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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Philosophy and The Social Problem - -Author: Will Durant - -Release Date: June 5, 2013 [EBook #42880] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM *** - - - - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was -produced from scanned images of public domain material -from the Google Print project.) - - - - - - - - - - PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - [Illustration: colophon] - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO · DALLAS - ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO - - MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED - - LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - - PHILOSOPHY - - AND - - THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - BY - - WILL DURANT, PH.D. - - INSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY, EXTENSION TEACHING - COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - - [Greek: ton men bion - hê physis edôke to de kalôs zên hê technê.] - --UNKNOWN DRAMATIC POET. - - NEW YORK - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - 1917 - - _All rights reserved_ - - COPYRIGHT, 1917, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1917. - - Norwood Press - J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. - Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. - - - TO - - ALDEN FREEMAN - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - -INTRODUCTION 1 - -PART I - -HISTORICAL APPROACH - -CHAPTER I - -THE PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCRATIC ETHIC - -I. History as rebarbarization 5 - -II. Philosophy as disintegrator 6 - -III. Individualism in Athens 7 - -IV. The Sophists 9 - -V. Intelligence as virtue 12 - -VI. The meaning of virtue 15 - -VII. "Instinct" and "reason" 23 - -VIII. The secularization of morals 27 - -IX. "Happiness" and "virtue" 31 - -X. The Socratic challenge 33 - -CHAPTER II - -PLATO: PHILOSOPHY AS POLITICS - -I. The man and the artist 36 - -II. How to solve the social problem 40 - -III. On making philosopher-kings 44 - -IV. Dishonest democracy 52 - -V. Culture and slavery 55 - -VI. Plasticity and order 60 - -VII. The meaning of justice 62 - -VIII. The future of Plato 64 - -CHAPTER III - -FRANCIS BACON AND THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SCIENCE - -I. From Plato to Bacon 67 - -II. Character 69 - -III. The expurgation of the intellect 70 - -IV. Knowledge is power 74 - -V. The socialization of science 76 - -VI. Science and Utopia 79 - -VII. Scholasticism in science 81 - -VIII. The Asiatics of Europe 85 - -CHAPTER IV - -SPINOZA ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - -I. Hobbes 90 - -II. The spirit of Spinoza 91 - -III. Political ethics 93 - -IV. Is man a political animal? 95 - -V. What the social problem is 98 - -VI. Free speech 101 - -VII. Virtue as power 105 - -VIII. Freedom and order 108 - -IX. Democracy and intelligence 112 - -X. The legacy of Spinoza 115 - -CHAPTER V - -NIETZSCHE - -I. From Spinoza to Nietzsche 117 - -II. Biographical 120 - -III. Exposition 126 - - 1. Morality as impotence 126 - 2. Democracy 128 - 3. Feminism 131 - 4. Socialism and anarchism 133 - 5. Degeneration 138 - 6. Nihilism 141 - 7. The will to power 143 - 8. The superman 150 - 9. How to make supermen 155 - 10. On the necessity of exploitation 159 - 11. Aristocracy 162 - 12. Signs of ascent 165 - -IV. Criticism 172 - -V. Nietzsche replies 177 - -VI. Conclusion 178 - -PART II - -SUGGESTIONS - -CHAPTER I - -SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS - -I. The problem 185 - -II. "Solutions" 190 - - 1. Feminism 190 - 2. Socialism 194 - 3. Eugenics 198 - 4. Anarchism 200 - 5. Individualism 202 - 6. Individualism again 202 - -III. Dissolutions 205 - -CHAPTER II - -THE RECONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY - -I. Epistemologs 214 - -II. Philosophy as control 218 - -III. Philosophy as mediator between science and statesmanship 222 - -CHAPTER III - -ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE - -I. The need 227 - -II. The organization of intelligence 230 - -III. Information as panacea 234 - -IV. Sex, art, and play in social reconstruction 240 - -V. Education 246 - -CHAPTER IV - -THE READER SPEAKS - -I. The democratization of aristocracy 251 - -II. The professor as Buridan's ass 255 - -III. Is information wanted? 257 - -IV. Finding Mæcenas 261 - -V. The chance of philosophy 264 - -CONCLUSION 268 - - - - -PART I - -HISTORICAL APPROACH - - - - -PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The purpose of this essay is to show: first, that the social problem has -been the basic concern of many of the greater philosophers; second, that -an approach to the social problem through philosophy is the first -condition of even a moderately successful treatment of this problem; and -third, that an approach to philosophy through the social problem is -indispensable to the revitalization of philosophy. - -By "philosophy" we shall understand a study of experience as a whole, or -of a portion of experience in relation to the whole. - -By the "social problem" we shall understand, simply and very broadly, -the problem of reducing human misery by modifying social institutions. -It is a problem that, ever reshaping itself, eludes sharper definition; -for misery is related to desire, and desire is personal and in perpetual -flux: each of us sees the problem unsteadily in terms of his own -changing aspirations. It is an uncomfortably complicated problem, of -course; and we must bear in mind that the limit of our intention here is -to consider philosophy as an approach to the problem, and the problem -itself as an approach to philosophy. We are proposing no solutions. - -Let us, as a wholesome measure of orientation, touch some of the -mountain-peaks in philosophical history, with an eye for the social -interest that lurks in every metaphysical maze. "Aristotle," says -Professor Woodbridge, "set treatise-writers the fashion of beginning -each treatise by reviewing previous opinions on their subject, and -proving them all wrong."[1] The purpose of the next five chapters will -be rather the opposite: we shall see if some supposedly dead -philosophies do not admit of considerable resuscitation. Instead of -trying to show that Socrates, Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, and Nietzsche were -quite mistaken in their views on the social problem, we shall try to see -what there is in these views that can help us to understand our own -situation to-day. We shall not make a collection of systems of social -philosophy; we shall not lose ourselves in the past in a scholarly -effort to relate each philosophy to its social and political -environment; we shall try to relate these philosophies rather to our own -environment, to look at our own problems successively through the eyes -of these philosophers. Other interpretations of these men we shall not -so much contradict as seek to supplement. - -Each of our historical chapters, then, will be not so much a review as a -preface and a progression. The aim will be neither history nor -criticism, but a kind of construction by proxy. It is a method that has -its defects: it will, for example, sacrifice thoroughness of scholarship -to present applicability, and will necessitate some repetitious -gathering of the threads when we come later to our more personal -purpose. But as part requital for this, we shall save ourselves from -considering the past except as it is really present, except as it is -alive and nourishingly significant to-day. And from each study we shall -perhaps make some advance towards our final endeavor,--the mutual -elucidation of the social problem and philosophy. - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCRATIC ETHIC - - -I - -History as Rebarbarization - -History is a process of rebarbarization. A people made vigorous by -arduous physical conditions of life, and driven by the increasing -exigencies of survival, leaves its native habitat, moves down upon a -less vigorous people, conquers, displaces, or absorbs it. Habits of -resolution and activity developed in a less merciful environment now -rapidly produce an economic surplus; and part of the resources so -accumulated serve as capital in a campaign of imperialist conquest. The -growing surplus generates a leisure class, scornful of physical activity -and adept in the arts of luxury. Leisure begets speculation; speculation -dissolves dogma and corrodes custom, develops sensitivity of perception -and destroys decision of action. Thought, adventuring in a labyrinth of -analysis, discovers behind society the individual; divested of its -normal social function it turns inward and discovers the self. The -sense of common interest, of commonwealth, wanes; there are no citizens -now, there are only individuals. - -From afar another people, struggling against the forces of an obdurate -environment, sees here the cleared forests, the liberating roads, the -harvest of plenty, the luxury of leisure. It dreams, aspires, dares, -unites, invades. The rest is as before. - -Rebarbarization is rejuvenation. The great problem of any civilization -is how to rejuvenate itself without rebarbarization. - - -II - -Philosophy as Disintegrator - -The rise of philosophy, then, often heralds the decay of a civilization. -Speculation begins with nature and begets naturalism; it passes to -man--first as a psychological mystery and then as a member of -society--and begets individualism. Philosophers do not always desire -these results; but they achieve them. They feel themselves the unwilling -enemies of the state: they think of men in terms of personality while -the state thinks of men in terms of social mechanism. Some philosophers -would gladly hold their peace, but there is that in them which will out; -and when philosophers speak, gods and dynasties fall. Most states have -had their roots in heaven, and have paid the penalty for it: the -twilight of the gods is the afternoon of states. - -Every civilization comes at last to the point where the individual, made -by speculation conscious of himself as an end _per se_, demands of the -state, as the price of its continuance, that it shall henceforth enhance -rather than exploit his capacities. Philosophers sympathize with this -demand, the state almost always rejects it: therefore civilizations come -and civilizations go. The history of philosophy is essentially an -account of the efforts great men have made to avert social -disintegration by building up natural moral sanctions to take the place -of the supernatural sanctions which they themselves have destroyed. To -find--without resorting to celestial machinery--some way of winning for -their people social coherence and permanence without sacrificing -plasticity and individual uniqueness to regimentation,--that has been -the task of philosophers, that is the task of philosophers. - -We should be thankful that it is. Who knows but that within our own time -may come at last the forging of an effective _natural_ ethic?--an -achievement which might be the most momentous event in the history of -our world. - - -III - -Individualism in Athens - -The great ages in the history of European thought have been for the most -part periods of individualistic effervescence: the age of Socrates, the -age of Cæsar and Augustus, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment;--and -shall we add the age which is now coming to a close? These ages have -usually been preceded by periods of imperialist expansion: imperialism -requires a tightening of the bonds whereby individual allegiance to the -state is made secure; and this tightening, given a satiety of -imperialism, involves an individualistic reaction. And again, the -dissolution of the political or economic frontier by conquest or -commerce breaks down cultural barriers between peoples, develops a sense -of the relativity of customs, and issues in the opposition of individual -"reason" to social tradition. - -A political treatise attributed to the fourth-century B.C. reflects the -attitude that had developed in Athens in the later fifth century. "If -all men were to gather in a heap the customs which they hold to be good -and noble, and if they were next to select from it the customs which -they hold to be base and vile, nothing would be left over."[2] Once such -a view has found capable defenders, the custom-basis of social -organization begins to give way, and institutions venerable with age are -ruthlessly subpoenaed to appear before the bar of reason. Men begin to -contrast "Nature" with custom, somewhat to the disadvantage of the -latter. Even the most basic of Greek institutions is questioned: "The -Deity," says a fourth-century Athenian Rousseau, "made all men free; -Nature has enslaved no man."[3] Botsford speaks of "the powerful -influence of fourth-century socialism on the intellectual class."[4] -Euripides and Aristophanes are full of talk about a movement for the -emancipation of women.[5] Law and government are examined: Anarcharsis' -comparison of the law to a spider's web, which catches small flies and -lets the big ones escape, now finds sympathetic comprehension; and men -arise, like Callicles and Thrasymachus, who frankly consider government -as a convenient instrument of mass-exploitation. - - -IV - -The Sophists - -The cultural representatives of this individualistic development were -the Sophists. These men were university professors without a university -and without the professorial title. They appeared in response to a -demand for higher instruction on the part of the young men of the -leisure class; and within a generation they became the most powerful -intellectual force in Greece. There had been philosophers, questioners, -before them; but these early philosophers had questioned nature rather -than man or the state. The Sophists were the first group of men in -Greece to overcome the natural tendency to acquiesce in the given order -of things. They were proud men,--humility is a vice that never found -root in Greece,--and they had a buoyant confidence in the newly -discovered power of human intelligence. They assumed, in harmony with -the spirit of all Greek achievement, that in the development and -extension of knowledge lay the road to a sane and significant life, -individual and communal; and in the quest for knowledge they were -resolved to scrutinize unawed all institutions, prejudices, customs, -morals. Protagoras professed to respect conventions,[6] and pronounced -conventions and institutions the source of man's superiority to the -beast; but his famous principle, that "man is the measure of all -things," was a quiet hint that morals are a matter of taste, that we -call a man "good" when his conduct is advantageous to us, and "bad" when -his conduct threatens to make for our own loss. To the Sophists virtue -consisted, not in obedience to unjudged rules and customs, but in the -efficient performance of whatever one set out to do. They would have -condemned the bungler and let the "sinner" go. That they were flippant -sceptics, putting no distinction of worth between any belief and its -opposite, and willing to prove anything for a price, is an old -accusation which later students of Greek philosophy are almost unanimous -in rejecting.[7] - -The great discovery of the Sophists was the individual; it was an -achievement for which Plato and his oligarchical friends could not -forgive them, and because of which they incurred the contumely which it -is now so hard to dissociate from their name. The purpose of laws, said -the Sophists, was to widen the possibilities of individual development; -if laws did not do that, they had better be forgotten. There was a -higher law than the laws of men,--a natural law, engraved in every -heart, and judge of every other law. The conscience of the individual -was above the dictates of any state. All radicalisms lay compact in that -pronouncement. Plato, prolific of innovations though he was, yet shrank -from such a leap into the new. But the Sophists pressed their point, men -listened to them, and the Greek world changed. When Socrates appeared, -he found that world all out of joint, a war of all against all, a -stridency of uncoördinated personalities rushing into chaos. And when he -was asked, What should men do to be saved, he answered, simply, Let us -think. - - -V - -Intelligence as Virtue - -Intelligence as virtue: it was not a new doctrine; it was merely a new -emphasis placed on an already important element in the Greek--or rather -the Athenian--view of life. But it was a needed emphasis. The Sophists -(not Socrates, _pace_ Cicero) had brought philosophy down from heaven to -earth, but they had left it grovelling at the feet of business -efficiency and success, a sort of _ancilla pecuniæ_, a broker knowing -where one's soul could be invested at ten per cent. Socrates agreed with -the Sophists in condemning any but a very temporary devotion to -metaphysical abstractions,--the one and the many, motion and rest, the -indivisibility of space, the puzzles of predication, and so forth; he -joined them in ridiculing the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and -in demanding that all thinking should be focussed finally on the real -concerns of life; but his spirit was as different from theirs as the -spirit of Spinoza was different from that of a mediæval money-lender. -With the Sophists philosophy was a profession; they were "lovers of -wisdom"--for a consideration. With Socrates philosophy was a quest of -the permanently good, of the lastingly satisfying attitude to life. To -find out just what are justice, temperance, courage, piety,--"that is an -inquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing so far as in me lies." -It was not an easy quest; and the results were not startlingly -definite: "I wander to and fro when I attempt these problems, and do not -remain consistent with myself." His interlocutors went from him -apparently empty; but he had left in them seed which developed in the -after-calm of thought. He could clarify men's notions, he could reveal -to them their assumptions and prejudices; but he could not and would not -manufacture opinions for them. He left no written philosophy because he -had only the most general advice to give, and knew that no other advice -is ever taken. He trusted his friends to pass on the good word. - -Now what was the good word? It was, first of all, the identity of virtue -and wisdom, morals and intelligence; but more than that, it was the -basic identity, in the light of intelligence, of communal and individual -interests. Here at the Sophist's feet lay the débris of the old -morality. What was to replace it? The young Athenians of a generation -denuded of supernatural belief would not listen to counsels of "virtue," -of self-sacrifice to the community. What was to be done? Should social -and political pressure be brought to bear upon the Sophists to compel -them to modify the individualistic tenor of their teachings? Analysis -destroys morals. What is the moral--destroy analysis? - -The moral, answered Socrates, is to get better morals, to find an -ethic immune to the attack of the most ruthless sceptic. The Sophists -were right, said Socrates; morality means more than social obedience. -But the Sophists were wrong in opposing the good of the individual to -that of the community; Socrates proposed to prove that if a man were -intelligent, he would see that those same qualities which make a man a -good citizen--justice, wisdom, temperance, courage--are also the best -means to individual advantage and development. All these "virtues" -are simply the supreme and only virtue--wisdom--differentiated by -the context of circumstance. No action is virtuous unless it is an -intelligent adaptation of means to a criticised end. "Sin" is failure -to use energy to the best account; it is an unintelligent waste of -strength. A man does not knowingly pursue anything but the Good; let him -but see his advantage, and he will be attracted towards it irresistibly; -let him pursue it, and he will be happy, and the state safe. The -trouble is that men lack perspective, and cannot see their true Good; -they need not "virtue" but intelligence, not sermons but training in -perspective. The man who has [Greek: enkrateia], _who rules within_, who -is strong enough to stop and think, the man who has achieved [Greek: -sôphrosunê],--the self-knowledge that brings self-command,--such a -man will not be deceived by the tragedy of distance, by the apparent -smallness of the future good alongside of the more easily appreciable -good that lies invitingly at hand. Hence the moral importance of -dialectic, of cross-examination, of concept and definition: we must -learn "how to make our ideas clear"; we must ask ourselves just what it -is that we want, just how real this seeming good is. Dialectic is the -handmaiden of virtue; and all clarification is morality. - - -VI - -The Meaning of Virtue - -This is frank intellectualism, of course; and the best-refuted doctrine -in philosophy. It is amusing to observe the ease with which critics and -historians despatch the Socratic ethic. It is "an extravagant paradox," -says Sidgwick,[8] "incompatible with moral freedom." "Nothing is -easier," says Gomperz,[9] "than to detect the one-sidedness of this -point of view." "This doctrine," says Grote,[10] "omits to notice, what -is not less essential, the proper conditions of the emotions, desires, -etc." "It tended to make all conduct a matter of the intellect and not -of the character, and so in a sense to destroy moral responsibility," -says Hobhouse.[11] "Himself blessed with a will so powerful that it -moved almost without friction," says Henry Jackson,[12] "Socrates fell -into the error of ignoring its operations, and was thus led to regard -knowledge as the sole condition of well-doing." "Socrates was a -misunderstanding," says Nietzsche;[13] "reason at any price, life made -clear, cold, cautious, conscious, without instincts, opposed to the -instincts, was in itself only a disease, ... and by no means a return to -'virtue,' to 'health,' and to happiness." And the worn-out dictum about -seeing the better and approving it, yet following the worse, is quoted -as the deliverance of a profound psychologist, whose verdict should be -accepted as a final solution of the problem. - -Before refuting a doctrine it is useful to try to understand it. What -could Socrates have meant by saying that all real virtue is -intelligence? What is virtue? - -A civilization may be characterized in terms of its conception of -virtue. There is hardly anything more distinctive of the Greek attitude, -as compared with our own, than the Greek notion of virtue as -intelligence. Consider the present connotations of the word _virtue_: -men shrink at having the term applied to them; and "nothing makes one so -vain," says Oscar Wilde, "as being told that one is a sinner." During -the Middle Ages the official conception of virtue was couched in terms -of womanly excellence; and the sternly masculine God of the Hebrews -suffered considerably from the inroads of Mariolatry. Protestantism was -in part a rebellion of the ethically subjugated male; in Luther the man -emerges riotously from the monk. But as people cling to the ethical -implications of a creed long after the creed itself has been abandoned, -so our modern notion of virtue is still essentially mediæval and -feminine. Virginity, chastity, conjugal fidelity, gentility, obedience, -loyalty, kindness, self-sacrifice, are the stock-in-trade of all -respectable moralists; to be "good" is to be harmless, to be not "bad," -to be a sort of sterilized citizen, guaranteed not to injure. This -sheepish innocuousness comes easily to the natively uninitiative, to -those who are readily amenable to fear and prohibitions. It is a static -virtue; it contracts rather than expands the soul; it offers no handle -for development, no incentive to social stimulation and productivity. It -is time we stopped calling this insipidly negative attitude by the once -mighty name of virtue. Virtue must be defined in terms of that which is -vitally significant in our lives. - -And therefore, too, virtue cannot be defined in terms of individual -subordination to the group. The vitally significant thing in a man's -life is not the community, but himself. To ask him to consider the -interests of the community above his own is again to put up for his -worship an external, transcendent god; and the trouble with a -transcendent god is that he is sure to be dethroned. To call "immoral" -the refusal of the individual to meet such demands is the depth of -indecency; it is itself immoral,--that is, it is nonsense. The notion of -"duty" as involving self-sacrifice, as essentially duty to others, is a -soul-cramping, funereal notion, and deserves all that Ibsen and his -progeny have said of it.[14] Ask the individual to sacrifice himself to -the community, and it will not be long before he sacrifices the -community to himself. Granted that, in the language of Heraclitus, there -is always a majority of fools, and that self-sacrifice can be procured -by the simple hypnotic suggestion of _post-mortem_ remuneration: sooner -or later come doubt and disillusionment, and the society whose -permanence was so easily secured becomes driftwood on the tides of time. -History means that if it means anything. - -No; the intelligent individual will give allegiance to the group of -which he happens to find himself a member, only so far as the policies -of the group accord with his own criticised desires. Whatever -allegiance he offers will be to those forces, wherever they may be, -which in his judgment move in the line of these desires. Even for such -forces he will not sacrifice himself,--though there may be times when -martyrdom is a luxury for which life itself is not too great a price. -Since these forces have been defined in terms of his own judgment and -desire, conflict between them and himself can come only when his -behavior diverges from the purposes defined and resumed in times of -conscious thought,--_i.e._, only when he ceases to adapt means to his -ends, ceases, that is, to be intelligent. The prime moral conflict is -not between the individual and his group, but between the partial self -of fragmentary impulse and the coördinated self of conscious purpose. -There is a group within each man as well as without: a group of partial -selves is the reality behind the figment of the unitary self. Every -individual is a society, every person is a crowd. And the tragedies of -the moral life lie not in the war of each against all, but in the -restless interplay of these partial selves behind the stage of action. -As a man's intelligence grows this conflict diminishes, for both means -and ends, both behavior and purposes, are being continually revised and -redirected in accordance with intelligence, and therefore in convergence -towards it. Progressively the individual achieves unity, and through -unity, personality. Faith in himself has made him whole. The ethical -problem, so far as it is the purely individual problem of attaining to -coördinated personality, is solved. - -Moral responsibility, then,--whatever social responsibility may be,--is -the responsibility of the individual to himself. The social is not -necessarily the moral--let the sociological fact be what it will. The -unthinking conformity of the "normal social life" is, just because it is -unthinking, below the level of morality: let us call it sociality, and -make morality the prerogative of the really thinking animal. In any -society so constituted as to give to the individual an increase in -powers as recompense for the pruning of his liberties, the unsocial will -be immoral,--that is, self-destructively unreasonable and unintelligent; -but even in such a society the moral would overflow the margins of the -social, and would take definition ultimately from the congruity of the -action with the criticised purposes of the individual self. This does -not mean that all ethics lies compact in the shibboleth, "Be yourself." -Those who make the least sparing use of this phrase are too apt to -consider it an excuse for lives that reek with the heat of passion and -smack of insufficient evolution. These people need to be reminded--all -the more forcibly since the most palatable and up-to-date philosophies -exalt instinct and deride thought--that one cannot be thoroughly one's -self except by deliberation and intelligence. To act indeliberately is -not to be, but in great part to cancel, one's self. For example, the -vast play of direct emotional expression is almost entirely -indeliberate: if you are greatly surprised, your lips part, your eyes -open a trifle wider, your pulse quickens, your respiration is affected; -and if I am surprised, though you be as different from me as Hyperion -from a satyr, my respiration will be affected, my pulse will quicken, my -eyes will open a trifle wider, and my lips will part;--my direct -reaction will be essentially the same as yours. The direct expression of -surprise is practically the same in all the higher animals. Darwin's -classical description of the expression of fear is another example; it -holds for every normal human being; not to speak of lower species. So -with egotism, jealousy, anger, and a thousand other instinctive -reaction-complexes; they are common to the species, and when we so -react, we are expressing not our individual selves so much as the -species to which we happen to belong. When you hit a man because he has -"insulted" you, when you swagger a little after delivering a successful -speech, when you push aside women and children in order to take their -place in the rescue boat, when you do any one of a million indeliberate -things like these, it is not you that act, it is your species, it is -your ancestors, acting through you; your acquired individual difference -is lost in the whirlwind of inherited impulse. Your act, as the -Scholastics phrased it, is not a "human" act; you yourself are not -really acting in any full measure of yourself, you are but playing -slave and mouth-piece to the dead. But subject the inherited tendencies -to the scrutiny of your individual experience, _think_, and your action -will then express yourself, not in any abbreviated sense, but up to the -hilt. There is no merit, no "virtue," no development in playing the game -of fragmentary impulses, in living up to the past; to be moral, to grow, -is to be not part but all of one's self, to call into operation the -acquired as well as the inherited elements of one's character, to be -_whole_. So many of us invite ruin by actions which do not really -express us, but are the voice of the merest fragment of ourselves,--the -remainder of us being meanwhile asleep.[15] To be whole, to be your -deliberate self, to do what you please but only after considering what -you really please, to follow your own ideals (but to follow them!), to -choose your own means and not to have them forced upon you by your -ancestors, to act consciously, to see the part _sub specie totius_, to -see the present act in its relation to your vital purposes, to think, to -be intelligent,--all these are definitions of virtue and morality. - -There is, then, in the old sense of the word, no such thing as morality, -there is only intelligence or stupidity. Yes, virtue is calculus, -horrible as that may sound to long and timid ears: to calculate -properly just what you must do to attain your real ends, to see just -what and where your good is, and to make for it,--that is all that can -without indecency be asked of any man, that is all that is ever -vouchsafed by any man who is intelligent. - -Perhaps you think it is an easy virtue,--this cleaving to -intelligence,--easier than being harmless. Try it. - - -VII - -"Instinct" and "Reason" - -And now to go back to the refutations. - -The strongest objection to the Socratic doctrine is that intelligence is -not a creator, but only a servant, of ends. What we shall consider to be -our good appears to be determined not by reason, but by desire. Reason -itself seems but the valet of desire, ready to do for it every manner of -menial service. Desire is an adept at marshalling before intelligence -such facts as favor the wish, and turns the mind's eye resolutely away -from other truth, as a magician distracts the attention of his audience -while his hands perform their wonders. If morality is entirely a matter -of intelligence, it is entirely a question of means, it is excluded -irrevocably from the realm of ends. - -The conclusion may be allowed in substance, though it passes beyond the -warrant of the facts. It is true that basic ends are never suggested by -intelligence, reason, knowledge; but it is also true that many ends -suggested by desire are vetoed by intelligence. Why are the desires of a -man more modest than those of a boy or a child, if not because the blows -of repeated failure have dulled the edge of desire? Desires lapse, or -lose in stature, as knowledge grows and man takes lessons from reality. -There is an adaptation of ends to means as well as of means to ends; and -desire comes at last to take counsel of its slave. - -Be it granted, none the less, that ends are dictated by desire, and that -if morality is intelligence, there can be no question of the morality of -any end _per se_. That, strangely, is not a refutation of the Socratic -ethic so much as an essential element of it and its starting-point. -Every desire has its own initial right; morality means not the -suppression of desires, but their coördination. What that implies for -society we shall see presently; for the individual it implies that he is -immoral, not when he seeks his own advantage, but when he does not -really behave for his own advantage, when some narrow temporary purpose -upsets perspective and overrides a larger end.[16] What we call -"self-control" is the permanent predominance of the larger end; what we -call weakness of will is instability of perspective. Self-control means -an intelligent judgment of values, an intelligent coördination of -motives, an intelligent forecasting of effects. It is far-sight, -far-hearing, an enlargement of the sense; it hears the weakened voice of -the admonishing past, it sees results far down the vista of the future; -it annihilates space and time for the sake of light. Self-control is -coördinated energy,--which is the first and last word in ethics and -politics, and perhaps in logic and metaphysics too. Weak will means that -desires fall out of focus, and taking advantage of the dark steal into -action: it is a derangement of the light, a failure of intelligence. In -this sense a "good will" means coördination of desires by the ultimate -desire, end, ideal; it means health and wholeness of will; it means, -literally, integrity. In the old sense "good will" meant, too often, -mere fear either of the prohibitions of present law or of the -prohibitions stored up in conscience. Such conscience, we all know, is a -purely negative and static thing, a convenient substitute for policemen, -a degenerate descendant of that _conscientia_, or _knowing-together_, -which meant to the Romans a discriminating awareness in -action,--discriminating awareness of the whole that lurks round the -corner of every part. This is one instance of a sort of pathology of -words,--words coming to function in a sense alien to their normal -intent. _Right_ and _wrong_, for example, once carried no ethical -connotation, but merely denoted a direct or tortuous route to a goal; -and significantly the Hebrew word for sin meant, in the days of its -health, an arrow that had missed its mark. - -But, it is urged, there is no such thing as intelligence in the sense of -a control of passion by reason, desire by thought. Granted; it is so -much easier to admit objections than to refute them! Let intelligence be -interpreted as you will, so be it you recognize in it a delayed -response, a moment of reprieve before execution, giving time for the -appearance of new impulses, motives, tendencies, and allowing each -element in the situation to fall into its place in a coördinated whole. -Let intelligence be a struggle of impulses, a survival of the fittest -desire; let us contrast not reason with passion, but response delayed by -the rich interplay of motive forces, with response immediately following -upon the first-appearing impulse. Let impulse mean for us fruit that -falls unripe from the tree, because too weak to hang till it is mature. -Let us understand intelligence as not a faculty superadded to impulse, -but rather that coördination of impulses which is wrought out by the -blows of hard experience. The Socratic ethic fits quite comfortably into -this scheme; intelligence is delayed response and morality means, Take -your time. - -It is charged that the Socratic view involves determinism; and this -charge, too, is best met with open-armed admission. We need not raise -the question of the pragmatic value of the problem. But to suppose that -determinism destroys moral responsibility is to betray the mid-Victorian -origin of one's philosophy. Men of insight like Socrates, Plato, and -Spinoza, saw without the necessity of argument that moral responsibility -is not a matter of freedom of will, but a relation of means to ends, a -responsibility of the agent to himself, an intelligent coördination of -impulses by one's ultimate purposes. Any other morality, whatever pretty -name it may display, is the emasculated morality of slaves. - - -VIII - -The Secularization of Morals - -The great problem involved in the Socratic ethic lies, apparently, in -the bearings of the doctrine on social unity and stability. Apparently; -for it is wholesome to remember that social organization, like the -Sabbath, was made for man, and not the other way about. If social -organization demands of the individual more sacrifices than its -advantages are worth to him, then the stability of that organization is -not a problem, it is a misfortune. But if the state does not demand such -sacrifices, the advantage of the individual will be in social behavior; -and the question whether he will behave socially becomes a question of -how much intelligence he has, how clear-eyed he is in ferreting out his -own advantage. In a state that does not ask more from its members than -it gives, morality and intelligence and social behavior will not -quarrel. The social problem appears here as the twofold problem of, -first, making men intelligent, and, second, making social organization -so great an advantage to the individual as to insure social behavior in -all intelligent men. - -Which has the better chance of survival:--a society of "good" men or a -society of intelligent men? So far as a man is "good" he merely obeys, -he does not initiate. A society of "good" men is necessarily stagnant; -for in such a society the virtue most in demand, as Emerson puts it, is -conformity. If great men emerge through the icy crust of this -conformity, they are called criminals and sinners; the lives of great -men all remind us that we cannot make our lives sublime and yet be -"good." But intelligence as an ethical ideal is a progressive norm; for -it implies the progressive coördination of one's life in reference to -one's ultimate ideals. The god of the "good" man is the _status quo_; -the intelligent man obeys rather the call of the _status ad quem_. - -Observe how the problem of man _versus_ the group is clarified by thus -relating the individual to a larger whole determined not by geographical -frontiers, but by purposes born of his own needs and moulded by his own -intelligence. For as the individual's intelligence grows, his purposes -are brought more and more within the limits of personal capacity and -social possibility: he is ever less inclined to make unreasonable -demands upon himself, or men in general, or the group in which he lives. -His ever broadening vision makes apparent the inherent self-destructiveness -of anti-social aims; and though he chooses his ends without reference -to any external moral code, those ends are increasingly social. -Enlightenment saves his social dispositions from grovelling conformity, -and his "self-regarding sentiments" from suicidal narrowness. And now -the conflict between himself and his group continues for the most part -only in so far as the group makes unreasonable demands upon him. But -this, too, diminishes as the individuals constituting or dominating -the group become themselves more intelligent, more keenly cognizant -of the limits within which the demands of the group upon its members -must be restricted if individual allegiance is to be retained. Since -the reduction of the conflict between the individual and the community -without detriment to the interests of either is the central problem of -political ethics, it is obvious that the practical task of ethics is -not to formulate a specific moral code, but to bring about a spread -of intelligence. And since the reduction of this conflict brings with -it a better coördination of the members of the group, through their -greater ability to perceive the advantages of communal action in an -intelligently administered group, the problem of social coherence and -permanence itself falls into the same larger problem of intellectual -development. - -"How to make our ideas clear";--what if that be the social problem? What -a wealth of import in that little phrase of Socrates,--[Greek: to -ti]--"what is it?" What is my good, my interest? What do I really -want?--To find the answer to that, said Robert Louis Stevenson, is to -achieve wisdom and old age. What is my country? What is patriotism? "If -you wish to converse with me," said Voltaire, "you must define your -terms." If you wish to be moral, you must define your terms. If our -civilization is to keep its head above the flux of time, we must define -our terms. - -For these are the critical days of the secularization of moral -sanctions; the theological navel-string binding men to "good behavior" -has snapped. What are the leaders of men going to do about it? Will they -try again the old gospel of self-sacrifice? But a world fed on -self-sacrifice is a world of lies, a world choking with the stench of -hypocrisy. To preach self-sacrifice is not to solve, it is precisely to -shirk, the problem of ethics,--the problem of eliminating individual -self-sacrifice while preserving social stability: the problem of -reconciling the individual as such with the individual as citizen. Or -will our leaders try to replace superstition with an extended physical -compulsion, making the policeman and the prison do all the work of -social coördination? But surely compulsion is a last resort; not because -it is "wrong," but because it is inexpedient, because it rather cuts -than unties the knot, because it produces too much friction to allow of -movement. Compulsion is warranted when there is question of preventing -the interference of one individual or group with another; but it is a -poor instrument for the establishment or maintenance of ideals. Suppose -we stop moralizing, suppose we reduce regimentation, suppose we begin to -define our terms. Suppose we let people know quite simply (and not in -Academese) that moral codes are born not in heaven but in social needs; -and suppose we set about finding a way of spreading intelligence so that -individual treachery to real communal interest, and communal -exploitation of individual allegiance, may both appear on the surface, -as they are at bottom, unintelligently suicidal. Is that too much to -hope for? Perhaps. But then again, it may be, the worth and meaning of -life lie precisely in this, that there is still a possibility of -organizing that experiment. - - -IX - -"Happiness" and "Virtue" - -A word now about the last part of the Socratic formula: intelligence = -virtue = happiness. And this a word of warning: remember that the -"virtue" here spoken of is not the mediæval virtue taught in Sunday -schools. Surely our children must wonder are we fools or liars when we -tell them, "Be good and you will be happy." Better forget "virtue" and -read simply: intelligence=happiness. That appears more closely akin to -the rough realities of life: intelligence means ability to adapt means -to ends, and happiness means success in adapting means to ends; -happiness, then, varies with ability. Happiness is intelligence on the -move; a pervasive physiological tonus accompanying the forward movement -of achievement. It is not the consciousness of virtue: that is not -happiness, but snobbery. And similarly, remorse is, in the intelligent -man, not the consciousness of "sin," but the consciousness of a past -stupidity. So far as you fail to win your real ends you are -unhappy,--and have proved unintelligent. But the Preacher says, "He that -increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." True enough if the increment of -knowledge is the correction of a past error; the sorrow is a penalty -paid for the error, not for the increase of knowledge. True, too, that -intelligence does not consistently lessen conflicts, and that it -discloses a new want for every want it helps to meet. But the joy of -life lies not so much in the disappearance of difficulties as in the -overcoming of them; not so much in the diminution of conflict as in the -growth of achievement. Surely it is time we had an ethic that stressed -achievement rather than quiescence. And further, intelligence must not -be thought of as the resignation of disillusionment, the consciousness -of impotence; intelligence is to be conceived of in terms of adaptive -activity, of movement towards an end, of coördinated self-expression -and behavior. Finally, it is but fair to interpret the formula as making -happiness and intelligence coincide only so far as the individual's -happiness depends on his own conduct. The causes of unhappiness may be -an inherited deformity, or an accident not admitting of provision; such -cases do not so much contradict as lie outside the formula. So far as -your happiness depends on your activities, it will vary with the degree -of intelligence you show. Act intelligently, and you will not know -regret; feel that you are moving on toward your larger ends, and you -will be happy. - - -X - -The Socratic Challenge - -But if individual and social health and happiness depend on intelligence -rather than on "virtue," and if the exaltation of intelligence was a -cardinal element in the Athenian view of life, why did the Socratic -ethic fail to save Athens from decay? And why did the supposedly -intelligent Athenians hail this generous old Dr. Johnson of philosophy -into court and sentence him to death? - -The answer is, Because the Athenians refused to make the Socratic -experiment. They were intelligent, but not intelligent enough. They -could diagnose the social malady, could trace it to the decay of -supernatural moral norms; but they could not find a cure, they had not -the vision to see that salvation lay not in the compulsory retention of -old norms, but in the forging of new and better ones, capable of -withstanding the shock of questioning and trial. What they saw was -chaos; and like most statesmen they longed above all things for order. -They were not impressed by Socrates' allegiance to law, his cordial -admission of the individual's obligations to the community for the -advantages of social organization. They listened to the disciples: to -Antisthenes, who laughed at patriotism; to Aristippus, who denounced all -government; to Plato, scorner of democracy; and they attacked the master -because (not to speak of pettier political reasons) it was he, they -thought, who was the root of the evil. They could not see that this man -was their ally and not their foe; that rescue for Athens lay in helping -him rather than in sentencing him to die. And how well they could have -helped him! For to preach intelligence is not enough; there remains to -provide for every one the instrumentalities of intelligence. What men -needed, what Athenian statesmanship might have provided, was an -organization of intelligence for intelligence, an organization of all -the forces of intelligence in the state in a persistent intellectual -campaign. If that could not save Athens, Athens could not be saved. But -the myopic leaders of the Athenian state could not see salvation in -intelligence, they could only see it in hemlock. And Socrates had to -die. - -It will take a wise courage to accept the Socratic challenge,--such -courage as battle-fields and senate-chambers are not wont to show. But -unless that wise courage comes to us our civilization will go as other -civilizations have come and gone, "kindled and put out like a flame in -the night." - - NOTE.--From a book whose interesting defence of the Socratic ethic - from the standpoint of psychoanalysis was brought to the writer's - attention after the completion of the foregoing essay: "The - Freudian ethics is a literal and concrete justification of the - Socratic teaching. Truth is the sole moral sanction, and - discrimination of hitherto unrealized facts is the one way out of - every moral dilemma.... Virtue is wisdom." Practical morality is - "the establishment, through discrimination, of consistent, and not - contradictory (mutually suppressive), courses of action toward - phenomena. The moral sanction lies always in facts presented by the - phenomena; morality in the discrimination of those facts." Moral - development is "the progressive, lifelong integration of - experience."--_The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics_, by Edwin - B. Holt, New York, 1915, pp. 141, 145, 148. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -PLATO: PHILOSOPHY AS POLITICS - - -I - -The Man and the Artist - -Why do we love Plato? Perhaps because Plato himself was a lover: lover -of comrades, lover of the sweet intoxication of dialectical revelry, -full of passion for the elusive reality behind thoughts and things. We -love him for his unstinted energy, for the wildly nomadic play of his -fancy, for the joy which he found in life in all its unredeemed and -adventurous complexity. We love him because he was alive every minute of -his life, and never ceased to grow; such a man can be loved even for the -errors he has made. But above all we love him because of his high -passion for social reconstruction through intelligent control; because -he retained throughout his eighty years that zeal for human improvement -which is for most of us the passing luxury of youth; because he -conceived philosophy as an instrument not merely for the interpretation, -but for the remoulding, of the world. He speaks of himself, through -Socrates, as "almost the only Athenian living who sets his hand to the -true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time."[17] -Philosophy was for him a study of human possibilities in the light of -human realities and limitations; his daily food consisted of the -problems of human relations and endeavors: problems of liberty _versus_ -order; of sex relations and the family; of ideals of character and -citizenship, and the educational approaches to those ideals; problems of -the control of population, of heredity and environment, of art and -morals. With all his liking for the poetry of mysticism, philosophy none -the less was to him preëminently an adventure in this world; and unlike -ourselves, who follow one or another of his many leads, he sailed -virginal seas. Every reader in every age has called him modern; but what -age can there be to which Plato will not still be modern? - -Plato was twenty-eight when Socrates died;[18] and though he was not -present at the drinking of the hemlock, yet the passing of the master -must have been a tragic blow to him. It brought him face to face with -death, the mother of metaphysics. Proudest of all philosophers, he did -not hide his sense of debt to Socrates: "I thank the gods," he said, -"that I was born freeman, not slave; Greek, not barbarian; man, not -woman; but above all that I was born in the time of Socrates." The old -philosopher gone, Athens became for a time intolerable to Plato (some -say, Plato to Athens); and the young philosopher sailed off to see -foreign shores and take nourishment of other cultures. He liked the -peaceful orderliness and aged dignity with which a long dominant -priesthood had invested Egypt; beside this mellow civilization, he was -willing to be told, the culture of his native Athens was but a -precarious ethnological sport. He liked the Pythagoreans of southern -Italy, with their aristocratic approach to the problem of social -construction and their communal devotion to plain living and high -thinking; above all he liked their emphasis on harmony as the -fundamental pervasive relation of all things and as the ideal in which -our human discords might be made to resolve themselves had men artistry -enough. Other lands he saw and learnt from: stories tell how he risked -his handsome head to build an ideal state in Syracuse; how he was sold -into slavery and redeemed by a friend; and how he passed down through -Palestine even to India, absorbing the culture of their peoples with a -kind of osmotic genius. And at last, after twelve years of wandering, he -heard again the call of Athens, and went home, stored with experience -and ripe with thought. - -Arrived now at the mid-point of his life, he turned to the task of -self-expression. Should he join one of the political parties and try to -make the government of Athens a picture of his thought? Perhaps he felt -that his thought was not yet definite enough for that; politics requires -answers in Yes or No, and philosophy deals only in Yes-_and_-No. He -hesitated to join a party or pledge himself to a dogma; and was prepared -to be hated by all parties alike for this hesitation.[19] Aristocracy -was in his blood, and he would not stoop to conquer by a plebiscite. He -thought of turning to the stage, as Euripides had done, and teaching -through the mask; in his youth he had written plays, and smiled now to -think how he had hoped to rival Aristophanes. But there were too many -limitations here, of religious subject and dramatic form; Plato's -philosophy was a thing of ever broadening borders, and could not be -cramped into a ceremony. But neither was his philosophy an arid academic -affair, to be written down as one places in order the bones of a -skeleton; it was vibrantly alive, it was itself a drama and a religion. -Why should there not be a drama of idea as well as of action?--Had not -the play of thought its tragedies and comedies?--Was not philosophy, -after all, a matter of life and death? - -In such a juncture of desires came that fusion of drama and philosophy -which we know as Plato's dialogues,--assuredly the finest production in -all the history of philosophy. Here was just the instrument for a man -whose thought had not congealed into dogmas and a system. All genius is -heterogeneous; a great man is a sum of many men;--let the soul give its -_selves_ a voice, and it will speak in dialogue.[20] Just instrument, -too, for a man who wished to play with the varied possibilities of -speculation, who cared to clarify his own mind rather than to give forth -finalities where life itself was so blind and inconclusive. A conclusion -is too often but the point at which thought has lost its wind; being not -so much a solution of the problem as a dissolution of thought. Hence the -riotous play of the imagination in Plato; lively game of trial and -error, merry-go-round of thought; here is imagery squandered with lordly -abandon; here is humor such as one misses in our ponderous modern -philosophers; here is no system but all systems;[21] here is one -abounding fountain-head of European thought; here is prose strong and -beautiful as the great temples where Greek joy disported itself in -marble; here literary prose is born,--and born adult. - - -II - -How to Solve the Social Problem - -To understand Plato one must remember the Pythagorean _motif_: _harmony_ -is the heart of Plato's metaphysics, of his psychological and -educational theory, of his ethics and his politics. To feel such harmony -as there is, and to make such harmony as may be,--that to Plato is the -meaning of philosophy. - -We observe this at the outset in the more-mystified-than mystifying -theory of ideas. Obviously, the theory of ideas belongs to Socrates; the -Platonic element is a theory not of ideas so much as of ideals. Socrates -wants truth, but Plato wants beauty, harmony. Socrates is bent on -argument, and points you to a concept; Plato is a poet with a vision, -and points you to the picture that he sees. Understanding, says Plato, -is of the earth earthly; but poetic vision is divine.[22] Hence the maze -of quibbling in the dialogues; it is Plato and not Socrates who is -culprit here. Reasoning was an alien art to Plato; try as he might to -become a mathematician he remained always a poet,--and perhaps most so -when he dealt with numbers. Dialectic was in Plato's day a recent -invention; he plays with it like a youth in the breakers, letting it now -raise him to heights of ecstatic vision and now bury him in the -deadliest logic-chopping. But--let us not doubt it--he knows when he is -logic-chopping; he goes on, partly that he may paint his picture, partly -for the mere joy of parrying pros and cons; this new game, he feels, is -a sport for the gods. - -Let us smile at the heavy seriousness of those who suppose that this -man meant everything he said. No one does, but least of all men Plato, -who hardly taught except in parables. What is the "heaven" of the ideas -but a poet's way of saying that the constancies observable in the -relations among things are not identical with the things themselves, but -have a reality and permanence of their own? So we phrase it in our own -distinguished verbiage; but Plato prefers, as ever, to draw a picture. -And notice, in this picture, the ever present reference to social needs. -What is a concept, after all, but a scheme for the conservation of -mental resources, an instrument of prediction, a method of control? -Without the power to form concepts we could never turn experience to -use, it would slip between our fingers; we should be like the maidens -condemned to carry water in a sieve. The _idea_ of anything is the sum -of its observed constancies of behavior; hence the medium of our -adaptation and control. To have _ideas_ of things is to know the map or -plan of things; it is to see tendencies, directions, and results; it is -to know how to _use_ things. That is why knowledge is power; every idea -is a tool with which to bend the world to serve our will. And that too -is why the Ideas are real: they have power, and "anything which -possesses any sort of power is real."[23] - -All this, as was said, is but an embellishment of the Socratic doctrine -that salvation lies in brains. But Plato rushes on. Not only may -everything be brought under a concept, an Idea, but it may be brought -under a perfect Form, an Ideal. Things are not what they might be. Men -are not such as men might be, states are often sorry states, beds might -be more ideal beds, even dirt could be more perfectly dirt. To all -things that are, there correspond perfect Ideals of what they might be, -in a thoroughly harmonious world. To say that these Ideals are real, -that they exist, is only to claim for them that they are operative, and -get results. Whether his supernaturalism was only part of his political -theory, others may dispute; let it suffice us at present that Plato -believed that the Ideals could and did operate through human agency. The -distinctive thing about man is that perceiving the thing that is, he can -conceive the thing that might be. He is the forward-looking, -ideal-making animal; through him, if he but will it, proceeds creation. -The brute may be a thinker, but man may be also an artist. Out of the -abundance of the sexual instinct (as Plato implies in the _Symposium_) -emerges this ideal-seeking and -making quality; from which come art and -ethics and religion. William Morris looks at a slum and conceives -Utopia; and forthwith begins to make for Utopia even though the road -lead him through a jail. Is it that William Morris loves "humanity"? Not -at all; he loves beauty and his dream; he is uncomfortable with all this -dirt and despair before him; it is his fortune or misfortune that he -cannot see these slums without falling thrall to a vision of better -things. So with most of us "reformers": we wish to change things, not -because we love our fellows much more than "conservatives" do, nor -because we believe that happiness varies with income; but because we -hear the call of the beautiful, and see in the mind's eye another form -wherein the world might come more pleasingly to sight. - -What we have to do, says Plato, is to make people conceive a better -world, so that they may see this world as ugly, and may strive to -reshape it. We must conceive the perfect Forms of things, and batter -this poor world till it reform itself and take these perfect shapes. To -learn to see--and seeing learn to make--these perfect Forms: that is the -task of philosophers. To make philosophers: that is the social problem. - - -III - -On Making Philosopher-Kings - -It is simple, isn't it? Give us enough philosophers, and the beautiful -city will walk out of the picture into the fact. But how make -philosophers? And perhaps there is a perfect Form for philosophers, too? -How shall we "see--and seeing learn to make"--the perfect philosopher? - -Let us not worry about this little matter of dialectics, says Plato; we -know quite well some of the things we must do in order that we may have -more and greater philosophers. It is quite clear that one thing we must -do is to give our best brains to education. - -Is that trite? Not at all. Do we give our best brains to education? Do -we offer more to our ministers or commissioners of education than to our -presidents, or governors, or mayors, or bank presidents, or pugilists? -Or do we honor them more? When Plato says that the office of minister of -education is "of all the great offices of state the greatest," and that -the citizens should elect their very best man to this office,[24] he is -not pronouncing a platitude, he is making a radical, a revolutionary -proposition. It has never been done, and it will not soon be done; for -men, naturally enough, are more interested in making money than in -making philosophers. And yet, says Plato, gently but resolutely, we may -as well understand that until we give our best brains to the problem of -making philosophers our much-ado about social ills will amount to noise -and wind, and nothing more. "How charming people are!" he writes, -drawing an analogy between the individual and the body politic; "they -are always doctoring--and thereby increasing and complicating--their -disorders, fancying they will be cured by some nostrum which somebody -advises them to try,--never getting better but always growing worse.... -Are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at legislation, and -imagining that by reforms they will make an end to the dishonesties and -rascalities of mankind, not knowing that they are in reality cutting -away at the heads of a hydra?"[25] - -Notice that the aim of the educational process is, for Plato, not so -much the general spread of intelligence as the discovery and development -of the superior man. (This conception of the task of the educator -appears again and again in later thought: we hear it in the nineteenth -century, for example, in Carlyle's "hero," Schopenhauer's "genius," and -Nietzsche's "superman.") It is very naïve, thinks Plato, to look to the -masses as the source and hope of social improvement; the proper function -of the masses is to toil as cheerfully as may be for the development and -support of the genius who will make them happy--so far as they are -capable of happiness. To aim directly at the elevation of all is to open -the door to mediocrity and futility; to find and nurse the potential -genius,--that is an end worthy the educator's subtle art. - -Now if you are going to discover genius in the bud you must above all -things handle your material, at the outset at least, with tender care. -You must not overflow with prohibitions, or indulge yourself too much in -the luxury of punishments. "Mother and father and nurse and tutor set to -quarrelling about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is -able to understand them: he cannot say or do anything without their -setting forth to him that this is just and that unjust, this honorable -and that dishonorable, this holy and that unholy, do this and don't do -that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not he is straightened by -threats and blows, like a piece of warped wood."[26] Suppress here, and -you get expression there;--often enough, abnormal expression. Better -have no hard mould of uniformity and conformity wherein to crush and -deform each differently aspiring soul. Think twice before forcing your -_'isms_ and _'ologies_ upon the child; his own desires will be your best -curriculum. "The elements of instruction," writes Plato, in a -too-little-noticed passage, "should be presented to the mind in -childhood, but without any notion of forcing them. For a freeman ought -to be a freeman in the acquisition of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when -compulsory, does no harm; but knowledge which is acquired under -compulsion has no hold on the mind. Therefore do not use compulsion, but -let early education be a sort of amusement; that will better enable you -to find out the natural bent."[27] There is a stroke of Plato's genius -here: it is a point which we laggards are coming to after some two -thousand three hundred years. "To find out the natural bent," to catch -the spark of divine fire before conformity can put it out; that is the -beginning and yet the summit of the educator's task,--the _initium -dimidium facti_. - -In this search for genius all souls shall be tried. Education must be -universal and compulsory; children belong not to parents but to the -state and to the future.[28] And education cannot begin too early. -Cleinias, asking whether education should begin at birth, is astonished -to be answered, "No, before"; and if Plato could have his way, no doubt -there would be a realization of Dr. Holmes' suggestion that a man's -education should begin two thousand years before he is born. The chief -concern at the outset will be to develop the body, and not to fill the -soul with letters; let the child be taught his letters at ten, but not -before.[29] Music will share with gymnastics the task of rounded -development. The boy who tells his teacher that the athletic field is as -important and necessary a part of education as the lecture-room is -right. "How shall we find a gentle nature which has also great -courage?"[30] Music mixed with athletics will do it. "I am quite aware -that your mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the -musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him."[31] There -is a determination here that even the genius shall be healthy; Plato -will not tolerate the notion that to be a genius one needs to be sick: -let the genius have his say, but let him, too, be reminded that he is no -disembodied spirit. And let art take care lest its vaunted purgation be -a purgation of our strength and manhood; poetry and soft music may make -men slaves. No man shall bother with music after the age of sixteen.[32] - -At twenty a general test will weed out those who give indication that -further educative labor will be wasted on them; the others will go on -for another decade, and a second test will eliminate those who will in -the meantime have reached the limit of their capacities for development. -The final survivors will then--and not before--be introduced to -philosophy. "They must not be allowed to taste the dear delight too -early; that is a thing especially to be avoided; for young men, as you -may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue -for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting, like -puppy-dogs that delight to tear and pull at all who come near them.... -And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands -of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing -anything that they believed before, and hence not only they, but -philosophy generally, have a bad name with the rest of the world."[33] - -Five happy years are given to the study of philosophy. Gradually, the -student learns to see the universal behind the particular, to judge the -part by relating it to the whole; the fragments of his experience fall -into a harmonious philosophy of life. The sciences which he has learned -are now united as a consistent application of intelligence to life; -indeed, the faculty of uniting the sciences and focussing them on the -central problems of life, is precisely the criterion of the true -philosopher.[34] But involved in this is a certain practical quality, a -sense for realities and limitations. One must study books--and men; one -should read much, but live more. So Plato legislates that his new -philosophers shall spend the years from thirty-five to fifty in the busy -din of practical life; they must, in his immortal image, go back into -the cave. The purpose of higher education is to detach us for a time -from the life of action, but only so that we may later return to it with -a better perspective. To be put for a goodly time upon one's own -resources, to butter one's own bread for a while,--that is an almost -indispensable prerequisite to greatness. Out of such a test men come -with the scars of many wounds; but to those who are not fools every scar -is the mark of a lesson learned. - -And now here are our philosophers, ripe and fifty, hardened by the tests -of learning and of life. What shall we do with them? Put them away in a -lecture-room and pay no further attention to them? Give them, as their -life-work, the problem of finding how Spinoza deduces, or fails to -deduce, the Many from the One? Have them fill learned esoteric journals -with unintelligible jargon about the finite and the infinite, or space -and time, or the immateriality of roast beef? No, says Plato; let them -govern the state. - -Did Plato mean it? Was he so enraged at the state-murder of the most -beloved of philosophers that he forearmed himself against such a -_contretemps_ in his Utopia by making the philosophers supreme?--Was it -only his magnificent journalistic revenge? Was it merely his reaction to -the observed cramping and mediocritization of superior intellects in a -democracy? Was it but Plato's dramatic way of emphasizing the Socratic -plea for intelligence as the basis of morals and social life? Perhaps -all this; but much more. It was his sober judgment; it was the influence -of the Egyptian priesthood and the Pythagorean brotherhood coming to the -surface in him; it was the long-accumulated deposit of the stream of his -personal experience. - -We have to remember here that by _philosopher_ Plato does not mean -Immanuel Kant. He means a living being, a man like Seneca or Francis -Bacon, a man in whom knowledge is fused with action, and keen perception -joins with steady hand; a man who has had not only the teaching of books -but the discipline of hard experience; a man who has learned with equal -readiness to obey and to command; a man whose thought is coördinated by -application to the vital problems of human society. "Inasmuch as -philosophers alone are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and -those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not -philosophers, I must ask you which of the two kinds should be rulers of -our state?"[35] Well, then, "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings -and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, ... -cities will never cease from ill, nor the human race."[36] - -That, of course, is the heart and soul of Plato. - - -IV - -Dishonest Democracy - -Let us get back to the circumference and approach this same point by -another route. - -I grant you, says Plato, that to have rulers at all is very -disagreeable. And indeed we should not need to have them were it not for -a regrettable but real porcine element in us. My own Utopia is not an -aristocracy nor a democracy, nor any kind of an _'ocracy_; it is what -some of you would call an anarchist communism. I have described it very -clearly in the second book of my _Republic_, but nobody cares to notice -it, except to repeat my brother's gibe about it.[37] But instead of -this Utopia of mine being a "City of Pigs," it is just because we are -pigs that I had to give up painting this picture and turn to describing -"not only a state, but a luxurious state." I am still "of opinion that -the true state, which may be said to be a healthy constitution, is the -one which I have described," and not the "inflamed constitution" to -which I devoted the rest of my book, and which in my opinion is much -more a "City of Pigs" than the other. It is because people want "to lie -on sofas, and dine off tables, and have dainties and dessert in the -modern fashion, ... and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and -cakes, and gold, and ivory, ... hunters and actors, ... musicians, -players, dancers, ... tutors, ... servants ... nurses wet and dry, ... -barbers, confectioners and cooks, ... and hosts of animals (if people -are to eat animals), ... and physicians; ... then a slice of neighbor's -land ... and then war,"[38]--in short, it is because people are pigs -that you must have soldiers and rulers and laws. - -But if you must have them, why not train your best men for the work, -just as you train some to be doctors, and others to be lawyers, and -others to be engineers? Think of taking a man's pills just because he -can show a count of noses in his favor! Think of letting a man build the -world's greatest bridge because he is popular! You accuse me of -plagiarizing from Pythagoras, but in truth, you who believe in democracy -are the Pythagoreans of politics,--you believe in number as your god. -Your equality is the equality of the unequal, and is all a matter of -words and never of reality; your liberty is anarchy, it is the -congenital sickness wherein your democracy was conceived and delivered, -and whereof it inevitably dies; your freedom of speech is a license to -lie; your elections are a contest in flattery and prevarication. Your -democracy is a theatrocracy; and woe to the genius who falls into your -hands. Perhaps you like democracy because you are like democracy: all -your desires are on a level; that you should respect some of them and -discipline others is an idea that never enters your heads. It has never -occurred to you that it takes more time and training to make a statesman -than it does to make a bootblack. But statesmanship is something that -can never be conferred by plebiscite; it must be pursued through the -years, and must find the privilege of office without submitting to a -vote. Wisdom is too subtle a thing to be felt by the coarsened senses of -the mob. Your industry is wonderful because it is shot through with -specialization and training; but because you reject specialization and -training in filling the offices of your government the word _politics_ -has become dishonored in your mouths. And just because you will let any -one be your leader no real man ever submits himself to your choice. - - -V - -Culture and Slavery - -There is much exaggeration here, of course, as might be expected of one -whose material and social concerns were bound up with the oligarchical -party at Athens, whose friends and relatives had died in battle against -the armies of the democracy; whose early years had seen the democratic -mismanagement of the Peloponnesian war and the growth of a disorderly -individualism in Athens. But there are also lessons here for those who -are strong enough to learn even from their enemies.[39] To press home -these lessons at this point would take us too far afield; our plan for -the moment is to follow Plato's guidance until he has led us out into a -clear view of his position. - -We shall suppose such a scheme of education as Plato desires; we shall -suppose that a moderate number of those who entered the lists at birth -have survived test after test, have "tasted the dear delight" of -philosophy for five years, and have passed safely through the ordeal of -practical affairs; these men (and women, as we shall see) now -automatically become the rulers of the Platonic state: let us observe -them in their work and in their lives. - -To the guardians it is a matter of first principles that the function of -the state--and therefore their function--is a positive function; they -are to lead the people, and not merely to serve as an umpire of -disputes. They are the protagonists of a social evolution that has at -last become conscious; they are resolved that henceforth social -organization shall be a far-seeing plan and not a haphazard flux of -expediencies of control. They know that they are asked to be experts in -foresight and coördination; they will legislate accordingly, and will -no more think of asking the people what laws should be passed than a -physician would ask the people what measures should be taken to preserve -the public health. - -And first of all they will control population; they will consider this -to be the indispensable prerequisite to a planned development. The state -must not be larger than is consistent with unity and with the efficacy -of central control. People may mate as they will,--that is their own -concern; but they must understand quite clearly that procreation is an -affair of the state. Children must be born not of love but of science; -marriage will be a temporary relation, allowing frequent remating for -the sake of beautiful offspring. Men shall not have children before -thirty, nor after forty. Deformed or incurably diseased children will be -exposed to die. Children must leave their mothers at birth, and be -brought up by the state. Women must be freed from bondage to their -children, if women are to be real citizens, interested in the public -weal, and loving not a narrow family but the great community. - -For women are to be citizens; it would be foolish to let half the people -be withdrawn from interest in and service to the state. Women will -receive all the educational advantages offered to men; they will even -wrestle with them, naked, in the games. If any of them--and surely some -of them will--pass all the tests, they shall be guardians, too. People -are to be divided, for political purposes, not by difference of sex, -but by difference of capacity. Some women may be fit not for -housekeeping but for ruling,--let them rule; some men may be fit not for -ruling but for housekeeping,--let them keep house. - -Without family, and without clearly ascertainable relationship between -any man and any child, there can be no individual inheritance of -property; the guardians will have all things in common, and without -Tertullian's exception.[40] Shut off from the possibility of personal -bequests or of "founding a family," the guardians will have no stimulus -to laying up a hoard of material goods; nay, they will not be moved to -such hoarding by fear of the morrow, for a modest but sufficient -maintenance will be supplied them by the working classes. There will be -no money in use among them; they will live a hard simple life, devoted -to the problems of communal defence and development. Freed from family -ties, from private property and luxury, from violence and litigation, -and all distinctions of Mine and Thine, they will have no reason to -oppress the workers in order to lay up stores for themselves; they will -be happy in the exercise of their high responsibilities and powers. They -will not be tempted to legislate for the good of their own class rather -than for the good of the community; their joy will lie in the creation -of a prosperous and harmonious state. - -Under their direction will be the soldiers, also specially selected and -trained, and supported by the workers. But these workers? - -They will be those who have been eliminated in the tests. The demands of -specialization will have condemned them to labor for those who have the -gift of guidance. They shall have no voice in the direction of the -state; that, as said, is a reward for demonstrated capacity, and not a -"natural right."[41] Frankly, there are some people who are not fit to -be other than slaves; and to varnish that fact with oratory about "the -dignity of labor" is merely to give an instance of the indignities to -which a democratic politician will descend. These workers are incapable -of a subtler happiness than that of knowing that they are doing what -they are fit to do, and are contributing to the maintenance of communal -prosperity. Such as they are, these workers, like the other members of -the state, will find their highest possibilities of development in such -an organized society. And to make sure that they will not rebel, they -will have been taught by "royal lies" that their position and function -in the state have been ordained by the gods. There is no sense in -shivering at this quite judicious juggling with the facts; there are -times when truth is a barrier to content, and must be set aside. -Physicians have been known to cure ailments with a timely lie. Labor -stimulated by such deception may be slavery, if you wish to call it so; -but it is the inevitable condition of order, and order is the inevitable -condition of culture and communal success. - - -VI - -Plasticity and Order - -But is it just?--some one asks. Perhaps there are other things than -order to be considered. Perhaps this hunger for order is a disease, like -the monistic hunger for unity; perhaps it is a corollary to the _à -priori_ type of mind; perhaps it is part of the philosopher's general -inability to face a possibly irrational reality. Here for order's sake -the greater part of the people must work in silence: they shall not -utter their desires. Here for order's sake are sacrificed that communal -plasticity, that freedom of variety, that happy looseness and -changeability of structure, in which lie all the suggestion and potency -of social reconstruction. If there is any lesson which shines out -through all the kaleidoscope of history, it is that a political system -is doomed to early death if its charter offer no provision and facility -for its own reform. Plasticity is king. Human ideals change, and leave -nations, institutions, even gods, in their wake. "Law and order in a -state are" _not_ "the cause of every good";[42] they are the security of -goods attained, but they may be also the hindrance of goods conceived. A -state without freedom of criticism and variation is like a sail-boat in -a calm; it stands but it cannot move. Such a state is a geometrical -diagram, a perfect syllogism evolved out of impossible premises; and its -own perfection is its refutation. In such a state there could be no -Plato, with a penchant for conceiving Utopias; much less a Socrates, -holding that a life uncriticised is unworthy of a man. It would be a -state not for philosophers but for priests: very truly its basis would -not be dialectical clarity but royal lies. Here is the supreme -pessimism, the ultimate atheism, of the aristocrat, that he does not -believe in the final wholesomeness of truth. And surely something can be -said for democracy. Granted that democracy is not a problem solved but a -problem added; it is at least a problem that time may help to clarify. -Granted that men used to slavery cannot turn and wisely rule themselves; -what is better than that they should, by inevitable trial and error, -learn? _Errando discimus._ Granted that physicians do not consult us in -their prescriptions; but neither do they come to us before they are -chosen and called. "That the guardian should require another guardian to -guard him is ridiculous indeed."[43] But he would! Power corrupts -unless it is shared by all. "Cities cannot exist, if a few only share in -the virtues, as in the arts."[44] To build your culture on the backs of -slaves is to found your city on Vesuvius. Men will not be lied to -forever,--at least with the same lies! And to end with such a -Utopia,--what is it but to yield to Thrasymachus, to arrange all things -at last in the interest of the stronger? Is it just? - - -VII - -The Meaning of Justice - -But what is justice?--asks Plato. Don't you see that our notion of -justice is the very crux of the whole business? Is justice merely a -matter of telling the truth? Nonsense; it may be well to have our -children believe that; but those who are not children know that if a lie -is a better instrument of achievement than the truth in some given -juncture of events, then a lie is justified. Truth is a social value, -and has its justification only in that; if untruth prove here and there -of social value, then untruth is just.[45] The confusion of justice with -some absolute eternal law comes of a separation of ethics from politics, -and an attempt to arrive at a definition of justice from the study of -individuals. But morals grow out of politics; justice is essentially a -political relation. And taking the state as a whole, it is clear that -nothing is "good" unless it works; that it would be absurd to say that -justice demands of a state that it should be ordered in such a way as to -make for its own decay. Social organization must be effective, and lies -and class-divisions are justified if they make for the effectiveness of -a political order. Surely social effectiveness forbids that men fit to -legislate should live out their lives as cobblers, or that men should -rule whose natural aptitude is for digging ditches. Justice means, for -politics at least, that each member of society is minding his natural -business, is doing that for which he is fitted by his own natural -capacity. Injustice is the encroachment of one part on another; justice -is the efficient functioning of each part. Justice, then, is social -coördination and harmony. It is not "the interest of the stronger," it -is the harmony of the whole. So in the individual, justice is the -harmonious operation of a unified personality; each element in one's -nature doing that which it is fitted to do; again it is not mere -strength or forcefulness, but harmonious, organized strength; it is -effective order. And effective order demands a class division. You may -mouth as you please the delusive delicacies of democracy; but classes -you will have, for men will always be some of gold and some of silver -and some of brass. And the brass must not pass itself off as silver, -nor the silver as gold. Give the brass all the time and opportunity in -the world, and it will still be brass. Of course brass will not believe -that it is brass, but we had better make it understand once for all that -it is so, even if we have to tell a thousand lies to get the truth -believed. - -And as for variation and plasticity, remember that these too are -valueless except as they make for a better society. They assuredly make -for change; but change is not betterment. History is a chaos of -variations; without some organ for their control they cancel one another -and terminate inevitably in futility. Our problem is not how to change, -but how to set our best brains to controlling change for the sake of a -finer life. - - -VIII - -The Future of Plato - -There are _aperçus_ here, and a bewildering wealth of suggestions, which -one is tempted to pursue to their ultimate present significance. But to -do that would be to encroach too much on the subjects of later chapters. -The vital thing here is not to accept or refute any special element in -Plato's political philosophy; it is rather to see how inextricably -politics and philosophy were bound together in his mind as two sides of -fundamentally one endeavor. Here is the passion to remould things; here -is the seeing of perfection and the will to make perfection; here -speaks out for the first time in European history the courage of the -intellect that not only will perceive but will remake. Here is a man; no -dead academic cobweb-weaver, but a masterful, kingly soul, mixed up in -warm intimacy with the complex flow of the life about him. He paints -Utopia; but at the same time he takes his own counsel anent the -importance of an educational approach to the social problem, and founds -the most famous and influential university the world has ever seen. -Picture him in the gardens and lecture-halls of his Academy, arranging -and supervising and coördinating, and turning out men to whom nations -looked--and not in vain--for statesmen. Not merely to lift men up to the -beatific vision of unities and perfections, but to teach them the art of -creation, to fire them with the ardor of a new artistry; this he aimed -to do, and did. "The greatest works grow in importance, as trees do -after the death of the mortal men who planted them."[46] So grew the -_Republic_, and the Academy. - -To catch in a chapter the deep yet subtle spirit and meaning of this -"finest product of antiquity,"[47]--it is not easy. In Plato's Utopia -there would no doubt have been a law against writing so briefly on so -vast a phenomenon,--with, in this case, the inevitably consequent -derangement of the Platonic perspective, and the impossibility, within -such compass, of focussing Plato in the political and philosophical -meaning of his time. One's feeling here is of having desecrated with -small talk the Parthenon of philosophy. Perhaps as we go on we shall be -able to see more clearly the still-living value of Plato's thought: in -almost everything that we shall hereinafter discuss his voice will be -heard, even though unnamed. To-day, at last, he comes again into his -own--as in Renaissance days--after centuries dominated by the influence -of his first misinterpreter; and generations bred on the throned -lukewarmness of the _Nicomachean Ethics_ yield to a generation that is -learning to feel the hot constructive passion of the _Republic_. Dead -these two thousand and some hundred years, Plato belongs to the future. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -FRANCIS BACON AND THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SCIENCE - - -I - -From Plato to Bacon - -"As I read Plato," writes Professor Dewey, "philosophy began with some -sense of its essentially political basis and mission--a recognition that -its problems were those of the organization of a just social order. But -it soon got lost in dreams of another world."[48] Plato and Aristotle -are the _crura cerebri_ of Europe. But in Aristotle, along with a wealth -of acute observation of men and institutions, we find a diminishing -interest in reconstruction; the Stagirite spent too much of his time in -card-cataloguing Plato, and allowed his imagination to become suffocated -with logic. With the Stoics and Epicureans begin that alienation of -ethics from politics, and that subordination of philosophy to religious -needs, which it is part of the task of present thinking to undo. -Alexander had conquered the Orient, only to have Orientalism conquer -Greece. Under Scholasticism it was the fate of great minds to retrace -worn paths in the cage of a system of conclusions determined by external -authority; and the obligation to uphold the established precluded any -practical recognition of the reconstructive function of thought. With -the Renaissance--that Indian summer of Greek culture--the dream of a -remoulded world found voice again. Campanella, through the darkness of -his prison cell, achieved the vision of a communist utopia; and other -students of the rediscovered Plato painted similar pictures. Indeed this -reawakening of Plato's influence gave to the men of the Renaissance an -inspiriting sense of the wonders that lay potential in organized -intelligence. Again men faced the task of replacing with a natural ethic -the falling authoritarian sanctions of supernatural religion; and for a -time one might have hoped that the thought of Socrates was to find at -last its due fruition. But again men lost themselves in the notion of a -cultured class moving leisurely over the backs of slaves; and perhaps it -was well that the whole movement was halted by the more Puritan but also -more democratic outburst of the Reformation. What the world needed was a -method which offered hope for the redemption not of a class, but of all. -Galileo and Roger Bacon opened the way to meeting this need by their -emphasis on the value of hypothesis and experiment, and the necessity of -combining induction with deduction; it remained for Francis Bacon to -lay out the road for the organized employment of these new methods, and -to inspire all Europe with his warm vision of their social -possibilities. - - -II - -Character - -If you would understand Bacon, you must see him as not so much a -philosopher as an administrator. You find him a man of great practical -ability: he remoulds philosophy with one hand and rules part of England -with the other; not to speak of writing Shakespeare's plays between -times! He rises brilliantly from youthful penury to the political -pinnacle; and meanwhile he runs over the whole realm of human knowledge, -scattering praise and censure with lordly hand. Did we not know the fact -as part of the history of England we should never suspect that the -detailed and varied learning of this man was the incidental -accomplishment of a life busied with political intrigue. _Bene vixit qui -bene latuit_: surely here is a man who has lived widely, and in no -merely physical sense has made the world his home. Life is no "brief -candle" to him, nor men "such stuff as dreams are made of"; life is a -glorious gift, big with blessing for him who will but assist at the -delivery. There is nothing of the timid ascetic about him; like -Socrates, he knows that there is a sort of cowardice in shunning -pleasure;[49] best of all, there is so much work to be done, so many -opportunities for the man of unnarrowed soul. He feels the exhilaration -of one who has burst free from the shackles of intellectual authority: -he sees before him an uncharted future, raw material for hands that dare -to mould it; and he dares. All his life long he is mixed up with the -heart of things; every day is an adventure. Exiled from politics he -plunges gladly into the field of scientific reconstruction; he does not -forget that he is an administrator, any more than Plato could forget -that he was a dramatist; he finds the world of thought a chaos, and -bequeaths it a planful process for the coördination of human life; all -Europe responds to his call for the "enlarging of the bounds of human -empire." He works joyfully and buoyantly to the very last, and dies as -he has wished, "in an earnest pursuit, which is like one that is wounded -in hot blood, who, for the time, scarce feels the hurt." - - -III - -The Expurgation of the Intellect - -Consider the reaction of an experienced statesman who leaves the service -of a king to enter the service of truth. He has left a field wherein all -workers moved in subordination to one head and one focal purpose; he -enters a field in which each worker is working by himself, with no -division of labor, no organization of endeavor, no correlation of ends. -There he has found administration, here he finds a naïve -_laissez-faire_; there order, here anarchy; there some sense of common -end and effort, here none. He understands at once the low repute of -philosophy among men of affairs. "For the people are very apt to contemn -truth, upon account of the controversies raised about it; and so think -those all in a wrong way, who never meet."[50] He understands at once -why it is that the world has been so little changed by speculation and -research. He is a man whose consciousness of pervasive human misery is -too sharp for comfort;[51] and he sees no hope of remedy for this in -isolated guerilla attacks waged upon the merest outposts of truth, each -attack with its jealously peculiar strategy, its own dislocated, almost -irrelevant end. And yet if there is no remedy for men's ills in this -nascent science and renascent philosophy, in what other quarter, then, -shall men look for hope and cure? - -There is no other, Bacon feels; unless victory is first won in the -laboratory and the study it will never be won in political assemblies; -no plebiscite or royal edict, but only truth, can make men free. Man's -hope lies in the reorganization of the processes of discovery and -interpretation. Unless philosophy and science be born again of social -aims and social needs they cannot have life in them. A new spirit must -enter. - -But first old spirits must be exorcised. Speculation and research must -bring out a declaration of independence against theology. "The -corruption of philosophy by superstition and an admixture of theology is -... widely spread, and does the greatest harm."[52] The search for final -causes, for design in nature, must be left to theologians; the function -of science is not to interpret the purposes of nature, but to discover -the connections of cause and effect in nature. Dogma must be set aside: -"if a man will begin with certainties he shall end in doubts; but if he -will be content to begin in doubts he shall end in certainties."[53] -Dogma must be set aside, too, because it necessitates deduction as a -basic method; and deduction as a basic method is disastrous. - -But that is not all; there is much more in the way of preliminaries: -there must be a general "expurgation of the intellect." The mind is full -(some would say made up) of prejudices, wild fancies, "idols," or -imaginings of things that are not so: if you are to think correctly, -usefully, all these must go. Try, then, to get as little of yourself as -possible in the way of the thing you wish to see. Beware of the very -general tendency to put order and regularity in the world and then to -suppose that they are native to the structure of things; or to force all -facts into the unyielding mould of a preconceived opinion, carefully -neglecting all contrary instances; or to give too credulous an ear to -that which flatters the wish. Look into yourself and see the forest of -prejudices that has grown up within you: through your temperamental -attitudes; through your education; through your friends (friendship is -so often an agreement in prejudices); through your favorite authors and -authorities. If you find yourself seizing and dwelling on anything with -particular satisfaction, hold it in suspicion. Beware of words, for they -are imposed according to the apprehension of the crowd; make sure that -you do not take abstractions for things. And remind yourself -occasionally that you are not the measure of all things, but their -distorting mirror. - -So much by way of clearing the forest. Comes then induction as the fount -and origin of all truth: patient induction, obedient to the call of -fact, and with watchful eye for, above all things, the little unwelcome -instance that contradicts. Not that induction is everything; it includes -experiment, of course, and is punctuated by hypothesis.[54] (More, it is -clearly but the servant of deduction, since the aim of all science is to -predict by deduction from generalizations formed by induction; but just -as clear is it that the efficacy of the whole business lies grounded in -the faithfulness of the induction: induction is servant, but it has all -men at its mercy.) And to formulate methods of induction, to surround -the process by mechanical guards, to protect it from the premature -flights of young generalizations,--that is a matter of life and death to -science. - - -IV - -Knowledge is Power - -And now, armed with these methods of procedure, we stand face to face -with nature. What shall we ask her? _Prudens questio dimidium scientiæ_: -to know what to ask is half of every science. - -You must ask for laws,--or, to use a Platonic term, forms. In every -process there is matter and there is form: the matter being the seat of -the process or operation, and the form its method or law. "Though in -nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, performing pure -individual acts, according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy the very -law, and the investigation, discovery, and explanation of it, is the -foundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law, -with its clauses, that I mean when I speak of Forms."[55] Not so much -what a "thing" is, but how it behaves;--that is the question. And what -is more, if you will examine your conception of a "thing," you will see -that it is really a conception of how the "thing" behaves; every _What_ -is at last a _How_. Every "thing" is a machine, whose essence or meaning -is to be found not by a mere description of its parts, but by an account -of how it operates. "How does it work?" asks the boy before a machine; -see to it that you ask the same question of nature. - -For observe, if you know how a thing works, you are on the way to -managing and controlling it. Indeed, a Form can be defined as those -elements in a process which must be known before the process can be -controlled. Here we see the meaning of science; it is an effort to -discover the laws which must be known in order "that the mind may -exercise her power over the nature of things."[56] Science is the -formulation of control; knowledge is power. The object of science is not -merely to know, but to rebuild; every science longs to be an art. The -quest for knowledge, then, is not a matter of curiosity, it is a fight -for power. We "put nature on the rack and compel her to bear witness" -against herself. Where this conception reigns, logic-chopping is out of -court. "The end of our new logic is to find not arguments but arts; ... -not probable reasons but plans and designs of works; ... to overcome not -an adversary in argument but nature in action."[57] - -But there is logic-chopping in other things than logic. All strife of -men with men, of group with group, if it leaves no result beyond the -victory and passing supremacy of the individual or group, is -logic-chopping. Such victories pass from side to side, and cancel -themselves into final nullity. Real achievement is victory, not over -other men but with them. "It will not be amiss to distinguish the three -kinds, and as it were grades, of ambition in mankind. The first is of -those who desire to extend their own power in their native country; -which kind is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who labor to -extend the power of their country and its dominion among men. This -certainly has more dignity, though not less covetousness. But if a man -endeavor to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human -race over the universe, his ambition is without doubt both a more -wholesome thing and a more noble than the other two. The empire of man -over things depends wholly on the arts and sciences. For we cannot -command nature except by obeying her."[58] - - -V - -The Socialization of Science - -_Natura non vincitur nisi parendo._ "I accept the universe," says -Margaret Fuller. "Gad! you'd better!" says Carlyle. I accept it, says -Bacon, but only as raw material. We will listen to nature, but only that -we may learn what language she understands. We stoop to conquer. - -There is nothing impossible but thinking makes it so. "By far the -greatest obstacle to the progress of science and the undertaking of new -tasks ... is found in this, that men despair and think things -impossible.... If therefore any one believes or promises more, they -think this comes of an ungoverned and unripened mind."[59] There is -nothing that we may not do, if we _will_, but we must will; and must -will the means as well as the end. Would we have an empire of man over -nature? Very well: organize the arts and sciences. - -"Consider what may be expected from men abounding in leisure, and from -association of labors, and from successions of ages; the rather because -it is not a way over which only one man can pass at a time (as is the -case with that of reasoning), but within which the labors and industries -of men (especially as regards the collecting of experience) may with the -best effort be distributed and then combined. For then only will men -begin to know their strength when instead of great numbers doing all the -same things, one shall take charge of one thing and another of -another."[60] There should be more coöperation, less chaotic rivalry, in -research. And the coöperation should be international; the various -universities of the world, so far as they engage in research, should be -like the different buildings of a great manufacturing plant, each with -its own particular specialty and quest. Is it not remarkable how "little -sympathy and correspondence exists between colleges and universities, as -well throughout Europe as in the same state and kingdom?"[61] Why cannot -all the research in the world be coördinated into one unified advance? -Perhaps the truth-seekers would be unwilling; but has that been shown? -And is the number of willing coöperators too small to warrant further -effort? How can we know without the trial? Grant that the genius would -balk at some external central direction; but research after all is -seldom a matter of genius. "The course I propose ... is such as leaves -but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits -and understandings nearly on the level."[62] Let scope and freedom be -amply provided for the genius; it is the work of following up the -_aperçus_ of genius that most sorely needs coördination. Organization of -research means really the liberation of genius: liberation from the -halting necessities of mechanical repetition in experiment. Nor is -coördination regimentation; let each man follow his hobby to whatever -university has been assigned to the investigation of that particular -item. Liberty is futility unless it is organized. - -It is a plan, you see, for the socialization of science. It is a large -and royal vision; to make it real involves "indeed _opera basilica_," it -is the business of a king, "towards which the endeavors of one man can -be but as the sign on a cross-road, which points out the way but cannot -tread it."[63] It will need such legislative appropriations as are now -granted only to the business of competitive destruction on land and sea. -"As the secretaries and spies of princes and states bring in bills for -intelligence, so you must allow the spies and intelligencers of nature -to bring in their bills if you would not be ignorant of many things -worthy to be known. And if Alexander placed so large a treasure at -Aristotle's command for the support of hunters, fowlers, fishers and the -like, in much more need do they stand of this beneficence who unfold the -labyrinths of nature."[64] - - -VI - -Science and Utopia - -Such an organization of science is Bacon's notion of Utopia. He gives us -in _The New Atlantis_, in plain strong prose, a picture of a state in -which this organization has reached the national stage. It is a state -nominally ruled by a king (Bacon never forgets that he is a loyal -subject and counsellor of James I); but "preëminent amongst the -excellent acts of the king ... was the erection and institution of an -Order or Society which we call Solomon's House; the noblest foundation, -as we think, that ever was upon the earth, and the lantern of this -kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of the nature of all things."[65] -Every twelve years this Order sends out to all parts of the world -"merchants of light"; men who remain abroad for twelve years, gather -information and suggestions in every field of art and science, and then -(the next expedition having brought men to replace them) return home -laden with books, instruments, inventions, and ideas. "Thus, you see, we -maintain a trade not for gold, silver or jewels; nor for silk; nor for -spices; nor for any other commodity or matter; but only for God's first -creation, which was Light."[66] Meanwhile at home there is a busy army -filling many laboratories, experimenting in zoölogy, medicine, -dietetics, chemistry, botany, physics, and other fields; there are, in -addition to these men, "three that collect the experiments in all the -books; ... three that try new experiments"; three that tabulate the -results of the experimenters; "three that look into the experiments of -their fellows, and cast about how to draw out of them things of use ... -for man's life; ... three that direct new experiments"; three that from -the results draw up "observations, axioms, and aphorisms."[67] "We -imitate also the flights of birds; we have some degree of flying in the -air; we have ships and boats for going under water."[68] And the purpose -of it all, he says, with fine Baconian ring, is "the enlarging of the -bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible."[69] - - -VII - -Scholasticism in Science - -This is the voice of the Renaissance, speaking with some method to its -music. It is the voice of Erasmus rather than that of Luther; but it is -the voice of a larger and less class-bound vision than that which moved -the polite encomiast of folly. Such minds as were not lost in the -religious turmoil of the time responded to Bacon's call for a new -beginning; a "sense of liberation, ... of new destinies, pulsates in -that generation at Bacon's touch."[70] Bacon says, and with justice, -that he "rang the bell which called the wits together."[71] When, in -1660, a group of London savants formed the Royal Society, it was from -Bacon that they took their inspiration, and from the "House of Solomon" -part of their plan of organization. Diderot and D'Alembert acknowledged -the impetus given by their reading of Bacon to the adventurous -enterprise which completed and distributed the _Encyclopédie_ despite -the prohibition of the king. To-day, after two hundred years of -Cartesian futility about mind and body and the problem of knowledge, the -Baconian emphasis on the socially-reconstructive function of thought -renews its power and appeal. The world returns to Socrates, to Plato, -and to Bacon. - -But with some measure of wholesome disillusionment. These last two -centuries have told us that science, unaided, cannot solve our social -problem. We have invented, invented, invented, invented; and with what -result? The gap between class and class has so widened during these -inventive years that there are now not classes but castes. Social -harmony is a matter of brief interludes in a drama more violent than any -ever mimicked on the stage. Men trained and accomplished in science, -like Prince Kropotkin, abandon it on the score that it has turned its -back on the purpose that gave it vitality and worth.[72] - -What is the purpose of science? What do scientists consider to be the -purpose of science? The laboratories are crowded with men who have no -inkling of any other than a purely material reconstruction as the -function of their growing knowledge. Specialization has so divided -science that hardly any sense of the whole survives. The ghosts of -scholasticism--of a pursuit of knowledge divorced from its social -end--hover about the microscopes and test-tubes of the scientific world; -and the upshot of it all is that to them who have, more is given. Let -Bacon speak here: "There is another great and powerful cause why the -sciences have made but little progress, which is this. It is not -possible to run a course aright, when the goal itself has not been -rightly placed."[73] Sciences with obvious social functions have -languished through lapse of all sense of direction, all feeling of -focus; psychology, for example, is but now reviving under the stimulus -of men who dared to "stir the earth a little about the roots of this -science,"[74] because they had perceived its purpose and meaning in the -drama of reconstruction. The blunt truth is that unless a scientist is -also a philosopher, with some capacity to see things _sub specie -totius_,--unless he can come out of his hole into the open,--he is not -fit to direct his own research. "As no perfect discovery can be made -upon a flat or level, neither is it possible to discover the more remote -and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the -same science, and ascend not to a higher science."[75] Before it can be -of real service to life, science must be enlightened by some -discrimination of values, some consideration and fitting together of -human ends: without philosophy as its eye piece, science is but the -traditional child who has taken apart the traditional watch, with none -but the traditional results. - -There is more to this indictment. Science has been organized, though -very imperfectly, for research; it has been organized hardly at all for -social application and control. The notion that science can be used in -conserving the vital elements of order and at the same time facilitating -experimental and progressive change, is but beginning to walk about. -Indeed, the employment and direction of scientific ability in the -business of government is still looked upon as a doubtful procedure; to -say that the administration of municipal affairs, for example, is to be -given over to men trained in the social sciences rather than to men -artful in trapping votes with oratorical molasses, is still a venture -into the loneliness of heresy. Again let Bacon speak, who was -administrator and philosopher in one. "It is wrong to trust the natural -body to empirics who commonly have a few receipts whereon they rely, but -who know neither the causes of the disease, nor the constitution of -patients, nor the danger of accidents, nor the true methods of cure. And -so it must needs be dangerous to have the civil body of states managed -by empirical statesmen, unless well mixed with others who are grounded -in learning. On the contrary it is almost without instance that any -government was unprosperous under learned governors."[76] - -Plato over again, you say. Yes; just as "Greek philosophy is the dough -with which modern philosophers have baked their bread, kneading it over -and over again,"[77] so this vital doctrine of the application of the -best available intelligence to the problem of social order and -development must be restated in every generation until at last the world -may see its truth and merit exemption from its repetition. - - -VIII - -The Asiatics of Europe - -But the place of Bacon in the continuum of history is hardly stated by -connecting him with Plato. Conceive of him rather as a new protagonist -in the long epic of intelligence; another blow struck in the seemingly -endless war between magic and science, between supernaturalism and -naturalism, between the spirit of worship and the spirit of control. -Primitive man--and he lives everywhere under the name of legion--looks -out upon nature as something to be feared and obeyed, something to be -cajoled by ritual and sacrifice and prayer. In ages of great social -disorder, such as the millennium inaugurated in Western Europe by the -barbarian invasions, the primitive elements in the mental make-up of men -emerge through the falling cultural surface; and cults rich in ritual -and steeped in emotional luxury grow in rank abundance. It is in the -character of man to worship power: if he feels the power without him -more intensely than the power within, he worships nature with a humble -fear, and leans on magic and supernatural rewards; if he feels the power -within him more intensely than the power without, he sees divinity in -himself and other centres of remoulding activity, and thinks not of -worshipping and obeying nature, but of controlling and commanding her. -The second attitude comes, of course, with knowledge, and action that -expresses knowledge; it is quite human that nature should not be -worshipped once she has been known. A man is primitive, then, when he -worships nature and makes no effort to control her; he is mature when he -stops worshipping and begins to control,--when he understands that -"Nature is not a temple but a workshop,"[78] not a barrier to divinity, -but the raw material of Utopia. - -Now the essence of Bacon is not the replacement of deduction by -induction, but the change of emphasis from worship to control. This -emphasis, once vivid in Plato but soon obscured by Oriental influence, -is one of the two dominant elements in modern thought (the other being -the puzzling over an artificial problem of knowledge); and unless the -Baconian element finally subordinates the Cartesian, the word _modern_ -must no longer arrogate to itself a eulogistic connotation. Hence Bacon, -and not Descartes, is the initiator of modern philosophy; part -initiator, at least, of that current of thought which finds rebellious -expression in the enlightenment of the eighteenth-century, and comes to -supremacy in the scientific victories of the nineteenth. The vital -sequence in modern philosophy is not Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, -and Bergson (for these are the Asiatics of Europe), but Bacon, Hobbes, -Condorcet, Comte, Darwin, and James.[79] - -The hope of the world is in this resolute spirit of control,--control of -the material without us, and of the passions within. Bit by bit, one is -not afraid to say, we shall make for ourselves a better world. Shall we -not find a way to eliminate disease, to control the increase of -population, to find in plastic organization a substitute for revolution? -Shall we perhaps even succeed in transmuting the lust for power over man -into ambition to conquer the forces that impede man? Shall we make men -understand that there is more potency of joy in the sense of having -contributed to the power of men over nature than in any personal triumph -of one over another man?--more glory in a conquest of bacteria than in -all the martial victories that have ever spilled human blood? Here is -the beginning of real civilization, and the mark of man. "The -environment transforms the animal; man transforms the environment."[80] -"Looking at the history of the world as a whole, the tendency has been -in Europe to subordinate nature to man; out of Europe, to subordinate -man to nature. Formerly the richest countries were those in which nature -was most bountiful; now the richest countries are those in which man is -most active."[81] Control is the sign of maturity, the achievement of -Europe, the future of America. It is, one argues again, the drama of -history, this war between Asia and Europe, between nature and man, -between worship and control. Fundamentally it is the upward struggle of -intelligence: Plato is its voice, Zeno its passing exhaustion, Bacon its -resurrection. It was not an unopposed rebirth: there is still no telling -whether East or West will win. Surrounded by the backwash of Oriental -currents everywhere, the lover of the Baconian spirit needs constantly -to refresh himself at the fount of Bacon's inexhaustible inspiration and -confidence. "I stake all," he says, "on the victory of art over nature -in the race." And one needs to hold ever before oneself Bacon's favorite -device: A ship passing through the Pillars of Hercules out into the -unknown sea, and over it the words, PLUS ULTRA. - -More beyond! - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -SPINOZA ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM[82] - - -I - -Hobbes - -Passing from Bacon to Spinoza we meet with Thomas Hobbes, a man from -whom Spinoza drew many of his ideas, though very little of his -inspiration. The social incidence of the greater part of Hobbes's -thinking has long been recognized; he is not a figure over whom the -biographer of social thought finds much cause to quarrel. He is at once -the materialist _par excellence_ of modern philosophy, and the most -uncompromising protagonist of the absolutist theory of the state. The -individual, all compact of pugnacity, was to Hobbes the bogey which the -state, voracious of all liberties, became two centuries later to Herbert -Spencer. He had in acute degree the philosopher's natural appetite for -order; and trembled at the thought of initiatives not foreseen by his -political geometry. He lived in the midst of alarms: war stepped on the -heels of war in what was very nearly a real _bellum omnium contra -omnes_. He lived in the midst of political reaction: men were weary of -Renaissance exuberance and Reformation strife, and sank gladly into the -open arms of the past. There could be no end, thought Hobbes, to this -turmoil of conflicting egos, individual and national, until all groups -and individuals knelt in absolute obedience to one sovereign power. - -But all this has been said before; we need but remind ourselves of it -here so that we may the better appreciate the vibrant sympathy for the -individual man, the generous defence of popular liberties, that fill -with the glow of subdued passion the pages of the gentle Spinoza. - - -II - -The Spirit of Spinoza - -Yet Spinoza was not wanting in that timidity and that fear of unbridled -instinct which stood dictator over the social philosophy of Hobbes. He -knew as well as Hobbes the dangers of a democracy that could not -discipline itself. "Those who have had experience of how changeful the -temper of the people is, are almost in despair. For the populace is -governed not by reason but by emotion; it is headlong in everything, and -easily corrupted by avarice and luxury."[83] And even more than Hobbes -he withdrew from the affairs of men and sought in the protection of a -suburban attic the peace and solitude which were the vital medium of his -thought. He found that sometimes at least, "truth hath a quiet breast." -"_Se tu sarai solo_," wrote Leonardo, "_tu sarai tutto tuo_." And surely -Goethe thought of Spinoza when he said: "No one can produce anything -important unless he isolate himself." - -But this dread of the crowd was only a part of Spinoza's nature, and not -the dominant part. His fear of men was lost in his boundless capacity -for affection; he tried so hard to understand men that he could not help -but love them. "I have labored carefully not to mock, lament, or -execrate, but to understand, human actions; and to this end I have -looked upon passions ... not as vices of human nature, but as properties -just as pertinent to it as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like -to the nature of the atmosphere."[84] Even the accidents of time and -space were sinless to his view, and all the world found room in the -abundance of his heart. "Spinoza deified the All in order to find peace -in the face of it," says Nietzsche:[85] but perhaps, too, because all -love is deification. - -All in all, history shows no man more honest and independent; and the -history of philosophy shows no man so sincere, so far above quibbling -and dispute and the picking of petty flaws, so eager to receive the -truth even when brought by the enemy, so ready to forgive even -persecution in the depth and breadth of his tolerance. No man who -suffered so much injustice made so few complaints. He became great -because he could merge his own suffering in the suffering of all,--a -mark of all deep men. "They who have not suffered," says Ibsen,--and, -one might add, suffered with those they saw suffer,--"never create; they -only write books." - -Spinoza did not write much; the long-suffering are seldom long-winded. A -fragment _On the Improvement of the Understanding_; a brief volume on -religion and the state; the _Ethics_; and as he began to write the -chapter on democracy in the _Political Treatise_ consumption conquered -him. Bacteria take no bribes. - - -III - -Political Ethics - -Had he lived longer it would have dawned perhaps even on the German -historians that Spinoza's basic interest was not in metaphysics so much -as in political ethics. The _Ethics_, because it is the most sustained -flight of reasoning in philosophy, has gathered round it all the -associations that throng about the name of Spinoza, so that one is apt -to think of him in terms of a mystical "pantheism" rather than of -coördinative intelligence, democracy, and free thought.[86] Höffding -considers it a defect in Spinoza's philosophy that it takes so little -notice of epistemology: but should we not be grateful for that? Here are -men suffering, said Spinoza, here are men enslaved by passions and -prelates and kings; surely till these things are dealt with we have no -time for epistemological delicacies. Instead of increasing the world's -store of learned ignorance by writing tomes on the possibility of a -subject knowing an object, Spinoza thought it better to give himself to -the task of helping to keep alive in an age of tyrannical reaction the -Renaissance doctrine of popular sovereignty. Instead of puzzling himself -and others about epistemology he pondered the problem of stimulating the -growth of intelligence and evolving a rational ethic. He thought that -philosophy was something more than a chess-game for professors. - -There is no need to spend time and space here on what for Spinoza, as -for Socrates and Plato, was the problem of problems,--how human reason -could be developed to a point where it might replace supernatural -sanctions for social conduct and provide the medium of social -reconstruction. One point, however, may be profitably emphasized. - -A careless reading of the _Ethics_ may lead to the belief that Spinoza -bases his philosophy on a naïve opposition of reason to passion. It is -not so. "A desire cannot be restrained or removed," says Spinoza, -"except by an opposite and stronger desire."[87] Reason is not dictator -to desire, it is a relation among desires,--that relation which arises -when experience has hammered impulses into coördination. An impulse, -passion or emotion is by itself "a confused idea," a blurred picture of -the thing that is indeed desired. Thought and impulse are not two kinds -of mental process: thought is impulse clarified by experience, impulse -is thought in chaos. - - -IV - -Is Man a Political Animal? - -Why is there a social problem? Is it because men are "bad"? Nonsense, -answers Spinoza: the terms "good" and "bad," as conveying moral approval -and disapproval, are philosophically out of court; they mean nothing -except that "each of us wishes all men to live according to _his_ -desire," and consoles himself for their non-complaisance by making moral -phrases. There is a social problem, says Spinoza, because men are not -naturally social. This does not mean that there are no social tendencies -in the native human constitution; it does mean that these tendencies are -but a sorry fraction of man's original nature, and do not avail to chain -the "ape and tiger" hiding under his extremely civilized shirt. Man is a -"political animal"; but he is also an animal. We must approach the -social problem through a very respectful consideration of the ape and -tiger; we must follow Hobbes and inquire into "the natural condition of -man." - -"In the state of nature every man lives as he wishes,"[88]--he is not -pestered with police regulations and aldermanic ordinances. He "_may_ do -whatever he _can_: his rights extend to the utmost limits of his -powers."[89] He may fight, hate, deceive, exploit, to his heart's -desire; and he does. We moderns smile at the "natural man" as a myth, -and think our forbears were social _ab initio_. But be it remembered -that by "social" Spinoza implies no mere preference of society to -solitude, but a subordination of individual caprice to more or less -tacit communal regulation. And Spinoza considers it useful, if we are -going to talk about "human nature in politics," to ask whether man -_naturally_ submits to regulation or naturally rebels against it. When -he wrote of a primitive non-social human condition he wrote as a -psychologist inferring the past rather than as an historian revealing -it. He observed man, kindly yet keenly; he saw that "everyone desires to -keep down his fellow-men by all possible means, and when he prevails, -boasts more of the injuries he has done to others than of the advantage -he has won for himself";[90] and he concluded that if we could trace -human history to its sources we should find a creature--call him human -or pre-human--willing, perhaps glad, to have the company of his like, -but still unattracted and unhampered by social organization. - -We like to laugh at the simple anthropology of Spinoza and Rousseau; but -the laugh should be turned upon us when we suppose that the historical -_motif_ played any but a very minor part in the discussion of the -natural state of man. History was not the point at all: these men were -not interested in the past so much as in the possibilities of the -future. That is why the eighteenth century was so largely their -creation. When a man is interested in the past he writes history; when -he is interested in the future he makes it. - -The point to be borne in mind, Spinoza urges, is that we are still -essentially unsocialized; the instinct to acquire possession and power, -if necessary by oppression and exploitation, is still stronger than the -disposition to share, to be tolerant of disagreement, and to work in -mutual aid. The "natural man" is not a myth, he is the solid reality -that struts about dressed in a little brief civilization. "Religion -teaches that each man should love his neighbor as himself, and defend -the rights of others as earnestly as he would his own. Yet this -conviction has very little influence over man's emotions. It is no doubt -of some account in the hour of death, for then disease has weakened the -emotions, and the man lies helpless. And the principle is assented to in -church, for there men have no dealings with one another. But in the mart -or the court it has little or no effect, though that is just where the -need for it is greatest."[91] He still "does everything for the sake of -his own profit";[92] nor will even the unlimited future change him in -that, for it is his very essence. His happiness is in the pursuit of his -profit, his supreme joy is in the increase of his power. And a social -order built upon any other basis than this exuberant egoism of man will -be as lasting, in the eye of history, as a name that is writ in water. - - -V - -What the Social Problem Is - -But what if it is a good basis? What if "the foundation of virtue is the -endeavor to preserve one's own being" to the uttermost?[93] What if -there is a way in which, without any hypocritical mystification, this -self-seeking, while still remaining self-seeking, may become -coöperation? - -Spinoza's answer is not startling: it is the Socratic answer, issuing -from a profound psychological analysis. Given the liberation and -development of intelligence, and the discordant strife of egos will -yield undreamed-of harmonies. Men are so made, they are so compact of -passion and obscurity, that they will not let one another be free; how -can that be changed? Deception has been tried, and has succeeded only -temporarily if at all. Compulsion has been tried; but compulsion is a -negative force, it makes for inhibition rather than inspiration. It is a -necessary evil; but hardly the last word of constructive social -thinking. There is something more in a man than his capacity for fear, -there is some other way of appealing to him than the way of threats; -there is his hunger and thirst to know and understand and develop. Think -of the untouched resources of this human desire for mental enlargement; -think of the millions who almost starve that they may learn. Is that the -force that is to build the future and fashion the city of our dreams? -Here are men torn with impulses, shaken by mutual interference; is it -conceivable that they would be so deeply torn and shaken if that hunger -of theirs for knowledge--knowledge of themselves, too,--were met with -generous opportunity? Men long to be reasonable; they know, even the -least of them, that under the tyranny of impulse there is no ultimately -fruitful life; what is there that they would not give for the power to -see things clearly and be captains of their souls? Here if anywhere is -an opportunity for such statesmanship as does not often grace the courts -of emperors and kings! - -How we can come to know ourselves, our inmost nature, how we can through -this knowledge achieve coördination and our real desires,--that is for -Spinoza the heart of the social problem. The source of man's strength is -that he can know his weakness. If he can but find himself out, then he -can change himself. "A passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form -a clear and distinct idea of it."[94] When a passion is tracked to its -lair and confronted with its futile partiality, its sting is drawn, it -can hurt us no more; it may coöperate but it may no longer rule. It is -seen to be "inadequate," to express but a fragment of us, and so seen it -sinks into its place in the hierarchy of desires. "And in proportion as -we know our emotions better, the more are they susceptible to -control."[95] Passion is passivity; control is power. Knowledge brings -control, and control brings freedom; freedom is not a gift, it is a -victory. Knowledge, control, freedom, power, virtue: these are all one -thing. Before the "empire of man over nature" must come the empire of -man over himself, must come coördination. Achievement is born of clear -vision and unified intent, not of actions that are but bubbles on the -muddy rapids of desire. - - -VI - -Free Speech - -"Before all things, a means must be devised for improving and clarifying -the understanding."[96] "Since there is no single thing we know which is -more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, it follows that there -is nothing by which a person can better show how much skill and talent -he possesses than by so educating men that at last they will live under -the direct authority of reason."[97] But how? - -First of all, says Spinoza, thought must be absolutely free: we must -have the possible profit of even the most dangerous heresies. If that -proposition appear a trifle trite, let it be remembered that Spinoza -wrote at a time when Galileo's broken-hearted retraction was still fresh -in men's memories, and when Descartes was modifying his philosophy to -soothe the Jesuits. The chapter on freedom of thought is really the -pivotal point and _raison d'être_ of the _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_; -and it is still rich in encouragement and inspiration. Perhaps there is -nothing else in Spinoza's writings that is so typical at once of his -gentleness and of his strength. - -Free speech should be granted, Spinoza argues, because it must be -granted. Men may conceal real beliefs, but these same beliefs will -inevitably influence their behavior; a belief is not that which is -spoken, it is that which is done. A law against free speech is -subversive of law itself, for it invites derision from the -conscientious. "All laws which can be broken without any injury to -another are counted but a laughing-stock."[98] It is useless for the -state to command "such things as are abhorrent to human nature." "Men in -general are so constituted that there is nothing they will endure with -so little patience as that views which they believe to be true should be -counted crimes against the law.... Under such circumstances men do not -think it disgraceful, but most honorable, to hold the laws in -abhorrence, and to refrain from no action against the government."[99] -Where men are not permitted to criticise their rulers in public, they -will plot against them in private. There is no religious enthusiasm -stronger than that with which laws are broken by those whose liberty has -been suppressed. - -Spinoza goes further. Thought must be liberated not only from legal -restrictions but from indirect and even unintentional compulsion as -well. Spinoza feels very strongly the danger to freedom, that is -involved in the organization of education by the state. "Academies that -are founded at the public expense are instituted not so much to -cultivate men's natural abilities as to restrain them. But in a free -commonwealth arts and sciences will be best cultivated to the full if -everyone that asks leave is allowed to teach in public, at his own cost -and risk."[100] He would have preferred such "free lances" as the -Sophists to the state universities of the American Middle West. He did -not suggest means of avoiding the apparent alternative of universities -subsidized by the rich. It is a problem that has still to be solved. - -In demanding absolute freedom of speech Spinoza touches the bases of -state organization. Nothing is so dangerous and yet so necessary; for -ignorance is the mother of authority. The defenders of free speech have -never yet met the contention of such men as Hobbes, that freedom of -thought is subversive of established government. The reason is only -this, that the contention is probably true, so far as most established -governments go. Absolute liberty of speech is assuredly destructive of -despotism, no matter how constitutional the despotism may be; and those -who have at heart the interests of any such government may be forgiven -for hesitating to applaud Spinoza. Freedom of speech makes for social -vitality, certainly; without it, indeed, the avenues of mental and -social development would be blocked, and life hardly worth living. But -freedom of speech cannot be said to make for social stability and -permanence, unless the social organization in question invites criticism -and includes some mechanism for profiting by it. Where democracy is -real, or is on the way to becoming real, free speech will help, not -harm, the state; for there is no man so loyal as the man who knows that -he may criticise his government freely and to some account. But where -there is the autocracy of a person or a class, freedom of speech makes -for dissolution,--dissolution, however, not of the society so much as of -the government. The Bourbons are gone, but France remains. Nay, if the -Bourbons had remained, France might be gone. - -But to argue to-day for freedom of speech is to invite the charge of -emphasizing the obvious. It may be wholesome to remind ourselves, by a -few examples, that however universal the theory of free speech may be, -the practice is still rather sporadic. An American professor is -dismissed because he thinks there is a plethora of unearned income in -his country; an English publicist is reported to have been refused -"permission" to fill lecture engagements in America because he had not -been sufficiently patriotic; and one of the most prominent of living -philosophers loses his chair because he supposes that conscience has -rights against cabinets. But indeed our governing bodies are harmless -offenders here in comparison with the people themselves. The last lesson -which men and women will learn is the lesson of free thought and free -speech. The most famous of living dramatists finds himself unsafe in -London streets, because he has dared to criticise his government; the -most able of living novelists finds it convenient to leave Paris because -there are still some Germans whom he does not hate; and an American -community full of constitutional lawyers shows its love of "law and -order" by stoning a group of boys bent on expounding the desirability of -syndicalism. - -Perhaps the world has need of many Spinozas still. - - -VII - -Virtue as Power - -Freedom of expression is the corner-stone of Spinoza's politics; the -postulate without which he refuses to proceed. But Spinoza does not have -to be told that this question of free speech precipitates him into the -larger problems of "the individual _vs._ the state"; he knows that that -problem is the very _raison d'être_ of political philosophy; he knows -that indeed the problem goes to the core of philosophy, and finds its -source and crux in the complex socio-egoistical make-up of the -individual man. - -The "God-intoxicated" Spinoza is quite sober and disillusioned about the -social possibilities of altruism. "It is a universal law of human -nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, -except with the hope of gaining a greater good."[101] "This is as -necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part."[102] This -confident reduction of human conduct to self-reference does not for -Spinoza involve any condemnation: "reason, since it asks for nothing -that is opposed to nature, demands that every person should ... seek his -own profit."[103] Observe, reason _demands_ this; this same self-seeking -is the most valuable and necessary item in the composition of man. -Spinoza, as said, goes so far as to identify this self-seeking with -virtue: "to act absolutely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing -but to act, live, and preserve our being (these three have the same -meaning) as reason directs, from the ground of seeking our own -profit."[104] This is a brave rejection of self-renunciation and -asceticism by one whose nature, so far as we can judge it now, inclined -him very strongly in the direction of these "virtues." What we have to -do, says Spinoza, is not to deny the self, but to broaden it; here -again, of course, intelligence is the mother of morals. Progress lies -not in self-reduction but in self-expansion. Progress is increase in -virtue, but "by virtue and power I understand the same thing";[105] -progress is an increase in the ability of men to achieve their ends. It -is part of our mental confectionery to define progress in terms of our -own ends; a nation is "backward" or "forward" according as it moves -towards or away from our own ideals. But that, says Spinoza, is naïve -nonsense; a nation is progressive or backward according as its citizens -are or are not developing greater power to realize _their own_ purposes. -That is a doctrine that may have "dangerous" implications, but -intelligence will face the implications and the facts, ready not to -suppress them but to turn them to account. - -It was the passion for power that led to the first social groupings and -developed the social instincts. Our varied sympathies, our parental and -filial impulses, our heroisms and generosities, all go back to social -habits born of individual needs. "Since fear of solitude exists in all -men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself and -procure the necessaries of life, it follows that men by nature tend -towards social organization."[106] "Let satirists scoff at human affairs -as much as they please, let theologians denounce them, and let the -melancholy, despising men and admiring brutes, praise as much as they -can a life rude and without refinement,--men will nevertheless find out -that by mutual help they can much more easily procure the things they -need, and that it is only by their united strength that they can avoid -the dangers which everywhere threaten them."[107] _Nihil homine homini -utilius._ Men discover that they are useful to one another, and that -mutual profit from social organization increases as intelligence grows. -In a "state of nature"--that is, before social organization--each man -has a "natural right" to do all that he is strong enough to do; in -society he yields part of this sovereignty to the communal organization, -because he finds that this concession, universalized, increases his -strength. The fear of solitude, and not any positive love of fellowship, -is the prime force in the origin of society. Man does not join in social -organization because he has social instincts; he develops such instincts -as the result of joining in such organization. - - -VIII - -Freedom and Order - -Even to-day the social instincts are not strong enough to prevent -unsocial behavior. "Men are not born fit for citizenship, but must be -made so."[108] Hence custom and law. Each man, in his sober moments, -desires such social arrangements as will protect him from aggression and -interference. "There is no one who does not wish to live, so far as -possible, in security and without fear; and this cannot possibly happen -so long as each man is allowed to do as he pleases."[109] "That men who -are necessarily subject to passions, and are inconstant and changeable, -may be able to live together in security, and to trust one another's -fidelity,"--that is the purpose of law.[110] Ideally, the state is to -the individual what reason is to passion.[111] Law protects a man not -only from the passions of others, but from his own; it is a help to -delayed response. How to frame laws so that the greatest possible number -of men may find their own security and fulfilment in allegiance to the -law,--that is the problem of the statesman. Law implies force, but so -does life, so does nature; indeed, the punishments decreed by "man-made" -states are usually milder than those which in a "state of nature" would -be the natural consequents of most interferences; not seldom the law--as -when it prevents lynching--protects an aggressor from the natural -results of his act. Force is the essence of law; hence international law -will not really be law until nations are coördinated into a larger group -possessed of the instrumentalities of compulsion.[112] - -It is clear that Spinoza has the philosophic love of order. "Whatever -conduces to human harmony and fellowship is good; whatever brings -discord into the state is evil."[113] But discord, one must repeat, is -often the prelude to a greater harmony; development implies variation, -and all variation is a discord except to ears that hear the future. The -social sanction of liberty lies of course in the potential value of -variations; without that vision of new social possibilities which is -suggested by variations from the norm a people perishes. Spinoza does -not see this; but there is a fine passage in the _Tractatus -Politicus_[114] which shows him responsive to the ideal of liberty as -well as to that of order: "The last end of the state is not to dominate -men, nor to restrain them by fear; rather it is so to free each man from -fear that he may live and act with full security and without injury to -himself or his neighbor. The end of the state is, I repeat, not to make -rational beings into brute beasts or machines. It is to enable their -bodies and their minds to function safely. It is to lead men to live by, -and to exercise, a free reason, that they may not waste their strength -in hatred, anger, and guile, not act unfairly toward one another. Thus -the end of the state is really liberty." - -So it is that Spinoza takes sharp issue with Hobbes and exalts freedom, -decentralization, and democracy, where Hobbes, starting with almost -identical premises, concludes to a centralized despotism of body and -soul. This does not mean that Spinoza had no eye for the defects of -democracy. "Experience is supposed to teach that it makes for peace and -concord when all authority is conferred upon one man. For no political -order has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks, -while none have been so short-lived, nay, so vexed by seditions, as -popular or democratic states. But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation -are to be called peace, then peace is the worst misfortune that can -befall a state. It is true that quarrels are wont to be sharper and more -frequent between parents and children than between masters and slaves; -yet it advances not the art of home life to change a father's right into -a right of property, and count his children as only his slaves. Slavery, -then, and not peace, comes from the giving of all power to one man. For -peace consists not in the absence of war, but in a union and harmony of -men's souls."[115] - -No; better the insecurity of freedom than the security of bondage. -Better the dangers that come of the ignorance of majorities than those -that flow from the concentration of power in the hands of an inevitably -self-seeking minority. Even secret diplomacy is worse than the risks of -publicity. "It has been the one song of those who thirst after absolute -power that the interest of the state requires that its affairs be -conducted in secret.... But the more such arguments disguise themselves -under the mask of public welfare the more oppressive is the slavery to -which they will lead.... Better that right counsels be known to enemies, -than that the evil secrets of tyrants should be concealed from the -citizens. They who can treat secretly of the affairs of a nation have it -absolutely under their authority; and as they plot against the enemy in -time of war, so do they against the citizens in time of peace.... It is -folly to choose to avoid a small loss by means of the greatest of -evils."[116] - -This is but one of many passages in Spinoza that startle the reader with -their present applicability and value. There is in the same treatise a -plan for an unpaid citizen soldiery, much like the scheme adopted in -Switzerland; there is a plea against centralization and for the -development of municipal pride by home rule and responsibility; there is -a warning against the danger to democracy involved in the territorial -expansion of states; and there is a plan for the state ownership of all -land, the rental from this to supply all revenue in time of peace. But -let us pass to a more characteristic feature of Spinoza's political -theory, and consider with him the function of intelligence in the state. - - -IX - -Democracy and Intelligence - -"There is no single thing in nature which is more profitable to man than -a man who lives according to the guidance of reason."[117] Such a man, -to begin with, has made his peace with the inevitable, and accepts with -good cheer the necessary limitations of social life. He has a genial -sense of human imperfections, and does not cushion himself upon Utopia. -He pursues his own ends but with some perspective of their social -bearings; and he is confident that "when each man seeks that which is -[really] profitable to himself, then are men most profitable to one -another."[118] He knows that the ends of other men will often conflict -with his; but he will not for that cause make moral phrases at them. He -feels the tragedy of isolated purposes, and knows the worth of -coöperation. As he comes to understand the intricate bonds between -himself and his fellows he finds ever more satisfaction in purposes that -overflow the narrow margins of his own material advantage; until at last -he learns to desire nothing for himself without desiring an equivalent -for others.[119] - -Given such men, democracy follows; such democracy, too, as will be a -fulfilment and not a snare. Given such men, penal codes will interest -only the antiquarian. Given such men, a society will know the full -measure of civic allegiance and communal stability and development. How -make such men? By revivals? By the gentle anæsthesia of heaven and the -cheap penology of hell? By memorizing catechisms and commandments? By -appealing like Comte, to the heart, and trusting to the eternal feminine -to lead us ever onward? (Onward whither?) Or by spreading the means of -intelligence? - -It is at this point that the social philosophy of Spinoza, like that of -Socrates, betrays its weaker side. How is intelligence to be spread? -Perhaps it is too much to ask the philosopher this question; he may feel -that he has done enough if he has made clear what it is which will most -help us to achieve our ends. Spinoza, after all, was not the kind of man -who could be expected to enter into practical problems; his soul was -filled with the vision of the eternal laws and had no room for the -passing expediencies of action. His devotional geometry was a typical -Jewish performance; there is something in the emotional make-up of the -Jew which makes him slide very easily into the attitude of worship, as -contrasted with the Græco-Roman emphasis on intellect and control. All -pantheism tends to quietism; to see things _sub specie eternitatis_ may -very well pass from the attitude of the scientist to the attitude of the -mystic who has no interest in temporal affairs. It is the task of -philosophy to study the eternal and universal not for its own sake but -for its worth in directing us through the maze of temporal particulars; -the philosopher must be like the mariner who guides himself through -space and time by gazing at the everlasting stars. It is wholesome that -the history of philosophy should begin with Thales; so that all who -come to the history of philosophy may learn, at the door of their -subject, that though stars are beautiful, wells are deep. - - -X - -The Legacy of Spinoza - -But to leave the matter thus would be to lose a part of the truth in the -glare of one's brilliance. We have to recognize that though Spinoza -stopped short (or rather was cut short) at merely a statement of the -prime need of all democracies,--intelligence,--he was nevertheless the -inspiration of men who carried his beginning more nearly to a practical -issue. To Spinoza, through Voltaire and the English deists, one may -trace not a few of the thought-currents which carried away the -foundations of ecclesiastical power, civil and intellectual, in -eighteenth-century France, and left the middle class conscience-free to -engineer a revolution. It was from Spinoza chiefly that Rousseau derived -his ideas of popular sovereignty, of the general will, of the right of -revolution, of the legitimacy of the force that makes men free, and of -the ideal state as that in which all the citizens form an assembly with -final power.[120] The French Declaration of Rights and the American -Declaration of Independence go back in part to the forgotten treatises -of the quiet philosopher of Amsterdam. To have initiated or accelerated -such currents of thought--theoretical in their origin but extremely -practical in their issue--is thereby once for all to have put one's self -above the reach of mere fault-finding. One wonders again, as so many -have wondered, what would have been the extent of this man's achievement -had he not died at the age of forty-four. When Spinoza's pious landlady -returned from church on the morning of February 21, 1677, and found her -gentle philosopher dead, she stood in the presence of one of the great -silent tragedies of human history. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -NIETZSCHE - - -I - -From Spinoza to Nietzsche - -Let us dare to compress within a page or two the social aspect of -philosophical thought from Spinoza to Nietzsche. Without forgetting that -our purpose is to show the social problem as the dominant interest of -only _many_, not all, of the greater philosophers, we may yet risk the -assertion that the majority of the men who formed the epistemological -tradition from Descartes to Kant were at heart concerned less with the -problem of knowledge than with that of social relations. Descartes slips -through this generalization; he is a man of leisure lost in the maze of -a puzzle which he has not discovered so much as he has unconsciously -constructed it. In Locke's hands the puzzle is distorted into the -question of "innate ideas," in order that under cover of an innocent -epistemological excursion a blow may be struck at hereditary prejudices -and authoritarian teaching, and the way made straight for the advance of -popular sovereignty (as against the absolutism of Hobbes), free speech, -reasonable religion, and social amelioration. The dominance of the -social interest is not so easily shown in the case of Leibniz; but let -it be remembered none the less that epistemology was but an aside in the -varied drama of Leibniz' life, and that his head was dizzy with schemes -for the betterment of this "best of all possible worlds." Bishop -Berkeley begins with _esse est percipi_ and ends with tar-water as the -_solution_ of all problems. David Hume, in the midst of a life busied -with politics and the discussion of social, political, and economic -problems, spares a year or two for epistemology, only to use it as a -handle whereby to deal a blow to dogma; he "was more damaging to -religion than Voltaire, but was ingenious enough not to get the credit -for it."[121] The social incidence of philosophy in eighteenth-century -France was so decided that one might describe that philosophy as part of -the explosive with which the middle class undermined the _status quo_. -This social emphasis continues in Comte, who cannot forget that he was -once the secretary of St. Simon, and will not let us forget that the -function of the philosopher is to coördinate experience with a view to -the remoulding of human life. John Stuart Mill is radical first and -logician afterward; and the more lasting as well as the more interesting -element in Spencer is the sociological, educational, and political -theory. In Kant the basic social interest is buried under -epistemological cobwebs; yet not so choked but that it finds very -resolute voice at last. The essence of the matter here is the return of -the prodigal, the relapse of a once adventurous soul into the comfort of -religious and political absolutes, categorical--and Potsdam--imperatives. -Here is "dogmatic slumber" overcome only to yield to the torpor and -_abêtisement_ of "practical reason"; here is no "Copernican revolution" -but a stealthy attempt to recover an anthropocentricism lost in the -glare of the Enlightenment. It dawns on us that the importance of German -philosophy is not metaphysical, nor epistemological, but political; -the vital remnant of Kant to-day is to be found not in our overflowing -Mississippi of Kantiana, but in the German notion of obedience.[122] -Fichte reënforces this notion of unquestioning obedience with the -doctrine of state socialism: he begins by tending geese, and ends by -writing philosophy for them. So with Hegel: he starts out buoyantly with -the proposition that revolution is the heart of history, and ends by -discovering that the King of Prussia is God in disguise. In Schopenhauer -the bubble bursts; a millennium of self-deception ends at last in -exhaustion and despair. Every Hildebrand has his Voltaire, and every -Voltaire his Schopenhauer. - - -II - -Biographical - -"In future," Nietzsche once wrote, "let no one concern himself about me, -but only about the things for which I lived." We must make this -biographical note brief. - -Nietzsche was born in Röcken, Germany, 1844, the son of a "noble young -parson." He was brought up in strict piety, and prepared himself to -enter the ministry; even at boarding-school he was called "the little -minister," and made people cry by his recitations from the Bible. We -have pictures of him which show him in all his boyish seriousness; it is -evident that he is of a deeply religious nature, and therefore doomed to -heresy. At eighteen he discovers that he has begun to doubt the -traditional creed. "When I examine my own thoughts," he writes, "and -hearken into my own soul, I often feel as if I heard the buzzing and -roaring of wild-contending parties."[123] At twenty-one, while studying -in the University of Leipzig, he discovers the philosophy of -Schopenhauer; he reads all hungrily, feeling here a kindred youth; "the -need of knowing myself, even of gnawing at myself, forcibly seized upon -me."[124] He is ripe for pessimism, having both religion and a bad -stomach. Because of his defective eyesight he is barred from military -service; in 1870 he burns with patriotic fever, and at last is allowed -to join the army as a nurse; but he is almost overcome at sight of the -sick and wounded, and himself falls ill with dysentery and dyspepsia. In -this same year he sees a troop of cavalry pass through a town in stately -gallop and array; his weakened frame thrills with the sight of this -strength: "I felt for the first time that the strongest and highest Will -to Life does not find expression in a miserable struggle for existence, -but in a Will to War, a Will to Power, a Will to Overpower!"[125] -Nevertheless, he settles down to a quietly ascetic life as professor of -philology at the University of Basle. But there is adventure in him; and -in his first book[126] he slips from the prose of philology into an -almost lyrical philosophy. Illness finds voice here in the eulogy of -health; weakness in the deification of strength; melancholy in the -praise of "Dionysian joy"; loneliness in the exaltation of friendship. -He has a friend--Wagner--the once romantic rebel of revolution's -barricades; but this friend too is taken from him, with slowly painful -breaking of bond after bond. For Wagner, the strong, the overbearing, -the ruthless, is coming to a philosophy of Christian sympathy and -gentleness; qualities that cannot seem divine to Nietzsche, because they -are long-familiar elements in his own character. "What I am not," he -says, most truthfully, "that for me is God and virtue."[127] And so he -stands at last alone, borne up solely by the exhilaration of creative -thought. He has acquaintances, but he puts up with them "simply, like a -patient animal"; "not one has the faintest inkling of my task." And he -suffers terribly "through this absence of sympathy and -understanding."[128] - -He leaves even these acquaintances, and abandons his work at Basle; -broken in health he finds his way hopefully to the kindlier climate of -Italy. Doctor after doctor prescribes for him, one prescription reading, -"a nice Italian sweetheart." He longs for the comradeship, but dreads -the friction, of marriage. "It seems to me absurd," he writes, "that one -who has chosen for his sphere ... the assessment of existence as a -whole, should burden himself with the cares of a family, with winning -bread, security, and social position for wife and children." He does not -hesitate to conclude that "where the highest philosophical thinking is -concerned all married men are suspect."[129] Nevertheless he wanders -humanly into something very like a love-affair; he is almost shattered -with rapid disillusionment, and takes refuge in philosophy. "Every -misunderstanding," he tells himself, "has made me freer. I want less and -less from humanity, and can give it more and more. The severance of -every individual tie is hard to bear; but in each case a wing grows in -its place."[130] And yet the need of comradeship is still there, like a -gnawing hunger: many years later he catches a passing smile from a -beautiful young woman, whom he has never seen before; and "suddenly my -lonely philosopher's heart grew warm within me."[131] But she walks off -without seeing him, and they never meet again. - -The simple Italians who rent him his attic room in Genoa understand him -better perhaps than he can be understood by more pretentious folk. They -know his greatness, though they cannot classify it. The children of his -landlady call him "Il Santo"; and the market-women keep their choicest -grapes for the bent philosopher who, it is whispered, writes bitterly -about women and "the superfluous." But what they know for certain is -that he is a man of exceeding gentleness and purity, that he is the very -soul of chivalry; "stories are still told of his politeness towards -women to whom no one else showed any kindness."[132] Let him write what -he pleases, so long as he is what he is. - -He lives simply, almost in poverty. "His little room," writes a visitor, -"is bare and cheerless. It has evidently been selected for cheapness -rather than for comfort. No carpet, not even a stove. I found it -fearfully cold."[133] His publisher has made no profit on his books; -they are too sharply opposed to the "spirit of the age"; hence -the title he gives to two of his volumes: _Unzeitgemässe -Betrachtungen_,--_Thoughts Out of Season_. There is no money, he is now -informed, in such untimely volumes; hereafter he must publish his books -at his own cost. He does, stinting himself severely to meet the new -expense; his greatest books see the light in this way.[134] - -He works hard, knowing that his shaken frame has but short lease of -life; and he comes to love his painful solitude as a gift. "I can't help -seeing an enemy in any one who breaks in upon my working summer.... The -idea that any person should intrude upon the web of thought which I am -spinning around me, is simply appalling. I have no more time to -lose--unless I am stingy with my precious _half-hours_ I shall have a -bad conscience."[135] Half-hours; his eyes will not work for more than -thirty minutes at a time. He feels that only to him to whom time is holy -does time bring reward. "He is fully convinced," an acquaintance writes -of him, "about his mission and his permanent importance. In this belief -he is strong and great; it elevates him above all misfortune."[136] He -speaks of his _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ in terms of almost conscious -exaggeration: "It is a book," he says, "that stands alone. Do not let us -mention the poets in the same breath; nothing perhaps has ever been -produced out of such a superabundance of strength."[137] He does not -know that it is his illness and his hunger for appreciation that have -demanded this self-laudation as restorative and nourishment. He -predicts, rightly enough, that he will not begin to get his due meed of -appreciation till 1901.[138] His "unmasking of Christian morality," he -says, "is an event unequalled in history."[139] - -All this man's energy is in his brain; he oozes ideas at every pore. He -crowds into a sentence the material of a chapter; and every aphorism is -a mountain-peak. He dares to say that which others dare only to think: -and we call him witty because truth tabooed is the soul of wit. Every -page bears the imprint of the passion and the pain that gave it birth. -"I am not a man," he says, "I am dynamite"; he writes like a man who -feels error after error exploding at his touch; and he defines a -philosopher as "a terrible explosive in the presence of which everything -is in danger."[140] "There are more idols than realities in the world; -and I have an 'evil eye' for idols."[141] - -What is this philosophy which seemed to its creator more important than -even the mightiest events of the past? How shall we compress it without -distorting it, as it has been distorted by so many of its lovers and its -haters? Let us ask the man himself to speak to us; let us see if we -cannot put the matter in his own words, ourselves but supplying, so to -speak, connective tissue. That done, we shall understand the man better, -and ourselves, and perhaps our social problem. - - -III - -Exposition - - -1 - -_Morality as Impotence_ - -From a biological standpoint the phenomenon morality is of a highly -suspicious nature.[142] _Cui bono?_--Whom shall we suspect of profiting -by this institution? Is it a mode of enhancing life?--Does it make men -stronger and more perfect?--or does it make for deterioration and decay? -It is obvious that up to the present, morality has not been a problem at -all; it has rather been the very ground on which people have met after -all distrust, dissension, and contradiction, the hallowed place of -peace, where thinkers could obtain rest even from themselves.[143] But -what if morality be the greatest of all the stumbling-blocks in the way -of human self-betterment? Is it possible that morality itself is the -social problem, and that the solution of that problem lies in the -judicious abolition of morality? It is a view for which something can be -said. - -You have heard that morality is a means used by the strong to control -the weak. And it is true: just consider the conversion of Constantine. -But to stop here is to let half the truth be passed off on you as the -whole; and half a truth is half a lie. Much more true is it that -morality is a means used by the weak to control the strong, the chain -which weakness softly lays upon the feet of strength. The whole of the -morality of Europe is based upon the values which are useful to the -herd.[144] Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching -and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself -succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all -times has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of -the weak; their chief weapon in this process was the moral -principle.[145] Good is every one who does not oppress, who hurts no -one, attacks no one, does not take vengeance but hands over vengeance to -God; who goes out of the way of evil, and demands little from life; like -ourselves, patient, meek, just. Good is to do nothing for which we are -not strong enough.[146] Zarathustra laughed many times over the -weaklings who thought themselves good because they had lame paws![147] -Obedience, subordination, submission, devotion, love, the pride of duty; -fatalism, resignation, objectivity, stoicism, asceticism, self-denial; -in short, anemia: these are the virtues which the herd would have all -men cultivate,--particularly the strong men.[148] And the deification of -Jesus,--that is to say of meekness,--what was it but another attempt to -lull the strong to sleep? - - -2 - -_Democracy_ - -See, now, how nearly that attempt has succeeded. For is not democracy, -if not victorious, at least on the road to victory to-day? And what is -the democratic movement but the inheritor of Christianity?[149] Not the -Christianity of the great popes; they knew better, and were building a -splendid aristocracy when Luther spoiled it all by letting loose the -levelling instincts of the herd.[150] The instinct of the herd is in -favor of the leveller (Christ).[151] I very much fear that the first -Christian is in his deepest instincts a rebel against everything -privileged; he lives and struggles unremittingly for "equal -rights."[152] It is by Christianity, more than by anything else, that -the poison of this doctrine of "equal rights" has been spread abroad. -And do not let us underestimate the fatal influence! Nowadays no one has -the courage of special rights, of rights of dominion. The aristocratic -attitude of mind has been most thoroughly undermined by the lie of the -equality of souls.[153] - -But is not this the greatest of all lies--the "equality of men"? That is -to say, the dominion of the inferior. Is it not the most threadbare and -discredited of ideas? Democracy represents the disbelief in all great -men and select classes; everybody equals everybody else; "at bottom we -are all herd." There is no welcome for the genius here; the more -promising for the future the modern individual happens to be, the more -suffering falls to his lot.[154] If the rise of great and rare men had -been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude, there never would -have been any such thing as a great man. The herd regards the exception, -whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something -antagonistic and dangerous. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions -above them--the strong, the mighty, the wise, the fruitful--is to -persuade them to become their head-servants.[155] - -But the torture of the exceptional soul is only part of the villainy of -democracies. The other part is chaos. Voltaire was right: "_Quand la -populace se mêle de raisonner, tout est perdu_." Democracy is an -aristocracy of orators, a competition in headlines, a maelstrom of ever -new majorities, a torrent of petty factions sweeping on to ruin. Under -democracy the state will decay, for the instability of legislation will -leave little respect for law, until finally even the policeman will have -to be replaced by private enterprise.[156] Democracy has always been the -death-agony of the power of organization:[157] remember Athens, and look -at England. Within fifty years these Babel governments will clash in a -gigantic war for the control of the markets of the world; and when that -war comes, England will pay the penalty for the democratic inefficiency -of its dominant muddle-class.[158] - -This wave of democracy will recede, and recede quickly, if men of -ability will only oppose it openly. It is necessary for higher men to -declare war on the masses. In all directions mediocre people are joining -hands in order to make themselves master. The middle classes must be -dissolved, and their influence decreased;[159] there must be no more -intermarrying of aristocracy with plutocracy; this democratic folly -would never have come at all had not the master-classes allowed their -blood to be mingled with that of slaves.[160] Let us fight parliamentary -government and the power of the press; they are the means whereby -cattle become rulers.[161] Finally, it is senseless and dangerous to let -the counting-mania (the custom of universal suffrage)--which is still -but a short time under cultivation, and could easily be uprooted--take -deeper root; its introduction was merely an expedient to steer clear of -temporary difficulties; the time is ripe for a demonstration of -democratic incompetence and a restoration of power to men who are born -to rule.[162] - - -3 - -_Feminism_ - -Democracy, after all, is a disease; an attempt on the part of the -botched to lay down for all the laws of social health. You may observe -the disease in its growth-process by studying the woman movement. -Woman's first and last function is that of bearing robust children.[163] -The emancipated ones are the abortions among women, those who lack the -wherewithal to have children (I go no farther, lest I should become -medicynical).[164] All intellect in women is a pretension; when a woman -has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her -sex. These women think to make themselves charming to free spirits by -wearing advanced views; as though a woman without piety would not be -something perfectly obnoxious and ludicrous to a profound and godless -man![165] If there is anything worthy of laughter it is the man who -takes part in this feminist agitation. Let it be understood clearly that -the relations between men and women make equality impossible. It is in -the nature of woman to take color and commandment from a man,--unless -she happens to be a man. Man's happiness is "I will," woman's happiness -is "He will."[166] Woman gives herself, man takes her: I do not think -one will get over this natural contrast by any social contract.[167] -Indeed, women will lose power with every step towards emancipation. -Since the French Revolution the influence of woman has declined in -proportion as she has increased her rights and claims. Let her first do -her proper work properly (consider how much man has suffered from -stupidity in the kitchen), and then it may be time to consider an -extension of her activities. To be mistaken in this fundamental problem -of "man and woman," to deny here the profoundest antagonism, and the -necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here of equal -rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a typical -sign of shallow-mindedness. On the other hand, a man who has depth of -spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence -which is capable of severity and harshness, and easily confounded with -them, can only think of woman as Orientals do: he must conceive of her -as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for -service and accomplishing her mission therein--he must take his stand in -this matter upon the immense rationality of Asia, upon the superiority -of the instincts of Asia.[168] - - -4 - -_Socialism and Anarchism_ - -All this uprising of housekeepers is, of course, part of the general -sickness with which Christianity has inoculated and weakened the strong -races of Europe. Consider now the more virulent forms of the disease: -socialism and anarchism. The coming of the "kingdom of God" has here -been placed in the future, and been given an earthly, a human, meaning; -but on the whole the faith in the old ideal is still maintained. There -is still the comforting delusion about equal rights, with all the envy -that lurks in that delusion. One speaks of "equal rights": that is to -say, so long as one is not a dominant personality, one wishes to prevent -one's competitors from growing in power.[169] It is a pleasure for all -poor devils to grumble--it gives them a little intoxicating sensation of -power. There is a small dose of revenge in every lamentation.[170] When -you hear one of those reformers talk of humanity, you must not take him -seriously; it is only his way of getting fools to believe that he is an -altruist; beneath the cover of this buncombe a man strong in the -gregarious instincts makes his bid for fame and followers and power. -This pretense to altruism is only a roundabout way of asking for -altruism, it is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is -botched and bungled.[171] In short, socialism is not justice but -covetousness.[172] No doubt we should look upon its exponents and -followers with ironic compassion: they want something which we -have.[173] - -From the standpoint of natural science the highest conception of society -according to socialists is the lowest in the order of rank among -societies. A socialist community would be another China, a vast and -stifling mediocracy; it would be the tyranny of the lowest and most -brainless brought to its zenith.[174] A nation in which there would be -no exploitation would be dead. Life itself is essentially appropriation, -conquest of the strange and weak; to put it at its mildest, -exploitation.[175] The absence of exploitation would mean the end of -organic functioning. Surely it is as legitimate and valuable for -superior men to command and use inferior men as it is for superior -species to command and use inferior species, as man commands and uses -animals.[176] It is not surprising that the lamb should bear a grudge -against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the -great birds of prey.[177] What should be done with muscle except to -supply it with directive brains? How, otherwise, can anything worthy -ever be built by men? In fact, man has value and significance only in so -far as he is a stone in a great building; for which purpose he has first -of all to be solid; he has to be a "stone."[178] - -Now the common people understand this quite well, and are as happy as -any of the well-to-do, so long as a silly propaganda does not disturb -them with dreams that can never be fulfilled.[179] Poverty, -cheerfulness, and independence--it is possible to find these three -qualities combined in one individual; poverty, cheerfulness, and -slavery--this is likewise a possible combination: and I can say nothing -better to the workmen who serve as factory-slaves.[180] - -As for the upper classes, they need be at no loss for weapons with which -to fight this pestilence. An occasional opening of the trap-door between -the Haves and the Have-nots, increasing the number of property-owners, -will serve best of all. If this policy is pursued, there will always be -too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything more -than an attack of illness.[181] A little patience with inheritance and -income taxes, and the noise of the cattle will subside.[182] - -Notice, meanwhile, that socialism and despotism are bedfellows. Give the -socialist his way, and he will put everything into the hands of the -state,--that is to say, into the hands of demagogue politicians.[183] -And then, all in the twinkling of an eye, socialism begets its opposite -in good Hegelian fashion, and the dogs of anarchism are let loose to -fill the world with their howling. And not without excuse or benefit; -for politicians must be kept in their place, and the state rigidly -restricted to its necessary functions, even if anarchist agitation helps -one to do it.[184] And the anarchists are right: the state is the -coldest of all monsters, and this lie creeps out of its mouth, "I, the -State, am the people."[185] So the wise man will turn anarchism, as well -as socialism, to account; and he will not fret even when a king or two -is hurried into heaven with nitroglycerine. Only since they have been -shot at have princes once more sat securely on their thrones.[186] - -Anarchism justifies itself in the aristocrat, who feels law as his -instrument, not as his master; but the rebellion against law as such is -but one more outburst of physiological misfits bent on levelling and -revenge.[187] It is childish to desire a society in which every -individual would have as much freedom as another.[188] Decadence speaks -in the democratic idiosyncrasy against everything which rules and -wishes to rule, the modern _misarchism_ (to coin a bad word for a bad -thing).[189] When all men are strong enough to command, then law will be -superfluous; weakness needs the vertebræ of law. He is commanded who -cannot obey his own self. Let the anarchist be thankful that he has laws -to obey. To command is more difficult; whenever living things command -they risk themselves; they take the hard responsibilities for the -result.[190] Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves;[191] -when the mob is capable of that, it will be time to think of dispensing -with law. The truth is, of course, that the anarchist is lulled into -nonsense by Rousseau's notion of the naturally good man. He does not -understand that revolution merely unlashes the dogs in man, till they -once more cry for the whip.[192] Cast out the Bourbons, and in ten years -you will welcome Napoleon. - -That is the end of anarchism; and it is the end of democracy, too. - -The truth is that men are willing and anxious to be ruled by rulers -worthy of the name. But the corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling -into evil odor. The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes -has been the cause of all the disorders in history. Democracy is not -ruling, but drifting; it is a political relaxation, as if an organism -were to allow each of its parts to do just as it pleased. Precisely -these disorganizing principles give our age its specific character. Our -society has lost the power to function properly; it no longer rids -itself naturally of its rotten elements; it no longer has the strength -even to excrete.[193] - - -5 - -_Degeneration_ - -What kind of men is to be found in such a society? Mediocre men; men -stupid to the point of sanctity; fragile, useless souls-de-luxe; men -suffering from a sort of hemiplegia of virtue,--that is to say, -paralyzed in the self-assertive instincts; men tamed, almost emasculated -by a morality whose essence is the abdication of the will.[194] Now, as -a rule, the taming of a beast is achieved only by deteriorating it; so -too the moral man is not a better man, he is rather a weaker member of -his species. He is altruistic, of course; that is, he feels that he -needs help. There is no place for really great men in this march towards -nonentity; if a great man appears he is called a criminal.[195] A -Periclean Greek, a Renaissance Florentine, would breathe like one -asphyxiated in this moralic acid atmosphere; the first condition of life -for such a man is that he free himself from this Chinadom of the -spirit.[196] But the number of those who are capable of rising into the -pure air of unmoralism is very small; and those who have made timid -sallies into theological heresy are the most addicted to the comfort and -security of ethical orthodoxy. In short, men are coming to look upon -lowered vitality as the heart of virtue; and morality will be saddled -with the guilt if the maximum potentiality of the power and splendor of -the human species should never be attained.[197] - -Men of this stamp require a good deal of religious pepsin to overcome -the indigestibility of life; if they leave one faith in the passing -bravery of their youth they soon sink back into another.[198] God, -previously diluted from tribal deity into _substantia_ and -_ding-an-sich_,[199] now recovers a respectable degree of reality; the -imaginary pillar on which men lean is made stronger and more concrete as -their weakness increases. How much faith a person requires in order to -flourish, how much fixed opinion he needs which he does not wish to have -shaken, because he holds himself thereby,--is a measure of his power (or -more plainly speaking, of his weakness).[200] - -The same criterion classifies our friends the metaphysicians,--those -albinos of thought,--who are, of course, priests in disguise.[201] The -degree of a man's will-power may be measured by the extent to which he -can dispense with the meaning in things; by the extent to which he is -able to endure a world without meaning; because he himself arranges a -small portion of it.[202] The world has no meaning: all the better; put -some meaning into it, says the man with a man's heart. The world has no -meaning: but it is only a world of appearance, says the weak-kneed -philosopher; behind this phenomenal world is the real world, which has -meaning, and means good. Of the real world "there is no knowledge; -consequently there is a God"--what novel elegance of syllogism![203] -This belief that the world which ought to be is real is a belief proper -to the unfruitful who do not wish to create a world. The "will to truth" -is the impotence of the "will to create."[204] Even monism is being -turned into medicine for sick souls; clearly these lovers of wisdom seek -not truth, but remedies for their illnesses.[205] There is too much beer -and midnight oil in modern philosophy, and not enough fresh air.[206] -Philosophers condemn this world because they have avoided it; those who -are contemplative naturally belittle activity.[207] In truth, the -history of philosophy is the story of a secret and mad hatred of the -prerequisites of life, of the feelings which make for the real values of -life.[208] No wonder that philosophy is fallen to such low estate. -Science flourishes nowadays, and has the good conscience clearly -visible on its countenance; while the remnant to which modern philosophy -has gradually sunk excites distrust and displeasure, if not scorn and -pity. Philosophy reduced to a "theory of knowledge," a philosophy that -never gets beyond the threshold, and rigorously denies itself the right -to enter--that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony; -something that awakens pity. How could such a philosophy rule![209] - - -6 - -_Nihilism_ - -All these things, democracy, feminism, socialism, anarchism, and modern -philosophy, are heads of the Christian hydra, each a sore in the total -disease. Given such illness, affecting all parts of the social body, and -what result shall we expect and find? Pessimism, despair, -nihilism,--that is, disbelief in all values of life.[210] Confidence in -life is gone; life itself has become a problem. Love of life is still -possible,--only it is the love of a woman of whom one is doubtful.[211] -The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, discovers traces of evil -in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the -conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that nature is evil, that man -is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace (that is to say, it -is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short, _he denies -life_.[212] The man who frees himself from the theology of the Church -but adheres to Christian ethics necessarily falls into pessimism. He -perceives that man is no longer an assistant in, let alone the -culmination of, the evolutionary process; he perceives that Becoming has -been aiming at Nothing, and has achieved it; and that is something which -he cannot bear.[213] Suffering, which was, before, a trial with promised -reward, is now an intolerable mystery; if he is materially comfortable -himself, he finds source for sentiment and tears in the pain and misery -of others; he concocts a "social problem," and never dreams that the -social problem is itself a result of decadence.[214] He does not feel at -home in this world in which the Christian God is dead, and to which, -nevertheless, he brings nothing more appreciative than the old Christian -moral attitude. He despairs because he is a chaos, and knows it; "I do -not know where I am, or what I am to do; I am everything that knows not -where it is or what to do," he sighs.[215] Life, he says at last, is not -worth living. - -Let us not try to answer such a man; he needs not logic but a -sanitarium. But see, through him, and in him, the destructiveness of -Christian morals. This despicable civilization, says Rousseau, is to -blame for our bad morality. What if our good morality is to blame for -this despicable civilization?[216] See how the old ethic depreciates -the joy of living, and the gratitude felt towards life; how it checks -the knowledge and unfolding of life; how it chokes the impulse to -beautify and ennoble life.[217] And at what a time! Think what a race -with masculine will could accomplish now! Precisely now, when will in -its fullest strength were necessary, it is in the weakest and most -pusillanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning the organizing -power of the will: to that we have come.[218] The world is dark with -despair at the moment of greatest light. - -What if man could be made to love the light and use it? - - -7 - -_The Will to Power_ - -Is it possible that this despair is not the final state in the -exhaustion of a race, but only a transition from belief in a perfect and -ethical world to an attitude of transvaluation and control?[219] Perhaps -we are at the bottom of our spiritual toboggan, and an ascending -movement is around the corner of the years. Now that our Christian -bubble has burst into Schopenhauer, we are left free to recover some -part of the joyous strength of the ancients. Let us become again as -little children, unspoiled by religion and morality; let us forget what -it is to feel sinful; let the thousandfold laughter of children clear -the air of the odor of decay. Let us begin anew; and the soul will rise -and overflow all its margins with the joy of rediscovered life.[220] -Life has not deceived us! On the contrary, from year to year it appears -richer, more desirable, and more mysterious; the old fetters are broken -by the thought that life may be an experiment and not a duty, not a -fatality, not a deceit![221] Life--that means for us to transform -constantly into light and flame all that we are, and also all that we -meet with; we cannot possibly do otherwise.[222] To be natural again, to -dare to be as immoral as nature is; to be such pagans as were the Greeks -of the Homeric age, to say Yea to life, even to its suffering; to win -back some of that mountain-air Dionysian spirit which took pleasure in -the tragic, nay, which invented tragedy as the expression of its -super-abundant vitality, as the expression of its welcome of even the -cruelest and most terrible elements of life![223] To be healthy once -more! - -For there is no other virtue than health, vigor, energy. All virtues -should be looked upon as physiological conditions, and moral judgments -are symptoms of physiological prosperity or the reverse. Indeed, it -might be worth while to try to see whether a scientific order of values -might not be constructed according to a scale of numbers and measures -representing energy. All other values are matters of prejudice, -simplicity, and misunderstanding.[224] Instead of moral values let us -use naturalistic values, physiological values; let us say frankly with -Spinoza that virtue and power are one and the same. What is good? All -that enhances the feeling of power, the will to power, and power itself, -in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness? -The feeling that power is increasing, that resistance is being -overcome.[225] This is not orthodox ethics; and perhaps it will not do -for long ears,--though an unspoiled youth would understand it. A healthy -and vigorous boy will look up sarcastically if you ask him, "Do you wish -to become virtuous?"--but ask him, "Do you wish to become stronger than -your comrades?" and he is all eagerness at once.[226] Youth knows that -ability is virtue; watch the athletic field. Youth is not at home in the -class room, because there knowledge is estranged from action; and youth -measures the height of what a man knows by the depth of his power to -do.[227] There is a better gospel in the boy on the field than in the -man in the pulpit. - -Which of the boys whom we know do we love best in our secret hearts--the -prayerful Aloysius, or the masterful leader of the urchins in the -street? We moralize and sermonize in mean efforts to bring the young -tyrant down to our virtuous anæmia; but we know that we are wrong, and -respect him most when he stands his ground most firmly. To require of -strength that it should express itself as weakness is just as absurd as -to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength.[228] -Let us go to school to our children, and we shall understand that all -native propensities are beneficent, that the evil impulses are to a far -view as necessary and preservative as the good.[229] In truth we worship -youth because at its finest it is a free discharge of instinctive -strength; and we know that happiness is nothing else than that. To -abandon instinct, to deliberate, to clog action with conscious -thought,--that is to achieve old age. After all, nothing can be done -perfectly so long as it is done consciously; consciousness is a defect -to be overcome.[230] Instinct is the most intelligent of all kinds of -intelligence which have hitherto been discovered.[231] Genius lies in -the instincts; goodness too; all consciousness is theatricality.[232] -When a people begins to worship reason, it begins to die.[233] Youth -knows better: it follows instinct trustfully, and worships power. - -And we worship power too, and should say so were we as honest as our -children. Our gentlest virtues are but forms of power: out of the -abundance of the power of sex come kindness and pity; out of revenge, -justice; out of the love of resistance, bravery. Love is a secret path -to the heart of the powerful, in order to become his master; gratitude -is revenge of a lofty kind; self-sacrifice is an attempt to share in the -power of him to whom the sacrifice is made. Honor is the acknowledgment -of an equal power; praise is the pride of the judge; all conferring of -benefits is an exercise of power.[234] Behold a man in distress: -straightway the compassionate ones come to him, depict his misfortune to -him, at last go away, satisfied and elevated; they have gloated over the -unhappy man's misfortune and their own; they have spent a pleasant -Sunday afternoon.[235] So with the scientist and the philosopher: in -their thirst for knowledge lurks the lust of gain and conquest. And the -cry of the oppressed for freedom is again a cry for power.[236] - -You cannot understand man, you cannot understand society, until you -learn to see in all things this will to power. Physiologists should -bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation -as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above -all to discharge its strength: self-preservation is only one of the -results of this. And psychologists should think twice before saying that -happiness or pleasure is the motive of all action. Pleasure is but an -incident of the restless search for power; happiness is an accompanying, -not an actuating, factor. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the -discontentedness of the will, in the fact that without opponents and -obstacles it is never satisfied. Man is now master of the forces of -nature, and master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings; in -comparison with primitive man the man of to-day represents an enormous -quantum of power, but not an increase of happiness. How can one -maintain, then, that man has striven after happiness? No; not happiness, -but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not virtue, but -capacity; that is the secret of man's longing and man's seeking.[237] - -Let biologists, too, reëxamine the stock-in-trade of their theory. Life -is not the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations, but -will to power, which, proceeding from within, subjugates and -incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external phenomena." All -motive force, all "causation" whatever, is this will to power; there is -no other force, physical, dynamical, or psychical.[238] As to the famous -"struggle for existence," it seems at present to be more of an -assumption than a fact. It does occur, but as an exception; and it is -due not to a desire for food but _à tergo_ to a surcharge of energy -demanding discharge. The general condition of life is not one of want -or famine, but rather of riches, of lavish luxuriance, and even of -absurd prodigality; where there is a struggle it is a struggle for -power. We must not confound Malthus with Nature.[239] One does indeed -find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred to, but in a -different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and -well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the -lowly. Darwin sees selection in favor of the stronger, the -better-constituted. Precisely the reverse stares one in the face: the -suppression of the lucky cases, the reversion to average, the -uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery -of the mediocre. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read -thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the exceptional creatures; the -will to nonentity prevails over the will to life. We have to beware of -this formulation of reality into a moral.[240] - -No; morality is not mediocrity, it is superiority; it does not mean -being like most people, but being better, stronger, more capable than -most people. It does not mean timidity: if anything is virtue it is to -stand unafraid in the presence of any prohibition.[241] It does not mean -the pursuit of ends sanctified by society; it means the will to your own -ends, and to the means to them. It means behaving as states -behave,--with frank abandonment of all altruistic pretence. Corporate -bodies are intended to do that which individuals have not the courage to -do: for this reason all communities are vastly more upright and -instructive as regards the nature of man than individuals, who are too -cowardly to have the courage of their desires. All altruism is the -prudence of the private man; societies are not mutually altruistic. -Altruism and life are incompatible: all the forces and instincts which -are the source of life lie stagnant beneath the ban of the old morality. -But real morality is certainty of instinct, effectiveness of action; it -is any action which increases the power of a man or of men; it is an -expression of ascendent and expanding life; it is achievement; it is -power.[242] - - -8 - -_The Superman_ - -With such a morality you breed men who are men; and to breed men who are -men is all that your "social problem" comes to. This does not mean that -the whole race is to be improved: the very last thing a sensible man -would promise to accomplish would be to improve mankind. Mankind does -not improve, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much -more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all -ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail. To say that -the social problem consists in a general raising of the average standard -of comfort and ability amounts to abandoning the problem; there is as -little prospect of mankind's attaining to a higher order as there is for -the ant and the ear-wig to enter into kinship with God and eternity. The -most fundamental of all errors here lies in regarding the many, the -herd, as an aim instead of the individual: the herd is only a means. The -road to perfection lies in the bringing forth of the most powerful -individuals, for whose use the great masses would be converted into mere -tools, into the most intelligent and flexible tools possible. Every -human being, with his total activity, has dignity and significance only -so far as he is, consciously or unconsciously, a tool in the service of -a superior individual. All that can be done is to produce here and -there, now and then, such a superior individual, _l'uomo singulare_, the -higher man, the superman. The problem does not concern what humanity as -a whole or as a species is to accomplish, but what kind of man is to be -desired as highest in value, what kind of man is to be worked for and -bred. To produce the superman: that is the social problem. If this is -not understood, nothing is understood.[243] - -Now what would such a man be like? Shall we try to picture him? - -We see him as above all a lover of life: strong enough, too, to love -life without deceiving himself about it. There is no _memento mori_ -here; rather a _memento vivere_; rich instincts call for much living. A -hard man, loving danger and difficulty: what does not kill him, he -feels, leaves him stronger. Pleasure--pleasure as it is understood by -the rich--is repugnant to him: he seeks not pleasure but work, not -happiness but responsibility and achievement. He does not make -philosophy an excuse for living prudently and apart, an artifice for -withdrawing successfully from the game of life; he does not stand aside -and merely look on; he puts his shoulder to the wheel; for him it is the -essence of philosophy to feel the obligation and burden of a hundred -attempts and temptations, the joy of a hundred adventures; he risks -himself constantly; he plays out to the end this bad game.[244] - -To risk and to create, this is the meaning of life to the superman. He -could not bear to be a man, if man could not be a poet, a maker. To -change every "It was" into a "Thus I would have it!"--in this he finds -that life may redeem itself. He is moved not by ambition but by a mighty -overflowing spendthrift spirit that drives him on; he must remake; for -this he compels all things to come to him and into him, in order that -they may flow back from him as gifts of his love and his abundance; in -this refashioning of things by thought he sees the holiness of life; the -greatest events, he knows, are these still creative hours.[245] - -He is a man of contrasts, or contradictions; he does not desire to be -always the same man; he is a multitude of elements and of men; his value -lies precisely in his comprehensiveness and multifariousness, in the -variety of burdens which he can bear, in the extent to which he can -stretch his responsibility; in him the antagonistic character of -existence is represented and justified. He loves instinct, knows that it -is the fountain of all his energies; but he knows, too, the natural -delight of æsthetic natures in measure, the pleasure of self-restraint, -the exhilaration of the rider on a fiery steed. He is a selective -principle, he rejects much; he reacts slowly to all kinds of stimuli, -with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate pride have bred in -him; he tests the approaching stimulus. He decides slowly; but he holds -firmly to a decision made.[246] - -He loves and has the qualities which the folk call virtues, but he loves -too and shows the qualities which the folk call vices; it is again in -this union of opposites that he rises above mediocrity; he is a broad -arch that spans two banks lying far apart. The folk on either side fear -him; for they cannot calculate on him, or classify him. He is a free -spirit, an enemy of all fetters and labels; he belongs to no party, -knowing that the man who belongs to a party perforce becomes a liar. He -is a sceptic (not that he must appear to be one); freedom from any kind -of conviction is a necessary factor in his strength of will. He does not -make propaganda or proselytes; he keeps his ideals to himself as -distinctions; his opinion is his opinion: another person has not easily -a right to it; he has renounced the bad taste of wishing to agree with -many people. He knows that he cannot reveal himself to anybody; like -everything profound, he loves the mask; he does not descend to -familiarity; and is not familiar when people think he is. If he cannot -lead, he walks alone.[247] - -He has not only intellect; if that were all it would not be enough; he -has blood. Behind him is a lineage of culture and ability; lives of -danger and distinction; his ancestors have paid the price for what he -is, just as most men pay the price for what their ancestors have been. -Naturally, then, he has a strong feeling of distance; he sees inequality -and gradation, order and rank, everywhere among men. He has the most -aristocratic of virtues: intellectual honesty. He does not readily -become a friend or an enemy; he honors only his equals, and therefore -cannot be the enemy of many; where one despises one cannot wage war. He -lacks the power of easy reconciliation; but "retaliation" is as -incomprehensible to him as "equal rights." He remains just even as -regards his injurer; despite the strong provocation of personal insult -the clear and lofty objectivity of the just and judging eye (whose -glance is as profound as it is gentle) is untroubled. He recognizes -duties only to his equals; to others he does what he thinks best; he -knows that justice is found only among equals. He has that distinctively -aristocratic trait, the ability to command and with equal readiness to -obey; that is indispensable to his pride. He will not permit himself to -be praised; he does what serves his purpose. The essence of him is that -he has a purpose, for which he will not hesitate to run all risks, even -to sacrifice men, to bend their backs to the worst. That something may -exist which is a hundred times more important than the question whether -he feels well or unwell, and therefore too whether the others feel well -or unwell: this is a fundamental instinct of his nature. To have a -purpose, and to cleave to it through all dangers till it be -achieved,--that is his great passion, that is himself.[248] - - -9 - -_How to Make Supermen_ - -It is our task, then, to procreate this synthetic man, who embodies -everything and justifies it, and for whom the rest of mankind is but -soil; to bring the philosopher, the artist, and the saint, within and -without us, to the light, and to strive thereby for the completion of -nature. In this cultivation lies the meaning of culture: the direction -of all life to the end of producing the finest possible individuals. -What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; his very -essence is to create a being higher than himself; that is the instinct -of procreation, the instinct of action and of work. Even the higher man -himself feels this need of begetting; and for lesser men all virtue and -morals lie in preparing the way that the superman may come. There is no -greater horror than the degenerating soul which says, "All for myself." -In this great purpose, too, is the essence of a better religion, and a -surpassing of the bounds of narrow individualism; with this purpose -there come moments, sparks from the clear fire of love, in whose light -we understand the word "I" no longer; we feel that we are creating, and -therefore in a sense becoming, something greater than ourselves.[249] - -How to make straight the way for the superman? - -First by reforming marriage. Let it be understood at once that love is a -hindrance rather than a help to such marriages as are calculated to -breed higher men. To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to -regard it falsely; that is why love-marriages are from the social point -of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony. Were there a -benevolent God, the marriages of men would cause him more displeasure -than anything else; he would observe that all buyers are careful, but -that even the most cunning one buys his wife in a sack; and surely he -would cause the earth to tremble in convulsions when a saint and a goose -couple. When a man is in love, he should not be allowed to come to a -decision about his life, and to determine once for all the character of -his lifelong society on account of a whim. If we treated marriage -seriously, we would publicly declare invalid the vows of lovers, and -refuse them permission to marry. We would remake public opinion, so that -it would encourage trial marriage; we would exact certificates of health -and good ancestry; we would punish bachelorhood by longer military -service, and would reward with all sorts of privileges those fathers who -should lavish sons upon the world. And above all we would make people -understand that the purpose of marriage is not that they should -duplicate, but that they should surpass, themselves. Perhaps we would -read to them from _Zarathustra_, with fitting ceremonies and -solemnities: "Thou art young, and wishest for child and marriage. But I -ask thee, art thou a man who dareth to wish for a child? Art thou the -victorious one, the self-subduer, the commander of thy senses, the -master of thy virtues?--or in thy wish doth there speak the animal, or -necessity? Or solitude? Or discord with thyself? I would that thy -victory and freedom were longing for a child. Thou shalt build living -monuments unto thy victory and thy liberation. Thou shalt build beyond -thyself. But first thou must build thyself square in body and soul. Thou -shalt not only propagate thyself, but propagate thyself upward! -Marriage: thus I call the will of two to create that one which is more -than they who created it. I call marriage reverence unto each other as -unto those who will such a will."[250] - -In a word, eugenic marriage; and after eugenic marriage, rigorous -education. But interest in education will become powerful only when -belief in a God and his care have been abandoned, just as medicine began -to flourish only when the belief in miraculous cures had lapsed. When -men begin at last to _believe_ in education, they will endure much -rather than have their sons miss going to a good and hard school at the -proper time. What is it that one learns in a hard school? To obey and to -command. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling, as good -schooling, from every other schooling, namely that a good deal is -demanded, severely exacted; that excellence is required as if it were -normal; that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame -is sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent -and antecedents. To prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh in a -tradesman's balance what is permitted and what is forbidden; to be more -hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness;--we -are in every need of a school where these things would be taught. Such a -school would allow its pupils to learn productively, by living and -doing; it would not subject them to the tyranny of books and the weight -of the past; it would teach them less about the past and more about the -future; it would teach them the future of humanity as depending on human -will, on _their_ will; it would prepare the way for and be a part of a -vast enterprise in breeding and education.[251] But even such a school -would not provide all that is necessary in education. Not all should -receive the same training and the same care; select groups must be -chosen, and special instruction lavished on them; the greatest success, -however, will remain for the man who does not seek to educate either -everybody or certain limited circles, but only one single individual. -The last century was superior to ours precisely because it possessed so -many individually educated men. - - -10 - -_On the Necessity of Exploitation_ - -And next slavery. - -This is one of those ugly words which are the _verba non grata_ of -modern discussion, because they jar us so ruthlessly out of the grooves -of our thinking. Nevertheless it is clear to all but those to whom -self-deception is the staff of life, that as the honest Greeks had it, -some are born to be slaves. Try to educate all men equally, and you -become the laughing-stock of your own maturity. The masses seem to be -worth notice in three aspects only: first as the copies of great men, -printed on bad paper from worn-out plates; next as a contrast to the -great men; and lastly as their tools. Living consists in living at the -cost of others: the man who has not grasped this fact has not taken the -first step towards truth to himself. And to consider distress of all -kinds as an objection, as something which must be done away with, is the -greatest nonsense on earth; almost as mad as the will to abolish bad -weather, out of pity to the poor, so to speak. The masses must be used, -whether that means or does not mean that they must suffer;--it requires -great strength to live and forget how far life and injustice are one. -What is the suffering of whole peoples compared to the creative agonies -of great individuals?[252] - -There are many who threw away everything they were worth when they threw -away their slavery. In all respects slaves live more securely and more -happily than modern laborers; the laborer chooses his harder lot to -satisfy the vanity of telling himself that he is not a slave. These men -are dangerous; not because they are strong, but because they are sick; -it is the sick who are the greatest danger to the healthy; it is the -weak ones, they who mouth so much about their sickness, who vomit bile -and call it newspaper,--it is they who instil the most dangerous venom -and scepticism into our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves; it is -they who most undermine the life beneath our feet. It is for such as -these that Christianity may serve a good purpose (so serving our purpose -too). Those qualities which are within the grasp only of the strongest -and most terrible natures, and which make their existence -possible--leisure, adventure, disbelief, and even dissipation--would -necessarily ruin mediocre natures--and does do so when they possess -them. In the case of the latter, industry, regularity, moderation, and -strong "conviction" are in their proper place--in short, all "gregarious -virtues"; under their influence these mediocre men become perfect. We -good Europeans, then, though atheists and immoralists, will take care to -support the religions and the morality which are associated with the -gregarious instinct; for by means of them an order of men is, so to -speak, prepared, which must at some time or other fall into our hands, -which must actually crave for our hands.[253] - -Slavery, let us understand it well, is the necessary price of culture; -the free work, or art, of some involves the compulsory labor of others. -As in the organism so in society: the higher function is possible only -through the subjection of the lower functions. A high civilization is a -pyramid; it can stand only on a broad base, its first prerequisite is a -strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In order that there may be -a broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the -enormous majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly -subjected. At their cost, through the surplus of their labor, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want. The misery of the -toilers must still increase in order to make the production of a world -of art possible to a small number of Olympian men.[254] - - -11 - -_Aristocracy_ - -The greatest folly of the strong is to let the weak make them ashamed to -exploit, to let the weak suggest to them, "It is a shame to be -happy--there is too much misery!" Let us therefore reaffirm the right of -the happy to existence, the right of bells with a full tone over bells -that are cracked and discordant. Not that exploitation as such is -desirable; it is good only where it supports and develops an aristocracy -of higher men who are themselves developing still higher men. This -philosophy aims not at an individualistic morality but at a new order of -rank. In this age of universal suffrage, in this age in which everybody -is allowed to sit in judgment upon everything and everybody, one feels -compelled to reëstablish the order of rank. The higher men must be -protected from contamination and suffocation by the lower. The richest -and most complex forms perish so easily! Only the lowest succeed in -maintaining their apparent imperishableness.[255] - -The first question as to the order of rank: how far is a man disposed to -be solitary or gregarious? If he is disposed to be gregarious, his value -consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his tribe or -type; if he is disposed to be solitary, his qualities are those which -distinguish him from others; hence the important consequence: the -solitary type should not be valued from the standpoint of the gregarious -type, or _vice versa_. Viewed from above, both types are necessary; and -so is their antagonism. Degeneration lies in the approximation of the -qualities of the herd to those of the solitary creature, and _vice -versa_; in short, in their beginning to resemble each other. Hence the -difference in their virtues, their rights and their obligations; in the -light of this difference one comes to abhor the vulgarity of Stuart Mill -when he says, "What is right for one man is right for another." It is -not; what is right for the herd is precisely what is wrong for their -leaders; and what is right for the leaders is wrong for the herd. The -leaders use, the herd is used; the virtues of either lie in the -efficiency here of leadership, there of service. Slave-morality is one -thing, and master-morality another.[256] - -And leadership of course requires an aristocracy. Let us repeat it: -democracy has always been the death-agony of the power of organization -and direction; these require great aristocratic families, with long -traditions of administration and leadership; old ancestral lines that -guarantee for many generations the duration of the necessary will and -the necessary instincts. Not only aristocracy, then, but caste; for if a -man have plebeian ancestors, his soul will be a plebeian soul; -education, discipline, culture will be wasted on him, merely enabling -him to become a great liar. Therefore intermarriage, even social -intercourse of leaders with herd, is to be avoided with all precaution -and intolerance; too much intercourse with barbarians ruined the Romans, -and will ruin any noble race.[257] - -In what direction may one turn with any hope of finding even the -aspiration for such an aristocracy? Only there where a _noble_ attitude -of mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in -manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any higher degree of -culture. Men with this attitude of mind will insistently call for, and -will at last produce, philosophical men of power, artist-tyrants,--a -higher kind of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, -knowledge, riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic -Europe as the most suitable and subtle instrument for taking the fate of -Europe into their hands, and working as artists upon man himself. The -fundamental belief of these great desirers will be that society must not -be allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as the foundation and -scaffolding by means of which a select class of beings may be able to -elevate themselves to their highest duties, and in general to a higher -existence: like those sun-climbing plants in Java which encircle an oak -so long and so often with their arms that at last, high above it, but -supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and -exhibit their happiness.[258] - - -12 - -_Signs of Ascent_ - -Are we moving toward such a consummation? Can we detect about us any -signs of this ascending movement of life? Not signs of "progress"; that -is another narcotic, like Christianity,--good for slaves, but to be -avoided by those who rule. Man as a species is not progressing; the -general level of the species is not raised. But humanity as mass -sacrificed to the prosperity of the one stronger type of Man,--that -_would be_ a progress.[259] - -Progress of this kind, to some degree, there has always been. The ruling -class in Greece, as seen in Homer and even in Thucydides (though with -Socrates degeneration begins), is an example of this kind of progress or -attainment. Imagine this culture, which has its poet in Sophocles, its -statesman in Pericles, its physician in Hippocrates, its natural -philosopher in Democritus; here is a yea-saying, a gratitude, to life in -all its manifestations; here life is understood, and covered with art -that it may be borne; here men are frivolous so that they may forget for -a moment the arduousness and perilousness of their task; they are -superficial, but from profundity; they exalt philosophers who preach -moderation, because they themselves are so immoderate, so instinctive, -so hilariously wild; they are great, they are elevated above any ruling -class before or after them because here the morals of the governing -caste have grown up among the governing caste, and not among the -herd.[260] - -We catch some of the glory of these Greeks in the men of the -Renaissance: men perfect in their immorality, terrible in their demands; -we should not dare to stand amid the conditions which produced these -men and which these men produced; we should not even dare to imagine -ourselves in those conditions: our nerves would not endure that -reality,--not to speak of our muscles. One man of their type, -continuator and development of their type, brother (as Taine most -rightly says) of Dante and Michelangelo,--one such man we have known -with less of the protection of distance; and he was too hard to bear. -That _Ens Realissimum_, synthesis of monster and superman, surnamed -Napoleon! The first man, and the man of greatest initiative and -developed views, of modern times; a man of tolerance, not out of -weakness, but out of strength, able to risk the full enjoyment of -naturalness and be strong enough for this freedom. In such a man we see -something in the nature of "disinterestedness" in his work on his -marble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the -process. Men were glad to serve him; as most normal men are glad to -serve the great man; the crowd was tired of "equal rights," tired of -being masterless; it longed to worship genius again. What was the excuse -for that terrible farce, the French Revolution? It made men ready for -Napoleon.[261] - -When shall we produce another superman? Let us go back to our question: -Can we detect about us any signs of strength? - -Yes. We are learning to get along without God. We are recovering from -the noble sentiments of Rousseau. We are giving the body its due; -physiology is overcoming theology. We are less hungry for lies,--we are -facing squarely some of the ugliness of life,--prostitution, for -example. We speak less of "duty" and "principles"; we are not so -enamored of bourgeois conventions. We are less ashamed of our instincts; -we no longer believe in a right which proceeds from a power that is -unable to uphold it. There is an advance towards "naturalness": in all -political questions, even in the relations between parties, even in -merchants', workmen's circles only questions of power come into play; -what one can do is the first question, what one ought to do is a -secondary consideration. There is a certain degree of liberal-mindedness -regarding morality; where this is most distinctly wanting we regard its -absence as a sign of a morbid condition (Carlyle, Ibsen, Schopenhauer); -if there is anything which can reconcile us to our age it is precisely -the amount of immorality which it allows itself without falling in its -own estimation.[262] - -Modern science, despite its narrowing specialization, is a sign of -ascent. Here is strictness in service, inexorability in small matters as -well as great, rapidity in weighing, judging, and condemning; the -hardest is demanded here, the best is done without reward of praise or -distinction; it is rather as among soldiers,--almost nothing but blame -and sharp reprimand is _heard_; for doing well prevails here as the -rule, and the rule has, as everywhere, a silent tongue. It is the same -with this "severity of science" as with the manners and politeness of -the best society: it frightens the uninitiated. He, however, who is -accustomed to it, does not like to live anywhere but in this clear, -transparent, powerful, and highly electrified atmosphere, this _manly_ -atmosphere.[263] - -In this achievement of science lies such an opportunity as philosophy -has never had before. Science traces the course of things but points to -no goal: what it does give consists of the fundamental facts upon which -the new goal must be based. All the sciences have now to pave the way -for the future task of the philosopher; this task being understood to -mean that he must solve the problem of _value_, that he has to fix the -hierarchy of values. He must become lawgiver, commander; he must -determine the "whither" and "why" for mankind. All knowledge must be at -his disposal, and must serve him as a tool for creation.[264] - -Most certain of the signs of a reascending movement of life is the -development of militarism. The military development of Europe is a -delightful surprise. This fine discipline is teaching us to do our duty -without expecting praise. Universal military service is the curious -antidote which we possess for the effeminacy of democratic ideas. Men -are learning again the joy of living in danger. Some of them are even -learning the old truth that war is good in itself, aside from any gain -in land or other wealth; instead of saying "A good cause will hallow -every war," they learn to say "A good war hallows every cause." When the -instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and conquest, it -is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of shopkeepers. A -state which should prevent war would not only be committing suicide (for -war is just as necessary to the state as the slave is to society); it -would be hostile to life, it would be an outrage on the future of man. -The maintenance of the military state is the last means of adhering to -the great traditions of the past; or where it has been lost, of reviving -it. Only in this can the superior or strong type of man be -preserved.[265] - -A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men, and -then to get around them. The state is the organization of immorality for -the attainment of this purpose. But as existing to-day the state is a -very imperfect instrument, subject at any moment to democratic -foundering. What concerns the thinker here is the slow and hesitant -formation of a united Europe. This was the thought, and the sole real -work and impulse, of the only broad-minded and deep-thinking men of this -century,--the tentative effort to anticipate the future of "the -European." Only in their weaker moments, or when they grew old, did they -fall back again into the national narrowness of the "Fatherlanders"--then -they were once more "patriots." One thinks here of men like Napoleon, -Heine, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Schopenhauer. And after all, is -there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism? What possible value -can there be in encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything -to-day points to greater and more common interests?--at a moment when -the spiritual dependence and denationalization which are obvious to all -are paving the way for the _rapprochements_ and fertilizations which -make up the real value and sense of present-day culture?[266] - -What an instrument such a united Europe would be for the development and -protection and expression of superior individuals! What a buoyant ascent -of life after this long descent into democracy! See now, in review, the -two movements which we have studied and on which we have strung our -philosophy: on the one hand Christian mythology and morality, the cult -of weakness, the fear of life, the deterioration of the species, ever -increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong, the lapse into -democracy, feminism, socialism, and at last into anarchy,--all -terminating in pessimism, despair, total loss of the love of life; on -the other hand the reaffirmation of the worth of life, the resolute -distinction between slave-morality and master-morality, the recognition -of the aristocratic valuation of health, vigor, energy, as moral in all -their forms, and of the will to power as the source and significance of -all action and all living; the conception of the higher man, of the -exceptional individual, as the goal of human endeavor; the redirection -of marriage, of education, of social structure, to the fostering and -cherishing of these higher types;--culminating in the supernational -organization of Europe as the instrumentality and artistic expression of -the superior man.[267] - -Is this philosophy too hard to bear? Very well. But those races that -cannot bear it are doomed; and those which regard it as the greatest -blessing are destined to be masters of the world.[268] - - -IV - -Criticism - -What shall one say to this? What would a democrat say,--such a democrat -as would be a friend to socialism and feminism, and even to -anarchism,--and a lover of Jesus? One pictures such a man listening with -irritated patience to the foregoing, and responding very readily to an -invitation to take the floor. - - * * * * * - -There are lessons here, he begins, as if brushing away an initial -encumbrance. There is something of Nietzsche in all of us, just as there -is something of Jesus (almost as there is something of man and of woman -in all of us, as Weininger argued); and part of that crowd called -_myself_ is flattered by this doctrine of ruthless power. Nietzsche -stood outside our social and moral structure, he was a sort of hermit in -the world of thought; and so he could see things in that structure which -are too near to our noses for easy vision. And as you listen to him you -see history anew as a long succession of masterings and enslavings and -deceivings, and you become almost reconciled to the future being nothing -but a further succession of the same. And then you begin to see that if -the future is to be different, one of the things we must do is to pinch -ourselves out of this Nietzschean dream. - -And a good way to begin is with Nietzsche's own principle, that every -philosophy is a physiology.[269] He asks us to believe that there is no -such thing as a morbid trait in him,[270] but we must not take him at -his word. The most important point about this philosophy is that it was -written by a sick man, a man sick to the very roots--if you will let me -say it, abnormal in sexual constitution; a man not sufficiently -attracted to the other sex, because he has so much of the other sex in -him. "She is a woman," he writes in _Zarathustra_, "and never loves -anyone but a warrior"; that is, if Nietzsche but knew it, the diagnosis -of his own disease. This hatred of women, this longing for power, this -admiration for strength, for successful lying,[271] this inability to -see a _tertium quid_ between tyranny and slavery,[272]--all these are -feminine traits. A stronger man would not have been so shrewishly shrill -about woman and Christianity; a stronger man would have needed less -repetition, less emphasis and underlining, less of italics and -exclamation points; a stronger man would have been more gentle, and -would have smiled where Nietzsche scolds. It is the philosophy, you see, -of a man abnormally weak in the social instincts, and at the same time -lacking in proper outlet for such social instincts as nature has left -him. - -Consequently, he never gets beyond the individual. He thinks society is -made up of individuals, when it is really made up of groups. He supposes -that the only virtues a man can have are those which help him as an -isolated unit; the idea that a man may find self-expression in social -expression, in coöperation, that there are virtues which are virtues -because they enable one to work with others against a common evil,--this -notion never occurs to him. He does not see that sympathy and mutual -aid, for example, though they preserve some inferior individuals, yet -secure that group-solidarity, and therefore group-survival, without -which even the strong ones would perish.[273] He does not imagine that -perhaps the barbarians who invaded Rome needed the gospel of a "gentle -Jesus meek and mild" if anything at all was to remain of that same -classical culture which he paints so lovingly.[274] He laughs at -self-denial; and then invites you to devote yourself forever to some -self-elected superman. - -This philosophy of aristocracy, of the necessity of slavery, of the -absurdity of democracy,--of course it is exciting to all weak people who -would like to have power,--and who have not read it all before in Plato. -In this particular case the humor of the situation lies in the very -powerful attack which Nietzsche makes on the irreligious religious -humbug which has proved one of the chief instruments of mastery in the -hands of the class whose power he is trying to strengthen. "I hope to be -forgiven," says Nietzsche, "for discovering that all moral philosophy -hitherto has belonged to the soporific appliances."[275] -"Discovering"--as if the aristocracy had not known that all along! -"Here is a naïve bookworm," these "strong men" will say among -themselves, "who has discovered what every one of us knows. He presumes -to tell us how to increase our power, and he can find no better way of -helping us than to expose in print the best secrets of our trade." - -Just in this lies the value of Nietzsche, as Rousseau said of -Machiavelli: he lets us in behind the scenes of the drama of -exploitation. We know better now the men with whom democracy must deal. -We see the greed for power that hides behind the contention that culture -cannot exist without slavery. Grant that contention: so much the worse -for culture! If culture means the increasing concentration of the -satisfactions of life in the hands of a few "superior" pigs, their -culture may be dispensed with; if it is to stay, it will have to mean -the direction of knowledge and ability to the spread of the -satisfactions of life. Which is finer,--the relationship of master and -slave, or that of friend and friend? Surely a world of people liking and -helping one another is a finer world to live in than one in which the -instincts of aggression are supreme. And such a coöperative civilization -need not fear the tests of survival; selection puts an ever higher -premium on solidarity, an ever lower value on pugnacity. Intelligence, -not ready anger, will win the great contests of the future. Friendship -will pay. - -The history of the world is a record of the patient and planful attempt -to replace hatred by understanding, narrowness by large vision, -opposition by coöperation, slavery by friendship. Friendship: a word to -be avoided by those who would appear _blasé_. But let us repeat it; -words have been known to nourish deeds which without them might never -have grown into reality. Some find heaven in making as many men as -possible their slaves; others find heaven in making as many men as -possible their friends. Which type of man will we have? Which type of -man, if abundant, would make this world a splendor and a delight? - -The hope for which Jesus lived was that _man_ might some day come to -mean _friend_. It is the only hope worth living for. - - -V - -Nietzsche Replies - -"It is certainly not the least charm of a theory," says Nietzsche, "that -it is refutable."[276] But "what have I to do with mere -refutations?"[277] "A prelude I am of better players."[278] "Verily, I -counsel you," said Zarathustra, "depart from me and defend yourselves -against Zarathustra! And better still, be ashamed of him. Perhaps he -hath deceived you. The man of perception must not only be able to love -his enemies, but also to hate his friends. One ill requiteth one's -teacher by always remaining only his scholar. Why will ye not pluck at -my wreath? Ye revere me; but how if your reverence one day falleth down? -Beware of being crushed to death with a statue! Ye say ye believe in -Zarathustra? But what is Zarathustra worth? Ye are my faithful ones; but -what are all faithful ones worth? When ye had not yet sought yourselves -ye found me. Thus do all faithful ones; hence all belief is worth so -little. Now I ask you to lose me and find yourselves; not until all of -you have disowned me shall I return unto you."[279] - - -VI - -Conclusion - -"Look," says Rudin, in Turgenev's story, "you see that apple tree? It -has broken down with the weight and multitude of its own fruit. It is -the emblem of genius." "To perish beneath a load one can neither bear -nor throw off," wrote Nietzsche,--"that is a philosopher."[280] I shall -announce the song of the lightning, said Zarathustra, and perish in the -announcing.[281] - -Insanity with such a man is but a matter of time; he feels it coming -upon him; he values his hours like a man condemned to execution. In -twenty days he writes the _Genealogy of Morals_; in one year (1888) he -produces _The Twilight of the Idols_, _Antichrist_, _The Case of -Wagner_, _Ecce Homo_, and his longest and greatest book, _The Will to -Power_. He not only writes these books; he reads the proof-sheets, -straining his eyes beyond repair. He is almost blind now; he is -deceived, taken advantage of, because he can hardly see farther than his -touch. "If I were blind," he writes pitifully, "I should be -healthy."[282] Yet his body is racked with pain: "on 118 days this year -I have had severe attacks."[283] "I have given a name to my pain, and -call it 'a dog'--it is just as pitiful, just as importunate and -shameless; and I can domineer over it, vent my bad humor on it, as -others do with their dogs, servants, and wives."[284] - -Meanwhile the world lives on unnoticing, or noticing only to -misunderstand. "My foes have become mighty, and have so distorted my -teaching, that my best beloved must be ashamed of the gifts that I gave -them."[285] He learns that the libertines of Europe are using his -philosophy as a cloak for their sins: "I can read in their faces that -they totally misunderstand me, and that it is only the animal in them -which rejoices at being able to cast off its fetters."[286] He finds one -whom he thinks to make his disciple; he is buoyed up for a few days by -the hope; the hope is shattered, and loneliness closes in once more upon -him. "A kingdom for a kind word!" he cries out in the depth of his -longing; and again he writes, "For years no milk of human kindness, no -breath of love."[287] - -In December, 1888, one whom he has thought friendly writes that his -brother-in-law is sending to a magazine an attack on him. It is the last -blow; it means that his sister has joined the others in deserting him. -"I take one sleeping-draught after another to deaden the pain, but for -all that I cannot sleep. To-day I will take such a dose that I will lose -my wits."[288] He has been taking chloral, and worse drugs, to pay for -the boon of sleep; the poison tips the scale already made heavy by his -blindness and eye-strain, by his loneliness, by the treachery of his -friends, by his general bodily ailments; he wakes up from this final -draught in a stupor from which he never recovers; he writes to Brandes -and signs himself "The Crucified"; he wanders into the street, is -tormented by children, falls in a fit; his good landlord helps him back -to his room, sends for the simple, ignorant doctor of the neighborhood; -but it is too late; the man is insane. Age, forty-four; another--the -only name greater than his among modern philosophers--had died at that -pitifully early age. - -The body lingered eleven years behind the mind. Death came in 1900. He -was buried as he had wished: "Promise me," he had asked his sister, many -years before, "that when I die only my friends shall stand about my -coffin, and no inquisitive crowd. See that no priest or anyone else -utters falsehoods at my graveside, when I can no longer defend myself; -and let me descend into my tomb as an honest pagan."[289] - -After his death the world began to read him. As in so many cases the -life had to be given that the doctrine might be heard. "Only where there -are graves," he had written in _Zarathustra_, "are there -resurrections."[290] - - - - -PART II - -SUGGESTIONS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS - - -I - -The Problem - -And so we come through our five episodes in the history of the -reconstructive mind, and find ourselves in the bewildering present, -comfortably seated, let us say, in the great reading room of our -Columbia Library. An attendant liberates us from the maze of -"Nietzsche's Works" lying about us, and returns presently with a stack -of thirty books purporting to give the latest developments in the field -of social study and research. We are soon lost in their graphs and -statistics, their records and results; gradually we come to feel beneath -these dead facts the lives they would reveal; and as we read we see a -picture. - - * * * * * - -It is the picture of one life. We see it beginning helplessly in the -arms of the factory physician; it is only after some violence that it -consents to breathe,--as if it hesitates to enter upon its adventure. It -has a touch of consumption but is otherwise a fair enough baby, says the -factory physician. It will do,--not saying for what or whom. Luckily, -it is a boy, and will be able to work soon. He does; at the age of nine -he becomes a newsboy; he is up at five in the morning and peddles news -till eight; at nine he gets to school, fagged out but restless; he gives -trouble; cannot memorize quickly enough, nor sit still long enough; -plays truant, loving the hard lessons of the street; school over, he has -a half-hour of play, but must then travel his news route till six; after -supper he has no taste for study; if he cannot go down into the street, -he will go to bed. At fourteen, hating the school where he is beaten or -scolded daily, he connives with his parents at certain falsehoods which -secure his premature entrance into the factory. He works hard, and for a -time happily enough; there is more freedom here than in the school. He -discovers sex, passes through the usual chapter of accidents, and -finally achieves manhood in the form of a sexual disease. He falls in -love several times, and out as many times but one; he marries, shares -his disease with his wife, and begets ten children,--nearly all of them -feeble, and two of them blind; he does not want so many children, but -the priest has told him that religion commands it. He works harder to -support them, but his health is giving way, and life becomes a heavy -burden to him. The factory installs scientific management, and he finds -himself performing the same operation every ten seconds from seven to -twelve and from one to six;--some three thousand times a day; he -protests, but is told that science commands it. He joins a union, and -goes out on strike; his family suffer severely, one of the children -dying of malnutrition; he wins a wage-increase of five per cent; his -landlord raises his rent, and a month later his wife informs him that -the prices of food and clothing have gone up six per cent. His country -goes to war about a piece of territory he has never heard of; his one -fairly strong boy rushes off to the defence of the colors, returns (age -twenty) with one leg and almost an arm, and sits in the house smoking, -drinking, and dribbling in repetitious semi-torpor his memories of -battle. Then comes street-corner talk of socialism, capitalism, and -other things new and therefore hard to understand; a glimmer of hope, a -cloud of doubt, then resignation. Four of the children die before they -are twenty; two others become consumptive weaklings. The father is sent -away from the factory because he is too old and feeble; he finds work in -a saloon; drink helps him to slip down; he steals a bracelet from the -factory-owner's kept woman, is arrested, tries to hang himself, but is -discovered when half dead, and is restored to life against his will. He -serves his sentence, returns to his family, and becomes a beggar. He -dies of exposure and disease, and his widow is supported by two of his -daughters, who have become successful prostitutes. - -It is the picture of one life. And as you look at it you see beyond it -the hundred thousand lives of which it is one; you see this suffering -and meaninglessness as but one hundredth part of a thousandth part of -the meaningless suffering of men; you hear the angry cries of the -rebellious young, the drunken laughter of the older ones who have no -more rebellion in them, the quiet weeping of the mothers of many -children. Around you here you see the happy faces of young students, -eloquent of comfortable homes; at your elbow a gentleman of family is -writing a book on the optimism of Robert Browning. And then suddenly, -beneath this world of leisure and learning, you feel the supporting -brawn of the wearied workers; you vision the very pillars of this vast -edifice held up painfully, hour after hour, on the backs of a million -sweating men; your leisure is their labor, your learning is paid for by -their ignorance, your luxury is their toil. - -For a moment the great building seems to tremble, as if rebellion -stirred beneath and upheaval was upon the world. Then it is still once -more, and you and I are here with our thirty books. - -One feels guilty of sentiment here (after reading Nietzsche!), and -hurries back to the sober features of those crowded volumes. Here, in -cold scientific statement, is our social problem: here are volumes -biological on heredity, eugenics, dietetics, and disease; volumes -sociological on marriage, prostitution, the family, the position of -woman, contraception and the control of population; volumes -psychological on education, criminology, and the replacement of -supernatural by social religion; volumes economic on private property, -poverty, child labor, industrial methods, arbitration, minimum wage, -trusts, free trade, immigration, prohibition, war; volumes political on -individualism and communism, anarchism and socialism, single tax, -Darwinism and politics, democracy and aristocracy, patriotism, -imperialism, electoral and administrative methods; methodological -volumes on trade-unions and craft-unions, "direct action" and "political -action," violence and non-resistance, revolution and reform. It is a -discouraging maze; we plunge into it almost hopelessly. Several of these -authors have schemes for taking the social machine apart, and a few even -have schemes for putting it together again; hardly one of them remembers -the old warning that this machine must be kept going while it is being -repaired. And each of these solutions, as its author never suspects, is -but an added problem. - -Let us listen to these men for a while, let us follow them for a space, -and see where they bring us out. They may not bring us out at all; but -perhaps that is just what we need to see. - - -II - -"Solutions" - - -1 - -_Feminism_ - -And first, with due propriety, let us listen to the case of woman _vs._ -the _status quo_. We imagine the argument as put by a studious and -apparently harmless young lady. She begins gently and proceeds -_crescendo_. - -"The case for woman is quite simple; as simple as the case for -democracy. We are human beings, we are governed, we are taxed; and we -believe that just government implies the consent of the governed. - -"We might have been content with the old life, had you masters of the -world been content to leave us the old life. But you would not. Your -system of industry has made the position of most young men so hopeless -and insecure that they are year by year putting back the age of -marriage. You have forced us out of our homes into your factories; and -you have used us as a means of making still harder the competition for -employment among the men. Your advocates speak of the sacredness of the -home; and meanwhile you have dragged 5,000,000 English women out of -their homes to be the slaves of your deadening machines.[291] You exalt -marriage; and in this country one woman out of every ten is unmarried, -and one out of every twenty married women works in your unclean shops. -The vile cities born of your factory-system have made life so hard for -us, temptations so frequent, vice so attractive and convenient, that we -cannot grow up among you without suffering some indelible taint. - -"Some of us go into your factories because we dread marriage, and some -of us marry because we dread your factories. But there is not much to -choose between them. If we marry we become machines for supplying -another generation of workers and soldiers; and if we talk of -birth-control you arrest us. As if we had no right to all that science -has discovered! And the horror of it is that while you forbid us to -learn how to protect ourselves and our children from the evils of large -families, you yourselves buy this knowledge from your physicians and use -it; and one of your societies for the prevention of birth-control has -been shown to consist of members with an average of 1.5 children per -family.[292] Your physicians meet in learned assemblies and vote in -favor of maintaining the law which forbids the spread of this -information; and then we find that physicians have the smallest average -family in the community.[293] One must be a liar and a thief to fit -comfortably into this civilization which you ask us to defend. - -"But we are resolved to get this information; and all your laws to -prevent us will only lessen our respect for law. We will not any longer -bring children into the world unless we have some reasonable hope of -giving them a decent life. And not only that. We shall end, too, the -hypocrisies of marriage. If you will have monogamy you may have it; but -if you continue merely to pretend monogamy we shall find a way of -regaining our independence. We shall not rest until we have freed -ourselves from the sting of your generosity; until our bread comes not -from your hand in kindness but from the state or our employers in -recognition of our work. Then we shall be free to leave you, and you -free to leave us, as we were free to take one another at the -beginning,--so far, alas! as the categorical imperative of love left us -free. And our children will not suffer; better for them that they see us -part than that they live with us in the midst of hypocrisy and secret -war. - -"Because we want this freedom--to stay or to go--this freedom to know -and control the vital factors of our lives, therefore we demand equal -suffrage. It is but a little thing, a mere beginning; and beware how you -betray your secrets in your efforts to bar us from this beginning. Are -you afraid to share with us the power of the ballot? Do you confess so -openly that you wish to command us without our consent, that you wish to -use us for your secret ends? You dare not fight fair and in the open? Is -the ballot a weapon which you use on us and will not let us use on you? -It is so you conceive citizenship! Or will you ask us to believe that -you are thinking not of your own interests but of posterity? - -"But we shall get this from you, just as we get other things from -you,--by repetition. And then we shall go on to make the world more fit -for women to live in: we shall force open all the avenues of life that -have been closed to us before, making us narrow and petty and dull. We -shall compel your universities to admit us to their classes; we shall -enter your professions, we shall compete with you for office, we shall -win the experiences and dare the adventures which we need to make us -your rivals in literature and philosophy and art. You say we cannot be -your comrades, your friends; that we can be only tyrants or slaves; but -what else can we be, with all the instructive wealth of life kept from -us? You hide from us the great books that are being written to-day, and -then you are surprised at our gossip, our silly scandal-mongering, our -inability to converse with you on business and politics, on science and -religion and philosophy; you will not let us grow, and then you complain -because we are so small. But we want to grow now, we want to grow! We -cannot longer be mothers only. The world does not need so many children; -and even to bring up better children we must have a wider and healthier -life. We must have our intellects stimulated more and our feelings less. -We have burst the bonds of our old narrow world; we must explore -everything now. It is too late to stop us; and if you try you will only -make life a mess of hatred and conflict for us both. And after all, do -you know why we want to grow? It is because we long for the day when we -shall be no longer merely your mistresses, but also your friends." - - -2 - -_Socialism_ - -Another complainant: a young Socialist: such a man as works far into -almost every night in the dingy office of his party branch, and devotes -his Sundays to _Das Kapital_; bright-eyed, untouched by disillusionment; -fired by the vision of a land of happy comrades. - -"I agree with the young lady," he says; "the source of all our ills is -the capitalist system. It was born of steam-driven machinery and -conceived in _laissez-faire_. It saw the light in Adam Smith's England, -ruined the health of the men of that country, and then came to America, -where it grew fat on 'liberty' and 'the right to do as one pleases with -one's own.' It believed in competition--that is to say war--as its God, -in whom all things lived and moved and sweated dividends; it made the -acquisition of money, by no matter what means, the test of virtue and -success, so that honest men became ashamed of themselves if they did not -fail; it made all life a matter of 'push' and 'pull,' like the two sides -of a door in one of those business palaces which make its cities great -mazes of brick and stone rising like new Babels in the face of heaven. -Its motto was, Beware of small profits; its aim was the greatest -possible happiness of the smallest possible number. Out of competition -it begot the trust, the rebate, and the 'gentleman's agreement'; out of -'freedom of contract' it begot wage-slavery; out of 'liberty, equality -and fraternity' it begot an industrial feudalism worse than the old -feudalism, based on the inheritance not of land, but of the living -bodies and souls of thousands of men, women and children. When it came -(in 1770) the annual income of England was $600,000,000; in 1901 the -annual income of England was $8,000,000,000; the system has made a -thousand millionaires, but it has left the people starving as -before.[294] It has increased wages, and has increased prices a trifle -more. It has improved the condition of the upper tenth of the workers, -and has thrown the great remaining mass of the workers into a hell of -torpor and despair. It has crowned all by inventing the myopic science -of scientific management, whereby men are made to work at such speed, -and with such rigid uniformity, that the mind is crazed, and the body is -worn out twenty years before its time. It has made the world reek with -poverty, and ugliness, and meanness, and the vulgarity of conspicuous -wealth. It has made life intolerable and disgraceful to all but sheep -and pigs. - -"There is only one way of saving our civilization--such as there is of -it--from wasting away through the parasitic degeneration of a few of its -parts and the malnutrition of the rest; and that is by frankly -abandoning this _laissez-faire_ madness, and changing the state into a -mechanism for the management of the nation's business. We workers must -get hold of the offices, and turn government into administration. -Without that our strikes and boycotts, our 'direct action' and economic -organization, arrive at little result; every strike we 'win' means that -prices will go up, and our time and energy--and dues--have gone to -nothing but self-discipline in solidarity. We can control prices only by -controlling monopolies; and we can control monopolies only by -controlling government. That means politics, and it's a scheme that -won't work until the proletariat get brains enough to elect honest and -sensible men to office; but if they haven't the brains to do that they -won't have the brains to do anything effective on the economic or any -other field. We know how hard it is to get people to think; but we -flatter ourselves that our propaganda is an educative force that grows -stronger every year, and has already achieved such power as to decide -the most important election held in this country since the Civil War. - -"Already a large number of people have been educated--chiefly by our -propaganda--to understand, for example, the economic greed that lies -behind all wars. They perceive that so long as capital finds its highest -rate of profit in the home market, capitalists see to it that peace -remains secure; but that when capital has expanded to the point at which -the rate of interest begins to fall, or when labor has ceased to be -docile, because it has ceased to be unorganized and uninformed, -capitalists then seek foreign markets and foreign investments, and soon -require the help of war--that is, the lives of the workers at home--to -help them enforce their terms on foreign governments and peoples. Only -the national ownership of capital can change that. We thought once that -we were too civilized ever to go to war again; we begin to see that our -industrial feudalism leads inevitably to war and armaments, and the -intellectual stagnation that comes from a militaristic mode of national -life. We begin to see all history as a Dark Age (with fitful intervals -of light),--a long series of wars in which men have killed and died for -delusions, fighting to protect the property of their exploiters. And it -becomes a little clearer to us than before that this awful succession of -killings and robberies is no civilization at all, and that we shall -never have a civilization worthy of the name until we transform our -industrial war into the coöperative commonwealth, and all 'foreigners' -into friends." - - -3 - -_Eugenics_ - -"My dear young man," says the Eugenist at this point, "you must study -biology. Your plan for the improvement of mankind is all shot through -with childish ignorance of nature's way of doing things. Come into my -laboratory for a few years; and you will learn how little you can do by -merely changing the environment. It's nature that counts, not nurture. -Improvement depends on the elimination of the inferior, not on their -reformation by Socialist leaflets or settlement work. What you have to -do is to find some substitute for that natural selection--the automatic -and ruthless killing off of the unfit--which we are more and more -frustrating with our short-sighted charity. Humanitarianism must get -informed. Our squeamishness about interfering with the holy 'liberty of -the individual' will have to be moderated by some sense of the right of -society to protect itself from interference by the individual. Here are -the feeble-minded, for example; they breed more rapidly than healthy -people do, and they almost always transmit their defect. If you don't -interfere with these people, if you don't teach them or force them to be -childless, you will have an increase in insanity along with the -development of humanity. Think of making a woman suffer to deliver into -the world a cripple or an idiot. And further, consider that the lowest -eighth of the people produce one-half of the next generation. The better -people, the more vigorous and healthy people, are refusing to have -children; every year the situation is becoming more critical. City-life -and factory-life make things still worse; young men coming from the -country plunge into the maelstrom of the city, then into its -femalestrom; they emerge with broken health, marry deformities dressed -up in the latest fashion, and produce children inferior in vigor and -ability to themselves. Given a hundred years more of this, and western -Europe and America will be in a condition to be overcome easily by the -fertile and vigorous races of the East. That is what you have to think -of. The problem is larger than that of making poor people less poor; it -is the problem of preserving our civilization. Your socialism will help, -but it will be the merest beginning; it will be but an introduction to -the socialization of selection,--which is eugenics. We will prevent -procreation by people who have a transmissible defect or disease; we -will require certificates of health and clean ancestry before permitting -marriage; we will encourage the mating, with or without love, of men and -women possessed of energy and good physique. We will teach people, in -Mr. Marett's phrase, to marry less with their eyes and more with their -heads. It will take us a long while to put all this into effect; but we -will put it. Time is on our side; every year will make our case -stronger. Within half a century the educated world will come and beg us -to guide them in a eugenic revolution." - - -4 - -_Anarchism_ - -A gentle anarchist: - -"You do well to talk of revolution; but you do wrong to forget the -individual in the race. Your eugenic revolution will not stop the -exploitation of the workers by the manufacturers through the state. Give -men justice and they will soon be healthy; give them the decent life -which is the only just reward for their work, and you will not need -eugenics. Instead of bothering about parasitic germs you should attend -to parasitic exploiters; it is in this social parasitism that the real -danger of degeneration lies. Continued injustice of employers to -employees is splitting every western nation into factions; class-loyalty -will soon be stronger than loyalty to the community; and the time will -come when nations in which this civil war has not been superseded by -voluntary mutual aid will crumble into oblivion. - -"And yet men are willing to be loyal to the community, if the community -is organized to give them justice. If exploitation were to cease there -would be such bonds of brotherhood among men as would make the community -practically everlasting. All you need do is to let men coöoperate in -freedom. They long to coöperate; all evolution shows a growth in the -ability to coöoperate; man surpassed the brute just because of this. Nor -is law or state needed; coercive government is necessary only in -societies founded on injustice. The state has always been an instrument -of exploitation; and law is merely the organized violence of the ruling -class. It is a subtle scheme; it enables industrial lords to do without -any pangs of conscience what but for their statute-books might give them -a qualm or two. Notice, for example, how perfectly Christian such -slaughters as those in Colorado or Virginia can be made to appear--even -to the slaughterers--by the delightful expedient of the statute-book. -They kill and call it law, so that they may sleep. - -"And then we are told that one must never use violence in labor -disputes. But obviously it is precisely violence that is used against -labor, and against the free spirit. As a matter of history, rebels did -not begin to use violence on the authorities until the authorities had -used violence on them. We feel ourselves quite justified in using any -means of attack on a system so founded in coercion. The whole question -with us is one not of morals but of expediency. We have been moral a -little too long." - - -5 - -_Individualism_ - -"Precisely," says the Stirnerite anarchist; "it is all a question of -might, not of right; and we exploited ones may be as right as rectitude -and never get anywhere unless we can rhyme a little might to our right. -Each of us has a right to do whatever he is strong enough to do. 'One -gets farther with a handful of might than with a bagful of right.' He -who wants much, and knows how to get it, has in all times taken it, as -Napoleon did the continent, and the French Algeria. Therefore the only -point is that the respectful 'lower classes' should at length learn to -take for themselves what they want." - - -6 - -_Individualism Again_ - -And lastly, _Advocatus Diaboli_, Mr. Status Quo: - -"I agree with you right heartily, Sir Stirnerite anarchist; it is time -you children came to understand that everything is a question of power. -Let the fittest survive and let us all use whatever means we find -expedient. I am frank with you now; but you must not be surprised if -to-morrow I write out a few checks for the salaries of the liars whom I -have in my employ. Why should we tell the truth and go under? Surely you -will understand that not all knowledge is good for all men. If it gives -you satisfaction, for example, to spread information about -birth-control, you will not feel hurt if it gives us satisfaction to -oppose you, for the sake of the future armies of unemployed without -which our great scheme of industry would be seriously hampered. - -"And I agree with your fellow-anarchist, that the state is often a -nuisance. I can make use of a little government; but when the state -begins to tell me how to run my business then I feel as if your -criticism of the state is very just--and convenient. I am an -individualist,--a good old American individualist,--like Jefferson and -Emerson. The state can't manage industry half as well as we can. You -know--as our Socialists do not--that government ownership is only -ownership by politicians, by Hinky-Dinks and Bath-house Johns; and I can -tell you from intimate knowledge of these people that they will do -anything for money except efficient administrative work. - -"Your scheme of having the workers take over the industries is a good -scheme--for the millennium. Where would you get men to direct you? They -come to us because we pay them well; if your syndicalist shops would pay -them as well as we do, they would be the beginning of a new aristocracy; -if you think these clever men will work for 'honor' you are leaning on -an airy dream. Destroy private property and you will have a nation of -hoboes and Hindus. - -"As to exploitation, what would you have? We are strong, and you are -weak; it is the law of nature that we should use you, just as it is the -law of nature that one species should use the weaker species as its -prey. The weaker will always suffer, with or without law. Even if all -bellies are full, the majority will envy the intellectual power of their -betters, and will suffer just as keenly on the intellectual plane as -they do now on the physical. The alternative of the under-dog is to get -intelligence and power, or 'stay put.' - -"My advice, then, is to let things be. You can change the superficial -conditions of the struggle for existence and for power, but the -fundamental facts of it will remain. Monarchy, aristocracy, -democracy,--it's all the same. The most powerful will rule, whether by -armies or by newspapers; it makes no difference if God is on the side of -the biggest battalions, or the side of the biggest type. We bought the -battalions; we buy the type. - -"Come, let us get back to our business." - - -III - -Dissolutions - -Here is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of our social _'isms_; and here is the -history of many a social rebel. From dissatisfaction to socialism, from -socialism to anarchism, from anarchism to Stirnerism, from Stirnerism -and the cult of the ego to Nietzsche and the right to exploit;--so has -many a man made the merry-go-round of thought and come back wearily at -last to the _terra firma_ of the thing that is. We sail into the sea of -social controversy without chart or compass or rudder; and though we -encounter much wind, we never make the port of our desire. We need maps, -and instruments, and knowledge; we need to make inquiries, to face our -doubts, to define our purposes; we shall have to examine more ruthlessly -our preconceptions and hidden premises, to force into the light the -wishes that secretly father our illegitimate thoughts. We must ask -ourselves questions that will reach down to the tenderest roots of our -philosophies. - -You are a feminist, let us say. Very well. Have you ever considered the -sociological consequences of that very real disintegration of the "home" -which an advancing feminism implies? Granted that this disintegration -has been begun by the industrial revolution. Do you want it to go on -more rapidly? Do you want women to become more like men? Do you think -that the "new woman" will care to have children? It is surely better for -the present comfort of our society that there should be a considerable -fall in the birth rate; but will that expose the people of Europe and -America to absorption by the races of the East? You argue that the case -for feminism is as simple as the case for democracy; but is the case for -democracy simple? Is democracy competent? Is it bringing us where we -want to go? Or is it a sort of collective determination to drift with -the tide,--a sort of magnified _laissez-faire_? And as to "rights" and -"justice," how do you answer Nietzsche's contention that the more highly -organized species, sex, or class, must by its very nature use, command, -and exploit the less highly organized species, sex, or class? - -You are a Socialist; and you yearn for a Utopia of friends and equals; -but will you, to make men equal, be compelled to chain the strength of -the strong with many laws and omnipresent force?--will you sacrifice the -superiority of the chosen few to the mediocrity of the many? Will you, -to control the exploiter, be obliged to control all men, even in -detail?--will your socialism really bring the slavery and servile state -that Spencer and Chesterton and Belloc fear? Is further centralization -of government desirable? Have you considered sufficiently the old -difficulty about the stimulus to endeavor in a society that should -restrict private property to a minimum and prohibit inheritance? Have -you arranged to protect your coöperative commonwealth by limiting -immigration--from Europe and from heaven?[295] Are you not, in general, -exaggerating the force of the aggregative as against the segregative -tendencies in human nature? And do you think that a change of laws can -make the weak elude the exploiting arm of the strong? Will not the -strongest men always make whatever laws are made, and rule wherever men -are ruled? Can any government stand that is not the expression of the -strongest forces in the community? And if the strongest force be -organized labor, are you sure that organized labor will not exploit and -tyrannize? Will the better organized and skilled workers be "just" to -the unskilled and imperfectly organized workers? And what do you mean by -"justice"? - -And as to the eugenist, surely it is unnecessary to expose his -unpreparedness to meet the questions which his programme raises. -Questions, for example, as to what "units" of character to breed for, if -there are such "units"; whether definite breeding for certain results -would forfeit adaptive plasticity; whether compulsory sterilization is -warranted by our knowledge of heredity; whether serious disease is not -often associated with genius; whether the native mental endowments of -rich and poor are appreciably different, and whether the "comparative -infertility of the upper classes" is really making for the deterioration -of the race; whether progress depends on racial changes so much as on -changes in social institutions and traditions. And so on. - -And the anarchist, whom one loves if only for the fervor of his hope and -the beauty of his dream,--the anarchist falters miserably in the face of -interrogation. If all laws were to be suspended to-morrow, all coercion -of citizen by state, how long would it be before new laws would arise? -Would the aforementioned strong cease to be strong and the weak cease to -be weak? Would people be willing to forego private property? Are not -belief and disbelief in private property determined less by logic and -"justice" than by one's own success or failure in the acquisition of -private property? Do only the weak and uncontrolled advocate absolute -lack of restraint? Do most men want liberty so much that they will -tolerate chaos and a devil-take-the-hind-most individualism for the sake -of it? Can it be, after all, that freedom is a negative thing,--that -what men want is, for some, achievement, for others, peace,--and that -for these they will give even freedom? What if a great number of people -dread liberty, and are not at all so sensitive to restraint and -commandment as the anarchist? Perhaps only children and geniuses can be -truly anarchistic? Perhaps freedom itself is a problem and not a -solution? Does the mechanization, through law and custom, of certain -elements in our social behavior, like the mechanization, through habit -and instinct, of certain elements in individual behavior, result in -greater freedom for the higher powers and functions? Again, to have -freedom for all, all must be equal; but does not development make for -differentiation and inequality? Consider the America of three hundred -years ago; a nation of adventurous settlers, hardly any of them better -off than any other,--all of a class, all on a level; and see what -inequalities and castes a few generations have produced! Is there a -necessary antithesis between liberty and order, freedom and control?--or -are order and control the first condition of freedom? Does not law serve -many splendid purposes,--could it not serve more? Is the state necessary -so long as there are long-eared and long-fingered gentry? - -As for your revolutions, who profits by them? The people who have -suffered, or the people who have thought? Is a revolution, so far as the -poor are concerned, merely the dethronement of one set of rulers or -exploiters so that another set may have a turn? Do not most -revolutions, like that which wished to storm heaven by a tower, end in -a confusion of tongues? And after each outbreak do not the workers -readapt themselves to their new slavery with that ease and torpid -patience which are the despair of every leader, until they are awakened -by another quarrel among their masters? - - * * * * * - -One could fling about such questions almost endlessly, till every _'ism_ -should disappear under interrogation points. Every such _'ism_, clearly, -is but a half-truth, an arrested development, suffering from -malinformation. One is reminded of the experiment in which a -psychologist gave a ring-puzzle to a monkey, and--in another room--a -like puzzle to a university professor: the monkey fell upon the puzzle -at once with teeth and feet and every manner of hasty and haphazard -reaction,--until at last the puzzle, dropped upon the floor, came apart -by chance; the professor sat silent and motionless before the puzzle, -working out in thought the issue of many suggested solutions, and -finally, after forty minutes, touched it to undo it at a stroke. Our -_'isms_ are simian reactions to the social puzzle. We jump at -conclusions, we are impinged upon extremes, we bound from opposite to -opposite, we move with blinders to a passion-colored goal. Some of us -are idealists, and see only the beautiful desire; some of us are -realists, and see only the dun and dreary fact; hardly any of us can -look fact in the face and see through it to that which it might be. We -"bandy half-truths" for a decade and then relapse into the peaceful -insignificance of conformity.[296] - -It dawns on students of social problems, as it dawned long since on -philosophers, that the beginning of their wisdom is a confession of -their ignorance. We know now that the thing we need, and for lack of -which we blunder valiantly into futility, is not good intentions but -informed intelligence. All problems are problems of education; all the -more so in a democracy. Not because education can change the original -nature of man, but because intelligent coöperation can control the -stimuli which determine the injuriousness or beneficence of original -dispositions. Impulse is not the enemy of intelligence; it is its raw -material. We desire knowledge--and particularly knowledge of -ourselves--so that we may know what external conditions evoke -destructive, and what conditions evoke constructive, responses. We do -not, for example, expect intelligence to eradicate pugnacity; we do not -want it to do so; but we want to eradicate the environmental conditions -which turn this impulse to wholesale suicide. Men should fight; it is -the essence of their value that they are willing to fight; the problem -of intelligence is to discuss and to create means for the diversion of -pugnacity to socially helpful ends. Character is _per se_ neither good -nor bad, but becomes one or the other according to the nature of the -stimuli presented. What we call moral reform, then, waits on information -and consequent remoulding of the factors determining the direction of -our original dispositions. We become "better" men and women only so far -as we become more intelligent. Just as psychoanalysis can, in some -measure, reconstruct the personal life, so social analysis can -reconstruct social life and turn into productive channels the innocent -but too often destructive forces of original nature.[297] - -Our problem, then, to repeat once more our central theme, is to -facilitate the growth and spread of intelligence. With this definition -of the issue we come closer to our thesis,--that the social problem must -be approached through philosophy, and philosophy through the social -problem. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE RECONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY - - -I - -Epistemologs - -Now there are a great many people who will feel no thrill at all at the -mention of philosophy,--who will rather consider themselves excused by -the very occurrence of the word from continuing on the road which this -discussion proposes to travel. No man dares to talk of philosophy in -these busy days except after an apologetic preface; philosophers -themselves have come to feel that their thinking is so remote from -practical endeavor that they have for the most part abandoned the effort -to relate their work to the concrete issues of life. In the eyes of the -man who does things philosophy is but an aërial voyaging among the mists -of transcendental dialectic, or an ineffective moralizing substitute for -supernatural religion. Philosophy was once mistress of all the -disciplines of thought and search; now none so poor to do her reverence. - -There is no way of meeting this indictment other than to concede it. It -is true. It is mild. Only a lover of philosophy can know--with the -intimacy of a _particeps criminis_--how deeply philosophy has fallen -from her ancient heights. Looking back to Greece we find that philosophy -there was a real pursuit of wisdom, a very earnest effort to arrive by -discussion and self-criticism at a way of life, a _philosophia vitæ -magistra_, a knowledge of the individual and social good and of the -means thereto, a conscious direction of social institutions to ethical -ends; philosophy and life in those days were bound up with one another -as mechanics is now bound up with efficient construction. Even in the -Middle Ages philosophy meant coördinate living, synthetic behavior; with -all their reputation for cobweb-spinning, the Scholastics were much -closer to life in their thinking than most modern philosophers have been -in theirs. - -The lapse of philosophy from her former significance and vitality is the -result of the exaggerated emphasis placed on the epistemological problem -by modern thinkers; and this in turn is in great part due to the -difficulties on which Descartes stumbled in his effort to reconcile his -belief in mechanism with his desire to placate the Jesuits. How minor a -rôle is played by the problems of the relation between subject and -object, the validity of knowledge, epistemological realism and idealism, -in a frankly mechanist philosophy, appears in Bacon, Hobbes, and -Spinoza;[298] these men--deducting Bacon's astute obeisance to -theology--know what they want and say what they mean; they presume, with -a maturity so natural as to be mistaken for _naïveté_, that the validity -of thought is a matter to be decided by action rather than by theory; -they take it for granted that the supreme and ultimate purpose of -philosophy is not analysis but synthesis, not the intellectual -categorizing of experience but the intelligent reconstruction of life. -Indeed, as one pursues this clew through the devious--almost -stealthy--course of modern speculation it appears that no small part of -the epistemological development has been made up of the oscillations, -compromises, and obscurities natural in men who were the exponents and -the victims of a painful transition. Civilization was passing from one -intellectual basis to another; and in these weird epistemologs the vast -process came uncomfortably to semiconsciousness. They were old bottles -bursting with new wine; and their tragedy was that they knew it. They -clung to the old world even while the new one was swimming perilously -into their ken; they found a pitiful solace in the old phrases, the old -paraphernalia of a dead philosophy; and in the suffering of their -readjustment there was, quite inevitably, some measure of -self-deception. - -And that is why they are so hard to understand. Even so subtle a -thinker as Santayana finds them too difficult, and abandons them in -righteous indignation. There is no worse confounding of confusion than -self-deception: let a man be honest with himself, and he may lie with -tolerable intelligibility and success; but let him be his own dupe and -he may write a thousand critiques and never get himself understood. -Indeed, some of them do not want to be understood, they only want to be -believed. Hegel, for example, was not at all surprised to find that no -one understood him; he would have been surprised and chagrined to find -that some one had. Obscurity can cover a multitude of sins. - -Add to this self-befoggery the appalling _historismus_ (as Eucken calls -it), the strange lifeless interest in the past for its own sake, the -petty poring over problems of text and minutiæ of theory in the classics -of speculation;--and the indictment of philosophy as a useless appanage -of the idle rich gains further ground. We do not seem to understand how -much of the past is dead, how much of it is but a drag on the -imaginative courage that dares to think of a future different from the -past, and better. Philosophy is too much a study of the details of -superseded systems; it is too little the study of the miraculous living -moment in which the past melts into the present and the future finds -creation. Most people have an invincible habit of turning their backs to -the future; they like the past because the future is an adventure. So -with most philosophers to-day; they like to write analyses of Kant, -commentaries on Berkeley, discussions of Plato's myths; they are -students remembering, they have not yet become men thinking. They do not -know that the work of philosophy is in the street as well as in the -library, they do not feel and understand that the final problem of -philosophy is not the relation of subject and object but the misery of -men. - -And so it is well that philosophy, such as it chiefly is in these days, -should be scorned as a busy idler in a world where so much work is -asking to be done. - -Philosophy was vital in Plato's day; so vital that some philosophers -were exiled and others put to death. No one would think of putting a -philosopher to death to-day. Not because men are more delicate about -killing; but because there is no need to kill that which is already -dead.[299] - - -II - -Philosophy as Control - -But after all, this is not a subject for rhetoric so much as for -resolution. Here we are again in our splendid library; here we sit, -financially secure, released from the material necessities of life, to -stand apart and study, to report and help and state and solve; under us -those millions holding us aloft so that we may see for them, dying by -the thousand so that we may find the truth that will make the others -free; and what do we do? We make phrases like "_esse est percipi_," -"synthetic judgments _à priori_," and "being is nothing"; we fill the -philosophic world with great Saharas of Kantiana; we write epistemology -for two hundred years. Surely there is but one decent thing for us to -do: either philosophy is of vital use to the community, or it is not. If -it is not, we will abandon it; if it is, then we must seek that vital -use and show it. We have been privileged to study and think and travel -and learn the world; and now we stand gaping before it as if there were -nothing wrong, as if nothing could be done, as if nothing should be -done. We are expert eyes, asked to point the way; and all that we report -is that there is nothing to see, and nowhere to go. We are without even -a partial sense of the awful responsibility of intelligence. - -It is time we put this problem of knowledge, even the problem of the -validity of knowledge, into the hands of science. How we come to know, -what the process of knowledge is, what "truth" is,--all these are -questions of fact; they are problems for the science of psychology, -they are not problems for philosophy. This continual sharpening of the -knife, as Lotze put it, becomes tiresome--almost pathetic--if, after -all, there is no cutting done. Like Faust, who found himself when, -blinded by the sun, he turned his face to the earth, so we shall have to -forget our epistemological heaven and remember mother earth; we shall -have to give up our delightful German puzzles and play our living part -in the flow of social purpose. Philosophers must once more learn to -live. - -To make such a demand for a new direction of philosophy to life is after -all only a development of pragmatism, turning that doctrine of action as -the test and significance of thought to uses not so individual as those -in which William James found its readiest application. If philosophy has -meaning, it must be as life become aware of its purposes and -possibilities, it must be as life cross-examining life for the sake of -life; it must be as specialized foresight for the direction of social -movement, as reconstructive intelligence in conscious evolution. Man -finds himself caught in a flux of change; he studies the laws operating -in the flux; studying, he comes to understand; understanding, he comes -to control; controlling, he comes face to face with the question of all -questions, For what? Where does he wish to go, what does he want to be? -It is then that man puts his whole experience before him in synthetic -test; then that he gropes for meanings, searches for values, struggles -to see and define his course and goal; then that he becomes philosopher. -Consider these questions of goal and course as questions asked by a -society, and the social function of philosophy appears. Science -enlightens means, philosophy must enlighten ends. Science informs, -philosophy must form. A philosopher is a man who remakes himself; the -social function of philosophy is to remake society. - -Have we yet felt the full zest of that brave discovery of the last -century,--that purpose is not in things but in us? What a declaration of -independence there is in that simple phrase, what liberation of a -fettered thought to dare all ventures of creative endeavor! Here at last -is man's coming-of-age! Well: now that we have won this freedom, what -shall we do with it? That is the question which freedom begets, often as -its Frankenstein; for unless freedom makes for life, freedom dies. Once -our sloth and cowardice might have pleaded the uselessness of effort in -a world where omnipotent purpose lay outside of us, superimposed and -unchangeable; now that we can believe that divinity is in ourselves, -that purpose and guidance are through us, we can no longer shirk the -question of reconstruction. The world is ours to do with what we can and -will. Once we believed in the unchangeable environment--that new ogre -that succeeded to the Absolute--and (as became an age of -_laissez-faire_) we thought that wisdom lay in meeting all its demands; -now we know that environments can be remade; and we face the question, -How shall we remake ours? - -This is preëminently a problem in philosophy; it is a question of -values. If the world is to be remade, it will have to be under the -guidance of philosophy. - - -III - -Philosophy as Mediator between Science and Statesmanship - -But why philosophy?--some one asks. Why will not science do? Philosophy -dreams, while one by one the sciences which she nursed steal away from -her and go down into the world of fact and achievement. Why should not -science be called upon to guide us into a better world? - -Because science becomes more and more a fragmentated thing, with ever -less coördination, ever less sense of the whole. Our industrial system -has forced division of labor here, as in the manual trades, almost to -the point of idiocy: let a man seek to know everything about something, -and he will soon know nothing about anything else; efficiency will -swallow up the man. Because of this shredded science we have great -zoölogists talking infantile patriotism about the war, and great -electricians who fill sensational sheets with details of their trips to -heaven. We live in a world where thought breaks into pieces, and -coördination ebbs; we flounder into a chaos of hatred and destruction -because synthetic thinking is not in fashion. - -Consider, for example, the problem of monopoly: we ask science what we -are to do here; why is it that after we have listened to the economist, -and the historian, and the lawyer, and the psychologist, we are hardly -better off than before? Because each of these men speaks in ignorance of -what the others have discovered. We must find some way of making these -men acquainted with one another before they can become really useful to -large social purposes; we must knock their heads together. We want more -uniters and coördinators, less analyzers and accumulators. -Specialization is making the philosopher a social necessity of the very -first importance. - -This does not mean that we must put the state into the hands of the -epistemologists. Hardly. The type of philosopher who must be produced -will be a man too close to life to spend much time on merely analytical -problems. He will feel the call of action, and will automatically reject -all knowledge that does not point to deeds. The essential feature of him -will be grasp: he will have his net fixed for the findings of those -sciences which have to do, not with material reconstructions, but with -the discovery of the secrets of human nature. He will know the -essentials of biology and psychology, of sociology and history, of -economics and politics; in him these long-divorced sciences will meet -again and make one another fertile once more. He will busy himself with -Mendel and Freud, Sumner and Veblen, and will scandalously neglect the -Absolute. He will study the needs and exigencies of his time, he will -consider the Utopias men make, he will see in them the suggestive -pseudopodia of political theory, and will learn from them what men at -last desire. He will sober the vision with fact, and find a focus for -immediate striving. With this focus he will be able to coördinate his -own thinking, to point the nose of science to a goal; science becoming -thereby no longer inventive and instructive merely, but preventive and -constructive. And so fortified and unified he will preach his gospel, -talking not to students about God, but to statesmen about men. - -For we come again--ever and ever again--to Plato: unless wisdom and -practical ability, philosophy and statesmanship, can be more closely -bound together than they are, there will be no lessening of human -misery. Think of the learning of scientists and the ignorance of -politicians! You see all these agitated, pompous men, making laws at the -rate of some ten thousand a year; you see those quiet, unheard of, -underpaid seekers in the laboratories of the world; unless you can bring -these two groups together through coördination and direction, your -society will stand still forever, however much it moves. Philosophy -must take hold; it must become the social direction of science, it must -become, strange to say, applied science. - -We stand to-day in social science where Bacon stood in natural science: -we seek a method first for the elucidation of causes, and second for the -transformation, in the light of this knowledge, of man's environment and -man. "We live in the stone age of political science," says Lester Ward; -"in politics we are still savages."[300] Our political movements are -conceived in impulse and developed in emotion; they end in fission and -fragmentation because there is no thought behind them. Who will supply -thinking to these instincts, direction to this energy, light to this -wasted heat? Our young men talk only of ideals, our politicians only of -fact; who will interpret to the one the language of the other? What is -it, too, that statesmen need if not that saving sense of the whole which -makes philosophy, and which philosophy makes? Just as philosophy without -statesmanship is--let us say--epistemology, so statesmanship without -philosophy is--American politics. The function of the philosopher, then, -is to do the listening to to-day's science, and then to do the thinking -for to-morrow's statesmanship. The philosophy of an age should be the -organized foresight of that age, the interpreter of the future to the -present. "Selection adapts man to yesterday's conditions, not to -to-day's";[301] the organized foresight of conscious evolution will -adapt man to the conditions of to-morrow. And an ounce of foresight is -worth a ton of morals. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE - - -I - -The Need - -Intelligence is organized experience; but intelligence itself must be -organized. Consider the resources of the unused intelligence of the -world; intelligence potential but undeveloped; intelligence developed -but isolated; intelligence allowed to waste itself in purely personal -pursuits, unasked to enter into coöperation for larger ends. Consider -the Platos fretting in exile while petty politicians rule the world; -consider Montaigne, and Hobbes, and Hume, and Carlyle, and the thousand -other men whose genius was left to grow--or die--in solitude or -starvation; consider the vast number of university-trained minds who are -permitted, for lack of invitation and organized facilities, to slip into -the world of profit and loss and destructively narrow intent; consider -the expert ability in all lines which can be found in the faculties of -the world, and which goes to training an infinitesimal fraction of the -community. The thought of university graduates, of university -faculties, of university-trained investigators, has had a rapidly -growing influence in the last ten years in America; and because it is an -influence due to enlightenment it is fundamentally an influence for -"good." It was this influence that showed when President Wilson said -that the eight-hour day was demanded by the informed opinion of the -time. The sources of such influence have merely been touched; they are -deep; we must find a way to make informed opinion more articulate and -powerful. "The most valuable knowledge consists of methods," said -Nietzsche;[302] and the most valuable methods are methods of -organization, whether of data or of men. Organization's the thing. -Economic forces are organized; the forces of intelligence are not. To -organize intelligence; that is surely one method of approach to the -social problem; and what if, indeed, it be the very heart and substance -of the social problem? - -Now a very easy way of making the propounder of such an organization -feel unusually modest is to ask him that little trouble-making question, -How? To answer that would be to answer almost everything that can be -answered. Here are _opera basilica_ again!--for what are we doing, after -all, but trying to take Francis Bacon seriously? Of course the -difficulty in organizing intelligence is how to know who are -intelligent, and how to get enough people to agree with you that you -know. If each man's self-valuation were accepted, our organization would -be rather bulky. Are there any men very widely recognized as -intelligent, who could be used as the nucleus of an organization? There -are individual men so recognized,--Edison, for example, and, strange to -say, one or two men who by accident are holding political office. But -these are stray individuals; are there any groups whose average of -intelligence is highly rated by a large portion of the community? There -are. Physicians are so rated; so much so that by popular usage they have -won almost a monopoly on the once more widely used term _doctor_. -University professors are highly rated. Let us take the physicians and -the professors; here is a nucleus of recognized intelligence. - -There are objections, here, of course; some one urges that many -physicians are quacks, another that professors are rated as intelligent, -but only in an unpractical sort of way. Perhaps we shall find some -scheme for eliminating the quacks; but the professors present a -difficult problem. It is true that they suffer from intellectualism, -academitis, overfondness for theories, and other occupational diseases; -it is true that the same people who stand in awe of the very word -_professor_ would picture the article indicated by the word as a thin, -round-shouldered, be-spectacled ninny, incapable of finding his way -alone through city streets, and so immersed in the stars that he is -sooner or later submerged in a well. But what if this quality of -detachment, of professorial calm, be just one of the qualities needed -for the illumination of our social problem? Perhaps we have too much -emotion in these questions, and need the colder light of the man who is -trained to use his "head" and not his "heart." Perhaps the most useful -thing in the world for our purpose is this terribly dispassionate, -coldly scrutinizing professor. We need men as impartial and clear-eyed -as men come; and whatever a professor may _say_, yet he _sees_ his field -more clearly and impartially than any other group of men whatever. Let -the professors stay. - -And so we have our physicians and our professors,--say all physicians -and professors who have taught or practised three years in institutions, -or as the graduates of institutions, of recognized standing. And now let -us dream our dream. - - -II - -The Organization of Intelligence - -These men, through meetings and correspondence, organize themselves into -a "Society for Social Research"; they begin at once to look for an -"inspired millionaire" to finance the movement for six months or so; -they advertise themselves diligently in the press, and make known their -intention to get together the best brains of the country to study the -facts and possibilities of the social problem. And then--a difficult -point--they face the task of arranging some more or less impersonal -method of deciding who are the intelligent people and who not. They ask -themselves just what kind of information a man should be expected to -have, to fit him for competent handling of social questions; and after -long discussions they conclude that such a man should be well trained in -one--and acquainted with the general findings of the others--of what we -may call the social disciplines: biology, psychology, sociology, -history, economics, law, politics, philosophy, and perhaps more. They -formulate a long and varied test for the discovery of fitness in these -fields; and they arrange that every university in the country shall -after plentiful advertisement and invitation to all and sundry, give -these tests, and pay the expenses incurred by any needy candidate who -shall emerge successful from the trial. In this way men whose studies -have been private, and unadorned with academic degree, are to find -entrance to the Society. - -It is recognized that the danger of such a test lies in the premium -which it sets on the bookish as against the practical man: on the man -whose knowledge has come to him in the classroom or the study, as -against the man who has won his knowledge just by living face to face -with life. There are philosophers who have never heard of Kant, and -psychologists who have been Freudians for decades without having ever -read a book. A society recruited by such a test will be devoid of -artists and poets, may finally eliminate all but fact-gathering -dryasdusts, and so end deservedly in nothing. And yet some test there -must be, to indicate, however crudely, one's fitness or unfitness to -take part in this work; the alternative would be the personal choice of -the initial few, whose prejudices and limitations would so become the -constitution and by-laws of the society. Perhaps, too, some way may -appear of using the artists and poets, and the genius who knows no -books. - -Well: the tests are given; the original nucleus of physicians and -professors submit themselves to these tests, and some, failing, are -eliminated; other men come, from all fields of work, and from them a -number survive the ordeal and pass into the Society. So arises a body of -say 5000 men, divided into local groups but working in unison so far as -geographical separateness will permit; and to them now come, impressed -with their earnestness, a wealthy man, who agrees to finance the Society -for such time as may be needed to test its usefulness. - -Now what does our Society do? - -It seeks information. That, and not a programme, is the fruitful -beginning of reform. "Men are willing to investigate only the small -things of life," says Samuel Butler; this Society for Social Research is -prepared and resolved to investigate anything that has vital bearing on -the social problem; it stands ready to make enemies, ready to soil its -hands. It appoints committees to gather and formulate all that -biologists can tell of human origin and the innate impulses of men; all -that psychology in its varied branches can tell of human behavior; all -that sociology knows of how and why human societies and institutions -rise and fall; all that medicine can tell of social ills and health; it -appoints committees to go through all science with the loadstone of the -social purpose, picking up this fact here and that one there; committees -to study actual and proposed forms of government, administrative and -electoral methods; committees to investigate marriage, eugenics, -prostitution, poverty, and the thousand other aspects and items of the -social problem; committees to call for and listen to responsible -expressions of every kind of opinion; committees to examine and analyze -social experiments, profit-sharing plans, Oneida communities; even a -committee on Utopia, before which persons with schemes and _'isms_ and -perfect cities in their heads may freely preach their gospel. In short -this Society becomes the organized eye and ear of the community, ready -and eager to seek out all the facts of human life and business that may -enlighten human will. - -And having found the facts it publishes them. Its operations show real -earnestness, sincerity, and ability; and in consequence it wins such -prestige that its reports find much heralding, synopsis, and comment in -the press. But in addition to that it buys, for the first day of every -month, a half-page of space in several of the more widely circulated -periodicals and journals of the country, and publishes its findings -succinctly and intelligibly. It gives full references for all its -statements of fact; it makes verification possible for all doubters and -deniers. It includes in each month's report a reliable statement of the -year's advances in some one of the social disciplines, so that its -twelve reports in any year constitute a record of the socially vital -scientific findings of the year. It limits itself strictly to verifiable -information, and challenges demonstration of humanly avoidable -partiality. And it takes great care that its reports are couched not in -learned and technical language but in such phraseology as will be -intelligible to the graduates of an average grammar school. That is -central. - - -III - -Information of Panacea - -Without some such means of getting and spreading information there is no -hope for fundamental social advance. We have agreed, have we not, that -to make men happier and more capable we must divert their socially -injurious impulses into beneficent channels; that we can do this only by -studying those impulses and controlling the stimuli which arouse them; -that we can control those stimuli only by studying the varied factors -of the environment and the means of changing them; in short, that at the -bottom of the direction of impulse lies the necessity of knowledge, of -information spread to all who care to receive it. Autocracy may improve -the world without spreading enlightenment; but democracy cannot. -_Delenda est ignorantia._[303] - -This, after all, is a plan for the democratization of aristocracy; it is -Plato translated into America. It utilizes superior intelligence and -gives it voice, but sanctions no change that has not received the free -consent of the community. It gives the aristocracy of intellect the -influence and initiative which crude democracy frustrates; but it avoids -the corruption that usually goes with power, by making this influence -work through the channels of persuasion rather than compulsion. It -counteracts the power of wealth to disseminate partisan views through -news-items and editorials, and relies on fact to get the better at last -of double-leaded prejudice. It rests on the faith that lies will out. - -Would the mass of the people listen to such reports? Consider, first, -the repute that attaches to the professorial title. Let a man write even -the sorriest nonsense but sign himself as one of the faculty of some -responsible institution, and he will find a hearing; the reader, -perhaps, need not go far to find an example. In recent industrial and -political issues the pronouncements of a few professors carried very -great weight; and there are some modest purveyors of so supposedly -harmless a thing as philosophy whose voice is feared by all interests -that prosper in the dark. Will the combined reputation of the most -enlightened men in the country mean less? A report published by this -Society for Social Research will mean that a large body of intelligent -men have from their number appointed three or five or ten to find the -facts of a certain situation or dispute; these appointed men will, if -they report hastily, or carelessly, or dishonestly, impair the repute of -all their fellows in the Society; they will take care, then, and will -probably find honesty as good a policy as some of us pretend it to be. -With every additional report so guarded from defect the repute of the -society will grow until it becomes the most powerful intellectual force -in the world. - -When one reflects how many pages of misrepresentation were printed in -the papers of only one city in the presidential campaign of 1916, and -then imagines what would have been the effect of a mere statement of -facts on both sides,--the records of the candidates and the parties, -their acknowledged connections, friends and enemies, their expressed -principles and programmes, the facts about the tariff, the German issue, -international law, the railway-brotherhood dispute, and so forth--one -begins to appreciate the importance of information. After the initial -and irrevocable differences of original nature nothing is so vital as -the spread of enlightenment; and nothing offers itself so well to -organized effort. Eugenics is weak because it has no thought-out -programme; _'isms_ rise and fall because people are not informed. Let -who can, improve the native qualities of men; but that aside, the most -promising plan is the dissemination of fact. - -Such a society for research would be a sort of social consciousness, a -"mind of the race." It would make social planning possible for the first -time; it would make history conscious. It would look ahead and warn; it -would point the nose of the community to unwelcome but important facts; -it would examine into such statements as that of Sir William Ramsay, -that England's coal fields will be exhausted in one hundred and -seventy-five years; and its warnings, backed by the prestige of its -expert information, would perhaps avert the ravages of social waste and -private greed. Nature, said Lester Ward, is a spendthrift, man an -economizer. But economy means prevision, and social economy means -organized provision. Here would be not agitation, not propaganda, not -moralizing, but only clarification; these men would be "merchants of -light," simply giving information so that what men should do they might -do knowingly and not in the dark. - -Indeed, if one can clarify one need not agitate. Just to state facts is -the most terrible thing that can be done to an injustice. Sermons and -stump-speeches stampede the judgment for a moment, but the sound of -their perorations still lingers in the air when reaction comes. Fact has -this advantage over rhetoric, that time strengthens the one and weakens -the other. Tell the truth and time will be your eloquence. - -Let us suppose that our Society has existed some three years; let us -suppose that on the first day of every month it has spread through the -press simple reports of its investigations, simple accounts of socially -significant work in science, and simple statements of fact about the -economic and political issues of the day; let us suppose that by far the -greater part of these reports have been conscientious and accurate and -clear. Very well: in the course of these three years a large number of -mentally alert people all over the country will have developed the habit -of reading these monthly reports; they will look forward to them, they -will attach significance to them, they will herald them as events, -almost as decisions. In any question of national policy its statements -will influence thousands and thousands of the more independent minds. -Let us calculate the number of people who, in these United States, would -be reached by such reports; let us say the reports are printed in three -or four New York dailies, having a total circulation of one million; in -other dailies throughout the country totalling some five million -circulation; and in one or more weeklies or monthlies with a large or a -select circulation. One may perhaps say that out of the seven or eight -million people so reached (mostly adult males), five per cent will be so -influenced by the increasing prestige of the Society that they will read -the reports. Of these four hundred thousand readers it is reasonable to -suppose that three hundred thousand will be voters, and not only voters -but men of influence among their fellows. These men will each of them be -a medium through which the facts reported will be spread; it is not too -much to say that the number of American voters influenced directly or -indirectly by these reports will reach to a million.[304] Now imagine -the influence of this million of voters on a presidential election. -Their very existence would be a challenge; candidates would have them in -mind when making promises and criticisms; parties would think of them -when formulating policies and drawing up platforms; editors would beware -of falling into claptrap and deceit for fear of these million men armed -with combustible fact. It would mean such an elevation of political -discussion and political performance as democracy has never yet -produced; such an elevation as democracy must produce or die. - - -IV - -Sex, Art, and Play in Social Reconstruction - -So far our imagined Society has done no more than to seek and give -information. It has, it is true, listened to propagandists and Utopians, -and has published extracts from their testimony; but even this has been -not to agitate but to inform; that such and such opinions are held by -such and such men, and by such and such a number of men, is also a point -of information. Merely to state facts is the essential thing, and the -extremely effective thing. But now there are certain functions which -such a Society might perform beyond the giving of facts--functions that -involve personal attitudes and interpretations. It may be possible for -our Society to take on these functions without detracting from the trust -reposed in its statements of fact. What are these functions? - -First of all, the stimulation of artistic production, and the extension -of artistic appreciation. Our Society, which is composed of rather staid -men, themselves not peculiarly fitted to pass judgment outside the field -of science, will invite, let us say, twenty of the most generally and -highly valued of English and American authors to form themselves into a -Committee on Literary Awards, as a branch of the Society for Social -Research. Imagine Thomas Hardy and George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells -and John Galsworthy and Rudyard Kipling and John Masefield and George -Moore and Joseph Conrad and W. D. Howells and Theodore Dreiser and many -more, telling the world every month, in individual instalments, their -judgment on current fiction, drama, poetry, English literature in -general; imagine the varied judgments printed with synoptic coördination -of the results as a way of fixing the standing of a book in the English -literary world; and judge of the stimulus that would reside in lists -signed by such names. Imagine another group of men, the literary élite -of France, making briefer reports on French literature; and other groups -in Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia; imagine the world getting -every month the judgment of Anatole France and Remain Rolland and -Gerhardt Hauptmann and Anton Tchekov and Georg Brandes on the current -literature of their peoples; imagine them making lists, too, of the best -books in all their literatures; imagine eager young men and women poring -over these conflicting lists, discussing them, making lists of their -own, and getting guidance so. And to the literary lists add monthly -reports, by a committee of the Society itself, on the best books in the -various fields of science. Finally, let the artists speak,--painters and -sculptors and all; let them say where excellence has dwelt this month in -their respective fields. There are hundreds of thousands who hunger for -such guidance as this plan would give. There are young people who -flounder about hopelessly because they find no guidance; young people -who are easily turned to fine work by the stimulus of responsible -judgment, and as easily lapse into the banalities of popular fiction and -popular magazines when this guiding stimulus fails to come. There are -thousands of people who would be glad to pay their modest contribution -to the support of any organization that would manage to get such -direction for them. Half the value of a university course lies in this, -that the teacher will suggest readings, judge books, and provide general -guidance for individual work. Perhaps the most valuable kind of -information in the world is that which guides one in the search for -information. Such guidance, given to all who ask for it, would go far to -save us from the mediocrity that almost stifles our national life.[305] - -And more; why should not the stimulation be for the producers as well as -for the consumers? Why should not some kind of award be made, say every -six months, to the authors adjudged best in their lines by their -qualified contemporaries? Why should such a book as _Jean Christophe_ -or _The Brothers Karamazov_ go unheralded except in fragmentary -individual ways? Why not reward such productions with a substantial -prize?--or, if that be impossible, by some presentation of certificate? -Even a "scrap of paper" would go a long way to stimulate the writer and -guide the reader. But why should not a money reward be possible? If rich -men will pay thousands upon thousands for the (perhaps) original works -of dead artists, why should they not turn their wealth into spiritual -gold by helping the often impecunious writers of the living day? It is a -convenient error to believe that financial aid would detract from the -independence of the creator: it would, did it come from men rewarding on -the basis of their own judgment; it would not if the judgment of the -world's men of letters should be taken as criterion. And perhaps fewer -Chattertons and Davidsons would mar the history of literature and art. - -This direction of attention to what is best and greatest in the work of -our age is a matter of deeper moment than superficial thought can grasp. -If, by some such method, the meaning of "success" could be freed from -monetary implication and attached rather to excellence in art and -science, the change would have almost inestimably far-reaching results. -Men worship money, as has often been pointed out,[306] not for its own -sake, nor for the material good it brings, but for the prestige of -success that goes with its "conspicuous consumption"; let the artist -find more appreciation for his ability than the captain of industry -finds for his, and there will be a great release of energy from economic -exploitation to creative work in science, literature, and art. A large -part of the stimuli that prompt men to exploit their fellows will be -gone; and that richest of all incentives--social esteem--will go to -produce men eager to contribute to the general power and happiness of -the community.[307] - -The art impulse, as is generally believed, is a diversion of sex energy. -An organism is essentially not a food-getting but a reproductive -mechanism; the food-getting is a contributory incident in the -reproduction. As development proceeds the period of pregnancy and -adolescence increases, more of the offspring survive to maturity, large -broods, litters, or families become unnecessary, and more and more of -the energy that was sexual slides over into originally secondary -pursuits, like play and art. At the same time there is a gradual -diminution in pugnacity (which was another factor in the drama of -reproduction), and rivalry in games and arts encroaches more and more on -the emotional field once monopolized by strife for mates and food. The -game--a sort of Hegelian synthesis of hostility and sociability--takes -more and more the place of war, and artistic creation increasingly -replaces reproduction. - -If all this is anything more than theoretic skating over thin sheets of -fact, it means that one "way out" from our social perplexities lies in -the provision of stronger stimulus to creation and recreation, art and -games. It is a serious part of the social planner's work to find some -way of nourishing the art impulse wherever it appears, and drawing it on -by arranging rewards for its productions. And again we shall have to -understand that play is an important matter in a nation's life; that one -of the best signs for the future of America is the prevalence of healthy -athleticism; and that an attempt to widen these sport activities to -greater intersectional and international scope than they have yet -attained will get at some of the roots of international pugnacity. A -wise government would be almost as interested in the people's games as -in their schools, and would spend millions in making rivalry absorb the -dangerous energy of pugnacity. Olympic games should not be Olympic -games, occurring only with Olympiads; not a month should pass but great -athletes, selected by eliminative tests from every part of every -country, should meet, now here, now there, to match brawn and wits in -the friendly enmity of games. Let men know one another through games, -and they will not for slight reasons pass from sportsmanship to that -competitive destruction and deceit which our political Barnums call "the -defence of our national honor." - - -V - -Education - -This diversion of the sexual instinct into art and games (a prophylactic -which has long since been applied to individuals, and awaits application -to groups) must begin in the early days of personal development; so that -our Society for Social Research would, if it were to take on this task, -find itself inextricably mixed up with the vast problem of educational -method and aim. - -Here more than anywhere one hears the call for enlightenment and sees -the need for clarification. Here is an abundance of _'isms_ and a dearth -of knowledge. Most teachers use methods which they themselves consider -antiquated, and teach subjects which they will admit not one in a -hundred of their pupils will ever need to know. Curious lessons in -ethics are administered, which are seldom practised in the classroom, -and make initiative children come to believe that commandment-breaking -is heroic. Boys and girls bursting with vitality and the splendid -exuberance of youth are cramped for hours into set positions, while by a -sort of water-cure process knowledge is pumped into them from books -duller than a doctor's dissertation in philosophy. And so forth: the -indictment against our schools has been drawn up a thousand times and in -a thousand ways, and needs no reënforcement here. But though we have -indicted we have not made any systematic attempt to find just what is -wrong, and how, and where; and what may be done to remedy the evil. -Experiments have been made, but their bearings and results have been -very imperfectly recorded. - -Suppose now that our Society for Social Research should appoint a great -Committee on Education to hire expert investigators and make a thorough -attempt to clarify the issues in education. Here the function of -philosophy should be clear; for the educator touches at almost every -point those problems of values, individual and social, which are the -special hunting-ground of the philosopher. The importance of psychology -here is recognized, but the importance of biology and pathology has not -been seen in fit perspective. Why should not a special group of men be -set aside for years, if necessary, to study the applicability of the -several sciences to education? Why should not all scientific knowledge, -so far as it touches human nature, be focused on the semi-darkness in -which the educator works? - -Two special problems in this field invite research. One concerns the -effect, on national character and capacity, of a system of education -controlled by the government. The point was made by Spinoza, as may be -remembered, that a government will, if it controls the schools, aim to -restrain rather than to develop the energies of men. Kant remarked the -same difficulty. The function of education in the eyes of a dominant -class is to make men able to do skilled work but unable to do original -thinking (for all original thinking begins with destruction); the -function of education in the eyes of a government is to teach men that -eleventh commandment which God forgot to give to Moses: thou shalt love -thy country right or wrong. All this, of course, requires some -marvellous prestidigitation of the truth, as school text-books of -national history show. The ignorant, it seems, are the necessary ballast -in the ship of state. - -The alternative to such schools seems to be a return to private -education, with the rich man's son getting even more of a start on the -poor boy than he gets now. Is there a _tertium quid_ here? Perhaps this -is one point which a resolute effort to get the facts would clarify. -What does such governmentally-regulated education do to the forces of -personal difference and initiative? Will men and women educated in such -a way produce their maximum in art and thought and industry? Or will -they be automata, always waiting for a push? What different results -would come if the nationally-owned schools were to confine their work -absolutely to statements of fact, presentations of science, and were to -leave "character-moulding" and lessons in ethics to private persons or -institutions? Then at least each parent might corrupt his own child in -his own pet way; and there might be a greater number of children who -would not be corrupted at all. - -Another problem which might be advanced towards a solution by a little -light is that of giving higher education to those who want it but are -too poor to pay. There are certain studies, called above the social -disciplines, which help a man not so much to raise himself out of his -class and become a snob, as to get a better understanding of himself and -his fellow-men. Since mutual understanding is a hardly exaggerable -social good, why should not a way be found to provide for all who wish -it evening instruction in history, sociology, economics, psychology, -biology, philosophy, and similar fields of knowledge? Every added -citizen who has received instruction in these matters is a new asset to -the community; he will vote with more intelligence, he will work better -in coöperation, he will be less subject to undulations of social mania, -he will be a hint to all office-seekers to put their usual nonsense on -the shelf. Perhaps by this medium too our Society would spread its -reports and widen its influence. Imagine a nation of people instructed -in these sciences: with such a people civilization would begin. - -And then again, our busy-body Society would turn its research light on -the universities, and tell them a thing or two of what the light would -show. It would betray the lack of coördination among the various -sciences,--the department of psychology, for example, never coming to so -much as speaking terms with the department of economics; it would call -for an extension, perhaps, of the now infrequent seminars and -conferences between departments whose edges overlap, or which shed light -on a common field. It would invite the university to give less of its -time to raking over the past, and help it to orient itself toward the -future; it would suggest to every university that it provide an open -forum for the responsible expression of all shades of opinion; it would, -in general, call for a better organization of science as part of the -organization of intelligence; it would remind the universities that they -are more vital even than governments; and it might perhaps succeed in -getting engraved on the gates of every institution of learning the words -of Thomas Hobbes: "Seeing the universities are the foundation of civil -and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing -such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same upon the people, there -ought certainly to be great care taken to have it pure." - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE READER SPEAKS - - -I - -The Democratization of Aristocracy - -And now we stop for objections. - -"This plan is a hare-brained scheme for a new priesthood and a new -aristocracy. It would put a group of college professors and graduates -into a position where they could do almost as they please. You think you -avoid this by telling the gentlemen that they must limit themselves to -the statement of fact; but if you knew the arts of journalism you would -not make so naïve a distinction between airing opinions and stating -facts. When a man buys up a newspaper what he wants to do is not so much -to control the editorials as to 'edit' the news,--that is, to select the -facts which shall get into print. It's wonderful what lies you can -spread without telling lies. For example, if you want to hurt a public -man, you quote all his foolish speeches and ignore his wise ones; you -put his mistakes into head-lines and hide his achievements in a corner. -I will guarantee to prove anything I like, or anything I don't like, -just by stating facts. So with your Society for Social Research; it -would become a great political, rather than an educational, -organization; it would almost unconsciously select its information to -suit its hobbies. Why, the thing is psychologically impossible. If you -want something to be true you will be half blind and half deaf to -anything that obstructs your desire; that is the way we're made. And -even if nature did not attend to this, money would: as soon as your -society exercised real power on public opinion it would be bought up, in -a gentle, sleight-o'hand way, by some economic group; a few of the more -influential members of the Society would be 'approached,' some 'present' -would be made, and justice would have another force to contend with. No; -your Society won't do." - - * * * * * - -Well, let us see. Here you have a body of 5000 men; rather a goodly -number for even an American millionaire to purchase. They wish to -investigate, say, the problem of birth-control; what do they do? They -vote, without nominations, for six of their number to manage the -investigation; the six men receiving the highest vote investigate and -write out a report. Now if any report were published which misstated -facts, or omitted important items, the fault would at once diminish the -repute and influence of the Society. Let merely the suspicion get about -that these reports are unfair, and the Society would begin to decay. -That is, the power of the Society would grow with its fairness and fall -with its unfairness,--a very happy arrangement. The fear of this fall in -influence would be the best incentive to impartial reports. Every -committee would feel that the future of the Society depended on the -fairness of its own report; and every man on every committee would -hesitate before making himself responsible for the disrepute of the -Society; he would feel himself on trial before his fellow-members, and -would halt himself in the natural slide into partiality. - -Not that he would always succeed; men are men. But it is reasonable to -expect that men working under these conditions would be considerably -more impartial than the average newspaper. Again, who is as impartial as -the scientist? One cannot do much in science without a stern control of -the personal equation; to describe protozoa, for example, as one would -like them to be, is no very clever way of attaining repute in -protozoölogy. This is not so true in the social as in the physical -sciences, though even in this new field scientific fairness and accuracy -are rapidly increasing. One can get more reliable and impartial reports -of an industrial situation,--_e.g._, of the Colorado troubles,--from the -scientific investigators than from either side to the controversy. The -very deficiencies of the student type--incapacity for decisions or for -effective methods in action--involve a compensatory grasp of -understanding and impartiality of attitude. Our best guarantee against -dishonesty is not virtue but intelligence, and our Society is supposed -to be a sort of distilled intelligence. - -That the scheme savors of aristocracy is not to its discredit. We need -aristocracy, in the sense of better methods for giving weight to -superior brains; we need a touch of Plato in our democracy. After all, -the essence of the plan, as we have said, is the democratization of -Plato and Nietzsche and Carlyle; the intelligent man gets more political -power, but only through the mechanism of democracy. His greater power -comes not by his greater freedom to do what he pleases despite the -majority, but by improved facilities for enlightening and converting the -majority. Democracy, ideally, means only that the aristocracy is -periodically elected and renewed; and this is a plan whereby the -aristocrats--the really best--shall be more clearly seen to be so. -Furthermore, the plan avoids the great defect of Plato's scheme,--that -philosophers are not fitted for executive and administrative work, that -those skilled to see are very seldom also able to do. Here the -philosopher, the man who gets at the truth, rules, but only indirectly, -and without the burdens of office and execution. And indeed it is not -the philosopher who rules, but truth. The liberator is made king. - - -II - -The Professor as Buridan's Ass - -"You have anticipated my objection, and cleverly twisted it into an -argument. But that would be too facile an escape; you must face more -squarely the fact that your professors are mere intellectualist -highbrows, incapable of understanding the real issues involved in our -social war, and even more incapable of suggesting practical ways out. -The more you look the more you see; the more you see, the less you do. -You think that reflection leaves you peace of mind; it doesn't, it -leaves your mind in pieces. The intellectual is like Dr. Buridan's ass: -he is so careful to stand in the middle that he never gives a word of -practical advice, for fear that he will compromise himself and fracture -a syllogism. The trouble is that we think too much, not too little; we -make thinking a substitute for action. Really, as Rousseau argued, -thinking is unnatural; what the world needs is men who can make up their -minds and then march on, almost in blinders, to a goal. We know enough, -we know too much; and surely we have a plethora of investigating -committees. A committee is just a scientific way of doing nothing. Your -plan would flood the country with committees and leave courage buried -under facts. You should call your organization a Society for -Talky-talk." - -The only flaw in this argument is that it does not touch the proposal. -What is suggested is not that the Society take action or make -programmes, much less execute them; we ask our professors merely to do -for a larger public, and more thoroughly and systematically, what we are -glad to have them do for a small number of us in college and university. -Action is _ex hypothesi_ left to others; the function of the researcher -is quite simply to look and tell us what he sees. That he is a highbrow, -an intellectual, and even a Buridan's ass, does not interfere with his -seeing; nobody ever argued that Buridan's ass was blind. - -We forget that seeing is itself an art. Some of us have specialized in -the art, and have naturally failed to develop cleverness in practical -affairs. But that does not mean that our special talent cannot be used -by the community, any more than Sir Oliver Lodge's fondness for -celestial exploration makes us reject his work on electricity. Thinking -is itself a form of action, and not the easiest nor the least effective. -It is true that "if you reflect too much you will never accomplish -anything," but if you reflect too little you will accomplish about as -much. We make headway only by the head way. Action without forethought -tends to follow a straight line; but in life the straight line is often -the longest distance between two points, because, as Leonardo said, the -straightest line offers the greatest resistance. Thought is roundabout, -and loves flank attacks. The man of action rushes into play -courageously, succeeds now, fails then; and sooner or later wishes--if -he lives to wish--that he could think more. The increasing dependence of -industry on scientific research, and of politics on expert -investigators, shows how the world is coming to value the man whose -specialty is seeing. Faith in intellect, as Santayana says, "is the only -faith yet sanctioned by its fruit."[308] The two most important men in -America just now are, or have been, college professors. To speak still -more boldly: the greatest single human source of good in our generation -is the "intellectual" researcher and professor. The man to be feared -above all others is the man who can see. - - -III - -Is Information Wanted? - -"But your whole scheme shows a very amateur knowledge of human nature. -You seem to think you can get people interested in fact. You can't; fact -is too much against their interest. If the facts favor their wish, they -are interested; if not, they forget them. The hardest thing in the world -is to listen to truth that threatens to frustrate desire. That is why -people won't listen to your reports, unless you tell them what they want -to hear. They will--and perhaps excusably--prefer the bioscope to your -embalmed statistics; just as they will prefer to read _The Family -Herald_ rather than the subtleties recommended by the Mutual Admiration -Society which you would make out of our men of letters. You can -investigate till you are blue in the face, and all you will get out of -it won't be worth the postage stamps you use. Public opinion doesn't -follow fact, it follows desire; people don't vote for a man because he -is supported by 'truth' but because he promises to do something they -like. And the man who makes the biggest promises to the biggest men will -get office ninety-nine times out of a hundred, no matter what the facts -are. What counts is not truth but money." - - * * * * * - -This is the basic difficulty. Is it worth while to spread information? -Think how much information is spread every week in Europe and -America;--the world remaining the while as "wicked" as it probably ever -was. Public opinion is still, it seems, as Sir Robert Peel described it -to be: "a compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right -feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs,"[309]--particularly the -paragraphs. Once we thought that the printing-press was the beginning of -democracy, that Gutenberg had enfranchised the world. Now it appears -that print and plutocracy get along very well together. Nevertheless the -hope of the weak lies in numbers and in information; in democracy and -in print. "The remedy for the abuses of public opinion is not to -discredit it but to instruct it."[310] The cure for misstatements is -better statements. If the newspapers are used to spread falsehood that -is no reason why newspapers should not be used to spread truth. After -all, the spread of information has done many things,--killed dogma, -sterilized many marriages, and even prevented wars; and there is no -reason why a further spread may not do more valuable things than any yet -done. It has been said, so often that we are apt to admit it just to -avoid its repetition, that discussion effects nothing. But indeed -nothing else effects anything. Whatever is done without information and -discussion is soon undone, must be soon undone; all that bears time is -that which survives the test of thought. All problems are at last -problems in information: to find out just how things stand is the only -finally effective way of getting at anything. - -As to the limited number of persons who would be reached by the reports, -let us not ask too much. There is no pretence here that the great mass -of the people would be reached; no doubt these would go on living what -Wells calls the "normal social life." But these people do not count for -constructive purposes; they divide about evenly in every election. The -men who do count--the local leaders, the clergymen, the lecturers, the -teachers, the union officials, the newspaper men, the "agitators," the -arch-rebels and the arch-Tories,--all these men will be reached; and the -information given will strengthen some and weaken others, and so play -its effective part in the drama of social change. Each one of these men -will be a center for the further distribution of information. Imagine a -new monthly with a country-wide circulation of one million _voters_ -(that is, a general circulation of five million); would such a -periodical have power?--would not millions be given to control it? Well, -here we have more power, because not so concentrated in a few editorial -hands, not so easily purchaseable, and based on better intellect and -repute. The money that would be paid at any time for the control of a -periodical of such influence would finance our Society for many years. - -It is impossible to believe that such a spread of knowledge as is here -suggested would do nothing to elevate the moral and political life of -the country. Consider the increased scrupulousness with which a -Congressman would vote if he knew that at the next election his record -would be published in cold print in a hundred newspapers, over the name -of the Society for Social Research. Consider the effect, on -Congressional appropriations for public buildings, of a plain statement -of the population and size of the towns which require such colossal -edifices for their mail. Publicity, it has been said, is the only cure -for bad motives. Consider the stimulus which such reports would give to -political discussion everywhere. Hardly a dispute occurs which is not -based upon insufficient acquaintance with the facts; here would be -information up to date, ready to give the light which dispels the heat. -Men would turn to these reports all the more willingly because the -reports were pledged to confine themselves to fact. Men would find here -no attacks, no argument, no theory or creed; it would be refreshing, in -some ways, to bathe the mind, hot with contention, in these cool streams -of fact, and to emerge cleansed of error and filled with the vitality of -truth. We have spent so much time attacking what we hate that we have -not stopped to tell people what we like; if we would only affirm more -and deny less there would be less of cross-purpose in the world. And -information is affirmation. It would not open the wounds of controversy -so much as offer points of contact; and in the light of fact, enemies -might see that their good lay for the most part on a common road. If you -want to change a foe into a friend (or, some cynic will say, a friend -into a foe), give him information. - - -IV - -Finding Mæcenas - -"Well; suppose you are right. Suppose information, as you say, is king. -How are you going to do it? Do you really think you will get some -benevolent millionaire to finance you? And will you, like Fourier, wait -in your room every day at noon for the man who will turn your dream into -a fact?" - - * * * * * - -What we tend to forget about rich men is that besides being rich they -are men. There are a surprising number of them--particularly those who -have inherited money--who are eager to return to the community the -larger part of their wealth, if only they could be shown a way of doing -it which would mean more than a change of pockets. Merely to give to -charity is, in Aristotle's phrase, to pour water into a leaking cask. -What such men want is a way of increasing intelligence; they know from -hard experience that in the end intelligence is the quality to be -desired and produced. They have spent millions, perhaps billions, on -education; and this plan of ours is a plan for education. If it is what -it purports to be, some one of these men will offer to finance it. - -And not only one. Let the beginnings of our Society be sober and -efficient, let its first investigations be thorough and intelligent, let -its initial reports be impartial, succinct, illuminating and simple, and -further help will come almost unasked. After a year of honest and -capable work our Society would find itself supported by rather a group -of men than by one man; it might conceivably find itself helped by the -state, at the behest of the citizens. What would prevent a candidate for -governor from declaring his intention that should he be elected he would -secure an annual appropriation for our Society?--and why should not the -voters be attracted by such a declaration? Why should not the voters -demand such a declaration? - -Nor need we fear that a Society so helped by the rich man and the state -would turn into but one more instrumentality of obstructionism. Not that -such an organization of intelligence would be "radical": the words -"radical" and "conservative" have become but instruments of calumny, and -truth slips between them. But in the basic sense of the word our Society -would be extremely radical; for there is nothing so radical, so -revolutionary, as just to tell the truth, to say what it is you see. -That surely is to go to the radix of the thing. And truth has this -advantage, that it is discriminately revolutionary: there are some -things old to which truth is no enemy, just as there are some things new -which will melt in the glare of fact. Let the fact say. - -This is the final faith: that truth will make us free, so far as we can -ever be free. Let the truth be published to the world, and men separated -in the dark will see one another, and one another's purposes, more -clearly, and with saner understanding than before. The most disastrous -thing you can do to an evil is to describe it. Let truth be told, and -the parasite will lose his strength through shame, and meanness will -hide its face. Only let information be given to all and freely, and it -will be a cleansing of our national blood; enmity will yield to open and -honest opposition, where it will not indeed become coöperation. All we -need is to see better. Let there be light. - - -V - -The Chance of Philosophy - -"One more objection before you take the money. And that is: What on -earth has all this to do with philosophy? I can understand that to have -economists on your investigating committees, and biologists, and -psychologists, and historians, would be sensible; but what could a -philosopher do? These are matters for social science, not for -metaphysics. Leave the philosophers out and some of us may take your -scheme seriously." - - * * * * * - -It is a good objection, if only because it shows again the necessity for -a new kind of philosopher. Merely to make such an objection is to -reënforce the indictment brought above against the philosopher as he is. -But what of the philosopher as he might be? - -What might the philosopher be? - -Well, first of all, he would be a living man, and not an annotator of -the past. He would have grown freely, his initial spark of divine fire -unquenched by scholastic inflexibilities of discipline and study. He -would have imbibed no sermons, but his splendid curiosity would have -found food and encouragement from his teachers. He would have lived in -and learned to love the country and the city; he would be at home in the -ploughed fields as well as in the centres of learning; he would like the -cleansing solitude of the woods and yet too the invigorating bustle of -the city streets. He would be brought up on Plato and Thucydides, -Leonardo and Michelangelo, Bacon and Montaigne; he would study the -civilization of Greece and that of the Renaissance on all sides, joining -the history of politics, economics, and institutions with that of -science, literature, and philosophy; and yet he would find time to study -his own age thoroughly. He would be interested in life, and full of it; -he would jump into campaigns, add his influence carefully to movements -he thought good, and help make the times live up more nearly to their -possibilities. He would not shut himself up forever in laboratories, -libraries, and lecture rooms; he would live more widely than that. He -would be of the earth earthly, of the world worldly. He would not talk -of ideals in the abstract and do nothing for them in the concrete; above -all else in the world he would abhor the kind of talk that is a refuge -from the venture and responsibility of action. He would not only love -wisdom, he would live it. - -But we must not make our ideal philosopher too repulsively perfect. Let -us agree at least to this, that a man who should know the social -disciplines, and not merely one science, would be of help in some such -business as we have been proposing; and if we suppose that he has not -only knowledge but wisdom, that his acquaintance with the facts of -science is matched by his knowledge of life, that through fellowship -with genius in Greece and Florence he has acquired a fund of wisdom -which needs but the nourishment of living to grow richer from day to -day,--then we are on the way to seeing that this is the sort of man our -Society would need above all other sorts of men. Such philosophers would -be worthy to guide research and direct the enlightenment of the world; -such philosophers might be to their generation what Socrates and Plato -were to their generations and Francis Bacon to his; such a philosophy, -in Nietzsche's words, might rule! - -This is the chance of philosophy. It may linger further in that calm -death of social ineffectiveness in which we see it sinking; or it may -catch the hands of the few philosophers who insist on focusing thought -on life, and so regain the position which it alone is fitted to fill. -Unless that position is filled, and properly, all the life of the world -is zigzag and fruitless,--what we have called the logic-chopping life; -and unless that position is filled philosophy too is logic-chopping, -zigzag, and fruitless, and turns away from life men whom life most -sorely needs. There are some among us, even some philosophers among us, -who are eager to lead the way out of bickering into discussion, out of -criticism into construction, out of books into life. We must keep a keen -eye for such men, and their beginnings; and we must strengthen them with -our little help. Philosophy is too divinely splendid a thing to be kept -from the most divine of things,--creation. Some of us love it as the -very breath of our lives; it is our vital medium, without which life -would be less than vegetation; and we will not rest so long as the name -_philosopher_ means anything less aspiring and inspiring than it did -with Plato. Science flourishes and philosophy languishes, because -science is honest and philosophy sycophantic, because science touches -life and helps it, while philosophy shrinks fearfully and helplessly -away. If philosophy is to live again, it must rediscover life, it must -come back into the cave, it must come down from the "real" and -transcendental world and play its venturesome part in the hard and happy -world of efforts and events. - -It is the chance of philosophy. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -See now, in summary, how modest a suggestion it is, grandiloquent though -it may have seemed. We propose no _'ism_, we make no programme; we -suggest, tentatively, a method. We propose a new start, a new tack, a -new approach,--not to the exclusion of other approaches, but to their -assistance. If this thing should be done, it would not mean that other -gropers toward a better world would have to stand idle; it would but -give light to them that walk in darkness. And it would make possible a -more generous coöperation among the different currents in the stream of -reconstructive thought. - -We are a little discouraged to-day; we lovers of the new have become -doubtful of the object of our love. Perhaps--we sometimes feel--all this -effort is a vain circling in the mist; perhaps we do not advance, but -only move. Our faith in progress is dimmed. We even tire of the "social -problem"; we have tried so many ways, knocked at so many doors, and -found so little of that which we sought. Sometimes, in the lassitude of -mistaken effort and drear defeat, we almost think that the social -problem is never to find even partial solution, that it is not a -problem but a limitation, a limitation forever. We need a new -beginning, a new impetus,--perhaps a new delusion? - -See, too, how the thought of our five teachers lies concentrated and -connected in this new approach: what have we done but renew concretely -the Socratic plea for intelligence, the Platonic hope for -philosopher-kings, Bacon's dream of knowledge organized and ruling the -world, Spinoza's gentle insistence on democracy as the avenue of -development, and Nietzsche's passionate defence of aristocracy and -power? There was something in us that thrilled at Plato's conception of -a philosophy that could guide as well as dissect our social life; but -there was another something in us that hesitated before his plan of -slavery as the basis of it all. We felt that we would rather be free and -miserable than bound and filled. Why should a man feed himself if his -feet are chained, and he must never move? And we were inspired, too, by -the demand that the best should rule, that they should have power fitted -to their worth; we should be glad to find some way whereby the best -could have power, could rule, and yet with the consent of all,--we -wanted an aristocracy sanctioned by democracy, a social order standing -on the broad base of free citizenship and wide coöperation. Socrates -shows us how to use Bacon to reconcile Plato and Nietzsche with Spinoza: -intelligence will organize intelligence so that superior worth may have -superior influence and yet work with and through the will of all. - - * * * * * - -And here at the end comes a thought that some of us perhaps have had -more than once as this discussion advanced: What could the Church do for -the organization of intelligence? - -It could do wonderful things. It has power, organization, facilities, -through which the gospel of "the moral obligation to be intelligent" -could be preached to a wider audience than any newspaper could reach. -And among the clergy are hundreds of young men who have found new -inspiration in the figure of Jesus seen through the aspirations of -democracy; hundreds eager to do their part in any work that will lessen -the misery of men. What if they were to find in this organization of -intelligence a focus for their labor?--what if they should not only -themselves undertake the studies which would fit them for membership in -the Society, but should also make it their business to stir up in all -who might come to them the spirit of the seeker, to incite them to read -religiously the reports of the Society, to call on them to spread abroad -the good news of truth to be had for the asking? What if these men -should make their churches extension centers for the educational work of -the Society,--giving freely the use of their halls and even contributing -to the expense of organizing classes and paying for skilled instruction? -What if they should see in the spread of intelligence the best avenue -to that wide friendship which Jesus so passionately preached? What -better way is there to make men love one another than to make men -understand one another? True charity comes only with clarity,--just as -"mercy" is but justice that understands. Surely the root of all evil is -the inability to see clearly that which is; how better can religion -combat evil than to preach clarity as the beginning of social -redemption? - - * * * * * - -One of the many burdens that drag on the soul is a knowledge of the -past. It is a strong man who can know history and keep his courage; a -great dream that can face the fact and live. We look at those flitting -experiments called civilizations: we see them rise one after another, we -see them produce and produce and produce, we feel the weight of their -accumulating wealth; still visionable to us the busyness of geniuses and -slaves piling stone upon stone and making pyramids to greet the stars, -still audible the voices of Socrates in the agora and of old Plato -passing quietly among the students in the grove, still haunting us the -white faces of martyrs in the amphitheatres of Rome: and then the -pyramids stand bare and lonely, the voices of Greek genius are hushed, -the Colosseum is a ruin and a memory; one after another these peoples -pass, these wonderful peoples, greater perhaps, wiser and nobler -perhaps, than the peoples of our time; and we almost choke with the -heavy sense of a vast futility encompassing the world. Some of us turn -away then from the din of effort, and seek in resignation the comfort of -a living death; some others find in the doubt and difficulty the zest -and reward of the work. After all, the past is not dead, it has not -failed; only the vileness of it is dead, gone with the winnowing of -time; that which was great and worthy lives and works and is real. Plato -speaks to us still, speaks to millions and millions of us; and the blood -of martyrs is the seed of saints. We speak and pass, but the word -remains. Effort is not lost. Not to have tried is the only failure, the -only misery; all effort is happiness, all effort is success. And so -again we write ourselves in books and stone and color, and smile in the -face of time; again we hear the call of the work, that it be done: - - Edens that wait the wizardry of thought, - Beauty that craves the touch of artist hands, - Truth that but hungers to be felt or seen; - -and again we are hot with the passion for perfection. We will remake. We -will wonder and desire and dream and plan and try. We are such beings as -dream and plan and try; and the glory of our defeats dims the splendor -of the sun. We will take thought and add a cubit to our stature; we will -bring intelligence to the test and call it together from all corners of -the earth; we will harness the genius of the race and renew creation. - -We will remake. - -Printed in the United States of America. - - * * * * * - -The following pages contain advertisements of a few of the Macmillan -books on kindred subjects. - - -Poverty and Social Progress - -BY MAURICE PARMELEE, PH.D. - -_Cloth, crown 8vo, 477 pp., $1.90_ - -"Suitable for college classes as well as for the general reader, and -contains a great mass of material of value to the citizen who really -wants to know."--_Independent._ - -"A very competent presentation of the various social factors that go to -make up the problem of poverty."--_Churchman._ - -"A most useful and educative book. It would be well if every -serious-minded person interested in social welfare would read this calm, -impartial survey of the problems of poverty, and learn from it that -poverty is not a spontaneous phenomenon, and that it could be -practically wiped out by the reorganization of society. The book is -offered for use as a text for college courses on charities, poverty, -pauperism, dependency, and the like, but its most useful place is in the -hands of the worker, the producer, the business man and woman, the -serious shapers and makers of the present economic state of -society."--_American Review of Reviews._ - -"Promoters of the democratic and humanitarian movement of our time will -find this volume replete with valuable data and stimulating to close and -careful thinking. Dr. Parmelee defines social progress as advancement -toward realization of a normal human life for all mankind. He shows this -obstructed by poverty in so many ways that there is no panacea for it, -and a variety of remedies are requisite. The chief obstructions being in -the production and distribution of wealth, his discussion centers mainly -in the problems of these."--_Outlook._ - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -The Great Society - -A Psychological Analysis - -BY GRAHAM WALLAS - -Author of "Human Nature in Politics" - -_Cloth, crown 8vo, 383 pp., $2.00_ - -Graham Wallas's new book, "The Great Society," will be equally -interesting to the psychologists, students of sociology, politics and -the general reader. Mr. Wallas is a man of wide connections in England, -a man whose experience has well fitted him for the task which he has -essayed. He has been for many years a university extension lecturer; he -was at one time a member of the school-board of London, chairman of the -School Management Committee, a member of the Technical Education Board, -of the London County Council and of the Education Committee of that -council. He has been, since 1896, a lecturer at the London School of -Economics. He has served on the Senate of London University, as -university reader in political science and on the Royal Commission on -Civil Service. He has written more or less widely, his most popular -publication being, perhaps, "Human Nature in Politics." - -The present work, a portion of which was delivered last winter as the -Lowell Lecture in Boston, begins with an exposition of what the author -means by the term "The Great Society." It then proceeds to a -consideration of the following topics: Disposition, Social Psychology, -Instinct and Intelligence, Disposition and Environment, Habit, Fear, -Pleasure, Pain, Happiness, The Psychology of the Crowd, Love and Hatred, -Thought, The Organization of Thought, The Organization of Will, and the -Organization of Happiness. - -"His deft and almost subtle grasp of the viewpoints of the philosophic -factors in history; his focusing of a theory into the tiny sunspot of an -illuminant sentence, and adopting a style that is as inviting and -penetrating as Havelock Ellis, make the book one of sustained -interest"--_Galveston Daily News._ - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -The Social Problem - -_A CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS_ - -BY CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, PH.D. - -Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri, Author of -"Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects," "Sociology and Modern Social -Problems," etc. - -_Cloth, 12mo, 255 pp., $1.25_ - -This work is a brief analysis of the social problem in Western -civilization. It outlines a scientific social philosophy which can serve -as a basis for a well-balanced progress. The author points out that the -present crisis in our civilization calls for a reconstruction of our -social philosophy; for we cannot build anew the structure of Western -society upon the inadequate bases of eighteenth and nineteenth century -thought. The book indicates the direction which our social thinking must -take if we are to avoid revolution, on the one hand, and reaction, on -the other. It aims to furnish a scientific basis for the progressive -social movement; and it is commended to progressives in whatever class, -party, or sect they may happen to find themselves. The attitude of the -book is thoroughly positive and constructive toward all the essential -values of our civilization. - -"'The Social Problem' by Professor Charles A. Ellwood is one of the best -books of the kind I have ever seen. The subject is handled in a -masterful way. The best books I read in my field ordinarily do not gain -more than eighty-five or ninety per cent of my assent. This book, -however, I would endorse to ninety-eight or ninety-nine per cent. - -"It is not only sound in its general positions, but sound in details. -Every statement is guarded and weighty. There is a fine sense of the -value of words, there is no duplication, and the author reaches his goal -with the fewest possible sentences. I know of no book upon the social -problem, which can command so completely the endorsement of social -thinkers everywhere."--_Professor Edward A. Ross of the University of -Wisconsin, Author of "The Changing Chinese," "Social Psychology," etc._ - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -_AMERICAN SOCIAL PROGRESS SERIES_ - - -The City Worker's World in America - -BY MARY KINGSBURY SIMKHOVITCH - -_Director of Greenwich House_ - -_Cloth, 12mo, $1.25_ - - A new volume in the American Social Progress Series edited by - SAMUEL MCCUNE LINDSAY. LL. D. - - A plain description of the facts of the city dweller's life, with - some indications of the evolutionary process going on at the city's - heart. - - -Social Reform and the Constitution - -BY FRANK J. GOODNOW - -_12mo, $1.50_ - - "The work is well worth not only reading but study and is a decided - contribution to the literature of the subject."--_Boston - Transcript._ - - -The New Basis of Civilization - -BY SIMON N. PATTEN - -_12mo, $1.00_ - - "The book is valuable and inspiring in its general conception and - guiding principles. Social workers will welcome it, and moralists - should greatly profit by its teachings." - ---_Chicago Evening Post._ - - -Standards of Public Morality - - -BY ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY - -_12mo, $1.00_ - - "The book is worth reading not only once, but twice."--_New York - Times._ - - -Misery and Its Causes - -BY EDWARD T. DEVINE - -_12mo. $1.25_ - - "One of the most vital and helpful books on social problems ever - published." - ---_Congregationalist and Christian World._ - - -Governmental Action for Social Welfare - -BY JEREMIAH W. JENKS - -_12mo, $1.00_ - - "Professor Jenks' little book ought to be in the hands of every - member of every legislature in the country."--_Review of Reviews._ - - -The Social Basis of Religion - -BY SIMON N. PATTEN - -_12mo, $1.25_ - - "It is a work of deep thought and abundant research. Those who read - it will find their ideas and thoughts quickened and will be sure - that their time has been profitably spent." - ---_Salt Lake Tribune._ - - -The Church and Society - -BY R. FULTON CUTTING - -_12mo, $1.25_ - - "A stimulating and informing little book."--_Boston Herald._ - - -The Juvenile Court - -BY THOMAS D. ELIOT - -_12mo, $1.25_ - - "Another volume which will repay careful reading--the most useful - treatise on youthful criminology."--_Providence Journal._ - - -Social Insurance: A Program for Social Reform - -BY HENRY ROGERS SEAGER - -_12mo, $1.00_ - - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Class-lectures. As Bacon has it, Aristotle, after the Ottoman -manner, did not believe that he could rule securely unless he first put -all his brothers to death. - -[2] The _Dialexeis_; cf. Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, New York, 1901, vol. -i, p. 404. - -[3] Gompers, vol. i, p. 403. - -[4] Botsford and Sihler, _Hellenic Civilization_, New York, 1915, p. 430. - -[5] _Ibid._, p. 340, etc. - -[6] And sincerely, says Burnet, because he had gone through radicalism -to scepticism, and felt that one convention was as good as another. - -[7] Cf. Henry Jackson, article "Sophists," _Encyclopædia Britannica_, -eleventh edition. - -[8] _History of Ethics_, London, 1892, p. 24. - -[9] _Op. cit._, vol. ii, 1905, p. 67. - -[10] _History of Greece_, vol. viii, p. 134. - -[11] _Morals in Evolution_, New York, 1915, p. 556. - -[12] Henry Jackson, article "Socrates," _Encyclopædia Britannica_, -eleventh edition. - -[13] _Twilight of the Idols_, London, 1915, p. 15. For Nietzsche's -answer to Nietzsche, cf. _ibid._, p. 57: "To accustom the eye to -calmness, to patience, and to allow things to come up to it; to defer -judgment, and to acquire the habit of approaching and grasping an -individual case from all sides,--this is the first preparatory schooling -of intellectuality," this is one of "the three objects for which we need -educators.... One must not respond immediately to a stimulus; one must -acquire a command of the obstructing and isolating instincts. To learn -to see, as I understand this matter, amounts almost to that which in -popular language is called 'strength of will': its essential feature -is precisely ... to be able to postpone one's decision.... All lack of -intellectuality, all vulgarity, arises out of the inability to resist a -stimulus." - -[14] "Why art thou sad? Assuredly thou hast performed some sacred -duty?"--Bazarov in Turgenev's _Fathers and Children_, 1903, p. 185. - -[15] "Morality is the effort to throw off sleep.... I have never yet -met a man who was wide awake. How could I have looked him in the -face?"--Thoreau, _Walden_, New York, 1899, p. 92. - -[16] What happens when I "see the better and approve it, but follow the -worse," is that an end later approved as "better"--_i.e._, better for -me--is at the time obscured by the persistent or recurrent suggestion of -an end temporarily more satisfying, but eventually disappointing. Most -self-reproach is the use of knowledge won _post factum_ to criticise -a self that had to adventure into action unarmed with this hindsight -wisdom. - -[17] _Gorgias_, p. 521. - -[18] 399 B.C. - -[19] _Epistles_, viii, 325. - -[20] "When the soul does not speak in dialogue it is not in -difficulty."--Professor Wood bridge, in class. - -[21] "If we look for a system of philosophy in Plato, we shall -probably not find it; but if we look for none we may find most of the -philosophies ever written."--Professor Woodbridge. - -[22] _Phædrus_, 244. - -[23] _Sophist_, 247. - -[24] _Laws_, 765-6. - -[25] _Republic_, 425. - -[26] _Protagoras_, 325. - -[27] _Republic_, 536. - -[28] _Laws_, 804. - -[29] _Ibid._, 810. - -[30] _Republic_, 375. - -[31] _Ibid._, 410. - -[32] _Laws_, 810. - -[33] _Republic_, 539. - -[34] _Republic_, 537. - -[35] _Republic_, 184. - -[36] _Ibid._, 473. - -[37] The passage, abbreviated, follows: "First, then, let us consider -what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. -Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and -build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work -in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially -clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat -and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; these they -will serve up on a mat of reeds or clean leaves, themselves reclining -the while upon beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children -will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands -on their heads, and having the praises of the gods on their lips, living -in sweet society, and having a care that their families do not exceed -their means; for they will have an eye to poverty or war.... Of course -they will have a relish,--salt, and olives, and cheese, and onions, and -cabbages or other country herbs which are fit for boiling; and we shall -give them a dessert of figs, and pulse, and beans, and myrtle-berries, -and beech-nuts, which they will roast at the fire, drinking in -moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace -to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after -them."--_Republic_, 372. Cf. The Rousseauian anthropology of _Laws_, 679. - -[38] _Republic_, 372-3. - -[39] Much of modern criticism of democracy finds its inspiration in -Plato. Cf. Bernard Shaw: "The democratic politician remains exactly -as Plato described him." Cf. also the _Modern Utopia_ and _Research -Magnificent_ of H. G. Wells. Nietzsche's debt to Plato will appear in a -later chapter. - -[40] "Omnia communia inter nos habemus, praeter mulieres." - -[41] Let us remember that a property-qualification for the vote remained -in our own political system till the time of Jefferson, and has in our -own day been resuscitated in some of the Southern states. - -[42] _Laws_, 783. - -[43] _Republic_, 403 - -[44] _Protagoras_, 322. - -[45] Plato, says Cleanthes, "cursed as impious him who first sundered -the just from the useful."--Gomperz, ii, 73. Cf. _Republic_, 331. - -[46] Edmund Gosse, _Life of Henrik Ibsen_, p. 100, note. - -[47] Nietzsche, _Beyond Good and Evil_, pref. - -[48] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, New York, 1910, p. 21. - -[49] Cf. _De Augmentis_, bk. viii, ch. 2. - -[50] _Advancement of Learning_, Boston, 1863, bk. i. - -[51] _Philosophical Works_, ed. J. M. Robertson, London, 1805, p. 33. - -[52] _Novum Organum_, i, 65. - -[53] _Advancement of Learning_, p. 133. - -[54] Called by Bacon the "first vintage." - -[55] _Novum Organum_, ii, 2. - -[56] Preface to _Magna Instauratio_. - -[57] _Novum Organum_, pref. - -[58] _Novum Organum_, i, 129. - -[59] _Ibid._, i, 92. - -[60] _Ibid._, i, 113. - -[61] _Advancement of Learning_, bk. ii, ch. 1. - -[62] _Novum Organum_, i, 61. - -[63] _Advancement of Learning_, bk. i, ch. 1. - -[64] _Ibid._, bk. ii, ch. 1. - -[65] _New Atlantis_, Cambridge University Press, 1900, p. 22. - -[66] _Ibid._, p. 24. - -[67] Pp. 44, 45. - -[68] P. 43. - -[69] P. 34. - -[70] J. M. Robertson, preface to _Philosophical Works_. - -[71] Robert Adamson, article "Bacon," _Encyclopædia Britannica_. - -[72] Cf. preface to _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_. - -[73] _Novum Organum_, i, 81. - -[74] _Advancement of Learning_, p. 207. - -[75] _Ibid._, p. 131. - -[76] _Advancement of Learning._, bk. i. - -[77] Professor Woodbridge, class-lectures. - -[78] Turgenev, in _Fathers and Children_. - -[79] This division into saints and sinners must be taken with -reservations, of course. In many respects Descartes belongs to the -second group, and in some respects James and Comte belong to the first. -But the dichotomy clarifies, if only by exaggeration. - -[80] L. Ward, _Pure Sociology_, p. 16. - -[81] Buckle, _History of Civilization_, i, 138. - -[82] Special acknowledgment for some of the material of this chapter -is due to R. A. Duff, _Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy_, -Glasgow, 1903. - -[83] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 17. - -[84] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 1. - -[85] _Will to Power_, vol. i, § 95. - -[86] Cf. Duff, _op. cit._, pref.: "It can be shown that Spinoza had no -interest in metaphysics for its own sake, while he was passionately -interested in moral and political problems. He was a metaphysician at -all only in the sense that he was resolute in thinking out the ideas, -principles, and categories which are interwoven with all our practical -endeavor, and the proper understanding of which is the condition of -human welfare." - -[87] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 7. - -[88] _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, v, 2. - -[89] _Ibid._, ch. 16. - -[90] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 58, schol. - -[91] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, i, 5. - -[92] _Ethics_, bk. i, appendix. - -[93] _Ibid._, bk. iv, prop. 18, schol. - -[94] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 3. - -[95] _Ibid._, cor. - -[96] _De Intellectus Emendatione._ - -[97] _Ethics_, bk. iv, appendix, § 9. - -[98] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 10. - -[99] _Ibid._, ch. 19. - -[100] _Ibid._, ch. 8. - -[101] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 16. - -[102] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 18, schol. - -[103] _Ibid._ - -[104] _Ibid._, bk. iv, prop. 24. - -[105] Bk. iv, def. 8. - -[106] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, § 1. - -[107] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 35, schol. - -[108] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 5, § 2. - -[109] _Ibid._, ch. 16. - -[110] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 37, schol. 2. - -[111] Contrast Plato: the state (_i.e._, the governing classes) is to -the lower classes as reason is to passion. - -[112] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 3, § 14. - -[113] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 40. - -[114] Ch. 20. - -[115] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, § 4. - -[116] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, § 4, ch. 7, § 29. - -[117] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 35, cor. 1. - -[118] _Ibid._, cor. 2. - -[119] _Ibid._, prop. 18, schol.; also prop. 37. _Cf._ Whitman: "By God! -I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the -same terms." - -[120] Not that these ideas were original with Spinoza; they were the -general legacy of Renaissance political thought. But it was through the -writings of Spinoza that this legacy was transmitted to Rousseau. Cf. -Duff, p. 319. - -[121] Professor Woodbridge: class-lectures. - -[122] Cf. Professor Dewey's _German Philosophy and Politics_, New York, -1915. - -[123] Förster-Nietzsche, _The Young Nietzsche_, London, 1912, p. 98. - -[124] _Ibid._, p. 152. - -[125] _Ibid._, p. 235. - -[126] _The Birth of Tragedy_, 1872. - -[127] _Thus Spake Zarathustra_, p. 129. - -[128] Förster-Nietzsche, _The Lonely Nietzsche_, London, 1915, pp. 291, -212, 77. - -[129] _Ibid._, p. 313. - -[130] _Ibid._, p. 181. - -[131] _Ibid._, p. 424. - -[132] _Ibid._, p. 297. - -[133] _Ibid._, p. 195. - -[134] Chronology of Nietzsche's chief works, with initials used in -subsequent references: _Thoughts Out of Season_ ("_T. O. S._") (1873-6); -_Human All Too Human_ ("_H. H._") (1876-80); _Dawn of Day_ ("_D. D._") -(1881); _Joyful Wisdom_ ("_J. W._") (1882); _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ -("_Z._") (1883-4); _Beyond Good and Evil_ ("_B. G. E._") (1886); -_Genealogy of Morals_ ("_G. M._") (1887); _Twilight of the Idols_ -("_T.I._") (1888); _Antichrist_ ("_Antich._"); _Ecce Homo_ ("_E. H._"), -and _Will to Power_ ("_W. P._") (1889). - -[135] _Lonely N._, p. 104. - -[136] _Ibid._, p. 195. - -[137] _E. H._, p. 106. - -[138] _J. W._, § 371. - -[139] _E. H._, p. 141. - -[140] _Ibid._, pp. 131, 81. - -[141] _T. I._, pref. - -[142] _W. P._, § 400 (all references to _W. P._ will be by sections). - -[143] _J. W._, § 345 (all references to _J. W._ by section unless -otherwise stated). - -[144] _W. P._, 276. - -[145] _Ibid._, 345. - -[146] _G. M._, p. 46. - -[147] _Z._, p. 166. - -[148] _W. P._, 721; _T. I._, p. 89. - -[149] _B. G. E._, § 202. - -[150] _J. W._, 358; _Antich._, § 361. - -[151] _W. P._, 284. - -[152] _Antich._, § 46. - -[153] _Ibid._, § 43. - -[154] _W. P._, 464, 861, 748, 752, 686. - -[155] _Ibid._, 885, 281. - -[156] _H. H._, §§ 428, 472. - -[157] _T. I._, p. 96. - -[158] _G. M._, p. 225; written in 1887. - -[159] _W. P._, 861, 891. - -[160] _B. G. E._, p. 233. - -[161] _W. P._, 753. - -[162] _G. M._, p. 223. - -[163] _B. G. E._, p. 189. - -[164] _E. H._, p. 65. - -[165] _B. G. E._, pp. 96, 189. - -[166] _Z._, p. 89. - -[167] _J. W._, 363. - -[168] _B. G. E._, pp. 188, 184, 189. - -[169] _W. P._, 339, 86. - -[170] _T. I._, p. 86. - -[171] _J. W._, 377; _W. P._, 350, 315, 373. - -[172] _H. H._, § 451. - -[173] _W. P._, 761. - -[174] _Ibid._, 51, 125. - -[175] _B. G. E._, p. 226. - -[176] _W. P._, 856. - -[177] _G. M._, p. 44. - -[178] _J. W._, 356. - -[179] _Lonely N._, p. 83. - -[180] _D. D._, § 206. - -[181] _W. P._, 125. - -[182] _Wanderer and His Shadow_, § 292 (_H. H._, ii, p. 343). - -[183] _H. H._, i, § 473. - -[184] _D. D._, § 179. - -[185] _Z._, p. 62. - -[186] _W. P._, 329. - -[187] _T. I._, p. 86; _E. H._, p. 66; _Antich._, § 57. - -[188] _W. P._, 859. - -[189] _G. M._, p. 91. - -[190] _Z._, p. 159. - -[191] _T. I._, p. 94. - -[192] _H. H._, § 463. - -[193] _W. P._, 750, 874, 65, 50. - -[194] _B. G. E._, p. 173; _W. P._, 823, 851, 871, 11. - -[195] _W. P._, 397, 12, 736. - -[196] _E. H._, p. 136. - -[197] _G. M._, p. 10. - -[198] _T. O. S._, i, p. 78. - -[199] _Antich._, § 17. - -[200] _J. W._, 347. - -[201] _Antich._, § 17; _D. D._, § 542. - -[202] _W. P._, 585. - -[203] _G. M._, p. 202. - -[204] _W. P._, 585. - -[205] _Ibid._, 600; _D. D._, § 424. - -[206] _J. W._, 366. - -[207] _D. D._, § 41. - -[208] _W. P._, 461. - -[209] _B. G. E._, p. 136. - -[210] _W. P._, § 8. - -[211] _J. W._, p. 7. - -[212] _W. P._, § 351. - -[213] _Ibid._, § 12. - -[214] _Ibid._, § 43. - -[215] _Antich._, § 1. - -[216] _D. D._, § 163. - -[217] _W. P._, 266. - -[218] _Ibid._, 20. - -[219] _Ibid._, 585. - -[220] _Z._, pp. 193, 315; _E. H._, pp. 71, 28. - -[221] _J. W._, § 324. - -[222] _Ibid._, p. 6. - -[223] _W. P._, 120, 1029; _Antich._, § 55; _E. H._, pp. 72, 70; _Birth -of Tragedy_, _passim_. - -[224] _W. P._, 255, 258, 710, 462, 392, 305. - -[225] _Antich._, § 2. - -[226] _W. P._, 918. - -[227] _T. O. S._, p. 76. - -[228] _G. M._, p. 45. - -[229] _J. W._, § 4. - -[230] _Antich._, § 14. - -[231] _B. G. E._, p. 162. - -[232] _W. P._, 440, 289. - -[233] _E. H._, p. 10. - -[234] _W. P._, 255, 774, 775; _D. D._, § 215; _J. W._, 13. - -[235] _D. D._, § 224. - -[236] _W. P._, 376, 776. - -[237] _W. P._, 650, 657, 685, 696, 704; _Antich._, § 2. - -[238] _Ibid._, 681, 688, 689. - -[239] _T. I._, p. 71; _W. P._, 649. - -[240] _W. P._, 685. - -[241] _Z._, p. 398. - -[242] _W. P._, 880, 716, 343, 423, 291. - -[243] _E. H._, p. 2; _D. D._, § 49; _Lonely N._, p. 17; _W. P._, 269, -90, 766, 660. - -[244] _E. H._, p. 138; _T. O. S._, ii, p. 66; _Z._, p. 222; _W. P._, -934, 944; _J. W._, p. 8; _T. I._, § 40; _B. G. E._, p. 138. - -[245] _Z._, pp. 199, 103, 186; _W. P._, 792. - -[246] _W. P._, 881, 870, 918; _B. G. E._, p. 154; _E. H._, p. 13; _D. -D._, § 552. - -[247] _W. P._, 967, 366-7, 349; _Z._, p. 141; _Antich._, § 55; _B. G. -E._, pp. 54, 57. - -[248] _W. P._, 969, 371, 356, 926, 946, 26; _Z._, p. 430; _E. H._, pp. -23, 19, 128; _G. M._, p. 85; _D. D._, § 60. - -[249] _W. P._, 866; _T. O. S._, ii, p. 154; _Z._, pp. 8, 104; _T. I._, -p. 269. - -[250] _W. P._, 804, 732-3; _Z._, pp. 94-6; _D. D._, § 150-1. - -[251] _H. H._, § 242; _W. P._, 912; _B. G. E._, p. 129; _D. D._, § 194; -"Schopenhauer as Educator" (in _T. O. S._), _passim_. - -[252] _T. O. S._, ii, pp. 84, 28; _W. P._, 369, 965; _E. H._, p. 135. - -[253] _Z._, pp. 84, 64; _H. H._, § 457; _G. M._, 156-7; _B. G. E._, §§ -61-2; _W. P._, 373, 901, 132. - -[254] _H. H._, § 439; _W. P._, 660; _Antich._, § 57; _Lonely N._, p. 7. - -[255] _G. M._, pp. 160-1; _W. P._, 287, 854, 864. - -[256] _W. P._, 886, 926. - -[257] _T. I._, p. 96; _W. P._, 957; _B. G. E._, p. 239; _T. O. S._, ii, -p. 39. - -[258] _W. P._, 464, 960; _B. G. E._, p. 225. - -[259] _W. P._, 44, 684, 909; _G. M._, p. 91. - -[260] _D. D._, §§ 165, 168; _W. P._, 1052; _B. G. E._, p. 69; _J. W._, -p. 10. - -[261] _T. I._, pp. 91, 110; _J. W._, § 362; _G. M._, pp. 56, 226; _W. -P._, 975, 877; _B. G. E._, pp. 201, 53. - -[262] _W. P._, 109-34, 747. - -[263] _J. W._, 293. - -[264] _T. I._, p. 260; _G. M._, p. 58; _B. G. E._, p. 151; _Lonely N._, -p. 221. - -[265] _W. P._, 127, 728-9; _G. M._, pp. 88, 226; _J. W._, 283; _Z._, p. -60; _Lonely N._, p. 15. - -[266] _B. G. E._, p. 94; _W. P._, 717, 748; _G. M._, pp. 223-4. - -[267] _W. P._, 712. - -[268] _Ibid._, 1053. - -[269] _J. W._, p. 5. - -[270] _E. H._, p. 53. - -[271] _W. P._, 544, with footnote quoting Napoleon: "An almost -instinctive belief with me is that all strong men lie when they speak, -and much more so when they write." - -[272] "Far too long a slave and a tyrant have been hidden in woman: ... -she is not yet capable of friendship."--_Z._, p. 75. - -[273] Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political Theory_, New York, 1911, -p. 25. - -[274] There is something verging on a recognition of this in _W. P._, -403-4. - -[275] _B. G. E._, p. 173. - -[276] _B. G. E._, p. 25. - -[277] _G. M._, p. 6. - -[278] _Z._, p. 303. - -[279] _Z._, p. 107. - -[280] _T. I._, p. 2. - -[281] _Z._, p. 10. - -[282] _J. W._, 312. - -[283] _Ibid._, p. 69; referring to 1879. - -[284] _Ibid._, 312. - -[285] _Lonely N._, p. 206. - -[286] _Ibid._, p. 218. - -[287] _Lonely N._, p. 289. - -[288] _Ibid._, p. 391. - -[289] _Ibid._, p. 65. - -[290] _Ibid._, p. 157. - -[291] Mrs. Gallichan, _The Truth about Woman_, New York, 1914, p. 281. - -[292] Jos. McCabe, _Tyranny of Shams_, London, 1916, p. 171. - -[293] Dr. Drysdale, _The Small Family System_, London, 1915. - -[294] Winston Churchill in Parliament, quoted by Schoonmaker, The -_World-War and Beyond_, New York, 1915, p. 95. - -[295] Carver, _Essays in Social Justice_, New York, 1915, p. 261. - -[296] The "experimental attitude ... substitutes detailed analyses for -wholesale assertions, specific inquiries for temperamental convictions, -small facts for opinions whose size is in precise ratio to their -vagueness. It is within the social sciences, in morals, politics, -and education, that thinking still goes on by large antitheses, by -theoretical oppositions of order and freedom, individualism and -socialism, culture and utility, spontaneity and discipline, actuality -and tradition. The field of the physical sciences was once occupied -by similar 'total' views, whose emotional appeal was inversely as -their intellectual clarity. But with the advance of the experimental -method, the question has ceased to be which one of two rival claimants -has a right to the field. It has become a question of clearing up a -confused subject matter by attacking it bit by bit. I do not know -a case where the final result was anything like victory for one or -another among the preëxperimental notions. All of them disappeared -because they became increasingly irrelevant to the situation discovered, -and with their detected irrelevance they became unmeaning and -uninteresting."--Professor John Dewey, _New Republic_, Feb. 3, 1917. - -[297] All this has been indicated--with, however, too little emphasis -on the reconstructive function of intelligence--by Bertrand Russell in -_Principles of Social Reconstruction_ (London, 1916); and more popularly -by Max Eastman in _Understanding Germany_ (New York, 1916); it has been -put very briefly again and again by Professor Dewey,--_e.g._, in an -essay on "Progress" in the _International Journal of Ethics_, April, -1916. - -[298] This is not a defence of mechanism or materialism; it is a plea -for a better perspective in philosophy. - -[299] It would be invidious to name the exceptions which one is -glad to remember here; but it is in place to say that the practical -arrest of Bertrand Russell is a sign of resuscitation on the part -of philosophy,--a sign for which all lovers of philosophy should be -grateful. When philosophers are once more feared, philosophy will once -more be respected. - -[300] _American Journal of Sociology_, March, 1905, p. 645. - -[301] Ross, _Social Control_, New York, 1906, p. 9. - -[302] _Will to Power_, § 469. - -[303] Barker, _Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_, p. 80. - -[304] Perhaps this million could be reached more surely and economically -through direct pamphlet-publication by the Society. - -[305] Some students--_e.g._, Joseph McCabe, _The Tyranny of Shams_, -London, 1916, p. 248--are so impressed with the dangers lying in our -vast production of written trash that they favor restricting the -circulation of cheap fiction in our public libraries. But what we -have to do is not to prohibit the evil but to encourage the good, to -give positive stimulus rather than negative prohibition. People hate -compulsion, but they grope for guidance. - -[306] _E.g._, by G. Lowes Dickinson, _Justice and Liberty_, p. 133. - -[307] Cf. Russell, _Principles of Social Reconstruction_, p. 236: "The -supreme principle, both in politics and in private life, should be -to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and -desires that center round possession." - -[308] _Reason in Common Sense_, New York, 1911, p. 96. - -[309] Quoted by Walter Weyl, _The New Democracy_, p. 136. - -[310] Ross, _Social Control_, New York, 1906, p. 103. - - * * * * * - -Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber: - -seee things clearly=> see things clearly {pg 100} - -whosesale assertions=> wholesale assertions {footnote pg 211} - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Philosophy and The Social Problem, by Will Durant - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM *** - -***** This file should be named 42880-8.txt or 42880-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/8/8/42880/ - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was -produced from scanned images of public domain material -from the Google Print project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: Philosophy and The Social Problem - -Author: Will Durant - -Release Date: June 5, 2013 [EBook #42880] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ASCII - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM *** - - - - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was -produced from scanned images of public domain material -from the Google Print project.) - - - - - - - - - - PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - [Illustration: colophon] - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - NEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO . DALLAS - ATLANTA . SAN FRANCISCO - - MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED - - LONDON . BOMBAY . CALCUTTA - MELBOURNE - - THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD. - TORONTO - - - - - PHILOSOPHY - - AND - - THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - BY - - WILL DURANT, PH.D. - - INSTRUCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY, EXTENSION TEACHING - COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY - - [Greek: ton men bion - he physis edoke to de kalos zen he techne.] - --UNKNOWN DRAMATIC POET. - - NEW YORK - - THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - - 1917 - - _All rights reserved_ - - COPYRIGHT, 1917, - BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. - - Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1917. - - Norwood Press - J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. - Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. - - - TO - - ALDEN FREEMAN - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - -INTRODUCTION 1 - -PART I - -HISTORICAL APPROACH - -CHAPTER I - -THE PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCRATIC ETHIC - -I. History as rebarbarization 5 - -II. Philosophy as disintegrator 6 - -III. Individualism in Athens 7 - -IV. The Sophists 9 - -V. Intelligence as virtue 12 - -VI. The meaning of virtue 15 - -VII. "Instinct" and "reason" 23 - -VIII. The secularization of morals 27 - -IX. "Happiness" and "virtue" 31 - -X. The Socratic challenge 33 - -CHAPTER II - -PLATO: PHILOSOPHY AS POLITICS - -I. The man and the artist 36 - -II. How to solve the social problem 40 - -III. On making philosopher-kings 44 - -IV. Dishonest democracy 52 - -V. Culture and slavery 55 - -VI. Plasticity and order 60 - -VII. The meaning of justice 62 - -VIII. The future of Plato 64 - -CHAPTER III - -FRANCIS BACON AND THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SCIENCE - -I. From Plato to Bacon 67 - -II. Character 69 - -III. The expurgation of the intellect 70 - -IV. Knowledge is power 74 - -V. The socialization of science 76 - -VI. Science and Utopia 79 - -VII. Scholasticism in science 81 - -VIII. The Asiatics of Europe 85 - -CHAPTER IV - -SPINOZA ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - -I. Hobbes 90 - -II. The spirit of Spinoza 91 - -III. Political ethics 93 - -IV. Is man a political animal? 95 - -V. What the social problem is 98 - -VI. Free speech 101 - -VII. Virtue as power 105 - -VIII. Freedom and order 108 - -IX. Democracy and intelligence 112 - -X. The legacy of Spinoza 115 - -CHAPTER V - -NIETZSCHE - -I. From Spinoza to Nietzsche 117 - -II. Biographical 120 - -III. Exposition 126 - - 1. Morality as impotence 126 - 2. Democracy 128 - 3. Feminism 131 - 4. Socialism and anarchism 133 - 5. Degeneration 138 - 6. Nihilism 141 - 7. The will to power 143 - 8. The superman 150 - 9. How to make supermen 155 - 10. On the necessity of exploitation 159 - 11. Aristocracy 162 - 12. Signs of ascent 165 - -IV. Criticism 172 - -V. Nietzsche replies 177 - -VI. Conclusion 178 - -PART II - -SUGGESTIONS - -CHAPTER I - -SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS - -I. The problem 185 - -II. "Solutions" 190 - - 1. Feminism 190 - 2. Socialism 194 - 3. Eugenics 198 - 4. Anarchism 200 - 5. Individualism 202 - 6. Individualism again 202 - -III. Dissolutions 205 - -CHAPTER II - -THE RECONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY - -I. Epistemologs 214 - -II. Philosophy as control 218 - -III. Philosophy as mediator between science and statesmanship 222 - -CHAPTER III - -ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE - -I. The need 227 - -II. The organization of intelligence 230 - -III. Information as panacea 234 - -IV. Sex, art, and play in social reconstruction 240 - -V. Education 246 - -CHAPTER IV - -THE READER SPEAKS - -I. The democratization of aristocracy 251 - -II. The professor as Buridan's ass 255 - -III. Is information wanted? 257 - -IV. Finding Maecenas 261 - -V. The chance of philosophy 264 - -CONCLUSION 268 - - - - -PART I - -HISTORICAL APPROACH - - - - -PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - -The purpose of this essay is to show: first, that the social problem has -been the basic concern of many of the greater philosophers; second, that -an approach to the social problem through philosophy is the first -condition of even a moderately successful treatment of this problem; and -third, that an approach to philosophy through the social problem is -indispensable to the revitalization of philosophy. - -By "philosophy" we shall understand a study of experience as a whole, or -of a portion of experience in relation to the whole. - -By the "social problem" we shall understand, simply and very broadly, -the problem of reducing human misery by modifying social institutions. -It is a problem that, ever reshaping itself, eludes sharper definition; -for misery is related to desire, and desire is personal and in perpetual -flux: each of us sees the problem unsteadily in terms of his own -changing aspirations. It is an uncomfortably complicated problem, of -course; and we must bear in mind that the limit of our intention here is -to consider philosophy as an approach to the problem, and the problem -itself as an approach to philosophy. We are proposing no solutions. - -Let us, as a wholesome measure of orientation, touch some of the -mountain-peaks in philosophical history, with an eye for the social -interest that lurks in every metaphysical maze. "Aristotle," says -Professor Woodbridge, "set treatise-writers the fashion of beginning -each treatise by reviewing previous opinions on their subject, and -proving them all wrong."[1] The purpose of the next five chapters will -be rather the opposite: we shall see if some supposedly dead -philosophies do not admit of considerable resuscitation. Instead of -trying to show that Socrates, Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, and Nietzsche were -quite mistaken in their views on the social problem, we shall try to see -what there is in these views that can help us to understand our own -situation to-day. We shall not make a collection of systems of social -philosophy; we shall not lose ourselves in the past in a scholarly -effort to relate each philosophy to its social and political -environment; we shall try to relate these philosophies rather to our own -environment, to look at our own problems successively through the eyes -of these philosophers. Other interpretations of these men we shall not -so much contradict as seek to supplement. - -Each of our historical chapters, then, will be not so much a review as a -preface and a progression. The aim will be neither history nor -criticism, but a kind of construction by proxy. It is a method that has -its defects: it will, for example, sacrifice thoroughness of scholarship -to present applicability, and will necessitate some repetitious -gathering of the threads when we come later to our more personal -purpose. But as part requital for this, we shall save ourselves from -considering the past except as it is really present, except as it is -alive and nourishingly significant to-day. And from each study we shall -perhaps make some advance towards our final endeavor,--the mutual -elucidation of the social problem and philosophy. - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOCRATIC ETHIC - - -I - -History as Rebarbarization - -History is a process of rebarbarization. A people made vigorous by -arduous physical conditions of life, and driven by the increasing -exigencies of survival, leaves its native habitat, moves down upon a -less vigorous people, conquers, displaces, or absorbs it. Habits of -resolution and activity developed in a less merciful environment now -rapidly produce an economic surplus; and part of the resources so -accumulated serve as capital in a campaign of imperialist conquest. The -growing surplus generates a leisure class, scornful of physical activity -and adept in the arts of luxury. Leisure begets speculation; speculation -dissolves dogma and corrodes custom, develops sensitivity of perception -and destroys decision of action. Thought, adventuring in a labyrinth of -analysis, discovers behind society the individual; divested of its -normal social function it turns inward and discovers the self. The -sense of common interest, of commonwealth, wanes; there are no citizens -now, there are only individuals. - -From afar another people, struggling against the forces of an obdurate -environment, sees here the cleared forests, the liberating roads, the -harvest of plenty, the luxury of leisure. It dreams, aspires, dares, -unites, invades. The rest is as before. - -Rebarbarization is rejuvenation. The great problem of any civilization -is how to rejuvenate itself without rebarbarization. - - -II - -Philosophy as Disintegrator - -The rise of philosophy, then, often heralds the decay of a civilization. -Speculation begins with nature and begets naturalism; it passes to -man--first as a psychological mystery and then as a member of -society--and begets individualism. Philosophers do not always desire -these results; but they achieve them. They feel themselves the unwilling -enemies of the state: they think of men in terms of personality while -the state thinks of men in terms of social mechanism. Some philosophers -would gladly hold their peace, but there is that in them which will out; -and when philosophers speak, gods and dynasties fall. Most states have -had their roots in heaven, and have paid the penalty for it: the -twilight of the gods is the afternoon of states. - -Every civilization comes at last to the point where the individual, made -by speculation conscious of himself as an end _per se_, demands of the -state, as the price of its continuance, that it shall henceforth enhance -rather than exploit his capacities. Philosophers sympathize with this -demand, the state almost always rejects it: therefore civilizations come -and civilizations go. The history of philosophy is essentially an -account of the efforts great men have made to avert social -disintegration by building up natural moral sanctions to take the place -of the supernatural sanctions which they themselves have destroyed. To -find--without resorting to celestial machinery--some way of winning for -their people social coherence and permanence without sacrificing -plasticity and individual uniqueness to regimentation,--that has been -the task of philosophers, that is the task of philosophers. - -We should be thankful that it is. Who knows but that within our own time -may come at last the forging of an effective _natural_ ethic?--an -achievement which might be the most momentous event in the history of -our world. - - -III - -Individualism in Athens - -The great ages in the history of European thought have been for the most -part periods of individualistic effervescence: the age of Socrates, the -age of Caesar and Augustus, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment;--and -shall we add the age which is now coming to a close? These ages have -usually been preceded by periods of imperialist expansion: imperialism -requires a tightening of the bonds whereby individual allegiance to the -state is made secure; and this tightening, given a satiety of -imperialism, involves an individualistic reaction. And again, the -dissolution of the political or economic frontier by conquest or -commerce breaks down cultural barriers between peoples, develops a sense -of the relativity of customs, and issues in the opposition of individual -"reason" to social tradition. - -A political treatise attributed to the fourth-century B.C. reflects the -attitude that had developed in Athens in the later fifth century. "If -all men were to gather in a heap the customs which they hold to be good -and noble, and if they were next to select from it the customs which -they hold to be base and vile, nothing would be left over."[2] Once such -a view has found capable defenders, the custom-basis of social -organization begins to give way, and institutions venerable with age are -ruthlessly subpoenaed to appear before the bar of reason. Men begin to -contrast "Nature" with custom, somewhat to the disadvantage of the -latter. Even the most basic of Greek institutions is questioned: "The -Deity," says a fourth-century Athenian Rousseau, "made all men free; -Nature has enslaved no man."[3] Botsford speaks of "the powerful -influence of fourth-century socialism on the intellectual class."[4] -Euripides and Aristophanes are full of talk about a movement for the -emancipation of women.[5] Law and government are examined: Anarcharsis' -comparison of the law to a spider's web, which catches small flies and -lets the big ones escape, now finds sympathetic comprehension; and men -arise, like Callicles and Thrasymachus, who frankly consider government -as a convenient instrument of mass-exploitation. - - -IV - -The Sophists - -The cultural representatives of this individualistic development were -the Sophists. These men were university professors without a university -and without the professorial title. They appeared in response to a -demand for higher instruction on the part of the young men of the -leisure class; and within a generation they became the most powerful -intellectual force in Greece. There had been philosophers, questioners, -before them; but these early philosophers had questioned nature rather -than man or the state. The Sophists were the first group of men in -Greece to overcome the natural tendency to acquiesce in the given order -of things. They were proud men,--humility is a vice that never found -root in Greece,--and they had a buoyant confidence in the newly -discovered power of human intelligence. They assumed, in harmony with -the spirit of all Greek achievement, that in the development and -extension of knowledge lay the road to a sane and significant life, -individual and communal; and in the quest for knowledge they were -resolved to scrutinize unawed all institutions, prejudices, customs, -morals. Protagoras professed to respect conventions,[6] and pronounced -conventions and institutions the source of man's superiority to the -beast; but his famous principle, that "man is the measure of all -things," was a quiet hint that morals are a matter of taste, that we -call a man "good" when his conduct is advantageous to us, and "bad" when -his conduct threatens to make for our own loss. To the Sophists virtue -consisted, not in obedience to unjudged rules and customs, but in the -efficient performance of whatever one set out to do. They would have -condemned the bungler and let the "sinner" go. That they were flippant -sceptics, putting no distinction of worth between any belief and its -opposite, and willing to prove anything for a price, is an old -accusation which later students of Greek philosophy are almost unanimous -in rejecting.[7] - -The great discovery of the Sophists was the individual; it was an -achievement for which Plato and his oligarchical friends could not -forgive them, and because of which they incurred the contumely which it -is now so hard to dissociate from their name. The purpose of laws, said -the Sophists, was to widen the possibilities of individual development; -if laws did not do that, they had better be forgotten. There was a -higher law than the laws of men,--a natural law, engraved in every -heart, and judge of every other law. The conscience of the individual -was above the dictates of any state. All radicalisms lay compact in that -pronouncement. Plato, prolific of innovations though he was, yet shrank -from such a leap into the new. But the Sophists pressed their point, men -listened to them, and the Greek world changed. When Socrates appeared, -he found that world all out of joint, a war of all against all, a -stridency of uncoordinated personalities rushing into chaos. And when he -was asked, What should men do to be saved, he answered, simply, Let us -think. - - -V - -Intelligence as Virtue - -Intelligence as virtue: it was not a new doctrine; it was merely a new -emphasis placed on an already important element in the Greek--or rather -the Athenian--view of life. But it was a needed emphasis. The Sophists -(not Socrates, _pace_ Cicero) had brought philosophy down from heaven to -earth, but they had left it grovelling at the feet of business -efficiency and success, a sort of _ancilla pecuniae_, a broker knowing -where one's soul could be invested at ten per cent. Socrates agreed with -the Sophists in condemning any but a very temporary devotion to -metaphysical abstractions,--the one and the many, motion and rest, the -indivisibility of space, the puzzles of predication, and so forth; he -joined them in ridiculing the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, and -in demanding that all thinking should be focussed finally on the real -concerns of life; but his spirit was as different from theirs as the -spirit of Spinoza was different from that of a mediaeval money-lender. -With the Sophists philosophy was a profession; they were "lovers of -wisdom"--for a consideration. With Socrates philosophy was a quest of -the permanently good, of the lastingly satisfying attitude to life. To -find out just what are justice, temperance, courage, piety,--"that is an -inquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing so far as in me lies." -It was not an easy quest; and the results were not startlingly -definite: "I wander to and fro when I attempt these problems, and do not -remain consistent with myself." His interlocutors went from him -apparently empty; but he had left in them seed which developed in the -after-calm of thought. He could clarify men's notions, he could reveal -to them their assumptions and prejudices; but he could not and would not -manufacture opinions for them. He left no written philosophy because he -had only the most general advice to give, and knew that no other advice -is ever taken. He trusted his friends to pass on the good word. - -Now what was the good word? It was, first of all, the identity of virtue -and wisdom, morals and intelligence; but more than that, it was the -basic identity, in the light of intelligence, of communal and individual -interests. Here at the Sophist's feet lay the debris of the old -morality. What was to replace it? The young Athenians of a generation -denuded of supernatural belief would not listen to counsels of "virtue," -of self-sacrifice to the community. What was to be done? Should social -and political pressure be brought to bear upon the Sophists to compel -them to modify the individualistic tenor of their teachings? Analysis -destroys morals. What is the moral--destroy analysis? - -The moral, answered Socrates, is to get better morals, to find an -ethic immune to the attack of the most ruthless sceptic. The Sophists -were right, said Socrates; morality means more than social obedience. -But the Sophists were wrong in opposing the good of the individual to -that of the community; Socrates proposed to prove that if a man were -intelligent, he would see that those same qualities which make a man a -good citizen--justice, wisdom, temperance, courage--are also the best -means to individual advantage and development. All these "virtues" -are simply the supreme and only virtue--wisdom--differentiated by -the context of circumstance. No action is virtuous unless it is an -intelligent adaptation of means to a criticised end. "Sin" is failure -to use energy to the best account; it is an unintelligent waste of -strength. A man does not knowingly pursue anything but the Good; let him -but see his advantage, and he will be attracted towards it irresistibly; -let him pursue it, and he will be happy, and the state safe. The -trouble is that men lack perspective, and cannot see their true Good; -they need not "virtue" but intelligence, not sermons but training in -perspective. The man who has [Greek: enkrateia], _who rules within_, who -is strong enough to stop and think, the man who has achieved [Greek: -sophrosune],--the self-knowledge that brings self-command,--such a -man will not be deceived by the tragedy of distance, by the apparent -smallness of the future good alongside of the more easily appreciable -good that lies invitingly at hand. Hence the moral importance of -dialectic, of cross-examination, of concept and definition: we must -learn "how to make our ideas clear"; we must ask ourselves just what it -is that we want, just how real this seeming good is. Dialectic is the -handmaiden of virtue; and all clarification is morality. - - -VI - -The Meaning of Virtue - -This is frank intellectualism, of course; and the best-refuted doctrine -in philosophy. It is amusing to observe the ease with which critics and -historians despatch the Socratic ethic. It is "an extravagant paradox," -says Sidgwick,[8] "incompatible with moral freedom." "Nothing is -easier," says Gomperz,[9] "than to detect the one-sidedness of this -point of view." "This doctrine," says Grote,[10] "omits to notice, what -is not less essential, the proper conditions of the emotions, desires, -etc." "It tended to make all conduct a matter of the intellect and not -of the character, and so in a sense to destroy moral responsibility," -says Hobhouse.[11] "Himself blessed with a will so powerful that it -moved almost without friction," says Henry Jackson,[12] "Socrates fell -into the error of ignoring its operations, and was thus led to regard -knowledge as the sole condition of well-doing." "Socrates was a -misunderstanding," says Nietzsche;[13] "reason at any price, life made -clear, cold, cautious, conscious, without instincts, opposed to the -instincts, was in itself only a disease, ... and by no means a return to -'virtue,' to 'health,' and to happiness." And the worn-out dictum about -seeing the better and approving it, yet following the worse, is quoted -as the deliverance of a profound psychologist, whose verdict should be -accepted as a final solution of the problem. - -Before refuting a doctrine it is useful to try to understand it. What -could Socrates have meant by saying that all real virtue is -intelligence? What is virtue? - -A civilization may be characterized in terms of its conception of -virtue. There is hardly anything more distinctive of the Greek attitude, -as compared with our own, than the Greek notion of virtue as -intelligence. Consider the present connotations of the word _virtue_: -men shrink at having the term applied to them; and "nothing makes one so -vain," says Oscar Wilde, "as being told that one is a sinner." During -the Middle Ages the official conception of virtue was couched in terms -of womanly excellence; and the sternly masculine God of the Hebrews -suffered considerably from the inroads of Mariolatry. Protestantism was -in part a rebellion of the ethically subjugated male; in Luther the man -emerges riotously from the monk. But as people cling to the ethical -implications of a creed long after the creed itself has been abandoned, -so our modern notion of virtue is still essentially mediaeval and -feminine. Virginity, chastity, conjugal fidelity, gentility, obedience, -loyalty, kindness, self-sacrifice, are the stock-in-trade of all -respectable moralists; to be "good" is to be harmless, to be not "bad," -to be a sort of sterilized citizen, guaranteed not to injure. This -sheepish innocuousness comes easily to the natively uninitiative, to -those who are readily amenable to fear and prohibitions. It is a static -virtue; it contracts rather than expands the soul; it offers no handle -for development, no incentive to social stimulation and productivity. It -is time we stopped calling this insipidly negative attitude by the once -mighty name of virtue. Virtue must be defined in terms of that which is -vitally significant in our lives. - -And therefore, too, virtue cannot be defined in terms of individual -subordination to the group. The vitally significant thing in a man's -life is not the community, but himself. To ask him to consider the -interests of the community above his own is again to put up for his -worship an external, transcendent god; and the trouble with a -transcendent god is that he is sure to be dethroned. To call "immoral" -the refusal of the individual to meet such demands is the depth of -indecency; it is itself immoral,--that is, it is nonsense. The notion of -"duty" as involving self-sacrifice, as essentially duty to others, is a -soul-cramping, funereal notion, and deserves all that Ibsen and his -progeny have said of it.[14] Ask the individual to sacrifice himself to -the community, and it will not be long before he sacrifices the -community to himself. Granted that, in the language of Heraclitus, there -is always a majority of fools, and that self-sacrifice can be procured -by the simple hypnotic suggestion of _post-mortem_ remuneration: sooner -or later come doubt and disillusionment, and the society whose -permanence was so easily secured becomes driftwood on the tides of time. -History means that if it means anything. - -No; the intelligent individual will give allegiance to the group of -which he happens to find himself a member, only so far as the policies -of the group accord with his own criticised desires. Whatever -allegiance he offers will be to those forces, wherever they may be, -which in his judgment move in the line of these desires. Even for such -forces he will not sacrifice himself,--though there may be times when -martyrdom is a luxury for which life itself is not too great a price. -Since these forces have been defined in terms of his own judgment and -desire, conflict between them and himself can come only when his -behavior diverges from the purposes defined and resumed in times of -conscious thought,--_i.e._, only when he ceases to adapt means to his -ends, ceases, that is, to be intelligent. The prime moral conflict is -not between the individual and his group, but between the partial self -of fragmentary impulse and the coordinated self of conscious purpose. -There is a group within each man as well as without: a group of partial -selves is the reality behind the figment of the unitary self. Every -individual is a society, every person is a crowd. And the tragedies of -the moral life lie not in the war of each against all, but in the -restless interplay of these partial selves behind the stage of action. -As a man's intelligence grows this conflict diminishes, for both means -and ends, both behavior and purposes, are being continually revised and -redirected in accordance with intelligence, and therefore in convergence -towards it. Progressively the individual achieves unity, and through -unity, personality. Faith in himself has made him whole. The ethical -problem, so far as it is the purely individual problem of attaining to -coordinated personality, is solved. - -Moral responsibility, then,--whatever social responsibility may be,--is -the responsibility of the individual to himself. The social is not -necessarily the moral--let the sociological fact be what it will. The -unthinking conformity of the "normal social life" is, just because it is -unthinking, below the level of morality: let us call it sociality, and -make morality the prerogative of the really thinking animal. In any -society so constituted as to give to the individual an increase in -powers as recompense for the pruning of his liberties, the unsocial will -be immoral,--that is, self-destructively unreasonable and unintelligent; -but even in such a society the moral would overflow the margins of the -social, and would take definition ultimately from the congruity of the -action with the criticised purposes of the individual self. This does -not mean that all ethics lies compact in the shibboleth, "Be yourself." -Those who make the least sparing use of this phrase are too apt to -consider it an excuse for lives that reek with the heat of passion and -smack of insufficient evolution. These people need to be reminded--all -the more forcibly since the most palatable and up-to-date philosophies -exalt instinct and deride thought--that one cannot be thoroughly one's -self except by deliberation and intelligence. To act indeliberately is -not to be, but in great part to cancel, one's self. For example, the -vast play of direct emotional expression is almost entirely -indeliberate: if you are greatly surprised, your lips part, your eyes -open a trifle wider, your pulse quickens, your respiration is affected; -and if I am surprised, though you be as different from me as Hyperion -from a satyr, my respiration will be affected, my pulse will quicken, my -eyes will open a trifle wider, and my lips will part;--my direct -reaction will be essentially the same as yours. The direct expression of -surprise is practically the same in all the higher animals. Darwin's -classical description of the expression of fear is another example; it -holds for every normal human being; not to speak of lower species. So -with egotism, jealousy, anger, and a thousand other instinctive -reaction-complexes; they are common to the species, and when we so -react, we are expressing not our individual selves so much as the -species to which we happen to belong. When you hit a man because he has -"insulted" you, when you swagger a little after delivering a successful -speech, when you push aside women and children in order to take their -place in the rescue boat, when you do any one of a million indeliberate -things like these, it is not you that act, it is your species, it is -your ancestors, acting through you; your acquired individual difference -is lost in the whirlwind of inherited impulse. Your act, as the -Scholastics phrased it, is not a "human" act; you yourself are not -really acting in any full measure of yourself, you are but playing -slave and mouth-piece to the dead. But subject the inherited tendencies -to the scrutiny of your individual experience, _think_, and your action -will then express yourself, not in any abbreviated sense, but up to the -hilt. There is no merit, no "virtue," no development in playing the game -of fragmentary impulses, in living up to the past; to be moral, to grow, -is to be not part but all of one's self, to call into operation the -acquired as well as the inherited elements of one's character, to be -_whole_. So many of us invite ruin by actions which do not really -express us, but are the voice of the merest fragment of ourselves,--the -remainder of us being meanwhile asleep.[15] To be whole, to be your -deliberate self, to do what you please but only after considering what -you really please, to follow your own ideals (but to follow them!), to -choose your own means and not to have them forced upon you by your -ancestors, to act consciously, to see the part _sub specie totius_, to -see the present act in its relation to your vital purposes, to think, to -be intelligent,--all these are definitions of virtue and morality. - -There is, then, in the old sense of the word, no such thing as morality, -there is only intelligence or stupidity. Yes, virtue is calculus, -horrible as that may sound to long and timid ears: to calculate -properly just what you must do to attain your real ends, to see just -what and where your good is, and to make for it,--that is all that can -without indecency be asked of any man, that is all that is ever -vouchsafed by any man who is intelligent. - -Perhaps you think it is an easy virtue,--this cleaving to -intelligence,--easier than being harmless. Try it. - - -VII - -"Instinct" and "Reason" - -And now to go back to the refutations. - -The strongest objection to the Socratic doctrine is that intelligence is -not a creator, but only a servant, of ends. What we shall consider to be -our good appears to be determined not by reason, but by desire. Reason -itself seems but the valet of desire, ready to do for it every manner of -menial service. Desire is an adept at marshalling before intelligence -such facts as favor the wish, and turns the mind's eye resolutely away -from other truth, as a magician distracts the attention of his audience -while his hands perform their wonders. If morality is entirely a matter -of intelligence, it is entirely a question of means, it is excluded -irrevocably from the realm of ends. - -The conclusion may be allowed in substance, though it passes beyond the -warrant of the facts. It is true that basic ends are never suggested by -intelligence, reason, knowledge; but it is also true that many ends -suggested by desire are vetoed by intelligence. Why are the desires of a -man more modest than those of a boy or a child, if not because the blows -of repeated failure have dulled the edge of desire? Desires lapse, or -lose in stature, as knowledge grows and man takes lessons from reality. -There is an adaptation of ends to means as well as of means to ends; and -desire comes at last to take counsel of its slave. - -Be it granted, none the less, that ends are dictated by desire, and that -if morality is intelligence, there can be no question of the morality of -any end _per se_. That, strangely, is not a refutation of the Socratic -ethic so much as an essential element of it and its starting-point. -Every desire has its own initial right; morality means not the -suppression of desires, but their coordination. What that implies for -society we shall see presently; for the individual it implies that he is -immoral, not when he seeks his own advantage, but when he does not -really behave for his own advantage, when some narrow temporary purpose -upsets perspective and overrides a larger end.[16] What we call -"self-control" is the permanent predominance of the larger end; what we -call weakness of will is instability of perspective. Self-control means -an intelligent judgment of values, an intelligent coordination of -motives, an intelligent forecasting of effects. It is far-sight, -far-hearing, an enlargement of the sense; it hears the weakened voice of -the admonishing past, it sees results far down the vista of the future; -it annihilates space and time for the sake of light. Self-control is -coordinated energy,--which is the first and last word in ethics and -politics, and perhaps in logic and metaphysics too. Weak will means that -desires fall out of focus, and taking advantage of the dark steal into -action: it is a derangement of the light, a failure of intelligence. In -this sense a "good will" means coordination of desires by the ultimate -desire, end, ideal; it means health and wholeness of will; it means, -literally, integrity. In the old sense "good will" meant, too often, -mere fear either of the prohibitions of present law or of the -prohibitions stored up in conscience. Such conscience, we all know, is a -purely negative and static thing, a convenient substitute for policemen, -a degenerate descendant of that _conscientia_, or _knowing-together_, -which meant to the Romans a discriminating awareness in -action,--discriminating awareness of the whole that lurks round the -corner of every part. This is one instance of a sort of pathology of -words,--words coming to function in a sense alien to their normal -intent. _Right_ and _wrong_, for example, once carried no ethical -connotation, but merely denoted a direct or tortuous route to a goal; -and significantly the Hebrew word for sin meant, in the days of its -health, an arrow that had missed its mark. - -But, it is urged, there is no such thing as intelligence in the sense of -a control of passion by reason, desire by thought. Granted; it is so -much easier to admit objections than to refute them! Let intelligence be -interpreted as you will, so be it you recognize in it a delayed -response, a moment of reprieve before execution, giving time for the -appearance of new impulses, motives, tendencies, and allowing each -element in the situation to fall into its place in a coordinated whole. -Let intelligence be a struggle of impulses, a survival of the fittest -desire; let us contrast not reason with passion, but response delayed by -the rich interplay of motive forces, with response immediately following -upon the first-appearing impulse. Let impulse mean for us fruit that -falls unripe from the tree, because too weak to hang till it is mature. -Let us understand intelligence as not a faculty superadded to impulse, -but rather that coordination of impulses which is wrought out by the -blows of hard experience. The Socratic ethic fits quite comfortably into -this scheme; intelligence is delayed response and morality means, Take -your time. - -It is charged that the Socratic view involves determinism; and this -charge, too, is best met with open-armed admission. We need not raise -the question of the pragmatic value of the problem. But to suppose that -determinism destroys moral responsibility is to betray the mid-Victorian -origin of one's philosophy. Men of insight like Socrates, Plato, and -Spinoza, saw without the necessity of argument that moral responsibility -is not a matter of freedom of will, but a relation of means to ends, a -responsibility of the agent to himself, an intelligent coordination of -impulses by one's ultimate purposes. Any other morality, whatever pretty -name it may display, is the emasculated morality of slaves. - - -VIII - -The Secularization of Morals - -The great problem involved in the Socratic ethic lies, apparently, in -the bearings of the doctrine on social unity and stability. Apparently; -for it is wholesome to remember that social organization, like the -Sabbath, was made for man, and not the other way about. If social -organization demands of the individual more sacrifices than its -advantages are worth to him, then the stability of that organization is -not a problem, it is a misfortune. But if the state does not demand such -sacrifices, the advantage of the individual will be in social behavior; -and the question whether he will behave socially becomes a question of -how much intelligence he has, how clear-eyed he is in ferreting out his -own advantage. In a state that does not ask more from its members than -it gives, morality and intelligence and social behavior will not -quarrel. The social problem appears here as the twofold problem of, -first, making men intelligent, and, second, making social organization -so great an advantage to the individual as to insure social behavior in -all intelligent men. - -Which has the better chance of survival:--a society of "good" men or a -society of intelligent men? So far as a man is "good" he merely obeys, -he does not initiate. A society of "good" men is necessarily stagnant; -for in such a society the virtue most in demand, as Emerson puts it, is -conformity. If great men emerge through the icy crust of this -conformity, they are called criminals and sinners; the lives of great -men all remind us that we cannot make our lives sublime and yet be -"good." But intelligence as an ethical ideal is a progressive norm; for -it implies the progressive coordination of one's life in reference to -one's ultimate ideals. The god of the "good" man is the _status quo_; -the intelligent man obeys rather the call of the _status ad quem_. - -Observe how the problem of man _versus_ the group is clarified by thus -relating the individual to a larger whole determined not by geographical -frontiers, but by purposes born of his own needs and moulded by his own -intelligence. For as the individual's intelligence grows, his purposes -are brought more and more within the limits of personal capacity and -social possibility: he is ever less inclined to make unreasonable -demands upon himself, or men in general, or the group in which he lives. -His ever broadening vision makes apparent the inherent self-destructiveness -of anti-social aims; and though he chooses his ends without reference -to any external moral code, those ends are increasingly social. -Enlightenment saves his social dispositions from grovelling conformity, -and his "self-regarding sentiments" from suicidal narrowness. And now -the conflict between himself and his group continues for the most part -only in so far as the group makes unreasonable demands upon him. But -this, too, diminishes as the individuals constituting or dominating -the group become themselves more intelligent, more keenly cognizant -of the limits within which the demands of the group upon its members -must be restricted if individual allegiance is to be retained. Since -the reduction of the conflict between the individual and the community -without detriment to the interests of either is the central problem of -political ethics, it is obvious that the practical task of ethics is -not to formulate a specific moral code, but to bring about a spread -of intelligence. And since the reduction of this conflict brings with -it a better coordination of the members of the group, through their -greater ability to perceive the advantages of communal action in an -intelligently administered group, the problem of social coherence and -permanence itself falls into the same larger problem of intellectual -development. - -"How to make our ideas clear";--what if that be the social problem? What -a wealth of import in that little phrase of Socrates,--[Greek: to -ti]--"what is it?" What is my good, my interest? What do I really -want?--To find the answer to that, said Robert Louis Stevenson, is to -achieve wisdom and old age. What is my country? What is patriotism? "If -you wish to converse with me," said Voltaire, "you must define your -terms." If you wish to be moral, you must define your terms. If our -civilization is to keep its head above the flux of time, we must define -our terms. - -For these are the critical days of the secularization of moral -sanctions; the theological navel-string binding men to "good behavior" -has snapped. What are the leaders of men going to do about it? Will they -try again the old gospel of self-sacrifice? But a world fed on -self-sacrifice is a world of lies, a world choking with the stench of -hypocrisy. To preach self-sacrifice is not to solve, it is precisely to -shirk, the problem of ethics,--the problem of eliminating individual -self-sacrifice while preserving social stability: the problem of -reconciling the individual as such with the individual as citizen. Or -will our leaders try to replace superstition with an extended physical -compulsion, making the policeman and the prison do all the work of -social coordination? But surely compulsion is a last resort; not because -it is "wrong," but because it is inexpedient, because it rather cuts -than unties the knot, because it produces too much friction to allow of -movement. Compulsion is warranted when there is question of preventing -the interference of one individual or group with another; but it is a -poor instrument for the establishment or maintenance of ideals. Suppose -we stop moralizing, suppose we reduce regimentation, suppose we begin to -define our terms. Suppose we let people know quite simply (and not in -Academese) that moral codes are born not in heaven but in social needs; -and suppose we set about finding a way of spreading intelligence so that -individual treachery to real communal interest, and communal -exploitation of individual allegiance, may both appear on the surface, -as they are at bottom, unintelligently suicidal. Is that too much to -hope for? Perhaps. But then again, it may be, the worth and meaning of -life lie precisely in this, that there is still a possibility of -organizing that experiment. - - -IX - -"Happiness" and "Virtue" - -A word now about the last part of the Socratic formula: intelligence = -virtue = happiness. And this a word of warning: remember that the -"virtue" here spoken of is not the mediaeval virtue taught in Sunday -schools. Surely our children must wonder are we fools or liars when we -tell them, "Be good and you will be happy." Better forget "virtue" and -read simply: intelligence=happiness. That appears more closely akin to -the rough realities of life: intelligence means ability to adapt means -to ends, and happiness means success in adapting means to ends; -happiness, then, varies with ability. Happiness is intelligence on the -move; a pervasive physiological tonus accompanying the forward movement -of achievement. It is not the consciousness of virtue: that is not -happiness, but snobbery. And similarly, remorse is, in the intelligent -man, not the consciousness of "sin," but the consciousness of a past -stupidity. So far as you fail to win your real ends you are -unhappy,--and have proved unintelligent. But the Preacher says, "He that -increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." True enough if the increment of -knowledge is the correction of a past error; the sorrow is a penalty -paid for the error, not for the increase of knowledge. True, too, that -intelligence does not consistently lessen conflicts, and that it -discloses a new want for every want it helps to meet. But the joy of -life lies not so much in the disappearance of difficulties as in the -overcoming of them; not so much in the diminution of conflict as in the -growth of achievement. Surely it is time we had an ethic that stressed -achievement rather than quiescence. And further, intelligence must not -be thought of as the resignation of disillusionment, the consciousness -of impotence; intelligence is to be conceived of in terms of adaptive -activity, of movement towards an end, of coordinated self-expression -and behavior. Finally, it is but fair to interpret the formula as making -happiness and intelligence coincide only so far as the individual's -happiness depends on his own conduct. The causes of unhappiness may be -an inherited deformity, or an accident not admitting of provision; such -cases do not so much contradict as lie outside the formula. So far as -your happiness depends on your activities, it will vary with the degree -of intelligence you show. Act intelligently, and you will not know -regret; feel that you are moving on toward your larger ends, and you -will be happy. - - -X - -The Socratic Challenge - -But if individual and social health and happiness depend on intelligence -rather than on "virtue," and if the exaltation of intelligence was a -cardinal element in the Athenian view of life, why did the Socratic -ethic fail to save Athens from decay? And why did the supposedly -intelligent Athenians hail this generous old Dr. Johnson of philosophy -into court and sentence him to death? - -The answer is, Because the Athenians refused to make the Socratic -experiment. They were intelligent, but not intelligent enough. They -could diagnose the social malady, could trace it to the decay of -supernatural moral norms; but they could not find a cure, they had not -the vision to see that salvation lay not in the compulsory retention of -old norms, but in the forging of new and better ones, capable of -withstanding the shock of questioning and trial. What they saw was -chaos; and like most statesmen they longed above all things for order. -They were not impressed by Socrates' allegiance to law, his cordial -admission of the individual's obligations to the community for the -advantages of social organization. They listened to the disciples: to -Antisthenes, who laughed at patriotism; to Aristippus, who denounced all -government; to Plato, scorner of democracy; and they attacked the master -because (not to speak of pettier political reasons) it was he, they -thought, who was the root of the evil. They could not see that this man -was their ally and not their foe; that rescue for Athens lay in helping -him rather than in sentencing him to die. And how well they could have -helped him! For to preach intelligence is not enough; there remains to -provide for every one the instrumentalities of intelligence. What men -needed, what Athenian statesmanship might have provided, was an -organization of intelligence for intelligence, an organization of all -the forces of intelligence in the state in a persistent intellectual -campaign. If that could not save Athens, Athens could not be saved. But -the myopic leaders of the Athenian state could not see salvation in -intelligence, they could only see it in hemlock. And Socrates had to -die. - -It will take a wise courage to accept the Socratic challenge,--such -courage as battle-fields and senate-chambers are not wont to show. But -unless that wise courage comes to us our civilization will go as other -civilizations have come and gone, "kindled and put out like a flame in -the night." - - NOTE.--From a book whose interesting defence of the Socratic ethic - from the standpoint of psychoanalysis was brought to the writer's - attention after the completion of the foregoing essay: "The - Freudian ethics is a literal and concrete justification of the - Socratic teaching. Truth is the sole moral sanction, and - discrimination of hitherto unrealized facts is the one way out of - every moral dilemma.... Virtue is wisdom." Practical morality is - "the establishment, through discrimination, of consistent, and not - contradictory (mutually suppressive), courses of action toward - phenomena. The moral sanction lies always in facts presented by the - phenomena; morality in the discrimination of those facts." Moral - development is "the progressive, lifelong integration of - experience."--_The Freudian Wish and Its Place in Ethics_, by Edwin - B. Holt, New York, 1915, pp. 141, 145, 148. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -PLATO: PHILOSOPHY AS POLITICS - - -I - -The Man and the Artist - -Why do we love Plato? Perhaps because Plato himself was a lover: lover -of comrades, lover of the sweet intoxication of dialectical revelry, -full of passion for the elusive reality behind thoughts and things. We -love him for his unstinted energy, for the wildly nomadic play of his -fancy, for the joy which he found in life in all its unredeemed and -adventurous complexity. We love him because he was alive every minute of -his life, and never ceased to grow; such a man can be loved even for the -errors he has made. But above all we love him because of his high -passion for social reconstruction through intelligent control; because -he retained throughout his eighty years that zeal for human improvement -which is for most of us the passing luxury of youth; because he -conceived philosophy as an instrument not merely for the interpretation, -but for the remoulding, of the world. He speaks of himself, through -Socrates, as "almost the only Athenian living who sets his hand to the -true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time."[17] -Philosophy was for him a study of human possibilities in the light of -human realities and limitations; his daily food consisted of the -problems of human relations and endeavors: problems of liberty _versus_ -order; of sex relations and the family; of ideals of character and -citizenship, and the educational approaches to those ideals; problems of -the control of population, of heredity and environment, of art and -morals. With all his liking for the poetry of mysticism, philosophy none -the less was to him preeminently an adventure in this world; and unlike -ourselves, who follow one or another of his many leads, he sailed -virginal seas. Every reader in every age has called him modern; but what -age can there be to which Plato will not still be modern? - -Plato was twenty-eight when Socrates died;[18] and though he was not -present at the drinking of the hemlock, yet the passing of the master -must have been a tragic blow to him. It brought him face to face with -death, the mother of metaphysics. Proudest of all philosophers, he did -not hide his sense of debt to Socrates: "I thank the gods," he said, -"that I was born freeman, not slave; Greek, not barbarian; man, not -woman; but above all that I was born in the time of Socrates." The old -philosopher gone, Athens became for a time intolerable to Plato (some -say, Plato to Athens); and the young philosopher sailed off to see -foreign shores and take nourishment of other cultures. He liked the -peaceful orderliness and aged dignity with which a long dominant -priesthood had invested Egypt; beside this mellow civilization, he was -willing to be told, the culture of his native Athens was but a -precarious ethnological sport. He liked the Pythagoreans of southern -Italy, with their aristocratic approach to the problem of social -construction and their communal devotion to plain living and high -thinking; above all he liked their emphasis on harmony as the -fundamental pervasive relation of all things and as the ideal in which -our human discords might be made to resolve themselves had men artistry -enough. Other lands he saw and learnt from: stories tell how he risked -his handsome head to build an ideal state in Syracuse; how he was sold -into slavery and redeemed by a friend; and how he passed down through -Palestine even to India, absorbing the culture of their peoples with a -kind of osmotic genius. And at last, after twelve years of wandering, he -heard again the call of Athens, and went home, stored with experience -and ripe with thought. - -Arrived now at the mid-point of his life, he turned to the task of -self-expression. Should he join one of the political parties and try to -make the government of Athens a picture of his thought? Perhaps he felt -that his thought was not yet definite enough for that; politics requires -answers in Yes or No, and philosophy deals only in Yes-_and_-No. He -hesitated to join a party or pledge himself to a dogma; and was prepared -to be hated by all parties alike for this hesitation.[19] Aristocracy -was in his blood, and he would not stoop to conquer by a plebiscite. He -thought of turning to the stage, as Euripides had done, and teaching -through the mask; in his youth he had written plays, and smiled now to -think how he had hoped to rival Aristophanes. But there were too many -limitations here, of religious subject and dramatic form; Plato's -philosophy was a thing of ever broadening borders, and could not be -cramped into a ceremony. But neither was his philosophy an arid academic -affair, to be written down as one places in order the bones of a -skeleton; it was vibrantly alive, it was itself a drama and a religion. -Why should there not be a drama of idea as well as of action?--Had not -the play of thought its tragedies and comedies?--Was not philosophy, -after all, a matter of life and death? - -In such a juncture of desires came that fusion of drama and philosophy -which we know as Plato's dialogues,--assuredly the finest production in -all the history of philosophy. Here was just the instrument for a man -whose thought had not congealed into dogmas and a system. All genius is -heterogeneous; a great man is a sum of many men;--let the soul give its -_selves_ a voice, and it will speak in dialogue.[20] Just instrument, -too, for a man who wished to play with the varied possibilities of -speculation, who cared to clarify his own mind rather than to give forth -finalities where life itself was so blind and inconclusive. A conclusion -is too often but the point at which thought has lost its wind; being not -so much a solution of the problem as a dissolution of thought. Hence the -riotous play of the imagination in Plato; lively game of trial and -error, merry-go-round of thought; here is imagery squandered with lordly -abandon; here is humor such as one misses in our ponderous modern -philosophers; here is no system but all systems;[21] here is one -abounding fountain-head of European thought; here is prose strong and -beautiful as the great temples where Greek joy disported itself in -marble; here literary prose is born,--and born adult. - - -II - -How to Solve the Social Problem - -To understand Plato one must remember the Pythagorean _motif_: _harmony_ -is the heart of Plato's metaphysics, of his psychological and -educational theory, of his ethics and his politics. To feel such harmony -as there is, and to make such harmony as may be,--that to Plato is the -meaning of philosophy. - -We observe this at the outset in the more-mystified-than mystifying -theory of ideas. Obviously, the theory of ideas belongs to Socrates; the -Platonic element is a theory not of ideas so much as of ideals. Socrates -wants truth, but Plato wants beauty, harmony. Socrates is bent on -argument, and points you to a concept; Plato is a poet with a vision, -and points you to the picture that he sees. Understanding, says Plato, -is of the earth earthly; but poetic vision is divine.[22] Hence the maze -of quibbling in the dialogues; it is Plato and not Socrates who is -culprit here. Reasoning was an alien art to Plato; try as he might to -become a mathematician he remained always a poet,--and perhaps most so -when he dealt with numbers. Dialectic was in Plato's day a recent -invention; he plays with it like a youth in the breakers, letting it now -raise him to heights of ecstatic vision and now bury him in the -deadliest logic-chopping. But--let us not doubt it--he knows when he is -logic-chopping; he goes on, partly that he may paint his picture, partly -for the mere joy of parrying pros and cons; this new game, he feels, is -a sport for the gods. - -Let us smile at the heavy seriousness of those who suppose that this -man meant everything he said. No one does, but least of all men Plato, -who hardly taught except in parables. What is the "heaven" of the ideas -but a poet's way of saying that the constancies observable in the -relations among things are not identical with the things themselves, but -have a reality and permanence of their own? So we phrase it in our own -distinguished verbiage; but Plato prefers, as ever, to draw a picture. -And notice, in this picture, the ever present reference to social needs. -What is a concept, after all, but a scheme for the conservation of -mental resources, an instrument of prediction, a method of control? -Without the power to form concepts we could never turn experience to -use, it would slip between our fingers; we should be like the maidens -condemned to carry water in a sieve. The _idea_ of anything is the sum -of its observed constancies of behavior; hence the medium of our -adaptation and control. To have _ideas_ of things is to know the map or -plan of things; it is to see tendencies, directions, and results; it is -to know how to _use_ things. That is why knowledge is power; every idea -is a tool with which to bend the world to serve our will. And that too -is why the Ideas are real: they have power, and "anything which -possesses any sort of power is real."[23] - -All this, as was said, is but an embellishment of the Socratic doctrine -that salvation lies in brains. But Plato rushes on. Not only may -everything be brought under a concept, an Idea, but it may be brought -under a perfect Form, an Ideal. Things are not what they might be. Men -are not such as men might be, states are often sorry states, beds might -be more ideal beds, even dirt could be more perfectly dirt. To all -things that are, there correspond perfect Ideals of what they might be, -in a thoroughly harmonious world. To say that these Ideals are real, -that they exist, is only to claim for them that they are operative, and -get results. Whether his supernaturalism was only part of his political -theory, others may dispute; let it suffice us at present that Plato -believed that the Ideals could and did operate through human agency. The -distinctive thing about man is that perceiving the thing that is, he can -conceive the thing that might be. He is the forward-looking, -ideal-making animal; through him, if he but will it, proceeds creation. -The brute may be a thinker, but man may be also an artist. Out of the -abundance of the sexual instinct (as Plato implies in the _Symposium_) -emerges this ideal-seeking and -making quality; from which come art and -ethics and religion. William Morris looks at a slum and conceives -Utopia; and forthwith begins to make for Utopia even though the road -lead him through a jail. Is it that William Morris loves "humanity"? Not -at all; he loves beauty and his dream; he is uncomfortable with all this -dirt and despair before him; it is his fortune or misfortune that he -cannot see these slums without falling thrall to a vision of better -things. So with most of us "reformers": we wish to change things, not -because we love our fellows much more than "conservatives" do, nor -because we believe that happiness varies with income; but because we -hear the call of the beautiful, and see in the mind's eye another form -wherein the world might come more pleasingly to sight. - -What we have to do, says Plato, is to make people conceive a better -world, so that they may see this world as ugly, and may strive to -reshape it. We must conceive the perfect Forms of things, and batter -this poor world till it reform itself and take these perfect shapes. To -learn to see--and seeing learn to make--these perfect Forms: that is the -task of philosophers. To make philosophers: that is the social problem. - - -III - -On Making Philosopher-Kings - -It is simple, isn't it? Give us enough philosophers, and the beautiful -city will walk out of the picture into the fact. But how make -philosophers? And perhaps there is a perfect Form for philosophers, too? -How shall we "see--and seeing learn to make"--the perfect philosopher? - -Let us not worry about this little matter of dialectics, says Plato; we -know quite well some of the things we must do in order that we may have -more and greater philosophers. It is quite clear that one thing we must -do is to give our best brains to education. - -Is that trite? Not at all. Do we give our best brains to education? Do -we offer more to our ministers or commissioners of education than to our -presidents, or governors, or mayors, or bank presidents, or pugilists? -Or do we honor them more? When Plato says that the office of minister of -education is "of all the great offices of state the greatest," and that -the citizens should elect their very best man to this office,[24] he is -not pronouncing a platitude, he is making a radical, a revolutionary -proposition. It has never been done, and it will not soon be done; for -men, naturally enough, are more interested in making money than in -making philosophers. And yet, says Plato, gently but resolutely, we may -as well understand that until we give our best brains to the problem of -making philosophers our much-ado about social ills will amount to noise -and wind, and nothing more. "How charming people are!" he writes, -drawing an analogy between the individual and the body politic; "they -are always doctoring--and thereby increasing and complicating--their -disorders, fancying they will be cured by some nostrum which somebody -advises them to try,--never getting better but always growing worse.... -Are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at legislation, and -imagining that by reforms they will make an end to the dishonesties and -rascalities of mankind, not knowing that they are in reality cutting -away at the heads of a hydra?"[25] - -Notice that the aim of the educational process is, for Plato, not so -much the general spread of intelligence as the discovery and development -of the superior man. (This conception of the task of the educator -appears again and again in later thought: we hear it in the nineteenth -century, for example, in Carlyle's "hero," Schopenhauer's "genius," and -Nietzsche's "superman.") It is very naive, thinks Plato, to look to the -masses as the source and hope of social improvement; the proper function -of the masses is to toil as cheerfully as may be for the development and -support of the genius who will make them happy--so far as they are -capable of happiness. To aim directly at the elevation of all is to open -the door to mediocrity and futility; to find and nurse the potential -genius,--that is an end worthy the educator's subtle art. - -Now if you are going to discover genius in the bud you must above all -things handle your material, at the outset at least, with tender care. -You must not overflow with prohibitions, or indulge yourself too much in -the luxury of punishments. "Mother and father and nurse and tutor set to -quarrelling about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is -able to understand them: he cannot say or do anything without their -setting forth to him that this is just and that unjust, this honorable -and that dishonorable, this holy and that unholy, do this and don't do -that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not he is straightened by -threats and blows, like a piece of warped wood."[26] Suppress here, and -you get expression there;--often enough, abnormal expression. Better -have no hard mould of uniformity and conformity wherein to crush and -deform each differently aspiring soul. Think twice before forcing your -_'isms_ and _'ologies_ upon the child; his own desires will be your best -curriculum. "The elements of instruction," writes Plato, in a -too-little-noticed passage, "should be presented to the mind in -childhood, but without any notion of forcing them. For a freeman ought -to be a freeman in the acquisition of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when -compulsory, does no harm; but knowledge which is acquired under -compulsion has no hold on the mind. Therefore do not use compulsion, but -let early education be a sort of amusement; that will better enable you -to find out the natural bent."[27] There is a stroke of Plato's genius -here: it is a point which we laggards are coming to after some two -thousand three hundred years. "To find out the natural bent," to catch -the spark of divine fire before conformity can put it out; that is the -beginning and yet the summit of the educator's task,--the _initium -dimidium facti_. - -In this search for genius all souls shall be tried. Education must be -universal and compulsory; children belong not to parents but to the -state and to the future.[28] And education cannot begin too early. -Cleinias, asking whether education should begin at birth, is astonished -to be answered, "No, before"; and if Plato could have his way, no doubt -there would be a realization of Dr. Holmes' suggestion that a man's -education should begin two thousand years before he is born. The chief -concern at the outset will be to develop the body, and not to fill the -soul with letters; let the child be taught his letters at ten, but not -before.[29] Music will share with gymnastics the task of rounded -development. The boy who tells his teacher that the athletic field is as -important and necessary a part of education as the lecture-room is -right. "How shall we find a gentle nature which has also great -courage?"[30] Music mixed with athletics will do it. "I am quite aware -that your mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the -musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him."[31] There -is a determination here that even the genius shall be healthy; Plato -will not tolerate the notion that to be a genius one needs to be sick: -let the genius have his say, but let him, too, be reminded that he is no -disembodied spirit. And let art take care lest its vaunted purgation be -a purgation of our strength and manhood; poetry and soft music may make -men slaves. No man shall bother with music after the age of sixteen.[32] - -At twenty a general test will weed out those who give indication that -further educative labor will be wasted on them; the others will go on -for another decade, and a second test will eliminate those who will in -the meantime have reached the limit of their capacities for development. -The final survivors will then--and not before--be introduced to -philosophy. "They must not be allowed to taste the dear delight too -early; that is a thing especially to be avoided; for young men, as you -may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue -for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting, like -puppy-dogs that delight to tear and pull at all who come near them.... -And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands -of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing -anything that they believed before, and hence not only they, but -philosophy generally, have a bad name with the rest of the world."[33] - -Five happy years are given to the study of philosophy. Gradually, the -student learns to see the universal behind the particular, to judge the -part by relating it to the whole; the fragments of his experience fall -into a harmonious philosophy of life. The sciences which he has learned -are now united as a consistent application of intelligence to life; -indeed, the faculty of uniting the sciences and focussing them on the -central problems of life, is precisely the criterion of the true -philosopher.[34] But involved in this is a certain practical quality, a -sense for realities and limitations. One must study books--and men; one -should read much, but live more. So Plato legislates that his new -philosophers shall spend the years from thirty-five to fifty in the busy -din of practical life; they must, in his immortal image, go back into -the cave. The purpose of higher education is to detach us for a time -from the life of action, but only so that we may later return to it with -a better perspective. To be put for a goodly time upon one's own -resources, to butter one's own bread for a while,--that is an almost -indispensable prerequisite to greatness. Out of such a test men come -with the scars of many wounds; but to those who are not fools every scar -is the mark of a lesson learned. - -And now here are our philosophers, ripe and fifty, hardened by the tests -of learning and of life. What shall we do with them? Put them away in a -lecture-room and pay no further attention to them? Give them, as their -life-work, the problem of finding how Spinoza deduces, or fails to -deduce, the Many from the One? Have them fill learned esoteric journals -with unintelligible jargon about the finite and the infinite, or space -and time, or the immateriality of roast beef? No, says Plato; let them -govern the state. - -Did Plato mean it? Was he so enraged at the state-murder of the most -beloved of philosophers that he forearmed himself against such a -_contretemps_ in his Utopia by making the philosophers supreme?--Was it -only his magnificent journalistic revenge? Was it merely his reaction to -the observed cramping and mediocritization of superior intellects in a -democracy? Was it but Plato's dramatic way of emphasizing the Socratic -plea for intelligence as the basis of morals and social life? Perhaps -all this; but much more. It was his sober judgment; it was the influence -of the Egyptian priesthood and the Pythagorean brotherhood coming to the -surface in him; it was the long-accumulated deposit of the stream of his -personal experience. - -We have to remember here that by _philosopher_ Plato does not mean -Immanuel Kant. He means a living being, a man like Seneca or Francis -Bacon, a man in whom knowledge is fused with action, and keen perception -joins with steady hand; a man who has had not only the teaching of books -but the discipline of hard experience; a man who has learned with equal -readiness to obey and to command; a man whose thought is coordinated by -application to the vital problems of human society. "Inasmuch as -philosophers alone are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and -those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not -philosophers, I must ask you which of the two kinds should be rulers of -our state?"[35] Well, then, "Until philosophers are kings, or the kings -and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, ... -cities will never cease from ill, nor the human race."[36] - -That, of course, is the heart and soul of Plato. - - -IV - -Dishonest Democracy - -Let us get back to the circumference and approach this same point by -another route. - -I grant you, says Plato, that to have rulers at all is very -disagreeable. And indeed we should not need to have them were it not for -a regrettable but real porcine element in us. My own Utopia is not an -aristocracy nor a democracy, nor any kind of an _'ocracy_; it is what -some of you would call an anarchist communism. I have described it very -clearly in the second book of my _Republic_, but nobody cares to notice -it, except to repeat my brother's gibe about it.[37] But instead of -this Utopia of mine being a "City of Pigs," it is just because we are -pigs that I had to give up painting this picture and turn to describing -"not only a state, but a luxurious state." I am still "of opinion that -the true state, which may be said to be a healthy constitution, is the -one which I have described," and not the "inflamed constitution" to -which I devoted the rest of my book, and which in my opinion is much -more a "City of Pigs" than the other. It is because people want "to lie -on sofas, and dine off tables, and have dainties and dessert in the -modern fashion, ... and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and -cakes, and gold, and ivory, ... hunters and actors, ... musicians, -players, dancers, ... tutors, ... servants ... nurses wet and dry, ... -barbers, confectioners and cooks, ... and hosts of animals (if people -are to eat animals), ... and physicians; ... then a slice of neighbor's -land ... and then war,"[38]--in short, it is because people are pigs -that you must have soldiers and rulers and laws. - -But if you must have them, why not train your best men for the work, -just as you train some to be doctors, and others to be lawyers, and -others to be engineers? Think of taking a man's pills just because he -can show a count of noses in his favor! Think of letting a man build the -world's greatest bridge because he is popular! You accuse me of -plagiarizing from Pythagoras, but in truth, you who believe in democracy -are the Pythagoreans of politics,--you believe in number as your god. -Your equality is the equality of the unequal, and is all a matter of -words and never of reality; your liberty is anarchy, it is the -congenital sickness wherein your democracy was conceived and delivered, -and whereof it inevitably dies; your freedom of speech is a license to -lie; your elections are a contest in flattery and prevarication. Your -democracy is a theatrocracy; and woe to the genius who falls into your -hands. Perhaps you like democracy because you are like democracy: all -your desires are on a level; that you should respect some of them and -discipline others is an idea that never enters your heads. It has never -occurred to you that it takes more time and training to make a statesman -than it does to make a bootblack. But statesmanship is something that -can never be conferred by plebiscite; it must be pursued through the -years, and must find the privilege of office without submitting to a -vote. Wisdom is too subtle a thing to be felt by the coarsened senses of -the mob. Your industry is wonderful because it is shot through with -specialization and training; but because you reject specialization and -training in filling the offices of your government the word _politics_ -has become dishonored in your mouths. And just because you will let any -one be your leader no real man ever submits himself to your choice. - - -V - -Culture and Slavery - -There is much exaggeration here, of course, as might be expected of one -whose material and social concerns were bound up with the oligarchical -party at Athens, whose friends and relatives had died in battle against -the armies of the democracy; whose early years had seen the democratic -mismanagement of the Peloponnesian war and the growth of a disorderly -individualism in Athens. But there are also lessons here for those who -are strong enough to learn even from their enemies.[39] To press home -these lessons at this point would take us too far afield; our plan for -the moment is to follow Plato's guidance until he has led us out into a -clear view of his position. - -We shall suppose such a scheme of education as Plato desires; we shall -suppose that a moderate number of those who entered the lists at birth -have survived test after test, have "tasted the dear delight" of -philosophy for five years, and have passed safely through the ordeal of -practical affairs; these men (and women, as we shall see) now -automatically become the rulers of the Platonic state: let us observe -them in their work and in their lives. - -To the guardians it is a matter of first principles that the function of -the state--and therefore their function--is a positive function; they -are to lead the people, and not merely to serve as an umpire of -disputes. They are the protagonists of a social evolution that has at -last become conscious; they are resolved that henceforth social -organization shall be a far-seeing plan and not a haphazard flux of -expediencies of control. They know that they are asked to be experts in -foresight and coordination; they will legislate accordingly, and will -no more think of asking the people what laws should be passed than a -physician would ask the people what measures should be taken to preserve -the public health. - -And first of all they will control population; they will consider this -to be the indispensable prerequisite to a planned development. The state -must not be larger than is consistent with unity and with the efficacy -of central control. People may mate as they will,--that is their own -concern; but they must understand quite clearly that procreation is an -affair of the state. Children must be born not of love but of science; -marriage will be a temporary relation, allowing frequent remating for -the sake of beautiful offspring. Men shall not have children before -thirty, nor after forty. Deformed or incurably diseased children will be -exposed to die. Children must leave their mothers at birth, and be -brought up by the state. Women must be freed from bondage to their -children, if women are to be real citizens, interested in the public -weal, and loving not a narrow family but the great community. - -For women are to be citizens; it would be foolish to let half the people -be withdrawn from interest in and service to the state. Women will -receive all the educational advantages offered to men; they will even -wrestle with them, naked, in the games. If any of them--and surely some -of them will--pass all the tests, they shall be guardians, too. People -are to be divided, for political purposes, not by difference of sex, -but by difference of capacity. Some women may be fit not for -housekeeping but for ruling,--let them rule; some men may be fit not for -ruling but for housekeeping,--let them keep house. - -Without family, and without clearly ascertainable relationship between -any man and any child, there can be no individual inheritance of -property; the guardians will have all things in common, and without -Tertullian's exception.[40] Shut off from the possibility of personal -bequests or of "founding a family," the guardians will have no stimulus -to laying up a hoard of material goods; nay, they will not be moved to -such hoarding by fear of the morrow, for a modest but sufficient -maintenance will be supplied them by the working classes. There will be -no money in use among them; they will live a hard simple life, devoted -to the problems of communal defence and development. Freed from family -ties, from private property and luxury, from violence and litigation, -and all distinctions of Mine and Thine, they will have no reason to -oppress the workers in order to lay up stores for themselves; they will -be happy in the exercise of their high responsibilities and powers. They -will not be tempted to legislate for the good of their own class rather -than for the good of the community; their joy will lie in the creation -of a prosperous and harmonious state. - -Under their direction will be the soldiers, also specially selected and -trained, and supported by the workers. But these workers? - -They will be those who have been eliminated in the tests. The demands of -specialization will have condemned them to labor for those who have the -gift of guidance. They shall have no voice in the direction of the -state; that, as said, is a reward for demonstrated capacity, and not a -"natural right."[41] Frankly, there are some people who are not fit to -be other than slaves; and to varnish that fact with oratory about "the -dignity of labor" is merely to give an instance of the indignities to -which a democratic politician will descend. These workers are incapable -of a subtler happiness than that of knowing that they are doing what -they are fit to do, and are contributing to the maintenance of communal -prosperity. Such as they are, these workers, like the other members of -the state, will find their highest possibilities of development in such -an organized society. And to make sure that they will not rebel, they -will have been taught by "royal lies" that their position and function -in the state have been ordained by the gods. There is no sense in -shivering at this quite judicious juggling with the facts; there are -times when truth is a barrier to content, and must be set aside. -Physicians have been known to cure ailments with a timely lie. Labor -stimulated by such deception may be slavery, if you wish to call it so; -but it is the inevitable condition of order, and order is the inevitable -condition of culture and communal success. - - -VI - -Plasticity and Order - -But is it just?--some one asks. Perhaps there are other things than -order to be considered. Perhaps this hunger for order is a disease, like -the monistic hunger for unity; perhaps it is a corollary to the _a -priori_ type of mind; perhaps it is part of the philosopher's general -inability to face a possibly irrational reality. Here for order's sake -the greater part of the people must work in silence: they shall not -utter their desires. Here for order's sake are sacrificed that communal -plasticity, that freedom of variety, that happy looseness and -changeability of structure, in which lie all the suggestion and potency -of social reconstruction. If there is any lesson which shines out -through all the kaleidoscope of history, it is that a political system -is doomed to early death if its charter offer no provision and facility -for its own reform. Plasticity is king. Human ideals change, and leave -nations, institutions, even gods, in their wake. "Law and order in a -state are" _not_ "the cause of every good";[42] they are the security of -goods attained, but they may be also the hindrance of goods conceived. A -state without freedom of criticism and variation is like a sail-boat in -a calm; it stands but it cannot move. Such a state is a geometrical -diagram, a perfect syllogism evolved out of impossible premises; and its -own perfection is its refutation. In such a state there could be no -Plato, with a penchant for conceiving Utopias; much less a Socrates, -holding that a life uncriticised is unworthy of a man. It would be a -state not for philosophers but for priests: very truly its basis would -not be dialectical clarity but royal lies. Here is the supreme -pessimism, the ultimate atheism, of the aristocrat, that he does not -believe in the final wholesomeness of truth. And surely something can be -said for democracy. Granted that democracy is not a problem solved but a -problem added; it is at least a problem that time may help to clarify. -Granted that men used to slavery cannot turn and wisely rule themselves; -what is better than that they should, by inevitable trial and error, -learn? _Errando discimus._ Granted that physicians do not consult us in -their prescriptions; but neither do they come to us before they are -chosen and called. "That the guardian should require another guardian to -guard him is ridiculous indeed."[43] But he would! Power corrupts -unless it is shared by all. "Cities cannot exist, if a few only share in -the virtues, as in the arts."[44] To build your culture on the backs of -slaves is to found your city on Vesuvius. Men will not be lied to -forever,--at least with the same lies! And to end with such a -Utopia,--what is it but to yield to Thrasymachus, to arrange all things -at last in the interest of the stronger? Is it just? - - -VII - -The Meaning of Justice - -But what is justice?--asks Plato. Don't you see that our notion of -justice is the very crux of the whole business? Is justice merely a -matter of telling the truth? Nonsense; it may be well to have our -children believe that; but those who are not children know that if a lie -is a better instrument of achievement than the truth in some given -juncture of events, then a lie is justified. Truth is a social value, -and has its justification only in that; if untruth prove here and there -of social value, then untruth is just.[45] The confusion of justice with -some absolute eternal law comes of a separation of ethics from politics, -and an attempt to arrive at a definition of justice from the study of -individuals. But morals grow out of politics; justice is essentially a -political relation. And taking the state as a whole, it is clear that -nothing is "good" unless it works; that it would be absurd to say that -justice demands of a state that it should be ordered in such a way as to -make for its own decay. Social organization must be effective, and lies -and class-divisions are justified if they make for the effectiveness of -a political order. Surely social effectiveness forbids that men fit to -legislate should live out their lives as cobblers, or that men should -rule whose natural aptitude is for digging ditches. Justice means, for -politics at least, that each member of society is minding his natural -business, is doing that for which he is fitted by his own natural -capacity. Injustice is the encroachment of one part on another; justice -is the efficient functioning of each part. Justice, then, is social -coordination and harmony. It is not "the interest of the stronger," it -is the harmony of the whole. So in the individual, justice is the -harmonious operation of a unified personality; each element in one's -nature doing that which it is fitted to do; again it is not mere -strength or forcefulness, but harmonious, organized strength; it is -effective order. And effective order demands a class division. You may -mouth as you please the delusive delicacies of democracy; but classes -you will have, for men will always be some of gold and some of silver -and some of brass. And the brass must not pass itself off as silver, -nor the silver as gold. Give the brass all the time and opportunity in -the world, and it will still be brass. Of course brass will not believe -that it is brass, but we had better make it understand once for all that -it is so, even if we have to tell a thousand lies to get the truth -believed. - -And as for variation and plasticity, remember that these too are -valueless except as they make for a better society. They assuredly make -for change; but change is not betterment. History is a chaos of -variations; without some organ for their control they cancel one another -and terminate inevitably in futility. Our problem is not how to change, -but how to set our best brains to controlling change for the sake of a -finer life. - - -VIII - -The Future of Plato - -There are _apercus_ here, and a bewildering wealth of suggestions, which -one is tempted to pursue to their ultimate present significance. But to -do that would be to encroach too much on the subjects of later chapters. -The vital thing here is not to accept or refute any special element in -Plato's political philosophy; it is rather to see how inextricably -politics and philosophy were bound together in his mind as two sides of -fundamentally one endeavor. Here is the passion to remould things; here -is the seeing of perfection and the will to make perfection; here -speaks out for the first time in European history the courage of the -intellect that not only will perceive but will remake. Here is a man; no -dead academic cobweb-weaver, but a masterful, kingly soul, mixed up in -warm intimacy with the complex flow of the life about him. He paints -Utopia; but at the same time he takes his own counsel anent the -importance of an educational approach to the social problem, and founds -the most famous and influential university the world has ever seen. -Picture him in the gardens and lecture-halls of his Academy, arranging -and supervising and coordinating, and turning out men to whom nations -looked--and not in vain--for statesmen. Not merely to lift men up to the -beatific vision of unities and perfections, but to teach them the art of -creation, to fire them with the ardor of a new artistry; this he aimed -to do, and did. "The greatest works grow in importance, as trees do -after the death of the mortal men who planted them."[46] So grew the -_Republic_, and the Academy. - -To catch in a chapter the deep yet subtle spirit and meaning of this -"finest product of antiquity,"[47]--it is not easy. In Plato's Utopia -there would no doubt have been a law against writing so briefly on so -vast a phenomenon,--with, in this case, the inevitably consequent -derangement of the Platonic perspective, and the impossibility, within -such compass, of focussing Plato in the political and philosophical -meaning of his time. One's feeling here is of having desecrated with -small talk the Parthenon of philosophy. Perhaps as we go on we shall be -able to see more clearly the still-living value of Plato's thought: in -almost everything that we shall hereinafter discuss his voice will be -heard, even though unnamed. To-day, at last, he comes again into his -own--as in Renaissance days--after centuries dominated by the influence -of his first misinterpreter; and generations bred on the throned -lukewarmness of the _Nicomachean Ethics_ yield to a generation that is -learning to feel the hot constructive passion of the _Republic_. Dead -these two thousand and some hundred years, Plato belongs to the future. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -FRANCIS BACON AND THE SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF SCIENCE - - -I - -From Plato to Bacon - -"As I read Plato," writes Professor Dewey, "philosophy began with some -sense of its essentially political basis and mission--a recognition that -its problems were those of the organization of a just social order. But -it soon got lost in dreams of another world."[48] Plato and Aristotle -are the _crura cerebri_ of Europe. But in Aristotle, along with a wealth -of acute observation of men and institutions, we find a diminishing -interest in reconstruction; the Stagirite spent too much of his time in -card-cataloguing Plato, and allowed his imagination to become suffocated -with logic. With the Stoics and Epicureans begin that alienation of -ethics from politics, and that subordination of philosophy to religious -needs, which it is part of the task of present thinking to undo. -Alexander had conquered the Orient, only to have Orientalism conquer -Greece. Under Scholasticism it was the fate of great minds to retrace -worn paths in the cage of a system of conclusions determined by external -authority; and the obligation to uphold the established precluded any -practical recognition of the reconstructive function of thought. With -the Renaissance--that Indian summer of Greek culture--the dream of a -remoulded world found voice again. Campanella, through the darkness of -his prison cell, achieved the vision of a communist utopia; and other -students of the rediscovered Plato painted similar pictures. Indeed this -reawakening of Plato's influence gave to the men of the Renaissance an -inspiriting sense of the wonders that lay potential in organized -intelligence. Again men faced the task of replacing with a natural ethic -the falling authoritarian sanctions of supernatural religion; and for a -time one might have hoped that the thought of Socrates was to find at -last its due fruition. But again men lost themselves in the notion of a -cultured class moving leisurely over the backs of slaves; and perhaps it -was well that the whole movement was halted by the more Puritan but also -more democratic outburst of the Reformation. What the world needed was a -method which offered hope for the redemption not of a class, but of all. -Galileo and Roger Bacon opened the way to meeting this need by their -emphasis on the value of hypothesis and experiment, and the necessity of -combining induction with deduction; it remained for Francis Bacon to -lay out the road for the organized employment of these new methods, and -to inspire all Europe with his warm vision of their social -possibilities. - - -II - -Character - -If you would understand Bacon, you must see him as not so much a -philosopher as an administrator. You find him a man of great practical -ability: he remoulds philosophy with one hand and rules part of England -with the other; not to speak of writing Shakespeare's plays between -times! He rises brilliantly from youthful penury to the political -pinnacle; and meanwhile he runs over the whole realm of human knowledge, -scattering praise and censure with lordly hand. Did we not know the fact -as part of the history of England we should never suspect that the -detailed and varied learning of this man was the incidental -accomplishment of a life busied with political intrigue. _Bene vixit qui -bene latuit_: surely here is a man who has lived widely, and in no -merely physical sense has made the world his home. Life is no "brief -candle" to him, nor men "such stuff as dreams are made of"; life is a -glorious gift, big with blessing for him who will but assist at the -delivery. There is nothing of the timid ascetic about him; like -Socrates, he knows that there is a sort of cowardice in shunning -pleasure;[49] best of all, there is so much work to be done, so many -opportunities for the man of unnarrowed soul. He feels the exhilaration -of one who has burst free from the shackles of intellectual authority: -he sees before him an uncharted future, raw material for hands that dare -to mould it; and he dares. All his life long he is mixed up with the -heart of things; every day is an adventure. Exiled from politics he -plunges gladly into the field of scientific reconstruction; he does not -forget that he is an administrator, any more than Plato could forget -that he was a dramatist; he finds the world of thought a chaos, and -bequeaths it a planful process for the coordination of human life; all -Europe responds to his call for the "enlarging of the bounds of human -empire." He works joyfully and buoyantly to the very last, and dies as -he has wished, "in an earnest pursuit, which is like one that is wounded -in hot blood, who, for the time, scarce feels the hurt." - - -III - -The Expurgation of the Intellect - -Consider the reaction of an experienced statesman who leaves the service -of a king to enter the service of truth. He has left a field wherein all -workers moved in subordination to one head and one focal purpose; he -enters a field in which each worker is working by himself, with no -division of labor, no organization of endeavor, no correlation of ends. -There he has found administration, here he finds a naive -_laissez-faire_; there order, here anarchy; there some sense of common -end and effort, here none. He understands at once the low repute of -philosophy among men of affairs. "For the people are very apt to contemn -truth, upon account of the controversies raised about it; and so think -those all in a wrong way, who never meet."[50] He understands at once -why it is that the world has been so little changed by speculation and -research. He is a man whose consciousness of pervasive human misery is -too sharp for comfort;[51] and he sees no hope of remedy for this in -isolated guerilla attacks waged upon the merest outposts of truth, each -attack with its jealously peculiar strategy, its own dislocated, almost -irrelevant end. And yet if there is no remedy for men's ills in this -nascent science and renascent philosophy, in what other quarter, then, -shall men look for hope and cure? - -There is no other, Bacon feels; unless victory is first won in the -laboratory and the study it will never be won in political assemblies; -no plebiscite or royal edict, but only truth, can make men free. Man's -hope lies in the reorganization of the processes of discovery and -interpretation. Unless philosophy and science be born again of social -aims and social needs they cannot have life in them. A new spirit must -enter. - -But first old spirits must be exorcised. Speculation and research must -bring out a declaration of independence against theology. "The -corruption of philosophy by superstition and an admixture of theology is -... widely spread, and does the greatest harm."[52] The search for final -causes, for design in nature, must be left to theologians; the function -of science is not to interpret the purposes of nature, but to discover -the connections of cause and effect in nature. Dogma must be set aside: -"if a man will begin with certainties he shall end in doubts; but if he -will be content to begin in doubts he shall end in certainties."[53] -Dogma must be set aside, too, because it necessitates deduction as a -basic method; and deduction as a basic method is disastrous. - -But that is not all; there is much more in the way of preliminaries: -there must be a general "expurgation of the intellect." The mind is full -(some would say made up) of prejudices, wild fancies, "idols," or -imaginings of things that are not so: if you are to think correctly, -usefully, all these must go. Try, then, to get as little of yourself as -possible in the way of the thing you wish to see. Beware of the very -general tendency to put order and regularity in the world and then to -suppose that they are native to the structure of things; or to force all -facts into the unyielding mould of a preconceived opinion, carefully -neglecting all contrary instances; or to give too credulous an ear to -that which flatters the wish. Look into yourself and see the forest of -prejudices that has grown up within you: through your temperamental -attitudes; through your education; through your friends (friendship is -so often an agreement in prejudices); through your favorite authors and -authorities. If you find yourself seizing and dwelling on anything with -particular satisfaction, hold it in suspicion. Beware of words, for they -are imposed according to the apprehension of the crowd; make sure that -you do not take abstractions for things. And remind yourself -occasionally that you are not the measure of all things, but their -distorting mirror. - -So much by way of clearing the forest. Comes then induction as the fount -and origin of all truth: patient induction, obedient to the call of -fact, and with watchful eye for, above all things, the little unwelcome -instance that contradicts. Not that induction is everything; it includes -experiment, of course, and is punctuated by hypothesis.[54] (More, it is -clearly but the servant of deduction, since the aim of all science is to -predict by deduction from generalizations formed by induction; but just -as clear is it that the efficacy of the whole business lies grounded in -the faithfulness of the induction: induction is servant, but it has all -men at its mercy.) And to formulate methods of induction, to surround -the process by mechanical guards, to protect it from the premature -flights of young generalizations,--that is a matter of life and death to -science. - - -IV - -Knowledge is Power - -And now, armed with these methods of procedure, we stand face to face -with nature. What shall we ask her? _Prudens questio dimidium scientiae_: -to know what to ask is half of every science. - -You must ask for laws,--or, to use a Platonic term, forms. In every -process there is matter and there is form: the matter being the seat of -the process or operation, and the form its method or law. "Though in -nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies, performing pure -individual acts, according to a fixed law, yet in philosophy the very -law, and the investigation, discovery, and explanation of it, is the -foundation as well of knowledge as of operation. And it is this law, -with its clauses, that I mean when I speak of Forms."[55] Not so much -what a "thing" is, but how it behaves;--that is the question. And what -is more, if you will examine your conception of a "thing," you will see -that it is really a conception of how the "thing" behaves; every _What_ -is at last a _How_. Every "thing" is a machine, whose essence or meaning -is to be found not by a mere description of its parts, but by an account -of how it operates. "How does it work?" asks the boy before a machine; -see to it that you ask the same question of nature. - -For observe, if you know how a thing works, you are on the way to -managing and controlling it. Indeed, a Form can be defined as those -elements in a process which must be known before the process can be -controlled. Here we see the meaning of science; it is an effort to -discover the laws which must be known in order "that the mind may -exercise her power over the nature of things."[56] Science is the -formulation of control; knowledge is power. The object of science is not -merely to know, but to rebuild; every science longs to be an art. The -quest for knowledge, then, is not a matter of curiosity, it is a fight -for power. We "put nature on the rack and compel her to bear witness" -against herself. Where this conception reigns, logic-chopping is out of -court. "The end of our new logic is to find not arguments but arts; ... -not probable reasons but plans and designs of works; ... to overcome not -an adversary in argument but nature in action."[57] - -But there is logic-chopping in other things than logic. All strife of -men with men, of group with group, if it leaves no result beyond the -victory and passing supremacy of the individual or group, is -logic-chopping. Such victories pass from side to side, and cancel -themselves into final nullity. Real achievement is victory, not over -other men but with them. "It will not be amiss to distinguish the three -kinds, and as it were grades, of ambition in mankind. The first is of -those who desire to extend their own power in their native country; -which kind is vulgar and degenerate. The second is of those who labor to -extend the power of their country and its dominion among men. This -certainly has more dignity, though not less covetousness. But if a man -endeavor to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human -race over the universe, his ambition is without doubt both a more -wholesome thing and a more noble than the other two. The empire of man -over things depends wholly on the arts and sciences. For we cannot -command nature except by obeying her."[58] - - -V - -The Socialization of Science - -_Natura non vincitur nisi parendo._ "I accept the universe," says -Margaret Fuller. "Gad! you'd better!" says Carlyle. I accept it, says -Bacon, but only as raw material. We will listen to nature, but only that -we may learn what language she understands. We stoop to conquer. - -There is nothing impossible but thinking makes it so. "By far the -greatest obstacle to the progress of science and the undertaking of new -tasks ... is found in this, that men despair and think things -impossible.... If therefore any one believes or promises more, they -think this comes of an ungoverned and unripened mind."[59] There is -nothing that we may not do, if we _will_, but we must will; and must -will the means as well as the end. Would we have an empire of man over -nature? Very well: organize the arts and sciences. - -"Consider what may be expected from men abounding in leisure, and from -association of labors, and from successions of ages; the rather because -it is not a way over which only one man can pass at a time (as is the -case with that of reasoning), but within which the labors and industries -of men (especially as regards the collecting of experience) may with the -best effort be distributed and then combined. For then only will men -begin to know their strength when instead of great numbers doing all the -same things, one shall take charge of one thing and another of -another."[60] There should be more cooperation, less chaotic rivalry, in -research. And the cooperation should be international; the various -universities of the world, so far as they engage in research, should be -like the different buildings of a great manufacturing plant, each with -its own particular specialty and quest. Is it not remarkable how "little -sympathy and correspondence exists between colleges and universities, as -well throughout Europe as in the same state and kingdom?"[61] Why cannot -all the research in the world be coordinated into one unified advance? -Perhaps the truth-seekers would be unwilling; but has that been shown? -And is the number of willing cooperators too small to warrant further -effort? How can we know without the trial? Grant that the genius would -balk at some external central direction; but research after all is -seldom a matter of genius. "The course I propose ... is such as leaves -but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits -and understandings nearly on the level."[62] Let scope and freedom be -amply provided for the genius; it is the work of following up the -_apercus_ of genius that most sorely needs coordination. Organization of -research means really the liberation of genius: liberation from the -halting necessities of mechanical repetition in experiment. Nor is -coordination regimentation; let each man follow his hobby to whatever -university has been assigned to the investigation of that particular -item. Liberty is futility unless it is organized. - -It is a plan, you see, for the socialization of science. It is a large -and royal vision; to make it real involves "indeed _opera basilica_," it -is the business of a king, "towards which the endeavors of one man can -be but as the sign on a cross-road, which points out the way but cannot -tread it."[63] It will need such legislative appropriations as are now -granted only to the business of competitive destruction on land and sea. -"As the secretaries and spies of princes and states bring in bills for -intelligence, so you must allow the spies and intelligencers of nature -to bring in their bills if you would not be ignorant of many things -worthy to be known. And if Alexander placed so large a treasure at -Aristotle's command for the support of hunters, fowlers, fishers and the -like, in much more need do they stand of this beneficence who unfold the -labyrinths of nature."[64] - - -VI - -Science and Utopia - -Such an organization of science is Bacon's notion of Utopia. He gives us -in _The New Atlantis_, in plain strong prose, a picture of a state in -which this organization has reached the national stage. It is a state -nominally ruled by a king (Bacon never forgets that he is a loyal -subject and counsellor of James I); but "preeminent amongst the -excellent acts of the king ... was the erection and institution of an -Order or Society which we call Solomon's House; the noblest foundation, -as we think, that ever was upon the earth, and the lantern of this -kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of the nature of all things."[65] -Every twelve years this Order sends out to all parts of the world -"merchants of light"; men who remain abroad for twelve years, gather -information and suggestions in every field of art and science, and then -(the next expedition having brought men to replace them) return home -laden with books, instruments, inventions, and ideas. "Thus, you see, we -maintain a trade not for gold, silver or jewels; nor for silk; nor for -spices; nor for any other commodity or matter; but only for God's first -creation, which was Light."[66] Meanwhile at home there is a busy army -filling many laboratories, experimenting in zoology, medicine, -dietetics, chemistry, botany, physics, and other fields; there are, in -addition to these men, "three that collect the experiments in all the -books; ... three that try new experiments"; three that tabulate the -results of the experimenters; "three that look into the experiments of -their fellows, and cast about how to draw out of them things of use ... -for man's life; ... three that direct new experiments"; three that from -the results draw up "observations, axioms, and aphorisms."[67] "We -imitate also the flights of birds; we have some degree of flying in the -air; we have ships and boats for going under water."[68] And the purpose -of it all, he says, with fine Baconian ring, is "the enlarging of the -bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible."[69] - - -VII - -Scholasticism in Science - -This is the voice of the Renaissance, speaking with some method to its -music. It is the voice of Erasmus rather than that of Luther; but it is -the voice of a larger and less class-bound vision than that which moved -the polite encomiast of folly. Such minds as were not lost in the -religious turmoil of the time responded to Bacon's call for a new -beginning; a "sense of liberation, ... of new destinies, pulsates in -that generation at Bacon's touch."[70] Bacon says, and with justice, -that he "rang the bell which called the wits together."[71] When, in -1660, a group of London savants formed the Royal Society, it was from -Bacon that they took their inspiration, and from the "House of Solomon" -part of their plan of organization. Diderot and D'Alembert acknowledged -the impetus given by their reading of Bacon to the adventurous -enterprise which completed and distributed the _Encyclopedie_ despite -the prohibition of the king. To-day, after two hundred years of -Cartesian futility about mind and body and the problem of knowledge, the -Baconian emphasis on the socially-reconstructive function of thought -renews its power and appeal. The world returns to Socrates, to Plato, -and to Bacon. - -But with some measure of wholesome disillusionment. These last two -centuries have told us that science, unaided, cannot solve our social -problem. We have invented, invented, invented, invented; and with what -result? The gap between class and class has so widened during these -inventive years that there are now not classes but castes. Social -harmony is a matter of brief interludes in a drama more violent than any -ever mimicked on the stage. Men trained and accomplished in science, -like Prince Kropotkin, abandon it on the score that it has turned its -back on the purpose that gave it vitality and worth.[72] - -What is the purpose of science? What do scientists consider to be the -purpose of science? The laboratories are crowded with men who have no -inkling of any other than a purely material reconstruction as the -function of their growing knowledge. Specialization has so divided -science that hardly any sense of the whole survives. The ghosts of -scholasticism--of a pursuit of knowledge divorced from its social -end--hover about the microscopes and test-tubes of the scientific world; -and the upshot of it all is that to them who have, more is given. Let -Bacon speak here: "There is another great and powerful cause why the -sciences have made but little progress, which is this. It is not -possible to run a course aright, when the goal itself has not been -rightly placed."[73] Sciences with obvious social functions have -languished through lapse of all sense of direction, all feeling of -focus; psychology, for example, is but now reviving under the stimulus -of men who dared to "stir the earth a little about the roots of this -science,"[74] because they had perceived its purpose and meaning in the -drama of reconstruction. The blunt truth is that unless a scientist is -also a philosopher, with some capacity to see things _sub specie -totius_,--unless he can come out of his hole into the open,--he is not -fit to direct his own research. "As no perfect discovery can be made -upon a flat or level, neither is it possible to discover the more remote -and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the -same science, and ascend not to a higher science."[75] Before it can be -of real service to life, science must be enlightened by some -discrimination of values, some consideration and fitting together of -human ends: without philosophy as its eye piece, science is but the -traditional child who has taken apart the traditional watch, with none -but the traditional results. - -There is more to this indictment. Science has been organized, though -very imperfectly, for research; it has been organized hardly at all for -social application and control. The notion that science can be used in -conserving the vital elements of order and at the same time facilitating -experimental and progressive change, is but beginning to walk about. -Indeed, the employment and direction of scientific ability in the -business of government is still looked upon as a doubtful procedure; to -say that the administration of municipal affairs, for example, is to be -given over to men trained in the social sciences rather than to men -artful in trapping votes with oratorical molasses, is still a venture -into the loneliness of heresy. Again let Bacon speak, who was -administrator and philosopher in one. "It is wrong to trust the natural -body to empirics who commonly have a few receipts whereon they rely, but -who know neither the causes of the disease, nor the constitution of -patients, nor the danger of accidents, nor the true methods of cure. And -so it must needs be dangerous to have the civil body of states managed -by empirical statesmen, unless well mixed with others who are grounded -in learning. On the contrary it is almost without instance that any -government was unprosperous under learned governors."[76] - -Plato over again, you say. Yes; just as "Greek philosophy is the dough -with which modern philosophers have baked their bread, kneading it over -and over again,"[77] so this vital doctrine of the application of the -best available intelligence to the problem of social order and -development must be restated in every generation until at last the world -may see its truth and merit exemption from its repetition. - - -VIII - -The Asiatics of Europe - -But the place of Bacon in the continuum of history is hardly stated by -connecting him with Plato. Conceive of him rather as a new protagonist -in the long epic of intelligence; another blow struck in the seemingly -endless war between magic and science, between supernaturalism and -naturalism, between the spirit of worship and the spirit of control. -Primitive man--and he lives everywhere under the name of legion--looks -out upon nature as something to be feared and obeyed, something to be -cajoled by ritual and sacrifice and prayer. In ages of great social -disorder, such as the millennium inaugurated in Western Europe by the -barbarian invasions, the primitive elements in the mental make-up of men -emerge through the falling cultural surface; and cults rich in ritual -and steeped in emotional luxury grow in rank abundance. It is in the -character of man to worship power: if he feels the power without him -more intensely than the power within, he worships nature with a humble -fear, and leans on magic and supernatural rewards; if he feels the power -within him more intensely than the power without, he sees divinity in -himself and other centres of remoulding activity, and thinks not of -worshipping and obeying nature, but of controlling and commanding her. -The second attitude comes, of course, with knowledge, and action that -expresses knowledge; it is quite human that nature should not be -worshipped once she has been known. A man is primitive, then, when he -worships nature and makes no effort to control her; he is mature when he -stops worshipping and begins to control,--when he understands that -"Nature is not a temple but a workshop,"[78] not a barrier to divinity, -but the raw material of Utopia. - -Now the essence of Bacon is not the replacement of deduction by -induction, but the change of emphasis from worship to control. This -emphasis, once vivid in Plato but soon obscured by Oriental influence, -is one of the two dominant elements in modern thought (the other being -the puzzling over an artificial problem of knowledge); and unless the -Baconian element finally subordinates the Cartesian, the word _modern_ -must no longer arrogate to itself a eulogistic connotation. Hence Bacon, -and not Descartes, is the initiator of modern philosophy; part -initiator, at least, of that current of thought which finds rebellious -expression in the enlightenment of the eighteenth-century, and comes to -supremacy in the scientific victories of the nineteenth. The vital -sequence in modern philosophy is not Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, -and Bergson (for these are the Asiatics of Europe), but Bacon, Hobbes, -Condorcet, Comte, Darwin, and James.[79] - -The hope of the world is in this resolute spirit of control,--control of -the material without us, and of the passions within. Bit by bit, one is -not afraid to say, we shall make for ourselves a better world. Shall we -not find a way to eliminate disease, to control the increase of -population, to find in plastic organization a substitute for revolution? -Shall we perhaps even succeed in transmuting the lust for power over man -into ambition to conquer the forces that impede man? Shall we make men -understand that there is more potency of joy in the sense of having -contributed to the power of men over nature than in any personal triumph -of one over another man?--more glory in a conquest of bacteria than in -all the martial victories that have ever spilled human blood? Here is -the beginning of real civilization, and the mark of man. "The -environment transforms the animal; man transforms the environment."[80] -"Looking at the history of the world as a whole, the tendency has been -in Europe to subordinate nature to man; out of Europe, to subordinate -man to nature. Formerly the richest countries were those in which nature -was most bountiful; now the richest countries are those in which man is -most active."[81] Control is the sign of maturity, the achievement of -Europe, the future of America. It is, one argues again, the drama of -history, this war between Asia and Europe, between nature and man, -between worship and control. Fundamentally it is the upward struggle of -intelligence: Plato is its voice, Zeno its passing exhaustion, Bacon its -resurrection. It was not an unopposed rebirth: there is still no telling -whether East or West will win. Surrounded by the backwash of Oriental -currents everywhere, the lover of the Baconian spirit needs constantly -to refresh himself at the fount of Bacon's inexhaustible inspiration and -confidence. "I stake all," he says, "on the victory of art over nature -in the race." And one needs to hold ever before oneself Bacon's favorite -device: A ship passing through the Pillars of Hercules out into the -unknown sea, and over it the words, PLUS ULTRA. - -More beyond! - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -SPINOZA ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM[82] - - -I - -Hobbes - -Passing from Bacon to Spinoza we meet with Thomas Hobbes, a man from -whom Spinoza drew many of his ideas, though very little of his -inspiration. The social incidence of the greater part of Hobbes's -thinking has long been recognized; he is not a figure over whom the -biographer of social thought finds much cause to quarrel. He is at once -the materialist _par excellence_ of modern philosophy, and the most -uncompromising protagonist of the absolutist theory of the state. The -individual, all compact of pugnacity, was to Hobbes the bogey which the -state, voracious of all liberties, became two centuries later to Herbert -Spencer. He had in acute degree the philosopher's natural appetite for -order; and trembled at the thought of initiatives not foreseen by his -political geometry. He lived in the midst of alarms: war stepped on the -heels of war in what was very nearly a real _bellum omnium contra -omnes_. He lived in the midst of political reaction: men were weary of -Renaissance exuberance and Reformation strife, and sank gladly into the -open arms of the past. There could be no end, thought Hobbes, to this -turmoil of conflicting egos, individual and national, until all groups -and individuals knelt in absolute obedience to one sovereign power. - -But all this has been said before; we need but remind ourselves of it -here so that we may the better appreciate the vibrant sympathy for the -individual man, the generous defence of popular liberties, that fill -with the glow of subdued passion the pages of the gentle Spinoza. - - -II - -The Spirit of Spinoza - -Yet Spinoza was not wanting in that timidity and that fear of unbridled -instinct which stood dictator over the social philosophy of Hobbes. He -knew as well as Hobbes the dangers of a democracy that could not -discipline itself. "Those who have had experience of how changeful the -temper of the people is, are almost in despair. For the populace is -governed not by reason but by emotion; it is headlong in everything, and -easily corrupted by avarice and luxury."[83] And even more than Hobbes -he withdrew from the affairs of men and sought in the protection of a -suburban attic the peace and solitude which were the vital medium of his -thought. He found that sometimes at least, "truth hath a quiet breast." -"_Se tu sarai solo_," wrote Leonardo, "_tu sarai tutto tuo_." And surely -Goethe thought of Spinoza when he said: "No one can produce anything -important unless he isolate himself." - -But this dread of the crowd was only a part of Spinoza's nature, and not -the dominant part. His fear of men was lost in his boundless capacity -for affection; he tried so hard to understand men that he could not help -but love them. "I have labored carefully not to mock, lament, or -execrate, but to understand, human actions; and to this end I have -looked upon passions ... not as vices of human nature, but as properties -just as pertinent to it as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like -to the nature of the atmosphere."[84] Even the accidents of time and -space were sinless to his view, and all the world found room in the -abundance of his heart. "Spinoza deified the All in order to find peace -in the face of it," says Nietzsche:[85] but perhaps, too, because all -love is deification. - -All in all, history shows no man more honest and independent; and the -history of philosophy shows no man so sincere, so far above quibbling -and dispute and the picking of petty flaws, so eager to receive the -truth even when brought by the enemy, so ready to forgive even -persecution in the depth and breadth of his tolerance. No man who -suffered so much injustice made so few complaints. He became great -because he could merge his own suffering in the suffering of all,--a -mark of all deep men. "They who have not suffered," says Ibsen,--and, -one might add, suffered with those they saw suffer,--"never create; they -only write books." - -Spinoza did not write much; the long-suffering are seldom long-winded. A -fragment _On the Improvement of the Understanding_; a brief volume on -religion and the state; the _Ethics_; and as he began to write the -chapter on democracy in the _Political Treatise_ consumption conquered -him. Bacteria take no bribes. - - -III - -Political Ethics - -Had he lived longer it would have dawned perhaps even on the German -historians that Spinoza's basic interest was not in metaphysics so much -as in political ethics. The _Ethics_, because it is the most sustained -flight of reasoning in philosophy, has gathered round it all the -associations that throng about the name of Spinoza, so that one is apt -to think of him in terms of a mystical "pantheism" rather than of -coordinative intelligence, democracy, and free thought.[86] Hoeffding -considers it a defect in Spinoza's philosophy that it takes so little -notice of epistemology: but should we not be grateful for that? Here are -men suffering, said Spinoza, here are men enslaved by passions and -prelates and kings; surely till these things are dealt with we have no -time for epistemological delicacies. Instead of increasing the world's -store of learned ignorance by writing tomes on the possibility of a -subject knowing an object, Spinoza thought it better to give himself to -the task of helping to keep alive in an age of tyrannical reaction the -Renaissance doctrine of popular sovereignty. Instead of puzzling himself -and others about epistemology he pondered the problem of stimulating the -growth of intelligence and evolving a rational ethic. He thought that -philosophy was something more than a chess-game for professors. - -There is no need to spend time and space here on what for Spinoza, as -for Socrates and Plato, was the problem of problems,--how human reason -could be developed to a point where it might replace supernatural -sanctions for social conduct and provide the medium of social -reconstruction. One point, however, may be profitably emphasized. - -A careless reading of the _Ethics_ may lead to the belief that Spinoza -bases his philosophy on a naive opposition of reason to passion. It is -not so. "A desire cannot be restrained or removed," says Spinoza, -"except by an opposite and stronger desire."[87] Reason is not dictator -to desire, it is a relation among desires,--that relation which arises -when experience has hammered impulses into coordination. An impulse, -passion or emotion is by itself "a confused idea," a blurred picture of -the thing that is indeed desired. Thought and impulse are not two kinds -of mental process: thought is impulse clarified by experience, impulse -is thought in chaos. - - -IV - -Is Man a Political Animal? - -Why is there a social problem? Is it because men are "bad"? Nonsense, -answers Spinoza: the terms "good" and "bad," as conveying moral approval -and disapproval, are philosophically out of court; they mean nothing -except that "each of us wishes all men to live according to _his_ -desire," and consoles himself for their non-complaisance by making moral -phrases. There is a social problem, says Spinoza, because men are not -naturally social. This does not mean that there are no social tendencies -in the native human constitution; it does mean that these tendencies are -but a sorry fraction of man's original nature, and do not avail to chain -the "ape and tiger" hiding under his extremely civilized shirt. Man is a -"political animal"; but he is also an animal. We must approach the -social problem through a very respectful consideration of the ape and -tiger; we must follow Hobbes and inquire into "the natural condition of -man." - -"In the state of nature every man lives as he wishes,"[88]--he is not -pestered with police regulations and aldermanic ordinances. He "_may_ do -whatever he _can_: his rights extend to the utmost limits of his -powers."[89] He may fight, hate, deceive, exploit, to his heart's -desire; and he does. We moderns smile at the "natural man" as a myth, -and think our forbears were social _ab initio_. But be it remembered -that by "social" Spinoza implies no mere preference of society to -solitude, but a subordination of individual caprice to more or less -tacit communal regulation. And Spinoza considers it useful, if we are -going to talk about "human nature in politics," to ask whether man -_naturally_ submits to regulation or naturally rebels against it. When -he wrote of a primitive non-social human condition he wrote as a -psychologist inferring the past rather than as an historian revealing -it. He observed man, kindly yet keenly; he saw that "everyone desires to -keep down his fellow-men by all possible means, and when he prevails, -boasts more of the injuries he has done to others than of the advantage -he has won for himself";[90] and he concluded that if we could trace -human history to its sources we should find a creature--call him human -or pre-human--willing, perhaps glad, to have the company of his like, -but still unattracted and unhampered by social organization. - -We like to laugh at the simple anthropology of Spinoza and Rousseau; but -the laugh should be turned upon us when we suppose that the historical -_motif_ played any but a very minor part in the discussion of the -natural state of man. History was not the point at all: these men were -not interested in the past so much as in the possibilities of the -future. That is why the eighteenth century was so largely their -creation. When a man is interested in the past he writes history; when -he is interested in the future he makes it. - -The point to be borne in mind, Spinoza urges, is that we are still -essentially unsocialized; the instinct to acquire possession and power, -if necessary by oppression and exploitation, is still stronger than the -disposition to share, to be tolerant of disagreement, and to work in -mutual aid. The "natural man" is not a myth, he is the solid reality -that struts about dressed in a little brief civilization. "Religion -teaches that each man should love his neighbor as himself, and defend -the rights of others as earnestly as he would his own. Yet this -conviction has very little influence over man's emotions. It is no doubt -of some account in the hour of death, for then disease has weakened the -emotions, and the man lies helpless. And the principle is assented to in -church, for there men have no dealings with one another. But in the mart -or the court it has little or no effect, though that is just where the -need for it is greatest."[91] He still "does everything for the sake of -his own profit";[92] nor will even the unlimited future change him in -that, for it is his very essence. His happiness is in the pursuit of his -profit, his supreme joy is in the increase of his power. And a social -order built upon any other basis than this exuberant egoism of man will -be as lasting, in the eye of history, as a name that is writ in water. - - -V - -What the Social Problem Is - -But what if it is a good basis? What if "the foundation of virtue is the -endeavor to preserve one's own being" to the uttermost?[93] What if -there is a way in which, without any hypocritical mystification, this -self-seeking, while still remaining self-seeking, may become -cooperation? - -Spinoza's answer is not startling: it is the Socratic answer, issuing -from a profound psychological analysis. Given the liberation and -development of intelligence, and the discordant strife of egos will -yield undreamed-of harmonies. Men are so made, they are so compact of -passion and obscurity, that they will not let one another be free; how -can that be changed? Deception has been tried, and has succeeded only -temporarily if at all. Compulsion has been tried; but compulsion is a -negative force, it makes for inhibition rather than inspiration. It is a -necessary evil; but hardly the last word of constructive social -thinking. There is something more in a man than his capacity for fear, -there is some other way of appealing to him than the way of threats; -there is his hunger and thirst to know and understand and develop. Think -of the untouched resources of this human desire for mental enlargement; -think of the millions who almost starve that they may learn. Is that the -force that is to build the future and fashion the city of our dreams? -Here are men torn with impulses, shaken by mutual interference; is it -conceivable that they would be so deeply torn and shaken if that hunger -of theirs for knowledge--knowledge of themselves, too,--were met with -generous opportunity? Men long to be reasonable; they know, even the -least of them, that under the tyranny of impulse there is no ultimately -fruitful life; what is there that they would not give for the power to -see things clearly and be captains of their souls? Here if anywhere is -an opportunity for such statesmanship as does not often grace the courts -of emperors and kings! - -How we can come to know ourselves, our inmost nature, how we can through -this knowledge achieve coordination and our real desires,--that is for -Spinoza the heart of the social problem. The source of man's strength is -that he can know his weakness. If he can but find himself out, then he -can change himself. "A passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form -a clear and distinct idea of it."[94] When a passion is tracked to its -lair and confronted with its futile partiality, its sting is drawn, it -can hurt us no more; it may cooperate but it may no longer rule. It is -seen to be "inadequate," to express but a fragment of us, and so seen it -sinks into its place in the hierarchy of desires. "And in proportion as -we know our emotions better, the more are they susceptible to -control."[95] Passion is passivity; control is power. Knowledge brings -control, and control brings freedom; freedom is not a gift, it is a -victory. Knowledge, control, freedom, power, virtue: these are all one -thing. Before the "empire of man over nature" must come the empire of -man over himself, must come coordination. Achievement is born of clear -vision and unified intent, not of actions that are but bubbles on the -muddy rapids of desire. - - -VI - -Free Speech - -"Before all things, a means must be devised for improving and clarifying -the understanding."[96] "Since there is no single thing we know which is -more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, it follows that there -is nothing by which a person can better show how much skill and talent -he possesses than by so educating men that at last they will live under -the direct authority of reason."[97] But how? - -First of all, says Spinoza, thought must be absolutely free: we must -have the possible profit of even the most dangerous heresies. If that -proposition appear a trifle trite, let it be remembered that Spinoza -wrote at a time when Galileo's broken-hearted retraction was still fresh -in men's memories, and when Descartes was modifying his philosophy to -soothe the Jesuits. The chapter on freedom of thought is really the -pivotal point and _raison d'etre_ of the _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_; -and it is still rich in encouragement and inspiration. Perhaps there is -nothing else in Spinoza's writings that is so typical at once of his -gentleness and of his strength. - -Free speech should be granted, Spinoza argues, because it must be -granted. Men may conceal real beliefs, but these same beliefs will -inevitably influence their behavior; a belief is not that which is -spoken, it is that which is done. A law against free speech is -subversive of law itself, for it invites derision from the -conscientious. "All laws which can be broken without any injury to -another are counted but a laughing-stock."[98] It is useless for the -state to command "such things as are abhorrent to human nature." "Men in -general are so constituted that there is nothing they will endure with -so little patience as that views which they believe to be true should be -counted crimes against the law.... Under such circumstances men do not -think it disgraceful, but most honorable, to hold the laws in -abhorrence, and to refrain from no action against the government."[99] -Where men are not permitted to criticise their rulers in public, they -will plot against them in private. There is no religious enthusiasm -stronger than that with which laws are broken by those whose liberty has -been suppressed. - -Spinoza goes further. Thought must be liberated not only from legal -restrictions but from indirect and even unintentional compulsion as -well. Spinoza feels very strongly the danger to freedom, that is -involved in the organization of education by the state. "Academies that -are founded at the public expense are instituted not so much to -cultivate men's natural abilities as to restrain them. But in a free -commonwealth arts and sciences will be best cultivated to the full if -everyone that asks leave is allowed to teach in public, at his own cost -and risk."[100] He would have preferred such "free lances" as the -Sophists to the state universities of the American Middle West. He did -not suggest means of avoiding the apparent alternative of universities -subsidized by the rich. It is a problem that has still to be solved. - -In demanding absolute freedom of speech Spinoza touches the bases of -state organization. Nothing is so dangerous and yet so necessary; for -ignorance is the mother of authority. The defenders of free speech have -never yet met the contention of such men as Hobbes, that freedom of -thought is subversive of established government. The reason is only -this, that the contention is probably true, so far as most established -governments go. Absolute liberty of speech is assuredly destructive of -despotism, no matter how constitutional the despotism may be; and those -who have at heart the interests of any such government may be forgiven -for hesitating to applaud Spinoza. Freedom of speech makes for social -vitality, certainly; without it, indeed, the avenues of mental and -social development would be blocked, and life hardly worth living. But -freedom of speech cannot be said to make for social stability and -permanence, unless the social organization in question invites criticism -and includes some mechanism for profiting by it. Where democracy is -real, or is on the way to becoming real, free speech will help, not -harm, the state; for there is no man so loyal as the man who knows that -he may criticise his government freely and to some account. But where -there is the autocracy of a person or a class, freedom of speech makes -for dissolution,--dissolution, however, not of the society so much as of -the government. The Bourbons are gone, but France remains. Nay, if the -Bourbons had remained, France might be gone. - -But to argue to-day for freedom of speech is to invite the charge of -emphasizing the obvious. It may be wholesome to remind ourselves, by a -few examples, that however universal the theory of free speech may be, -the practice is still rather sporadic. An American professor is -dismissed because he thinks there is a plethora of unearned income in -his country; an English publicist is reported to have been refused -"permission" to fill lecture engagements in America because he had not -been sufficiently patriotic; and one of the most prominent of living -philosophers loses his chair because he supposes that conscience has -rights against cabinets. But indeed our governing bodies are harmless -offenders here in comparison with the people themselves. The last lesson -which men and women will learn is the lesson of free thought and free -speech. The most famous of living dramatists finds himself unsafe in -London streets, because he has dared to criticise his government; the -most able of living novelists finds it convenient to leave Paris because -there are still some Germans whom he does not hate; and an American -community full of constitutional lawyers shows its love of "law and -order" by stoning a group of boys bent on expounding the desirability of -syndicalism. - -Perhaps the world has need of many Spinozas still. - - -VII - -Virtue as Power - -Freedom of expression is the corner-stone of Spinoza's politics; the -postulate without which he refuses to proceed. But Spinoza does not have -to be told that this question of free speech precipitates him into the -larger problems of "the individual _vs._ the state"; he knows that that -problem is the very _raison d'etre_ of political philosophy; he knows -that indeed the problem goes to the core of philosophy, and finds its -source and crux in the complex socio-egoistical make-up of the -individual man. - -The "God-intoxicated" Spinoza is quite sober and disillusioned about the -social possibilities of altruism. "It is a universal law of human -nature that no one ever neglects anything which he judges to be good, -except with the hope of gaining a greater good."[101] "This is as -necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its part."[102] This -confident reduction of human conduct to self-reference does not for -Spinoza involve any condemnation: "reason, since it asks for nothing -that is opposed to nature, demands that every person should ... seek his -own profit."[103] Observe, reason _demands_ this; this same self-seeking -is the most valuable and necessary item in the composition of man. -Spinoza, as said, goes so far as to identify this self-seeking with -virtue: "to act absolutely in conformity with virtue is, in us, nothing -but to act, live, and preserve our being (these three have the same -meaning) as reason directs, from the ground of seeking our own -profit."[104] This is a brave rejection of self-renunciation and -asceticism by one whose nature, so far as we can judge it now, inclined -him very strongly in the direction of these "virtues." What we have to -do, says Spinoza, is not to deny the self, but to broaden it; here -again, of course, intelligence is the mother of morals. Progress lies -not in self-reduction but in self-expansion. Progress is increase in -virtue, but "by virtue and power I understand the same thing";[105] -progress is an increase in the ability of men to achieve their ends. It -is part of our mental confectionery to define progress in terms of our -own ends; a nation is "backward" or "forward" according as it moves -towards or away from our own ideals. But that, says Spinoza, is naive -nonsense; a nation is progressive or backward according as its citizens -are or are not developing greater power to realize _their own_ purposes. -That is a doctrine that may have "dangerous" implications, but -intelligence will face the implications and the facts, ready not to -suppress them but to turn them to account. - -It was the passion for power that led to the first social groupings and -developed the social instincts. Our varied sympathies, our parental and -filial impulses, our heroisms and generosities, all go back to social -habits born of individual needs. "Since fear of solitude exists in all -men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself and -procure the necessaries of life, it follows that men by nature tend -towards social organization."[106] "Let satirists scoff at human affairs -as much as they please, let theologians denounce them, and let the -melancholy, despising men and admiring brutes, praise as much as they -can a life rude and without refinement,--men will nevertheless find out -that by mutual help they can much more easily procure the things they -need, and that it is only by their united strength that they can avoid -the dangers which everywhere threaten them."[107] _Nihil homine homini -utilius._ Men discover that they are useful to one another, and that -mutual profit from social organization increases as intelligence grows. -In a "state of nature"--that is, before social organization--each man -has a "natural right" to do all that he is strong enough to do; in -society he yields part of this sovereignty to the communal organization, -because he finds that this concession, universalized, increases his -strength. The fear of solitude, and not any positive love of fellowship, -is the prime force in the origin of society. Man does not join in social -organization because he has social instincts; he develops such instincts -as the result of joining in such organization. - - -VIII - -Freedom and Order - -Even to-day the social instincts are not strong enough to prevent -unsocial behavior. "Men are not born fit for citizenship, but must be -made so."[108] Hence custom and law. Each man, in his sober moments, -desires such social arrangements as will protect him from aggression and -interference. "There is no one who does not wish to live, so far as -possible, in security and without fear; and this cannot possibly happen -so long as each man is allowed to do as he pleases."[109] "That men who -are necessarily subject to passions, and are inconstant and changeable, -may be able to live together in security, and to trust one another's -fidelity,"--that is the purpose of law.[110] Ideally, the state is to -the individual what reason is to passion.[111] Law protects a man not -only from the passions of others, but from his own; it is a help to -delayed response. How to frame laws so that the greatest possible number -of men may find their own security and fulfilment in allegiance to the -law,--that is the problem of the statesman. Law implies force, but so -does life, so does nature; indeed, the punishments decreed by "man-made" -states are usually milder than those which in a "state of nature" would -be the natural consequents of most interferences; not seldom the law--as -when it prevents lynching--protects an aggressor from the natural -results of his act. Force is the essence of law; hence international law -will not really be law until nations are coordinated into a larger group -possessed of the instrumentalities of compulsion.[112] - -It is clear that Spinoza has the philosophic love of order. "Whatever -conduces to human harmony and fellowship is good; whatever brings -discord into the state is evil."[113] But discord, one must repeat, is -often the prelude to a greater harmony; development implies variation, -and all variation is a discord except to ears that hear the future. The -social sanction of liberty lies of course in the potential value of -variations; without that vision of new social possibilities which is -suggested by variations from the norm a people perishes. Spinoza does -not see this; but there is a fine passage in the _Tractatus -Politicus_[114] which shows him responsive to the ideal of liberty as -well as to that of order: "The last end of the state is not to dominate -men, nor to restrain them by fear; rather it is so to free each man from -fear that he may live and act with full security and without injury to -himself or his neighbor. The end of the state is, I repeat, not to make -rational beings into brute beasts or machines. It is to enable their -bodies and their minds to function safely. It is to lead men to live by, -and to exercise, a free reason, that they may not waste their strength -in hatred, anger, and guile, not act unfairly toward one another. Thus -the end of the state is really liberty." - -So it is that Spinoza takes sharp issue with Hobbes and exalts freedom, -decentralization, and democracy, where Hobbes, starting with almost -identical premises, concludes to a centralized despotism of body and -soul. This does not mean that Spinoza had no eye for the defects of -democracy. "Experience is supposed to teach that it makes for peace and -concord when all authority is conferred upon one man. For no political -order has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks, -while none have been so short-lived, nay, so vexed by seditions, as -popular or democratic states. But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation -are to be called peace, then peace is the worst misfortune that can -befall a state. It is true that quarrels are wont to be sharper and more -frequent between parents and children than between masters and slaves; -yet it advances not the art of home life to change a father's right into -a right of property, and count his children as only his slaves. Slavery, -then, and not peace, comes from the giving of all power to one man. For -peace consists not in the absence of war, but in a union and harmony of -men's souls."[115] - -No; better the insecurity of freedom than the security of bondage. -Better the dangers that come of the ignorance of majorities than those -that flow from the concentration of power in the hands of an inevitably -self-seeking minority. Even secret diplomacy is worse than the risks of -publicity. "It has been the one song of those who thirst after absolute -power that the interest of the state requires that its affairs be -conducted in secret.... But the more such arguments disguise themselves -under the mask of public welfare the more oppressive is the slavery to -which they will lead.... Better that right counsels be known to enemies, -than that the evil secrets of tyrants should be concealed from the -citizens. They who can treat secretly of the affairs of a nation have it -absolutely under their authority; and as they plot against the enemy in -time of war, so do they against the citizens in time of peace.... It is -folly to choose to avoid a small loss by means of the greatest of -evils."[116] - -This is but one of many passages in Spinoza that startle the reader with -their present applicability and value. There is in the same treatise a -plan for an unpaid citizen soldiery, much like the scheme adopted in -Switzerland; there is a plea against centralization and for the -development of municipal pride by home rule and responsibility; there is -a warning against the danger to democracy involved in the territorial -expansion of states; and there is a plan for the state ownership of all -land, the rental from this to supply all revenue in time of peace. But -let us pass to a more characteristic feature of Spinoza's political -theory, and consider with him the function of intelligence in the state. - - -IX - -Democracy and Intelligence - -"There is no single thing in nature which is more profitable to man than -a man who lives according to the guidance of reason."[117] Such a man, -to begin with, has made his peace with the inevitable, and accepts with -good cheer the necessary limitations of social life. He has a genial -sense of human imperfections, and does not cushion himself upon Utopia. -He pursues his own ends but with some perspective of their social -bearings; and he is confident that "when each man seeks that which is -[really] profitable to himself, then are men most profitable to one -another."[118] He knows that the ends of other men will often conflict -with his; but he will not for that cause make moral phrases at them. He -feels the tragedy of isolated purposes, and knows the worth of -cooperation. As he comes to understand the intricate bonds between -himself and his fellows he finds ever more satisfaction in purposes that -overflow the narrow margins of his own material advantage; until at last -he learns to desire nothing for himself without desiring an equivalent -for others.[119] - -Given such men, democracy follows; such democracy, too, as will be a -fulfilment and not a snare. Given such men, penal codes will interest -only the antiquarian. Given such men, a society will know the full -measure of civic allegiance and communal stability and development. How -make such men? By revivals? By the gentle anaesthesia of heaven and the -cheap penology of hell? By memorizing catechisms and commandments? By -appealing like Comte, to the heart, and trusting to the eternal feminine -to lead us ever onward? (Onward whither?) Or by spreading the means of -intelligence? - -It is at this point that the social philosophy of Spinoza, like that of -Socrates, betrays its weaker side. How is intelligence to be spread? -Perhaps it is too much to ask the philosopher this question; he may feel -that he has done enough if he has made clear what it is which will most -help us to achieve our ends. Spinoza, after all, was not the kind of man -who could be expected to enter into practical problems; his soul was -filled with the vision of the eternal laws and had no room for the -passing expediencies of action. His devotional geometry was a typical -Jewish performance; there is something in the emotional make-up of the -Jew which makes him slide very easily into the attitude of worship, as -contrasted with the Graeco-Roman emphasis on intellect and control. All -pantheism tends to quietism; to see things _sub specie eternitatis_ may -very well pass from the attitude of the scientist to the attitude of the -mystic who has no interest in temporal affairs. It is the task of -philosophy to study the eternal and universal not for its own sake but -for its worth in directing us through the maze of temporal particulars; -the philosopher must be like the mariner who guides himself through -space and time by gazing at the everlasting stars. It is wholesome that -the history of philosophy should begin with Thales; so that all who -come to the history of philosophy may learn, at the door of their -subject, that though stars are beautiful, wells are deep. - - -X - -The Legacy of Spinoza - -But to leave the matter thus would be to lose a part of the truth in the -glare of one's brilliance. We have to recognize that though Spinoza -stopped short (or rather was cut short) at merely a statement of the -prime need of all democracies,--intelligence,--he was nevertheless the -inspiration of men who carried his beginning more nearly to a practical -issue. To Spinoza, through Voltaire and the English deists, one may -trace not a few of the thought-currents which carried away the -foundations of ecclesiastical power, civil and intellectual, in -eighteenth-century France, and left the middle class conscience-free to -engineer a revolution. It was from Spinoza chiefly that Rousseau derived -his ideas of popular sovereignty, of the general will, of the right of -revolution, of the legitimacy of the force that makes men free, and of -the ideal state as that in which all the citizens form an assembly with -final power.[120] The French Declaration of Rights and the American -Declaration of Independence go back in part to the forgotten treatises -of the quiet philosopher of Amsterdam. To have initiated or accelerated -such currents of thought--theoretical in their origin but extremely -practical in their issue--is thereby once for all to have put one's self -above the reach of mere fault-finding. One wonders again, as so many -have wondered, what would have been the extent of this man's achievement -had he not died at the age of forty-four. When Spinoza's pious landlady -returned from church on the morning of February 21, 1677, and found her -gentle philosopher dead, she stood in the presence of one of the great -silent tragedies of human history. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -NIETZSCHE - - -I - -From Spinoza to Nietzsche - -Let us dare to compress within a page or two the social aspect of -philosophical thought from Spinoza to Nietzsche. Without forgetting that -our purpose is to show the social problem as the dominant interest of -only _many_, not all, of the greater philosophers, we may yet risk the -assertion that the majority of the men who formed the epistemological -tradition from Descartes to Kant were at heart concerned less with the -problem of knowledge than with that of social relations. Descartes slips -through this generalization; he is a man of leisure lost in the maze of -a puzzle which he has not discovered so much as he has unconsciously -constructed it. In Locke's hands the puzzle is distorted into the -question of "innate ideas," in order that under cover of an innocent -epistemological excursion a blow may be struck at hereditary prejudices -and authoritarian teaching, and the way made straight for the advance of -popular sovereignty (as against the absolutism of Hobbes), free speech, -reasonable religion, and social amelioration. The dominance of the -social interest is not so easily shown in the case of Leibniz; but let -it be remembered none the less that epistemology was but an aside in the -varied drama of Leibniz' life, and that his head was dizzy with schemes -for the betterment of this "best of all possible worlds." Bishop -Berkeley begins with _esse est percipi_ and ends with tar-water as the -_solution_ of all problems. David Hume, in the midst of a life busied -with politics and the discussion of social, political, and economic -problems, spares a year or two for epistemology, only to use it as a -handle whereby to deal a blow to dogma; he "was more damaging to -religion than Voltaire, but was ingenious enough not to get the credit -for it."[121] The social incidence of philosophy in eighteenth-century -France was so decided that one might describe that philosophy as part of -the explosive with which the middle class undermined the _status quo_. -This social emphasis continues in Comte, who cannot forget that he was -once the secretary of St. Simon, and will not let us forget that the -function of the philosopher is to coordinate experience with a view to -the remoulding of human life. John Stuart Mill is radical first and -logician afterward; and the more lasting as well as the more interesting -element in Spencer is the sociological, educational, and political -theory. In Kant the basic social interest is buried under -epistemological cobwebs; yet not so choked but that it finds very -resolute voice at last. The essence of the matter here is the return of -the prodigal, the relapse of a once adventurous soul into the comfort of -religious and political absolutes, categorical--and Potsdam--imperatives. -Here is "dogmatic slumber" overcome only to yield to the torpor and -_abetisement_ of "practical reason"; here is no "Copernican revolution" -but a stealthy attempt to recover an anthropocentricism lost in the -glare of the Enlightenment. It dawns on us that the importance of German -philosophy is not metaphysical, nor epistemological, but political; -the vital remnant of Kant to-day is to be found not in our overflowing -Mississippi of Kantiana, but in the German notion of obedience.[122] -Fichte reenforces this notion of unquestioning obedience with the -doctrine of state socialism: he begins by tending geese, and ends by -writing philosophy for them. So with Hegel: he starts out buoyantly with -the proposition that revolution is the heart of history, and ends by -discovering that the King of Prussia is God in disguise. In Schopenhauer -the bubble bursts; a millennium of self-deception ends at last in -exhaustion and despair. Every Hildebrand has his Voltaire, and every -Voltaire his Schopenhauer. - - -II - -Biographical - -"In future," Nietzsche once wrote, "let no one concern himself about me, -but only about the things for which I lived." We must make this -biographical note brief. - -Nietzsche was born in Roecken, Germany, 1844, the son of a "noble young -parson." He was brought up in strict piety, and prepared himself to -enter the ministry; even at boarding-school he was called "the little -minister," and made people cry by his recitations from the Bible. We -have pictures of him which show him in all his boyish seriousness; it is -evident that he is of a deeply religious nature, and therefore doomed to -heresy. At eighteen he discovers that he has begun to doubt the -traditional creed. "When I examine my own thoughts," he writes, "and -hearken into my own soul, I often feel as if I heard the buzzing and -roaring of wild-contending parties."[123] At twenty-one, while studying -in the University of Leipzig, he discovers the philosophy of -Schopenhauer; he reads all hungrily, feeling here a kindred youth; "the -need of knowing myself, even of gnawing at myself, forcibly seized upon -me."[124] He is ripe for pessimism, having both religion and a bad -stomach. Because of his defective eyesight he is barred from military -service; in 1870 he burns with patriotic fever, and at last is allowed -to join the army as a nurse; but he is almost overcome at sight of the -sick and wounded, and himself falls ill with dysentery and dyspepsia. In -this same year he sees a troop of cavalry pass through a town in stately -gallop and array; his weakened frame thrills with the sight of this -strength: "I felt for the first time that the strongest and highest Will -to Life does not find expression in a miserable struggle for existence, -but in a Will to War, a Will to Power, a Will to Overpower!"[125] -Nevertheless, he settles down to a quietly ascetic life as professor of -philology at the University of Basle. But there is adventure in him; and -in his first book[126] he slips from the prose of philology into an -almost lyrical philosophy. Illness finds voice here in the eulogy of -health; weakness in the deification of strength; melancholy in the -praise of "Dionysian joy"; loneliness in the exaltation of friendship. -He has a friend--Wagner--the once romantic rebel of revolution's -barricades; but this friend too is taken from him, with slowly painful -breaking of bond after bond. For Wagner, the strong, the overbearing, -the ruthless, is coming to a philosophy of Christian sympathy and -gentleness; qualities that cannot seem divine to Nietzsche, because they -are long-familiar elements in his own character. "What I am not," he -says, most truthfully, "that for me is God and virtue."[127] And so he -stands at last alone, borne up solely by the exhilaration of creative -thought. He has acquaintances, but he puts up with them "simply, like a -patient animal"; "not one has the faintest inkling of my task." And he -suffers terribly "through this absence of sympathy and -understanding."[128] - -He leaves even these acquaintances, and abandons his work at Basle; -broken in health he finds his way hopefully to the kindlier climate of -Italy. Doctor after doctor prescribes for him, one prescription reading, -"a nice Italian sweetheart." He longs for the comradeship, but dreads -the friction, of marriage. "It seems to me absurd," he writes, "that one -who has chosen for his sphere ... the assessment of existence as a -whole, should burden himself with the cares of a family, with winning -bread, security, and social position for wife and children." He does not -hesitate to conclude that "where the highest philosophical thinking is -concerned all married men are suspect."[129] Nevertheless he wanders -humanly into something very like a love-affair; he is almost shattered -with rapid disillusionment, and takes refuge in philosophy. "Every -misunderstanding," he tells himself, "has made me freer. I want less and -less from humanity, and can give it more and more. The severance of -every individual tie is hard to bear; but in each case a wing grows in -its place."[130] And yet the need of comradeship is still there, like a -gnawing hunger: many years later he catches a passing smile from a -beautiful young woman, whom he has never seen before; and "suddenly my -lonely philosopher's heart grew warm within me."[131] But she walks off -without seeing him, and they never meet again. - -The simple Italians who rent him his attic room in Genoa understand him -better perhaps than he can be understood by more pretentious folk. They -know his greatness, though they cannot classify it. The children of his -landlady call him "Il Santo"; and the market-women keep their choicest -grapes for the bent philosopher who, it is whispered, writes bitterly -about women and "the superfluous." But what they know for certain is -that he is a man of exceeding gentleness and purity, that he is the very -soul of chivalry; "stories are still told of his politeness towards -women to whom no one else showed any kindness."[132] Let him write what -he pleases, so long as he is what he is. - -He lives simply, almost in poverty. "His little room," writes a visitor, -"is bare and cheerless. It has evidently been selected for cheapness -rather than for comfort. No carpet, not even a stove. I found it -fearfully cold."[133] His publisher has made no profit on his books; -they are too sharply opposed to the "spirit of the age"; hence -the title he gives to two of his volumes: _Unzeitgemaesse -Betrachtungen_,--_Thoughts Out of Season_. There is no money, he is now -informed, in such untimely volumes; hereafter he must publish his books -at his own cost. He does, stinting himself severely to meet the new -expense; his greatest books see the light in this way.[134] - -He works hard, knowing that his shaken frame has but short lease of -life; and he comes to love his painful solitude as a gift. "I can't help -seeing an enemy in any one who breaks in upon my working summer.... The -idea that any person should intrude upon the web of thought which I am -spinning around me, is simply appalling. I have no more time to -lose--unless I am stingy with my precious _half-hours_ I shall have a -bad conscience."[135] Half-hours; his eyes will not work for more than -thirty minutes at a time. He feels that only to him to whom time is holy -does time bring reward. "He is fully convinced," an acquaintance writes -of him, "about his mission and his permanent importance. In this belief -he is strong and great; it elevates him above all misfortune."[136] He -speaks of his _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ in terms of almost conscious -exaggeration: "It is a book," he says, "that stands alone. Do not let us -mention the poets in the same breath; nothing perhaps has ever been -produced out of such a superabundance of strength."[137] He does not -know that it is his illness and his hunger for appreciation that have -demanded this self-laudation as restorative and nourishment. He -predicts, rightly enough, that he will not begin to get his due meed of -appreciation till 1901.[138] His "unmasking of Christian morality," he -says, "is an event unequalled in history."[139] - -All this man's energy is in his brain; he oozes ideas at every pore. He -crowds into a sentence the material of a chapter; and every aphorism is -a mountain-peak. He dares to say that which others dare only to think: -and we call him witty because truth tabooed is the soul of wit. Every -page bears the imprint of the passion and the pain that gave it birth. -"I am not a man," he says, "I am dynamite"; he writes like a man who -feels error after error exploding at his touch; and he defines a -philosopher as "a terrible explosive in the presence of which everything -is in danger."[140] "There are more idols than realities in the world; -and I have an 'evil eye' for idols."[141] - -What is this philosophy which seemed to its creator more important than -even the mightiest events of the past? How shall we compress it without -distorting it, as it has been distorted by so many of its lovers and its -haters? Let us ask the man himself to speak to us; let us see if we -cannot put the matter in his own words, ourselves but supplying, so to -speak, connective tissue. That done, we shall understand the man better, -and ourselves, and perhaps our social problem. - - -III - -Exposition - - -1 - -_Morality as Impotence_ - -From a biological standpoint the phenomenon morality is of a highly -suspicious nature.[142] _Cui bono?_--Whom shall we suspect of profiting -by this institution? Is it a mode of enhancing life?--Does it make men -stronger and more perfect?--or does it make for deterioration and decay? -It is obvious that up to the present, morality has not been a problem at -all; it has rather been the very ground on which people have met after -all distrust, dissension, and contradiction, the hallowed place of -peace, where thinkers could obtain rest even from themselves.[143] But -what if morality be the greatest of all the stumbling-blocks in the way -of human self-betterment? Is it possible that morality itself is the -social problem, and that the solution of that problem lies in the -judicious abolition of morality? It is a view for which something can be -said. - -You have heard that morality is a means used by the strong to control -the weak. And it is true: just consider the conversion of Constantine. -But to stop here is to let half the truth be passed off on you as the -whole; and half a truth is half a lie. Much more true is it that -morality is a means used by the weak to control the strong, the chain -which weakness softly lays upon the feet of strength. The whole of the -morality of Europe is based upon the values which are useful to the -herd.[144] Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching -and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself -succeeds. Thus the fundamental tendency of the weak and mediocre of all -times has been to enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of -the weak; their chief weapon in this process was the moral -principle.[145] Good is every one who does not oppress, who hurts no -one, attacks no one, does not take vengeance but hands over vengeance to -God; who goes out of the way of evil, and demands little from life; like -ourselves, patient, meek, just. Good is to do nothing for which we are -not strong enough.[146] Zarathustra laughed many times over the -weaklings who thought themselves good because they had lame paws![147] -Obedience, subordination, submission, devotion, love, the pride of duty; -fatalism, resignation, objectivity, stoicism, asceticism, self-denial; -in short, anemia: these are the virtues which the herd would have all -men cultivate,--particularly the strong men.[148] And the deification of -Jesus,--that is to say of meekness,--what was it but another attempt to -lull the strong to sleep? - - -2 - -_Democracy_ - -See, now, how nearly that attempt has succeeded. For is not democracy, -if not victorious, at least on the road to victory to-day? And what is -the democratic movement but the inheritor of Christianity?[149] Not the -Christianity of the great popes; they knew better, and were building a -splendid aristocracy when Luther spoiled it all by letting loose the -levelling instincts of the herd.[150] The instinct of the herd is in -favor of the leveller (Christ).[151] I very much fear that the first -Christian is in his deepest instincts a rebel against everything -privileged; he lives and struggles unremittingly for "equal -rights."[152] It is by Christianity, more than by anything else, that -the poison of this doctrine of "equal rights" has been spread abroad. -And do not let us underestimate the fatal influence! Nowadays no one has -the courage of special rights, of rights of dominion. The aristocratic -attitude of mind has been most thoroughly undermined by the lie of the -equality of souls.[153] - -But is not this the greatest of all lies--the "equality of men"? That is -to say, the dominion of the inferior. Is it not the most threadbare and -discredited of ideas? Democracy represents the disbelief in all great -men and select classes; everybody equals everybody else; "at bottom we -are all herd." There is no welcome for the genius here; the more -promising for the future the modern individual happens to be, the more -suffering falls to his lot.[154] If the rise of great and rare men had -been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude, there never would -have been any such thing as a great man. The herd regards the exception, -whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something -antagonistic and dangerous. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions -above them--the strong, the mighty, the wise, the fruitful--is to -persuade them to become their head-servants.[155] - -But the torture of the exceptional soul is only part of the villainy of -democracies. The other part is chaos. Voltaire was right: "_Quand la -populace se mele de raisonner, tout est perdu_." Democracy is an -aristocracy of orators, a competition in headlines, a maelstrom of ever -new majorities, a torrent of petty factions sweeping on to ruin. Under -democracy the state will decay, for the instability of legislation will -leave little respect for law, until finally even the policeman will have -to be replaced by private enterprise.[156] Democracy has always been the -death-agony of the power of organization:[157] remember Athens, and look -at England. Within fifty years these Babel governments will clash in a -gigantic war for the control of the markets of the world; and when that -war comes, England will pay the penalty for the democratic inefficiency -of its dominant muddle-class.[158] - -This wave of democracy will recede, and recede quickly, if men of -ability will only oppose it openly. It is necessary for higher men to -declare war on the masses. In all directions mediocre people are joining -hands in order to make themselves master. The middle classes must be -dissolved, and their influence decreased;[159] there must be no more -intermarrying of aristocracy with plutocracy; this democratic folly -would never have come at all had not the master-classes allowed their -blood to be mingled with that of slaves.[160] Let us fight parliamentary -government and the power of the press; they are the means whereby -cattle become rulers.[161] Finally, it is senseless and dangerous to let -the counting-mania (the custom of universal suffrage)--which is still -but a short time under cultivation, and could easily be uprooted--take -deeper root; its introduction was merely an expedient to steer clear of -temporary difficulties; the time is ripe for a demonstration of -democratic incompetence and a restoration of power to men who are born -to rule.[162] - - -3 - -_Feminism_ - -Democracy, after all, is a disease; an attempt on the part of the -botched to lay down for all the laws of social health. You may observe -the disease in its growth-process by studying the woman movement. -Woman's first and last function is that of bearing robust children.[163] -The emancipated ones are the abortions among women, those who lack the -wherewithal to have children (I go no farther, lest I should become -medicynical).[164] All intellect in women is a pretension; when a woman -has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her -sex. These women think to make themselves charming to free spirits by -wearing advanced views; as though a woman without piety would not be -something perfectly obnoxious and ludicrous to a profound and godless -man![165] If there is anything worthy of laughter it is the man who -takes part in this feminist agitation. Let it be understood clearly that -the relations between men and women make equality impossible. It is in -the nature of woman to take color and commandment from a man,--unless -she happens to be a man. Man's happiness is "I will," woman's happiness -is "He will."[166] Woman gives herself, man takes her: I do not think -one will get over this natural contrast by any social contract.[167] -Indeed, women will lose power with every step towards emancipation. -Since the French Revolution the influence of woman has declined in -proportion as she has increased her rights and claims. Let her first do -her proper work properly (consider how much man has suffered from -stupidity in the kitchen), and then it may be time to consider an -extension of her activities. To be mistaken in this fundamental problem -of "man and woman," to deny here the profoundest antagonism, and the -necessity for an eternally hostile tension, to dream here of equal -rights, equal training, equal claims and obligations: that is a typical -sign of shallow-mindedness. On the other hand, a man who has depth of -spirit as well as of desires, and has also the depth of benevolence -which is capable of severity and harshness, and easily confounded with -them, can only think of woman as Orientals do: he must conceive of her -as a possession, as confinable property, as a being predestined for -service and accomplishing her mission therein--he must take his stand in -this matter upon the immense rationality of Asia, upon the superiority -of the instincts of Asia.[168] - - -4 - -_Socialism and Anarchism_ - -All this uprising of housekeepers is, of course, part of the general -sickness with which Christianity has inoculated and weakened the strong -races of Europe. Consider now the more virulent forms of the disease: -socialism and anarchism. The coming of the "kingdom of God" has here -been placed in the future, and been given an earthly, a human, meaning; -but on the whole the faith in the old ideal is still maintained. There -is still the comforting delusion about equal rights, with all the envy -that lurks in that delusion. One speaks of "equal rights": that is to -say, so long as one is not a dominant personality, one wishes to prevent -one's competitors from growing in power.[169] It is a pleasure for all -poor devils to grumble--it gives them a little intoxicating sensation of -power. There is a small dose of revenge in every lamentation.[170] When -you hear one of those reformers talk of humanity, you must not take him -seriously; it is only his way of getting fools to believe that he is an -altruist; beneath the cover of this buncombe a man strong in the -gregarious instincts makes his bid for fame and followers and power. -This pretense to altruism is only a roundabout way of asking for -altruism, it is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is -botched and bungled.[171] In short, socialism is not justice but -covetousness.[172] No doubt we should look upon its exponents and -followers with ironic compassion: they want something which we -have.[173] - -From the standpoint of natural science the highest conception of society -according to socialists is the lowest in the order of rank among -societies. A socialist community would be another China, a vast and -stifling mediocracy; it would be the tyranny of the lowest and most -brainless brought to its zenith.[174] A nation in which there would be -no exploitation would be dead. Life itself is essentially appropriation, -conquest of the strange and weak; to put it at its mildest, -exploitation.[175] The absence of exploitation would mean the end of -organic functioning. Surely it is as legitimate and valuable for -superior men to command and use inferior men as it is for superior -species to command and use inferior species, as man commands and uses -animals.[176] It is not surprising that the lamb should bear a grudge -against the great birds of prey, but that is no reason for blaming the -great birds of prey.[177] What should be done with muscle except to -supply it with directive brains? How, otherwise, can anything worthy -ever be built by men? In fact, man has value and significance only in so -far as he is a stone in a great building; for which purpose he has first -of all to be solid; he has to be a "stone."[178] - -Now the common people understand this quite well, and are as happy as -any of the well-to-do, so long as a silly propaganda does not disturb -them with dreams that can never be fulfilled.[179] Poverty, -cheerfulness, and independence--it is possible to find these three -qualities combined in one individual; poverty, cheerfulness, and -slavery--this is likewise a possible combination: and I can say nothing -better to the workmen who serve as factory-slaves.[180] - -As for the upper classes, they need be at no loss for weapons with which -to fight this pestilence. An occasional opening of the trap-door between -the Haves and the Have-nots, increasing the number of property-owners, -will serve best of all. If this policy is pursued, there will always be -too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything more -than an attack of illness.[181] A little patience with inheritance and -income taxes, and the noise of the cattle will subside.[182] - -Notice, meanwhile, that socialism and despotism are bedfellows. Give the -socialist his way, and he will put everything into the hands of the -state,--that is to say, into the hands of demagogue politicians.[183] -And then, all in the twinkling of an eye, socialism begets its opposite -in good Hegelian fashion, and the dogs of anarchism are let loose to -fill the world with their howling. And not without excuse or benefit; -for politicians must be kept in their place, and the state rigidly -restricted to its necessary functions, even if anarchist agitation helps -one to do it.[184] And the anarchists are right: the state is the -coldest of all monsters, and this lie creeps out of its mouth, "I, the -State, am the people."[185] So the wise man will turn anarchism, as well -as socialism, to account; and he will not fret even when a king or two -is hurried into heaven with nitroglycerine. Only since they have been -shot at have princes once more sat securely on their thrones.[186] - -Anarchism justifies itself in the aristocrat, who feels law as his -instrument, not as his master; but the rebellion against law as such is -but one more outburst of physiological misfits bent on levelling and -revenge.[187] It is childish to desire a society in which every -individual would have as much freedom as another.[188] Decadence speaks -in the democratic idiosyncrasy against everything which rules and -wishes to rule, the modern _misarchism_ (to coin a bad word for a bad -thing).[189] When all men are strong enough to command, then law will be -superfluous; weakness needs the vertebrae of law. He is commanded who -cannot obey his own self. Let the anarchist be thankful that he has laws -to obey. To command is more difficult; whenever living things command -they risk themselves; they take the hard responsibilities for the -result.[190] Freedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves;[191] -when the mob is capable of that, it will be time to think of dispensing -with law. The truth is, of course, that the anarchist is lulled into -nonsense by Rousseau's notion of the naturally good man. He does not -understand that revolution merely unlashes the dogs in man, till they -once more cry for the whip.[192] Cast out the Bourbons, and in ten years -you will welcome Napoleon. - -That is the end of anarchism; and it is the end of democracy, too. - -The truth is that men are willing and anxious to be ruled by rulers -worthy of the name. But the corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling -into evil odor. The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes -has been the cause of all the disorders in history. Democracy is not -ruling, but drifting; it is a political relaxation, as if an organism -were to allow each of its parts to do just as it pleased. Precisely -these disorganizing principles give our age its specific character. Our -society has lost the power to function properly; it no longer rids -itself naturally of its rotten elements; it no longer has the strength -even to excrete.[193] - - -5 - -_Degeneration_ - -What kind of men is to be found in such a society? Mediocre men; men -stupid to the point of sanctity; fragile, useless souls-de-luxe; men -suffering from a sort of hemiplegia of virtue,--that is to say, -paralyzed in the self-assertive instincts; men tamed, almost emasculated -by a morality whose essence is the abdication of the will.[194] Now, as -a rule, the taming of a beast is achieved only by deteriorating it; so -too the moral man is not a better man, he is rather a weaker member of -his species. He is altruistic, of course; that is, he feels that he -needs help. There is no place for really great men in this march towards -nonentity; if a great man appears he is called a criminal.[195] A -Periclean Greek, a Renaissance Florentine, would breathe like one -asphyxiated in this moralic acid atmosphere; the first condition of life -for such a man is that he free himself from this Chinadom of the -spirit.[196] But the number of those who are capable of rising into the -pure air of unmoralism is very small; and those who have made timid -sallies into theological heresy are the most addicted to the comfort and -security of ethical orthodoxy. In short, men are coming to look upon -lowered vitality as the heart of virtue; and morality will be saddled -with the guilt if the maximum potentiality of the power and splendor of -the human species should never be attained.[197] - -Men of this stamp require a good deal of religious pepsin to overcome -the indigestibility of life; if they leave one faith in the passing -bravery of their youth they soon sink back into another.[198] God, -previously diluted from tribal deity into _substantia_ and -_ding-an-sich_,[199] now recovers a respectable degree of reality; the -imaginary pillar on which men lean is made stronger and more concrete as -their weakness increases. How much faith a person requires in order to -flourish, how much fixed opinion he needs which he does not wish to have -shaken, because he holds himself thereby,--is a measure of his power (or -more plainly speaking, of his weakness).[200] - -The same criterion classifies our friends the metaphysicians,--those -albinos of thought,--who are, of course, priests in disguise.[201] The -degree of a man's will-power may be measured by the extent to which he -can dispense with the meaning in things; by the extent to which he is -able to endure a world without meaning; because he himself arranges a -small portion of it.[202] The world has no meaning: all the better; put -some meaning into it, says the man with a man's heart. The world has no -meaning: but it is only a world of appearance, says the weak-kneed -philosopher; behind this phenomenal world is the real world, which has -meaning, and means good. Of the real world "there is no knowledge; -consequently there is a God"--what novel elegance of syllogism![203] -This belief that the world which ought to be is real is a belief proper -to the unfruitful who do not wish to create a world. The "will to truth" -is the impotence of the "will to create."[204] Even monism is being -turned into medicine for sick souls; clearly these lovers of wisdom seek -not truth, but remedies for their illnesses.[205] There is too much beer -and midnight oil in modern philosophy, and not enough fresh air.[206] -Philosophers condemn this world because they have avoided it; those who -are contemplative naturally belittle activity.[207] In truth, the -history of philosophy is the story of a secret and mad hatred of the -prerequisites of life, of the feelings which make for the real values of -life.[208] No wonder that philosophy is fallen to such low estate. -Science flourishes nowadays, and has the good conscience clearly -visible on its countenance; while the remnant to which modern philosophy -has gradually sunk excites distrust and displeasure, if not scorn and -pity. Philosophy reduced to a "theory of knowledge," a philosophy that -never gets beyond the threshold, and rigorously denies itself the right -to enter--that is philosophy in its last throes, an end, an agony; -something that awakens pity. How could such a philosophy rule![209] - - -6 - -_Nihilism_ - -All these things, democracy, feminism, socialism, anarchism, and modern -philosophy, are heads of the Christian hydra, each a sore in the total -disease. Given such illness, affecting all parts of the social body, and -what result shall we expect and find? Pessimism, despair, -nihilism,--that is, disbelief in all values of life.[210] Confidence in -life is gone; life itself has become a problem. Love of life is still -possible,--only it is the love of a woman of whom one is doubtful.[211] -The "good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, discovers traces of evil -in every one of his acts. And thus he ultimately arrives at the -conclusion, which to him is quite logical, that nature is evil, that man -is corrupted, and that being good is an act of grace (that is to say, it -is impossible to man when he stands alone). In short, _he denies -life_.[212] The man who frees himself from the theology of the Church -but adheres to Christian ethics necessarily falls into pessimism. He -perceives that man is no longer an assistant in, let alone the -culmination of, the evolutionary process; he perceives that Becoming has -been aiming at Nothing, and has achieved it; and that is something which -he cannot bear.[213] Suffering, which was, before, a trial with promised -reward, is now an intolerable mystery; if he is materially comfortable -himself, he finds source for sentiment and tears in the pain and misery -of others; he concocts a "social problem," and never dreams that the -social problem is itself a result of decadence.[214] He does not feel at -home in this world in which the Christian God is dead, and to which, -nevertheless, he brings nothing more appreciative than the old Christian -moral attitude. He despairs because he is a chaos, and knows it; "I do -not know where I am, or what I am to do; I am everything that knows not -where it is or what to do," he sighs.[215] Life, he says at last, is not -worth living. - -Let us not try to answer such a man; he needs not logic but a -sanitarium. But see, through him, and in him, the destructiveness of -Christian morals. This despicable civilization, says Rousseau, is to -blame for our bad morality. What if our good morality is to blame for -this despicable civilization?[216] See how the old ethic depreciates -the joy of living, and the gratitude felt towards life; how it checks -the knowledge and unfolding of life; how it chokes the impulse to -beautify and ennoble life.[217] And at what a time! Think what a race -with masculine will could accomplish now! Precisely now, when will in -its fullest strength were necessary, it is in the weakest and most -pusillanimous condition. Absolute mistrust concerning the organizing -power of the will: to that we have come.[218] The world is dark with -despair at the moment of greatest light. - -What if man could be made to love the light and use it? - - -7 - -_The Will to Power_ - -Is it possible that this despair is not the final state in the -exhaustion of a race, but only a transition from belief in a perfect and -ethical world to an attitude of transvaluation and control?[219] Perhaps -we are at the bottom of our spiritual toboggan, and an ascending -movement is around the corner of the years. Now that our Christian -bubble has burst into Schopenhauer, we are left free to recover some -part of the joyous strength of the ancients. Let us become again as -little children, unspoiled by religion and morality; let us forget what -it is to feel sinful; let the thousandfold laughter of children clear -the air of the odor of decay. Let us begin anew; and the soul will rise -and overflow all its margins with the joy of rediscovered life.[220] -Life has not deceived us! On the contrary, from year to year it appears -richer, more desirable, and more mysterious; the old fetters are broken -by the thought that life may be an experiment and not a duty, not a -fatality, not a deceit![221] Life--that means for us to transform -constantly into light and flame all that we are, and also all that we -meet with; we cannot possibly do otherwise.[222] To be natural again, to -dare to be as immoral as nature is; to be such pagans as were the Greeks -of the Homeric age, to say Yea to life, even to its suffering; to win -back some of that mountain-air Dionysian spirit which took pleasure in -the tragic, nay, which invented tragedy as the expression of its -super-abundant vitality, as the expression of its welcome of even the -cruelest and most terrible elements of life![223] To be healthy once -more! - -For there is no other virtue than health, vigor, energy. All virtues -should be looked upon as physiological conditions, and moral judgments -are symptoms of physiological prosperity or the reverse. Indeed, it -might be worth while to try to see whether a scientific order of values -might not be constructed according to a scale of numbers and measures -representing energy. All other values are matters of prejudice, -simplicity, and misunderstanding.[224] Instead of moral values let us -use naturalistic values, physiological values; let us say frankly with -Spinoza that virtue and power are one and the same. What is good? All -that enhances the feeling of power, the will to power, and power itself, -in man. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness. What is happiness? -The feeling that power is increasing, that resistance is being -overcome.[225] This is not orthodox ethics; and perhaps it will not do -for long ears,--though an unspoiled youth would understand it. A healthy -and vigorous boy will look up sarcastically if you ask him, "Do you wish -to become virtuous?"--but ask him, "Do you wish to become stronger than -your comrades?" and he is all eagerness at once.[226] Youth knows that -ability is virtue; watch the athletic field. Youth is not at home in the -class room, because there knowledge is estranged from action; and youth -measures the height of what a man knows by the depth of his power to -do.[227] There is a better gospel in the boy on the field than in the -man in the pulpit. - -Which of the boys whom we know do we love best in our secret hearts--the -prayerful Aloysius, or the masterful leader of the urchins in the -street? We moralize and sermonize in mean efforts to bring the young -tyrant down to our virtuous anaemia; but we know that we are wrong, and -respect him most when he stands his ground most firmly. To require of -strength that it should express itself as weakness is just as absurd as -to require of weakness that it should express itself as strength.[228] -Let us go to school to our children, and we shall understand that all -native propensities are beneficent, that the evil impulses are to a far -view as necessary and preservative as the good.[229] In truth we worship -youth because at its finest it is a free discharge of instinctive -strength; and we know that happiness is nothing else than that. To -abandon instinct, to deliberate, to clog action with conscious -thought,--that is to achieve old age. After all, nothing can be done -perfectly so long as it is done consciously; consciousness is a defect -to be overcome.[230] Instinct is the most intelligent of all kinds of -intelligence which have hitherto been discovered.[231] Genius lies in -the instincts; goodness too; all consciousness is theatricality.[232] -When a people begins to worship reason, it begins to die.[233] Youth -knows better: it follows instinct trustfully, and worships power. - -And we worship power too, and should say so were we as honest as our -children. Our gentlest virtues are but forms of power: out of the -abundance of the power of sex come kindness and pity; out of revenge, -justice; out of the love of resistance, bravery. Love is a secret path -to the heart of the powerful, in order to become his master; gratitude -is revenge of a lofty kind; self-sacrifice is an attempt to share in the -power of him to whom the sacrifice is made. Honor is the acknowledgment -of an equal power; praise is the pride of the judge; all conferring of -benefits is an exercise of power.[234] Behold a man in distress: -straightway the compassionate ones come to him, depict his misfortune to -him, at last go away, satisfied and elevated; they have gloated over the -unhappy man's misfortune and their own; they have spent a pleasant -Sunday afternoon.[235] So with the scientist and the philosopher: in -their thirst for knowledge lurks the lust of gain and conquest. And the -cry of the oppressed for freedom is again a cry for power.[236] - -You cannot understand man, you cannot understand society, until you -learn to see in all things this will to power. Physiologists should -bethink themselves before putting down the instinct of self-preservation -as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above -all to discharge its strength: self-preservation is only one of the -results of this. And psychologists should think twice before saying that -happiness or pleasure is the motive of all action. Pleasure is but an -incident of the restless search for power; happiness is an accompanying, -not an actuating, factor. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the -discontentedness of the will, in the fact that without opponents and -obstacles it is never satisfied. Man is now master of the forces of -nature, and master too of his own wild and unbridled feelings; in -comparison with primitive man the man of to-day represents an enormous -quantum of power, but not an increase of happiness. How can one -maintain, then, that man has striven after happiness? No; not happiness, -but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not virtue, but -capacity; that is the secret of man's longing and man's seeking.[237] - -Let biologists, too, reexamine the stock-in-trade of their theory. Life -is not the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations, but -will to power, which, proceeding from within, subjugates and -incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of "external phenomena." All -motive force, all "causation" whatever, is this will to power; there is -no other force, physical, dynamical, or psychical.[238] As to the famous -"struggle for existence," it seems at present to be more of an -assumption than a fact. It does occur, but as an exception; and it is -due not to a desire for food but _a tergo_ to a surcharge of energy -demanding discharge. The general condition of life is not one of want -or famine, but rather of riches, of lavish luxuriance, and even of -absurd prodigality; where there is a struggle it is a struggle for -power. We must not confound Malthus with Nature.[239] One does indeed -find the "cruelty of Nature" which is so often referred to, but in a -different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky and -well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the -lowly. Darwin sees selection in favor of the stronger, the -better-constituted. Precisely the reverse stares one in the face: the -suppression of the lucky cases, the reversion to average, the -uselessness of the more highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery -of the mediocre. If we drew our morals from reality, they would read -thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the exceptional creatures; the -will to nonentity prevails over the will to life. We have to beware of -this formulation of reality into a moral.[240] - -No; morality is not mediocrity, it is superiority; it does not mean -being like most people, but being better, stronger, more capable than -most people. It does not mean timidity: if anything is virtue it is to -stand unafraid in the presence of any prohibition.[241] It does not mean -the pursuit of ends sanctified by society; it means the will to your own -ends, and to the means to them. It means behaving as states -behave,--with frank abandonment of all altruistic pretence. Corporate -bodies are intended to do that which individuals have not the courage to -do: for this reason all communities are vastly more upright and -instructive as regards the nature of man than individuals, who are too -cowardly to have the courage of their desires. All altruism is the -prudence of the private man; societies are not mutually altruistic. -Altruism and life are incompatible: all the forces and instincts which -are the source of life lie stagnant beneath the ban of the old morality. -But real morality is certainty of instinct, effectiveness of action; it -is any action which increases the power of a man or of men; it is an -expression of ascendent and expanding life; it is achievement; it is -power.[242] - - -8 - -_The Superman_ - -With such a morality you breed men who are men; and to breed men who are -men is all that your "social problem" comes to. This does not mean that -the whole race is to be improved: the very last thing a sensible man -would promise to accomplish would be to improve mankind. Mankind does -not improve, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much -more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all -ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail. To say that -the social problem consists in a general raising of the average standard -of comfort and ability amounts to abandoning the problem; there is as -little prospect of mankind's attaining to a higher order as there is for -the ant and the ear-wig to enter into kinship with God and eternity. The -most fundamental of all errors here lies in regarding the many, the -herd, as an aim instead of the individual: the herd is only a means. The -road to perfection lies in the bringing forth of the most powerful -individuals, for whose use the great masses would be converted into mere -tools, into the most intelligent and flexible tools possible. Every -human being, with his total activity, has dignity and significance only -so far as he is, consciously or unconsciously, a tool in the service of -a superior individual. All that can be done is to produce here and -there, now and then, such a superior individual, _l'uomo singulare_, the -higher man, the superman. The problem does not concern what humanity as -a whole or as a species is to accomplish, but what kind of man is to be -desired as highest in value, what kind of man is to be worked for and -bred. To produce the superman: that is the social problem. If this is -not understood, nothing is understood.[243] - -Now what would such a man be like? Shall we try to picture him? - -We see him as above all a lover of life: strong enough, too, to love -life without deceiving himself about it. There is no _memento mori_ -here; rather a _memento vivere_; rich instincts call for much living. A -hard man, loving danger and difficulty: what does not kill him, he -feels, leaves him stronger. Pleasure--pleasure as it is understood by -the rich--is repugnant to him: he seeks not pleasure but work, not -happiness but responsibility and achievement. He does not make -philosophy an excuse for living prudently and apart, an artifice for -withdrawing successfully from the game of life; he does not stand aside -and merely look on; he puts his shoulder to the wheel; for him it is the -essence of philosophy to feel the obligation and burden of a hundred -attempts and temptations, the joy of a hundred adventures; he risks -himself constantly; he plays out to the end this bad game.[244] - -To risk and to create, this is the meaning of life to the superman. He -could not bear to be a man, if man could not be a poet, a maker. To -change every "It was" into a "Thus I would have it!"--in this he finds -that life may redeem itself. He is moved not by ambition but by a mighty -overflowing spendthrift spirit that drives him on; he must remake; for -this he compels all things to come to him and into him, in order that -they may flow back from him as gifts of his love and his abundance; in -this refashioning of things by thought he sees the holiness of life; the -greatest events, he knows, are these still creative hours.[245] - -He is a man of contrasts, or contradictions; he does not desire to be -always the same man; he is a multitude of elements and of men; his value -lies precisely in his comprehensiveness and multifariousness, in the -variety of burdens which he can bear, in the extent to which he can -stretch his responsibility; in him the antagonistic character of -existence is represented and justified. He loves instinct, knows that it -is the fountain of all his energies; but he knows, too, the natural -delight of aesthetic natures in measure, the pleasure of self-restraint, -the exhilaration of the rider on a fiery steed. He is a selective -principle, he rejects much; he reacts slowly to all kinds of stimuli, -with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate pride have bred in -him; he tests the approaching stimulus. He decides slowly; but he holds -firmly to a decision made.[246] - -He loves and has the qualities which the folk call virtues, but he loves -too and shows the qualities which the folk call vices; it is again in -this union of opposites that he rises above mediocrity; he is a broad -arch that spans two banks lying far apart. The folk on either side fear -him; for they cannot calculate on him, or classify him. He is a free -spirit, an enemy of all fetters and labels; he belongs to no party, -knowing that the man who belongs to a party perforce becomes a liar. He -is a sceptic (not that he must appear to be one); freedom from any kind -of conviction is a necessary factor in his strength of will. He does not -make propaganda or proselytes; he keeps his ideals to himself as -distinctions; his opinion is his opinion: another person has not easily -a right to it; he has renounced the bad taste of wishing to agree with -many people. He knows that he cannot reveal himself to anybody; like -everything profound, he loves the mask; he does not descend to -familiarity; and is not familiar when people think he is. If he cannot -lead, he walks alone.[247] - -He has not only intellect; if that were all it would not be enough; he -has blood. Behind him is a lineage of culture and ability; lives of -danger and distinction; his ancestors have paid the price for what he -is, just as most men pay the price for what their ancestors have been. -Naturally, then, he has a strong feeling of distance; he sees inequality -and gradation, order and rank, everywhere among men. He has the most -aristocratic of virtues: intellectual honesty. He does not readily -become a friend or an enemy; he honors only his equals, and therefore -cannot be the enemy of many; where one despises one cannot wage war. He -lacks the power of easy reconciliation; but "retaliation" is as -incomprehensible to him as "equal rights." He remains just even as -regards his injurer; despite the strong provocation of personal insult -the clear and lofty objectivity of the just and judging eye (whose -glance is as profound as it is gentle) is untroubled. He recognizes -duties only to his equals; to others he does what he thinks best; he -knows that justice is found only among equals. He has that distinctively -aristocratic trait, the ability to command and with equal readiness to -obey; that is indispensable to his pride. He will not permit himself to -be praised; he does what serves his purpose. The essence of him is that -he has a purpose, for which he will not hesitate to run all risks, even -to sacrifice men, to bend their backs to the worst. That something may -exist which is a hundred times more important than the question whether -he feels well or unwell, and therefore too whether the others feel well -or unwell: this is a fundamental instinct of his nature. To have a -purpose, and to cleave to it through all dangers till it be -achieved,--that is his great passion, that is himself.[248] - - -9 - -_How to Make Supermen_ - -It is our task, then, to procreate this synthetic man, who embodies -everything and justifies it, and for whom the rest of mankind is but -soil; to bring the philosopher, the artist, and the saint, within and -without us, to the light, and to strive thereby for the completion of -nature. In this cultivation lies the meaning of culture: the direction -of all life to the end of producing the finest possible individuals. -What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; his very -essence is to create a being higher than himself; that is the instinct -of procreation, the instinct of action and of work. Even the higher man -himself feels this need of begetting; and for lesser men all virtue and -morals lie in preparing the way that the superman may come. There is no -greater horror than the degenerating soul which says, "All for myself." -In this great purpose, too, is the essence of a better religion, and a -surpassing of the bounds of narrow individualism; with this purpose -there come moments, sparks from the clear fire of love, in whose light -we understand the word "I" no longer; we feel that we are creating, and -therefore in a sense becoming, something greater than ourselves.[249] - -How to make straight the way for the superman? - -First by reforming marriage. Let it be understood at once that love is a -hindrance rather than a help to such marriages as are calculated to -breed higher men. To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to -regard it falsely; that is why love-marriages are from the social point -of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony. Were there a -benevolent God, the marriages of men would cause him more displeasure -than anything else; he would observe that all buyers are careful, but -that even the most cunning one buys his wife in a sack; and surely he -would cause the earth to tremble in convulsions when a saint and a goose -couple. When a man is in love, he should not be allowed to come to a -decision about his life, and to determine once for all the character of -his lifelong society on account of a whim. If we treated marriage -seriously, we would publicly declare invalid the vows of lovers, and -refuse them permission to marry. We would remake public opinion, so that -it would encourage trial marriage; we would exact certificates of health -and good ancestry; we would punish bachelorhood by longer military -service, and would reward with all sorts of privileges those fathers who -should lavish sons upon the world. And above all we would make people -understand that the purpose of marriage is not that they should -duplicate, but that they should surpass, themselves. Perhaps we would -read to them from _Zarathustra_, with fitting ceremonies and -solemnities: "Thou art young, and wishest for child and marriage. But I -ask thee, art thou a man who dareth to wish for a child? Art thou the -victorious one, the self-subduer, the commander of thy senses, the -master of thy virtues?--or in thy wish doth there speak the animal, or -necessity? Or solitude? Or discord with thyself? I would that thy -victory and freedom were longing for a child. Thou shalt build living -monuments unto thy victory and thy liberation. Thou shalt build beyond -thyself. But first thou must build thyself square in body and soul. Thou -shalt not only propagate thyself, but propagate thyself upward! -Marriage: thus I call the will of two to create that one which is more -than they who created it. I call marriage reverence unto each other as -unto those who will such a will."[250] - -In a word, eugenic marriage; and after eugenic marriage, rigorous -education. But interest in education will become powerful only when -belief in a God and his care have been abandoned, just as medicine began -to flourish only when the belief in miraculous cures had lapsed. When -men begin at last to _believe_ in education, they will endure much -rather than have their sons miss going to a good and hard school at the -proper time. What is it that one learns in a hard school? To obey and to -command. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling, as good -schooling, from every other schooling, namely that a good deal is -demanded, severely exacted; that excellence is required as if it were -normal; that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame -is sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent -and antecedents. To prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh in a -tradesman's balance what is permitted and what is forbidden; to be more -hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness;--we -are in every need of a school where these things would be taught. Such a -school would allow its pupils to learn productively, by living and -doing; it would not subject them to the tyranny of books and the weight -of the past; it would teach them less about the past and more about the -future; it would teach them the future of humanity as depending on human -will, on _their_ will; it would prepare the way for and be a part of a -vast enterprise in breeding and education.[251] But even such a school -would not provide all that is necessary in education. Not all should -receive the same training and the same care; select groups must be -chosen, and special instruction lavished on them; the greatest success, -however, will remain for the man who does not seek to educate either -everybody or certain limited circles, but only one single individual. -The last century was superior to ours precisely because it possessed so -many individually educated men. - - -10 - -_On the Necessity of Exploitation_ - -And next slavery. - -This is one of those ugly words which are the _verba non grata_ of -modern discussion, because they jar us so ruthlessly out of the grooves -of our thinking. Nevertheless it is clear to all but those to whom -self-deception is the staff of life, that as the honest Greeks had it, -some are born to be slaves. Try to educate all men equally, and you -become the laughing-stock of your own maturity. The masses seem to be -worth notice in three aspects only: first as the copies of great men, -printed on bad paper from worn-out plates; next as a contrast to the -great men; and lastly as their tools. Living consists in living at the -cost of others: the man who has not grasped this fact has not taken the -first step towards truth to himself. And to consider distress of all -kinds as an objection, as something which must be done away with, is the -greatest nonsense on earth; almost as mad as the will to abolish bad -weather, out of pity to the poor, so to speak. The masses must be used, -whether that means or does not mean that they must suffer;--it requires -great strength to live and forget how far life and injustice are one. -What is the suffering of whole peoples compared to the creative agonies -of great individuals?[252] - -There are many who threw away everything they were worth when they threw -away their slavery. In all respects slaves live more securely and more -happily than modern laborers; the laborer chooses his harder lot to -satisfy the vanity of telling himself that he is not a slave. These men -are dangerous; not because they are strong, but because they are sick; -it is the sick who are the greatest danger to the healthy; it is the -weak ones, they who mouth so much about their sickness, who vomit bile -and call it newspaper,--it is they who instil the most dangerous venom -and scepticism into our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves; it is -they who most undermine the life beneath our feet. It is for such as -these that Christianity may serve a good purpose (so serving our purpose -too). Those qualities which are within the grasp only of the strongest -and most terrible natures, and which make their existence -possible--leisure, adventure, disbelief, and even dissipation--would -necessarily ruin mediocre natures--and does do so when they possess -them. In the case of the latter, industry, regularity, moderation, and -strong "conviction" are in their proper place--in short, all "gregarious -virtues"; under their influence these mediocre men become perfect. We -good Europeans, then, though atheists and immoralists, will take care to -support the religions and the morality which are associated with the -gregarious instinct; for by means of them an order of men is, so to -speak, prepared, which must at some time or other fall into our hands, -which must actually crave for our hands.[253] - -Slavery, let us understand it well, is the necessary price of culture; -the free work, or art, of some involves the compulsory labor of others. -As in the organism so in society: the higher function is possible only -through the subjection of the lower functions. A high civilization is a -pyramid; it can stand only on a broad base, its first prerequisite is a -strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In order that there may be -a broad, deep, and fruitful soil for the development of art, the -enormous majority must, in the service of a minority, be slavishly -subjected. At their cost, through the surplus of their labor, that -privileged class is to be relieved from the struggle for existence, in -order to create and to satisfy a new world of want. The misery of the -toilers must still increase in order to make the production of a world -of art possible to a small number of Olympian men.[254] - - -11 - -_Aristocracy_ - -The greatest folly of the strong is to let the weak make them ashamed to -exploit, to let the weak suggest to them, "It is a shame to be -happy--there is too much misery!" Let us therefore reaffirm the right of -the happy to existence, the right of bells with a full tone over bells -that are cracked and discordant. Not that exploitation as such is -desirable; it is good only where it supports and develops an aristocracy -of higher men who are themselves developing still higher men. This -philosophy aims not at an individualistic morality but at a new order of -rank. In this age of universal suffrage, in this age in which everybody -is allowed to sit in judgment upon everything and everybody, one feels -compelled to reestablish the order of rank. The higher men must be -protected from contamination and suffocation by the lower. The richest -and most complex forms perish so easily! Only the lowest succeed in -maintaining their apparent imperishableness.[255] - -The first question as to the order of rank: how far is a man disposed to -be solitary or gregarious? If he is disposed to be gregarious, his value -consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his tribe or -type; if he is disposed to be solitary, his qualities are those which -distinguish him from others; hence the important consequence: the -solitary type should not be valued from the standpoint of the gregarious -type, or _vice versa_. Viewed from above, both types are necessary; and -so is their antagonism. Degeneration lies in the approximation of the -qualities of the herd to those of the solitary creature, and _vice -versa_; in short, in their beginning to resemble each other. Hence the -difference in their virtues, their rights and their obligations; in the -light of this difference one comes to abhor the vulgarity of Stuart Mill -when he says, "What is right for one man is right for another." It is -not; what is right for the herd is precisely what is wrong for their -leaders; and what is right for the leaders is wrong for the herd. The -leaders use, the herd is used; the virtues of either lie in the -efficiency here of leadership, there of service. Slave-morality is one -thing, and master-morality another.[256] - -And leadership of course requires an aristocracy. Let us repeat it: -democracy has always been the death-agony of the power of organization -and direction; these require great aristocratic families, with long -traditions of administration and leadership; old ancestral lines that -guarantee for many generations the duration of the necessary will and -the necessary instincts. Not only aristocracy, then, but caste; for if a -man have plebeian ancestors, his soul will be a plebeian soul; -education, discipline, culture will be wasted on him, merely enabling -him to become a great liar. Therefore intermarriage, even social -intercourse of leaders with herd, is to be avoided with all precaution -and intolerance; too much intercourse with barbarians ruined the Romans, -and will ruin any noble race.[257] - -In what direction may one turn with any hope of finding even the -aspiration for such an aristocracy? Only there where a _noble_ attitude -of mind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in -manifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any higher degree of -culture. Men with this attitude of mind will insistently call for, and -will at last produce, philosophical men of power, artist-tyrants,--a -higher kind of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, -knowledge, riches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic -Europe as the most suitable and subtle instrument for taking the fate of -Europe into their hands, and working as artists upon man himself. The -fundamental belief of these great desirers will be that society must not -be allowed to exist for its own sake, but only as the foundation and -scaffolding by means of which a select class of beings may be able to -elevate themselves to their highest duties, and in general to a higher -existence: like those sun-climbing plants in Java which encircle an oak -so long and so often with their arms that at last, high above it, but -supported by it, they can unfold their tops in the open light, and -exhibit their happiness.[258] - - -12 - -_Signs of Ascent_ - -Are we moving toward such a consummation? Can we detect about us any -signs of this ascending movement of life? Not signs of "progress"; that -is another narcotic, like Christianity,--good for slaves, but to be -avoided by those who rule. Man as a species is not progressing; the -general level of the species is not raised. But humanity as mass -sacrificed to the prosperity of the one stronger type of Man,--that -_would be_ a progress.[259] - -Progress of this kind, to some degree, there has always been. The ruling -class in Greece, as seen in Homer and even in Thucydides (though with -Socrates degeneration begins), is an example of this kind of progress or -attainment. Imagine this culture, which has its poet in Sophocles, its -statesman in Pericles, its physician in Hippocrates, its natural -philosopher in Democritus; here is a yea-saying, a gratitude, to life in -all its manifestations; here life is understood, and covered with art -that it may be borne; here men are frivolous so that they may forget for -a moment the arduousness and perilousness of their task; they are -superficial, but from profundity; they exalt philosophers who preach -moderation, because they themselves are so immoderate, so instinctive, -so hilariously wild; they are great, they are elevated above any ruling -class before or after them because here the morals of the governing -caste have grown up among the governing caste, and not among the -herd.[260] - -We catch some of the glory of these Greeks in the men of the -Renaissance: men perfect in their immorality, terrible in their demands; -we should not dare to stand amid the conditions which produced these -men and which these men produced; we should not even dare to imagine -ourselves in those conditions: our nerves would not endure that -reality,--not to speak of our muscles. One man of their type, -continuator and development of their type, brother (as Taine most -rightly says) of Dante and Michelangelo,--one such man we have known -with less of the protection of distance; and he was too hard to bear. -That _Ens Realissimum_, synthesis of monster and superman, surnamed -Napoleon! The first man, and the man of greatest initiative and -developed views, of modern times; a man of tolerance, not out of -weakness, but out of strength, able to risk the full enjoyment of -naturalness and be strong enough for this freedom. In such a man we see -something in the nature of "disinterestedness" in his work on his -marble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the -process. Men were glad to serve him; as most normal men are glad to -serve the great man; the crowd was tired of "equal rights," tired of -being masterless; it longed to worship genius again. What was the excuse -for that terrible farce, the French Revolution? It made men ready for -Napoleon.[261] - -When shall we produce another superman? Let us go back to our question: -Can we detect about us any signs of strength? - -Yes. We are learning to get along without God. We are recovering from -the noble sentiments of Rousseau. We are giving the body its due; -physiology is overcoming theology. We are less hungry for lies,--we are -facing squarely some of the ugliness of life,--prostitution, for -example. We speak less of "duty" and "principles"; we are not so -enamored of bourgeois conventions. We are less ashamed of our instincts; -we no longer believe in a right which proceeds from a power that is -unable to uphold it. There is an advance towards "naturalness": in all -political questions, even in the relations between parties, even in -merchants', workmen's circles only questions of power come into play; -what one can do is the first question, what one ought to do is a -secondary consideration. There is a certain degree of liberal-mindedness -regarding morality; where this is most distinctly wanting we regard its -absence as a sign of a morbid condition (Carlyle, Ibsen, Schopenhauer); -if there is anything which can reconcile us to our age it is precisely -the amount of immorality which it allows itself without falling in its -own estimation.[262] - -Modern science, despite its narrowing specialization, is a sign of -ascent. Here is strictness in service, inexorability in small matters as -well as great, rapidity in weighing, judging, and condemning; the -hardest is demanded here, the best is done without reward of praise or -distinction; it is rather as among soldiers,--almost nothing but blame -and sharp reprimand is _heard_; for doing well prevails here as the -rule, and the rule has, as everywhere, a silent tongue. It is the same -with this "severity of science" as with the manners and politeness of -the best society: it frightens the uninitiated. He, however, who is -accustomed to it, does not like to live anywhere but in this clear, -transparent, powerful, and highly electrified atmosphere, this _manly_ -atmosphere.[263] - -In this achievement of science lies such an opportunity as philosophy -has never had before. Science traces the course of things but points to -no goal: what it does give consists of the fundamental facts upon which -the new goal must be based. All the sciences have now to pave the way -for the future task of the philosopher; this task being understood to -mean that he must solve the problem of _value_, that he has to fix the -hierarchy of values. He must become lawgiver, commander; he must -determine the "whither" and "why" for mankind. All knowledge must be at -his disposal, and must serve him as a tool for creation.[264] - -Most certain of the signs of a reascending movement of life is the -development of militarism. The military development of Europe is a -delightful surprise. This fine discipline is teaching us to do our duty -without expecting praise. Universal military service is the curious -antidote which we possess for the effeminacy of democratic ideas. Men -are learning again the joy of living in danger. Some of them are even -learning the old truth that war is good in itself, aside from any gain -in land or other wealth; instead of saying "A good cause will hallow -every war," they learn to say "A good war hallows every cause." When the -instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and conquest, it -is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of shopkeepers. A -state which should prevent war would not only be committing suicide (for -war is just as necessary to the state as the slave is to society); it -would be hostile to life, it would be an outrage on the future of man. -The maintenance of the military state is the last means of adhering to -the great traditions of the past; or where it has been lost, of reviving -it. Only in this can the superior or strong type of man be -preserved.[265] - -A nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great men, and -then to get around them. The state is the organization of immorality for -the attainment of this purpose. But as existing to-day the state is a -very imperfect instrument, subject at any moment to democratic -foundering. What concerns the thinker here is the slow and hesitant -formation of a united Europe. This was the thought, and the sole real -work and impulse, of the only broad-minded and deep-thinking men of this -century,--the tentative effort to anticipate the future of "the -European." Only in their weaker moments, or when they grew old, did they -fall back again into the national narrowness of the "Fatherlanders"--then -they were once more "patriots." One thinks here of men like Napoleon, -Heine, Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Schopenhauer. And after all, is -there a single idea behind this bovine nationalism? What possible value -can there be in encouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything -to-day points to greater and more common interests?--at a moment when -the spiritual dependence and denationalization which are obvious to all -are paving the way for the _rapprochements_ and fertilizations which -make up the real value and sense of present-day culture?[266] - -What an instrument such a united Europe would be for the development and -protection and expression of superior individuals! What a buoyant ascent -of life after this long descent into democracy! See now, in review, the -two movements which we have studied and on which we have strung our -philosophy: on the one hand Christian mythology and morality, the cult -of weakness, the fear of life, the deterioration of the species, ever -increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong, the lapse into -democracy, feminism, socialism, and at last into anarchy,--all -terminating in pessimism, despair, total loss of the love of life; on -the other hand the reaffirmation of the worth of life, the resolute -distinction between slave-morality and master-morality, the recognition -of the aristocratic valuation of health, vigor, energy, as moral in all -their forms, and of the will to power as the source and significance of -all action and all living; the conception of the higher man, of the -exceptional individual, as the goal of human endeavor; the redirection -of marriage, of education, of social structure, to the fostering and -cherishing of these higher types;--culminating in the supernational -organization of Europe as the instrumentality and artistic expression of -the superior man.[267] - -Is this philosophy too hard to bear? Very well. But those races that -cannot bear it are doomed; and those which regard it as the greatest -blessing are destined to be masters of the world.[268] - - -IV - -Criticism - -What shall one say to this? What would a democrat say,--such a democrat -as would be a friend to socialism and feminism, and even to -anarchism,--and a lover of Jesus? One pictures such a man listening with -irritated patience to the foregoing, and responding very readily to an -invitation to take the floor. - - * * * * * - -There are lessons here, he begins, as if brushing away an initial -encumbrance. There is something of Nietzsche in all of us, just as there -is something of Jesus (almost as there is something of man and of woman -in all of us, as Weininger argued); and part of that crowd called -_myself_ is flattered by this doctrine of ruthless power. Nietzsche -stood outside our social and moral structure, he was a sort of hermit in -the world of thought; and so he could see things in that structure which -are too near to our noses for easy vision. And as you listen to him you -see history anew as a long succession of masterings and enslavings and -deceivings, and you become almost reconciled to the future being nothing -but a further succession of the same. And then you begin to see that if -the future is to be different, one of the things we must do is to pinch -ourselves out of this Nietzschean dream. - -And a good way to begin is with Nietzsche's own principle, that every -philosophy is a physiology.[269] He asks us to believe that there is no -such thing as a morbid trait in him,[270] but we must not take him at -his word. The most important point about this philosophy is that it was -written by a sick man, a man sick to the very roots--if you will let me -say it, abnormal in sexual constitution; a man not sufficiently -attracted to the other sex, because he has so much of the other sex in -him. "She is a woman," he writes in _Zarathustra_, "and never loves -anyone but a warrior"; that is, if Nietzsche but knew it, the diagnosis -of his own disease. This hatred of women, this longing for power, this -admiration for strength, for successful lying,[271] this inability to -see a _tertium quid_ between tyranny and slavery,[272]--all these are -feminine traits. A stronger man would not have been so shrewishly shrill -about woman and Christianity; a stronger man would have needed less -repetition, less emphasis and underlining, less of italics and -exclamation points; a stronger man would have been more gentle, and -would have smiled where Nietzsche scolds. It is the philosophy, you see, -of a man abnormally weak in the social instincts, and at the same time -lacking in proper outlet for such social instincts as nature has left -him. - -Consequently, he never gets beyond the individual. He thinks society is -made up of individuals, when it is really made up of groups. He supposes -that the only virtues a man can have are those which help him as an -isolated unit; the idea that a man may find self-expression in social -expression, in cooperation, that there are virtues which are virtues -because they enable one to work with others against a common evil,--this -notion never occurs to him. He does not see that sympathy and mutual -aid, for example, though they preserve some inferior individuals, yet -secure that group-solidarity, and therefore group-survival, without -which even the strong ones would perish.[273] He does not imagine that -perhaps the barbarians who invaded Rome needed the gospel of a "gentle -Jesus meek and mild" if anything at all was to remain of that same -classical culture which he paints so lovingly.[274] He laughs at -self-denial; and then invites you to devote yourself forever to some -self-elected superman. - -This philosophy of aristocracy, of the necessity of slavery, of the -absurdity of democracy,--of course it is exciting to all weak people who -would like to have power,--and who have not read it all before in Plato. -In this particular case the humor of the situation lies in the very -powerful attack which Nietzsche makes on the irreligious religious -humbug which has proved one of the chief instruments of mastery in the -hands of the class whose power he is trying to strengthen. "I hope to be -forgiven," says Nietzsche, "for discovering that all moral philosophy -hitherto has belonged to the soporific appliances."[275] -"Discovering"--as if the aristocracy had not known that all along! -"Here is a naive bookworm," these "strong men" will say among -themselves, "who has discovered what every one of us knows. He presumes -to tell us how to increase our power, and he can find no better way of -helping us than to expose in print the best secrets of our trade." - -Just in this lies the value of Nietzsche, as Rousseau said of -Machiavelli: he lets us in behind the scenes of the drama of -exploitation. We know better now the men with whom democracy must deal. -We see the greed for power that hides behind the contention that culture -cannot exist without slavery. Grant that contention: so much the worse -for culture! If culture means the increasing concentration of the -satisfactions of life in the hands of a few "superior" pigs, their -culture may be dispensed with; if it is to stay, it will have to mean -the direction of knowledge and ability to the spread of the -satisfactions of life. Which is finer,--the relationship of master and -slave, or that of friend and friend? Surely a world of people liking and -helping one another is a finer world to live in than one in which the -instincts of aggression are supreme. And such a cooperative civilization -need not fear the tests of survival; selection puts an ever higher -premium on solidarity, an ever lower value on pugnacity. Intelligence, -not ready anger, will win the great contests of the future. Friendship -will pay. - -The history of the world is a record of the patient and planful attempt -to replace hatred by understanding, narrowness by large vision, -opposition by cooperation, slavery by friendship. Friendship: a word to -be avoided by those who would appear _blase_. But let us repeat it; -words have been known to nourish deeds which without them might never -have grown into reality. Some find heaven in making as many men as -possible their slaves; others find heaven in making as many men as -possible their friends. Which type of man will we have? Which type of -man, if abundant, would make this world a splendor and a delight? - -The hope for which Jesus lived was that _man_ might some day come to -mean _friend_. It is the only hope worth living for. - - -V - -Nietzsche Replies - -"It is certainly not the least charm of a theory," says Nietzsche, "that -it is refutable."[276] But "what have I to do with mere -refutations?"[277] "A prelude I am of better players."[278] "Verily, I -counsel you," said Zarathustra, "depart from me and defend yourselves -against Zarathustra! And better still, be ashamed of him. Perhaps he -hath deceived you. The man of perception must not only be able to love -his enemies, but also to hate his friends. One ill requiteth one's -teacher by always remaining only his scholar. Why will ye not pluck at -my wreath? Ye revere me; but how if your reverence one day falleth down? -Beware of being crushed to death with a statue! Ye say ye believe in -Zarathustra? But what is Zarathustra worth? Ye are my faithful ones; but -what are all faithful ones worth? When ye had not yet sought yourselves -ye found me. Thus do all faithful ones; hence all belief is worth so -little. Now I ask you to lose me and find yourselves; not until all of -you have disowned me shall I return unto you."[279] - - -VI - -Conclusion - -"Look," says Rudin, in Turgenev's story, "you see that apple tree? It -has broken down with the weight and multitude of its own fruit. It is -the emblem of genius." "To perish beneath a load one can neither bear -nor throw off," wrote Nietzsche,--"that is a philosopher."[280] I shall -announce the song of the lightning, said Zarathustra, and perish in the -announcing.[281] - -Insanity with such a man is but a matter of time; he feels it coming -upon him; he values his hours like a man condemned to execution. In -twenty days he writes the _Genealogy of Morals_; in one year (1888) he -produces _The Twilight of the Idols_, _Antichrist_, _The Case of -Wagner_, _Ecce Homo_, and his longest and greatest book, _The Will to -Power_. He not only writes these books; he reads the proof-sheets, -straining his eyes beyond repair. He is almost blind now; he is -deceived, taken advantage of, because he can hardly see farther than his -touch. "If I were blind," he writes pitifully, "I should be -healthy."[282] Yet his body is racked with pain: "on 118 days this year -I have had severe attacks."[283] "I have given a name to my pain, and -call it 'a dog'--it is just as pitiful, just as importunate and -shameless; and I can domineer over it, vent my bad humor on it, as -others do with their dogs, servants, and wives."[284] - -Meanwhile the world lives on unnoticing, or noticing only to -misunderstand. "My foes have become mighty, and have so distorted my -teaching, that my best beloved must be ashamed of the gifts that I gave -them."[285] He learns that the libertines of Europe are using his -philosophy as a cloak for their sins: "I can read in their faces that -they totally misunderstand me, and that it is only the animal in them -which rejoices at being able to cast off its fetters."[286] He finds one -whom he thinks to make his disciple; he is buoyed up for a few days by -the hope; the hope is shattered, and loneliness closes in once more upon -him. "A kingdom for a kind word!" he cries out in the depth of his -longing; and again he writes, "For years no milk of human kindness, no -breath of love."[287] - -In December, 1888, one whom he has thought friendly writes that his -brother-in-law is sending to a magazine an attack on him. It is the last -blow; it means that his sister has joined the others in deserting him. -"I take one sleeping-draught after another to deaden the pain, but for -all that I cannot sleep. To-day I will take such a dose that I will lose -my wits."[288] He has been taking chloral, and worse drugs, to pay for -the boon of sleep; the poison tips the scale already made heavy by his -blindness and eye-strain, by his loneliness, by the treachery of his -friends, by his general bodily ailments; he wakes up from this final -draught in a stupor from which he never recovers; he writes to Brandes -and signs himself "The Crucified"; he wanders into the street, is -tormented by children, falls in a fit; his good landlord helps him back -to his room, sends for the simple, ignorant doctor of the neighborhood; -but it is too late; the man is insane. Age, forty-four; another--the -only name greater than his among modern philosophers--had died at that -pitifully early age. - -The body lingered eleven years behind the mind. Death came in 1900. He -was buried as he had wished: "Promise me," he had asked his sister, many -years before, "that when I die only my friends shall stand about my -coffin, and no inquisitive crowd. See that no priest or anyone else -utters falsehoods at my graveside, when I can no longer defend myself; -and let me descend into my tomb as an honest pagan."[289] - -After his death the world began to read him. As in so many cases the -life had to be given that the doctrine might be heard. "Only where there -are graves," he had written in _Zarathustra_, "are there -resurrections."[290] - - - - -PART II - -SUGGESTIONS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -SOLUTIONS AND DISSOLUTIONS - - -I - -The Problem - -And so we come through our five episodes in the history of the -reconstructive mind, and find ourselves in the bewildering present, -comfortably seated, let us say, in the great reading room of our -Columbia Library. An attendant liberates us from the maze of -"Nietzsche's Works" lying about us, and returns presently with a stack -of thirty books purporting to give the latest developments in the field -of social study and research. We are soon lost in their graphs and -statistics, their records and results; gradually we come to feel beneath -these dead facts the lives they would reveal; and as we read we see a -picture. - - * * * * * - -It is the picture of one life. We see it beginning helplessly in the -arms of the factory physician; it is only after some violence that it -consents to breathe,--as if it hesitates to enter upon its adventure. It -has a touch of consumption but is otherwise a fair enough baby, says the -factory physician. It will do,--not saying for what or whom. Luckily, -it is a boy, and will be able to work soon. He does; at the age of nine -he becomes a newsboy; he is up at five in the morning and peddles news -till eight; at nine he gets to school, fagged out but restless; he gives -trouble; cannot memorize quickly enough, nor sit still long enough; -plays truant, loving the hard lessons of the street; school over, he has -a half-hour of play, but must then travel his news route till six; after -supper he has no taste for study; if he cannot go down into the street, -he will go to bed. At fourteen, hating the school where he is beaten or -scolded daily, he connives with his parents at certain falsehoods which -secure his premature entrance into the factory. He works hard, and for a -time happily enough; there is more freedom here than in the school. He -discovers sex, passes through the usual chapter of accidents, and -finally achieves manhood in the form of a sexual disease. He falls in -love several times, and out as many times but one; he marries, shares -his disease with his wife, and begets ten children,--nearly all of them -feeble, and two of them blind; he does not want so many children, but -the priest has told him that religion commands it. He works harder to -support them, but his health is giving way, and life becomes a heavy -burden to him. The factory installs scientific management, and he finds -himself performing the same operation every ten seconds from seven to -twelve and from one to six;--some three thousand times a day; he -protests, but is told that science commands it. He joins a union, and -goes out on strike; his family suffer severely, one of the children -dying of malnutrition; he wins a wage-increase of five per cent; his -landlord raises his rent, and a month later his wife informs him that -the prices of food and clothing have gone up six per cent. His country -goes to war about a piece of territory he has never heard of; his one -fairly strong boy rushes off to the defence of the colors, returns (age -twenty) with one leg and almost an arm, and sits in the house smoking, -drinking, and dribbling in repetitious semi-torpor his memories of -battle. Then comes street-corner talk of socialism, capitalism, and -other things new and therefore hard to understand; a glimmer of hope, a -cloud of doubt, then resignation. Four of the children die before they -are twenty; two others become consumptive weaklings. The father is sent -away from the factory because he is too old and feeble; he finds work in -a saloon; drink helps him to slip down; he steals a bracelet from the -factory-owner's kept woman, is arrested, tries to hang himself, but is -discovered when half dead, and is restored to life against his will. He -serves his sentence, returns to his family, and becomes a beggar. He -dies of exposure and disease, and his widow is supported by two of his -daughters, who have become successful prostitutes. - -It is the picture of one life. And as you look at it you see beyond it -the hundred thousand lives of which it is one; you see this suffering -and meaninglessness as but one hundredth part of a thousandth part of -the meaningless suffering of men; you hear the angry cries of the -rebellious young, the drunken laughter of the older ones who have no -more rebellion in them, the quiet weeping of the mothers of many -children. Around you here you see the happy faces of young students, -eloquent of comfortable homes; at your elbow a gentleman of family is -writing a book on the optimism of Robert Browning. And then suddenly, -beneath this world of leisure and learning, you feel the supporting -brawn of the wearied workers; you vision the very pillars of this vast -edifice held up painfully, hour after hour, on the backs of a million -sweating men; your leisure is their labor, your learning is paid for by -their ignorance, your luxury is their toil. - -For a moment the great building seems to tremble, as if rebellion -stirred beneath and upheaval was upon the world. Then it is still once -more, and you and I are here with our thirty books. - -One feels guilty of sentiment here (after reading Nietzsche!), and -hurries back to the sober features of those crowded volumes. Here, in -cold scientific statement, is our social problem: here are volumes -biological on heredity, eugenics, dietetics, and disease; volumes -sociological on marriage, prostitution, the family, the position of -woman, contraception and the control of population; volumes -psychological on education, criminology, and the replacement of -supernatural by social religion; volumes economic on private property, -poverty, child labor, industrial methods, arbitration, minimum wage, -trusts, free trade, immigration, prohibition, war; volumes political on -individualism and communism, anarchism and socialism, single tax, -Darwinism and politics, democracy and aristocracy, patriotism, -imperialism, electoral and administrative methods; methodological -volumes on trade-unions and craft-unions, "direct action" and "political -action," violence and non-resistance, revolution and reform. It is a -discouraging maze; we plunge into it almost hopelessly. Several of these -authors have schemes for taking the social machine apart, and a few even -have schemes for putting it together again; hardly one of them remembers -the old warning that this machine must be kept going while it is being -repaired. And each of these solutions, as its author never suspects, is -but an added problem. - -Let us listen to these men for a while, let us follow them for a space, -and see where they bring us out. They may not bring us out at all; but -perhaps that is just what we need to see. - - -II - -"Solutions" - - -1 - -_Feminism_ - -And first, with due propriety, let us listen to the case of woman _vs._ -the _status quo_. We imagine the argument as put by a studious and -apparently harmless young lady. She begins gently and proceeds -_crescendo_. - -"The case for woman is quite simple; as simple as the case for -democracy. We are human beings, we are governed, we are taxed; and we -believe that just government implies the consent of the governed. - -"We might have been content with the old life, had you masters of the -world been content to leave us the old life. But you would not. Your -system of industry has made the position of most young men so hopeless -and insecure that they are year by year putting back the age of -marriage. You have forced us out of our homes into your factories; and -you have used us as a means of making still harder the competition for -employment among the men. Your advocates speak of the sacredness of the -home; and meanwhile you have dragged 5,000,000 English women out of -their homes to be the slaves of your deadening machines.[291] You exalt -marriage; and in this country one woman out of every ten is unmarried, -and one out of every twenty married women works in your unclean shops. -The vile cities born of your factory-system have made life so hard for -us, temptations so frequent, vice so attractive and convenient, that we -cannot grow up among you without suffering some indelible taint. - -"Some of us go into your factories because we dread marriage, and some -of us marry because we dread your factories. But there is not much to -choose between them. If we marry we become machines for supplying -another generation of workers and soldiers; and if we talk of -birth-control you arrest us. As if we had no right to all that science -has discovered! And the horror of it is that while you forbid us to -learn how to protect ourselves and our children from the evils of large -families, you yourselves buy this knowledge from your physicians and use -it; and one of your societies for the prevention of birth-control has -been shown to consist of members with an average of 1.5 children per -family.[292] Your physicians meet in learned assemblies and vote in -favor of maintaining the law which forbids the spread of this -information; and then we find that physicians have the smallest average -family in the community.[293] One must be a liar and a thief to fit -comfortably into this civilization which you ask us to defend. - -"But we are resolved to get this information; and all your laws to -prevent us will only lessen our respect for law. We will not any longer -bring children into the world unless we have some reasonable hope of -giving them a decent life. And not only that. We shall end, too, the -hypocrisies of marriage. If you will have monogamy you may have it; but -if you continue merely to pretend monogamy we shall find a way of -regaining our independence. We shall not rest until we have freed -ourselves from the sting of your generosity; until our bread comes not -from your hand in kindness but from the state or our employers in -recognition of our work. Then we shall be free to leave you, and you -free to leave us, as we were free to take one another at the -beginning,--so far, alas! as the categorical imperative of love left us -free. And our children will not suffer; better for them that they see us -part than that they live with us in the midst of hypocrisy and secret -war. - -"Because we want this freedom--to stay or to go--this freedom to know -and control the vital factors of our lives, therefore we demand equal -suffrage. It is but a little thing, a mere beginning; and beware how you -betray your secrets in your efforts to bar us from this beginning. Are -you afraid to share with us the power of the ballot? Do you confess so -openly that you wish to command us without our consent, that you wish to -use us for your secret ends? You dare not fight fair and in the open? Is -the ballot a weapon which you use on us and will not let us use on you? -It is so you conceive citizenship! Or will you ask us to believe that -you are thinking not of your own interests but of posterity? - -"But we shall get this from you, just as we get other things from -you,--by repetition. And then we shall go on to make the world more fit -for women to live in: we shall force open all the avenues of life that -have been closed to us before, making us narrow and petty and dull. We -shall compel your universities to admit us to their classes; we shall -enter your professions, we shall compete with you for office, we shall -win the experiences and dare the adventures which we need to make us -your rivals in literature and philosophy and art. You say we cannot be -your comrades, your friends; that we can be only tyrants or slaves; but -what else can we be, with all the instructive wealth of life kept from -us? You hide from us the great books that are being written to-day, and -then you are surprised at our gossip, our silly scandal-mongering, our -inability to converse with you on business and politics, on science and -religion and philosophy; you will not let us grow, and then you complain -because we are so small. But we want to grow now, we want to grow! We -cannot longer be mothers only. The world does not need so many children; -and even to bring up better children we must have a wider and healthier -life. We must have our intellects stimulated more and our feelings less. -We have burst the bonds of our old narrow world; we must explore -everything now. It is too late to stop us; and if you try you will only -make life a mess of hatred and conflict for us both. And after all, do -you know why we want to grow? It is because we long for the day when we -shall be no longer merely your mistresses, but also your friends." - - -2 - -_Socialism_ - -Another complainant: a young Socialist: such a man as works far into -almost every night in the dingy office of his party branch, and devotes -his Sundays to _Das Kapital_; bright-eyed, untouched by disillusionment; -fired by the vision of a land of happy comrades. - -"I agree with the young lady," he says; "the source of all our ills is -the capitalist system. It was born of steam-driven machinery and -conceived in _laissez-faire_. It saw the light in Adam Smith's England, -ruined the health of the men of that country, and then came to America, -where it grew fat on 'liberty' and 'the right to do as one pleases with -one's own.' It believed in competition--that is to say war--as its God, -in whom all things lived and moved and sweated dividends; it made the -acquisition of money, by no matter what means, the test of virtue and -success, so that honest men became ashamed of themselves if they did not -fail; it made all life a matter of 'push' and 'pull,' like the two sides -of a door in one of those business palaces which make its cities great -mazes of brick and stone rising like new Babels in the face of heaven. -Its motto was, Beware of small profits; its aim was the greatest -possible happiness of the smallest possible number. Out of competition -it begot the trust, the rebate, and the 'gentleman's agreement'; out of -'freedom of contract' it begot wage-slavery; out of 'liberty, equality -and fraternity' it begot an industrial feudalism worse than the old -feudalism, based on the inheritance not of land, but of the living -bodies and souls of thousands of men, women and children. When it came -(in 1770) the annual income of England was $600,000,000; in 1901 the -annual income of England was $8,000,000,000; the system has made a -thousand millionaires, but it has left the people starving as -before.[294] It has increased wages, and has increased prices a trifle -more. It has improved the condition of the upper tenth of the workers, -and has thrown the great remaining mass of the workers into a hell of -torpor and despair. It has crowned all by inventing the myopic science -of scientific management, whereby men are made to work at such speed, -and with such rigid uniformity, that the mind is crazed, and the body is -worn out twenty years before its time. It has made the world reek with -poverty, and ugliness, and meanness, and the vulgarity of conspicuous -wealth. It has made life intolerable and disgraceful to all but sheep -and pigs. - -"There is only one way of saving our civilization--such as there is of -it--from wasting away through the parasitic degeneration of a few of its -parts and the malnutrition of the rest; and that is by frankly -abandoning this _laissez-faire_ madness, and changing the state into a -mechanism for the management of the nation's business. We workers must -get hold of the offices, and turn government into administration. -Without that our strikes and boycotts, our 'direct action' and economic -organization, arrive at little result; every strike we 'win' means that -prices will go up, and our time and energy--and dues--have gone to -nothing but self-discipline in solidarity. We can control prices only by -controlling monopolies; and we can control monopolies only by -controlling government. That means politics, and it's a scheme that -won't work until the proletariat get brains enough to elect honest and -sensible men to office; but if they haven't the brains to do that they -won't have the brains to do anything effective on the economic or any -other field. We know how hard it is to get people to think; but we -flatter ourselves that our propaganda is an educative force that grows -stronger every year, and has already achieved such power as to decide -the most important election held in this country since the Civil War. - -"Already a large number of people have been educated--chiefly by our -propaganda--to understand, for example, the economic greed that lies -behind all wars. They perceive that so long as capital finds its highest -rate of profit in the home market, capitalists see to it that peace -remains secure; but that when capital has expanded to the point at which -the rate of interest begins to fall, or when labor has ceased to be -docile, because it has ceased to be unorganized and uninformed, -capitalists then seek foreign markets and foreign investments, and soon -require the help of war--that is, the lives of the workers at home--to -help them enforce their terms on foreign governments and peoples. Only -the national ownership of capital can change that. We thought once that -we were too civilized ever to go to war again; we begin to see that our -industrial feudalism leads inevitably to war and armaments, and the -intellectual stagnation that comes from a militaristic mode of national -life. We begin to see all history as a Dark Age (with fitful intervals -of light),--a long series of wars in which men have killed and died for -delusions, fighting to protect the property of their exploiters. And it -becomes a little clearer to us than before that this awful succession of -killings and robberies is no civilization at all, and that we shall -never have a civilization worthy of the name until we transform our -industrial war into the cooperative commonwealth, and all 'foreigners' -into friends." - - -3 - -_Eugenics_ - -"My dear young man," says the Eugenist at this point, "you must study -biology. Your plan for the improvement of mankind is all shot through -with childish ignorance of nature's way of doing things. Come into my -laboratory for a few years; and you will learn how little you can do by -merely changing the environment. It's nature that counts, not nurture. -Improvement depends on the elimination of the inferior, not on their -reformation by Socialist leaflets or settlement work. What you have to -do is to find some substitute for that natural selection--the automatic -and ruthless killing off of the unfit--which we are more and more -frustrating with our short-sighted charity. Humanitarianism must get -informed. Our squeamishness about interfering with the holy 'liberty of -the individual' will have to be moderated by some sense of the right of -society to protect itself from interference by the individual. Here are -the feeble-minded, for example; they breed more rapidly than healthy -people do, and they almost always transmit their defect. If you don't -interfere with these people, if you don't teach them or force them to be -childless, you will have an increase in insanity along with the -development of humanity. Think of making a woman suffer to deliver into -the world a cripple or an idiot. And further, consider that the lowest -eighth of the people produce one-half of the next generation. The better -people, the more vigorous and healthy people, are refusing to have -children; every year the situation is becoming more critical. City-life -and factory-life make things still worse; young men coming from the -country plunge into the maelstrom of the city, then into its -femalestrom; they emerge with broken health, marry deformities dressed -up in the latest fashion, and produce children inferior in vigor and -ability to themselves. Given a hundred years more of this, and western -Europe and America will be in a condition to be overcome easily by the -fertile and vigorous races of the East. That is what you have to think -of. The problem is larger than that of making poor people less poor; it -is the problem of preserving our civilization. Your socialism will help, -but it will be the merest beginning; it will be but an introduction to -the socialization of selection,--which is eugenics. We will prevent -procreation by people who have a transmissible defect or disease; we -will require certificates of health and clean ancestry before permitting -marriage; we will encourage the mating, with or without love, of men and -women possessed of energy and good physique. We will teach people, in -Mr. Marett's phrase, to marry less with their eyes and more with their -heads. It will take us a long while to put all this into effect; but we -will put it. Time is on our side; every year will make our case -stronger. Within half a century the educated world will come and beg us -to guide them in a eugenic revolution." - - -4 - -_Anarchism_ - -A gentle anarchist: - -"You do well to talk of revolution; but you do wrong to forget the -individual in the race. Your eugenic revolution will not stop the -exploitation of the workers by the manufacturers through the state. Give -men justice and they will soon be healthy; give them the decent life -which is the only just reward for their work, and you will not need -eugenics. Instead of bothering about parasitic germs you should attend -to parasitic exploiters; it is in this social parasitism that the real -danger of degeneration lies. Continued injustice of employers to -employees is splitting every western nation into factions; class-loyalty -will soon be stronger than loyalty to the community; and the time will -come when nations in which this civil war has not been superseded by -voluntary mutual aid will crumble into oblivion. - -"And yet men are willing to be loyal to the community, if the community -is organized to give them justice. If exploitation were to cease there -would be such bonds of brotherhood among men as would make the community -practically everlasting. All you need do is to let men coooperate in -freedom. They long to cooperate; all evolution shows a growth in the -ability to coooperate; man surpassed the brute just because of this. Nor -is law or state needed; coercive government is necessary only in -societies founded on injustice. The state has always been an instrument -of exploitation; and law is merely the organized violence of the ruling -class. It is a subtle scheme; it enables industrial lords to do without -any pangs of conscience what but for their statute-books might give them -a qualm or two. Notice, for example, how perfectly Christian such -slaughters as those in Colorado or Virginia can be made to appear--even -to the slaughterers--by the delightful expedient of the statute-book. -They kill and call it law, so that they may sleep. - -"And then we are told that one must never use violence in labor -disputes. But obviously it is precisely violence that is used against -labor, and against the free spirit. As a matter of history, rebels did -not begin to use violence on the authorities until the authorities had -used violence on them. We feel ourselves quite justified in using any -means of attack on a system so founded in coercion. The whole question -with us is one not of morals but of expediency. We have been moral a -little too long." - - -5 - -_Individualism_ - -"Precisely," says the Stirnerite anarchist; "it is all a question of -might, not of right; and we exploited ones may be as right as rectitude -and never get anywhere unless we can rhyme a little might to our right. -Each of us has a right to do whatever he is strong enough to do. 'One -gets farther with a handful of might than with a bagful of right.' He -who wants much, and knows how to get it, has in all times taken it, as -Napoleon did the continent, and the French Algeria. Therefore the only -point is that the respectful 'lower classes' should at length learn to -take for themselves what they want." - - -6 - -_Individualism Again_ - -And lastly, _Advocatus Diaboli_, Mr. Status Quo: - -"I agree with you right heartily, Sir Stirnerite anarchist; it is time -you children came to understand that everything is a question of power. -Let the fittest survive and let us all use whatever means we find -expedient. I am frank with you now; but you must not be surprised if -to-morrow I write out a few checks for the salaries of the liars whom I -have in my employ. Why should we tell the truth and go under? Surely you -will understand that not all knowledge is good for all men. If it gives -you satisfaction, for example, to spread information about -birth-control, you will not feel hurt if it gives us satisfaction to -oppose you, for the sake of the future armies of unemployed without -which our great scheme of industry would be seriously hampered. - -"And I agree with your fellow-anarchist, that the state is often a -nuisance. I can make use of a little government; but when the state -begins to tell me how to run my business then I feel as if your -criticism of the state is very just--and convenient. I am an -individualist,--a good old American individualist,--like Jefferson and -Emerson. The state can't manage industry half as well as we can. You -know--as our Socialists do not--that government ownership is only -ownership by politicians, by Hinky-Dinks and Bath-house Johns; and I can -tell you from intimate knowledge of these people that they will do -anything for money except efficient administrative work. - -"Your scheme of having the workers take over the industries is a good -scheme--for the millennium. Where would you get men to direct you? They -come to us because we pay them well; if your syndicalist shops would pay -them as well as we do, they would be the beginning of a new aristocracy; -if you think these clever men will work for 'honor' you are leaning on -an airy dream. Destroy private property and you will have a nation of -hoboes and Hindus. - -"As to exploitation, what would you have? We are strong, and you are -weak; it is the law of nature that we should use you, just as it is the -law of nature that one species should use the weaker species as its -prey. The weaker will always suffer, with or without law. Even if all -bellies are full, the majority will envy the intellectual power of their -betters, and will suffer just as keenly on the intellectual plane as -they do now on the physical. The alternative of the under-dog is to get -intelligence and power, or 'stay put.' - -"My advice, then, is to let things be. You can change the superficial -conditions of the struggle for existence and for power, but the -fundamental facts of it will remain. Monarchy, aristocracy, -democracy,--it's all the same. The most powerful will rule, whether by -armies or by newspapers; it makes no difference if God is on the side of -the biggest battalions, or the side of the biggest type. We bought the -battalions; we buy the type. - -"Come, let us get back to our business." - - -III - -Dissolutions - -Here is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of our social _'isms_; and here is the -history of many a social rebel. From dissatisfaction to socialism, from -socialism to anarchism, from anarchism to Stirnerism, from Stirnerism -and the cult of the ego to Nietzsche and the right to exploit;--so has -many a man made the merry-go-round of thought and come back wearily at -last to the _terra firma_ of the thing that is. We sail into the sea of -social controversy without chart or compass or rudder; and though we -encounter much wind, we never make the port of our desire. We need maps, -and instruments, and knowledge; we need to make inquiries, to face our -doubts, to define our purposes; we shall have to examine more ruthlessly -our preconceptions and hidden premises, to force into the light the -wishes that secretly father our illegitimate thoughts. We must ask -ourselves questions that will reach down to the tenderest roots of our -philosophies. - -You are a feminist, let us say. Very well. Have you ever considered the -sociological consequences of that very real disintegration of the "home" -which an advancing feminism implies? Granted that this disintegration -has been begun by the industrial revolution. Do you want it to go on -more rapidly? Do you want women to become more like men? Do you think -that the "new woman" will care to have children? It is surely better for -the present comfort of our society that there should be a considerable -fall in the birth rate; but will that expose the people of Europe and -America to absorption by the races of the East? You argue that the case -for feminism is as simple as the case for democracy; but is the case for -democracy simple? Is democracy competent? Is it bringing us where we -want to go? Or is it a sort of collective determination to drift with -the tide,--a sort of magnified _laissez-faire_? And as to "rights" and -"justice," how do you answer Nietzsche's contention that the more highly -organized species, sex, or class, must by its very nature use, command, -and exploit the less highly organized species, sex, or class? - -You are a Socialist; and you yearn for a Utopia of friends and equals; -but will you, to make men equal, be compelled to chain the strength of -the strong with many laws and omnipresent force?--will you sacrifice the -superiority of the chosen few to the mediocrity of the many? Will you, -to control the exploiter, be obliged to control all men, even in -detail?--will your socialism really bring the slavery and servile state -that Spencer and Chesterton and Belloc fear? Is further centralization -of government desirable? Have you considered sufficiently the old -difficulty about the stimulus to endeavor in a society that should -restrict private property to a minimum and prohibit inheritance? Have -you arranged to protect your cooperative commonwealth by limiting -immigration--from Europe and from heaven?[295] Are you not, in general, -exaggerating the force of the aggregative as against the segregative -tendencies in human nature? And do you think that a change of laws can -make the weak elude the exploiting arm of the strong? Will not the -strongest men always make whatever laws are made, and rule wherever men -are ruled? Can any government stand that is not the expression of the -strongest forces in the community? And if the strongest force be -organized labor, are you sure that organized labor will not exploit and -tyrannize? Will the better organized and skilled workers be "just" to -the unskilled and imperfectly organized workers? And what do you mean by -"justice"? - -And as to the eugenist, surely it is unnecessary to expose his -unpreparedness to meet the questions which his programme raises. -Questions, for example, as to what "units" of character to breed for, if -there are such "units"; whether definite breeding for certain results -would forfeit adaptive plasticity; whether compulsory sterilization is -warranted by our knowledge of heredity; whether serious disease is not -often associated with genius; whether the native mental endowments of -rich and poor are appreciably different, and whether the "comparative -infertility of the upper classes" is really making for the deterioration -of the race; whether progress depends on racial changes so much as on -changes in social institutions and traditions. And so on. - -And the anarchist, whom one loves if only for the fervor of his hope and -the beauty of his dream,--the anarchist falters miserably in the face of -interrogation. If all laws were to be suspended to-morrow, all coercion -of citizen by state, how long would it be before new laws would arise? -Would the aforementioned strong cease to be strong and the weak cease to -be weak? Would people be willing to forego private property? Are not -belief and disbelief in private property determined less by logic and -"justice" than by one's own success or failure in the acquisition of -private property? Do only the weak and uncontrolled advocate absolute -lack of restraint? Do most men want liberty so much that they will -tolerate chaos and a devil-take-the-hind-most individualism for the sake -of it? Can it be, after all, that freedom is a negative thing,--that -what men want is, for some, achievement, for others, peace,--and that -for these they will give even freedom? What if a great number of people -dread liberty, and are not at all so sensitive to restraint and -commandment as the anarchist? Perhaps only children and geniuses can be -truly anarchistic? Perhaps freedom itself is a problem and not a -solution? Does the mechanization, through law and custom, of certain -elements in our social behavior, like the mechanization, through habit -and instinct, of certain elements in individual behavior, result in -greater freedom for the higher powers and functions? Again, to have -freedom for all, all must be equal; but does not development make for -differentiation and inequality? Consider the America of three hundred -years ago; a nation of adventurous settlers, hardly any of them better -off than any other,--all of a class, all on a level; and see what -inequalities and castes a few generations have produced! Is there a -necessary antithesis between liberty and order, freedom and control?--or -are order and control the first condition of freedom? Does not law serve -many splendid purposes,--could it not serve more? Is the state necessary -so long as there are long-eared and long-fingered gentry? - -As for your revolutions, who profits by them? The people who have -suffered, or the people who have thought? Is a revolution, so far as the -poor are concerned, merely the dethronement of one set of rulers or -exploiters so that another set may have a turn? Do not most -revolutions, like that which wished to storm heaven by a tower, end in -a confusion of tongues? And after each outbreak do not the workers -readapt themselves to their new slavery with that ease and torpid -patience which are the despair of every leader, until they are awakened -by another quarrel among their masters? - - * * * * * - -One could fling about such questions almost endlessly, till every _'ism_ -should disappear under interrogation points. Every such _'ism_, clearly, -is but a half-truth, an arrested development, suffering from -malinformation. One is reminded of the experiment in which a -psychologist gave a ring-puzzle to a monkey, and--in another room--a -like puzzle to a university professor: the monkey fell upon the puzzle -at once with teeth and feet and every manner of hasty and haphazard -reaction,--until at last the puzzle, dropped upon the floor, came apart -by chance; the professor sat silent and motionless before the puzzle, -working out in thought the issue of many suggested solutions, and -finally, after forty minutes, touched it to undo it at a stroke. Our -_'isms_ are simian reactions to the social puzzle. We jump at -conclusions, we are impinged upon extremes, we bound from opposite to -opposite, we move with blinders to a passion-colored goal. Some of us -are idealists, and see only the beautiful desire; some of us are -realists, and see only the dun and dreary fact; hardly any of us can -look fact in the face and see through it to that which it might be. We -"bandy half-truths" for a decade and then relapse into the peaceful -insignificance of conformity.[296] - -It dawns on students of social problems, as it dawned long since on -philosophers, that the beginning of their wisdom is a confession of -their ignorance. We know now that the thing we need, and for lack of -which we blunder valiantly into futility, is not good intentions but -informed intelligence. All problems are problems of education; all the -more so in a democracy. Not because education can change the original -nature of man, but because intelligent cooperation can control the -stimuli which determine the injuriousness or beneficence of original -dispositions. Impulse is not the enemy of intelligence; it is its raw -material. We desire knowledge--and particularly knowledge of -ourselves--so that we may know what external conditions evoke -destructive, and what conditions evoke constructive, responses. We do -not, for example, expect intelligence to eradicate pugnacity; we do not -want it to do so; but we want to eradicate the environmental conditions -which turn this impulse to wholesale suicide. Men should fight; it is -the essence of their value that they are willing to fight; the problem -of intelligence is to discuss and to create means for the diversion of -pugnacity to socially helpful ends. Character is _per se_ neither good -nor bad, but becomes one or the other according to the nature of the -stimuli presented. What we call moral reform, then, waits on information -and consequent remoulding of the factors determining the direction of -our original dispositions. We become "better" men and women only so far -as we become more intelligent. Just as psychoanalysis can, in some -measure, reconstruct the personal life, so social analysis can -reconstruct social life and turn into productive channels the innocent -but too often destructive forces of original nature.[297] - -Our problem, then, to repeat once more our central theme, is to -facilitate the growth and spread of intelligence. With this definition -of the issue we come closer to our thesis,--that the social problem must -be approached through philosophy, and philosophy through the social -problem. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE RECONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY - - -I - -Epistemologs - -Now there are a great many people who will feel no thrill at all at the -mention of philosophy,--who will rather consider themselves excused by -the very occurrence of the word from continuing on the road which this -discussion proposes to travel. No man dares to talk of philosophy in -these busy days except after an apologetic preface; philosophers -themselves have come to feel that their thinking is so remote from -practical endeavor that they have for the most part abandoned the effort -to relate their work to the concrete issues of life. In the eyes of the -man who does things philosophy is but an aerial voyaging among the mists -of transcendental dialectic, or an ineffective moralizing substitute for -supernatural religion. Philosophy was once mistress of all the -disciplines of thought and search; now none so poor to do her reverence. - -There is no way of meeting this indictment other than to concede it. It -is true. It is mild. Only a lover of philosophy can know--with the -intimacy of a _particeps criminis_--how deeply philosophy has fallen -from her ancient heights. Looking back to Greece we find that philosophy -there was a real pursuit of wisdom, a very earnest effort to arrive by -discussion and self-criticism at a way of life, a _philosophia vitae -magistra_, a knowledge of the individual and social good and of the -means thereto, a conscious direction of social institutions to ethical -ends; philosophy and life in those days were bound up with one another -as mechanics is now bound up with efficient construction. Even in the -Middle Ages philosophy meant coordinate living, synthetic behavior; with -all their reputation for cobweb-spinning, the Scholastics were much -closer to life in their thinking than most modern philosophers have been -in theirs. - -The lapse of philosophy from her former significance and vitality is the -result of the exaggerated emphasis placed on the epistemological problem -by modern thinkers; and this in turn is in great part due to the -difficulties on which Descartes stumbled in his effort to reconcile his -belief in mechanism with his desire to placate the Jesuits. How minor a -role is played by the problems of the relation between subject and -object, the validity of knowledge, epistemological realism and idealism, -in a frankly mechanist philosophy, appears in Bacon, Hobbes, and -Spinoza;[298] these men--deducting Bacon's astute obeisance to -theology--know what they want and say what they mean; they presume, with -a maturity so natural as to be mistaken for _naivete_, that the validity -of thought is a matter to be decided by action rather than by theory; -they take it for granted that the supreme and ultimate purpose of -philosophy is not analysis but synthesis, not the intellectual -categorizing of experience but the intelligent reconstruction of life. -Indeed, as one pursues this clew through the devious--almost -stealthy--course of modern speculation it appears that no small part of -the epistemological development has been made up of the oscillations, -compromises, and obscurities natural in men who were the exponents and -the victims of a painful transition. Civilization was passing from one -intellectual basis to another; and in these weird epistemologs the vast -process came uncomfortably to semiconsciousness. They were old bottles -bursting with new wine; and their tragedy was that they knew it. They -clung to the old world even while the new one was swimming perilously -into their ken; they found a pitiful solace in the old phrases, the old -paraphernalia of a dead philosophy; and in the suffering of their -readjustment there was, quite inevitably, some measure of -self-deception. - -And that is why they are so hard to understand. Even so subtle a -thinker as Santayana finds them too difficult, and abandons them in -righteous indignation. There is no worse confounding of confusion than -self-deception: let a man be honest with himself, and he may lie with -tolerable intelligibility and success; but let him be his own dupe and -he may write a thousand critiques and never get himself understood. -Indeed, some of them do not want to be understood, they only want to be -believed. Hegel, for example, was not at all surprised to find that no -one understood him; he would have been surprised and chagrined to find -that some one had. Obscurity can cover a multitude of sins. - -Add to this self-befoggery the appalling _historismus_ (as Eucken calls -it), the strange lifeless interest in the past for its own sake, the -petty poring over problems of text and minutiae of theory in the classics -of speculation;--and the indictment of philosophy as a useless appanage -of the idle rich gains further ground. We do not seem to understand how -much of the past is dead, how much of it is but a drag on the -imaginative courage that dares to think of a future different from the -past, and better. Philosophy is too much a study of the details of -superseded systems; it is too little the study of the miraculous living -moment in which the past melts into the present and the future finds -creation. Most people have an invincible habit of turning their backs to -the future; they like the past because the future is an adventure. So -with most philosophers to-day; they like to write analyses of Kant, -commentaries on Berkeley, discussions of Plato's myths; they are -students remembering, they have not yet become men thinking. They do not -know that the work of philosophy is in the street as well as in the -library, they do not feel and understand that the final problem of -philosophy is not the relation of subject and object but the misery of -men. - -And so it is well that philosophy, such as it chiefly is in these days, -should be scorned as a busy idler in a world where so much work is -asking to be done. - -Philosophy was vital in Plato's day; so vital that some philosophers -were exiled and others put to death. No one would think of putting a -philosopher to death to-day. Not because men are more delicate about -killing; but because there is no need to kill that which is already -dead.[299] - - -II - -Philosophy as Control - -But after all, this is not a subject for rhetoric so much as for -resolution. Here we are again in our splendid library; here we sit, -financially secure, released from the material necessities of life, to -stand apart and study, to report and help and state and solve; under us -those millions holding us aloft so that we may see for them, dying by -the thousand so that we may find the truth that will make the others -free; and what do we do? We make phrases like "_esse est percipi_," -"synthetic judgments _a priori_," and "being is nothing"; we fill the -philosophic world with great Saharas of Kantiana; we write epistemology -for two hundred years. Surely there is but one decent thing for us to -do: either philosophy is of vital use to the community, or it is not. If -it is not, we will abandon it; if it is, then we must seek that vital -use and show it. We have been privileged to study and think and travel -and learn the world; and now we stand gaping before it as if there were -nothing wrong, as if nothing could be done, as if nothing should be -done. We are expert eyes, asked to point the way; and all that we report -is that there is nothing to see, and nowhere to go. We are without even -a partial sense of the awful responsibility of intelligence. - -It is time we put this problem of knowledge, even the problem of the -validity of knowledge, into the hands of science. How we come to know, -what the process of knowledge is, what "truth" is,--all these are -questions of fact; they are problems for the science of psychology, -they are not problems for philosophy. This continual sharpening of the -knife, as Lotze put it, becomes tiresome--almost pathetic--if, after -all, there is no cutting done. Like Faust, who found himself when, -blinded by the sun, he turned his face to the earth, so we shall have to -forget our epistemological heaven and remember mother earth; we shall -have to give up our delightful German puzzles and play our living part -in the flow of social purpose. Philosophers must once more learn to -live. - -To make such a demand for a new direction of philosophy to life is after -all only a development of pragmatism, turning that doctrine of action as -the test and significance of thought to uses not so individual as those -in which William James found its readiest application. If philosophy has -meaning, it must be as life become aware of its purposes and -possibilities, it must be as life cross-examining life for the sake of -life; it must be as specialized foresight for the direction of social -movement, as reconstructive intelligence in conscious evolution. Man -finds himself caught in a flux of change; he studies the laws operating -in the flux; studying, he comes to understand; understanding, he comes -to control; controlling, he comes face to face with the question of all -questions, For what? Where does he wish to go, what does he want to be? -It is then that man puts his whole experience before him in synthetic -test; then that he gropes for meanings, searches for values, struggles -to see and define his course and goal; then that he becomes philosopher. -Consider these questions of goal and course as questions asked by a -society, and the social function of philosophy appears. Science -enlightens means, philosophy must enlighten ends. Science informs, -philosophy must form. A philosopher is a man who remakes himself; the -social function of philosophy is to remake society. - -Have we yet felt the full zest of that brave discovery of the last -century,--that purpose is not in things but in us? What a declaration of -independence there is in that simple phrase, what liberation of a -fettered thought to dare all ventures of creative endeavor! Here at last -is man's coming-of-age! Well: now that we have won this freedom, what -shall we do with it? That is the question which freedom begets, often as -its Frankenstein; for unless freedom makes for life, freedom dies. Once -our sloth and cowardice might have pleaded the uselessness of effort in -a world where omnipotent purpose lay outside of us, superimposed and -unchangeable; now that we can believe that divinity is in ourselves, -that purpose and guidance are through us, we can no longer shirk the -question of reconstruction. The world is ours to do with what we can and -will. Once we believed in the unchangeable environment--that new ogre -that succeeded to the Absolute--and (as became an age of -_laissez-faire_) we thought that wisdom lay in meeting all its demands; -now we know that environments can be remade; and we face the question, -How shall we remake ours? - -This is preeminently a problem in philosophy; it is a question of -values. If the world is to be remade, it will have to be under the -guidance of philosophy. - - -III - -Philosophy as Mediator between Science and Statesmanship - -But why philosophy?--some one asks. Why will not science do? Philosophy -dreams, while one by one the sciences which she nursed steal away from -her and go down into the world of fact and achievement. Why should not -science be called upon to guide us into a better world? - -Because science becomes more and more a fragmentated thing, with ever -less coordination, ever less sense of the whole. Our industrial system -has forced division of labor here, as in the manual trades, almost to -the point of idiocy: let a man seek to know everything about something, -and he will soon know nothing about anything else; efficiency will -swallow up the man. Because of this shredded science we have great -zoologists talking infantile patriotism about the war, and great -electricians who fill sensational sheets with details of their trips to -heaven. We live in a world where thought breaks into pieces, and -coordination ebbs; we flounder into a chaos of hatred and destruction -because synthetic thinking is not in fashion. - -Consider, for example, the problem of monopoly: we ask science what we -are to do here; why is it that after we have listened to the economist, -and the historian, and the lawyer, and the psychologist, we are hardly -better off than before? Because each of these men speaks in ignorance of -what the others have discovered. We must find some way of making these -men acquainted with one another before they can become really useful to -large social purposes; we must knock their heads together. We want more -uniters and coordinators, less analyzers and accumulators. -Specialization is making the philosopher a social necessity of the very -first importance. - -This does not mean that we must put the state into the hands of the -epistemologists. Hardly. The type of philosopher who must be produced -will be a man too close to life to spend much time on merely analytical -problems. He will feel the call of action, and will automatically reject -all knowledge that does not point to deeds. The essential feature of him -will be grasp: he will have his net fixed for the findings of those -sciences which have to do, not with material reconstructions, but with -the discovery of the secrets of human nature. He will know the -essentials of biology and psychology, of sociology and history, of -economics and politics; in him these long-divorced sciences will meet -again and make one another fertile once more. He will busy himself with -Mendel and Freud, Sumner and Veblen, and will scandalously neglect the -Absolute. He will study the needs and exigencies of his time, he will -consider the Utopias men make, he will see in them the suggestive -pseudopodia of political theory, and will learn from them what men at -last desire. He will sober the vision with fact, and find a focus for -immediate striving. With this focus he will be able to coordinate his -own thinking, to point the nose of science to a goal; science becoming -thereby no longer inventive and instructive merely, but preventive and -constructive. And so fortified and unified he will preach his gospel, -talking not to students about God, but to statesmen about men. - -For we come again--ever and ever again--to Plato: unless wisdom and -practical ability, philosophy and statesmanship, can be more closely -bound together than they are, there will be no lessening of human -misery. Think of the learning of scientists and the ignorance of -politicians! You see all these agitated, pompous men, making laws at the -rate of some ten thousand a year; you see those quiet, unheard of, -underpaid seekers in the laboratories of the world; unless you can bring -these two groups together through coordination and direction, your -society will stand still forever, however much it moves. Philosophy -must take hold; it must become the social direction of science, it must -become, strange to say, applied science. - -We stand to-day in social science where Bacon stood in natural science: -we seek a method first for the elucidation of causes, and second for the -transformation, in the light of this knowledge, of man's environment and -man. "We live in the stone age of political science," says Lester Ward; -"in politics we are still savages."[300] Our political movements are -conceived in impulse and developed in emotion; they end in fission and -fragmentation because there is no thought behind them. Who will supply -thinking to these instincts, direction to this energy, light to this -wasted heat? Our young men talk only of ideals, our politicians only of -fact; who will interpret to the one the language of the other? What is -it, too, that statesmen need if not that saving sense of the whole which -makes philosophy, and which philosophy makes? Just as philosophy without -statesmanship is--let us say--epistemology, so statesmanship without -philosophy is--American politics. The function of the philosopher, then, -is to do the listening to to-day's science, and then to do the thinking -for to-morrow's statesmanship. The philosophy of an age should be the -organized foresight of that age, the interpreter of the future to the -present. "Selection adapts man to yesterday's conditions, not to -to-day's";[301] the organized foresight of conscious evolution will -adapt man to the conditions of to-morrow. And an ounce of foresight is -worth a ton of morals. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -ORGANIZED INTELLIGENCE - - -I - -The Need - -Intelligence is organized experience; but intelligence itself must be -organized. Consider the resources of the unused intelligence of the -world; intelligence potential but undeveloped; intelligence developed -but isolated; intelligence allowed to waste itself in purely personal -pursuits, unasked to enter into cooperation for larger ends. Consider -the Platos fretting in exile while petty politicians rule the world; -consider Montaigne, and Hobbes, and Hume, and Carlyle, and the thousand -other men whose genius was left to grow--or die--in solitude or -starvation; consider the vast number of university-trained minds who are -permitted, for lack of invitation and organized facilities, to slip into -the world of profit and loss and destructively narrow intent; consider -the expert ability in all lines which can be found in the faculties of -the world, and which goes to training an infinitesimal fraction of the -community. The thought of university graduates, of university -faculties, of university-trained investigators, has had a rapidly -growing influence in the last ten years in America; and because it is an -influence due to enlightenment it is fundamentally an influence for -"good." It was this influence that showed when President Wilson said -that the eight-hour day was demanded by the informed opinion of the -time. The sources of such influence have merely been touched; they are -deep; we must find a way to make informed opinion more articulate and -powerful. "The most valuable knowledge consists of methods," said -Nietzsche;[302] and the most valuable methods are methods of -organization, whether of data or of men. Organization's the thing. -Economic forces are organized; the forces of intelligence are not. To -organize intelligence; that is surely one method of approach to the -social problem; and what if, indeed, it be the very heart and substance -of the social problem? - -Now a very easy way of making the propounder of such an organization -feel unusually modest is to ask him that little trouble-making question, -How? To answer that would be to answer almost everything that can be -answered. Here are _opera basilica_ again!--for what are we doing, after -all, but trying to take Francis Bacon seriously? Of course the -difficulty in organizing intelligence is how to know who are -intelligent, and how to get enough people to agree with you that you -know. If each man's self-valuation were accepted, our organization would -be rather bulky. Are there any men very widely recognized as -intelligent, who could be used as the nucleus of an organization? There -are individual men so recognized,--Edison, for example, and, strange to -say, one or two men who by accident are holding political office. But -these are stray individuals; are there any groups whose average of -intelligence is highly rated by a large portion of the community? There -are. Physicians are so rated; so much so that by popular usage they have -won almost a monopoly on the once more widely used term _doctor_. -University professors are highly rated. Let us take the physicians and -the professors; here is a nucleus of recognized intelligence. - -There are objections, here, of course; some one urges that many -physicians are quacks, another that professors are rated as intelligent, -but only in an unpractical sort of way. Perhaps we shall find some -scheme for eliminating the quacks; but the professors present a -difficult problem. It is true that they suffer from intellectualism, -academitis, overfondness for theories, and other occupational diseases; -it is true that the same people who stand in awe of the very word -_professor_ would picture the article indicated by the word as a thin, -round-shouldered, be-spectacled ninny, incapable of finding his way -alone through city streets, and so immersed in the stars that he is -sooner or later submerged in a well. But what if this quality of -detachment, of professorial calm, be just one of the qualities needed -for the illumination of our social problem? Perhaps we have too much -emotion in these questions, and need the colder light of the man who is -trained to use his "head" and not his "heart." Perhaps the most useful -thing in the world for our purpose is this terribly dispassionate, -coldly scrutinizing professor. We need men as impartial and clear-eyed -as men come; and whatever a professor may _say_, yet he _sees_ his field -more clearly and impartially than any other group of men whatever. Let -the professors stay. - -And so we have our physicians and our professors,--say all physicians -and professors who have taught or practised three years in institutions, -or as the graduates of institutions, of recognized standing. And now let -us dream our dream. - - -II - -The Organization of Intelligence - -These men, through meetings and correspondence, organize themselves into -a "Society for Social Research"; they begin at once to look for an -"inspired millionaire" to finance the movement for six months or so; -they advertise themselves diligently in the press, and make known their -intention to get together the best brains of the country to study the -facts and possibilities of the social problem. And then--a difficult -point--they face the task of arranging some more or less impersonal -method of deciding who are the intelligent people and who not. They ask -themselves just what kind of information a man should be expected to -have, to fit him for competent handling of social questions; and after -long discussions they conclude that such a man should be well trained in -one--and acquainted with the general findings of the others--of what we -may call the social disciplines: biology, psychology, sociology, -history, economics, law, politics, philosophy, and perhaps more. They -formulate a long and varied test for the discovery of fitness in these -fields; and they arrange that every university in the country shall -after plentiful advertisement and invitation to all and sundry, give -these tests, and pay the expenses incurred by any needy candidate who -shall emerge successful from the trial. In this way men whose studies -have been private, and unadorned with academic degree, are to find -entrance to the Society. - -It is recognized that the danger of such a test lies in the premium -which it sets on the bookish as against the practical man: on the man -whose knowledge has come to him in the classroom or the study, as -against the man who has won his knowledge just by living face to face -with life. There are philosophers who have never heard of Kant, and -psychologists who have been Freudians for decades without having ever -read a book. A society recruited by such a test will be devoid of -artists and poets, may finally eliminate all but fact-gathering -dryasdusts, and so end deservedly in nothing. And yet some test there -must be, to indicate, however crudely, one's fitness or unfitness to -take part in this work; the alternative would be the personal choice of -the initial few, whose prejudices and limitations would so become the -constitution and by-laws of the society. Perhaps, too, some way may -appear of using the artists and poets, and the genius who knows no -books. - -Well: the tests are given; the original nucleus of physicians and -professors submit themselves to these tests, and some, failing, are -eliminated; other men come, from all fields of work, and from them a -number survive the ordeal and pass into the Society. So arises a body of -say 5000 men, divided into local groups but working in unison so far as -geographical separateness will permit; and to them now come, impressed -with their earnestness, a wealthy man, who agrees to finance the Society -for such time as may be needed to test its usefulness. - -Now what does our Society do? - -It seeks information. That, and not a programme, is the fruitful -beginning of reform. "Men are willing to investigate only the small -things of life," says Samuel Butler; this Society for Social Research is -prepared and resolved to investigate anything that has vital bearing on -the social problem; it stands ready to make enemies, ready to soil its -hands. It appoints committees to gather and formulate all that -biologists can tell of human origin and the innate impulses of men; all -that psychology in its varied branches can tell of human behavior; all -that sociology knows of how and why human societies and institutions -rise and fall; all that medicine can tell of social ills and health; it -appoints committees to go through all science with the loadstone of the -social purpose, picking up this fact here and that one there; committees -to study actual and proposed forms of government, administrative and -electoral methods; committees to investigate marriage, eugenics, -prostitution, poverty, and the thousand other aspects and items of the -social problem; committees to call for and listen to responsible -expressions of every kind of opinion; committees to examine and analyze -social experiments, profit-sharing plans, Oneida communities; even a -committee on Utopia, before which persons with schemes and _'isms_ and -perfect cities in their heads may freely preach their gospel. In short -this Society becomes the organized eye and ear of the community, ready -and eager to seek out all the facts of human life and business that may -enlighten human will. - -And having found the facts it publishes them. Its operations show real -earnestness, sincerity, and ability; and in consequence it wins such -prestige that its reports find much heralding, synopsis, and comment in -the press. But in addition to that it buys, for the first day of every -month, a half-page of space in several of the more widely circulated -periodicals and journals of the country, and publishes its findings -succinctly and intelligibly. It gives full references for all its -statements of fact; it makes verification possible for all doubters and -deniers. It includes in each month's report a reliable statement of the -year's advances in some one of the social disciplines, so that its -twelve reports in any year constitute a record of the socially vital -scientific findings of the year. It limits itself strictly to verifiable -information, and challenges demonstration of humanly avoidable -partiality. And it takes great care that its reports are couched not in -learned and technical language but in such phraseology as will be -intelligible to the graduates of an average grammar school. That is -central. - - -III - -Information of Panacea - -Without some such means of getting and spreading information there is no -hope for fundamental social advance. We have agreed, have we not, that -to make men happier and more capable we must divert their socially -injurious impulses into beneficent channels; that we can do this only by -studying those impulses and controlling the stimuli which arouse them; -that we can control those stimuli only by studying the varied factors -of the environment and the means of changing them; in short, that at the -bottom of the direction of impulse lies the necessity of knowledge, of -information spread to all who care to receive it. Autocracy may improve -the world without spreading enlightenment; but democracy cannot. -_Delenda est ignorantia._[303] - -This, after all, is a plan for the democratization of aristocracy; it is -Plato translated into America. It utilizes superior intelligence and -gives it voice, but sanctions no change that has not received the free -consent of the community. It gives the aristocracy of intellect the -influence and initiative which crude democracy frustrates; but it avoids -the corruption that usually goes with power, by making this influence -work through the channels of persuasion rather than compulsion. It -counteracts the power of wealth to disseminate partisan views through -news-items and editorials, and relies on fact to get the better at last -of double-leaded prejudice. It rests on the faith that lies will out. - -Would the mass of the people listen to such reports? Consider, first, -the repute that attaches to the professorial title. Let a man write even -the sorriest nonsense but sign himself as one of the faculty of some -responsible institution, and he will find a hearing; the reader, -perhaps, need not go far to find an example. In recent industrial and -political issues the pronouncements of a few professors carried very -great weight; and there are some modest purveyors of so supposedly -harmless a thing as philosophy whose voice is feared by all interests -that prosper in the dark. Will the combined reputation of the most -enlightened men in the country mean less? A report published by this -Society for Social Research will mean that a large body of intelligent -men have from their number appointed three or five or ten to find the -facts of a certain situation or dispute; these appointed men will, if -they report hastily, or carelessly, or dishonestly, impair the repute of -all their fellows in the Society; they will take care, then, and will -probably find honesty as good a policy as some of us pretend it to be. -With every additional report so guarded from defect the repute of the -society will grow until it becomes the most powerful intellectual force -in the world. - -When one reflects how many pages of misrepresentation were printed in -the papers of only one city in the presidential campaign of 1916, and -then imagines what would have been the effect of a mere statement of -facts on both sides,--the records of the candidates and the parties, -their acknowledged connections, friends and enemies, their expressed -principles and programmes, the facts about the tariff, the German issue, -international law, the railway-brotherhood dispute, and so forth--one -begins to appreciate the importance of information. After the initial -and irrevocable differences of original nature nothing is so vital as -the spread of enlightenment; and nothing offers itself so well to -organized effort. Eugenics is weak because it has no thought-out -programme; _'isms_ rise and fall because people are not informed. Let -who can, improve the native qualities of men; but that aside, the most -promising plan is the dissemination of fact. - -Such a society for research would be a sort of social consciousness, a -"mind of the race." It would make social planning possible for the first -time; it would make history conscious. It would look ahead and warn; it -would point the nose of the community to unwelcome but important facts; -it would examine into such statements as that of Sir William Ramsay, -that England's coal fields will be exhausted in one hundred and -seventy-five years; and its warnings, backed by the prestige of its -expert information, would perhaps avert the ravages of social waste and -private greed. Nature, said Lester Ward, is a spendthrift, man an -economizer. But economy means prevision, and social economy means -organized provision. Here would be not agitation, not propaganda, not -moralizing, but only clarification; these men would be "merchants of -light," simply giving information so that what men should do they might -do knowingly and not in the dark. - -Indeed, if one can clarify one need not agitate. Just to state facts is -the most terrible thing that can be done to an injustice. Sermons and -stump-speeches stampede the judgment for a moment, but the sound of -their perorations still lingers in the air when reaction comes. Fact has -this advantage over rhetoric, that time strengthens the one and weakens -the other. Tell the truth and time will be your eloquence. - -Let us suppose that our Society has existed some three years; let us -suppose that on the first day of every month it has spread through the -press simple reports of its investigations, simple accounts of socially -significant work in science, and simple statements of fact about the -economic and political issues of the day; let us suppose that by far the -greater part of these reports have been conscientious and accurate and -clear. Very well: in the course of these three years a large number of -mentally alert people all over the country will have developed the habit -of reading these monthly reports; they will look forward to them, they -will attach significance to them, they will herald them as events, -almost as decisions. In any question of national policy its statements -will influence thousands and thousands of the more independent minds. -Let us calculate the number of people who, in these United States, would -be reached by such reports; let us say the reports are printed in three -or four New York dailies, having a total circulation of one million; in -other dailies throughout the country totalling some five million -circulation; and in one or more weeklies or monthlies with a large or a -select circulation. One may perhaps say that out of the seven or eight -million people so reached (mostly adult males), five per cent will be so -influenced by the increasing prestige of the Society that they will read -the reports. Of these four hundred thousand readers it is reasonable to -suppose that three hundred thousand will be voters, and not only voters -but men of influence among their fellows. These men will each of them be -a medium through which the facts reported will be spread; it is not too -much to say that the number of American voters influenced directly or -indirectly by these reports will reach to a million.[304] Now imagine -the influence of this million of voters on a presidential election. -Their very existence would be a challenge; candidates would have them in -mind when making promises and criticisms; parties would think of them -when formulating policies and drawing up platforms; editors would beware -of falling into claptrap and deceit for fear of these million men armed -with combustible fact. It would mean such an elevation of political -discussion and political performance as democracy has never yet -produced; such an elevation as democracy must produce or die. - - -IV - -Sex, Art, and Play in Social Reconstruction - -So far our imagined Society has done no more than to seek and give -information. It has, it is true, listened to propagandists and Utopians, -and has published extracts from their testimony; but even this has been -not to agitate but to inform; that such and such opinions are held by -such and such men, and by such and such a number of men, is also a point -of information. Merely to state facts is the essential thing, and the -extremely effective thing. But now there are certain functions which -such a Society might perform beyond the giving of facts--functions that -involve personal attitudes and interpretations. It may be possible for -our Society to take on these functions without detracting from the trust -reposed in its statements of fact. What are these functions? - -First of all, the stimulation of artistic production, and the extension -of artistic appreciation. Our Society, which is composed of rather staid -men, themselves not peculiarly fitted to pass judgment outside the field -of science, will invite, let us say, twenty of the most generally and -highly valued of English and American authors to form themselves into a -Committee on Literary Awards, as a branch of the Society for Social -Research. Imagine Thomas Hardy and George Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells -and John Galsworthy and Rudyard Kipling and John Masefield and George -Moore and Joseph Conrad and W. D. Howells and Theodore Dreiser and many -more, telling the world every month, in individual instalments, their -judgment on current fiction, drama, poetry, English literature in -general; imagine the varied judgments printed with synoptic coordination -of the results as a way of fixing the standing of a book in the English -literary world; and judge of the stimulus that would reside in lists -signed by such names. Imagine another group of men, the literary elite -of France, making briefer reports on French literature; and other groups -in Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, Scandinavia; imagine the world getting -every month the judgment of Anatole France and Remain Rolland and -Gerhardt Hauptmann and Anton Tchekov and Georg Brandes on the current -literature of their peoples; imagine them making lists, too, of the best -books in all their literatures; imagine eager young men and women poring -over these conflicting lists, discussing them, making lists of their -own, and getting guidance so. And to the literary lists add monthly -reports, by a committee of the Society itself, on the best books in the -various fields of science. Finally, let the artists speak,--painters and -sculptors and all; let them say where excellence has dwelt this month in -their respective fields. There are hundreds of thousands who hunger for -such guidance as this plan would give. There are young people who -flounder about hopelessly because they find no guidance; young people -who are easily turned to fine work by the stimulus of responsible -judgment, and as easily lapse into the banalities of popular fiction and -popular magazines when this guiding stimulus fails to come. There are -thousands of people who would be glad to pay their modest contribution -to the support of any organization that would manage to get such -direction for them. Half the value of a university course lies in this, -that the teacher will suggest readings, judge books, and provide general -guidance for individual work. Perhaps the most valuable kind of -information in the world is that which guides one in the search for -information. Such guidance, given to all who ask for it, would go far to -save us from the mediocrity that almost stifles our national life.[305] - -And more; why should not the stimulation be for the producers as well as -for the consumers? Why should not some kind of award be made, say every -six months, to the authors adjudged best in their lines by their -qualified contemporaries? Why should such a book as _Jean Christophe_ -or _The Brothers Karamazov_ go unheralded except in fragmentary -individual ways? Why not reward such productions with a substantial -prize?--or, if that be impossible, by some presentation of certificate? -Even a "scrap of paper" would go a long way to stimulate the writer and -guide the reader. But why should not a money reward be possible? If rich -men will pay thousands upon thousands for the (perhaps) original works -of dead artists, why should they not turn their wealth into spiritual -gold by helping the often impecunious writers of the living day? It is a -convenient error to believe that financial aid would detract from the -independence of the creator: it would, did it come from men rewarding on -the basis of their own judgment; it would not if the judgment of the -world's men of letters should be taken as criterion. And perhaps fewer -Chattertons and Davidsons would mar the history of literature and art. - -This direction of attention to what is best and greatest in the work of -our age is a matter of deeper moment than superficial thought can grasp. -If, by some such method, the meaning of "success" could be freed from -monetary implication and attached rather to excellence in art and -science, the change would have almost inestimably far-reaching results. -Men worship money, as has often been pointed out,[306] not for its own -sake, nor for the material good it brings, but for the prestige of -success that goes with its "conspicuous consumption"; let the artist -find more appreciation for his ability than the captain of industry -finds for his, and there will be a great release of energy from economic -exploitation to creative work in science, literature, and art. A large -part of the stimuli that prompt men to exploit their fellows will be -gone; and that richest of all incentives--social esteem--will go to -produce men eager to contribute to the general power and happiness of -the community.[307] - -The art impulse, as is generally believed, is a diversion of sex energy. -An organism is essentially not a food-getting but a reproductive -mechanism; the food-getting is a contributory incident in the -reproduction. As development proceeds the period of pregnancy and -adolescence increases, more of the offspring survive to maturity, large -broods, litters, or families become unnecessary, and more and more of -the energy that was sexual slides over into originally secondary -pursuits, like play and art. At the same time there is a gradual -diminution in pugnacity (which was another factor in the drama of -reproduction), and rivalry in games and arts encroaches more and more on -the emotional field once monopolized by strife for mates and food. The -game--a sort of Hegelian synthesis of hostility and sociability--takes -more and more the place of war, and artistic creation increasingly -replaces reproduction. - -If all this is anything more than theoretic skating over thin sheets of -fact, it means that one "way out" from our social perplexities lies in -the provision of stronger stimulus to creation and recreation, art and -games. It is a serious part of the social planner's work to find some -way of nourishing the art impulse wherever it appears, and drawing it on -by arranging rewards for its productions. And again we shall have to -understand that play is an important matter in a nation's life; that one -of the best signs for the future of America is the prevalence of healthy -athleticism; and that an attempt to widen these sport activities to -greater intersectional and international scope than they have yet -attained will get at some of the roots of international pugnacity. A -wise government would be almost as interested in the people's games as -in their schools, and would spend millions in making rivalry absorb the -dangerous energy of pugnacity. Olympic games should not be Olympic -games, occurring only with Olympiads; not a month should pass but great -athletes, selected by eliminative tests from every part of every -country, should meet, now here, now there, to match brawn and wits in -the friendly enmity of games. Let men know one another through games, -and they will not for slight reasons pass from sportsmanship to that -competitive destruction and deceit which our political Barnums call "the -defence of our national honor." - - -V - -Education - -This diversion of the sexual instinct into art and games (a prophylactic -which has long since been applied to individuals, and awaits application -to groups) must begin in the early days of personal development; so that -our Society for Social Research would, if it were to take on this task, -find itself inextricably mixed up with the vast problem of educational -method and aim. - -Here more than anywhere one hears the call for enlightenment and sees -the need for clarification. Here is an abundance of _'isms_ and a dearth -of knowledge. Most teachers use methods which they themselves consider -antiquated, and teach subjects which they will admit not one in a -hundred of their pupils will ever need to know. Curious lessons in -ethics are administered, which are seldom practised in the classroom, -and make initiative children come to believe that commandment-breaking -is heroic. Boys and girls bursting with vitality and the splendid -exuberance of youth are cramped for hours into set positions, while by a -sort of water-cure process knowledge is pumped into them from books -duller than a doctor's dissertation in philosophy. And so forth: the -indictment against our schools has been drawn up a thousand times and in -a thousand ways, and needs no reenforcement here. But though we have -indicted we have not made any systematic attempt to find just what is -wrong, and how, and where; and what may be done to remedy the evil. -Experiments have been made, but their bearings and results have been -very imperfectly recorded. - -Suppose now that our Society for Social Research should appoint a great -Committee on Education to hire expert investigators and make a thorough -attempt to clarify the issues in education. Here the function of -philosophy should be clear; for the educator touches at almost every -point those problems of values, individual and social, which are the -special hunting-ground of the philosopher. The importance of psychology -here is recognized, but the importance of biology and pathology has not -been seen in fit perspective. Why should not a special group of men be -set aside for years, if necessary, to study the applicability of the -several sciences to education? Why should not all scientific knowledge, -so far as it touches human nature, be focused on the semi-darkness in -which the educator works? - -Two special problems in this field invite research. One concerns the -effect, on national character and capacity, of a system of education -controlled by the government. The point was made by Spinoza, as may be -remembered, that a government will, if it controls the schools, aim to -restrain rather than to develop the energies of men. Kant remarked the -same difficulty. The function of education in the eyes of a dominant -class is to make men able to do skilled work but unable to do original -thinking (for all original thinking begins with destruction); the -function of education in the eyes of a government is to teach men that -eleventh commandment which God forgot to give to Moses: thou shalt love -thy country right or wrong. All this, of course, requires some -marvellous prestidigitation of the truth, as school text-books of -national history show. The ignorant, it seems, are the necessary ballast -in the ship of state. - -The alternative to such schools seems to be a return to private -education, with the rich man's son getting even more of a start on the -poor boy than he gets now. Is there a _tertium quid_ here? Perhaps this -is one point which a resolute effort to get the facts would clarify. -What does such governmentally-regulated education do to the forces of -personal difference and initiative? Will men and women educated in such -a way produce their maximum in art and thought and industry? Or will -they be automata, always waiting for a push? What different results -would come if the nationally-owned schools were to confine their work -absolutely to statements of fact, presentations of science, and were to -leave "character-moulding" and lessons in ethics to private persons or -institutions? Then at least each parent might corrupt his own child in -his own pet way; and there might be a greater number of children who -would not be corrupted at all. - -Another problem which might be advanced towards a solution by a little -light is that of giving higher education to those who want it but are -too poor to pay. There are certain studies, called above the social -disciplines, which help a man not so much to raise himself out of his -class and become a snob, as to get a better understanding of himself and -his fellow-men. Since mutual understanding is a hardly exaggerable -social good, why should not a way be found to provide for all who wish -it evening instruction in history, sociology, economics, psychology, -biology, philosophy, and similar fields of knowledge? Every added -citizen who has received instruction in these matters is a new asset to -the community; he will vote with more intelligence, he will work better -in cooperation, he will be less subject to undulations of social mania, -he will be a hint to all office-seekers to put their usual nonsense on -the shelf. Perhaps by this medium too our Society would spread its -reports and widen its influence. Imagine a nation of people instructed -in these sciences: with such a people civilization would begin. - -And then again, our busy-body Society would turn its research light on -the universities, and tell them a thing or two of what the light would -show. It would betray the lack of coordination among the various -sciences,--the department of psychology, for example, never coming to so -much as speaking terms with the department of economics; it would call -for an extension, perhaps, of the now infrequent seminars and -conferences between departments whose edges overlap, or which shed light -on a common field. It would invite the university to give less of its -time to raking over the past, and help it to orient itself toward the -future; it would suggest to every university that it provide an open -forum for the responsible expression of all shades of opinion; it would, -in general, call for a better organization of science as part of the -organization of intelligence; it would remind the universities that they -are more vital even than governments; and it might perhaps succeed in -getting engraved on the gates of every institution of learning the words -of Thomas Hobbes: "Seeing the universities are the foundation of civil -and moral doctrine, from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing -such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same upon the people, there -ought certainly to be great care taken to have it pure." - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -THE READER SPEAKS - - -I - -The Democratization of Aristocracy - -And now we stop for objections. - -"This plan is a hare-brained scheme for a new priesthood and a new -aristocracy. It would put a group of college professors and graduates -into a position where they could do almost as they please. You think you -avoid this by telling the gentlemen that they must limit themselves to -the statement of fact; but if you knew the arts of journalism you would -not make so naive a distinction between airing opinions and stating -facts. When a man buys up a newspaper what he wants to do is not so much -to control the editorials as to 'edit' the news,--that is, to select the -facts which shall get into print. It's wonderful what lies you can -spread without telling lies. For example, if you want to hurt a public -man, you quote all his foolish speeches and ignore his wise ones; you -put his mistakes into head-lines and hide his achievements in a corner. -I will guarantee to prove anything I like, or anything I don't like, -just by stating facts. So with your Society for Social Research; it -would become a great political, rather than an educational, -organization; it would almost unconsciously select its information to -suit its hobbies. Why, the thing is psychologically impossible. If you -want something to be true you will be half blind and half deaf to -anything that obstructs your desire; that is the way we're made. And -even if nature did not attend to this, money would: as soon as your -society exercised real power on public opinion it would be bought up, in -a gentle, sleight-o'hand way, by some economic group; a few of the more -influential members of the Society would be 'approached,' some 'present' -would be made, and justice would have another force to contend with. No; -your Society won't do." - - * * * * * - -Well, let us see. Here you have a body of 5000 men; rather a goodly -number for even an American millionaire to purchase. They wish to -investigate, say, the problem of birth-control; what do they do? They -vote, without nominations, for six of their number to manage the -investigation; the six men receiving the highest vote investigate and -write out a report. Now if any report were published which misstated -facts, or omitted important items, the fault would at once diminish the -repute and influence of the Society. Let merely the suspicion get about -that these reports are unfair, and the Society would begin to decay. -That is, the power of the Society would grow with its fairness and fall -with its unfairness,--a very happy arrangement. The fear of this fall in -influence would be the best incentive to impartial reports. Every -committee would feel that the future of the Society depended on the -fairness of its own report; and every man on every committee would -hesitate before making himself responsible for the disrepute of the -Society; he would feel himself on trial before his fellow-members, and -would halt himself in the natural slide into partiality. - -Not that he would always succeed; men are men. But it is reasonable to -expect that men working under these conditions would be considerably -more impartial than the average newspaper. Again, who is as impartial as -the scientist? One cannot do much in science without a stern control of -the personal equation; to describe protozoa, for example, as one would -like them to be, is no very clever way of attaining repute in -protozoology. This is not so true in the social as in the physical -sciences, though even in this new field scientific fairness and accuracy -are rapidly increasing. One can get more reliable and impartial reports -of an industrial situation,--_e.g._, of the Colorado troubles,--from the -scientific investigators than from either side to the controversy. The -very deficiencies of the student type--incapacity for decisions or for -effective methods in action--involve a compensatory grasp of -understanding and impartiality of attitude. Our best guarantee against -dishonesty is not virtue but intelligence, and our Society is supposed -to be a sort of distilled intelligence. - -That the scheme savors of aristocracy is not to its discredit. We need -aristocracy, in the sense of better methods for giving weight to -superior brains; we need a touch of Plato in our democracy. After all, -the essence of the plan, as we have said, is the democratization of -Plato and Nietzsche and Carlyle; the intelligent man gets more political -power, but only through the mechanism of democracy. His greater power -comes not by his greater freedom to do what he pleases despite the -majority, but by improved facilities for enlightening and converting the -majority. Democracy, ideally, means only that the aristocracy is -periodically elected and renewed; and this is a plan whereby the -aristocrats--the really best--shall be more clearly seen to be so. -Furthermore, the plan avoids the great defect of Plato's scheme,--that -philosophers are not fitted for executive and administrative work, that -those skilled to see are very seldom also able to do. Here the -philosopher, the man who gets at the truth, rules, but only indirectly, -and without the burdens of office and execution. And indeed it is not -the philosopher who rules, but truth. The liberator is made king. - - -II - -The Professor as Buridan's Ass - -"You have anticipated my objection, and cleverly twisted it into an -argument. But that would be too facile an escape; you must face more -squarely the fact that your professors are mere intellectualist -highbrows, incapable of understanding the real issues involved in our -social war, and even more incapable of suggesting practical ways out. -The more you look the more you see; the more you see, the less you do. -You think that reflection leaves you peace of mind; it doesn't, it -leaves your mind in pieces. The intellectual is like Dr. Buridan's ass: -he is so careful to stand in the middle that he never gives a word of -practical advice, for fear that he will compromise himself and fracture -a syllogism. The trouble is that we think too much, not too little; we -make thinking a substitute for action. Really, as Rousseau argued, -thinking is unnatural; what the world needs is men who can make up their -minds and then march on, almost in blinders, to a goal. We know enough, -we know too much; and surely we have a plethora of investigating -committees. A committee is just a scientific way of doing nothing. Your -plan would flood the country with committees and leave courage buried -under facts. You should call your organization a Society for -Talky-talk." - -The only flaw in this argument is that it does not touch the proposal. -What is suggested is not that the Society take action or make -programmes, much less execute them; we ask our professors merely to do -for a larger public, and more thoroughly and systematically, what we are -glad to have them do for a small number of us in college and university. -Action is _ex hypothesi_ left to others; the function of the researcher -is quite simply to look and tell us what he sees. That he is a highbrow, -an intellectual, and even a Buridan's ass, does not interfere with his -seeing; nobody ever argued that Buridan's ass was blind. - -We forget that seeing is itself an art. Some of us have specialized in -the art, and have naturally failed to develop cleverness in practical -affairs. But that does not mean that our special talent cannot be used -by the community, any more than Sir Oliver Lodge's fondness for -celestial exploration makes us reject his work on electricity. Thinking -is itself a form of action, and not the easiest nor the least effective. -It is true that "if you reflect too much you will never accomplish -anything," but if you reflect too little you will accomplish about as -much. We make headway only by the head way. Action without forethought -tends to follow a straight line; but in life the straight line is often -the longest distance between two points, because, as Leonardo said, the -straightest line offers the greatest resistance. Thought is roundabout, -and loves flank attacks. The man of action rushes into play -courageously, succeeds now, fails then; and sooner or later wishes--if -he lives to wish--that he could think more. The increasing dependence of -industry on scientific research, and of politics on expert -investigators, shows how the world is coming to value the man whose -specialty is seeing. Faith in intellect, as Santayana says, "is the only -faith yet sanctioned by its fruit."[308] The two most important men in -America just now are, or have been, college professors. To speak still -more boldly: the greatest single human source of good in our generation -is the "intellectual" researcher and professor. The man to be feared -above all others is the man who can see. - - -III - -Is Information Wanted? - -"But your whole scheme shows a very amateur knowledge of human nature. -You seem to think you can get people interested in fact. You can't; fact -is too much against their interest. If the facts favor their wish, they -are interested; if not, they forget them. The hardest thing in the world -is to listen to truth that threatens to frustrate desire. That is why -people won't listen to your reports, unless you tell them what they want -to hear. They will--and perhaps excusably--prefer the bioscope to your -embalmed statistics; just as they will prefer to read _The Family -Herald_ rather than the subtleties recommended by the Mutual Admiration -Society which you would make out of our men of letters. You can -investigate till you are blue in the face, and all you will get out of -it won't be worth the postage stamps you use. Public opinion doesn't -follow fact, it follows desire; people don't vote for a man because he -is supported by 'truth' but because he promises to do something they -like. And the man who makes the biggest promises to the biggest men will -get office ninety-nine times out of a hundred, no matter what the facts -are. What counts is not truth but money." - - * * * * * - -This is the basic difficulty. Is it worth while to spread information? -Think how much information is spread every week in Europe and -America;--the world remaining the while as "wicked" as it probably ever -was. Public opinion is still, it seems, as Sir Robert Peel described it -to be: "a compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right -feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs,"[309]--particularly the -paragraphs. Once we thought that the printing-press was the beginning of -democracy, that Gutenberg had enfranchised the world. Now it appears -that print and plutocracy get along very well together. Nevertheless the -hope of the weak lies in numbers and in information; in democracy and -in print. "The remedy for the abuses of public opinion is not to -discredit it but to instruct it."[310] The cure for misstatements is -better statements. If the newspapers are used to spread falsehood that -is no reason why newspapers should not be used to spread truth. After -all, the spread of information has done many things,--killed dogma, -sterilized many marriages, and even prevented wars; and there is no -reason why a further spread may not do more valuable things than any yet -done. It has been said, so often that we are apt to admit it just to -avoid its repetition, that discussion effects nothing. But indeed -nothing else effects anything. Whatever is done without information and -discussion is soon undone, must be soon undone; all that bears time is -that which survives the test of thought. All problems are at last -problems in information: to find out just how things stand is the only -finally effective way of getting at anything. - -As to the limited number of persons who would be reached by the reports, -let us not ask too much. There is no pretence here that the great mass -of the people would be reached; no doubt these would go on living what -Wells calls the "normal social life." But these people do not count for -constructive purposes; they divide about evenly in every election. The -men who do count--the local leaders, the clergymen, the lecturers, the -teachers, the union officials, the newspaper men, the "agitators," the -arch-rebels and the arch-Tories,--all these men will be reached; and the -information given will strengthen some and weaken others, and so play -its effective part in the drama of social change. Each one of these men -will be a center for the further distribution of information. Imagine a -new monthly with a country-wide circulation of one million _voters_ -(that is, a general circulation of five million); would such a -periodical have power?--would not millions be given to control it? Well, -here we have more power, because not so concentrated in a few editorial -hands, not so easily purchaseable, and based on better intellect and -repute. The money that would be paid at any time for the control of a -periodical of such influence would finance our Society for many years. - -It is impossible to believe that such a spread of knowledge as is here -suggested would do nothing to elevate the moral and political life of -the country. Consider the increased scrupulousness with which a -Congressman would vote if he knew that at the next election his record -would be published in cold print in a hundred newspapers, over the name -of the Society for Social Research. Consider the effect, on -Congressional appropriations for public buildings, of a plain statement -of the population and size of the towns which require such colossal -edifices for their mail. Publicity, it has been said, is the only cure -for bad motives. Consider the stimulus which such reports would give to -political discussion everywhere. Hardly a dispute occurs which is not -based upon insufficient acquaintance with the facts; here would be -information up to date, ready to give the light which dispels the heat. -Men would turn to these reports all the more willingly because the -reports were pledged to confine themselves to fact. Men would find here -no attacks, no argument, no theory or creed; it would be refreshing, in -some ways, to bathe the mind, hot with contention, in these cool streams -of fact, and to emerge cleansed of error and filled with the vitality of -truth. We have spent so much time attacking what we hate that we have -not stopped to tell people what we like; if we would only affirm more -and deny less there would be less of cross-purpose in the world. And -information is affirmation. It would not open the wounds of controversy -so much as offer points of contact; and in the light of fact, enemies -might see that their good lay for the most part on a common road. If you -want to change a foe into a friend (or, some cynic will say, a friend -into a foe), give him information. - - -IV - -Finding Maecenas - -"Well; suppose you are right. Suppose information, as you say, is king. -How are you going to do it? Do you really think you will get some -benevolent millionaire to finance you? And will you, like Fourier, wait -in your room every day at noon for the man who will turn your dream into -a fact?" - - * * * * * - -What we tend to forget about rich men is that besides being rich they -are men. There are a surprising number of them--particularly those who -have inherited money--who are eager to return to the community the -larger part of their wealth, if only they could be shown a way of doing -it which would mean more than a change of pockets. Merely to give to -charity is, in Aristotle's phrase, to pour water into a leaking cask. -What such men want is a way of increasing intelligence; they know from -hard experience that in the end intelligence is the quality to be -desired and produced. They have spent millions, perhaps billions, on -education; and this plan of ours is a plan for education. If it is what -it purports to be, some one of these men will offer to finance it. - -And not only one. Let the beginnings of our Society be sober and -efficient, let its first investigations be thorough and intelligent, let -its initial reports be impartial, succinct, illuminating and simple, and -further help will come almost unasked. After a year of honest and -capable work our Society would find itself supported by rather a group -of men than by one man; it might conceivably find itself helped by the -state, at the behest of the citizens. What would prevent a candidate for -governor from declaring his intention that should he be elected he would -secure an annual appropriation for our Society?--and why should not the -voters be attracted by such a declaration? Why should not the voters -demand such a declaration? - -Nor need we fear that a Society so helped by the rich man and the state -would turn into but one more instrumentality of obstructionism. Not that -such an organization of intelligence would be "radical": the words -"radical" and "conservative" have become but instruments of calumny, and -truth slips between them. But in the basic sense of the word our Society -would be extremely radical; for there is nothing so radical, so -revolutionary, as just to tell the truth, to say what it is you see. -That surely is to go to the radix of the thing. And truth has this -advantage, that it is discriminately revolutionary: there are some -things old to which truth is no enemy, just as there are some things new -which will melt in the glare of fact. Let the fact say. - -This is the final faith: that truth will make us free, so far as we can -ever be free. Let the truth be published to the world, and men separated -in the dark will see one another, and one another's purposes, more -clearly, and with saner understanding than before. The most disastrous -thing you can do to an evil is to describe it. Let truth be told, and -the parasite will lose his strength through shame, and meanness will -hide its face. Only let information be given to all and freely, and it -will be a cleansing of our national blood; enmity will yield to open and -honest opposition, where it will not indeed become cooperation. All we -need is to see better. Let there be light. - - -V - -The Chance of Philosophy - -"One more objection before you take the money. And that is: What on -earth has all this to do with philosophy? I can understand that to have -economists on your investigating committees, and biologists, and -psychologists, and historians, would be sensible; but what could a -philosopher do? These are matters for social science, not for -metaphysics. Leave the philosophers out and some of us may take your -scheme seriously." - - * * * * * - -It is a good objection, if only because it shows again the necessity for -a new kind of philosopher. Merely to make such an objection is to -reenforce the indictment brought above against the philosopher as he is. -But what of the philosopher as he might be? - -What might the philosopher be? - -Well, first of all, he would be a living man, and not an annotator of -the past. He would have grown freely, his initial spark of divine fire -unquenched by scholastic inflexibilities of discipline and study. He -would have imbibed no sermons, but his splendid curiosity would have -found food and encouragement from his teachers. He would have lived in -and learned to love the country and the city; he would be at home in the -ploughed fields as well as in the centres of learning; he would like the -cleansing solitude of the woods and yet too the invigorating bustle of -the city streets. He would be brought up on Plato and Thucydides, -Leonardo and Michelangelo, Bacon and Montaigne; he would study the -civilization of Greece and that of the Renaissance on all sides, joining -the history of politics, economics, and institutions with that of -science, literature, and philosophy; and yet he would find time to study -his own age thoroughly. He would be interested in life, and full of it; -he would jump into campaigns, add his influence carefully to movements -he thought good, and help make the times live up more nearly to their -possibilities. He would not shut himself up forever in laboratories, -libraries, and lecture rooms; he would live more widely than that. He -would be of the earth earthly, of the world worldly. He would not talk -of ideals in the abstract and do nothing for them in the concrete; above -all else in the world he would abhor the kind of talk that is a refuge -from the venture and responsibility of action. He would not only love -wisdom, he would live it. - -But we must not make our ideal philosopher too repulsively perfect. Let -us agree at least to this, that a man who should know the social -disciplines, and not merely one science, would be of help in some such -business as we have been proposing; and if we suppose that he has not -only knowledge but wisdom, that his acquaintance with the facts of -science is matched by his knowledge of life, that through fellowship -with genius in Greece and Florence he has acquired a fund of wisdom -which needs but the nourishment of living to grow richer from day to -day,--then we are on the way to seeing that this is the sort of man our -Society would need above all other sorts of men. Such philosophers would -be worthy to guide research and direct the enlightenment of the world; -such philosophers might be to their generation what Socrates and Plato -were to their generations and Francis Bacon to his; such a philosophy, -in Nietzsche's words, might rule! - -This is the chance of philosophy. It may linger further in that calm -death of social ineffectiveness in which we see it sinking; or it may -catch the hands of the few philosophers who insist on focusing thought -on life, and so regain the position which it alone is fitted to fill. -Unless that position is filled, and properly, all the life of the world -is zigzag and fruitless,--what we have called the logic-chopping life; -and unless that position is filled philosophy too is logic-chopping, -zigzag, and fruitless, and turns away from life men whom life most -sorely needs. There are some among us, even some philosophers among us, -who are eager to lead the way out of bickering into discussion, out of -criticism into construction, out of books into life. We must keep a keen -eye for such men, and their beginnings; and we must strengthen them with -our little help. Philosophy is too divinely splendid a thing to be kept -from the most divine of things,--creation. Some of us love it as the -very breath of our lives; it is our vital medium, without which life -would be less than vegetation; and we will not rest so long as the name -_philosopher_ means anything less aspiring and inspiring than it did -with Plato. Science flourishes and philosophy languishes, because -science is honest and philosophy sycophantic, because science touches -life and helps it, while philosophy shrinks fearfully and helplessly -away. If philosophy is to live again, it must rediscover life, it must -come back into the cave, it must come down from the "real" and -transcendental world and play its venturesome part in the hard and happy -world of efforts and events. - -It is the chance of philosophy. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -See now, in summary, how modest a suggestion it is, grandiloquent though -it may have seemed. We propose no _'ism_, we make no programme; we -suggest, tentatively, a method. We propose a new start, a new tack, a -new approach,--not to the exclusion of other approaches, but to their -assistance. If this thing should be done, it would not mean that other -gropers toward a better world would have to stand idle; it would but -give light to them that walk in darkness. And it would make possible a -more generous cooperation among the different currents in the stream of -reconstructive thought. - -We are a little discouraged to-day; we lovers of the new have become -doubtful of the object of our love. Perhaps--we sometimes feel--all this -effort is a vain circling in the mist; perhaps we do not advance, but -only move. Our faith in progress is dimmed. We even tire of the "social -problem"; we have tried so many ways, knocked at so many doors, and -found so little of that which we sought. Sometimes, in the lassitude of -mistaken effort and drear defeat, we almost think that the social -problem is never to find even partial solution, that it is not a -problem but a limitation, a limitation forever. We need a new -beginning, a new impetus,--perhaps a new delusion? - -See, too, how the thought of our five teachers lies concentrated and -connected in this new approach: what have we done but renew concretely -the Socratic plea for intelligence, the Platonic hope for -philosopher-kings, Bacon's dream of knowledge organized and ruling the -world, Spinoza's gentle insistence on democracy as the avenue of -development, and Nietzsche's passionate defence of aristocracy and -power? There was something in us that thrilled at Plato's conception of -a philosophy that could guide as well as dissect our social life; but -there was another something in us that hesitated before his plan of -slavery as the basis of it all. We felt that we would rather be free and -miserable than bound and filled. Why should a man feed himself if his -feet are chained, and he must never move? And we were inspired, too, by -the demand that the best should rule, that they should have power fitted -to their worth; we should be glad to find some way whereby the best -could have power, could rule, and yet with the consent of all,--we -wanted an aristocracy sanctioned by democracy, a social order standing -on the broad base of free citizenship and wide cooperation. Socrates -shows us how to use Bacon to reconcile Plato and Nietzsche with Spinoza: -intelligence will organize intelligence so that superior worth may have -superior influence and yet work with and through the will of all. - - * * * * * - -And here at the end comes a thought that some of us perhaps have had -more than once as this discussion advanced: What could the Church do for -the organization of intelligence? - -It could do wonderful things. It has power, organization, facilities, -through which the gospel of "the moral obligation to be intelligent" -could be preached to a wider audience than any newspaper could reach. -And among the clergy are hundreds of young men who have found new -inspiration in the figure of Jesus seen through the aspirations of -democracy; hundreds eager to do their part in any work that will lessen -the misery of men. What if they were to find in this organization of -intelligence a focus for their labor?--what if they should not only -themselves undertake the studies which would fit them for membership in -the Society, but should also make it their business to stir up in all -who might come to them the spirit of the seeker, to incite them to read -religiously the reports of the Society, to call on them to spread abroad -the good news of truth to be had for the asking? What if these men -should make their churches extension centers for the educational work of -the Society,--giving freely the use of their halls and even contributing -to the expense of organizing classes and paying for skilled instruction? -What if they should see in the spread of intelligence the best avenue -to that wide friendship which Jesus so passionately preached? What -better way is there to make men love one another than to make men -understand one another? True charity comes only with clarity,--just as -"mercy" is but justice that understands. Surely the root of all evil is -the inability to see clearly that which is; how better can religion -combat evil than to preach clarity as the beginning of social -redemption? - - * * * * * - -One of the many burdens that drag on the soul is a knowledge of the -past. It is a strong man who can know history and keep his courage; a -great dream that can face the fact and live. We look at those flitting -experiments called civilizations: we see them rise one after another, we -see them produce and produce and produce, we feel the weight of their -accumulating wealth; still visionable to us the busyness of geniuses and -slaves piling stone upon stone and making pyramids to greet the stars, -still audible the voices of Socrates in the agora and of old Plato -passing quietly among the students in the grove, still haunting us the -white faces of martyrs in the amphitheatres of Rome: and then the -pyramids stand bare and lonely, the voices of Greek genius are hushed, -the Colosseum is a ruin and a memory; one after another these peoples -pass, these wonderful peoples, greater perhaps, wiser and nobler -perhaps, than the peoples of our time; and we almost choke with the -heavy sense of a vast futility encompassing the world. Some of us turn -away then from the din of effort, and seek in resignation the comfort of -a living death; some others find in the doubt and difficulty the zest -and reward of the work. After all, the past is not dead, it has not -failed; only the vileness of it is dead, gone with the winnowing of -time; that which was great and worthy lives and works and is real. Plato -speaks to us still, speaks to millions and millions of us; and the blood -of martyrs is the seed of saints. We speak and pass, but the word -remains. Effort is not lost. Not to have tried is the only failure, the -only misery; all effort is happiness, all effort is success. And so -again we write ourselves in books and stone and color, and smile in the -face of time; again we hear the call of the work, that it be done: - - Edens that wait the wizardry of thought, - Beauty that craves the touch of artist hands, - Truth that but hungers to be felt or seen; - -and again we are hot with the passion for perfection. We will remake. We -will wonder and desire and dream and plan and try. We are such beings as -dream and plan and try; and the glory of our defeats dims the splendor -of the sun. We will take thought and add a cubit to our stature; we will -bring intelligence to the test and call it together from all corners of -the earth; we will harness the genius of the race and renew creation. - -We will remake. - -Printed in the United States of America. - - * * * * * - -The following pages contain advertisements of a few of the Macmillan -books on kindred subjects. - - -Poverty and Social Progress - -BY MAURICE PARMELEE, PH.D. - -_Cloth, crown 8vo, 477 pp., $1.90_ - -"Suitable for college classes as well as for the general reader, and -contains a great mass of material of value to the citizen who really -wants to know."--_Independent._ - -"A very competent presentation of the various social factors that go to -make up the problem of poverty."--_Churchman._ - -"A most useful and educative book. It would be well if every -serious-minded person interested in social welfare would read this calm, -impartial survey of the problems of poverty, and learn from it that -poverty is not a spontaneous phenomenon, and that it could be -practically wiped out by the reorganization of society. The book is -offered for use as a text for college courses on charities, poverty, -pauperism, dependency, and the like, but its most useful place is in the -hands of the worker, the producer, the business man and woman, the -serious shapers and makers of the present economic state of -society."--_American Review of Reviews._ - -"Promoters of the democratic and humanitarian movement of our time will -find this volume replete with valuable data and stimulating to close and -careful thinking. Dr. Parmelee defines social progress as advancement -toward realization of a normal human life for all mankind. He shows this -obstructed by poverty in so many ways that there is no panacea for it, -and a variety of remedies are requisite. The chief obstructions being in -the production and distribution of wealth, his discussion centers mainly -in the problems of these."--_Outlook._ - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -The Great Society - -A Psychological Analysis - -BY GRAHAM WALLAS - -Author of "Human Nature in Politics" - -_Cloth, crown 8vo, 383 pp., $2.00_ - -Graham Wallas's new book, "The Great Society," will be equally -interesting to the psychologists, students of sociology, politics and -the general reader. Mr. Wallas is a man of wide connections in England, -a man whose experience has well fitted him for the task which he has -essayed. He has been for many years a university extension lecturer; he -was at one time a member of the school-board of London, chairman of the -School Management Committee, a member of the Technical Education Board, -of the London County Council and of the Education Committee of that -council. He has been, since 1896, a lecturer at the London School of -Economics. He has served on the Senate of London University, as -university reader in political science and on the Royal Commission on -Civil Service. He has written more or less widely, his most popular -publication being, perhaps, "Human Nature in Politics." - -The present work, a portion of which was delivered last winter as the -Lowell Lecture in Boston, begins with an exposition of what the author -means by the term "The Great Society." It then proceeds to a -consideration of the following topics: Disposition, Social Psychology, -Instinct and Intelligence, Disposition and Environment, Habit, Fear, -Pleasure, Pain, Happiness, The Psychology of the Crowd, Love and Hatred, -Thought, The Organization of Thought, The Organization of Will, and the -Organization of Happiness. - -"His deft and almost subtle grasp of the viewpoints of the philosophic -factors in history; his focusing of a theory into the tiny sunspot of an -illuminant sentence, and adopting a style that is as inviting and -penetrating as Havelock Ellis, make the book one of sustained -interest"--_Galveston Daily News._ - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -The Social Problem - -_A CONSTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS_ - -BY CHARLES A. 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Those who read - it will find their ideas and thoughts quickened and will be sure - that their time has been profitably spent." - ---_Salt Lake Tribune._ - - -The Church and Society - -BY R. FULTON CUTTING - -_12mo, $1.25_ - - "A stimulating and informing little book."--_Boston Herald._ - - -The Juvenile Court - -BY THOMAS D. ELIOT - -_12mo, $1.25_ - - "Another volume which will repay careful reading--the most useful - treatise on youthful criminology."--_Providence Journal._ - - -Social Insurance: A Program for Social Reform - -BY HENRY ROGERS SEAGER - -_12mo, $1.00_ - - -THE MACMILLAN COMPANY - -Publishers 64-66 Fifth Avenue New York - - -FOOTNOTES: - -[1] Class-lectures. As Bacon has it, Aristotle, after the Ottoman -manner, did not believe that he could rule securely unless he first put -all his brothers to death. - -[2] The _Dialexeis_; cf. Gomperz, _Greek Thinkers_, New York, 1901, vol. -i, p. 404. - -[3] Gompers, vol. i, p. 403. - -[4] Botsford and Sihler, _Hellenic Civilization_, New York, 1915, p. 430. - -[5] _Ibid._, p. 340, etc. - -[6] And sincerely, says Burnet, because he had gone through radicalism -to scepticism, and felt that one convention was as good as another. - -[7] Cf. Henry Jackson, article "Sophists," _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, -eleventh edition. - -[8] _History of Ethics_, London, 1892, p. 24. - -[9] _Op. cit._, vol. ii, 1905, p. 67. - -[10] _History of Greece_, vol. viii, p. 134. - -[11] _Morals in Evolution_, New York, 1915, p. 556. - -[12] Henry Jackson, article "Socrates," _Encyclopaedia Britannica_, -eleventh edition. - -[13] _Twilight of the Idols_, London, 1915, p. 15. For Nietzsche's -answer to Nietzsche, cf. _ibid._, p. 57: "To accustom the eye to -calmness, to patience, and to allow things to come up to it; to defer -judgment, and to acquire the habit of approaching and grasping an -individual case from all sides,--this is the first preparatory schooling -of intellectuality," this is one of "the three objects for which we need -educators.... One must not respond immediately to a stimulus; one must -acquire a command of the obstructing and isolating instincts. To learn -to see, as I understand this matter, amounts almost to that which in -popular language is called 'strength of will': its essential feature -is precisely ... to be able to postpone one's decision.... All lack of -intellectuality, all vulgarity, arises out of the inability to resist a -stimulus." - -[14] "Why art thou sad? Assuredly thou hast performed some sacred -duty?"--Bazarov in Turgenev's _Fathers and Children_, 1903, p. 185. - -[15] "Morality is the effort to throw off sleep.... I have never yet -met a man who was wide awake. How could I have looked him in the -face?"--Thoreau, _Walden_, New York, 1899, p. 92. - -[16] What happens when I "see the better and approve it, but follow the -worse," is that an end later approved as "better"--_i.e._, better for -me--is at the time obscured by the persistent or recurrent suggestion of -an end temporarily more satisfying, but eventually disappointing. Most -self-reproach is the use of knowledge won _post factum_ to criticise -a self that had to adventure into action unarmed with this hindsight -wisdom. - -[17] _Gorgias_, p. 521. - -[18] 399 B.C. - -[19] _Epistles_, viii, 325. - -[20] "When the soul does not speak in dialogue it is not in -difficulty."--Professor Wood bridge, in class. - -[21] "If we look for a system of philosophy in Plato, we shall -probably not find it; but if we look for none we may find most of the -philosophies ever written."--Professor Woodbridge. - -[22] _Phaedrus_, 244. - -[23] _Sophist_, 247. - -[24] _Laws_, 765-6. - -[25] _Republic_, 425. - -[26] _Protagoras_, 325. - -[27] _Republic_, 536. - -[28] _Laws_, 804. - -[29] _Ibid._, 810. - -[30] _Republic_, 375. - -[31] _Ibid._, 410. - -[32] _Laws_, 810. - -[33] _Republic_, 539. - -[34] _Republic_, 537. - -[35] _Republic_, 184. - -[36] _Ibid._, 473. - -[37] The passage, abbreviated, follows: "First, then, let us consider -what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. -Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and -build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work -in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially -clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat -and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; these they -will serve up on a mat of reeds or clean leaves, themselves reclining -the while upon beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children -will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands -on their heads, and having the praises of the gods on their lips, living -in sweet society, and having a care that their families do not exceed -their means; for they will have an eye to poverty or war.... Of course -they will have a relish,--salt, and olives, and cheese, and onions, and -cabbages or other country herbs which are fit for boiling; and we shall -give them a dessert of figs, and pulse, and beans, and myrtle-berries, -and beech-nuts, which they will roast at the fire, drinking in -moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace -to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after -them."--_Republic_, 372. Cf. The Rousseauian anthropology of _Laws_, 679. - -[38] _Republic_, 372-3. - -[39] Much of modern criticism of democracy finds its inspiration in -Plato. Cf. Bernard Shaw: "The democratic politician remains exactly -as Plato described him." Cf. also the _Modern Utopia_ and _Research -Magnificent_ of H. G. Wells. Nietzsche's debt to Plato will appear in a -later chapter. - -[40] "Omnia communia inter nos habemus, praeter mulieres." - -[41] Let us remember that a property-qualification for the vote remained -in our own political system till the time of Jefferson, and has in our -own day been resuscitated in some of the Southern states. - -[42] _Laws_, 783. - -[43] _Republic_, 403 - -[44] _Protagoras_, 322. - -[45] Plato, says Cleanthes, "cursed as impious him who first sundered -the just from the useful."--Gomperz, ii, 73. Cf. _Republic_, 331. - -[46] Edmund Gosse, _Life of Henrik Ibsen_, p. 100, note. - -[47] Nietzsche, _Beyond Good and Evil_, pref. - -[48] _Influence of Darwin on Philosophy_, New York, 1910, p. 21. - -[49] Cf. _De Augmentis_, bk. viii, ch. 2. - -[50] _Advancement of Learning_, Boston, 1863, bk. i. - -[51] _Philosophical Works_, ed. J. M. Robertson, London, 1805, p. 33. - -[52] _Novum Organum_, i, 65. - -[53] _Advancement of Learning_, p. 133. - -[54] Called by Bacon the "first vintage." - -[55] _Novum Organum_, ii, 2. - -[56] Preface to _Magna Instauratio_. - -[57] _Novum Organum_, pref. - -[58] _Novum Organum_, i, 129. - -[59] _Ibid._, i, 92. - -[60] _Ibid._, i, 113. - -[61] _Advancement of Learning_, bk. ii, ch. 1. - -[62] _Novum Organum_, i, 61. - -[63] _Advancement of Learning_, bk. i, ch. 1. - -[64] _Ibid._, bk. ii, ch. 1. - -[65] _New Atlantis_, Cambridge University Press, 1900, p. 22. - -[66] _Ibid._, p. 24. - -[67] Pp. 44, 45. - -[68] P. 43. - -[69] P. 34. - -[70] J. M. Robertson, preface to _Philosophical Works_. - -[71] Robert Adamson, article "Bacon," _Encyclopaedia Britannica_. - -[72] Cf. preface to _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_. - -[73] _Novum Organum_, i, 81. - -[74] _Advancement of Learning_, p. 207. - -[75] _Ibid._, p. 131. - -[76] _Advancement of Learning._, bk. i. - -[77] Professor Woodbridge, class-lectures. - -[78] Turgenev, in _Fathers and Children_. - -[79] This division into saints and sinners must be taken with -reservations, of course. In many respects Descartes belongs to the -second group, and in some respects James and Comte belong to the first. -But the dichotomy clarifies, if only by exaggeration. - -[80] L. Ward, _Pure Sociology_, p. 16. - -[81] Buckle, _History of Civilization_, i, 138. - -[82] Special acknowledgment for some of the material of this chapter -is due to R. A. Duff, _Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy_, -Glasgow, 1903. - -[83] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 17. - -[84] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 1. - -[85] _Will to Power_, vol. i, Sec. 95. - -[86] Cf. Duff, _op. cit._, pref.: "It can be shown that Spinoza had no -interest in metaphysics for its own sake, while he was passionately -interested in moral and political problems. He was a metaphysician at -all only in the sense that he was resolute in thinking out the ideas, -principles, and categories which are interwoven with all our practical -endeavor, and the proper understanding of which is the condition of -human welfare." - -[87] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 7. - -[88] _Tractatus Theologico-Politicus_, v, 2. - -[89] _Ibid._, ch. 16. - -[90] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 58, schol. - -[91] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, i, 5. - -[92] _Ethics_, bk. i, appendix. - -[93] _Ibid._, bk. iv, prop. 18, schol. - -[94] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 3. - -[95] _Ibid._, cor. - -[96] _De Intellectus Emendatione._ - -[97] _Ethics_, bk. iv, appendix, Sec. 9. - -[98] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 10. - -[99] _Ibid._, ch. 19. - -[100] _Ibid._, ch. 8. - -[101] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 16. - -[102] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 18, schol. - -[103] _Ibid._ - -[104] _Ibid._, bk. iv, prop. 24. - -[105] Bk. iv, def. 8. - -[106] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, Sec. 1. - -[107] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 35, schol. - -[108] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 5, Sec. 2. - -[109] _Ibid._, ch. 16. - -[110] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 37, schol. 2. - -[111] Contrast Plato: the state (_i.e._, the governing classes) is to -the lower classes as reason is to passion. - -[112] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 3, Sec. 14. - -[113] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 40. - -[114] Ch. 20. - -[115] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, Sec. 4. - -[116] _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_, ch. 6, Sec. 4, ch. 7, Sec. 29. - -[117] _Ethics_, bk. iv, prop. 35, cor. 1. - -[118] _Ibid._, cor. 2. - -[119] _Ibid._, prop. 18, schol.; also prop. 37. _Cf._ Whitman: "By God! -I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the -same terms." - -[120] Not that these ideas were original with Spinoza; they were the -general legacy of Renaissance political thought. But it was through the -writings of Spinoza that this legacy was transmitted to Rousseau. Cf. -Duff, p. 319. - -[121] Professor Woodbridge: class-lectures. - -[122] Cf. Professor Dewey's _German Philosophy and Politics_, New York, -1915. - -[123] Foerster-Nietzsche, _The Young Nietzsche_, London, 1912, p. 98. - -[124] _Ibid._, p. 152. - -[125] _Ibid._, p. 235. - -[126] _The Birth of Tragedy_, 1872. - -[127] _Thus Spake Zarathustra_, p. 129. - -[128] Foerster-Nietzsche, _The Lonely Nietzsche_, London, 1915, pp. 291, -212, 77. - -[129] _Ibid._, p. 313. - -[130] _Ibid._, p. 181. - -[131] _Ibid._, p. 424. - -[132] _Ibid._, p. 297. - -[133] _Ibid._, p. 195. - -[134] Chronology of Nietzsche's chief works, with initials used in -subsequent references: _Thoughts Out of Season_ ("_T. O. S._") (1873-6); -_Human All Too Human_ ("_H. H._") (1876-80); _Dawn of Day_ ("_D. D._") -(1881); _Joyful Wisdom_ ("_J. W._") (1882); _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ -("_Z._") (1883-4); _Beyond Good and Evil_ ("_B. G. E._") (1886); -_Genealogy of Morals_ ("_G. M._") (1887); _Twilight of the Idols_ -("_T.I._") (1888); _Antichrist_ ("_Antich._"); _Ecce Homo_ ("_E. H._"), -and _Will to Power_ ("_W. P._") (1889). - -[135] _Lonely N._, p. 104. - -[136] _Ibid._, p. 195. - -[137] _E. H._, p. 106. - -[138] _J. W._, Sec. 371. - -[139] _E. H._, p. 141. - -[140] _Ibid._, pp. 131, 81. - -[141] _T. I._, pref. - -[142] _W. P._, Sec. 400 (all references to _W. P._ will be by sections). - -[143] _J. W._, Sec. 345 (all references to _J. W._ by section unless -otherwise stated). - -[144] _W. P._, 276. - -[145] _Ibid._, 345. - -[146] _G. M._, p. 46. - -[147] _Z._, p. 166. - -[148] _W. P._, 721; _T. I._, p. 89. - -[149] _B. G. E._, Sec. 202. - -[150] _J. W._, 358; _Antich._, Sec. 361. - -[151] _W. P._, 284. - -[152] _Antich._, Sec. 46. - -[153] _Ibid._, Sec. 43. - -[154] _W. P._, 464, 861, 748, 752, 686. - -[155] _Ibid._, 885, 281. - -[156] _H. H._, Sec.Sec. 428, 472. - -[157] _T. I._, p. 96. - -[158] _G. M._, p. 225; written in 1887. - -[159] _W. P._, 861, 891. - -[160] _B. G. E._, p. 233. - -[161] _W. P._, 753. - -[162] _G. M._, p. 223. - -[163] _B. G. E._, p. 189. - -[164] _E. H._, p. 65. - -[165] _B. G. E._, pp. 96, 189. - -[166] _Z._, p. 89. - -[167] _J. W._, 363. - -[168] _B. G. E._, pp. 188, 184, 189. - -[169] _W. P._, 339, 86. - -[170] _T. I._, p. 86. - -[171] _J. W._, 377; _W. P._, 350, 315, 373. - -[172] _H. H._, Sec. 451. - -[173] _W. P._, 761. - -[174] _Ibid._, 51, 125. - -[175] _B. G. E._, p. 226. - -[176] _W. P._, 856. - -[177] _G. M._, p. 44. - -[178] _J. W._, 356. - -[179] _Lonely N._, p. 83. - -[180] _D. D._, Sec. 206. - -[181] _W. P._, 125. - -[182] _Wanderer and His Shadow_, Sec. 292 (_H. H._, ii, p. 343). - -[183] _H. H._, i, Sec. 473. - -[184] _D. D._, Sec. 179. - -[185] _Z._, p. 62. - -[186] _W. P._, 329. - -[187] _T. I._, p. 86; _E. H._, p. 66; _Antich._, Sec. 57. - -[188] _W. P._, 859. - -[189] _G. M._, p. 91. - -[190] _Z._, p. 159. - -[191] _T. I._, p. 94. - -[192] _H. H._, Sec. 463. - -[193] _W. P._, 750, 874, 65, 50. - -[194] _B. G. E._, p. 173; _W. P._, 823, 851, 871, 11. - -[195] _W. P._, 397, 12, 736. - -[196] _E. H._, p. 136. - -[197] _G. M._, p. 10. - -[198] _T. O. S._, i, p. 78. - -[199] _Antich._, Sec. 17. - -[200] _J. W._, 347. - -[201] _Antich._, Sec. 17; _D. D._, Sec. 542. - -[202] _W. P._, 585. - -[203] _G. M._, p. 202. - -[204] _W. P._, 585. - -[205] _Ibid._, 600; _D. D._, Sec. 424. - -[206] _J. W._, 366. - -[207] _D. D._, Sec. 41. - -[208] _W. P._, 461. - -[209] _B. G. E._, p. 136. - -[210] _W. P._, Sec. 8. - -[211] _J. W._, p. 7. - -[212] _W. P._, Sec. 351. - -[213] _Ibid._, Sec. 12. - -[214] _Ibid._, Sec. 43. - -[215] _Antich._, Sec. 1. - -[216] _D. D._, Sec. 163. - -[217] _W. P._, 266. - -[218] _Ibid._, 20. - -[219] _Ibid._, 585. - -[220] _Z._, pp. 193, 315; _E. H._, pp. 71, 28. - -[221] _J. W._, Sec. 324. - -[222] _Ibid._, p. 6. - -[223] _W. P._, 120, 1029; _Antich._, Sec. 55; _E. H._, pp. 72, 70; _Birth -of Tragedy_, _passim_. - -[224] _W. P._, 255, 258, 710, 462, 392, 305. - -[225] _Antich._, Sec. 2. - -[226] _W. P._, 918. - -[227] _T. O. S._, p. 76. - -[228] _G. M._, p. 45. - -[229] _J. W._, Sec. 4. - -[230] _Antich._, Sec. 14. - -[231] _B. G. E._, p. 162. - -[232] _W. P._, 440, 289. - -[233] _E. H._, p. 10. - -[234] _W. P._, 255, 774, 775; _D. D._, Sec. 215; _J. W._, 13. - -[235] _D. D._, Sec. 224. - -[236] _W. P._, 376, 776. - -[237] _W. P._, 650, 657, 685, 696, 704; _Antich._, Sec. 2. - -[238] _Ibid._, 681, 688, 689. - -[239] _T. I._, p. 71; _W. P._, 649. - -[240] _W. P._, 685. - -[241] _Z._, p. 398. - -[242] _W. P._, 880, 716, 343, 423, 291. - -[243] _E. H._, p. 2; _D. D._, Sec. 49; _Lonely N._, p. 17; _W. P._, 269, -90, 766, 660. - -[244] _E. H._, p. 138; _T. O. S._, ii, p. 66; _Z._, p. 222; _W. P._, -934, 944; _J. W._, p. 8; _T. I._, Sec. 40; _B. G. E._, p. 138. - -[245] _Z._, pp. 199, 103, 186; _W. P._, 792. - -[246] _W. P._, 881, 870, 918; _B. G. E._, p. 154; _E. H._, p. 13; _D. -D._, Sec. 552. - -[247] _W. P._, 967, 366-7, 349; _Z._, p. 141; _Antich._, Sec. 55; _B. G. -E._, pp. 54, 57. - -[248] _W. P._, 969, 371, 356, 926, 946, 26; _Z._, p. 430; _E. H._, pp. -23, 19, 128; _G. M._, p. 85; _D. D._, Sec. 60. - -[249] _W. P._, 866; _T. O. S._, ii, p. 154; _Z._, pp. 8, 104; _T. I._, -p. 269. - -[250] _W. P._, 804, 732-3; _Z._, pp. 94-6; _D. D._, Sec. 150-1. - -[251] _H. H._, Sec. 242; _W. P._, 912; _B. G. E._, p. 129; _D. D._, Sec. 194; -"Schopenhauer as Educator" (in _T. O. S._), _passim_. - -[252] _T. O. S._, ii, pp. 84, 28; _W. P._, 369, 965; _E. H._, p. 135. - -[253] _Z._, pp. 84, 64; _H. H._, Sec. 457; _G. M._, 156-7; _B. G. E._, Sec.Sec. -61-2; _W. P._, 373, 901, 132. - -[254] _H. H._, Sec. 439; _W. P._, 660; _Antich._, Sec. 57; _Lonely N._, p. 7. - -[255] _G. M._, pp. 160-1; _W. P._, 287, 854, 864. - -[256] _W. P._, 886, 926. - -[257] _T. I._, p. 96; _W. P._, 957; _B. G. E._, p. 239; _T. O. S._, ii, -p. 39. - -[258] _W. P._, 464, 960; _B. G. E._, p. 225. - -[259] _W. P._, 44, 684, 909; _G. M._, p. 91. - -[260] _D. D._, Sec.Sec. 165, 168; _W. P._, 1052; _B. G. E._, p. 69; _J. W._, -p. 10. - -[261] _T. I._, pp. 91, 110; _J. W._, Sec. 362; _G. M._, pp. 56, 226; _W. -P._, 975, 877; _B. G. E._, pp. 201, 53. - -[262] _W. P._, 109-34, 747. - -[263] _J. W._, 293. - -[264] _T. I._, p. 260; _G. M._, p. 58; _B. G. E._, p. 151; _Lonely N._, -p. 221. - -[265] _W. P._, 127, 728-9; _G. M._, pp. 88, 226; _J. W._, 283; _Z._, p. -60; _Lonely N._, p. 15. - -[266] _B. G. E._, p. 94; _W. P._, 717, 748; _G. M._, pp. 223-4. - -[267] _W. P._, 712. - -[268] _Ibid._, 1053. - -[269] _J. W._, p. 5. - -[270] _E. H._, p. 53. - -[271] _W. P._, 544, with footnote quoting Napoleon: "An almost -instinctive belief with me is that all strong men lie when they speak, -and much more so when they write." - -[272] "Far too long a slave and a tyrant have been hidden in woman: ... -she is not yet capable of friendship."--_Z._, p. 75. - -[273] Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political Theory_, New York, 1911, -p. 25. - -[274] There is something verging on a recognition of this in _W. P._, -403-4. - -[275] _B. G. E._, p. 173. - -[276] _B. G. E._, p. 25. - -[277] _G. M._, p. 6. - -[278] _Z._, p. 303. - -[279] _Z._, p. 107. - -[280] _T. I._, p. 2. - -[281] _Z._, p. 10. - -[282] _J. W._, 312. - -[283] _Ibid._, p. 69; referring to 1879. - -[284] _Ibid._, 312. - -[285] _Lonely N._, p. 206. - -[286] _Ibid._, p. 218. - -[287] _Lonely N._, p. 289. - -[288] _Ibid._, p. 391. - -[289] _Ibid._, p. 65. - -[290] _Ibid._, p. 157. - -[291] Mrs. Gallichan, _The Truth about Woman_, New York, 1914, p. 281. - -[292] Jos. McCabe, _Tyranny of Shams_, London, 1916, p. 171. - -[293] Dr. Drysdale, _The Small Family System_, London, 1915. - -[294] Winston Churchill in Parliament, quoted by Schoonmaker, The -_World-War and Beyond_, New York, 1915, p. 95. - -[295] Carver, _Essays in Social Justice_, New York, 1915, p. 261. - -[296] The "experimental attitude ... substitutes detailed analyses for -wholesale assertions, specific inquiries for temperamental convictions, -small facts for opinions whose size is in precise ratio to their -vagueness. It is within the social sciences, in morals, politics, -and education, that thinking still goes on by large antitheses, by -theoretical oppositions of order and freedom, individualism and -socialism, culture and utility, spontaneity and discipline, actuality -and tradition. The field of the physical sciences was once occupied -by similar 'total' views, whose emotional appeal was inversely as -their intellectual clarity. But with the advance of the experimental -method, the question has ceased to be which one of two rival claimants -has a right to the field. It has become a question of clearing up a -confused subject matter by attacking it bit by bit. I do not know -a case where the final result was anything like victory for one or -another among the preexperimental notions. All of them disappeared -because they became increasingly irrelevant to the situation discovered, -and with their detected irrelevance they became unmeaning and -uninteresting."--Professor John Dewey, _New Republic_, Feb. 3, 1917. - -[297] All this has been indicated--with, however, too little emphasis -on the reconstructive function of intelligence--by Bertrand Russell in -_Principles of Social Reconstruction_ (London, 1916); and more popularly -by Max Eastman in _Understanding Germany_ (New York, 1916); it has been -put very briefly again and again by Professor Dewey,--_e.g._, in an -essay on "Progress" in the _International Journal of Ethics_, April, -1916. - -[298] This is not a defence of mechanism or materialism; it is a plea -for a better perspective in philosophy. - -[299] It would be invidious to name the exceptions which one is -glad to remember here; but it is in place to say that the practical -arrest of Bertrand Russell is a sign of resuscitation on the part -of philosophy,--a sign for which all lovers of philosophy should be -grateful. When philosophers are once more feared, philosophy will once -more be respected. - -[300] _American Journal of Sociology_, March, 1905, p. 645. - -[301] Ross, _Social Control_, New York, 1906, p. 9. - -[302] _Will to Power_, Sec. 469. - -[303] Barker, _Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_, p. 80. - -[304] Perhaps this million could be reached more surely and economically -through direct pamphlet-publication by the Society. - -[305] Some students--_e.g._, Joseph McCabe, _The Tyranny of Shams_, -London, 1916, p. 248--are so impressed with the dangers lying in our -vast production of written trash that they favor restricting the -circulation of cheap fiction in our public libraries. But what we -have to do is not to prohibit the evil but to encourage the good, to -give positive stimulus rather than negative prohibition. People hate -compulsion, but they grope for guidance. - -[306] _E.g._, by G. Lowes Dickinson, _Justice and Liberty_, p. 133. - -[307] Cf. Russell, _Principles of Social Reconstruction_, p. 236: "The -supreme principle, both in politics and in private life, should be -to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and -desires that center round possession." - -[308] _Reason in Common Sense_, New York, 1911, p. 96. - -[309] Quoted by Walter Weyl, _The New Democracy_, p. 136. - -[310] Ross, _Social Control_, New York, 1906, p. 103. - - * * * * * - -Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber: - -seee things clearly=> see things clearly {pg 100} - -whosesale assertions=> wholesale assertions {footnote pg 211} - - - - - -End of Project Gutenberg's Philosophy and The Social Problem, by Will Durant - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM *** - -***** This file should be named 42880.txt or 42880.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/4/2/8/8/42880/ - -Produced by Chuck Greif and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was -produced from scanned images of public domain material -from the Google Print project.) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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