of the constitution, +and not from the consciousness. If, then, there should be one Person who +possessed the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason from +consciousness why he should be conscious thereof. + +Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, that it +is only possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject, +or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious." +This utterance, taken in the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey, +involves the denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that +the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the difficulty +vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the Absolute?" If by this is +meant, have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute Person, the +experience is manifestly impossible. But man may have a certain +knowledge, _that_ such Person is without knowing in all respects _what_ +he is, just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing what +it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to +represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he is guilty of +personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning with regard to the +Being as he would with regard to the term. Absoluteness is a simple +unanalyzable idea, but it is not God; it is only one quality of God. So +with infinity. God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as +unanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the +apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it about the +apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend the absolute Person _as +such_, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, and a positive knowledge +that the Being is who is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question +respecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute +Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. We may have a +true, clear, thorough knowledge _that_ he exists without having an +exhaustive knowledge of _what_ he is. The former is necessary to us; the +latter impossible. So, too, the knowledge by us, of any _a priori_ law, +will be exhaustive. Yet while we know that it _must_ be such, and not +otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other _a priori_ laws, +nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. And since, as we +have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to +number, and God is not material substance that can be broken into +"parts," but an organized Spirit, we see that we may consider the +elements of his organization in their logical order; and, remembering +that absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may examine +his nature and attributes without impiety. + +Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's +reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be +represented in the form of a whole composed of parts." This is +tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be represented under the form +of the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a +statement. But what the Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known +as having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and +from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his Knowledge, +his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet these are distinguished from +each other, and from him. All this is consistent, because infinity is +_quality_, and permeates them all; and not amount, which jumbles them +all into a confused, _indistinguishable_ mass. + +In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily subject to the law +of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object of whose existence we can be in +any way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time +to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a +certain portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed the law +of created beings, under which they must see objects, the remark is +true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, and concludes that, because +we are under limitation in seeing the object, it is under the same +limitation, so far as we apprehend it in being seen, he asserts what is +a psychological error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom, +"Things which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another." +Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see this, that is, we do, +must, occupy a time in observing it. But do we see that the axiom is +under any condition of Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is, +_must be_, true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is +thus _absolutely_ true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and +absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, then, a +faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in succession, and +so under the law of Time, also sees that those objects, whether ideas, +or that Being to whom all ideas belong, are, _in themselves_, out of all +relation to Time. Thus is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is +he like God; thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, so +often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, 'In contemplating +God, transcend time,'" means, "In all your reflections upon God, behold +him in his true aspect, in the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It +is true that "to know the infinite" _exhaustively_, "the human mind must +itself be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that mind. +Only that knowledge is required which is possible, viz., that the Deity +is, and what he is, _in so far as we are in his image_. + +Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a relation," in +the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who +possesses it. It rather adds,--is, indeed, a pure addition. We appear to +ourselves as limited and related, not because of our personality, but +because of our finiteness as _quality_ in the personality. + +Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal Spirit +should not have personality, but we see that if he was destitute of it, +he must possess a lower form of being,--since this is the highest +possible form,--which would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other +words, we see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently +says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the personality of God +so strong, that one is bewildered with the question, "How could he +escape the conviction which they awaken? How could he reject the cry of +his spiritual nature, and accept the barren contradictions of his lower +mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness alone that +we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service. +It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in +any religious relation to Him at all,--that we can form such a +representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, +insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity." +"Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation +to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist. +And when, from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects, +we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask +to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest +personality, and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, 'I +AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our +duty to believe that He is infinite." We may at this point quote with +profit the words of that Book whose authority Mr. Mansel, without +doubt, most heartily acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send +them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all +might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in +unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because ye know not the +truth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth." Either +God is personal or he is not. If he is, then all that we claim is +conceded. If he is not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as +personal, then it is our duty to think and believe a _falsehood_. This +no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened man, _can_ +bring his mind to accept as a moral law. The soul instinctively asserts +that obligation lies parallel with _truth_, and "that no lie is of the +truth." So, then, there can be no duty except where truth is. And the +converse may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of duty +is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and truly spiritual a +man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our duty to think God personal, +and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance +of a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the +highest realm of being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with +it we accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere, +that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one must be rejected, +man should cling to, and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler +nature. Thus will we do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see +the destruction of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God as +personal," because he is personal; and we know that he is personal +because it is our duty to think him so. We need pay no regard to the +perplexities of the Understanding. We soar with the eagle above the +clouds, and float ever in the light of the Sun. The teachings of the +Moral Sense are far more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any +discursions of the lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all +perplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to +stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all +utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the least, +the declaration of this faculty is _as_ valid as that of the lower, and +is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because higher. Still +further, no man would believe that God, in the most solemn, yea, awful +moment of his Self-revelation, would declare a lie. The bare thought, +fully formed, horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in +that supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one of +the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, He revealed +Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the most positive, the most +unquestionable form in which He could utter the fact of His personality. +This, then, and all that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all +perplexities must be interpreted by this surety. + +In summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of +consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the following +psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation +between something within and something without itself; and the +consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly +present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot +think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to +whom it belongs, and so _not_ to be "a relation between something within +and something without itself." This is precisely the case with the +Deity. All relations and limits spring from within him, and there is +nothing "without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence of all +limit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this: +"It must be so in the _nature of things_." This "nature of things" is, +in philosophical language, the system of _a priori_ laws of the +Universe, and these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It +appears, then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its +limits wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity. + +With these remarks the author would close his criticism upon Mr. +Mansel's book. We start from entirely different bases, and these two +systems logically follow from their foundations. If Sir William Hamilton +is right in his psychology, his follower is unquestionably right in his +deductions. But if that psychology is partial, if besides the +Understanding there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the +intuition, giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment, +then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly fallacious. The +establishment of the validity of the Pure Reason is the annihilation of +"the Philosophy of the Unconditioned." On the ground which the author +has adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute, +self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of these terms +has been given. We have found that certain objects may be seen as out of +all relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Consciousness and +personality have also been found to involve no limit, in the proper +sense of that term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the +light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of +Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according to the capacity +with which the being was endowed, and was not determined by any +peculiarity of the consciousness; while the other appeared to be the +highest possible form of existence, and that also in which God had +revealed himself. From such a ground it is possible to go forward and +construct a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the teachings +of the Bible. + + + + +REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES." + + +In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common by the +three writers named early in this work, have been, it may be, passed +over unnoticed. This was done, because, being held in common, it was +believed that an examination of them, as presented by the latest writer, +would be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought or +expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have intended to notice +when speaking of those writers. But where Mr. Spencer seems to present +their very thought as his own, it has appeared better to remark upon it +in his latest form of expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar +to himself. These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience' +sake, what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary +upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate Religious Ideas," "Ultimate +Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity of all Knowledge," and "The +Reconciliation." Before entering upon this, however, some general +remarks will be pertinent. + +1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding is the +highest faculty of the human intellect. This is implied in the following +sentence: "Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose +themselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective +science, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of +that understanding."--_First Principles_, p. 98. + +His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from sensuous +objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the _material_ Universe +is present to his mind. His questions refer to objects of sense, and he +shows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the Sense or +Understanding is futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be +answered. But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than an +animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; that he is also +a spiritual person, having an _Eye_, the pure Reason, which can _see_ +straight to the central Truth, with a clearness and in a light which +dims and pales the noonday sun, know also that, and how, these +difficulties, insoluble to the lower faculties, are, in this noble +alembic, finally dissolved. + +2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's +faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like them, he employs +only such terms as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding. So also +with them he is at fault, in that he raises questions which no Sense or +Understanding could suggest even, questions whose very presence are +decisive that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of +applying to them terms entirely impertinent,--terms belonging only to +those lower tribunals before which these questions can never come. For +instance, he always employs the word "conceive" to express the effort of +the mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion. In +some form of noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained +upon his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely +divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and the like, +dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment to the positions +attained in an earlier portion of this work. It was there found that the +word conceive was _utterly irrelevant_ to any subject except to objects +of Sense and the Understanding in its work of classifying them, or +generalizing from them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted, +it was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the +mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, and could not +properly be used together. For instance, infinite has no more relation +to, and can no more qualify period, than the points of the compass are +pertinent to, and can qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite +period, is simply absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite +and absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They can be +pertinent only to God and his _a priori_ ideas. Many, perhaps most of +the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, will be based on this +single misuse of words; which yet grows naturally out of that denial and +perversion of faculties which Mr. Spencer, in common with the other +Limitist writers, has attempted. On the other hand, it is to be +remembered, that, if we arrive at the truth at all, we must _intuit_ it; +we must either see it as a simple _a priori_ idea, or as a logical +deduction from such ideas. + +3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that he goes on +propounding his questions, and asserting that they are insoluble, +apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they +have all been solved, or at least that the principles on which it would +seem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean +ability,--Dr. Hickok,--and that until the proposed solutions are +thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages are idle. He +implies that there is no cognition higher than a conception, when some +very respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior. +He speaks of the Understanding as if it were without question the +highest faculty of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge +said it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into English +thinking the distinction between the Understanding, as "the faculty +judging according to sense," and the Reason, as "the power of universal +and necessary convictions," which, being such, must necessarily rank far +above the other. And finally he uses the words and phrases above +disallowed, and the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to +prove, by the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already +been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as +Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume heretofore +alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so appreciate the +_demonstration_ therein contained, of the utter incompetency of the +Sense or Understanding to solve such questions as Mr. Spencer has raised +by his incident of the partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to +them of the efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and +unsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a +sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half dozen proofs, more or +less that a theory is fallacious who has learned that, and why, the +theory _cannot_ be true. Let us now take up in order the chapters +heretofore mentioned. + + + + +"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS." + + +The summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens, +concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no +cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain +that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made +whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and +illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions,"--p. 29. So +far very good; but his use of it is utterly unsound. "And now to +consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate +topic--Ultimate Religious Ideas." But this "general truth" has _no_ +bearings upon "ultimate religious ideas"; how then can you consider +them? _No_ ideas, and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or +the results of conceptions--or are the products of "cumulative or +indirect processes of thought." They are not results or products _at +all_. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation of what is +inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known at all. Man might pile +up "cumulative processes of thought" for unnumbered ages, and might form +most exact conceptions of objects of Sense,--conceptions are not +possible of others,--and he could never creep up to the least and +faintest religious idea. + +On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting the origin of the +Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper question is, whether any one of +them is even conceivable in the true sense of that word. Let us +successively test them." This is not necessary. It has already been +_demonstrated_ that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding, +cannot touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow, +therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he implies. +Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. No "vague +symbolic conceptions," or any conception at all, of it _can be formed_. +A conception is possible only "under relation, difference, and +plurality." _This_ is a pure, simple idea, and so can only be known in +itself by a seeing--an immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out +of all relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no +difference. It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. The +discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are in it no +various points upon which that faculty may fasten. It may, perhaps, +better be expressed by the words pure independence. Again, it is _not_ +properly "existence without a beginning," but rather, existence out of +all relation to beginning; and so it is an idea, out of all relation to +those faculties which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we +can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence without a +beginning," it does not follow that we cannot _see_ that a Being +existing out of all relation to beginning _is_. "To this let us add" +that the intuition of such a Being is a complete "explanation of the +Universe," and does make it "easier to understand" "that it existed an +hour ago, a day ago, a year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily +is _out of all relation to time_, that there is no such thing as an +"infinite period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the +procession of events which we call time he _is_; and that before that +procession began--when there was no time, he was. Thus we see that all +events are based upon Him who is independent; and that time, in our +general use of it, is but the measure of what He produces. We arrive, +then, at the conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not +because self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be +clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the Universe +is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which cannot entertain +such a notion at all; and because this notion is _seen_ to be a +necessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains +as objects both the idea and the Being to whom it primarily belongs. + +The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, and not the +theory that it is self-created, though this latter, in Mr. Spencer's +definition of it, seems only a phase of the other. To say that +"self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by +some inherent necessity," is only to remove self-existence one step +farther back, as he himself shows. Potential existence is either no +existence at all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence, +then we have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and with +no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not only unthinkable, +but absurd. But if potential existence is positive, it needs to be +accounted for as much as actual. While, then, there can be no doubt as +to the validity of the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives, +respecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence +and self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction made +above between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo +idea, and the fact that the true idea is a _reality_, should never be +lost sight of. By failing to discriminate--as in the Understanding he +could not do--between them, and by concluding both as objects alike +impossible to the human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also +decided that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"--creation by +external agency--is equally untenable. In his examination of this, he +starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious assumption, that this +is a "conception"; that it can be, _is_ founded upon a "cumulative +process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it." +These words, phrases, and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a +conception, process, or prediction that we want; it is a _sight_. Hence, +no assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings of a human +artificer" _can in the least degree_ "vaguely symbolize to us" the +"method after which the Universe" was "shaped." This differed in _kind_ +from all possible human methods, and had not one element in common with +them. + +Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not appear to be well +grounded. "An immeasurable void"--Space--is not an entity, is _no_ +thing, and therefore cannot "exist," neither is any explanation for it +needed. His question, "how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came +immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no "explanation." It +is only _some_ thing which must be accounted for. The theory of creation +by external agency being, then, an adequate one to account for the +Universe, supplies the following statement. That Being who is primarily +out of all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent +power, into nothing--Space, room, the condition of material +existence,--something, matter and the Universe became. "The genesis of +the universe" having thus been explained and seen to be "the result of +external agency," we are ready to furnish for the question, "how came +there to be an external agency?" that true answer, which we have already +shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily existent, +or self-existent, _i. e._ who possess pure independence as an essential +attribute, whose being is thus fixed, and is therefore without the +province of power, is the external agency which is needed. This Person, +differing in kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor +concluded from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only be +seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual _Eye_, like in +kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual things may be +discerned. This Person, being thus seen immediately, is known in a far +more satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the +Understanding, could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of +Him is, like His self, _immutable_. We KNOW that we stand on the eternal +Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which radiates +from the throne of God. Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist. +It is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure +truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate +intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. It is, then, +because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic in man, and seen +by him to be an attribute of God, that God is known to be the Creator of +the Universe. Having attained to this truth, we readily see that the +conclusions which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that +"self-existence is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic +hypothesis equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; that "our +conception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the +notion of unlimited duration through past time"; so far as they imply +our destitution of knowledge on these topics, are the opposite of the +facts. We _see_, though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The +theistic hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see, +also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration must be +limited; and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation +to duration. + +Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and says: "We find +ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions, and yet, +on the other hand, we find these assumptions cannot be represented in +thought." Upon this it may be remarked: + +1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, which man +makes, and cannot help making, except he deny himself;--necessary +convictions, first truths, first principles, _a priori_ ideas. They are +organic, and so are the foundation of all knowledge. They are not +results learned from lessons, but are _primary_, and conditional to an +ability to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at +most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves a labor +which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted, and which, we +are persuaded, they would find the most difficult of all, viz., to +account for the fact of these assumptions. For the question is pertinent +and urgent; + +2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? Where, for +instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze the rocks, study +plants and their growth, become familiar with animals and their habits, +or exhaust the Sense in an examination of man, and one can find no +notion of self. Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it +arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" How comes +it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most +civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" from nothing or from +something? If from something, how came that something to be? We might +ask, Does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality +of a somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity by +which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of this assumption, as a +mental phenomenon, involve the higher fact of some mental ground, some +form, some capacity, which is both organic to the mind, and organized in +the mind, in accordance with which the assumption is, and which +determines what it must be? Or are we to believe that these assumptions +are mere happenings, without law, and for which no reason can be +assigned? Again we press the question, How came these assumptions to +suggest themselves? + +3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." If "thought" is +restricted to that mental operation of the Understanding by which it +generalizes in accordance with the Sense, the statement is true. But if +it is meant, as seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these +assumptions are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at all by +the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. The ideas presented +by the phrases are, as was seen above, clear and definite. + +Since Mr. Spencer has quoted _in extenso_, and with entire approbation, +what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, the Absolute, and the +Infinite," we have placed the full examination of these topics in our +remarks upon Mr. Mansel's writings, and shall set down only a few brief +notes here. + +Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged to suppose +_some_ cause"; or, in other words, that the notion of cause is organic. +Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a First +Cause." Then, this First Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be +independent;" "or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." +One would almost suppose that a _rational_ man penned these decisions, +instead of one who denies that he has a _reason_. The illusion is +quickly dispelled, however, by the objections he lifts out of the dingy +ground-room of the Understanding. It is curious to observe in these +pages a fact which we have noticed before, in speaking of Sir William +Hamilton's works, viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence, +the workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along side by +side, the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter. Mr. +Spencer's conclusions which we have quoted, and his objections which we +are to answer, are a striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his +remarks he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with +finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used +interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly in the Sense +and Understanding. The latter belong wholly in the Pure Reason. The +former pertain to material objects, to mental images of them, or to +number. The latter qualify only spiritual persons, and have no +pertinence elsewhere. Limitation is the conception of an object _as +bounded_. Illimitation is the conception of an object as without +boundaries. Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives +nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds in the +Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. It does not refer +to boundaries at all. It belongs only to created spiritual persons, and +expresses the fact that they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only +by its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason to +illimitation in the lower faculties. It is _positive_, and is that +quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as _universality_. +It expresses the idea of _all possible endowments in perfect harmony_. +From his misuse of these terms Mr. Spencer is led to speak in an +irrelevant manner upon the question, "Is the First Cause finite or +infinite?" He uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a +question of material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region +surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as out of place as +to say white love or yellow kindness. His methods of thought on these +topics are also gravely erroneous. He attempts an analysis by the +logical Understanding, where a synthesis by the Reason is required,--a +synthesis which has already been given by our Creator to man as an +original idea. It is not necessary to examine some limited thing, or all +limited things, and wander around their boundaries to learn that the +First Cause is infinite. We need to make no discursus, but only to look +the idea of first cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it, +to find all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr. +Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, that +such a being _must be_ self-existent. And this conviction would be so +strong that the mind would rest itself in this decision: "A thousand +phantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong," says the soul, "but +this I know must be true, or there is no truth in the Universe." + +One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special +notice. It is this. "But if we admit that there can be some thing +uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." This +"assumes" the truth of a major premise all _things_ are substantially +alike. If the word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,--objects +of sense,--then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and +Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the implication is +meant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind +except such "things," then it is a clear _petitio principii_. For the +very question at issue is, whether, in fact, there is not one +entity--"thing"--which so differs in kind from all others, that it is +uncaused, _i. e._ self-existent; and whether the admission that that +entity is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy +the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the +subordinate causes which we observe by the Sense. + +In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, "but it can +have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it +which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if +it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this +something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. +Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total, +including within itself all power, and transcending all law." We cannot +criticize this better, and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed +in it, than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The +First Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging +to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact sense of that term, +is impossible to him, for there is nothing for him to _change to_. This +is not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action; for creation +involves no change in God's nature or attributes, and so no real or +essential change, which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through +whom all changes become. He is not, then, a _simple_ unit, but is an +organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends in a unity, all +possible laws, forms, and relations, as necessary elements of his +necessary existence,--as endowments which necessarily belong to him, and +are conditional of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are +not "imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed upon him. +They belong to his Self, and are conditional of his being. So, then, +instead of "transcending all law," he is the embodiment of all law; and +his perfection is, that possessing this endowment, he accords his +conduct thereto. A being who should "transcend all law" would have no +reason why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither would +he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos. Pure +chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness cannot establish law; and +so could not be the First Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no +alternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute." + +And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental activities, +that the positions we have gained are fixed, final, irrevocable; and +further, that they are not the "results" of "reasonings," but that first +there was a seeing, and then an analysis of what was seen, and that the +seeing is _true_, though every other experience be false; we _know_ that +our position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and that +what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the illegitimate order," +but is pure truth. + +For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is referred +back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's work, which Mr. +Spencer has quoted. + +A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 _et seq._, will complete the +review of this chapter. "Passing over the consideration of credibility, +and confining ourselves to that of" consistency, we would find in any +rigorous analysis, that Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory; +but we _have found_ that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an +absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of the +Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, and is entirely +thinkable. Such a system, based upon the necessary convictions of man, +and justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard, in +accordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and +decided, gives a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his +eternal REST. + +In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the permanent in +all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another equally permanent, equally +common, and incomparably more important fact, viz: that Fetishism, +Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism,--all religions alike assert _that +a god created the Universe_. In other words, the great common element, +in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in +which we live is, _that it is the product of an agency external to +itself, and that the external agency is personal_. Take the case of the +rude aboriginal, who "assumes a separate personality behind every +phenomenon." He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is +too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those material +objects which appear permanent need to be accounted for. It is only the +changes which seem to him to need a reason. Behind each change he +imagines a sort of personal power, superior to it and man, which +produces it, and this satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he +looks in the same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of +belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea which can +be readily traced through all forms of religion, that some _personal_ +being, external, and superior to the things that be, produced them. Nor +is Atheism a proper exception to this law. For Atheism is not a +religion, but the denial of all religion. It is not a doctrine of God, +but is a denial that there is any God; and what is most in point, it +never was a _popular_ belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over +which a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander. +Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken: for +Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm +does not lose his individuality because the Universe is evolved from +him. _Now_ he is thought of as one, and the Universe as another, +although the Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and +hereafter to be reabsorbed by him. _Now_, this part of his essence which +was _produced_ through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is _individualized_; +and so is one, while he is another. Thus, here also, the idea of a +proper external agency is preserved. The facts, then, are decisively in +favor of the proposition above laid down. "_Our_ investigation" +discloses "a fundamental verity in each religion." And the facts and the +verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, and there they +do find perfect consistency and harmony. + +It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this chapter, to +account for the fact that, upon a single idea so many theories of God +have fastened themselves; or better, perhaps, that a single idea has +developed itself in so many forms. This cannot better be done than in +the language of that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle +Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse of the +1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be known of God is +manifest to them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible +things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being +understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and +Godhead, so that they are without excuse. Because that, when they knew +God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became +vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened: +professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the +glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible +man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This +passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, did it +possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom Mr. Spencer +asserts it is _impossible for us to know_, gives us in a popular form +the truth. Man, having organic in his mind the idea of God, and having +in the Universe an ample manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal +power and Godhead of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that +idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded the idea in +the Reason, to the service of base passion. By this degradation and +perversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of +fancy formed in the Understanding, under the direction of the animal +nature, as to be lost to the popular mind,--the trappings only being +seen. When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all that +restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, men became +vain in their imaginations; their fancy ran riot in all directions. +Cutting loose from all law, they plunged into every excess which could +be invented; and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner +of vagaries were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we find +some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, during and +previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular history begins the human +race had passed into the second stage. Crystallization had begun. +Students were commencing the search for truth. Religion was taking upon +itself more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not be wholly +obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some +gifted individuals, and philosophy began. Philosophy in its purest form, +as taught by Socrates and Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure +Theism. But the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted +them so far above the common people, that they could affect only a few. +And what was most disheartening, that same degradation which originally +lost to man the truth, now prevented him from receiving it. Thus it was +that by a binding of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing +through the world with the Understanding at the beck of the Sense, the +many forms of religion became. + + + + +"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS." + + +On a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the +question, "What are Space and Time," with which Mr. Spencer opens this +chapter. It was there found that, in general terms, they are _a priori_ +conditions of created being; and, moreover, that they possess +characteristics suitable to what they condition, just as the _a priori_ +conditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to +what they condition. It was further found that this general law is, from +the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind and without it; +that it is, must be, the form of thought for the perceiving subject, +corresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object. It +also appeared that the Universe as object, and the Sense and +Understanding as faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and +further, that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space +and Time, because these were the very conditions of their being; +moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be considered with +reference to the Universe, and apart from it could not be examined by +them at all. Yet it was further found that the Universe might in the +presence of the Reason be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and +Time still remained as pure _a priori_ conditions, the one as _room_, +the other as _opportunity_, for the coming of created being. Space and +Time being such conditions, _and nothing more_, are entities only in the +same sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities. +They are _conditions_ suited to what they condition. In the light of +this result let us examine Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them. + +Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they exist (ex +sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. This of course involves +the being of a where and a when in which they can stand out; and that +where and when must needs be accounted for, and so on _ad infinitum_. +Again, Mr. Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they, +in existing "objectively," had a _formal_ objective existence. Yet this, +in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The mind apprehends many +objects, which do not "exist." They only are. Thus, as has just been +said, Space and Time, as conditions of created being, _are_. They are +entities but not existences. They are _a priori_ entities, and so are +_necessarily_. By this they stand in the same category with all pure +laws, all first principles. + +"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication +to call them nothings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds +of nothings." This sentence "involves the absurdity" of assuming that +"nothing" is an entity. If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it +presents no content for a concept, and cannot, because there is no +content to be presented. It is then _blank_. Just so of Time. As +nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of meaning. +Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word, +differs from nothing represented by another, we would not lay a straw in +his way, but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company. + +Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities nor the +attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as +entities." But he then goes on to speak of them as "things," evidently +using the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object, +as an apple or stone; thereby implying that entity and thing in that +sense are synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder in +the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties. +But once take away this foundation, once cease attempting "to represent +them in thought as things," and his difficulties vanish. Space is a +condition. Perhaps receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability are +attributes. If so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it. +But whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain that +Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to the Reason, +is qualified by the characteristics named above; and all this without +any contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby. On +the ground now established, we learn that extension and Space are _not_ +"convertible terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a +condition of phenomena. It is only all _physical_ "entities which we +actually know as such" that "are limited." From our standpoint, that +Space is _no_ thing, such remarks as "We find ourselves totally unable +to form any mental image of unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd. +"We find ourselves" just as "totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have _no relevancy_ to +either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's doctrine, which we have +found _true_ as far as it goes, Mr. Spencer evinces a surprising lack of +knowledge of the facts in question. "In the first place," he says, "to +assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective +conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective +realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If the reader will take +the trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based, he will +at once perceive the absurdity of the logic. It may be said in general +that all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and +objective: they are conditions of his being--subjective; and they are +objects of his examination and cognizance--objective. Is not the +multiplication table an objective reality, _i. e._, would it not remain +if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective law; and so was +it not originally discovered by introspection and reflection? Again he +says, "for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid +ourselves of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now +the fact is, that primarily we do not have _any_ consciousness of Space +and Time. _Consciousness has to do with phenomena._ When examining the +material Universe, the _objects_, and the objects as at a distance from +each other and as during, are what we are conscious of. For instance, I +view the planets Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my +consciousness. There is a distance between them; but this distance _is_ +not, except as they _are_. If they are not, the word distance has no +meaning with reference to them. Take them away, and I have no +consciousness of distance as remaining. These planets continue in +existence. They endure. This endurance we call time, but if they should +cease, one could not think of endurance in connection with them as +remaining. Here we most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that +"the question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but he will +find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very +differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the two articles +in the "North American Review," heretofore alluded to. Here, "the direct +testimony of consciousness is," that spaces and times within the +Universe are without the mind; that Space and Time, as _a priori_ +conditions for the possibility of formal object and during event, are +also without the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and +"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the mind +corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And the question may +be asked, it is believed with great force, If this last were not so, how +could the mind take any cognizance of the actuality? Again, most truly, +Space and Time "cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the +mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than this should the +truth be uttered. They could not become non-existent if the Universe +with every sentient being, yea, even--to make an impossible +supposition--if the Deity himself, should cease to be. In this they +differ no whit from the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals. +These too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, which +has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as _a priori_ +conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the same relation to +material object and during event that the multiplication table does to +intellect, or the moral law to a spiritual person. It will now be +doubtless plain that Mr. Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the +lower faculties. The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and +Time as void forms into which objects may come. So also the +Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality. +These faculties cannot be in a living man without acting. Activity is +their law. Hence images are ever arising and _must_ arise in the Sense, +and be connected in the Understanding, and all this in the forms and +conditions of Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these +conditions will always _imagine_ that Space and Time are only without +him--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the +imagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes. +Now how shall one see these conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or, +to phrase it better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In +this sense, as we have seen, every _a priori_ condition must be +objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not Space but a +space, _i. e._ a part of Space limited by matter; and, after all, it is +the boundaries which are the true object rather than the space, which +cannot be "conceived" of if the boundaries be removed. Without further +argument, is it not evident that there Space, like all other _a priori_ +conditions, is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of +material existence? + +At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's psychological +errors:--"For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be +thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_ +of thought and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been +amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to recur to it +again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's remark is the truth. The +question at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which +cannot be approached by argument, but can be decided only by a _seeing_. +It is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of +our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and another, "I +cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. All that is left is to +stimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see. The following +reflections may help us to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we +have no higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It implies, +also, that we can never have any _self_-knowledge, in the fundamental +signification of that phrase. We can observe the conduct of the mind, +and study and classify the results; but the laws, the constitution of +the activity itself must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when +speaking of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot see and +study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable only of reaction as +acted upon, capable only of seeing results, but never able to penetrate +to the hidden springs which underlie the event. Just so is it with the +Sense and Understanding. They are mere mechanical faculties capable of +acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind the +appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as this all science +is impossible, but most of all a science of the human mind. If man is +enclosed by such walls, no knowledge of his central self can be gained. +He may know what he _does_; but what he _is_, is as inscrutable to him +as what God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of brute. He +has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, but he has no +_knowledge_; he is _sure_ of nothing. He can reach no ground which is +ultimate, no _Rock_ which he knows is _immutable_. Is man such a being? +The longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing NO! He +is capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that self to +the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of his constitution, all +the forms of his activity, he can clearly and amply place before himself +and know them. And how is this? It is because God has endowed him with +an EYE like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, as +He is self-comprehending,--the Reason, with which man may read himself +as a child reads a book; that man can make "the _form_ of thought the +_matter_ of thought." True, the Understanding is shut out from any +consideration of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly +an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual person, whom +God has endowed with the faculty of VISION; and the great organic evil, +which the fall wrought into the world, was this very denial of the +spiritual light, and this crowding down and out of sight, of the +spiritual person beneath the animal nature, this denial of the essential +faculties of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of +the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the highest place, +which is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing. + +Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the truth. In almost +his first sentence there is a grievous logical _faux pas_. He says: +"Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third +possibility can be named." Yet we will name one, as follows: _The +divisibility of matter has no relation to infinity_. And this _third_ +supposition happens to be the truth. But it will be said that the +question should be stated thus: Either there is a limit to the +divisibility of matter, or there is no limit. This statement is +exhaustive, because limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives +there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a limit to the +divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be given by the physical +sense; for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit. +The mental sense could not give it, because it is a question of actual +substance and not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter is +limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its final +elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and an upper surface, a +right and a left side." When, then, one of these parts shall be broken, +what results? Not _pieces_, as the materialist, thinking only in the +Sense, would have us believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there +will remain _no matter_,--to the sense nothing. To it, the result would +be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there would be left _God's +power_ in its simplicity,--that final Unit out of which all diversity +becomes. + +The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of Matter may +be explained thus. And for convenience sake, we will limit the term +Matter to such substances as are object to the physical sense, like +granite, while Force shall be used to comprise those finer substances, +like the Ether, which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is +composed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, but which +are held together by Force. The space between the atoms, which would +otherwise be _in vacuo_, is _full_ of Force. We might be more exhaustive +in our analysis, and say--which would be true--that a space-filling +force composes the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one of its +modifications. But without this the other statement is sufficient. When, +then, a portion of matter is compressed, the force which holds the +ultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force, and +these particles are brought nearer together. Now, how is it with the +moving body and the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth. + + C + A--------B + 1 + +A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along the line +from A to B. At C it meets another body with a mass of 4 at rest. From +thence the two move on towards B with a velocity of 2. What has +happened? In the body there was a certain amount of force, which set it +in motion and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. _No +force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred._ When a bullet +is fired from a gun, it possesses at one _point_ a maximum of force. +From that point this force is steadily _transferred_ to the air and +other substances, until all that it received from the powder is spent. +But at any one point in its flight, the sum of the force which has been +transferred since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred, +will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting the question +raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact is a point in time, _not a +period_, and the transfer of force is instantaneous. C, then, is a +_point_, not a period, and the velocity on the one side is 4 and the +other side 2, while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout +the line. If it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one +velocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities, +we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and they give the truth. The +following sentence of Mr. Spencer is, at least, careless. "For when, of +two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the +striking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to +velocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of +time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be +moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is +impossible." If there is any sense in the remark, "instantaneously" must +mean a _point_ of time _without period_. For, if any period is allowed, +the sentence has no meaning, since during that period "the striking +unit" passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by +instantaneously he means _without period_, then the last clause of the +sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently means a period. For +if it means point, then it contradicts the first clause. There, it is +asserted that 4 was "_reduced_" to 2, _i. e._ that at one point the +velocity was 4, and at the next point it was 2, and that there was _no +time_ between. If 4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity +2 was next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it appears +that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are +contradictory. + +Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms, we +shall not be troubled by the objections to the Newtonian theory which +follow. In reply to the question, "What is the constitution of these +units?" the answer, "We have no alternative but to regard each of them +as a small piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only +faculty which could examine them. But even upon this theory Mr. +Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which each atom consists," +are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate +atom excludes the supposition of "parts," since that phrase has no +meaning except it refers to a final, indivisible, material unit. All +that the Sense could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but +that it is, and _is not divisible_, I believe." But when we see by the +Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes God's power, all +difficulty in the question vanishes. Having thus answered the above +objections, it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against +Boscovich's theory, which is a modification of that of Newton. + +Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. The fact that he +seeks for absolute motion by the _physical sense_, a faculty which was +only given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion, and is, _in its +kind_, incapable of finding the absolute motion, (for if it should see +it, it could not _know_ it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has +said on this subject. For the presentations which he has made of the +phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. The +perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, as will appear +further on. The phenomena adduced on page 55 are, then, merely +_appearances_ in the physical sense; and the motion is merely relative. +In the first instance, the captain walks East with reference to the ship +and globe. In the second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the +ship sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant motion +is, that he is _stationary_ with reference to this larger object. What, +then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant motion, at the most. So we +see that "our ideas of Motion" are not "illusive," but _deficient_. The +motion is just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is +_relative_, and this is all the Sense _can_ give. Our author +acknowledges that "we tacitly assume that there are real motions"; that +"we take for granted that there are fixed points in space, with respect +to which all motions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid +ourselves of this idea." A question instantly arises, and it seems to be +one which he is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We +press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that he will find +it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. Undoubtedly, +"absolute motion cannot even be imagined." _No_ motion can be imagined, +though the moving body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much +less known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to, and +more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when the very opposite +is the fact. Neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph +beginning with, "For motion is change of place," that "while we are +obliged to think that there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion +incomprehensible." The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a sphere. +We _may_ assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest. Instantly +absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for it is motion measured from +that point. Surely there can be no harm in the _supposition_. The Reason +shows us that the supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the +throne of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart from +the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is absolutely +impossible. Motion _cannot_ be, except as a formal body is. Hence, to +speak of motion in "unlimited space" is simply absurd. Formal object +_cannot_ be, except as _thereby_ a limit is established in Space. Hence +it is evident that "absolute motion" is not motion with reference to +"unlimited Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving; +but is motion with reference to that point fixed in Space, around which +all things revolve, but which is itself at perfect rest. + +"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we contemplate the +transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the moving of a body, and _cannot +be transferred_. The _force_ which causes the motion is what is +transferred. All that can be said of motion is, that it is, that it +increases, that it diminishes, that it ceases. If the moving body +impinges upon another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not +motion that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion. The +motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new motion is begun in +the body which was at rest. Again it is asked: "In what respect does a +body after impact differ from itself before impact?" And further on: +"The motion you say has been communicated. But how? What has been +communicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to the +body struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has +transferred an _attribute_." Observe now that a somewhat is +unquestionably communicated; and the question is:--What is it? Query. +Does Mr Spencer mean to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and +"attribute"? He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by +assertion without explanation or proof, which involves the very question +at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a "thing" or an +"attribute"; and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that +a somewhat has been communicated? On the above-named hypothesis his +statement should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated. +"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither a thing, nor +an attribute has been communicated, _i. e._ no somewhat has been +communicated; which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment. If +on the other hand Mr. Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute" +comprise only a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly +met. It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the Universe +in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as attribute is +essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot be communicated, it +will follow that a thing has been communicated. This thing we call +force. It is not in hand now to inquire what force is. It is manifest to +the Sense that the body is in a different state after impact, than it +was before. Something has been put into the body, which, though not +directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by the +results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl, when +poured in. Before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of +force--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it. +After the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the +motion. It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion +diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances which +cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body, and +at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. If it be now asked, where +does this force ultimately go to, it is to be said that it comes from +God, and goes to God, who is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate +answers, but the Reason leads us to the Supreme. + +If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and halving again +"the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. It is not a _mental +operation_ but an _actual fact_ which is to be accounted for. Take a +striking illustration. A ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a +hockey. Away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily +diminishing velocity till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops. +These are the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them. +There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain amount +of motor force. From that instant onward, that force flows out of the +ball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded, until none +is left. And it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow +out of a pail, as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving +substance. "The smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an +impassable gap from no movement," _than it is from a larger movement +above it_. That which will account for a movement four becoming two, +will account for a movement two becoming zero. The "puzzle," then, may +be explained thus. Time is the procession of events. Let it be +represented by a line. Take a point in that line, which will then mark +its division but represent _no period_. On one side of that point is +rest; on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and +occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. The force +instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a steady stream until +none is left, and the body is again at rest. Here, also, we take a +point. This is the point of zero. It again divides the line. Before the +bisection is motion; after the bisection is rest. All this cannot be +perceived by the Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen +by the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The ball starts, +proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is a steady diminution, or +nearly enough so for the experiment; at least the diminution can be +averaged for the illustration. Then comparing motion with time, the same +difficulty falls upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the +time must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how a +moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty--the Sense--this is +true, and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure. This +it is. The Sense and Understanding being impotent to discover an +absolute unit of any kind, the Sense _assumes_ for itself what meets all +practical want--a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space and +Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed standard; and as, like +time,--duration,--it can be represented by a line, let them have a +common standard. Suppose, then, that the ball's flight occupies ten +minutes of time. The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly +equal spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow +of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be observed that +the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, for its convenience, +divides into parts; but that neither those parts, nor any parts, have +any real existence. As Time is an indivisible whole, measured off for +convenience, so any given force is such a whole, and is so measured off. +All this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It is the +Reason which sees that they can be _only_ phenomenal, and that behind +the appearance is pure Spirit--God, who is primarily out of all +relation. + +On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, Mr. Spencer +says: "It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an +affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force as existing in +the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with +consciousness." This very strange assertion can only be true, provided a +major premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving an +affection of consciousness in the object in which it _apparently_ +inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse than absurd; it seems +silly. We cannot learn that force exists, without our consciousness is +affected thereby; but this is a very different thing from our being +unable to conceive of a force as _existing_, without there is a +consciousness in the object through which it _appears_. If Mr. Spencer +had said that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force can +be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor, he +would have uttered the truth. We would then have the following result. +Primarily all force is exerted by the Deity; and he is conscious +thereof. He draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were +visible. Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator with +the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift the chair. +The great error, which appears on every page of Mr. Spencer's book and +invalidates all his conclusions, shows itself fully here. He presents +images from the Sense, and then tries to satisfy the Reason--the faculty +which calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that Sense. His +attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest movement is +separated by an impassable gap from no movement," and many such, are +only pertinent to the Sense, can never be explained by the Sense, and +are found by the Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of +explanation as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena are +appearances in _wholes_, whose partitions cannot be absolute, and that +these wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite +Person--God, who is utterly impalpable to the Sense, and can be known +only by the Reason. + +The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible, more +emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon "the connection between +Force and Matter." "Our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to +resist." This is true to the Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other +matter, of course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the Sense, +then, we have a material object. But Force is not object to the Sense +directly, but only indirectly by its effects through Matter. The Sense, +in its percept, deems the force other than the matter. Hence it is +really no more difficult for the Sense to answer the question, How could +the Sun send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth +and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that the Sense +_can do_ is to present the phenomena. It is utterly impotent to account +for the least of them. + +In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems to have been +unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the atoms be twice as far apart, +and their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth +of their present amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance, +and then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. Whence it +follows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other +density; and can offer no resistance to any external agents." Now if +this be true, there can be no "external agents" to which to offer any +"resistance." It is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself; +and that matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." It +is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions and +repulsions" are _contra_-acting forces which exactly balance each other, +and so the molecules are held in their position by _no_ force. Instead +of this, they are _co_-acting forces, which are wholly expended in +holding the molecules in their places. The repulsions, then, are +expended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the +particles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium; while +the attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their +natural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to +separate them. Hence, referring to the two cases mentioned, in the first +instance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth, and this +corresponds with the fact; and in the second instance the power of +resistance is increased fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact. + +We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning the +material Universe and of our strictures thereon. Perhaps the reader's +mind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures +than by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the Reason, and +upon which they are based. + +The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, and as a +necessary _a priori_ idea, God. This is a _spontaneous_, synthetical +act, precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple _a +priori_ principle, as idea. In it the Reason intuits, not a single +principle seen to be necessary simply, but the fact that all possible +principles _must_ be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity, in a +single Being, who thereby possesses all possible endowments; and so is +utterly independent, and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person, +the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from the many +in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. It is the +necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is not a judgment but an +intuition, not a guess but a certainty. God, then, is known, when known +at all, not "by plurality, difference, and relation," but by an +_immediate_ insight into his unity, and so is directly known as he is. +And the whole Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this +revelation was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which this +intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate with his +dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary _a +priori_ ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. Power is, then, a +simple idea, incapable of analysis; and which cannot therefore be +defined, except by synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's +remark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we can +only state the occasion on which it arises." From these data the _a +priori_ idea of the Universe may be developed as follows:-- + +God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent endowment +forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; which is at once capacity +and faculty, in which he sees, and by which he sees, all possible ideas, +and these in all possible combinations or ideals. Thus has he all +possible knowledge. From the various ideal systems which thus are, he, +having perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his own +worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; and thereby +determines the forms and laws under which the Universe shall become. He +also possesses, as inherent endowment, all power; _i. e._ the ability to +realize every one of his ideals; but _not_ the ability to violate the +natural laws of his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system +is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as the two remain +isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in order to the realization of +his ideal, it must be combined with the power; _i. e._, the power must +be organized according to the ideal. How, then, can the power, having +been sent forth from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in +its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is no +substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, then, that, if +exercised at all, it must be exercised upon _itself_. When, therefore, +God would create the Universe, he sent forth two "pencils," or columns +of power, of equal and sufficient volume, which, acting upon each other +from opposite directions, just held each other in balance, and thus +force was. These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result +in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact would +determine the first place in Space, and the first point in Time; from +which, if attainable, an absolute measure of each could be made. All we +have now attained is the single duality "space-filling force," which is +wholly homogeneous, is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe, +and yet by no means _is_ the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without +form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." Now must +"the Spirit of God move upon the face of the waters"; then through vast +and to us immeasurable periods of time, through cycle and epicycle, the +work of organization will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in +the _a priori_ ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the crush +of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. During this process, +whatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the _a priori_ +ideal, assumes that form and the heat force becomes; whatever is to act +under the law of magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force +becomes; so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in the +revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree of +preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the life force is +organized; and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth. After +another vast period that point is reached when an animal may be +organized, which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose +life is utterly different in kind from any animal life, and man appears. +Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is personally +present, that the first energy was his, and that every subsequent +energizing act is his special and personal act. He organized the +duality, force. He then organized this force into heat-force, +light-force, magnetic-force, matter-force, life-force, and soul-force. +And so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually +present in every atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of +thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, schist, +clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of substance which +appear to the eye, it is to be remembered that all these are but _forms +to the Sense_ of that "reason-conception," force,--that primal duality, +which power acting upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never +carve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed, +and must work just as it is made to work, so the Sense, which is purely +mechanical, can never do any other than the work for which it was made, +can never transcend the laws of its organization. It can only give +forms--results, but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say _that +things are_, but never say _what_ or _why_ they are. + +Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, Mr. +Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. Motion is matter +affected by another form of force. The "puzzle" of motion and rest is +only phenomenal to the Sense; it is an appearance of force acting +through another force. It may also be said that the Universe is solid +force. There is no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny, +that is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through which +force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of superfluity. +From centre to circumference it is present, and controls all things, and +is all things. So it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth +and holds worlds in their place, than how it draws down the pebble which +a boy has thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel over +the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds +round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at calcined crags or +lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or geology, or chemistry be our +study, the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be +equally the results of this one force, acting under different laws, and +taking upon itself different forms, and becoming different objects. + +That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so readily the +solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. Spencer's +examination of the outer world, will afford us an easier solution, if +possible, of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner +world. That which is not of us, but is far from us, may perchance be +imperfectly known; but ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our +being, may be certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest +knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, that we become +acquainted with many facts respecting the outer world. It cannot but be +of the utmost importance, that we know ourselves; for thus only can we +fulfil the behest of that likeness to God, in which we were originally +created. We seek for, we may obtain, we _have obtained_ knowledge in the +inner world,--a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable. + +It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a fundamental +one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" which "occur in +succession"; but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur. +Consciousness is _one_, and retains that oneness throughout all +modifications. These occur in the unity, as items of experience affect +it. Is this series of modifications "of consciousness infinite or +finite"? To this question experience _can_ give no answer. All +experiments are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty +of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the _forms_ of the +activity. These they may find, but they cannot account for. A law lies +on all those powers by which an experiment may be made, which forever +estops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back +of the form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental +capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its +constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding in +judgments, is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not +another. It is only when we ascend to the Reason that we reach the +region of true knowledge. Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct +of the lower powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the +Eye of self, Man attains a true and fundamental _self-knowledge_. From +this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no +pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or in fact to any series. +We attain to the further knowledge that this series is, _must be_, +limited; because the constituted beings, in whom it in each case +inheres, are limited, and had a beginning. It matters not now to inquire +how a self-conscious person could be created. It is sufficient to know +that one has been created. This fact involves the further fact that +consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of nature, after the +being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, in other words, an +organization must be, before the modifications which inhere in that +organization can become. The attainment of this as necessary law is far +more satisfactory than any experience could be, were it possible; for we +can never know but that an experience may be modified; but a law given +in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained many pages back, +that the subject and the object are identical under the final +examination of the Reason, enables us to attain the present end of the +chain. The question is one of fact, and is purely psychological. It +cannot be passed upon, or in any way interfered with, by logical +processes. It is only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be +known. Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel +propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, to his +entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet the Savannah +crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all arguing is folly. The +question is one of fact in experience. And upon it the soul gives +undoubted answer, as we have stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some +would have us believe, to see how this may be. Consciousness is an +indivisible unity, and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as +the light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This +unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, then, +_now_, and the person now knows what the present modification _is_. The +person does not need to look to memory and learn what the former +modification was. It immediately knows what the modification _is_ now. +Thus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful +examination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's +difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only question is, +what is it that consciousness gives? If we say that it does thus give +both the subject and the object, that simple affirmation sweeps away in +a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It +becomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what +seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German +fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, or necessary, +either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations of consciousness, +because this involves the discovery, by _mechanical_ faculties, of their +own being and state before they became activities on the one hand, which +is a contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere +of their capability, the attempt to do which would be a greater folly +than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. But we have intuited the +law, which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all +creatures; and we ever live in the light of the present end. When, then, +Mr. Spencer says that "Consciousness implies perpetual change and the +perpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases," we +know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, in fact, +that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness is the permanent, +the abiding, the changeless. It is the light of the personal Eye. Into +it all changes come; but they are only _incidental_. In the finite and +partial person, they come, because such person _must grow_; and so, +because of his partiality and incompleteness, they become necessary +incidents; but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore +cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot change, and it +is plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness. +All variety is immanent in its light, and no change can come into it +because _there is no change to come_; but this Person sees _all_ his +endowments _at once_, in the unity of this his light, just as we see +_some_ of our endowments in the unity of this our light. The change is +not in the consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This +view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection must be +known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; that, "if it is not +thought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by +comparison with others, it is not recognized--is not a state of +consciousness at all." Such comparison we have found only incidental in +consciousness, pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and +not essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these +difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities "of Motion +and Rest." + +Take another step and we can answer the question "What is this that +thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, is a spiritual person? A +substance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no +further than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it, +which is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such +spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be simple +substance, and nothing more. The laws without the substance would be +only laws, and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere. +But the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in +the ground, and being its organization when combined, become a spiritual +person who thinks. The _ego_, that is the sense of personality, is only +one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore cannot be said +to think. The pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that +"successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain +to the true psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as +stated above,--an abiding light into which modifications come,--and +there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self, and in +entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, more, from such a +standpoint it is utter unreason, the height of folly, to doubt for an +instant, for immanent and central in the light of Reason lies the solemn +fact of man's selfhood. We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's +conclusion, that "Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in +which the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are +identified," and we _know_ that such a state is an actuality. Mr. Mansel +may hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both, but he is +wholly wrong. The Savannah has crossed the Atlantic. + +We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. Spencer. We have +seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all" presentative "of +realities" which can "be comprehended." We have, indeed, found it to be +true, that, "after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of +facts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and +wider,--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths +that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far,--the +fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever." But having +learned this, we do not arrive at the conclusion that "the explanation +of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness +the inexplicableness of that which remains behind." On the other hand we +know that such a conclusion is erroneous, and _that the method by which +it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to the object +sought_. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, Mr. Spencer's +work, and our work, would not have been in vain. Only by a method +differing from this IN KIND--a method in which there is no "colligation +of facts," and no "generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple, +direct insight into Pure Truth--can "the fundamental truth" be known; +and thus it may be known by every human soul. "_God made man in his own +image._" In our scheme there is ample room for the man of Science, with +the eye of Sense, to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With +telescope and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture innumerable +multitudes of them. But having done this, we count it folly to attempt +to generalize truth therefrom. But holding up the facts in the clear +light of Reason, and searching them through and through, we _see_ in +them the immutable principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate, +intuitive knowledge to be immutable, and thus we "_know the truth_." + + + + +"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE." + + +In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the result, which, in +his opinion, philosophy has attained as follows: "All possible +conceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the +entire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without +positive result; the only result arrived at being the negative one above +stated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must +ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable list of names of +philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William Hamilton as supporters of +that position. Such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of +the Limitists, but it is no support to their cause. The questions at +issue are of such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of +profound _opinions_, can have a feather's weight in the decision. For +instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of Euclid. What weight +have human opinion with reference to its validity? Though a thousand +mathematicians should deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as +now; and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no +item to the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never heard +of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be so, and that +this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility of any power or +will to change. On principles simple, fixed, and final, just like those +of mathematics, seen by the same Eye and known with the same +intellectual certainty, and by logical processes just as pure, +conclusive, _demonstrative_ as those of geometry, _and by such alone_, +can the questions now before us be settled. But though names and +opinions have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is +demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the absence +of two names, representatives of a class, which must ever awaken, among +the devout and pure-hearted, attention and love, and whose teachings, +however unnoticed by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and +hearts of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness +the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is capable of absolute +knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad countenance, the butt of jeer +and scoff from the wits and comedians of his day, went about teaching +those who hung upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which +God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus Christ, with a +countenance more beautifully serious, more sweetly sad, said to those +Jews which believed on him, "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my +disciples indeed; _and ye shall know the truth_, and the truth shall +make you free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern +of the animal nature--the Sense and Understanding--wise to refuse the +light, and reject the truths of the Pure Reason and the God-man, and to +call the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot +explain, philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" will, +can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it cries after, +yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest +truth; and it shall attain to it, because God, in giving the tongue to +cry, gave also the Eye to see. The Spiritual person in man, made in the +very image of God, can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight +of the animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, God as +the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by every possible +manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to this high Mount of Vision, +is one object of God in his system of the Universe. + +The teaching of the Word--that august personage, "who came forth from +God, and went to God," has been alluded to above. It deserves more than +an allusion, more than any notice which can be given it here. It is +astonishing, though perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings +of the apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from +the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical truths. +Even the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated +their inestimable value in this regard. The reason for this undoubtedly +is, that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious +truth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who +have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining beams of a +true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler +light. It will not, therefore, we trust, be deemed irreverent to say +that, laying aside all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the +inspiration of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul +merely as human productions, written at some time nobody knows when, and +by some men nobody knows who, they are the most wonderful revelations, +the profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen. In them +the highest truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of +reflection, are stated in simple, clear language, and _they answer +exactly to the teachings of the Reason_. Upon this, President Hopkins +says: "The identity which we found in the last lecture between the +teaching of the constitution of man and the law of God, was not sought. +The result was reached because the analysis would go there. I was myself +surprised at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence +to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In all +questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two will be found in +exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, but is accorded to by the +other. In fine, whoever wrote the Book must have had an accurate and +exhaustive knowledge of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference +then to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of +metaphysical truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve our +most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, final, fixed laws, +which are seen by a direct intuition to be such; and these writings are +of great value, because they cultivate and assist the Reason in its +search for these highest Truths. + +One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority of Mr. +Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand more. We seek for, +and can obtain, that which he cannot give us--a demonstration; which he +cannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by +which alone a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless, +so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "_product_ of thought, or +process of thought," is in any way applicable to the question in hand. +Intuitions are the mental actions needed. Light is neither product nor +process. We pass over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It +proves nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of questions +to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the soul a stone, when it +cries for bread. One sentence of his is doubtless true. "Manifestly, as +the _most_ general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a +more general one, it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the +Understanding has attained to the last generalization _by these very +terms_, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his conclusion +follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring +us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must +be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than +comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." How shall +we account for the last generalization, and show this conclusion to be +false? Thus. Hitherto there have been, properly speaking, no +comprehensions, only perceptions in the Sense and connections in the +Understanding. "The sense _distinguishes_ quality and _conjoins_ +quantity; the understanding _connects_ phenomena; the reason +_comprehends_ the whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing +the operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself the +_a priori_ laws in accordance with which they are, _sees_ directly and +immediately why they are, and thus comprehends and accounts for them. It +sees that there is an end to every process of generalization; and it +then sees, what the Understanding could never guess, that _after_--in +the order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal +truth, in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be. +There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final truth is seen and +known in its very self. + +The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and Mansel have been +heretofore examined, and need no further notice. We will pass on then to +his subsequent reflections upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a +general criticism upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if +there is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which +does not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations +are from the material world, and the terms and expressions are suited +thereto. With reference to objects in the Sense, and connections in the +Understanding, the "fundamental condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer +supplies, is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as +"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both these laws +alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, that they +belong to _things in nature_, and consequently have no pertinence to the +questions now before us. We are discussing _ideas_, not _things_; and +those are simple, and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may +be perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall doubt that +Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature, it would seem that +after having read p. 80, he could doubt no longer. "Animals," "species +or genus," "mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which +he illustrates his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can he +speak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in +hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals, +birds, reptiles, or fishes'? If we can know only these, why speak of +those?" It would seem that the instant they are thus set together and +contrasted, the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It is by +an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, that I dwell +upon God and the questions concerning him. These modes of the animal +nature, by which I know 'mammals,' are different in kind from those of +the spiritual person, by which I know God and the eternal truth." And +when this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's +mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound the two, and +make utter confusion of the subject, as the Limitists have done, he can +hardly refrain from quoting Romans I. 20 _et seq._ against them. + +Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition of the Real as +distinguished from the Phenomenal must, if it exists, conform to this +law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the +Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought +of, it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind." To +begin with the law which is here asserted, is _not_ a "general" law, and +so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special law, and lies +only upon a particular kind of cognition. This has been already +abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one line of proof. No mathematical +law comes under his law of cognition; neither can he, nor any other +Limitist, make it appear that it does so come. His law is law only for +things in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are known +in themselves--are _self-evident_, and since God, infinity, and +absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, and need not be +classed. So his corollary falls to the ground. Can we have any "sensible +experience" of God? Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a +sensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent, wife, or +child. Did you ever see a person--a soul? No. Can you see--"have +sensible experience of"--a soul? No. What is it, then, that we have such +experience of? Plainly the body--that material frame through which the +soul manifests itself. The Universe is that material system through +which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made; +and that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul +through the body which is given it. It follows then,--and not only from +this, but it may be shown by further illustration,--that every other +person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and further, that, +if we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child, we can +with equal certainty study, and to some extent comprehend, the soul of +God. Or, in other words, if man is only an animal nature, having a Sense +and Understanding, all personality is an insoluble mystery; all +spiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so, +because, upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any faculty +which can catch a glimpse of such object. A Sense and Understanding can +no more see, or in any possible manner take cognizance of, a spiritual +person than a man born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is +destitute of the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of +personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? Let him once +admit that he has, and in that admission is involved the admission of +the reality of that faculty by which we know God, for the faculty which +cognizes personality, and cognizes God, is one and the same. + +Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, yet, to please +him, we will use them. Some conclusions, then, may be expressed thus: +God as the Deity cannot be "classed"; he is unique. This is involved in +the very terms by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this +is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is in himself. +"We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; and some foretastes of +that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth. But the +infinite Person, _as person_, must be "assimilated" with other persons. +Yet his infinity and absoluteness, _as such_, cannot be "grouped." And +yet again, _as qualities_, they can be "grouped" with other qualities. +Unquestionably between the Creator, _as such_, and the created, _as +such_, "there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions +existing between different divisions of the created." God as +self-existent differs in kind from man as dependent, and this difference +continues irrevocable; while that same God and that same man are _alike_ +in kind _as persons_. This is true, because all spiritual persons are +composite beings; and while the essential elements of a spiritual person +are common to created persons and the uncreated Person, there are +_other_ characteristics, _not essential_ to personality, which belong +some to the created, and some to the uncreated, and differentiate them. +Or, in other words, God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet +they are diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the +range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How can this be +explained? Evidently thus. There are _qualities_ transfusing the +personality which cannot be interchangeable, and which constitute the +diversity. Personality is _form_ of being. Qualities transfuse the form. +Absoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one Person, and +are such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to +any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom they belong, +unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality are also qualities of a +spiritual person, but are qualities of the created spiritual person, and +are such as must always subordinate that person to the other. In each +instance it is, "_in the nature of things_," impossible for either to +pass over and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of his +being, and must stay so. + +But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual +person can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual Person. On the +other hand, it is the high glory of the independent spiritual Person, +that he can create another being "in his own image," to whom he can +communicate a knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his +children, so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the fact of +his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, and, to the loving +soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as +really as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge. This he could +not do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could +not have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the nature of +things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, then, God as "the +Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so as unconditioned we do not know +him "as of such or such kind," after the manner of the Understanding, +yet we may, do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is +unconditioned, through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the +spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned. + +We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement. +As much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic +teachings of the Limitists, we confess that we were utterly unprepared +to meet, even in Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably +degrading, and uttered with so calm and naïve an unconsciousness of the +degradation it involved, as the following. Although for want of room his +illustrations are omitted, it is believed that the following extracts +give a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine. + +"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble, +have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by +certain inner processes. + +"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the matter of +which organic bodies consist, into that state of stable equilibrium +displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this +tendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which +constitute Life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the +antagonism.... + +"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the +correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant, +the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions +responding to the coexistence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid +around it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them, +the correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and +repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present, +but being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be formed, +to be secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation.... + +"What is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit +form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical and chemical actions +responding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the +food? Whence it becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form +is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of +Life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by +the establishment of other correspondences. Divesting this conception of +all superfluities, and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see +that Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations. And when we so define it, we discover +that the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the +definition. We perceive that this, which we call intelligence, shows +itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are +adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time and space; +that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are +resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +coördinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally.... + +"And lastly let it be noted that what we call _truth_, guiding us to +successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is simply the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while +_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence +of such accurate correspondence. + +"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in +its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of +our knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the +establishment of some connection between subjective states, answering to +some connection between objective agencies; and each successively more +complex cognition being the establishment of some more involved +connection of such states, answering to some more involved connection of +such agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be +carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence either the +states themselves or the agencies themselves." + +Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day +words, Man is an animal, and only an animal, differing nowhat from the +dog and chimpanzee, except in the fact that his life "consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments," than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark +particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. Forget +not one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would +impart. "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in +its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations." See, there is not a limit, not a +qualification to the assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if +thou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into a cage +in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach thee that thou art. +From the highest to the lowest forms, life is one. In its lower forms, +life is a set of "direct and simple" "correspondences." "But in animals, +_and especially in the higher orders of them_," and, of course, most +especially in the human animal as the highest order, "the +correspondences become extremely complex." As much as to say, reader, +you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of quite so low a type as +the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the difference is no serious matter. You +do not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does +from the forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you and +him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous adjustment of +internal relations to external relations" is carried on, is more +"complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. He roams the forest, inhabits +some cave or hollow tree, and lives on the food which nature +spontaneously offers to his hairy hand. You cut down the forest, +construct a house, and live on the food which some degree of skill has +prepared. He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from +the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, shaggy +covering, which nature has provided. You on the contrary are destitute +of such a covering, and rob the sheep, and kill the silk-worm, to supply +the lack. But in all this there is no _difference in kind_. The +mechanism by which life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is +true, than that by which life is sustained in him; there arise, +therefore, larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply +those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how it supports the +soul! Your life in its highest form is only this animal life,--is only +the constructive force by which that "extremely complex" machinery +carries on "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." All other notions of life are "superfluities." + +Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage, +how many "superfluities" must you and I strip off from our "conception" +of life! And with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we +take up our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh man! +thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the +ground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou +hadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that +thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a +little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that +thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life +was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly and divine +things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou, +consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become +purer and more beautiful, nobler and more lovely, until perfect love +should cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see God face to face, +and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is +changed now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery +to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned +how dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to +listen; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the +heart; yet we cannot choose but hear. + +"The pyschical life"--the life of the soul, "the immortal spark of +fire,"--and the physical life "are _equally_ definable as the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations." We had supposed +that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the +contemplation of God and his laws, and the great end of being, and all +those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the +activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have +shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now "we perceive that this +which we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to +which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and +remote in time or space; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially +consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more +involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_ +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +coördinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally." In such relations consists the life +of the "caterpillar." In such relations, _only a little "more +complex,"_ consists the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does +"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. This is the +path by which we are led to the last, the highest "truth" which man can +attain. Thus do we learn "that what we call _truth_, guiding us to +successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_ +the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while +error, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of +such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, reader, what an +exalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of +thine intelligence, "the highest achievement of science," yea, the total +object of the life of thy soul,--thy "psychial" life,--is to attain such +exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of +apparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," and thus +in attaining the "_truth_" which shall guide "us to successful action +and the consequent maintenance of life," that we shall secure forever +our animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human +animal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to +this acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what +thou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of +the "_truth_," and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i. +e._ in "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations"; and so be guided "to successful action, and the consequent +maintenance of life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless +hunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But +when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this +task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and +aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy +pathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever +sadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst +deem thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst often +occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which eye hath not seen, +nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son of God, and "a joint-heir with +Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade +not away, eternal in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with +faith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst +traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual +life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off, +all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through +all eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly +deluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage +that thy god is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as +to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being "the +highest achievement of science," permit not thyself to be disturbed by +those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that "_truth_" and +those "achievements" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual +relations to God as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was +bound to know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations +of perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is +"of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the +least degree of allowance"; that for these crimes there impended a just +penalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real "failure" was +the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the +penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's +book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we can make, is, to miss in +maintaining perfectly "the continuous adjustment of internal relations +to external relations,"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding +at dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose +one's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which +may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" as shall +secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"--the advance +"towards death." When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance, +some "error" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast +rendered thy "failure" inevitable, and art surely descending "towards +death," hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean +song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." + + Sing and be gay + The livelong day, + Thinking no whit of to-morrow. + Enjoy while you may + All pleasure and play, + For after death is no sorrow. + +Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining "the accurate +correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon thine only "failure," the +inevitable advance "towards death." Than death no greater evil can +befall thee, and that is already sure. Then let "dance and song," and +"women and wine," bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting +days. + +Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and +especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has +these many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we +spoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to +be made to know that he is only an animal; that "Life in all its +manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists +in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." Do you not join with me in pitying him? + +And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as +the newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering +soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the +teacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after +newspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even +to those we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the +profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage +remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the human animal, and on +that point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all +sincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say, +"From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us." + +Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms +of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the +doctrine that not only is "Life in its simplest form"--the animal +life--"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions," but that "_each advance to a +higher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary +correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he +asserts that not only "the physical," _but also "the psychical life_ are +_equally_" but "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to +external relations"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter +his insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he +asserts "that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable +into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as +exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that +occur externally,"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment +of a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth +century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy +the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal +life, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an +animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but +not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is +presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach +rejects a roll of tobacco. + +With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy +which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large +sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous +proportions, to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our +youth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully +illustrates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, +D. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his "Lectures +on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will +desire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is +presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the +soldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury +charnel-house. + +"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These +are the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life. + +"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly +conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for +the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously +elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the +king himself is served by the field.' + +"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and +suffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation. +_This_, as man is now constituted, _is conditional for his rational +life_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only +through the organization which that builds up. + +"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral +life, by which man is made in the image of God._ In man, as thus +constituted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own +end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole +nature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of +transition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For +everything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may +be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their +end,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the +end itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the +characteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute. +Man determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to +man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or +from behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in +front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses. + +"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the +addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within +which the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the +field of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is +dropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all +that is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to +gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic +life that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but +the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so +that man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of +the world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the +addition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have +we a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and +expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an +end. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as +subservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means." +The italics are ours. + +Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one +which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the +atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and +self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic +storms,--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the +earth's noble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree +needful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to +gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this +subject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which +might be selected from the works of that profoundest of English +metaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:-- + +"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this +investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the +understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not +accompanied with and modified by the coöperation of the will, the moral +feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of +Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing +laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of +contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a +self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by +which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for +itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the +faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account +for that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an +insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the +inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no +other difference than in the degree of their intellectual +faculties_."--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours. + +The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the +words of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has +enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose +teachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer, +have been these many years, and still are received and studied with +profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons. We +refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to +those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after +the spirit." That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal +nature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is +of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and +continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the +things of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of +the spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of +the spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity +against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can +be." _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the spirit +and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the +spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one +to the other."--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17. + +Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that +our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus +intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of God which is meant, have led +their readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in +contrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that +he is contrasting, in all such passages, the animal nature with the +spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks +to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person +in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is _identical_. + +The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have +already accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the +contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr. +Spencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit," +an animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the +Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the +spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to +man and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and God. It is +manifest, then, that there is "an insurmountable distinction and +impassable barrier" not only "between man and the inferior animals," but +between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this +is a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that +which exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then, +do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that +which President Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is +not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. +He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the +sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." Thus far his +life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions +with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"--undoubtedly "consists in +the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; +and being the highest order of animal, his life "consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life +for? "This, as man is now constituted, is _conditional for his rational +life_." "The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all +these_." As God made man, and in the natural order, the "flesh," the +animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," the spiritual life. +And the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does +this also, this "Intelligence in its highest form," consist "in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"? Are +the words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live +after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"--_i. e._ by +living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of +the spiritual person--"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?" +And are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite +doctrine, true? wherein he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what +we call truth," &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if +ye live after the flesh," if you are guided by "_truth_," if you are +able perfectly to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to +objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will attain to what +is _successful action_, the preservation of "life," of "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations," of the animal +life, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man; +but if you "mortify the deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to +"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," +you will meet with "_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards +death,"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall +man,--and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in the direction already +taken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would +not be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to "the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," but +would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body +as the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation +of God's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his +energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even +the laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ +his superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of +its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained that through +this means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life, +continuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means. +Strip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense +and Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible +medium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the +spiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have +lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he +would feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally, +he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an +ultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards +putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such +that he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the +preservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with +efforts to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to +objective relations." Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an +activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible +nature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There +is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and +ideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that +august Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created +person's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the +created. But God is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an +undeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge. +What nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this +being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to employ all his +power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._ +to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and God; and +to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that +part in the Universe which God had assigned him, _i. e._, to accord his +will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual person +standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as +spontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have +portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means. +One great evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man, +is, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person +all submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit +is enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many, +perhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they +have any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through +all the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr. +Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all, +who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the +Understanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and +that "the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental +relations of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as exactly to +tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so +vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders +his maledictions. + +We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior +to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in +the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the +animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to +express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is +born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let +us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and +ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the +spiritual person. Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it +with loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and grievous +bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to +regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally +good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of God, and then he should +make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his +footsteps. + +We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. "The highest +achievements of science" for us, our "truth," guiding us "to successful +action," is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of God which is +written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly +"successful action,"--the accordance of our wills with the will of God. + +What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this +chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes, +a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and +complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and +final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the +same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to +turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it, +there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should +be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we +should willingly do, did our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least +necessary. That part of the passage which contains the gist of the +subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and +illustrations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full +presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely +build our criticism. These then will be given. + +"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning +that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the +consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly +from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in +something beyond the relative? + +"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our +intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that +anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure +negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by +a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The +_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the +_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object +of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the +conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which +extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot +warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable +only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence +of anything beyond phenomena. + +"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave +error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be +admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton +and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, +the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is +unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments +have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to +be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise +necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine +ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions +quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate +its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these +propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or +rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak +specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic +formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which +cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the +thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are +thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still +real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect. + +"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which +the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates +the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we +cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_ +an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the +Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the +making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to +the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step +in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, +everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout +necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to +conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without +at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for +appearance without reality is unthinkable." After carrying on this train +of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result. +"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness +of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an +indefinite consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, he says: +"Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of +thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness +of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our +conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows +the presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract from +Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his +doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive alone is real, the +negative is only an abstraction of the other"; or, in other words, the +one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply +nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is +unquestionably right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such +contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the +other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such +correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the +negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive +one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from +consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William +Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which +the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word." +Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the +fact that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative +or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, "that both Sir +William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do," in certain places, "distinctly +imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, +is positive not negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy +condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though +it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that; +though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as +it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, +there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The +continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in +the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so +ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited." +Thus he brings us to "the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be +constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its +very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?" +This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in +consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as +follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is +at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our +consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned +consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give +definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence +is the very basis of our intelligence." ... + +"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in +the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is +Relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a +Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which +this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen +how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that +the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real +Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute +be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the +argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of +thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the +consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from +this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that +actuality." + +The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced +by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a +positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established, +must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite +consciousness" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his +former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to +show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy. + +As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, +Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting +the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the +logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to +their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an +approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective +presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made +with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts +forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new +truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of +human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in +diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all +that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be +our present endeavor to show that such is the result. + +Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to +take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out +this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be +the elements of error, and show them to be such. + +1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of" +"the Absolute." Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if +it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a +consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with +that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion is +tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. +It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our +whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument +will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and +is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for +all intellect, for God as well as man. But three positions can be taken. +Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else +it has no reference to him. In the last instance God is Chaos; in the +second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; +the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses +refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the +position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on God and man. One of +those laws is, that, if any assertion is true, all that is logically +involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and +perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now +apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have +a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression +would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_, +has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no +mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there +is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is +Chaos. Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and +men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is +in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all in every part." He is +then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are +contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. God is wholly possessed +of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than +unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us +pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, +from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God _is limited_. He must +be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then +by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is +not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to +the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other +beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him. +Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest +possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of +being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person, +possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, +within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being +than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of +any other must be excluded. God is then a person. + +We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with +the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well +wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded +upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he +has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once +established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before, +but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark +upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth. + +2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a +faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite +consciousness." Let us examine these in their order. + +_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he +uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with +due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is +the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling +is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and +of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to +say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full form being "I am conscious +that I know the feeling." Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying +this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the +Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual +faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the +absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the +spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position: +consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person +sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as +different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of +a spiritual person. + +_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." The +expression "vague consciousness" being a popular and very common one, +deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in +mind meantime the position already attained. + +The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I have a vague or +undefined consciousness of impending evil." Let us analyze this +experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or +rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is +positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling. +Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, +of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That +cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive +faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the +feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of +vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the +feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of +the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not +consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "_indefinite_ +consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation in fact. +But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is +commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except +he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness +except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness +is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it +is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of +an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its +characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the +result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls "_indefinite_ +consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we partly know, and +are partly ignorant of the object under consideration. + +In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration, +Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting +consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we +have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his +theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it +full attention. "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental +element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily +indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally +_the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to +which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an +ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our +intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously +arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so +easily answered. More than one interpretation may be assigned, as will +appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the "raw +material of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him +the "raw material of thought"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts +down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its +stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain +our answer by analyzing man's natural organization. + +Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily a +logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may +be considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres, _i. e._, +which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of +laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however, +for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the +organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_ +and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the +activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the +substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas. +Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple, +unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes. +These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must +the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any +capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is +the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that +form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a +_set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of +organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered, +as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other, +it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes ideals, or +forms of being and activity. To illustrate from an earthly object. The +law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could +the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any +other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all +these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their +own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance with which +God may create this Universe. For an illustration of our topic in its +highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's +"Rational Psychology," where he analyzes personality into its elements +of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is +sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a +person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a +being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as +Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance +acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of +organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The "raw material of +thought," then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar +form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance +thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances +which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now, +by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus +organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness +considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by +experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_. +"Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness considered as quiescent +because in it have been awakened no "definite forms"--no "thinking." "In +the nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an +"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that "our +consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already asserted and +proved, is a "positive," and therefore an active state; is identical +with, is "literally the unconditioned consciousness," or consciousness +in its quiescent state, considered before it had been awakened into +activity, which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be +a contradiction. + +To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation may be +given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that it looks upon +consciousness only as an activity, and in the logical order after its +action has begun. We are, then, conscious, and in this is positive +action, but no definite object is present which gives a form in +consciousness, and so consciousness _returns upon itself_. We are +conscious that we are conscious, which is an awkward way of saying that +we are self-conscious, or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious; +for accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the +subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion from this +hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will be very loath to +accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. Indeed, in a sentence we +are about to quote, he seems to make a most marked distinction between +self-consciousness and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which +he calls its "obverse." + +But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material of thought" is, +what more especially claims our attention and is most strange, is his +application of that notion. To present this more clearly, we will quote +further from the passage already under examination. "As we can in +successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace +them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of +consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, there ever +remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and +independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of +thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of +absolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from +ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this +consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our +self-consciousness." Now, by comparing this extract with the other, +which it immediately follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as +synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned," +"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of thought," +"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and "consciousness of +absolute existence." Let us note, now, certain conclusions, which seem +to follow from this use of language. We are conscious "of absolute +existence." No person can be conscious except he is conscious of some +state or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, a +state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness of absolute +existence"--as it seems _our_ absolute existence--is the "raw material +of thought." But, again, as was shown above, this "raw material," this +"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is +consciousness considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it +becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this quiescent +state we could have no knowledge by experience. But since the above +phrases are synonymous, it follows that "consciousness of absolute +existence" is the "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," is a +consciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience, is a +consciousness of which we can have no consciousness. Is this +philosophy? + +It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which Mr. +Spencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing. +There is such a fact, a statement of which will complete this criticism. +Unquestionably, in self-examination, a man may abstract all "successive +mental acts," may consider himself as he is, in the logical order before +he _has experiences_. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense +of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in other +words, that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an +experience without a being to entertain the experience; and hence that +it is impossible for a man to think or act, except on the assumption +that he is. But all this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the +unconditioned," or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is not +absolute, and it is _our_ existence of which we are conscious. The +reality and abidingness of _our_ existence is ground for _our_ +experience, nothing more. Even if it were possible for us to have a +consciousness of our state before any experience, or to actually now +abstract all experience, and be conscious of our consciousness +unmodified by any object, _i. e._ to be conscious of unconsciousness, +this would not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could find +no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our existence was +involved in our experience. Such a consciousness would indeed appear +"unconditioned" by the coming into it of any activity, which would +give a form in it; but this would give us no notion of true +unconditionedness--true "absolute existence." This consciousness, though +undisturbed by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would have been +created, and be dependent upon God for continuance in existence, and for +a chance to come into circumstances, where it could be modified by +experiences, and so could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives +us the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our +experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of +the unconditioned, be that what it may. + +But to return from this considerable digression to the result which was +attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. Spencer calls +"_indefinite_ consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we +partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration. +Let this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns +us,--the character of God. + +But three suppositions are possible. Either we know nothing of God, not +even that he is; or we have a partial knowledge of him, we know that he +is, and all which we can logically deduce from this; or we know him +exhaustively. The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no +notice. The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed +satisfactory, has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is to +be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, his position is +that we know that God is and no more. Admit this for a moment. We are +conscious then of a positive, certain, inalienable knowledge that God +is; but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise +concerning him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent +that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; it is our +ignorance. + +We might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that +God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, organically ignorant of +what he is? Let the reader answer the question to his own mind. It is +required to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in +the light of the second hypothesis above stated. + +Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can logically deduce +it from this premiss; but, in so far as God is such, that he cannot be +thus known, except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us, he must +be forever inscrutable. To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be +admitted, it logically follows that he must be self-existent. +Self-existence is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second +element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may go on through +all that it is possible to deduce, and the system thus wrought will be +The Science of Natural Theology, a science as pure and sure as pure +equations. Its results will be what God must be. Looking into the +Universe we will find what must be corresponding with what is, and our +knowledge will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be utterly +inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics which we cannot +attain by logical deductions. For instance, let it be granted that the +doctrine of the Trinity is true--that there are three persons in one +Godhead. This would be a fact which man could never attain, could never +make the faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that +God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed man of +Greece, become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men +to the truth; but the notion of the Trinity could never come to him, +except God himself with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those +matters of which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can be +demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand; viz: +that what is revealed shall not contradict the law already "written in +the heart." Yet, once more, there are certain characteristics of God +that must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and +this, because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that one +cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in +question. Such for instance are the questions, How is God self-existent, +how could he be eternal, how exercise his power, and the like? These are +questions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should +know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in reality is no +reason at all, and therefore the inability in question is no detriment +to man. + +By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, two positions +seem to be established. 1. That we have, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a +positive consciousness that the absolute Being is, and that this and all +which we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us; +in other words, that the system advocated in this volume directly +follows from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite +consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in consciousness, +but in our knowledge; and further, that the hypothesis of a +consciousness of the "raw material of thought" is absurd. + + + + +"THE RECONCILIATION." + + +It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be the thorough +refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been given in the preceding +comments on Mr. Spencer's three philosophical chapters, the one named in +our heading would need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this +from being the case, that some of the worst features in the results of +his system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding to +consider these, let us note a most important admission. He speaks of his +conclusion as bringing "the results of speculation into harmony with +those of common sense," and then makes the, for him, extraordinary +statement, "Common Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two +remarks it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final +standard with which any position most be reconciled. The question +instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The writer has never seen a +definition, and would submit for the reader's consideration the +following. + +Common Sense _is the practical Pure Reason_; it is that faculty by which +the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the _a priori_ +law as inherent in the fact presented by the Sense. + +For the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus: + +Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty by which +the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to +that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to accomplish the object in +view. + +A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the informing law in the +fact; and good judgment, who skilfully selects and adapts his means to +the circumstances of the case, and the end sought. Of course it will not +be understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises +this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it. + +The reader will readily see the results which directly follow from Mr. +Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense asserts the existence +of a reality," and this assertion is true; but with equal truth does it +assert the law of logic; that, if a premiss is true, _all that is +logically involved in it is true_. It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer +has unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be +called the Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure +Reason, and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his +own. + +It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system +assumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated +in the following extract: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as +a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena +being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are +obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us +that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an +Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on +which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and +Science coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows: +"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some +Power by which we are acted upon." This may be expressed in another form +thus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are +acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this +sentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be +ascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable +by one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but +that Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the +Universe, since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting the +definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the +Universe is "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." +It follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we +are acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we +began to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in +ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be +asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were +not created by Mr. Spencer's "some Power," because it only _acts upon +us_. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man +to be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated _who might be +acted upon_. Then, however, we came into being, another than "some +Power" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat. +Every somewhat _in_ the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power." +This is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took +place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the +creation of man is "a manifestation of some Power acting upon" him! + +The position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer. +If, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term +phenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion +that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on +which to establish the omnipresence of his Power. + +But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all +events are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally +known and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be +"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that +statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be +established. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a +consciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No "Power" can make a +sinless soul feel guilty; no "Power" _can relieve a sinful soul from +feeling guilty_. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance +of Power, _it arises from the violation of Law_. And not only may this +experience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of +man. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always +elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in +the material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged +to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other +phenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the +intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy +vitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he +has said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there +were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted +for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he. +Yet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis +of their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the +following problem is presented. + +To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that +the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their +guilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they +have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of +those persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned +through the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one +God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has +already been made. + +Another pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it +affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than +_experience_. Mr. Spencer's words are: "phenomena being, _so far as we +can ascertain_, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard +this Power as omnipresent." Now, if he, or one of his friends, should +happen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space, +and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in +astonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open +place and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere +or system of phenomena, made by another "Power,"--said bridge being +constructed "'alf and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,--then there +would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to +England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists +his new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against +or above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their +colaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we +are here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when, +instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine, +based not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that +phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts +experience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real +difficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison +between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy. + +Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an +earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches us that this Power is +wholly incomprehensible." We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence, +What better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to +at this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a +somewhat older book than "First Principles," a book which, did it +deserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its +perfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis +for all philosophy. The sentence is this: "Beloved, let us love one +another, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God, +_and_ KNOWETH GOD." + +But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst +phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A "phenomenon" is "a +manifestation of some Power." "In this consciousness of an +Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on +which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and +Science coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is all the +Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that +we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know +the law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may +fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast +Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity +the children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual +disregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or +purple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table +may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the +flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if +possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of +consequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know +nothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good +of life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough and +ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the +avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and +terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood +gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley, +spreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and +their agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from +their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings +of man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters +flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest +symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and +lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface, +into the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the +crowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come +suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara. + +It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct +antagonism with that of the Bible,--that, if Spencerianism is true, the +Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's "Power," the +Bible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: "And God said unto +Moses, I AM THAT I AM. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the +children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."--_Exodus_ IV. 14. This +declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard, +all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or +by implication, deny. That other declaration is this: "Beloved, let us +love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born +of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; _for God +is love_."--1 _John_ IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the +two philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially +bad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere +handful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice +of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be +numbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the +ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do +not study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of +religious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most +profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man, +and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the +philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new +and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to +supplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of +the work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and +unworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the +existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a +quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the +antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is +especially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much +sooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of +Buddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian +churches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher +than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it +presents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his +own and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to +take some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated +above. + +Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less +willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one +which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is, +that it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a +falsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true, +but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human +nature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other +words, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions, +spontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise +negatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class +of philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the +power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in +which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it +may be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion +with it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child +is an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against +some of the distorted and monstrous _human_ theologies of his day. But +counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the +English atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists +wherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human +race. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be +accounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God +is a person, _is organic in human nature_. Another equally universal and +spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some +way, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances +most degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and +through them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and +pertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and +under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every +revolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established +new ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground +of the other,--that the notion _is organic in man_. A third utterance of +the human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that +the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting, +yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human +sacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages, +and must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over +against the I AM, which human nature presents and the Bible supports; +over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created; +and over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also +affirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those +creatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the +result of _Science_, an incomprehensible omnipresent _Power_; only a +Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For our part, +whatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible. +On the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in +the Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar. + +Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power +"Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from according with the +fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the +presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race. +Religion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the +sinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the +adoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race, +it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory +sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all +the notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in +him to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious +nature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent +assertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of +God, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful. + +Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by +stating that "from age to age Science has continually defeated it +(Religion) wherever they have come into collision, and has obliged it to +relinquish one or more of its positions." In this assertion, also, he +manifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to +comprehend their significance. Religion may properly be divided into two +classes. + +1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among +men, having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination +would produce. + +2. The religion of Jesus Christ. + +1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science has ever +driven even the religions of this class. It has, indeed, corrected many +_forms of expression_, and has sometimes driven _individuals_, who +failed to distinguish between the form, and the idea which the form +overlies, into a rejection of the truth itself. + +2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's remark has no +shadow of foundation. Since the beginning of its promulgation by +Jehovah, and especially since the completion of that promulgation by +our Saviour and his apostles, not one whit of its practical law or its +philosophy has been abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States, +there may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly held, +and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and personal +supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, and of that +fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of confusion," in so +conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that it shall manifestly +redound, not only to the glory of himself, but to the very best good of +man, so manifestly to so great a good, that all the loss of life, and +all the suffering, is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good +achieved, and that too _most strongly by the sufferers_, than was ever +before manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, in +spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever been +utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have +presented. Its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of +expression; and in the Bible it meets with forms of expression which it +ever has been, is now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a +paralytic would be to overturn the Himalaya. + +The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now +properly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact. Just as far +as a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation, +just so far does it come to look upon Deity simply as power. African +Fetishism is the doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power, +rendered into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands +one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort of +personality for the Power. + +On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And now observe that +all along, the agent which has effected the purification has been +Science. We habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its +functions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and Science is +scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is +demonstrable that every step by which Religion has progressed from its +first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached, +Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; and that even now, +Science is urging further steps in the same direction." In this passage +half truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes +simply untrue. The evil may be stand under two heads. + +1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be altogether too +profound. Since he has observed that certain changes for the better have +been made in some human religions, by the study of the natural sciences, +he jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of +steady growth; and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow +of other basis for his assertion--that the "first" "conception" of +religion was very "low." This assumption we utterly deny, and demand of +Mr. Spencer his proof. For ourselves we are willing to come down from +the impregnable fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the +Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In this we are +taught that the Golden Age came _first_, in which was a life of spotless +purity; after which were the silver and brazen ages, and the Iron Age in +which was crime, and the "low conception" of religion came _last_. How +marked is the general agreement of this with the Bible account! + +2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too +philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his +facts to match it. This is a common mistake among men, and which they +are unconscious of. Now the fact is, Science was _not_ "the agent which +effected the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science. +Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" to Religion. +Religion's first position was not a low one, but nearly the highest. +Afterwards it sunk very low; but men sunk it there. Science never +"helped it" or "forced it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades +Religion and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be +especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's doctrine of +Science is. He says: "That even the _highest_ achievements of Science +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +coördinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally." Of course the highest _object_ of +Science will be "_truth_"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply +the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." To +interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a science of +clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, and to +some largely, to many chiefly, a science of _cookery_ do, combined, +constitute Science, and the preservation of the body is its highest +attainment. Is this Science "the agent which has effected the +purification of Religion?" What then is the truth? + +"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have +sought out many inventions."--_Eccl._ VII. 29. The first religion was a +communion with God. The Creator taught man, as a father would his +children. But when man sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and +sank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary +sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of +Abraham,--_Gen._ XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor +in the first chapter of Romans, and which may be found fully paralleled +in our own day. At the proper time, God took mankind in hand, and began +to develop his great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up +Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. Spencer shall +deny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of Moses, he +at least cannot deny that they have a being; and, placing them on the +same ground of examination and criticism as Herodotus, that they were +written more than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark. +Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, and no one +of the prophets, who came after, added one new idea. They only +emphasized and amplified "The Law." So far then as this part of +Religion was concerned, Science never helped a particle. Yea, more, the +words to Moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances +of man before the Christian era. + +"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However defective was the +former dispensation, he, who appeared to most of the men of his day as +only a carpenter's son, declared to mankind the final and perfect truth. +As the system taught by Moses was not the result of any philosophical +developments, but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most +civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was brought up, and +was manifestly constructed _de novo_, and from some kind of revelation, +so this, which the carpenter's son taught, was incomparably superior to +any utterance which the human soul had up to that time, or has since, +made. It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the highest +principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing new was left to say +when John finished his writing; and the canon might well be closed. And +since that day, has Religion advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water +is drank at the old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of +Religion among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not advance +it. You can yet count the years on your fingers since men of Science +generally ceased to be strenuously hostile to Religion. Religion, in +every instance, has advanced just where it has gone back, and drank at +the old fountains. Who, then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent +which has effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes +"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought her up to her +present high position. + +When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer--to use a commonplace but +very forcible phrase--has "ruled God out of the ring," how impertinent +seems his rebuke, administered a few pages further on, in the passage +beginning, "Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," to +those who believe that God means what he says, and that men may know +him. These men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches +that an "incomprehensible omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to +worship, and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns +under a pot. + +There does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not +already been touched upon. With these remarks, then, the examination of +this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, may be closed. + + + + +CONCLUSION. + + +If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's "Evidences of +Christianity," or the "Sermons of President Dwight on the Existence of +God"; and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter +unsatisfaction, enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as +before, he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author +forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise. +Those works, and all of that class are, for the object they have in +view, worthless; not because the various statements they make are +untrue, not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting; +but because they are radically defective in that, their _method_ is +irrelevant to the subject in hand; because in all the arguments that +have been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final; +because the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through +every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, their +method itself is false, and men have attempted to establish by a series +of arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument, and +can only be established by the opposite, the _a priori_ method. Though +the Limitist Philosophy has no positive value, it has this negative one, +that it has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the +worthlessness of the _a posteriori_ processes of thought on the matter +in hand. Yea, more, the existence of _any_ spiritual person cannot be +proved in that way. You can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree; +but never that he has a soul. This is always taken for granted. Lest the +author should appear singular in this view, he would call the attention +of the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he at once +sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of Dr. +Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in this present work, furnished +occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and +irreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if +I were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how +well content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration +which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And +how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I +even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive +facility of his writings! But on this very account, I feel myself bound +in conscience _to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of +this triumphal car_, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is +borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels." + +Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught us in the Book, +and the only one taught us there, which is open to every human being, +for which every human being has the faculty, and respecting which all +that is needed is, that the person exercise what he already has. The boy +could not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to his +task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils the +conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of +this knowledge, except his soul is poured out in love to God; "for every +one that _loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God_." We come then to the +knowledge of God by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason, +the Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and highest +action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an intellectual +achievement, this is the highest possible to the Reason. She attains +then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, and of this she is fully +conscious. Nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are +no more worlds to conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable +Goodness she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest. +Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, and that +the _a priori_ method, by which to establish for man the fact of the +being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of +thought. + +Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in the highest +degree improbable, that the most important truths which can pertain to +man, truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life, but +of his most exalted life, the life of the spiritual person as the +companion of its Creator, should be based upon an inferior, less +satisfactory, and less adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of +our childhood's studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy who +cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon learns what he +knows to be _self-evident_ truths. He who should offer to _prove_ the +truth of the multiplication-table, would only expose himself to +ridicule. When the boy has attained to youth, and advanced in his +studies, the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and +he finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any +evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the validity of the +axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to offer arguments, would he +not instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby +tacitly made, that self-evidence was not satisfactory; and would he not, +finding his spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be +_liable_ to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this +spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal conviction +respecting matters of subordinate importance, can it be possible,--I +repeat the question, for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own +and the decisive answer,--can it be possible that the decisions of +questions of the highest moment, that the knowledge of the principles of +our moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable, +and most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, and +Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, +unalterable, yea, universal convictions? And when the teacher seemingly, +and may it not with truth be said _actually_, distrusting the +reliability of such a conviction, goes about to bolster up his belief, +and the belief of his pupil, in the existence of God, and thereto rakes +together, with painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence, +instead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him +with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that the +sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction between his +spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should become uncertain which +to follow, a doubter, and finally a confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is +incredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that +to which all the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for +which they were created--are established on inferior grounds, and those +less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; and if, on the +other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that they are established on +the highest grounds, and since the truths of mathematics are also based +on the highest ground, self-evidence, and since there can be none higher +than the highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe, +so far as they can be known by man, have _precisely the same foundation +of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are_ +SELF-EVIDENT. + +But some good Reader will check at the result now attained because it +involves the position that the human Reason is the final standard of +truth for man. Good reader, this position is involved, and is true; and +for the sake of Christ's religion it must be taken. The only possible +ground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable +Christian Philosophy, is the principle that _The human Reason is the +final standard of truth for man_. + +It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem that book as +his final standard; and to such an extent in many instances has his +reverential regard for it been carried, that the expression will hardly +be too strong for truth, that it has become an object of worship; and +upon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock. +While the author would treat with respect every religious feeling, he +would still remind such a person that the Bible is the moral school-book +of the spiritual person in man, which God himself prepared for man's +use, and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being +whom it was meant to educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of +making man, God established in him the standard, and the right to +require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the standard and +thus established the right. This principle may be supported by the +following considerations: + +1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none have employed it +more vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it. +One of the class just referred to affirms that the Bible is the standard +of truth. "Admit," says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it +were what it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the +case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers, and +evidence from the book itself; and finally closes by saying, that such +an array of evidence is ample to satisfy any _reasonable_ man of its +truth and validity. His argument is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he +has not appealed to a reasonable man, _i. e._ to the Reason, _i. e._, if +he has not acknowledged a standard for _the_ standard, and thus has not +tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason as the +highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us no adequate +expression. + +2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the validity of +this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We know that thou art a +teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, +except God be with him."--_John_ III. 2. In these words, he both +recognized the validity of the standard, and the fact that its +requirements had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of our +Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works which none other man +did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me +and my Father."--_John_ XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared +among them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a belief +in my mission; but when I had given them adequate and ample evidence of +my heavenly character, when, in a word, I had by my works satisfied all +the rational demands for evidence which they could make, then no excuse +remained for their rejection of me." + +The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, and know +God, is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human +mind, or too fully illustrated in human thought. In no better strain can +we bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those +words of Jesus Christ which have formed the title of our book. + +"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, 'If ye continue in +my word, _then_ are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, +and the truth shall make you free.'"--_John_ VIII. 31, 32. Throughout +all the acts of Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the +last days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human +effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, the nature +and purport of his mission. He appeared to them a man; and yet it would +seem as if the Godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its +infirmities, and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary +character and work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received him +not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus Christ possessed in +his own right _an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic_. We study out some +laws in some of their applications; he knew all laws in all their +applications. In these his last days he was engaged in making the most +profound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one +being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call them +religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy are identical. +Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain that no merely human +teacher ever used words with the careful balancing, the skilful +selection, the certain exactitude, that Jesus did. Hence in the most +emphatic sense may it be said, that, whether he used figurative or +literal language, he meant just what he said. The terms used in the text +quoted are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in +its most literal signification. In these words then, in this passage of +the highest philosophical import, is to be found the basis of the whole +_a priori_ philosophy. They were spoken of the most important truths, +those which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare; but as the +greater includes the less, so do they include all lesser science. In +positive and unmistakable terms has Christ declared the fact of +knowledge. God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, in +so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a purely +intellectual act. Love is indeed a _condition_ of the act, but it is not +the very act itself. + +On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has failed to +assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally has this knowledge been +termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning thereby, a sort of an impression +of happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility; and this state of +bliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond +all question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the eye +of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and knowing it +because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated to, wrapt in +the effort, and he is searching for it as for hid treasures, there will +roll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable Delight which is a +boundless ocean in Deity. But this state of the Sensibility follows +after, and is dependent upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge. +There should be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the +various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to +buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be taken, then, as the +words of the perfect philosopher, and the perfect religionist. Bearing, +as he did, the destiny of a world on his heart, and burdened beyond all +utterance by the mighty load, his soul was full of the theme for which +he was suffering, he could speak to man only of his highest needs and +his highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, is not +only eternal,--all truth is eternal,--but it is that eternal truth most +important to him, the _a priori_ laws of the spiritual person and of all +his relations. The what he is, the why he is, and the what he ought to +become, are the objects of his examination. When, then, a spiritual +person has performed his highest act, the act of unconditional and +entire consecration to the search after the truth, _i. e._ to God; and +when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh, +he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt away in the +contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye will be open, and +will dart with its far-glancing, searching gaze throughout the mysteries +of the Universe, and he will know the truth. Before, when he was +absorbed in the pursuit of the things of Sense, he could see almost no +_a priori_ principles at all, and what he did see, only in their +practical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish +with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the +upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most +important of those objects which formerly with so much painful and +painstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and +having touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, he +again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and love, and soars +upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal Sun, the infinite Person, +the final Truth, God. Then does he come to comprehend, "to KNOW, with +all saints, what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the +love of God." Then do the pure _a priori_ laws, especially those of the +relations of spiritual persons, _i. e._ of the moral government of God, +come full into the field of his vision. Then in the clear blaze, in the +noonday effulgence of the ineffable, eternal Sun, does he see the Law +which binds God as it binds man,--that Law so terrible in its demands +upon him who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could +find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending "his +only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is lifted up to this +knowledge needs no other revelation. All other knowledge is a child's +lesson-book to him. All lower study is tasteless; all lower life is +neglected, forgotten. He studies forever the pure equations of truth; he +lives in the bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been +utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, he may +have learned of God only by the hearing of the ear, but by one act, in a +moment, in the twinkling of an eye, he has passed all the gradations of +earthly knowledge, and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He +received little instruction from men; but forevermore God is his +teacher. + +This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, no rhapsody of +the imagination. It is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect. +It is the same in kind, though of far nobler import, as if upon this act +of consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a +sudden overwhelming burst of light, the whole _a priori_ system of the +physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not essential, +and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and the higher is +revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual life. + +In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the unreserved, +the absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth, +do we find that common goal to which an _a priori_ philosophy inevitably +leads us, and which the purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does +it appear that in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are +identical. The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. The +principles of both have the highest possible evidence, for they are +self-evident; and, having them given by the intuition of the Reason, a +man can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the Universe as he would +cipher out a problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is +wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical astronomy +of the moral heavens, as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of +his lost purity. + +How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter of the +Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preëminence! how dazzling in thy +transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl; thy +diadem the Morning Stars, thy robe the glory of God. Founded is thy +throne on Eternity; and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are +enduring truth. Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the +snow-capped mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the surety of +thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, with mien of +noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw down the gauntlet of +thy challenge to the assembled doubters of the Universe. + +It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly +on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth +in the human soul, certain of the positions attained and maintained in +this volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential +distinction between the Creator and the created. If the universe is a +definite and limited object, some created being may, at some period, +come to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite number +of the qualities and attributes--the endowments of Deity, some one may +learn the number, and what they are, and come at length to have a +knowledge equal to God's knowledge. Even if this possibility should be +admitted,--which it is not, for a reason to appear further on,--yet it +would in no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree, +reduced the difference in _kind_ which subsists between him and the +Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive marks will, it +would seem, be decisive upon this point. + +God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon him. +Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable attribute of +Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for any creature. Every +creature is necessarily dependent upon the Creator every moment, for his +continuance in being. Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge; +let him, if the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to +that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could use, and +he would not have made, nor could he make an effort even, in the +direction of removing his dependence upon his Creator. In the very +height of his glory, in the acme of his attainment, it would need only +that God rest an instant, cease to sustain him, and he would not be, he +would have gone out, as the light goes out on a burner when one turns +the faucet. + +Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in +kind; and the creature never can acquire the Creator's mode. The Deity +possesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment, given to him at once, +by a spontaneous intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no +knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out of all +relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, can never acquire any +knowledge except through processes; and, what is more, can never review +the knowledge already acquired, except by a process which occupies a +time. This relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this +distinction between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable. + +Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing +ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, _a priori_ laws, but it +gives all possible images, which those laws, standing in their natural +relations to each other, can become. Thus all ideals are realized to +him, whether the creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in +accordance therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the opposite +kind. The creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by +contact with a material universe; and then can never construct an ideal, +except he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in +material forms. To illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no +radical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other +created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason, but it must grow +before it can make its presentations, and the means of its education +must be a material system. Let a spiritual person be created, and set in +the Universe, utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it +would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry seed. The +necessity of alliance with a material Universe is equally apparent in +the mature spiritual person. Such a one cannot construct a single ideal, +except he have seen all the elements already in material forms. He who +will attempt to construct an ideal of any _thing_, which never has been, +as a griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have been on +earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this +position. Therefore it is that no one can, "by searching, find out God." +The creature can only learn what the Creator declares to him. + +Still another element of distinction, equally marked and decisive as +those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity possesses as inherent and +immanent endowment Power, or the ability of himself to realize his +ideals in objects. Thus is he the Creator. If this were not so, there +could have been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to +furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, cannot +receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power to create. Hence +he can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand. +Pigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and +sculptors can become. + +Each and every one of the distinctions above made is _organic_. They +cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal is not a possible object of +effort. The creature may _wish_ them removed; but no line of thought can +be studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of +that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the fullest +scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power +of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's design. + +THE END. + + + + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been +maintained. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the +Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. 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Jones + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation + +Author: Jesse H. Jones + +Release Date: October 27, 2011 [EBook #37864] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KNOW THE TRUTH; A CRITIQUE *** + + + + +Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, +Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from +images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia +Center, Michigan State University Libraries.) + + + + + + +</pre> + +<div> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<h1 class="booktitle">KNOW THE TRUTH;</h1> + +<p class="h3">A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY +OF LIMITATION,</p> + +<p class="h6">INCLUDING</p> + +<p class="h4">SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF<br /> +REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND MR.<br /> +HERBERT SPENCER</p> + +<p class="h6">BY</p> +<p class="h4">JESSE H. JONES</p> + +<p class="h5">"Give me to see, that I may know where to strike."</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h5">NEW YORK:<br /> +PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.<br /> +BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES<br /> +1865.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h6">Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by<br /> +<span class="smcap">Jesse H. Jones</span>, +in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h6">RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:<br /> +STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY<br /> +H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h5">Dedication.<br /> +<br /> +TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL<br /> +SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED<br /> +HIS TEACHINGS,<br /> +<br /> +This Little Treatise<br /> + +IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY + +<i>THE AUTHOR</i>.</p> + +<p class="spacer"> </p> + +<p class="h3">Contents</p> +<p> +<a href="#PREFACE"><b>PREFACE.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#KNOW_THE_TRUTH"><b>KNOW THE TRUTH.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_I"><b>PART I.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_II"><b>PART II.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#PART_III"><b>PART III.</b></a><br /> +<a href="#REVIEW_OF_LIMITS_OF_RELIGIOUS_THOUGHT"><b>REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#REVIEW_OF_MR_HERBERT_SPENCERS_FIRST_PRINCIPLES"><b>REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#ULTIMATE_RELIGIOUS_IDEAS"><b>"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#ULTIMATE_SCIENTIFIC_IDEAS"><b>"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#THE_RELATIVITY_OF_ALL_KNOWLEDGE"><b>"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#THE_RECONCILIATION"><b>"THE RECONCILIATION."</b></a><br /> +<a href="#CONCLUSION"><b>CONCLUSION.</b></a><br /> +</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[v]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PREFACE">PREFACE.</h2> + +<p>This book has been written simply in the interest of +Truth. It was because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian +School were believed to be dangerous errors, which this process +of thought exposes, that it was undertaken.</p> + +<p>Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two +systems of philosophical theology in the world. The one +will be Pantheism, or Atheism,—both of which contain +the same essential principle, but viewed from different standpoints,—the +other will be a pure Theism. In the schools +of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth +is to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be +held responsible for all which can be logically deduced from +his system; and every erroneous result which can be so +deduced is decisive of the presence of an error in principle +in the foundation; and all schemes of philosophy, by such a +trial, are seen to be based on one of these two classes of +schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's +"Rational Psychology" will be in point:</p> + +<p>"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality +wholly out of and beyond all the conditions and modes of +space and time, we can by no possibility leave nature for the +supernatural. The clear-sighted and honest intellect, resting +in this conclusion that the conditions of space and time<span class="pagenum">[vi]</span> +cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the deluded +intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive understanding +in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an +all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have +found a deity within the modes of space and time, will be +Pantheistic. The Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, +when it reaches its conclusions by a logical process in the +abstract law of thought; and it will be material and empiric, +when it concludes from the fixed connections of cause and +effect in the generalized law of nature; but in neither case +is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity, +circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, +is but nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized +reality, is no God."</p> + +<p>The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving +that the Deity cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he +can be known at all. What the mind cannot know at all, +<i>it is irrational to believe</i>. If man cannot <i>know that</i> God is, +and have a clear sight of his attributes as a rational ground +of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind credulity +to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such +knowledge, he has <i>no standard</i> by which to measure teachings, +and be <i>sure</i> he has the truth. Under such circumstances, +faith is <i>impossible</i>. Faith can only be based on +<i>Reason</i>. If there is no Reason, there can be no faith. +Hence he who talks about faith, and denies Reason, does not +know what faith is. The logician rightfully held that God +could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in +asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, +as he was right in the former instance. The acceptance of +his one truth, and one error, compels man to be an Atheist; +because then he has no faculty by which to know aught of<span class="pagenum">[vii]</span> +God; and few thorough men will accept blind credulity as +the basis of Religion.</p> + +<p>The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot +be too strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that +this little treatise could never have been written. Indeed, +the author looks for but scanty credit on the score of originality, +since most of what he has written he has learned, +directly or indirectly, from that profound thinker. He has +deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles developed +by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall +be judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have +been satisfied.</p> + +<p>After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, +and while the author was committing it to paper, the essays on +"Space and Time," and on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," +in the numbers of the "North American Review" +for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his notice. +Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with +which he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure +student, almost wholly isolated in the world, to find the views +which he had wrought out in his secluded chamber, so ably +advocated in the leading review of his country. Not that he +had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand as thoroughly +as has been there done. By no means. Rather what +results he had attained accord with some of those therein +laid down. Of those essays it is not too much to say, that, if +they have not exhausted the topics of which they treat, they +have settled forever the conclusions to be reached, and leave +for other writers only illustration and comment. If the author +shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,—that of +quantitative infinity,—the difference will, it is believed, be +found to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference<span class="pagenum">[viii]</span> +is maintained from the conviction that no term in science +should have more than one signification. It is better to adopt +illimitable and indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, +in place of the commonly used terms infinite and absolute.</p> + +<p>A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched +upon in the following discussion, which deserves a more +extensive consideration than the scope and plan of this work +would permit to it here; and which, so far as the author's +limited reading goes, has received very little attention from +modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the distinction +between the animal nature and spiritual person, so repeatedly +enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the +apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle +John, in the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of +the world, even the best Christian philosophers, seem to have +esteemed this a moral and religious distinction, and no more, +when in fact it cleaves down through the whole human being, +and forms the first great radical division in any proper analysis +of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements. +<i>This is a purely natural division.</i> It is organic in man. It +belonged as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the +most degraded wretch on the globe now. It is of such a +character that, had it been properly understood and developed, +the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could never have been +constructed.</p> + +<p>An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as +follows. First, the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, +its province accurately defined, and both the laws and forms +of its activity exactly stated. Second, a like examination of +the spiritual person should follow; and third, the relations, +interactions, and influences of the two parts upon each other +should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is to<span class="pagenum">[ix]</span> +be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, +of these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, +it is doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can +read all their relations and inter-communications. The development +of the third point, by any one mind, must needs, +therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the above +designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend +upon circumstances beyond control of the writer.</p> + +<p>As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the +subject, the great, the <i>vital</i> point upon which the whole controversy +with the Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question +of <i>fact</i>; viz., whether man has a Reason, as the faculty +giving <i>a priori</i> principles, or not. If he has such a Reason, +then by it the questions now at issue can be settled, and that +finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge, +except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense +and judged by the Understanding. Until, then, the question +of fact is decided, it would be a gain if public attention was +confined wholly to it. Establish first a well ascertained and +sure foundation before erecting a superstructure.</p> + +<p>The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not +admit the presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. +On the contrary, it involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. +What has been said at one point respecting one author must +be said again in reply to another. Yet the main object for +which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be thoroughly +accomplished in no other way.</p> + +<p>The author has in each case used American editions of the +works named.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="KNOW_THE_TRUTH">KNOW THE TRUTH.</h2> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[1]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_I">PART I.</h2> + +<p class="h3">THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.</p> + +<p>In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an +English print, a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious +Thought Examined," &c., "by Henry Longueville Mansel, +B. D."</p> + +<p>The high position occupied by the publishers,—a firm of +Christian gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication +of books either devoutly religious, or, at least, having +a high moral tone, and being marked by deep, earnest +thought, have obtained the confidence of the religious community; +the recommendations with which its advent was heralded, +but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme +announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of +mental activity in our midst,—gave the book an immediate +and extensive circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation +of all religious, and especially of all theological thinking. +The author, basing his teaching on certain metaphysical +tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the boundary to all +positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in its upward +surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to +say, "Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here +must thy proud waves be stayed." And this effort was declaredly +made in the interest of religion. It was asserted<span class="pagenum">[2]</span> +that from such a ground only, as was therein sought to be +established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and destroyed. +Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine +in the Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume +was composed of lectures delivered upon what is known +as "The Bampton Foundation;"—a bequest of a clergyman, +the income of which, under certain rules, he directed +should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ, +by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on +such a theme, by such a man, and composed under such auspices, +would necessarily receive the almost universal attention +of religious thinkers, and would mark an era in human +thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England, +the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her +most careful and studious examination. And the West alike +with the East pored over its pages, and wrought upon its +knotty questions. Clergymen especially, and theological students, +perused it with the earnestness of those who search +for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not +hesitate to say that it was unqualified rejection. The book +now takes its place among religious productions, not as a +contribution to our positive knowledge, not as a practicable +new road, surveyed out through the Unknown Regions of +Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative value, as a +monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside +where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on +which is inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be +found."</p> + +<p>The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently +to public attention a writer heretofore not extensively +read in this country, Sir William Hamilton, upon +whose metaphysical teachings the lecturer avowedly based +his whole scheme. The doctrines of the metaphysician were +subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which dissolved +the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were +pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or<span class="pagenum">[3]</span> +expressed in any extensive and exhaustive criticism of these +writers; in which the errors of their principles and the revolting +nature of the results they attained, were presented; +but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous and deep-seated +conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and +pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's +highest nature. It was rejected because it <i>could</i> not be received.</p> + +<p>Something more than a year ago, and while the American +theological mind, resting in the above-stated conviction, was +absorbed in the tremendous interests connected with the Great +Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors appeared upon the stage. +A book was published entitled "The Philosophy of Herbert +Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the foundation +of a new system of Philosophy, which would command +the confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all +succeeding ages. Avowing the same general principles with +Mansel and Hamilton, this writer professed to have found a +radical defect in their system, which being corrected, rendered +that system complete and final; so that, from it as a base, he +sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal Science. This +man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his predecessors; +because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity demonstrated, +he does not care, unless from professional motives, +to examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the +folly; but still so widely read, as to be generally associated +with the other writers above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. +Upon being examined, he is found to be a man of +less scope and mental muscle than either of his teachers; +yet going over the same ground and expressing the same +ideas, scarcely in new language even; and it further appears +that his discovery is made at the expense of his logic +and consistency, and involves an unpardonable contradiction. +Previous to the publication of the books just mentioned, +an American writer had submitted to the world a system +of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which<span class="pagenum">[4]</span> +certainly seems worthy of some notice from their authors. +Yet it has received none. To introduce him we must retrace +our steps for a little.</p> + +<p>In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn +Theological Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational +Psychology," in which he professed to establish, by <i>a priori</i> +processes, positions which, if true, afford a ground for the +answer, at once and forever, of all the difficulties raised by +Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being comparatively +a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the attention +it should have done. It was too much like Analytical +Geometry and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for +any but a few patient thinkers. For them it was marrow +and fatness.</p> + +<p>Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we +will hereafter term Limitists, have neglected to take the +great truths enunciated by the American metaphysician, and +apply them to their own system, and so be convinced by their +own study of the worthlessness of that system, it becomes +their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work +in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to +unravel each of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the +world that it may "<i>know the truth</i>;" and thus to destroy +a system which, if allowed undisputed sway, would sap the +very foundations of Christian faith.</p> + +<p>The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a +single fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions +with it. He who would strike these effectually, must +aim his blow, and give it with all his might, straight at that +one object; sure that if he destroys that, the destruction of +the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as the Limitists +are determined not to confess the dissolution of their scheme, +by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot +prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of +their own tenets, it is further necessary to go through their +writings, and examine them passage by passage, and show<span class="pagenum">[5]</span> +the fallacy of each. In the former direction we can but re-utter +some of the principles of the great American teacher. +In the latter there is room for new effort; and this shall be +our especial province.</p> + +<p>The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists +is founded, was originally enunciated by Sir William +Hamilton, in the following terms. "The Unconditioned is +incognizable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative +of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively +known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive, +and consequently can know, only the <i>limited and the +conditionally limited</i>. The unconditionally unlimited, or the +Infinite, the unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot +positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived +only by a thinking away from, or abstraction of, those very +conditions under which thought itself is realized; consequently, +the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative—negative +of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one +hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, +that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a +relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, +that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a +relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other +hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe +to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination coincide,) +an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the +infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would +itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, +for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite +divisibility of parts.... As the conditionally limited +(which we may briefly call the conditioned) is thus the only +possible object of knowledge, and of positive thought—thought +necessarily supposes conditions. <i>To think</i> is <i>to condition</i>; +and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of +the possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the +mean between two extremes—two inconditionates, exclusive<span class="pagenum">[6]</span> +of each other, neither of which <i>can be conceived as possible</i>, +but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded +middle, one <i>must be admitted as necessary</i>."</p> + +<p>This theory may be epitomized as follows:—"The Unconditioned +denotes the genus of which the Infinite and +Absolute are the species." This genus is inconceivable, is +"negative of the conceivable itself." Hence both the species +must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable, they +may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond +all limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond +all conditions:" or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, +the other, unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen +to be "mutually repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable +immensity, there cannot be absolute totality; and the reverse. +Within these two all possible being is included; and, because +either excludes the other, it can be in only one. Since both +are inconceivable we can never know in which the conditioned +or conceivable being is. Either would give us a being—God—capable +of accounting for the Universe. This fact +is assumed to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may +therefore rationally satisfy himself with the study of those +matters which are cognizable—the conditioned.</p> + +<p>It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism +of the philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, +in the natural course, upon a subsequent page. We have +stated it here, for the purpose of placing in that strong light +which it deserves, another topic, which has received altogether +too little attention from the opponents of the Limitists. +Underlying and involved in the above theory, there +is a question of <i>fact</i>, of the utmost importance. Sir William +Hamilton's metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if +his psychology is true, his system is impregnable. It is his +diagnosis of the human mind, then, which demands our attention. +He has presented this in the following passage:—</p> + +<p>"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time +and Space into conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing<span class="pagenum">[7]</span> +his deduction of the 'Categories of Understanding' and +the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as the work of a great +but perverse ingenuity. The categories of understanding +are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, +therefore, generalize the <i>Conditioned—Existence Conditioned</i>, +as the supreme category, or categories, of thought?—and +if it were necessary to analyze this form into its subaltern +applications, why not develop these immediately out of +the generic principle, instead of preposterously, and by a +forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the understanding +from a questionable division of logical proposition? +Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding +(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant +about, or rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when +it is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived +as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception +of contradictories is one? In the Kantian philosophy, +both faculties perform the same function, both seek the one +in the many;—the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) +sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the +Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'"</p> + +<p>Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement +that "both faculties," <i>i. e.</i>, Understanding and Reason, +"perform the same function," we are to notice the two leading +points which are made, viz.:—1. That there is no distinction +between the Understanding and the Reason; or, in +other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is +claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, +2. A generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; +both of which may be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding +is the highest faculty of knowledge belonging to +the human soul. Upon this, a class of thinkers, following +Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and assert that +the distinction between the two faculties named above, has +a substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in <i>kind</i>, +and that the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike<span class="pagenum">[8]</span> +the mode of activity in the other. Thus, then, is the great +issue between the Hamiltonian and Platonic schools made +upon a question of <i>fact</i>. He who would attack the former +school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their fundamental +assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of +the Pure Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human +soul, will, in such establishment, accomplish the destruction +of the Hamiltonian system of philosophy. Believing this +system to be thoroughly vicious in its tendencies; being such +indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the whole Christian +religion; and what is of equal importance, being false +to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will +attempt to achieve the just named and so desirable result; +and by the mode heretofore indicated.</p> + +<p>It is required, then, to <i>prove</i> that there is a faculty belonging +to the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or +the Understanding; a faculty peculiar and unique, which +possesses such qualities as have commonly been ascribed by +its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby to establish +such faculty as a fact, and under that name.</p> + +<p>Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to +make an exact statement of what is to be proved. To this +end, let the following points be noted:—</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those +of the Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. +According to the laws of its construction, it receives impressions +from objects, either material, and so in a different place +from that which it occupies, or imaginary, and so proceeding +from the imaging faculty in itself. But it is only capacity +to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding, +though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within +the limits of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up +the presentations of the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, +and deduces conclusions: but it can attain to nothing more +than was already in the objects presented. It can construct +a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a<span class="pagenum">[9]</span> +relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, +but of another and higher kind from that of the Sense. +Sense can have no object except such, at least, as is constructed +out of impressions received from without. What +we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can have +no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover, +but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty +and capacity in one, which, possessing inherent within itself, +as objects, the <i>a priori</i> conditional laws of the Universe, and +the <i>a priori</i> conditional ideal forms which these laws, standing +together according to their necessary relations, compose, +transcends, in its activity and acquisitions, all limitations +of a <i>Nature</i>; and attends to objects which belong to the +Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness qualifies. We +observe, therefore,</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse +in kind from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All +the objects of the Sense must come primarily or secondarily, +from a material Universe; and the discussions and conclusions +of the Understanding must refer to such a Universe. +The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, <i>laws</i>, +or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons +why conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in +their combinations, compose the forms conditional for all +activity; and which, therefore, constitute within us an <i>a priori</i> +standard by which to determine the validity of all judgments. +To illustrate. Linnæus constructed a system of botanical +classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in a +flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding. +Later students have, however, discovered that +certain <i>organic laws</i> extend as a framework through the +whole vegetable kingdom; which, once seen, throw back the +Linnæan system into company with the Ptolemaic Astronomy; +and upon which laws a <i>science</i> of Botany becomes possible. +That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the +Pure Reason.<span class="pagenum">[10]</span></p> + +<p>To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects +of activity, diverse from the Sense and Understanding. +It is at once capacity and faculty, having as object first principles, +possessing these as an <i>inherent heritage</i>, and able to +compare with them as standard all objects of the Sense and +judgments of the Understanding; and to decide thereby +their validity. These principles, and combinations of principles, +are known as <i>Ideas</i>, and, being innate, are denominated +<i>innate Ideas</i>. It is their reality which Sir William +Hamilton denies, declaring them to be only higher generalizations +of the Understanding, and it is the faculty called the +Pure Reason, in which they are supposed to inhere, whose +actuality is now to be proved.</p> + +<p>The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown +that the logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially +defective; what are the phenomena which cannot be +comprehended in his scheme; and, finally, that they can be +accounted for on no other ground than that stated.</p> + +<p>1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and +essentially defective. They start with the assumption that a +generalization is the highest form of human knowledge. To +appreciate this fully, let us examine the process they thus +exalt. A generalization is a process of thought through +which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a conclusion, +embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all +the facts of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of +the north temperate zone have long observed it to be a fact, +that north winds are cold; and so have arrived at the general +conclusion that such winds will lower the temperature. +A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in +the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their +judgment has to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation +shows that, at one period in geologic history, +north winds, even in northern climes, were warm, and that +tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and the judgment +is again modified. Now observe this most important<span class="pagenum">[11]</span> +fact here brought out. <i>Every judgment may be modified by +a larger experience.</i> Apply this to another class of facts. +An apple is seen to fall when detached from the parent stem. +An arrow, projected into the air, returns again. An invisible +force keeps the moon in its orbit. Other like phenomena are +observed; and, after patient investigation, it is found to be +a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our planet +belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the +distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a +generalization is the highest form of knowledge, we can never be +sure we are right, for a subsequent experience may teach us +the reverse. We know we have not <i>all the facts</i>. We may +again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was once here, +warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere +so distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest +ray, even, of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force +we called gravitation, was inversely as the <i>cube</i> of the distance, +we could only accept the testimony, and modify our +judgment accordingly. Conclusions of to-day may be errors +to-morrow; and we can never know we are right. The Limitists +permit us only interminable examinations of interminable +changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result +than a new basis for new studies.</p> + +<p>From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns +to itself, crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" +when suddenly, as if frenzied by the presence of a god, it +shouts exultingly "The truth! the truth! I see the eternal +truth."</p> + +<p>The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their +diagnosis is both defective and false. It is defective, in that +they have failed to perceive those qualities of <i>universality</i> +and <i>necessity</i>, which most men instinctively accord to certain +perceptions of the mind; and false, in that they deny the +reality of those qualities, and of the certain perceptions as +modified by them, and the actuality of that mental faculty +which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a<span class="pagenum">[12]</span> +part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the +mind both generalizes and intuits.</p> + +<p>It is the <i>essential</i> tenet of their whole scheme, that the +human mind nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an +affirmation which it unreservedly qualifies as necessary and +universal. Their doctrine is, that these affirmations <i>seem</i> to +be such, but that a searching examination shows this seeming +to be only a bank of fog. For instance. The mind seems +to affirm that two and two <i>must</i> make four. "Not so," says +the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make +four, but it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you +see? if two and two must make four, then the Infinite must +see it so; and if he must see it so, he is thereby conditioned; +and what is worse, we know just as much about it as he does." +In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be said,—there is no +seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly mendacious, it +affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are four, +<i>must</i> be four; and to see it so, <i>is conditional for</i> <span class="smcap">all</span> <i>intellect</i>." +Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often unconsciously, +always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, +In society the rights of the individual can never trench upon +the rights of the body politic,—is a necessary, and universally +applicable principle; which, however much it may be violated, +can never be changed. The whole fabric of society is +based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it could not +construct a practical system of society upon what would be +left,—its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, +"All this seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, +that it can never be sure. You must modify (correct?) this +seeming, by the consideration that, if it is so, then the Infinite +must know it so, and the finite and Infinite must know +it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and conditioned +thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect unreservedly +asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The +utterance is true, absolutely and universally true, and every +intellect <i>must</i> see it so."<span class="pagenum">[13]</span></p> + +<p>Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every +science of which the human mind is cognizant. But more are +not needed. Enough has been adduced to establish the <i>fact</i> +of those qualities, universality and necessity, as inherent +in certain mental affirmations. Having thus pointed out the +essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is required to state:</p> + +<p>2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended +therein.</p> + +<p>In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and +assertions of the mind, which are instinctive, and which it +involuntarily qualifies as universal and necessary, are not, +and cannot be comprehended in Sir William Hamilton's +scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the +<i>a priori</i> laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of +the present undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its +success. This will be secured by presenting a classification +of them, and sufficient examples under each class. Moreover, +to avoid a labor which would not be in place here, we +shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without +question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of +our purest and every way best thinkers,—Rev. Mark Hopkins, +D. D., President of Williams College, Mass.</p> + +<p>"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be +divided into, first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These +are at the foundation of the abstract sciences, having for +their subject, quantity. In the second division are those +which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon these +rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations. +The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. +These are at the foundation of æsthetical science. In the +fourth division are those which pertain to morals and religion. +Of these the pervading element is the sense of obligation +or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in connection +with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, +and with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon +that."—<i>Moral Science</i>, p. 161.<span class="pagenum">[14]</span></p> + +<p>First.—Mathematical ideas and axioms.</p> + +<p>Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, +except a Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally +<i>constructed</i>; that a will put it together, and might take it +apart? Seven times seven now make forty-nine. Will +any one say that it might have been made to make forty-seven; +or that at some future time such may be the case? +Or again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the +same thing are equal to one another." Will some one say, +that the intellectual beings in the universe might, with equal +propriety, have been so constructed as to affirm that, in some +instances, things which are equal to the same thing are <i>unequal</i> +to one another? Or consider the properties of a triangle. +Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties are +a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle +might have been made to have three right angles? Yet +again. Examine the syllogism. Was its law constructed?</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">All M is X;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All Z is M;<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All Z is X.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Will any one say that <i>perhaps</i>, we don't know but it might +have been so made, as to appear to us that the conclusion +was Some Z is not X? Or will the Limitists run into that +miserable petty subterfuge of an assertion, "All this <i>seems</i> +to us as it is, and we cannot see how it could be different; +but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined in such +narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to +assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of +wider scope? Perhaps they see things differently." <i>Perhaps</i> +they do; but if they do, their minds or ours falsify! The +question is one of <i>veracity</i>, nothing more. Throughout all the +range of mathematics, the positive and <i>unqualified</i> affirmation +of the mind is that its intuitions are absolute and universal; +that they are <i>a priori</i> laws conditional of <i>all</i> intellect; that +of the Deity just as much as that of man. Feebleness and +want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its affirmation,<span class="pagenum">[15]</span> +"Seven times seven <i>must</i> make forty-nine; <i>and cannot by +any possibility of effort make any other product</i>;" and every +intellect, <i>if it sees at all, must see it so</i>. And so on through +the catalogue. From this, it follows in this instance, that +human knowledge is <i>exhaustive</i>, and so is exactly similar, +and equal to the Deity's knowledge.</p> + +<p>Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere +being and its relations.</p> + +<p>Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist +in the Universe without standing in some relation to all +the other material bodies in that Universe. Either this is +absolutely true, or it is not. If it is so true, then every intellectual +being to whom it presents itself as object at all, +must see it as every other does. One may see more relations +than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must +be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the +converse, or any partially contradictory proposition, may be +true. For example. A material body may exist in the Universe, +and stand in no relation to some of the other material +bodies in that Universe. But, few men will hesitate to say, +that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it could only +become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of +thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.</p> + +<p>Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage +and offspring, in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, +no matter to what class they belong, by the fact of becoming +parents, establish a new relation for themselves; and, "after +their kind," they are under bonds to their young. And, to a +greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon them. +As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is +greater, and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether +it be the fierce eagle, or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; +whether it be the prowling lion, or the distrustful deer, +or the cowering hare; or whether it be the races of man who +are examined, the relations established by parentage are +everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this<span class="pagenum">[16]</span> +might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call +law, is only a judgment of mankind; and so that this relation +did not exist at first, but was the product of growth? +And will one further say that there is no necessity or universality +in this relation; but that the races might, for aught +we know, have just as well been established with a parentage +which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference +of the ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the +law of sentient being? Yet such results logically flow from +the principles of the Limitists. Precisely the same line of +argument might be pursued respecting the laws of human +society. But it is not needed here. It is evident now, that +what gives validity to judgments <i>is the fact that they accord +with an a priori principle in the mind</i>.</p> + +<p>Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. +A science of beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed +to permit of so extensive an illustration of this class as the +others. Yet enough is established for our purpose. Let us +consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is said that certain +Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian +era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, +and constructed a statue according to it; and that both were +pronounced at the time <i>perfect</i>. Both statue and formula +are now lost. Be the story true, or a legend, there is valid +ground for the assertion, that the mind instinctively assumes, +in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a perfect ideal by +which as standard, all art must be judged. The very fact +that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its +own ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some +mind, there is an ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect +arm, and a perfect foot a perfect leg, and these a perfect +trunk; and a perfect neck supports a perfect head, adorned +by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect ideal, is <i>decisive</i> +that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is true, +because God who made us, and constructed the ground from +whence this instinctive affirmation springs, is true.<span class="pagenum">[17]</span></p> + +<p>Take another instance. Few men, who have studied +Gothic spires, have failed to observe that the height of some, +in proportion to their base, is too great, and that of others, +too small. The mind irresistibly affirms, that between these +opposite imperfections, there is a golden mean, at which the +proportion shall be <i>perfect</i>. When the formula of this proportion +shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled +with tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered +and promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical +skill will be all that can differentiate one workman +from another. The fact that the law has not been discovered +yet, throws no discredit upon the positive affirmation of the +mind, that there must be such a law; any more than the fact +of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he +saw the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon +seeing that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with +which it fell.</p> + +<p>Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to +make these assertions. If they were judgments, the mind +would only speak of probabilities; but here, it qualifies the +assertion with necessity. Men, however positive in their +temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain to-morrow," +but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here +the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance +is the extreme of positiveness. It says <i>must</i>. And if its +affirmation is not true, then there is no <i>reason</i> why those +works of art which are held in highest esteem, should be +adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro, except the whim +of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of their +admirers.</p> + +<p>Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals +and religion.</p> + +<p>We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could +by any possibility ever guess, much less investigate. Here +no sense could ever penetrate; there is no object for it to +perceive. Here all judgments are impertinent; for in this<span class="pagenum">[18]</span> +sphere are only laws, and duties, and obligations. An understanding +cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because such +a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because +it has no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon +in the other classes, it would be utterly impotent +to explain a single phenomenon in this. What is moral obligation? +Whence does it arise, or how is it imposed? and +who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All these, +and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even +by the Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral +law of the Universe is one which can be learned from no +judgment, or combination of judgments. It can be learned +only by being <i>seen</i>. The moral law is no conclusion, which +may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an affirmation +which is <i>imperative</i>. To illustrate. It is an axiom, +that the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. +Man is a free moral agent; and so, under the obligation +imposed. At the first, it was optional with the Deity +whether he would create man or not. But will any one +assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it +was optional with him, whether man should be under the +obligation, or not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be +free from the duties inherent therein? Does not the mind +instinctively and necessarily affirm, that the fact of free moral +agency assures the fact of such a relation to God's moral +government, that obligation <i>must</i> follow? One cannot hesitate +to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released +from his obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.</p> + +<p>Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the +Universe; and yet man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he +proclaimed that law in the words "Thou shalt love the Lord +thy God with all thy mind and strength, and thy neighbor +as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought, deny. +A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of +the Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man +not only sees the law, but he feels and acknowledges the<span class="pagenum">[19]</span> +obligation, even in his rebellion. In fact there would be +no rebellion, no sense of sin, if there were no obligation. +Whence comes the authority of the law? No power can +give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a +Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can +have authority; it imposes, and can impose obligation; only +because <i>it is an a priori law of the Universe</i>, alike binding +upon <i>all</i> moral beings, upon God as well as man; and is +so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct intuition. +Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a +necessarily fundamental law of <i>all</i> moral beings. <i>Therefore</i> +he acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set +up a throne for Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, +is an involuntary acknowledgment of the authority of +that law he seeks to rival.</p> + +<p>It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding +can take any cognizance of the objects of investigation which +fall in this class. This is because the Sense can gather no +material over which the Understanding can run. Is the +moral law matter? No. How then can the Sense observe +it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced +from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this +it is replied</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral +law of the Universe. Their conduct accords with the law +of selfishness. Such conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war +is the natural condition of Society, are those which would +follow from a consideration of man, as he appears to the +Sense.</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,—How came +it there? <i>How came this fundamental law to be?</i> and to this +the Sense and Understanding return no shadow of answer.</p> + +<p>But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. +All the ideas and beliefs, every process of thought which +belongs to this sphere, are absolute and universal. They +must be what they are; and so are conditional of all moral<span class="pagenum">[20]</span> +beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just what the +Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that +the truth, as far as so seen, is <i>common</i> to both.</p> + +<p>Although the facts which have been adduced above, are +inexplicable by the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality +of the Reason, as it has been heretofore described, yet +another line of argument of great wight must not be omitted. +There are in language certain <i>positive</i> terms, which +the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in +asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by +the Sense and Understanding. Such are the words infinite +and absolute. The mere presence of such words in language, +as positive terms, is a decisive evidence of the fact, that there +is also a faculty which entertains positive ideas corresponding +to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in this matter, is +not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that these +words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite +and absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away +from, or abstraction of, those very conditions under which +thought itself is realized; consequently, the notion of the +Unconditioned is only negative—negative of the conceivable +itself." But, if this is true, how came these words in the +language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions. +Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to +designate another case in language, in which a positive term +can be alleged to have a <i>purely</i> negative signification. Take +an illustration to which we shall recur further on. The +question has been raised, whether a sixth sense can be. Can +the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a positive +term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? +We find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but +can such positive terms be found, which will correspond to +the phrase, no sixth sense? In this instance, in physics, the +absurdity is seen at once. Why is not as readily seen the +equal absurdity of affirming that, in metaphysics, positive +terms have grown up in the language which are simple<span class="pagenum">[21]</span> +negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts +may rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. +The axioms in mathematics, the principles of the +relations of being, the laws of æsthetics, and most of all the +whole system of principles pertaining to morals and religion, +standing, as they do, a series of mental affirmations, which +all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as necessary and +universal, compel assent to the proposition, that there must +be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and Understanding,—for +these have already been found impotent—which +can be ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. +And the presence in language of such positive terms +as absolute and infinite, is a most valuable auxiliary argument. +The faculty which is required,—the faculty which +qualifies all the products of its activity with the characteristics +above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality +may therefore be deemed established.</p> + +<p>The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next +required to show the mode of its activity. This can best be +done, by first noticing the <i>kind</i> of results which it produces. +The Reason gives us, not thoughts, but ideas. These are +simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is evident that any such +object of mental examination can be known only in, and by, +itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot +be compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element +which can be ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, +for it is primary and necessary. <i>It can only be seen.</i> +Such an object must be known under the following circumstances. +It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and must +be <i>immediately and directly seen</i> by that faculty; all this in +such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would +annihilate the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? +Above we found it to be both capacity and faculty: +capacity in that it possessed as integral elements, <i>a priori</i> +first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in that it saw, +brought forward, and made available, those principles. The<span class="pagenum">[22]</span> +mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a <i>seeing</i>, direct, +immediate, <i>sure</i>; which holds pure truth <i>fast</i>, right in the +very centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in +thus seeing pure truth is best denominated an intuition of +the Reason. And here it may be said,—If perception and +perceive could be strictly confined to the Sense; concept and +conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and intuit to +the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of expression +regarding these departments of the mind.</p> + +<p>Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the +existence of a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its +activity, it devolves to declare the function of that faculty.</p> + +<p>The function of the Pure Reason is, first:—to intuit, by +an immediate perception, the <i>a priori</i> elemental principles +which condition all being; second,—to intuit, by a like immediate +perception, those principles, combined in <i>a priori</i> +systematic processes, which are the conditional ideal forms +for all being; and third,—again to intuit, by another immediate +perception, precisely similar in kind to the others, the +fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all +<i>a priori</i> elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, +into a perfect unity,—an absolute, infinite Person,—God.</p> + +<p>To illustrate.</p> + +<p>1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and +that it is <i>necessarily</i> criminal; or, in other words, that no act, +of any will, can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, +then, that "Malice is criminal," is an axiom, and conditions +all being, God as well as man.</p> + +<p>2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must +be seen in Space and Time, and it affirms the same necessity +in this as in the former case.</p> + +<p>3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's +<i>a priori</i> argument for the existence of God. His statement +of it should, however, be so modified as to appear, not as an +<i>a priori</i> argument for the existence of God, but as an ampli<span class="pagenum">[23]</span>fied +declaration of the fact, that the existence of God is a +first principle of Reason; and as such, can no more be denied +than the multiplication table. Objection.—This doctrine +degrades God to the level of the finite; both being +alike conditioned. Answer.—By no means; as will be +seen from the two following points.</p> + +<p>1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, +which means, if it means anything, that the existence +of God is <i>beyond his own control</i>; or, in other words, +that self-existence is an <i>a priori</i> elemental principle, which +conditions God's existing at all.</p> + +<p>2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition +has entirely different significations. God is conditioned +only by <i>Himself</i>. Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, +properly speaking, but the very absence of limitation. +The fact that He is absolute and infinite, is a condition of +His existence. Man's conditions are the very opposite of +these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead +of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he +differs in <i>kind</i> from God as do his conditions.</p> + +<p>Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully +competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sir William +Hamilton and his followers; and the statement of such +solution is the work immediately in hand.</p> + +<p>Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, +attended every discussion of this subject, will be removed by +examining the definitions given to certain terms;—either +by statement, or by implication in the use made of them;—by +exposing the errors involved; and by clearly expressing +the true signification of each term.</p> + +<p>By way of criticism the general statement may be made,—that +the Limitists—as was natural from their rejection of +the faculty of the Pure Reason—use only such terms, and +in such senses, as are pertinent to those subjects which come +under the purvey of the Understanding and the Sense; but +which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the sphere of<span class="pagenum">[24]</span> +spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error +are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.</p> + +<p>1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express +abstractions. For instance, "<i>the infinite</i>, from a human point +of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions +under which thought is possible." "It is thus manifest that +a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory +with that of the Infinite."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, +pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" +what? Will you allow person, or other definite term to be +supplied? Mansel would reply—No! no possible answer +can be given by man.</p> + +<p>Now, without passing at all upon the question whether +these terms can represent concrete objects of thought or not, +it is to be said, that the use of them to express abstract notions, +is utterly unsound. The mere fact of abstraction is +an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite and Absolute +Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract +Infinite.</p> + +<p>2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by +the Limitists in their use of the words infinite and absolute, +as expressing quantity. Take a few examples from many.</p> + +<p>"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute +whole, that is, a whole so great that we cannot also +conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an +absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also +conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. +On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or realize, +or construe to the mind (as here understanding and imagination +coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done +by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which +would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; +nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an +infinite divisibility of parts."—<i>Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 20.</p> + +<p>"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute +and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest meta<span class="pagenum">[25]</span>physicians +have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than +the sum of all reality."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, p. 76.</p> + +<p>"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think +of the First Cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To +think of it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of +something beyond its limits; it is absolutely impossible to +conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving a region surrounding +its boundaries."—<i>Spencer's First Principles</i>, p. 37.</p> + +<p>The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever +stood on the north side of the affections. Besides the extracts +selected, any person reading the authors above named, +will find numerous phrases like these: "infinite whole," "infinite +sum," "infinite number," "infinite series," by which +they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a +material amount.</p> + +<p>Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite +and absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any +object of the Sense or of the Understanding, judging according +to the Sense, or to any number. There is no +whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and +limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as +absurd as to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, +is to "multiply words without knowledge."</p> + +<p>Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do +not tend in any degree to clear up the fogs in which they +have lost themselves, but only make the muddle thicker. +Take, for instance, the following extract:—</p> + +<p>"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The +Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be +conceived as unconscious; it cannot be conceived as complex, +neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived +by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of +difference; it cannot be identified with the Universe, neither +can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, +regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible."—<i>Limits +of Religious Thought</i>, p. 79.<span class="pagenum">[26]</span></p> + +<p>The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the +watery waste of such a philosophy, can find no rest for the +sole of her foot, except on that floating carcase of a doctrine, +Chaos is God. The simple fact that such confusion logically +results from the premises of the Limitists, is a sufficient warrant +for rejecting their whole system of thought,—principle +and process; and for striking for a new base of operations. +But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable +Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? +Man seeks a Rock upon which he can climb and cry, +I <span class="smcap">know</span> that this is truth. Where is the Everlasting Rock? +In our search for the answer to these queries, we may be +aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,—the object to +be obtained.</p> + +<p>By observation and reflection man comes to know that he +is living in, and forms part of, a system of things, which he +comprehensively terms the Universe. The problem is,—<i>To +find an Ultimate Ground, a Final Cause, which shall be +adequate to account for the existence and sustentation of this +Universe</i>. There are but two possible directions from which +the solution of this problem can come. It must be found +either within the Universe, or without the Universe.</p> + +<p>Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of +two positions must be true. Either a part of the Universe +is cause for the existence of the whole of the Universe; or +the Universe is self-existent. Upon the first position nothing +need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the very statement +of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than +a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second +point, would be beyond the intention of the author. The +questions at issue lie not between theists and pantheists, but +between those who alike reject Pantheism as erroneous. The +writer confesses himself astonished that a class of rational +men could ever have been found, who should have attempted +to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe <i>in itself</i>. All +that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns<span class="pagenum">[27]</span> +by observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains +is, that a vast system of physical objects exists. From the +facts observed, he draws conclusions: but the stream cannot +rise higher than its fountain. With reference to any lesser +object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A watch is. +It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to +each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, +upon being asked to account for the existence of the +watch, should confine himself wholly to an examination of +the nature of the springs, the wheels, the hands, face, &c., +endeavoring to find the reason of its being within itself, the +world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the +world laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man +who rummages among the springs and wheels of the vast +machine of the Universe, to find the reason of <i>its</i> being. In +the former instance, the bystander would exclaim,—"The +watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only intelligent +being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. +Man made the watch." And his assertion would be true. +<i>A fortiori</i> would a bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The +Universe is an evidence of intelligence. An intelligent Being, +superior to the Universe, made the Universe." And his +assertion is true. We are driven then to our last position; +but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">The Ultimate Ground of the Universe must Be +sought for, and can only be found, without +the Universe.</span></p> + +<p>From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any +hope of reaching the goal. Setting out on our new course +we will gain a step by noticing a fact involved in the illustration +just given. The bystander exclaims, "The watch is +an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is necessarily +expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: +the one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of +mind. One cannot think of matter except as inferior, nor<span class="pagenum">[28]</span> +of mind except as superior. These two, matter and mind, +comprise all possible existence. The Reason not only cannot +see <i>how</i> any other existence can be, but affirms <i>that</i> no +other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the +Universe. What mind?</p> + +<p>By examination, man perceives what appears to be an +order in the Universe, concludes that there is such an order, +assumes the conclusion to be valid, and names the order Nature. +Turning his eye upon himself, he finds himself not +only associated with, but, through a portion of his faculties, +forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper scrutiny, +a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most +secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows +refulgent in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, +indeed, in Nature; but he thrills with joy at the quickly +acquired knowledge that Nature is only a nest, in which he, +a purely supernatural being, must flutter for a time, until he +shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the Spirit +Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central +self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that +he instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe +of gold and diamonds;" <i>a fortiori</i> must that Being, +who is the Ultimate Ground, not only of Nature, but of those +supernatural intelligences who live in Nature, be supernatural, +spiritual, and supreme?</p> + +<p>Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all +possible existence. It has now been found that mind, in its +highest form, even in man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly +supernatural. It has further been determined, that the object +of our search must be the Supreme Spirit.</p> + +<p>Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, +the most egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists +have made. In order to do this satisfactorily, the following +analysis of the human mind is presented. The soul is a +spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this animal nature +belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally<span class="pagenum">[29]</span> +acknowledged,—at least the Limitists will not deny,—that +the Sense and the Understanding are wholly within, and +conditioned by Nature. Observe then their folly. They +deny that a part can account for a whole; they reject Pantheism; +<i>and yet they employ only those faculties which they +confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature</i>—for +they deny the existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive +faculty of the spiritual person—<i>to search, only in Nature, +for the cause of Nature</i>. A fly would buzz among the wheels +of a clock to as little purpose.</p> + +<p>The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful +attention.</p> + +<p><i>The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is</i> <span class="smcap">the Supreme +Spirit</span>.</p> + +<p>To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis +of man. In his spiritual personality we have found him +wholly supernatural. We have further found that, only as a +spiritual person is he capable of pursuing this investigation to +a final and valid termination. If, then, we would complete our +undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no +eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring +wing can never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no +judgments are needed. Through Reason—the soul's far-darting +eye,—and through Reason alone, can we gaze on the +Immutable.</p> + +<p>Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that +man, as spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,—the faculty +which gives him <i>a priori</i> first principles, as the standard for +conduct and the forms for activity,—a Spiritual Sensibility, +which answers with emotive music to the call of the Reason; +and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells central, solitary, +and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny. +Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause.</p> + +<p>The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man +appears the very likeness of the Being we seek. His highest +powers unmistakably shadow forth the form of that Being,<span class="pagenum">[30]</span> +who is The Final. Man originates; but he is dependent +for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to +his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is +utterly independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends +wherever, without himself, he chooses. Man, after a +process of culture, comes to intuit some first principles, in +some combinations. We seek a being who necessarily sees, +at once and forever, all possible first principles, in all possible +relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man +stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of +the way, but more frequently perversely violating the eternal +law which he finds written on his heart. We seek a being +who never stumbles, but who is perfectly wise; and whose +conduct is in immutable accord with the <i>a priori</i> standards +of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent for existence, +and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom +we seek will be found to be also a spiritual person who is +self-existent, and who sets his own bounds to his activity.</p> + +<p>That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true +one, and that the result which we approach, and are about +to utter, is well founded, receives decisive confirmation from +the following facts. Man perceives that malice must be +criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A similar +remark is true of mathematical, and all other <i>a priori</i> laws. +Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable +thrill of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal +river which flows, calmly and forever, through the bosom +of the "Everlasting Father." For his own conduct, man is +the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the likeness of +the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible +form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. +Here, therefore, Philosophy and Revelation are at one. +With startling, and yet grateful unanimity, they affirm the +solemn truth, "<span class="smcap">God made man in his own image</span>."</p> + +<p>We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full +in the field of our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the<span class="pagenum">[31]</span> +beginning and the ending, saith Jehovah, who is, and who +was, and who is to come, the Almighty." <span class="smcap">That spiritual +Person who is self-existent, absolute, and infinite, +is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause of the +Universe.</span></p> + +<p>The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within +the portico of the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, +at last, the veil of Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.</p> + +<p>It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those +expressions must be, in which the terms infinite and absolute +are employed as signifying abstractions or amounts. They +can have no meaning with reference to the Universe. But +what their true significance is, stands out with unmistakable +clearness and precision.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual</i> <span class="smcap">quality</span> <i>of the +necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except +by Himself, and as complete</i>.</p> + +<p>2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,—the one the +positive, and the other the negative term expressive of the +same idea.</p> + +<p>3. <i>Infinity is that distinctive spiritual</i> <span class="smcap">quality</span> <i>of the +necessary Being which gives to Him universality</i>.</p> + +<p>Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of +the self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all +other persons, constitute Him unique and supreme.</p> + +<p>It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, +that whenever, by a process of thought, a result has +been attained and set forth, he who propounds the result is +directly responsible for all that is logically involved in it. +The authority of that law is here both acknowledged and +invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical development +of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human +mind is capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that +there can be found therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle +of contradiction. As germain, and important to the matter +in hand, some steps in this development will be noted.<span class="pagenum">[32]</span></p> + +<p>In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account +for the being and continuance of the Universe, we have +found that the Universe and its Cause are two distinct and +yet intimately and necessarily connected beings, the one dependent +upon the other, and that other utterly independent; +and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other absolute +and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person, +and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness +belong; while the other is wholly person, and consequently +the pure, absolute, and infinite Person. We have +further found that absoluteness and infinity are spiritual +qualities of that one Person, which are incommunicable, and +differentiate Him from all other possible beings; and which +establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all +possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the +limitations and conditions of personality,—a Person at once +limited and unlimited, conditioned and unconditioned, related +and unrelated, whose limitations, conditions, and relations +are entirely consistent with his absoluteness and infinity, who +is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the Universe.</p> + +<p>The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure self-comprehending; +but he only partially perceives the workings +of his own being. <i>A fortiori</i>, must the infinite Person be +self-conscious, and exhaustively self-comprehending. The +finite person is an intellect, sensibility, and will; but these +are circumscribed by innumerable limitations. So must the +infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and will; but His +intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure Delight, +and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as +act, Omnipotence.</p> + +<p>1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.</p> + +<p>Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of +what it is possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" +or, in other words, "The pure ideals of all possible +entities, lie as pure reason conceptions in the light of the +divine intelligence, and in these must be found the rules<span class="pagenum">[33]</span> +after which the creative agency must go forth." These <i>a +priori</i> "pure ideals" are <i>conditional</i> of his knowledge. +They are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He +must know them as they are. He cannot intuit, or think +otherwise than in accordance with them. However many +there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and definite, +and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. +In fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved +the fact, that the number of his qualities, attributes, +faculties, forms of activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, +definite, and so known to him; and yet he is infinite +and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself to be so.</p> + +<p>2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.</p> + +<p>Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, +produced by the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth +and worthiness, and his entire complacency therein. Yet he +is pleased with the good conduct, and displeased with the +evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And if two +are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more +than the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or +lessens his own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.</p> + +<p>3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; +in act, Omnipotence.</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> In choice, the whole personality,—both the spontaneous +and self activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the +one direction. Some of the objects towards which this state +manifests itself may be very small. The fact that each receives +the attention appropriate to his place in the system of +beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which spontaneously +prompts to all good acts. But</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always +must be, limited. His ability to act is limited and +determined by the "pure ideals," in which "must be found +the rules after which the creative agency must go forth." In +act he is also limited by his choice. The fact that he is +Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act<span class="pagenum">[34]</span> +which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct +a rational being, to whom two and two will appear +five; and if he should attempt to, he would cease to be perfect +Goodness. Again, the infinite Person performs an act—of +Creation. The act is, must be, limited and definite; and +so must the product—the Universe be. He cannot create +an unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very +words unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, +are contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, +an infinite act, even if possible, would not, could not create, +or have any relation to the construction of a Universe. An +infinite act must be the realization of an infinite ideal. The +infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of himself; +and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, +being the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the +only possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in +himself. But, should it be in his power to realize it <i>again</i>, +that exertion of power would be an infinite act, and its +product another infinite Person. No other infinite act, and +no other result, are rationally supposable.</p> + +<p>The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited +and definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; +but in the mind of its Creator every atom is numbered. No +spirit may ever have skirted its boundary; but that boundary +is as clear and distinct to his eye as the outline of the Alps +against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The questions Where? +How far? How long? How much? and the like, are pertinent +only in the Universe; and their answers are always +limited and definite.</p> + +<p>The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by +a large class of thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly +contradictory and self-destructive. We speak of a Person, +a term which necessarily involves limitation and condition, +as infinite and absolute. We speak of this infinity and absoluteness +as spiritual qualities, which are conditional and limiting +to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an inability<span class="pagenum">[35]</span> +to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists, +our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, +for the completion of this portion of our task, to present a +rational ground upon which these apparent contradictions +shall become manifestly consistent.</p> + +<p>In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of +as limited and unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a +play upon words, and that they apply to different qualities in +the personality. It is not said, of course, that the number of +his faculties is limited and unlimited; or that his self-complacency +is boundless and constrained; or that his act is conditioned +and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes +stated to puzzle and disturb. They are written to +express a great, fundamental, and all-important truth, which +seems never once to have shadowed the minds of the Limitists,—a +truth which, when once seen, dispels forever all +the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. +The truth is this.</p> + +<p>That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations +are wholly subjective, <i>i. e.</i> find their whole base and spring +in his self; and who is therefore entirely free from on all possible +limitations, conditions, and relations, from without himself; +and who possesses, therefore, all possible fulness of all +possible excellences, and finds the perennial acme of happiness +in self-contemplation, and the consciousness of his perfect +worth; and being such is ground for all other possible +being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated, unconditioned, +unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed +by Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite +Person are <i>different in kind</i> from the conditions imposed +upon finite persons and physical things. The former in no +way diminish aught from the fulness of their possessor's endowments; +the latter not only do so diminish, but render +it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.</p> + +<p>The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly +express the truth we have attained.<span class="pagenum">[36]</span></p> + +<p><i>Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which +diminish the fulness of the possessor's endowments.</i></p> + +<p>An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from +some reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we +quote. "What we need is not merely a rule by which to +direct <i>the process</i> in the attainment of any artistic end, but +we must find the legislator who may determine the end itself"...</p> + +<p>Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine +the archetype, and control the pure spontaneity in its action.</p> + +<hr class="tb" /> + +<p>"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner +want to gratify, with no higher end than the gratification of +the highest constitutional craving? Can we find nothing +beyond a want, which shall from its own behest demand that +this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the round +worlds and all their furniture are <i>good</i>—but why good? +Certainly as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness +of sentient beings, is <i>good</i>—but why good? Because +it supplies the want of the Supreme Architect. And is this +the <i>supreme good</i>? Surely if it is, we are altogether within +nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment by what +name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only +as the highest architect finds such wants within himself, and +the archetypal rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual +manner; and precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in +the shortest way, so he goes to his work in making and peopling +worlds in the most direct manner. Here is no will; +no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds himself +so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving +of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and +the gratifying of this craving is <i>the highest good</i>."</p> + +<p>We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the +diminishing from the undiminishing condition. A sense of +want, <i>a craving</i>, is the necessary result of a diminishing condition. +Hence the presence of any craving is the distinguishing +mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments<span class="pagenum">[37]</span> +which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the +distinguishing mark of the infinite and absolute Person. In +this plenitude his infinity and absoluteness consist; and it is, +therefore, conditional of them. Upon this plenitude, as conditional +of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok speaks further, +as follows:—</p> + +<p>"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and +law for benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist +shall be put to his beneficent agency above all considerations +that he finds his nature craving it. It must be that for whose +sake, happiness, even that which, as kind and benevolent, +craves on all sides the boon to bless others, itself should be. +Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic autonomy, +which knows that within itself there is an excellency +which obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be +found, nor anything very analogous to it, in sensient nature +and a dictate from some generalized experience. It lies +within the rational spirit, and is law in the heart, as an inward +imperative in its own right, and must there be found.... +This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating +and self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth +imperative above want; an end in itself, and not means to +another end; a user of things, but not itself to be used by anything; +and, on account of its intrinsic excellency, an authoritative +determiner for its own behoof of the entire artistic agency +with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or accusing.</p> + +<p>"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, +gives the ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and +can attain to nothing higher, than that it should satisfy this +worthiness as end; and thereby in all his works, he fixes, in +his own light, upon the subjective archetype, and attains to +the objective result of that which is befitting his own dignity. +It is, therefore, in no craving want which must be gratified, +but from the interest of an inner behest, which should be +executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created +all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"<span class="pagenum">[38]</span></p> + +<p>In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, +the division of conditions into two classes—the one class, +conditions proper, comprising those which diminish the endowments +of the being upon whom they lie, and are ground +for a craving or lack; and the other class, comprising those +conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the +being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground +for perfect plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction +on account thereof—is seen to be thoroughly philosophical. +And let it be here noted, that the very construction, or, if +the term suit better, perception of this distinction, is a decisive +evidence of the fact, and a direct product of the operation +of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only +what the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, +not only could no other but diminishing conditions +be thought of, but by no possibility could a hint that +there were any others flit through the mind. Such a mind, +being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature, <i>cannot</i> +climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those +conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural +and spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed +at, much more examined critically and classified, but by a +being possessed of a faculty the same in kind with the intellect +in which such spiritual conditions inhere.</p> + +<p>The actual processes which go on in the mind are as +follows. The Sense, possessing a purely mechanical structure, +a structure not differing in <i>kind</i> from that of the vegetable,—both +being alike entirely conditioned by the law of +cause and effect,—perceives phenomena. The relation of the +object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory, and +the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, +are fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in +fixed mechanical forms, it is, by this very construction, incapable, +not only of receiving impressions and examining +phenomena outside of those forms, but it can never be startled +with the guess that there <i>is</i> anything else than what is received<span class="pagenum">[39]</span> +therein. For instance: A man born blind, though +he can have no possible notion of what light is, knows that +light is, from the testimony of those who can see. But if a +race of men born blind should be found, who had never had +any communication with men who could see, it is notorious +that they could have no possible notion even that light was. +A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. +This position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, +by the failure of the mind in its efforts to construct +an entirely new sense. Every attempt only intensifies our +appreciation of the futility of the effort. From fragments +of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a patchwork +sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new +sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental +faculty, must transcend the very conditions of its existence. +It is precisely with the Understanding as with the lower faculty. +It cannot transcend its limits. It can add no item to +the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces it from a +presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond +to those in its associate faculty.</p> + +<p>It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties +may construct a <i>system</i>, but can never develop a <i>science</i>. +It can arrange, classify, by such standards as its fancy may +select, the phenomena in nature; but this must be in accordance +with some sensuous form. <i>No law can be seen</i>, by which +it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such classification must +always be determined by the number of stamens in the flower, +for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as +good as any other, <i>unless there comes a higher faculty</i> which, +overlooking all nature, perceives the <i>a priori</i> law working in +nature, which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive +development of a science which in its <i>idea</i> cannot be improved. +It is manifest, further, that those conditions, to which +we have applied the epithet proper, lie upon the two faculties +we have been considering. In this we agree with the +Limitists.<span class="pagenum">[40]</span></p> + +<p>It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose +existence was proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent +to overlook, and so comprehend nature, and all the +conditions of nature, and thereby assign to said conditions +their true and inferior place, while it soars out of nature, and +intuits those <i>a priori</i> laws which, though the conditions of, +are wholly unconditioned <i>by nature</i>; but which are both the +conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this +in an entirely different sense from the other. This is the +province of the Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, +above all clouds of sense, under the full blaze of eternal +truth, the soul sees all nature spread like a vast map before +her searching eye, sharply observes, and appreciates all the +conditions of nature; and then, while holding it full in the +field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other +land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too +in all their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision +never approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these +supernatural conditions are no deprivation which awaken a +want, but that they inhere and cohere, as final ground for +absolute plenitude of endowments and fulness of bliss, in +the Self-existent Person.</p> + +<p>It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves +the doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual +person is on a par with the Universal Genius in the infinite +spiritual Person. The objection is fallacious, because +based upon the assumption that likeness in mode of action +involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the finite +Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal +Genius; the objects perceived by both are the same, they +are seen in the same light, and so are in accord; but the +<i>range</i> of the finite is one, and the <i>range</i> of the infinite is +another; and so diverse also are the circumstances attending +the act of seeing. The range of the finite Reason is, <i>always +must be, partial</i>: the range of the infinite Reason is, <i>always +must be, exhaustive</i> (not infinite). In circumstances, the finite<span class="pagenum">[41]</span> +Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a +germ in which it is inactive, and <i>must</i> be developed by association +with nature, and under forms of nature; and can +never, by any possibility of growth, attain to that perfectness +in which it shall be satisfied, or to a point in development +from which it can continue its advance as <i>pure spirit</i>. It +always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a spiritual +body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore +independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute +possession of all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. +Hence, while the infinite and finite reasons see the same object +in the same light, and therefore <i>alike</i>, the difference in +range, and the difference in circumstance, must forever constitute +them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight just +noticed is the <i>necessary a priori</i> ground upon which a moral +government is <i>possible</i>.</p> + +<p>In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction +between the two classes of conditions rests, we have been +led to distinguish more clearly between the faculties of the +mind, and especially to observe how the Pure Reason enables +us thereby to solve the problems she has raised. In this +radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication +of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears +that the terms must, possible, and the like, being used +to express no idea of restraint, as coming from without upon +the infinite Person, or of lack or craving, as subsisting within +him, are properly employed in expressing the fact that his +<i>Self, as a priori ground for his activity</i>, is, though the only, +yet a real, positive, and irremovable limit, condition, and law +of his action. Of two possible ends he may freely choose +either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one; +but the constituting laws of the Self he <i>cannot</i>, and the moral +laws of his Self he <i>will not</i>, violate.</p> + +<p>That point has now been reached at which this branch of +the discussion in hand may be closed. The final base from +which to conduct an examination of the questions respecting<span class="pagenum">[42]</span> +absoluteness and infinity has been attained. In the progress +to this consummation it was found that a radical psychological +error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by the Limitists. +Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially +defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found +to belong to certain mental affirmations. Four classes of +these affirmations or ideas were named and illustrated; and +by them the fact of the Reason was established. Then its +mode of activity and its functions were stated; and finally +the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by +this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the +final cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; +and it was then seen that</p> + +<blockquote><p>That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and +infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the +Universe.</p></blockquote> + +<p>Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to +such a position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. +From the result thus secured the way is prepared +for an examination of the general principles and their special +applications which the Limitists maintain, and this will +occupy our future pages.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[43]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_II">PART II.</h2> + +<p class="h3">AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION +OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES +UNDER IT.</p> + +<p>It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid +and final basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings +of the human soul, and afford it a sure rest. In the +fact that God made man in his own image, and that thus +there is, <i>to a certain extent</i>, a community of faculties, a community +of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a +community of interests, have we found such a basis. We +have hereby learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary +and final; in other words, that he can know the truth, +and be sure that his knowledge is correct. If the proofs +which have been offered of the fact of the Pure Reason, and +the statements which have been made of the mode of its activity +and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of +the Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have +been satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider +the analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental +proposition, which was promised on an early page. We +there gave, it was thought, sufficiently full extracts for a fair +presentation of his theory, and followed them with a candid +epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the purpose +named, we are constrained at the outset to make an +acknowledgment.</p> + +<p>It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in +silence the masterly article on this subject in the "North +American Review" for October, 1864, and after it to pretend<span class="pagenum">[44]</span> +to offer anything new. Whatever the author might +have wrought out in his own mental workshop,—and his +work was far less able than what is there given,—that article +has left nothing to be said. He has therefore been +tempted to one of two courses: either to transfer it to these +pages, or pass by the subject entirely. Either course may, +perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which is, +while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few +short extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in +this, which is, that some persons may see this volume, who +have no access to the Review, and to whom, therefore, these +pages will be valuable. To save needless repetition, this +discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned back +and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to.</p> + +<p>Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, +one is met by a logical <i>faux pas</i> which is truly amazing. +Immediately after the assertion that "the mind can +know only the <i>limited and the conditionally limited</i>," and in +the very sentence in which he denies the possibility of a +knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, <i>he proceeds to define +those words in definite and known terms</i>! The Infinite he +defines as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute +as "the unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say +that the defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, +then! "The Infinite," an unknown term, may be represented +by <i>x</i>; and the unconditionally unlimited, a compound +unknown term, by <i>ab</i>. Now, who has the right to say, either +in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that +<i>x</i>=<i>ab</i>? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy +of the Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. +Either the terms infinite and absolute are known terms +and definable, or they are unknown terms and undefinable. +Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and definable. Which +does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are unknown; +then all else that he has written about them are +batches of meaningless words. If he is held to the latter,<span class="pagenum">[45]</span> +they are definable; then are they known, and his system is +denied in the assertion of it. Since his words are so contradictory, +he must be judged by his deeds; and in these he always +assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the infinite +and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; +for there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis +of his theory, then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis.</p> + +<p>Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory +is quoted, and read the last sentence. Is his utterance a +"principle," or is it a judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a +guess. The logician asserts that we know only the conditioned, +and yet bases his assertion upon "the principles," &c. +What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is axiom, +then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence +in which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in +saying, is just what he did. He blindly assumed certain +"fundamental laws of thought,"—to quote another of his +phrases—to establish the impotence of the mind to know +those laws <i>as fundamental</i>. Again, if his philosophy is valid, +the words "must," "necessary," and the like are entirely +out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned +there is, can be, no must, no necessity.</p> + +<p>From these excursions about the principle let us now return +to the principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: +There are two extremes,—"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." +These include all being. They are contradictories, +that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the other. But the +mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the logical +conclusion? <i>That the mind cannot conceive of anything.</i> +What is his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of +something between the infinite and the absolute, which is +neither the one nor the other, but a <i>tertium quid</i>—the conditioned. +Where did this <i>tertium quid</i> come from, when he +had already comprehended everything in the two extremes? +If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, +then "excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter +at all.<span class="pagenum">[46]</span></p> + +<p>To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just +stated, Hamilton erected the subterfuge of <i>mental imbecility</i>. +To deny any knowledge to man, was to expose himself to +ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers after him, drew a +line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the hither +side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations +in the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions +which appeared in the mind, when one examined +those questions which lie on the further side of that line, resulted +from the impotency of the mind to comprehend the +questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How +satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will +show. But strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are +cognizable; and then let us proceed with our reasoning. +The essayist in the North American presents the theory +under four heads, as follows:—</p> + +<p>"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory +and exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true.</p> + +<p>"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.</p> + +<p>"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of +each is referable to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.</p> + +<p>"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable +between them."</p> + +<p>The first and fourth points require our especial attention.</p> + +<p>1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is <i>as defined</i>, +that the terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, +turns upon the definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are +erroneous; but in order to see wherein, the following general +reflections may be made:—</p> + +<p>The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, +have two distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and +one to God. Such definitions as are suitable to the latter +application, and self-consistent, have already been given. +Though reluctant to admit into a philosophical treatise a term +bearing two distinct meanings, we shall waive for a little our<span class="pagenum">[47]</span> +scruples,—though choosing, for ourselves, to use the equivalent +rather than the term.</p> + +<p>Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space +and Time shall not be contradictory to infinite Space and +Time. Let us first observe Hamilton's theory. According +to it, Space, for instance, is either unconditional illimitation, +or it is unconditional limitation; in other words, it is illimitable, +or it is a limited whole. The first part of the assertion +is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a self-evident +truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject +will see not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, +but that the attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with +the attempt to think two and two five. The last part is a +psychological blunder, has no pertinence to the question, and +is not what Hamilton was groping for. He was searching +for the truth, that <i>there is no absolute unit in Space</i>. A limited +whole has nothing to do with the matter in hand—absoluteness—at +all. The illimitability of Space, which has +just been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, +then, is the opposite pole of thought? We have just declared +it. There is no absolute unit of Space; or, in other words, +all division is in Space, but Space is indivisible. This, also, +is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain, then, two poles of +thought, and definitions of the two terms given, which are +exhaustive and consistent.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">"Space is illimitable.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Space is indivisible."<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness +of Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is <i>in</i> Space, +and all division is <i>in</i> Space; but Space is neither limited or +divided. One of the logician's extremes is seen, then, to +have no foundation in fact; and that which is found to be +true is also found to be consistent with, nay, essential to, +what should have been the other.</p> + +<p>Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any +attempt to find out God through the forms of Space and<span class="pagenum">[48]</span> +Time, a repetition will not be needed here. God is only to +be sought for, found, and studied, by such methods as are +suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the attempts +of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal +difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are +simply absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time +are to be discussed by themselves. And the questions respecting +God are to be discussed by themselves. He who +tries to reason from the one to the other is not less absurd +than he who should try to reason from a farm to the multiplication +table.</p> + +<p>In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that +there is just a modicum of truth underlying his theory,—just +enough to give it a degree of plausibility. The Sense, +as faculty for the perception of physical objects, or their images, +and the Understanding as discursive faculty for passing +over and forming judgments upon the materials gathered by +the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one he +stated. The Sense was made <i>incapable</i> of perceiving an ultimate +atom or of comprehending the universe. From the +fact that the Sense never has perceived these objects, the +Understanding concludes that it never will. Only by the insight +and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure Reason, +do we come to know that it never <i>can</i>. It was because those +lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space +and Time, and are unable to perceive or conceive anything +out of those conditions, and because, in considering them, he +failed to see the other mental powers, that Sir William Hamilton +constructed his Philosophy of the Unconditioned.</p> + +<p>2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.</p> + +<p>Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies +strictly to the work of the Understanding; and that faculty +can never have any notion of the Infinite or Absolute. But, +assuming that "conceive" is a general term for cognize, the +conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If all being +is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can +be known.<span class="pagenum">[49]</span></p> + +<p>3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. +If man can know nothing because of mental imbecility, why +suppose that he has a mental faculty at all? Why not +enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's theory, the +assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically consistent. +The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He +must confess that men know something. By a false psychology +he had ruled the Reason out of the mind, and so +had left himself no faculty by which to form any notion of +absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust themselves +before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he +constructed a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent +if he had said, There is no absolute and infinite. +The conditioned is the whole of existence; and this the mind +knows.</p> + +<p>"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable +between them."</p> + +<p>What the essayist in the North American says upon this +point is so apt, and so accords with our own previous reflections, +that we will not forbear making an extract. "The +last of the four theses will best be re-stated in Hamilton's +own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned is the +mean between two extremes—two inconditionates, exclusive +of each other, neither of which <i>can be conceived as possible</i>, +but of which, on the principles of contradiction and excluded +middle, one <i>must be admitted as necessary</i>.' This sentence +excites unmixed wonder. To mention in the same breath the +law of excluded middle, and two contradictions with a mean +between them, requires a hardihood unparalleled in the history +of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two contradictory +extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a cogitable +mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either +extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories +is wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of +a mean; if the mean exists, that may be true, and both the +contradictories false. But if a mean between the two contradictories<span class="pagenum">[50]</span> +be both impossible and absurd, (and we have +hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,) Hamilton's +conditioned entirely vanishes."</p> + +<p>Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, +is found to be but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, +further criticism would appear to be unnecessary.</p> + +<p>Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William +Hamilton's psychological error,—the rejection of the Reason +as the intellectual faculty of the spiritual person,—and having, +with him, used the terms limit, condition, and the like, +in such significations as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding +only, the Limitists proceed to present in a paradoxical +light many questions which arise concerning "the Infinite." +They take the ground that, to our view, he can be +neither person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of +these implies limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us +to know aught of him, except as such. Then having, as +they think, completely confused the mind, they draw hence +new support for their conclusion, that we can attain to no +satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following extracts +selected from many will show this.</p> + +<p>"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, +in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies +distinction between one object and another. To be +conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that +something can only be known as that which it is, by being +distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is +necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished +from another, it must possess some form of existence +which the other has not, or it must not possess some form +which the other has. But it is obvious that the Infinite cannot +be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence +of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence +would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by +the presence of an attribute which the Finite has not; for +as no finite part can be a constituent of an infinite whole,<span class="pagenum">[51]</span> +this differential characteristic must itself be infinite; and +must at the same time have nothing in common with the +finite....</p> + +<p>"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition +which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, +annihilates itself. Consciousness is essentially a limitation; +for it is the determination of the mind to one actual out of +many possible modifications. But the Infinite, if it is conceived +at all, must be conceived as potentially everything, +and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general +which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is +anything in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded +from being any other thing. But again, it must also +be conceived as actually everything, and potentially nothing; +for an unrealized potentiality is likewise a limitation. If +the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very +possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher +perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no +characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from +anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness....</p> + +<p>"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it +refuses to attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in +the only form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation +and change,—the perception of one object out of many, and +a comparison of that object with others. To he always conscious +of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be +conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we +can have no conception of what consciousness is."—<i>Limits +of Religious Thought</i>, pp. 93-95.</p> + +<p>"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call +the conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge +and of positive thought—thought necessarily supposes conditions. +To <i>think</i> is to <i>condition</i>; and conditional limitation +is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought....</p> + +<p>"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness +is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object<span class="pagenum">[52]</span> +of thought; known only in correlation, and mutually limiting +each other; while, independently of this, all that we know +either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only +a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the +different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit +that the consequence of this doctrine is—that philosophy, if +viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. +Departing from the particular, we admit that we can +never, in out highest generalizations, rise above the finite; +that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing +more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of +an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize +as beyond the reach of philosophy."</p> + +<p>"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we +cordially agree; for a more complete admission could not be +imagined, not only that a knowledge, and even a notion, of +the absolute is impossible for man, but that we are unable +to conceive the possibility of such a knowledge even in the +Deity himself, without contradicting our human conceptions +of the possibility of intelligence itself."—<i>Sir William Hamilton's +Essays</i>, pp. 21, 22, 38.</p> + +<p>"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God—Benevolence, +Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example—can +be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy +and just and wise Being, who is not identical with any one +of his attributes, but the common subject of them all; in one +word, a <i>Person</i>. But Personality, as we conceive it, is +essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality +is presented to us as relative and limited; and it is from that +presentation that all our representative notions of personality +are derived. Personality is presented to us as a relation +between the conscious self and the various modes of his +consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought without +a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some +mode of thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the +thought and the thinker are distinguished from and limit each<span class="pagenum">[53]</span> +other; and the various modes of thought are distinguished +each from each by limitation likewise...."—<i>Limits of +Religious Thought</i>, p. 102.</p> + +<p>"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting +the absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, +more elevating, more religious, than those barren, vague, +meaningless abstractions in which men babble about nothing +under the name of the Infinite and Personal conscious existence, +limited though it be, is yet the noblest of all existence +of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness +alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able to +offer Him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a +Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation +to Him at all; that we can form such a representation of +Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient though +it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity."—<i>Limits of Religious +Thought</i>, p. 104.</p> + +<p>The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are +as follows:—</p> + +<p>"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions +subversive of each other as equally possible; <i>but only +as unable to understand</i> as possible two extremes; one of +which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, +it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a wonderful +revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of +our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, +inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned +beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality."—<i>Sir +William Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 22.</p> + +<p>"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The +conception of the Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side +we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There +is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether +alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction +in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction +in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving<span class="pagenum">[54]</span> +it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving +it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it +as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented +as active; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented +as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of +all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of +that sum."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, pp. 84, 85.</p> + +<p>We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists +should speak for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not +simply in these passages, but throughout their writings, may +be briefly summed up as follows.</p> + +<p>The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the +profoundest subjects which come before it, and which it is +goaded to examine, finds itself in an inextricable maze of +contradictions; and, after vainly struggling for a while to get +out, becomes nonplussed, confused, confounded, dazed; and, +falling down helpless and effortless in the maze, and with +devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds that +the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out +of the light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and +therefore dark, and therefore <i>blind</i> faith.</p> + +<p>But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of +the errors of the Limitists, that a perception and confession +of mental impotence is <i>not</i> the logical deduction from their +premises. Lustrous as may be their names in logic,—and +Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the logical firmament,—no +one of them ever saw, or else dared to acknowledge, +the logical sequence from their principles. They have +climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their +verge; and there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like +naked men on Alpine precipices, with no eagle wings to +spread and soar away towards the Eternal Truth; and not +daring to take the awful plunge before them. Behold the +gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:—</p> + +<p>"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it +is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we<span class="pagenum">[55]</span> +cannot reconcile these two representations with each other, +as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently +contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does +not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our +own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility +in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction, +in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the +necessary consequence of an attempt on the part of the +human thinker to transcend the boundaries of his own consciousness. +It proves that there are limits to man's power of +thought; and it proves no more."—<i>Limits of Religious +Thought</i>, p. 106.</p> + +<p>Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable +English. "It is our duty to think of God as personal," +when to think of Him as personal is to think a lie; "to believe +that He is infinite," when so to believe is to believe +the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie is to incur +the penalty decreed by the Bible—God's book—upon +all who believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of +a professed Christian minister in one of the first Universities +in the world. Not that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. +By no means. But it logically follows from his premises. +In his philosophy the mind instinctively, necessarily, and +with equal authority in each case, asserts</p> + +<p>That there must be an infinite Being;</p> + +<p>That that Being must be Self-conscious,</p> + +<p>Must be unlimited; and that</p> + +<p>Consciousness is a limitation.</p> + +<p>These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What +follows then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows +that the mind is a deceiver! We learn again the lesson we +have learned before. It is not weakness, it is falsehood: +it is not want of capacity, it is want of integrity that is proved +by this contradiction. Man is worse than a hopeless, mental +imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat.</p> + +<p>But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its<span class="pagenum">[56]</span> +might the mind revolts from it, as nature does from a +vacuum? True that the human mind is an incorrigible falsifier? +With the indignation of outraged honesty, man's soul +rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own integrity +and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate +or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have +within myself the ultimate standard of truth."</p> + +<p>It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. +The ground of all their difficulties is simple and +plain. While denying to the human mind the faculty of +the Pure Reason, they have, <i>by the (to them) undistinguished +use of that faculty</i>, raised questions which the Understanding +by no possibility could raise, which the Reason +alone is capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone +can solve; and have attempted to solve them solely by the +assistance, and in the forms of, the Sense and the Understanding. +Their problems belong to a spiritual person; and +they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an animal +nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. +All their processes are developed on the vicious assumption, +that the highest form of knowledge possible to the human +mind is a generalization in the Understanding, upon facts +given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which is always +one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be +a peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among +a million. The meagreness and utter insufficiency of this +doctrine, to account for all the phenomena of the human +mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall therefore need +only now to distinguish certain special phases of their fundamental +error.</p> + +<p>As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note +how the doctrine of the Limitists, that the Understanding +is man's highest faculty of knowledge, and the logical sequences +therefrom respecting the laws of thought and consciousness +vitiate their whole system. One of their most +important errors is thus expressed:—"To be conscious, we<span class="pagenum">[57]</span> +must be conscious of something; and that something can +only be known as that which it is, by being distinguished +from that which it is not." "Thought cannot transcend +consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis +of subject and object of thought known only in correlation, +and mutually limiting each other; while, independently +of this, all that we know either of subject or object, +either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the +particular, of the plural, of the different, of the modified, of +the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible form +of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish +its qualities among themselves, and discriminate +between them and the qualities of the apple. And Sir William +Hamilton fairly and truly acknowledges that, as a +consequence, science, except as a system of objects of sense, +is impossible.</p> + +<p>The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, +that the diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of +the mind is erroneous. Their dictum, that all knowledge +must be attained through "relation, plurality, and difference," +is not true. There is a kind of knowledge which +we obtain by a direct and immediate <i>sight</i>; and that, too, +under such conditions as are no limitation upon the object +thought. For instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, +"Malice is criminal." It also affirms that this is an +eternal, immutable, universal law, conditional for all possibility +of moral beings. This direct and immediate sight, and +the consciousness attending it, are <i>full</i> of that one object, +and so are occupied only with it; and it does <span class="smcap">not</span> come +under any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is +it with all <i>a priori</i> laws. The mode of the pure reason is +thus seen to be the direct opposite of that of the Understanding +and the Sense.</p> + +<p>Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose +importance cannot be overstated. It is one which involves +the very possibility of God's existence as a self-conscious<span class="pagenum">[58]</span> +person. To present it, we recur again to the extracts made +just above from Sir William Hamilton. "Consciousness is +only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of +thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting +each other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment +as logically following from this: "that we are unable to +conceive the possibility of such knowledge," <i>i. e.</i> of the absolute, +"even in the Deity himself." That is, God can be +believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the +human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this +assertion of the logician—a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, +but which has, perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained +by philosophers—may be concisely stated thus. In +every correlation of subject and object,—in every instance +where they are to be contrasted,—the subject must be one, +and the object must be <i>another and different</i>. Hamilton, in +another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into +yourselves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence +in our feeble consciousness, is, that there are there +several terms, of which the one perceives the other, of which +the other is perceived by the first; in this consists self-knowledge," +&c. Mark the "several terms," and that the +one can only see the other, never itself.</p> + +<p>This position is both a logical and psychological error. +It is a logical error because it <i>assumes</i>, without argument, +that there is involved in the terms subject and object such a +logical contradiction and contradistinction that the subject +cannot be object to itself. This assumption is groundless. +As a matter of fact, it is <i>generally</i> true that, so far as man is +concerned, the subject is one, and the object another and different. +But this by no means proves that it is <i>always</i> so; it +only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And +when one comes to examine the question in itself, there is +absolutely no logical ground for the assumption. It is found +to be a question upon which no decision from logical considerations +can have any validity, because <i>it is purely psycho<span class="pagenum">[59]</span>logical</i>, +and can only be decided by evidence upon a matter +of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological error, because +a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the opposite +is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject +and object are identical.</p> + +<p>This fact that the subject and object are often identical in +the searching eye of human reason, and <i>always</i> so under the +eye of Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital +importance to be passed with a mere allusion. It seems +amazing that a truth which, the instant it is stated, solves a +thousand difficulties which philosophy has raised, should +never yet have been affirmed by any of the great spiritual-eyed +thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only +to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal +reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came +to see this truth during a process of thought, having for its +object the solution of the problem, How can the infinite Person +be self-comprehending, and still infinite? While considering +this, and without ever having received a hint from any +source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned on +a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a +heaven full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably +profounder question: How can any soul, not God only, but +any soul, be a self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain +and explain this? It was only years after that he +met the negative statement in Herbert Spencer's book. The +difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented to their +minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous +image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, +have concluded that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always +dangerous to argue from an illustration; and, in this +instance, it has been fatal. If man was only an animal +nature, and so only a <i>receiver</i> of impressions, with a capacity +to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of +the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is +also a spiritual <i>person</i>, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate<span class="pagenum">[60]</span> +intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. +The Reason is not receptivity merely, or mainly; it is +originator. In its own light it gives to itself <i>a priori</i> truth, +and itself as seeing that truth; and so the subject and object +are identical. This is one of the differentiating qualities +of the spiritual person.</p> + +<p>Our position may be more accurately stated and more +amply illustrated and sustained as follows:</p> + +<p><i>Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in +the self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the +subject and object are</i> <span class="smcap">identical</span>.</p> + +<p>1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject +and object are identical. The question is a question of fact. +In illustrating the fact, it will be proved. When a man +looks at his hands, he sees they are instruments for <i>his</i> use. +When he considers his physical sense, he still perceives it to +be instrument for <i>his</i> use. In all his conclusions, judgments, +he still finds, not himself, but <i>his</i> instrument. Even in the +Pure Reason he finds only <i>his</i> faculty; though it be the +highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches +for the <i>I am</i>; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties +and capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar +to American Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, +which leads us directly to the goal we seek. It is the phrase, +"self-examination." In all thorough, religious self-examination +the subject and object are identical. In the ordinary +labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or +that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. +But in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion +is not, "I can do this or that." It is, "I am this or that." +The person stands unveiled before itself, in the awful sanctuary +of God's presence. The decision to be made is not +upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end +for which all labor shall be performed. The character of +the person is under consideration, and is to be determined. +The selfhood, with all its wondrous mysteries, is at once<span class="pagenum">[61]</span> +subject and object. The I am in man, alike in kind to that +most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of "the everlasting +Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn +duty. How shall the finite I am accord <i>itself</i> to the pure +purpose of the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that +some persons have never been conscious of this experience. +To some, from a natural inaptitude, and to others, from a +perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some have so +little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are +never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, +but they never know it. Their impressions ever come +from without. Another class of persons shun such an experience +as Balshazzar would have shunned, if he could, the +handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in +the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with +sensuous gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming +thought of self-examination awakens within them a vague +instinctive dread; and they shudder, turn away, and by +every effort avoid it. Sometimes they succeed; and through +the gates of death rush headlong into the spirit-land, only to +be tortured forever there with the experience they so successfully +eluded here. For the many thousands, who know +by experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination +is, now that their attention has been drawn to its full +psychological import, no further word is necessary. They +know that in that supreme insight there was seen and +known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and +simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as +one, as identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, +that the wonder is that it has not heretofore been assigned its +suitable place in philosophy.</p> + +<p>2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, +spiritual Person, the subject and object are identical. This +question, though one of fact, cannot be determined <i>by us</i>, by +our experience; it must be shown to follow logically from +certain <i>a priori</i> first principles. This may be done as follows.<span class="pagenum">[62]</span> +Eternity, independence, universality, are qualities of +God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent, +he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom +he is necessarily related. Being universal, he possesses all +possible endowment, and is ground for all possible existence; +so that no being can exist but by his will. As Universal +Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or intellectual +effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this +is a <i>permanent state</i>. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending +all others; and therefore he <i>exhaustively</i> knows himself. +He distinguishes his Self as object, from no what else, +because there is no else to distinguish his Self from; but +having an exhaustive self-comprehension, he distinguishes +within that Self all possible forms of being each from each.</p> + +<p>He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is +nothing to learn and nothing to change to, except to a wicked +state; and for this there <i>can be to him no temptation</i>. He is +ever the same, and hence there can be no instant in time +when he does not <i>exhaustively</i> know himself. Thus always +in him are the subject and object identical.</p> + +<p>These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason +sees <i>a priori</i> truth <i>immediately</i>, and out of all relation, plurality +and difference, and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, +the subject and object are identical, by their simple +statement explode, as a Pythagorean system, the mental +astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and the +Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the +circumvolving planets.</p> + +<p>The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as +their processes of thought, and has naturally sprung from +their fundamental error. We will note one in the following +sentence. "Consciousness, in the only form in which we +can conceive it, implies limitation and change,—the perception +of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object +with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, +it is usable only with regard to things in Nature, and can<span class="pagenum">[63]</span> +have no relevancy to such subjects as are now under consideration. +It is a word which expresses <i>only</i> such operations +as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The following definition +explains this: "The concept refers to all the things +whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives +(con-cepis), or <i>grasps together</i> into one class and one act of +mind."—<i>Bowen's Logic</i>, p. 7. This is not the mode of the +Reason's action at all. It does not run over a variety of +objects and select out from them the points of similarity, and +grasp these together into one act of mind. It sees one object +in its unity as pure law, or first truth; and examines that in +its own light. Hence, the proper word is, <i>intuits</i>. Seen +from this standpoint, consciousness does <i>not</i> imply limitation +and change. A first truth we always see as <i>absolute</i>,—we +are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither +consciousness nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. +We would paraphrase the sentence thus: Consciousness, in +the highest form in which we know it, implies and possesses +<i>permanence</i>; and is the light in which pure truth is +seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same.</p> + +<p>It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the +Pure Reason run along side by side in the same sentence; +the inferior faculty encumbering and defeating the efforts of +the other. Take the following for example.</p> + +<p>"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that +very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a +higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses +no characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished +from anything else, and discerned as an object of consciousness." +The presence in language of the word infinite and +its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence of a faculty +capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation. +This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for +consideration, the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it +down into her den, and says, "can be that which it is not." +This she says, because she cannot act, except to conceive,<span class="pagenum">[64]</span> +and cannot conceive, except to distinguish this from something +else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance +of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The +Understanding conceives the finite as one and independent, +and the infinite as one and independent. Then the Reason +steps in, and says the infinite is all-comprehending. This +conflicts with the Understanding's <i>conception</i>, and so the puzzle +comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's affirmation +is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is actually +everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in +its blind, impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic +feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else." +<i>There is nothing else from which to distinguish it.</i> The perception +of the Reason is as follows. The infinite Person +comprehends intellectually, and is ground for potentially and +actually, all that is possible and real; and so there can be +no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all +fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature +of completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, +which is all there is, (if no-thing—void—can be said to <i>be</i>,) +beside him; and from any part, which there is within him. +Thus is he object to himself in his own consciousness.</p> + +<p>This vicious working of the Understanding against the +Reason, in the same sentences, can be more fully illustrated +from the following extracts. "God, as necessarily determined +to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, +is determined to pass either <i>from the better to the worse, or +from the worse to the better</i>. A third possibility that both +states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted +by our author, it is not necessary to consider."—<i>Sir William +Hamilton's Essays</i>, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be +conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality +from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence +into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent +is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived +exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception.<span class="pagenum">[65]</span> +We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; +but if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. +It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and +at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of +it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into +being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates +itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems forced +upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the +condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature +is conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being +of the Creator."—<i>Limits of Religious Thought</i>, p. 81.</p> + +<p>"God," a word which has <i>no significance</i> except to the +Reason: "as necessarily determined,"—a phrase which belongs +only to the Understanding. The opposite is the truth: +"to pass from absolute essence." This can have no meaning +except to the Pure Reason: "to relative manifestation." +This belongs to the Understanding. It contradicts the other; +and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the attempt +to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing +from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The +words imply that God, in passing from the state of absolute +essence, ceased to be absolute essence, and became "relative +manifestation." All this is absurd; and is in the Understanding +and Sense. God never <i>became</i>. The Creator is +still absolute essence, as before creation; and the logician's +this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not a +contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be +thus stated. The infinite Person, freely according his will +to the behest of his worth, and yet equally free to not so +accord his will, put forth from himself the creative energy; +and this under such modes, that he neither lost nor gained +by the act; but that, though the latter state was diverse from +the first, still neither was better than the other, but both +were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute +plenitude of endowments. All possible ideals were present +before his eye. All possible joy continued a changeless<span class="pagenum">[66]</span> +state in his sensibility. His will, as choice, was absolute benevolence; +and, as act, was competent to all possible effort. +To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing to, +and subtracted nothing from, his fulness.</p> + +<p>The fact must be learned that muscular action and the +working of pure spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode +cannot be an illustration of the superior. A change in a +pure spirit, which neither adds nor subtracts, leaves the good +unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person created, he +passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to better; +but the two states, though diverse, were equally good.</p> + +<p>We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can +the relative," etc. "If the Relative is a distinct reality from +the absolute," then each is <i>self-existent</i>, and independent. +The sentence annihilates itself. "It must be conceived as +passing from non-existence into existence." The image here +is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is, +that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, +existence come, without there being any cause for that existence +coming. This would be the phenomenon to the Sense. +And the Sense is utterly unable to account for the phenomenon. +The object in the Sense must appear as <i>form</i>; but in +the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well +be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands +before his audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms +of his hands to the spectators, apparently empty. He then +closes his right hand, and then opening it again, appears holding +a bouquet of delicious flowers, which he hands about to +the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from +nothing, <i>i. e.</i> to have no cause. It appears "to pass from +non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the +cheating seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause +for the coming of the bunch of flowers, though we cannot +see it." Precisely similar is creation. Could there have +been a Sense present at that instant, creation would have +seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing something<span class="pagenum">[67]</span> +would have seemed to come. But under the correcting +guide of the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before +creation, the infinite Person did not manifest himself; +and so was actually alone. At creation his power, which before +was immanent, he now made emanent; and put it forth +in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the +requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. +That which was ideal he now made actual. The form as +Idea was one, the power as Potentiality was another, and +each was in him by itself. He put forth the power into the +form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the Universe was. +Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the +same manner it might be shown how, all along through the +writings of the Limitists, the Understanding runs along by +the Reason, and vitiates her efforts to solve her problems. +We shall have occasion to do something of this farther on.</p> + +<p>The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished +without an examination of the celebrated dictum, "To +think is to condition." Those who have held this to be universally +true, have also received its logical sequence, that to +the finite intellect God cannot appear self-comprehending. +In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not a universal, +but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, +to circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall +best enter upon this labor by answering the question, What +is thinking?</p> + +<p>First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is +called thinking. Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection +are thinkings. Under this head we notice two points. +<i>a.</i> That act of the Understanding in which an object presented +by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and generic +elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations determined, +is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I distinguish +specifically that it is domestic, and generically that +it is carnivorous. <i>b.</i> That act of the finite spiritual person +by which he compares the judgments of the Understanding<span class="pagenum">[68]</span> +with the <i>a priori</i> laws of the Pure Reason, and by this final +standard decides their truth or error. Thus, the judgment +of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought to hunt down +and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The standard +of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is +found to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, +the intuitions of the reason. These, in the finite person, +come <i>after</i> a process of reflection, and are partly consequent +upon it; yet they take place in another faculty, which is +developed by this process; but they are such, that by no +process of reflection <i>alone</i> could they be. Thinking, in the +Universal Genius, is the <i>sight</i>, at once and forever, of all +possible object of mental effort. It is necessary and <i>spontaneous</i>, +and so is an endowment, not an attainment; and is +possessed without effort. We are prepared now to entertain +the following statements:—</p> + +<p>A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, <i>i. e.</i> +causative ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not +true. The fact of the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground +of the condition. The condition of the object thought, whatever +the form of thinking may be, must lie as far back at +least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's self, as +ground for his Genius, must also be ground for <i>all</i> conditions. +Yet men think of an object <i>in its conditions</i>. This is because +the same Being who constructed the objects in their +conditions, constructed also man as thinker, <i>correlated to +those conditions</i>, so that he should think upon things <i>as they +are</i>. In this view, to think is not condition, but is mental +activity in the conditions already imposed. Thus it is with +the Understanding; and the process of thinking, as above +designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in <i>a</i>, +of the second general definition. It follows, therefore,</p> + +<p>B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within +the sphere of conditions proper,—observing the distinction +of conditions into two classes heretofore made,—the +finite intellect must act under them, and see those objects<span class="pagenum">[69]</span> +upon which they lie, accordingly,—as, for instance, a geometrical +figure must be seen in Time and Space,—so far it is +true, and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, +is to see it under all the conditions imposed upon the bird as +flying, and the observer as seeing. But when men intuit the +<i>a priori</i> truth, Malice is criminal, they perceive that it lies +under no conditions proper, but is absolute and universal. +We perceive, then,</p> + +<p>C. That for all mental operations which have as object +pure laws and ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these +inhere, this dictum is not true. The thinker may be conditioned +in the proper sense of that term; yet he entertains +objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they are +not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality +of the principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to +be such, and that necessarily.</p> + +<p>Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, +is meant, not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, +constructs the conditions, but that he recognizes in himself, +as thinking subject, and in the object thought, the several +conditions (proper) thereof,—the following statements will +define the province of this dictum.</p> + +<p>1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, +and the discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.</p> + +<p>2. Created spiritual persons, <i>as constituted beings,</i> also lie +wholly within it. <i>But it extends no farther.</i> On the other +hand,</p> + +<p>3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit +pure laws, and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms +themselves lie wholly without it.</p> + +<p>4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those +laws and forms inhere. Or, in general terms,</p> + +<p>When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object +thought, since the thinker must needs see the object under +its conditions, it is true that, To think is to condition. But +so far as it is meant that thinking is such a kind of operation<span class="pagenum">[70]</span> +that it cannot proceed except the object be conditioned, it is +not true; for there are processes of thought whose objects +are unconditioned.</p> + +<p>The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which +Mr. Spencer opens his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," +introduces a subject common to all the Limitists, and which, +therefore, should be considered in this part of our work. A +remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in the +"North American Review" for October 1864, applies with +equal force here in reference to another essay by the same +writer, in the preceding July number of that periodical. At +most, his view can only be unfolded. He has left nothing to +be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and difficult as +this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought at +least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than +the Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and +so will we do.</p> + +<p>In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are +<i>a priori</i> conditions of created being. The following extracts +are in point. "Pure Space, therefore, as given in the primitive +intuition, is pure form for any possible phenomenon. +As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is given in the +primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and universal. +Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological +order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction +from experience, nor at all given by experience; but it is +wholly independent of all experience, prior to it, and without +which it were impossible that any experience of outer object +should be." "Pure Time, as given in the intuition, is immediately +beheld to be conditional for all possible period, +prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily +continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."—<i>Rational +Psychology</i>, pp. 125, 128.</p> + +<p>Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between +them as conditions. Space is the <i>a priori</i> condition of <i>material</i> +being. Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man,<span class="pagenum">[71]</span> +be stripped of all its material appurtenances, and left to exist +as pure spirit, it could hold no communication with any other +being but God; and no other being but he could hold any +communication with it. It would exist out of all relation to +Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the <i>a priori</i> +condition of all created being, of the spiritual as well as +material. In the case just alluded to, the isolated spiritual +person would have a consciousness of succession and duration, +although he would have no standard by which to measure +that duration, he could think in processes, and only in +processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time. +Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to +time has no significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena +as given in the internal sense only, and in these there +can be only succession. The inner phenomenon may endure +in time, but can have neither length, breadth, nor thickness +in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, may fill +a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may +be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with +any outer or inner side."—<i>Rational Psychology</i>, p. 135.</p> + +<p>Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space +has three dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions +in space,—length, breadth, and thickness. In other +words, it is solid room. "Time has but one dimension," or, +rather, but one dimension can enter into Time,—length. In +Time there can only be procession. Space and Time may +then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical," +illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they +may be defined as follows:</p> + +<p>"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.</p> + +<p>"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."</p> + +<p>Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and +illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object +may come into it; the other, that event may occur in it. +There is for neither a final unit nor any limit. All objects<span class="pagenum">[72]</span> +are divisible in Space, and all periods in Time; and thus +also are all limits comprehended, but they are without limit. +Turning now from these more general aspects of the subject, +a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.</p> + +<p>The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen +above, that Space and Time are <i>a priori</i> conditions of created +being. We can best consider this law in its application to +the facts, by observing two general divisions, with two sub-divisions +under each. Space and Time have, then, two general +phases, one within, and one without, the mind. Each +of these has two special phases. The former, one in the +Sense, and one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, +and one without, the Universe.</p> + +<p>First general phase within the mind. First special phase, +in the Sense. "As pure form in the primitive intuition, they +are wholly limitless, and void of any conjunction in unity, +having themselves no figure nor period, and having within +themselves no figure nor period, but only pure diversity, in +which any possible conjunction of definite figures and periods +may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are +pure, <i>a priori</i>, formal laws, which are conditional to the being +of any sense as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this +sense could present no figure or period, till some figure or +period was produced into it by an external agency. As such +necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a necessity +of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other +words, the fact that all phenomena <i>must</i> appear in them, lies +beyond the province of power. This, however, is no more a +limit to the Deity than it is a limit to him that he cannot +hate his creatures and be good. In our experience the Sense +gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the actual phenomena +of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with ideal +objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the +physical sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, +by the activity of the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing +some form in the inner or mental sense, from forms<span class="pagenum">[73]</span> +actually observed. Upon both alike the formal law of Space +and Time must lie.</p> + +<p>Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although +there is pure form, if there was no more than this, no notion +of a system of things could be. Each object would have its +own space, and each event its own time. But one object +and event could not be seen in any relation to another object +and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some +ground by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall +be joined into a unity of Space and Time; so that all objects +shall be seen in one Space, and all events in one Time. "A +notional connective for the phenomena may determine these +phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of all +space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena +and their space and time in an objective experience." The +operation of the Understanding is, then, the connection, by a +notional, of all particular spaces and times; <i>i. e.</i> the space +and time of each phenomenon in the Sense, into a comprehensive +unity of Space and Time, in which all phenomena +can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, +not only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space +and time, but all phenomena must be seen in <i>one</i> Space and +Time. This connection of the manifold into unity is the +peculiar work of the Understanding. An examination of +the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a general +formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental +law given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must +be seen in Space, and all events in Time, involves the subordinate +law:</p> + +<p><i>That no mind can observe material objects or any events +except under the conditions of Space and Time</i>; or, to change +the phraseology, <i>Space and Time are</i> a priori <i>conditional to +the being of any mind or faculty in a mind capable of observing +a material object or any event</i>. This will, perhaps, +be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However +that may be, this is true, but is only <i>a part of the truth</i>.<span class="pagenum">[74]</span> +The rest will appear just below. The reader will notice +that no exception is made to the law here laid down, and will +start at the thought that this law lies upon the Deity equally +as upon created beings. No exception is made, because +none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as unqualified +in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on +an earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of +numbers does the law of Space and Time condition all intellect. +The Deity can no more see a house out of all relation +to Space and Time than he can see how to make two and +two five.</p> + +<p>Second general phase, without the mind. First special +phase, within the Universe. All that we are now to examine +is objective to us; and all the questions which can arise +are questions of fact. Let us search for the fact carefully +and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It was +found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and +Time as pure conditions for matter and event. We are now +to observe the pure become the actual condition; or, in other +words, we are to see the condition <i>realized</i>. Since, then, we +are to observe material objects and events in a material system, +it is fitting to use the Sense and the Understanding; +and our statements and conclusions will conform to those +faculties.</p> + +<p>We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in +the form of a sphere in which all things are included. This +spherical system is complete, definite, limited, and so has +boundaries. A portion of "immeasurable void"—Space—has +been occupied. Where there was nothing, something +has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our +having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time +in the Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, +all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the +boundaries of the Universe, and thus enables spaces and +times to be. We have no concept except as in limits, and +those limits are conceived to be substance. In other words,<span class="pagenum">[75]</span> +space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept. Take +away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession +of events which forms the duration, and in the concept +pure negation is left. To illustrate. Suppose there be +in our presence a cubic yard of vacuum. Is this vacuum an +entity? Not at all. It can neither be perceived by the +Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a +space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube +was object to us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial +boundaries. All, then, that is object, all that is entity, +is substance. In our concept, therefore, a space is solid +distance within the substance, and the totality of all distances +in the Universe is conceived to be Space. Again; suppose +there pass before our mind a procession of events. One +event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession +of events is a time, and the recurring event marks a period +in time. The events proceeding are all that there is in the +concept; and apart from the procession a conception of time +is impossible. The procession of all the events of the Universe, +that is <i>duration</i>, is our concept of Time. Thus, within +the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration; +and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. +Let us assume for a moment that our concept is the final +truth, and observe the result. In that concept space is limited +by matter, and matter is conceived of as unlimited. +This result is natural and necessary, because matter, substance, +"a space-filling force," is the underlying notional +upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is +truly illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really +atheism, logically follows. Again; in our concept time is +duration, and duration is conceived of as unlimited. If so, +the during event is unlimited. From this hypothesis idealistic +pantheism logically follows. But bring our concept into +the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and +all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of +finding matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is<span class="pagenum">[76]</span> +seen to be illimitable and pure condition, that matter may +establish a limit within it. And Time, instead of being duration, +and so limited by the during event, is found to be +illimitable and pure condition, that event may have duration +in it. This brings us to the</p> + +<p>Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. +We have been considering facts in an objective experience, +and have used therefore the Sense and Understanding, +as was proper. What we are now to consider is a subject +of which all experience is impossible. It can therefore +be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure +Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object +in Space, and all during event in Time; in a word, remove +the Universe, and what will be left? As the Universe had +a beginning, and both it and all things in it are conditioned +by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will its conditions +cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, +upon which would be imposed no conditions of Space and +Time? These questions are answered in the statement of +them. Those conditions must remain. When we have abstracted +from our <i>concept</i> all substance and duration, there is +left only <i>void</i>. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to +say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe +there was void. Also, that in void there is no thing, +no where, and no when; or, void is the negation of actual +substance, space and time. But pure Space and Time, as <i>a +priori</i> conditions that material object and during event may +be, have not ceased. There is still <i>room</i>, that an object may +become. There is still <i>opportunity</i>, that an event may occur. +By the Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same +necessary being for material object and occurring event, as +the conditions of mental activity have for mind; and they +have their peculiar characteristics exactly according with +what they do condition, just as the laws of thought have +their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to +what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the<span class="pagenum">[77]</span> +moral law must be given in the intuition as necessarily binding +upon him; and this is an <i>a priori</i> condition of the being +of such person. Precisely similar is the relation between +Space and Time as <i>a priori</i> conditions, and object and event +upon which they lie. The moral law has its characteristics, +which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and Time +have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object +and event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, +and both as <i>a priori</i> conditions of a Universe, must have the +same necessity of being that God has. They <i>must</i> be, as he +<i>must</i> be. But observe, they are pure conditions, and no +more. They are neither things nor persons. The idea of +them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can +be assigned their logical position, but further than this the +mind cannot go.</p> + +<p>The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of +the positions stated above. We have not wrought to pain +such soul, but only for truth, and the clue of escape from all +dilemmas. The only question to be raised is, are they true? +If a more patient investigation than we have given to this +subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only +have failed as others before us have; but we shall love the +truth which shall be found none the less. But if they shall +be found true, then is it certain that God always knew them +so and was always pleased with them, and no derogation to +his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, however +much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. +Most blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness +are those pure words of the apostle John, "No lie +is of the truth."</p> + +<p>The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to +state how it is that primarily God was out of all relation to +Space and Time. He was out of all relation to Space, because +he is not material object, thereby having limits, form, +and position in Space. He was out of all relation to Time, +because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible objects<span class="pagenum">[78]</span> +of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can +learn nothing, and can experience no process of thought. +Within his mind no event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, +while this is true, it is equally true that, as the Creator, he +is conditioned by Space and Time, just as he is conditioned +by himself; and it may be found by future examination that +they are essential to that Self. But, whatever conclusion +may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a subject, +this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; +and Space and Time, whatever they are, will, <i>can</i> in no wise +interfere with and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. +It is a pleasure to be able to close this discussion with reflections +profound and wise as those contained in the following +extract from the essay heretofore alluded to.</p> + +<p>"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are +veiled in impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to +attribute real infinity to Space and Time, lest it should conflict +with the infinity of God. Such timidity has but a slender +title to respect. If the Laws of Thought necessitate +any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion that +Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile +this result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative +but to accept of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. +No man is worthy to join in the search for truth, who +trembles at the sight of it when found. But a profound +faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by anticipation, +and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is +infinite, Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. +Limitation is possible only between existences of the +same kind. There could not be two infinite Spaces, two infinite +Times, or two infinite Gods; but while infinites of the same +kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds may. When an +hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; +when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, +infinite Space and Time will limit the infinite God. <i>But not</i><span class="pagenum">[79]</span> +<i>before.</i> Time exists ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, +God exists ubiquitously and eternally. The nature of the +relations between the three infinites, so long as Space and +Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and absolutely +incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or +mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous +as it is irreverent."</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[80]</span></p> + +<h2 id="PART_III">PART III.</h2> + +<p class="h3">AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES +IN THE WRITINGS OF THE LIMITISTS.<br /> +<br /> +ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM +HAMILTON.</p> + +<p>It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give +an extended examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, +or even to notice it particularly. From the first, it +was only proposed to attempt the refutation of that peculiar +theory which he enounced in his celebrated essay, "The +Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has +generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation +thereof; and which he supplemented, but never superseded. +If the arguments adduced, and illustrations presented, in the +first part, in behalf of the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, +and the analysis and attempted refutation of the +celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, an excluded +middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as sufficient, +as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, +and the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far +at least as Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if +any, further remark will be expected. A few subordinate +passages in the essay above referred to may, however, it is +believed, be touched with profit by the hand of criticism and +explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention is +now called.</p> + +<p>In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: +"Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin +is involved in the proposition, <i>that the Unconditioned, the</i><span class="pagenum">[81]</span> +<i>Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, +and this by difference, plurality, and relation</i>." It is hardly +necessary to repeat here the criticism, that the terms infinite, +absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when used to express +abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite—what? The fact +of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates +every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may +be thus stated:—The infinite Person, or the necessary principle +as inhering in that Person, is <i>immediately</i> known in +consciousness, and this, not by difference, plurality, and relation, +but by a direct intuition of the Pure Reason. In this +act the object seen—the idea—is held right in the Reason's +eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not +known by difference, because there is no other object but the +one before that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it +known by plurality, because it is seen by itself, and there is +no other object contemplated, with which to join it. Nor is +it known by relation, because it is seen to be what it is <i>in +itself</i>, and as out of all relation. A little below, in the same +paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, thus:—"The +recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle +of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition +and the end of philosophy." The true idea, accurately +stated, is as follows. The fact that, by a constituting law of +intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately intuits absoluteness +as the distinctive quality of <i>a priori</i> first principles, and +of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the condition, +and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.</p> + +<p>These two erroneous positions the logician follows with +his celebrated "statement of the opinions which may be entertained +regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object +of knowledge and of thought." The four "opinions," to +which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are too well +known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only +to afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, +as it is believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.<span class="pagenum">[82]</span></p> + +<p>The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable +as a fact, is known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known +to be such and such; all this, by an immediate intuition of +the Pure Reason, of which the spiritual person is definitely +conscious; and that Person is so seen to be primarily unconditioned, +<i>i. e.</i> out of all relation, difference, and plurality.</p> + +<p>"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word +has no force except with regard to things in nature.</p> + +<p>Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain +than that an <i>exhaustive</i> knowledge of the Deity is impossible +to any creature. But equally certain is it, that, except as we +have some true, positive, <i>reliable</i> knowledge of him <i>as he is</i>, +we cannot be moral beings under his moral government. +Take, for instance, the moral law as the expression of God's +nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not love—hate; +or he is indifferent, <i>i. e.</i> love has no relation to him. If +the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy +to the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it +is unquestionably true that he is utterly inscrutable. Then +are we in just the condition which the Limitists assert. But +observe the results respecting ourselves. Our whole moral +nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is +possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We +feel that we ought to love the perfect Being. At times we +go starving for love to him and beg that bread. He has no +love to give. He never felt a pulsation of affection. He +sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; and, +covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable +mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. +He gives us a stone. Does such a picture instantly shock, +yea, horrify, all our finer sensibilities? Does the soul cry out +in agony, her rejection of such a conclusion? In that cry +we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made the soul. +Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It +is impossible, then, to think of God except as <i>love</i>. We know +what love is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat<span class="pagenum">[83]</span> +common to the Deity and his spiritual creatures. This +enables us to attain a final law, as follows.</p> + +<p><i>In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities +in common with him, in so far do they know him positively; +but in all matters to which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, +they only know him negatively;</i> i. e. <i>they know that he +is the opposite of themselves.</i></p> + +<p>That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply +to prove that Sir William Hamilton denied the reality of the +Reason as distinct from the Understanding, requires and will +now receive a particular examination. He says: "In the +Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function; +both seek the one in the many;—the Idea (Idee) is +only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; +Reason only the Understanding which has 'overleaped +itself.'" In this sentence, and the remarks which follow it, +the logician shows that he neither comprehends the assigned +function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any accurate +knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he +passes judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly +erroneous than his. For "both faculties" do <i>not</i> +"perform the same function." Only the Understanding +seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks <i>the many +in the one</i>. The functions and modes of activity of the two +faculties are exactly opposite. The Understanding runs +about through the universe, and gathers up what facts it may, +and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason sees the truth +<i>first</i>, as necessary <i>a priori</i> law, and holding it up as standard, +measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts +in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is +guilty of a most glaring <i>petitio principii</i>. For, the very +question at issue is, whether "both faculties" do "perform +the same function"; whether "both" do "seek the one in +the many." In order not to leave the hither side of the +question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to +revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The<span class="pagenum">[84]</span> +Reason sees the truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice +is criminal. Is this primarily learned by experience; or is +it an intuitive conviction, which conditions experience. Or, +in more general terms, does a child need to be taught what +guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its letters +before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within +it spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter +be the true experience, then it can only be accounted for +upon the ground that an idea of right and wrong, as an <i>a +priori</i> law, is organic in man; and, by our definition, the +presentation of this law to the attention in consciousness is +the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one principle +was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but +the many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one +standard, which was seen <i>first</i>, and as necessarily true. +Take another illustration. All religions, in accounting for +the universe, have one common point of agreement, which is, +that some being or beings, superior to it and men, produced +it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more +subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a +crude form, is associated with the other. These notions +must be accounted for. How shall it be done? Are they +the result of experience? Then, the first human beings had +no such notions. But another and more palpable objection +arises. Are they the result of individual experience? +Then there would be as many religions as individuals. But, +very ignorant people have the experience,—persons who +never learned anything but the rudest forms of work, from +the accumulated experience of others; nor by their own experience, +to make the smallest improvement in a simple agricultural +instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience +one of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last +resort, it may be said they were taught it by philosophers. +But this is negatived by the fact, that philosophers do not, to +any considerable extent, teach the people, either immediately +or mediately; but that generally those who have the least philosophy<span class="pagenum">[85]</span> +have the largest influence. And what is most in point, +none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the +gist of the idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the +same. Be it a Fetish, or Brahm, or God, in the kernel final +cause will be found. It would seem that any candid mind +must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, were this +possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn +now and examine any individual in the same direction, as +we did just above, respecting the question of right and wrong, +and a plain answer will come directly. The notion of first +cause, however crude and rudimentary its form, is organic. +It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual takes it—"the +one,"—and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of +nature—"the many,"—and is satisfied. And this is an +experience not peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared +equally by the illiterate,—those entirely unacquainted with +scientific abstractions. These illustrations might be carried +to an almost indefinite length, showing that commonly, in +the every-day experiences of life, men are accustomed not +only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is +cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure +phenomena by an original and fixed standard, as, "This +man is malicious, and therefore wicked." Between the two +modes of procedure, the following distinction may always be +observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, only probable. +Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what +may be, decisions what must be. The former result from +concepts and experience, the latter from intuitions and logical +processes. Thus is made plain the fact that, to give it +the most favorable aspect, Sir William Hamilton, in his +eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely mistaken one +class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the actuality +of the most profound and important faculty of the +human mind. In view of the foregoing results, one need +not hesitate to say that, whether he ever attempted it or not, +Kant never "has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned<span class="pagenum">[86]</span> +can have no objective reality," for it is impossible +to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective reality +is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important +"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, +unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," +and not "a fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of +God, who comprehends all positives. A little after, Hamilton +says: "And while he [Kant] appropriated Reason as a +specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations, hypostatized +as positive, under the Platonic name of <i>Ideas</i>," &c. +Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the Reason +such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are +they hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish +an affirmative answer to the first question, a negative to the +others follows directly, and the logician's system is a failure. +Again, the discrimination of thought into <i>positive</i> and <i>negative</i> +is simply absurd. All thought is <i>positive</i>. The phrase, +negative thought, is only a convenient expression for the +refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not thoughts +at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the +operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. +Ideas are a part of such objects. All objects in the +mind are positive. The phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. +But, without any deduction, we see immediately +that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of the +human race affirms this.</p> + +<p>The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. +"For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the +unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence +in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ +the terms <i>Absolute</i>, <i>Infinite</i>, <i>Unconditioned</i>, as only various +expressions for the same identity, are imperatively bound to +prove that their idea of <i>the One corresponds, either with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with +that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or +that it includes both, or that it excludes both</i>. This they have<span class="pagenum">[87]</span> +not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do." The +italics are Hamilton's. The above statement is invalid, for +the following reasons. The Absolute, therein named, has +been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, and an +absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," +as applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of +thought. Since we seek the truth, that Absolute must be +rejected. Again, the definitions of the terms absolute and +infinite, which have been found consistent, and pertinent to +Space and Time, have been further found irrelevant and +meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is the +Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation +to Space and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and +known as he is. The terms infinite and absolute will, of +necessity, then, when applied to him, have entirely different +significations from what they will when applied to Space and +Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in this latter +sphere will have other than a negative value in the former. +The questions in that sphere must be decided on their +own merits, as must those in this. What is really required, +then, is, that the One, the Person, be shown to be both absolute +and infinite, and that these, as qualities, consistently inhere +in that <i>unity</i>. As this has already been done in the +first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.</p> + +<p>Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. +Cousin, Hamilton quotes from him as follows: "The condition +of intelligence <i>is difference</i>; and an act of knowledge +is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms." +In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues from this, +thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition +of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; +consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and +under which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, +as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we +suppose the absolute cognizable, it must be identified either, +first, with the subject knowing; or, second, with the object<span class="pagenum">[88]</span> +known; or, third, with the indifference of both." Rejecting +the first two, Hamilton says: "The <i>third</i> hypothesis, on the +other hand, is <i>contradictory of the plurality of intelligence</i>; +for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality +of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. +The alternative is therefore necessary: Either the absolute +cannot be known or conceived at all, or our author is wrong +in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference."</p> + +<p>In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far +as the author is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by +philosophers. The logician presents an alternative which is +unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, if not entire unanimity, +writers have been accustomed to assign plurality, relation, +difference, and—to adopt a valuable suggestion of +Mr. Spencer—likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and +among them those who have claimed for man a positive +knowledge of the absolute. The error by which they have +been drawn into this contradiction is purely psychological; +and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed out, +from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, +the Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and +concludes about, things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by +which he sees and knows, with an <i>absolutely certain</i> knowledge, +principles and laws; and to subject this faculty to those +conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if the logician's +premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If +"an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a +plurality of terms," then is it impossible that we should +know God, <i>or that he should know himself</i>. The logic is impregnable. +But the conclusion is revolting. What must be +done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of mental +impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It +will not satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she +casts it out utterly, as a most gross insult. Unquestionably, +but one course is left; and that is so plain, that one cannot<span class="pagenum">[89]</span> +see how even a Limitist could have overlooked it. Correct +the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will +give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the +principle that <i>every truth is in complete harmony with every +other truth</i>; and hold with no less tenacity to the principle +that the human intellect is true. And what is the true premiss +which through an irrefutable logic will give us a satisfactory, +a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A plurality +of terms is <i>not</i> the necessary condition of intelligence; but +objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly +known by an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, +relation, difference, and likeness, are necessary conditions of +intelligence through the Sense and Understanding; but they +do not in the least degree lie upon the Reason, which sees its +objects as pure, simple ideas which are <i>self-evident</i>, and, consequently, +are not subject to those conditions. Whatever +knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly +gain under the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, +and likeness; for "mammals" are things in nature. But +absoluteness is a pure, simple, unanalyzable idea in the Reason, +and as such is seen and known by a direct insight as +out of all plurality, relation, difference, and likeness: for +this is a <i>quality</i> of the self-existent Person, and so belongs +wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined +only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.</p> + +<p>Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The +knowledge given by the Sense and Understanding. This is +of material objects. Take, for example, an apple. The +Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that many +characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, +skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, +also, that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it +grows, and, as well, that its several qualities have relations +among themselves. One color belongs to the skin, another +to the pulp. The skin, as cover, relates to the pulp as covered, +and the like. The apple, moreover, is distinguished<span class="pagenum">[90]</span> +from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of likeness. +It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different +flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, +and possesses those marks just named, which, though differing +among themselves, according to the fruit in which they +inhere, have a commonality of kind, as compared with other +objects. This distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of +characteristics, and connecting them into a unity, as an +apple, is the work of the Sense and Understanding.</p> + +<p>2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is +of <i>a priori</i> laws, of these laws combined in pure archetypal +forms, and of God as the Supreme Being who comprehends +all laws and forms. A fundamental difference in the two +modes of activity immediately strikes one's attention. In +the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and <i>analysis</i>. +In the latter it is by comprehension and <i>synthesis</i>. +Take the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. +No one but a Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the +position of Dr Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or +<i>oughtness</i> is a simple idea." This being once acceded, carries +with it the whole theory which the author seeks to +maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot +be distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is <i>sui generis</i>. +Hence, it cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference +or likeness. If known at all, it must be known <i>as it is in +itself</i>, by a spontaneous insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of +the activity of the Pure Reason, and such are the objects of +that activity. In maintaining, then, the doctrine of "intellectual +intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in subjecting +all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and difference."</p> + +<p>Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. +Hamilton states certain problems, which he is "confident" +Cousin cannot solve. There is nothing very difficult about +them; and it is a wonder that he should have so presented +them. Following the passage—which is here quoted—will +be found what appear simple and easy solutions.<span class="pagenum">[91]</span></p> + +<p>"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)—(1) how +liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of +modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality;—(2) +how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular +manner, and not determine itself by final causes;—(3) +how intelligence can influence a blind power, without +operating as an efficient cause;—(4) or how, in fine, morality +can be founded on a liberty which at best only escapes +necessity by taking refuge with chance;—these are problems +which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and +which we are confident he is unable to solve."</p> + +<p>1. Liberty cannot be <i>conceived</i>. It must be intuited. +There is "a plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge +of that plurality." 2. "A faculty" cannot resolve +to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot determine +itself <i>at all</i>. Only a <i>spiritual person</i> can <i>resolve</i>, can have +a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence. +Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual +person can be influenced, and he by object through +the intelligence as medium, and only he can be an efficient +cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a liberty, which +only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;" and, +what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it +as possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought +of the Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: +viz., the employment both in thinking and expressions of faculties, +capacities, and qualities, as if they possessed all the +powers of persons. This habit is thoroughly erroneous, and +destructive of truth. The truth desired to answer this whole +passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The infinite and +absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, and +indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality +of personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion +or restraint in the choice of one of two possible ends. +This Person intuits a multitude of modes of activity. He +possesses also perfect wisdom, which enables him, having<span class="pagenum">[92]</span> +chosen the right end, to determine with unerring accuracy +which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure +the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination +to put in force the best means for securing that end. +Hence this Person decides that the best mode shall <i>be</i>. He +also possesses all-power. This is <i>his</i> endowment, not that +of his intelligence. The intelligence is not person, but <i>faculty</i> +in the person. So is it with the <i>power</i>. So then this +Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting +his dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; +and is efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity +nor chance. He is not under necessity, because there +is no constraint which compels him to choose the right +end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under chance, +because he is <i>certain</i> which is the best mode of action to +gain the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and +modes of activity, which has been so clearly set forth by +Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in the motions of spiritual +persons in each sphere, lie the ground for answering +<i>all</i> difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or chance. +With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's +philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of +his followers.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[93]</span></p> + +<h2 id="REVIEW_OF_LIMITS_OF_RELIGIOUS_THOUGHT">REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."</h2> + +<p>This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind +of the candid and reflective reader a feeling of profound +respect. The writer is manifestly a deeply religious man. +The book bears the marks of piety, and an earnest search +after the truth respecting that august Being whom its author +reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe +him to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit +must ever inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and +condemn the intellectual principles upon which his work is +based, we cannot but desire to be like him, in rendering +solemn homage to the Being he deems inscrutable.</p> + +<p>In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which +were formerly noticed as belonging to the system of the +Limitists will here be found plainly observable. Following +his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the Understanding to be the +highest faculty of the human intellect, and the consequent +corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge. +The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the +act of the mind in grasping together various marks into a +concept, when that word and act of mind are utterly irrelevant +to the object to which he applies them; and hence they +can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak +of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the +human"; or of "starting from the human, and reasoning up +to the divine"; where, upon the hypothesis that the two are +entirely diverse, no reasoning process, based upon either one, +can reach the other. On the other hand, if any knowledge +of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the +ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain<span class="pagenum">[94]</span> +respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator +plainly declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he +said, "God made man in his own image." If man's mind is +wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot know truth as God +knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, man +cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every +subject of a moral government is amenable to law. In +order to be so amenable, he must know the law <i>as it is</i>. +No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will do. It must +be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth +is <i>one</i>. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be +binding, sees it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation +that God feels. And such an one must man be if he is +a moral agent. Whether he is such an agent or not, we will +not argue here; since all governments and laws of society +are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be +assumed as granted.</p> + +<p>Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which +Mr. Mansel, in his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is +to be said, that "First Cause," if properly mentioned at all, +should have been put last; and that "Infinite" and "Absolute" +are not pertinent to Cause, but to Person. So then +when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him, not +as Cause, for this is <i>incidental</i>, but as the infinite and absolute +Person, for these three marks are <i>essential</i>. Further, +these last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; +while the term Cause expresses "an <i>a priori</i> Element of +connection, and thus a primitive understanding-conception." +Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the term Cause +is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He +defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by +itself, having no necessary relation to any other Being," +when it is rather the exclusion of the possibility of any other +Being. Again, he defines "the Infinite" to be "that which +is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater +is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can receive no<span class="pagenum">[95]</span> +additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not +from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, +for which is neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the <i>Thing</i>. +This <i>Thing</i> "is free from all possible limitation." How can +that be when the Being he thus defines is, must be, necessarily +existent, and so is bound by one of the greatest of limitations, +the inability to cease to be. But some light may +be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the +subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is +free from all possible limitation" is "that than which a +greater is inconceivable." Moreover, this greatest of all +possible things possesses all possible "attributes," and is in +every possible "mode of existence" "from all eternity." +Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is inconceivable," +two suppositions may be made. Either there may be +a thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; +or there may be a thing greater than, and including all, other +things. Probably the latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but +it is Materialistic Pantheism. This Being must be in every +"mode of existence" "from all eternity." Personality is a +"mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever +have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode +of existence, therefore this Being must forever have been in +that mode. Yet again these two modes are contradictory +and mutually exclusive; then this Being must have been +from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually exclusive +modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show +that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the +understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, +therefore, utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great +as to be without limits? Has greatness anything to do with +infinity? Manifestly not. It becomes necessary, then, to +recur to and amplify those definitions which we have already +given to the terms he uses.</p> + +<p>Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary +Being.<span class="pagenum">[96]</span></p> + +<p>Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by +which he is endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and +totality. Or in other words, having this quality, he is wholly +independent of any other being; and also the possibility of +the existence of any other independent Being is excluded; +and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all possible +beings must depend.</p> + +<p>Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives +him universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that +he possesses all possible endowments in perfection.</p> + +<p>Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external +restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, +which his very constituting elements themselves impose, +are not removed by these qualities. For instance, the +possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, Power, and the +like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession of +them in <i>perfect harmony</i> is essential to his perfectness in the +entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars +him from the <i>undue</i> exercise of any one of his attributes; or, +concisely, his perfection restrains him from being imperfect. +We revert, then, to the fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, +between improper limitations, or those which are involved +in perfection; and proper limitations, or those which +are involved in deficiency and dependence; and applying it +here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of as belonging +to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are +necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection +which constitutes him the Ultimate.</p> + +<p>In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." +It is not that God has one, or one million endowments. It +asks no question about the number; and cares not for it. It +is satisfied in the assertion that he possesses <i>all that are possible</i>, +and in perfect harmony. It is, further, an idea, not a +concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be "conceived." +No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence; because +these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding<span class="pagenum">[97]</span> +and Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, <i>is</i>, +the quality of an intelligence endowed with a limited number +of attributes;—for there can be no number without limitation, +since the phrase unlimited number is a contradiction +of terms;—but this limitation involves no lack, because +there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, +as cognate or opposite modes of consciousness." Without +doubt it is, in a certain sense, true, that "the metaphysical +representation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must +necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, +amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality." +This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and from +him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion +by no means follows, in which he says: "What kind +of an Absolute Being is that which does not contain in itself +all that is actual, even evil included." This is founded upon +the suppressed premiss, that such a Being <i>must</i> do what he +does, and his creatures <i>must</i> do what they do; and so evil +must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may +be admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: +viz., that he sees in the ideals of his Reason <i>how</i> his +laws may be violated, and so, how sin may and will be in +this moral system; but it is a perversion of words to say that +this knowledge on the part of God is evil.</p> + +<p>The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect +law, is involved in the knowing how such agent may keep +that law. But the fact of the knowledge does not involve +any whit of consent to the act of violation. On the other +hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth +of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced +by those persons whom God has made, who violate +his moral laws. He being perfectly wise and perfectly good, +for perfectly wise and good reasons sustains them in the +ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of things, no +persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not +direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain<span class="pagenum">[98]</span> +fall upon him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. +That definition of the term absolute, upon which +Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit only for the Sense and +Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of all existence. +It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the +definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid +down, it may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, +as that of finite person, may be denied to God, and no +lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's blasphemy may, then, +be answered as follows: God is the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The +form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. +Infinity and absoluteness are <i>qualities</i> of the Person as thus +organized. The quality of absoluteness, for instance, as +transfusing the essence, is the endowment of pure independence, +and involves the exclusion of the possibility of any +other independent Being, and the possession of the ability to +create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as +Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, +except he is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. +But in so far as it means—and this is undoubtedly what +Hegel did mean—that God must be the efficient author of +sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must produce +evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been +uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy +cave of the Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably +correct notion of the true nature of the subject he had in +hand,—the character of God. From the above considerations +it is apparent that all the requirements of the Reason +are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things—the Universe—are +dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent.</p> + +<p>The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted +with entire approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly +vitiated by their author's indefensible assumption, +that cause is "indispensable" to our idea of the Deity. +As was remarked above, the notion of cause is incidental.<span class="pagenum">[99]</span> +The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall +decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be +a person or not. Hence we may freely admit that "the +cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect: the cause +is a cause of the effect; the effect is an effect of the +cause." It is also true that "the conception"—idea—"of +the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." +The position we have taken is in advance of this, +for we say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. +Introducing, then, not "the idea of succession in time," but +the idea of the logical order, we rightly say, "the Absolute +exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor +are we here "checked by the third conception, that of the +Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of existence," and +yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How is +this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment. +Now, taking as the point of departure the first +creative nisus or effort of the Deity, this is true. Before +that act he was perfect in every possible endowment, and +accorded his choice thereto. He was able to create, but did +not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that act, +he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no +<i>essential</i> change in God. But he was in one mode of being +before, and in another mode of being in and after that act. +Yet he was equally perfect, and equally blessed, before as +after. What then follows? This: that there was some good +and sufficient reason why before that act he should be a +potential creator, and in that act he should become an actual +creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, <i>i. e.</i> the +infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. +Mansel says, "if Causation is a possible mode of existence, +that which exists without causing is not infinite, that which +becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits," his +utterance is prompted by that pantheistic understanding-conception +of God, which thinks him the sum of all that +was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this,<span class="pagenum">[100]</span> +he is <i>actual</i>. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that +is required to fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, +whom it qualifies, possesses all fulness, has all the forms and +springs of being in himself. It is optional with him whether +he will create or not; and his remaining out of all relation, +or his creating a Universe, and thus establishing relations to +and for himself, in no way affect his essential nature, <i>i. e.</i> +his infinity. He is a person, possessing all possible endowments, +and in this does his infinity consist. In this view, +"creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the +only possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. +Such a <i>Person</i>, the necessary Being, must have been +in existence before the Universe; and his first act in producing +that Universe would mark the first moment of time. +No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be, presented to the +advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that scheme +is seen to be both impossible and absurd.</p> + +<p>One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next +paragraph he says, that, "supposing the Absolute to become +a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will +and consciousness." But the difficulties which he then +raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained +thus. Always in God's consciousness <i>the subject and object +are identical</i>. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. +Hence all relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent +upon him; and it is a misapprehension of the true +idea to suppose, that any relation which falls <i>in idea</i> within +him, and only becomes actual at his will, is any proper limitation. +Both subject and object are thus absolute, being +identical; and yet there is no contradiction.</p> + +<p>The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the +absolute Being any interrelations, as of attributes among +themselves, or of attributes to the Being. This arises from +an erroneous definition of the term absolute. The definition +heretofore given in this treatise presents no such difficulty. +The possession of these attributes and interrelations is essential<span class="pagenum">[101]</span> +to the exclusion by then possessor of another independent +Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality +which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the +consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the +almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that +the absolute is both one and simple," uses the term "simple" +in the same sense that it would have when applied to the idea +of moral obligation, viz., that it is unanalyzable, then that +voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice of antiquity +in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; +and is to be treated as that was. On such questions <i>opinions</i> +have no weight. The search is after a knowledge which is +sure, and which every man may have within himself. We +land, then, in no "inextricable dilemma." The absolute +Person we see to be conscious; and to possess complexity +in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition +we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, +difference, and likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, +established the Universe, which is still entirely dependent +upon him; from which he differs, and with which he is not +identified.</p> + +<p>Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived +as infinite, must be in actual exercise on every possible +object: otherwise it is potential only, with regard to +those on which it is not exercised; and an unrealized potentiality +is a limitation." With our interpretation the assertion +is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute +of the Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon +every one of its "possible objects" <i>as ideas</i>. But the objects +are not therefore actual. Neither is there any need +that they should ever become so. He sees them just as +clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he +does as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized +potentialities"; and yet they are the opposite of limitations +proper. But this sentence, as an expression of the thought +which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to convey, is vitiated<span class="pagenum">[102]</span> +by the presence of that understanding-conception that infinity +is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity +as <i>quality</i> of the necessarily existent Person, and it +directly follows that this or that act, of that Person, in no +way disturbs that infinity. The quality conditions the +acting being; but the act of that being cannot limit the +quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the reverse. +Hence the questions arising from the interrelations +of Power and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at +once. Infinity as quality, not amount, pervades them all, +and holds them all in perfect harmony, adjusting each to +each, in a melody more beautiful than that of the spheres. +Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of" +this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall +be; neither does he will that it shall not be. If he willed +that it should not be, and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; +but only on such a hypothesis can the conclusion follow. +But he does will that certain creatures shall be, who, +though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, +are, like him, final causes,—the final arbiters of their own +destinies, who in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and +may choose good or ill. He made these creatures, knowing +that some of them would choose wrong, and so evil would +be: but <i>he</i> did not will the evil. He only willed the conditions +upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper +bars to prevent the evil; and the <i>a priori</i> facts of his immutable +perfection in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, +are decisive of the consequent fact, that, in willing those +conditions, God did the very best possible deed. If it be +further asserted that the fact, that the Being who possesses +all possible endowments in perfection could not wisely prevent +sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better to +have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted +it by a wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same +as to say, that it is essential to God's perfection that he be +imperfect; or, that it was better for the perfect Being to<span class="pagenum">[103]</span> +violate his Self than to permit sin. If any one in his thinking +chooses to accept of such alternatives, there remains no +ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful +looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall +devour the adversary."</p> + +<p>Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel +further remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, +that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of +the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. +Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with +that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining +how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to +the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher +state than that of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting +voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of +comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; +and therefore was not originally perfect. If the state of +activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, +in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection." +On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore +adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection +does not belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God +<i>is</i>, as ground for what God does, and standing in the logical +order before his act; and it will directly appear that a state +of quiescence or a state of activity in no way modifies his +perfection. What God is, remains permanent and perfect, +and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and +perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as +the point of departure, that, before that point, God was in a +state of complete blessedness, and that after that point he +was also in such a state; and, further, that while these two +states are equal, there is not "complete indifference," because +there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine mind, +why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when +it was, and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged +in his conduct, gives to the two states equality, +and yet differentiates the one from the other.<span class="pagenum">[104]</span></p> + +<p>"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming +into being?" It cannot be <i>conceived</i> at all. The faculty +of the mind by which it forms a concept—the discursive +Understanding—is impotent to conceive what cannot be +conceived—the act of creation. The changes of matter +can be concluded into a system, but not the power by which +the matter came to be, and the changes were produced. If +the how is known at all, it must be seen. The laws of the +process must be intuited, as also the process as logically +according with those laws. The following is believed to be +an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the +above question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses +as <i>a priori</i> organic elements of his being, all possible endowments +in perfect harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible +combinations of laws, are at once and always present before +the Eye of his Reason, which is thus constituted Universal +Genius. These combinations may be conveniently named +ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way +dependent upon his will, but are rather <i>a priori</i> conditional +of any creative activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange +themselves into systems,—archetypes of what may be, +some of which may appear nobler, and others inferior. This +Person, being such as we have stated, possesses also as endowment +all power, and thereby excludes the possibility of +there being any "<i>other</i>" power. This power is adequate to +do all that <i>power</i> can do,—to accomplish all that lies within +the province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not +to exert his power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and +the power will be simply power. But whenever he shall see +fit to send forth his power, and organize it according to the +ideal forms, the Universe will become. In all this the Person, +"of his own will," freely establishes whatever his unerring +wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the +actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper +limit or restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but +are only a manifestation of that fulness,—a declaration of<span class="pagenum">[105]</span> +his glory. In a word, Creation is that executive act of God +by which he combines with his power that ideal system which +he had chosen because best, or <i>it is the organization of ample +power according to perfect law</i>. If one shall now ask, "How +could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the +question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's +animal nature; and since no representation—picture—can +be made, no answer can be furnished. It is not needed to +know <i>how</i> God is, or does anything, but only that he does it. +All the essential requirements of the problem are met when +it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all fulness is +in God, that from this fulness he established all other beings +and their natural relations, and that no relation is <i>imposed</i> +upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the +evil of the understanding-conception, that creation is the +bringing of something out of nothing. There is an actual +self-existent ground, from which the Universe is produced. +Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts with the <i>a priori</i> +idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is "before all +things, and by whom all things consist,"—who organizes his +own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces +the Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness.</p> + +<p>On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," +Mr. Mansel makes use of the following language: +"A limit is itself a relation; and to conceive a limit as such, +is virtually to acknowledge the existence of a correlative on +the other side of it." Upon reading this sentence, some +sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense. Some +object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. +But let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses +all limitation within himself, and for whom there is no +"other side," nor any "correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. +We do not seek to account for sensuous objects. It is pure +Spirit whom we consider. We do not need to form a concept +of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of space,"<span class="pagenum">[106]</span> +nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty +which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization. +What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit +is, who, possessing personality as form, and absoluteness and +infinity as qualities, thereby contains all limits and the +ground of all being in himself, and antithetical to whom is +only negation.</p> + +<p>From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not +the dreary Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair +land of harmonious consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, +self-conscious, the absolute and infinite Person, is the Being +we seek and have found; and upon such a Being the soul +of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant +in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the +beautiful spirit of religious reverence which shines through +the closing paragraphs of this lecture. It is evident with +what dissatisfaction the writer views the sterile puzzles of +which he has been treating, and what a relief it is to turn +from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow +to anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the +evil.'" The wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation +which his devout spirit has made, as the truth—which +it is—and say, "I will accept this as final. My definitions +and deductions shall accord with this highest revelation. +This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done +so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and +truthful would have been the conclusions he would have +given us.</p> + +<p>In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination +of the human nature, for the purpose, if possible, +of finding "some explanation of the singular phenomenon +of human thought," which he has just developed. At the +threshold of the investigation the fact of consciousness appears, +and he begins the statement of its conditions in the +following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception +of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested,<span class="pagenum">[107]</span> +necessarily implies <i>distinction between one object and +another</i>. To be conscious we must be conscious of something; +and that something can only be known as that which +it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In +this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, +the very question at issue; for, the position maintained by +one class of writers is, that in certain of our mental operations, +viz., in intuitions, the mind sees a simple truth, idea, +first principle, as it is, in itself, and that there is no distinction +in the act of knowledge. It is unquestionably true that, +in the examination of objects on the Sense, and the conclusion +of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come +into consciousness without implying a "distinction between +one object and another." But it is also evident that a first +truth, to be known as such, must be intuited—seen as it is in +itself; and so directly known to have the qualities of necessity +and universality which constitute it a first truth. Of +this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been aware, +when he denied the actuality of the Reason,—perceiving, +doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his +own theory tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would +seem it must be, that men have necessary and universal convictions, +then it must also be admitted that these convictions +are not entertained by distinguishing them from other mental +operations, but that they are seen of themselves to be true; +and thus it appears that there are some modes of consciousness +which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The +subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. +If the author means that "the Infinite" cannot +be infinite without he is also finite, so that all distinction +ceases, then his meaning is both pantheistic and contradictory; +for the word infinite has no meaning, if it is not the +opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly Pantheism. +Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" +as independent, from the Finite <i>as independent</i>, and +thus, as possessing some quality with which it was not endowed<span class="pagenum">[108]</span> +by the infinite Person, then there can be no doubt of +his correctness. But if, as would seem, his idea of infinity is +that of amount, is such that it appears inconsistent, contradictory, +for the infinite Person to retain his infinity, and still +create beings who are really other than himself, and possessing, +as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality, +then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, +and the capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that +the Reason requires is, that the finite be created by and +wholly dependent upon the infinite Person; then all the relations +and conditions are only <i>improper</i>,—such as that Person +has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish +his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel +says, "A consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus +necessarily involves a self-contradiction, for it implies the +recognition, by limitation and difference, of that which can +only be given as unlimited and indifferent," it is evident that +he uses the term infinite to express the understanding-conception +of unlimited amount, which is not relevant here, +rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not contradictory +to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite. +There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we +have no knowledge except of the limited and different, or, +in other words, that the Understanding is the highest faculty +of the mind. It has already been abundantly shown that +this is erroneous,—that the Reason knows its objects in +themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or +likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," +and using the concrete and proper form, we may say:</p> + +<p>We are conscious of infinity, <i>i. e.</i> we are conscious that we +see with the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, <i>a priori</i> idea; +and that it is quality of the Deity.</p> + +<p>2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are +conscious, that we see with the eye of Reason the complex <i>a +priori</i> idea of a perfect Person possessing independence and +universality as qualities of his Self. But we are not conscious<span class="pagenum">[109]</span> +of him in that we exhaustively comprehend him. As +is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a certain extent, +but not wholly what he is.</p> + +<p>In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of +another grave psychological error. He says, "Consciousness +is essentially a limitation, for it is the determination to one +actual out of many possible modifications." There is no truth +in this sentence. Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not +a determination; it is not a modification. It may be well to +state here certain conclusions on this assertion, which will be +brought out in the fuller discussion of it, when we come to +speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is <i>one</i>, and +retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur +in the unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless +Dr. Hickok's illustration is the best possible. Consciousness +is the <i>light</i> in which a spiritual person sees the modifications +of himself, <i>i. e.</i> the activity of his faculties and capacities. +Like Space, only in a different sphere, it is an illimitable +indivisible unity, which is, that all limits may be in it—that +all objects may come into it. If, then, only one modification—object—comes +into it at a time, this is because the faculties +which see in its light are thus organized;—the being to +whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining +to consciousness <i>as such</i>, which constitutes a limit,—which +could bar the infinite Person from seeing all things at once +in its light. This Person, then, so far as known, must be +known as an actual absolute, infinite Spirit, and hence no +"thing"; and further as the originator and sustainer of all +"<i>things</i>,"—which, though dependent on him, in no way take +aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially +everything, in the sense that all possible combinations, or +forms of objects, must ever stand as ideals in his Reason; and +he can, at his will, organize his power in accordance therewith. +But he must also be known as free to create or not to +create; and that the fact that many potential forms remain +such, in no way detracts from his infinity.<span class="pagenum">[110]</span></p> + +<p>Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions +which, we feel assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If +all thought is limitation,—if whatever we conceive is, by the +very act of conception, regarded as finite,—the infinite, from +a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of +those conditions under which thought is possible." "From +a human point of view," and <i>we</i>, at least, can take no other, +what follows? That the Deity <i>can have no thoughts</i>; cannot +know what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three +suppositions can be made. Either he has no thoughts, is +destitute of an intellect; or his intellect is Universal Genius, +and he sees all possible objects at once; or there is a faculty +different in kind from and higher than the Reason, of which +we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged +by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically +following from the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so +abhorrent to the soul that it must be unhesitatingly rejected. +The second is the position advocated in this treatise. The +third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject this +third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and +because, being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it +should not be allowed. To advocate a position of which, in +the very terms of it, the intellect can have no possible +shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of the +work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" +not "distinction" in the understanding-conception of that +term. So consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits +when cognized are seen in the light of consciousness. According +to the philosophy we advocate, God is a particular +being, and is so known; yet he is not known as "one thing +out of many," but is known in himself, as being such and +such, and yet being <i>unique</i>. When Mr. Mansel says, "In +assuming the possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, +I assume, therefore, that it is at the same time limited and +unlimited," he evidently uses those terms with a signification +pertinent only to the Understanding. He is thinking of<span class="pagenum">[111]</span> +<i>amount</i> under the forms of Space and Time; and so his remark +has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will +think of him as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; +and will define infinity and absoluteness in accordance therewith.</p> + +<p>If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a +consistent rationalism <i>must</i> attribute "consciousness to God." +<i>We</i> are always conscious of "limitation and change," because +partiality and growth are organic with us. But we can perceive +no peculiarity in consciousness, which should produce +such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a person has +little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no +more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding +information, he is conscious of just so much. +Whence, it appears, that the "limitation and change" spring +from the nature of the constitution, and not from the consciousness. +If, then, there should be one Person who possessed +the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason +from consciousness why he should be conscious thereof.</p> + +<p>Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, +that it is only possible in the form of a <i>relation</i>. +There must be a Subject, or person conscious, and an Object +or thing of which he is conscious." This utterance, taken in +the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey, involves the +denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that +the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the +difficulty vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the +Absolute?" If by this is meant, have an exhaustive comprehension +of the absolute Person, the experience is manifestly +impossible. But man may have a certain knowledge, +<i>that</i> such Person is without knowing in all respects <i>what</i> he is, +just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing +what it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and +infinite to represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he +is guilty of personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning +with regard to the Being as he would with regard to the<span class="pagenum">[112]</span> +term. Absoluteness is a simple unanalyzable idea, but it is +not God; it is only one quality of God. So with infinity. +God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as unanalyzable +simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the +apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it +about the apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend +the absolute Person <i>as such</i>, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, +and a positive knowledge that the Being is who +is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question respecting +the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute +Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. +We may have a true, clear, thorough knowledge <i>that</i> +he exists without having an exhaustive knowledge of <i>what</i> +he is. The former is necessary to us; the latter impossible. +So, too, the knowledge by us, of any <i>a priori</i> law, will be exhaustive. +Yet while we know that it <i>must</i> be such, and not +otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other <i>a priori</i> +laws, nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. +And since, as we have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness +nor infinity relate to number, and God is not material substance +that can be broken into "parts," but an organized +Spirit, we see that we may consider the elements of his +organization in their logical order; and, remembering that +absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may +examine his nature and attributes without impiety.</p> + +<p>Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on +a moment's reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite +can be represented in the form of a whole composed of +parts." This is tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be +represented under the form of the material—a truth so evident +as hardly to need so formal a statement. But what the +Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known as having +qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and +from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his +Knowledge, his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet +these are distinguished from each other, and from him. All<span class="pagenum">[113]</span> +this is consistent, because infinity is <i>quality</i>, and permeates +them all; and not amount, which jumbles them all into a +confused, <i>indistinguishable</i> mass.</p> + +<p>In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily +subject to the law of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object +of whose existence we can be in any way conscious is +necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time to some +former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a certain +portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed +the law of created beings, under which they must see objects, +the remark is true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, +and concludes that, because we are under limitation in seeing +the object, it is under the same limitation, so far as we apprehend +it in being seen, he asserts what is a psychological +error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom, "Things +which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another." +Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see +this, that is, we do, must, occupy a time in observing it. +But do we see that the axiom is under any condition of +Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is, <i>must be</i>, +true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is thus +<i>absolutely</i> true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and +absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, +then, a faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in +succession, and so under the law of Time, also sees that +those objects, whether ideas, or that Being to whom all ideas +belong, are, <i>in themselves</i>, out of all relation to Time. Thus +is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is he like God; +thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, +so often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, +'In contemplating God, transcend time,'" means, "In all +your reflections upon God, behold him in his true aspect, in +the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It is true that "to +know the infinite" <i>exhaustively</i>, "the human mind must itself +be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that +mind. Only that knowledge is required which is possible,<span class="pagenum">[114]</span> +viz., that the Deity is, and what he is, <i>in so far as we are in +his image</i>.</p> + +<p>Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a +relation," in the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from +any being who possesses it. It rather adds,—is, indeed, a +pure addition. We appear to ourselves as limited and related, +not because of our personality, but because of our +finiteness as <i>quality</i> in the personality.</p> + +<p>Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and +universal Spirit should not have personality, but we see that +if he was destitute of it, he must possess a lower form of +being,—since this is the highest possible form,—which +would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other words, we +see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently +says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the +personality of God so strong, that one is bewildered with the +question, "How could he escape the conviction which they +awaken? How could he reject the cry of his spiritual nature, +and accept the barren contradictions of his lower +mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness +alone that we know that God exists, or that we are able +to offer him any service. It is only by conceiving Him as a +Conscious Being, that we can stand in any religious relation +to Him at all,—that we can form such a representation of +Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, insufficient +though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity." "Personality +comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation +to personality comprises all that we know of that which +seems to exist. And when, from the little world of man's +consciousness and its objects, we would lift up our eyes to the +inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask to whom all this is +related, the highest existence is still the highest personality, +and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, +'I AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; +and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite." We +may at this point quote with profit the words of that Book<span class="pagenum">[115]</span> +whose authority Mr. Mansel, without doubt, most heartily +acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send them +strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all +might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure +in unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because +ye know not the truth, but because ye know it, and +that no lie is of the truth." Either God is personal or he is +not. If he is, then all that we claim is conceded. If he is +not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as personal, +then it is our duty to think and believe a <i>falsehood</i>. +This no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened +man, <i>can</i> bring his mind to accept as a moral law. +The soul instinctively asserts that obligation lies parallel +with <i>truth</i>, and "that no lie is of the truth." So, then, there +can be no duty except where truth is. And the converse +may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of +duty is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and +truly spiritual a man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our +duty to think God personal, and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly +accept it as the utterance of a great fundamental +truth in that spiritual realm which is the highest realm of +being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with it we +accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere, +that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one +must be rejected, man should cling to, and trust in the +higher—the teaching of the nobler nature. Thus will we +do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see the destruction +of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God +as personal," because he is personal; and we know that he +is personal because it is our duty to think him so. We need +pay no regard to the perplexities of the Understanding. We +soar with the eagle above the clouds, and float ever in the +light of the Sun. The teachings of the Moral Sense are far +more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any discursions of the +lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all perplexity +to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to<span class="pagenum">[116]</span> +stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all +utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the +least, the declaration of this faculty is <i>as</i> valid as that of the +lower, and is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because +higher. Still further, no man would believe that God, +in the most solemn, yea, awful moment of his Self-revelation, +would declare a lie. The bare thought, fully formed, horrifies +the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in that +supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one +of the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, +He revealed Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the +most positive, the most unquestionable form in which He +could utter the fact of His personality. This, then, and all +that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all perplexities +must be interpreted by this surety.</p> + +<p>In summing up the results to which an examination of the +facts of consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the +following psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily +conceived as a relation between something within and something +without itself; and the consciousness of a limit of +thought implies, though it does not directly present to us, the +existence of something of which we do not and cannot +think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly +within the being to whom it belongs, and so <i>not</i> to be "a +relation between something within and something without +itself." This is precisely the case with the Deity. All relations +and limits spring from within him, and there is nothing +"without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence +of all limit from without is rudely expressed in such +common phrases as this: "It must be so in the <i>nature of +things</i>." This "nature of things" is, in philosophical language, +the system of <i>a priori</i> laws of the Universe, and +these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It appears, +then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its limits +wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity.</p> + +<p>With these remarks the author would close his criticism<span class="pagenum">[117]</span> +upon Mr. Mansel's book. We start from entirely different +bases, and these two systems logically follow from their foundations. +If Sir William Hamilton is right in his psychology, +his follower is unquestionably right in his deductions. But +if that psychology is partial, if besides the Understanding +there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the intuition, +giving the final standard by which to measure that +judgment, then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly +fallacious. The establishment of the validity of the +Pure Reason is the annihilation of "the Philosophy of the +Unconditioned." On the ground which the author has +adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute, +self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of +these terms has been given. We have found that certain +objects may be seen as out of all relation, plurality, difference, +or likeness. Consciousness and personality have also +been found to involve no limit, in the proper sense of that +term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the +light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions +of Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according +to the capacity with which the being was endowed, and +was not determined by any peculiarity of the consciousness; +while the other appeared to be the highest possible form of +existence, and that also in which God had revealed himself. +From such a ground it is possible to go forward and construct +a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the +teachings of the Bible.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[118]</span></p> + +<h2 id="REVIEW_OF_MR_HERBERT_SPENCERS_FIRST_PRINCIPLES">REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES."</h2> + +<p>In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common +by the three writers named early in this work, have +been, it may be, passed over unnoticed. This was done, +because, being held in common, it was believed that an examination +of them, as presented by the latest writer, would +be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought +or expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have +intended to notice when speaking of those writers. But where +Mr. Spencer seems to present their very thought as his own, +it has appeared better to remark upon it in his latest form of +expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar to himself. +These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience' +sake, what we have to say will take the form of a +running commentary upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate +Religious Ideas," "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity +of all Knowledge," and "The Reconciliation." Before +entering upon this, however, some general remarks will be +pertinent.</p> + +<p>1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding +is the highest faculty of the human intellect. This +is implied in the following sentence: "Those imbecilities of +the understanding that disclose themselves when we try to +answer the highest questions of objective science, subjective +science proves to be necessitated by the laws of that understanding."—<i>First +Principles</i>, p. 98.</p> + +<p>His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from +sensuous objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the +<i>material</i> Universe is present to his mind. His questions refer +to objects of sense, and he shows plainly enough that any<span class="pagenum">[119]</span> +attempt to answer them by the Sense or Understanding is +futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be answered. +But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than +an animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; +that he is also a spiritual person, having an <i>Eye</i>, the pure +Reason, which can <i>see</i> straight to the central Truth, with a +clearness and in a light which dims and pales the noonday +sun, know also that, and how, these difficulties, insoluble to +the lower faculties, are, in this noble alembic, finally dissolved.</p> + +<p>2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology +of man's faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like +them, he employs only such terms as are pertinent to the +Sense and Understanding. So also with them he is at fault, +in that he raises questions which no Sense or Understanding +could suggest even, questions whose very presence are decisive +that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of +applying to them terms entirely impertinent,—terms belonging +only to those lower tribunals before which these questions +can never come. For instance, he always employs the word +"conceive" to express the effort of the mind in presenting to +itself the subjects now under discussion. In some form of +noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained upon +his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely +divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and +the like, dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment +to the positions attained in an earlier portion of this work. It +was there found that the word conceive was <i>utterly irrelevant</i> +to any subject except to objects of Sense and the Understanding +in its work of classifying them, or generalizing from +them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted, it was +found that they not only presented no object of thought to +the mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, +and could not properly be used together. For instance, infinite +has no more relation to, and can no more qualify period, +than the points of the compass are pertinent to, and can<span class="pagenum">[120]</span> +qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite period, is simply +absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite and +absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They +can be pertinent only to God and his <i>a priori</i> ideas. Many, +perhaps most of the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, +will be based on this single misuse of words; which yet grows +naturally out of that denial and perversion of faculties which +Mr. Spencer, in common with the other Limitist writers, has +attempted. On the other hand, it is to be remembered, that, +if we arrive at the truth at all, we must <i>intuit</i> it; we must +either see it as a simple <i>a priori</i> idea, or as a logical deduction +from such ideas.</p> + +<p>3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that +he goes on propounding his questions, and asserting that they +are insoluble, apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an +enchanted castle that they have all been solved, or at least +that the principles on which it would seem that they could +be solved have been stated by a man of no mean ability,—Dr. +Hickok,—and that until the proposed solutions are +thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages +are idle. He implies that there is no cognition higher than +a conception, when some very respectable writers have named +intuitions as incomparably superior. He speaks of the Understanding +as if it were without question the highest faculty +of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge said +it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into +English thinking the distinction between the Understanding, +as "the faculty judging according to sense," and the Reason, +as "the power of universal and necessary convictions," which, +being such, must necessarily rank far above the other. And +finally he uses the words and phrases above disallowed, and +the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to prove, by +the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already +been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning +as Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume +heretofore alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so<span class="pagenum">[121]</span> +appreciate the <i>demonstration</i> therein contained, of the utter +incompetency of the Sense or Understanding to solve such +questions as Mr. Spencer has raised by his incident of the +partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to them of the +efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and unsatisfactory +in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few +facts in a sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half +dozen proofs, more or less that a theory is fallacious who has +learned that, and why, the theory <i>cannot</i> be true. Let us +now take up in order the chapters heretofore mentioned.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="ULTIMATE_RELIGIOUS_IDEAS">"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS."</h2> + +<p>The summing up of certain reflections with which this +chapter opens, concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic +conceptions are such that no cumulative or indirect +processes of thought can enable us to ascertain that there +are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made +whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether +vicious and illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure +fictions,"—p. 29. So far very good; but his use of it is utterly +unsound. "And now to consider the bearings of this general +truth on our immediate topic—Ultimate Religious Ideas." +But this "general truth" has <i>no</i> bearings upon "ultimate +religious ideas"; how then can you consider them? <i>No</i> ideas, +and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or the results +of conceptions—or are the products of "cumulative or indirect +processes of thought." They are not results or products +<i>at all</i>. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation +of what is inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known +at all. Man might pile up "cumulative processes of thought" +for unnumbered ages, and might form most exact conceptions +of objects of Sense,—conceptions are not possible of others,—and +he could never creep up to the least and faintest religious +idea.<span class="pagenum">[122]</span></p> + +<p>On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting +the origin of the Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper +question is, whether any one of them is even conceivable in +the true sense of that word. Let us successively test them." +This is not necessary. It has already been <i>demonstrated</i> +that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding, cannot +touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow, +therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he +implies. Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. +No "vague symbolic conceptions," or any conception +at all, of it <i>can be formed</i>. A conception is possible only +"under relation, difference, and plurality." <i>This</i> is a pure, +simple idea, and so can only be known in itself by a seeing—an +immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out of all +relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no difference. +It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. +The discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are +in it no various points upon which that faculty may fasten. +It may, perhaps, better be expressed by the words pure independence. +Again, it is <i>not</i> properly "existence without a +beginning," but rather, existence out of all relation to beginning; +and so it is an idea, out of all relation to those faculties +which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we +can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence +without a beginning," it does not follow that we cannot <i>see</i> +that a Being existing out of all relation to beginning <i>is</i>. "To +this let us add" that the intuition of such a Being is a complete +"explanation of the Universe," and does make it "easier +to understand" "that it existed an hour ago, a day ago, a +year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily is <i>out of all +relation to time</i>, that there is no such thing as an "infinite +period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the +procession of events which we call time he <i>is</i>; and that before +that procession began—when there was no time, he was. +Thus we see that all events are based upon Him who is +independent; and that time, in our general use of it, is but<span class="pagenum">[123]</span> +the measure of what He produces. We arrive, then, at the +conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not because +self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be +clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the +Universe is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which +cannot entertain such a notion at all; and because this notion +is <i>seen</i> to be a necessary idea in the province of that higher +faculty which entertains as objects both the idea and the +Being to whom it primarily belongs.</p> + +<p>The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, +and not the theory that it is self-created, though this latter, +in Mr. Spencer's definition of it, seems only a phase of the +other. To say that "self-creation is potential existence +passing into actual existence by some inherent necessity," is +only to remove self-existence one step farther back, as he +himself shows. Potential existence is either no existence at +all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence, then we +have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and +with no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not +only unthinkable, but absurd. But if potential existence is +positive, it needs to be accounted for as much as actual. +While, then, there can be no doubt as to the validity of +the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives, respecting the +entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence and +self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction +made above between self-existence as a true and self-creation +as a pseudo idea, and the fact that the true idea is a <i>reality</i>, +should never be lost sight of. By failing to discriminate—as +in the Understanding he could not do—between them, +and by concluding both as objects alike impossible to the +human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also decided +that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"—creation +by external agency—is equally untenable. In his examination +of this, he starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious +assumption, that this is a "conception"; that it can +be, <i>is</i> founded upon a "cumulative process of thought, or the<span class="pagenum">[124]</span> +fulfilment of predictions based on it." These words, phrases, +and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a conception, process, +or prediction that we want; it is a <i>sight</i>. Hence, no +assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings +of a human artificer" <i>can in the least degree</i> "vaguely symbolize +to us" the "method after which the Universe" was +"shaped." This differed in <i>kind</i> from all possible human +methods, and had not one element in common with them.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not +appear to be well grounded. "An immeasurable void"—Space—is +not an entity, is <i>no</i> thing, and therefore cannot +"exist," neither is any explanation for it needed. His question, +"how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came +immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no +"explanation." It is only <i>some</i> thing which must be accounted +for. The theory of creation by external agency being, then, +an adequate one to account for the Universe, supplies the +following statement. That Being who is primarily out of +all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent +power, into nothing—Space, room, the condition of material +existence,—something, matter and the Universe became. +"The genesis of the universe" having thus been explained +and seen to be "the result of external agency," we are +ready to furnish for the question, "how came there to be an +external agency?" that true answer, which we have already +shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily +existent, or self-existent, <i>i. e.</i> who possess pure independence +as an essential attribute, whose being is thus +fixed, and is therefore without the province of power, is the +external agency which is needed. This Person, differing in +kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor concluded +from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only +be seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual +<i>Eye</i>, like in kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual +things may be discerned. This Person, being thus seen +immediately, is known in a far more satisfactory mode than<span class="pagenum">[125]</span> +he could be by any generalizations of the Understanding, +could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of +Him is, like His self, <i>immutable</i>. We <span class="smcap">know</span> that we stand +on the eternal Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the +unwavering Light which radiates from the throne of God. +Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist. It is the +simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure +truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate +intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. +It is, then, because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic +in man, and seen by him to be an attribute of God, +that God is known to be the Creator of the Universe. Having +attained to this truth, we readily see that the conclusions +which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that "self-existence +is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic hypothesis +equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; +that "our conception of self-existence can be formed only +by joining with it the notion of unlimited duration through +past time"; so far as they imply our destitution of knowledge +on these topics, are the opposite of the facts. We <i>see</i>, +though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The theistic +hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see, +also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration +must be limited; and that self-existence involves existence +out of all relation to duration.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and +says: "We find ourselves on the one hand obliged to make +certain assumptions, and yet, on the other hand, we find these +assumptions cannot be represented in thought." Upon this +it may be remarked:</p> + +<p>1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, +which man makes, and cannot help making, except he +deny himself;—necessary convictions, first truths, first principles, +<i>a priori</i> ideas. They are organic, and so are the +foundation of all knowledge. They are not results learned +from lessons, but are <i>primary</i>, and conditional to an ability<span class="pagenum">[126]</span> +to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at +most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves +a labor which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have +never attempted, and which, we are persuaded, they would +find the most difficult of all, viz., to account for the fact of +these assumptions. For the question is pertinent and urgent;</p> + +<p>2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? +Where, for instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze +the rocks, study plants and their growth, become familiar +with animals and their habits, or exhaust the Sense in an +examination of man, and one can find no notion of self. +Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it +arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" +How comes it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally +with the most civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" +from nothing or from something? If from something, how +came that something to be? We might ask, Does not the +presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality of a +somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity +by which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of +this assumption, as a mental phenomenon, involve the higher +fact of some mental ground, some form, some capacity, which +is both organic to the mind, and organized in the mind, in +accordance with which the assumption is, and which determines +what it must be? Or are we to believe that these +assumptions are mere happenings, without law, and for which +no reason can be assigned? Again we press the question, +How came these assumptions to suggest themselves?</p> + +<p>3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." +If "thought" is restricted to that mental operation of the +Understanding by which it generalizes in accordance with +the Sense, the statement is true. But if it is meant, as +seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these assumptions +are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at +all by the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. +The ideas presented by the phrases are, as was seen above, +clear and definite.<span class="pagenum">[127]</span></p> + +<p>Since Mr. Spencer has quoted <i>in extenso</i>, and with entire +approbation, what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, +the Absolute, and the Infinite," we have placed the full examination +of these topics in our remarks upon Mr. Mansel's +writings, and shall set down only a few brief notes here.</p> + +<p>Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged +to suppose <i>some</i> cause"; or, in other words, that the notion +of cause is organic. Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves +to the hypothesis of a First Cause." Then, this First +Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be independent;" +"or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." One +would almost suppose that a <i>rational</i> man penned these +decisions, instead of one who denies that he has a <i>reason</i>. +The illusion is quickly dispelled, however, by the objections +he lifts out of the dingy ground-room of the Understanding. +It is curious to observe in these pages a fact which we have +noticed before, in speaking of Sir William Hamilton's works, +viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence, the +workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along +side by side, the former all the while befogging and hindering +the latter. Mr. Spencer's conclusions which we have +quoted, and his objections which we are to answer, are a +striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his remarks +he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with +finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used +interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly +in the Sense and Understanding. The latter belong wholly +in the Pure Reason. The former pertain to material objects, +to mental images of them, or to number. The latter qualify +only spiritual persons, and have no pertinence elsewhere. +Limitation is the conception of an object <i>as bounded</i>. Illimitation +is the conception of an object as without boundaries. +Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives +nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds +in the Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. +It does not refer to boundaries at all. It belongs<span class="pagenum">[128]</span> +only to created spiritual persons, and expresses the fact that +they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only by its +place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason +to illimitation in the lower faculties. It is <i>positive</i>, and is +that quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as +<i>universality</i>. It expresses the idea of <i>all possible endowments +in perfect harmony</i>. From his misuse of these terms Mr. +Spencer is led to speak in an irrelevant manner upon the +question, "Is the First Cause finite or infinite?" He uses +words and treats the whole matter as if it were a question of +material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region +surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as +out of place as to say white love or yellow kindness. His +methods of thought on these topics are also gravely erroneous. +He attempts an analysis by the logical Understanding, +where a synthesis by the Reason is required,—a synthesis +which has already been given by our Creator to man +as an original idea. It is not necessary to examine some +limited thing, or all limited things, and wander around their +boundaries to learn that the First Cause is infinite. We +need to make no discursus, but only to look the idea of first +cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it, to find +all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr. +Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, +that such a being <i>must be</i> self-existent. And this conviction +would be so strong that the mind would rest itself in +this decision: "A thousand phantasmagoria of the imagination +may be wrong," says the soul, "but this I know must be +true, or there is no truth in the Universe."</p> + +<p>One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration +deserves special notice. It is this. "But if we admit that +there can be some thing uncaused, there is no reason to assume +a cause for anything." This "assumes" the truth of +a major premise all <i>things</i> are substantially alike. If the +word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,—objects of +sense,—then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and<span class="pagenum">[129]</span> +Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the +implication is meant that there are no other entities which +can be object to the mind except such "things," then it is a +clear <i>petitio principii</i>. For the very question at issue is, +whether, in fact, there is not one entity—"thing"—which +so differs in kind from all others, that it is uncaused, <i>i. e.</i> +self-existent; and whether the admission that that entity +is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy +the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to +account for the subordinate causes which we observe by the +Sense.</p> + +<p>In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, +"but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There +can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing +which prevents change. For if it contains something +which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something +must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. +Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, +complete, total, including within itself all power, and transcending +all law." We cannot criticize this better, and mark +how curiously truth and error are mixed in it, than by so +parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The First +Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging +to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact +sense of that term, is impossible to him, for there is nothing +for him to <i>change to</i>. This is not invalidated by his passing +from inaction to action; for creation involves no change in +God's nature or attributes, and so no real or essential change, +which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through +whom all changes become. He is not, then, a <i>simple</i> unit, +but is an organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends +in a unity, all possible laws, forms, and relations, as +necessary elements of his necessary existence,—as endowments +which necessarily belong to him, and are conditional +of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are not +"imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed<span class="pagenum">[130]</span> +upon him. They belong to his Self, and are conditional of +his being. So, then, instead of "transcending all law," he is +the embodiment of all law; and his perfection is, that possessing +this endowment, he accords his conduct thereto. A +being who should "transcend all law" would have no reason +why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither +would he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or +pure chaos. Pure chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness +cannot establish law; and so could not be the First +Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no alternative +but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute."</p> + +<p>And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental +activities, that the positions we have gained are fixed, +final, irrevocable; and further, that they are not the "results" +of "reasonings," but that first there was a seeing, and then +an analysis of what was seen, and that the seeing is <i>true</i>, +though every other experience be false; we <i>know</i> that our +position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and +that what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the +illegitimate order," but is pure truth.</p> + +<p>For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is +referred back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's +work, which Mr. Spencer has quoted.</p> + +<p>A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 <i>et seq.</i>, will +complete the review of this chapter. "Passing over the +consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that +of" consistency, we would find in any rigorous analysis, that +Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory; but we <i>have +found</i> that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an +absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of +the Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, +and is entirely thinkable. Such a system, based upon the +necessary convictions of man, and justly commanding that +these shall be the fixed standard, in accordance with which +all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and decided, gives +a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his eternal +<span class="smcap">Rest</span>.<span class="pagenum">[131]</span></p> + +<p>In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the +permanent in all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another +equally permanent, equally common, and incomparably more +important fact, viz: that Fetishism, Polytheism, Pantheism, +and Monotheism,—all religions alike assert <i>that a god created +the Universe</i>. In other words, the great common element, +in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast +system of things in which we live is, <i>that it is the product of +an agency external to itself, and that the external agency is +personal</i>. Take the case of the rude aboriginal, who "assumes +a separate personality behind every phenomenon." +He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is +too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those +material objects which appear permanent need to be accounted +for. It is only the changes which seem to him to need a +reason. Behind each change he imagines a sort of personal +power, superior to it and man, which produces it, and this +satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he looks in the +same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of +belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea +which can be readily traced through all forms of religion, +that some <i>personal</i> being, external, and superior to the things +that be, produced them. Nor is Atheism a proper exception +to this law. For Atheism is not a religion, but the denial of +all religion. It is not a doctrine of God, but is a denial that +there is any God; and what is most in point, it never was a +<i>popular</i> belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over which +a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander. +Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position +taken: for Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, +Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm does not lose his individuality +because the Universe is evolved from him. <i>Now</i> he is +thought of as one, and the Universe as another, although the +Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and hereafter +to be reabsorbed by him. <i>Now</i>, this part of his essence +which was <i>produced</i> through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is<span class="pagenum">[132]</span> +<i>individualized</i>; and so is one, while he is another. Thus, +here also, the idea of a proper external agency is preserved. +The facts, then, are decisively in favor of the proposition +above laid down. "<i>Our</i> investigation" discloses "a fundamental +verity in each religion." And the facts and the +verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, +and there they do find perfect consistency and harmony.</p> + +<p>It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this +chapter, to account for the fact that, upon a single idea so +many theories of God have fastened themselves; or better, +perhaps, that a single idea has developed itself in so many +forms. This cannot better be done than in the language of +that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle Paul. +In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse +of the 1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be +known of God is manifest to them; for God hath shewed it +unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation +of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things +which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, so +that they are without excuse. Because that, when they +knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were +thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their +foolish heart was darkened: professing themselves to be wise +they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible +God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to +birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This +passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, +did it possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom +Mr. Spencer asserts it is <i>impossible for us to know</i>, gives us +in a popular form the truth. Man, having organic in his +mind the idea of God, and having in the Universe an ample +manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal power and Godhead +of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that +idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded +the idea in the Reason, to the service of base passion. By +this degradation and perversion the organic idea became so<span class="pagenum">[133]</span> +bedizened with the finery of fancy formed in the Understanding, +under the direction of the animal nature, as to be +lost to the popular mind,—the trappings only being seen. +When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all +that restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, +men became vain in their imaginations; their fancy +ran riot in all directions. Cutting loose from all law, they +plunged into every excess which could be invented; and out +of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner of vagaries +were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we +find some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, +during and previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular +history begins the human race had passed into the second +stage. Crystallization had begun. Students were commencing +the search for truth. Religion was taking upon itself +more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not +be wholly obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness +of some gifted individuals, and philosophy began. +Philosophy in its purest form, as taught by Socrates and +Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure Theism. But +the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted +them so far above the common people, that they could affect +only a few. And what was most disheartening, that same +degradation which originally lost to man the truth, now prevented +him from receiving it. Thus it was that by a binding +of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing +through the world with the Understanding at the beck of +the Sense, the many forms of religion became.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="ULTIMATE_SCIENTIFIC_IDEAS">"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS."</h2> + +<p>On a former page we have already attempted a positive +answer to the question, "What are Space and Time," with +which Mr. Spencer opens this chapter. It was there found<span class="pagenum">[134]</span> +that, in general terms, they are <i>a priori</i> conditions of created +being; and, moreover, that they possess characteristics suitable +to what they condition, just as the <i>a priori</i> conditions of +the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to what +they condition. It was further found that this general law is, +from the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind +and without it; that it is, must be, the form of thought for +the perceiving subject, corresponding to the condition of existence +for the perceived object. It also appeared that the +Universe as object, and the Sense and Understanding as +faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and further, that +these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space +and Time, because these were the very conditions of their +being; moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be +considered with reference to the Universe, and apart from it +could not be examined by them at all. Yet it was further +found that the Universe might in the presence of the Reason +be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and Time still +remained as pure <i>a priori</i> conditions, the one as <i>room</i>, the +other as <i>opportunity</i>, for the coming of created being. Space +and Time being such conditions, <i>and nothing more</i>, are entities +only in the same sense that the multiplication table and the +moral law are entities. They are <i>conditions</i> suited to what +they condition. In the light of this result let us examine +Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them.</p> + +<p>Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they +exist (ex sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. +This of course involves the being of a where and a when in +which they can stand out; and that where and when must +needs be accounted for, and so on <i>ad infinitum</i>. Again, Mr. +Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they, +in existing "objectively," had a <i>formal</i> objective existence. +Yet this, in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The +mind apprehends many objects, which do not "exist." They +only are. Thus, as has just been said, Space and Time, as +conditions of created being, <i>are</i>. They are entities but not<span class="pagenum">[135]</span> +existences. They are <i>a priori</i> entities, and so are <i>necessarily</i>. +By this they stand in the same category with all +pure laws, all first principles.</p> + +<p>"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and +so by implication to call them nothings, involves the absurdity +that there are two kinds of nothings." This sentence "involves +the absurdity" of assuming that "nothing" is an entity. +If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it presents no content +for a concept, and cannot, because there is no content +to be presented. It is then <i>blank</i>. Just so of Time. As +nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of +meaning. Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing +represented by one word, differs from nothing represented by +another, we would not lay a straw in his way, but yet would +be much surprised if he led a large company.</p> + +<p>Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities +nor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider +them as entities." But he then goes on to speak of +them as "things," evidently using the word in the same sense +as if applying it to a material object, as an apple or stone; +thereby implying that entity and thing in that sense are +synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder +in the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of +difficulties. But once take away this foundation, once cease +attempting "to represent them in thought as things," and +his difficulties vanish. Space is a condition. Perhaps receptivity, +indivisibility, and illimitability are attributes. If +so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it. But +whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain +that Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to +the Reason, is qualified by the characteristics named above; +and all this without any contradiction or other insuperable +difficulty arising thereby. On the ground now established, +we learn that extension and Space are <i>not</i> "convertible +terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a condition +of phenomena. It is only all <i>physical</i> "entities which<span class="pagenum">[136]</span> +we actually know as such" that "are limited." From our +standpoint, that Space is <i>no</i> thing, such remarks as "We +find ourselves totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd. "We find ourselves" +just as "totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have +<i>no relevancy</i> to either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's +doctrine, which we have found <i>true</i> as far as it goes, Mr. +Spencer evinces a surprising lack of knowledge of the facts +in question. "In the first place," he says, "to assert that +Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective +conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective +realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If +the reader will take the trouble to construct the syllogism on +which this is based, he will at once perceive the absurdity of +the logic. It may be said in general that all conditions of a +thinking being are both subjective and objective: they are +conditions of his being—subjective; and they are objects +of his examination and cognizance—objective. Is not the +multiplication table an objective reality, <i>i. e.</i>, would it not +remain if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective +law; and so was it not originally discovered by introspection +and reflection? Again he says, "for that consciousness +of Space and Time which we cannot rid ourselves +of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now +the fact is, that primarily we do not have <i>any</i> consciousness +of Space and Time. <i>Consciousness has to do with phenomena.</i> +When examining the material Universe, the <i>objects</i>, and the +objects as at a distance from each other and as during, are +what we are conscious of. For instance, I view the planets +Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my consciousness. +There is a distance between them; but this distance +<i>is</i> not, except as they <i>are</i>. If they are not, the word distance +has no meaning with reference to them. Take them away, +and I have no consciousness of distance as remaining. These +planets continue in existence. They endure. This endurance<span class="pagenum">[137]</span> +we call time, but if they should cease, one could not think of +endurance in connection with them as remaining. Here we +most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that "the +question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but +he will find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies +very differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the +two articles in the "North American Review," heretofore +alluded to. Here, "the direct testimony of consciousness is," +that spaces and times within the Universe are without the +mind; that Space and Time, as <i>a priori</i> conditions for the +possibility of formal object and during event, are also without +the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and +"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the +mind corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And +the question may be asked, it is believed with great force, +If this last were not so, how could the mind take any cognizance +of the actuality? Again, most truly, Space and Time +"cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the +mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than +this should the truth be uttered. They could not become +non-existent if the Universe with every sentient being, yea, +even—to make an impossible supposition—if the Deity +himself, should cease to be. In this they differ no whit from +the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals. These +too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, +which has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as +<i>a priori</i> conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the +same relation to material object and during event that the +multiplication table does to intellect, or the moral law to a +spiritual person. It will now be doubtless plain that Mr. +Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the lower faculties. +The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and Time +as void forms into which objects may come. So also the +Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a +totality. These faculties cannot be in a living man without +acting. Activity is their law. Hence images are ever<span class="pagenum">[138]</span> +arising and <i>must</i> arise in the Sense, and be connected in the +Understanding, and all this in the forms and conditions of +Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these conditions +will always <i>imagine</i> that Space and Time are only +without him—because he will be thinking only in the iron +prison-house of the imagining faculty—and so cannot transcend +the conditions it imposes. Now how shall one see these +conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or, to phrase it +better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In +this sense, as we have seen, every <i>a priori</i> condition must be +objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not +Space but a space, <i>i. e.</i> a part of Space limited by matter; +and, after all, it is the boundaries which are the true object +rather than the space, which cannot be "conceived" of if +the boundaries be removed. Without further argument, is it +not evident that there Space, like all other <i>a priori</i> conditions, +is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of +material existence?</p> + +<p>At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's +psychological errors:—"For if Space and Time are +forms of thought, they can never be thought of; since it is +impossible for anything to be at once the <i>form</i> of thought +and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been +amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to +recur to it again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's +remark is the truth. The question at issue here is one of +those profound and subtile ones which cannot be approached +by argument, but can be decided only by a <i>seeing</i>. It is a +psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths +of our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and +another, "I cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. +All that is left is to stimulate the dull faculty of the one +until he can see. The following reflections may help us +to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we have no +higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It +implies, also, that we can never have any <i>self</i>-knowledge, in<span class="pagenum">[139]</span> +the fundamental signification of that phrase. We can observe +the conduct of the mind, and study and classify the +results; but the laws, the constitution of the activity itself +must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when speaking +of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot +see and study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable +only of reaction as acted upon, capable only of seeing results, +but never able to penetrate to the hidden springs which underlie +the event. Just so is it with the Sense and Understanding. +They are mere mechanical faculties capable of +acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind +the appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as +this all science is impossible, but most of all a science of the +human mind. If man is enclosed by such walls, no knowledge +of his central self can be gained. He may know what +he <i>does</i>; but what he <i>is</i>, is as inscrutable to him as what +God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of +brute. He has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, +but he has no <i>knowledge</i>; he is <i>sure</i> of nothing. He can +reach no ground which is ultimate, no <i>Rock</i> which he knows +is <i>immutable</i>. Is man such a being? The longings and +aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing <span class="smcap">No</span>! He is +capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that +self to the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of +his constitution, all the forms of his activity, he can clearly +and amply place before himself and know them. And how +is this? It is because God has endowed him with an EYE +like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, +as He is self-comprehending,—the Reason, with +which man may read himself as a child reads a book; that +man can make "the <i>form</i> of thought the <i>matter</i> of thought." +True, the Understanding is shut out from any consideration +of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly +an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual +person, whom God has endowed with the faculty of <span class="smcap">Vision</span>; +and the great organic evil, which the fall wrought into the<span class="pagenum">[140]</span> +world, was this very denial of the spiritual light, and this +crowding down and out of sight, of the spiritual person beneath +the animal nature, this denial of the essential faculties +of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of +the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the +highest place, which is involved in all such teachings as we +are criticizing.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the +truth. In almost his first sentence there is a grievous logical +<i>faux pas</i>. He says: "Matter is either infinitely divisible +or it is not; no third possibility can be named." Yet we +will name one, as follows: <i>The divisibility of matter has no +relation to infinity</i>. And this <i>third</i> supposition happens to +be the truth. But it will be said that the question should be +stated thus: Either there is a limit to the divisibility of matter, +or there is no limit. This statement is exhaustive, because +limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives +there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a +limit to the divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be +given by the physical sense; for no one questions but what +it is incapable of finding a limit. The mental sense could +not give it, because it is a question of actual substance and +not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter +is limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its +final elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and +an upper surface, a right and a left side." When, then, one +of these parts shall be broken, what results? Not <i>pieces</i>, as +the materialist, thinking only in the Sense, would have us +believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there will +remain <i>no matter</i>,—to the sense nothing. To it, the result +would be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there +would be left <i>God's power</i> in its simplicity,—that final Unit +out of which all diversity becomes.</p> + +<p>The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity +of Matter may be explained thus. And for convenience +sake, we will limit the term Matter to such substances as are<span class="pagenum">[141]</span> +object to the physical sense, like granite, while Force shall +be used to comprise those finer substances, like the Ether, +which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is composed +of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, +but which are held together by Force. The space between +the atoms, which would otherwise be <i>in vacuo</i>, is <i>full</i> of +Force. We might be more exhaustive in our analysis, and +say—which would be true—that a space-filling force composes +the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one +of its modifications. But without this the other statement is +sufficient. When, then, a portion of matter is compressed, +the force which holds the ultimate particles in their places is +overcome by an external force, and these particles are brought +nearer together. Now, how is it with the moving body and +the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i2">C<br /></span> +<span class="i0">A————B<br /></span> +<span class="i2">1<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along +the line from A to B. At C it meets another body with a +mass of 4 at rest. From thence the two move on towards B +with a velocity of 2. What has happened? In the body +there was a certain amount of force, which set it in motion +and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. +<i>No force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred.</i> +When a bullet is fired from a gun, it possesses at one <i>point</i> a +maximum of force. From that point this force is steadily +<i>transferred</i> to the air and other substances, until all that it +received from the powder is spent. But at any one point in +its flight, the sum of the force which has been transferred +since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred, +will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting +the question raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact +is a point in time, <i>not a period</i>, and the transfer of force is +instantaneous. C, then, is a <i>point</i>, not a period, and the +velocity on the one side is 4 and the other side 2, while the<span class="pagenum">[142]</span> +momentum or force is exactly equal throughout the line. If +it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one +velocity to another without passing through the intermediate +velocities, we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and +they give the truth. The following sentence of Mr. Spencer +is, at least, careless. "For when, of two such units, +one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the striking +unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to velocity +2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any +lapse of time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; +must be moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same +instant, which is impossible." If there is any sense in the +remark, "instantaneously" must mean a <i>point</i> of time <i>without +period</i>. For, if any period is allowed, the sentence has +no meaning, since during that period "the striking unit" +passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by instantaneously +he means <i>without period</i>, then the last clause +of the sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently +means a period. For if it means point, then it contradicts +the first clause. There, it is asserted that 4 was "<i>reduced</i>" +to 2, <i>i. e.</i> that at one point the velocity was 4, and at the +next point it was 2, and that there was <i>no time</i> between. If +4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity 2 was +next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it +appears that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous +are contradictory.</p> + +<p>Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting +atoms, we shall not be troubled by the objections to the +Newtonian theory which follow. In reply to the question, +"What is the constitution of these units?" the answer, "We +have no alternative but to regard each of them as a small +piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only +faculty which could examine them. But even upon this +theory Mr. Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which +each atom consists," are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis +that it is an ultimate atom excludes the supposition<span class="pagenum">[143]</span> +of "parts," since that phrase has no meaning except it refers +to a final, indivisible, material unit. All that the Sense +could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but +that it is, and <i>is not divisible</i>, I believe." But when we see +by the Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes +God's power, all difficulty in the question vanishes. +Having thus answered the above objections, it is unnecessary +to notice the similar ones raised against Boscovich's theory, +which is a modification of that of Newton.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. +The fact that he seeks for absolute motion by the <i>physical +sense</i>, a faculty which was only given us to perceive relative—phenomenal—motion, +and is, <i>in its kind</i>, incapable of finding +the absolute motion, (for if it should see it, it could not +<i>know</i> it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has said on this +subject. For the presentations which he has made of the +phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. +The perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, +as will appear further on. The phenomena adduced on page +55 are, then, merely <i>appearances</i> in the physical sense; and +the motion is merely relative. In the first instance, the captain +walks East with reference to the ship and globe. In the +second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the ship +sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant +motion is, that he is <i>stationary</i> with reference to this larger +object. What, then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant +motion, at the most. So we see that "our ideas of +Motion" are not "illusive," but <i>deficient</i>. The motion is +just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is +<i>relative</i>, and this is all the Sense <i>can</i> give. Our author acknowledges +that "we tacitly assume that there are real +motions"; that "we take for granted that there are fixed +points in space, with respect to which all motions are absolute; +and we find it impossible to rid ourselves of this idea." +A question instantly arises, and it seems to be one which he +is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We<span class="pagenum">[144]</span> +press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that +he will find it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. +Undoubtedly, "absolute motion cannot even be +imagined." <i>No</i> motion can be imagined, though the moving +body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much less +known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior +to, and more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when +the very opposite is the fact. Neither does it follow from +what is said in the paragraph beginning with, "For motion +is change of place," that "while we are obliged to think that +there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion incomprehensible." +The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a +sphere. We <i>may</i> assume that the centre of the sphere is at +rest. Instantly absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for +it is motion measured from that point. Surely there can be +no harm in the <i>supposition</i>. The Reason shows us that the +supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the throne +of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart +from the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is +absolutely impossible. Motion <i>cannot</i> be, except as a formal +body is. Hence, to speak of motion in "unlimited space" is +simply absurd. Formal object <i>cannot</i> be, except as <i>thereby</i> a +limit is established in Space. Hence it is evident that "absolute +motion" is not motion with reference to "unlimited +Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving; +but is motion with reference to that point fixed in +Space, around which all things revolve, but which is itself at +perfect rest.</p> + +<p>"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we +contemplate the transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the +moving of a body, and <i>cannot be transferred</i>. The <i>force</i> +which causes the motion is what is transferred. All that can +be said of motion is, that it is, that it increases, that it diminishes, +that it ceases. If the moving body impinges upon +another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not motion +that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion.<span class="pagenum">[145]</span> +The motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new +motion is begun in the body which was at rest. Again it +is asked: "In what respect does a body after impact differ +from itself before impact?" And further on: "The motion +you say has been communicated. But how? What has been +communicated? The striking body has not transferred a +<i>thing</i> to the body struck; and it is equally out of the question +to say that it has transferred an <i>attribute</i>." Observe now +that a somewhat is unquestionably communicated; and the +question is:—What is it? Query. Does Mr Spencer mean +to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and "attribute"? +He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by assertion +without explanation or proof, which involves the very +question at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a +"thing" or an "attribute"; and a decision directly contrary +to the acknowledgment that a somewhat has been communicated? +On the above-named hypothesis his statement +should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated. +"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither +a thing, nor an attribute has been communicated, <i>i. e.</i> no +somewhat has been communicated; which contradicts the +evidence and the acknowledgment. If on the other hand Mr. +Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute" comprise only +a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly met. +It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the +Universe in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as +attribute is essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot +be communicated, it will follow that a thing has been communicated. +This thing we call force. It is not in hand now +to inquire what force is. It is manifest to the Sense that the +body is in a different state after impact, than it was before. +Something has been put into the body, which, though not +directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by +the results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a +bowl, when poured in. Before the impact the body was +destitute of that kind of force—motor force would be a convenient<span class="pagenum">[146]</span> +term—which tended to move it. After the impact +a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the motion. +It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion +diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances +which cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the +moving body, and at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. +If it be now asked, where does this force ultimately go to, it +is to be said that it comes from God, and goes to God, who +is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate answers, but +the Reason leads us to the Supreme.</p> + +<p>If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and +halving again "the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. +It is not a <i>mental operation</i> but an <i>actual fact</i> which is to be +accounted for. Take a striking illustration. A ball lying on +smooth ice is struck with a hockey. Away it goes skimming +over the glassy surface with a steadily diminishing velocity +till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops. These are +the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them. +There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain +amount of motor force. From that instant onward, that force +flows out of the ball into the resisting substances by which +it is surrounded, until none is left. And it is just as pertinent +to ask how all the water can flow out of a pail, as how all the +motor force can flow out of a moving substance. "The +smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an impassable +gap from no movement," <i>than it is from a larger movement +above it</i>. That which will account for a movement four +becoming two, will account for a movement two becoming +zero. The "puzzle," then, may be explained thus. Time is +the procession of events. Let it be represented by a line. +Take a point in that line, which will then mark its division +but represent <i>no period</i>. On one side of that point is rest; +on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and +occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. +The force instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a +steady stream until none is left, and the body is again at rest.<span class="pagenum">[147]</span> +Here, also, we take a point. This is the point of zero. It +again divides the line. Before the bisection is motion; after +the bisection is rest. All this cannot be perceived by the +Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen by +the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The +ball starts, proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is +a steady diminution, or nearly enough so for the experiment; +at least the diminution can be averaged for the illustration. +Then comparing motion with time, the same difficulty falls +upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the time +must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how +a moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty—the +Sense—this is true, and so we are compelled to correct our +course of procedure. This it is. The Sense and Understanding +being impotent to discover an absolute unit of any +kind, the Sense <i>assumes</i> for itself what meets all practical +want—a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space +and Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed +standard; and as, like time,—duration,—it can be represented +by a line, let them have a common standard. Suppose, +then, that the ball's flight occupies ten minutes of time. +The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly equal +spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the +flow of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be +observed that the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, +for its convenience, divides into parts; but that neither those +parts, nor any parts, have any real existence. As Time is +an indivisible whole, measured off for convenience, so any +given force is such a whole, and is so measured off. All this +appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It +is the Reason which sees that they can be <i>only</i> phenomenal, +and that behind the appearance is pure Spirit—God, who +is primarily out of all relation.</p> + +<p>On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, +Mr. Spencer says: "It suffices to remark that since the force +as known to us is an affection of consciousness, we cannot<span class="pagenum">[148]</span> +conceive the force as existing in the chair under the same +form without endowing the chair with consciousness." This +very strange assertion can only be true, provided a major +premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving +an affection of consciousness in the object in which +it <i>apparently</i> inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse +than absurd; it seems silly. We cannot learn that force +exists, without our consciousness is affected thereby; but this +is a very different thing from our being unable to conceive +of a force as <i>existing</i>, without there is a consciousness in the +object through which it <i>appears</i>. If Mr. Spencer had said +that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force +can be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of +the exertor, he would have uttered the truth. We would +then have the following result. Primarily all force is exerted +by the Deity; and he is conscious thereof. He draws the +chair down just as really as though the hand were visible. +Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator +with the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift +the chair. The great error, which appears on every page of +Mr. Spencer's book and invalidates all his conclusions, shows +itself fully here. He presents images from the Sense, and +then tries to satisfy the Reason—the faculty which calls for +an absolute account—by the analyses of that Sense. His +attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest +movement is separated by an impassable gap from no movement," +and many such, are only pertinent to the Sense, can +never be explained by the Sense, and are found by the +Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of explanation +as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena +are appearances in <i>wholes</i>, whose partitions cannot be absolute, +and that these wholes are accounted for by the being +of an absolute and infinite Person—God, who is utterly +impalpable to the Sense, and can be known only by the +Reason.</p> + +<p>The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible,<span class="pagenum">[149]</span> +more emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon +"the connection between Force and Matter." "Our ultimate +test of Matter is the ability to resist." This is true to the +Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other matter, of +course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the +Sense, then, we have a material object. But Force is not +object to the Sense directly, but only indirectly by its effects +through Matter. The Sense, in its percept, deems the force +other than the matter. Hence it is really no more difficult +for the Sense to answer the question, How could the Sun +send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth +and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that +the Sense <i>can do</i> is to present the phenomena. It is utterly +impotent to account for the least of them.</p> + +<p>In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems +to have been unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the +atoms be twice as far apart, and their attractions and repulsions +will both be reduced to one fourth of their present +amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance, and +then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. +Whence it follows that this matter will as readily as not +assume any other density; and can offer no resistance to any +external agents." Now if this be true, there can be no "external +agents" to which to offer any "resistance." It is +simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself; and that +matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." +It is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions +and repulsions" are <i>contra</i>-acting forces which exactly balance +each other, and so the molecules are held in their position by +<i>no</i> force. Instead of this, they are <i>co</i>-acting forces, which +are wholly expended in holding the molecules in their places. +The repulsions, then, are expended in resisting pressure from +without which seeks to crowd the particles in upon themselves +and thus disturb their equilibrium; while the attractions +are expended in holding the particles down to their +natural distance from each other when any disturbing force<span class="pagenum">[150]</span> +attempts to separate them. Hence, referring to the two +cases mentioned, in the first instance the power of resistance +is reduced to one fourth, and this corresponds with the fact; +and in the second instance the power of resistance is increased +fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact.</p> + +<p>We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning +the material Universe and of our strictures thereon. +Perhaps the reader's mind cannot better be satisfied as to the +validity of these strictures than by presenting an outline of +the system furnished by the Reason, and upon which they are +based.</p> + +<p>The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, +and as a necessary <i>a priori</i> idea, God. This is a <i>spontaneous</i>, +synthetical act, precisely the same in kind with that which +gives a simple <i>a priori</i> principle, as idea. In it the Reason +intuits, not a single principle seen to be necessary simply, but +the fact that all possible principles <i>must</i> be combined in a +perfectly harmonious unity, in a single Being, who thereby +possesses all possible endowments; and so is utterly independent, +and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person, +the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from +the many in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. +It is the necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is +not a judgment but an intuition, not a guess but a certainty. +God, then, is known, when known at all, not "by plurality, +difference, and relation," but by an <i>immediate</i> insight into his +unity, and so is directly known as he is. And the whole +Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this revelation +was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which +this intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate +with his dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures +the necessary <i>a priori</i> ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. +Power is, then, a simple idea, incapable of +analysis; and which cannot therefore be defined, except by +synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's remark +upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we<span class="pagenum">[151]</span> +can only state the occasion on which it arises." From these +data the <i>a priori</i> idea of the Universe may be developed as +follows:—</p> + +<p>God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent +endowment forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; +which is at once capacity and faculty, in which he sees, and +by which he sees, all possible ideas, and these in all possible +combinations or ideals. Thus has he all possible knowledge. +From the various ideal systems which thus are, he, having +perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his +own worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; +and thereby determines the forms and laws under which the +Universe shall become. He also possesses, as inherent endowment, +all power; <i>i. e.</i> the ability to realize every one of +his ideals; but <i>not</i> the ability to violate the natural laws of +his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system +is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as +the two remain isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in +order to the realization of his ideal, it must be combined with +the power; <i>i. e.</i>, the power must be organized according to +the ideal. How, then, can the power, having been sent forth +from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in +its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is +no substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, +then, that, if exercised at all, it must be exercised upon <i>itself</i>. +When, therefore, God would create the Universe, he sent +forth two "pencils," or columns of power, of equal and sufficient +volume, which, acting upon each other from opposite +directions, just held each other in balance, and thus force was. +These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result +in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact +would determine the first place in Space, and the first point +in Time; from which, if attainable, an absolute measure of +each could be made. All we have now attained is the single +duality "space-filling force," which is wholly homogeneous, +is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe, and yet by<span class="pagenum">[152]</span> +no means <i>is</i> the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without +form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." +Now must "the Spirit of God move upon the face of the +waters"; then through vast and to us immeasurable periods +of time, through cycle and epicycle, the work of organization +will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in the +<i>a priori</i> ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the +crush of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. +During this process, whatever of the force is to act under the +law of heat in the <i>a priori</i> ideal, assumes that form and the +heat force becomes; whatever is to act under the law of +magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force becomes; +so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in +the revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree +of preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the +life force is organized; and by degrees all its various forms +are brought forth. After another vast period that point is +reached when an animal may be organized, which shall be +the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose life is utterly +different in kind from any animal life, and man appears. +Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is +personally present, that the first energy was his, and that +every subsequent energizing act is his special and personal +act. He organized the duality, force. He then organized +this force into heat-force, light-force, magnetic-force, +matter-force, life-force, and soul-force. And so it is that his +personal supervision and energy is actually present in every +atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of +thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, +schist, clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of +substance which appear to the eye, it is to be remembered +that all these are but <i>forms to the Sense</i> of that "reason-conception," +force,—that primal duality, which power acting +upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never carve +any other image than those for which it is specially constructed, +and must work just as it is made to work, so the<span class="pagenum">[153]</span> +Sense, which is purely mechanical, can never do any other +than the work for which it was made, can never transcend the +laws of its organization. It can only give forms—results, +but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say <i>that +things are</i>, but never say <i>what</i> or <i>why</i> they are.</p> + +<p>Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, +Mr. Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. +Motion is matter affected by another form of force. The +"puzzle" of motion and rest is only phenomenal to the Sense; +it is an appearance of force acting through another force. It +may also be said that the Universe is solid force. There is +no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny, that +is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through +which force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of +superfluity. From centre to circumference it is present, and +controls all things, and is all things. So it is no more difficult +to see how force reaches forth and holds worlds in their +place, than how it draws down the pebble which a boy has +thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel +over the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings +the worlds round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at +calcined crags or lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or +geology, or chemistry be our study, the objects grouped under +those sciences will be found to be equally the results of this +one force, acting under different laws, and taking upon itself +different forms, and becoming different objects.</p> + +<p>That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so +readily the solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. +Spencer's examination of the outer world, will afford us an +easier solution, if possible, of the difficulties which he has +raised respecting the inner world. That which is not of us, +but is far from us, may perchance be imperfectly known; but +ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our being, may be +certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest +knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, +that we become acquainted with many facts respecting the<span class="pagenum">[154]</span> +outer world. It cannot but be of the utmost importance, that +we know ourselves; for thus only can we fulfil the behest of +that likeness to God, in which we were originally created. +We seek for, we may obtain, we <i>have obtained</i> knowledge in +the inner world,—a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable.</p> + +<p>It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a +fundamental one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" +which "occur in succession"; but that the modifications in +our consciousness so occur. Consciousness is <i>one</i>, and retains +that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in +the unity, as items of experience affect it. Is this series of +modifications "of consciousness infinite or finite"? To this +question experience <i>can</i> give no answer. All experiments +are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty +of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the +<i>forms</i> of the activity. These they may find, but they cannot +account for. A law lies on all those powers by which an +experiment may be made, which forever estops them from +attaining to the substance of the power which lies back of the +form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental +capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its +constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding +in judgments, is impotent to discover why it must +judge one way and not another. It is only when we ascend +to the Reason that we reach the region of true knowledge. +Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct of the lower +powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the Eye +of self, Man attains a true and fundamental <i>self-knowledge</i>. +From this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness +have no pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or +in fact to any series. We attain to the further knowledge +that this series is, <i>must be</i>, limited; because the constituted +beings, in whom it in each case inheres, are limited, and had +a beginning. It matters not now to inquire how a self-conscious +person could be created. It is sufficient to know that +one has been created. This fact involves the further fact<span class="pagenum">[155]</span> +that consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of +nature, after the being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, +in other words, an organization must be, before the modifications +which inhere in that organization can become. The +attainment of this as necessary law is far more satisfactory +than any experience could be, were it possible; for we can +never know but that an experience may be modified; but a +law given in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained +many pages back, that the subject and the object are identical +under the final examination of the Reason, enables us to +attain the present end of the chain. The question is one of +fact, and is purely psychological. It cannot be passed upon, +or in any way interfered with, by logical processes. It is +only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be known. +Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel +propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, +to his entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet +the Savannah crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all +arguing is folly. The question is one of fact in experience. +And upon it the soul gives undoubted answer, as we have +stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some would have us believe, +to see how this may be. Consciousness is an indivisible unity, +and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as the light +in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This +unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, +then, <i>now</i>, and the person now knows what the present +modification <i>is</i>. The person does not need to look to memory +and learn what the former modification was. It immediately +knows what the modification <i>is</i> now. Thus a simple attainment +of the psychological truth through a careful examination +dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's +difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only +question is, what is it that consciousness gives? If we say +that it does thus give both the subject and the object, that +simple affirmation sweeps away in a moment the whole basis +of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It becomes as the spear<span class="pagenum">[156]</span> +of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what seemed +whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of +German fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, +or necessary, either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations +of consciousness, because this involves the discovery, +by <i>mechanical</i> faculties, of their own being and state +before they became activities on the one hand, which is a +contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the +sphere of their capability, the attempt to do which would be +a greater folly than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. +But we have intuited the law, which declares the necessity of +a beginning for us and all creatures; and we ever live in the +light of the present end. When, then, Mr. Spencer says that +"Consciousness implies perpetual change and the perpetual +establishment of relations between its successive phases," we +know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, +in fact, that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness +is the permanent, the abiding, the changeless. It is the light +of the personal Eye. Into it all changes come; but they are +only <i>incidental</i>. In the finite and partial person, they come, +because such person <i>must grow</i>; and so, because of his partiality +and incompleteness, they become necessary incidents; +but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore +cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot +change, and it is plain that these facts in no way interfere +with his consciousness. All variety is immanent in its light, +and no change can come into it because <i>there is no change to +come</i>; but this Person sees <i>all</i> his endowments <i>at once</i>, in the +unity of this his light, just as we see <i>some</i> of our endowments +in the unity of this our light. The change is not in the +consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This +view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection +must be known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; +that, "if it is not thought of in connection with others—not +distinguished or identified by comparison with others, it is not +recognized—is not a state of consciousness at all." Such<span class="pagenum">[157]</span> +comparison we have found only incidental in consciousness, +pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and not +essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these +difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities +"of Motion and Rest."</p> + +<p>Take another step and we can answer the question "What +is this that thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, +is a spiritual person? A substance—a kind of force—the +nature of which we need inquire about no further than to +know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it, which +is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such +spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be +simple substance, and nothing more. The laws without the +substance would be only laws, and could give no being having +no ground in which to inhere. But the substance as ground +and the complete set of laws as inhering in the ground, and +being its organization when combined, become a spiritual +person who thinks. The <i>ego</i>, that is the sense of personality, +is only one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore +cannot be said to think. The pages now before us are all +vitiated by the theory that "successive impressions and +ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain to the true +psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as +stated above,—an abiding light into which modifications come,—and +there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of +self, and in entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, +more, from such a standpoint it is utter unreason, the height +of folly, to doubt for an instant, for immanent and central +in the light of Reason lies the solemn fact of man's selfhood. +We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's conclusion, that +"Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in which +the knowing and the known are one—in which subject and +object are identified," and we <i>know</i> that such a state is an +actuality. Mr. Mansel may hold that such an assertion is +the annihilation of both, but he is wholly wrong. The Savannah +has crossed the Atlantic.<span class="pagenum">[158]</span></p> + +<p>We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. +Spencer. We have seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas +are all" presentative "of realities" which can "be comprehended." +We have, indeed, found it to be true, that, "after +no matter how great a progress in the colligation of facts and +the establishment of generalizations ever wider and wider,—after +the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths +that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how +far,—the fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach +as ever." But having learned this, we do not arrive at the +conclusion that "the explanation of that which is explicable +does but bring out into greater clearness the inexplicableness +of that which remains behind." On the other hand we know +that such a conclusion is erroneous, and <i>that the method by +which it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to +the object sought</i>. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, +Mr. Spencer's work, and our work, would not have been in +vain. Only by a method differing from this <span class="smcap">in kind</span>—a +method in which there is no "colligation of facts," and no +"generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple, direct +insight into Pure Truth—can "the fundamental truth" be +known; and thus it may be known by every human soul. +"<i>God made man in his own image.</i>" In our scheme there +is ample room for the man of Science, with the eye of Sense, +to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With telescope +and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture +innumerable multitudes of them. But having done this, we +count it folly to attempt to generalize truth therefrom. But +holding up the facts in the clear light of Reason, and searching +them through and through, we <i>see</i> in them the immutable +principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate, intuitive knowledge +to be immutable, and thus we "<i>know the truth</i>."</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[159]</span></p> + +<h2 id="THE_RELATIVITY_OF_ALL_KNOWLEDGE">"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE."</h2> + +<p>In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the +result, which, in his opinion, philosophy has attained as +follows: "All possible conceptions have been one by one +tried and found wanting; and so the entire field of speculation +has been gradually exhausted without positive result; +the only result arrived at being the negative one above stated—that +the reality existing behind all appearances is, and +must ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable +list of names of philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William +Hamilton as supporters of that position. Such a parade of +names may be grateful to the feelings of the Limitists, but +it is no support to their cause. The questions at issue are of +such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of profound +<i>opinions</i>, can have a feather's weight in the decision. +For instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of +Euclid. What weight have human opinion with reference +to its validity? Though a thousand mathematicians should +deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as now; and when +a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no item to +the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never +heard of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be +so, and that this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility +of any power or will to change. On principles simple, +fixed, and final, just like those of mathematics, seen by the +same Eye and known with the same intellectual certainty, +and by logical processes just as pure, conclusive, <i>demonstrative</i> +as those of geometry, <i>and by such alone</i>, can the questions +now before us be settled. But though names and opinions +have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is +demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the +absence of two names, representatives of a class, which +must ever awaken, among the devout and pure-hearted, attention<span class="pagenum">[160]</span> +and love, and whose teachings, however unnoticed +by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and hearts +of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness +the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is +capable of absolute knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad +countenance, the butt of jeer and scoff from the wits and +comedians of his day, went about teaching those who hung +upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which +God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus +Christ, with a countenance more beautifully serious, more +sweetly sad, said to those Jews which believed on him, "If +ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed; +<i>and ye shall know the truth</i>, and the truth shall make you +free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal +cavern of the animal nature—the Sense and Understanding—wise +to refuse the light, and reject the truths of the +Pure Reason and the God-man, and to call the motley +conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot explain, +philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" +will, can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it +cries after, yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication +for the highest truth; and it shall attain to it, because +God, in giving the tongue to cry, gave also the Eye to see. +The Spiritual person in man, made in the very image of God, +can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight of the +animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, +God as the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by +every possible manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to +this high Mount of Vision, is one object of God in his system +of the Universe.</p> + +<p>The teaching of the Word—that august personage, "who +came forth from God, and went to God," has been alluded to +above. It deserves more than an allusion, more than any +notice which can be given it here. It is astonishing, though +perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings of the<span class="pagenum">[161]</span> +apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from +the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical +truths. Even the most devout students of them do +not seem to have appreciated their inestimable value in this +regard. The reason for this undoubtedly is, that their transcendent +importance as declarations of religious truth has +shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those +who have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining +beams of a true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed +in the glory of the nobler light. It will not, therefore, +we trust, be deemed irreverent to say that, laying aside +all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the inspiration +of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul +merely as human productions, written at some time nobody +knows when, and by some men nobody knows who, they are +the most wonderful revelations, the profoundest metaphysical +treatises the world has ever seen. In them the highest +truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of reflection, +are stated in simple, clear language, and <i>they answer +exactly to the teachings of the Reason</i>. Upon this, President +Hopkins says: "The identity which we found in the last +lecture between the teaching of the constitution of man and +the law of God, was not sought. The result was reached +because the analysis would go there. I was myself surprised +at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence +to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In +all questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two +will be found in exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, +but is accorded to by the other. In fine, whoever wrote the +Book must have had an accurate and exhaustive knowledge +of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference then +to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of metaphysical +truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve +our most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, +final, fixed laws, which are seen by a direct intuition to be<span class="pagenum">[162]</span> +such; and these writings are of great value, because they +cultivate and assist the Reason in its search for these highest +Truths.</p> + +<p>One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority +of Mr. Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand +more. We seek for, and can obtain, that which he cannot +give us—a demonstration; which he cannot give us because +he denies the very existence of that faculty by which alone +a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless, +so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "<i>product</i> of +thought, or process of thought," is in any way applicable to +the question in hand. Intuitions are the mental actions +needed. Light is neither product nor process. We pass +over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It proves +nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of +questions to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the +soul a stone, when it cries for bread. One sentence of his is +doubtless true. "Manifestly, as the <i>most</i> general cognition +at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, +it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the Understanding +has attained to the last generalization <i>by these very +terms</i>, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his +conclusion follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation +must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The +deepest truth which we can get at must be unaccountable. +Comprehension must become something other than comprehension, +before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." +How shall we account for the last generalization, and show +this conclusion to be false? Thus. Hitherto there have +been, properly speaking, no comprehensions, only perceptions +in the Sense and connections in the Understanding. "The +sense <i>distinguishes</i> quality and <i>conjoins</i> quantity; the understanding +<i>connects</i> phenomena; the reason <i>comprehends</i> the +whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing the +operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself<span class="pagenum">[163]</span> +the <i>a priori</i> laws in accordance with which they are, <i>sees</i> directly +and immediately why they are, and thus comprehends +and accounts for them. It sees that there is an end to every +process of generalization; and it then sees, what the Understanding +could never guess, that <i>after</i>—in the order of our +procedure—the last generalization there is an eternal truth, +in accordance with which process and conclusion were and +must be. There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final +truth is seen and known in its very self.</p> + +<p>The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and +Mansel have been heretofore examined, and need no further +notice. We will pass on then to his subsequent reflections +upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a general criticism +upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if there is a +single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which does +not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations +are from the material world, and the terms and expressions +are suited thereto. With reference to objects in +the Sense, and connections in the Understanding, the "fundamental +condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer supplies, +is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as +"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both +these laws alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, +that they belong to <i>things in nature</i>, and consequently +have no pertinence to the questions now before us. +We are discussing <i>ideas</i>, not <i>things</i>; and those are simple, +and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may be +perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall +doubt that Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in +nature, it would seem that after having read p. 80, he could +doubt no longer. "Animals," "species or genus," "mammals, +birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which he illustrates +his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can +he speak of such things when they have nothing to do with +the matter in hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness +to do with 'mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes'?<span class="pagenum">[164]</span> +If we can know only these, why speak of those?" It would +seem that the instant they are thus set together and contrasted, +the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It +is by an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, +that I dwell upon God and the questions concerning him. +These modes of the animal nature, by which I know 'mammals,' +are different in kind from those of the spiritual person, +by which I know God and the eternal truth." And when +this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's +mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound +the two, and make utter confusion of the subject, as the +Limitists have done, he can hardly refrain from quoting +Romans I. 20 <i>et seq.</i> against them.</p> + +<p>Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition +of the Real as distinguished from the Phenomenal must, +if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in general. The +First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, +must be classed. To be positively thought of, it must be +thought of as such or such—as of this or that kind." To +begin with the law which is here asserted, is <i>not</i> a "general" +law, and so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special +law, and lies only upon a particular kind of cognition. This +has been already abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one +line of proof. No mathematical law comes under his law of +cognition; neither can he, nor any other Limitist, make it +appear that it does so come. His law is law only for things +in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are +known in themselves—are <i>self-evident</i>, and since God, infinity, +and absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, +and need not be classed. So his corollary falls to the +ground. Can we have any "sensible experience" of God? +Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a sensible +experience of him as of any other person—of parent, wife, +or child. Did you ever see a person—a soul? No. Can +you see—"have sensible experience of"—a soul? No. +What is it, then, that we have such experience of? Plainly<span class="pagenum">[165]</span> +the body—that material frame through which the soul +manifests itself. The Universe is that material system +through which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons +whom he has made; and that manifestation is the same +in kind as that of a created soul through the body which is +given it. It follows then,—and not only from this, but it +may be shown by further illustration,—that every other +person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and +further, that, if we can study and comprehend the soul of our +wife or child, we can with equal certainty study, and to some +extent comprehend, the soul of God. Or, in other words, if +man is only an animal nature, having a Sense and Understanding, +all personality is an insoluble mystery; all spiritual +persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so, because, +upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any +faculty which can catch a glimpse of such object. A +Sense and Understanding can no more see, or in any possible +manner take cognizance of, a spiritual person than a man +born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is destitute of +the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of +personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? +Let him once admit that he has, and in that admission is involved +the admission of the reality of that faculty by which +we know God, for the faculty which cognizes personality, +and cognizes God, is one and the same.</p> + +<p>Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, +yet, to please him, we will use them. Some conclusions, +then, may be expressed thus: God as the Deity cannot be +"classed"; he is unique. This is involved in the very terms +by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this +is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is +in himself. "We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; +and some foretastes of that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed +us here on earth. But the infinite Person, <i>as person</i>, +must be "assimilated" with other persons. Yet his infinity +and absoluteness, <i>as such</i>, cannot be "grouped." And yet<span class="pagenum">[166]</span> +again, <i>as qualities</i>, they can be "grouped" with other qualities. +Unquestionably between the Creator, <i>as such</i>, and the created, +<i>as such</i>, "there must be a distinction transcending any of +the distinctions existing between different divisions of the +created." God as self-existent differs in kind from man +as dependent, and this difference continues irrevocable; +while that same God and that same man are <i>alike</i> in kind +<i>as persons</i>. This is true, because all spiritual persons are +composite beings; and while the essential elements of a +spiritual person are common to created persons and the uncreated +Person, there are <i>other</i> characteristics, <i>not essential</i> +to personality, which belong some to the created, and some +to the uncreated, and differentiate them. Or, in other words, +God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet they are +diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the +range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How +can this be explained? Evidently thus. There are <i>qualities</i> +transfusing the personality which cannot be interchangeable, +and which constitute the diversity. Personality is <i>form</i> of +being. Qualities transfuse the form. Absoluteness and infinity +are qualities which belong to one Person, and are such +that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging +to any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom +they belong, unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality +are also qualities of a spiritual person, but are qualities of +the created spiritual person, and are such as must always +subordinate that person to the other. In each instance it is, +"<i>in the nature of things</i>," impossible for either to pass over +and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of +his being, and must stay so.</p> + +<p>But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent +spiritual person can have no knowledge of the independent +spiritual Person. On the other hand, it is the high glory of +the independent spiritual Person, that he can create another +being "in his own image," to whom he can communicate a +knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his children,<span class="pagenum">[167]</span> +so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the +fact of his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, +and, to the loving soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the +highest knowledge just as really as our earthly parents teach +us earthly knowledge. This he could not do if we had not +the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could not +have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the +nature of things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, +then, God as "the Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so +as unconditioned we do not know him "as of such or such +kind," after the manner of the Understanding, yet we may, +do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is unconditioned, +through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the +spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned.</p> + +<p>We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified +amazement. As much as we had familiarized ourselves +with the materialistic teachings of the Limitists, we +confess that we were utterly unprepared to meet, even in +Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably degrading, +and uttered with so calm and naïve an unconsciousness +of the degradation it involved, as the following. Although +for want of room his illustrations are omitted, it is believed +that the following extracts give a fair and ample presentation +of his doctrine.</p> + +<p>"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their +ensemble, have for their final purpose the balancing of certain +outer processes by certain inner processes.</p> + +<p>"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the +matter of which organic bodies consist, into that state of +stable equilibrium displayed by inorganic bodies; there are +internal forces by which this tendency is constantly antagonized; +and the perpetual changes which constitute Life +may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the +antagonism....</p> + +<p>"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that +the correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple;<span class="pagenum">[168]</span> +as in a plant, the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic +and chemical actions responding to the coexistence of light, +heat, water, and carbonic acid around it. But in animals, +and especially in the higher orders of them, the correspondences +become extremely complex. Materials for growth +and repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere +present, but being widely dispersed and under special +forms, have to be formed, to be secured, and to be reduced to +a fit state for assimilation....</p> + +<p>"What is that process by which food when swallowed is +reduced to a fit form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical +and chemical actions responding to the mechanical and +chemical actions which distinguish the food? Whence it +becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form is the +correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a +higher form of Life consists in a better preservation of this +primary correspondence by the establishment of other correspondences. +Divesting this conception of all superfluities, +and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see that Life +is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal relations +to external relations. And when we so define it, we +discover that the physical and the psychial life are equally +comprehended by the definition. We perceive that this, +which we call intelligence, shows itself when the external +relations to which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be +numerous, complex, and remote in time and space; that every +advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the establishment +of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments; +and that even the highest achievements of science +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and +sequence, so coördinated as exactly to tally with certain relations +of coexistence and sequence that occur externally....</p> + +<p>"And lastly let it be noted that what we call <i>truth</i>, guiding +us to successful action and the consequent maintenance +of life, is simply the accurate correspondence of subjective<span class="pagenum">[169]</span> +to objective relations; while <i>error</i>, leading to failure and +therefore towards death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence.</p> + +<p>"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence +in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily +relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious. +The simplest cognition being the establishment of some connection +between subjective states, answering to some connection +between objective agencies; and each successively more +complex cognition being the establishment of some more +involved connection of such states, answering to some more +involved connection of such agencies; it is clear that the +process, no matter how far it be carried, can never bring +within the reach of Intelligence either the states themselves +or the agencies themselves."</p> + +<p>Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few +plain every-day words, Man is an animal, and only an +animal, differing nowhat from the dog and chimpanzee, +except in the fact that his life "consists in the establishment +of more varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments," +than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark +particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. +Forget not one syllable of the profound and most important +knowledge he would impart. "Life in all its manifestations, +inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +See, there is not a limit, not a qualification to the +assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if thou +hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into +a cage in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach +thee that thou art. From the highest to the lowest forms, +life is one. In its lower forms, life is a set of "direct and +simple" "correspondences." "But in animals, <i>and especially +in the higher orders of them</i>," and, of course, most especially +in the human animal as the highest order, "the correspondences<span class="pagenum">[170]</span> +become extremely complex." As much as to +say, reader, you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of +quite so low a type as the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the +difference is no serious matter. You do not differ half as +much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does from the +forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you +and him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations" is carried +on, is more "complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. +He roams the forest, inhabits some cave or hollow tree, and +lives on the food which nature spontaneously offers to his +hairy hand. You cut down the forest, construct a house, +and live on the food which some degree of skill has prepared. +He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from +the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, +shaggy covering, which nature has provided. You on the +contrary are destitute of such a covering, and rob the sheep, +and kill the silk-worm, to supply the lack. But in all this +there is no <i>difference in kind</i>. The mechanism by which +life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is true, than +that by which life is sustained in him; there arise, therefore, +larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply +those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how +it supports the soul! Your life in its highest form is only +this animal life,—is only the constructive force by which +that "extremely complex" machinery carries on "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +All other notions of life are "superfluities."</p> + +<p>Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely +heralded sage, how many "superfluities" must you and I +strip off from our "conception" of life! And with what +bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we take up +our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh +man! thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast +down to the ground. But a little ago we believed thee a +spiritual being; that thou hadst a nature too noble to rot<span class="pagenum">[171]</span> +with the beasts among the clods; that thou wast made fit to +live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a little ago we +believed thee possessed of a psychical life—a soul; that thou +wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's +life was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly +and divine things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and +that thou, consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, +shouldst become purer and more beautiful, nobler and +more lovely, until perfect love should cast out all fear, and +thou shouldst then see God face to face, and rejoice in the +sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is changed +now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter +mockery to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English +sage, and learned how dismally different is our destiny. +Painful is it, oh reader, to listen; and the words of our +teacher sweep like a sirocco over the heart; yet we cannot +choose but hear.</p> + +<p>"The pyschical life"—the life of the soul, "the immortal +spark of fire,"—and the physical life "are <i>equally</i> definable +as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." We had supposed that intelligence in its highest +forms was wholly occupied with the contemplation of God +and his laws, and the great end of being, and all those tremendous +questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the +activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. +We find we have shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. +Now "we perceive that this which we call Intelligence shows +itself when the external relations to which the internal ones +are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in +time or space; that <i>every advance in Intelligence essentially +consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, +and more involved adjustments; and that even the highest +achievements of science</i> are resolvable into mental relations +of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as <i>exactly to tally</i> +with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." In such relations consists the life of the "caterpillar."<span class="pagenum">[172]</span> +In such relations, <i>only a little "more complex,"</i> consists +the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does +"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. +This is the path by which we are led to the last, the highest +"truth" which man can attain. Thus do we learn "that what +we call <i>truth</i>, guiding us to successful action, and the consequent +maintenance of life, is <i>simply</i> the accurate correspondence +of subjective to objective relations; while error, leading +to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence +of such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, +reader, what an exalted destiny thine is here declared to +be! The largest effort of thine intelligence, "the highest +achievement of science," yea, the total object of the life of +thy soul,—thy "psychial" life,—is to attain such exceeding +skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of apparel, +in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the accurate +correspondence of subjective to objective relations," +and thus in attaining the "<i>truth</i>" which shall guide "us to +successful action and the consequent maintenance of life," +that we shall secure forever our animal existence on earth. +Study patiently thy lesson, oh human animal! Con it o'er +and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to this +acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below +what thou hadst once fondly expected,—mayest attain a +perfect knowledge of the "<i>truth</i>," and a perfect skill in the +application of that truth, <i>i. e.</i> in "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations"; and so be guided +"to successful action, and the consequent maintenance of +life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless hunter +who pursues thee,—the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. +But when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of +thy soul, to this task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate +moment to the dreams and aspirations which have hitherto +lain like golden sunlight on thy pathway. Let no vain regret +for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever sadden thy day, +or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst deem<span class="pagenum">[173]</span> +thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst +often occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which +eye hath not seen, nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son +of God, and "a joint-heir with Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible +and undefiled, and which fade not away, eternal +in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with faith's +triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst +traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure +spiritual life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been +stripped off, all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness +was thine through all eternity. But all these visions +were only dreams; they wholly deluded thee. We have +learned from the lips of this latest English sage that thy god +is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as +to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to +external relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a +lot being "the highest achievement of science," permit not +thyself to be disturbed by those old-fashioned and sometimes +troublesome notions that "<i>truth</i>" and those "achievements" +pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual relations to God as +the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was bound to +know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations +of perfect law,—the truth he knew,—were <i>crimes</i> against +Him who is "of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot +look upon sin with the least degree of allowance"; that for +these crimes there impended a just penalty—an appalling +punishment; and that the only real "failure" was the failure +to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the +penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this +wise man's book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we +can make, is, to miss in maintaining perfectly "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations,"—is +to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding at dinner, or to +wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose one's self +imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which<span class="pagenum">[174]</span> +may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" +as shall secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"—the +advance "towards death." When, then, oh reader! by +some unfortunate mischance, some "error" into which thine +ignorance hath led thee, thou hast rendered thy "failure" inevitable, +and art surely descending "towards death," hesitate +not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean +song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<span class="i0">Sing and be gay<br /></span> +<span class="i0">The livelong day,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Thinking no whit of to-morrow.<br /></span> +<span class="i0">Enjoy while you may<br /></span> +<span class="i0">All pleasure and play,<br /></span> +<span class="i0">For after death is no sorrow.<br /></span> +</div></div> + +<p>Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining +"the accurate correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon +thine only "failure," the inevitable advance "towards death." +Than death no greater evil can befall thee, and that is already +sure. Then let "dance and song," and "women and wine," +bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting days.</p> + +<p>Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate +man, and especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian +man, who has these many years cherished those vain, deceitful +dreams of which we spoke a little ago! To be brought +down from such lofty aspirations; to be made to know that +he is only an animal; that "Life in all its manifestations, +inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." +Do you not join with me in pitying him?</p> + +<p>And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from +over the sea as the newly found and wonderful truth, which +is to satisfy the hungering soul of man and still its persistent +cry for bread. And this is the teacher, mocking that painful +cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after newspaper, and +periodical after periodical on this side the water, even to those +we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the<span class="pagenum">[175]</span> +profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us +some sage remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the +human animal, and on that point compare therewith other +animals. But, speaking in all sincerity after the manner of +the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say, "From all +such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us."</p> + +<p>Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a +denial in terms of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to +be a philosopher, advances the doctrine that not only is "Life +in its simplest form"—the animal life—"the correspondence +of certain inner physico-chemical actions with certain outer +physico-chemical actions," but that "<i>each advance to a higher +form of Life</i> consists in a better preservation of this primary +correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be +explicit, he asserts that not only "the physical," <i>but also "the +psychical life</i> are <i>equally</i>" but "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations"; and when, still +further to insult man, and to utter his insult in the most +positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he asserts "that +even the highest achievements of science are resolvable into +mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated +as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and +sequence that occur externally,"—that is, that the highest +science is the attainment of a perfect cuisine; in a word, +when a human being in this nineteenth century offers to his +fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy the tenet that +the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal life, +and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as +an animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, +but not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a +doctrine is presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as +a healthy stomach rejects a roll of tobacco.</p> + +<p>With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system +of philosophy which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen +words and large sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such +vile shape and hideous proportions, to the teachings of that<span class="pagenum">[176]</span> +pure and noble instructor of our youth, that man who, by his +gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully illustrates the spirit +and life of the Apostle John,—Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., +President of Williams College. No one who has read his +"Lectures on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should +fail to do so, will desire an apology for inserting the following +extract, wherein is presented a theory upon which the soul +of man can rest, as at home the soldier rests, who has just +been released from the Libby or Salisbury charnel-house.</p> + +<p>"And here, again, we have three great forces with their +products. These are the vegetable, the animal, and the +rational life.</p> + +<p>"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as +strictly conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for +vegetable, for the animal is nourished by nothing that has +not been previously elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit +of the earth is for all; the king himself is served by the +field.'</p> + +<p>"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of +enjoyment and suffering, and having the instincts necessary +to its preservation. <i>This</i>, as man is now constituted, <i>is conditional +for his rational life</i>. The rational has its roots in +that, and manifests itself only through the organization which +that builds up.</p> + +<p>"<i>We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and +moral life, by which man is made in the image of God.</i> In +man, as thus constituted, we first find a being who is capable +of choosing his own end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting +the end indicated by his whole nature. This is moral freedom, +<i>and in this is the precise point of transition from all +that is below to that which is highest</i>. For everything below +man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may be +in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their +end,—and they have one somewhat wide,—they have none +in respect to the end itself. This, for our purpose, and for +all purposes, is the characteristic distinction, so long sought,<span class="pagenum">[177]</span> +between man and the brute. Man determines his own end; +the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to man everything +is driven to its end by a force working from without or from +behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself +in front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses.</p> + +<p>"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one +of the addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of +the field within which the forces act.... It is to +be noticed, however, that while the field of each added and +superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is dropped. Each +lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all that +is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject +to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has +also the organic life that belongs to the animal. In him none +of these are dropped; <i>but the rational life is united with and +superinduced upon all these</i>, so that man is not only a +microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of the world. +He partakes of all that is below him, <i>and becomes man by +the addition of something higher</i>.... Here, then, is our +model and law. Have we a lower sensitive and animal +nature? Let that nature be cherished and expanded by all +its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an end. +But—and here we find the limit—let it be cherished <i>only +as subservient to the higher intellectual life</i>, for it is also a +means." The italics are ours.</p> + +<p>Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,—and +it is one which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and +calm into the atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in +its own clear and self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand +assaulting materialistic storms,—we would buttress it with +the utterances of other of the earth's noble ones; and this +we do not because it is in any degree needful, but because +our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to gather the +concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon +this subject. Exactly in point is the following—one of +many passages which might be selected from the works of<span class="pagenum">[178]</span> +that profoundest of English metaphysicians and theologians, +S. T. Coleridge:—</p> + +<p>"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy +of this investigation are greatly increased by our not considering +the understanding (even our own) in itself, and as +it would be were it not accompanied with and modified by +the coöperation of the will, the moral feeling, and that faculty, +perhaps best distinguished by the name of Reason, of determining +that which is universal and necessary, of fixing laws +and principles whether speculative or practical, and of contemplating +a final purpose or end. This intelligent will—having +a self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light +of the reason, by which its acts are made to bear as a whole +upon some end in and for itself, and to which the understanding +is subservient as an organ or the faculty of selecting and +appropriating the means—seems best to account for that +progressiveness of the human race, <i>which so evidently marks +an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between +man and the inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, +were there no other difference than in the degree of their intellectual +faculties</i>."—<i>Works</i>, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours.</p> + +<p>The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed +to the words of another metaphysician, who has been much +longer known, and has enjoyed a wider fame than either of +those just mentioned; and whose teachings, however little +weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer, have been +these many years, and still are received and studied with +profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of +persons. We refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, +now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus, +who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit." That is, +who do not walk after the law of the animal nature, but who +do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is of this +great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and +continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do +mind the things of the flesh; but they that are after the<span class="pagenum">[179]</span> +spirit, the things of the spirit. For the minding of the flesh +is death, but the minding of the spirit is life and peace; because +the minding of the flesh as enmity against God, for it +is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." +<i>Romans</i> VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the +spirit and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth +against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these +are contrary the one to the other."—<i>Galatians</i> V. 16, 17.</p> + +<p>Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, +that our translators in writing the word spirit with +a capital, and thus intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of +God which is meant, have led their readers astray. The +apostle's repeated use of that term, in contrasting the flesh +with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that he is contrasting, +in all such passages, the animal nature with the +spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position +and thinks to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of +the spiritual person in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is +<i>identical</i>.</p> + +<p>The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind +will have already accomplished—the construction in our own +terms, and the contrasting of the system above embodied +with that presented by Mr. Spencer. The human being, +Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit," an animal +nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the +Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are +the Reason, the spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal +nature is common to man and the brutes. The spiritual +person is common to man and God. It is manifest, then, that +there is "an insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier" +not only "between man and the inferior animals," but +between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, +and that this is a greater distinction than any other in the +Universe, except that which exists between the Creator and +the created. What relation, then, do these so widely diverse +natures bear to each other? Evidently that which President<span class="pagenum">[180]</span> +Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is not +the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. +He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and +the sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." +Thus far his life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical +actions with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"—undoubtedly +"consists in the continuous adjustment of +internal relations to external relations"; and being the highest +order of animal, his life "consists in the establishment of more +varied, more complete, and more involved adjustments" than +that of any other animal. What, then, is this life for? "This, +as man is now constituted, is <i>conditional for his rational life</i>." +"The rational life is united with and <i>superinduced upon all +these</i>." As God made man, and in the natural order, the +"flesh," the animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," +the spiritual life. And the spirit, or spiritual person of which +Paul writes so much,—does this also, this "Intelligence in its +highest form," consist "in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations"? Are the words of +the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live +after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"—<i>i. e.</i> +by living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance +with the law of the spiritual person—"do mortify the deeds +of the body, ye shall live?" And are Mr. Spencer's words, in +which he teaches exactly the opposite doctrine, true? wherein +he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what we call truth," +&c., (see <i>ante</i>, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if ye live after +the flesh," if you are guided by "<i>truth</i>," if you are able perfectly +to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective +to objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will +attain to what is <i>successful action</i>, the preservation of "life," +of "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations," of the animal life, and thus your bodies will live +forever—the highest good for man; but if you "mortify the +deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations," you<span class="pagenum">[181]</span> +will meet with "<i>error</i>, leading to failure and therefore towards +death,"—the death of the body, the highest evil which can +befall man,—and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in +the direction already taken, we find that in his normal condition +the spiritual person would not be chiefly, much less +exclusively, occupied with attending to "the continuous adjustment +of internal relations to external relations," but would +only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the +body as the ground through which, in accordance with the +present dispensation of God's providence, that person may +exert himself and employ his energies upon those objects +which belong to his peculiar sphere, even the laws and duties +of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ his +superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation +of its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained +that through this means that person shall develop +and manifest himself; yet the life, continuance in being, of +the soul, is in no way dependent on this means. Strip away +the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense +and Understanding, leave him—as he would then be—with +no possible medium of communication with the Universe, and +he, the I am, the spiritual person, would remain intact, as +active as ever. He would have lost none of his capacity to +see laws and appreciate their force; he would feel the <i>bindingness</i> +of obligation just as before; and finally, he would be just +as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an ultimate +end, though he would be unable to make a single motion +towards putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, +then, being such that he has in himself no element of decomposition, +has no need, for the preservation of his own existence, +to be continually occupied with efforts to maintain "the accurate +correspondence of subjective to objective relations." +Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an activity having +objects which accord with this his indestructible nature. With +what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There +is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself<span class="pagenum">[182]</span> +the laws and ideals of his action. As such, and created, he +is near of kin to that august Being in whoso image he was +created. His laws are the created person's laws. The end +of the Creator should be that also of the created. But God +is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an undeveloped germ, +and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge. What +nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could +this being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to +employ all his power in the contemplation of the eternal laws +of the Universe, <i>i. e.</i> to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance +with himself and God; and to bend all his energies +to the realization by his own efforts of that part in the +Universe which God had assigned him, <i>i. e.</i>, to accord his +will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual +person standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, +would pursue as spontaneously as if it were the law of his +being. But this which we have portrayed is not the course +which human beings do pursue. By no means. One great +evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man, +is, that human beings are born into the world with the +spiritual person all submerged by the animal nature; or, to +use Paul's figure, the spirit is enslaved by the flesh; and such +is the extent of this that many, perhaps most, men are born +and grow up and die, and never know that they have any +souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through all +the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and +Mr. Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual +persons at all, who say that the highest knowledge is a +generalization in the Understanding, a form of a knowledge +common to man and the brutes, and that "the highest achievements +of science are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence +and sequence, so coördinated as exactly to tally +with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays +so vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines +that he thunders his maledictions.<span class="pagenum">[183]</span></p> + +<p>We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse +from, superior to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. +This is his <i>position</i> in the logical order. We have also spoken +of him as submerged under the animal nature, as enslaved +to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to express the +awfully degraded <i>condition</i> in which every human being is +born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural +degradation. Let us then, as philosophers, carry our examination +one step farther and ask: In this state of things +what would be the fitting occupation of the spiritual person. +Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it with +loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and +grievous bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with +all his might to regain his normal condition to become naturally +good as well as morally good,—he should fill his soul +with thoughts of God, and then he should make every rational +exertion to induce others to follow in his footsteps.</p> + +<p>We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. +"The highest achievements of science" for us, our "truth," +guiding us "to successful action," is that pure <i>a priori</i> truth, +the eternal law of God which is written in us, and given to +us for our guidance to what is truly "successful action,"—the +accordance of our wills with the will of God.</p> + +<p>What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered +of this chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, +as he believes, a new principle of philosophy, a principle +which will symmetrize and complete the Hamiltonian system, +and thus establish it as the true and final science for mankind. +Since we do not view this principle in the same light +with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to +turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish +that with it, there might arise a feeling in many minds that +the whole passage should be quoted, that there might be no +doubt as to his meaning. This we should willingly do, did +our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least necessary. +That part of the passage which contains the gist of the subject,<span class="pagenum">[184]</span> +followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and illustrations, +would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently +full presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which +we might safely build our criticism. These then will be +given.</p> + +<p>"There still remains the final question—What must we say +concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to +rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena? Is the result +of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything +but the relative; or must we also believe in something beyond +the relative?</p> + +<p>"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits +of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the +relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be +thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence. +'The <i>absolute</i> is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,' +writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The <i>Absolute</i> +and the <i>Infinite</i>,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the <i>Inconceivable</i> +and the <i>Imperceptible</i>, names indicating, not an +object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere +absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.' +From each of which extracts may be deduced the conclusion, +that, since reason cannot warrant us in affirming the +positive existence of what is cognizable only as a negation, +we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything +beyond phenomena.</p> + +<p>"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, +a grave error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must +doubtless be admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented +by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly +true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used +by these writers to show that the Absolute is unknowable, +have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments +have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet +there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us +from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. It is not to be<span class="pagenum">[185]</span> +denied that so long as we confine ourselves to the purely +logical aspect of the question, the propositions quoted above +must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate +its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these +propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, +or rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To +speak specifically:—Besides that <i>definite</i> consciousness of +which Logic formulates the laws, there is also an <i>indefinite</i> +consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete +thoughts, and besides the thoughts which, though incomplete, +admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible +to complete, and yet which are still real, in the sense that +they are normal affections of the intellect.</p> + +<p>"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments +by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, +distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond +the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, +is, by implication, to affirm that there <i>is</i> an Absolute. In +the very denial of our power to learn <i>what</i> the Absolute is, +there lies hidden the assumption <i>that</i> it is; and the making +of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present +to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly +with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is +upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis +of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as +an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to conceive that +our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without +at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are +appearances; for appearance without reality is unthinkable." +After carrying on this train of argument a little further, he +reaches this just and decisive result. "Clearly, then, the +very demonstration that a <i>definite</i> consciousness of the Absolute +is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite +consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, +he says: "Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the +necessary conditions of thought, we are obliged to form a<span class="pagenum">[186]</span> +positive though vague consciousness of this which transcends +distinct consciousness, is to analyze our conception of the +antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows the +presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract +from Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician +enounces his doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive +alone is real, the negative is only an abstraction of the other"; +or, in other words, the one gives a substance of some kind in +the mind, the other gives simply nothingness, void, absolute +negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is unquestionably +right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such contradictories +'the negative is <i>only</i> an abstraction of the other'—'is +<i>nothing else</i> than its negation'—is not true. In such +correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that +the negative concept contains something besides the negation +of the positive one; for the things of which equality is denied +are not abolished from consciousness by the denial. And the +fact overlooked by Sir William Hamilton is, that the like +holds, even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceivable, +in the strict sense of the word." Proceeding with +his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the fact +that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative +or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, +"that both Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel +do," in certain places, "distinctly imply that our consciousness +of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, is positive not +negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy +condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; +though it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, +nor that, nor that; though in obedience to it we negative, +one after another, each idea as it arises; yet as we cannot +expel the entire contents of consciousness, there ever remains +behind an element which passes into new shapes. The continual +negation of each particular form and limit simply results +in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and +limits, and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed<span class="pagenum">[187]</span> +and unlimited." Thus he brings us to "the ultimate +difficulty—How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness +of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, +consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?" This +he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in consciousness +which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion +as follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate +mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and +necessarily indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned +being literally the unconditioned consciousness, or +raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give definite +forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence +is the very basis of our intelligence." ...</p> + +<p>"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:—We +have seen how, in the very assertion that all our knowledge, +properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the assertion +that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each +step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, +the same assumption is made. We have seen how, from the +very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the +Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real +Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative +or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, +and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And +on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally +seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an +actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility, +results our indestructible belief in that actuality."</p> + +<p>The approval which has been accorded to certain of the +arguments adduced by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial +point, that the Absolute is a positive somewhat in consciousness, +and to that point as established, must not be supposed +to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite consciousness" +by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his former +teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter +to show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy.<span class="pagenum">[188]</span></p> + +<p>As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton +and Mr. Mansel, Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably +be deemed decisive. Admitting the logical accuracy of their +reasoning, he very justly turns from the logical to the psychological +aspect of the subject, takes exception to their +premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives +an approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and +defective presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue +which must now be made with him is whether the position +he has here taken, and which he puts forth as that peculiar +element in his philosophical system, that new truth, which +shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of +human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in +diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, +and all that he has before written, and so does not +annihilate them. It will be our present endeavor to show +that such is the result.</p> + +<p>Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory +than, first, to take up what we believe to be the element of +truth in it, and carry out this to its logical results; and afterwards +to present what seem to be the elements of error, and +show them to be such.</p> + +<p>1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness +of" "the Absolute." Without criticizing his use +here of consciousness as if it were a faculty of knowledge, +and remembering that we cannot have a consciousness of +anything without having a knowledge commensurate with +that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion +is tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that +the Absolute is. It does not seem that he himself can disallow +this. Grant this, and our whole system follows, as does +also the fallacy of his own. Our argument will proceed +thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and +is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it +is law for all intellect, for God as well as man. But three +positions can be taken. Either it is true for the Deity, or<span class="pagenum">[189]</span> +else it is false for him, or else it has no reference to him. In +the last instance God is Chaos; in the second he and man +are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; the first +is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses +refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains +but the position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on +God and man. One of those laws is, that, if any assertion is +true, all that is logically involved in it is true; in other words, +all truth is in absolute and perfect harmony. This is fundamental +to the possibility of Logic. Now apply this law to +the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have a +positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of +expression would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then +that he is in a <i>mode</i>, has a <i>formal</i> being. But three hypotheses +are possible. He is in no mode, he is in one mode; +he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there is no form, no +order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is Chaos. +Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, +and men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in +all modes, he is in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all +in every part." He is then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity +and finiteness are contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. +God is wholly possessed of contradictory and mutually +exclusive qualities, which is more than unthinkable—it is +absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us pause +here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, +from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God <i>is +limited</i>. He must be in one mode to the exclusion of all +other modes. He is limited then by the necessity to be what +he is; and if he could become what he is not, he would not +have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to the exclusion +of the possibility of any other independent Being. +Other beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and +subordinate to him. Since he is superior to all other beings +he must be in the highest possible mode of being. Personality +is the highest possible mode of being. This will appear<span class="pagenum">[190]</span> +from the following considerations. A person, possesses the +reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, within +himself, and is thus a <i>final cause</i>. No higher form of being +than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony +a hypothesis of any other must be excluded. God is then a +person.</p> + +<p>We have now brought the argument to that point where +its connection with the system advocated in this treatise is +manifest. If the links are well wrought, and the chain complete, +not only is this system firmly grounded upon Mr. +Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, +he has in this his special point given partial utterance to +what, once established, involves the fallacy not only of all +he has written before, but as well of the whole Limitist +Philosophy. It remains now to remark upon the errors in +his form of expressing the truth.</p> + +<p>2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness +as a faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," +an "indefinite consciousness." Let us examine these in their +order.</p> + +<p><i>a.</i> He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. +In this he uses the term in the inexact, careless, +popular manner, rather than with due precision. As has +been observed on a former page, consciousness is the light in +which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling +is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, +and of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical +expression to say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full +form being "I am conscious that I know the feeling." Thus +is it with all man's activities. Applying this to the case in +hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the Absolute, +but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual faculty, +the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the +absolute Person is, and through this presentation—intuition—the +spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, +our position: consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light<span class="pagenum">[191]</span> +in which the person sees all his faculties and capacities act; +and so is to be considered as different in kind from them all +as the peculiar and unique endowment of a spiritual person.</p> + +<p><i>b.</i> Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." +The expression "vague consciousness" being a +popular and very common one, deserves a careful examination, +and this we hope to give it, keeping in mind meantime the +position already attained.</p> + +<p>The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I +have a vague or undefined consciousness of impending evil." +Let us analyze this experience. In doing so it will be +observed that the consciousness, or rather the seeing by the +person in the light of consciousness, is positive, clear, and +definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling. Again, the feeling +is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, of threatening +danger. What, then, is vague—is undefined? This. +That cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach +of the cognitive faculties, and of course cannot be known; +because what produces the feeling is unknown, the intellectual +apprehension experiences a sense of vagueness; and this +it instinctively carries over and applies to the feeling. Yet +really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of the +cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not consciousness +that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "<i>indefinite</i> +consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation +in fact. But this may be shown by another line of thought. +Consciousness is commensurate with knowledge, <i>i. e.</i>, man +can have no knowledge except he is conscious of that knowledge; +neither can he have any consciousness except he knows +that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness is, <i>i. e.</i>, +what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it +is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our +knowledge of an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly +know its characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. +Thus then also the result above stated follows; and what +Mr. Spencer calls "<i>indefinite</i> consciousness" is a "<i>definite</i><span class="pagenum">[192]</span> +consciousness" that we partly know, and are partly ignorant +of the object under consideration.</p> + +<p>In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under +consideration, Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion +respecting consciousness, which, when examined in the +light of the positions we have advocated, affords another +decisive evidence of the fallacy of his theory. We quote it +again, that the reader may not miss of giving it full attention. +"By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element +is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. +Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally <i>the +unconditioned consciousness</i>, or <i>raw material of thought</i>, to +which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an +ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our +intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously +arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a +question which is not so easily answered. More than one +interpretation may be assigned, as will appear upon examination. +A problem is given. To find what the "raw material +of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in +him the "raw material of thought"—the crude thought-ore +which he smelts down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, +giving forth in its stead the refined metal—exact +thought. We must then proceed to attain our answer by +analyzing man's natural organization.</p> + +<p>Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily +a logical order to the parts which are combined in the +complexity. He may be considered as a substance in which +a constitution inheres, <i>i. e.</i>, which is organized according to +a <i>set</i> of fixed laws, and that set of laws may be stated in their +logical order. It is sufficient, however, for our purpose to +consider him as an organized substance, the organization +being such that he is a person—a selfhood, <i>self-active</i> and +capable of self-examination. The raw material of <i>all</i> the +activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take +away the substance, and there remains only the set of laws<span class="pagenum">[193]</span> +as <i>abstract</i> ideas. Again, take away the set of laws, and the +substance is simple, unorganized substance. In the combining +of the two the person becomes. These, then, are all +there is of the person, and therefore in these must the raw +material be. From this position it follows directly that any +capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, +is the substance acting in accordance with the law which +determines that form of the activity. To explain the term, +form of activity. There is a <i>set</i> of laws. Each law, by itself, +is a simple law, and is incapable of organizing a substance +into a being. But when these laws are considered, as they +naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each +other, it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes +ideals, or forms of being and activity. To illustrate from +an earthly object. The law of gravitation alone could not +organize a Universe; neither could the law of cohesion, nor of +centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any other one law. All +these laws must be acting together,—or rather all these +laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to +their own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance +with which God may create this Universe. For an +illustration of our topic in its highest form, the reader is +referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's "Rational Psychology," +where he analyzes personality into its elements of Spontaneity, +Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is sufficiently +evident that either of these alone cannot organize a +person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute +such a being. There are, then, various forms of activity +in the person, as Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each +of which the organized substance acts in a mode or form, and +this form is determined by the set of organizing laws. Consciousness +also is such a form. The "raw material of +thought," then, must be this substance considered under the +peculiar form of activity which we call consciousness, but +<i>before the substance thus formulated has been awakened into +activity by those circumstances which are naturally suited to</i><span class="pagenum">[194]</span> +<i>it, for bringing it into action</i>. Now, by the very terms of +the statement it is evident that the substance thus organized +in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness considered +apart from and prior to its activity, can never be +known <i>by experience</i>, i. e., <i>we can never be conscious of an +unconscious state</i>. "Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness +considered as quiescent because in it have been +awakened no "definite forms"—no "thinking." "In the +nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an +"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that +"our consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already +asserted and proved, is a "positive," and therefore an +active state; is identical with, is "literally the unconditioned +consciousness," or consciousness in its quiescent state, considered +before it had been awakened into activity, which is +far more absurd than what was just above shown to be a +contradiction.</p> + +<p>To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation +may be given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that +it looks upon consciousness only as an activity, and in the +logical order after its action has begun. We are, then, conscious, +and in this is positive action, but no definite object is +present which gives a form in consciousness, and so consciousness +<i>returns upon itself</i>. We are conscious that we are conscious, +which is an awkward way of saying that we are self-conscious, +or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious; for +accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the +subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion +from this hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will +be very loath to accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. +Indeed, in a sentence we are about to quote, he seems to +make a most marked distinction between self-consciousness +and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which he calls +its "obverse."</p> + +<p>But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material +of thought" is, what more especially claims our attention and<span class="pagenum">[195]</span> +is most strange, is his application of that notion. To present +this more clearly, we will quote further from the passage +already under examination. "As we can in successive mental +acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace them by +others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance +of consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, +there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently +and independently of conditions. At the same time +that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from +forming a conception of absolute existence, we are by the +laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves +of the consciousness of absolute existence: this consciousness +being, as we here see, the obverse of our self-consciousness." +Now, by comparing this extract with the other, which it immediately +follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as +synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned," +"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of +thought," "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and +"consciousness of absolute existence." Let us note, now, +certain conclusions, which seem to follow from this use of +language. We are conscious "of absolute existence." No +person can be conscious except he is conscious of some state +or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, +a state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness +of absolute existence"—as it seems <i>our</i> absolute existence—is +the "raw material of thought." But, again, as was +shown above, this "raw material," this "undifferentiated +substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is consciousness +considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it +becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this +quiescent state we could have no knowledge by experience. +But since the above phrases are synonymous, it follows that +"consciousness of absolute existence" is the "undifferentiated +substance of consciousness," is a consciousness of which we +can have no knowledge by experience, is a consciousness of +which we can have no consciousness. Is this philosophy?<span class="pagenum">[196]</span></p> + +<p>It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact +which Mr. Spencer has endeavored to express in the language +we are criticizing. There is such a fact, a statement of which +will complete this criticism. Unquestionably, in self-examination, +a man may abstract all "successive mental acts," may +consider himself as he is, in the logical order before he <i>has +experiences</i>. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense +of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in +other words, that it is an organic law of our being that there +cannot be an experience without a being to entertain the +experience; and hence that it is impossible for a man to +think or act, except on the assumption that he is. But all +this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the unconditioned," +or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is +not absolute, and it is <i>our</i> existence of which we are conscious. +The reality and abidingness of <i>our</i> existence is +ground for <i>our</i> experience, nothing more. Even if it were +possible for us to have a consciousness of our state before +any experience, or to actually now abstract all experience, +and be conscious of our consciousness unmodified by any +object, <i>i. e.</i> to be conscious of unconsciousness, this would +not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could +find no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our +existence was involved in our experience. Such a consciousness +would indeed appear "unconditioned" by the coming +into it of any activity, which would give a form in it; but +this would give us no notion of true unconditionedness—true +"absolute existence." This consciousness, though undisturbed +by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would +have been created, and be dependent upon God for continuance +in existence, and for a chance to come into circumstances, +where it could be modified by experiences, and so +could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives us the +fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our +experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness +of the unconditioned, be that what it may.<span class="pagenum">[197]</span></p> + +<p>But to return from this considerable digression to the result +which was attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. +Spencer calls "<i>indefinite</i> consciousness" is a "<i>definite</i> consciousness" +that we partly know, and are partly ignorant +of the object under consideration. Let this conclusion be +applied to the topic which immediately concerns us,—the +character of God.</p> + +<p>But three suppositions are possible. Either we know +nothing of God, not even that he is; or we have a partial +knowledge of him, we know that he is, and all which we can +logically deduce from this; or we know him exhaustively. +The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no notice. +The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed satisfactory, +has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is +to be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, +his position is that we know that God is and no more. Admit +this for a moment. We are conscious then of a positive, certain, +inalienable knowledge that God is; but that with reference +to any and all questions which may arise concerning +him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent +that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; +it is our ignorance.</p> + +<p>We might suggest the question—of what use can it be to +man to know that God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, +organically ignorant of what he is? Let the reader answer +the question to his own mind. It is required to show how +the theory advocated in this book will appear in the light of +the second hypothesis above stated.</p> + +<p>Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can +logically deduce it from this premiss; but, in so far as God +is such, that he cannot be thus known, except wherein he +makes a direct revelation to us, he must be forever inscrutable. +To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be admitted, it +logically follows that he must be self-existent. Self-existence +is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second +element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may<span class="pagenum">[198]</span> +go on through all that it is possible to deduce, and the system +thus wrought will be The Science of Natural Theology, a +science as pure and sure as pure equations. Its results will +be what God must be. Looking into the Universe we will +find what must be corresponding with what is, and our knowledge +will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be +utterly inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics +which we cannot attain by logical deductions. For instance, +let it be granted that the doctrine of the Trinity is true—that +there are three persons in one Godhead. This would be a +fact which man could never attain, could never make the +faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that +God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed +man of Greece, become convinced that some god must +come from heaven to lead men to the truth; but the notion +of the Trinity could never come to him, except God himself +with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those matters of +which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can +be demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a +right to demand; viz: that what is revealed shall not contradict +the law already "written in the heart." Yet, once +more, there are certain characteristics of God that must forever +be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and this, +because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that +one cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining +the knowledge in question. Such for instance are the questions, +How is God self-existent, how could he be eternal, +how exercise his power, and the like? These are questions +respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should +know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in +reality is no reason at all, and therefore the inability in +question is no detriment to man.</p> + +<p>By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, +two positions seem to be established. 1. That we have, as +Mr. Spencer affirms, a positive consciousness that the absolute +Being is, and that this and all which we can logically deduce<span class="pagenum">[199]</span> +from this are objects of knowledge to us; in other words, +that the system advocated in this volume directly follows +from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite +consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in +consciousness, but in our knowledge; and further, that +the hypothesis of a consciousness of the "raw material of +thought" is absurd.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2 id="THE_RECONCILIATION">"THE RECONCILIATION."</h2> + +<p>It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be +the thorough refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been +given in the preceding comments on Mr. Spencer's three +philosophical chapters, the one named in our heading would +need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this from being +the case, that some of the worst features in the results of his +system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding +to consider these, let us note a most important admission. +He speaks of his conclusion as bringing "the results of +speculation into harmony with those of common sense," and +then makes the, for him, extraordinary statement, "Common +Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two remarks +it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final +standard with which any position most be reconciled. The +question instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The +writer has never seen a definition, and would submit for the +reader's consideration the following.</p> + +<p>Common Sense <i>is the practical Pure Reason</i>; it is that +faculty by which the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness +the <i>a priori</i> law as inherent in the fact presented +by the Sense.</p> + +<p>For the sake of completeness its complement may be +defined thus:</p> + +<p>Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty<span class="pagenum">[200]</span> +by which the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks +so conformed to that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to +accomplish the object in view.</p> + +<p>A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the +informing law in the fact; and good judgment, who skilfully +selects and adapts his means to the circumstances of the case, +and the end sought. Of course it will not be understood +that it is herein implied that every person who exercises +this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it.</p> + +<p>The reader will readily see the results which directly follow +from Mr. Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense +asserts the existence of a reality," and this assertion is true; +but with equal truth does it assert the law of logic; that, if +a premiss is true, <i>all that is logically involved in it is true</i>. +It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer has unwittingly acknowledged +the fundamental principle of what may be called the +Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure Reason, +and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his +own.</p> + +<p>It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. +Spencer's system assumed in this chapter their worst phases. +This remark is illustrated in the following extract: "We are +obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of +some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena being, +so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are +obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism +teaches us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this +consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power +we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. +And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science +coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows: +"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a +manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." +This may be expressed in another form thus: Every phenomenon +is a manifestation of some Power by which we are +acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise<span class="pagenum">[201]</span> +meaning of this sentence, unless the exact signification of the +term phenomenon be ascertained. It might be confined to +material appearances, appreciable by one of the five senses. +But the context seems to leave no doubt but that Mr. Spencer +uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the Universe, +since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting +the definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat +in the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power +by which we are acted upon." It follows, then, that there is +no somewhat in the Universe, except we are acted upon by +it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we began +to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in +ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further +is to be asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were +created. But we were not created by Mr. Spencer's "some +Power," because it only <i>acts upon us</i>. In his creation, man +was not acted upon, because there was no man to be acted +upon; but in that act a being was originated <i>who might be +acted upon</i>. Then, however, we came into being, another +than "some Power" was the cause of us. But the act of +creating man was a somewhat. Every somewhat <i>in</i> the +Universe is "a manifestation of some Power." This is not +such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took +place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to +say that the creation of man is "a manifestation of some +Power acting upon" him!</p> + +<p>The position above taken seems the more favorable one +for Mr. Spencer. If, to avoid the difficulties which spring +from it, he limits the term phenomenon, as for instance to +material appearances, then his assertion that phenomena are +unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on which +to establish the omnipresence of his Power.</p> + +<p>But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly +speaking, all events are phenomena. Let there be named an +event which is universally known and acknowledged, and +which, in the nature of the case, cannot be "a manifestation<span class="pagenum">[202]</span> +of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that +statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration +be established. The experience by the human +soul of a sense of guilt, of a consciousness of ill-desert, is +such an event. No "Power" can make a sinless soul feel +guilty; no "Power" <i>can relieve a sinful soul from feeling +guilty</i>. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance +of Power, <i>it arises from the violation of Law</i>. And not only +may this experience be named, but every other experience +of the moral nature of man. In this connection let it be +observed that Mr. Spencer always elsewhere uses the term +phenomenon to represent material phenomena in the material +universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged +to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for +any other phenomena than these and their concomitants, the +affections of the intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so +thoroughly is his philosophy vitiated by this omission, that +one could never learn from anything he has said in these +pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there were +any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be +accounted for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel +are just as bad as he. Yet in this the Limitists have done +well; it is impossible, on the basis of their system, to render +such an account. To test the matter, the following problem +is presented.</p> + +<p>To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the +fact that the nations of men have universally made public +acknowledgment of their guilt, in having violated the law of +a superior being; and that they have offered propitiatory +sacrifices therefor, except in the case of those persons and +nations who have received the Bible, or have learned through +the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one +God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice +has already been made.</p> + +<p>Another pernicious result of the system under examination +is, that it affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's<span class="pagenum">[203]</span> +omnipresence than <i>experience</i>. Mr. Spencer's words are: +"phenomena being, <i>so far as we can ascertain</i>, unlimited in +their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent." +Now, if he, or one of his friends, should happen to +get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space, +and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, +skirting in astonishment along that boundary, should happen +to light upon an open place and a bridge, which invited them +to pass across to another sphere or system of phenomena, made +by another "Power,"—said bridge being constructed "'alf +and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,—then there would +be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again +to England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the +other Limitists his new experience; and they, having no +ground on which to argue against or above experience, must +needs receive the declaration of their colaborator, with its +inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we are here +acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when, +instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the +doctrine, based not upon human experience, but upon God's +inborn ideas that phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, +and that upon these facts experience can afford no +decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real difficulties of +philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison +between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy.</p> + +<p>Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. +Spencer in an earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches +us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible." We might, +it is believed, ask with pertinence, What better, then, is man +than the brute? But the subject is recurred to at this time, +only to quote against this position a sentence from a somewhat +older book than "First Principles," a book which, did +it deserve no other regard than as a human production, would +seem, from its perfect agreement with the facts of human +nature, to be the true basis for all philosophy. The sentence +is this: "Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of<span class="pagenum">[204]</span> +God; and every one that loveth, is born of God, <i>and</i> +<span class="smcap">knoweth God</span>."</p> + +<p>But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents +its worst phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. +A "phenomenon" is "a manifestation of some Power." "In +this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power +we have just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. +And so we arrive at the point where Religion and Science +coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is +all the Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power +is omnipresent, so that we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, +so that we can never know the law of its +action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may +fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may +become one vast Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums +and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity the children of men may +either live in continual dread, or in continual disregard; they +may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or purple and +fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table +may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification +of the flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to +propitiate, if possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent +Power; or, reckless of consequences, they may laugh and +dance and be gay, saying, we know nothing of this Power, +he may crush us any moment, let us take the good of life +while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough +and ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains +Titan-piled; the avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to +rush with crash and roar and terrible destruction upon the +hapless village beneath it; the flood gathering its waters +from vast ranges of hills into a single valley, spreading into +great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and their +agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges +from their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little +gatherings of man, and leaving the country, over which its +devastating waters flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally,<span class="pagenum">[205]</span> +perhaps the completest symbol of all may be found in that +collection of the united streams and lakes of tens upon tens +of thousands of miles of the earth's surface, into the aorta of +the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the crowded +waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come +suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara.</p> + +<p>It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct +antagonism with that of the Bible,—that, if Spencerianism +is true, the Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. +Spencer's "Power," the Bible presents us a doctrine of God +as follows: "And God said unto Moses, <span class="smcap">I am that I am</span>. +And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, +<span class="smcap">I am</span> hath sent me unto you."—<i>Exodus</i> IV. 14. This +declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one +man ever heard, all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, +either in distinct terms, or by implication, deny. That other +declaration is this: "Beloved, let us love one another: for +love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, +and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; +<i>for God is love</i>."—1 <i>John</i> IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism +between the two philosophies now presented, the +later one appears in an especially bad light from the fact, +that, being very recent and supported by a mere handful of +men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice +of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this +may be numbered by millions, and among them have been and +are many of the ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great +majority of Bible readers do not study it as a philosophical +treatise, but rather as a book of religious and spiritual instruction; +yet, since it is the most profoundly philosophical +book which has ever been in the hands of man, and professedly +teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also +the philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates +of the new and innovating system should have taken +up that one which it sought to supplant, and have made an +attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of the work before<span class="pagenum">[206]</span> +them, to show its position to be fallacious and unworthy +of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the +existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance +of a quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge +the antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's +volume this neglect is especially noteworthy. Judging from +internal evidence, one would much sooner conclude that it +was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of Buddha, than +by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian churches. +Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no +higher than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, +and that it presents a most profound philosophy, which is so +largely received in his own and neighboring nations, made it +imperative upon him not only to take some notice of it, but +to meet and answer it, as we have indicated above.</p> + +<p>Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he +will be less willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, +at the same time, one which will be more likely forcibly to +move a certain class of mind, is, that it is in direct antagonism +to human nature. Not only is the Bible a falsehood and a +cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true, but human +nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. +Human nature universally considers God, or its gods, as +persons; or, in other words, all human beings, or at least +with very rare exceptions, spontaneously ascribe personality +to Deity. This position is in no wise negatived by the fact of +the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class of philosophical +atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the +power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the +religion in which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which +he, thinking it, as it may be, integral, for philosophical reasons +rejects, and all religion with it, he may educate himself into +speculative atheism. But no child is an atheist. Not even +Shelley became such, until he had dashed against some of the +distorted and monstrous <i>human</i> theologies of his day. But +counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and<span class="pagenum">[207]</span> +all the English atheists, and all the American atheists, and +all other atheists wherever they may be found, they will not +number one tenth of the human race. On what ground can +the unanimity of the other nine tenths be accounted for? +There appears none possible, but that the notion that God is +a person, <i>is organic in human nature</i>. Another equally +universal and spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there +is a likeness, in some way, between God and man. There +are the grossest, and in many instances most degrading modes +of representing this; but under them all, and through them +all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and pertinacity +of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, +and under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing +after every revolution, which, tearing down old customs and +worships, established new ones, can without doubt only be +accounted for on the precise ground of the other,—that the +notion <i>is organic in man</i>. A third utterance of the human +race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that +the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had +revolting, yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, +even to human sacrifices. But the notion has remained +indestructible through all ages, and must therefore +be accounted for, as have been the others. Over against the +<span class="smcap">I am</span>, which human nature presents and the Bible supports; +over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say +man was created; and over against Him who, those two +still agreeing witnesses also affirm, is moved by his great +heart of Love to have mercy on those creatures who come +to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the result +of <i>Science</i>, an incomprehensible omnipresent <i>Power</i>; only a +Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For +our part, whatever others may do, we will believe in human +nature and the Bible. On the truthfulness of these two +witnesses, as on the Central Rock in the Universe, we plant +ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this<span class="pagenum">[208]</span> +Power "Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from +according with the fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible +to account for the presence of religion as a constitutive element +of the human race. Religion was primarily worship, +the reverential acknowledgment, by the sinless creature, of +the authority of the Creator, combined with the adoration of +His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race, it +has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory +sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or +equally, if this is all the notion we can form of him, we are +utterly at a loss to find aught in him to worship, much less +can we account for the fact of the religious nature in us, and +most of all are we confounded by the persistent assertion, by +this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of God, +for Power can be neither personal nor merciful.</p> + +<p>Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his +position by stating that "from age to age Science has continually +defeated it (Religion) wherever they have come into +collision, and has obliged it to relinquish one or more of its +positions." In this assertion, also, he manifests either a want +of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to comprehend +their significance. Religion may properly be divided into +two classes.</p> + +<p>1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously +among men, having all the errors and deformities +which a fleshly imagination would produce.</p> + +<p>2. The religion of Jesus Christ.</p> + +<p>1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science +has ever driven even the religions of this class. It has, +indeed, corrected many <i>forms of expression</i>, and has sometimes +driven <i>individuals</i>, who failed to distinguish between +the form, and the idea which the form overlies, into a +rejection of the truth itself.</p> + +<p>2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's +remark has no shadow of foundation. Since the beginning +of its promulgation by Jehovah, and especially since the completion<span class="pagenum">[209]</span> +of that promulgation by our Saviour and his apostles, +not one whit of its practical law or its philosophy has been +abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States, there +may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly +held, and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and +personal supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, +and of that fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of +confusion," in so conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that +it shall manifestly redound, not only to the glory of himself, +but to the very best good of man, so manifestly to so great a +good, that all the loss of life, and all the suffering, is felt to +be not worthy to be compared to the good achieved, and that +too <i>most strongly by the sufferers</i>, than was ever before +manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, +in spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever +been utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the +elements we have presented. Its utmost triumph has been +to force a change in the form of expression; and in the Bible +it meets with forms of expression which it ever has been, is +now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a paralytic +would be to overturn the Himalaya.</p> + +<p>The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may +perhaps be now properly closed with the simple allusion to +a single fact. Just as far as a race of human beings descends +in the gradations of degradation, just so far does it come to +look upon Deity simply as power. African Fetishism is the +doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power, rendered +into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands +one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort +of personality for the Power.</p> + +<p>On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And +now observe that all along, the agent which has effected the +purification has been Science. We habitually overlook the +fact that this has been one of its functions. Religion ignores +its immense debt to Science; and Science is scarcely at all +conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is demonstrable<span class="pagenum">[210]</span> +that every step by which Religion has progressed from its +first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now +reached, Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; +and that even now, Science is urging further steps in the +same direction." In this passage half truths are so sweepingly +asserted as universal that it becomes simply untrue. +The evil may be stand under two heads.</p> + +<p>1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be +altogether too profound. Since he has observed that certain +changes for the better have been made in some human +religions, by the study of the natural sciences, he jumps to +the conclusion that religion has been under a state of steady +growth; and of course readily assumes—for there is not a +shadow of other basis for his assertion—that the "first" +"conception" of religion was very "low." This assumption +we utterly deny, and demand of Mr. Spencer his proof. For +ourselves we are willing to come down from the impregnable +fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the +Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In +this we are taught that the Golden Age came <i>first</i>, in which +was a life of spotless purity; after which were the silver and +brazen ages, and the Iron Age in which was crime, and the +"low conception" of religion came <i>last</i>. How marked is the +general agreement of this with the Bible account!</p> + +<p>2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage +than that it is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his +philosophy first and cuts his facts to match it. This is a +common mistake among men, and which they are unconscious +of. Now the fact is, Science was <i>not</i> "the agent which effected +the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science. +Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" +to Religion. Religion's first position was not a low +one, but nearly the highest. Afterwards it sunk very low; +but men sunk it there. Science never "helped it" or "forced +it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades Religion +and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be<span class="pagenum">[211]</span> +especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's +doctrine of Science is. He says: "That even the <i>highest</i> +achievements of Science are resolvable into mental relations +of coexistence and sequence, so coördinated as exactly to +tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that +occur externally." Of course the highest <i>object</i> of Science +will be "<i>truth</i>"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." +To interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a +science of clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, +and to some largely, to many chiefly, a science of +<i>cookery</i> do, combined, constitute Science, and the preservation +of the body is its highest attainment. Is this Science "the +agent which has effected the purification of Religion?" What +then is the truth?</p> + +<p>"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; +but they have sought out many inventions."—<i>Eccl.</i> VII. 29. +The first religion was a communion with God. The Creator +taught man, as a father would his children. But when man +sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and sank to +that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary +sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of +Abraham,—<i>Gen.</i> XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with +such fiery vigor in the first chapter of Romans, and which +may be found fully paralleled in our own day. At the proper +time, God took mankind in hand, and began to develop his +great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up +Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. +Spencer shall deny the biblical account of the origin of the +five books of Moses, he at least cannot deny that they have +a being; and, placing them on the same ground of examination +and criticism as Herodotus, that they were written more +than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark. +Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, +and no one of the prophets, who came after, added one new +idea. They only emphasized and amplified "The Law."<span class="pagenum">[212]</span> +So far then as this part of Religion was concerned, Science +never helped a particle. Yea, more, the words to Moses in +the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances of man +before the Christian era.</p> + +<p>"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However +defective was the former dispensation, he, who appeared to +most of the men of his day as only a carpenter's son, declared +to mankind the final and perfect truth. As the system taught +by Moses was not the result of any philosophical developments, +but was incomparably superior to the religion of the +most civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was +brought up, and was manifestly constructed <i>de novo</i>, and from +some kind of revelation, so this, which the carpenter's son +taught, was incomparably superior to any utterance which +the human soul had up to that time, or has since, made. +It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the +highest principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing +new was left to say when John finished his writing; and the +canon might well be closed. And since that day, has Religion +advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water is drank at the +old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of Religion +among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not +advance it. You can yet count the years on your fingers +since men of Science generally ceased to be strenuously hostile +to Religion. Religion, in every instance, has advanced just +where it has gone back, and drank at the old fountains. Who, +then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent which has +effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes +"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought +her up to her present high position.</p> + +<p>When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer—to use +a commonplace but very forcible phrase—has "ruled God +out of the ring," how impertinent seems his rebuke, administered +a few pages further on, in the passage beginning, +"Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," +to those who believe that God means what he says, and that<span class="pagenum">[213]</span> +men may know him. These men at least stand on a far +higher plane than he who teaches that an "incomprehensible +omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to worship, and his +words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns under +a pot.</p> + +<p>There does not appear in this chapter any further topic +that has not already been touched upon. With these remarks, +then, the examination of this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's +First Principles, may be closed.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[214]</span></p> + +<h2 id="CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION.</h2> + +<p>If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's +"Evidences of Christianity," or the "Sermons of President +Dwight on the Existence of God"; and if he has risen from +their perusal with a feeling of utter unsatisfaction, enduring +the same craving for a sure truth harassing as before, he will +have partly shared the experience which drove the author +forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this +treatise. Those works, and all of that class are, for the object +they have in view, worthless; not because the various statements +they make are untrue, not because elegant language and +beauty of style are wanting; but because they are radically +defective in that, their <i>method</i> is irrelevant to the subject in +hand; because in all the arguments that have been or can be +brought forward there is nothing decisive and final; because +the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through +every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, +their method itself is false, and men have attempted to +establish by a series of arguments what must be ground for +the possibility of an argument, and can only be established by +the opposite, the <i>a priori</i> method. Though the Limitist Philosophy +has no positive value, it has this negative one, that it +has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the +worthlessness of the <i>a posteriori</i> processes of thought on the +matter in hand. Yea, more, the existence of <i>any</i> spiritual +person cannot be proved in that way. You can prove that +the boy's body climbs the tree; but never that he has a soul. +This is always taken for granted. Lest the author should +appear singular in this view, he would call the attention of +the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he +at once sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency<span class="pagenum">[215]</span> +of the logic of Dr. Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in +this present work, furnished occasion for a charge of having +expressed myself with slight and irreverence of celebrated +names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if I were fond +and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how well +content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration +which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of +Paley! And how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary +praise, could I even approach to the incomparable +grace, propriety, and persuasive facility of his writings! But +on this very account, I feel myself bound in conscience <i>to throw +the whole force of my intellect in the way of this triumphal car</i>, +on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is borne, +even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels."</p> + +<p>Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught +us in the Book, and the only one taught us there, which is +open to every human being, for which every human being +has the faculty, and respecting which all that is needed is, +that the person exercise what he already has. The boy could +not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to +his task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils +the conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the +acquisition of this knowledge, except his soul is poured out +in love to God; "for every one that <i>loveth, is born of God, +and knoweth God</i>." We come then to the knowledge of God +by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason, the +Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and +highest action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an +intellectual achievement, this is the highest possible to the +Reason. She attains then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, +and of this she is fully conscious. Nor is there awakened +any feverish complaining that there are no more worlds to +conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable Goodness +she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest. +Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, +and that the <i>a priori</i> method, by which to establish for man<span class="pagenum">[216]</span> +the fact of the being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion +with other lines of thought.</p> + +<p>Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in +the highest degree improbable, that the most important truths +which can pertain to man, truths which do not concern +primarily the affairs of this life, but of his most exalted life, +the life of the spiritual person as the companion of its Creator, +should be based upon an inferior, less satisfactory, and less +adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of our childhood's +studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy +who cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon +learns what he knows to be <i>self-evident</i> truths. He who +should offer to <i>prove</i> the truth of the multiplication-table, +would only expose himself to ridicule. When the boy has +attained to youth, and advanced in his studies, the pages of +the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and he finds +new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any +evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the +validity of the axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to +offer arguments, would he not instinctively and rightfully +feel that the confession was thereby tacitly made, that self-evidence +was not satisfactory; and would he not, finding his +spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be +<i>liable</i> to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this +spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal +conviction respecting matters of subordinate importance, can +it be possible,—I repeat the question, for it seems to carry +with it irresistibly its own and the decisive answer,—can it be +possible that the decisions of questions of the highest moment, +that the knowledge of the principles of our moral being and +of the moral government to which we are amenable, and +most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, +and Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, +yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal convictions? +And when the teacher seemingly, and may it not with truth +be said <i>actually</i>, distrusting the reliability of such a conviction,<span class="pagenum">[217]</span> +goes about to bolster up his belief, and the belief of his pupil, +in the existence of God, and thereto rakes together, with +painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence, instead +of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon +him with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that +the sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction +between his spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should +become uncertain which to follow, a doubter, and finally a +confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is incredible that the fundamental +principles of man's moral nature—that to which all +the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for which +they were created—are established on inferior grounds, and +those less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; +and if, on the other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that +they are established on the highest grounds, and since the +truths of mathematics are also based on the highest ground, +self-evidence, and since there can be none higher than the +highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe, +so far as they can be known by man, have <i>precisely the same +foundation of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics—they +are</i> <span class="smcap">self-evident</span>.</p> + +<p>But some good Reader will check at the result now attained +because it involves the position that the human Reason is the +final standard of truth for man. Good reader, this position +is involved, and is true; and for the sake of Christ's religion +it must be taken. The only possible ground for a thoroughly +satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable Christian Philosophy, +is the principle that <i>The human Reason is the final +standard of truth for man</i>.</p> + +<p>It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem +that book as his final standard; and to such an extent in +many instances has his reverential regard for it been carried, +that the expression will hardly be too strong for truth, that +it has become an object of worship; and upon the mind of +such a one the above assertion will produce a shock. While +the author would treat with respect every religious feeling,<span class="pagenum">[218]</span> +he would still remind such a person that the Bible is the +moral school-book of the spiritual person in man, which God +himself prepared for man's use, and must in every case be +inferior and subordinate to the being whom it was meant to +educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of making +man, God established in him the standard, and the right to +require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the +standard and thus established the right. This principle may +be supported by the following considerations:</p> + +<p>1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none +have employed it more vigorously than those who have in +terms most bitterly opposed it. One of the class just referred +to affirms that the Bible is the standard of truth. "Admit," +says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it were what +it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the +case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the +fathers, and evidence from the book itself; and finally closes +by saying, that such an array of evidence is ample to satisfy +any <i>reasonable</i> man of its truth and validity. His argument +is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he has not appealed to +a reasonable man, <i>i. e.</i> to the Reason, <i>i. e.</i>, if he has not +acknowledged a standard for <i>the</i> standard, and thus has not +tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason +as the highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us +no adequate expression.</p> + +<p>2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the +validity of this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We +know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man +can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with +him."—<i>John</i> III. 2. In these words, he both recognized +the validity of the standard, and the fact that its requirements +had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of +our Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works +which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now +have they both seen and hated both me and my Father."—<i>John</i> +XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared among<span class="pagenum">[219]</span> +them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a +belief in my mission; but when I had given them adequate +and ample evidence of my heavenly character, when, in a +word, I had by my works satisfied all the rational demands +for evidence which they could make, then no excuse remained +for their rejection of me."</p> + +<p>The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, +and know God, is one which will never be too largely reflected +upon by the human mind, or too fully illustrated in human +thought. In no better strain can we bring our work to a close +than by offering some reflections on those words of Jesus +Christ which have formed the title of our book.</p> + +<p>"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, +'If ye continue in my word, <i>then</i> are ye my disciples indeed; +and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you +free.'"—<i>John</i> VIII. 31, 32. Throughout all the acts of +Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the last +days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human +effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, +the nature and purport of his mission. He appeared to +them a man; and yet it would seem as if the Godhead in +him struggled with language to overcome its infirmities, and +express with perfectest skill his extraordinary character and +work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received +him not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus +Christ possessed in his own right <i>an absolute and exhaustive +metaphysic</i>. We study out some laws in some of their applications; +he knew all laws in all their applications. In these +his last days he was engaged in making the most profound +and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one +being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call +them religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy +are identical. Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain +that no merely human teacher ever used words with the careful +balancing, the skilful selection, the certain exactitude, +that Jesus did. Hence in the most emphatic sense may it be<span class="pagenum">[220]</span> +said, that, whether he used figurative or literal language, he +meant just what he said. The terms used in the text quoted +are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken +in its most literal signification. In these words then, in this +passage of the highest philosophical import, is to be found the +basis of the whole <i>a priori</i> philosophy. They were spoken +of the most important truths, those which pertain to the soul's +everlasting welfare; but as the greater includes the less, so +do they include all lesser science. In positive and unmistakable +terms has Christ declared the fact of knowledge. +God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, +in so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a +purely intellectual act. Love is indeed a <i>condition</i> of the act, +but it is not the very act itself.</p> + +<p>On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has +failed to assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally +has this knowledge been termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning +thereby, a sort of an impression of happiness made upon +the spiritual sensibility; and this state of bliss has been +represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond all +question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the +eye of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and +knowing it because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated +to, wrapt in the effort, and he is searching for it as +for hid treasures, there will roll over his soul some ripples of +that ineffable Delight which is a boundless ocean in Deity. +But this state of the Sensibility follows after, and is dependent +upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge. There should +be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the +various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that +he had to buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be +taken, then, as the words of the perfect philosopher, and the +perfect religionist. Bearing, as he did, the destiny of a world +on his heart, and burdened beyond all utterance by the mighty +load, his soul was full of the theme for which he was suffering, +he could speak to man only of his highest needs and his<span class="pagenum">[221]</span> +highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, +is not only eternal,—all truth is eternal,—but it is that +eternal truth most important to him, the <i>a priori</i> laws of the +spiritual person and of all his relations. The what he is, the +why he is, and the what he ought to become, are the objects +of his examination. When, then, a spiritual person has performed +his highest act, the act of unconditional and entire +consecration to the search after the truth, <i>i. e.</i> to God; and +when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of +the flesh, he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt +away in the contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye +will be open, and will dart with its far-glancing, searching +gaze throughout the mysteries of the Universe, and he will +know the truth. Before, when he was absorbed in the pursuit +of the things of Sense, he could see almost no <i>a priori</i> principles +at all, and what he did see, only in their practical +bearing upon those material and transitory things which +perish with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless +pinion in the upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the +largest and highest and most important of those objects which +formerly with so much painful and painstaking labor he +climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and having +touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, +he again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and +love, and soars upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal +Sun, the infinite Person, the final Truth, God. Then does +he come to comprehend, "to <span class="smcap">know</span>, with all saints, what is +the height and depth and length and breadth of the love of +God." Then do the pure <i>a priori</i> laws, especially those of +the relations of spiritual persons, <i>i. e.</i> of the moral government +of God, come full into the field of his vision. Then in +the clear blaze, in the noonday effulgence of the ineffable, +eternal Sun, does he see the Law which binds God as it +binds man,—that Law so terrible in its demands upon him +who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could +find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending<span class="pagenum">[222]</span> +"his only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is +lifted up to this knowledge needs no other revelation. All +other knowledge is a child's lesson-book to him. All lower +study is tasteless; all lower life is neglected, forgotten. He +studies forever the pure equations of truth; he lives in the +bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been +utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, +he may have learned of God only by the hearing of +the ear, but by one act, in a moment, in the twinkling of an +eye, he has passed all the gradations of earthly knowledge, +and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He +received little instruction from men; but forevermore God +is his teacher.</p> + +<p>This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, +no rhapsody of the imagination. It is a simple literal fact +respecting man's intellect. It is the same in kind, though +of far nobler import, as if upon this act of consecration +there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a sudden +overwhelming burst of light, the whole <i>a priori</i> system of the +physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not +essential, and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and +the higher is revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual +life.</p> + +<p>In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the +unreserved, the absolute consecration of the whole being to +the search after truth, do we find that common goal to which +an <i>a priori</i> philosophy inevitably leads us, and which the +purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does it appear that +in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are identical. +The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. +The principles of both have the highest possible evidence, +for they are self-evident; and, having them given by the +intuition of the Reason, a man can cipher out the whole +natural scheme of the Universe as he would cipher out a +problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is +wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical<span class="pagenum">[223]</span> +astronomy of the moral heavens, as a school-book to +lead him back to the goal of his lost purity.</p> + +<p>How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter +of the Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preëminence! +how dazzling in thy transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest +afar on a throne of pearl; thy diadem the Morning Stars, thy +robe the glory of God. Founded is thy throne on Eternity; +and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are enduring truth. +Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the snow-capped +mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the +surety of thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, +with mien of noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw +down the gauntlet of thy challenge to the assembled doubters +of the Universe.</p> + +<p>It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing +out fearlessly on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering +trust in the pole-star truth in the human soul, certain of the +positions attained and maintained in this volume will seem to +involve the destruction of all essential distinction between the +Creator and the created. If the universe is a definite and +limited object, some created being may, at some period, come +to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite +number of the qualities and attributes—the endowments of +Deity, some one may learn the number, and what they are, +and come at length to have a knowledge equal to God's knowledge. +Even if this possibility should be admitted,—which +it is not, for a reason to appear further on,—yet it would in +no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree, +reduced the difference in <i>kind</i> which subsists between him +and the Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive +marks will, it would seem, be decisive upon this point.</p> + +<p>God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon +him. Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable +attribute of Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for +any creature. Every creature is necessarily dependent upon +the Creator every moment, for his continuance in being.<span class="pagenum">[224]</span> +Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge; let him, if +the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to +that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could +use, and he would not have made, nor could he make an effort +even, in the direction of removing his dependence upon his +Creator. In the very height of his glory, in the acme of his +attainment, it would need only that God rest an instant, cease +to sustain him, and he would not be, he would have gone out, +as the light goes out on a burner when one turns the faucet.</p> + +<p>Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is +different in kind; and the creature never can acquire the +Creator's mode. The Deity possesses his knowledge as a +necessary endowment, given to him at once, by a spontaneous +intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no +knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out +of all relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, +can never acquire any knowledge except through processes; +and, what is more, can never review the knowledge already +acquired, except by a process which occupies a time. This +relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this distinction +between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable.</p> + +<p>Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode +of seeing ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, +<i>a priori</i> laws, but it gives all possible images, which those +laws, standing in their natural relations to each other, can +become. Thus all ideals are realized to him, whether the +creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in accordance +therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the +opposite kind. The creature can never have an idea until he +has been educated by contact with a material universe; and +then can never construct an ideal, except he have first seen +the elements of that ideal realized in material forms. To +illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no radical +difference between the beginning of a human being and any +other created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason,<span class="pagenum">[225]</span> +but it must grow before it can make its presentations, +and the means of its education must be a material system. +Let a spiritual person be created, and set in the Universe, +utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it +would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry +seed. The necessity of alliance with a material Universe is +equally apparent in the mature spiritual person. Such a +one cannot construct a single ideal, except he have seen all +the elements already in material forms. He who will attempt +to construct an ideal of any <i>thing</i>, which never has been, as a +griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have +been on earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness +of this position. Therefore it is that no one can, +"by searching, find out God." The creature can only learn +what the Creator declares to him.</p> + +<p>Still another element of distinction, equally marked and +decisive as those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity +possesses as inherent and immanent endowment Power, or +the ability of himself to realize his ideals in objects. Thus +is he the Creator. If this were not so, there could have +been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to +furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, +cannot receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power +to create. Hence he can only realize his ideals in materials +furnished to his hand. Pigments and brushes and chisels and +marble must be before painters and sculptors can become.</p> + +<p>Each and every one of the distinctions above made is +<i>organic</i>. They cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal +is not a possible object of effort. The creature may <i>wish</i> +them removed; but no line of thought can be studied out by +which a movement can be made towards the attainment of +that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the +fullest scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use +of every power of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's +design.</p> + +<p class="h3">THE END.</p> + +<hr class="chapter" /> + +<h2>Transcriber's Note:</h2> + +<p>Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been maintained.</p> + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the +Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation + +Author: Jesse H. Jones + +Release Date: October 27, 2011 [EBook #37864] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK KNOW THE TRUTH; A CRITIQUE *** + + + + +Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe, +Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading +Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from +images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia +Center, Michigan State University Libraries.) + + + + + + + + + + KNOW THE TRUTH; + + A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION, + + INCLUDING + + SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND + MR. HERBERT SPENCER + + BY JESSE H. JONES + + + "Give me to see, that I may know where to strike." + + + NEW YORK: + PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON. + BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES + 1865. + + + Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE + H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the + Southern District of New York. + + RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE: + STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY + H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY. + + + Dedication. + + TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL + SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS, + + This Little Treatise + + IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY + + _THE AUTHOR_. + + + + +PREFACE. + + +This book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was +because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be +dangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was +undertaken. + +Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of +philosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or +Atheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed +from different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the +schools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is +to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held +responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and +every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the +presence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of +philosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two +classes of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's +"Rational Psychology" will be in point: + +"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and +beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no +possibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and +honest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of +space and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the +deluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive +understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an +all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a +deity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The +Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its +conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it +will be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed +connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in +neither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity, +circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but +nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality, +is no God." + +The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity +cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What +the mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man +cannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a +rational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind +credulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such +knowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be +_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is +_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no +Reason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and +denies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held +that God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in +asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was +right in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one +error, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by +which to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind +credulity as the basis of Religion. + +The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too +strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little +treatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but +scanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has +written he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound +thinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles +developed by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be +judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied. + +After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the +author was committing it to paper, the essays on "Space and Time," and +on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," in the numbers of the "North +American Review" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his +notice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which +he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost +wholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out +in his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his +country. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand +as thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results +he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those +essays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the +topics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to +be reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment. +If the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that +of quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found +to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is +maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more +than one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and +indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the +commonly used terms infinite and absolute. + +A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the +following discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than +the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so +far as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little +attention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the +distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so +repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the +apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in +the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of the world, even the best +Christian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious +distinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole +human being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper +analysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements. +_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged +as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on +the globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly +understood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could +never have been constructed. + +An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First, +the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately +defined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated. +Second, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and +third, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon +each other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is +to be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of +these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is +doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and +inter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one +mind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the +above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon +circumstances beyond control of the writer. + +As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the +great, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the +Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man +has a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he +has such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled, +and that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge, +except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged +by the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it +would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish +first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a +superstructure. + +The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the +presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it +involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one +point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet +the main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be +thoroughly accomplished in no other way. + +The author has in each case used American editions of the works named. + + + + +KNOW THE TRUTH. + + + + +PART I. + +THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING. + + +In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print, +a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought Examined," &c., "by +Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D." + +The high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian +gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either +devoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being +marked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the +religious community; the recommendations with which its advent was +heralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme +announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental +activity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive +circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and +especially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching +on certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the +boundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in +its upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say, +"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves +be stayed." And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of +religion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein +sought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and +destroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the +Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of +lectures delivered upon what is known as "The Bampton Foundation;"--a +bequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he +directed should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ, +by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by +such a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive +the almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an +era in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England, +the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful +and studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over +its pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially, +and theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who +search for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to +say that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place +among religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive +knowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the +Unknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative +value, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside +where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is +inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be found." + +The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to +public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this +country, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the +lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the +metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which +dissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were +pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or expressed in any +extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors +of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they +attained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous +and deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and +pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest +nature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received. + +Something more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind, +resting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous +interests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors +appeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled "The Philosophy +of Herbert Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the +foundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the +confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages. +Avowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this +writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which +being corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from +it as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal +Science. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his +predecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity +demonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to +examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still +so widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers +above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is +found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his +teachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas, +scarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery +is made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an +unpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books +just mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system +of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly +seems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received +none. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little. + +In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological +Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational Psychology," in which he +professed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if +true, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the +difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being +comparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the +attention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry +and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient +thinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness. + +Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term +Limitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the +American metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be +convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it +becomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work +in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each +of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may "_know +the truth_;" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed +sway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith. + +The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single +fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He +who would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with +all his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys +that, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as +the Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their +scheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot +prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own +tenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and +examine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the +former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great +American teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this +shall be our especial province. + +The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded, +was originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following +terms. "The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion +being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be +positively known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive, +and consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally +limited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the +unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed +to the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or +abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is +realized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only +negative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one +hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a +whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a +still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small, +that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into +smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or +realize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination +coincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the +infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself +require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same +reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of +parts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the +conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of +positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is +_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the +possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the mean between two +extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of +which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of +contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_." + +This theory may be epitomized as follows:--"The Unconditioned denotes +the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." This +genus is inconceivable, is "negative of the conceivable itself." Hence +both the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable, +they may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond all +limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond all conditions:" +or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other, +unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be "mutually +repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be +absolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being +is included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only +one. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the +conditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a +being--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed +to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally +satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are +cognizable--the conditioned. + +It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the +philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural +course, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose +of placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which +has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the +Limitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a +question of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's +metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his +system is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then, +which demands our attention. He has presented this in the following +passage:-- + +"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into +conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the +'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as +the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of +understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, +therefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the +supreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary +to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop +these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of +preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws +of the understanding from a questionable division of logical +proposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding +(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or +rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently +apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the +conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In +the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both +seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) +sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which +has 'overleaped itself.'" + +Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that "both +faculties," _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, "perform the same +function," we are to notice the two leading points which are made, +viz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the +Reason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is +claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A +generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may +be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest +faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of +thinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and +assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a +substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that +the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity +in the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and +Platonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the +former school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their +fundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure +Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such +establishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of +philosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its +tendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the +whole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false +to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to +achieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode +heretofore indicated. + +It is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to +the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding; +a faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have +commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby +to establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name. + +Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an +exact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following +points be noted:-- + +_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the +Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the +laws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either +material, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or +imaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it +is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding, +though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits +of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of +the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it +can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It +can construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a +relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of +another and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object +except such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received +from without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can +have no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover, +but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in +one, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a +priori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional +ideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their +necessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and +acquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects +which belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness +qualifies. We observe, therefore, + +_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind +from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the +Sense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and +the discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such +a Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_, +or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why +conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations, +compose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore, +constitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the +validity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnaeus constructed a system +of botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in +a flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding. +Later students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_ +extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once +seen, throw back the Linnaean system into company with the Ptolemaic +Astronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible. +That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason. + +To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity, +diverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and +faculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an +_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all +objects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide +thereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of +principles, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated +_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies, +declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding, +and it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed +to inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved. + +The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the +logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective; +what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and, +finally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that +stated. + +1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially +defective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the +highest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us +examine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of +thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a +conclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts +of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone +have long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so +have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the +temperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in +the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has +to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at +one period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes, +were warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and +the judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact +here brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger +experience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to +fall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the +air, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit. +Other like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it +is found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our +planet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the +distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is +the highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a +subsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all +the facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was +once here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so +distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even, +of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called +gravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only +accept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions +of to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right. +The Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable +changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for +new studies. + +From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself, +crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" when suddenly, as +if frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly "The truth! +the truth! I see the eternal truth." + +The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is +both defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to +perceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most +men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false, +in that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain +perceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental +faculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a +part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both +generalizes and intuits. + +It is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind +nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it +unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is, +that these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching +examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance. +The mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. "Not so," +says the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but +it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two +must make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it +so, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much +about it as he does." In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be +said,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly +mendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are +four, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL +_intellect_." Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often +unconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In +society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of +the body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle; +which, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole +fabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it +could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be +left,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, "All this +seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be +sure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration +that, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and +Infinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and +conditioned thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect +unreservedly asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance +is true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see +it so." + +Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which +the human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been +adduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and +necessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus +pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is +required to state: + +2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein. + +In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of +the mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as +universal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir +William Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the +_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present +undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be +secured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples +under each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place +here, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without +question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest +and every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of +Williams College, Mass. + +"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into, +first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the +abstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second +division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon +these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations. +The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at +the foundation of aesthetical science. In the fourth division are those +which pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is +the sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in +connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and +with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that."--_Moral +Science_, p. 161. + +First.--Mathematical ideas and axioms. + +Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a +Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_; +that a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven +now make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to +make forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or +again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are +equal to one another." Will some one say, that the intellectual beings +in the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as +to affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same +thing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a +triangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties +are a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might +have been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the +syllogism. Was its law constructed? + + All M is X; + All Z is M; + All Z is X. + +Will any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so +made, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or +will the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an +assertion, "All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it +could be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined +in such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to +assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider +scope? Perhaps they see things differently." _Perhaps_ they do; but if +they do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_, +nothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and +_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are +absolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of +_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man. +Feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its +affirmation, "Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by +any possibility of effort make any other product_;" and every intellect, +_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue. +From this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is +_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's +knowledge. + +Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its +relations. + +Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the +Universe without standing in some relation to all the other material +bodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not. +If it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents +itself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see +more relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must +be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse, +or any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A +material body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to +some of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will +hesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it +could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of +thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind. + +Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring, +in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class +they belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation +for themselves; and, "after their kind," they are under bonds to their +young. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon +them. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater, +and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle, +or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling +lion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be +the races of man who are examined, the relations established by +parentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this +might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a +judgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first, +but was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no +necessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might, +for aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage +which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the +ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient +being? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the +Limitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued +respecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is +evident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that +they accord with an a priori principle in the mind_. + +Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of +beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive +an illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established +for our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is +said that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian +era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and +constructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at +the time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story +true, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the +mind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a +perfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very +fact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own +ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an +ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a +perfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a +perfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect +ideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is +true, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence +this instinctive affirmation springs, is true. + +Take another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have +failed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base, +is too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly +affirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden +mean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of +this proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with +tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and +promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that +can differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has +not been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive +affirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than +the fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw +the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing +that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell. + +Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these +assertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of +probabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men, +however positive in their temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain +to-morrow," but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here +the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the +extreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not +true, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in +highest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro, +except the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of +their admirers. + +Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion. + +We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility +ever guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate; +there is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are +impertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and +obligations. An understanding cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because +such a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has +no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other +classes, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in +this. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it +imposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All +these, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the +Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe +is one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of +judgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no +conclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an +affirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that +the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a +free moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it +was optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will +any one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it +was optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or +not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent +therein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that +the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to +God's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot +hesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his +obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable. + +Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet +man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words +"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and +thy neighbor as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought, +deny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the +Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees +the law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his +rebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if +there were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No +power can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a +Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority; +it imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori +law of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as +well as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct +intuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a +necessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he +acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for +Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary +acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival. + +It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any +cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class. +This is because the Sense can gather no material over which the +Understanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the +Sense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced +from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied + +_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the +Universe. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such +conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of +Society, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he +appears to the Sense. + +_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there? +_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and +Understanding return no shadow of answer. + +But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas +and beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are +absolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are +conditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just +what the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that +the truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both. + +Although the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by +the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it +has been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great +wight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_ +terms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in +asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and +Understanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere +presence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive +evidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains +positive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in +this matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that +these words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite and +absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction +of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized; +consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative +of the conceivable itself." But, if this is true, how came these words +in the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions. +Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another +case in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a +_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall +recur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense +can be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a +positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We +find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such +positive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth +sense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why +is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in +metaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are +simple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may +rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in +mathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of +aesthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to +morals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental +affirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as +necessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that +there must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and +Understanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be +ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in +language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most +valuable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty +which qualifies all the products of its activity with the +characteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may +therefore be deemed established. + +The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to +show the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing +the _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not +thoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is +evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in, +and by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be +compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be +ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and +necessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the +following circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and +must be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in +such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate +the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to +be both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral +elements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in +that it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The +mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct, +immediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very +centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing +pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it +may be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to +the Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and +intuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of +expression regarding these departments of the mind. + +Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of +a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to +declare the function of that faculty. + +The function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate +perception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all +being; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those +principles, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the +conditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by +another immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others, +the fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a +priori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into +a perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God. + +To illustrate. + +1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and that it is +_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will, +can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is +criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man. + +2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space +and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former +case. + +3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_ +argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however, +be so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the +existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the +existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no +more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine +degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned. +Answer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points. + +1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which +means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his +own control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_ +elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all. + +2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has +entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_. +Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but +the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and +infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very +opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead +of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in +_kind_ from God as do his conditions. + +Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to +solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers; +and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand. + +Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended +every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the +definitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by +implication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved; +and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term. + +By way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the +Limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the +Pure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent +to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and +the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the +sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error +are sufficient to illustrate the criticism. + +1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For +instance, "_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name +for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." +"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally +self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."--_Limits of Religious +Thought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will +you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would +reply--No! no possible answer can be given by man. + +Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can +represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the +use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere +fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite +and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract +Infinite. + +2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in +their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity. +Take a few examples from many. + +"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, +that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative +part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so +small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible +into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, +or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and +imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by +the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself +require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same +reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of +parts."--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20. + +"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite, +must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged, +amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."--_Limits of +Religious Thought_, p. 76. + +"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause +as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited, +necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is +absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving +a region surrounding its boundaries."--_Spencer's First Principles_, p. +37. + +The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the +north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person +reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these: +"infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series," +by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material +amount. + +Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and +absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or +of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number. +There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and +limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as +to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words +without knowledge." + +Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in +any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but +only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following +extract:-- + +"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be +conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it +cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; +it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by +the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the +Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the +Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike +incomprehensible."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79. + +The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of +such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on +that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that +such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is +a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of +thought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of +operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable +Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a +Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where +is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries, +we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to +be obtained. + +By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in, +and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms +the Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final +Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and +sustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions +from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found +either within the Universe, or without the Universe. + +Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions +must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence +of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the +first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the +very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than +a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point, +would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie +not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject +Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a +class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have +attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All +that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by +observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast +system of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws +conclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With +reference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A +watch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to +each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being +asked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself +wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the +hands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within +itself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world +laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among +the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the +reason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would +exclaim,--"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only +intelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made +the watch." And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a +bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The Universe is an evidence of +intelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the +Universe." And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last +position; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy. + +THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE +FOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE. + +From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching +the goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing +a fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims, +"The watch is an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is +necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the +one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think +of matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These +two, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not +only cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no +other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What +mind? + +By examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the +Universe, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion +to be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself, +he finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his +faculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper +scrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most +secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent +in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature; +but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is +only a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for +a time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the +Spirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central +self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he +instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and +diamonds;" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not +only of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in +Nature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme? + +Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible +existence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in +man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further +been determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme +Spirit. + +Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most +egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to +do this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is +presented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this +animal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally +acknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and +the Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe +then their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they +reject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they +confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the +existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual +person--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly +would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose. + +The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention. + +_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT. + +To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his +spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have +further found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing +this investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would +complete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no +eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can +never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed. +Through Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone, +can we gaze on the Immutable. + +Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as +spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a +priori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for +activity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to +the call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells +central, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny. +Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause. + +The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very +likeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow +forth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he +is dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to +his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly +independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without +himself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit +some first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who +necessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in +all possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man +stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but +more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds +written on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is +perfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a +priori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent +for existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek +will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and +who sets his own bounds to his activity. + +That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that +the result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded, +receives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives +that malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A +similar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws. +Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill +of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows, +calmly and forever, through the bosom of the "Everlasting Father." For +his own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the +likeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible +form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore, +Philosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful +unanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, "GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN +IMAGE." + +We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of +our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith +Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." THAT +SPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE +ULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE. + +The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of +the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of +Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries. + +It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must +be, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying +abstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the +Universe. But what their true significance is, stands out with +unmistakable clearness and precision. + +1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the +necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself, +and as complete_. + +2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and +the other the negative term expressive of the same idea. + +3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary +Being which gives to Him universality_. + +Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the +self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons, +constitute Him unique and supreme. + +It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that +whenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set +forth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that +is logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both +acknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical +development of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is +capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found +therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain, +and important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will +be noted. + +In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being +and continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its +Cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected +beings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly +independent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other +absolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person, +and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong; +while the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute, +and infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and +infinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are +incommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings; +and which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all +possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations +and conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited, +conditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations, +conditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness +and infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the +Universe. + +The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure +self-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his +own being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and +exhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect, +sensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable +limitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and +will; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure +Delight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act, +Omnipotence. + +1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius. + +Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is +possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" or, in other +words, "The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason +conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must +be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth." +These _a priori_ "pure ideals" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They +are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as +they are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with +them. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and +definite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In +fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact, +that the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of +activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to +him; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself +to be so. + +2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight. + +Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by +the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his +entire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and +displeased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And +if two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than +the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his +own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness. + +3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in +act, Omnipotence. + +_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self +activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction. +Some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be +very small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his +place in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which +spontaneously prompts to all good acts. But + +_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be, +limited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the "pure +ideals," in which "must be found the rules after which the creative +agency must go forth." In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact +that he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act +which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a +rational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should +attempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite +Person performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and +definite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an +unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words +unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are +contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even +if possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the +construction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of +an infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of +himself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being +the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only +possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But, +should it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power +would be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No +other infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable. + +The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and +definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of +its Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its +boundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the +outline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The +questions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are +pertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and +definite. + +The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of +thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and +self-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily +involves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of +this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are +conditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an +inability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists, +our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the +completion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground +upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly +consistent. + +In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and +unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that +they apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of +course, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or +that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act +is conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated +to puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental, +and all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the +minds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever +all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The +truth is this. + +That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly +subjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and +who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations, +conditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses, +therefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds +the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the +consciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all +other possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated, +unconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by +Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in +kind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical +things. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their +possessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render +it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency. + +The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth +we have attained. + +_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish +the fulness of the possessor's endowments._ + +An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some +reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. "What we need +is not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment +of any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine +the end itself"... + +Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and +control the pure spontaneity in its action. + + * * * * * + +"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify, +with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional +craving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own +behest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the +round worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly +as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient +beings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the +Supreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we +are altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment +by what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the +highest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal +rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and +precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes +to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner. +Here is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds +himself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving +of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of +this craving is _the highest good_." + +We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the +undiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary +result of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is +the distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments +which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark +of the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and +absoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon +this plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok +speaks further, as follows:-- + +"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for +benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his +beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature +craving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which, +as kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others, +itself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic +autonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which +obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything +very analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some +generalized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law +in the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there +be found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and +self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above +want; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things, +but not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic +excellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire +artistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or +accusing. + +"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the +ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing +higher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby +in all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective +archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is +befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which +must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which +should be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created +all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'" + +In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division +of conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper, +comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom +they lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class, +comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the +being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect +plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is +seen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the +very construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this +distinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of +the operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what +the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not +only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no +possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the +mind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature, +_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those +conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and +spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined +critically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the +same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions +inhere. + +The actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense, +possessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in +_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely +conditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The +relation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory, +and the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are +fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms, +it is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving +impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can +never be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what +is received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have +no possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the +testimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should +be found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it +is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light +was. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This +position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the +failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense. +Every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the +effort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a +patchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new +sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must +transcend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the +Understanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits. +It can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces +it from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to +those in its associate faculty. + +It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may +construct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange, +classify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in +nature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law +can be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such +classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the +flower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as +good as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which, +overlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature, +which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a +science which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further, +that those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie +upon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with +the Limitists. + +It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was +proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so +comprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign +to said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of +nature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions +of, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the +conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an +entirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the +Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense, +under the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread +like a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and +appreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it +full in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other +land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all +their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never +approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural +conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere +and cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and +fulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person. + +It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the +doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par +with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The +objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness +in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the +finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius; +the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same +light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and +the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the +circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite +Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason +is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the +finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ +in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with +nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of +growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to +a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure +spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a +spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore +independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of +all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite +and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore +_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance, +must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight +just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral +government is _possible_. + +In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the +two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more +clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how +the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised. +In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication +of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the +terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of +restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack +or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in +expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his +activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable +limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may +freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one; +but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of +his Self he _will not_, violate. + +That point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion +in hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an +examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has +been attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a +radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by +the Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially +defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to +certain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas +were named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was +established. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated; +and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by +this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final +cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was +then seen that + + That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and + infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the + Universe. + +Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a +position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the +result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the +general principles and their special applications which the Limitists +maintain, and this will occupy our future pages. + + + + +PART II. + +AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF +CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES UNDER IT. + + +It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final +basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul, +and afford it a sure rest. In the fact that God made man in his own +image, and that thus there is, _to a certain extent_, a community of +faculties, a community of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a +community of interests, have we found such a basis. We have hereby +learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final; in other +words, that he can know the truth, and be sure that his knowledge is +correct. If the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the Pure +Reason, and the statements which have been made of the mode of its +activity and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of the +Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have been +satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider the +analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental proposition, which was +promised on an early page. We there gave, it was thought, sufficiently +full extracts for a fair presentation of his theory, and followed them +with a candid epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the +purpose named, we are constrained at the outset to make an +acknowledgment. + +It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in silence the +masterly article on this subject in the "North American Review" for +October, 1864, and after it to pretend to offer anything new. Whatever +the author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop,--and his +work was far less able than what is there given,--that article has left +nothing to be said. He has therefore been tempted to one of two courses: +either to transfer it to these pages, or pass by the subject entirely. +Either course may, perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which +is, while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few short +extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in this, which is, +that some persons may see this volume, who have no access to the Review, +and to whom, therefore, these pages will be valuable. To save needless +repetition, this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned +back and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to. + +Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, one is met +by a logical _faux pas_ which is truly amazing. Immediately after the +assertion that "the mind can know only the _limited and the +conditionally limited_," and in the very sentence in which he denies the +possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, _he proceeds to +define those words in definite and known terms_! The Infinite he defines +as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute as "the +unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say that the +defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, then! "The Infinite," an +unknown term, may be represented by _x_; and the unconditionally +unlimited, a compound unknown term, by _ab_. Now, who has the right to +say, either in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that +_x_=_ab_? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy of the +Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. Either the +terms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable, or they are +unknown terms and undefinable. Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and +definable. Which does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are +unknown; then all else that he has written about them are batches of +meaningless words. If he is held to the latter, they are definable; +then are they known, and his system is denied in the assertion of it. +Since his words are so contradictory, he must be judged by his deeds; +and in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the +infinite and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; for +there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis of his theory, +then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis. + +Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted, and +read the last sentence. Is his utterance a "principle," or is it a +judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a guess. The logician asserts that we +know only the conditioned, and yet bases his assertion upon "the +principles," &c. What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is +axiom, then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in +which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in saying, is just +what he did. He blindly assumed certain "fundamental laws of +thought,"--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence +of the mind to know those laws _as fundamental_. Again, if his +philosophy is valid, the words "must," "necessary," and the like are +entirely out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned +there is, can be, no must, no necessity. + +From these excursions about the principle let us now return to the +principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: There are two +extremes,--"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." These include all being. +They are contradictories, that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the +other. But the mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the +logical conclusion? _That the mind cannot conceive of anything._ What is +his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of something between the +infinite and the absolute, which is neither the one nor the other, but a +_tertium quid_--the conditioned. Where did this _tertium quid_ come +from, when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes? +If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, then +"excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter at all. + +To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated, Hamilton +erected the subterfuge of _mental imbecility_. To deny any knowledge to +man, was to expose himself to ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers +after him, drew a line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the +hither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in +the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions which +appeared in the mind, when one examined those questions which lie on the +further side of that line, resulted from the impotency of the mind to +comprehend the questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How +satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will show. But +strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are cognizable; and then +let us proceed with our reasoning. The essayist in the North American +presents the theory under four heads, as follows:-- + +"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory and +exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true. + +"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible. + +"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of each is referable +to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility. + +"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between +them." + +The first and fourth points require our especial attention. + +1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is _as defined_, that the +terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, turns upon the +definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous; but in order to +see wherein, the following general reflections may be made:-- + +The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, have two +distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and one to God. Such +definitions as are suitable to the latter application, and +self-consistent, have already been given. Though reluctant to admit into +a philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings, we shall +waive for a little our scruples,--though choosing, for ourselves, to +use the equivalent rather than the term. + +Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space and Time shall +not be contradictory to infinite Space and Time. Let us first observe +Hamilton's theory. According to it, Space, for instance, is either +unconditional illimitation, or it is unconditional limitation; in other +words, it is illimitable, or it is a limited whole. The first part of +the assertion is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a +self-evident truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject will see +not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, but that the +attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two +and two five. The last part is a psychological blunder, has no +pertinence to the question, and is not what Hamilton was groping for. He +was searching for the truth, that _there is no absolute unit in +Space_. A limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in +hand--absoluteness--at all. The illimitability of Space, which has just +been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, then, is the +opposite pole of thought? We have just declared it. There is no absolute +unit of Space; or, in other words, all division is in Space, but Space +is indivisible. This, also, is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain, +then, two poles of thought, and definitions of the two terms given, +which are exhaustive and consistent. + + "Space is illimitable. + Space is indivisible." + +The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness of +Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is _in_ Space, and all +division is _in_ Space; but Space is neither limited or divided. One of +the logician's extremes is seen, then, to have no foundation in fact; +and that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with, +nay, essential to, what should have been the other. + +Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find +out God through the forms of Space and Time, a repetition will not be +needed here. God is only to be sought for, found, and studied, by such +methods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the +attempts of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal +difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are simply +absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time are to be discussed by +themselves. And the questions respecting God are to be discussed by +themselves. He who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less +absurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the +multiplication table. + +In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that there is just +a modicum of truth underlying his theory,--just enough to give it a +degree of plausibility. The Sense, as faculty for the perception of +physical objects, or their images, and the Understanding as discursive +faculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials +gathered by the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one +he stated. The Sense was made _incapable_ of perceiving an ultimate atom +or of comprehending the universe. From the fact that the Sense never has +perceived these objects, the Understanding concludes that it never will. +Only by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure +Reason, do we come to know that it never _can_. It was because those +lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space and Time, +and are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions, +and because, in considering them, he failed to see the other mental +powers, that Sir William Hamilton constructed his Philosophy of the +Unconditioned. + +2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible. + +Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies strictly to the +work of the Understanding; and that faculty can never have any notion of +the Infinite or Absolute. But, assuming that "conceive" is a general +term for cognize, the conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If +all being is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can +be known. + +3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. If man can know +nothing because of mental imbecility, why suppose that he has a mental +faculty at all? Why not enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's +theory, the assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically +consistent. The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He must confess +that men know something. By a false psychology he had ruled the Reason +out of the mind, and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any +notion of absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust +themselves before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he constructed +a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent if he had said, There +is no absolute and infinite. The conditioned is the whole of existence; +and this the mind knows. + +"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between +them." + +What the essayist in the North American says upon this point is so apt, +and so accords with our own previous reflections, that we will not +forbear making an extract. "The last of the four theses will best be +re-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned +is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each +other, neither of which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on +the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be +admitted as necessary_.' This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To +mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two +contradictions with a mean between them, requires a hardihood +unparalleled in the history of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two +contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a +cogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either +extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is +wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if the mean +exists, that may be true, and both the contradictories false. But if a +mean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd, +(and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,) +Hamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes." + +Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, is found to be +but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, further criticism would +appear to be unnecessary. + +Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William Hamilton's +psychological error,--the rejection of the Reason as the intellectual +faculty of the spiritual person,--and having, with him, used the terms +limit, condition, and the like, in such significations as are pertinent +to the Sense and Understanding only, the Limitists proceed to present in +a paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning "the +Infinite." They take the ground that, to our view, he can be neither +person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of these implies +limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him, +except as such. Then having, as they think, completely confused the +mind, they draw hence new support for their conclusion, that we can +attain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following +extracts selected from many will show this. + +"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in +whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction +between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of +something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by +being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is +necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from +another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not, +or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious +that the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by +the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence +would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence +of an attribute which the Finite has not; for as no finite part can be a +constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must +itself be infinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common +with the finite.... + +"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition +which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself. +Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination +of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the +Infinite, if it is conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially +everything, and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general +which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything +in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being +any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually +everything, and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is +likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it +is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a +higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no +characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything +else, and discerned as an object of consciousness.... + +"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to +attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which +we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the perception of +one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others. To +he always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be +conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no +conception of what consciousness is."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, +pp. 93-95. + +"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the +conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of +positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is +to _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the +possibility of thought.... + +"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible +under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought; known only in +correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of +this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or +matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of +the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the +consequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy, if viewed as more than +a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the +particular, we admit that we can never, in out highest generalizations, +rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, +can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of +an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as +beyond the reach of philosophy." + +"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially +agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only +that a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for +man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a +knowledge even in the Deity himself, without contradicting our human +conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself."--_Sir William +Hamilton's Essays_, pp. 21, 22, 38. + +"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God--Benevolence, +Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example--can be conceived by us only as +existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not +identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them +all; in one word, a _Person_. But Personality, as we conceive it, is +essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality is presented +to us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all +our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is +presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various +modes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought +without a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of +thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the +thinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the various +modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation +likewise...."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 102. + +"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the +absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating, +more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in +which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite and +Personal conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest +of all existence of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness alone +that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any +service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can +stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form +such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual +wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual +curiosity."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 104. + +The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows:-- + +"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive +of each other as equally possible; _but only as unable to understand_ as +possible two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their +mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a +wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our +inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with +a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere +of all comprehensive reality."--_Sir William Hamilton's Essays_, p. 22. + +"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the +Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side we view it, appears +encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing +such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; +and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a +contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in +conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as +personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. +It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without +equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived +as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only +of that sum."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, pp. 84, 85. + +We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists should speak +for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not simply in these passages, +but throughout their writings, may be briefly summed up as follows. + +The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest +subjects which come before it, and which it is goaded to examine, finds +itself in an inextricable maze of contradictions; and, after vainly +struggling for a while to get out, becomes nonplussed, confused, +confounded, dazed; and, falling down helpless and effortless in the +maze, and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds +that the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the +light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark, +and therefore _blind_ faith. + +But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of the errors +of the Limitists, that a perception and confession of mental impotence +is _not_ the logical deduction from their premises. Lustrous as may be +their names in logic,--and Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the +logical firmament,--no one of them ever saw, or else dared to +acknowledge, the logical sequence from their principles. They have +climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their verge; and +there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like naked men on Alpine +precipices, with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the +Eternal Truth; and not daring to take the awful plunge before them. +Behold the gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:-- + +"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty +to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile +these two representations with each other, as our conception of +personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion +of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists +anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any +impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction, +in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary +consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend +the boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits +to man's power of thought; and it proves no more."--_Limits of Religious +Thought_, p. 106. + +Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable English. "It +is our duty to think of God as personal," when to think of Him as +personal is to think a lie; "to believe that He is infinite," when so to +believe is to believe the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie +is to incur the penalty decreed by the Bible--God's book--upon all who +believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of a professed +Christian minister in one of the first Universities in the world. Not +that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. By no means. But it logically +follows from his premises. In his philosophy the mind instinctively, +necessarily, and with equal authority in each case, asserts + +That there must be an infinite Being; + +That that Being must be Self-conscious, + +Must be unlimited; and that + +Consciousness is a limitation. + +These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What follows +then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows that the mind is a +deceiver! We learn again the lesson we have learned before. It is not +weakness, it is falsehood: it is not want of capacity, it is want of +integrity that is proved by this contradiction. Man is worse than a +hopeless, mental imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat. + +But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its might the mind +revolts from it, as nature does from a vacuum? True that the human mind +is an incorrigible falsifier? With the indignation of outraged honesty, +man's soul rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own +integrity and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate +or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have within myself +the ultimate standard of truth." + +It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. The +ground of all their difficulties is simple and plain. While denying to +the human mind the faculty of the Pure Reason, they have, _by the (to +them) undistinguished use of that faculty_, raised questions which the +Understanding by no possibility could raise, which the Reason alone is +capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone can solve; and have +attempted to solve them solely by the assistance, and in the forms of, +the Sense and the Understanding. Their problems belong to a spiritual +person; and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an +animal nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. All their +processes are developed on the vicious assumption, that the highest form +of knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the +Understanding, upon facts given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which +is always one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be a +peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among a million. The +meagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine, to account for all +the phenomena of the human mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall +therefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their +fundamental error. + +As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine +of the Limitists, that the Understanding is man's highest faculty of +knowledge, and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of +thought and consciousness vitiate their whole system. One of their most +important errors is thus expressed:--"To be conscious, we must be +conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that +which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." "Thought +cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the +antithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation, +and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that +we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a +knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of +the modified, of the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible +form of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish its +qualities among themselves, and discriminate between them and the +qualities of the apple. And Sir William Hamilton fairly and truly +acknowledges that, as a consequence, science, except as a system of +objects of sense, is impossible. + +The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, that the +diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous. +Their dictum, that all knowledge must be attained through "relation, +plurality, and difference," is not true. There is a kind of knowledge +which we obtain by a direct and immediate _sight_; and that, too, under +such conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought. For +instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, "Malice is +criminal." It also affirms that this is an eternal, immutable, universal +law, conditional for all possibility of moral beings. This direct and +immediate sight, and the consciousness attending it, are _full_ of that +one object, and so are occupied only with it; and it does NOT come under +any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is it with all _a +priori_ laws. The mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct +opposite of that of the Understanding and the Sense. + +Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance +cannot be overstated. It is one which involves the very possibility of +God's existence as a self-conscious person. To present it, we recur +again to the extracts made just above from Sir William Hamilton. +"Consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and +object of thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each +other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment as logically following +from this: "that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such +knowledge," _i. e._ of the absolute, "even in the Deity himself." That +is, God can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the +human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this assertion of +the logician--a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, but which has, +perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be +concisely stated thus. In every correlation of subject and object,--in +every instance where they are to be contrasted,--the subject must be +one, and the object must be _another and different_. Hamilton, in +another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into yourselves, +and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble +consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one +perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first; in +this consists self-knowledge," &c. Mark the "several terms," and that +the one can only see the other, never itself. + +This position is both a logical and psychological error. It is a logical +error because it _assumes_, without argument, that there is involved in +the terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and +contradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself. This +assumption is groundless. As a matter of fact, it is _generally_ true +that, so far as man is concerned, the subject is one, and the object +another and different. But this by no means proves that it is _always_ +so; it only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And when +one comes to examine the question in itself, there is absolutely no +logical ground for the assumption. It is found to be a question upon +which no decision from logical considerations can have any validity, +because _it is purely psychological_, and can only be decided by +evidence upon a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological +error, because a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the +opposite is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject and +object are identical. + +This fact that the subject and object are often identical in the +searching eye of human reason, and _always_ so under the eye of +Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be +passed with a mere allusion. It seems amazing that a truth which, the +instant it is stated, solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy +has raised, should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great +spiritual-eyed thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only +to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal +reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came to see this truth +during a process of thought, having for its object the solution of the +problem, How can the infinite Person be self-comprehending, and still +infinite? While considering this, and without ever having received a +hint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned +on a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a heaven +full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably profounder +question: How can any soul, not God only, but any soul, be a +self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain and explain this? It +was only years after that he met the negative statement in Herbert +Spencer's book. The difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented +to their minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous +image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, have concluded +that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always dangerous to argue from +an illustration; and, in this instance, it has been fatal. If man was +only an animal nature, and so only a _receiver_ of impressions, with a +capacity to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of +the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is also a +spiritual _person_, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate +intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. The Reason is not +receptivity merely, or mainly; it is originator. In its own light it +gives to itself _a priori_ truth, and itself as seeing that truth; and +so the subject and object are identical. This is one of the +differentiating qualities of the spiritual person. + +Our position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated +and sustained as follows: + +_Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in the +self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the subject +and object are_ IDENTICAL. + +1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject and object are +identical. The question is a question of fact. In illustrating the fact, +it will be proved. When a man looks at his hands, he sees they are +instruments for _his_ use. When he considers his physical sense, he +still perceives it to be instrument for _his_ use. In all his +conclusions, judgments, he still finds, not himself, but _his_ +instrument. Even in the Pure Reason he finds only _his_ faculty; though +it be the highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches +for the _I am_; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties and +capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar to American +Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, which leads us directly to +the goal we seek. It is the phrase, "self-examination." In all thorough, +religious self-examination the subject and object are identical. In the +ordinary labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or +that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. But +in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion is not, "I can do this +or that." It is, "I am this or that." The person stands unveiled before +itself, in the awful sanctuary of God's presence. The decision to be +made is not upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end +for which all labor shall be performed. The character of the person is +under consideration, and is to be determined. The selfhood, with all its +wondrous mysteries, is at once subject and object. The I am in man, +alike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of +"the everlasting Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn +duty. How shall the finite I am accord _itself_ to the pure purpose of +the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that some persons have never +been conscious of this experience. To some, from a natural inaptitude, +and to others, from a perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some +have so little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are +never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, but they +never know it. Their impressions ever come from without. Another class +of persons shun such an experience as Balshazzar would have shunned, if +he could, the handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in +the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with sensuous +gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of +self-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread; and they +shudder, turn away, and by every effort avoid it. Sometimes they +succeed; and through the gates of death rush headlong into the +spirit-land, only to be tortured forever there with the experience they +so successfully eluded here. For the many thousands, who know by +experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination is, now that +their attention has been drawn to its full psychological import, no +further word is necessary. They know that in that supreme insight there +was seen and known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and +simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as one, as +identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, that the wonder is +that it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in +philosophy. + +2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, spiritual +Person, the subject and object are identical. This question, though one +of fact, cannot be determined _by us_, by our experience; it must be +shown to follow logically from certain _a priori_ first principles. This +may be done as follows. Eternity, independence, universality, are +qualities of God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent, +he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom he is necessarily +related. Being universal, he possesses all possible endowment, and is +ground for all possible existence; so that no being can exist but by his +will. As Universal Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or +intellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this +is a _permanent state_. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending all +others; and therefore he _exhaustively_ knows himself. He distinguishes +his Self as object, from no what else, because there is no else to +distinguish his Self from; but having an exhaustive self-comprehension, +he distinguishes within that Self all possible forms of being each from +each. + +He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is nothing to learn +and nothing to change to, except to a wicked state; and for this there +_can be to him no temptation_. He is ever the same, and hence there can +be no instant in time when he does not _exhaustively_ know himself. Thus +always in him are the subject and object identical. + +These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason sees _a priori_ +truth _immediately_, and out of all relation, plurality and difference, +and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, the subject and object +are identical, by their simple statement explode, as a Pythagorean +system, the mental astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and +the Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the +circumvolving planets. + +The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as their processes +of thought, and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error. We +will note one in the following sentence. "Consciousness, in the only +form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the +perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object +with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, it is usable only +with regard to things in Nature, and can have no relevancy to such +subjects as are now under consideration. It is a word which expresses +_only_ such operations as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The +following definition explains this: "The concept refers to all the +things whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives +(con-cepis), or _grasps together_ into one class and one act of +mind."--_Bowen's Logic_, p. 7. This is not the mode of the Reason's +action at all. It does not run over a variety of objects and select out +from them the points of similarity, and grasp these together into one +act of mind. It sees one object in its unity as pure law, or first +truth; and examines that in its own light. Hence, the proper word is, +_intuits_. Seen from this standpoint, consciousness does _not_ imply +limitation and change. A first truth we always see as _absolute_,--we +are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither consciousness +nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. We would paraphrase the +sentence thus: Consciousness, in the highest form in which we know it, +implies and possesses _permanence_; and is the light in which pure truth +is seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same. + +It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the Pure Reason run +along side by side in the same sentence; the inferior faculty +encumbering and defeating the efforts of the other. Take the following +for example. + +"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very +possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher +perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic +feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and +discerned as an object of consciousness." The presence in language of +the word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence +of a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation. +This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for consideration, +the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den, and +says, "can be that which it is not." This she says, because she cannot +act, except to conceive, and cannot conceive, except to distinguish +this from something else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance +of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The Understanding +conceives the finite as one and independent, and the infinite as one and +independent. Then the Reason steps in, and says the infinite is +all-comprehending. This conflicts with the Understanding's _conception_, +and so the puzzle comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's +affirmation is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is +actually everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in its blind, +impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic feature by which +it can be distinguished from anything else." _There is nothing else from +which to distinguish it._ The perception of the Reason is as follows. +The infinite Person comprehends intellectually, and is ground for +potentially and actually, all that is possible and real; and so there +can be no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all +fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature of +completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, which is all there +is, (if no-thing--void--can be said to _be_,) beside him; and from any +part, which there is within him. Thus is he object to himself in his own +consciousness. + +This vicious working of the Understanding against the Reason, in the +same sentences, can be more fully illustrated from the following +extracts. "God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence +to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either _from the better +to the worse, or from the worse to the better_. A third possibility that +both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted +by our author, it is not necessary to consider."--_Sir William +Hamilton's Essays_, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be conceived as +coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it +must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to +conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for +that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that +conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but if we +think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at +one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it +as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the +progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very +thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems +forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the +condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is +conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the +Creator."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 81. + +"God," a word which has _no significance_ except to the Reason: "as +necessarily determined,"--a phrase which belongs only to the +Understanding. The opposite is the truth: "to pass from absolute +essence." This can have no meaning except to the Pure Reason: "to +relative manifestation." This belongs to the Understanding. It +contradicts the other; and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the +attempt to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing +from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The words imply that +God, in passing from the state of absolute essence, ceased to be +absolute essence, and became "relative manifestation." All this is +absurd; and is in the Understanding and Sense. God never _became_. The +Creator is still absolute essence, as before creation; and the +logician's this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not +a contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be thus stated. +The infinite Person, freely according his will to the behest of his +worth, and yet equally free to not so accord his will, put forth from +himself the creative energy; and this under such modes, that he neither +lost nor gained by the act; but that, though the latter state was +diverse from the first, still neither was better than the other, but +both were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute plenitude +of endowments. All possible ideals were present before his eye. All +possible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility. His will, +as choice, was absolute benevolence; and, as act, was competent to all +possible effort. To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing +to, and subtracted nothing from, his fulness. + +The fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure +spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration +of the superior. A change in a pure spirit, which neither adds nor +subtracts, leaves the good unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person +created, he passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to +better; but the two states, though diverse, were equally good. + +We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can the relative," etc. +"If the Relative is a distinct reality from the absolute," then each is +_self-existent_, and independent. The sentence annihilates itself. "It +must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence." The +image here is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is, +that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, existence +come, without there being any cause for that existence coming. This +would be the phenomenon to the Sense. And the Sense is utterly unable to +account for the phenomenon. The object in the Sense must appear as +_form_; but in the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well +be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands before his +audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms of his hands to the +spectators, apparently empty. He then closes his right hand, and then +opening it again, appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers, which +he hands about to the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from +nothing, _i. e._ to have no cause. It appears "to pass from +non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the cheating +seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause for the coming of the +bunch of flowers, though we cannot see it." Precisely similar is +creation. Could there have been a Sense present at that instant, +creation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing +something would have seemed to come. But under the correcting guide of +the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before creation, the +infinite Person did not manifest himself; and so was actually alone. At +creation his power, which before was immanent, he now made emanent; and +put it forth in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the +requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. That which was +ideal he now made actual. The form as Idea was one, the power as +Potentiality was another, and each was in him by itself. He put forth +the power into the form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the +Universe was. Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the +same manner it might be shown how, all along through the writings of the +Limitists, the Understanding runs along by the Reason, and vitiates her +efforts to solve her problems. We shall have occasion to do something of +this farther on. + +The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an +examination of the celebrated dictum, "To think is to condition." Those +who have held this to be universally true, have also received its +logical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear +self-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not +a universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to +circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon +this labor by answering the question, What is thinking? + +First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking. +Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this +head we notice two points. _a._ That act of the Understanding in which +an object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and +generic elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations +determined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I +distinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is +carnivorous. _b._ That act of the finite spiritual person by which he +compares the judgments of the Understanding with the _a priori_ laws of +the Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or +error. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought +to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The +standard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found +to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of +the reason. These, in the finite person, come _after_ a process of +reflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in +another faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such, +that by no process of reflection _alone_ could they be. Thinking, in the +Universal Genius, is the _sight_, at once and forever, of all possible +object of mental effort. It is necessary and _spontaneous_, and so is an +endowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are +prepared now to entertain the following statements:-- + +A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, _i. e._ causative +ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of +the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The +condition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be, +must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's +self, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for _all_ +conditions. Yet men think of an object _in its conditions_. This is +because the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions, +constructed also man as thinker, _correlated to those conditions_, so +that he should think upon things _as they are_. In this view, to think +is not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already +imposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking, +as above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in _a_, +of the second general definition. It follows, therefore, + +B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere +of conditions proper,--observing the distinction of conditions into two +classes heretofore made,--the finite intellect must act under them, and +see those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,--as, for instance, +a geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,--so far it is true, +and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under +all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as +seeing. But when men intuit the _a priori_ truth, Malice is criminal, +they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute +and universal. We perceive, then, + +C. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and +ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not +true. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term; +yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they +are not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the +principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that +necessarily. + +Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant, +not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions, +but that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the +object thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,--the following +statements will define the province of this dictum. + +1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the +discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it. + +2. Created spiritual persons, _as constituted beings,_ also lie wholly +within it. _But it extends no farther._ On the other hand, + +3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws, +and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly +without it. + +4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms +inhere. Or, in general terms, + +When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the +thinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that, +To think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is +such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be +conditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose +objects are unconditioned. + +The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which Mr. Spencer opens +his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," introduces a subject common +to all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this +part of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in +the "North American Review" for October 1864, applies with equal force +here in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding +July number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded. +He has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and +difficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought +at least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the +Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do. + +In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are _a priori_ +conditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. "Pure +Space, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for +any possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is +given in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and +universal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological +order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience, +nor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all +experience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any +experience of outer object should be." "Pure Time, as given in the +intuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible +period, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily +continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."--_Rational +Psychology_, pp. 125, 128. + +Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as +conditions. Space is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being. +Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its +material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold +no communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he +could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation +to Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition +of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case +just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a +consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no +standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes, +and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time. +Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to time has no +significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the +internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The +inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length, +breadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, +may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may +be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any +outer or inner side."--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135. + +Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space has three +dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in +space,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid +room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can +enter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. Space +and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical," +illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be +defined as follows: + +"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter. + +"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence." + +Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and +illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come +into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a +final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all +periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are +without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the +subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows. + +The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that +Space and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best +consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two +general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time +have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind. +Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and +one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the +Universe. + +First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense. +"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and +void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor +period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure +diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and +periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure, +_a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense +as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no +figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an +external agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a +necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words, +the fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the +province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than +it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In +our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the +actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with +ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical +sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of +the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or +mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal +law of Space and Time must lie. + +Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form, +if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could +be. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time. +But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another +object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground +by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a +unity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space, +and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may +determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of +all space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their +space and time in an objective experience." The operation of the +Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular +spaces and times; _i. e._ the space and time of each phenomenon in the +Sense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all +phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not +only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all +phenomena must be seen in _one_ Space and Time. This connection of the +manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An +examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a +general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law +given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space, +and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law: + +_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under +the conditions of Space and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _Space +and Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty +in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This +will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However +that may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest +will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made +to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law +lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is +made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as +unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an +earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law +of Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a +house out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make +two and two five. + +Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the +Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the +questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the +fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It +was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as +pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure +become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the +condition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects +and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the +Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those +faculties. + +We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a +sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is +complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of +"immeasurable void"--Space--has been occupied. Where there was nothing, +something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our +having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the +Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, +all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the +Universe, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept +except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In +other words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept. +Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of +events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is +left. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of +vacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be +perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a +space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to +us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then, +that is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept, +therefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the +totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space. +Again; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One +event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is +a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events +proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the +procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the +events of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time. +Thus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration; +and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume +for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the +result. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is +conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because +matter, substance, "a space-filling force," is the underlying notional +upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly +illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism, +logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration +is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From +this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our +concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and +all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding +matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be +illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within +it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during +event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may +have duration in it. This brings us to the + +Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have +been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used +therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to +consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can +therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure +Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and +all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will +be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in +it are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will +its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon +which would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions +are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain. +When we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration, +there is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to +say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was +void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or, +void is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space +and Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event +may be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may +become. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the +Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being +for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental +activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics +exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of +thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to +what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must +be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is +an _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar +is the relation between Space and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and +object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its +characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and +Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and +event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a +priori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being +that God has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are +pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The +idea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be +assigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot +go. + +The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions +stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth, +and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised +is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to +this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have +failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall +be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it +certain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them, +and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, +however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most +blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those +pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth." + +The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is +that primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out +of all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby +having limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation +to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible +objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn +nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no +event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is +equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time, +just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future +examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever +conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a +subject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute +spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and +Space and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with +and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be +able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as +those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore +alluded to. + +"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in +impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to +Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such +timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought +necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion +that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this +result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept +of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join +in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But +a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by +anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite, +Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation +is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be +two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while +infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds +may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space; +when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space +and Time will limit the infinite God. _But not before._ Time exists +ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and +eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so +long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and +absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or +mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is +irreverent." + + + + +PART III. + +AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS +OF THE LIMITISTS. + +ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON. + + +It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended +examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice +it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the +refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated +essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has +generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof; +and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments +adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of +the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and +attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, +an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as +sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and +the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as +Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark +will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred +to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of +criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention +is now called. + +In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is +manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the +proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is +immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality, +and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism, +that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when +used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The +fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates +every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus +stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in +that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by +difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the +Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the +Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not +known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before +that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality, +because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated, +with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen +to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little +below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, +thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of +intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of +philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact +that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately +intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first +principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the +condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy. + +These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated +"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the +Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The +four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are +too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to +afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is +believed, the true opinion, which is as follows. + +The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is +known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all +this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the +spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to +be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and +plurality. + +"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force +except with regard to things in nature. + +Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an +_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But +equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive, +_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under +his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the +expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not +love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him. +If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to +the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true +that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which +the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our +whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is +possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we +ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him +and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of +affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; +and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable +mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does +such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer +sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a +conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made +the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It +is impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love +is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and +his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as +follows. + +_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common +with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to +which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him +negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._ + +That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir +William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the +Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination. +He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same +function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the +Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the +Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the +remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends +the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any +accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes +judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than +his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the +Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in +the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are +exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and +gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason +sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up +as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts +in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty +of a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue +is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether +"both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither +side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to +revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the +truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this +primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which +conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to +be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its +letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it +spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true +experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an +idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and, +by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in +consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one +principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the +many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was +seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All +religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of +agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men, +produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more +subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form, +is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How +shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first +human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable +objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then +there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant +people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the +rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by +their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple +agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one +of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said +they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact, +that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people, +either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the +least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point, +none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the +idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or +Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem +that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, +were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now +and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above, +respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come +directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its +form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual +takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of +nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not +peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the +illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions. +These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length, +showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are +accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is +cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by +an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and +therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following +distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, +only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what +may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and +experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is +made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir +William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely +mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the +actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind. +In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that, +whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that +the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is +impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective +reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important +"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, +unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a +fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends +all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant] +appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these +negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of +_Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the +Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they +hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative +answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly, +and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of +thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is +_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient +expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not +thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the +operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are +a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The +phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction, +we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of +the human race affirms this. + +The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who, +with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and +real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who +consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_, +as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively +bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that +Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes +both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we +suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The +above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute, +therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, +and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as +applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since +we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the +definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found +consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found +irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is +the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space +and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The +terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to +him, have entirely different significations from what they will when +applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in +this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former. +The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as +must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the +Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as +qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been +done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here. + +Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton +quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is +difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists +a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues +from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the +condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; +consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which +it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of +knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable, +it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or, +second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of +both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis, +on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_; +for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of +terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is +therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at +all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of +plurality and difference." + +In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author +is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician +presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, +if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign +plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of +Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them +those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The +error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely +psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed +out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the +Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about, +things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with +an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject +this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if +the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an +act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of +terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he +should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is +revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of +mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not +satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as +a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is +so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked +it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will +give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle +that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and +hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is +true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic +will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A +plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but +objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by +an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference, +and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense +and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the +Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are +_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions. +Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under +the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for +"mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple, +unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a +direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and +likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so +belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined +only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural. + +Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given +by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for +example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that +many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, +skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also, +that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as +well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One +color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover, +relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is +distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of +likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different +flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and +possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among +themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a +commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This +distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and +connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and +Understanding. + +2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws, +of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the +Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental +difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's +attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and +_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take +the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a +Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr +Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea." +This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the +author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be +distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it +cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If +known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous +insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason, +and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the +doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in +subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and +difference." + +Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states +certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is +nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should +have so presented them. Following the passage--which is here +quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions. + +"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be +conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a +knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by +preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final +causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without +operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be +founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking +refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his +works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve." + +1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a +plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A +faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot +determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can +have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence. +Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be +influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and +only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a +liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;" +and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as +possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the +Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment +both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and +qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is +thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to +answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The +infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, +and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of +personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint +in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a +multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which +enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring +accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure +the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put +in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides +that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is +_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not +person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then +this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his +dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is +efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He +is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him +to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under +chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain +the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity, +which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in +the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for +answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or +chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's +philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his +followers. + + + + +REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT." + + +This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid +and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is +manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety, +and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom +its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him +to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever +inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the +intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but +desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems +inscrutable. + +In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly +noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found +plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the +Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the +consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge. +The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the +mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word +and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies +them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak +of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of +"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon +the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process, +based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any +knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the +ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain +respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly +declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man +in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot +know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty, +man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a +moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must +know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will +do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is +_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees +it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And +such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an +agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of +society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be +assumed as granted. + +Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in +his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First +Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and +that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to +Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him, +not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute +Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these +last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause +expresses "an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primitive +understanding-conception." Hardly more satisfactory than his use of the +term Cause is his definition of the terms absolute and infinite. He +defines "the Absolute" to be "that which exists in and by itself, having +no necessary relation to any other Being," when it is rather the +exclusion of the possibility of any other Being. Again, he defines "the +Infinite" to be "that which is free from all possible limitation; that +than which a greater is inconceivable; and which, consequently, can +receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not +from all eternity." "That which" means the thing which, for which is +neuter. Mr. Mansel's infinite is, then, the _Thing_. This _Thing_ "is +free from all possible limitation." How can that be when the Being he +thus defines is, must be, necessarily existent, and so is bound by one +of the greatest of limitations, the inability to cease to be. But some +light may be thrown upon his use of the term "limitation" by the +subsequent portions of his definition. The Thing "which is free from all +possible limitation" is "that than which a greater is inconceivable." +Moreover, this greatest of all possible things possesses all possible +"attributes," and is in every possible "mode of existence" "from all +eternity." Respecting the phrase "than which a greater is +inconceivable," two suppositions may be made. Either there may be a +thing "greater" than, and diverse from, all other things; or there may +be a thing greater than, and including all, other things. Probably the +latter is Mr. Mansel's thought; but it is Materialistic Pantheism. This +Being must be in every "mode of existence" "from all eternity." +Personality is a "mode of existence"; therefore this Being must forever +have been in that mode. But impersonality is also a mode of existence, +therefore this Being must forever have been in that mode. Yet again +these two modes are contradictory and mutually exclusive; then this +Being must have been from all eternity in two contradictory and mutually +exclusive modes of existence! Is further remark necessary to show +that Mr. Mansel's definition is thoroughly vitiated by the +understanding-conception that infinity is amount, and is, therefore, +utterly worthless? Can there be a thing so great as to be without +limits? Has greatness anything to do with infinity? Manifestly not. It +becomes necessary, then, to recur to and amplify those definitions which +we have already given to the terms he uses. + +Absoluteness and infinity are qualities of the necessary Being. + +Absoluteness is that quality of the necessary Being by which he is +endowed with self-existence, self-dependence, and totality. Or in other +words, having this quality, he is wholly independent of any other being; +and also the possibility of the existence of any other independent Being +is excluded; and so he is the Complete, the Final, upon whom all +possible beings must depend. + +Infinity is that quality of the necessary Being which gives him +universality in the totality. It expresses the fact, that he possesses +all possible endowments in perfection. + +Possessing these qualities, that Being is free from any external +restraint or limitation; but those restraints and limitations, which his +very constituting elements themselves impose, are not removed by these +qualities. For instance, the possession of Love, Mercy, Justice, Wisdom, +Power, and the like, are essential to God's entirety; and the possession +of them in _perfect harmony_ is essential to his perfectness in the +entirety. This fact of perfect harmony, exact balance, bars him from the +_undue_ exercise of any one of his attributes; or, concisely, his +perfection restrains him from being imperfect. We revert, then, to the +fundamental distinction, attained heretofore, between improper +limitations, or those which are involved in perfection; and proper +limitations, or those which are involved in deficiency and dependence; +and applying it here, we see that those limitations, which we speak of +as belonging to God, are not indicative of a lack, but rather are +necessarily incidental to that possession of all possible perfection +which constitutes him the Ultimate. + +In this view infinity can have no relevancy to "number." It is not that +God has one, or one million endowments. It asks no question about the +number; and cares not for it. It is satisfied in the assertion that he +possesses _all that are possible_, and in perfect harmony. It is, +further, an idea, not a concept. It must be intuited, for it cannot be +"conceived." No analogy of "line" or "surface" has any pertinence; +because these are concepts, belonging wholly in the Understanding and +Sense, where no idea can come. Yet it may be, _is_, the quality of an +intelligence endowed with a limited number of attributes;--for there can +be no number without limitation, since the phrase unlimited number is a +contradiction of terms;--but this limitation involves no lack, because +there are no "others," which can be "thereby related to it, as cognate +or opposite modes of consciousness." Without doubt it is, in a certain +sense, true, that "the metaphysical representation of the Deity, as +absolute and infinite, must necessarily, as the profoundest +metaphysicians have acknowledged, amount to nothing less than the sum of +all reality." This sense is that all reality is by him, and for him, and +from him; and is utterly dependent upon him. But Hegel's conclusion by +no means follows, in which he says: "What kind of an Absolute Being is +that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil +included." This is founded upon the suppressed premiss, that such a +Being _must_ do what he does, and his creatures _must_ do what they do; +and so evil must come. This much only can be admitted, and this may be +admitted, without derogating aught from God's perfectness: viz., that he +sees in the ideals of his Reason _how_ his laws may be violated, and so, +how sin may and will be in this moral system; but it is a perversion of +words to say that this knowledge on the part of God is evil. + +The knowing how a moral agent may break the perfect law, is involved in +the knowing how such agent may keep that law. But the fact of the +knowledge does not involve any whit of consent to the act of violation. +On the other hand, it may, does, become the ground for the putting forth +of every wise effort to prevent that act. Again; evil is produced by +those persons whom God has made, who violate his moral laws. He being +perfectly wise and perfectly good, for perfectly wise and good reasons +sustains them in the ability to sin. There can be, in the nature of +things, no persons at all, without this ability to sin. But God does not +direct them to sin; neither when they do sin does any stain fall upon +him for sustaining their existence during their sinning. That definition +of the term absolute, upon which Hegel bases his assertion, is one fit +only for the Sense and Understanding; as if God was the physical sum of +all existence. It is Materialistic Pantheism. But by observing the +definitions and distinctions, which have been heretofore laid down, it +may be readily seen how an actual mode of existence, as that of finite +person, may be denied to God, and no lack be indicated thereby. Hegel's +blasphemy may, then, be answered as follows: God is the infinite and +absolute spiritual Person. Personality is the form of his being. The +form cannot be empty. Organized essence fills the form. Infinity and +absoluteness are _qualities_ of the Person as thus organized. The +quality of absoluteness, for instance, as transfusing the essence, is +the endowment of pure independence, and involves the exclusion of the +possibility of any other independent Being, and the possession of the +ability to create every possible dependent being. In so far, then, as +Hegel's assertion means that no being can exist, and do evil, except he +is created and sustained by the Deity, it is true. But in so far as it +means--and this is undoubtedly what Hegel did mean--that God must be the +efficient author of sin, that, forced by the iron rod of Fate, he must +produce evil, the assertion is utterly false, and could only have been +uttered by one who, having dwelt all his life in the gloomy cave of the +Understanding, possessed not even a tolerably correct notion of the true +nature of the subject he had in hand,--the character of God. From the +above considerations it is apparent that all the requirements of the +Reason are fulfilled when it is asserted that all things--the +Universe--are dependent upon God; and he is utterly independent. + +The paragraphs next succeeding, which have been quoted with entire +approbation by Mr. Herbert Spencer, are thoroughly vitiated by their +author's indefensible assumption, that cause is "indispensable" to our +idea of the Deity. As was remarked above, the notion of cause is +incidental. The Deity may or may not become a cause, as he shall +decide. But he has no choice as to whether he shall be a person or not. +Hence we may freely admit that "the cause, as such, exists only in +relation to its effect: the cause is a cause of the effect; the +effect is an effect of the cause." It is also true that "the +conception"--idea--"of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of +all relation." The position we have taken is in advance of this, for we +say, involves an actual existence out of all relation. Introducing, +then, not "the idea of succession in time," but the idea of the logical +order, we rightly say, "the Absolute exists first by itself, and +afterwards becomes a Cause." Nor are we here "checked by the third +conception, that of the Infinite." "Causation is a possible mode of +existence," and yet "that which exists without causing" is infinite. How +is this? It is thus. Infinity is the universality of perfect endowment. +Now, taking as the point of departure the first creative nisus or effort +of the Deity, this is true. Before that act he was perfect in every +possible endowment, and accorded his choice thereto. He was able to +create, but did not, for a good and sufficient reason. In and after that +act, he was still perfect as before. That act then involved no +_essential_ change in God. But he was in one mode of being before, and +in another mode of being in and after that act. Yet he was equally +perfect, and equally blessed, before as after. What then follows? This: +that there was some good and sufficient reason why before that act he +should be a potential creator, and in that act he should become an +actual creator: and this reason preserves the perfection, _i. e._ the +infinity of God, equally in both modes. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "if +Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without +causing is not infinite, that which becomes a cause has passed beyond +its former limits," his utterance is prompted by that pantheistic +understanding-conception of God, which thinks him the sum of all that +was, and is, and ever shall be, or can be; and that in all this, he is +_actual_. On the other hand, as we have seen, all that is required to +fulfil the idea of infinity is, that the Being, whom it qualifies, +possesses all fulness, has all the forms and springs of being in +himself. It is optional with him whether he will create or not; and his +remaining out of all relation, or his creating a Universe, and thus +establishing relations to and for himself, in no way affect his +essential nature, _i. e._ his infinity. He is a person, possessing all +possible endowments, and in this does his infinity consist. In this +view, "creation at any particular moment of time" is seen to be the only +possible hypothesis by which to account for the Universe. Such a +_Person_, the necessary Being, must have been in existence before the +Universe; and his first act in producing that Universe would mark the +first moment of time. No "alternative of Pantheism" is, can be, +presented to the advocates of this theory. On the other hand, that +scheme is seen to be both impossible and absurd. + +One cannot disagree with Mr. Mansel, when in the next paragraph he says, +that, "supposing the Absolute to become a cause, it will follow that it +operates by means of free will and consciousness." But the difficulties +which he then raises lie only in the Understanding, and may be explained +thus. Always in God's consciousness _the subject and object are +identical_. All that God is, is always present to his Eye. Hence all +relations always appear subordinate to, and dependent upon him; and it +is a misapprehension of the true idea to suppose, that any relation +which falls _in idea_ within him, and only becomes actual at his will, +is any proper limitation. Both subject and object are thus absolute, +being identical; and yet there is no contradiction. + +The difficulty is further raised that there cannot be in the absolute +Being any interrelations, as of attributes among themselves, or of +attributes to the Being. This arises from an erroneous definition of the +term absolute. The definition heretofore given in this treatise presents +no such difficulty. The possession of these attributes and +interrelations is essential to the exclusion by then possessor of +another independent Being; and it is a perversion to so use a quality +which is essential to a being, that it shall militate against the +consistency of his being what he must be. If then "the almost unanimous +voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and +simple," uses the term "simple" in the same sense that it would have +when applied to the idea of moral obligation, viz., that it is +unanalyzable, then that voice is wrong, just as thoroughly as the voice +of antiquity in favor of the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was wrong; +and is to be treated as that was. On such questions _opinions_ have no +weight. The search is after a knowledge which is sure, and which every +man may have within himself. We land, then, in no "inextricable +dilemma." The absolute Person we see to be conscious; and to possess +complexity in unity, universality in totality. By an immediate intuition +we know him as primarily out of all relation, plurality, difference, and +likeness; and yet as having, of his own self, established the Universe, +which is still entirely dependent upon him; from which he differs, and +with which he is not identified. + +Again Mr. Mansel says: "A mental attribute to be conceived as infinite, +must be in actual exercise on every possible object: otherwise it is +potential only, with regard to those on which it is not exercised; and +an unrealized potentiality is a limitation." With our interpretation the +assertion is true and contains no puzzle. Every mental attribute of the +Deity is most assuredly "in actual exercise," upon every one of its +"possible objects" _as ideas_. But the objects are not therefore actual. +Neither is there any need that they should ever become so. He sees them +just as clearly, and knows them just as thoroughly as ideals, as he does +as actual objects. All ideal objects are "unrealized potentialities"; +and yet they are the opposite of limitations proper. But this sentence, +as an expression of the thought which Mr. Mansel seemingly wished to +convey, is vitiated by the presence of that understanding-conception +that infinity is amount, which must be actual. Once regard infinity as +_quality_ of the necessarily existent Person, and it directly follows +that this or that act, of that Person, in no way disturbs that infinity. +The quality conditions the acting being; but the act of that being +cannot limit the quality. The quality is, that the act may be; not the +reverse. Hence the questions arising from the interrelations of Power +and Goodness, Justice and Mercy, are solved at once. Infinity as +quality, not amount, pervades them all, and holds them all in perfect +harmony, adjusting each to each, in a melody more beautiful than that of +the spheres. Even "the existence of Evil" is "compatible with that of" +this "perfectly good Being." He does not will that it shall be; neither +does he will that it shall not be. If he willed that it should not be, +and it was, then he would be "thwarted"; but only on such a hypothesis +can the conclusion follow. But he does will that certain creatures shall +be, who, though dependent upon him for existence and sustenance, are, +like him, final causes,--the final arbiters of their own destinies, who +in the choice of ends are unrestrained, and may choose good or ill. He +made these creatures, knowing that some of them would choose wrong, and +so evil would be: but _he_ did not will the evil. He only willed the +conditions upon which evil was possible, and placed all proper bars to +prevent the evil; and the _a priori_ facts of his immutable perfection +in endowments, and of his untarnished holiness, are decisive of the +consequent fact, that, in willing those conditions, God did the very +best possible deed. If it be further asserted that the fact, that the +Being who possesses all possible endowments in perfection could not +wisely prevent sin, is a limitation; and, further, that it were better +to have prevented sin by an unwise act than to have permitted it by a +wise act; it can only be replied: This is the same as to say, that it is +essential to God's perfection that he be imperfect; or, that it was +better for the perfect Being to violate his Self than to permit sin. If +any one in his thinking chooses to accept of such alternatives, there +remains no ground of argument with him; but only "a certain fearful +looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the +adversary." + +Carrying on his presentation of difficulties, Mr. Mansel further +remarks: "Let us however suppose for an instant, that these difficulties +are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established +on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling +this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining +how the absolute can give rise to the relative, the infinite to the +finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that +of quiescence, the absolute, whether acting voluntarily or +involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection +to one of comparative perfection; and therefore was not originally +perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of +quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original +perfection." On this topic we can but repeat the argument heretofore +adduced. Let the supposition be entertained that perfection does not +belong to a state, but to God's nature, to what God _is_, as ground for +what God does, and standing in the logical order before his act; and it +will directly appear that a state of quiescence or a state of activity +in no way modifies his perfection. What God is, remains permanent and +perfect, and his acts are only manifestations of that permanent and +perfect. It follows, then, taking the first moment of time as the point +of departure, that, before that point, God was in a state of complete +blessedness, and that after that point he was also in such a state; and, +further, that while these two states are equal, there is not "complete +indifference," because there was a reason, clearly seen by the Divine +mind, why the passage from quiescence to activity should be when it was, +and as it was, and that this reason having been acknowledged in his +conduct, gives to the two states equality, and yet differentiates the +one from the other. + +"Again, how can the Relative be conceived as coming into being?" It +cannot be _conceived_ at all. The faculty of the mind by which it forms +a concept--the discursive Understanding--is impotent to conceive what +cannot be conceived--the act of creation. The changes of matter can be +concluded into a system, but not the power by which the matter came to +be, and the changes were produced. If the how is known at all, it must +be seen. The laws of the process must be intuited, as also the process +as logically according with those laws. The following is believed to be +an intelligible account of the process, and an answer to the above +question. The absolute and infinite Person possesses as _a priori_ +organic elements of his being, all possible endowments in perfect +harmony. Hence all laws, and all possible combinations of laws, are at +once and always present before the Eye of his Reason, which is thus +constituted Universal Genius. These combinations may be conveniently +named ideal forms. They arise spontaneously, being in no way dependent +upon his will, but are rather _a priori_ conditional of any creative +activity. So, too, they harmoniously arrange themselves into +systems,--archetypes of what may be, some of which may appear nobler, +and others inferior. This Person, being such as we have stated, +possesses also as endowment all power, and thereby excludes the +possibility of there being any "_other_" power. This power is adequate +to do all that _power_ can do,--to accomplish all that lies within the +province of power. So long as the Person sees fit not to exert his +power, his ideal forms will be only ideals, and the power will be simply +power. But whenever he shall see fit to send forth his power, and +organize it according to the ideal forms, the Universe will become. In +all this the Person, "of his own will," freely establishes whatever his +unerring wisdom shows is most worthy of his dignity; and so the +actualities and relations which he thus ordains are no proper limit or +restraint, for they in no way lessen his fulness, but are only a +manifestation of that fulness,--a declaration of his glory. In a word, +Creation is that executive act of God by which he combines with his +power that ideal system which he had chosen because best, or _it is the +organization of ample power according to perfect law_. If one shall now +ask, "How could he send forth the power?" it is to be replied that the +question is prompted by the curiosity of the "flesh," man's animal +nature; and since no representation--picture--can be made, no answer can +be furnished. It is not needed to know _how_ God is, or does anything, +but only that he does it. All the essential requirements of the problem +are met when it is ascertained in the light of the Reason, that all +fulness is in God, that from this fulness he established all other +beings and their natural relations, and that no relation is _imposed_ +upon him by another. The view thus advanced avoids the evil of the +understanding-conception, that creation is the bringing of something out +of nothing. There is an actual self-existent ground, from which the +Universe is produced. Neither is the view pantheistic, for it starts +with the _a priori_ idea of an absolute and infinite Person who is +"before all things, and by whom all things consist,"--who organizes his +own power in accordance with his own ideals, and thus produces the +Universe, and all this by free will in self-consciousness. + +On page eighty-four, in speaking "of the atheistic alternative," Mr. +Mansel makes use of the following language: "A limit is itself a +relation; and to conceive a limit as such, is virtually to acknowledge +the existence of a correlative on the other side of it." Upon reading +this sentence, some sensuous form spontaneously appears in the Sense. +Some object is conceived, and something outside it, that bounds it. But +let the idea be once formed of a Being who possesses all limitation +within himself, and for whom there is no "other side," nor any +"correlative," and the difficulty vanishes. We do not seek to account +for sensuous objects. It is pure Spirit whom we consider. We do not need +to form a concept of "a first moment in time," or "a first unit of +space," nor could we if we would. To do so would be for the faculty +which forms concepts to transcend the very laws of its organization. +What we need is, to see the fact that a Spirit is, who, possessing +personality as form, and absoluteness and infinity as qualities, thereby +contains all limits and the ground of all being in himself, and +antithetical to whom is only negation. + +From the ground thus attained there is seen to result, not the dreary +Sahara of interminable contradictions, but the fair land of harmonious +consistency. A Spirit, sole, personal, self-conscious, the absolute and +infinite Person, is the Being we seek and have found; and upon such a +Being the soul of man may rest with the unquestioning trust of an infant +in its mother's arms. One cannot pass by unnoticed the beautiful spirit +of religious reverence which shines through the closing paragraphs of +this lecture. It is evident with what dissatisfaction the writer views +the sterile puzzles of which he has been treating, and what a relief it +is to turn from them to "the God who is 'gracious and merciful, slow to +anger, and of great kindness, and repenteth Him of the evil.'" The +wonder is, that he did not receive that presentation which his devout +spirit has made, as the truth--which it is--and say, "I will accept this +as final. My definitions and deductions shall accord with this highest +revelation. This shall be my standard of interpretation." Had he done +so, far other, and, as it is believed, more satisfactory and truthful +would have been the conclusions he would have given us. + +In his third Lecture Mr. Mansel is occupied with an examination of the +human nature, for the purpose, if possible, of finding "some explanation +of the singular phenomenon of human thought," which he has just +developed. At the threshold of the investigation the fact of +consciousness appears, and he begins the statement of its conditions in +the following language: "Now, in the first place, the very conception of +Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily +implies _distinction between one object and another_. To be conscious we +must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known as +that which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." In +this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very +question at issue; for, the position maintained by one class of writers +is, that in certain of our mental operations, viz., in intuitions, the +mind sees a simple truth, idea, first principle, as it is, in itself, +and that there is no distinction in the act of knowledge. It is +unquestionably true that, in the examination of objects on the Sense, +and the conclusion of judgments in the Understanding, no object can come +into consciousness without implying a "distinction between one object +and another." But it is also evident that a first truth, to be known as +such, must be intuited--seen as it is in itself; and so directly known +to have the qualities of necessity and universality which constitute it +a first truth. Of this fact Sir William Hamilton seems to have been +aware, when he denied the actuality of the Reason,--perceiving, +doubtless, that only on the ground of such a denial was his own theory +tenable. But if it shall be admitted, as it would seem it must be, that +men have necessary and universal convictions, then it must also be +admitted that these convictions are not entertained by distinguishing +them from other mental operations, but that they are seen of themselves +to be true; and thus it appears that there are some modes of +consciousness which do not imply the "distinction" claimed. The +subsequent sentences seem capable of more than one interpretation. If +the author means that "the Infinite" cannot be infinite without he is +also finite, so that all distinction ceases, then his meaning is both +pantheistic and contradictory; for the word infinite has no meaning, if +it is not the opposite of finite, and to identify them is undoubtedly +Pantheism. Or if he means "that the Infinite cannot be distinguished" as +independent, from the Finite _as independent_, and thus, as possessing +some quality with which it was not endowed by the infinite Person, then +there can be no doubt of his correctness. But if, as would seem, his +idea of infinity is that of amount, is such that it appears +inconsistent, contradictory, for the infinite Person to retain his +infinity, and still create beings who are really other than himself, and +possessing, as quality, finiteness, which he cannot possess as quality, +then is his idea of what infinity is wrong. Infinity is quality, and the +capacity to thus create is essential to it. All that the Reason requires +is, that the finite be created by and wholly dependent upon the infinite +Person; then all the relations and conditions are only _improper_,--such +as that Person has established, and which, therefore, in no way diminish +his glory or detract from his fulness. When, then, Mr. Mansel says, "A +consciousness of the Infinite, as such, thus necessarily involves a +self-contradiction, for it implies the recognition, by limitation and +difference, of that which can only be given as unlimited and +indifferent," it is evident that he uses the term infinite to express +the understanding-conception of unlimited amount, which is not relevant +here, rather than the reason-idea of universality which is not +contradictory to a real distinction between the Infinite and finite. +There is also involved the unexpressed assumption that we have no +knowledge except of the limited and different, or, in other words, that +the Understanding is the highest faculty of the mind. It has already +been abundantly shown that this is erroneous,--that the Reason knows its +objects in themselves, as out of all relation, plurality, difference, or +likeness. Dropping now the abstract term "the infinite," and using the +concrete and proper form, we may say: + +We are conscious of infinity, _i. e._ we are conscious that we see with +the eye of Reason infinity as a simple, _a priori_ idea; and that it is +quality of the Deity. + +2. We are conscious of the infinite Person; in that we are conscious, +that we see with the eye of Reason the complex _a priori_ idea of a +perfect Person possessing independence and universality as qualities of +his Self. But we are not conscious of him in that we exhaustively +comprehend him. As is said elsewhere, we know that he is, and to a +certain extent, but not wholly what he is. + +In further discussing this question Mansel is guilty of another grave +psychological error. He says, "Consciousness is essentially a +limitation, for it is the determination to one actual out of many +possible modifications." There is no truth in this sentence. +Consciousness is not a limitation; it is not a determination; it is not +a modification. It may be well to state here certain conclusions on this +assertion, which will be brought out in the fuller discussion of it, +when we come to speak of Mr. Spencer's book. Consciousness is _one_, and +retains that oneness throughout all modifications. These occur in the +unity as items of experience affect it. Doubtless Dr. Hickok's +illustration is the best possible. Consciousness is the _light_ in which +a spiritual person sees the modifications of himself, _i. e._ the +activity of his faculties and capacities. Like Space, only in a +different sphere, it is an illimitable indivisible unity, which is, that +all limits may be in it--that all objects may come into it. If, then, +only one modification--object--comes into it at a time, this is because +the faculties which see in its light are thus organized;--the being to +whom it belongs is partial; but there is nothing pertaining to +consciousness _as such_, which constitutes a limit,--which could bar the +infinite Person from seeing all things at once in its light. This +Person, then, so far as known, must be known as an actual absolute, +infinite Spirit, and hence no "thing"; and further as the originator and +sustainer of all "_things_,"--which, though dependent on him, in no way +take aught from him. He may be known also, as potentially everything, in +the sense that all possible combinations, or forms of objects, must ever +stand as ideals in his Reason; and he can, at his will, organize his +power in accordance therewith. But he must also be known as free to +create or not to create; and that the fact that many potential forms +remain such, in no way detracts from his infinity. + +Another of Mr. Mansel's positions involve conclusions which, we feel +assured, he will utterly reject. He says, "If all thought is +limitation,--if whatever we conceive is, by the very act of conception, +regarded as finite,--the infinite, from a human point of view, is merely +a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is +possible." "From a human point of view," and _we_, at least, can take no +other, what follows? That the Deity _can have no thoughts_; cannot know +what our thoughts are, or that we think. But three suppositions can be +made. Either he has no thoughts, is destitute of an intellect; or his +intellect is Universal Genius, and he sees all possible objects at once; +or there is a faculty different in kind from and higher than the Reason, +of which we have, can have, no knowledge. The first, though acknowledged +by Hamilton in a passage elsewhere quoted, and logically following from +the position taken by Mr. Mansel, is so abhorrent to the soul that it +must be unhesitatingly rejected. The second is the position advocated in +this treatise. The third is hinted at by Mr. Herbert Spencer. We reject +this third, because the Reason affirms it to be impossible; and because, +being unnecessary, by the law of parsimony it should not be allowed. To +advocate a position of which, in the very terms of it, the intellect can +have no possible shadow of knowledge, is, to say the least, no part of +the work of a philosopher. "The condition of consciousness is" not +"distinction" in the understanding-conception of that term. So +consciousness is not a limitation, though all limits when cognized are +seen in the light of consciousness. According to the philosophy we +advocate, God is a particular being, and is so known; yet he is not +known as "one thing out of many," but is known in himself, as being such +and such, and yet being _unique_. When Mr. Mansel says, "In assuming the +possibility of an infinite object of consciousness, I assume, therefore, +that it is at the same time limited and unlimited," he evidently uses +those terms with a signification pertinent only to the Understanding. He +is thinking of _amount_ under the forms of Space and Time; and so his +remark has no validity. He who thinks of God rightly, will think of him +as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person; and will define infinity +and absoluteness in accordance therewith. + +If the views now advanced are presentations of truth, a consistent +rationalism _must_ attribute "consciousness to God." _We_ are always +conscious of "limitation and change," because partiality and growth are +organic with us. But we can perceive no peculiarity in consciousness, +which should produce such an effect. On the contrary we see, that if a +person has little knowledge, he will be conscious of so much and no +more. And if a person has great capabilities, and corresponding +information, he is conscious of just so much. Whence, it appears, that +the "limitation and change" spring from the nature of the constitution, +and not from the consciousness. If, then, there should be one Person who +possessed the sum of all excellencies, there could arise no reason from +consciousness why he should be conscious thereof. + +Mr. Mansel names as the "second characteristic of Consciousness, that it +is only possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject, +or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious." +This utterance, taken in the sense which Mr. Mansel wishes to convey, +involves the denial of consciousness to God. But upon the ground that +the subject and object in the Deity are always identical the difficulty +vanishes. But how can man be "conscious of the Absolute?" If by this is +meant, have an exhaustive comprehension of the absolute Person, the +experience is manifestly impossible. But man may have a certain +knowledge, _that_ such Person is without knowing in all respects _what_ +he is, just as a child may know that an apple is, without knowing what +it is. Again Mr. Mansel uses the terms absolute and infinite to +represent a simple unanalyzable Being. In this he is guilty of +personifying an abstract term, and then reasoning with regard to the +Being as he would with regard to the term. Absoluteness is a simple +unanalyzable idea, but it is not God; it is only one quality of God. So +with infinity. God is universal complexity; and to reason of him as +unanalyzable simplicity is as absurd as to select the color of the +apple's skin, and call that the apple, and then reason from it about the +apple. So, then, though man cannot comprehend the absolute Person _as +such_, he has a positive idea of absoluteness, and a positive knowledge +that the Being is who is thus qualified. Upon the subsequent question +respecting the partiality of our knowledge of the infinite and absolute +Person, a remark made above may be repeated and amplified. We may have a +true, clear, thorough knowledge _that_ he exists without having an +exhaustive knowledge of _what_ he is. The former is necessary to us; the +latter impossible. So, too, the knowledge by us, of any _a priori_ law, +will be exhaustive. Yet while we know that it _must_ be such, and not +otherwise, it neither follows that we know all other _a priori_ laws, +nor that we know all the exemplifications of this one. And since, as we +have heretofore seen, neither absoluteness nor infinity relate to +number, and God is not material substance that can be broken into +"parts," but an organized Spirit, we see that we may consider the +elements of his organization in their logical order; and, remembering +that absoluteness and infinity as qualities pervade all, we may examine +his nature and attributes without impiety. + +Mr. Mansel says further: "But in truth it is obvious, on a moment's +reflection, that neither the Absolute nor the Infinite can be +represented in the form of a whole composed of parts." This is +tantamount to saying, the spiritual cannot be represented under the form +of the material--a truth so evident as hardly to need so formal a +statement. But what the Divine means is, that that Being cannot be known +as having qualities and attributes which may be distinguished in and +from himself; which is an error. God is infinite. So is his Knowledge, +his Wisdom, his Holiness, his Love, &c. Yet these are distinguished from +each other, and from him. All this is consistent, because infinity is +_quality_, and permeates them all; and not amount, which jumbles them +all into a confused, _indistinguishable_ mass. + +In speaking of "human consciousness" as "necessarily subject to the law +of Time," Mr. Mansel says, "Every object of whose existence we can be in +any way conscious is necessarily apprehended by us as succeeding in time +to some former object of consciousness, and as itself occupying a +certain portion of time." In so far as there is here expressed the law +of created beings, under which they must see objects, the remark is +true. But when Mr. Mansel proceeds further, and concludes that, because +we are under limitation in seeing the object, it is under the same +limitation, so far as we apprehend it in being seen, he asserts what is +a psychological error. To show this, take the mathematical axiom, +"Things which are equal to the same things, are equal to one another." +Except under the conditions of Time, we cannot see this, that is, we do, +must, occupy a time in observing it. But do we see that the axiom is +under any condition of Time? By no means. We see, directly, that it is, +_must be_, true, and that in itself it has no relation to Time. It is +thus _absolutely_ true; and as one of the ideas of the infinite and +absolute Person, it possesses these his qualities. We have, then, a +faculty, the Reason, which, while it sees its objects in succession, and +so under the law of Time, also sees that those objects, whether ideas, +or that Being to whom all ideas belong, are, _in themselves_, out of all +relation to Time. Thus is the created spiritual person endowed; thus is +he like God; thus does he know "the Infinite." Hence, "the command, so +often urged upon man by philosophers and theologians, 'In contemplating +God, transcend time,'" means, "In all your reflections upon God, behold +him in his true aspect, in the reason-idea, as out of all relation." It +is true that "to know the infinite" _exhaustively_, "the human mind must +itself be infinite." But this knowledge is not required of that mind. +Only that knowledge is required which is possible, viz., that the Deity +is, and what he is, _in so far as we are in his image_. + +Again; personality is not "essentially a limitation and a relation," in +the sense that it necessarily detracts aught from any being who +possesses it. It rather adds,--is, indeed, a pure addition. We appear to +ourselves as limited and related, not because of our personality, but +because of our finiteness as _quality_ in the personality. + +Hence we not only see no reason why the complete and universal Spirit +should not have personality, but we see that if he was destitute of it, +he must possess a lower form of being,--since this is the highest +possible form,--which would be an undoubted limitation; or, in other +words, we see that he must be a Person. In what Mr. Mansel subsequently +says upon this subject, he presents arguments for the personality of God +so strong, that one is bewildered with the question, "How could he +escape the conviction which they awaken? How could he reject the cry of +his spiritual nature, and accept the barren contradictions of his lower +mind?" Let us note a few sentences. "It is by consciousness alone that +we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer him any service. +It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can stand in +any religious relation to Him at all,--that we can form such a +representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual wants, +insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual curiosity." +"Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation +to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist. +And when, from the little world of man's consciousness and its objects, +we would lift up our eyes to the inexhaustible universe beyond, and ask +to whom all this is related, the highest existence is still the highest +personality, and the Source of all Being reveals Himself by His name, 'I +AM.'" "It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our +duty to believe that He is infinite." We may at this point quote with +profit the words of that Book whose authority Mr. Mansel, without +doubt, most heartily acknowledges. "And for this cause God shall send +them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie; that they all +might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in +unrighteousness." "I have not written unto you because ye know not the +truth, but because ye know it, and that no lie is of the truth." Either +God is personal or he is not. If he is, then all that we claim is +conceded. If he is not personal, and "it is our duty to think" of him as +personal, then it is our duty to think and believe a _falsehood_. This +no man, at least neither Mr. Mansel nor any other enlightened man, _can_ +bring his mind to accept as a moral law. The soul instinctively asserts +that obligation lies parallel with _truth_, and "that no lie is of the +truth." So, then, there can be no duty except where truth is. And the +converse may also be accepted, viz.: Where an enlightened sense of duty +is, there is truth. When, therefore, so learned and truly spiritual a +man as Mr. Mansel asserts "that it is our duty to think God personal, +and believe him infinite," we unhesitatingly accept it as the utterance +of a great fundamental truth in that spiritual realm which is the +highest realm of being, and so, as one of the highest truths, and with +it we accept all its logical consequences. It is a safe rule anywhere, +that if two mental operations seem to clash, and one must be rejected, +man should cling to, and trust in the higher--the teaching of the nobler +nature. Thus will we do, and from the Divine's own ground will we see +the destruction of his philosophy. "It is our duty to think of God as +personal," because he is personal; and we know that he is personal +because it is our duty to think him so. We need pay no regard to the +perplexities of the Understanding. We soar with the eagle above the +clouds, and float ever in the light of the Sun. The teachings of the +Moral Sense are far more sure, safe, and satisfactory than any +discursions of the lower faculty. Therefore it is man's wisdom, in all +perplexity to heed the cry of his highest nature, and determine to +stand on its teachings, as his highest knowledge, interpret all +utterances by this, and reject all which contradict it. At the least, +the declaration of this faculty is _as_ valid as that of the lower, and +is to be more trusted in every disagreement, because higher. Still +further, no man would believe that God, in the most solemn, yea, awful +moment of his Self-revelation, would declare a lie. The bare thought, +fully formed, horrifies the soul as a blasphemy of the damned. Yet, in +that supreme act, in the solitude of the Sinaitic wilderness, to one of +the greatest, one of the profoundest, most devout of men, He revealed +Himself by the pregnant words, "I AM": the most positive, the most +unquestionable form in which He could utter the fact of His personality. +This, then, and all that is involved in it, we accept as truth; and all +perplexities must be interpreted by this surety. + +In summing up the results to which an examination of the facts of +consciousness conducted him, Mr. Mansel utters the following +psychological error: "But a limit is necessarily conceived as a relation +between something within and something without itself; and the +consciousness of a limit of thought implies, though it does not directly +present to us, the existence of something of which we do not and cannot +think." Not so; for a limit may be seen to be wholly within the being to +whom it belongs, and so _not_ to be "a relation between something within +and something without itself." This is precisely the case with the +Deity. All relations and limits spring from within him, and there is +nothing "without" to establish the relation claimed. This absence of all +limit from without is rudely expressed in such common phrases as this: +"It must be so in the _nature of things_." This "nature of things" is, +in philosophical language, the system of _a priori_ laws of the +Universe, and these are necessary ideas in the Divine Reason. It +appears, then, that what must be in the nature of things, finds its +limits wholly within, and its relations established by the Deity. + +With these remarks the author would close his criticism upon Mr. +Mansel's book. We start from entirely different bases, and these two +systems logically follow from their foundations. If Sir William Hamilton +is right in his psychology, his follower is unquestionably right in his +deductions. But if that psychology is partial, if besides the +Understanding there is the Reason, if above the judgment stands the +intuition, giving the final standard by which to measure that judgment, +then is the philosophical system of the Divine utterly fallacious. The +establishment of the validity of the Pure Reason is the annihilation of +"the Philosophy of the Unconditioned." On the ground which the author +has adopted, it is seen that "God is a spirit," infinite, absolute, +self-conscious, personal; and a consistent interpretation of these terms +has been given. We have found that certain objects may be seen as out of +all relation, plurality, difference, or likeness. Consciousness and +personality have also been found to involve no limit, in the proper +sense of that term. On the contrary, the one was ascertained to be the +light in which any or all objects might be seen under conditions of +Time, or at once; and that this seeing was according to the capacity +with which the being was endowed, and was not determined by any +peculiarity of the consciousness; while the other appeared to be the +highest possible form of existence, and that also in which God had +revealed himself. From such a ground it is possible to go forward and +construct a Rational Theology which shall verify by Reason the teachings +of the Bible. + + + + +REVIEW OF MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S "FIRST PRINCIPLES." + + +In the criticisms heretofore made, some points, held in common by the +three writers named early in this work, have been, it may be, passed +over unnoticed. This was done, because, being held in common, it was +believed that an examination of them, as presented by the latest writer, +would be most satisfactory. Therefore, what was peculiar in thought or +expression to Sir Wm. Hamilton or Mr. Mansel, we have intended to notice +when speaking of those writers. But where Mr. Spencer seems to present +their very thought as his own, it has appeared better to remark upon it +in his latest form of expression. Mr. Spencer also holds views peculiar +to himself. These we shall examine in their place. And for convenience' +sake, what we have to say will take the form of a running commentary +upon those chapters entitled, "Ultimate Religious Ideas," "Ultimate +Scientific Ideas," "The Relativity of all Knowledge," and "The +Reconciliation." Before entering upon this, however, some general +remarks will be pertinent. + +1. Like his teachers, Mr. Spencer believes that the Understanding is the +highest faculty of the human intellect. This is implied in the following +sentence: "Those imbecilities of the understanding that disclose +themselves when we try to answer the highest questions of objective +science, subjective science proves to be necessitated by the laws of +that understanding."--_First Principles_, p. 98. + +His illustrations, also, are all, or nearly all, taken from sensuous +objects. In speaking of the Universe, evidently the _material_ Universe +is present to his mind. His questions refer to objects of sense, and he +shows plainly enough that any attempt to answer them by the Sense or +Understanding is futile. Hence he concludes that they cannot be +answered. But those who "know of a surety," that man is more than an +animal nature, containing a Sense and an Understanding; that he is also +a spiritual person, having an _Eye_, the pure Reason, which can _see_ +straight to the central Truth, with a clearness and in a light which +dims and pales the noonday sun, know also that, and how, these +difficulties, insoluble to the lower faculties, are, in this noble +alembic, finally dissolved. + +2. As Mr. Spencer follows his teachers in the psychology of man's +faculties, so does he also in the use of terms. Like them, he employs +only such terms as are pertinent to the Sense and Understanding. So also +with them he is at fault, in that he raises questions which no Sense or +Understanding could suggest even, questions whose very presence are +decisive that a Pure Reason is organic in man; and then is guilty of +applying to them terms entirely impertinent,--terms belonging only to +those lower tribunals before which these questions can never come. For +instance, he always employs the word "conceive" to express the effort of +the mind in presenting to itself the subjects now under discussion. In +some form of noun, verb, or adjective, this word seems to have rained +upon his pages; while such terms as "infinite period," "infinitely +divisible," "absolutely incompressible," "infinitesimal," and the like, +dot them repeatedly. Let us revert, then, a moment to the positions +attained in an earlier portion of this work. It was there found that the +word conceive was _utterly irrelevant_ to any subject except to objects +of Sense and the Understanding in its work of classifying them, or +generalizing from them, so, also, with regard to the other terms quoted, +it was found that they not only presented no object of thought to the +mind, but that the words had no relation to each other, and could not +properly be used together. For instance, infinite has no more relation +to, and can no more qualify period, than the points of the compass are +pertinent to, and can qualify the affections. The phrase, infinite +period, is simply absurd, and so also are the others. The words infinite +and absolute have nothing to do with amount of any sort. They can be +pertinent only to God and his _a priori_ ideas. Many, perhaps most of +the criticisms in detail we shall have to make, will be based on this +single misuse of words; which yet grows naturally out of that denial and +perversion of faculties which Mr. Spencer, in common with the other +Limitist writers, has attempted. On the other hand, it is to be +remembered, that, if we arrive at the truth at all, we must _intuit_ it; +we must either see it as a simple _a priori_ idea, or as a logical +deduction from such ideas. + +3. A third, and graver error on Mr. Spencer's part is, that he goes on +propounding his questions, and asserting that they are insoluble, +apparently as unconscious as a sleeper in an enchanted castle that they +have all been solved, or at least that the principles on which it would +seem that they could be solved have been stated by a man of no mean +ability,--Dr. Hickok,--and that until the proposed solutions are +thoroughly analyzed and shown to be unsound, his own pages are idle. He +implies that there is no cognition higher than a conception, when some +very respectable writers have named intuitions as incomparably superior. +He speaks of the Understanding as if it were without question the +highest faculty of man's intellect, when no less a person than Coleridge +said it would satisfy his life's labor to have introduced into English +thinking the distinction between the Understanding, as "the faculty +judging according to sense," and the Reason, as "the power of universal +and necessary convictions," which, being such, must necessarily rank far +above the other. And finally he uses the words and phrases above +disallowed, and the faculties to which they belong, in an attempt to +prove, by the citation of a few items in an experience, what had already +been demonstrated by another in a process of as pure reasoning as +Calculus. No one, it is believed, can master the volume heretofore +alluded to, entitled "Rational Psychology," and so appreciate the +_demonstration_ therein contained, of the utter incompetency of the +Sense or Understanding to solve such questions as Mr. Spencer has raised +by his incident of the partridge, (p. 69,) and the utter irrelevancy to +them of the efforts of those faculties, without feeling how tame and +unsatisfactory in comparison is the evidence drawn from a few facts in a +sensuous experience. One cares not to see a half dozen proofs, more or +less that a theory is fallacious who has learned that, and why, the +theory _cannot_ be true. Let us now take up in order the chapters +heretofore mentioned. + + + + +"ULTIMATE RELIGIOUS IDEAS." + + +The summing up of certain reflections with which this chapter opens, +concludes thus: "But that when our symbolic conceptions are such that no +cumulative or indirect processes of thought can enable us to ascertain +that there are corresponding actualities, nor any predictions be made +whose fulfilment can prove this, then they are altogether vicious and +illusive, and in no way distinguishable from pure fictions,"--p. 29. So +far very good; but his use of it is utterly unsound. "And now to +consider the bearings of this general truth on our immediate +topic--Ultimate Religious Ideas." But this "general truth" has _no_ +bearings upon "ultimate religious ideas"; how then can you consider +them? _No_ ideas, and most of all religious ideas, are conceptions, or +the results of conceptions--or are the products of "cumulative or +indirect processes of thought." They are not results or products _at +all_. They are organic, are the spontaneous presentation of what is +inborn, and so must be directly seen to be known at all. Man might pile +up "cumulative processes of thought" for unnumbered ages, and might form +most exact conceptions of objects of Sense,--conceptions are not +possible of others,--and he could never creep up to the least and +faintest religious idea. + +On the next page, speaking of "suppositions respecting the origin of the +Universe," Mr. Spencer says, "The deeper question is, whether any one of +them is even conceivable in the true sense of that word. Let us +successively test them." This is not necessary. It has already been +_demonstrated_ that a conception, or any effort of the Understanding, +cannot touch, or have relation to such topics. But it does not follow, +therefore, that no one of them is cognizable at all; which he implies. +Take the abstract notion of self-existence, for example. No "vague +symbolic conceptions," or any conception at all, of it _can be formed_. +A conception is possible only "under relation, difference, and +plurality." _This_ is a pure, simple idea, and so can only be known in +itself by a seeing--an immediate intuition. It is seen by itself, as out +of all relation. It is seen as simple, and so is learned by no +difference. It is seen as a unit, and so out of all plurality. The +discursive faculty cannot pass over it, because there are in it no +various points upon which that faculty may fasten. It may, perhaps, +better be expressed by the words pure independence. Again, it is _not_ +properly "existence without a beginning," but rather, existence out of +all relation to beginning; and so it is an idea, out of all relation to +those faculties which are confined to objects that did begin. Because we +can "by no mental effort" "form a conception of existence without a +beginning," it does not follow that we cannot _see_ that a Being +existing out of all relation to beginning _is_. "To this let us add" +that the intuition of such a Being is a complete "explanation of the +Universe," and does make it "easier to understand" "that it existed an +hour ago, a day ago, a year ago"; for we see that this Being primarily +is _out of all relation to time_, that there is no such thing as an +"infinite period," the phrase being absurd; but that through all the +procession of events which we call time he _is_; and that before that +procession began--when there was no time, he was. Thus we see that all +events are based upon Him who is independent; and that time, in our +general use of it, is but the measure of what He produces. We arrive, +then, at the conclusion that the Universe is not self-existent, not +because self-existence cannot be object to the human mind, and be +clearly seen to be an attribute of one Being, but because the Universe +is primarily object to faculties in that mind, which cannot entertain +such a notion at all; and because this notion is _seen_ to be a +necessary idea in the province of that higher faculty which entertains +as objects both the idea and the Being to whom it primarily belongs. + +The theory that the Universe is self-existent is Pantheism, and not the +theory that it is self-created, though this latter, in Mr. Spencer's +definition of it, seems only a phase of the other. To say that +"self-creation is potential existence passing into actual existence by +some inherent necessity," is only to remove self-existence one step +farther back, as he himself shows. Potential existence is either no +existence at all, or it is positive existence. If it is no existence, +then we have true self-creation; which is, that out of nothing, and with +no cause, actual existence starts itself. This is not only unthinkable, +but absurd. But if potential existence is positive, it needs to be +accounted for as much as actual. While, then, there can be no doubt as +to the validity of the conclusions to which Mr. Spencer arrives, +respecting the entire incompetency of the hypotheses of self-existence +and self-creation, to account for the Universe, the distinction made +above between self-existence as a true and self-creation as a pseudo +idea, and the fact that the true idea is a _reality_, should never be +lost sight of. By failing to discriminate--as in the Understanding he +could not do--between them, and by concluding both as objects alike +impossible to the human intellect, and for the same reasons, he has also +decided that the "commonly received or theistic hypothesis"--creation by +external agency--is equally untenable. In his examination of this, he +starts as usual with his ever-present, fallacious assumption, that this +is a "conception"; that it can be, _is_ founded upon a "cumulative +process of thought, or the fulfilment of predictions based on it." +These words, phrases, and notions, are all irrelevant. It is not a +conception, process, or prediction that we want; it is a _sight_. Hence, +no assumptions have to be made or granted. No "proceedings of a human +artificer" _can in the least degree_ "vaguely symbolize to us" the +"method after which the Universe" was "shaped." This differed in _kind_ +from all possible human methods, and had not one element in common with +them. + +Mr. Spencer's remarks at this point upon Space do not appear to be well +grounded. "An immeasurable void"--Space--is not an entity, is _no_ +thing, and therefore cannot "exist," neither is any explanation for it +needed. His question, "how came it so?" takes, then, this form: How came +immeasurable nothing to be nothing? Nothing needs no "explanation." It +is only _some_ thing which must be accounted for. The theory of creation +by external agency being, then, an adequate one to account for the +Universe, supplies the following statement. That Being who is primarily +out of all relation, produced, from himself, and by his immanent +power, into nothing--Space, room, the condition of material +existence,--something, matter and the Universe became. "The genesis of +the universe" having thus been explained and seen to be "the result of +external agency," we are ready to furnish for the question, "how came +there to be an external agency?" that true answer, which we have already +shadowed forth. That pure spiritual Person who is necessarily existent, +or self-existent, _i. e._ who possess pure independence as an essential +attribute, whose being is thus fixed, and is therefore without the +province of power, is the external agency which is needed. This Person, +differing in kind from the Universe, cannot be found in it, nor +concluded from it, but can only be known by being seen, and can only be +seen because man possesses the endowment of a spiritual _Eye_, like in +kind to His own All-seeing eye, by which spiritual things may be +discerned. This Person, being thus seen immediately, is known in a far +more satisfactory mode than he could be by any generalizations of the +Understanding, could he be represented in these at all. The knowledge of +Him is, like His self, _immutable_. We KNOW that we stand on the eternal +Rock. Our eye is illuminated with the unwavering Light which radiates +from the throne of God. Nor is this any hallucination of the rhapsodist. +It is the simple experience which every one enjoys who looks at pure +truth in itself. It is the Pure Reason seeing, by an immediate +intuition, God as pure spirit, revealed directly to itself. It is, then, +because self-existence is a pure, simple idea, organic in man, and seen +by him to be an attribute of God, that God is known to be the Creator of +the Universe. Having attained to this truth, we readily see that the +conclusions which Mr. Spencer states on pages 35, 36, as that +"self-existence is rigorously inconceivable"; that the theistic +hypothesis equally with the others is "literally unthinkable"; that "our +conception of self-existence can be formed only by joining with it the +notion of unlimited duration through past time"; so far as they imply +our destitution of knowledge on these topics, are the opposite of the +facts. We _see_, though we cannot "conceive," self-existence. The +theistic hypothesis becomes, therefore, literally thinkable. We see, +also, that unlimited duration is an absurdity; that duration must be +limited; and that self-existence involves existence out of all relation +to duration. + +Mr. Spencer then turns to the nature of the Universe, and says: "We find +ourselves on the one hand obliged to make certain assumptions, and yet, +on the other hand, we find these assumptions cannot be represented in +thought." Upon this it may be remarked: + +1. What are here called assumptions are properly assertions, which man +makes, and cannot help making, except he deny himself;--necessary +convictions, first truths, first principles, _a priori_ ideas. They are +organic, and so are the foundation of all knowledge. They are not +results learned from lessons, but are _primary_, and conditional to an +ability to learn. But supposing them to be assumptions, having, at +most, no more groundwork than a vague guess, there devolves a labor +which Mr. Spencer and his coadjutors have never attempted, and which, we +are persuaded, they would find the most difficult of all, viz., to +account for the fact of these assumptions. For the question is pertinent +and urgent; + +2. How came these assumptions to suggest themselves? Where, for +instance, did the notion of self come from? Analyze the rocks, study +plants and their growth, become familiar with animals and their habits, +or exhaust the Sense in an examination of man, and one can find no +notion of self. Yet the notion is, and is peculiar to man. How does it +arise? Is it "created by the slow action of natural causes?" How comes +it to belong, then, to the rudest aboriginal equally with the most +civilized and cultivated? Was it "created" from nothing or from +something? If from something, how came that something to be? We might +ask, Does not the presentation of any phenomenon involve the actuality +of a somewhat, in which that phenomenon inheres, and of a receptivity by +which it is appreciated? Does not the fact of this assumption, as a +mental phenomenon, involve the higher fact of some mental ground, some +form, some capacity, which is both organic to the mind, and organized in +the mind, in accordance with which the assumption is, and which +determines what it must be? Or are we to believe that these assumptions +are mere happenings, without law, and for which no reason can be +assigned? Again we press the question, How came these assumptions to +suggest themselves? + +3. "These assumptions cannot be represented in thought." If "thought" is +restricted to that mental operation of the Understanding by which it +generalizes in accordance with the Sense, the statement is true. But if +it is meant, as seems to be implied, that the notions expressed in these +assumptions are not, cannot be, clearly and definitely known at all by +the mind, then it is directly contrary to the truth. The ideas presented +by the phrases are, as was seen above, clear and definite. + +Since Mr. Spencer has quoted _in extenso_, and with entire approbation, +what Mr. Mansel says respecting "the Cause, the Absolute, and the +Infinite," we have placed the full examination of these topics in our +remarks upon Mr. Mansel's writings, and shall set down only a few brief +notes here. + +Upon this topic Mr. Spencer admits that "we are obliged to suppose +_some_ cause"; or, in other words, that the notion of cause is organic. +Then we must "inevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a First +Cause." Then, this First Cause "must be infinite." Then, "it must be +independent;" "or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." +One would almost suppose that a _rational_ man penned these decisions, +instead of one who denies that he has a _reason_. The illusion is +quickly dispelled, however, by the objections he lifts out of the dingy +ground-room of the Understanding. It is curious to observe in these +pages a fact which we have noticed before, in speaking of Sir William +Hamilton's works, viz.: how, on the same page, and in the same sentence, +the workings of the Understanding and Reason will run along side by +side, the former all the while befogging and hindering the latter. Mr. +Spencer's conclusions which we have quoted, and his objections which we +are to answer, are a striking exemplification of this. Frequently in his +remarks he uses the words limited and unlimited, as synonymous with +finite and infinite, when they are not so, and cannot be used +interchangeably with propriety. The former belong wholly in the Sense +and Understanding. The latter belong wholly in the Pure Reason. The +former pertain to material objects, to mental images of them, or to +number. The latter qualify only spiritual persons, and have no +pertinence elsewhere. Limitation is the conception of an object _as +bounded_. Illimitation is the conception of an object as without +boundaries. Rigidly, it is a simple negation of boundaries, and gives +nothing positive in the Concept. Finity or finiteness corresponds in the +Reason to limitation in the Sense and Understanding. It does not refer +to boundaries at all. It belongs only to created spiritual persons, and +expresses the fact that they are partial, and must grow and learn. Only +by its place in the antithesis does infinity correspond in the Reason to +illimitation in the lower faculties. It is _positive_, and is that +quality of the pure spirit which is otherwise known as _universality_. +It expresses the idea of _all possible endowments in perfect harmony_. +From his misuse of these terms Mr. Spencer is led to speak in an +irrelevant manner upon the question, "Is the First Cause finite or +infinite?" He uses words and treats the whole matter as if it were a +question of material substance, which might be "bounded," with a "region +surrounding its boundaries," and the like, which are as out of place as +to say white love or yellow kindness. His methods of thought on these +topics are also gravely erroneous. He attempts an analysis by the +logical Understanding, where a synthesis by the Reason is required,--a +synthesis which has already been given by our Creator to man as an +original idea. It is not necessary to examine some limited thing, or all +limited things, and wander around their boundaries to learn that the +First Cause is infinite. We need to make no discursus, but only to look +the idea of first cause through and through, and thoroughly analyze it, +to find all the truth. By such a process we would find all that Mr. +Spencer concedes that "we are obliged to suppose," and further, that +such a being _must be_ self-existent. And this conviction would be so +strong that the mind would rest itself in this decision: "A thousand +phantasmagoria of the imagination may be wrong," says the soul, "but +this I know must be true, or there is no truth in the Universe." + +One sentence in the paragraph now under consideration deserves special +notice. It is this. "But if we admit that there can be some thing +uncaused, there is no reason to assume a cause for anything." This +"assumes" the truth of a major premise all _things_ are substantially +alike. If the word "thing" is restricted to its exact limits,--objects +of sense,--then the sentence pertains wholly to the Sense and +Understanding, and is true. But if, as it would seem, the implication is +meant that there are no other entities which can be object to the mind +except such "things," then it is a clear _petitio principii_. For the +very question at issue is, whether, in fact, there is not one +entity--"thing"--which so differs in kind from all others, that it is +uncaused, _i. e._ self-existent; and whether the admission that that +entity is uncaused does not, because of this seen difference, satisfy +the mind, and furnish a reasonable ground on which to account for the +subordinate causes which we observe by the Sense. + +In speaking of the First Cause as "independent," he says, "but it can +have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it +which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if +it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this +something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. +Thus, the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total, +including within itself all power, and transcending all law." We cannot +criticize this better, and mark how curiously truth and error are mixed +in it, than by so parodying it that only truth shall be stated. The +First Cause possesses within himself all possible relations as belonging +to his necessary ideals. Hence, change, in the exact sense of that term, +is impossible to him, for there is nothing for him to _change to_. This +is not invalidated by his passing from inaction to action; for creation +involves no change in God's nature or attributes, and so no real or +essential change, which is here meant. But he is the permanent, through +whom all changes become. He is not, then, a _simple_ unit, but is an +organized Being, who is ground for, and comprehends in a unity, all +possible laws, forms, and relations, as necessary elements of his +necessary existence,--as endowments which necessarily belong to him, and +are conditional of his pure independence. Hence, these restraints are +not "imposed" upon him, except as his existence is imposed upon him. +They belong to his Self, and are conditional of his being. So, then, +instead of "transcending all law," he is the embodiment of all law; and +his perfection is, that possessing this endowment, he accords his +conduct thereto. A being who should "transcend all law" would have no +reason why he should act, and no form how he should act, neither would +he be an organism, but would be pure lawlessness or pure chaos. Pure +chaos cannot organize order; pure lawlessness cannot establish law; and +so could not be the First Cause. As Mr. Spencer truly says, "we have no +alternative but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute." + +And now having learned, by a true diagnosis of the mental activities, +that the positions we have gained are fixed, final, irrevocable; and +further, that they are not the "results" of "reasonings," but that first +there was a seeing, and then an analysis of what was seen, and that the +seeing is _true_, though every other experience be false; we _know_ that +our position is not "illusive," but that we stand on the rock; and that +what we have seen is no "symbolic conception of the illegitimate order," +but is pure truth. + +For the further consideration of this subject, the reader is referred +back to our remarks on that passage in Mr. Mansel's work, which Mr. +Spencer has quoted. + +A few remarks upon his summing up, p. 43 _et seq._, will complete the +review of this chapter. "Passing over the consideration of credibility, +and confining ourselves to that of" consistency, we would find in any +rigorous analysis, that Atheism and Pantheism are self-contradictory; +but we _have found_ that Theism, "when rigorously analyzed," presents an +absolutely consistent system, in which all the difficulties of the +Understanding are explained to the person by the Reason, and is entirely +thinkable. Such a system, based upon the necessary convictions of man, +and justly commanding that these shall be the fixed standard, in +accordance with which all doubts and queries shall be dissolved and +decided, gives a rational satisfaction to man, and discloses to him his +eternal REST. + +In proceeding to his final fact, which he derives as the permanent in +all religions, Mr. Spencer overlooks another equally permanent, equally +common, and incomparably more important fact, viz: that Fetishism, +Polytheism, Pantheism, and Monotheism,--all religions alike assert _that +a god created the Universe_. In other words, the great common element, +in all the popular modes of accounting for the vast system of things in +which we live is, _that it is the product of an agency external to +itself, and that the external agency is personal_. Take the case of the +rude aboriginal, who "assumes a separate personality behind every +phenomenon." He does not attempt to account for all objects. His mind is +too infantile, and he is too degraded to suspect that those material +objects which appear permanent need to be accounted for. It is only the +changes which seem to him to need a reason. Behind each change he +imagines a sort of personal power, superior to it and man, which +produces it, and this satisfies him. He inquires no further; yet he +looks in the same direction as the Monotheist. In this crude form of +belief, which is named Fetishism, we see that essential idea which can +be readily traced through all forms of religion, that some _personal_ +being, external, and superior to the things that be, produced them. Nor +is Atheism a proper exception to this law. For Atheism is not a +religion, but the denial of all religion. It is not a doctrine of God, +but is a denial that there is any God; and what is most in point, it +never was a _popular_ belief, but is only a philosophical Sahara over +which a few caravans of speculative doubters and negatists wander. +Neither can Hindu pantheism be quoted against the position taken: for +Brahm is not the Universe; neither are Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. Brahm +does not lose his individuality because the Universe is evolved from +him. _Now_ he is thought of as one, and the Universe as another, +although the Universe is thought to be a part of his essence, and +hereafter to be reabsorbed by him. _Now_, this part of his essence which +was _produced_ through Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva, is _individualized_; +and so is one, while he is another. Thus, here also, the idea of a +proper external agency is preserved. The facts, then, are decisively in +favor of the proposition above laid down. "_Our_ investigation" +discloses "a fundamental verity in each religion." And the facts and the +verity find no consistent ground except in a pure Theism, and there they +do find perfect consistency and harmony. + +It is required, finally, in closing the discussion of this chapter, to +account for the fact that, upon a single idea so many theories of God +have fastened themselves; or better, perhaps, that a single idea has +developed itself in so many forms. This cannot better be done than in +the language of that metaphysician, not second to Plato, the apostle +Paul. In his Epistle to the Romans, beginning at the 19th verse of the +1st chapter, he says: "Because that which may be known of God is +manifest to them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible +things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being +understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and +Godhead, so that they are without excuse. Because that, when they knew +God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became +vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened: +professing themselves to be wise they became fools, and changed the +glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible +man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." This +passage, which would be worthy the admiring study of ages, did it +possess no claim to be the teaching of that Being whom Mr. Spencer +asserts it is _impossible for us to know_, gives us in a popular form +the truth. Man, having organic in his mind the idea of God, and having +in the Universe an ample manifestation to the Sense, of the eternal +power and Godhead of the Creator of that Universe, corresponding to that +idea, perverted the manifestation to the Sense, and degraded the idea in +the Reason, to the service of base passion. By this degradation and +perversion the organic idea became so bedizened with the finery of +fancy formed in the Understanding, under the direction of the animal +nature, as to be lost to the popular mind,--the trappings only being +seen. When once the truth was thus lost sight of, and with it all that +restraint which a knowledge of the true God would impose, men became +vain in their imaginations; their fancy ran riot in all directions. +Cutting loose from all law, they plunged into every excess which could +be invented; and out of such a stimulated and teeming brain all manner +of vagaries were devised. This was the first stage; and of it we find +some historic hints in the biblical account of the times, during and +previous to the life of Abraham. Where secular history begins the human +race had passed into the second stage. Crystallization had begun. +Students were commencing the search for truth. Religion was taking upon +itself more distinct forms. The organic idea, which could not be wholly +obliterated, formed itself distinctly in the consciousness of some +gifted individuals, and philosophy began. Philosophy in its purest form, +as taught by Socrates and Plato, presented again the lost idea of pure +Theism. But the spirituality which enabled them to see the truth, lifted +them so far above the common people, that they could affect only a few. +And what was most disheartening, that same degradation which originally +lost to man the truth, now prevented him from receiving it. Thus it was +that by a binding of the Reason to the wheels of Passion, and discursing +through the world with the Understanding at the beck of the Sense, the +many forms of religion became. + + + + +"ULTIMATE SCIENTIFIC IDEAS." + + +On a former page we have already attempted a positive answer to the +question, "What are Space and Time," with which Mr. Spencer opens this +chapter. It was there found that, in general terms, they are _a priori_ +conditions of created being; and, moreover, that they possess +characteristics suitable to what they condition, just as the _a priori_ +conditions of the spiritual person possess characteristics suitable to +what they condition. It was further found that this general law is, from +the necessity of the case, realized both within the mind and without it; +that it is, must be, the form of thought for the perceiving subject, +corresponding to the condition of existence for the perceived object. It +also appeared that the Universe as object, and the Sense and +Understanding as faculties in the subject, thus corresponded; and +further, that these faculties could never transcend and comprehend Space +and Time, because these were the very conditions of their being; +moreover, that by them all spaces and times must be considered with +reference to the Universe, and apart from it could not be examined by +them at all. Yet it was further found that the Universe might in the +presence of the Reason be abstracted; and that, then, pure Space and +Time still remained as pure _a priori_ conditions, the one as _room_, +the other as _opportunity_, for the coming of created being. Space and +Time being such conditions, _and nothing more_, are entities only in the +same sense that the multiplication table and the moral law are entities. +They are _conditions_ suited to what they condition. In the light of +this result let us examine Mr. Spencer's teachings respecting them. + +Strictly speaking, Space and Time do not "exist." If they exist (ex +sto), they must stand out somewhere and when. This of course involves +the being of a where and a when in which they can stand out; and that +where and when must needs be accounted for, and so on _ad infinitum_. +Again, Mr. Spencer would seem to speak, in his usual style, as if they, +in existing "objectively," had a _formal_ objective existence. Yet this, +in the very statement of it, appears absurd. The mind apprehends many +objects, which do not "exist." They only are. Thus, as has just been +said, Space and Time, as conditions of created being, _are_. They are +entities but not existences. They are _a priori_ entities, and so are +_necessarily_. By this they stand in the same category with all pure +laws, all first principles. + +"Moreover, to deny that Space and Time are things, and so by implication +to call them nothings, involves the absurdity that there are two kinds +of nothings." This sentence "involves the absurdity" of assuming that +"nothing" is an entity. If I say that Space is nothing, I say that it +presents no content for a concept, and cannot, because there is no +content to be presented. It is then _blank_. Just so of Time. As +nothings they are, then, both equally blank, and destitute of meaning. +Now if Mr. Spencer wishes to hold that nothing represented by one word, +differs from nothing represented by another, we would not lay a straw in +his way, but yet would be much surprised if he led a large company. + +Again, having decided that they are neither "nonentities nor the +attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them as +entities." But he then goes on to speak of them as "things," evidently +using the word in the same sense as if applying it to a material object, +as an apple or stone; thereby implying that entity and thing in that +sense are synonymous terms. Upon this leap in the dark, this blunder in +the use of language, he proceeds to build up a mountain of difficulties. +But once take away this foundation, once cease attempting "to represent +them in thought as things," and his difficulties vanish. Space is a +condition. Perhaps receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability are +attributes. If so, it has attributes, for these certainly belong to it. +But whether these shall be called attributes or not, it is certain that +Space is, is a pure condition, is thus a positive object to the Reason, +is qualified by the characteristics named above; and all this without +any contradiction or other insuperable difficulty arising thereby. On +the ground now established, we learn that extension and Space are _not_ +"convertible terms." Extension is an attribute of matter. Space is a +condition of phenomena. It is only all _physical_ "entities which we +actually know as such" that "are limited." From our standpoint, that +Space is _no_ thing, such remarks as "We find ourselves totally unable +to form any mental image of unbounded Space," appear painfully absurd. +"We find ourselves" just as "totally unable to form any mental image of +unbounded" love. Such phrases as "mental image" have _no relevancy_ to +either Space or Time. In criticizing Kant's doctrine, which we have +found _true_ as far as it goes, Mr. Spencer evinces a surprising lack of +knowledge of the facts in question. "In the first place," he says, "to +assert that Space and Time, as we are conscious of them, are subjective +conditions, is by implication to assert that they are not objective +realities." But the conclusion does not follow. If the reader will take +the trouble to construct the syllogism on which this is based, he will +at once perceive the absurdity of the logic. It may be said in general +that all conditions of a thinking being are both subjective and +objective: they are conditions of his being--subjective; and they are +objects of his examination and cognizance--objective. Is not the +multiplication table an objective reality, _i. e._, would it not remain +if he be destroyed? And yet is it not also a subjective law; and so was +it not originally discovered by introspection and reflection? Again he +says, "for that consciousness of Space and Time which we cannot rid +ourselves of, is the consciousness of them as existing objectively." Now +the fact is, that primarily we do not have _any_ consciousness of Space +and Time. _Consciousness has to do with phenomena._ When examining the +material Universe, the _objects_, and the objects as at a distance from +each other and as during, are what we are conscious of. For instance, I +view the planets Jupiter and Saturn. They appear as objects in my +consciousness. There is a distance between them; but this distance _is_ +not, except as they _are_. If they are not, the word distance has no +meaning with reference to them. Take them away, and I have no +consciousness of distance as remaining. These planets continue in +existence. They endure. This endurance we call time, but if they should +cease, one could not think of endurance in connection with them as +remaining. Here we most freely and willingly agree with Mr. Spencer that +"the question is, What does consciousness directly testify?" but he will +find that consciousness on this side of the water testifies very +differently from his consciousness: as for instance in the two articles +in the "North American Review," heretofore alluded to. Here, "the direct +testimony of consciousness is," that spaces and times within the +Universe are without the mind; that Space and Time, as _a priori_ +conditions for the possibility of formal object and during event, are +also without the mind; but the "testimony" is none the less clear and +"direct" that Space and Time are laws of thought in the mind +corresponding to the actualities without the mind. And the question may +be asked, it is believed with great force, If this last were not so, how +could the mind take any cognizance of the actuality? Again, most truly, +Space and Time "cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the +mind to become non-existent." Much more strongly than this should the +truth be uttered. They could not become non-existent if the Universe +with every sentient being, yea, even--to make an impossible +supposition--if the Deity himself, should cease to be. In this they +differ no whit from the laws of Mathematics, of Logic, and of Morals. +These too would remain as well. Thus is again enforced the truth, which +has been stated heretofore, that Space and Time, as _a priori_ +conditions of the Universe, stand in precisely the same relation to +material object and during event that the multiplication table does to +intellect, or the moral law to a spiritual person. It will now be +doubtless plain that Mr. Spencer's remarks sprang directly from the +lower faculties. The Sense in its very organization possesses Space and +Time as void forms into which objects may come. So also the +Understanding possesses the notional as connecting into a totality. +These faculties cannot be in a living man without acting. Activity is +their law. Hence images are ever arising and _must_ arise in the Sense, +and be connected in the Understanding, and all this in the forms and +conditions of Space and Time. He who thinks continually in these +conditions will always _imagine_ that Space and Time are only without +him--because he will be thinking only in the iron prison-house of the +imagining faculty--and so cannot transcend the conditions it imposes. +Now how shall one see these conditions? They do "exist objectively"; or, +to phrase it better, they have a true being independent of our minds. In +this sense, as we have seen, every _a priori_ condition must be +objective to the mind. What is objective to the Sense is not Space but a +space, _i. e._ a part of Space limited by matter; and, after all, it is +the boundaries which are the true object rather than the space, which +cannot be "conceived" of if the boundaries be removed. Without further +argument, is it not evident that there Space, like all other _a priori_ +conditions, is object only to the Reason, and that as a condition of +material existence? + +At the bottom of page 49 we have another of Mr. Spencer's psychological +errors:--"For if Space and Time are forms of thought, they can never be +thought of; since it is impossible for anything to be at once the _form_ +of thought and the matter of thought." Although this topic has been +amply discussed elsewhere, it may not be uninstructive to recur to it +again. Exactly the opposite of Mr. Spencer's remark is the truth. The +question at issue here is one of those profound and subtile ones which +cannot be approached by argument, but can be decided only by a _seeing_. +It is a psychological question pertaining to the profoundest depths of +our being. If one says, "I see the forms of thought," and another, "I +cannot see them," neither impeaches the other. All that is left is to +stimulate the dull faculty of the one until he can see. The following +reflections may help us to see. Mr. Spencer's remark implies that we +have no higher faculty than the Sense and the Understanding. It implies, +also, that we can never have any _self_-knowledge, in the fundamental +signification of that phrase. We can observe the conduct of the mind, +and study and classify the results; but the laws, the constitution of +the activity itself must forever remain closed to us. As was said, when +speaking of this subject under a different phase, the eye cannot see and +study itself. It is a mechanical organism, capable only of reaction as +acted upon, capable only of seeing results, but never able to penetrate +to the hidden springs which underlie the event. Just so is it with the +Sense and Understanding. They are mere mechanical faculties capable of +acting as they are acted upon, but never able to go behind the +appearance to its final source. On such a hypothesis as this all science +is impossible, but most of all a science of the human mind. If man is +enclosed by such walls, no knowledge of his central self can be gained. +He may know what he _does_; but what he _is_, is as inscrutable to him +as what God is. As such a being, he is only a higher order of brute. He +has some dim perceptions, some vague feelings, but he has no +_knowledge_; he is _sure_ of nothing. He can reach no ground which is +ultimate, no _Rock_ which he knows is _immutable_. Is man such a being? +The longings and aspirations of the ages roll back an unceasing NO! He +is capable of placing himself before himself, of analyzing that self to +the very groundwork of his being. All the laws of his constitution, all +the forms of his activity, he can clearly and amply place before himself +and know them. And how is this? It is because God has endowed him with +an EYE like unto His own, which enables man to be self-comprehending, as +He is self-comprehending,--the Reason, with which man may read himself +as a child reads a book; that man can make "the _form_ of thought the +_matter_ of thought." True, the Understanding is shut out from any +consideration of the forms of thought; but man is not simply or mainly +an Understanding. He is, in his highest being, a spiritual person, whom +God has endowed with the faculty of VISION; and the great organic evil, +which the fall wrought into the world, was this very denial of the +spiritual light, and this crowding down and out of sight, of the +spiritual person beneath the animal nature, this denial of the essential +faculties of such person, and this elevation of the lower faculties of +the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, into the highest place, +which is involved in all such teachings as we are criticizing. + +Mr. Spencer's remarks upon "Matter" are no nearer the truth. In almost +his first sentence there is a grievous logical _faux pas_. He says: +"Matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; no third +possibility can be named." Yet we will name one, as follows: _The +divisibility of matter has no relation to infinity_. And this _third_ +supposition happens to be the truth. But it will be said that the +question should be stated thus: Either there is a limit to the +divisibility of matter, or there is no limit. This statement is +exhaustive, because limitation belongs to matter. Of these alternatives +there can be no hesitation which one to choose. There is a limit to the +divisibility of matter. This answer cannot be given by the physical +sense; for no one questions but what it is incapable of finding a limit. +The mental sense could not give it, because it is a question of actual +substance and not of ideal forms. The Reason gives the answer. Matter is +limited at both extremes. Its amount is definite, as are its final +elements. These "ultimate parts" have "an under and an upper surface, a +right and a left side." When, then, one of these parts shall be broken, +what results? Not _pieces_, as the materialist, thinking only in the +Sense, would have us believe. When a final "part" shall be broken, there +will remain _no matter_,--to the sense nothing. To it, the result would +be annihilation. But the Reason declares that there would be left _God's +power_ in its simplicity,--that final Unit out of which all diversity +becomes. + +The subsequent difficulties raised respecting the solidity of Matter may +be explained thus. And for convenience sake, we will limit the term +Matter to such substances as are object to the physical sense, like +granite, while Force shall be used to comprise those finer substances, +like the Ether, which are impalpable to the physical sense. Matter is +composed of very minute ultimate particles which do not touch, but which +are held together by Force. The space between the atoms, which would +otherwise be _in vacuo_, is _full_ of Force. We might be more exhaustive +in our analysis, and say--which would be true--that a space-filling +force composes the Universe; and that Matter is only Force in one of its +modifications. But without this the other statement is sufficient. When, +then, a portion of matter is compressed, the force which holds the +ultimate particles in their places is overcome by an external force, and +these particles are brought nearer together. Now, how is it with the +moving body and the collision? Bisect a line and see the truth. + + C + A--------B + 1 + +A body with a mass of 4 is moving with a velocity of 4 along the line +from A to B. At C it meets another body with a mass of 4 at rest. From +thence the two move on towards B with a velocity of 2. What has +happened? In the body there was a certain amount of force, which set it +in motion and kept it in motion. And just here let us make a point. _No +force is ever lost or destroyed. It is only transferred._ When a bullet +is fired from a gun, it possesses at one _point_ a maximum of force. +From that point this force is steadily _transferred_ to the air and +other substances, until all that it received from the powder is spent. +But at any one point in its flight, the sum of the force which has been +transferred since the maximum, and of the force yet to be transferred, +will always equal the maximum. Now, how is it respecting the question +raised by Mr. Spencer? The instant of contact is a point in time, _not a +period_, and the transfer of force is instantaneous. C, then, is a +_point_, not a period, and the velocity on the one side is 4 and the +other side 2, while the momentum or force is exactly equal throughout +the line. If it is said that this proves that a body can pass from one +velocity to another without passing through the intermediate velocities, +we cannot help it. The above are the facts, and they give the truth. The +following sentence of Mr. Spencer is, at least, careless. "For when, of +two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes another at rest, the +striking unit must have its velocity 4 instantaneously reduced to +velocity 2; must pass from velocity 4 to velocity 2 without any lapse of +time, and without passing through intermediate velocities; must be +moving with velocities 4 and 2 at the same instant, which is +impossible." If there is any sense in the remark, "instantaneously" must +mean a _point_ of time _without period_. For, if any period is allowed, +the sentence has no meaning, since during that period "the striking +unit" passes through all "intermediate velocities." But if by +instantaneously he means _without period_, then the last clause of the +sentence is illogical, since instant there evidently means a period. For +if it means point, then it contradicts the first clause. There, it is +asserted that 4 was "_reduced_" to 2, _i. e._ that at one point the +velocity was 4, and at the next point it was 2, and that there was _no +time_ between. If 4 was instantaneously reduced to 2, then the velocity +2 was next after the velocity 4, and not coeval with it. Thus it appears +that these two clauses which were meant to be synonymous are +contradictory. + +Bearing in mind what we have heretofore learned respecting atoms, we +shall not be troubled by the objections to the Newtonian theory which +follow. In reply to the question, "What is the constitution of these +units?" the answer, "We have no alternative but to regard each of them +as a small piece of matter," would be true if the Sense was the only +faculty which could examine them. But even upon this theory Mr. +Spencer's remarks "respecting the parts of which each atom consists," +are entirely out of place; for the hypothesis that it is an ultimate +atom excludes the supposition of "parts," since that phrase has no +meaning except it refers to a final, indivisible, material unit. All +that the Sense could say, would be, "What this atom is I know not, but +that it is, and _is not divisible_, I believe." But when we see by the +Reason that the ultimate atom, when dissolved, becomes God's power, all +difficulty in the question vanishes. Having thus answered the above +objections, it is unnecessary to notice the similar ones raised against +Boscovich's theory, which is a modification of that of Newton. + +Mr. Spencer next examines certain phenomena of motion. The fact that he +seeks for absolute motion by the _physical sense_, a faculty which was +only given us to perceive relative--phenomenal--motion, and is, _in its +kind_, incapable of finding the absolute motion, (for if it should see +it, it could not _know_ it,) is sufficient to condemn all that he has +said on this subject. For the presentations which he has made of the +phenomena given us by the Sense does not exhaust the subject. The +perplexities therein developed are all resolvable, as will appear +further on. The phenomena adduced on page 55 are, then, merely +_appearances_ in the physical sense; and the motion is merely relative. +In the first instance, the captain walks East with reference to the ship +and globe. In the second, he walks East with reference to the ship; the +ship sails West with reference to the globe; while the resultant motion +is, that he is _stationary_ with reference to this larger object. What, +then, can the Sense give us? Only resultant motion, at the most. So we +see that "our ideas of Motion" are not "illusive," but _deficient_. The +motion is just what it appears, measured from a given object. It is +_relative_, and this is all the Sense _can_ give. Our author +acknowledges that "we tacitly assume that there are real motions"; that +"we take for granted that there are fixed points in space, with respect +to which all motions are absolute; and we find it impossible to rid +ourselves of this idea." A question instantly arises, and it seems to be +one which he is bound to entertain, viz: How comes this idea to be? We +press this question upon Mr. Spencer, being persuaded that he will find +it much more perplexing than those he has entertained. Undoubtedly, +"absolute motion cannot even be imagined." _No_ motion can be imagined, +though the moving body may be. But by no means does it follow, "much +less known." This involves that the knowing faculty is inferior to, and +more circumscribed than, the imagining faculty, when the very opposite +is the fact. Neither does it follow from what is said in the paragraph +beginning with, "For motion is change of place," that "while we are +obliged to think that there is absolute motion, we find absolute motion +incomprehensible." The Universe is limited and bounded, and is a sphere. +We _may_ assume that the centre of the sphere is at rest. Instantly +absolute motion becomes comprehensible, for it is motion measured from +that point. Surely there can be no harm in the _supposition_. The Reason +shows us that the supposition is the truth; and that that centre is the +throne of the eternal God. In this view not only is motion, apart from +the "limitations of space," totally unthinkable, but it is absolutely +impossible. Motion _cannot_ be, except as a formal body is. Hence, to +speak of motion in "unlimited space" is simply absurd. Formal object +_cannot_ be, except as _thereby_ a limit is established in Space. Hence +it is evident that "absolute motion" is not motion with reference to +"unlimited Space," which would be the same as motion without a moving; +but is motion with reference to that point fixed in Space, around which +all things revolve, but which is itself at perfect rest. + +"Another insuperable difficulty presents itself, when we contemplate the +transfer of Motion." Motion is simply the moving of a body, and _cannot +be transferred_. The _force_ which causes the motion is what is +transferred. All that can be said of motion is, that it is, that it +increases, that it diminishes, that it ceases. If the moving body +impinges upon another moving body, and causes it to move, it is not +motion that is transferred, but the force which causes the motion. The +motion in the impinging body is diminished, and a new motion is begun in +the body which was at rest. Again it is asked: "In what respect does a +body after impact differ from itself before impact?" And further on: +"The motion you say has been communicated. But how? What has been +communicated? The striking body has not transferred a _thing_ to the +body struck; and it is equally out of the question to say that it has +transferred an _attribute_." Observe now that a somewhat is +unquestionably communicated; and the question is:--What is it? Query. +Does Mr Spencer mean to comprehend the Universe in "thing" and +"attribute"? He would seem to. If he does, he gives a decision by +assertion without explanation or proof, which involves the very question +at issue, which is, Is the somewhat transferred a "thing" or an +"attribute"; and a decision directly contrary to the acknowledgment that +a somewhat has been communicated? On the above-named hypothesis his +statement should be as follows: A somewhat has been communicated. +"Thing" and "attribute" comprise all the Universe. Neither a thing, nor +an attribute has been communicated, _i. e._ no somewhat has been +communicated; which contradicts the evidence and the acknowledgment. If +on the other hand Mr. Spencer means that "thing" and "attribute" +comprise only a part of the Universe, then the question is not fairly +met. It may be more convenient for the moment to conclude the Universe +in the two terms thing and attribute; and then, as attribute is +essential to the object it qualifies, and so cannot be communicated, it +will follow that a thing has been communicated. This thing we call +force. It is not in hand now to inquire what force is. It is manifest to +the Sense that the body is in a different state after impact, than it +was before. Something has been put into the body, which, though not +directly appreciable to the Sense, is indirectly appreciable by the +results, and which is as real an addition as water is to a bowl, when +poured in. Before the impact the body was destitute of that kind of +force--motor force would be a convenient term--which tended to move it. +After the impact a sufficiency of that force was present to produce the +motion. It may be asked, where does this force go to when the motion +diminishes till the body stops. It passes into the substances which +cause the diminution until there is no surplus in the moving body, and +at the point of equilibrium motion ceases. If it be now asked, where +does this force ultimately go to, it is to be said that it comes from +God, and goes to God, who is the Final. The Sense gives only subordinate +answers, but the Reason leads us to the Supreme. + +If the view adopted be true, Mr. Spencer's halving and halving again +"the rate of movement forever," is irrelevant. It is not a _mental +operation_ but an _actual fact_ which is to be accounted for. Take a +striking illustration. A ball lying on smooth ice is struck with a +hockey. Away it goes skimming over the glassy surface with a steadily +diminishing velocity till it ceases. It starts, it proceeds, it stops. +These are the facts; and the mental operation must accord with them. +There is put into the ball, at the instant of contact, a certain amount +of motor force. From that instant onward, that force flows out of the +ball into the resisting substances by which it is surrounded, until none +is left. And it is just as pertinent to ask how all the water can flow +out of a pail, as how all the motor force can flow out of a moving +substance. "The smallest movement is separated" by no more of "an +impassable gap from no movement," _than it is from a larger movement +above it_. That which will account for a movement four becoming two, +will account for a movement two becoming zero. The "puzzle," then, may +be explained thus. Time is the procession of events. Let it be +represented by a line. Take a point in that line, which will then mark +its division but represent _no period_. On one side of that point is +rest; on the other motion. That point is the point of contact, and +occupies no period. At this point the motion is maximum. The force +instantly begins to flow off, and continues in a steady stream until +none is left, and the body is again at rest. Here, also, we take a +point. This is the point of zero. It again divides the line. Before the +bisection is motion; after the bisection is rest. All this cannot be +perceived by the Sense, nor conceived by the Understanding. It is seen +by the Reason. Now observe the actual phenomenon. The ball starts, +proceeds, stops. From maximum to zero there is a steady diminution, or +nearly enough so for the experiment; at least the diminution can be +averaged for the illustration. Then comparing motion with time, the same +difficulty falls upon the one as the other. If the motion is halved, the +time must be; and so, "mentally," it is impossible to imagine how a +moment of time can pass. To the halving faculty--the Sense--this is +true, and so we are compelled to correct our course of procedure. This +it is. The Sense and Understanding being impotent to discover an +absolute unit of any kind, the Sense _assumes_ for itself what meets all +practical want--a standard unit, by which it measures parts in Space and +Time. So motion must be measured by some assumed standard; and as, like +time,--duration,--it can be represented by a line, let them have a +common standard. Suppose, then, that the ball's flight occupies ten +minutes of time. The line from m to z will be divided into ten exactly +equal spaces; and it will be no more difficult to account for the flow +of force from 10 to 9, than from 1 to 0. Also let it be observed that +the force, like time, is a unit, which the Sense, for its convenience, +divides into parts; but that neither those parts, nor any parts, have +any real existence. As Time is an indivisible whole, measured off for +convenience, so any given force is such a whole, and is so measured off. +All this appearing and measuring are phenomenal in the Sense. It is the +Reason which sees that they can be _only_ phenomenal, and that behind +the appearance is pure Spirit--God, who is primarily out of all +relation. + +On page 58, near the close of his illustration of the chair, Mr. Spencer +says: "It suffices to remark that since the force as known to us is an +affection of consciousness, we cannot conceive the force as existing in +the chair under the same form without endowing the chair with +consciousness." This very strange assertion can only be true, provided a +major premiss, No force can be conceived to exist without involving an +affection of consciousness in the object in which it _apparently_ +inheres, is true. Such a premiss seems worse than absurd; it seems +silly. We cannot learn that force exists, without our consciousness is +affected thereby; but this is a very different thing from our being +unable to conceive of a force as _existing_, without there is a +consciousness in the object through which it _appears_. If Mr. Spencer +had said that no force can be, without being exerted, and no force can +be exerted, without an affection of the consciousness of the exertor, he +would have uttered the truth. We would then have the following result. +Primarily all force is exerted by the Deity; and he is conscious +thereof. He draws the chair down just as really as though the hand were +visible. Secondarily spiritual persons are endowed by their Creator with +the ability to exert his force for their uses, and so I lift the chair. +The great error, which appears on every page of Mr. Spencer's book and +invalidates all his conclusions, shows itself fully here. He presents +images from the Sense, and then tries to satisfy the Reason--the faculty +which calls for an absolute account--by the analyses of that Sense. His +attempt to "halve the rate," his remark that "the smallest movement is +separated by an impassable gap from no movement," and many such, are +only pertinent to the Sense, can never be explained by the Sense, and +are found by the Reason to need, and be capable of, no such kind of +explanation as the Sense attempts; but that the phenomena are +appearances in _wholes_, whose partitions cannot be absolute, and that +these wholes are accounted for by the being of an absolute and infinite +Person--God, who is utterly impalpable to the Sense, and can be known +only by the Reason. + +The improper use of the Sense mentioned above, is, if possible, more +emphatically exemplified in the remarks upon "the connection between +Force and Matter." "Our ultimate test of Matter is the ability to +resist." This is true to the Sense, but no farther. "Resist" what? Other +matter, of course. Thus is the sensuousness made manifest. In the Sense, +then, we have a material object. But Force is not object to the Sense +directly, but only indirectly by its effects through Matter. The Sense, +in its percept, deems the force other than the matter. Hence it is +really no more difficult for the Sense to answer the question, How could +the Sun send a force through 95,000,000 of miles of void to the Earth +and hold it, than through solid rock that distance? All that the Sense +_can do_ is to present the phenomena. It is utterly impotent to account +for the least of them. + +In the following passage, on page 61, Mr. Spencer seems to have been +unaccountably led astray. He says: "Let the atoms be twice as far apart, +and their attractions and repulsions will both be reduced to one fourth +of their present amounts. Let them be brought within half the distance, +and then attractions and repulsions will both be quadrupled. Whence it +follows that this matter will as readily as not assume any other +density; and can offer no resistance to any external agents." Now if +this be true, there can be no "external agents" to which to offer any +"resistance." It is simply to assert that all force neutralizes itself; +and that matter is impossible. But the conclusion does not "follow." It +is evidently based on the supposition that the "attractions and +repulsions" are _contra_-acting forces which exactly balance each other, +and so the molecules are held in their position by _no_ force. Instead +of this, they are _co_-acting forces, which are wholly expended in +holding the molecules in their places. The repulsions, then, are +expended in resisting pressure from without which seeks to crowd the +particles in upon themselves and thus disturb their equilibrium; while +the attractions are expended in holding the particles down to their +natural distance from each other when any disturbing force attempts to +separate them. Hence, referring to the two cases mentioned, in the first +instance the power of resistance is reduced to one fourth, and this +corresponds with the fact; and in the second instance the power of +resistance is increased fourfold, and this corresponds with the fact. + +We thus arrive at the end of Mr. Spencer's remarks concerning the +material Universe and of our strictures thereon. Perhaps the reader's +mind cannot better be satisfied as to the validity of these strictures +than by presenting an outline of the system furnished by the Reason, and +upon which they are based. + +The Reason gives, by a direct and immediate intuition, and as a +necessary _a priori_ idea, God. This is a _spontaneous_, synthetical +act, precisely the same in kind with that which gives a simple _a +priori_ principle, as idea. In it the Reason intuits, not a single +principle seen to be necessary simply, but the fact that all possible +principles _must_ be combined in a perfectly harmonious unity, in a +single Being, who thereby possesses all possible endowments; and so is +utterly independent, and is seen to be the absolute and infinite Person, +the perfect Spirit. This act is no conclusion of the One from the many +in a synthetical judgment, but is entirely different. It is the +necessary seeing of the many in the One; and so is not a judgment but an +intuition, not a guess but a certainty. God, then, is known, when known +at all, not "by plurality, difference, and relation," but by an +_immediate_ insight into his unity, and so is directly known as he is. +And the whole Universe is, that creatures might be, to whom this +revelation was possible. Among the other necessary endowments which this +intuition reveals, is that of immanent power commensurate with his +dignity, and adequate to realize in actual creatures the necessary _a +priori_ ideas, which he also possesses as endowments. Power is, then, a +simple idea, incapable of analysis; and which cannot therefore be +defined, except by synonymous terms; and to which President Hopkins's +remark upon moral obligation is equally pertinent; viz: "that we can +only state the occasion on which it arises." From these data the _a +priori_ idea of the Universe may be developed as follows:-- + +God, the absolute and infinite Person, possesses, as inherent endowment +forever immanent in himself, Universal Genius; which is at once capacity +and faculty, in which he sees, and by which he sees, all possible ideas, +and these in all possible combinations or ideals. Thus has he all +possible knowledge. From the various ideal systems which thus are, he, +having perfect wisdom, and according his choice to the behest of his own +worth, selects that one which is thus seen to be best; and thereby +determines the forms and laws under which the Universe shall become. He +also possesses, as inherent endowment, all power; _i. e._ the ability to +realize every one of his ideals; but _not_ the ability to violate the +natural laws of his being, as to make two and two five. The ideal system +is only ideal: the power is simply power; and so long as the two remain +isolated, no-thing will be. Therefore, in order to the realization of +his ideal, it must be combined with the power; _i. e._, the power must +be organized according to the ideal. How, then, can the power, having +been sent forth from God, be organized? Thus. If the power goes forth in +its simplicity, it will be expended uselessly, because there is no +substance upon which it may be exercised. It follows, then, that, if +exercised at all, it must be exercised upon _itself_. When, therefore, +God would create the Universe, he sent forth two "pencils," or columns +of power, of equal and sufficient volume, which, acting upon each other +from opposite directions, just held each other in balance, and thus +force was. These two "pencils," thus balancing each other, would result +in a sphere of "space-filling force." The point of contact would +determine the first place in Space, and the first point in Time; from +which, if attainable, an absolute measure of each could be made. All we +have now attained is the single duality "space-filling force," which is +wholly homogeneous, is of sufficient volume to constitute the Universe, +and yet by no means _is_ the Universe. There is only Chaos, "without +form and void, and darkness" is "upon the face of the deep." Now must +"the Spirit of God move upon the face of the waters"; then through vast +and to us immeasurable periods of time, through cycle and epicycle, the +work of organization will go on. Ever moving under forms laid down in +the _a priori_ ideal, God's power turns upon itself, as out of the crush +of elemental chaos the Universe is being evolved. During this process, +whatever of the force is to act under the law of heat in the _a priori_ +ideal, assumes that form and the heat force becomes; whatever is to act +under the law of magnetism, assumes that form, and magnetic force +becomes; so of light, and the various forms of matter. At length, in the +revolution of the cycles, the Universe attains that degree of +preparation which fits it for living things to be, and the life force is +organized; and by degrees all its various forms are brought forth. After +another vast period that point is reached when an animal may be +organized, which shall be the dwelling-place for a time of a being whose +life is utterly different in kind from any animal life, and man appears. +Now in all these vast processes, be it observed that God is personally +present, that the first energy was his, and that every subsequent +energizing act is his special and personal act. He organized the +duality, force. He then organized this force into heat-force, +light-force, magnetic-force, matter-force, life-force, and soul-force. +And so it is that his personal supervision and energy is actually +present in every atom of the Universe. When we turn from this process of +thought to the sensible facts, and speak of granite, sandstone, schist, +clay, herbage, animals, yes, of the thousand kinds of substance which +appear to the eye, it is to be remembered that all these are but _forms +to the Sense_ of that "reason-conception," force,--that primal duality, +which power acting upon itself becomes. Now as the machine can never +carve any other image than those for which it is specially constructed, +and must work just as it is made to work, so the Sense, which is purely +mechanical, can never do any other than the work for which it was made, +can never transcend the laws of its organization. It can only give +forms--results, but is impotent to go behind them. It can only say _that +things are_, but never say _what_ or _why_ they are. + +Seen in the light of the theory which has thus been presented, Mr. +Spencer's difficulties vanish. Matter is force. Motion is matter +affected by another form of force. The "puzzle" of motion and rest is +only phenomenal to the Sense; it is an appearance of force acting +through another force. It may also be said that the Universe is solid +force. There is no void in it. There is no nook, no crevice or cranny, +that is not full of force. To seek, then, for some medium through which +force may traverse vast distances, is the perfection of superfluity. +From centre to circumference it is present, and controls all things, and +is all things. So it is no more difficult to see how force reaches forth +and holds worlds in their place, than how it draws down the pebble which +a boy has thrown into the air. It is no substance which must travel over +the distance, it is rather an inflexible rod which swings the worlds +round in their orbits. Whether, then, we look at calcined crags or +lilies of the valley, whether astronomy, or geology, or chemistry be our +study, the objects grouped under those sciences will be found to be +equally the results of this one force, acting under different laws, and +taking upon itself different forms, and becoming different objects. + +That faculty and that line of thought, which have given so readily the +solution of the difficulties brought to view by Mr. Spencer's +examination of the outer world, will afford us an easier solution, if +possible, of the difficulties which he has raised respecting the inner +world. That which is not of us, but is far from us, may perchance be +imperfectly known; but ourselves, what we are, and the laws of our +being, may be certainly and accurately known. And this is the highest +knowledge. It may be important, as an element of culture, that we become +acquainted with many facts respecting the outer world. It cannot but be +of the utmost importance, that we know ourselves; for thus only can we +fulfil the behest of that likeness to God, in which we were originally +created. We seek for, we may obtain, we _have obtained_ knowledge in the +inner world,--a knowledge sure, steadfast, immutable. + +It seems to be more than a mere verbal criticism, rather a fundamental +one, that it is not "our states of consciousness" which "occur in +succession"; but that the modifications in our consciousness so occur. +Consciousness is _one_, and retains that oneness throughout all +modifications. These occur in the unity, as items of experience affect +it. Is this series of modifications "of consciousness infinite or +finite"? To this question experience _can_ give no answer. All +experiments are irrelevant; because these can only be after the faculty +of consciousness is. They can go no further back than the _forms_ of the +activity. These they may find, but they cannot account for. A law lies +on all those powers by which an experiment may be made, which forever +estops them from attaining to the substance of the power which lies back +of the form. The eye cannot examine itself. The Sense, as mental +capacity for the reception of impressions, cannot analyze its +constituents. The Understanding, as connective faculty concluding in +judgments, is impotent to discover why it must judge one way and not +another. It is only when we ascend to the Reason that we reach the +region of true knowledge. Here, overlooking, analyzing all the conduct +of the lower powers, and holding the self right in the full blaze of the +Eye of self, Man attains a true and fundamental _self-knowledge_. From +this Mount of Vision we know that infinity and finiteness have no +pertinence to modifications of consciousness, or in fact to any series. +We attain to the further knowledge that this series is, _must be_, +limited; because the constituted beings, in whom it in each case +inheres, are limited, and had a beginning. It matters not now to inquire +how a self-conscious person could be created. It is sufficient to know +that one has been created. This fact involves the further fact that +consciousness, as an actuality, began in the order of nature, after the +being to whom it belongs as endowment, or, in other words, an +organization must be, before the modifications which inhere in that +organization can become. The attainment of this as necessary law is far +more satisfactory than any experience could be, were it possible; for we +can never know but that an experience may be modified; but a law given +in the intuition is immutable. The fact, ascertained many pages back, +that the subject and the object are identical under the final +examination of the Reason, enables us to attain the present end of the +chain. The question is one of fact, and is purely psychological. It +cannot be passed upon, or in any way interfered with, by logical +processes. It is only by examination, by seeing, that the truth can be +known. Faraday ridiculed as preposterous the pretension that a vessel +propelled by steam could cross the ocean, and demonstrated, to his +entire satisfaction, the impossibility of the event. Yet the Savannah +crossed, and laughed at him. Just so here, all arguing is folly. The +question is one of fact in experience. And upon it the soul gives +undoubted answer, as we have stated. Nor is it so difficult, as some +would have us believe, to see how this may be. Consciousness is an +indivisible unity, and, as we have before seen, may best be defined as +the light in which the person intuits his own acts and activities. This +unity is abiding, and is ground for the modifications. It is, then, +_now_, and the person now knows what the present modification _is_. The +person does not need to look to memory and learn what the former +modification was. It immediately knows what the modification _is_ now. +Thus a simple attainment of the psychological truth through a careful +examination dispels as a morning mist the whole cloud of Mr. Spencer's +difficulties. Well might President Hopkins say, "The only question is, +what is it that consciousness gives? If we say that it does thus give +both the subject and the object, that simple affirmation sweeps away in +a moment the whole basis of the ideal and skeptical philosophy. It +becomes as the spear of Ithuriel, and its simple touch will change what +seemed whole continents of solid speculation into mere banks of German +fog." We have learned, then, that it is not possible, or necessary, +either to "perceive" or "conceive" the terminations of consciousness, +because this involves the discovery, by _mechanical_ faculties, of their +own being and state before they became activities on the one hand, which +is a contradiction, and on the other an utter transcending of the sphere +of their capability, the attempt to do which would be a greater folly +than would be that of the hand to see Jupiter. But we have intuited the +law, which declares the necessity of a beginning for us and all +creatures; and we ever live in the light of the present end. When, then, +Mr. Spencer says that "Consciousness implies perpetual change and the +perpetual establishment of relations between its successive phases," we +know that he has uttered a fundamental psychological error, in fact, +that almost the opposite is the truth. Consciousness is the permanent, +the abiding, the changeless. It is the light of the personal Eye. Into +it all changes come; but they are only _incidental_. In the finite and +partial person, they come, because such person _must grow_; and so, +because of his partiality and incompleteness, they become necessary +incidents; but let there be a Person having all knowledge, who therefore +cannot learn, having all perfection, who therefore cannot change, and it +is plain that these facts in no way interfere with his consciousness. +All variety is immanent in its light, and no change can come into it +because _there is no change to come_; but this Person sees _all_ his +endowments _at once_, in the unity of this his light, just as we see +_some_ of our endowments in the unity of this our light. The change is +not in the consciousness, but in the objects which come into it. This +view also disposes of the theory that "any mental affection must be +known as like these foregoing ones or unlike those"; that, "if it is not +thought of in connection with others--not distinguished or identified by +comparison with others, it is not recognized--is not a state of +consciousness at all." Such comparison we have found only incidental in +consciousness, pertaining to things in the Sense and Understanding and +not essential. Thus does a true psychology dissipate all these +difficulties as a true cosmology explained the perplexities "of Motion +and Rest." + +Take another step and we can answer the question "What is this that +thinks?" It is a spiritual person. What, then, is a spiritual person? A +substance--a kind of force--the nature of which we need inquire about no +further than to know that it is suitable to the use which is made of it, +which is organized, according to a set of constituting laws, into such +spiritual person. The substance without the laws would be simple +substance, and nothing more. The laws without the substance would be +only laws, and could give no being having no ground in which to inhere. +But the substance as ground and the complete set of laws as inhering in +the ground, and being its organization when combined, become a spiritual +person who thinks. The _ego_, that is the sense of personality, is only +one of the forms of activity of this being, and therefore cannot be said +to think. The pages now before us are all vitiated by the theory that +"successive impressions and ideas constitute consciousness." Once attain +to the true psychology of the person, and learn that consciousness is as +stated above,--an abiding light into which modifications come,--and +there arises no difficulty in believing in the reality of self, and in +entirely justifying that belief by Reason. Yea, more, from such a +standpoint it is utter unreason, the height of folly, to doubt for an +instant, for immanent and central in the light of Reason lies the solemn +fact of man's selfhood. We arrive, then, directly at Mr. Spencer's +conclusion, that "Clearly, a true cognition of self implies a state in +which the knowing and the known are one--in which subject and object are +identified," and we _know_ that such a state is an actuality. Mr. Mansel +may hold that such an assertion is the annihilation of both, but he is +wholly wrong. The Savannah has crossed the Atlantic. + +We attain, then, exactly the opposite result from Mr. Spencer. We have +seen that "Ultimate Scientific Ideas are all" presentative "of +realities" which can "be comprehended." We have, indeed, found it to be +true, that, "after no matter how great a progress in the colligation of +facts and the establishment of generalizations ever wider and +wider,--after the merging of limited and derivative truths in truths +that are larger and deeper, has been carried no matter how far,--the +fundamental truth remains as much beyond reach as ever." But having +learned this, we do not arrive at the conclusion that "the explanation +of that which is explicable does but bring out into greater clearness +the inexplicableness of that which remains behind." On the other hand we +know that such a conclusion is erroneous, and _that the method by which +it is reached is a false method, and utterly irrelevant to the object +sought_. Could this lesson but be thoroughly learned, Mr. Spencer's +work, and our work, would not have been in vain. Only by a method +differing from this IN KIND--a method in which there is no "colligation +of facts," and no "generalizations" concluded therefrom, but a simple, +direct insight into Pure Truth--can "the fundamental truth" be known; +and thus it may be known by every human soul. "_God made man in his own +image._" In our scheme there is ample room for the man of Science, with +the eye of Sense, to run through the Universe, and gather facts. With +telescope and microscope, he may pursue them, and capture innumerable +multitudes of them. But having done this, we count it folly to attempt +to generalize truth therefrom. But holding up the facts in the clear +light of Reason, and searching them through and through, we _see_ in +them the immutable principle, known by a spontaneous, immediate, +intuitive knowledge to be immutable, and thus we "_know the truth_." + + + + +"THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE." + + +In the opening of this chapter, Mr. Spencer states the result, which, in +his opinion, philosophy has attained as follows: "All possible +conceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and so the +entire field of speculation has been gradually exhausted without +positive result; the only result arrived at being the negative one above +stated--that the reality existing behind all appearances is, and must +ever be, unknown." He then sets down a considerable list of names of +philosophers, who are claimed by Sir William Hamilton as supporters of +that position. Such a parade of names may be grateful to the feelings of +the Limitists, but it is no support to their cause. The questions at +issue are of such a nature that no array of dignities, of learning, of +profound _opinions_, can have a feather's weight in the decision. For +instance, take Problem XLVII, of the first book of Euclid. What weight +have human opinion with reference to its validity? Though a thousand +mathematicians should deny its truth, it would be just as convincing as +now; and when a thousand mathematicians assert its truth, they add no +item to the vividness of the conviction. The school-boy, who never heard +of one of them, when he first reads it, knows it must be so, and that +this is an inevitable necessity, beyond the possibility of any power or +will to change. On principles simple, fixed, and final, just like those +of mathematics, seen by the same Eye and known with the same +intellectual certainty, and by logical processes just as pure, +conclusive, _demonstrative_ as those of geometry, _and by such alone_, +can the questions now before us be settled. But though names and +opinions have no weight in the final decision, though a demonstration is +demanded and must be given, still it is interesting to note the absence +of two names, representatives of a class, which must ever awaken, among +the devout and pure-hearted, attention and love, and whose teachings, +however unnoticed by Mr. Spencer, are a leaven working in the minds and +hearts of men, which develop with continually increasing distinctness +the solemn and sublime truth, that the human mind is capable of absolute +knowledge. Plato, with serious, yea, sad countenance, the butt of jeer +and scoff from the wits and comedians of his day, went about teaching +those who hung upon his lips, that in every human soul were Ideas which +God had implanted, and which were final truth. And Jesus Christ, with a +countenance more beautifully serious, more sweetly sad, said to those +Jews which believed on him, "If ye continue in my word, then are ye my +disciples indeed; _and ye shall know the truth_, and the truth shall +make you free." It may seem to men who grope about in the dismal cavern +of the animal nature--the Sense and Understanding--wise to refuse the +light, and reject the truths of the Pure Reason and the God-man, and to +call the motley conglomeration of facts which they gather, but cannot +explain, philosophy; but no soul which craves "the Higher Life" will, +can be satisfied with such attainments. It yearns for, it cries after, +yea, with ceaseless iteration it urges its supplication for the highest +truth; and it shall attain to it, because God, in giving the tongue to +cry, gave also the Eye to see. The Spiritual person in man, made in the +very image of God, can never be satisfied till, stripped of the weight +of the animal nature, it sees with its own Eye the Pure Reason, God as +the Highest Truth. And to bring it by culture, by every possible +manifestation of his wondrous nature, up to this high Mount of Vision, +is one object of God in his system of the Universe. + +The teaching of the Word--that august personage, "who came forth from +God, and went to God," has been alluded to above. It deserves more than +an allusion, more than any notice which can be given it here. It is +astonishing, though perhaps not wholly unaccountable, that the writings +of the apostles John and Paul have received so little attention from +the metaphysicians of the world, as declarations of metaphysical truths. +Even the most devout students of them do not seem to have appreciated +their inestimable value in this regard. The reason for this undoubtedly +is, that their transcendent importance as declarations of religious +truth has shone with such dazzling effulgence upon the eyes of those who +have loved them, that the lesser, but harmoniously combining beams of a +true spiritual philosophy have been unnoticed in the glory of the nobler +light. It will not, therefore, we trust, be deemed irreverent to say +that, laying aside all questions of the Divinity of Christ, or of the +inspiration of the Bible, and considering the writings of John and Paul +merely as human productions, written at some time nobody knows when, and +by some men nobody knows who, they are the most wonderful revelations, +the profoundest metaphysical treatises the world has ever seen. In them +the highest truths, those most difficult of attainment by processes of +reflection, are stated in simple, clear language, and _they answer +exactly to the teachings of the Reason_. Upon this, President Hopkins +says: "The identity which we found in the last lecture between the +teaching of the constitution of man and the law of God, was not sought. +The result was reached because the analysis would go there. I was myself +surprised at the exactness of the coincidence." Nor is this coincidence +to be observed simply in the statement of the moral law. In all +questions pertaining to man's nature and state, the two will be found in +exact accord. No law is affirmed by either, but is accorded to by the +other. In fine, whoever wrote the Book must have had an accurate and +exhaustive knowledge of Man, about whom he wrote. Without any reference +then to their religious bearings, but simply as expositions of +metaphysical truths, the writings of the two authors named deserve our +most careful attention. What we seek for are laws, final, fixed laws, +which are seen by a direct intuition to be such; and these writings are +of great value, because they cultivate and assist the Reason in its +search for these highest Truths. + +One need have no hesitation, then, in rejecting the authority of Mr. +Spencer's names, aye, even if they were a thousand more. We seek for, +and can obtain, that which he cannot give us--a demonstration; which he +cannot give us because he denies the very existence of that faculty by +which alone a demonstration is possible. As his empiricism is worthless, +so is his rationality. No "deduction" from any "_product_ of thought, or +process of thought," is in any way applicable to the question in hand. +Intuitions are the mental actions needed. Light is neither product nor +process. We pass over, then, his whole illustration of the partridge. It +proves nothing. He leads us through an interminable series of questions +to no goal; and says there is none. He gives the soul a stone, when it +cries for bread. One sentence of his is doubtless true. "Manifestly, as +the _most_ general cognition at which we arrive cannot be reduced to a +more general one, it cannot be understood." Of course not. When the +Understanding has attained to the last generalization _by these very +terms_, it cannot go any farther. But by no means does his conclusion +follow, that "Of necessity, therefore, explanation must eventually bring +us down to the inexplicable. The deepest truth which we can get at must +be unaccountable. Comprehension must become something other than +comprehension, before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." How shall +we account for the last generalization, and show this conclusion to be +false? Thus. Hitherto there have been, properly speaking, no +comprehensions, only perceptions in the Sense and connections in the +Understanding. "The sense _distinguishes_ quality and _conjoins_ +quantity; the understanding _connects_ phenomena; the reason +_comprehends_ the whole operation of both." The Reason, then, overseeing +the operations of the lower faculties, and possessing within itself the +_a priori_ laws in accordance with which they are, _sees_ directly and +immediately why they are, and thus comprehends and accounts for them. It +sees that there is an end to every process of generalization; and it +then sees, what the Understanding could never guess, that _after_--in +the order of our procedure--the last generalization there is an eternal +truth, in accordance with which process and conclusion were and must be. +There remains, then, no inexplicable, for the final truth is seen and +known in its very self. + +The passages quoted at this point from Hamilton and Mansel have been +heretofore examined, and need no further notice. We will pass on then to +his subsequent reflections upon them. It is worthy of remark, as a +general criticism upon these comments, that there is scarcely one, if +there is a single expression in the remainder of this chapter, which +does not refer to the animal nature and its functions. The illustrations +are from the material world, and the terms and expressions are suited +thereto. With reference to objects in the Sense, and connections in the +Understanding, the "fundamental condition of thought," which Mr. Spencer +supplies, is unquestionably valuable. There is "likeness" as well as +"relation, plurality, and difference." But observe that both these laws +alike are pertinent only to the Sense and Understanding, that they +belong to _things in nature_, and consequently have no pertinence to the +questions now before us. We are discussing _ideas_, not _things_; and +those are simple, and can only be seen, while these are complex, and may +be perceived, distinguished, and conceived. If any one shall doubt that +Mr. Spencer is wholly occupied with things in nature, it would seem that +after having read p. 80, he could doubt no longer. "Animals," "species +or genus," "mammals, birds, reptiles, or fishes," are objects by which +he illustrates his subject. And one is forced to exclaim, "How can he +speak of such things when they have nothing to do with the matter in +hand? What have God and infinity and absoluteness to do with 'mammals, +birds, reptiles, or fishes'? If we can know only these, why speak of +those?" It would seem that the instant they are thus set together and +contrasted, the soul must cry out with an irrepressible cry, "It is by +an utterly different faculty, and in entirely other modes, that I dwell +upon God and the questions concerning him. These modes of the animal +nature, by which I know 'mammals,' are different in kind from those of +the spiritual person, by which I know God and the eternal truth." And +when this distinction becomes clearly appreciated and fixed in one's +mind, and the query arises, how could a man so confound the two, and +make utter confusion of the subject, as the Limitists have done, he can +hardly refrain from quoting Romans I. 20 _et seq._ against them. + +Let us observe now Mr. Spencer's corollary. "A cognition of the Real as +distinguished from the Phenomenal must, if it exists, conform to this +law of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the +Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought +of, it must be thought of as such or such--as of this or that kind." To +begin with the law which is here asserted, is _not_ a "general" law, and +so does not lie upon all cognition. It is only a special law, and lies +only upon a particular kind of cognition. This has been already +abundantly shown; yet we reproduce one line of proof. No mathematical +law comes under his law of cognition; neither can he, nor any other +Limitist, make it appear that it does so come. His law is law only for +things in nature, and not for principles. Since then all ideas are known +in themselves--are _self-evident_, and since God, infinity, and +absoluteness are ideas, they are known in themselves, and need not be +classed. So his corollary falls to the ground. Can we have any "sensible +experience" of God? Most certainly not. Yet we can have just as much a +sensible experience of him as of any other person--of parent, wife, or +child. Did you ever see a person--a soul? No. Can you see--"have +sensible experience of"--a soul? No. What is it, then, that we have such +experience of? Plainly the body--that material frame through which the +soul manifests itself. The Universe is that material system through +which God manifests himself to those spiritual persons whom he has made; +and that manifestation is the same in kind as that of a created soul +through the body which is given it. It follows then,--and not only from +this, but it may be shown by further illustration,--that every other +person is just as really inscrutable to us as God is; and further, that, +if we can study and comprehend the soul of our wife or child, we can +with equal certainty study, and to some extent comprehend, the soul of +God. Or, in other words, if man is only an animal nature, having a Sense +and Understanding, all personality is an insoluble mystery; all +spiritual persons are alike utterly inscrutable. And this is so, +because, upon the hypothesis taken, man is destitute of any faculty +which can catch a glimpse of such object. A Sense and Understanding can +no more see, or in any possible manner take cognizance of, a spiritual +person than a man born blind can see the sun. Again, we say he is +destitute of the faculty. Will Mr. Spencer deny the fact of the idea of +personality? Will he assert that man has no such notion? Let him once +admit that he has, and in that admission is involved the admission of +the reality of that faculty by which we know God, for the faculty which +cognizes personality, and cognizes God, is one and the same. + +Although we do not like certain of Mr. Spencer's terms, yet, to please +him, we will use them. Some conclusions, then, may be expressed thus: +God as the Deity cannot be "classed"; he is unique. This is involved in +the very terms by which we designate him. Yet we cognize him, but this +is by an immediate intuition, in which we know him as he is in himself. +"We shall see him as he is," says the apostle; and some foretastes of +that transcendent revelation are vouchsafed us here on earth. But the +infinite Person, _as person_, must be "assimilated" with other persons. +Yet his infinity and absoluteness, _as such_, cannot be "grouped." And +yet again, _as qualities_, they can be "grouped" with other qualities. +Unquestionably between the Creator, _as such_, and the created, _as +such_, "there must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions +existing between different divisions of the created." God as +self-existent differs in kind from man as dependent, and this difference +continues irrevocable; while that same God and that same man are _alike_ +in kind _as persons_. This is true, because all spiritual persons are +composite beings; and while the essential elements of a spiritual person +are common to created persons and the uncreated Person, there are +_other_ characteristics, _not essential_ to personality, which belong +some to the created, and some to the uncreated, and differentiate them. +Or, in other words, God as person, and man as person, are alike. Yet +they are diverse in kind, and so diverse in kind that it is out of the +range of possibility for that diversity to be removed. How can this be +explained? Evidently thus. There are _qualities_ transfusing the +personality which cannot be interchangeable, and which constitute the +diversity. Personality is _form_ of being. Qualities transfuse the form. +Absoluteness and infinity are qualities which belong to one Person, and +are such that they thereby exclude the possibility of their belonging to +any other person; and so they constitute that one to whom they belong, +unique and supreme. Dependence and partiality are also qualities of a +spiritual person, but are qualities of the created spiritual person, and +are such as must always subordinate that person to the other. In each +instance it is, "_in the nature of things_," impossible for either to +pass over and become the other. Each is what he is by the terms of his +being, and must stay so. + +But from all this it by no means follows that the dependent spiritual +person can have no knowledge of the independent spiritual Person. On the +other hand, it is the high glory of the independent spiritual Person, +that he can create another being "in his own image," to whom he can +communicate a knowledge of himself. "Like as a father pitieth his +children, so Jehovah pitieth them that fear him." Out of the fact of +his Father-hood and our childhood, comes that solemn, and, to the loving +soul, joyful fact, that he teaches us the highest knowledge just as +really as our earthly parents teach us earthly knowledge. This he could +not do if we had not the capacity to receive the knowledge; and we could +not have had the capacity, except he had been able, in "the nature of +things," and willing to bestow it upon us. While, then, God as "the +Unconditioned cannot be classed," and so as unconditioned we do not know +him "as of such or such kind," after the manner of the Understanding, +yet we may, do, "see him as he is," do know that he is, and is +unconditioned, through the insight of the Reason, the eye of the +spiritual person, and what it is to be unconditioned. + +We now reach a passage which has filled us with unqualified amazement. +As much as we had familiarized ourselves with the materialistic +teachings of the Limitists, we confess that we were utterly unprepared +to meet, even in Mr. Spencer's writings, a theory of man so ineffably +degrading, and uttered with so calm and naive an unconsciousness of the +degradation it involved, as the following. Although for want of room his +illustrations are omitted, it is believed that the following extracts +give a fair and ample presentation of his doctrine. + +"All vital actions, considered not separately but in their ensemble, +have for their final purpose the balancing of certain outer processes by +certain inner processes. + +"There are unceasing external forces, tending to bring the matter of +which organic bodies consist, into that state of stable equilibrium +displayed by inorganic bodies; there are internal forces by which this +tendency is constantly antagonized; and the perpetual changes which +constitute Life may be regarded as incidental to the maintenance of the +antagonism.... + +"When we contemplate the lower kinds of life, we see that the +correspondences thus maintained are direct and simple; as in a plant, +the vitality of which mainly consists in osmotic and chemical actions +responding to the coexistence of light, heat, water, and carbonic acid +around it. But in animals, and especially in the higher orders of them, +the correspondences become extremely complex. Materials for growth and +repair not being, like those which plants require, everywhere present, +but being widely dispersed and under special forms, have to be formed, +to be secured, and to be reduced to a fit state for assimilation.... + +"What is that process by which food when swallowed is reduced to a fit +form for assimilation, but a set of mechanical and chemical actions +responding to the mechanical and chemical actions which distinguish the +food? Whence it becomes manifest, that, while Life in its simplest form +is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions, each advance to a higher form of +Life consists in a better preservation of this primary correspondence by +the establishment of other correspondences. Divesting this conception of +all superfluities, and reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see +that Life is definable as the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations. And when we so define it, we discover +that the physical and the psychial life are equally comprehended by the +definition. We perceive that this, which we call intelligence, shows +itself when the external relations to which the internal ones are +adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time and space; +that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science are +resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally.... + +"And lastly let it be noted that what we call _truth_, guiding us to +successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is simply the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while +_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence +of such accurate correspondence. + +"If, then, Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in +its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations, the necessarily relative character of +our knowledge becomes obvious. The simplest cognition being the +establishment of some connection between subjective states, answering to +some connection between objective agencies; and each successively more +complex cognition being the establishment of some more involved +connection of such states, answering to some more involved connection of +such agencies; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it be +carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence either the +states themselves or the agencies themselves." + +Or, to condense Mr. Spencer's whole teaching into a few plain every-day +words, Man is an animal, and only an animal, differing nowhat from the +dog and chimpanzee, except in the fact that his life "consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments," than the life of said dog and chimpanzee. Mark +particularly the sententious diction of this newly arisen sage. Forget +not one syllable of the profound and most important knowledge he would +impart. "Life in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in +its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment of internal +relations to external relations." See, there is not a limit, not a +qualification to the assertion! Now turn back a page or two, reader, if +thou hast this wonderful philosophy by thee, and gazing, as into a cage +in a menagerie, see the being its author would teach thee that thou art. +From the highest to the lowest forms, life is one. In its lower forms, +life is a set of "direct and simple" "correspondences." "But in animals, +_and especially in the higher orders of them_," and, of course, most +especially in the human animal as the highest order, "the +correspondences become extremely complex." As much as to say, reader, +you are not exactly a plant, nor are you yet of quite so low a type as +the chimpanzee aforesaid; but the difference is no serious matter. You +do not differ half as much from the chimpanzee as the chimpanzee does +from the forest he roves in. All the difference there is between you and +him is, that the machinery by which "the continuous adjustment of +internal relations to external relations" is carried on, is more +"complex" in you than in the chimpanzee. He roams the forest, inhabits +some cave or hollow tree, and lives on the food which nature +spontaneously offers to his hairy hand. You cut down the forest, +construct a house, and live on the food which some degree of skill has +prepared. He constructs no clothing, nor any covering to shield him from +the inclemency of the weather, but is satisfied with tawny, shaggy +covering, which nature has provided. You on the contrary are destitute +of such a covering, and rob the sheep, and kill the silk-worm, to supply +the lack. But in all this there is no _difference in kind_. The +mechanism by which life is sustained in you is more "complex," it is +true, than that by which life is sustained in him; there arise, +therefore, larger needs, and the corresponding "intelligence" to supply +those needs. But sweet thought, cheering thought, oh how it supports the +soul! Your life in its highest form is only this animal life,--is only +the constructive force by which that "extremely complex" machinery +carries on "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." All other notions of life are "superfluities." + +Reader, in view of the teaching of this new and widely heralded sage, +how many "superfluities" must you and I strip off from our "conception" +of life! And with what bitter disappointment and deep sadness should we +take up our lamentation for man, and say: How art thou fallen, oh man! +thou noblest denizen of earth; yea, how art thou cast down to the +ground. But a little ago we believed thee a spiritual being; that thou +hadst a nature too noble to rot with the beasts among the clods; that +thou wast made fit to live with angels and thy Creator, God. But a +little ago we believed thee possessed of a psychical life--a soul; that +thou wouldst live forever beyond the stars; and that this soul's life +was wholly occupied in the consideration of "heavenly and divine +things." A little ago we believed in holiness, and that thou, +consecrating thyself to pure and loving employments, shouldst become +purer and more beautiful, nobler and more lovely, until perfect love +should cast out all fear, and thou shouldst then see God face to face, +and rejoice in the sunlight of his smiling countenance. But all this is +changed now. Our belief has been found to be a cheat, a bitter mockery +to the soul. We have sat at the feet of the English sage, and learned +how dismally different is our destiny. Painful is it, oh reader, to +listen; and the words of our teacher sweep like a sirocco over the +heart; yet we cannot choose but hear. + +"The pyschical life"--the life of the soul, "the immortal spark of +fire,"--and the physical life "are _equally_ definable as the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations." We had supposed +that intelligence in its highest forms was wholly occupied with the +contemplation of God and his laws, and the great end of being, and all +those tremendous questions which we had thought fitted to occupy the +activities of a spiritual person. We are undeceived now. We find we have +shot towards the pole opposite to the truth. Now "we perceive that this +which we call Intelligence shows itself when the external relations to +which the internal ones are adjusted begin to be numerous, complex, and +remote in time or space; that _every advance in Intelligence essentially +consists in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more +involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements of science_ +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +cooerdinated as _exactly to tally_ with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally." In such relations consists the life +of the "caterpillar." In such relations, _only a little "more +complex,"_ consists the life of "the sparrow." Such relations only does +"the fowler" observe; such only does "the chemist" know. This is the +path by which we are led to the last, the highest "truth" which man can +attain. Thus do we learn "that what we call _truth_, guiding us to +successful action, and the consequent maintenance of life, is _simply_ +the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations; while +error, leading to failure and therefore towards death, is the absence of +such accurate correspondence." What a noble life, oh, reader, what an +exalted destiny thine is here declared to be! The largest effort of +thine intelligence, "the highest achievement of science," yea, the total +object of the life of thy soul,--thy "psychial" life,--is to attain such +exceeding skill in the construction of a shelter, in the fitting of +apparel, in the preparation of food, in a word, in securing "the +accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations," and thus +in attaining the "_truth_" which shall guide "us to successful action +and the consequent maintenance of life," that we shall secure forever +our animal existence on earth. Study patiently thy lesson, oh human +animal! Con it o'er and o'er. Who knows but thou mayest yet attain to +this acme of the perfection of thy nature, though it be far below what +thou hadst once fondly expected,--mayest attain a perfect knowledge of +the "_truth_," and a perfect skill in the application of that truth, _i. +e._ in "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations"; and so be guided "to successful action, and the consequent +maintenance of life," whereby thou shalt elude forever that merciless +hunter who pursues thee,--the grim man-stalker, the skeleton Death. But +when bending all thy energies, yea, all the powers of thy soul, to this +task, thou mayest recur at some unfortunate moment to the dreams and +aspirations which have hitherto lain like golden sunlight on thy +pathway. Let no vain regret for what seemed thy nobler destiny ever +sadden thy day, or deepen the darkness of thy night. True, thou didst +deem thyself capable of something higher than "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; didst often +occupy thyself with contemplating those "things which eye hath not seen, +nor ear heard"; didst deem thyself a son of God, and "a joint-heir with +Jesus Christ," "of things incorruptible and undefiled, and which fade +not away, eternal in the heavens"; didst sometimes seem to see, with +faith's triumphant gaze, those glorious scenes which thou wouldst +traverse when in the spirit-land thou shouldst lead a pure spiritual +life with other spirits, where all earthliness had been stripped off, +all tears had been wiped away, and perfect holiness was thine through +all eternity. But all these visions were only dreams; they wholly +deluded thee. We have learned from the lips of this latest English sage +that thy god is thy belly, and that thou must mind earthly things, so as +to keep up "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." Such being thy lot, and to fulfil such a lot being "the +highest achievement of science," permit not thyself to be disturbed by +those old-fashioned and sometimes troublesome notions that "_truth_" and +those "achievements" pertained to a spiritual person in spiritual +relations to God as the moral Governor of the Universe; that man was +bound to know the truth and obey it; that his "errors" were violations +of perfect law,--the truth he knew,--were _crimes_ against Him who is +"of too pure eyes to behold iniquity, and cannot look upon sin with the +least degree of allowance"; that for these crimes there impended a just +penalty--an appalling punishment; and that the only real "failure" was +the failure to repent of and forsake the crimes, and thus escape the +penalty. Far other is the fact, as thou wilt learn from this wise man's +book. As he teaches us, the only "error" we can make, is, to miss in +maintaining perfectly "the continuous adjustment of internal relations +to external relations,"--is to eat too much roast beef and plum-pudding +at dinner, or to wear too scanty or too thick clothing, or to expose +one's self imprudently in a storm, or by some other carelessness which +may produce "the absence of such accurate correspondence" as shall +secure unending life, and so lead to his only "failure"--the advance +"towards death." When, then, oh reader! by some unfortunate mischance, +some "error" into which thine ignorance hath led thee, thou hast +rendered thy "failure" inevitable, and art surely descending "towards +death," hesitate not to sing with heedless hilarity the old Epicurean +song, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." + + Sing and be gay + The livelong day, + Thinking no whit of to-morrow. + Enjoy while you may + All pleasure and play, + For after death is no sorrow. + +Thou hast committed thine only "error" in not maintaining "the accurate +correspondence"; thou hast fallen upon thine only "failure," the +inevitable advance "towards death." Than death no greater evil can +befall thee, and that is already sure. Then let "dance and song," and +"women and wine," bestow some snatches of pleasure upon thy fleeting +days. + +Delightful philosophy, is it not, reader? Poor unfortunate man, and +especially poor, befooled, cheated, hopeless Christian man, who has +these many years cherished those vain, deceitful dreams of which we +spoke a little ago! To be brought down from such lofty aspirations; to +be made to know that he is only an animal; that "Life in all its +manifestations, inclusive of Intelligence in its highest forms, consists +in the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external +relations." Do you not join with me in pitying him? + +And such is the philosophy which is heralded to us from over the sea as +the newly found and wonderful truth, which is to satisfy the hungering +soul of man and still its persistent cry for bread. And this is the +teacher, mocking that painful cry with such chaff, whom newspaper after +newspaper, and periodical after periodical on this side the water, even +to those we love best and cherish most, have pronounced one of the +profoundest essayists of the day. Perhaps he can give us some sage +remarks upon "laughter," as it is observed in the human animal, and on +that point compare therewith other animals. But, speaking in all +sincerity after the manner of the Book of Common Prayer, we can but say, +"From all such philosophers and philosophies, good Lord deliver us." + +Few, perhaps none of our readers, will desire to see a denial in terms +of such a theory. When a man, aspiring to be a philosopher, advances the +doctrine that not only is "Life in its simplest form"--the animal +life--"the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions with +certain outer physico-chemical actions," but that "_each advance to a +higher form of Life_ consists in a better preservation of this primary +correspondence"; and when, proceeding further, and to be explicit, he +asserts that not only "the physical," _but also "the psychical life_ are +_equally_" but "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to +external relations"; and when, still further to insult man, and to utter +his insult in the most positive, extreme, and unmistakable terms, he +asserts "that even the highest achievements of science are resolvable +into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as +exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that +occur externally,"--that is, that the highest science is the attainment +of a perfect cuisine; in a word, when a human being in this nineteenth +century offers to his fellows as the loftiest attainment of philosophy +the tenet that the highest form of life cognizable by man is an animal +life, and that man can have no other knowledge of himself than as an +animal, of a little higher grade, it is true, than other animals, but +not different in kind, then the healthy soul, when such a doctrine is +presented to it, will reject it as instantaneously as a healthy stomach +rejects a roll of tobacco. + +With what a sense of relief does one turn from a system of philosophy +which, when stripped of its garb of well-chosen words and large +sounding, plausible phrases, appears in such vile shape and hideous +proportions, to the teachings of that pure and noble instructor of our +youth, that man who, by his gentle, benignant mien, so beautifully +illustrates the spirit and life of the Apostle John,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, +D. D., President of Williams College. No one who has read his "Lectures +on Moral Science," and no lover of truth should fail to do so, will +desire an apology for inserting the following extract, wherein is +presented a theory upon which the soul of man can rest, as at home the +soldier rests, who has just been released from the Libby or Salisbury +charnel-house. + +"And here, again, we have three great forces with their products. These +are the vegetable, the animal, and the rational life. + +"Of these, vegetable life is the lowest. Its products are as strictly +conditional for animal life as chemical affinity is for vegetable, for +the animal is nourished by nothing that has not been previously +elaborated by the vegetable. 'The profit of the earth is for all; the +king himself is served by the field.' + +"Again, we have the animal and sensitive life, capable of enjoyment and +suffering, and having the instincts necessary to its preservation. +_This_, as man is now constituted, _is conditional for his rational +life_. The rational has its roots in that, and manifests itself only +through the organization which that builds up. + +"_We have, then, finally and highest of all, this rational and moral +life, by which man is made in the image of God._ In man, as thus +constituted, we first find a being who is capable of choosing his own +end, or, rather, of choosing or rejecting the end indicated by his whole +nature. This is moral freedom, _and in this is the precise point of +transition from all that is below to that which is highest_. For +everything below man the end is necessitated. Whatever choice there may +be in the agency of animals of means for the attainment of their +end,--and they have one somewhat wide,--they have none in respect to the +end itself. This, for our purpose, and for all purposes, is the +characteristic distinction, so long sought, between man and the brute. +Man determines his own end; the end of the brute is necessitated. Up to +man everything is driven to its end by a force working from without or +from behind; but for him the pillar of cloud and of fire puts itself in +front, and he follows it or not, as he chooses. + +"In the above cases it will be seen that the process is one of the +addition of new forces, with a constant limitation of the field within +which the forces act.... It is to be noticed, however, that while the +field of each added and superior force is narrowed, yet nothing is +dropped. Each lower force shoots through, and combines itself with all +that is higher. Because he is rational, man is not the less subject to +gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. He has also the organic +life that belongs to the animal. In him none of these are dropped; _but +the rational life is united with and superinduced upon all these_, so +that man is not only a microcosm, but is the natural head and ruler of +the world. He partakes of all that is below him, _and becomes man by the +addition of something higher_.... Here, then, is our model and law. Have +we a lower sensitive and animal nature? Let that nature be cherished and +expanded by all its innocent and legitimate enjoyments, for it is an +end. But--and here we find the limit--let it be cherished _only as +subservient to the higher intellectual life_, for it is also a means." +The italics are ours. + +Satisfactory, true, and self-sustained as is this theory,--and it is one +which like a granite Gothic spire lifts itself high and calm into the +atmosphere, standing firm and immovable in its own clear and +self-evident truth, unshaken by a thousand assaulting materialistic +storms,--we would buttress it with the utterances of other of the +earth's noble ones; and this we do not because it is in any degree +needful, but because our mind loves to linger round the theme, and to +gather the concurrent thought of various rarely endowed minds upon this +subject. Exactly in point is the following--one of many passages which +might be selected from the works of that profoundest of English +metaphysicians and theologians, S. T. Coleridge:-- + +"And here let me observe that the difficulty and delicacy of this +investigation are greatly increased by our not considering the +understanding (even our own) in itself, and as it would be were it not +accompanied with and modified by the cooeperation of the will, the moral +feeling, and that faculty, perhaps best distinguished by the name of +Reason, of determining that which is universal and necessary, of fixing +laws and principles whether speculative or practical, and of +contemplating a final purpose or end. This intelligent will--having a +self-conscious purpose, under the guidance and light of the reason, by +which its acts are made to bear as a whole upon some end in and for +itself, and to which the understanding is subservient as an organ or the +faculty of selecting and appropriating the means--seems best to account +for that progressiveness of the human race, _which so evidently marks an +insurmountable distinction and impassable barrier between man and the +inferior animals, but which would be inexplicable, were there no +other difference than in the degree of their intellectual +faculties_."--_Works_, Vol. I. p. 371. The italics are ours. + +The attention of the reader may with profit be also directed to the +words of another metaphysician, who has been much longer known, and has +enjoyed a wider fame than either of those just mentioned; and whose +teachings, however little weight they may seem to have with Mr. Spencer, +have been these many years, and still are received and studied with +profound respect and loving carefulness by multitudes of persons. We +refer to the apostle Paul, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to +those who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after +the spirit." That is, who do not walk after the law of the animal +nature, but who do walk after the law of the spiritual person, for it is +of this great psychological distinction that the apostle so fully and +continually speaks. "For they that are after the flesh do mind the +things of the flesh; but they that are after the spirit, the things of +the spirit. For the minding of the flesh is death, but the minding of +the spirit is life and peace; because the minding of the flesh as enmity +against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can +be." _Romans_ VIII. 1, 5, 6, 7. This I say, then, "Walk in the spirit +and fulfil not the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the +spirit, and the spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one +to the other."--_Galatians_ V. 16, 17. + +Upon these passages it should be remarked, by way of explanation, that +our translators in writing the word spirit with a capital, and thus +intimating that it is the Holy Spirit of God which is meant, have led +their readers astray. The apostle's repeated use of that term, in +contrasting the flesh with the spirit, appears decisive of the fact that +he is contrasting, in all such passages, the animal nature with the +spiritual person. But if any one is startled by this position and thinks +to reject it, let him bear in mind that the law of the spiritual person +in man and of the Holy Spirit of God is _identical_. + +The reader will hardly desire from us what his own mind will have +already accomplished--the construction in our own terms, and the +contrasting of the system above embodied with that presented by Mr. +Spencer. The human being, Man, is a twofold being, "flesh" and "spirit," +an animal nature and a spiritual person. In the animal nature are the +Sense and the Understanding. In the spiritual person are the Reason, the +spiritual Sensibilities, and the Will. The animal nature is common to +man and the brutes. The spiritual person is common to man and God. It is +manifest, then, that there is "an insurmountable distinction and +impassable barrier" not only "between man and the inferior animals," but +between man as spiritual person, and man as animal nature, and that this +is a greater distinction than any other in the Universe, except that +which exists between the Creator and the created. What relation, then, +do these so widely diverse natures bear to each other? Evidently that +which President Hopkins has assigned. "Because he is rational, man is +not the less subject to gravitation and cohesion and chemical affinity. +He has also the organic life that belongs to the plant, and the +sensitive and instinctive life that belongs to the animal." Thus far his +life "is the correspondence of certain inner physico-chemical actions +with certain outer physico-chemical actions,"--undoubtedly "consists in +the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"; +and being the highest order of animal, his life "consists in the +establishment of more varied, more complete, and more involved +adjustments" than that of any other animal. What, then, is this life +for? "This, as man is now constituted, is _conditional for his rational +life_." "The rational life is united with and _superinduced upon all +these_." As God made man, and in the natural order, the "flesh," the +animal life, is wholly subordinate to the "spirit," the spiritual life. +And the spirit, or spiritual person of which Paul writes so much,--does +this also, this "Intelligence in its highest form," consist "in the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations"? Are +the words of the apostle a cheat, a lie, when he says, "For if ye live +after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye through the spirit"--_i. e._ by +living with the help of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with the law of +the spiritual person--"do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live?" +And are Mr. Spencer's words, in which he teaches exactly the opposite +doctrine, true? wherein he says: "And lastly let it be noted that what +we call truth," &c., (see _ante_, p. 168,) wherein he teaches that "if +ye live after the flesh," if you are guided by "_truth_," if you are +able perfectly to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to +objective relations," "ye shall not surely die," you will attain to what +is _successful action_, the preservation of "life," of "the continuous +adjustment of internal relations to external relations," of the animal +life, and thus your bodies will live forever--the highest good for man; +but if you "mortify the deeds of the body," if you pay little heed to +"the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," +you will meet with "_error_, leading to failure and therefore towards +death,"--the death of the body, the highest evil which can befall +man,--and so "ye shall" not "live." Proceeding in the direction already +taken, we find that in his normal condition the spiritual person would +not be chiefly, much less exclusively, occupied with attending to "the +continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," but +would only regard these in so far as is necessary to preserve the body +as the ground through which, in accordance with the present dispensation +of God's providence, that person may exert himself and employ his +energies upon those objects which belong to his peculiar sphere, even +the laws and duties of spiritual beings. The person would indeed employ +his superior faculties to assist the lower nature in the preservation of +its animal life, but this only as a means. God has ordained that through +this means that person shall develop and manifest himself; yet the life, +continuance in being, of the soul, is in no way dependent on this means. +Strip away the whole animal nature, take from man his body, his Sense +and Understanding, leave him--as he would then be--with no possible +medium of communication with the Universe, and he, the I am, the +spiritual person, would remain intact, as active as ever. He would have +lost none of his capacity to see laws and appreciate their force; he +would feel the _bindingness_ of obligation just as before; and finally, +he would be just as able as in the earlier state to make a choice of an +ultimate end, though he would be unable to make a single motion towards +putting that choice into effect. The spiritual person, then, being such +that he has in himself no element of decomposition, has no need, for the +preservation of his own existence, to be continually occupied with +efforts to maintain "the accurate correspondence of subjective to +objective relations." Yet activity is his law, and, moreover, an +activity having objects which accord with this his indestructible +nature. With what then will such a being naturally occupy himself? There +is for him no danger of decay. He possesses within himself the laws and +ideals of his action. As such, and created, he is near of kin to that +august Being in whoso image he was created. His laws are the created +person's laws. The end of the Creator should be that also of the +created. But God is infinite, while the soul starts a babe, an +undeveloped germ, and must begin to learn at the alphabet of knowledge. +What nobler, what more sublime and satisfactory occupation could this +being, endowed with the faculties of a God, find, than to employ all his +power in the contemplation of the eternal laws of the Universe, _i. e._ +to the acquisition of an intimate acquaintance with himself and God; and +to bend all his energies to the realization by his own efforts of that +part in the Universe which God had assigned him, _i. e._, to accord his +will entirely with God's will. This course of life, a spiritual person +standing in his normal relation to an animal nature, would pursue as +spontaneously as if it were the law of his being. But this which we have +portrayed is not the course which human beings do pursue. By no means. +One great evil, at least, that "the Fall" brought upon the race of man, +is, that human beings are born into the world with the spiritual person +all submerged by the animal nature; or, to use Paul's figure, the spirit +is enslaved by the flesh; and such is the extent of this that many, +perhaps most, men are born and grow up and die, and never know that they +have any souls; and finally there arise, as there have arisen through +all the ages, just such philosophers as Sir William Hamilton and Mr. +Spencer, who in substance deny that men are spiritual persons at all, +who say that the highest knowledge is a generalization in the +Understanding, a form of a knowledge common to man and the brutes, and +that "the highest achievements of science are resolvable into mental +relations of coexistence and sequence, so cooerdinated as exactly to +tally with certain relations of coexistence and sequence that occur +externally." It is this evil, organic in man, that Paul portrays so +vividly; and it is against men who teach such doctrines that he thunders +his maledictions. + +We have spoken above of the spiritual person as diverse from, superior +to, and superinduced upon, the animal nature. This is his _position_ in +the logical order. We have also spoken of him as submerged under the +animal nature, as enslaved to the flesh. By such figures do we strive to +express the awfully degraded _condition_ in which every human being is +born into the world. And mark, this is simply a natural degradation. Let +us then, as philosophers, carry our examination one step farther and +ask: In this state of things what would be the fitting occupation of the +spiritual person. Is it that "continuous adjustment"? He turns from it +with loathing. Already he has served the "flesh" a long and grievous +bondage. Manifestly, then, he should struggle with all his might to +regain his normal condition to become naturally good as well as morally +good,--he should fill his soul with thoughts of God, and then he should +make every rational exertion to induce others to follow in his +footsteps. + +We attain, then, a far different result from Mr. Spencer. "The highest +achievements of science" for us, our "truth," guiding us "to successful +action," is that pure _a priori_ truth, the eternal law of God which is +written in us, and given to us for our guidance to what is truly +"successful action,"--the accordance of our wills with the will of God. + +What we now reach, and what yet remains to be considered of this +chapter, is that passage in which Mr. Spencer enounces, as he believes, +a new principle of philosophy, a principle which will symmetrize and +complete the Hamiltonian system, and thus establish it as the true and +final science for mankind. Since we do not view this principle in the +same light with Mr. Spencer, and especially since it is our intention to +turn it upon what he has heretofore written, and demolish that with it, +there might arise a feeling in many minds that the whole passage should +be quoted, that there might be no doubt as to his meaning. This we +should willingly do, did our space permit. Yet it seems not in the least +necessary. That part of the passage which contains the gist of the +subject, followed by a candid epitome of his arguments and +illustrations, would appear to be ample for a fair and sufficiently full +presentation of his theory, and for a basis upon which we might safely +build our criticism. These then will be given. + +"There still remains the final question--What must we say concerning +that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the +consciousness of phenomena? Is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly +from our minds everything but the relative; or must we also believe in +something beyond the relative? + +"The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our +intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that +anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure +negation, or as a non-existence. 'The _absolute_ is conceived merely by +a negation of conceivability,' writes Sir William Hamilton. 'The +_Absolute_ and the _Infinite_,' says Mr. Mansel, 'are thus, like the +_Inconceivable_ and the _Imperceptible_, names indicating, not an object +of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the +conditions under which consciousness is possible.' From each of which +extracts may be deduced the conclusion, that, since reason cannot +warrant us in affirming the positive existence of what is cognizable +only as a negation, we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence +of anything beyond phenomena. + +"Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it involves, I think, a grave +error. If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be +admitted; but the premiss, in the form presented by Sir William Hamilton +and Mr. Mansel, is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, +the arguments used by these writers to show that the Absolute is +unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments +have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing, yet there remains to +be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise +necessitated. It is not to be denied that so long as we confine +ourselves to the purely logical aspect of the question, the propositions +quoted above must be accepted in their entirety; but when we contemplate +its more general, or psychological aspect, we find that these +propositions are imperfect statements of the truth; omitting, or +rather excluding, as they do, an all-important fact. To speak +specifically:--Besides that _definite_ consciousness of which Logic +formulates the laws, there is also an _indefinite_ consciousness which +cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the +thoughts which, though incomplete, admit of completion, there are +thoughts which it is impossible to complete, and yet which are still +real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect. + +"Observe in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which +the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates +the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we +cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there _is_ +an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn _what_ the +Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption _that_ it is; and the +making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to +the mind, not as a nothing but as a something. Similarly with every step +in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, +everywhere named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is throughout +necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impossible to +conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without +at the same time conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances; for +appearance without reality is unthinkable." After carrying on this train +of argument a little further, he reaches this just and decisive result. +"Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a _definite_ consciousness +of the Absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an +indefinite consciousness of it." Carrying the argument further, he says: +"Perhaps the best way of showing that, by the necessary conditions of +thought, we are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness +of this which transcends distinct consciousness, is to analyze our +conception of the antithesis between Relative and Absolute." He follows +the presentation of certain "antinomies of thought" with an extract from +Sir William Hamilton's words, in which the logician enounces his +doctrine that in "correlatives" "the positive alone is real, the +negative is only an abstraction of the other"; or, in other words, the +one gives a substance of some kind in the mind, the other gives simply +nothingness, void, absolute negation. Criticizing this, Mr. Spencer is +unquestionably right in saying: "Now the assertion that of such +contradictories 'the negative is _only_ an abstraction of the +other'--'is _nothing else_ than its negation'--is not true. In such +correlatives as Equal and Unequal, it is obvious enough that the +negative concept contains something besides the negation of the positive +one; for the things of which equality is denied are not abolished from +consciousness by the denial. And the fact overlooked by Sir William +Hamilton is, that the like holds, even with those correlatives of which +the negative is inconceivable, in the strict sense of the word." +Proceeding with his argument, he establishes, by ample illustration, the +fact that a "something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative +or Absolute." He afterwards shows plainly by quotations, "that both Sir +William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel do," in certain places, "distinctly +imply that our consciousness of the Absolute, indefinite though it is, +is positive not negative." Further on he argues thus: "Though Philosophy +condemns successively each attempted conception of the Absolute; though +it proves to us that the Absolute is not this, nor that, nor that; +though in obedience to it we negative, one after another, each idea as +it arises; yet as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness, +there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes. The +continual negation of each particular form and limit simply results in +the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits, and so +ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited." +Thus he brings us to "the ultimate difficulty--How can there possibly be +constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its +very nature, consciousness is possible only under forms and limits?" +This he accounts for by by hypostatizing a "raw material" in +consciousness which is, must be, present. He presents his conclusion as +follows: "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental element is +at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible. Our +consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned +consciousness, or raw material of thought, to which in thinking we give +definite forms, it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence +is the very basis of our intelligence." ... + +"To sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument:--We have seen how, in +the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is +Relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a +Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which +this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen +how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that +the Relative itself is inconceivable, except as related to a real +Non-relative. We have seen that, unless a real Non-relative or Absolute +be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the +argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of +thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the +consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from +this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that +actuality." + +The approval which has been accorded to certain of the arguments adduced +by Mr. Spencer in favor of his especial point, that the Absolute is a +positive somewhat in consciousness, and to that point as established, +must not be supposed to apply also to that hypothesis of "indefinite +consciousness" by which he attempts to reconcile this position with his +former teachings. On the contrary, it will be our purpose hereafter to +show that this hypothesis is a complete fallacy. + +As against the positions taken by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, +Mr. Spencer's argument may unquestionably be deemed decisive. Admitting +the logical accuracy of their reasoning, he very justly turns from the +logical to the psychological aspect of the subject, takes exception to +their premiss, shows conclusively that it is fallacious, and gives an +approximate, though unfortunately a very partial and defective +presentation of the truth. Indeed, the main issue which must now be made +with him is whether the position he has here taken, and which he puts +forth as that peculiar element in his philosophical system, that new +truth, which shall harmonize Hamiltonian Limitism with the facts of +human nature, is not, when carried to its logical results, in +diametrical and irreconcilable antagonism to that whole system, and all +that he has before written, and so does not annihilate them. It will be +our present endeavor to show that such is the result. + +Perhaps we cannot better examine Mr. Spencer's theory than, first, to +take up what we believe to be the element of truth in it, and carry out +this to its logical results; and afterwards to present what seem to be +the elements of error, and show them to be such. + +1. "We are obliged to form a positive though vague consciousness of" +"the Absolute." Without criticizing his use here of consciousness as if +it were a faculty of knowledge, and remembering that we cannot have a +consciousness of anything without having a knowledge commensurate with +that consciousness, we will see that Mr. Spencer's assertion is +tantamount to saying, We have a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. +It does not seem that he himself can disallow this. Grant this, and our +whole system follows, as does also the fallacy of his own. Our argument +will proceed thus. Logic is the science of the pure laws of thought, and +is mathematically accurate, and is absolute. Being such, it is law for +all intellect, for God as well as man. But three positions can be taken. +Either it is true for the Deity, or else it is false for him, or else +it has no reference to him. In the last instance God is Chaos; in the +second he and man are in organic contradiction, and he created man so; +the first is the one now advocated. The second and third hypotheses +refute themselves in the statement of them. Nothing remains but the +position taken that the laws of Logic lie equally on God and man. One of +those laws is, that, if any assertion is true, all that is logically +involved in it is true; in other words, all truth is in absolute and +perfect harmony. This is fundamental to the possibility of Logic. Now +apply this law to the psychological premiss of Mr. Spencer, that we have +a positive knowledge that the Absolute is. A better form of expression +would be, The absolute Being is. It follows then that he is in a _mode_, +has a _formal_ being. But three hypotheses are possible. He is in no +mode, he is in one mode; he is in all modes. If he is in no mode, there +is no form, no order, no law for his being; which is to say, he is +Chaos. Chaos is not God, for Chaos cannot organize an orderly being, and +men are orderly beings, and were created. If he is in all modes, he is +in a state of utter contradiction. God "is all in every part." He is +then all infinite, and all finite. Infinity and finiteness are +contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities. God is wholly possessed +of contradictory and mutually exclusive qualities, which is more than +unthinkable--it is absurd. He is, must be, then, in one mode. Let us +pause here for a moment and observe that we have clearly established, +from Mr. Spencer's own premiss, the fact that God _is limited_. He must +be in one mode to the exclusion of all other modes. He is limited then +by the necessity to be what he is; and if he could become what he is +not, he would not have been absolute. Since he is absolute, he is, to +the exclusion of the possibility of any other independent Being. Other +beings are, and must therefore be, dependent on and subordinate to him. +Since he is superior to all other beings he must be in the highest +possible mode of being. Personality is the highest possible mode of +being. This will appear from the following considerations. A person, +possesses the reason and law of his action, and the capacity to act, +within himself, and is thus a _final cause_. No higher form of being +than this can be needed, and so by the law of parsimony a hypothesis of +any other must be excluded. God is then a person. + +We have now brought the argument to that point where its connection with +the system advocated in this treatise is manifest. If the links are well +wrought, and the chain complete, not only is this system firmly grounded +upon Mr. Spencer's premiss, but, as was intimated on an early page, he +has in this his special point given partial utterance to what, once +established, involves the fallacy not only of all he has written before, +but as well of the whole Limitist Philosophy. It remains now to remark +upon the errors in his form of expressing the truth. + +2. Mr. Spencer's error is twofold. He treats of consciousness as a +faculty of knowledge. He speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite +consciousness." Let us examine these in their order. + +_a._ He treats of consciousness as a faculty of knowledge. In this he +uses the term in the inexact, careless, popular manner, rather than with +due precision. As has been observed on a former page, consciousness is +the light in which the person sees his faculties act. Thus some feeling +is affected. This feeling is cognized by the intellectual faculty, and +of this the person is conscious. Hence it is an elliptical expression to +say "I am conscious of the feeling." The full form being "I am conscious +that I know the feeling." Thus is it with all man's activities. Applying +this to the case in hand, it appears, not that we are conscious of the +Absolute, but that we are conscious that the proper intellectual +faculty, the Pure Reason, presents what absoluteness is, and that the +absolute Person is, and through this presentation--intuition--the +spiritual person knows these facts. We repeat, then, our position: +consciousness is the indivisible unity, the light in which the person +sees all his faculties and capacities act; and so is to be considered as +different in kind from them all as the peculiar and unique endowment of +a spiritual person. + +_b._ Mr. Spencer speaks of a "vague," an "indefinite consciousness." The +expression "vague consciousness" being a popular and very common one, +deserves a careful examination, and this we hope to give it, keeping in +mind meantime the position already attained. + +The phrase is used in some such connection as this, "I have a vague or +undefined consciousness of impending evil." Let us analyze this +experience. In doing so it will be observed that the consciousness, or +rather the seeing by the person in the light of consciousness, is +positive, clear, and definite, and is the apprehension of a feeling. +Again, the feeling is positive and distinct; it is a feeling of dread, +of threatening danger. What, then, is vague--is undefined? This. That +cause which produces the feeling lies without the reach of the cognitive +faculties, and of course cannot be known; because what produces the +feeling is unknown, the intellectual apprehension experiences a sense of +vagueness; and this it instinctively carries over and applies to the +feeling. Yet really the sense of vagueness arises from an ignorance of +the cause of the feeling. Strictly speaking, then, it is not +consciousness that is vague; and so Mr. Spencer's "_indefinite_ +consciousness, which cannot be formulated," has no foundation in fact. +But this may be shown by another line of thought. Consciousness is +commensurate with knowledge, _i. e._, man can have no knowledge except +he is conscious of that knowledge; neither can he have any consciousness +except he knows that the consciousness is, and what the consciousness +is, _i. e._, what he is conscious of. Now all knowledge is definite; it +is only ignorance that is indefinite. When we say that our knowledge of +an object is indefinite, we mean that we partly know its +characteristics, and are partly ignorant of them. Thus then also the +result above stated follows; and what Mr. Spencer calls "_indefinite_ +consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we partly know, and +are partly ignorant of the object under consideration. + +In the last paragraph but one, of the chapter now under consideration, +Mr. Spencer makes a most extraordinary assertion respecting +consciousness, which, when examined in the light of the positions we +have advocated, affords another decisive evidence of the fallacy of his +theory. We quote it again, that the reader may not miss of giving it +full attention. "By its very nature, therefore, this ultimate mental +element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily +indestructible. Our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally +_the unconditioned consciousness_, or _raw material of thought_, to +which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows that an +ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our +intelligence." Upon reading this passage, the question spontaneously +arises, What does the writer mean? and it is a question which is not so +easily answered. More than one interpretation may be assigned, as will +appear upon examination. A problem is given. To find what the "raw +material of thought" is. Since man has thoughts, there must be in him +the "raw material of thought"--the crude thought-ore which he smelts +down in the blast-furnace of the Understanding, giving forth in its +stead the refined metal--exact thought. We must then proceed to attain +our answer by analyzing man's natural organization. + +Since man is a complex, constituted being, there is necessarily a +logical order to the parts which are combined in the complexity. He may +be considered as a substance in which a constitution inheres, _i. e._, +which is organized according to a _set_ of fixed laws, and that set of +laws may be stated in their logical order. It is sufficient, however, +for our purpose to consider him as an organized substance, the +organization being such that he is a person--a selfhood, _self-active_ +and capable of self-examination. The raw material of _all_ the +activities of such a person is this organized substance. Take away the +substance, and there remains only the set of laws as _abstract_ ideas. +Again, take away the set of laws, and the substance is simple, +unorganized substance. In the combining of the two the person becomes. +These, then, are all there is of the person, and therefore in these must +the raw material be. From this position it follows directly that any +capacity or faculty, or, in general, every activity of the person, is +the substance acting in accordance with the law which determines that +form of the activity. To explain the term, form of activity. There is a +_set_ of laws. Each law, by itself, is a simple law, and is incapable of +organizing a substance into a being. But when these laws are considered, +as they naturally stand in the Divine Reason, in relation to each other, +it is seen that this, their standing together, constitutes ideals, or +forms of being and activity. To illustrate from an earthly object. The +law of gravitation alone could not organize a Universe; neither could +the law of cohesion, nor of centripetal, nor centrifugal force, nor any +other one law. All these laws must be acting together,--or rather all +these laws must stand together in perfect harmony, according to their +own nature, thus constituting an ideal form, in accordance with which +God may create this Universe. For an illustration of our topic in its +highest form, the reader is referred to those pages of Dr. Hickok's +"Rational Psychology," where he analyzes personality into its elements +of Spontaneity, Autonomy, and Liberty. From that examination it is +sufficiently evident that either of these alone cannot organize a +person, but that all three must be present in order to constitute such a +being. There are, then, various forms of activity in the person, as +Reason, Sensibility, and Will, in each of which the organized substance +acts in a mode or form, and this form is determined by the set of +organizing laws. Consciousness also is such a form. The "raw material of +thought," then, must be this substance considered under the peculiar +form of activity which we call consciousness, but _before the substance +thus formulated has been awakened into activity by those circumstances +which are naturally suited to it, for bringing it into action_. Now, +by the very terms of the statement it is evident that the substance thus +organized in this form, or, to use the common term, consciousness +considered apart from and prior to its activity, can never be known _by +experience_, i. e., _we can never be conscious of an unconscious state_. +"Unconditioned consciousness" is consciousness considered as quiescent +because in it have been awakened no "definite forms"--no "thinking." "In +the nature of things," then, it is impossible to be conscious of an +"unconditioned consciousness." Yet Mr. Spencer says that "our +consciousness of the unconditioned," which he has already asserted and +proved, is a "positive," and therefore an active state; is identical +with, is "literally the unconditioned consciousness," or consciousness +in its quiescent state, considered before it had been awakened into +activity, which is far more absurd than what was just above shown to be +a contradiction. + +To escape such a result, a less objectionable interpretation may be +given to the dictum in hand. It may be said that it looks upon +consciousness only as an activity, and in the logical order after its +action has begun. We are, then, conscious, and in this is positive +action, but no definite object is present which gives a form in +consciousness, and so consciousness _returns upon itself_. We are +conscious that we are conscious, which is an awkward way of saying that +we are self-conscious, or, more concisely yet, that we are conscious; +for accurately this is all, and this is the same as to say that the +subject and object are identical in this act. The conclusion from this +hypothesis is one which we judge Mr. Spencer will be very loath to +accept, and yet it seems logically to follow. Indeed, in a sentence we +are about to quote, he seems to make a most marked distinction between +self-consciousness and this "consciousness of the unconditioned," which +he calls its "obverse." + +But whatever Mr. Spencer's notion of the "raw material of thought" is, +what more especially claims our attention and is most strange, is his +application of that notion. To present this more clearly, we will quote +further from the passage already under examination. "As we can in +successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions, and replace +them by others, but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of +consciousness, which is conditioned anew in every thought, there ever +remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and +independently of conditions. At the same time that by the laws of +thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of +absolute existence, we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from +ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence: this +consciousness being, as we here see, the obverse of our +self-consciousness." Now, by comparing this extract with the other, +which it immediately follows, it seems plain that Mr. Spencer uses as +synonymous the phrases "consciousness of the unconditioned," +"unconditioned consciousness," "raw material of thought," +"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," and "consciousness of +absolute existence." Let us note, now, certain conclusions, which seem +to follow from this use of language. We are conscious "of absolute +existence." No person can be conscious except he is conscious of some +state or condition of his being. Absolute existence is, therefore, a +state or condition of our being. Also this "consciousness of absolute +existence"--as it seems _our_ absolute existence--is the "raw material +of thought." But, again, as was shown above, this "raw material," this +"undifferentiated substance of consciousness," if it is anything, is +consciousness considered as capacity, and in the logical order before it +becomes, or is, active; and it further appeared that of this quiescent +state we could have no knowledge by experience. But since the above +phrases are synonymous, it follows that "consciousness of absolute +existence" is the "undifferentiated substance of consciousness," is a +consciousness of which we can have no knowledge by experience, is a +consciousness of which we can have no consciousness. Is this +philosophy? + +It would be but fair to suppose that there is some fact which Mr. +Spencer has endeavored to express in the language we are criticizing. +There is such a fact, a statement of which will complete this criticism. +Unquestionably, in self-examination, a man may abstract all "successive +mental acts," may consider himself as he is, in the logical order before +he _has experiences_. In this he will find "that an ever-present sense +of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence"; or, in other +words, that it is an organic law of our being that there cannot be an +experience without a being to entertain the experience; and hence that +it is impossible for a man to think or act, except on the assumption +that he is. But all this has nothing to do with a "consciousness of the +unconditioned," or of "absolute existence"; for our existence is not +absolute, and it is _our_ existence of which we are conscious. The +reality and abidingness of _our_ existence is ground for _our_ +experience, nothing more. Even if it were possible for us to have a +consciousness of our state before any experience, or to actually now +abstract all experience, and be conscious of our consciousness +unmodified by any object, _i. e._ to be conscious of unconsciousness, +this would not be a "consciousness of absolute existence." We could find +no more in it, and deduce no more from it, than that our existence was +involved in our experience. Such a consciousness would indeed appear +"unconditioned" by the coming into it of any activity, which would +give a form in it; but this would give us no notion of true +unconditionedness--true "absolute existence." This consciousness, though +undisturbed by any experience, would yet be conditioned, would have been +created, and be dependent upon God for continuance in existence, and for +a chance to come into circumstances, where it could be modified by +experiences, and so could grow. While, then, Mr. Spencer's theory gives +us the fact of the notion of the necessity of our existence to our +experience, it in no way accounts for the fact of our consciousness of +the unconditioned, be that what it may. + +But to return from this considerable digression to the result which was +attained a few pages back, viz: that what Mr. Spencer calls +"_indefinite_ consciousness" is a "_definite_ consciousness" that we +partly know, and are partly ignorant of the object under consideration. +Let this conclusion be applied to the topic which immediately concerns +us,--the character of God. + +But three suppositions are possible. Either we know nothing of God, not +even that he is; or we have a partial knowledge of him, we know that he +is, and all which we can logically deduce from this; or we know him +exhaustively. The latter, no one pretends, and therefore it needs no +notice. The first, even if our own arguments are not deemed +satisfactory, has been thoroughly refuted by Mr. Spencer, and so is to +be set aside. Only the second remains. Respecting this, his position is +that we know that God is and no more. Admit this for a moment. We are +conscious then of a positive, certain, inalienable knowledge that God +is; but that with reference to any and all questions which may arise +concerning him we are in total ignorance. Here, again, it is apparent +that it is not our consciousness or knowledge that is vague; it is our +ignorance. + +We might suggest the question--of what use can it be to man to know that +God is, and be utterly and necessarily, yea, organically ignorant of +what he is? Let the reader answer the question to his own mind. It is +required to show how the theory advocated in this book will appear in +the light of the second hypothesis above stated. + +Man knows that God is, and what God is so far as he can logically deduce +it from this premiss; but, in so far as God is such, that he cannot be +thus known, except wherein he makes a direct revelation to us, he must +be forever inscrutable. To illustrate. If the fact that God is, be +admitted, it logically follows that he must be self-existent. +Self-existence is a positive idea in the Reason, and so here is a second +element of knowledge respecting the Deity. Thus we may go on through +all that it is possible to deduce, and the system thus wrought will be +The Science of Natural Theology, a science as pure and sure as pure +equations. Its results will be what God must be. Looking into the +Universe we will find what must be corresponding with what is, and our +knowledge will be complete. Again, in many regards God may be utterly +inscrutable to us, since he may possess characteristics which we cannot +attain by logical deductions. For instance, let it be granted that the +doctrine of the Trinity is true--that there are three persons in one +Godhead. This would be a fact which man could never attain, could never +make the faintest guess at. He might, unaided, attain to the belief that +God would forgive; he might, with the profound and sad-eyed man of +Greece, become convinced that some god must come from heaven to lead men +to the truth; but the notion of the Trinity could never come to him, +except God himself with carefulness revealed it. Respecting those +matters of which we cannot know except by revelation, this only can be +demanded; and this by inherent endowment man has a right to demand; viz: +that what is revealed shall not contradict the law already "written in +the heart." Yet, once more, there are certain characteristics of God +that must forever be utterly inscrutable to every created being, and +this, because such is their nature and relation to the Deity, that one +cannot be endowed with a faculty capable of attaining the knowledge in +question. Such for instance are the questions, How is God self-existent, +how could he be eternal, how exercise his power, and the like? These are +questions respecting which no possible reason can arise why we should +know them, except the gratification of curiosity, which in reality is no +reason at all, and therefore the inability in question is no detriment +to man. + +By the discussion which may now be brought to a close, two positions +seem to be established. 1. That we have, as Mr. Spencer affirms, a +positive consciousness that the absolute Being is, and that this and all +which we can logically deduce from this are objects of knowledge to us; +in other words, that the system advocated in this volume directly +follows from that premiss. 2. That any doctrine of "indefinite +consciousness" is erroneous, that the vagueness is not in consciousness, +but in our knowledge; and further, that the hypothesis of a +consciousness of the "raw material of thought" is absurd. + + + + +"THE RECONCILIATION." + + +It would naturally seem, that, after what is believed to be the thorough +refutation of the limitist scheme, which has been given in the preceding +comments on Mr. Spencer's three philosophical chapters, the one named in +our heading would need scarce more than a notice. But so far is this +from being the case, that some of the worst features in the results of +his system stand out in clearest relief here. Before proceeding to +consider these, let us note a most important admission. He speaks of his +conclusion as bringing "the results of speculation into harmony with +those of common sense," and then makes the, for him, extraordinary +statement, "Common Sense asserts the existence of reality." In these two +remarks it would appear to be implied that Common Sense is a final +standard with which any position most be reconciled. The question +instantly arises, What is Common Sense? The writer has never seen a +definition, and would submit for the reader's consideration the +following. + +Common Sense _is the practical Pure Reason_; it is that faculty by which +the spiritual person sees in the light of consciousness the _a priori_ +law as inherent in the fact presented by the Sense. + +For the sake of completeness its complement may be defined thus: + +Judgment is the practical Understanding; it is that faculty by which +the spiritual person selects such means as he thinks so conformed to +that law thus intuited, as to be best suited to accomplish the object in +view. + +A man has good Common Sense, who quickly sees the informing law in the +fact; and good judgment, who skilfully selects and adapts his means to +the circumstances of the case, and the end sought. Of course it will not +be understood that it is herein implied that every person who exercises +this faculty has a defined and systematic knowledge of it. + +The reader will readily see the results which directly follow from Mr. +Spencer's premiss. It is true that "Common Sense asserts the existence +of a reality," and this assertion is true; but with equal truth does it +assert the law of logic; that, if a premiss is true, _all that is +logically involved in it is true_. It appears, then, that Mr. Spencer +has unwittingly acknowledged the fundamental principle of what may be +called the Coleridgian system, the psychological fact of the Pure +Reason, and thus again has furnished a basis for the demolition of his +own. + +It was said above that some of the evil results of Mr. Spencer's system +assumed in this chapter their worst phases. This remark is illustrated +in the following extract: "We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as +a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon; phenomena +being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are +obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent; and criticism teaches us +that this Power is wholly incomprehensible. In this consciousness of an +Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on +which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and +Science coalesce." The evils referred to may be developed as follows: +"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some +Power by which we are acted upon." This may be expressed in another form +thus: Every phenomenon is a manifestation of some Power by which we are +acted upon. Some doubt may arise respecting the precise meaning of this +sentence, unless the exact signification of the term phenomenon be +ascertained. It might be confined to material appearances, appreciable +by one of the five senses. But the context seems to leave no doubt but +that Mr. Spencer uses it in the wider sense of every somewhat in the +Universe, since he speaks of "phenomena" as "unlimited." Putting the +definition for the term, the sentence stands: Every somewhat in the +Universe is "a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." +It follows, then, that there is no somewhat in the Universe, except we +are acted upon by it. Our being arises to be accounted for. Either we +began to be, and were created, or the ground of our being is in +ourselves, our being is pure independence, and nothing further is to be +asked. This latter will be rejected. Then we were created. But we were +not created by Mr. Spencer's "some Power," because it only _acts upon +us_. In his creation, man was not acted upon, because there was no man +to be acted upon; but in that act a being was originated _who might be +acted upon_. Then, however, we came into being, another than "some +Power" was the cause of us. But the act of creating man was a somewhat. +Every somewhat _in_ the Universe is "a manifestation of some Power." +This is not such a manifestation. Therefore the creation of man took +place outside the Universe. Or does Mr. Spencer prefer to say that the +creation of man is "a manifestation of some Power acting upon" him! + +The position above taken seems the more favorable one for Mr. Spencer. +If, to avoid the difficulties which spring from it, he limits the term +phenomenon, as for instance to material appearances, then his assertion +that phenomena are unlimited is a contradiction, and he has no ground on +which to establish the omnipresence of his Power. + +But another line of criticism may be pursued. Strictly speaking, all +events are phenomena. Let there be named an event which is universally +known and acknowledged, and which, in the nature of the case, cannot be +"a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," and in that +statement also will the errors of the passage under consideration be +established. The experience by the human soul of a sense of guilt, of a +consciousness of ill-desert, is such an event. No "Power" can make a +sinless soul feel guilty; no "Power" _can relieve a sinful soul from +feeling guilty_. The feeling of guilt does not arise from the defiance +of Power, _it arises from the violation of Law_. And not only may this +experience be named, but every other experience of the moral nature of +man. In this connection let it be observed that Mr. Spencer always +elsewhere uses the term phenomenon to represent material phenomena in +the material universe. Throughout all his pages the reader is challenged +to find a single instance in which he attempts to account for any other +phenomena than these and their concomitants, the affections of the +intellect in the animal nature. Indeed, so thoroughly is his philosophy +vitiated by this omission, that one could never learn from anything he +has said in these pages, that man had a moral nature at all, that there +were any phenomena of sin and repentance which needed to be accounted +for. In this, Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel are just as bad as he. +Yet in this the Limitists have done well; it is impossible, on the basis +of their system, to render such an account. To test the matter, the +following problem is presented. + +To account, on the basis of the Limitist Philosophy, for the fact that +the nations of men have universally made public acknowledgment of their +guilt, in having violated the law of a superior being; and that they +have offered propitiatory sacrifices therefor, except in the case of +those persons and nations who have received the Bible, or have learned +through the Koran one of its leading features, that there is but one +God, and who in either case believe that the needful sacrifice has +already been made. + +Another pernicious result of the system under examination is, that it +affords no better ground for the doctrine of Deity's omnipresence than +_experience_. Mr. Spencer's words are: "phenomena being, _so far as we +can ascertain_, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard +this Power as omnipresent." Now, if he, or one of his friends, should +happen to get wings some day, and should just take a turn through space, +and should happen also to find a limit to phenomena, and, skirting in +astonishment along that boundary, should happen to light upon an open +place and a bridge, which invited them to pass across to another sphere +or system of phenomena, made by another "Power,"--said bridge being +constructed "'alf and 'alf" by the two aforesaid Powers,--then there +would be nothing to do but for the said explorer to fly back again to +England, as fast as ever he could, and relate to all the other Limitists +his new experience; and they, having no ground on which to argue against +or above experience, must needs receive the declaration of their +colaborator, with its inevitable conclusion, that the Power by which we +are here acted upon is limited, and so is not omnipresent. But when, +instead of such a fallacious philosophy, men shall receive the doctrine, +based not upon human experience, but upon God's inborn ideas that +phenomena are limited and God is omnipresent, and that upon these facts +experience can afford no decision, we shall begin to eliminate the real +difficulties of philosophy, and to approach the attainment of the unison +between human philosophy and the Divine Philosophy. + +Attached to the above is the conclusion reached by Mr. Spencer in an +earlier part of his work, that "criticism teaches us that this Power is +wholly incomprehensible." We might, it is believed, ask with pertinence, +What better, then, is man than the brute? But the subject is recurred to +at this time, only to quote against this position a sentence from a +somewhat older book than "First Principles," a book which, did it +deserve no other regard than as a human production, would seem, from its +perfect agreement with the facts of human nature, to be the true basis +for all philosophy. The sentence is this: "Beloved, let us love one +another, for love is of God; and every one that loveth, is born of God, +_and_ KNOWETH GOD." + +But the gross materialism of Mr. Spencer's philosophy presents its worst +phase in his completed doctrine of God. Mark. A "phenomenon" is "a +manifestation of some Power." "In this consciousness of an +Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power we have just that consciousness on +which Religion dwells. And so we arrive at the point where Religion and +Science coalesce." An "Incomprehensible Omnipresent Power" is all the +Deity Mr. Spencer allows to mankind. This Power is omnipresent, so that +we can never escape it; and incomprehensible, so that we can never know +the law of its action, or even if it have a law. At any moment it may +fall on us and crush us. At any moment this globe may become one vast +Vesuvius, and all its cities Herculaneums and Pompeiis. Of such a Deity +the children of men may either live in continual dread, or in continual +disregard; they may either spend their lives clad in sackcloth, or +purple and fine linen; bread and water may be their fare, or their table +may be spread like that of Dives; by merciless mortification of the +flesh, by scourges and iron chains, they may seek to propitiate, if +possible, this incomprehensible, omnipresent Power; or, reckless of +consequences, they may laugh and dance and be gay, saying, we know +nothing of this Power, he may crush us any moment, let us take the good +of life while we can. The symbols of such a Deity are the "rough and +ragged rocks," the hills, the snow-crowned mountains Titan-piled; the +avalanche starting with ominous thunder, to rush with crash and roar and +terrible destruction upon the hapless village beneath it; the flood +gathering its waters from vast ranges of hills into a single valley, +spreading into great lakes, drowning cattle, carrying off houses and +their agonized inhabitants, sweeping away dams, rending bridges from +their foundations, in fine, ruthlessly destroying the little gatherings +of man, and leaving the country, over which its devastating waters +flowed, a mournful desolation; and finally, perhaps the completest +symbol of all may be found in that collection of the united streams and +lakes of tens upon tens of thousands of miles of the earth's surface, +into the aorta of the world, over the rough, rocky bed of which the +crowded waters rush and roar, with rage and foam, until they come +suddenly to the swift tremendous plunge of Niagara. + +It should be further noticed, that this philosophy is in direct +antagonism with that of the Bible,--that, if Spencerianism is true, the +Bible is a falsehood and cheat. Instead of Mr. Spencer's "Power," the +Bible presents us a doctrine of God as follows: "And God said unto +Moses, I AM THAT I AM. And he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the +children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."--_Exodus_ IV. 14. This +declaration, the most highly metaphysical of any but one man ever heard, +all the Limitists, even devout Mr. Mansel, either in distinct terms, or +by implication, deny. That other declaration is this: "Beloved, let us +love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born +of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; _for God +is love_."--1 _John_ IV. 7, 8. Direct as is the antagonism between the +two philosophies now presented, the later one appears in an especially +bad light from the fact, that, being very recent and supported by a mere +handful of men, its advocates have utterly neglected to take any notice +of the other and elder one, although the adherents of this may be +numbered by millions, and among them have been and are many of the +ablest of earth's thinkers. True, the great majority of Bible readers do +not study it as a philosophical treatise, but rather as a book of +religious and spiritual instruction; yet, since it is the most +profoundly philosophical book which has ever been in the hands of man, +and professedly teaches us not only the philosophy of man, but also the +philosophy of God, it certainly would seem that the advocates of the new +and innovating system should have taken up that one which it sought to +supplant, and have made an attempt, commensurate with the magnitude of +the work before them, to show its position to be fallacious and +unworthy of regard. Instead of this they have nowhere recognized the +existence even of this philosophy except in the single instance of a +quotation by Mr. Mansel, in which he seems tacitly to acknowledge the +antagonism we have noted. In Mr. Spencer's volume this neglect is +especially noteworthy. Judging from internal evidence, one would much +sooner conclude that it was written by a Hindu pundit, in a temple of +Buddha, than by an Englishman, in a land of Bibles and Christian +churches. Now, although the Bible may stand in his estimation no higher +than the Bahgavat-Gita, yet the mere fact that it is, and that it +presents a most profound philosophy, which is so largely received in his +own and neighboring nations, made it imperative upon him not only to +take some notice of it, but to meet and answer it, as we have indicated +above. + +Another fault in Mr. Spencer's philosophy, one which he will be less +willing to admit, perhaps, than the above, and, at the same time, one +which will be more likely forcibly to move a certain class of mind, is, +that it is in direct antagonism to human nature. Not only is the Bible a +falsehood and a cheat, if Mr. Spencer's philosophical system is true, +but human nature is equally a falsehood and a cheat. To specify. Human +nature universally considers God, or its gods, as persons; or, in other +words, all human beings, or at least with very rare exceptions, +spontaneously ascribe personality to Deity. This position is in no wise +negatived by the fact of the Buddhist priesthood of India, or of a class +of philosophical atheists in any other country. Man is endowed with the +power of self-education; and if an individual sees, in the religion in +which he is brought up, some inconsistency, which he, thinking it, as it +may be, integral, for philosophical reasons rejects, and all religion +with it, he may educate himself into speculative atheism. But no child +is an atheist. Not even Shelley became such, until he had dashed against +some of the distorted and monstrous _human_ theologies of his day. But +counting all the Buddhists, and all the German atheists, and all the +English atheists, and all the American atheists, and all other atheists +wherever they may be found, they will not number one tenth of the human +race. On what ground can the unanimity of the other nine tenths be +accounted for? There appears none possible, but that the notion that God +is a person, _is organic in human nature_. Another equally universal and +spontaneous utterance of mankind is, that there is a likeness, in some +way, between God and man. There are the grossest, and in many instances +most degrading modes of representing this; but under them all, and +through them all, the indelible notion appears. The unanimity and +pertinacity of this notion, appearing in every part of the globe, and +under every variety of circumstance, and reappearing after every +revolution, which, tearing down old customs and worships, established +new ones, can without doubt only be accounted for on the precise ground +of the other,--that the notion _is organic in man_. A third utterance of +the human race, standing in the same category with these two, is, that +the Deity can be propitiated by sacrifice. This also has had revolting, +yea most hideous and unrighteous forms of expression, even to human +sacrifices. But the notion has remained indestructible through all ages, +and must therefore be accounted for, as have been the others. Over +against the I AM, which human nature presents and the Bible supports; +over against Him in whose image man and the Bible say man was created; +and over against Him who, those two still agreeing witnesses also +affirm, is moved by his great heart of Love to have mercy on those +creatures who come to him with repentance, Mr. Spencer gives us, as the +result of _Science_, an incomprehensible omnipresent _Power_; only a +Power, nothing more; and that "utterly inscrutable." For our part, +whatever others may do, we will believe in human nature and the Bible. +On the truthfulness of these two witnesses, as on the Central Rock in +the Universe, we plant ourselves. Here do we find our Gibraltar. + +Mr. Spencer further says that on the consciousness of this Power +"Religion dwells." Now, so far is this assertion from according with the +fact, that on his hypothesis it is impossible to account for the +presence of religion as a constitutive element of the human race. +Religion was primarily worship, the reverential acknowledgment, by the +sinless creature, of the authority of the Creator, combined with the +adoration of His absolute Holiness; but since sin has marred the race, +it has been coupled with the offering in some forms of a propitiatory +sacrifice. But if the Deity is only Power; or equally, if this is all +the notion we can form of him, we are utterly at a loss to find aught in +him to worship, much less can we account for the fact of the religious +nature in us, and most of all are we confounded by the persistent +assertion, by this religions nature, of the personality and mercy of +God, for Power can be neither personal nor merciful. + +Mr. Spencer proceeds to strengthen as well as he can his position by +stating that "from age to age Science has continually defeated it +(Religion) wherever they have come into collision, and has obliged it to +relinquish one or more of its positions." In this assertion, also, he +manifests either a want of acquaintance with the facts or a failure to +comprehend their significance. Religion may properly be divided into two +classes. + +1. Those religions which have appeared to grow up spontaneously among +men, having all the errors and deformities which a fleshly imagination +would produce. + +2. The religion of Jesus Christ. + +1. From the three great ideas mentioned above, no Science has ever +driven even the religions of this class. It has, indeed, corrected many +_forms of expression_, and has sometimes driven _individuals_, who +failed to distinguish between the form, and the idea which the form +overlies, into a rejection of the truth itself. + +2. Respecting the religion of Jesus Christ, Mr. Spencer's remark has no +shadow of foundation. Since the beginning of its promulgation by +Jehovah, and especially since the completion of that promulgation by +our Saviour and his apostles, not one whit of its practical law or its +philosophy has been abated; nay, more, to-day, in these American States, +there may be found a more widespread, thoroughly believed, firmly held, +and intelligent conviction of God's personality, and personal +supervision of the affairs of men, of his Fatherhood, and of that +fatherhood exercised in bringing "order out of confusion," in so +conducting the most terrible of conflicts, that it shall manifestly +redound, not only to the glory of himself, but to the very best good of +man, so manifestly to so great a good, that all the loss of life, and +all the suffering, is felt to be not worthy to be compared to the good +achieved, and that too _most strongly by the sufferers_, than was ever +before manifested by any nation under heaven. The truth is, that, in +spite of all its efforts to the contrary, criticism has ever been +utterly impotent to eliminate from human thinking the elements we have +presented. Its utmost triumph has been to force a change in the form of +expression; and in the Bible it meets with forms of expression which it +ever has been, is now, and ever shall be, as helpless to change as a +paralytic would be to overturn the Himalaya. + +The discussion of the topic immediately in hand may perhaps be now +properly closed with the simple allusion to a single fact. Just as far +as a race of human beings descends in the gradations of degradation, +just so far does it come to look upon Deity simply as power. African +Fetishism is the doctrine that Deity is an incomprehensible power, +rendered into the form of a popular religion; only the religion stands +one step higher than the philosophy, in that it assumes a sort of +personality for the Power. + +On page 102 the following extract will be found: "And now observe that +all along, the agent which has effected the purification has been +Science. We habitually overlook the fact that this has been one of its +functions. Religion ignores its immense debt to Science; and Science is +scarcely at all conscious how much Religion owes it. Yet it is +demonstrable that every step by which Religion has progressed from its +first low conception to the comparatively high one it has now reached, +Science has helped it, or rather forced it to take; and that even now, +Science is urging further steps in the same direction." In this passage +half truths are so sweepingly asserted as universal that it becomes +simply untrue. The evil may be stand under two heads. + +1. It is too philosophical. Mr. Spencer undertakes to be altogether too +profound. Since he has observed that certain changes for the better have +been made in some human religions, by the study of the natural sciences, +he jumps to the conclusion that religion has been under a state of +steady growth; and of course readily assumes--for there is not a shadow +of other basis for his assertion--that the "first" "conception" of +religion was very "low." This assumption we utterly deny, and demand of +Mr. Spencer his proof. For ourselves we are willing to come down from +the impregnable fortresses of the Bible upon the common ground of the +Grecian Mythology, and on this do battle against him. In this we are +taught that the Golden Age came _first_, in which was a life of spotless +purity; after which were the silver and brazen ages, and the Iron Age in +which was crime, and the "low conception" of religion came _last_. How +marked is the general agreement of this with the Bible account! + +2. But more and worse may be charged on this passage than that it is too +philosophical. Mr. Spencer constructs his philosophy first and cuts his +facts to match it. This is a common mistake among men, and which they +are unconscious of. Now the fact is, Science was _not_ "the agent which +effected the purification." Religion owes a very small debt to Science. +Science can never be more than a supplement, "a handmaid" to Religion. +Religion's first position was not a low one, but nearly the highest. +Afterwards it sunk very low; but men sunk it there. Science never +"helped it" or "forced it" one atom upwards. Science alone only degrades +Religion and gives new wings and hands to crime. This will be +especially manifest to those who remember what Mr. Spencer's doctrine of +Science is. He says: "That even the _highest_ achievements of Science +are resolvable into mental relations of coexistence and sequence, so +cooerdinated as exactly to tally with certain relations of coexistence +and sequence that occur externally." Of course the highest _object_ of +Science will be "_truth_"; and this, our teacher tells us, "is simply +the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective relations." To +interpret. A science of medicine, a science of ablutions, a science of +clothing, a science of ventilation, a science of temperature, and to +some largely, to many chiefly, a science of _cookery_ do, combined, +constitute Science, and the preservation of the body is its highest +attainment. Is this Science "the agent which has effected the +purification of Religion?" What then is the truth? + +"Lo this have I found, that God hath made man upright; but they have +sought out many inventions."--_Eccl._ VII. 29. The first religion was a +communion with God. The Creator taught man, as a father would his +children. But when man sinned, he began to seek out many inventions, and +sank to that awful state of degradation hinted at in the fragmentary +sketches of the popular manners and customs of the times of +Abraham,--_Gen._ XII. XXV.; which Paul epitomizes with such fiery vigor +in the first chapter of Romans, and which may be found fully paralleled +in our own day. At the proper time, God took mankind in hand, and began +to develop his great plan for giving purity to religion. So he raised up +Moses, and gave to Israel the Levitical law. Or if Mr. Spencer shall +deny the biblical account of the origin of the five books of Moses, he +at least cannot deny that they have a being; and, placing them on the +same ground of examination and criticism as Herodotus, that they were +written more than a thousand years before the Christian era. Now mark. +Whoever wrote them, they remained as they were first framed, and no one +of the prophets, who came after, added one new idea. They only +emphasized and amplified "The Law." So far then as this part of +Religion was concerned, Science never helped a particle. Yea, more, the +words to Moses in the wilderness were never paralleled in the utterances +of man before the Christian era. + +"In the fulness of time God sent his own Son." However defective was the +former dispensation, he, who appeared to most of the men of his day as +only a carpenter's son, declared to mankind the final and perfect truth. +As the system taught by Moses was not the result of any philosophical +developments, but was incomparably superior to the religion of the most +civilized people of the world, at whose court Moses was brought up, and +was manifestly constructed _de novo_, and from some kind of revelation, +so this, which the carpenter's son taught, was incomparably superior to +any utterance which the human soul had up to that time, or has since, +made. It comes forth at once complete and pure. It utters the highest +principles in the simplest language. Indeed, nothing new was left to say +when John finished his writing; and the canon might well be closed. And +since that day, has Religion advanced? Not a syllable. The purest water +is drank at the old fountain. But it will be said that the cause of +Religion among men has advanced. Very true, but Science did not advance +it. You can yet count the years on your fingers since men of Science +generally ceased to be strenuously hostile to Religion. Religion, in +every instance, has advanced just where it has gone back, and drank at +the old fountains. Who, then, has purified Religion? God is "the agent +which has effected the purification." God is he to whom Religion owes +"its immense debt," not Science. He it is who has brought her up to her +present high position. + +When, now, we see how completely Mr. Spencer--to use a commonplace but +very forcible phrase--has "ruled God out of the ring," how impertinent +seems his rebuke, administered a few pages further on, in the passage +beginning, "Volumes might be written upon the impiety of the pious," to +those who believe that God means what he says, and that men may know +him. These men at least stand on a far higher plane than he who teaches +that an "incomprehensible omnipresent Power" is all there is for us to +worship, and his words will sound to them like the crackling of thorns +under a pot. + +There does not appear in this chapter any further topic that has not +already been touched upon. With these remarks, then, the examination of +this chapter, and of Mr. Spencer's First Principles, may be closed. + + + + +CONCLUSION. + + +If it has ever been the reader's lot to examine Paley's "Evidences of +Christianity," or the "Sermons of President Dwight on the Existence of +God"; and if he has risen from their perusal with a feeling of utter +unsatisfaction, enduring the same craving for a sure truth harassing as +before, he will have partly shared the experience which drove the author +forward, until he arrived at the foundation principles of this treatise. +Those works, and all of that class are, for the object they have in +view, worthless; not because the various statements they make are +untrue, not because elegant language and beauty of style are wanting; +but because they are radically defective in that, their _method_ is +irrelevant to the subject in hand; because in all the arguments that +have been or can be brought forward there is nothing decisive and final; +because the skeptic can thrust the sharp sword of his criticism through +every one of them; because, in fine, the very root of the matter, their +method itself is false, and men have attempted to establish by a series +of arguments what must be ground for the possibility of an argument, and +can only be established by the opposite, the _a priori_ method. Though +the Limitist Philosophy has no positive value, it has this negative one, +that it has established, by the most thorough-going criticism, the +worthlessness of the _a posteriori_ processes of thought on the matter +in hand. Yea, more, the existence of _any_ spiritual person cannot be +proved in that way. You can prove that the boy's body climbs the tree; +but never that he has a soul. This is always taken for granted. Lest the +author should appear singular in this view, he would call the attention +of the reader to a passage in Coleridge's writings in which he at once +sets forth the beauty of the style and incompetency of the logic of Dr. +Paley's book. "I have, I am aware, in this present work, furnished +occasion for a charge of having expressed myself with slight and +irreverence of celebrated names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if +I were fond and ambitious of literary honor, of public applause, how +well content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration +which, in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And +how gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I +even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive +facility of his writings! But on this very account, I feel myself bound +in conscience _to throw the whole force of my intellect in the way of +this triumphal car_, on which the tutelary genius of modern idolatry is +borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the wheels." + +Instead of the method now condemned, there is one taught us in the Book, +and the only one taught us there, which is open to every human being, +for which every human being has the faculty, and respecting which all +that is needed is, that the person exercise what he already has. The boy +could not learn his arithmetic, except he set himself resolutely to his +task; and no man can learn of God, except he also fulfils the +conditions, except he consecrate himself wholly to the acquisition of +this knowledge, except his soul is poured out in love to God; "for every +one that _loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God_." We come then to the +knowledge of God by a direct and immediate act of the soul. The Reason, +the Sensibility, and the Will, give forth their combined and highest +action in the attainment of this knowledge. As an intellectual +achievement, this is the highest possible to the Reason. She attains +then, to the Ultima Thule of all effort, and of this she is fully +conscious. Nor is there awakened any feverish complaining that there are +no more worlds to conquer. In the contemplation of the ineffable +Goodness she finds her everlasting occupation, and her eternal rest. +Plainly, then, both Reason and Revelation teach but a single, and that +the _a priori_ method, by which to establish for man the fact of the +being of God. Let us buttress this conclusion with other lines of +thought. + +Reader, now that it is suggested to you, does it not seem in the highest +degree improbable, that the most important truths which can pertain to +man, truths which do not concern primarily the affairs of this life, but +of his most exalted life, the life of the spiritual person as the +companion of its Creator, should be based upon an inferior, less +satisfactory, and less adequate foundation of knowledge, than those of +our childhood's studies, of the arithmetic and the algebra? The boy who +cons the first pages of his arithmetical text-book, soon learns what he +knows to be _self-evident_ truths. He who should offer to _prove_ the +truth of the multiplication-table, would only expose himself to +ridicule. When the boy has attained to youth, and advanced in his +studies, the pages of the algebra and geometry are laid before him, and +he finds new and higher orders of self-evident truths. Would any +evidence, any argument, strengthen his conviction of the validity of the +axioms? Yea, rather, if one should begin to offer arguments, would he +not instinctively and rightfully feel that the confession was thereby +tacitly made, that self-evidence was not satisfactory; and would he not, +finding his spontaneous impulse, and his education, so contradictory, be +_liable_ to fall into complete skepticism? If now there be this +spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, unalterable, yea, universal conviction +respecting matters of subordinate importance, can it be possible,--I +repeat the question, for it seems to carry with it irresistibly its own +and the decisive answer,--can it be possible that the decisions of +questions of the highest moment, that the knowledge of the principles of +our moral being and of the moral government to which we are amenable, +and most of all of the Governor who is at once Creator, Lawgiver, and +Judge, is not based on at least equally spontaneous, yea, abiding, yea, +unalterable, yea, universal convictions? And when the teacher seemingly, +and may it not with truth be said _actually_, distrusting the +reliability of such a conviction, goes about to bolster up his belief, +and the belief of his pupil, in the existence of God, and thereto rakes +together, with painstaking labor, many sticks and straws of evidence, +instead of looking up to the truth which shines directly down upon him +with steady ineffable effulgence, is it at all strange that the +sharper-eyed pupil, keenly appreciating the contradiction between his +spontaneous conviction and his teaching, should become uncertain which +to follow, a doubter, and finally a confirmed skeptic? If, then, it is +incredible that the fundamental principles of man's moral nature--that +to which all the other elements of his being are subordinate, and for +which they were created--are established on inferior grounds, and those +less satisfactory than the grounds of other principles; and if, on the +other hand, the conviction is irresistible, that they are established on +the highest grounds, and since the truths of mathematics are also based +on the highest ground, self-evidence, and since there can be none higher +than the highest, it follows that the moral principles of the Universe, +so far as they can be known by man, have _precisely the same foundation +of truthfulness as the principles of mathematics--they are_ +SELF-EVIDENT. + +But some good Reader will check at the result now attained because it +involves the position that the human Reason is the final standard of +truth for man. Good reader, this position is involved, and is true; and +for the sake of Christ's religion it must be taken. The only possible +ground for a thoroughly satisfactory and thoroughly unanswerable +Christian Philosophy, is the principle that _The human Reason is the +final standard of truth for man_. + +It has been customary for the devout Bible-reader to esteem that book as +his final standard; and to such an extent in many instances has his +reverential regard for it been carried, that the expression will hardly +be too strong for truth, that it has become an object of worship; and +upon the mind of such a one the above assertion will produce a shock. +While the author would treat with respect every religious feeling, he +would still remind such a person that the Bible is the moral school-book +of the spiritual person in man, which God himself prepared for man's +use, and must in every case be inferior and subordinate to the being +whom it was meant to educate; and furthermore, that, by the very fact of +making man, God established in him the standard, and the right to +require that this fact be recognized. Mark, God made the standard and +thus established the right. This principle may be supported by the +following considerations: + +1. The church universally has acted upon it; and none have employed it +more vigorously than those who have in terms most bitterly opposed it. +One of the class just referred to affirms that the Bible is the standard +of truth. "Admit," says a friend standing by, "that it would be if it +were what it purports to be; but what evidence is there that this is the +case." Thereupon the champion presents evidence from the fathers, and +evidence from the book itself; and finally closes by saying, that such +an array of evidence is ample to satisfy any _reasonable_ man of its +truth and validity. His argument is undoubtedly satisfactory; but if he +has not appealed to a reasonable man, _i. e._ to the Reason, _i. e._, if +he has not acknowledged a standard for _the_ standard, and thus has not +tacitly, unconsciously and yet decisively employed the Reason as the +highest standard of truth, then his conduct has for us no adequate +expression. + +2. Nicodemus and Christ, in express terms, recognized the validity of +this standard. Said the ruler to Christ, "We know that thou art a +teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, +except God be with him."--_John_ III. 2. In these words, he both +recognized the validity of the standard, and the fact that its +requirements had been met. But decisively emphatic are the words of our +Saviour: "If I had not done among them the works which none other man +did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me +and my Father."--_John_ XV. 24. As if he had said, "While I appeared +among them simply as a man, I had no right to claim from them a belief +in my mission; but when I had given them adequate and ample evidence of +my heavenly character, when, in a word, I had by my works satisfied all +the rational demands for evidence which they could make, then no excuse +remained for their rejection of me." + +The doctrine of this treatise, that man may know the truth, and know +God, is one which will never be too largely reflected upon by the human +mind, or too fully illustrated in human thought. In no better strain can +we bring our work to a close than by offering some reflections on those +words of Jesus Christ which have formed the title of our book. + +"Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, 'If ye continue in +my word, _then_ are ye my disciples indeed; and ye shall know the truth, +and the truth shall make you free.'"--_John_ VIII. 31, 32. Throughout +all the acts of Christ, as recorded in John and especially during the +last days of his life, there may be traced the marks of a super-human +effort to express to the Jews, in the most skilful manner, the nature +and purport of his mission. He appeared to them a man; and yet it would +seem as if the Godhead in him struggled with language to overcome its +infirmities, and express with perfectest skill his extraordinary +character and work. But "he came unto his own, and his own received him +not." Being then such, even the Divine Man, Jesus Christ possessed in +his own right _an absolute and exhaustive metaphysic_. We study out some +laws in some of their applications; he knew all laws in all their +applications. In these his last days he was engaged in making the most +profound and highly philosophical revelations to his followers that one +being ever made to another. Or does the reader prefer to call them +religious? Very well: for here Religion and Philosophy are identical. +Being engaged in such a labor, it is certain that no merely human +teacher ever used words with the careful balancing, the skilful +selection, the certain exactitude, that Jesus did. Hence in the most +emphatic sense may it be said, that, whether he used figurative or +literal language, he meant just what he said. The terms used in the text +quoted are literal terms, and undoubtedly the passage is to be taken in +its most literal signification. In these words then, in this passage of +the highest philosophical import, is to be found the basis of the whole +_a priori_ philosophy. They were spoken of the most important truths, +those which pertain to the soul's everlasting welfare; but as the +greater includes the less, so do they include all lesser science. In +positive and unmistakable terms has Christ declared the fact of +knowledge. God knows all truth. In so far as we also know the truth, in +so far are we like him. And mark, this is knowledge, a purely +intellectual act. Love is indeed a _condition_ of the act, but it is not +the very act itself. + +On this subject it is believed that the Christian church has failed to +assert the most accurate doctrine. Too generally has this knowledge been +termed a spiritual knowledge, meaning thereby, a sort of an impression +of happiness made upon the spiritual sensibility; and this state of +bliss has been represented as in the highest degree desirable. Beyond +all question it is true, that, when the spiritual person, with the eye +of Reason, sees, and thus knows the truth, seeing it and knowing it +because his whole being, will, and intellect is consecrated to, wrapt in +the effort, and he is searching for it as for hid treasures, there will +roll over his soul some ripples of that ineffable Delight which is a +boundless ocean in Deity. But this state of the Sensibility follows +after, and is dependent upon, the act of love, and the act of knowledge. +There should be, there was made in Christ's mind, a distinction in the +various psychical modifications of him who had sold all that he had to +buy the one pearl. The words of Christ are to be taken, then, as the +words of the perfect philosopher, and the perfect religionist. Bearing, +as he did, the destiny of a world on his heart, and burdened beyond all +utterance by the mighty load, his soul was full of the theme for which +he was suffering, he could speak to man only of his highest needs and +his highest capabilities. The truth which man may know, then, is not +only eternal,--all truth is eternal,--but it is that eternal truth most +important to him, the _a priori_ laws of the spiritual person and of all +his relations. The what he is, the why he is, and the what he ought to +become, are the objects of his examination. When, then, a spiritual +person has performed his highest act, the act of unconditional and +entire consecration to the search after the truth, _i. e._ to God; and +when, having done this he ever after puts away all lusts of the flesh, +he shall in this condition become absorbed, wrapt away in the +contemplation of the truth; then his spiritual eye will be open, and +will dart with its far-glancing, searching gaze throughout the mysteries +of the Universe, and he will know the truth. Before, when he was +absorbed in the pursuit of the things of Sense, he could see almost no +_a priori_ principles at all, and what he did see, only in their +practical bearing upon those material and transitory things which perish +with their using; but now balancing himself on tireless pinion in the +upper ether, anon he stoops to notice the largest and highest and most +important of those objects which formerly with so much painful and +painstaking labor he climbed the rugged heights of sense to examine, and +having touched upon them cursorily, to supply the need of the hour, he +again spreads his powerful God-given wings of faith and love, and soars +upward, upward, upward, towards the eternal Sun, the infinite Person, +the final Truth, God. Then does he come to comprehend, "to KNOW, with +all saints, what is the height and depth and length and breadth of the +love of God." Then do the pure _a priori_ laws, especially those of the +relations of spiritual persons, _i. e._ of the moral government of God, +come full into the field of his vision. Then in the clear blaze, in the +noonday effulgence of the ineffable, eternal Sun, does he see the Law +which binds God as it binds man,--that Law so terrible in its demands +upon him who had violated it, that the infinite Person himself could +find no other way of escape for sinning man but in sending "his +only-begotten Son into the world." And he who is lifted up to this +knowledge needs no other revelation. All other knowledge is a child's +lesson-book to him. All lower study is tasteless; all lower life is +neglected, forgotten. He studies forever the pure equations of truth; he +lives in the bosom of God. Such an one may all his life-long have been +utterly ignorant of books. A poor negro on some rice plantation, he may +have learned of God only by the hearing of the ear, but by one act, in a +moment, in the twinkling of an eye, he has passed all the gradations of +earthly knowledge, and taken his seat on the topmost form in heaven. He +received little instruction from men; but forevermore God is his +teacher. + +This of which we have been speaking is, be it remembered, no rhapsody of +the imagination. It is a simple literal fact respecting man's intellect. +It is the same in kind, though of far nobler import, as if upon this act +of consecration there should be revealed to every consecrated one, in a +sudden overwhelming burst of light, the whole _a priori_ system of the +physical Universe. This is not so revealed because it is not essential, +and so would only gratify curiosity. The other and the higher is +revealed, because it is essential to man's spiritual life. + +In the culminating act, then, of a spiritual person, in the unreserved, +the absolute consecration of the whole being to the search after truth, +do we find that common goal to which an _a priori_ philosophy inevitably +leads us, and which the purest, Christ's, religion teaches us. Thus does +it appear that in their highest idea Philosophy and Religion are +identical. The Rock upon which both alike are grounded is eternal. The +principles of both have the highest possible evidence, for they are +self-evident; and, having them given by the intuition of the Reason, a +man can cipher out the whole natural scheme of the Universe as he would +cipher out a problem in equations. He has not done it, because he is +wicked; and God has given him the Bible, as the mathematical astronomy +of the moral heavens, as a school-book to lead him back to the goal of +his lost purity. + +How beautiful, then, art thou, O Religion, supernal daughter of the +Deity! how noble in thy magnificent preeminence! how dazzling in thy +transcendent loveliness! Thou sittest afar on a throne of pearl; thy +diadem the Morning Stars, thy robe the glory of God. Founded is thy +throne on Eternity; and from eternity to eternity all thy laws are +enduring truth. Sitting thus, O Queen, more firmly throned than the +snow-capped mountains, calmer than the ocean's depths, in the surety of +thy self-conscious integrity and truth, thou mayest, with mien of +noblest dignity, in unwavering confidence, throw down the gauntlet of +thy challenge to the assembled doubters of the Universe. + +It may be that to some minds, unaccustomed to venturing out fearlessly +on the ocean of thought, with an unwavering trust in the pole-star truth +in the human soul, certain of the positions attained and maintained in +this volume will seem to involve the destruction of all essential +distinction between the Creator and the created. If the universe is a +definite and limited object, some created being may, at some period, +come to know every atom of it. Moreover, if there is a definite number +of the qualities and attributes--the endowments of Deity, some one may +learn the number, and what they are, and come at length to have a +knowledge equal to God's knowledge. Even if this possibility should be +admitted,--which it is not, for a reason to appear further on,--yet it +would in no way involve that the creature had, in any the least degree, +reduced the difference in _kind_ which subsists between him and the +Creator. A consideration of the following distinctive marks will, it +would seem, be decisive upon this point. + +God is self-existent. His creatures are dependent upon him. +Self-existence is an essential, inherent, untransferable attribute of +Deity; and so is not a possible attainment for any creature. Every +creature is necessarily dependent upon the Creator every moment, for his +continuance in being. Let him attain ever so high a state of knowledge; +let him, if the supposition were rational, acquire a knowledge equal to +that of Deity; let him be endowed with all the power he could use, and +he would not have made, nor could he make an effort even, in the +direction of removing his dependence upon his Creator. In the very +height of his glory, in the acme of his attainment, it would need only +that God rest an instant, cease to sustain him, and he would not be, he +would have gone out, as the light goes out on a burner when one turns +the faucet. + +Again, the mode by which their knowledge is attained is different in +kind; and the creature never can acquire the Creator's mode. The Deity +possesses his knowledge as a necessary endowment, given to him at once, +by a spontaneous intuition. Hence he could never learn, for there was no +knowledge which he did not already possess. Thus he is out of all +relation to Time. The creature, on the other hand, can never acquire any +knowledge except through processes; and, what is more, can never review +the knowledge already acquired, except by a process which occupies a +time. This relation of the creature to Time is organic; and this +distinction between the creature and Creator is thus also irremovable. + +Another organic distinction is that observed in the mode of seeing +ideals. The Divine Reason not only gives ideas, _a priori_ laws, but it +gives all possible images, which those laws, standing in their natural +relations to each other, can become. Thus all ideals are realized to +him, whether the creative energy goes forth, and power is organized in +accordance therewith, or not. Here again the creature is of the opposite +kind. The creature can never have an idea until he has been educated by +contact with a material universe; and then can never construct an ideal, +except he have first seen the elements of that ideal realized in +material forms. To illustrate: The infant has no ideas; and there is no +radical difference between the beginning of a human being and any other +created spiritual person. He has a rudimentary Reason, but it must grow +before it can make its presentations, and the means of its education +must be a material system. Let a spiritual person be created, and set in +the Universe, utterly isolated, with no medium of communication, and it +would stay forever just what it was at the beginning, a dry seed. The +necessity of alliance with a material Universe is equally apparent in +the mature spiritual person. Such a one cannot construct a single ideal, +except he have seen all the elements already in material forms. He who +will attempt to construct an ideal of any _thing_, which never has been, +as a griffin, and not put into it any form of animals which have been on +earth, will immediately appreciate the unquestionableness of this +position. Therefore it is that no one can, "by searching, find out God." +The creature can only learn what the Creator declares to him. + +Still another element of distinction, equally marked and decisive as +those just named, may be mentioned. The Deity possesses as inherent and +immanent endowment Power, or the ability of himself to realize his +ideals in objects. Thus is he the Creator. If this were not so, there +could have been no Universe, for there was no substance and no one to +furnish a substance but he. The creature, on the other hand, cannot +receive as a gift, neither attain by culture the power to create. Hence +he can only realize his ideals in materials furnished to his hand. +Pigments and brushes and chisels and marble must be before painters and +sculptors can become. + +Each and every one of the distinctions above made is _organic_. They +cannot be eliminated. In fact their removal is not a possible object of +effort. The creature may _wish_ them removed; but no line of thought can +be studied out by which a movement can be made towards the attainment of +that wish. It would seem, then, that, such being the facts, the fullest +scope might fearlessly be allowed to the legitimate use of every power +of the creature. Such, it is believed, is God's design. + +THE END. + + + + +Transcriber's Note: + + +Archaic/multiple spellings and punctuation of the original have been +maintained. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Know the Truth; A critique of the +Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation, by Jesse H. 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