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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/44234-0.txt b/44234-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bd296d --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4503 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44234 *** + + Transcriber's Note: + + Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as + possible. + + On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth + Army," "from" is a correction of "fron". + + Italic text has been marked with _underscores_. + Bold text has been marked with =equals signs=. + OE ligatures have been expanded. + + + + +YPRES, 1914 + + +MONS, AND THE RETREAT + +By Captain G. S. GORDON + +With an Introduction by Field-Marshal LORD FRENCH + + 1/6 _net_. + + =The Evening News.=--'... The true history of those amazing and + heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a soldier and an expert.' + + +THE MARNE CAMPAIGN + +By Lieut. Col. F. E. WHITTON, C.M.G. + + 10/6 _net_. + + =Saturday Review.=--'... Clear and concise ... gives a much better + general impression of the Battle of the Marne than any other we + know.' + + +1914 + +By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc. + +With a Preface by MARÉCHAL FOCH + + 21/- _net_. + + +CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON. + + + + + YPRES, 1914 + + AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY + ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + + TRANSLATION BY G. C. W. + + WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE + HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) + COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE + + LONDON + CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD + 1919 + + + _Printed in Great Britain_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + INTRODUCTION ix + + GERMAN PREFACE xxiii + + PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1 + + THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 13 + + THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 19 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, 20TH-31ST + OCTOBER 1914 26 + + THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES 59 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END + OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1914 98 + + THE LAST PHASE 103 + + CONCLUSION 126 + + + APPENDIX + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 131 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK 132 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK 133 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN 133 + + + INDEX 135 + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + + + SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT + + PAGE + + DISPOSITIONS ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914 20 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30TH OCTOBER 1914 67 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 73 + + THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 81 + + THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON 10TH NOVEMBER 1914 108 + + THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 112 + + THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 115 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The German book of which a translation is here given was written in +the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto Schwink, a General Staff Officer, +by order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is +stated to be founded on official documents. It forms one of a series +of monographs, partly projected, partly published, on the various +phases of the war, but is the only one that is available dealing with +operations in which the British Army was engaged. Several concerned +with the Eastern theatre of war have already appeared, and one other +entitled 'LIÈGE-NAMUR,' relating to the Western. + +Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book '1914,' has said that the +period 27th to 31st October during the first battle of YPRES was +'more momentous and fateful than any other which I directed during my +period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. 31st October +and 1st November will remain for ever memorable in the history of our +country, for during those two days no more than a thin and straggling +line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its +practical ruin as an independent first-class Power.' The German account +accentuates the truth of Lord French's appreciation of the great peril +in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells us of the enemy's +plans, and of the large forces that he brought up with great skill +and secrecy to carry them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch's +expression, lets us 'know what was going on in the other fellow's +house.' But it does more than that: unconsciously perhaps, it bears +convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army, +the determination of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness +of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and +the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly credits Field-Marshal +Sir John French with 'reinforcements in abundance,' insists that our +troops 'fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of +bricks before abandoning them,' and definitely records that 'the fact +that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops gave way under +the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us the opportunity to +acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did +their duty thoroughly.' We are further told that the effect of our +artillery was such that 'it was not possible to push up reserves owing +to heavy artillery fire'; that 'all roads leading to the rear were +continuously shelled for a long way back'; that the German 'advancing +columns were under accurate artillery fire at long range'; that our +shells 'blocked streets and bridges and devastated villages so far +back that any regular transport of supplies became impossible.' As +regards rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with 'quantities of +machine-guns,' 'large numbers of machine-guns,' etc.; with the result +that 'the roads were swept by machine-guns'; and that 'over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a +machine-gun rattling out bullets.' At that date we had no machine-gun +units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of +a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, and had not yet been +replaced; actually machine-guns were few and far between. The only +inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, +were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, was mistaken for machine-gun +fire both as regards volume and effect. Our simple defences, to +complete which both time and labour had been lacking, became in German +eyes 'a well-planned maze of trenches,' 'a maze of obstacles and +entrenchments'; and we had 'turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point'; 'the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES ... +had been converted into fortresses' (_Festungen_); as also the edge +of a wood near GHELUVELT and LANGEMARCK. As at the last-named place +there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of two platoons, and the +'broad wire entanglements' described by the German General Staff were +in reality but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans 'took +in their stride,'[1] the lavish praise, were it not for the result of +the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. +It is fair, however, to deduce that the German nation had to be given +some explanation why the 'contemptible little Army' had not been pushed +straightway into the sea. + +The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German +General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent, +as their Preface says, the currency of 'the legends and rumours +which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so +difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards.' One cannot +naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not +will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed +by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1--to their future +financial advantage--'It can't be done yet. Too many highly placed +personages (_hohe Herrschaften_) would suffer in their reputations.' +It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War +that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other German military historians who had +been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil +a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began +even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient +to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties +that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous +number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy +artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench +warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly +attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French +and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit +defeat. + +The German General Staff specially claim that the first battle of +YPRES was a German victory, 'for it marked the failure of the enemy's +intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich +districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc. etc. +Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that General Staff's +own evidence, be regarded as a drawn one. For it is definitely stated +in the monograph that the object of the operations was 'successfully +closing with the enemy ... and gaining CALAIS, the aim and object +of the 1914 campaign'--this the German Army notoriously did not do. +The intention to break through is repeatedly stated: 'although fresh +reinforcements had been sent up by the German General Staff ... a +break-through had not been possible.' 'Another effort to break through +should be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's Army +Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry divisions) was formed +'as a strong new army of attack ... for breaking through on the front +WERWICQ-WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divisions) after the +failure of von Fabeck was formed 'to drive back and crush the enemy +lying north of the (COMINES-YPRES) canal ... and to break through +there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that 'no break-through of the +enemy's lines had been accomplished.... We had not succeeded in making +the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in +the west in our favour had to be consigned to its grave.' In fact, the +book is largely an apologia and a confession of failure which mere +protestations of victory cannot alter. + +The effects of a German victory on the course of the war, with the +Channel ports in German hands, as compared with those of an Allied +victory in Flanders, which at that period of the war and at that season +of the year could have resulted in little more than pushing the enemy +back into Belgium a few miles, may be easily imagined. If the battle +was a tactical draw, at least we had a strategic balance in our favour. + +The principal reasons advanced for the German ill-success are 'the +enemy's numerical superiority, and the strength of his positions,' and +of course the drastic course taken by the Belgians of 'calling in the +sea to their aid.' + +There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout the book. To +those who were there and saw our 'thin and straggling line' and the +hastily constructed and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and +broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin belts of wire, and +none of the communication trenches of a later date, they provoke only +amazement. Even German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements. + +As regards the superiority of numbers, the following appears to be +the approximate state of the case as regards the infantry on the +battle front from ARMENTIÈRES (inclusive) to the sea dealt with +in the monograph. It is necessary to count in battalions, as the +Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, and the British +Commander-in-Chief enumerates the reinforcements sent up to YPRES from +the II and Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial battalions, +London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also took part. The total figures +are:-- + + British, French, Belgian 263 battalions. + German 426 battalions. + +That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans of 13 to 21. Viscount +French in his '1914' says 7 to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52 +to 84 as against 49 to 84, and very different from the German claim +of '40 divisions to 25.' Actually in infantry divisions the Allies +had only 22, even counting as complete the Belgian six, which had +only the strength of German brigades. Any future correction of the +figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, will probably +emphasise the German superiority in numbers still more, and the +enemy indisputably had the advantage of united command, homogeneous +formations and uniform material which were lacking in the Allied force. + +As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had six divisions, including +one of three brigades. The enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, +the Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is not clear from +the German account how much cavalry was transferred from the Sixth Army +to the Fourth Army.[2] It may be noted that a German cavalry division +included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, horse artillery +batteries and the two or three _Jäger_ battalions, three or more +machine-gun batteries and two or more companies of cyclists; and was +thus, unlike ours, a force of all arms. + +The German General Staff reveal nothing about the exact strength of the +artillery. In a footnote it is mentioned that in addition to infantry +divisions the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, _Pionier_ +formations and other technical troops; and in the text that 'all the +available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist +the Fourth Army) for the break-through.' The Germans had trench-mortars +(_Minenwerfer_) which are several times mentioned, whilst our first +ones were still in the process of improvisation by the Engineers of the +Indian Corps at BETHUNE. + +The statement that 'the enemy's' (_i.e._ British, French and Belgian) +'superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns and +aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, even fourfold' is palpably nonsense +when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when the monograph was +written. + +The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot understand defeat in war +except on the premise that the victor had superiority of numbers. To +show to what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie's _Henry +V._, vol. II. page 216, will be found an account of a German theory, +accepted by the well-known historian Delbrück, that the English won at +Agincourt on account of superior numbers, although contemporary history +is practically unanimous that the French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie +sums it up thus: + + 'Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French is + inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered the + English, and finding that all contemporary authorities, both French + and English, are agreed that they did, the writer builds up a + theory that all the known facts can be explained on the supposition + that the French were really much inferior to us in numbers ... and + concludes that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number + of French (the English being 6000) at something between 4000 and + 7000.' + +It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff Officer +captured during the Ypres fighting said to his escort as he was being +taken away: 'Now I am out of it, do tell me where your reserves are +concealed; in what woods are they?' and he refused to believe that we +had none. Apparently it was inconceivable to the German General Staff +that we should stand to fight unless we had superior numbers; and these +not being visible in the field, they must be hidden away somewhere. + +Further light on what the Germans imagined is thrown by prisoners, +who definitely stated that their main attack was made south of YPRES, +because it was thought that our main reserves were near ST. JEAN, +north-east of that town. From others it was gathered that what could +be seen of our army in that quarter was in such small and scattered +parties that it was taken to be an outpost line covering important +concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, fearing a trap. + +It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation of the number +of formations engaged may not be altogether due to imaginary reserves, +as regards the British Army. Before the war the Great General Staff +knew very little about us. The collection of 'intelligence' with +regard to the British Empire was dealt with by a Section known in the +Moltkestrasse as the 'Demi-monde Section,' because it was responsible +for so many countries; and this Section admittedly had little time +to devote to us. Our organisation was different from that of any of +the great European armies. Their field artillery brigades contained +seventy-two guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or howitzers; +their infantry brigades consisted of two regiments, each of three +battalions, that is six battalions, not four as in the original British +Expeditionary Force. To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant +six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he belonged to +the Blankshire Regiment, the German might possibly believe he had +identified three battalions, whereas only one would be present. This +is actually brought out on page 118, when the author speaks of the 1st +Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment as the _Königsregiment +Liverpool_, and indicates his ignorance of the British Army, when +this single battalion engages the German _Garde Regiment zu Fuss_, by +describing the fight not only as one of regiment against regiment, but +as _Garde gegen Garde_ (Guard against Guards).[3] Such is the fighting +value of an English Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly +claimed, but the significant sentence immediately follows: 'any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question.' + +It may be as well to point out that the 'volunteers' who it is said +flocked to the barracks to form the Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were +not all volunteers in our sense of the word. The General Staff only +claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different state of +affairs from our New Armies, which had not 1 per cent. of trained +soldiers. Many of the 'volunteers' were fully trained men liable +to service, who merely anticipated their recall to the colours. It +was well known before the war that in each army corps area Germany +intended to form one 'Active' Corps and one or more 'Reserve' Corps. +The original armies of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the +IV Reserve of von Kluck's Army, which marched and fought just as the +active ones did. These first formed Reserve Corps were, it is believed, +entirely made up of trained men, but those with the higher numbers +XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in the Fourth Army, probably +did contain a good percentage of men untrained before the war. + +_Ersatz_ divisions were formed of the balance of reservists after the +Reserve divisions had been organised, and of untrained men liable for +service. After a time the words 'Active,' 'Reserve,' and '_Ersatz_' +applied to formations lost their significance, as the same classes of +men were to be found in all of them. + +No attempt has been made to tone down the author's patriotic sentiments +and occasional lapses from good taste; the general nature of the +narrative is too satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions +necessary when presenting it to the British public. + +The footnotes deal with a number of the more important points raised, +but are not exhaustive. + + * * * * * + + _Note._--The German time, at the period of the year in question one + hour earlier than ours, has been adhered to. + + The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished from those of + the Author by being printed in italics. + + In preparing the translation for issue it has not been thought + necessary to supply all the maps provided in the original, as the + general lie of the country must be fairly well known to British + readers. + + (_Translation of Title Page_) + + + Monographs on the Great War + + THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF + YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914 + + (DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND + BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914) + + FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES + + PUBLISHED + BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING + + + + +PREFACE + +BY GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS + + +The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison with those of +the past, and battles which formerly held the world in suspense are +now almost forgotten. The German people have been kept informed of the +progress of events on all fronts since the 4th August 1914, by the +daily official reports of the German General Staff, but the general +public will have been unable to gather from these a coherent and +continuous story of the operations. + +For this reason the General Staff of the German Field Army has decided +to permit the publication of a series of monographs which will give the +German people a general knowledge of the course of the most important +operations in this colossal struggle of nations. + +These monographs cannot be called histories of the war; years, even +decades, must pass before all the true inwardness and connection of +events will be completely revealed. This can only be done when the +archives of our opponents have been opened to the world as well as our +own and those of the General Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the +German people will be given descriptions of the most important of +the battles, written by men who took part in them, and have had the +official records at their disposal. + +It is possible that later research may make alterations here and there +necessary, but this appears no reason for delaying publications based +on official documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster +the legends and rumours which so easily take hold of the popular +imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct +afterwards. + +This series of monographs is not therefore intended as an addition to +military science, but has been written for all classes of the German +public who have borne the burden of the war, and especially for those +who have fought in the operations, in order to increase their knowledge +of the great events for the success of which they have so gladly +offered their lives. + + GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY. + + GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _Autumn, 1917_. + + + + +PRELIMINARY REMARKS + + +There is no more brilliant campaign in history than the advance of +our armies against the Western Powers in August and early September +1914. The weak French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to +beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, the active +defence of the Allied hostile armies and the passive resistance of the +great Belgian and French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal +march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage of each individual +German soldier, combined with the able leading of his commanders, +overcame all opposition and sent home the news of countless German +victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts of Paris were +trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy which half the world +had been weaving against us for so many years was to be brought to a +rapid conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, in the course of +which the centre and right wings of the German Western Army were, it +is true, withdrawn, but only to fight again as soon as possible, under +more favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting our +withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th September[4] our troops +brought him to a standstill along a line extending from the Swiss +frontier to the Aisne, north-east of Compiègne. In the trench warfare +which now began our pursuers soon discovered that our strength had been +by no means broken, or even materially weakened, by the hard fighting. + +As early as 5th September, before the battle of the Marne, the Chief +of the German General Staff had ordered the right wing should be +reinforced by the newly-formed Seventh Army.[5] It soon became clear +to the opposing commanders that any attempt to break through the +new German front was doomed to failure, and that a decisive success +could only be obtained by making an outflanking movement on a large +scale against the German right wing. Thus began what our opponents +have called the 'Race to the Sea,' in which each party tried to +gain a decision by outflanking the other's western wing. The good +communications of France, especially in the north, enabled the Allied +troops to be moved far more rapidly than our own, for the German +General Staff had at their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian +railways which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened +with transport of material of every description. In spite of this, +however, the French and British attacks failed to drive back the German +right wing at any point. Not only did they find German troops ready to +meet them in every case, but we were also generally able to keep the +initiative in our hands. + +In this manner by the end of September the opposing flanks had been +extended to the district north of the Somme, about Péronne-Albert. A +few days later began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens, +and by the middle of October our advanced troops were near Lille, +marching through the richest industrial country of France. The Army +Cavalry was placed so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to +bring pressure against the communications with England. Our cavalry +patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel and Hazebrouck, the pivots of +the enemy's movements, but they had to retire eastwards again when +superior hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The reports which +they brought back with them all pointed to preparations by the enemy +for an attack on a large scale, and for another effort to turn the +fortunes of the campaign to his favour. With this in view all available +troops, including newly-arrived detachments from England, were to be +used to break through the gap between Lille and Antwerp against our +right wing, roll it up and begin the advance against the northern Rhine. + +It must be remembered that at the time this plan was conceived +the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were still in French and +Belgian possession. It was hoped that Lille, with its well-built +fortifications, even though they were not quite up-to-date, would at +least hold up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was defended by +the whole Belgian Army of from five to six divisions which were to be +reinforced by British troops, and it was confidently expected that this +garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the most modern fortress +in Western Europe against any attack, especially if, as was generally +believed, this could only be carried out by comparatively weak forces. +Thus it seemed that the area of concentration for the Franco-Belgian +masses was secure until all preparations were ready for the blow to be +delivered through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the German +armies in the west. The plan was a bold one, but it was countered by a +big attack of considerable German forces in the same neighbourhood and +at the same time. The two opponents met and held each other up on the +Yser and at Ypres, and here the last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium +and gain possession of the rich provinces of Northern France before the +end of the year was frustrated. The question arises how the Germans +were able to find the men to do this, since it had been necessary to +send considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the Russian +advance. + +Whoever has lived through those great days of August 1914, and +witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm of the German nation, will never +forget that within a few days more than a million volunteers entered +German barracks to prepare to fight the enemies who were hemming in +Germany. Workmen, students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders, +officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. There was +such a constant stream of men that finally they had to be sent away, +and put off till a later date, for there was neither equipment nor +clothing left for them. By 16th August, before the advance in the +west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin had ordered the +formation of five new Reserve Corps to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, +whilst Bavaria formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony and +Würtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve Corps into being. Old and +young had taken up arms in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend +their country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted of these +volunteers, the remainder being trained men of both categories of the +_Landwehr_ and the _Landsturm_, as well as some reservists from the +depôts, who joined up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen +to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the moment, and the +need of their country: they were anxious to become useful soldiers as +quickly as possible to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. +Some regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes of the +higher educational schools came with their teachers and joined the same +company or battery. Countless retired officers placed themselves at the +disposal of the Government, and the country will never forget these +patriots who took over commands in the new units, the formation of +which was mainly due to their willing and unselfish work. + +The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to +the Western Front began on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division followed shortly after. Only comparatively few experienced +commanders were available for the units, and it was left to their keen +and patriotic spirit to compensate as far as possible for what the men +still lacked to play their part in the great struggle. + +The situation of the armies on the Western Front at this time was as +follows. In the neighbourhood of Lille the northern wing of the Sixth +Army was fighting against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October, +Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and garrison, was +taken after a twelve days' siege directed by General von Beseler, +commanding the III Reserve Corps, and well known in peace time as +Chief of the Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications. +The victorious besiegers had carried all before them. As they were +numerically insufficient to invest Antwerp on the west, south and +east, a break-through was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. +It was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; but the main +body of the Belgian army, in good fighting order, was able to escape +westwards along the coast, to await the arrival of British and French +reinforcements behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians were taken +prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 British troops[6] were +forced into Holland. In consequence of this new situation, and of the +reports of hostile concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, +the German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth Army under Duke +Albert of Würtemburg. It was to be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, +and XXVII Reserve Corps,[7] and was joined later on by the III Reserve +Corps with the 4th _Ersatz_ Division. By 13th October the detainment of +this new Army was in full progress west and south-west of Brussels. On +the evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began their march +to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of Bruges)--Deynze--point four +miles west of Audenarde. + +In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town of Lille. It had +been entered on 12th October by part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some +_Landwehr_ troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing to +the useless efforts of French territorial troops to defend it. The +order to the garrison was: 'The town is to be held till the Tenth +French Army arrives'; it resulted in the capture of 4500 French +prisoners, who were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing of the +Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Würtemburg and XIX Saxon Corps, +pushed forward to the Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.[8] +They took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through Comines to +Warneton and thence east of Armentières, where they came into touch +with the 14th Infantry Division which was further south near the +western forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the III Reserve +Corps, with its three divisions from Antwerp, was advancing westwards +on a broad front. By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards +and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen and reconnaissance +detachments had recognised movements of large bodies of troops about +Hazebrouck, Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations on a big +scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to this, considerable hostile +forces had reached Ypres, and appeared to be facing more or less +southwards opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.[9] + +An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the German General +Staff, gave the following instructions for the German forces between +Lille and the sea. The Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on +the defensive along the line Menin-Armentières-La Bassée and to await +the attack of our new Fourth Army against the left flank of the enemy. +The offensive action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was to +be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which now belonged to it, +should move as its right wing in echelon along the coast, whilst its +left was to advance through Menin. + +In accordance with these orders the III Reserve Corps occupied Ostend +on the 15th, its left wing reaching the line of the Thourout-Roulers +road. The Corps was then ordered not to advance further for a few +days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and French, who +were advancing against the north wing of the Sixth Army, being drawn +prematurely to movements in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore +were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and the canal south of +it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached +the line Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt--point six miles east of +Courtrai. On the advance of these four new Corps, the III Reserve +Corps was to draw away to the right wing, and during the 17th and the +following morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted to it +immediately south of the coast, and cleared the front of the Fourth +Army. The reconnaissance activity of the previous days had in places +led to severe fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of the +6th Reserve Division. It was found that the Belgian rearguards still +held part of the ground east of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any +attempt to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the question, +as the bridges had been blown up and the whole line put in a state of +defence. + +The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the III Reserve Corps +was a brilliant success. At midday on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, +who was to direct the enemy's attack from the line of the Yser, was +still in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had time to prepare +for his attack, and his only immediate care was to secure the line +from Armentières to the sea for the deployment. After the events on +the Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested General +Joffre, the Allied commander,[10] that he might be placed on the +northern flank of the line. He would then be close to Calais, which had +already become an English town,[11] he would be able to protect the +communications to his country; and, further, the fame to be gained by +a decisive and final victory attracted this ambitious commander to the +north. As a result the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien was +now in action against the strong German positions between Vermelles +(four miles south-west of La Bassée) and Laventie (west of Lille).[12] +Further to the north the III British Corps was fighting against the +Saxons advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry Corps.[13] +The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the hostile advance on the +line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east of Ypres.[14] Immediately to the +north again, the newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th +Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had arrived in the area +Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in its retreat by von Beseler's columns +(III Reserve Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched up to +Bixschoote,[15] and the gap between this place and Dixmude had been +closed by a French Cavalry Division which connected up with the Belgian +Army. The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, was +engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up to the sea for the most +stubborn defence. These strong forces were to cover the arrival of the +VIII and X French Corps[16] and were to deliver the first blow against +our supposed right wing. + +On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone out far in +advance of its Corps was surrounded near Roulers, and it was only by +its capture that the enemy definitely discovered the arrival of the +new German Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown to +him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. Field-Marshal French +was now confronted with a new situation. The preparations for his big +attack were not yet completed. The superiority of the masses already +concentrated did not yet appear to him to be sufficient to guarantee +success against the enemy's advance. The British commander therefore +decided to remain on the defensive[17] against our new Fourth Army, +until the completion of the French concentration. His line was already +closed up to the sea, it was naturally strong, and fresh troops were +arriving daily. The danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the +effect of making England put forth her full energy; the British troops +fought desperately to defend every inch of ground, using every possible +means to keep up the sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and +received rapid assistance from the French, and were backed up by fresh +reinforcements from England. + +From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm and unconditional +determination to win the war which pervaded the new Fourth Army +gave every prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who was +apparently still engaged in concentrating and reorganising his forces, +and gaining Calais, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign. + +Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful army, fully deployed +and ready to meet us. The British boast that they held up our attack +with a great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true in the +case of the 7th Division during the first two days in the small sector +ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT. On 22nd October between ARMENTIÈRES and the sea +there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking German Corps; +and, besides, the enemy had prepared a series of lines of strong +trenches covered by an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In +the course of the operations that developed, the relative strength of +the opposing forces never appreciably altered in our favour.[18] The +moral strength of our troops made up for the numerical superiority of +the enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back and destroyed, +it is hoped for ever, the ambition of our opponent to regain Belgium by +force of arms. + +The great desire of the Germans to defeat the hostile northern wing, +and to hit hardest the most hated of all our enemies, and, on the other +side, the obstinate determination of the British to hold on to the +passages to their country, and to carry out the offensive to the Rhine +with all their resources, resulted in this battle being one of the most +severe of the whole war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the +battle on the YSER and of YPRES can never be sufficiently praised, and +in spite of great losses their enthusiasm remained unchecked and their +offensive spirit unbroken. + + + + +THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS + + +The country in which it was hoped to bring about the final decision of +the campaign of 1914 was not favourable to an attack from east to west. + +Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, is almost +completely flat, and lies only slightly above sea-level, and in some +parts is even below it. Mount KEMMEL, in the south, is the only +exception; rising to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower +of Western Flanders. Before the war it was a well-wooded ridge with +pretty enclosures and villages. From its slopes and summits could be +seen the whole countryside from LILLE to MENIN and DIXMUDE. + +The possession of this hill was of great importance. Our cavalry +actually occupied it during the early days of October, but when the +enemy advanced he immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was +still too far away to help, and so Mount KEMMEL fell into the enemy's +hands. During the battle of YPRES it was his best observation post, and +of the utmost assistance to his artillery. + +We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern crest +of the ridge in front of YPRES, but in the autumn of 1914, as also +later in the war, this was always the signal for the most desperate +fighting. It was thus that the heights of ST. ELOI,[19] the high-lying +buildings of HOOGE and the village of WYTSCHAETE won their sanguinary +fame. + +Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its high ramparts and +fine buildings, YPRES was formerly one of the most picturesque towns in +Flanders. In the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance, +and became the centre of the cloth-weaving trade on its introduction +from Italy. BRUGES, lying close to the coast, became the market for its +wares. The Clothweavers' Guild, which accumulated great wealth, erected +in YPRES a fine Gothic hall, whose towers with those of St. Martin's +Church were landmarks for miles round. In modern times, however, the +importance of the town greatly diminished. The cloth-weaving industry +drifted away to the factories of MENIN and COURTRAI; and YPRES, like +its dead neighbour BRUGES, remained only a half-forgotten memory of its +former brilliance. + +The war has brought fresh importance to the town, but of a mournful +kind. On the impact of the German and Anglo-French masses in Flanders +in the autumn of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations. +The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front of it; for, as +an Englishman has written, it had become a point of honour to hold the +town. YPRES lay so close to the front that our advance could be seen +from its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing his +batteries and sheltering his reserves. For the sake of our troops we +had to bring it under fire; for German life is more precious than the +finest Gothic architecture. Thus the mythical death of YPRES became a +reality: no tower now sends forth its light across the countryside, and +a wilderness of wrecked and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town +so full of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders. + +The streams which run northwards from the hills about YPRES unite +for the most part near the town and flow into the YSER canal, which +connects the LYS at COMINES with the sea at NIEUPORT. This canal passes +through the YPRES ridge near HOLLEBEKE and, following northwards the +course of a small canalised tributary of the YSER, meets the YSER +itself south of DIXMUDE. The dunes at NIEUPORT have been cut through by +engineers for its exit to the sea. It is only from DIXMUDE northwards +that the canal becomes an obstacle which requires proper bridging +equipment for its passage. Its high embankments to the south of +DIXMUDE, however, give excellent cover in the otherwise flat country +and greatly simplify the task of the defender. + +The canal acquired a decisive importance when the hard-pressed +Belgians, during the battle on the night of 29th-30th October, let +in the sea at flood-tide through the sluices into the canal, and +then by blowing up the sluice-gates at NIEUPORT, allowed it to flood +the battlefield along the lower YSER. By this means they succeeded +in placing broad stretches of country under water, so much so that +any extensive military operations in that district became out of the +question. The high water-level greatly influenced all movements over +a very large area. By his order the King of the Belgians destroyed +for years the natural wealth of a considerable part of his fertile +country, for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation down to its +very roots. + +The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and difficult for +observation purposes. The high level of the water necessitates drainage +of the meadows, which for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes +which have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are bordered with +willows, and thick-set hedges form the boundaries of the cultivated +areas. Generally speaking, the villages do not consist of groups of +houses: the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming a +single street. The country is densely populated and is consequently +well provided with roads. But these are only good where they have been +made on embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, which begin +towards the end of October, rapidly turn the other roads into mere mud +tracks and in many cases make them quite useless for long columns of +traffic. + +The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by rain and +surface-water. The loam soil was on the whole easy to work in; but it +was only on the high ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to +give sufficient cover against the enemy's artillery fire; on the flat, +low-lying ground they could not in many cases be made more than two +feet deep. + +A few miles south of the coast the country assumes quite another +character: there are no more hedges and canals: instead gently rolling +sand-hills separate the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is +not fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes prevents the +sea encroaching on the land. + +The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of Flanders is the +difficulty of observation. The enemy, fighting in his own country,[20] +had every advantage, while our artillery observation posts were only +found with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed from the +front line, and it frequently happened that our brave artillerymen +had to bring up their guns into the front infantry lines in order to +use them effectively. Although the enemy was able to range extremely +accurately on our guns which were thus quickly disclosed, nothing could +prevent the German gunners from following the attacking infantry. + +Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult by the many hedges +and villages, so that it took a long time to discover the enemy's +dispositions and give our artillery good targets. + +Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent limitations +of view were all to the advantage of the defenders, who were everywhere +able to surprise the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh +defensive lines in front of them without knowing whether they were +occupied or not. The British, many of whom had fought in a colonial +war against the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country, +allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and then opened a +devastating fire at point-blank range from rifles and machine-guns +concealed in houses and trees. + +In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the German attacks so that +even the biggest operations degenerated into disconnected actions which +made the greatest demands on the powers of endurance and individual +skill of our volunteers. In spite of all these difficulties our men, +both old and young, even when left to act on their own initiative, +showed a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle on +the YSER a sacred memory both for the Army and the Nation, and every +one who took part in it may say with pride, 'I was there.' + + + + +THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + + +An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the following instructions for +the 18th:-- + + The III Reserve Corps to march to the line COXYDE-FURNES-OEREN, + west of the YSER. + + The XXII Reserve Corps to the line AERTRYCKE-THOUROUT. + + The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line LICHTERVELDE-ARDOYE. + + The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area EMELGHEM-ISEGHEM, and, on the + left wing, the XXVII Reserve Corps to the line LENDELEDE-COURTRAI. + +The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps all reached their +appointed destinations on the evening of the 18th without meeting any +strong resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced guards +and patrols came into touch with weak hostile detachments who were +awaiting our advance well entrenched, and surprised us with infantry +and artillery fire. At ROULERS a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes +circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, and cavalry patrols +pushing well forward showed that the British now realised the strength +of the new German forces. + +[Illustration: DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914. + +_On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right of +the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. It is also +inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps as north of +Armentières--only one of its Divisions was--while the II Corps was +certainly too closely pressed to detach any troops to the north as +depicted in the diagram._] + +In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the Army, the troops +of General von Beseler had opened the battle on the Yser. During +its advance northwards to cross the Yser at the appointed places +the III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition east of the +river-barrier. The men knew they were on the decisive wing of the +attack, and they pushed ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid +assault the 4th _Ersatz_ Division captured WESTENDE from the Belgians, +although a gallant defence was put up, and in spite of the fact that +British torpedo-boats and cruisers took part in the action from the +sea with their heavy artillery[21] both during the advance and the +fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve Division deployed to +attack a strongly entrenched hostile position. The 3rd Reserve _Jäger_ +Battalion captured the obstinately defended village of ST. PIERRE +CAPPELLE after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the main body of +the division succeeded in pushing forward to the neighbourhood of +SCHOORE. The 6th Reserve Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, +also closed with the enemy. It captured LEKE, and KEYEM, defended by +the 4th Belgian Division; but even this Brandenburg Division, for all +its war experience, found the task of forcing the crossings over the +YSER too much for it. + +The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing us a thousand or two +thousand yards nearer the YSER, but it had shown that the fight for +the river line was to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined +to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the highest possible +price. Four lines of trenches had been dug, and it could be seen that +every modern scientific resource had been employed in putting the +villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state of defence. A +great number of guns, very skilfully placed and concealed, shelled the +ground for a considerable distance east of the river, and in addition +to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy naval guns from the +sea. Battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division with their fire, and the British had even +brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats close inshore.[22] They +used a great quantity of ammunition, but the effect of it all was only +slight, for the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and indicated +bad observation. It became still more erratic when our long-range guns +were brought into action against the British Fleet. Detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division had to be echeloned back as far as Ostend, +in order to defend the coast against hostile landings. During the day +the General Commanding the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the +4th _Ersatz_ Division to cross the YSER at NIEUPORT, on account of +the heavy fire from the British naval guns, but to make it pass with +the main body of the Corps behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose +area the fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The _Ersatz_ +Division was informed accordingly. On the 19th another effort would +have to be made to force the crossings of the river by frontal attack, +for everywhere to the south strong opposition had been encountered. +From near DIXMUDE French troops carried on the line of the compact +Belgian Army. It was against these that the new Reserve Corps were now +advancing. + +On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th October a strong +attack was delivered from the west by the 4th Belgian Division, and +from the south-west by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a +brigade of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, against +KEYEM, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. They were driven +back after heavy fighting. During the 19th the southern wing of the +Brandenburg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing nearer the river +and, on its left, part of the artillery of the XXII Reserve Corps came +into action in support of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve +Corps, which until that day had been fighting unassisted. + +On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed on the whole front +of the Fourth Army. The XXII Reserve Corps advanced on BEERST and +DIXMUDE and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve Corps. +In front of it lay the strong bridge-head of DIXMUDE, well provided +with heavy guns. The whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed +into battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended +by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th Reserve Division the 209th +Reserve Regiment late in the evening took HANDZAEME after severe +street fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the village of +GITS, whilst CORTEMARCK was evacuated by the enemy during the attack. +The 46th Reserve Division in a running fight crossed the main road to +THOUROUT, north of ROULERS, and by the evening had arrived close to +STADEN. Heavy street fighting in the latter place continued during +the night: the enemy, supported by the population, offered strong +resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued behind +our front lines, endangering the cohesion of the attacking troops, but +never to a serious extent. + +The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition at RUMBEKE, +south-east of ROULERS; but all the enemy's efforts were in vain, +and the 233rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its +Corps Commander, General von Hügel, forced its way through the rows +of houses, many of which were defended with light artillery and +machine-guns. A very heavy fight took place for the possession of +ROULERS, which was stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were +put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from holes in the roofs +and windows, and concealed mines exploded among the advancing troops. +In spite of all this, by 5 P.M. ROULERS was taken by the 233rd, 234th +and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking from north, east and +south respectively. Further to the south, after a small skirmish with +British cavalry, the 52nd Reserve Division reached MORSLEDE, its +objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII Reserve Corps had +come into contact with the 3rd British Cavalry Division which tried to +hold up the Corps in an advanced position at ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE. After +a lively encounter the British cavalry was thrown back on to the 7th +British Division, which held a strong position about DADIZEELE.[23] + +Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation had been considerably +cleared up, in so far as we now knew that the Belgians, French and +British not only held the YSER and the YPRES canal, but also the high +ground east and north-east of YPRES. Everything pointed to the fact +that an unexpectedly strong opponent was awaiting us in this difficult +country, and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively +untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. In the meantime +the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, after +a discussion at Army Headquarters with General von Falkenhayn, Chief +of the General Staff, decided to renew the attack, as the left wing of +the Fourth Army had now come up on his immediate right. In consequence +of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved from its position on the +line MENIN-WARNETON and replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the +IV Cavalry Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of the +Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were continued with frequent +reinforcements of fresh troops, had the effect of holding the enemy and +drawing a strong force to meet them. They were not, however, destined +to have any decisive success, for the offensive strength of the Sixth +Army had been reduced by previous fighting, and it was not sufficient +to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions.[24] All the +more therefore were the hopes of Germany centred in the Fourth Army, +which was fighting further northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of +the campaign in Western Europe at this period. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM 20TH OCTOBER TO 31ST OCTOBER 1914 + + +On 20th October the battle broke out along the whole line, on a front +of about sixty miles. The enemy had got into position, and was prepared +to meet the attack of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. On the very +day that the British, French and Belgians intended to begin their +advance they found themselves compelled to exert all their strength to +maintain their positions against our offensive. The British and French +had to bring up constant reinforcements, and a hard and bitter struggle +began for every yard of ground. The spirit in which our opponents +were fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian Division, +picked up in PERVYSE on 16th October. This ran: 'The fate of the whole +campaign probably depends on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore +officers and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be called upon +to make, to do even more than their mere duty. The salvation of the +country and therefore of each individual among us depends on it. Let us +then resist to our utmost.' + +We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, opposed to such +a determined and numerically superior enemy, were able to justify the +confidence which had been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the +following proclamations by their highest commanders on their arrival in +Belgium: + + GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _14th October 1914_. + + TO THE FOURTH ARMY,--I offer my welcome to the Fourth Army, and + especially to its newly-formed Reserve Corps, and I am confident + that these troops will act with the same devotion and bravery as + the rest of the German Army. + + Advance, with the help of God--my watchword. + + (Signed) WILLIAM, I. R. + + + _ARMY ORDER._ + + I am pleased to take over the command of the Army entrusted to me + by the Emperor. I am fully confident that the Corps which have been + called upon to bring about the final decision in this theatre of + war will do their duty to their last breath with the old German + spirit of courage and trust, and that every officer and every man + is ready to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred + cause of our Fatherland. With God's assistance victory will then + crown our efforts. + + Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor. + + (Signed) DUKE ALBERT OF WÃœRTEMBURG, + _General and Army Commander_. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, + _15th October 1914_. + +Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army was not an infinitely +difficult one. It would have probably been achieved nevertheless if the +Belgians at the moment of their greatest peril had not called the sea +to their aid to bring the German attack to a halt. Let us, however, now +get down to the facts. + +On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering ram of the Fourth +Army, began an attack with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by +almost the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of the Yser +west of the line MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORBAKKE. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division +to the north and the 6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. +By the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had +driven the enemy back across the river in spite of the support given +him by British and French heavy batteries.[25] In front of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division the enemy still held a bridge-head at LOMBARTZYDE. +At 8.15 A.M. on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the Staff of the 6th +Reserve Division, that part of the 26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had +crossed the YSER. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd Battalions +of this regiment had worked their way up to the north-eastern part of +the bend of the YSER, south of SCHOORE, and had got into the enemy's +outposts on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a shot had been +fired, and not an unnecessary noise had disturbed the quiet of the +dawning day. Volunteers from the engineers silently and rapidly laid +bridging material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge west of +KEYEM, which had been blown up and lay in the water, was very quickly +made serviceable again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians had +considered their position sufficiently protected by the river, and by +the outposts along the eastern bank. By 6 A.M. German patrols were on +the far side of the YSER, and the enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire +began only when they started to make a further advance. Three companies +of the 1st and two companies of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as +part of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already crossed the +temporary bridges at the double and taken up a position on the western +bank: so that, in all, 2½ battalions and a machine-gun company were now +on the western bank. + +The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, and prepared a +thoroughly unpleasant day for those who had crossed. Heavy and light +guns of the British and French artillery[26] hammered incessantly +against the narrow German bridge-head and the bridges to it. Lying +without cover in the swampy meadows the infantry was exposed beyond +all help to the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from west and +south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks again and again, +but to attempt sending reinforcements across to it was hopeless. Some +gallant gunners, however, who had brought their guns close up to the +eastern bank, were able to give great help to their friends in their +critical situation. Thus assisted the infantry succeeded in holding +the position, and during the following night was able to make it +sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of success to any +further hostile efforts. During the night several Belgian attacks +with strong forces were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve +Division was able to put a further 2½ battalions across to the western +bank of the YSER bend. On the 23rd we gained possession of TERVAETE, +and the dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was thereby +considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th October saw all the infantry +of the 6th Reserve Division west of the river. A pontoon bridge was +thrown across the north-eastern part of the YSER bend, but it was +still impossible to bring guns forward on account of the enemy's +heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve Division still lay in its battle +positions along the river bank north of SCHOORBAKKE, but every time +attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian artillery smashed +the bridges to pieces. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division suffered heavily, +as it was subjected to constant artillery fire from three sides, and +to entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands and the +high level of the ground water. Whenever fire ceased during the night +strong hostile attacks soon followed; but they were all repulsed. +The withdrawal of the main body of the _Ersatz_ Division behind the +6th Reserve Division to cross the YSER, as General von Beseler had +once planned, had become impracticable for the moment, for it had +been discovered through the statements of prisoners that the 42nd +French Division had arrived in NIEUPORT to assist the Belgians. The +4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been weakened on the 18th by the +transfer of one of its three brigades to the 5th Reserve Division, +could not be expected to bring the new enemy to his knees by the +running fight that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone was +sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; in addition, the fire +of the enemy's naval guns from the sea prevented any large offensive +operations in the area in question. Thus the _Ersatz_ troops were +compelled to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining their +positions under the cross-fire of guns of every calibre, to driving +back the hostile attacks, and to holding the Belgian and French forces +off in front of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. +It was not until some long-range batteries were placed at the disposal +of the division that its position improved. A couple of direct hits +on the enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no longer carry +on their good work undisturbed. Their activity at once noticeably +decreased, and the more the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from +the dunes, the further the ships moved away from the coast and the less +were they seen. + +General von Beseler never for a moment doubted that the decision lay +with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions, especially as the four Corps of +the Fourth Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able to reach +the canal-barrier with any considerable forces. + +The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, +had in the meantime come into line south of General von Beseler's +troops, and had already fought some successful actions. It had arrived +on the 19th in the district east of BEERST and about VLADSLOO, just +in time to help in driving back the Franco-Belgian attack against the +southern flank of the 6th Reserve Division.[27] That same evening +it was ordered to attack from north and south against the DIXMUDE +bridge-head, an exceptionally difficult task. In addition to the fact +that the swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom of movement +to an enormous extent, the HANDZAEME canal, running at right angles to +it from east to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIXMUDE lay +at the junction of these two waterways, and behind its bridge-head +lines were the Belgian 'Iron' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French +Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and part of the 5th +Belgian Division, determined to defend the place at all costs. About +eighty guns of every calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire +the ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have to attack. On the +20th, in spite of all these difficulties, the 44th Reserve Division, +on the northern wing of the Corps, captured BEERST and reached the +canal bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's Corps. +The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the left wing, took VLADSLOO +and several villages south-east of it on the northern bank of the +HANDZAEME Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those villages +the reach of the canal between EESSEN and ZARREN was crossed on hastily +constructed footbridges, and a further advance made in a south-westerly +direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and the attack brought us to +within a hundred yards of the enemy. He realised his extremely critical +situation,[28] and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand +were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile artillery fire +the German losses were by no means slight. On one occasion when our +advancing infantry units were losing touch with one another in this +difficult country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered from +DIXMUDE. After a heavy struggle the onrush of the enemy was held up, +mainly owing to our artillery, which heroically brought its guns up +into position immediately behind the infantry front line. + +During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised in order to +recommence its attack on the bridge-head from east and south-east +on the following morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The +garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to hold out to the +last man, and had been informed that any one who attempted to desert +would be shot without mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard +all the exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting for +their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless by the 21st October +the 43rd Reserve Division, which consisted of volunteers from the +Guard Corps Reservists, had taken the château south of DIXMUDE, and +WOUMEN. The opposing sides lay within a hundred yards of each other. +Artillery preparation, attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. +Our artillery did fearful havoc and DIXMUDE was in flames. The +Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly reinforced, and +conducted itself most gallantly. From the north the battalions of the +44th Reserve Division were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy +back on to the town, and German batteries were brought up into, and +at times even in front of, the infantry front line. Although we were +unable to force our way into DIXMUDE, on the evening of the 23rd our +troops were in position all round it. + +On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII Reserve Corps, under +General of Cavalry von Kleist, had advanced at 9 A.M. on 20th October +on the front HANDZAEME-STADEN in order to reach the canal on the line +NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE. The 45th Reserve Division was on the right +and the 46th Reserve Division on the left. After some hours of street +fighting STADEN was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th Reserve +Division. By nightfall a line from CLERCKEN to the eastern edge of +HOUTHULST Forest was reached. On the 21st the Corps had to cross a +stretch of country which put these partially trained troops and their +inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great forest of +HOUTHULST with its dense undergrowth made it exceedingly difficult to +keep direction in the attack and to maintain communication between +units fighting an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such as the +STEENEBECK offered favourable opportunities to the enemy to put up a +strong defence behind a succession of depressions. Thus our gallant +troops after every successful assault found themselves confronted by +another strong position: but unwavering and regardless of loss, they +continued their advance. + +By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Division had completely +driven the enemy out of HOUTHULST Forest,[29] whilst its sister-division +had advanced north of the STEENEBECK, and with its northern wing +supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of it, had pushed +forward to beyond WOUMEN. On the morning of the 22nd the heavy +artillery opened fire against the French positions on the YSER canal +to prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however only the northern +Division was able to reach the sector allotted to the Corps, and an +Army Order directed the 46th Reserve Division to the south-west against +the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK, in order to help carry forward the +attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which was completely held up in front +of the latter place. As a result of this the advance of von Kleist's +Corps also came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable +fame during the day. In spite of a desperate resistance the 210th +Reserve Regiment stormed the strongly entrenched village of MERCKEM and +the village of LUYGHEM lying north of it; a daring attack by the 209th +and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through the enemy's positions on the +MURTJE VAART, whilst the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the +KORTEBECK sector, supported by the concentrated fire of its artillery +in position along the south-western edge of HOUTHULST Forest. The 216th +Reserve Regiment took MANGELAERE by storm, in doing which its gallant +commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed at the head of his troops. +The 1st British Division held a strong position along the KORTEBECK, in +touch with the French, and artillery of every calibre near NOORDSCHOOTE +enfiladed the German attack.[30] The British themselves speak of our +attack as a magnificent feat of arms carried out with infinite courage +and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they charged through +a hail of bullets in closed ranks up to the enemy's defences. The +212th Reserve Regiment under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried +forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve Regiment, pushed its +way into the strongly fortified village of BIXSCHOOTE. The enemy on +our side of the canal, on the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE, +was threatened with annihilation. BIXSCHOOTE commanded the main road +and the canal-crossing to POPERINGHE, where the enemy was detraining +his reinforcements.[31] The British therefore fought with the courage +of desperation: for not only was the fate of the high ground east +and north-east of YPRES now in the balance, but also the chance of +being able to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which had +been planned. YPRES and the high ground east of the canal were on +no account to be lost, and furious counter-attacks were therefore +delivered against the intermingled German units. Nevertheless our +gallant volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the butts of +their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand fighting was finally +decided in our favour. At 6.30 that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours. +Unfortunately, however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it was +lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking troops were to +be relieved under cover of darkness, but they assembled and marched +back before the relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, +immediately advanced into the evacuated village and took position +among the ruins. Simultaneously a big hostile counter-attack drove the +46th Reserve Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK, which it +had captured, and pressed it back beyond the stream again. The spirit +and strength of the young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, +and only a few of the subordinate commanders had yet learnt how to deal +with critical situations. Officers of the General Staff and Divisional +Staffs had to help to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and +followed their new leaders, and were taken forward again to the attack. +Thus on the 23rd the high ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back +by the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained lost to us, and +LANGEMARCK could not be captured.[32] + +On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was directed from the +north against YPRES. If the British and French did not intend to give +up their offensive plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking +Belgium and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from the hated +German, they would have to maintain their positions along the YPRES +bridge-head east of the canal between COMINES and the coast. For this +reason the country round YPRES was the central area of the Anglo-French +defence from the beginning to the end of the battle. Our opponents +defended this position on a wide semicircle by successive lines of +trenches and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, every +farm and even every large copse has won for itself a fame of blood. +The reinforcements which Field-Marshal French received in abundance +he placed round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes; they were +more often used to deliver attack after attack against our young troops +who had been weakened by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they +were already being employed in this manner against the 46th Reserve +Division.[33] He hoped to use the opportunity of our retirement behind +the KORTEBECK to break through our line and to roll up the part of the +front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and thus to regain +the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre on this extreme wing.[34] +However, the blow was parried by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, +badly placed lines the German units, which had scarcely had time to +reorganise, brought the hostile masses to a standstill and won back in +a counter-attack the ground which they had lost during the night. On +this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry the honours +of the day. The fire of the guns, brought up into the foremost lines, +made wide gaps in the attacking columns and the enemy's losses must +have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered severely in the +constant fighting and under the everlasting hostile artillery fire. +Some of our regiments had been reduced to half their strength. But in +spite of it the British did not succeed in breaking through between the +XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps. + +The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this time completely +held up in front of strongly entrenched positions on the line +LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT and opposed to an enemy who was +becoming stronger every day and making the most desperate efforts to +regain his freedom of action and begin a big offensive himself. The +XXVI Reserve Corps, which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the +51st Reserve Division from the area west of ROULERS, and the other +Division from MORSLEDE, encountered a stubborn resistance along the +ridge WESTROOSEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE-KEIBERG. Fighting under the eyes +of their general, who was himself in the thick of the struggle, the +51st Reserve Division stormed the slope on to the ridge and entered +WESTROOSEBEKE. The French division defending it was driven out at +four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the gallant 51st, +supported by the 23rd Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion, reached a line from +the railway-station north-west of POELCAPPELLE to POELCAPPELLE itself +during the evening. The attack was all the more daring through the fact +that HOUTHULST Forest was still in the enemy's hands, and the flank +of the division therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the +52nd Reserve Division had taken PASSCHENDAELE, KEIBERG and the high +ground between them from the British; the artillery again deserving +the highest praise for its co-operation.[35] The attack, however, was +brought to a standstill in front of the enemy's main position at the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE. The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by +General von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in close touch +with the 52nd Reserve Division on the evening of the 20th. Advancing in +four columns and by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards. +The Würtemburg Division had succeeded in driving the 7th British +Division out of BECELAERE after heavy street fighting, and the left +wing was bent back on TERHAND. Communication was there obtained with +the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of the Sixth Army, +which had captured a hostile position north-east of KRUISEIK. + +On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to our immediate front. +It followed a line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-REUTEL-GHELUVELT; +and the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,[36] +all picked troops, had already been located there. They had dug a +well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements before +a single German shell arrived to disturb their work.[37] The few +stretches of rising ground in the district had been included in the +skilfully selected positions as observation posts, and the defenders +were thus able to bring our advancing columns under accurate artillery +fire at long range. This was especially the case from the high ground +near ZONNEBEKE, whence the whole ground in front of the position as +far as LANGEMARCK could be enfiladed. All these difficulties, however, +were not sufficient to deter the offensive spirit of the German +troops, and '_Vorwärts_' was still their watchword: forwards and back +with the enemy, so that the rigid western front might once more be +mobile. The main body of the XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress +of LANGEMARCK[38] from north and east, whilst the XXVII Reserve Corps +fought for the upper hand in the woods between ZONNEBEKE and BECELAERE. +The great efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen +with its guns and support them with their fire were in vain, owing +to the difficult country, and the well-aimed fire from the enemy's +prepared positions reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were +killed, and officers of high rank took their places and reorganised the +intermingled units. + +With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to gain a decisive +victory between BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK on 22nd and 23rd October +the fate of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. For +the time being any further thought of a break-through was out of the +question. The troops up till now had met the enemy full of a keen +fighting spirit, and had stormed his positions singing '_Deutschland, +Deutschland über alles'_ regardless of casualties, and had been one and +all ready to die for their country; but they had suffered heavily in +the contest against a war-experienced and numerically superior opponent +entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when the last reserves +of the Army, the 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, +had been placed at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could +only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night of 23rd-24th +October the expected Anglo-French counter-attacks began, and continued +throughout the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right wing +of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary local successes and +putting in fresh forces the enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a +break-through; but the German troops though weakened held up all these +furious onslaughts from positions which had never been selected for +defence, but were merely those reached at the close of the attack.[39] + +The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced to continue ordering all +his Corps to attack, in order to co-operate with the Sixth Army which +was attacking and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed +to him to their ground: for in the north a decision appeared to be +imminent on the front of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps: in +addition to the entire infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had +crossed the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry of the +5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the 44th Reserve Division +succeeded in crossing the YSER during that day. The enemy was compelled +to evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST. GEORGE to south-east +of STUYVEKENSKERKE, in spite of the fact that there had been one French +and four Belgian Divisions[40] opposing the III Reserve Corps, and +that the ten howitzer batteries had proved insufficient to engage the +Belgian, French and British artillery successfully. In consequence of +this inferiority the old and new canal crossings lay under constant +concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport guns over the +waterway failed. Many a fine piece of engineering carried out by our +indefatigable sappers was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply +of ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of the greatest +difficulty, as all the roads leading to the rear across the swampy +meadows were continuously shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our +front troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next operation +was to break through the enemy's position here once and for all, though +it was clear from the beginning that the attack would be a very severe +one. Belgian and French working parties had dug a series of positions +between the YSER and the NIEUPORT-BIXSCHOOTE railway, from which the +ground in front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade fire from +skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed batteries. On both +wings, according to the latest information at hand, strong hostile +attacks were threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well as +near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these the Army Commander had +replaced the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been echeloned back along +the coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by detachments of +the Marine Division, and a few troops placed at his disposition by the +Governor of Belgium, and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the +same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range guns were placed +to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT +district. However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood +of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those battalions of the 44th +Reserve Division which had crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy +realised the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from the +north-west, and put all available Belgian and French reserves into +the attack. Thus between five and six battalions from three Belgian +regiments and the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a strong +force of artillery, advanced to the attack of our southern flank. The +Belgians themselves describe this attack in the following words: 'One +saw the companies doubling forward in small groups, lying down on +the officers' signal, and then getting up to go forward again until +they finally deployed into their attacking lines. But unfortunately +they were asked to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of +the men were mown down by the machine-guns. Company after company was +decimated, and in spite of the energy of their leaders they had to give +way, death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. The Marine +Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon gallantry, soon shared the same +fate. But all this sacrifice was not in vain--it stopped the enemy's +advance.'[41] + +It will be understood then that the first thing for the weak and widely +separated battalions of the 44th Reserve Division to do on the 25th was +to get breathing space and reorganise, even though they were exposed +all the time to the heaviest fire from west, south and south-east. +Further to the north, however, on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and +6th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries +across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of these two +divisions had been concentrated under the expert leadership of General +von Ziethen, it began to prepare the way for the infantry attack. By +midday both the divisions were advancing steadily towards the railway +embankment on the line RAMSCAPPELLE-PERVYSE. The Belgians had to +evacuate position after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire was +poured in by the enemy's artillery about NIEUPORT; and simultaneously +a brigade of the 6th Reserve Division south-east of PERVYSE had to be +directed southwards in order not to lose touch with the right wing of +the 44th Reserve Division. There were no reinforcements to fill up the +gaps, and thus the attack came shortly afterwards to a standstill. + +A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly from the south: the +German artillery, including 42-centimetre guns, had bombarded DIXMUDE +throughout the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and now the 43rd +Reserve Division had begun its assault on the town. It resulted in +the most violent street fighting; fast and furious came the bullets +from the machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of the town, +and from the shells from the batteries massed west of the YSER, but +nothing could hold up our attack. The Belgians have given the following +description of the power of the German assault: 'What plunder must not +they have been promised, to allow themselves to be killed in such a +way? What drink must they not have taken to give themselves such animal +courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, they storm forward with the +howls of wild beasts; lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under +foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot down in hundreds, they +keep coming on. Then follow isolated fights with bayonets and the butts +of rifles: some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls +bashed in.' The fight swayed backwards and forwards till well into the +night: guns brought up into the front line fired at point-blank range: +both sides put in their last reserves. + +During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets fixed, and we attacked +again. A small German detachment of about fifty men advanced across +the YSER bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the enemy's batteries, +it succumbed to greatly superior numbers. Thus the morning of 26th +October found the attackers back in their assault-positions: their +courage, spirit and indifference to death having added another leaf of +fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It was clear, however, that another +artillery bombardment was indispensable to success, and it was carried +out on the 26th and 27th. + +That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and the French Marine +Fusiliers in the fighting just described is shown by the fact that +on the morning of the 26th Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly +brought up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A German attack on +the 28th was able to make some progress on the southern flank against +these fresh troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No further +effort was made on the 29th, for there was a shortage of artillery +ammunition. The eastern edge of the town was, however, bombarded by +trench-mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect. + +Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII Reserve Corps should +only leave a weak force of from three to four battalions on the eastern +bank of the Yser opposite DIXMUDE; that DIXMUDE should be kept under +heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder of the 43rd Reserve +Division should cross the YSER, north of DIXMUDE, in order to attack +the town from the rear. + +North-west of DIXMUDE, by the evening of the 29th, the troops of +General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve Division had worked their +way forward some 300 yards towards the railway embankment. Only one +brigade of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was still north-east of NIEUPORT: +all the rest were taking part in the struggle further south, and west +of the YSER. NIEUPORT was shut in on the south: the left wing of the +44th Reserve Division lay west of BEERST, as protection against the +strong hostile forces near the river about DIXMUDE: the Belgians and +recently-arrived French forces held the railway embankment between +NIEUPORT and DIXMUDE. Broad stretches of wire entanglements lay in +front of this strong position, and the efforts of our troops had been +almost superhuman in their advance over this ground: it was intersected +with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards broad, and thick, +wired hedges. So strong, however, was the pressure against the enemy +that the French were compelled to reduce their forces about NIEUPORT +and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant reinforcements +to the area PERVYSE-RAMSCAPPELLE. A German airman, who was killed on +the morning of the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that +the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault began at 6.30 A.M., +though the ground in the area of the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions +had become extraordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the +recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water to such +an extent. Nevertheless the attack made considerable progress. The +11th Brigade of the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way +into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village of PERVYSE, +whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the 48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments +reached the railway embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it +towards RAMSCAPPELLE. Although every house had to be attacked, it +succeeded in reaching the western end of the village. The 12th Reserve +Regiment also made considerable advance. + +The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when the 33rd _Ersatz_ +Brigade on the northern wing advanced from the north-east against +NIEUPORT, the enemy retired. Airmen reported enemy's columns retreating +towards FURNES. Nothing could stop the victorious advance of General +von Beseler's troops, not even the heaviest guns of the British +battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, +enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 yards, nor the +incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian Divisions. On the +evening of the 30th RAMSCAPPELLE was completely in German possession, +the railway embankment south of it had been reached and even crossed in +places; in PERVYSE the fight was progressing favourably, and south of +it the 12th Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad dykes, was +working forward to the railway. Still further south the 44th Reserve +Division was in full advance towards the railway embankment east of +OOSTKERKE, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve Division had +crossed the YSER, without casualties, and had been sent forward in the +direction of CAESKERKE. + +The attack was to have been continued on the following morning, and +General von Beseler intended to withdraw the last part of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade, from the area north-east +of NIEUPORT, for the fire of the enemy's naval guns from the sea[42] +and the difficulties of the country appeared to militate against any +prospects of a rapid success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General +Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported that the attack +could be continued no further owing to the constant rising of the +water. What had happened? On the morning of the 30th the advancing +troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it had gradually +risen until they were now wading up to their knees, and they could +scarcely drag their feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down +for a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, he +was lost. The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain +of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry +weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off. But +the rising flood soon prevented the movement of wagons with ammunition +and supplies, and when the attackers looked back from the railway +embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole country had sunk behind +them: the green meadows were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the +general line of the roads was only indicated by the houses and the rows +of partly covered trees. It soon became evident that the enemy must +have blown up the canal-sluices, and called in the sea to his aid. +The advance of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps had been the +culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his reserves had been +put in to stop it, but in vain. If the Germans could only succeed in +pushing the exhausted Belgians and French out of their way, the road to +DUNKIRK and CALAIS was open. Warnings, friendly and otherwise, had been +given by the Allies to the Belgians that they must 'hold out'; but they +were no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of ANTWERP now +than when behind fortress ramparts. Their fighting spirit was broken; +so, influenced by the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert +finally decided to employ this last desperate means of defence, and +place a wide expanse of his fair country under water. The water-level +rose slowly and insidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the +YSER north of DIXMUDE had almost everywhere overflowed its banks. The +inundation destroyed buildings as well as soil, but it enabled the +worn-out defenders to recover their sore-threatened security. + +General von Beseler quickly realised the danger which now awaited +his attacking troops on the far side of the canal, behind whom a +sheet of water, 2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. +The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to make, yet it had +to be done. The attack would have to be given up and the greater +part of the western bank of the river evacuated. The order was +issued and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st October. In +spite of the dangers due to the altered appearance of the country +and the consequent difficulty in finding the way, and although the +Franco-Belgian artillery kept the YSER crossings under constant +heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. Not a wounded +man nor rifle fell into the enemy's hands, and the movement was so +well covered that the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until +it was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers under +Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind for a long time in PERVYSE. In +front of them the enemy was sweeping the village with artillery +and infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an apparently +boundless sea. A French colonel offered Lieutenant Buchholz honourable +conditions if he would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the +offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off with his little +band of followers. They rejoined their unit successfully. The enemy +only followed up slowly along the roads, with weak detachments of +infantry. Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the line ST. +GEORGE-STUYVEKENSKERKE, whilst the main body on the 31st took up its +new position east of the YSER as follows: the 5th Reserve Division +north of the main road ST. PIERRE CAPPELLE-MANNEKENSVERE; the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division in the area MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE; and the 6th +Reserve Division to the south of it. One battalion and one battery +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division remained facing NIEUPORT, extending +northwards to the coast. A new defensive position was selected along +the line WESTENDE-MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE-KASTEELHOEK: a continuation of +the attack was now out of the question, as the water was still rising +west of the YSER. On 31st October and 1st November, however, the XXII +Reserve Corps again tried to press its attack southwards on the east +bank of the river, in order to isolate the DIXMUDE bridge-head, but +here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented movement, and on the +evening of the 1st these brave troops also had to yield to the forces +of nature and withdraw behind the YSER. This operation was carried out +in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, and was unmolested by +the enemy, for he lay in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for +the time being DIXMUDE remained in possession of the French. + +The Army Commander had issued definite instructions on the evening of +the 24th October to the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the +effect that they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, and +take every opportunity of seizing important points on their immediate +front. In the execution of this order the German troops experienced +a good deal of heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The XXVII +Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing REUTEL and holding it;[43] +but in the meantime heavy hostile attacks were begun against the +XXIII, XXVI and the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. +The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of French units, +endeavoured to break through, and used all their strength. Indeed, +in many places the situation of these German volunteer corps became +critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the enemy was able to +keep our roads of advance and communications under artillery fire. As +the roads were already broken up by the constant rain, the ammunition +supply of our artillery, inferior in any case to our opponents', +failed. Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties our counter-attacks +continued. The fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th October. In this sector +the British and French made a succession of attacks in the direction +POELKAPPELLE, PASSCHENDAELE and east of ZONNEBEKE. The 37th _Landwehr_ +Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, under the command of General +von Meyer, had to be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to +detachments of the Marine Division and of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. +These _Landwehr_ men, far from being weighed down by their years, +gave effective support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger +friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of the fighting on the +evening of the 26th General von Meyer was mortally wounded: may his +memory be duly honoured. + +An exceptionally heavy British and French attack was delivered on the +24th and 25th near ZONNEBEKE, against the inner flanks of the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations are always +the weakest parts of the defence, and when the General Staff Officer +of the XXVII Reserve Corps asked for the support of the Corps on his +right, he received the reply that no infantry could be spared 'for the +enemy....' And at that moment the telephone circuit failed. There was +nothing to do but close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery +barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and their leaders. +The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve Division shelled the advancing +enemy as fast as they were able, and by this aid the infantry was +finally enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the same time +the enemy made a strong attack further to the south. The report came in +that he had surrounded BECELAERE; but before his supports could assist +him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division had driven back his +assaulting troops.[44] The Corps was able to hold its old line from the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE through REUTEL to POEZELHOEK. Comparative +quiet followed on the 28th and morning of the 29th, for both sides were +very exhausted. On the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived +at DADIZEELE as Army Reserve. + +The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of eight Cavalry +Divisions and several _Jäger_ battalions under General von der Marwitz, +was in action on the left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between +the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which lay half-way +between WARNETON and ARMENTIÈRES. The enemy could not be attacked +here by any form of mounted action; so far from this being possible, +ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting on foot, to which the +cavalrymen were unaccustomed. Nevertheless they carried out this task +in brilliant fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position +and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held up the British who were +streaming down from the high ground about WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES,[45] +the 3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the 4th, 9th and 10th +_Jäger_ battalions and five battalions of the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade +brought forward from Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the +assault of the line KRUISEIK-ZANDVOORDE and west of it. This direction +was taken in order to be able to attack from the south against the +rear of the enemy holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to +29th October were memorable and glorious days for this Cavalry Corps. +Among other achievements, the 3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture +KRUISEIK on the 26th after heavy street fighting.[46] In co-operation +with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, next to which the +16th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in the fighting under +Colonel List, General von Stetten, on the 29th, carried forward the +attack against GHELUVELT, the key of the enemy's position. More than +600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken by our victorious +cavalry.[47] Simultaneously on this day, the troops of General von +Stetten filled another rôle. They were covering the concentration of +new German forces which was in the course of completion behind their +battle-front. + + + + +THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES + + +Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during October, the Sixth +Army under Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria had remained on the offensive +on the line ARRAS-LA BASSÉE--east of ARMENTIÈRES;[48] but although +fresh reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the front by the +German General Staff, a break-through had not been possible. Both sides +had gradually changed their objectives and now merely sought to prevent +any movement of the opposing forces from that front to the decisive +zone of operations between NIEUPORT and YPRES. Any weakness in the +enemy's line, however, was utilised to gain new and improved positions +from which another effort to break through might be made as soon as +possible. Owing to the failure of the offensive south of NIEUPORT, +a decision under the conditions existing there could not be hoped +for; the German General Staff therefore began considering a plan for +concentrating a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and the +Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the Army Cavalry, and for +breaking through with it on the front WERWICQ-WARNETON, south of YPRES. + +On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn arrived at the +Headquarters of the Sixth Army to discuss this operation. The plan was +arranged and orders were issued accordingly. A new 'Army Group' was +to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the command of General von +Fabeck, commander of the XIII Würtemburg Corps.[49] It would consist +of the II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up from the south +to join the Sixth Army), the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (still in +reserve to the Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division (of the +Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by the 48th Reserve Division +recently arrived from the Fifth Army). In addition to these formations +all the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would be brought +up to assist, and if necessary the attacks further south would be +partially discontinued. The offensive was to take place on the 30th +October from the general line WERWICQ-DEULEMONT in a north-easterly +direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division of the II Corps was also +to be brought up by rail to LILLE. The orders of the German General +Staff pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth and Sixth +Armies was an essential condition for the success of the operation. +Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing +and centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding attacks, and +Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a general attack of his Army for the +30th October. + +How the flooding of the YSER on the front of the right wing of the +Fourth Army brought the offensive of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to +a standstill has already been described. From the 1st November the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division took over the protection of the line of the flooded +area from the coast to TERVAETE, whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved +southwards to the district ZARREN-STADEN in order to reinforce the +XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation might require.[50] To +the XXII Reserve Corps was allotted the task of holding the two French +divisions stationed in the DIXMUDE bridge-head, which formed a constant +threat to the German front. The Corps carried out this task admirably. + +On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve +Corps advanced to the attack as ordered. The first-named under General +von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the ruins of BIXSCHOOTE. +After five hours' desperate fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve +Infantry Regiments entered the devastated village which had been +occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying situation, +and the hopelessness of finding cover among the battered houses, +resulted in the victorious German regiments being exposed to a very +heavy artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties in the +village were greater than during the assault. In consequence the +commander decided to withdraw and take up a line along the northern +edge of BIXSCHOOTE, leaving in the village itself only sufficient +outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The division on the +left wing of the Corps also made progress and reached the main road +BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked +LANGEMARCK with its right wing, but was unable to take it. In spite of +gallant efforts only a few hundred yards of ground were gained by the +evening of the 31st, when these useless attacks were stopped by order. +The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the right wing of the +XXVII Reserve Corps were held to their positions by superior hostile +artillery fire, and also by mass attacks of the British and French +during the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had just arrived, +and in the presence of General Joffre an attempt to break through +our line was to be made on this sector of the front.[51] The German +defenders, however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus enabled +the offensive of the Army Group of General von Fabeck to take place. +In conjunction with this the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve +Corps, under its new commander, General von Schubert, simultaneously +advanced in the direction of GHELUVELT. + +During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th Infantry Division +was relieved in its battle-position west of LILLE by the 48th Reserve +Division, and by the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army Group +Fabeck was completed without disturbance. + +The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted +of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each +of 3 batteries, and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to +the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four _Jäger_ +battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade were +put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th +October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry +Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the +offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked +south of the MENIN-YPRES road, with its left wing on ZANDVOORDE, the +II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on WAMBEKE; +further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing +on MESSINES. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the +4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the +XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered +to advance on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division moved to the line MENIN-WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had +been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one +Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at +hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and +the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary. + +The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th +Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before +the advance of von Fabeck's Army; the II and IX French Corps had also +recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the YPRES salient.[55] +Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was +the second and severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British +in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were +brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the YSER and at YPRES, both +at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as +to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers +the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go +further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat +into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds, +gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during +the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the +Rhine. + +The character of the fighting which began with the appearance of the +new German Army Group on the scene had almost the savagery of the +Middle Ages in it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point, and each of them had to be stormed by our +men with heavy loss. Even when the first line of these fortifications +had been taken they were confronted by a second one immediately behind +it; for the enemy showed great skill in taking every advantage of the +ground, unfavourable in any case to the attacker. To the east and +south-east of YPRES, even more developed than in the north, there were +thick hedges, wire fences and broad dykes. Numerous woods also of +all sizes with dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable +and most difficult for observation purposes. Our movements were +constantly being limited to the roads which were swept by the enemy's +machine-guns. Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments the +villages were mostly in ruins by the time the infantry reached them, +but the enemy fought desperately for every heap of stones and every +pile of bricks before abandoning them. In the few village streets +that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally developed +into isolated individual combats, and no description can do adequate +justice to the bravery of the German troops on such occasions. Our men +advanced to the attack as if they were back on the barrack square, and +an Englishman writes: 'They advanced towards us singing patriotic songs +and with their bands playing.' There was such enthusiasm that even the +weakest were carried along by it, and made regardless of losses. The +battle of YPRES in the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German +heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long remain a source +of inspiration for the historian and the poet. + +By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the importance of the +attacks developing from the south-east against YPRES. They threatened +his position along the high ground on the line GHELUVELT-PASSCHENDAELE +and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way to, the town, the pivot +on which all the Franco-British offensive plans rested. On this day, +therefore, the British commander sent up the 7th Division into the +line again, although it had only just been relieved owing to its heavy +losses.[57] + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 30TH. 1914.] + +Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. Our heavy guns +began the bombardment of the enemy's well-constructed lines at about +7.45 A.M., but observation was made very difficult by the weather +conditions, and could only be carried out from the foremost infantry +lines. The telephonic communication rendered necessary was frequently +cut by the enemy's shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries +were able to make such excellent practice that at the most vital points +of the enemy's position the spirit of the defenders appeared to be +completely broken. The high ground about ZANDVOORDE offers a typical +case. Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of the British +defence and one of the main observation posts for the artillery. At +9 A.M. our troops charged the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M. +ZANDVOORDE itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; +the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian _Jäger_ battalions of the Army Cavalry +took a great share in the success. Soon afterwards the high ground +north-east and immediately west of the village fell into German hands. +Two whole British squadrons with their machine-guns lay, dead and +wounded, completely annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.[58] +Further south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British cavalry +supported by part of the III British Corps. After a severe hand-to-hand +encounter it took possession of the château, and finally also of the +village of HOLLEBEKE. The left wing of the Corps pushed forward as +far as the WAMBEKE stream, north of the village of the same name, but +had here to put in all its reserves to hold its ground against strong +hostile counter-attacks.[59] + +On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division was engaged +in heavy fighting, the position confronting it being a particularly +strong one. It lay along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet +high,[60] running north and south, eastwards of Mount KEMMEL, and gave +the enemy an extensive view eastwards over our lines. The defence +of this ridge was greatly facilitated by the villages of WYTSCHAETE +and MESSINES on it. These had been turned into fortresses, and were +connected by deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements.[61] +Owing to observation difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing +the airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was unable from its +positions in the valley to bring a sufficiently heavy bombardment on +the enemy's lines; and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with +great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for the assault. On +the right wing the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of +Austria) took the fortified village of WAMBEKE, and on the left wing +the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly towards MESSINES. The +ridge north-east of the last-named village was stormed, but the assault +on the locality itself, which was to have been delivered at 7.10 in +the evening, could not get on owing to heavy enfilade fire from the +south which held back the attackers some hundred yards away from its +edge.[62] The Cavalry Corps[63] had gained ground at first, but, in +consequence of their weakness in artillery, they had been unable to +take ST. YVES or to make progress against the strongly fortified wood +south-west of it. The same story describes the day's work of the XIX +Corps[64] fighting to the south of the cavalry. + +On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the +30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts +of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division +had not been able to carry us into GHELUVELT.[65] General von Deimling +and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the +front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions +desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another +artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary. + +From the enemy's point of view, however, the situation was anything +but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von +Deimling's troops into ZANDVOORDE endangered the southern side of the +YPRES salient, and the capture of HOLLEBEKE brought the Germans within +three miles of YPRES itself. YPRES was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal +French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he +now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the +line ZANDVOORDE-HOLLEBEKE in order to support the 7th British Division, +which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore, +the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued +along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable +Würtemburg troops again tried to storm MESSINES. + +On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops +to meet the enemy's reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division was brought up in readiness north of the LYS behind the II +Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that +the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge was of decisive importance, and that +every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main +pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the +II Bavarian Corps. + +According to the enemy's accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of +the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of +great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of +the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is +true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us +YPRES, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it +was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there +could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the YPRES +district. The fact that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops +gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to +fight the battle round YPRES, though their situation was most perilous, +gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real +worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly. + +At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery +bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten +and a half miles. The enemy's batteries were not long in replying; +being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous +fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning, +the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines, +blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far +back as the LYS, so that any regular transport of supplies became +impossible. At GHELUVELT, however, the important northern corner of the +Army Group Fabeck, the enemy's hail of shells had but little result, +because our capture of the high ground at ZANDVOORDE had made the work +of observation very difficult. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914.] + +After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of +GHELUVELT was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously. +Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was +to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own +regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the +143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th +Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and +the 26th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to +make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of +the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks +were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our +converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and +30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the +general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines, +though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by +a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His +Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of +the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze +of the enemy's obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by +artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line. +The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69] +and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of +smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of +no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds +were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of +importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, +so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good +sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant +men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the +assault, were the special target of the enemy's sharpshooters, well +trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy's +position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his +superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy's counter-attacks, +delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some +of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general +success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the +dense woods near REUTEL,[72] which were defended by a strong system of +obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in +trees.[73] + +While this was in progress the last assault on GHELUVELT was taking +place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village, +and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its château and park was in German +possession.[74] Colonel von Hügel took his storming parties of the +54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while +Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then, +however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against GHELUVELT. +The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was +hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a +hero's death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery +fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing +caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the +enemy's counter-attack failed and GHELUVELT became and remained ours, +and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75] +The enemy prevented our further advance beyond GHELUVELT by a heavy +fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west +of GHELUVELT. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to +be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the +left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of +some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th +Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it +took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an +accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the +enemy's staff work for some time. During the bombardment of HOOGE, a +direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British +Division were working: one general and several staff officers were +killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian +Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on +the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the +woods west of HOLLEBEKE, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far +as OOSTTAVERNE. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into +line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on WYTSCHAETE. + +We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the +victor in the fight for the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge? The 6th Bavarian +Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards WYTSCHAETE, +regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground +on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left +wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to +break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the +Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve +Infantry Regiment was to enter WYTSCHAETE from the east and the 21st +from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men +wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters +with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the +haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to +take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in +the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the +night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that +our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have +helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians +advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the +enemy's artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of +the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly +outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry +Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village +and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and +numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either +killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately, +however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news +of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them +sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore +decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern +edge of WYTSCHAETE, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the +21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at +this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire +from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim +light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards +among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in +spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment +held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was +quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and +communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with +the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six +regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night, +and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground. + +The fighting around MESSINES on the 31st had been equally severe. On +the 30th the 26th Infantry Division under Duke William of Urach had +already got its patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any +assault could be made an artillery preparation was required, especially +against the northern sector. On the morning of the 31st October our +howitzers and trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, and +by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the Würtemburg troops to +advance. + +The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge north of MESSINES, +along which runs the road to WYTSCHAETE, whilst the 125th Infantry +Regiment was to advance against MESSINES itself, and the 119th +Grenadier Regiment against the enemy's trenches immediately south of +it. The hostile position was so strong that a force greatly inferior in +strength would be able to hold it against an attack coming up from the +valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and only a few hedges +limited the field of view, so that every advance and assembly position +for miles round could be seen. A strong British garrison held MESSINES: +the trenches had been well made, and were covered by a continuous and +broad system of obstacles.[80] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914 BY THE 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION.] + +The way in which the Swabian troops[81] broke down the enemy's +resistance was indeed a masterpiece. Neither the enemy's artillery +fire, which imperilled the advance of the reserves, nor the British +machine-guns, a large number of which enfiladed the attack from the +south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg troops. At 11 A.M. the +125th Stuttgart Infantry Regiment had got possession of the north-east +corner of MESSINES. The road entering the village from GAPAARD was +blocked by a barricade; and after storming it, another one, a hundred +yards further inside the village, closed the way. The streets could +not be used for our advance, being choked with debris, and under heavy +rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers had to make their way +through or over the walls. There are a number of large, well-built +houses in MESSINES, which the enemy had turned into a succession of +strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up by our sappers. The convent +looked especially impregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong +towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. Captain +Heinrich's Würtemburg battery of the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was +therefore brought up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, +as horses could not move along them, and the infantry carrying up +the ammunition. The convent was soon in flames, burying its stubborn +defenders under its ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry +Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens and backyards, +was the first to make an entry into the market-square. With a few +stout-hearted followers he occupied a large building there which he +defended without any support till the evening against great odds. Not +until nightfall were others of his regiment able to reach him, and +secure the position he had held so courageously. This day of street +fighting had cost very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A +part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of MESSINES had also +had to be directed on to the village, and by the evening a continuous +line had been successfully formed through the centre of it. Isolated +fighting continued throughout the night, and in order to keep up +communication amidst the ruins and recognise one another in the dark, +the Würtemburg troops sang folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with +the rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the streets, and +the crackle of the burning and falling houses, all combined to make a +magnificent and unsurpassed piece of battle-music. + +North of the village the left wing of the 122nd Infantry Regiment +established itself on the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road: but its right wing +was unable to capture the high ground, as WYTSCHAETE itself was still +in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered severely: the progress +of the other regiment of their brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, +had roused their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their ranks +from the south where the Cavalry Corps were still unable to advance. +They were compelled by heavy losses to be content with the task of +securing the left flank of their division. + +On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers were rewarded for +their deeds of immortal fame by a message of warm praise from the +Emperor. + +The final objective, however, had not yet been attained, although in +the south the high ground had been reached and artillery observers sent +forward there, so that the enemy's positions could be accurately ranged +on right up to Mount KEMMEL. The main pressure of the attack would +therefore have to be continued here, on the left wing of the Army Group +Fabeck. + +During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the area +COMINES-WARNETON, north of the LYS, as reserve to the Army Group. + +On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist lay over the country, +so that the infantry got a few hours' rest before the continuous +shelling of the enemy's artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, +the battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the north the +Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the XXVII Reserve Corps further +extended their successes of the previous days. The line was advanced +up to the château of POEZELHOEK, which was taken from the 1st British +Division after a heavy fight.[82] + +The divisions of Deimling's XV Corps attacked with the right wing on +the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road and the left on KLEIN ZILLEBEKE. They +advanced but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, dense +woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again made progress very +difficult. The 30th Division managed to reach the eastern edge of the +HERENTHAGE Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, supported +by infantry, was in position. The wood north of ZANDVOORDE gave +exceptional trouble, but it was finally outflanked on both sides, and +its defenders taken prisoner.[83] + +The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on both sides of the +COMINES-YPRES canal, and drove the enemy back as far as the sharp bend +in it. The left wing captured the small wood west of OOSTTAVERNE which +was defended by Indian and British troops. The treacherous methods of +the Indians greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, and +with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated Asiatics allowed +our troops to pass them, and then got up and stabbed them in the back +with their knives.[84] The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, +on the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of the previous +evening, and at midday began its attack once more. Confidence and +enthusiasm served to obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and +the dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions as if on +parade. Very many of their dead or wounded still lay at the foot of the +heights, but the gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by 4 +P.M. had reached the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE. It was not possible to +push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire, and at this moment the +enemy counter-attacked with two fresh divisions.[85] The Bavarians, who +had become disorganised during the assault, were forced to evacuate the +village again under cover of darkness, after having actually entered +it at about 5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the attack, +being fired at from flank and rear, for the right wing of the 26th +Infantry Division was unable to take all the high ground north-west of +MESSINES until the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting +had gone on in MESSINES throughout the day, till finally the Würtemburg +troops gained the upper hand and cleared the enemy out of the village +to its western edge. The British were driven back down the western +slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in the valley, +losing heavily in the operation. As soon as its right wing reached the +MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held +almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary condition +for the capture of WYTSCHAETE was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division, however, was not able to carry out a third assault without +assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night of the 1st-2nd +therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian Division from its assembly area +WAMBEKE-GARDE DIEU into the fighting line, in order to carry forward +the attack through and beyond WYTSCHAETE towards KEMMEL. + +After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened again on the +morning of the 2nd November along the whole front of the Army Group +Fabeck. His indefatigable troops, some of whom had already endured +twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken place in the +campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched opponent once more. The +enemy was at least as strong as they were in fighting units on the +battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements of newly +arrived British and French troops.[86] + +On the eastern side of the _Ypres_ salient General von Deimling +attacked on a front of nearly four miles. His Corps, which had won its +laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine and in Northern France, again, in spite +of heavy casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. The +30th Division entered VELDHOEK and established itself firmly in the +north-eastern corner of the HERENTHAGE WOOD.[87] The attack had been +facilitated by a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +which had pressed forward some hundred yards north of VELDHOEK. Von +Deimling's left wing had advanced in the direction of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE, +but was held up by the difficult wooded country east of ZWARTELEEN. It +had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring troops on its +left. + +The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on the morning of the +2nd November by strong hostile counter-attacks in the sector west of +HOLLEBEKE. They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was even able +to make a slight advance on the right wing during the day. + +WYTSCHAETE was again the centre of the heaviest fighting on this +day.[88] The Bavarian Reserve Division was, at its own request, to +attack the village; the enemy's position immediately south of it +was allotted as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry +Regiment and an _Abtheilung_ (3 batteries) of the 17th Field Artillery +Regiment remained in Army Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel +began, and the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening him, +hurried up strong reserves to WYTSCHAETE. Kiefhaber's brigade of the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division rose to the assault. Under a hail of +shrapnel the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern slopes of the +WYTSCHAETE ridge for the third time, though with considerable loss, +the enemy's machine-guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon +as the foremost of them had reached the windmill the enemy launched +a counter-attack; but this time the Bavarians were not content with +simply holding their ground; their supports were brought up at the +critical moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious street +fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having to deal with every house +became greatly disorganised. Taking advantage of this the British and +French commanders sent forward fresh masses into the line, trying to +turn the balance in their favour at this important point by employing +every available man. It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the +Pomeranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, and it was +not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the Stettin Grenadier Regiment +had captured the long-coveted high ground south-west of WYTSCHAETE, +the struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been especially +severe. Without possession of this the south flank of the village +could not be held. Count Gneisenau's Colberg Grenadiers were then sent +forward to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable to hold +out in WYTSCHAETE against the rifle-butts and bayonets of the united +Pomeranians and Bavarians. Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its +western edge, was in German hands, although the fighting continued till +well into the night among the ruins with detachments of the enemy who +would not surrender. + +By the capture of WYTSCHAETE a fine commanding position had been +obtained, but the village itself, once so pleasant to the view, was +now terrible to look upon. The church was in flames, and the windmill +flared like a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded +side by side among the smouldering ruins. The enemy was fully aware +of the importance of WYTSCHAETE, but he had been so weakened that he +was unable to recover for another big counter-attack. He therefore +contented himself with small and fruitless efforts, only one of +which succeeded in temporarily entering the village during the 3rd. +Nevertheless for the next few days it lay under the constant fire of +heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not allow this to +interfere with their work. + +Many of the inhabitants still remained in WYTSCHAETE, as in MESSINES, +and it was pathetic to see how they clung to their devastated patches +of ground, regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from the +Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with their last scrap of +property, preferring to die by the shell that destroyed their homes. + +A small wood north-west of WYTSCHAETE, called the Park, was still +a dangerous point. This dense copse was surrounded by a system of +trenches and several rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully +sited flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it had been +turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, and cost us many days of +heavy fighting before it was finally taken. + +The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of MESSINES, immediately +put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the +51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November +by the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve. +The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation +with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the STEENBEEK stream. +However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every +movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery +fire from the commanding positions on Mount KEMMEL.[89] + +On the 3rd November the formation of a 'Group Urach' was ordered, +consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the +attack against the high ground east of KEMMEL; but in the following +days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general +situation in this sector. + +A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and +co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small +force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November +it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm KLEIN DOUVE with +complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was +relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions. + +In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy's operations +against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change. +The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the +big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops, +especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had +to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy's commanders, +however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make +much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on +the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy +fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly +damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour, +therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward +positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon +discovered by our airmen. + +During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army +came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck +could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still +too weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions, +particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to +the battle-front. + +If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was not to be entirely +abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby +avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES battle +from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, +the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the +2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General +Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the +disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on +the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered +the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from +the Sixth Army, west of LILLE; and this was followed by an order on +the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from +their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by +the IV Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard +Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under +Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached +on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group +Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the +Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated +to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push +the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES +canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. +In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with +instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, +had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on +the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group +Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for +the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there were left the II +Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von +Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. +The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the +10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given +the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions. + +The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to +the COMINES-YPRES canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th +November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near KLEIN +ZILLEBEKE and drove the recently arrived French troops from their +position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The +troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of +ZWARTELEEN, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. +The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made +observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and +an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the +retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy, +the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy's +counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much +weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part, +had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment +captured the fortified position along the western edge of VELDHOEK; +with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost +ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander, +hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including +_Landwehr_ men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to +meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head +of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering +considerable loss.[93] + +The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile +counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn +resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which +YPRES can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their +positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November, +took the high ground on which ST. ELOI is situated.[94] To the 5th +Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The +enemy remained for a long time in the houses of ST. ELOI, but the high +ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave +us a bird's-eye view of the country east of YPRES, where the mass of +the British field artillery was in position. + +The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in +and north of WYTSCHAETE was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the +dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the +village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers, +the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery +fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in +the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far +safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the +battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying +to the north-west. + +The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right +wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the +Park north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's fighting the 34th +Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent +at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had +been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south +of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was +very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was +found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade +fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, +and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was +surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the +impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen +with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and +they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park +of WYTSCHAETE was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st +Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd +Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is +a legend connected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was worthy of +it.[95] + +The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines +to the western slopes of the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places +across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, +as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch every movement in +our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field +or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were +by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses +were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of +ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation +of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, +we were unable to range accurately on the enemy's artillery, and the +most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their +observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon discovered, and the fight +now began against the observers there as well as against those posted +in the towers of YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the +gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of YPRES, which gave +such a fine view of the whole countryside. + +Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the +Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army. + +Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the +new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of +the COMINES-YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the operations +of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be +touched on. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH +NOVEMBER 1914 + + +Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under General von Fabeck +was engaged in the heavy fighting just described, the Fourth Army +of Duke Albert of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means of +constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing any troops from +his front to support his endangered positions near YPRES. By 11 A.M. +on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German forces rendered +necessary by the inundation of the front between the coast and DIXMUDE +had been sufficiently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered +on this day, on the line DIXMUDE-GHELUVELT. The right flank, from +DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured by the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade, 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the +orders of the general officer commanding the XXII Reserve Corps. The +dispositions of the attacking troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve +Corps in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE; the III Reserve Corps, +including the 44th Reserve Division, on both sides of LANGEMARCK, +facing the front HET SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group +in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were to the south +again, with the left flank resting on the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road.[97] + +By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps had been able +to gain ground at and north of BIXSCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve +Division advancing from the north had forced its way close up to the +western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts to capture this place +by attacks from north and east, in spite of reinforcements being +brought up, failed. It became evident that the enemy's skilfully +placed and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired +infantry positions in a country so favourable for defence, were more +than a match for our guns, especially at a time when ammunition was +scarce, and the misty weather prevented observation from aeroplanes. +A continuation of the offensive here would only have meant a useless +sacrifice of life. It was therefore decided with deep regret to resort +to the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to hold the enemy. +The situation of the Fourth Army indeed was no enviable one. Here +in the plains of Flanders, operations were effected by the November +weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country east and south +of YPRES. The troops had to endure great hardships; their trenches +rapidly filled with water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give +insufficient protection against artillery fire. In several places they +had to be evacuated altogether, and the men lay out in the open with +only a hastily constructed wire entanglement in front to secure them +against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most difficult in this +water-logged district. Frequently it could only be carried on by piling +up sand-bag parapets, and these being easily seen by the enemy were +promptly shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular reliefs +for the troops in the front line were out of the question, for the +units available at that time were too weak; and in any case, the men +found relief time a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to +observe every movement, especially where he still held good observation +points, as at BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK. + +A very extensive system of espionage served to complete his knowledge +of our intentions. Individual soldiers were left behind in civilian +clothing, with concealed telephonic communication; they kept hidden +during the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our movements +and dispositions quickly and accurately to their headquarters.[98] +A great deal of information was also given away by the Belgian +population, who crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent +news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. Although the +punishment meted out to espionage was severe, the Belgians always kept +up this form of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, and its +effect could be diminished only by maintaining thorough surveillance +of the country in rear of our lines. Our reserves, about which the +enemy was always well informed, had for the above reasons to be kept +close up behind the front lines in order to be near at hand at the +critical moment. Their movements, as well as the sending up of all +the necessary supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty. +Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden meadows, the farms in +the neighbourhood being insufficient to provide shelter for them all. +The troops who were withdrawn from the front line and put in reserve +had therefore small opportunity for either rest or recreation. + +The insecurity of our communications back into the interior of Belgium +must be passed over almost without mention, except to say that here +too a colossal task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the +General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, but to provide +observation posts along the Dutch frontier. In carrying out these +duties, the old _Landsturm_ troops showed a spirit of endurance which +said much for the military training they had received many years +before. The work of keeping watch over the excited population was not +without its dangers, and all praise is due to these garrison troops and +to the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their assistance. Thanks +to them, the long lines of communication through conquered Belgium were +not disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our army suffered +no interruption from the enemy. For the honour of all concerned this +must be put on record. + +On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made attacks on a larger scale +along the coast. On the 4th, believing that we had left only weak +outposts behind, even opposite NIEUPORT, when we retired to the eastern +bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments advanced through +LOMBARTZYDE. At first they gained a slight success, but were shortly +afterwards attacked by part of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade from the +east, and by the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade from the south, and driven back. +Detachments of the Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The +second attack made by about five thousand French troops, which took +place on the 7th, fared far worse; the whole of LOMBARTZYDE was taken +by our counter-attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.[99] + +On the 9th November the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade was relieved by parts +of the Marine Division, for the 10th November was the day on which the +new offensive was to be made with fresh troops against YPRES from the +south-east. + + + + +THE LAST PHASE + + +When the 4th Division and von Winckler's Guard Division were sent +forward on the 9th November into the northern part of the fighting +line, formerly occupied by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from +the heights of ST. ELOI it had just stormed, was able to look right +down on YPRES. The orders of the Sixth Army commander, dated the +7th and 8th November, had given all the necessary instructions for +the employment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division and von +Winckler's Guard Division were placed under the commander of the +Guard Corps, General Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called +Plettenberg's Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg's Corps formed the +Army Group Linsingen.[100] + +The task set the troops of General von Linsingen was 'to drive back +and crush the enemy lying north of the canal (COMINES-YPRES); the +main weight of the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The +Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west of the canal, +its task being to continue pressing forward and at the same time to +support the attack of the left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as +powerful enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.' The +decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, when another strong +reinforcement of engineers would have arrived. All the other units of +the Sixth Army and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according to +arrangement, to attack on this day with increased energy, so that the +enemy should be allowed no rest, and held to his positions along the +whole front. + +On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced to the attack. This +tenth day of November was to be a famous one in its history. The +sectors of attack for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, +the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps had been +closed in slightly to the north. Strengthened by the Guard _Jäger_ +Battalion, a Guard Machine-Gun Detachment[101] and the 9th Machine-Gun +Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards the POLYGON Wood. + +The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as follows: 'The XXII Reserve +Corps[102] in co-operation with the Marine Division will secure the +YSER canal front, and will take DIXMUDE.' Immediately north of DIXMUDE +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was in position, with the 43rd Reserve +Division to the east and south, the two divisions together making a +semicircle of steel round the objective. This time our troops were +determined to take the town so stubbornly defended by the French +infantry. The enemy fully realised the importance of this bridge-head. +Besides holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, it +covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On the 9th its garrison +was further reinforced by the arrival of fresh French troops. + +The rain of the previous days had made the ground over which the attack +on DIXMUDE was to be carried out very heavy going. The HANDZAEME canal, +running east and west, divides it into two parts, the northerly one +being particularly swampy and difficult to cross. The main attack had +therefore to be made from the east and south-east on a comparatively +narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern and obsolete +fortifications, but the first strongholds of the defenders were the +railway buildings and cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway +embankment had been transformed into a very strong defensive position, +and a heavy fire was expected from it when we advanced from the high +embankments of the YSER. Under the cover of darkness the division was +able to push its front line to an assault position within two hundred +yards of the enemy, and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment +began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless shells from our +_Minenwerfer_ did their utmost to break down the enemy's resistance. +By 7.40 A.M. our first attempt to take the enemy's advanced positions +had failed, and another artillery bombardment against his obstacles and +flanking posts was ordered. At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at +the cemetery was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into position +there before the artillery observers arrived to direct the fire of +their batteries from the front line on to the next strong point. The +artillery bombardment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M. when +the general assault was ordered. The infantry, with detachments of +sappers carrying hand-grenades and various material useful in an +assault, had worked its way forward close up to the line of obstacles. + +The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced rapidly at first by +frontal attack. North of it, the 15th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion under +Captain Hameln worked forward across the deep marshes between the +canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry Regiment came under +a heavy enfilade fire from the YSER embankment, and at 1.30 P.M. +orders were issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, +consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division and of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division, to be brought up into the line. Its task was +to help carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment against the +railway embankment, and to secure the left flank of the advance. The +nearer the attack approached to the town, the more desperate became +the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander of the 201st +Reserve Regiment, General von Seydewitz, always in the front line +encouraging his men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment +and the _Jäger_ entered the devastated town at about 3.30 P.M. Our +well-directed artillery fire had cleared the front at the critical +moment, and the enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind DIXMUDE, but +did not cease to offer resistance. He held the railway embankment south +of the town with particular tenacity. Even when this had been finally +stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the fight, with heavy loss, +among the burning houses in the southern part of the town, until the +201st Regiment by a wheel southwards were able to give assistance. +Teetzmann's brigade in its attack on the YSER embankment, to protect +the flank of the division, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it +pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so that the enemy's +retreat was threatened. In spite of this, however, he gave nothing +up without a struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: +in fact the street fighting that ensued was hardly less bitter and +terrible than at WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES. + +During the struggle in DIXMUDE, the French artillery fired into the +place regardless of friend or foe, and both suffered alike. The fight +was still raging among the houses at the northern exit, where von +Beerst was only making slow progress with the advanced detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, when our reserves were assembled in the +market-square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry and Marine +Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but finally had to give way, for +though not numerically superior, the offensive spirit of the German +troops overcame all resistance. It was not until the west bank of the +canal had been reached, that the mass of the enemy put up another +defence. + +DIXMUDE was captured, and the French had been driven back across the +canal. A combined counter-attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which +began during the evening and continued into the night, was unable to +alter the situation, and though DIXMUDE in consequence was under the +heaviest fire, our troops held their ground. Weak detachments of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division were even able to cross the river north of the +town under cover of darkness, though the extreme swampiness of the +ground prevented them carrying their success any further. The enemy had +prepared the bridges, west of DIXMUDE, for demolition some time before +and had constructed strong positions along the west bank of the YSER. +These were especially good, as the ground there is higher and overlooks +that on the east bank. Our artillery had therefore to make another +preparatory bombardment. The spoils taken at DIXMUDE were considerable, +and in spite of the fact that the British assert that the Allies only +lost a few hundred men, we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 +men.[103] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE. + ON NOVEMBER 10TH. 1914.] + +Our allied enemies had also been driven back over the canal, south +of DIXMUDE, on the 10th November. The XXIII Reserve Corps had made +a successful attack on NOORDSCHOOTE and through BIXSCHOOTE against +HET SAS. A long and bitter struggle took place for the high ground +south-west of BIXSCHOOTE; but by evening the canal had been reached +along almost its whole length between NOORDSCHOOTE and BIXSCHOOTE, +whilst about a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division and weak +detachments of the 46th had crossed it. The inundation had however +gradually extended southwards as far as this district, and put any +far-reaching extension of this success out of the question. The XXIII +Reserve Corps took prisoner about 1000 men and captured a considerable +number of machine-guns in this operation. + +The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight +on both sides of LANGEMARCK. Throughout the 9th November and during +the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had +been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III +Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division, +now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line. +Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had +ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as +dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the +44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to HET SAS, taking +prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting +this advance, says: 'West of LANGEMARCK our young regiments advanced +against the enemy's front line singing "_Deutschland, Deutschland +über alles_," and captured it.' The left wing of the division hung a +good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to +push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy's first position, +but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of LANGEMARCK. +The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east, +without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove +that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack +that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now +defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th +Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of +ST. JULIEN, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby +compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von +Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve +Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve +Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of HET SAS. + +After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements +which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of +trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps +spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would +enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which +was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow. + +In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg's +Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently +advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense +autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the +concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the +neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided +to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling's (XV) +Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a +preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by +means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed +group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers, +three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of +long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding +the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both +divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with +the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of ST. ELOI, were +able to gain some hundreds of yards. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +On the 11th November the combined offensive of the Fourth Army and +the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the +Fourth and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The great efforts +made by the Fourth Army on the 10th had considerably weakened it, and +further handicapped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces +of the attacking troops, no special success was gained by it on the +11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere held to his ground and +prevented from transferring any troops to other parts of the front. On +the extreme right wing the Marine Division made a successful attack +on NIEUPORT, capturing several hundred prisoners. At the same time the +Guard Cavalry Division, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to +the YSER, in order to relieve part of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which +went into Army Reserve. On the left wing of the Army, the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions +by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south flank of the XXVII +Reserve Corps attacked in close co-operation with Plettenberg's Corps. + +On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck +began the last phase of this severe and terrible struggle for YPRES; +and it was destined to fix the general line on which the opposing +armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915. + +Von Winckler's Guard Division fought on the right wing of the Army +Group Linsingen, and for us the day was to be a historic, though costly +one. In former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of the fray +at its most critical stages, and the sons were to show themselves +worthy of their fathers. The spirit of Frederick the Great and the +glory of St. Privat shone again on the battlefield of YPRES. The +British speak of the attack of the Guard as a most brilliant feat of +arms. + +Before the infantry of the Division could come into immediate contact +with the enemy, a broad zone had to be crossed under his artillery +fire: through the hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the +Guard brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the German batteries +opened, and a furious bombardment continued for two and a half hours, +and then the infantry attack began. It struck against two divisions of +the I British Corps, a war experienced foe, whose fighting methods were +well adapted to the country.[104] The artillery preparation however +had been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy's superiority in +numbers the advance made good progress, so that shortly after 10 A.M. +the strong position along the southern edge of the POLYGON Wood was in +the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.[105] + +At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of H.M. the Emperor's +1st Guard Regiment had forced a way through the wire entanglements +and trenches in front of VERBECK farm, and it was taken in the first +assault. The regiment had thereby captured an excellent position +from which to support the right wing of the attack.[106] Led by its +fearless commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed +on without a moment's delay into the wood north-west of the farm. +Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment was still engaged along the southern +edges of the woods west of REUTEL, with its front facing north, and +it put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing of the 54th +Reserve Division. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND. GUARD DIVISION. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +At 10 A.M., on the last artillery salvo, the battalions of the +4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on both sides of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT main road, and they took the front British trenches in +their stride. + +The Emperor Francis' 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from +VELDHOEK against the corner of the HERENTHAGE Wood, north of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the +infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in +its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a +few paces' distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind +a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be +an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their +officers and N.C.O.'s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, +the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another, +but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by +our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced +its way through to the château of VELDHOEK, which was surrounded by +a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their +way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly +a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came +from the château on their right, from some flanking trenches on their +left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining +officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance +in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the +companies pressed on till they were close up to the château itself, +when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides. +Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order +to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees +and from the château windows completely stopped any communication +with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded +by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were +assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood +and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the +relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von +Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the +boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château again, they +were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it +appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before +this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but +our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their +ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were +in the air.[108] + +Queen Augusta's 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the +main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two +attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the +main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment +on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good +progress, and a firm footing was gained in HERENTHAGE Wood south of +the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis' 2nd Grenadiers +unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire +to bear on Queen Augusta's 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to +be stopped.[109] + +At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The +King's Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the NUN'S Wood +(Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment +and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack +was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st +Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in +the woods (POLYGON Wood and the eastern part of the NONNE BOSCH), with +its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having +spent all its energies against the château of VELDHOEK, lay with its +front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own +artillery fire near the NONNE BOSCH, and the attack broke up and came +to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question. + +In the southern part of the HERENTHAGE Wood the 4th Infantry Division +pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep +trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to +make our progress slow, especially on the right wing. + +The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the +Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around ZWARTELEEN; the +capture of Hill 60 near ZWARTELEEN was of exceptional importance. From +this elevation another direct view over the country round YPRES was +obtained. + +South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks +stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of WYTSCHAETE, which +had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy +artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile +counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the +critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a +barrage. + +In the area near WYTSCHAETE, the 11th November was the day of the +heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians +pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four +machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about +150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, but the guns were so firmly embedded in +the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry. +When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of +the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a +neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in +the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to +three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had +put in to the fight on the YPRES front, and to what an extent he had to +concentrate his units to ward off our attacks. + +On and to the west of the MESSINES ridge the line remained almost +unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the +enemy's artillery fire from Mount KEMMEL on this front and the enfilade +fire of artillery and machine-guns from PLOEGSTEERT Wood compelled our +men to remain in their trenches. + +Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great +success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been +impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately +describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any +concentration of the enemy near YPRES could be seen, and immediately +opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of +the enemy's lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and, +more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive. +The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards +the result.[111] + +The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not +abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained +unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire +front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was +eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare +were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen +its detachments across the YSER at DIXMUDE, and on the 12th the 201st +Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed +the enemy's defences opposite it on the western bank of the YSER, and +held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly +constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the +enemy's bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open. + +At BIXSCHOOTE the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks, +but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country. +On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. +Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve +position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was +discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German +position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour +would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the +10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority +or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position +on the rising ground south-west of BIXSCHOOTE. On the front of the +Sixth Army HERENTHAGE Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the +14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the +artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult +and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by +no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the +assault. In the château of HERENTHAGE a large number of British snipers +surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of +ZWARTELEEN after being reinforced by Hofmann's composite Division. A +strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large +number of prisoners. + +On the 13th November the Park of WYTSCHAETE was captured from the +French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which +the French advanced against our positions shouting, 'Don't shoot,' in +German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were +roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions. + +On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, for which +such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by +us. We thereby obtained a position in the WYTSCHAETE salient which, +although overlooked from Mount KEMMEL, gave us such a commanding view +of all the ground between Mount KEMMEL and the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES +ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out +of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small +fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the +Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive; +a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength +of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their +health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused +a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary +to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by +the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs +of exhaustion in the enemy's ranks on the front opposite the Fourth +and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth +Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire +entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were +allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant +quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not +unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in +the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th +November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would +be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces. +This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and +although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as +well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert +of Würtemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence. + +The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British +monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the +roadstead of OSTEND. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions +near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The 'glorious' +activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to +a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to +put in an appearance there.[115] + +The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second +half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For +some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong +detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front, +where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to +bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it +roll back again. + +From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and +Sixth Armies was the COMINES-YPRES canal. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to +the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken +defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The +effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches +and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and +more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed +it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive +defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in +the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in +the short period available after they were called up the volunteers +had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of +superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with +merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual +was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly +learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this +water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to +Russia to fight under the great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied. +The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of +a final decision at YPRES had disappeared. + +The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,[116] for it marked the +failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western +Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole +of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable +resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for the Belgian, French +and British advance on the RHINE. The Belgian coast was now firmly in +our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations +against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive +break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our +favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural +that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise +this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour +has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led +to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been +accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance +and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the +enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior +opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the +sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions +had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out +an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne, +so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before +the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it +should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak, +and even the genius of a Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the +masses of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. Thus it came +about that we had to lie and wait in front of the gates of YPRES, while +all the available men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, to +help Hindenburg pave the way to victory. + +There was never peace on the YPRES front. The belt of steel with which +we had invested the town by our operations in October and November +1914, was a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst +our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins across the +Channel like an apparition whose shadow lay over the British Isles and +especially menaced the traffic-routes between England and France. The +British therefore continually tried their utmost to free themselves +of this menace and their pressure produced counter measures. Thus in +December 1914 heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea at +NIEUPORT, and also at BIXSCHOOTE and ZWARTELEEN. On Christmas Eve the +French vainly attacked BIXSCHOOTE: their hope of catching the Germans +dreaming heavily on that evening was of no avail. When spring lifted +the mist that hung over Flanders, a German offensive took place during +April and May that forced the northern part of the YPRES salient back +to within three miles of the town.[117] After this the positions only +altered very slightly. In March 1916 the British blew up our front +trench positions at ST. ELOI by five colossal mines, but were unable +to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In 1917 the death-agony +of YPRES was renewed, and for months war raged over the plains of +Flanders; the fighting was as furious as in October and November 1914. +The young soldiers of those days have now become veterans, who know +war and do not fear it even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are +those same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in +exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, once said: 'Therefore when you +are fighting this particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for +having occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the Germans +are not so easy to wipe out of the world's history as he imagines, show +it by redoubling the strength behind your blows. In front of you is the +opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! at him!' + +He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who were so jealous of us, +who brought on the war for the sake of their money-bags and spread the +conflagration all over the world, who at first hoped that it would be +but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to annihilate Germany: +all this steeled the hearts of our warriors in Flanders, whose creed +was the justice of the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest +Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and in blood. The +fighting in 1917 was perhaps more severe than that of those stormy +autumn days of 1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: to +keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this we succeeded in 1917 as +in 1914. + +Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the German Fatherland +with a silent shudder, but also with just and intense pride. It was +there that the British were made to realise that German heroism was +not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the war material which +the whole world had been manufacturing for years. When we read that up +to the 14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put into the battle +round YPRES by the Western Allies, whilst only 25 German divisions +were opposed to them,[118] and that in the course of the Flanders +battle of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled in vain +against a greatly inferior German force, it says much for our troops. +But far from all. For the enemy's superiority in material, in guns, +trench-mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, and +even fourfold. Who can doubt but that a nation whose sons know how to +fight like this, must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds of +blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and splendid fruit for the +German Fatherland. This indeed would be the highest reward that could +be bestowed on those of us who fought there. + + + + +APPENDIX + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + +from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General Duke Albert of Würtemburg. + _Chief of Staff_ Major-General Ilse. + + III Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Beseler). + + 5th Reserve Division. + 6th Reserve Division. + 4th _Ersatz_ Division. + + XXII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn). + + 43rd Reserve Division. + 44th Reserve Division. + + XXIII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Kleist). + + 45th Reserve Division. + 46th Reserve Division. + + XXVI Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Hügel). + + 51st Reserve Division. + 52nd Reserve Division. + + XXVII Reserve Corps. (Lieut.-General von Carlowitz, + relieved on 27th Oct. by + General of Artillery von Schubert). + + 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division. + 54th (Würtemburg) Reserve Division. + +The following units were also attached at various times:-- + + 9th Reserve Division. + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + Marine Division. + 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade. + Guard Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK + +from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding + XIII (Würtemburg) Corps. + _Chief of Staff_ Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg. + + XV Corps (General von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + + (This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.) + + II Bavarian Corps (General of Infantry von Martini, + relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914 + by General of Cavalry von Stetten). + + 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division. + 4th Bavarian Infantry Division. + + 26th (Würtemburg) (Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach). + Infantry Division + + Group GEROK was also temporarily in the Army Group FABECK. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Gerok, + Commanding Reserve Corps. + + 1st Cavalry Corps (Lieut.-General von Richthofen). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[119] + + 2nd Cavalry Corps (General of Cavalry von der Marwitz). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[120] + + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + + 3rd Infantry Division. + + 25th Reserve Division. + + 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + + 2nd Cavalry Division. + + Bavarian Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN + +from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Linsingen, + Commanding II Corps. + + _Chief of Staff_ Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold. + + XV Corps (General of Infantry von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + also from 16th Nov., Hofmann's Composite Division. + + Plettenberg's Corps (General of Infantry von Plettenberg, + Commanding Guard Corps). + + 4th Infantry Division. + Winckler's Composite Guard Division. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _See p. 115._ + +[2] _Fourth Army Cavalry._ + + _I._ _Cavalry Corps_ _Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, p. 64._ + _II._ " _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, p. 90._ + _IV._ " _3 Cavalry Divisions, p. 25._ + _2nd Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + _Bavarian Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + + _Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions._ + +_The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on p. 56 to have been +eight divisions, among which, according to p. 57, were the 3rd, 7th and +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army Cavalry of the +Fourth Army._ + +_It may be noted that in 'Liège-Namur' in the same series of General +Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry Corps is given as +the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions._ + +[3] _There is a further mistake (see footnote 110): the King's were not +present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The +honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion +was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire +and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry._ + +[4] _The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th +September._ + +[5] The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing but +between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French attacks south +of Laon in the middle of September. + +[6] _'2000 British' belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division +which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the +resistance of that fortress._ + +[7] The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz. + +[8] _Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions were +available to oppose them._ + +[9] _These 'considerable hostile forces' consisted of the 7th Division +and Byng's Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after +having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army +from Antwerp._ + +[10] _Needless to point out that General Joffre was never 'Allied +Commander.'_ + +[11] _At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British +army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there._ + +[12] _The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th +October, and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the +18th it had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after +considerable fighting._ + +[13] _On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the +4th, astride the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, +while the 6th Division on the right had reached the line +Premesques-Ennettières-Radinghem (S.E. of Armentières). General +Conneau's French Cavalry Corps filled the gap between its right and the +left of the II Corps._ + +[14] _The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is +superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as +Gheluvelt: its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem._ + +[15] _The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading +Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till +19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck +area on 18th October._ + +[16] _'Armée' in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint._ + +[17] _This statement as to Sir J. French's intentions is inaccurate. +The II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the +orders issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack._ + +[18] _Between Armentières and the sea the British had only the I +Corps, less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps +(composed of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps +and two Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced +to about one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the +Allied forces outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of +the statement that 'the relative strength of the opposing forces never +appreciably altered in our favour' will become apparent as the book is +read, and as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only +by a weak composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by +a succession of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed +the attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt +on 31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. See +also Introduction._ + +[19] _'The heights of St. Eloi' is a phrase which suggests that the +author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of +the area round Ypres._ + +[20] _The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own +country._ + +[21] _British torpedo boats do not carry 'heavy artillery.'_ + +[22] _The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the +Monitors 'Severn,' 'Humber,' and 'Mersey.'_ + +[23] _This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin, +19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on +account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the +eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the +line Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing +to press their pursuit._ + +[24] _The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of +very hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature._ + +[25] _There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it +is to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood's squadron that reference is made._ + +[26] _There was no British artillery present in this quarter._ + +[27] See pages 23-24. + +[28] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_. + +[29] _The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the +opposition which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the +Allied force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry's +French Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and +Territorials. These were driven back without being able to offer much +resistance, and in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British +Corps just as it began its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle +and Passchendaele (21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to +divert his reserves to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend +his attack which had been making good progress on a line south-east +from Langemarck to Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the +7th Division._ + +[30] _By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding +the line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the +1st Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, +the 1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to +Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with the +3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen's, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and 2nd +Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck. +The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, and only +one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available to support +the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the 2nd Division +carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th Infantry +Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. This +division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: it +repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and +night 21st-22nd._ + +[31] _The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the +Hazebrouck area._ + +[32] _This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On +the afternoon of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in +breaking through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron +Highlanders, and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote +road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward; +however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black Watch, +arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all further German +advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements came up, +the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. of the 2nd Infantry +Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from the 6th Infantry +Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen's of the 3rd Infantry +Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, the Queen's +retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven right back, +nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on them. The old +trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually recovered, but late +in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the advanced position +reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken up about the +line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during this action, +in which less than two British infantry brigades had defeated the 46th +Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck had been +heavily attacked, apparently (cf. p. 40) by the 51st Reserve Division, +which had been completely worsted. In this part of the action very +notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters just north +of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 rounds a man, and though +attacked in front and flank by very superior numbers, maintained their +position intact. The British accounts testify to the gallantry with +which the German attacks were pressed, officers carrying regimental +colours ran on ahead of the men and planted the colours in the ground +to give their men a point to make for, a mounted officer rode forward, +exposing himself recklessly, to encourage his soldiers, but the +musketry of the British infantry was too much for the Germans, and the +attack was completely repulsed._ + +[33] _Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the +repeated reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, +except for a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the +Ypres salient before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial +battalions, the Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry +regiments, the North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd +Dragoon Guards, the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were +added to the force, while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division +were replaced by three composite brigades from the II Corps, set free +after three weeks of strenuous fighting near La Bassée by the arrival +of the Meerut Division, and greatly below strength._ + +[34] _The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim +at doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not +an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate +object._ + +[35] _On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde +to Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the +line being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The +German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were thus +faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect +of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven +the French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank +exposed and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing +back its left flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and +the expulsion of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines +below) after heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender +foundation that a British reconnaissance was made in the direction +of Gheluwe covered by two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back +without being seriously pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening +from Becelaere were sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of +the 7th Division east of Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October +on the front from Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over +in this narrative. Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all +along the line of the 7th Division without success except on the left, +where by enfilade fire from Passchendaele they forced the left of the +22nd Infantry Brigade to fall back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. +Meanwhile the advance of the I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, +as already explained (see footnote 29), the uncovering of the left +of the I Corps prevented the advance being pressed beyond the line +Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line was made good and the German efforts +to advance successfully repulsed. On 22nd October the Germans attacked +the line of the 2nd Division north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily +repulsed, while further to their left they renewed their attacks on the +21st Infantry Brigade east of Polygon Wood with equal ill-success._ + +[36] _The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin +relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October._ + +[37] _The 'well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire +entanglements' would have been most welcome to the British. +Unfortunately there had been no time or opportunity to do more than +dig in hastily where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, +while such trenches as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were +hastily prepared in such loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when +bombarded; wire was conspicuous by its absence._ + +[38] _The only thing in the nature of a 'fortress' at Langemarck was +a small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of +22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters._ + +[39] _This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The +relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not +take place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved +by a division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th +October it was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of +the morning of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of +the 21st Infantry Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through +north of Reutel, penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a +counter-attack by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd +R. Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was +made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation +with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the 6th +Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road. +Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all +attacks were repulsed._ + +[40] _It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were +much below establishment._ + +[41] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_. + +[42] _This testimony to the effective character of the help given by +Admiral Hood's squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in +the narrative on page 22._ + +[43] _The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th October +(footnote 39), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division had +re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and +between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes there +were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of +the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress east +of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX Corps +which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the showing of this +narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly superior in +numbers to those engaged in the attacks._ + +[44] _The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th +French Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a +German battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French +unit with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, +however, less progress was made, but the implication that the British +reached Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve +Division at the point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on +this quarter only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support +available was insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it +was therefore abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made._ + +[45] _The British who were streaming down from the high ground about +Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps +4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division._ + +[46] _There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the +period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the +south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was +obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which +held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably +on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd +Reserve Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into +Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots +Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, and +succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, but +a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid +of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was +successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding +a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division +connected it up with the left of General Allenby's Cavalry Corps on the +Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground._ + +[47] _This account does not tell the story of 29th October very +intelligibly. The British front had been readjusted, and was now held +by the 2nd Division on the left, from the junction with the French to +west of Reutel, thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by +the 1st Division, thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the +3rd Cavalry Division on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans +(apparently the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force +against the junction of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the +9th kilo cross-roads, and rolled up the battalions to right and left +after very severe fighting, in which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd +Gordon Highlanders of the 7th Division distinguished themselves greatly +by repeated counter-attacks. The resistance of the troops in the front +line delayed the Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st +Division to be put in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the +most advanced trenches. The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as +Gheluvelt, and their final gain of ground was inconsiderable._ + +[48] _It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting +on the La Bassée-Armentières front as quite distinct from the main +battle for Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III +Corps had a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they +received being on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade +and the divisional troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced +General Conneau's French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. +As the net result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced +back to a line running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve +Chapelle, past Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentières to the Lys at +Houplines, part of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left +bank of the Lys to the junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of +Messines. The German attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and +the strain on the II and III Corps was very severe._ + +[49] _In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers +of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by +itself amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the +British forces engaged between La Bassée and Zonnebeke. For its Order +of Battle see at end of book._ + +[50] _If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the +further advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered +the German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, +and enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the +Belgians, however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the +assistance of their Allies._ + +[51] _No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st +October. It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here +as though it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in +action on the Zonnebeke area since 24th October._ + +[52] _The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British +Commander-in-Chief amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch +howitzers, six of 60-pounders, and three of 4·7-inch guns, a total of +forty-four guns and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns)._ + +[53] _At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held +by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the +I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the +XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions of +the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged +for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at full war +establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to one._ + +[54] _See footnote 51. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third +time as a new arrival._ + +[55] See page 62. + +[56] _It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the +statements previously given, even apart from the fact that the German +units were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous +heavy losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds +is no more than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division +who had held up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of +Langemarck on 23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian +Guard attacked on 11th November--or rather a scanty remnant of them +was: in the interval they had fought and held up a succession of +attacks._ + +[57] _The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only +had been given a day's rest, but the division as a whole had not been +relieved._ + +[58] _These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of +which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed. +None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of +the Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines._ + +[59] _There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the very +thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a front +of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete and +St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a brigade +of French infantry._ + +[60] Messines ridge. + +[61] _The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing +the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of +time and want of labour. 'Deep trenches protected by broad wire +entanglements' is a much exaggerated statement._ + +[62] _An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time, +but was decisively repulsed._ + +[63] _I and II Cavalry Corps. See Order of Battle._ + +[64] _The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry +Brigade on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were +dislodged by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders and 1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy +fighting, the 1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by +a very stubborn resistance._ + +[65] _Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines +canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde was brought +to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st Division +under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division under +Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a new line +to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde the +7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but east of +Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress._ + +[66] _The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some +of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front +east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve +Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long +spell of rest._ + +[67] _The 'reinforcements' which the Allies had received on 29th-30th +October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them. +(See footnote 66.)_ + +[68] _The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, +at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account put in +about eight battalions._ + +[69] _It would not be gathered from this account that the British +artillery had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to +ammunition expenditure._ + +[70] _The statement that 'many attacks had to be delivered against +fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments' is almost ludicrous in +its travesty of the facts._ + +[71] _It was not in 'long colonial wars' but in careful training on +the ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that +mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the +defence. Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the +outbreak of war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active +service._ + +[72] _The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st +October, the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division +holding on successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had +been pierced at Gheluvelt._ + +[73] _The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the +British possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war +establishments allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that +by 31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns +to increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one +or both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for +machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original +Expeditionary Force could maintain._ + +[74] _The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an +hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The 'château +and park,' north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales +Borderers, who maintained their ground, although their right was left +in the air by the loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came +up and delivered their celebrated counter-attack past the right of the +S.W.B. This apparently occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, +however, accurate in saying that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the +Worcesters did was that they completely checked the German efforts to +push forward; the position their counter-attack reached enabled them to +flank any advance west of Gheluvelt._ + +[75] _The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem +founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was +subsequently retaken._ + +[76] _The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the +detachments under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the +right of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury +Forest, was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground, +and at one point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans +back a long way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken._ + +[77] _The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General +Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General Munro, commanding +the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was killed, but the former died +many months after of his wounds._ + +[78] _During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the +XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held +by the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades +north-west of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, +however, unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and +further to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily +pressed. It was here that the London Scottish were put in to recover +trenches which had been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road._ + +[79] _Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the +night of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely +difficult to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade +was forced out of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that +the advance of the Germans was then held up west of the village, +counter-attacks by two battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just +arrived from La Bassée-Neuve Chapelle area, assisting to check them. +Subsequently these battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st +Lincolnshires) were also forced back, but by this time more French +reinforcements were coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, +and their counter-attacks, though not wholly successful, prevented +further German progress. But the admission of this account that two +whole German regiments (six battalions) were engaged in the attack is +a fine testimony to the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division +and attached infantry at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one +against them._ + +[80] _The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st +Cavalry Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by +portions of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the +5th Division (the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King's Own +Yorkshire L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve +Chapelle and much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th +(Würtemburg) Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only +artillery available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the +R.H.A. batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps._ + +[81] _i.e. Würtemburg._ + +[82] _This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Château had to be evacuated +during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal +of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans +did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts +as they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward +beyond Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give +the impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily +pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground._ + +[83] _The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was +in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under +Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as +were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position +south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day's +fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting as +infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts +of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of +Zandvoorde)._ + +[84] _The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th +Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, and +were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This account of +the 'treacherous methods of the Indians' smacks of the conventional; it +is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections of the German +Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against the British +for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of 'Kultur.'_ + +[85] _French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French +had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division +assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem._ + +[86] _These 'reinforcements of newly arrived British troops' are +imaginary._ + +[87] _The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in +breaking our line at this point and captured two guns which had been +pushed up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards, +though taken in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack +by the 1st Black Watch re-established the line, while south of the road +a counter-attack by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared +the Herenthage Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches +a little eastward. Further to the right Lord Cavern's detachment +(Brigadier-General Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his +battalions had come under Lord Cavan's orders) and the remnants of +the 1st Grenadiers and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their +own successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. +Deimling's left wing._ + +[88] _The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day +belongs solely to the French; no British troops were in action there._ + +[89] _After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of +the fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some +attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture +Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the +British Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east +of Wulverghem. Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it +maintained itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th +Division about the middle of November._ + +[90] _The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, 'Hofprediger' Dr. +Vogel, in his book '3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie' (p. +212), says the attack was made and failed, but 'next day the English +abandoned the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our +8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard +Dragoons.'_ + +[91] _What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient +except the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for +the simple reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, +though some French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek; +but in the course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the +7th Division was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II +Corps composed of battalions which had had three weeks' fighting near +La Bassée and had then to be thrust in after only two or three days' +rest to hold some of the most difficult parts of the line south-east +of Ypres. The 7th Infantry Division when relieved amounted to less +than a third of their original strength, without taking into account +the drafts that had joined since they landed, which amounted to 2000 +or more. Most of the battalions of the 1st Division were in scarcely +better case._ + +[92] _These 'successive lines of rearward positions' did not exist +except on paper during the period to be included in the 'Battle of +Ypres,' i.e. to 17th November._ + +[93] _During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting +on the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the +Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which +was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry +Brigade (cf. page 93, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the +22nd Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out +for a rest, and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the +line next day. On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd +Division, which had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, +gained a little ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the +line was again attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was +broken near Veldhoek, but was restored after some sharp fighting and +several counter-attacks. Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to +the east of it, the 2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than +held its own. In the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken +by two battalions of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the +1st Division._ + +[94] _St. Eloi is hardly situated 'on high ground,' as it is on +the down slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the +low ground after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the +Messines-Wytschaete ridge._ + +[95] _The allusion is not understood._ + +[96] _The heavy artillery at Sir John French's disposal at this period +was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered +by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed +on the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for +the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among +the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the vast +ammunition expenditure which had been incurred._ + +[97] _The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was +defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the +Broodseinde cross-roads._ + +[98] _The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks._ + +[99] _However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917 +Lombartzyde was in Allied possession._ + +[100] For Order of Battle, see Appendix. + +[101] _A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery with +six guns._ + +[102] Consisting of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division and the 43rd Reserve +Division. + +[103] _It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of +Dixmude should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this +assertion can have taken, as no British troops were concerned in the +Dixmude fighting, nor could there have been any occasion for any +official British announcement about Dixmude._ + +_In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jäger Regt. +read Res. Infantry Regt._ + +[104] _The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von +Winckler's Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions +was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced +to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of +the 3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the +3rd Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the +main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the +Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently +pronounced._ + +[105] _The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon +Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British +line was marked by a 'strong point' which had been erected near the +south-west corner of the wood, known later as 'Black Watch Corner': +this was successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the +Black Watch. Attacks were made on the 1st King's lining the southern +edge of the wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also +further eastward and to the left of the King's, on the 2nd Coldstream +Guards. The Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the +54th Reserve Division: at neither of these points did the attackers +meet with any success._ + +[106] _A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line +trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important +part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed +appreciably to its success._ + +[107] _This is the eastern part of the wood known later as 'Inverness +Copse.'_ + +[108] _This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the +1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington's._ + +[109] _The 4th (Queen Augusta's) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked +the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been +repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. +Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were +also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the +Germans made no progress._ + +[110] _This part of the German account is not borne out by the British +versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke +through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on +north-west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and +coming out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was +arrested mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them +up with rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, +orderlies from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of +the 1st Brigade, assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was +critical until about noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks +L.I. arrived on the scene. This battalion had been engaged for several +days near Zwarteleen, and had just been brought up to Westhoek to act +as Divisional Reserve. Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly +counter-attacked the Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out +headlong. Many of them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and +southern sides by the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western +edge of Polygon Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come +up to Glencorse Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other +units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which +extended thence to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment +who had pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating +any further. The King's, to whom this account gives the credit for +the Oxfordshire's counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard +Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on +the Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling +that at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd +Oxford and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief +part in the defeat of Napoleon's Guard._ + +_The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have been +the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, +chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were pushed forward +rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse._ + +[111] _The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon +11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek +was trifling in extent and value, and though 'Hill 60' and the wood +north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that +the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected +to produce a break-through. The 'numerical superiority' once again +attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength +of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly +lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much +more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever +possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German +Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours +of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of +incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops._ + +[112] _This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November +in which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th +and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the +Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th +November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage +Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered by +the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack +by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of +the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of +the Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry +Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks._ + +[113] _The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this._ + +[114] _One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on +17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on +this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, +holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven +the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the +first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception +undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision._ + +[115] _It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end._ + +[116] _See remarks in Introduction._ + +[117] _The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have +been mentioned._ + +[118] _It is not to be read in this monograph. See Introduction._ + +[119] _4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see page 64)._ + +[120] _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see page 90)._ + + + + +INDEX + + + ALBERT OF WÃœRTEMBURG, Duke, 6; + _see also_ ARMY, FOURTH. + + ANTWERP: value of, to Entente, 3; + capture of, 5; + retreat from, 7 (_note_). + + ARMY, FOURTH (German): formation of, 6; + advance of, through BELGIUM, 19; + dispositions on 20th Oct., 20; + task of, 25, 27; + attack on 3rd Nov., 98; + attack on 10th Nov., 104; + order of battle of, 131. + + ---- SIXTH (German): position of right wing of, 7; + failure of attacks of, 25; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + ARMY GROUP FABECK: constitution of, 60; + plan for, 60; + assembly of, 63; + artillery of, 63; + attack on 30th Oct., 67; + attack on 31st Oct., 73; + alteration of plan,91; + reinforcement of, 92; + offensive on 11th Nov. of, 111; + order of battle of, 132. + + ---- ---- _Linsingen_: composition of, 103; + task of, 103; + offensive of, 111; + order of battle of, 133. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS (German), meetings at, 25, 26. + + + BECELAERE: Anglo-French counter-attacks at, 55; + XXVII Res. Corps takes, 41. + + BELGIAN population, patriotism of, 100. + + ---- force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + BESELER, General von, 5; + _see also_ CORPS, III Reserve. + + BRITISH FLEET, co-operation of, 22 _and note_, 51 _and note_, + 28 (_note_), 125. + + BRITISH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + _Calais_: concentration about, 6; + German objective, 11. + + CAVALRY, ARMY (German): objective of, 3; + relief of, near LILLE, 64. + + CAVALRY, FOURTH (German) Army, composition of, xvii (_note_). + + ---- SIXTH (German) Army: composition of, 56, 57; + capture KRUISEIK, 57. + + CORPS (German), III Reserve: captures Antwerp, 5; + screens Fourth Army, 19; + crosses the YSER, 30. + + ---- ---- XV: attack on ZANDVOORDE, 63; + attack and capture of GHELUVELT, 72; + captures Hill 60, 119. + + ---- ---- XIX, captures LILLE, 7. + + ---- ---- XXII Res.-XXVII Res.: formation of, 4; + transport of, 5. + + ---- ---- XXII Res., attacks on DIXMUDE, 31, 53. + + ---- ---- XXIII Res.: attack on HOUTHULST Forest, 34; + attack on LANGEMARCK, 99. + + ---- ---- XXVI Res., takes PASSCHENDAELE, 40. + + ---- ---- XXVII Res., takes BECELAERE, 41. + + ---- ---- II Bavarian, dispositions of, 64. + + ---- (French) II, arrival of, 62, 64. + + ---- ---- IX, arrival of, 41, 62, 64. + + + DEIMLING, General von, wounded,73; + _see_ CORPS (German), XV. + + DIXMUDE: topographical, 15; + attack by French Marine division on, 45; + capture of, 108. + + + EASTERN FRONT, German units leave for, 125. + + EMPEROR, German: proclamation to Fourth Army, 27; + watches attack on GHELUVELT, 73. + + + FABECK, General von, _see_ ARMY GROUP FABECK. + + FRENCH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + GEROK, General von, _see_ GROUP GEROK. + + GHELUVELT: attack on, 72; + capture of, 75; + British force holding, 72 (_note_). + + GLOUCESTERSHIRE Regiment at LANGEMARCK, 37 (_note_). + + GROUP GEROK: formation of, 93; + order of battle of, 133. + + ---- URACH: formation of, 90; + attack on WYTSCHAETE Park, 95. + + GUARD (German) Division (von WINCKLER): marches to ROUBAIX, 92; + attack of, 116. + + GUARDS, British Life, cut up, 68 _and note_. + + + KEMMEL, Mount, topography and importance of, 13, 68, 96, 123. + + KING'S LIVERPOOL Regiment, counter-attack by, 118 _and note_ 2. + + + LILLE: value to Entente, 3; + capture of, 6. + + LINSINGEN, General Baron von, _see_ ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN. + + + MESSINES: importance of, 68; + attack on, 79; + British force holding, 80 (_note_). + + + NIEUPORT: topographical, 15; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + + OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE L.I., counter-attack German Guard, + 118 (_note_ 2). + + + PLETTENBERG'S Corps, attack on 11th Nov., 111. + + + URACH, General von, _see_ GROUP URACH. + + + WORCESTERSHIRE Regiment, counter-attack at GHELUVELT, 75 _and note_ 3. + + WYTSCHAETE: importance of, 68; + German attack on, 78; + Anglo-French counter-attack on, 79; + second German attack, 85; + third attack and capture of, 88; + capture of Park of, 123; + gallant defence by French troops, 87 (_note_). + + + YORKSHIRE L.I. retake HERENTHAGE Château, 124 (_note_). + + YPRES: topographical, 15; + historical, 14; + attack from the north against, 38; + attempt to break through south of, 59; + battle of, begins, 113. + + YSER, canal: topographical, 16; + flooding the, 51; + crossed by III Res. Corps, 30. + + + ZANDVOORDE: importance of, 67; + capture of, 67. + + + Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to His Majesty + at the Edinburgh University Press + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Ypres 1914, by Otto Schwink + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44234 *** diff --git a/44234-h/44234-h.htm b/44234-h/44234-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5e529ee --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/44234-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,5906 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en_GB" lang="en_GB"> + <head> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=UTF-8" /> + <meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> + <title> + The Project Gutenberg eBook of Ypres, 1914, by Otto Schwink. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + + h1,h2,h3 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; +} + +p { + margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; +} + +.p2 {margin-top: 2em;} +.p4 {margin-top: 4em;} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; +} + +hr.chap {width: 65%} + +hr.r5 {width: 5%; margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +hr.r65 {width: 65%; margin-top: 3em; margin-bottom: 3em;} + +ul { list-style-type: none; } +li.ifrst { margin-top: 1em; } +li.indx { margin-top: .5em; } +li.isub1 {text-indent: 1em;} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +.TOC td { vertical-align: bottom; } + +.OB td { vertical-align: top; } + + .tdr {text-align: right;} + .tdc {text-align: center;} +.tdh { + padding-left: 2em; + text-indent: -2em; +} + +.padl { padding-left: 2em; } +.padl4 { padding-left: 4em; } +.padt { padding-top: 1em; } + +.valt td { vertical-align: top; } + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: smaller; + text-align: right; + text-indent: 0em; +} /* page numbers */ + +.left {text-align: left;} + +.center {text-align: center;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +.fignote { + text-align: justify; + margin-left:10%; + margin-right:10%; +} + +/* Footnotes */ +.footnotes {border: dashed 1px;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: small; + text-decoration: + none; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:smaller; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; } + +.xlarge { font-size: x-large; } +.large { font-size: large; } +.small { font-size: small; } +.smaller { font-size: smaller; } + +.hanging p { + margin-left: 5em; + text-indent: -5em +} + +.notespace { + display: inline-block; + width: 4em; + text-align: right; + white-space: nowrap; +} + +.ilb { display: inline-block; } + </style> + </head> +<body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44234 ***</div> + +<div class="transnote"> +<p>Transcriber's Note:</p> + +<p>Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as +possible.</p> + +<p>On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth +Army," "from" is a correction of "fron".</p></div> + +<div class="center"> +<img id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" width="395" height="600" alt="" /> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> + +<h1>YPRES, 1914</h1> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p> + +<h3>MONS, AND THE RETREAT</h3> + +<p class="center">By Captain <span class="smcap">G. S. Gordon</span></p> + +<p class="center">With an Introduction by +Field-Marshal <span class="smcap">Lord French</span></p> + +<p class="right">1/6 <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p><b>The Evening News.</b>—‘... The true history of those +amazing and heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a +soldier and an expert.’</p></blockquote> + +<h3>THE MARNE CAMPAIGN</h3> + +<p class="center">By Lieut. Col. <span class="smcap">F. E. Whitton</span>, C.M.G.</p> + +<p class="right">10/6 <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘... Clear and concise ... gives +a much better general impression of the Battle of the +Marne than any other we know.’</p></blockquote> + +<h3>1914</h3> + +<p class="center">By Field-Marshal <span class="smcap">Viscount French</span> +of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc.</p> + +<p class="center">With a Preface by <span class="smcap">Maréchal Foch</span></p> + +<p class="right">21/- <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<hr class="r5" /> + +<p class="center">CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="xlarge">YPRES, 1914</span><br /> +AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY<br /> +ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</p> + +<p class="center p2">TRANSLATION BY G. C. W.</p> + +<p class="center p2">WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE<br /> +HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH)<br /> +COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE</p> + +<p class="center p4">LONDON<br /> +CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD<br /> +1919 +</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><i>Printed in Great Britain</i></p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h2> + +<table class="TOC" summary="Contents"> +<tr><td> </td><td class="tdr small">PAGE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">ix</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#PREFACE">German Preface</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">xxiii</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#PRELIMINARY_REMARKS">Preliminary Remarks</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">1</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS">The Theatre of Operations</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">13</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY">The Advance of the Fourth Army</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">19</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1">The Operations of the Fourth Army, 20th-31st +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">26</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH">The Attempt to break through south of Ypres</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">59</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2">The Operations of the Fourth Army from the end +of October to the 9th November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">98</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_LAST_PHASE">The Last Phase</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">103</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#CONCLUSION">Conclusion</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">126</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2"><h3><a href="#APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></h3></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_1">Order of Battle of the Fourth Army</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">131</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_2">Order of Battle of the Army Group Fabeck</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">132</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_3">Order of Battle of the Group Gerok</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">133</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_4">Order of Battle of the Army Group Linsingen</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">133</td></tr> + +<tr><td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">135</td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a><br /><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="ILLUSTRATIONS" id="ILLUSTRATIONS">ILLUSTRATIONS</a><br /> +<span class="smaller">SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT</span></h2> + +<table class="TOC" summary="Illustrations"> +<tr><td> </td><td class="tdr small">PAGE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_1">Dispositions on 20th October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">20</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_2">The Attack of the Army Group Fabeck on 30th +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">67</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_3">The Attack of the Army Group Fabeck on 31st +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">73</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_4">The Capture of Messines on 31st October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">81</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_5">The Capture of Dixmude on 10th November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">108</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_6">The Attack of the Sixth Army on 11th November +1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">112</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_7">The Attack of the 2nd Guard Division on 11th +November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">115</td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a><br /><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION</a></h2> + +<p>The German book of which a translation is here given +was written in the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto +Schwink, a General Staff Officer, by order of the Chief +of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is stated +to be founded on official documents. It forms one +of a series of monographs, partly projected, partly +published, on the various phases of the war, but is +the only one that is available dealing with operations +in which the British Army was engaged. Several +concerned with the Eastern theatre of war have +already appeared, and one other entitled ‘<span class="smcap">Liège-Namur</span>,’ +relating to the Western.</p> + +<p>Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book ‘1914,’ +has said that the period 27th to 31st October during +the first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was ‘more momentous and +fateful than any other which I directed during my +period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. +31st October and 1st November will remain for ever +memorable in the history of our country, for during +those two days no more than a thin and straggling +line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the +Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-class +Power.’ The German account accentuates the +truth of Lord French’s appreciation of the great peril +in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells +us of the enemy’s plans, and of the large forces that +he brought up with great skill and secrecy to carry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> +them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch’s expression, +lets us ‘know what was going on in the other +fellow’s house.’ But it does more than that: unconsciously +perhaps, it bears convincing testimony to +the fighting powers of the British Army, the determination +of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness +of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and +infantry, and the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly +credits Field-Marshal Sir John French with +‘reinforcements in abundance,’ insists that our troops +‘fought desperately for every heap of stones and +every pile of bricks before abandoning them,’ and +definitely records that ‘the fact that neither the +enemy’s commanders nor their troops gave way under +the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us +the opportunity to acknowledge that there were men +of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly.’ +We are further told that the effect of our +artillery was such that ‘it was not possible to push +up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire’; that ‘all +roads leading to the rear were continuously shelled +for a long way back’; that the German ‘advancing +columns were under accurate artillery fire at long +range’; that our shells ‘blocked streets and bridges +and devastated villages so far back that any regular +transport of supplies became impossible.’ As regards +rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with ‘quantities +of machine-guns,’ ‘large numbers of machine-guns,’ +etc.; with the result that ‘the roads were +swept by machine-guns’; and that ‘over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of +smoke betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets.’ +At that date we had no machine-gun units, and there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> +were only two machine-guns on the establishment of +a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, +and had not yet been replaced; actually machine-guns +were few and far between. The only inference +to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, +were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, +was mistaken for machine-gun fire both as regards +volume and effect. Our simple defences, to complete +which both time and labour had been lacking, became +in German eyes ‘a well-planned maze of trenches,’ ‘a +maze of obstacles and entrenchments’; and we had +‘turned every house, every wood and every wall into +a strong point’; ‘the villages of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and +<span class="smcap">Messines</span> ... had been converted into fortresses’ +(<i>Festungen</i>); as also the edge of a wood near <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> +and <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. As at the last-named place +there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of +two platoons, and the ‘broad wire entanglements’ +described by the German General Staff were in reality +but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans +‘took in their stride,’<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> the lavish praise, were it not +for the result of the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. +Part of it undoubtedly is. It is fair, however, +to deduce that the German nation had to be +given some explanation why the ‘contemptible little +Army’ had not been pushed straightway into the +sea.</p> + +<p>The monograph is frankly intended to present the +views that the German General Staff wish should be +held as regards the battles, and prevent, as their +Preface says, the currency of ‘the legends and rumours +which take such an easy hold on the popular imagina<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span>tion +and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct +afterwards.’ One cannot naturally expect the whole +truth to be revealed yet; that it is not will be seen +from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when +pressed by his nephews to write a true account of +1870-1—to their future financial advantage—‘It can’t +be done yet. Too many highly placed personages +(<i>hohe Herrschaften</i>) would suffer in their reputations.’ +It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian +War that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other +German military historians who had been given access +to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil a +little. The publication of the French General Staff +account began even later. What is now given to +us is, however, amply sufficient to follow the main +German plans and movements; but the difficulties +that prevented the enemy from making successful +use of the enormous number of troops at his disposal +and his superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine-guns, +aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench +warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more +we may fairly attribute our victory to the military +qualities of the British, French and Belgian troops, +and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit defeat.</p> + +<p>The German General Staff specially claim that the +first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was a German victory, ‘for it +marked the failure of the enemy’s intention to fall on +the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts +of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,’ etc. +etc. Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that +General Staff’s own evidence, be regarded as a drawn +one. For it is definitely stated in the monograph +that the object of the operations was ‘successfully<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> +closing with the enemy ... and gaining <span class="smcap">Calais</span>, the +aim and object of the 1914 campaign’—this the +German Army notoriously did not do. The intention +to break through is repeatedly stated: ‘although +fresh reinforcements had been sent up by the German +General Staff ... a break-through had not been +possible.’ ‘Another effort to break through should +be made as soon as possible.’ We are told that Fabeck’s +Army Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry +divisions) was formed ‘as a strong new army of attack +... for breaking through on the front <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Warneton</span>.’ +Linsingen’s Army Group (five divisions) +after the failure of von Fabeck was formed ‘to +drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the +(<span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span>) canal ... and to break through +there.’ Finally, however, it is admitted that ‘no +break-through of the enemy’s lines had been accomplished.... +We had not succeeded in making the +decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the +campaign in the west in our favour had to be consigned +to its grave.’ In fact, the book is largely an +apologia and a confession of failure which mere protestations +of victory cannot alter.</p> + +<p>The effects of a German victory on the course of the +war, with the Channel ports in German hands, as +compared with those of an Allied victory in Flanders, +which at that period of the war and at that season of +the year could have resulted in little more than pushing +the enemy back into Belgium a few miles, may be +easily imagined. If the battle was a tactical draw, +at least we had a strategic balance in our favour.</p> + +<p>The principal reasons advanced for the German +ill-success are ‘the enemy’s numerical superiority,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> +and the strength of his positions,’ and of course the +drastic course taken by the Belgians of ‘calling in +the sea to their aid.’</p> + +<p>There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout +the book. To those who were there and saw our +‘thin and straggling line’ and the hastily constructed +and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and +broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin +belts of wire, and none of the communication trenches +of a later date, they provoke only amazement. Even +German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements.</p> + +<p>As regards the superiority of numbers, the following +appears to be the approximate state of the case +as regards the infantry on the battle front from <span class="smcap">Armentières</span> +(inclusive) to the sea dealt with in the monograph. +It is necessary to count in battalions, as the +Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, +and the British Commander-in-Chief enumerates +the reinforcements sent up to <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> from the II and +Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial +battalions, London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also +took part. The total figures are:—</p> + +<table summary="Numbers of battalions"> +<tr><td>British, French, Belgian</td> +<td class="tdr padl">263 battalions.</td></tr> +<tr><td>German</td> +<td class="tdr padl">426 battalions.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p>That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans +of 13 to 21. Viscount French in his ‘1914’ says 7 +to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52 to 84 as +against 49 to 84, and very different from the German +claim of ‘40 divisions to 25.’ Actually in infantry +divisions the Allies had only 22, even counting as +complete the Belgian six, which had only the strength<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> +of German brigades. Any future correction of the +figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, +will probably emphasise the German superiority in +numbers still more, and the enemy indisputably had +the advantage of united command, homogeneous +formations and uniform material which were lacking +in the Allied force.</p> + +<p>As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had +six divisions, including one of three brigades. The +enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, the +Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is +not clear from the German account how much cavalry +was transferred from the Sixth Army to the Fourth +Army.<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> It may be noted that a German cavalry +division included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, +horse artillery batteries and the two or three <i>Jäger</i> +battalions, three or more machine-gun batteries and +two or more companies of cyclists; and was thus, +unlike ours, a force of all arms.</p> + +<p>The German General Staff reveal nothing about +the exact strength of the artillery. In a footnote it +is mentioned that in addition to infantry divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> +the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, <i>Pionier</i> +formations and other technical troops; and in the +text that ‘all the available heavy artillery of the +Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist the Fourth +Army) for the break-through.’ The Germans had +trench-mortars (<i>Minenwerfer</i>) which are several times +mentioned, whilst our first ones were still in the process +of improvisation by the Engineers of the Indian Corps +at <span class="smcap">Bethune</span>.</p> + +<p>The statement that ‘the enemy’s’ (<i>i.e.</i> British, +French and Belgian) ‘superiority in material, in guns, +trench-mortars, machine-guns and aeroplanes, etc., +was two, three, even fourfold’ is palpably nonsense +when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when +the monograph was written.</p> + +<p>The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot +understand defeat in war except on the premise that +the victor had superiority of numbers. To show to +what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie’s +<i>Henry V.</i>, vol. <span class="small">II</span>. page 216, will be found an account +of a German theory, accepted by the well-known +historian Delbrück, that the English won at Agincourt +on account of superior numbers, although contemporary +history is practically unanimous that the +French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie sums it up thus:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>‘Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French +is inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered +the English, and finding that all contemporary +authorities, both French and English, are agreed that they +did, the writer builds up a theory that all the known facts +can be explained on the supposition that the French were +really much inferior to us in numbers ... and concludes +that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> +of French (the English being 6000) at something between +4000 and 7000.’</p></blockquote> + +<p>It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff +Officer captured during the Ypres fighting said to his +escort as he was being taken away: ‘Now I am out +of it, do tell me where your reserves are concealed; +in what woods are they?’ and he refused to believe +that we had none. Apparently it was inconceivable +to the German General Staff that we should stand to +fight unless we had superior numbers; and these not +being visible in the field, they must be hidden away +somewhere.</p> + +<p>Further light on what the Germans imagined is +thrown by prisoners, who definitely stated that their +main attack was made south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, because it +was thought that our main reserves were near <span class="smcap">St. +Jean</span>, north-east of that town. From others it was +gathered that what could be seen of our army in that +quarter was in such small and scattered parties that +it was taken to be an outpost line covering important +concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, +fearing a trap.</p> + +<p>It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation +of the number of formations engaged may not +be altogether due to imaginary reserves, as regards +the British Army. Before the war the Great General +Staff knew very little about us. The collection of +‘intelligence’ with regard to the British Empire was +dealt with by a Section known in the Moltkestrasse as +the ‘Demi-monde Section,’ because it was responsible +for so many countries; and this Section admittedly +had little time to devote to us. Our organisation was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span> +different from that of any of the great European +armies. Their field artillery brigades contained seventy-two +guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or +howitzers; their infantry brigades consisted of two +regiments, each of three battalions, that is six battalions, +not four as in the original British Expeditionary Force. +To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant +six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he +belonged to the Blankshire Regiment, the German +might possibly believe he had identified three battalions, +whereas only one would be present. This is actually +brought out on <a href="#Page_118">page 118</a>, when the author speaks of +the 1st Battalion of the King’s (Liverpool) Regiment +as the <i>Königsregiment Liverpool</i>, and indicates his +ignorance of the British Army, when this single battalion +engages the German <i>Garde Regiment zu Fuss</i>, by +describing the fight not only as one of regiment against +regiment, but as <i>Garde gegen Garde</i> (Guard against +Guards).<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Such is the fighting value of an English +Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly claimed, +but the significant sentence immediately follows: +‘any further advance on the 11th November by our +Guard troops north of the road was now out of the +question.’</p> + +<p>It may be as well to point out that the ‘volunteers’ +who it is said flocked to the barracks to form the +Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were not all volunteers +in our sense of the word. The General Staff only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> +claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different +state of affairs from our New Armies, which had not +1 per cent. of trained soldiers. Many of the ‘volunteers’ +were fully trained men liable to service, who merely +anticipated their recall to the colours. It was well +known before the war that in each army corps area +Germany intended to form one ‘Active’ Corps and +one or more ‘Reserve’ Corps. The original armies +of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the +IV Reserve of von Kluck’s Army, which marched and +fought just as the active ones did. These first formed +Reserve Corps were, it is believed, entirely made up +of trained men, but those with the higher numbers +XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in +the Fourth Army, probably did contain a good percentage +of men untrained before the war.</p> + +<p><i>Ersatz</i> divisions were formed of the balance of +reservists after the Reserve divisions had been organised, +and of untrained men liable for service. After a time +the words ‘Active,’ ‘Reserve,’ and ‘<i>Ersatz</i>’ applied +to formations lost their significance, as the same classes +of men were to be found in all of them.</p> + +<p>No attempt has been made to tone down the author’s +patriotic sentiments and occasional lapses from good +taste; the general nature of the narrative is too +satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions +necessary when presenting it to the British public.</p> + +<p>The footnotes deal with a number of the more +important points raised, but are not exhaustive.</p> + +<blockquote> +<div class="hanging"> +<p><span class="notespace"><i>Note.</i>—</span>The German time, at the period of the year in +question one hour earlier than ours, has been +adhered to.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span></p> + +<p><span class="notespace"> </span>The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished +from those of the Author by being +printed in italics.</p> + +<p><span class="notespace"> </span>In preparing the translation for issue it has not +been thought necessary to supply all the +maps provided in the original, as the general +lie of the country must be fairly well known +to British readers.</p></div></blockquote> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center">(<i>Translation of Title Page</i>)</p> + +<p class="center p4"><b>Monographs on the Great War</b></p> + +<hr class="r5" /> + +<p class="center large">THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF<br /> +YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914</p> + +<p class="center large p2">(DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND<br /> +BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914)</p> + +<p class="center p2">FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES</p> + +<p class="center p2">PUBLISHED<br /> +BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF<br /> +OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING +</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a><br /><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</a><br /> +<span class="smaller smcap">By German Great Headquarters</span></h2> + +<p>The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison +with those of the past, and battles which +formerly held the world in suspense are now almost +forgotten. The German people have been kept +informed of the progress of events on all fronts since +the 4th August 1914, by the daily official reports of +the German General Staff, but the general public +will have been unable to gather from these a coherent +and continuous story of the operations.</p> + +<p>For this reason the General Staff of the German +Field Army has decided to permit the publication of +a series of monographs which will give the German +people a general knowledge of the course of the most +important operations in this colossal struggle of +nations.</p> + +<p>These monographs cannot be called histories of +the war; years, even decades, must pass before all +the true inwardness and connection of events will +be completely revealed. This can only be done when +the archives of our opponents have been opened to +the world as well as our own and those of the General +Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span> +people will be given descriptions of the most important +of the battles, written by men who took part in them, +and have had the official records at their disposal.</p> + +<p>It is possible that later research may make alterations +here and there necessary, but this appears no +reason for delaying publications based on official +documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster +the legends and rumours which so easily take hold +of the popular imagination and are so difficult, if +not impossible, to correct afterwards.</p> + +<p>This series of monographs is not therefore intended +as an addition to military science, but has been written +for all classes of the German public who have borne +the burden of the war, and especially for those who +have fought in the operations, in order to increase +their knowledge of the great events for the success of +which they have so gladly offered their lives.</p> + +<p class="p2 right">GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.</p> + +<div> +<p class="p2 ilb center"><span class="smcap">German Great Headquarters</span>,<br /> +<i>Autumn, 1917</i>. +</p></div> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PRELIMINARY_REMARKS" id="PRELIMINARY_REMARKS">PRELIMINARY REMARKS</a></h2> + +<p>There is no more brilliant campaign in history than +the advance of our armies against the Western Powers +in August and early September 1914. The weak +French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to +beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, +the active defence of the Allied hostile armies +and the passive resistance of the great Belgian and +French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal +march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage +of each individual German soldier, combined with the +able leading of his commanders, overcame all opposition +and sent home the news of countless German +victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts +of Paris were trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy +which half the world had been weaving against +us for so many years was to be brought to a rapid +conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, +in the course of which the centre and right wings of +the German Western Army were, it is true, withdrawn, +but only to fight again as soon as possible, under more +favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting +our withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th +September<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> our troops brought him to a standstill +along a line extending from the Swiss frontier to the +Aisne, north-east of Compiègne. In the trench warfare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +which now began our pursuers soon discovered that +our strength had been by no means broken, or even +materially weakened, by the hard fighting.</p> + +<p>As early as 5th September, before the battle of the +Marne, the Chief of the German General Staff had +ordered the right wing should be reinforced by the +newly-formed Seventh Army.<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It soon became clear +to the opposing commanders that any attempt to +break through the new German front was doomed to +failure, and that a decisive success could only be +obtained by making an outflanking movement on a +large scale against the German right wing. Thus +began what our opponents have called the ‘Race to +the Sea,’ in which each party tried to gain a decision +by outflanking the other’s western wing. The good +communications of France, especially in the north, +enabled the Allied troops to be moved far more rapidly +than our own, for the German General Staff had at +their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian railways +which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened +with transport of material of every description. +In spite of this, however, the French and +British attacks failed to drive back the German right +wing at any point. Not only did they find German +troops ready to meet them in every case, but we were +also generally able to keep the initiative in our hands.</p> + +<p>In this manner by the end of September the opposing +flanks had been extended to the district north of the +Somme, about Péronne-Albert. A few days later +began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +and by the middle of October our advanced troops +were near Lille, marching through the richest industrial +country of France. The Army Cavalry was placed +so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to bring +pressure against the communications with England. +Our cavalry patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel +and Hazebrouck, the pivots of the enemy’s movements, +but they had to retire eastwards again when superior +hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The +reports which they brought back with them all pointed +to preparations by the enemy for an attack on a large +scale, and for another effort to turn the fortunes of +the campaign to his favour. With this in view all +available troops, including newly-arrived detachments +from England, were to be used to break through the +gap between Lille and Antwerp against our right wing, +roll it up and begin the advance against the northern +Rhine.</p> + +<p>It must be remembered that at the time this plan +was conceived the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were +still in French and Belgian possession. It was hoped +that Lille, with its well-built fortifications, even though +they were not quite up-to-date, would at least hold +up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was +defended by the whole Belgian Army of from five to +six divisions which were to be reinforced by British +troops, and it was confidently expected that this +garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the +most modern fortress in Western Europe against any +attack, especially if, as was generally believed, this +could only be carried out by comparatively weak +forces. Thus it seemed that the area of concentration +for the Franco-Belgian masses was secure until<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +all preparations were ready for the blow to be delivered +through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the +German armies in the west. The plan was a bold +one, but it was countered by a big attack of considerable +German forces in the same neighbourhood and +at the same time. The two opponents met and held +each other up on the Yser and at Ypres, and here the +last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium and gain +possession of the rich provinces of Northern France +before the end of the year was frustrated. The +question arises how the Germans were able to find the +men to do this, since it had been necessary to send +considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the +Russian advance.</p> + +<p>Whoever has lived through those great days of +August 1914, and witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm +of the German nation, will never forget that +within a few days more than a million volunteers +entered German barracks to prepare to fight the +enemies who were hemming in Germany. Workmen, +students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders, +officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. +There was such a constant stream of men that finally +they had to be sent away, and put off till a later date, +for there was neither equipment nor clothing left for +them. By 16th August, before the advance in the +west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin +had ordered the formation of five new Reserve Corps +to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, whilst Bavaria +formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony +and Würtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve +Corps into being. Old and young had taken up arms +in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted +of these volunteers, the remainder being trained men +of both categories of the <i>Landwehr</i> and the <i>Landsturm</i>, +as well as some reservists from the depôts, who joined +up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen +to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the +moment, and the need of their country: they were +anxious to become useful soldiers as quickly as possible +to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. Some +regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes +of the higher educational schools came with their +teachers and joined the same company or battery. +Countless retired officers placed themselves at the +disposal of the Government, and the country will +never forget these patriots who took over commands +in the new units, the formation of which was mainly +due to their willing and unselfish work.</p> + +<p>The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps to the Western Front began +on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division +followed shortly after. Only comparatively few +experienced commanders were available for the units, +and it was left to their keen and patriotic spirit to +compensate as far as possible for what the men still +lacked to play their part in the great struggle.</p> + +<p>The situation of the armies on the Western Front +at this time was as follows. In the neighbourhood of +Lille the northern wing of the Sixth Army was fighting +against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October, +Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and +garrison, was taken after a twelve days’ siege directed +by General von Beseler, commanding the III Reserve +Corps, and well known in peace time as Chief of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications. +The victorious besiegers had carried all before +them. As they were numerically insufficient to invest +Antwerp on the west, south and east, a break-through +was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. It +was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; +but the main body of the Belgian army, in good fighting +order, was able to escape westwards along the +coast, to await the arrival of British and French reinforcements +behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians +were taken prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 +British troops<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> were forced into Holland. In consequence +of this new situation, and of the reports of hostile +concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, the +German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth +Army under Duke Albert of Würtemburg. It was to +be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, and XXVII +Reserve Corps,<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and was joined later on by the III +Reserve Corps with the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division. By 13th +October the detainment of this new Army was in full +progress west and south-west of Brussels. On the +evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began +their march to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of +Bruges)—Deynze—point four miles west of Audenarde.</p> + +<p>In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town +of Lille. It had been entered on 12th October by +part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some <i>Landwehr</i> +troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing +to the useless efforts of French territorial troops to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +defend it. The order to the garrison was: ‘The town +is to be held till the Tenth French Army arrives’; it +resulted in the capture of 4500 French prisoners, who +were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing +of the Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Würtemburg +and XIX Saxon Corps, pushed forward to the +Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> They +took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through +Comines to Warneton and thence east of Armentières, +where they came into touch with the 14th Infantry +Division which was further south near the western +forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the +III Reserve Corps, with its three divisions from +Antwerp, was advancing westwards on a broad front. +By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards +and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen +and reconnaissance detachments had recognised movements +of large bodies of troops about Hazebrouck, +Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations +on a big scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to +this, considerable hostile forces had reached Ypres, +and appeared to be facing more or less southwards +opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the +German General Staff, gave the following instructions +for the German forces between Lille and the sea. The +Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on the +defensive along the line Menin-Armentières-La Bassée<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> +and to await the attack of our new Fourth Army +against the left flank of the enemy. The offensive +action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was +to be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which +now belonged to it, should move as its right wing in +echelon along the coast, whilst its left was to advance +through Menin.</p> + +<p>In accordance with these orders the III Reserve +Corps occupied Ostend on the 15th, its left wing reaching +the line of the Thourout-Roulers road. The Corps +was then ordered not to advance further for a few +days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and +French, who were advancing against the north wing +of the Sixth Army, being drawn prematurely to movements +in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore +were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and +the canal south of it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached the line +Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt—point six miles +east of Courtrai. On the advance of these four new +Corps, the III Reserve Corps was to draw away to +the right wing, and during the 17th and the following +morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted +to it immediately south of the coast, and cleared the +front of the Fourth Army. The reconnaissance +activity of the previous days had in places led to severe +fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of +the 6th Reserve Division. It was found that the +Belgian rearguards still held part of the ground east +of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any attempt +to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the +question, as the bridges had been blown up and the +whole line put in a state of defence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> + +<p>The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the +III Reserve Corps was a brilliant success. At midday +on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, who was to direct +the enemy’s attack from the line of the Yser, was still +in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had +time to prepare for his attack, and his only immediate +care was to secure the line from Armentières to the +sea for the deployment. After the events on the +Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested +General Joffre, the Allied commander,<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> that he might +be placed on the northern flank of the line. He would +then be close to Calais, which had already become an +English town,<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> he would be able to protect the communications +to his country; and, further, the fame to +be gained by a decisive and final victory attracted +this ambitious commander to the north. As a result +the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien +was now in action against the strong German positions +between Vermelles (four miles south-west of La Bassée) +and Laventie (west of Lille).<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Further to the north +the III British Corps was fighting against the Saxons +advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry +Corps.<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +hostile advance on the line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east +of Ypres.<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Immediately to the north again, the +newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th +Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had +arrived in the area Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in +its retreat by von Beseler’s columns (III Reserve +Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched +up to Bixschoote,<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> and the gap between this place and +Dixmude had been closed by a French Cavalry Division +which connected up with the Belgian Army. +The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, +was engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up +to the sea for the most stubborn defence. These +strong forces were to cover the arrival of the VIII and +X French Corps<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and were to deliver the first blow +against our supposed right wing.</p> + +<p>On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone +out far in advance of its Corps was surrounded near +Roulers, and it was only by its capture that the enemy +definitely discovered the arrival of the new German +Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown +to him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. +Field-Marshal French was now confronted with a new +situation. The preparations for his big attack were not +yet completed. The superiority of the masses already +concentrated did not yet appear to him to be suffi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>cient +to guarantee success against the enemy’s advance. +The British commander therefore decided to remain +on the defensive<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> against our new Fourth Army, until +the completion of the French concentration. His line +was already closed up to the sea, it was naturally +strong, and fresh troops were arriving daily. The +danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the effect +of making England put forth her full energy; the +British troops fought desperately to defend every inch +of ground, using every possible means to keep up the +sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and +received rapid assistance from the French, and were +backed up by fresh reinforcements from England.</p> + +<p>From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm +and unconditional determination to win the +war which pervaded the new Fourth Army gave every +prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who +was apparently still engaged in concentrating and +reorganising his forces, and gaining Calais, the aim +and object of the 1914 campaign.</p> + +<p>Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful +army, fully deployed and ready to meet us. The +British boast that they held up our attack with a +great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true +in the case of the 7th Division during the first two +days in the small sector <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt</span>. On +22nd October between <span class="smcap">Armentières</span> and the sea +there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking +German Corps; and, besides, the enemy had prepared +a series of lines of strong trenches covered by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> +an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In the +course of the operations that developed, the relative +strength of the opposing forces never appreciably +altered in our favour.<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The moral strength of our +troops made up for the numerical superiority of the +enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back +and destroyed, it is hoped for ever, the ambition of +our opponent to regain Belgium by force of arms.</p> + +<p>The great desire of the Germans to defeat the +hostile northern wing, and to hit hardest the most +hated of all our enemies, and, on the other side, the +obstinate determination of the British to hold on to +the passages to their country, and to carry out the +offensive to the Rhine with all their resources, resulted +in this battle being one of the most severe of the whole +war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the +battle on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> can never be sufficiently +praised, and in spite of great losses their +enthusiasm remained unchecked and their offensive +spirit unbroken.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS" id="THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS">THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS</a></h2> + +<p>The country in which it was hoped to bring about +the final decision of the campaign of 1914 was not +favourable to an attack from east to west.</p> + +<p>Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, +is almost completely flat, and lies only slightly above +sea-level, and in some parts is even below it. Mount +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, in the south, is the only exception; rising +to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower +of Western Flanders. Before the war it was +a well-wooded ridge with pretty enclosures and +villages. From its slopes and summits could be +seen the whole countryside from <span class="smcap">Lille</span> to <span class="smcap">Menin</span> and +<span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>.</p> + +<p>The possession of this hill was of great importance. +Our cavalry actually occupied it during the early +days of October, but when the enemy advanced he +immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was +still too far away to help, and so Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> fell +into the enemy’s hands. During the battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +it was his best observation post, and of the utmost +assistance to his artillery.</p> + +<p>We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on +the eastern crest of the ridge in front of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but +in the autumn of 1914, as also later in the war, this +was always the signal for the most desperate fighting.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> +It was thus that the heights of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>,<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> the high-lying +buildings of <span class="smcap">Hooge</span> and the village of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +won their sanguinary fame.</p> + +<p>Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its +high ramparts and fine buildings, <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was formerly +one of the most picturesque towns in Flanders. In +the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance, +and became the centre of the cloth-weaving +trade on its introduction from Italy. <span class="smcap">Bruges</span>, lying +close to the coast, became the market for its wares. +The Clothweavers’ Guild, which accumulated great +wealth, erected in <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> a fine Gothic hall, whose +towers with those of St. Martin’s Church were landmarks +for miles round. In modern times, however, +the importance of the town greatly diminished. The +cloth-weaving industry drifted away to the factories +of <span class="smcap">Menin</span> and <span class="smcap">Courtrai</span>; and <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, like its dead +neighbour <span class="smcap">Bruges</span>, remained only a half-forgotten +memory of its former brilliance.</p> + +<p>The war has brought fresh importance to the town, +but of a mournful kind. On the impact of the German +and Anglo-French masses in Flanders in the autumn +of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations. +The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front +of it; for, as an Englishman has written, it had become +a point of honour to hold the town. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> lay so +close to the front that our advance could be seen from +its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing +his batteries and sheltering his reserves. For +the sake of our troops we had to bring it under fire;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +for German life is more precious than the finest Gothic +architecture. Thus the mythical death of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +became a reality: no tower now sends forth its light +across the countryside, and a wilderness of wrecked +and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town so full +of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders.</p> + +<p>The streams which run northwards from the hills +about <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> unite for the most part near the town +and flow into the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal, which connects the +<span class="smcap">Lys</span> at <span class="smcap">Comines</span> with the sea at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>. This +canal passes through the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> ridge near <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span> +and, following northwards the course of a small canalised +tributary of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, meets the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> itself south +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. The dunes at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> have been cut +through by engineers for its exit to the sea. It is +only from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> northwards that the canal becomes +an obstacle which requires proper bridging equipment +for its passage. Its high embankments to the +south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, however, give excellent cover in +the otherwise flat country and greatly simplify the +task of the defender.</p> + +<p>The canal acquired a decisive importance when the +hard-pressed Belgians, during the battle on the night +of 29th-30th October, let in the sea at flood-tide +through the sluices into the canal, and then by blowing +up the sluice-gates at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, allowed it to +flood the battlefield along the lower <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. By this +means they succeeded in placing broad stretches of +country under water, so much so that any extensive +military operations in that district became out of the +question. The high water-level greatly influenced all +movements over a very large area. By his order the +King of the Belgians destroyed for years the natural<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> +wealth of a considerable part of his fertile country, +for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation +down to its very roots.</p> + +<p>The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and +difficult for observation purposes. The high level of +the water necessitates drainage of the meadows, which +for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes which +have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are +bordered with willows, and thick-set hedges form the +boundaries of the cultivated areas. Generally speaking, +the villages do not consist of groups of houses: +the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming +a single street. The country is densely populated +and is consequently well provided with roads. But +these are only good where they have been made on +embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, +which begin towards the end of October, rapidly turn +the other roads into mere mud tracks and in many +cases make them quite useless for long columns of +traffic.</p> + +<p>The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by +rain and surface-water. The loam soil was on the +whole easy to work in; but it was only on the high +ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to +give sufficient cover against the enemy’s artillery fire; +on the flat, low-lying ground they could not in many +cases be made more than two feet deep.</p> + +<p>A few miles south of the coast the country assumes +quite another character: there are no more hedges +and canals: instead gently rolling sand-hills separate +the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is not +fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes +prevents the sea encroaching on the land.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span></p> + +<p>The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of +Flanders is the difficulty of observation. The enemy, +fighting in his own country,<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> had every advantage, +while our artillery observation posts were only found +with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed +from the front line, and it frequently happened that +our brave artillerymen had to bring up their guns +into the front infantry lines in order to use them +effectively. Although the enemy was able to range +extremely accurately on our guns which were thus +quickly disclosed, nothing could prevent the German +gunners from following the attacking infantry.</p> + +<p>Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult +by the many hedges and villages, so that it took a +long time to discover the enemy’s dispositions and +give our artillery good targets.</p> + +<p>Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent +limitations of view were all to the advantage +of the defenders, who were everywhere able to surprise +the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh +defensive lines in front of them without knowing +whether they were occupied or not. The British, +many of whom had fought in a colonial war against +the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country, +allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and +then opened a devastating fire at point-blank range +from rifles and machine-guns concealed in houses and +trees.</p> + +<p>In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the +German attacks so that even the biggest operations +degenerated into disconnected actions which made the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +greatest demands on the powers of endurance and +individual skill of our volunteers. In spite of all +these difficulties our men, both old and young, even +when left to act on their own initiative, showed a spirit +of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle +on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> a sacred memory both for the Army and +the Nation, and every one who took part in it may say +with pride, ‘I was there.’</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY" id="THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY">THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY</a></h2> + +<p>An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the +following instructions for the 18th:—</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>The III Reserve Corps to march to the line +<span class="smcap">Coxyde-Furnes-Oeren</span>, west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Aertrycke-Thourout</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Lichtervelde-Ardoye</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area <span class="smcap">Emelghem-Iseghem</span>, +and, on the left wing, the +XXVII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Lendelede-Courtrai</span>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve +Corps all reached their appointed destinations on the +evening of the 18th without meeting any strong +resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced +guards and patrols came into touch with weak hostile +detachments who were awaiting our advance well +entrenched, and surprised us with infantry and artillery +fire. At <span class="smcap">Roulers</span> a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes +circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, +and cavalry patrols pushing well forward showed +that the British now realised the strength of the new +German forces.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_1" id="map_1"></a><img src="images/i044.png" width="491" height="592" alt="DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914." /> + +<p class="fignote"><i>On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right +of the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. +It is also inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps +as north of Armentières—only one of its Divisions was—while +the II Corps was certainly too closely pressed to detach +any troops to the north as depicted in the diagram.</i></p> +</div> + +<p>In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a><br /><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> +Army, the troops of General von Beseler had opened +the battle on the Yser. During its advance northwards +to cross the Yser at the appointed places the +III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition +east of the river-barrier. The men knew they were +on the decisive wing of the attack, and they pushed +ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid +assault the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division captured <span class="smcap">Westende</span> +from the Belgians, although a gallant defence was put +up, and in spite of the fact that British torpedo-boats +and cruisers took part in the action from the sea with +their heavy artillery<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> both during the advance and +the fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve +Division deployed to attack a strongly entrenched +hostile position. The 3rd Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion +captured the obstinately defended village of <span class="smcap">St. Pierre +Cappelle</span> after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the +main body of the division succeeded in pushing forward +to the neighbourhood of <span class="smcap">Schoore</span>. The 6th Reserve +Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, also +closed with the enemy. It captured <span class="smcap">Leke</span>, and <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, +defended by the 4th Belgian Division; but even this +Brandenburg Division, for all its war experience, found +the task of forcing the crossings over the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> too +much for it.</p> + +<p>The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing +us a thousand or two thousand yards nearer the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +but it had shown that the fight for the river line was +to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined +to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the +highest possible price. Four lines of trenches had +been dug, and it could be seen that every modern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +scientific resource had been employed in putting the +villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state +of defence. A great number of guns, very skilfully +placed and concealed, shelled the ground for a considerable +distance east of the river, and in addition +to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy +naval guns from the sea. Battleships, cruisers and +torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank of the 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division with their fire, and the British had +even brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats +close inshore.<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> They used a great quantity of ammunition, +but the effect of it all was only slight, for +the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and +indicated bad observation. It became still more +erratic when our long-range guns were brought into +action against the British Fleet. Detachments of the +4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division had to be echeloned back as far +as Ostend, in order to defend the coast against hostile +landings. During the day the General Commanding +the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division to cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, on +account of the heavy fire from the British naval guns, +but to make it pass with the main body of the Corps +behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose area the +fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The +<i>Ersatz</i> Division was informed accordingly. On the +19th another effort would have to be made to force +the crossings of the river by frontal attack, for everywhere +to the south strong opposition had been encountered. +From near <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> French troops carried +on the line of the compact Belgian Army. It was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +against these that the new Reserve Corps were now +advancing.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th +October a strong attack was delivered from the west +by the 4th Belgian Division, and from the south-west +by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a brigade +of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, +against <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. +They were driven back after heavy fighting. +During the 19th the southern wing of the Brandenburg +(III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing +nearer the river and, on its left, part of the artillery +of the XXII Reserve Corps came into action in support +of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve Corps, +which until that day had been fighting unassisted.</p> + +<p>On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed +on the whole front of the Fourth Army. The XXII +Reserve Corps advanced on <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve +Corps. In front of it lay the strong bridge-head +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, well provided with heavy guns. The +whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed into +battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended +by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th +Reserve Division the 209th Reserve Regiment late in +the evening took <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> after severe street +fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the +village of <span class="smcap">Gits</span>, whilst <span class="smcap">Cortemarck</span> was evacuated by +the enemy during the attack. The 46th Reserve +Division in a running fight crossed the main road to +<span class="smcap">Thourout</span>, north of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, and by the evening +had arrived close to <span class="smcap">Staden</span>. Heavy street fighting +in the latter place continued during the night: the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> +enemy, supported by the population, offered strong +resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued +behind our front lines, endangering the cohesion +of the attacking troops, but never to a serious extent.</p> + +<p>The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition +at <span class="smcap">Rumbeke</span>, south-east of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>; but all +the enemy’s efforts were in vain, and the 233rd Reserve +Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its Corps Commander, +General von Hügel, forced its way through +the rows of houses, many of which were defended with +light artillery and machine-guns. A very heavy fight +took place for the possession of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, which was +stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were +put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from +holes in the roofs and windows, and concealed mines +exploded among the advancing troops. In spite of +all this, by 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> <span class="smcap">Roulers</span> was taken by the 233rd, +234th and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking +from north, east and south respectively. Further +to the south, after a small skirmish with British cavalry, +the 52nd Reserve Division reached <span class="smcap">Morslede</span>, its +objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII +Reserve Corps had come into contact with the 3rd +British Cavalry Division which tried to hold up the +Corps in an advanced position at <span class="smcap">Rolleghem-Cappelle</span>. +After a lively encounter the British cavalry was +thrown back on to the 7th British Division, which +held a strong position about <span class="smcap">Dadizeele</span>.<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> + +<p>Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation +had been considerably cleared up, in so far as we now +knew that the Belgians, French and British not only +held the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> canal, but also the high +ground east and north-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. Everything +pointed to the fact that an unexpectedly strong +opponent was awaiting us in this difficult country, +and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively +untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg’s +Army. In the meantime the Commander of +the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, +after a discussion at Army Headquarters with General +von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, decided +to renew the attack, as the left wing of the Fourth +Army had now come up on his immediate right. In +consequence of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved +from its position on the line <span class="smcap">Menin-Warneton</span> and +replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the IV Cavalry +Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of +the Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were +continued with frequent reinforcements of fresh troops, +had the effect of holding the enemy and drawing a +strong force to meet them. They were not, however, +destined to have any decisive success, for the offensive +strength of the Sixth Army had been reduced by +previous fighting, and it was not sufficient to break +through the enemy’s strongly entrenched positions.<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> +All the more therefore were the hopes of Germany +centred in the Fourth Army, which was fighting further +northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of the campaign +in Western Europe at this period.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1" id="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1"><span class="smcap">THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY +FROM 20th OCTOBER TO 31st OCTOBER 1914</span></a></h2> + +<p>On 20th October the battle broke out along the +whole line, on a front of about sixty miles. The enemy +had got into position, and was prepared to meet the +attack of Duke Albert of Würtemburg’s Army. On +the very day that the British, French and Belgians +intended to begin their advance they found themselves +compelled to exert all their strength to maintain +their positions against our offensive. The British +and French had to bring up constant reinforcements, +and a hard and bitter struggle began for every yard of +ground. The spirit in which our opponents were +fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian +Division, picked up in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> on 16th October. This +ran: ‘The fate of the whole campaign probably depends +on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore officers +and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be +called upon to make, to do even more than their mere +duty. The salvation of the country and therefore of +each individual among us depends on it. Let us then +resist to our utmost.’</p> + +<p>We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, +opposed to such a determined and numerically superior +enemy, were able to justify the confidence which had +been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the +following proclamations by their highest commanders +on their arrival in Belgium:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">Great Headquarters</span>,<br /> +<i>14th October 1914</i>. +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">To the Fourth Army</span>,—I offer my welcome to the +Fourth Army, and especially to its newly-formed Reserve +Corps, and I am confident that these troops will act with the +same devotion and bravery as the rest of the German Army.</p> + +<p>Advance, with the help of God—my watchword.</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap">William, I. R.</span> +</p> + +<h3 class="left"><i>ARMY ORDER.</i></h3> + +<p>I am pleased to take over the command of the Army +entrusted to me by the Emperor. I am fully confident +that the Corps which have been called upon to bring about +the final decision in this theatre of war will do their duty +to their last breath with the old German spirit of courage +and trust, and that every officer and every man is ready +to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred cause +of our Fatherland. With God’s assistance victory will +then crown our efforts.</p> + +<p>Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor.</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Duke Albert of Würtemburg</span>,<br /> +<i>General and Army Commander</i>. +</p> + +<div> +<p class="ilb center"><span class="smcap">Army Headquarters, Brussels</span>,<br /> +<i>15th October 1914</i>. +</p></div></blockquote> + +<p>Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army +was not an infinitely difficult one. It would have +probably been achieved nevertheless if the Belgians +at the moment of their greatest peril had not called +the sea to their aid to bring the German attack to a +halt. Let us, however, now get down to the facts.</p> + +<p>On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering +ram of the Fourth Army, began an attack +with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by almost +the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of +the Yser west of the line <span class="smcap">Mannekensvere-Schoor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>bakke</span>. +The 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division to the north and the +6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. By +the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions had driven the enemy back across the river +in spite of the support given him by British and French +heavy batteries.<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> In front of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division +the enemy still held a bridge-head at <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span>. +At 8.15 <span class="small">A.M.</span> on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the +Staff of the 6th Reserve Division, that part of the +26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had crossed the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span>. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd +Battalions of this regiment had worked their way up +to the north-eastern part of the bend of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +south of <span class="smcap">Schoore</span>, and had got into the enemy’s outposts +on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a +shot had been fired, and not an unnecessary noise had +disturbed the quiet of the dawning day. Volunteers +from the engineers silently and rapidly laid bridging +material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge +west of <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, which had been blown up and +lay in the water, was very quickly made serviceable +again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians +had considered their position sufficiently protected by +the river, and by the outposts along the eastern bank. +By 6 <span class="small">A.M.</span> German patrols were on the far side of the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span>, and the enemy’s infantry and machine-gun fire +began only when they started to make a further +advance. Three companies of the 1st and two companies +of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as part +of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already +crossed the temporary bridges at the double and taken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +up a position on the western bank: so that, in all, +2½ battalions and a machine-gun company were +now on the western bank.</p> + +<p>The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, +and prepared a thoroughly unpleasant day for +those who had crossed. Heavy and light guns of +the British and French artillery<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> hammered incessantly +against the narrow German bridge-head and +the bridges to it. Lying without cover in the swampy +meadows the infantry was exposed beyond all help +to the enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire from west +and south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks +again and again, but to attempt sending reinforcements +across to it was hopeless. Some gallant +gunners, however, who had brought their guns close +up to the eastern bank, were able to give great help +to their friends in their critical situation. Thus +assisted the infantry succeeded in holding the position, +and during the following night was able to make +it sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of +success to any further hostile efforts. During the +night several Belgian attacks with strong forces were +repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve Division +was able to put a further 2½ battalions across +to the western bank of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> bend. On the +23rd we gained possession of <span class="smcap">Tervaete</span>, and the +dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was +thereby considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th +October saw all the infantry of the 6th Reserve Division +west of the river. A pontoon bridge was thrown +across the north-eastern part of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> bend, but +it was still impossible to bring guns forward on account<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +of the enemy’s heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve +Division still lay in its battle positions along the +river bank north of <span class="smcap">Schoorbakke</span>, but every time +attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian +artillery smashed the bridges to pieces. The 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division suffered heavily, as it was subjected +to constant artillery fire from three sides, and to +entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands +and the high level of the ground water. Whenever +fire ceased during the night strong hostile attacks soon +followed; but they were all repulsed. The withdrawal +of the main body of the <i>Ersatz</i> Division behind the +6th Reserve Division to cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, as General +von Beseler had once planned, had become impracticable +for the moment, for it had been discovered through +the statements of prisoners that the 42nd French +Division had arrived in <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> to assist the Belgians. +The 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, which had been weakened +on the 18th by the transfer of one of its three brigades +to the 5th Reserve Division, could not be expected to +bring the new enemy to his knees by the running fight +that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone +was sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; +in addition, the fire of the enemy’s naval guns from the +sea prevented any large offensive operations in the +area in question. Thus the <i>Ersatz</i> troops were compelled +to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining +their positions under the cross-fire of guns of +every calibre, to driving back the hostile attacks, and +to holding the Belgian and French forces off in front +of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. +It was not until some long-range batteries +were placed at the disposal of the division that its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +position improved. A couple of direct hits on the +enemy’s ships soon taught them that they could no +longer carry on their good work undisturbed. Their +activity at once noticeably decreased, and the more +the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from +the dunes, the further the ships moved away from +the coast and the less were they seen.</p> + +<p>General von Beseler never for a moment doubted +that the decision lay with the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions, especially as the four Corps of the Fourth +Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able +to reach the canal-barrier with any considerable forces.</p> + +<p>The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General +of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, had in the meantime +come into line south of General von Beseler’s troops, +and had already fought some successful actions. It +had arrived on the 19th in the district east of <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> +and about <span class="smcap">Vladsloo</span>, just in time to help in driving +back the Franco-Belgian attack against the southern +flank of the 6th Reserve Division.<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> That same evening +it was ordered to attack from north and south +against the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, an exceptionally +difficult task. In addition to the fact that the +swampy meadows of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal limited freedom +of movement to an enormous extent, the <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> +canal, running at right angles to it from east +to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +lay at the junction of these two waterways, +and behind its bridge-head lines were the Belgian +‘Iron’ Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French +Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and +part of the 5th Belgian Division, determined to defend<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +the place at all costs. About eighty guns of every +calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire the +ground over which Falkenhayn’s Corps would have +to attack. On the 20th, in spite of all these difficulties, +the 44th Reserve Division, on the northern wing of +the Corps, captured <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> and reached the canal +bank west of <span class="smcap">Kasteelhoek</span> in touch with von Beseler’s +Corps. The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the +left wing, took <span class="smcap">Vladsloo</span> and several villages south-east +of it on the northern bank of the <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> +Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those +villages the reach of the canal between <span class="smcap">Eessen</span> and +<span class="smcap">Zarren</span> was crossed on hastily constructed footbridges, +and a further advance made in a south-westerly +direction. <span class="smcap">Eessen</span> itself was occupied, and +the attack brought us to within a hundred yards of +the enemy. He realised his extremely critical situation,<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> +and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand +were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile +artillery fire the German losses were by no means +slight. On one occasion when our advancing infantry +units were losing touch with one another in this difficult +country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered +from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. After a heavy struggle the onrush of +the enemy was held up, mainly owing to our artillery, +which heroically brought its guns up into position +immediately behind the infantry front line.</p> + +<p>During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised +in order to recommence its attack on the +bridge-head from east and south-east on the following +morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The +garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +hold out to the last man, and had been informed that +any one who attempted to desert would be shot without +mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard all the +exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting +for their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless +by the 21st October the 43rd Reserve Division, +which consisted of volunteers from the Guard Corps +Reservists, had taken the château south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +and <span class="smcap">Woumen</span>. The opposing sides lay within a +hundred yards of each other. Artillery preparation, +attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. Our +artillery did fearful havoc and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was in flames. +The Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly +reinforced, and conducted itself most gallantly. From +the north the battalions of the 44th Reserve Division +were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy +back on to the town, and German batteries were +brought up into, and at times even in front of, the +infantry front line. Although we were unable to force +our way into <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, on the evening of the 23rd +our troops were in position all round it.</p> + +<p>On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII +Reserve Corps, under General of Cavalry von Kleist, +had advanced at 9 <span class="small">A.M.</span> on 20th October on the front +<span class="smcap">Handzaeme-Staden</span> in order to reach the canal on +the line <span class="smcap">Noordschoote-Bixschoote</span>. The 45th Reserve +Division was on the right and the 46th Reserve +Division on the left. After some hours of street fighting +<span class="smcap">Staden</span> was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th +Reserve Division. By nightfall a line from <span class="smcap">Clercken</span> +to the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest was reached. +On the 21st the Corps had to cross a stretch of country +which put these partially trained troops and their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> +inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great +forest of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> with its dense undergrowth made +it exceedingly difficult to keep direction in the attack +and to maintain communication between units fighting +an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such +as the <span class="smcap">Steenebeck</span> offered favourable opportunities +to the enemy to put up a strong defence behind a +succession of depressions. Thus our gallant troops +after every successful assault found themselves confronted +by another strong position: but unwavering +and regardless of loss, they continued their advance.</p> + +<p>By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Division +had completely driven the enemy out of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> +Forest,<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> whilst its sister-division had advanced +north of the <span class="smcap">Steenebeck</span>, and with its northern wing +supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of +it, had pushed forward to beyond <span class="smcap">Woumen</span>. On the +morning of the 22nd the heavy artillery opened fire +against the French positions on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal to +prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however +only the northern Division was able to reach the sector +allotted to the Corps, and an Army Order directed the +46th Reserve Division to the south-west against the line +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck</span>, in order to help carry for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>ward +the attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which +was completely held up in front of the latter place. As +a result of this the advance of von Kleist’s Corps also +came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable +fame during the day. In spite of a desperate +resistance the 210th Reserve Regiment stormed the +strongly entrenched village of <span class="smcap">Merckem</span> and the village +of <span class="smcap">Luyghem</span> lying north of it; a daring attack by the +209th and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through +the enemy’s positions on the <span class="smcap">Murtje Vaart</span>, whilst +the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the +<span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> sector, supported by the concentrated +fire of its artillery in position along the south-western +edge of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest. The 216th Reserve Regiment +took <span class="smcap">Mangelaere</span> by storm, in doing which its +gallant commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed +at the head of his troops. The 1st British Division +held a strong position along the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span>, in touch +with the French, and artillery of every calibre near +<span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> enfiladed the German attack.<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> The +British themselves speak of our attack as a magni<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>ficent +feat of arms carried out with infinite courage +and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they +charged through a hail of bullets in closed ranks up +to the enemy’s defences. The 212th Reserve Regiment +under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried +forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve +Regiment, pushed its way into the strongly fortified +village of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. The enemy on our side of +the canal, on the line <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck-Zonnebeke</span>, +was threatened with annihilation. <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> +commanded the main road and the canal-crossing +to <span class="smcap">Poperinghe</span>, where the enemy was detraining +his reinforcements.<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> The British therefore fought +with the courage of desperation: for not only was the +fate of the high ground east and north-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +now in the balance, but also the chance of being able +to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which +had been planned. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> and the high ground east +of the canal were on no account to be lost, and furious +counter-attacks were therefore delivered against the +intermingled German units. Nevertheless our gallant +volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the +butts of their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand +fighting was finally decided in our favour. At 6.30 +that evening <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> was ours. Unfortunately, +however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it +was lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking +troops were to be relieved under cover of darkness, +but they assembled and marched back before the +relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, +immediately advanced into the evacuated village and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> +took position among the ruins. Simultaneously a +big hostile counter-attack drove the 46th Reserve +Division from the high ground south of <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span>, +which it had captured, and pressed it back beyond +the stream again. The spirit and strength of the +young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, +and only a few of the subordinate commanders had +yet learnt how to deal with critical situations. Officers +of the General Staff and Divisional Staffs had to help +to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and +followed their new leaders, and were taken forward +again to the attack. Thus on the 23rd the high +ground south of the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> was won back by +the 46th Reserve Division, but <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> remained +lost to us, and <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> could not be captured.<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> + +<p>On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was +directed from the north against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. If the British +and French did not intend to give up their offensive +plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking Belgium +and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from +the hated German, they would have to maintain their +positions along the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> bridge-head east of the +canal between <span class="smcap">Comines</span> and the coast. For this reason +the country round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was the central area of the +Anglo-French defence from the beginning to the end +of the battle. Our opponents defended this position +on a wide semicircle by successive lines of trenches +and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, +every farm and even every large copse has won for +itself a fame of blood. The reinforcements which +Field-Marshal French received in abundance he placed +round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but not only for defensive purposes; +they were more often used to deliver attack after +attack against our young troops who had been weakened +by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they were +already being employed in this manner against the +46th Reserve Division.<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> He hoped to use the oppor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>tunity +of our retirement behind the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> to +break through our line and to roll up the part of the +front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and +thus to regain the initiative and freedom of manœuvre +on this extreme wing.<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> However, the blow was parried +by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, badly +placed lines the German units, which had scarcely +had time to reorganise, brought the hostile masses to +a standstill and won back in a counter-attack the +ground which they had lost during the night. On +this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry +the honours of the day. The fire of the guns, +brought up into the foremost lines, made wide gaps +in the attacking columns and the enemy’s losses must +have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered +severely in the constant fighting and under the everlasting +hostile artillery fire. Some of our regiments +had been reduced to half their strength. But in spite +of it the British did not succeed in breaking through +between the XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps.</p> + +<p>The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this +time completely held up in front of strongly entrenched +positions on the line <span class="smcap">Langemarck-Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt</span> +and opposed to an enemy who was becoming +stronger every day and making the most desperate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +efforts to regain his freedom of action and begin a +big offensive himself. The XXVI Reserve Corps, +which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the 51st +Reserve Division from the area west of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, +and the other Division from <span class="smcap">Morslede</span>, encountered +a stubborn resistance along the ridge <span class="smcap">Westroosebeke-Passchendaele-Keiberg</span>. +Fighting under the +eyes of their general, who was himself in the thick of +the struggle, the 51st Reserve Division stormed the +slope on to the ridge and entered <span class="smcap">Westroosebeke</span>. +The French division defending it was driven out at +four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the +gallant 51st, supported by the 23rd Reserve <i>Jäger</i> +Battalion, reached a line from the railway-station +north-west of <span class="smcap">Poelcappelle</span> to <span class="smcap">Poelcappelle</span> itself +during the evening. The attack was all the more +daring through the fact that <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest was +still in the enemy’s hands, and the flank of the division +therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the +52nd Reserve Division had taken <span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span>, +<span class="smcap">Keiberg</span> and the high ground between them from +the British; the artillery again deserving the highest +praise for its co-operation.<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> The attack, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +was brought to a standstill in front of the enemy’s +main position at the cross-roads east of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>. +The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by General +von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in +close touch with the 52nd Reserve Division on the +evening of the 20th. Advancing in four columns and +by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards. +The Würtemburg Division had succeeded in driving +the 7th British Division out of <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span> after heavy +street fighting, and the left wing was bent back on +<span class="smcap">Terhand</span>. Communication was there obtained with +the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of +the Sixth Army, which had captured a hostile position +north-east of <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span>.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to +our immediate front. It followed a line <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck-Zonnebeke-Reutel-Gheluvelt</span>; +and +the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +all picked troops, had already been located there. +They had dug a well-planned maze of trenches behind +broad wire entanglements before a single German shell +arrived to disturb their work.<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> The few stretches +of rising ground in the district had been included in +the skilfully selected positions as observation posts, +and the defenders were thus able to bring our advancing +columns under accurate artillery fire at long range. +This was especially the case from the high ground near +<span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>, whence the whole ground in front of +the position as far as <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> could be enfiladed. +All these difficulties, however, were not sufficient to +deter the offensive spirit of the German troops, and +‘<i>Vorwärts</i>’ was still their watchword: forwards and +back with the enemy, so that the rigid western front +might once more be mobile. The main body of the +XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span><a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> +from north and east, whilst the XXVII +Reserve Corps fought for the upper hand in the woods +between <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span> and <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>. The great +efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen +with its guns and support them with their fire +were in vain, owing to the difficult country, and the +well-aimed fire from the enemy’s prepared positions +reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +killed, and officers of high rank took their places and +reorganised the intermingled units.</p> + +<p>With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to +gain a decisive victory between <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> on 22nd and 23rd October the fate of +the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. +For the time being any further thought of a break-through +was out of the question. The troops up till +now had met the enemy full of a keen fighting spirit, +and had stormed his positions singing ‘<i>Deutschland, +Deutschland über alles’</i> regardless of casualties, and +had been one and all ready to die for their country; +but they had suffered heavily in the contest against a +war-experienced and numerically superior opponent +entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when +the last reserves of the Army, the 37th <i>Landwehr</i> +Brigade and the 2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, had been placed +at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could +only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night +of 23rd-24th October the expected Anglo-French +counter-attacks began, and continued throughout +the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right +wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary +local successes and putting in fresh forces the +enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a break-through; +but the German troops though weakened +held up all these furious onslaughts from positions +which had never been selected for defence, but were +merely those reached at the close of the attack.<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced +to continue ordering all his Corps to attack, in order +to co-operate with the Sixth Army which was attacking +and, besides this, to pin the enemy’s forces opposed +to him to their ground: for in the north a decision +appeared to be imminent on the front of General von +Beseler’s III Reserve Corps: in addition to the entire +infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had crossed +the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry +of the 5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the +44th Reserve Division succeeded in crossing the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +during that day. The enemy was compelled to +evacuate the western bank of the canal from <span class="smcap">St. +George</span> to south-east of <span class="smcap">Stuyvekenskerke</span>, in +spite of the fact that there had been one French and +four Belgian Divisions<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> opposing the III Reserve +Corps, and that the ten howitzer batteries had proved +insufficient to engage the Belgian, French and British +artillery successfully. In consequence of this inferiority +the old and new canal crossings lay under constant +concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport +guns over the waterway failed. Many a fine piece of +engineering carried out by our indefatigable sappers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +was destroyed by the enemy’s shells. The supply of +ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of +the greatest difficulty, as all the roads leading to the +rear across the swampy meadows were continuously +shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our front +troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next +operation was to break through the enemy’s position +here once and for all, though it was clear from +the beginning that the attack would be a very severe +one. Belgian and French working parties had dug +a series of positions between the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and the <span class="smcap">Nieuport-Bixschoote</span> +railway, from which the ground in +front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade +fire from skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed +batteries. On both wings, according to the +latest information at hand, strong hostile attacks were +threatening us, that is to say, near <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> as well +as near and to the south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. To meet these +the Army Commander had replaced the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division, which had been echeloned back along the +coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by +detachments of the Marine Division, and a few troops +placed at his disposition by the Governor of Belgium, +and had ordered it to march to <span class="smcap">Thourout</span>. At the +same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range +guns were placed to prevent the enemy from +concentrating for an attack in the <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> district. +However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, and was directed against those +battalions of the 44th Reserve Division which had +crossed to the west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. The enemy realised +the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from +the north-west, and put all available Belgian and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> +French reserves into the attack. Thus between five +and six battalions from three Belgian regiments and +the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a +strong force of artillery, advanced to the attack of +our southern flank. The Belgians themselves describe +this attack in the following words: ‘One saw the +companies doubling forward in small groups, lying +down on the officers’ signal, and then getting up to go +forward again until they finally deployed into their +attacking lines. But unfortunately they were asked +to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of +the men were mown down by the machine-guns. +Company after company was decimated, and in spite +of the energy of their leaders they had to give way, +death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. +The Marine Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon +gallantry, soon shared the same fate. But all this +sacrifice was not in vain—it stopped the enemy’s +advance.’<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> + +<p>It will be understood then that the first thing for +the weak and widely separated battalions of the 44th +Reserve Division to do on the 25th was to get breathing +space and reorganise, even though they were +exposed all the time to the heaviest fire from west, +south and south-east. Further to the north, however, +on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries +across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of +these two divisions had been concentrated under the +expert leadership of General von Ziethen, it began to +prepare the way for the infantry attack. By midday<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> +both the divisions were advancing steadily towards +the railway embankment on the line <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle-Pervyse</span>. +The Belgians had to evacuate position +after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire +was poured in by the enemy’s artillery about <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>; +and simultaneously a brigade of the 6th Reserve +Division south-east of <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> had to be directed +southwards in order not to lose touch with the right +wing of the 44th Reserve Division. There were no +reinforcements to fill up the gaps, and thus the attack +came shortly afterwards to a standstill.</p> + +<p>A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly +from the south: the German artillery, including 42-centimetre +guns, had bombarded <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> throughout +the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and +now the 43rd Reserve Division had begun its assault +on the town. It resulted in the most violent street +fighting; fast and furious came the bullets from the +machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of +the town, and from the shells from the batteries +massed west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, but nothing could hold up +our attack. The Belgians have given the following +description of the power of the German assault: +‘What plunder must not they have been promised, +to allow themselves to be killed in such a way? What +drink must they not have taken to give themselves +such animal courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, +they storm forward with the howls of wild beasts; +lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under +foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot +down in hundreds, they keep coming on. Then follow +isolated fights with bayonets and the butts of rifles: +some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +bashed in.’ The fight swayed backwards and forwards +till well into the night: guns brought up into the +front line fired at point-blank range: both sides put +in their last reserves.</p> + +<p>During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets +fixed, and we attacked again. A small German +detachment of about fifty men advanced across the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the +enemy’s batteries, it succumbed to greatly superior +numbers. Thus the morning of 26th October found +the attackers back in their assault-positions: their +courage, spirit and indifference to death having added +another leaf of fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It +was clear, however, that another artillery bombardment +was indispensable to success, and it was carried +out on the 26th and 27th.</p> + +<p>That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and +the French Marine Fusiliers in the fighting just described +is shown by the fact that on the morning of the 26th +Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly brought +up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A +German attack on the 28th was able to make some +progress on the southern flank against these fresh +troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No +further effort was made on the 29th, for there was a +shortage of artillery ammunition. The eastern edge +of the town was, however, bombarded by trench-mortars, +which had just arrived, with good effect.</p> + +<p>Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII +Reserve Corps should only leave a weak force of from +three to four battalions on the eastern bank of the +Yser opposite <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>; that <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> should be +kept under heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +of the 43rd Reserve Division should cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, in order to attack the town from +the rear.</p> + +<p>North-west of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, by the evening of the 29th, +the troops of General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve +Division had worked their way forward some 300 +yards towards the railway embankment. Only one +brigade of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division was still north-east +of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>: all the rest were taking part in the +struggle further south, and west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> +was shut in on the south: the left wing of the +44th Reserve Division lay west of <span class="smcap">Beerst</span>, as protection +against the strong hostile forces near the river +about <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>: the Belgians and recently-arrived +French forces held the railway embankment between +<span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. Broad stretches of wire +entanglements lay in front of this strong position, and +the efforts of our troops had been almost superhuman +in their advance over this ground: it was intersected +with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards +broad, and thick, wired hedges. So strong, however, +was the pressure against the enemy that the French +were compelled to reduce their forces about <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> +and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant +reinforcements to the area <span class="smcap">Pervyse-Ramscappelle</span>. +A German airman, who was killed on the morning of +the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that +the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault +began at 6.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, though the ground in the area of +the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had become extraordinarily +swampy. It seemed impossible that the +recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water +to such an extent. Nevertheless the attack<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +made considerable progress. The 11th Brigade of +the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way +into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village +of <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span>, whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the +48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments reached the railway +embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it +towards <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle</span>. Although every house had +to be attacked, it succeeded in reaching the western +end of the village. The 12th Reserve Regiment +also made considerable advance.</p> + +<p>The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when +the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade on the northern wing advanced +from the north-east against <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, the enemy +retired. Airmen reported enemy’s columns retreating +towards <span class="smcap">Furnes</span>. Nothing could stop the victorious +advance of General von Beseler’s troops, not +even the heaviest guns of the British battleships, +cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, +enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 +yards, nor the incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian +Divisions. On the evening of the 30th <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle</span> +was completely in German possession, the +railway embankment south of it had been reached and +even crossed in places; in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> the fight was +progressing favourably, and south of it the 12th +Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad +dykes, was working forward to the railway. Still +further south the 44th Reserve Division was in full +advance towards the railway embankment east of +<span class="smcap">Oostkerke</span>, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve +Division had crossed the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, without casualties, +and had been sent forward in the direction of <span class="smcap">Caeskerke</span>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> + +<p>The attack was to have been continued on the following +morning, and General von Beseler intended to +withdraw the last part of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, from the area north-east +of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, for the fire of the enemy’s naval guns +from the sea<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> and the difficulties of the country +appeared to militate against any prospects of a rapid +success there. At 11.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span>, however, a General +Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported +that the attack could be continued no further owing +to the constant rising of the water. What had happened? +On the morning of the 30th the advancing +troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it +had gradually risen until they were now wading up +to their knees, and they could scarcely drag their +feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down for +a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun +and rifle fire, he was lost. The rise of the waters was +attributed to the torrential rain of the previous few +days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry +weather the excellent system of canals would soon +drain it off. But the rising flood soon prevented the +movement of wagons with ammunition and supplies, +and when the attackers looked back from the railway +embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole +country had sunk behind them: the green meadows +were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the general +line of the roads was only indicated by the houses +and the rows of partly covered trees. It soon became +evident that the enemy must have blown up the canal-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>sluices, +and called in the sea to his aid. The advance +of General von Beseler’s III Reserve Corps had been +the culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his +reserves had been put in to stop it, but in vain. If the +Germans could only succeed in pushing the exhausted +Belgians and French out of their way, the road to +<span class="smcap">Dunkirk</span> and <span class="smcap">Calais</span> was open. Warnings, friendly +and otherwise, had been given by the Allies to the +Belgians that they must ‘hold out’; but they were +no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of +<span class="smcap">Antwerp</span> now than when behind fortress ramparts. +Their fighting spirit was broken; so, influenced by +the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert +finally decided to employ this last desperate means +of defence, and place a wide expanse of his fair country +under water. The water-level rose slowly and insidiously +until, on the evening of the 30th, the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> had almost everywhere overflowed +its banks. The inundation destroyed buildings as +well as soil, but it enabled the worn-out defenders to +recover their sore-threatened security.</p> + +<p>General von Beseler quickly realised the danger +which now awaited his attacking troops on the far +side of the canal, behind whom a sheet of water, +2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. +The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to +make, yet it had to be done. The attack would have +to be given up and the greater part of the western +bank of the river evacuated. The order was issued +and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st +October. In spite of the dangers due to the altered +appearance of the country and the consequent difficulty +in finding the way, and although the Franco-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>Belgian +artillery kept the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> crossings under constant +heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. +Not a wounded man nor rifle fell into the enemy’s +hands, and the movement was so well covered that +the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until it +was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers +under Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind +for a long time in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span>. In front of them the +enemy was sweeping the village with artillery and +infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an +apparently boundless sea. A French colonel offered +Lieutenant Buchholz honourable conditions if he +would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the +offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off +with his little band of followers. They rejoined their +unit successfully. The enemy only followed up slowly +along the roads, with weak detachments of infantry. +Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the +line <span class="smcap">St. George-Stuyvekenskerke</span>, whilst the main +body on the 31st took up its new position east of the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> as follows: the 5th Reserve Division north of +the main road <span class="smcap">St. Pierre Cappelle-Mannekensvere</span>; +the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division in the area <span class="smcap">Mannekensvere-Schoore</span>; +and the 6th Reserve Division to the south +of it. One battalion and one battery of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division remained facing <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, extending northwards +to the coast. A new defensive position was +selected along the line <span class="smcap">Westende-Mannekensvere-Schoore-Kasteelhoek</span>: +a continuation of the attack +was now out of the question, as the water was still +rising west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. On 31st October and 1st +November, however, the XXII Reserve Corps again +tried to press its attack southwards on the east bank<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +of the river, in order to isolate the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, +but here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented +movement, and on the evening of the 1st these brave +troops also had to yield to the forces of nature and +withdraw behind the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. This operation was +carried out in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, +and was unmolested by the enemy, for he lay +in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for the +time being <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> remained in possession of the +French.</p> + +<p>The Army Commander had issued definite instructions +on the evening of the 24th October to the XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the effect that +they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, +and take every opportunity of seizing important points +on their immediate front. In the execution of this +order the German troops experienced a good deal of +heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The +XXVII Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing <span class="smcap">Reutel</span> +and holding it;<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> but in the meantime heavy hostile +attacks were begun against the XXIII, XXVI and +the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. +The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of +French units, endeavoured to break through, and +used all their strength. Indeed, in many places the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> +situation of these German volunteer corps became +critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the +enemy was able to keep our roads of advance and +communications under artillery fire. As the roads +were already broken up by the constant rain, the +ammunition supply of our artillery, inferior in any +case to our opponents’, failed. Nevertheless, in spite +of all difficulties our counter-attacks continued. The +fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th +October. In this sector the British and French made +a succession of attacks in the direction <span class="smcap">Poelkappelle</span>, +<span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span> and east of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>. The +37th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade and the 2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, +under the command of General von Meyer, had to +be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to detachments +of the Marine Division and of the 38th +<i>Landwehr</i> Brigade. These <i>Landwehr</i> men, far from +being weighed down by their years, gave effective +support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger +friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of +the fighting on the evening of the 26th General von +Meyer was mortally wounded: may his memory be +duly honoured.</p> + +<p>An exceptionally heavy British and French attack +was delivered on the 24th and 25th near <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>, +against the inner flanks of the XXVI and XXVII +Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations +are always the weakest parts of the defence, and when +the General Staff Officer of the XXVII Reserve Corps +asked for the support of the Corps on his right, he +received the reply that no infantry could be spared +‘for the enemy....’ And at that moment the tele<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>phone +circuit failed. There was nothing to do but +close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery +barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and +their leaders. The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve +Division shelled the advancing enemy as fast as they +were able, and by this aid the infantry was finally +enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the +same time the enemy made a strong attack further +to the south. The report came in that he had surrounded +<span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>; but before his supports could +assist him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division +had driven back his assaulting troops.<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> The Corps +was able to hold its old line from the cross-roads east +of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span> through <span class="smcap">Reutel</span> to <span class="smcap">Poezelhoek</span>. +Comparative quiet followed on the 28th and morning +of the 29th, for both sides were very exhausted. On +the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived +at <span class="smcap">Dadizeele</span> as Army Reserve.</p> + +<p>The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of +eight Cavalry Divisions and several <i>Jäger</i> battalions +under General von der Marwitz, was in action on the +left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between +the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which +lay half-way between <span class="smcap">Warneton</span> and <span class="smcap">Armentières</span>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> +The enemy could not be attacked here by any form +of mounted action; so far from this being possible, +ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting +on foot, to which the cavalrymen were unaccustomed. +Nevertheless they carried out this task in brilliant +fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position +and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held +up the British who were streaming down from the +high ground about <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and <span class="smcap">Messines</span>,<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> the +3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the +4th, 9th and 10th <i>Jäger</i> battalions and five battalions +of the 11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade brought forward from +Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the +assault of the line <span class="smcap">Kruiseik-Zandvoorde</span> and west +of it. This direction was taken in order to be able +to attack from the south against the rear of the enemy +holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to +29th October were memorable and glorious days for +this Cavalry Corps. Among other achievements, the +3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span> +on the 26th after heavy street fighting.<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> In co-operation +with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +Corps, next to which the 16th Bavarian Reserve +Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in +the fighting under Colonel List, General von Stetten, +on the 29th, carried forward the attack against <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, +the key of the enemy’s position. More than +600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken +by our victorious cavalry.<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Simultaneously on this +day, the troops of General von Stetten filled another +rôle. They were covering the concentration of new +German forces which was in the course of completion +behind their battle-front.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH" id="THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH">THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH +SOUTH OF YPRES</a></h2> + +<p>Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during +October, the Sixth Army under Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria had remained on the offensive on the +line <span class="smcap">Arras-La Bassée</span>—east of <span class="smcap">Armentières</span>;<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> but +although fresh reinforcements had been sent up to +that part of the front by the German General Staff, +a break-through had not been possible. Both sides +had gradually changed their objectives and now +merely sought to prevent any movement of the opposing +forces from that front to the decisive zone of +operations between <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> and <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. Any weakness +in the enemy’s line, however, was utilised to gain +new and improved positions from which another effort +to break through might be made as soon as possible.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> +Owing to the failure of the offensive south of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, +a decision under the conditions existing there +could not be hoped for; the German General Staff +therefore began considering a plan for concentrating +a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and +the Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the +Army Cavalry, and for breaking through with it on +the front <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Warneton</span>, south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>.</p> + +<p>On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn +arrived at the Headquarters of the Sixth Army to +discuss this operation. The plan was arranged and +orders were issued accordingly. A new ‘Army Group’ +was to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the +command of General von Fabeck, commander of the +XIII Würtemburg Corps.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> It would consist of the +II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up +from the south to join the Sixth Army), the 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division (still in reserve to the +Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division +(of the Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by +the 48th Reserve Division recently arrived from the +Fifth Army). In addition to these formations all +the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would +be brought up to assist, and if necessary the attacks +further south would be partially discontinued. The +offensive was to take place on the 30th October from +the general line <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Deulemont</span> in a north-easterly +direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> +of the II Corps was also to be brought up by rail to +<span class="smcap">Lille</span>. The orders of the German General Staff +pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth +and Sixth Armies was an essential condition for the +success of the operation. Crown Prince Rupert of +Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing and +centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding +attacks, and Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a +general attack of his Army for the 30th October.</p> + +<p>How the flooding of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> on the front of the +right wing of the Fourth Army brought the offensive +of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to a standstill +has already been described. From the 1st November +the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division took over the protection of +the line of the flooded area from the coast to <span class="smcap">Tervaete</span>, +whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved southwards +to the district <span class="smcap">Zarren-Staden</span> in order to reinforce +the XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation +might require.<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> To the XXII Reserve Corps was +allotted the task of holding the two French divisions +stationed in the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, which formed +a constant threat to the German front. The Corps +carried out this task admirably.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps advanced to the +attack as ordered. The first-named under General +von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the +ruins of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. After five hours’ desperate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve Infantry Regiments +entered the devastated village which had been +occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying +situation, and the hopelessness of finding cover +among the battered houses, resulted in the victorious +German regiments being exposed to a very heavy +artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties +in the village were greater than during the assault. +In consequence the commander decided to withdraw +and take up a line along the northern edge of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, +leaving in the village itself only sufficient +outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The +division on the left wing of the Corps also made progress +and reached the main road <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck</span> +in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> +with its right wing, but was unable to take it. +In spite of gallant efforts only a few hundred yards +of ground were gained by the evening of the 31st, +when these useless attacks were stopped by order. +The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the +right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps were held to +their positions by superior hostile artillery fire, and +also by mass attacks of the British and French during +the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had +just arrived, and in the presence of General Joffre an +attempt to break through our line was to be made on +this sector of the front.<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> The German defenders, +however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus +enabled the offensive of the Army Group of General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +von Fabeck to take place. In conjunction with this +the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +under its new commander, General von Schubert, +simultaneously advanced in the direction of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th +Infantry Division was relieved in its battle-position +west of <span class="smcap">Lille</span> by the 48th Reserve Division, and by +the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army +Group Fabeck was completed without disturbance.</p> + +<p>The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the +Army Group consisted of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 +battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each of 3 batteries, +and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> In addition +to the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, +the four <i>Jäger</i> battalions of the Army Cavalry and the +11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade were put under the command +of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th +October this new army of attack relieved the two +northern Cavalry Corps, and took over their outpost +lines. On the following morning the offensive began.<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> +The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked +south of the <span class="smcap">Menin-Ypres</span> road, with its left wing on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +<span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>, the II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with +its left wing on <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span>; further south again was the +26th Infantry Division with its left wing on <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. +In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with +the 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened +by two battalions of the XIX Saxon Corps, which +was attacking to the left of it, was ordered to advance +on <span class="smcap">St. Yves</span> and <span class="smcap">Ploegsteert</span> Wood. The 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division moved to the line <span class="smcap">Menin-Werwicq</span>. +The Army Cavalry which had been relieved +was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth +Army, one Cavalry Corps being placed behind the +right wing of the Army to be at hand to fill up a slight +gap which existed between the Fourth Army and the +Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary.</p> + +<p>The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French +Corps between the 7th Division of the IV British +Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before the advance +of von Fabeck’s Army; the II and IX French +Corps had also recently arrived<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> on the northern side of +the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient.<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> Again, therefore, the enemy had +a numerical superiority<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> in what was the second and +severest part of the battle on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. The British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> +in their reports have added together all the German +Corps which were brought up piecemeal for the fighting +on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and at <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, both at this period +and later on; and they describe the situation so as +to give the impression that they had held up with +inferior numbers the simultaneous attacks of all these +Corps from the outset. They go further and use the +figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat into +a victory. They boast of having held out against +great odds, gladly forgetting that their original intention +both before and during the battle had been to +overrun our positions and drive us back to the Rhine.</p> + +<p>The character of the fighting which began with the +appearance of the new German Army Group on the +scene had almost the savagery of the Middle Ages in +it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and +every wall into a strong point, and each of them had +to be stormed by our men with heavy loss. Even +when the first line of these fortifications had been +taken they were confronted by a second one immediately +behind it; for the enemy showed great skill +in taking every advantage of the ground, unfavourable +in any case to the attacker. To the east and +south-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, even more developed than in +the north, there were thick hedges, wire fences and +broad dykes. Numerous woods also of all sizes with +dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable +and most difficult for observation purposes. Our +movements were constantly being limited to the roads +which were swept by the enemy’s machine-guns. +Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments +the villages were mostly in ruins by the time the +infantry reached them, but the enemy fought desper<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>ately +for every heap of stones and every pile of bricks +before abandoning them. In the few village streets +that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally +developed into isolated individual combats, and +no description can do adequate justice to the bravery +of the German troops on such occasions. Our men +advanced to the attack as if they were back on the +barrack square, and an Englishman writes: ‘They +advanced towards us singing patriotic songs and with +their bands playing.’ There was such enthusiasm +that even the weakest were carried along by it, and +made regardless of losses. The battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> in +the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German +heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long +remain a source of inspiration for the historian and +the poet.</p> + +<p>By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the +importance of the attacks developing from the south-east +against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. They threatened his position along +the high ground on the line <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Passchendaele</span> +and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way +to, the town, the pivot on which all the Franco-British +offensive plans rested. On this day, therefore, the +British commander sent up the 7th Division into the +line again, although it had only just been relieved +owing to its heavy losses.<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_2" id="map_2"></a><img src="images/i091.png" width="418" height="401" alt="The ATTACK of the ARMY GROUP FABECK. on October 30TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. +Our heavy guns began the bombardment of the enemy’s +well-constructed lines at about 7.45 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, but observation +was made very difficult by the weather condi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>tions, +and could only be carried out from the foremost +infantry lines. The telephonic communication rendered +necessary was frequently cut by the enemy’s +shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries were +able to make such excellent practice that at the most +vital points of the enemy’s position the spirit of the +defenders appeared to be completely broken. The +high ground about <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> offers a typical case. +Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of +the British defence and one of the main observation +posts for the artillery. At 9 <span class="small">A.M.</span> our troops charged +the hostile position there, and by 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> +itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; +the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian <i>Jäger</i> battalions +of the Army Cavalry took a great share in the success.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +Soon afterwards the high ground north-east and +immediately west of the village fell into German +hands. Two whole British squadrons with their +machine-guns lay, dead and wounded, completely +annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> Further +south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British +cavalry supported by part of the III British Corps. +After a severe hand-to-hand encounter it took possession +of the château, and finally also of the village +of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>. The left wing of the Corps pushed +forward as far as the <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span> stream, north of the +village of the same name, but had here to put in all +its reserves to hold its ground against strong hostile +counter-attacks.<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> + +<p>On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division +was engaged in heavy fighting, the position confronting +it being a particularly strong one. It lay +along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet high,<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> +running north and south, eastwards of Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, +and gave the enemy an extensive view eastwards over +our lines. The defence of this ridge was greatly +facilitated by the villages of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and <span class="smcap">Messines</span> +on it. These had been turned into fortresses, +and were connected by deep trenches protected by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +broad wire entanglements.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Owing to observation +difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing the +airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was +unable from its positions in the valley to bring a +sufficiently heavy bombardment on the enemy’s lines; +and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with +great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for +the assault. On the right wing the 122nd Fusilier +Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria) took +the fortified village of <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span>, and on the left wing +the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly +towards <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. The ridge north-east of the last-named +village was stormed, but the assault on the +locality itself, which was to have been delivered at +7.10 in the evening, could not get on owing to heavy +enfilade fire from the south which held back the +attackers some hundred yards away from its edge.<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> +The Cavalry Corps<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> had gained ground at first, but, +in consequence of their weakness in artillery, they +had been unable to take <span class="smcap">St. Yves</span> or to make progress +against the strongly fortified wood south-west of it. +The same story describes the day’s work of the XIX +Corps<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> fighting to the south of the cavalry.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also +the attack on the 30th October had not had the success +expected. The combined efforts of the 54th Reserve +Division and the right wing of the 30th Division had +not been able to carry us into <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>.<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> General +von Deimling and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn +went forward themselves into the front line to +encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions +desperately, and held on firmly to the main +points of his line. Another artillery bombardment +was therefore considered necessary.</p> + +<p>From the enemy’s point of view, however, the +situation was anything but rosy on the evening of the +30th October. The entry of General von Deimling’s +troops into <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> endangered the southern +side of the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient, and the capture of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span> +brought the Germans within three miles of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span> itself. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal +French had put Indian troops into the fighting +line on the 30th, and he now brought all the available +British and French reserves towards the line +<span class="smcap">Zandvoorde-Hollebeke</span> in order to support the +7th British Division, which had been fought to a standstill.<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> +During the night, therefore, the fighting never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued along the +whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable +Würtemburg troops again tried to storm <span class="smcap">Messines</span>.</p> + +<p>On the 31st October the Germans had at first but +few fresh troops to meet the enemy’s reinforcements;<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> +so the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was brought up +in readiness north of the <span class="smcap">Lys</span> behind the II Bavarian +Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset +realised that the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> ridge was +of decisive importance, and that every effort must +be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main +pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector +of attack of the II Bavarian Corps.</p> + +<p>According to the enemy’s accounts the 31st October +1914 was one of the most critical days at his headquarters. +For us it was a day of great glory, and the +British state unreservedly in their reports of the fighting, +that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. +It is true that this last October day of the first war-year +did not give us <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but our semicircle around +the town became so reduced that it was brought within +range of our artillery from three sides, and there could +be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on +the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> district. The fact that neither the enemy’s +commanders nor their troops gave way under the +strong pressure we put on them, but continued to +fight the battle round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, though their situation +was most perilous, gives us an opportunity to acknow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>ledge +that there were men of real worth opposed to +us who did their duty thoroughly.</p> + +<p>At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, +a heavy artillery bombardment of the new hostile positions +was begun on a front of ten and a half miles. The +enemy’s batteries were not long in replying; being so +difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the +previous fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout +the morning, the British and French shells fell long +distances behind our lines, blocking streets and bridges, +and devastating the villages as far back as the <span class="smcap">Lys</span>, +so that any regular transport of supplies became impossible. +At <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, however, the important +northern corner of the Army Group Fabeck, the enemy’s +hail of shells had but little result, because our capture +of the high ground at <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> had made the +work of observation very difficult.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_3" id="map_3"></a><img src="images/i097.png" width="404" height="513" alt="The ATTACK of the ARMY GROUP FABECK. on October 31ST. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>After sufficient artillery preparation the British +stronghold of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> was to be attacked from +south and east simultaneously. Colonel von Aldershausen, +commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, +was to direct the attack from the east. Besides two +battalions of his own regiment, there were placed under +his command the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry +Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the +54th Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th +Reserve Regiment and the 26th Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion. +The 99th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack +from the south.<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> During the morning, in spite of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated +attacks were repulsed by British counter-movements. +At about 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> our converging attack was begun. +The commanders of the 54th Reserve and 30th Infantry +Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as +the general commanding the XV Corps, were again in +the foremost lines, though the last, General von Deimling, +was wounded almost at once by a shell-splinter. +Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. +His Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> +headquarters of the Sixth Army, watched the infantry +working its way through the maze of the enemy’s +obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported +by artillery, some of the guns being moved forward +with the front line. The British and French artillery +fired as rapidly as they knew how,<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> and over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, +betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it +was all of no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. +More hostile strongholds were constantly being discovered; +even all the points known to be of importance +could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, +so that many attacks had to be delivered against +fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments untouched +by our guns.<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Many of our gallant men were killed, +and the officers, who were the first to rise in the assault, +were the special target of the enemy’s sharpshooters, +well trained in long colonial wars.<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> Once our troops +entered an enemy’s position, the resistance was only +slight, and the German showed his superiority in single +combat. It was only the enemy’s counter-attacks, +delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that +regained some of his lost ground, but they did not, +however, compromise the general success of the day.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the +dense woods near <span class="smcap">Reutel</span>,<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> which were defended by +a strong system of obstacles and by a quantity of +machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in trees.<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> + +<p>While this was in progress the last assault on <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> +was taking place. The attacks from east and +south both broke into the village, and by 3 <span class="small">P.M.</span> the +whole place with its château and park was in German +possession.<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Colonel von Hügel took his storming +parties of the 54th Reserve Division northwards through +and beyond the village, while Captain Reiner galloped +his batteries close up to it. It was then, however, +that fresh hostile reserves were launched against <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>. +The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian +Reserve Division was hurried up to meet them, its +gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a hero’s death<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> +during the movement. For a short time our own +artillery fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: +for the men were wearing caps and were thus mistaken +for British troops. Nevertheless the enemy’s counter-attack +failed and <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> became and remained +ours, and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 +men, and 3 guns.<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The enemy prevented our further +advance beyond <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> by a heavy fire from a +new and strong position along the edge of the woods +west of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>. Here a new fortress had been +made, which would have to be broken down by our +artillery before it could be attacked. On the left wing +of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in +front of some small woods which had been turned into +strong points; the 39th Infantry Division was able +to advance only some 500 yards, though it took a +number of prisoners.<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> The artillery of the XV Corps +had an accidental success on this day which must +have interfered with the enemy’s staff work for some +time. During the bombardment of <span class="smcap">Hooge</span>, a direct +hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st +British Division were working: one general and +several staff officers were killed.<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> After heavy fighting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +at close quarters the II Bavarian Corps gained ground +along the whole of its wide sector of attack on the 31st +October. The right wing took possession of the edges +of the woods west of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>, whilst the left of +the Corps advanced as far as <span class="smcap">Oosttaverne</span>. The 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into line +immediately south of it, in order to make the attack +on <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>.</p> + +<p>We now come to the most vital point of the battle: +who was to be the victor in the fight for the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge? The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had worked forward by daylight towards +<span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, regardless of the heavy artillery fire +directed from the high ground on our troops moving +up from the valley.<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> At nightfall the left wing of the +II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to +break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite +of this the Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make +its attack. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment +was to enter <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> from the east and the 21st +from the south. All the preparations had been carefully +made. The men wore white arm-bands as a +distinguishing mark when at close quarters with the +enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed +away in the haversacks; rifles were unloaded and +bayonets fixed. It was hoped to take the enemy by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in the +assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened +during the night, but frequent star-shells lighted up +the darkness and showed that our opponents were +keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have +helped them to see our movements. At 2 <span class="small">A.M.</span> (1st +Nov.) the Bavarians advanced from their assembly +positions, taking little notice of the enemy’s artillery +which began to open on them. The general direction of +the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, +which was clearly outlined in the moonlight against +the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment under +Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the +village and pushed through to the western exit. The +surprise had succeeded, and numbers of the enemy +who still held out in isolated ruins were either killed +in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> Unfortunately, +however, our own guns continued to bombard +the village, as the news of the victory of the 17th +Regiment was not communicated to them sufficiently +quickly. At about 6 <span class="small">A.M.</span> Colonel Hofmann there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>fore +decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily +to the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, and to reorganise +there. It so happened that the 21st Reserve +Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village +at this moment, its advance having been delayed by +a heavy enfilade fire from the south-west. When the +men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim light of +dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running +eastwards among the ruins, they immediately opened +fire on them. Nevertheless, in spite of the losses +incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment +held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. +The error was quickly remedied by singing patriotic +songs and by flag-signals, and communication was +regained with the neighbouring infantry and with the +artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now +made by six regiments of the XVI French Corps, which +had arrived during the night, and the gallant 17th had +slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.</p> + +<p>The fighting around <span class="smcap">Messines</span> on the 31st had been +equally severe. On the 30th the 26th Infantry Division +under Duke William of Urach had already got its +patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any +assault could be made an artillery preparation was +required, especially against the northern sector. On +the morning of the 31st October our howitzers and +trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, +and by 10.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the moment had arrived for the +Würtemburg troops to advance.</p> + +<p>The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge +north of <span class="smcap">Messines</span>, along which runs the road to +<span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, whilst the 125th Infantry Regiment +was to advance against <span class="smcap">Messines</span> itself, and the 119th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +Grenadier Regiment against the enemy’s trenches +immediately south of it. The hostile position was so +strong that a force greatly inferior in strength would +be able to hold it against an attack coming up from +the valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and +only a few hedges limited the field of view, so that +every advance and assembly position for miles round +could be seen. A strong British garrison held <span class="smcap">Messines</span>: +the trenches had been well made, and were covered +by a continuous and broad system of obstacles.<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_4" id="map_4"></a><img src="images/i105.png" width="412" height="463" alt="The CAPTURE of MESSINES. on October 31ST. 1914 by the 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION." /> +</div> + +<p>The way in which the Swabian troops<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> broke down +the enemy’s resistance was indeed a masterpiece. +Neither the enemy’s artillery fire, which imperilled the +advance of the reserves, nor the British machine-guns, +a large number of which enfiladed the attack from +the south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg +troops. At 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the 125th Stuttgart Infantry +Regiment had got possession of the north-east corner +of <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. The road entering the village from +<span class="smcap">Gapaard</span> was blocked by a barricade; and after storming +it, another one, a hundred yards further inside +the village, closed the way. The streets could not be +used for our advance, being choked with debris, and +under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers +had to make their way through or over the walls.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> +There are a number of large, well-built houses in +<span class="smcap">Messines</span>, which the enemy had turned into a succession +of strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up +by our sappers. The convent looked especially impregnable +with its walls a yard thick, and strong +towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. +Captain Heinrich’s Würtemburg battery of +the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was therefore brought +up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, as +horses could not move along them, and the infantry +carrying up the ammunition. The convent was soon +in flames, burying its stubborn defenders under its +ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens +and backyards, was the first to make an entry into the +market-square. With a few stout-hearted followers +he occupied a large building there which he defended +without any support till the evening against great +odds. Not until nightfall were others of his regiment +able to reach him, and secure the position he had held +so courageously. This day of street fighting had cost +very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A +part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of +<span class="smcap">Messines</span> had also had to be directed on to the village, +and by the evening a continuous line had been successfully +formed through the centre of it. Isolated fighting +continued throughout the night, and in order to +keep up communication amidst the ruins and recognise +one another in the dark, the Würtemburg troops sang +folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with the +rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the +streets, and the crackle of the burning and falling +houses, all combined to make a magnificent and unsurpassed +piece of battle-music.</p> + +<p>North of the village the left wing of the 122nd +Infantry Regiment established itself on the <span class="smcap">Messines-Wytschaete</span> +road: but its right wing was unable to +capture the high ground, as <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> itself was +still in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered +severely: the progress of the other regiment of their +brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, had roused +their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their +ranks from the south where the Cavalry Corps were +still unable to advance. They were compelled by +heavy losses to be content with the task of securing +the left flank of their division.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers +were rewarded for their deeds of immortal fame by a +message of warm praise from the Emperor.</p> + +<p>The final objective, however, had not yet been +attained, although in the south the high ground had +been reached and artillery observers sent forward there, +so that the enemy’s positions could be accurately +ranged on right up to Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>. The main +pressure of the attack would therefore have to be continued +here, on the left wing of the Army Group Fabeck.</p> + +<p>During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division +arrived in the area <span class="smcap">Comines-Warneton</span>, north of the +<span class="smcap">Lys</span>, as reserve to the Army Group.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist +lay over the country, so that the infantry got a few +hours’ rest before the continuous shelling of the enemy’s +artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, the +battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the +north the Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the +XXVII Reserve Corps further extended their successes +of the previous days. The line was advanced +up to the château of <span class="smcap">Poezelhoek</span>, which was taken +from the 1st British Division after a heavy fight.<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> + +<p>The divisions of Deimling’s XV Corps attacked with +the right wing on the <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Ypres</span> main road +and the left on <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span>. They advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> +but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, +dense woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again +made progress very difficult. The 30th Division +managed to reach the eastern edge of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, +supported by infantry, was in position. The wood +north of <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> gave exceptional trouble, but it +was finally outflanked on both sides, and its defenders +taken prisoner.<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on +both sides of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal, and drove +the enemy back as far as the sharp bend in it. The +left wing captured the small wood west of <span class="smcap">Oosttaverne</span> +which was defended by Indian and British +troops. The treacherous methods of the Indians +greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, +and with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated +Asiatics allowed our troops to pass them, and then +got up and stabbed them in the back with their knives.<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> +The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of +the previous evening, and at midday began its attack +once more. Confidence and enthusiasm served to +obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and the +dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions +as if on parade. Very many of their dead or +wounded still lay at the foot of the heights, but the +gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by +4 <span class="small">P.M.</span> had reached the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. +It was not possible to push up reserves owing to heavy +artillery fire, and at this moment the enemy counter-attacked +with two fresh divisions.<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> The Bavarians, +who had become disorganised during the assault, were +forced to evacuate the village again under cover of +darkness, after having actually entered it at about +5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> They had suffered very heavily during the +attack, being fired at from flank and rear, for the right +wing of the 26th Infantry Division was unable to +take all the high ground north-west of <span class="smcap">Messines</span> until +the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting +had gone on in <span class="smcap">Messines</span> throughout the day, till +finally the Würtemburg troops gained the upper hand +and cleared the enemy out of the village to its western +edge. The British were driven back down the western +slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in +the valley, losing heavily in the operation. As soon +as its right wing reached the <span class="smcap">Messines-Wytschaete</span> +road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held +almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary +condition for the capture of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></span> +was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, however, +was not able to carry out a third assault without +assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night +of the 1st-2nd therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian +Division from its assembly area <span class="smcap">Wambeke-Garde +Dieu</span> into the fighting line, in order to carry forward +the attack through and beyond <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> towards +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>.</p> + +<p>After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened +again on the morning of the 2nd November along the +whole front of the Army Group Fabeck. His indefatigable +troops, some of whom had already endured +twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken +place in the campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched +opponent once more. The enemy was at +least as strong as they were in fighting units on the +battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements +of newly arrived British and French +troops.<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p> + +<p>On the eastern side of the <i>Ypres</i> salient General +von Deimling attacked on a front of nearly four miles. +His Corps, which had won its laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine +and in Northern France, again, in spite of heavy +casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. +The 30th Division entered <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span> and established +itself firmly in the north-eastern corner of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage +Wood</span>.<a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> The attack had been facilitated by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +which had pressed forward some hundred yards north +of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>. Von Deimling’s left wing had advanced +in the direction of <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span>, but was held up +by the difficult wooded country east of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>. +It had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring +troops on its left.</p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on +the morning of the 2nd November by strong hostile +counter-attacks in the sector west of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>. +They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was +even able to make a slight advance on the right wing +during the day.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> was again the centre of the heaviest +fighting on this day.<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> The Bavarian Reserve Division +was, at its own request, to attack the village; the +enemy’s position immediately south of it was allotted +as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry +Regiment and an <i>Abtheilung</i> (3 batteries) of the +17th Field Artillery Regiment remained in Army +Reserve. At 7 <span class="small">A.M.</span> a fierce artillery duel began, and +the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening +him, hurried up strong reserves to <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. +Kiefhaber’s brigade of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division +rose to the assault. Under a hail of shrapnel<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> +the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern +slopes of the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> ridge for the third time, +though with considerable loss, the enemy’s machine-guns +causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon as +the foremost of them had reached the windmill the +enemy launched a counter-attack; but this time the +Bavarians were not content with simply holding their +ground; their supports were brought up at the critical +moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious +street fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having +to deal with every house became greatly disorganised. +Taking advantage of this the British and French commanders +sent forward fresh masses into the line, +trying to turn the balance in their favour at this +important point by employing every available man. +It was 3.10 <span class="small">P.M.</span> when a cry for help reached the Pomeranian +(3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, +and it was not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the +Stettin Grenadier Regiment had captured the long-coveted +high ground south-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, the +struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been +especially severe. Without possession of this the +south flank of the village could not be held. Count +Gneisenau’s Colberg Grenadiers were then sent forward +to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable +to hold out in <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> against the rifle-butts and +bayonets of the united Pomeranians and Bavarians. +Soon after 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> the village, as far as its western edge, +was in German hands, although the fighting continued +till well into the night among the ruins with detachments +of the enemy who would not surrender.</p> + +<p>By the capture of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> a fine commanding +position had been obtained, but the village itself, once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> +so pleasant to the view, was now terrible to look upon. +The church was in flames, and the windmill flared like +a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded +side by side among the smouldering ruins. The +enemy was fully aware of the importance of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +but he had been so weakened that he was +unable to recover for another big counter-attack. +He therefore contented himself with small and fruitless +efforts, only one of which succeeded in temporarily +entering the village during the 3rd. Nevertheless for +the next few days it lay under the constant fire of +heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not +allow this to interfere with their work.</p> + +<p>Many of the inhabitants still remained in <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +as in <span class="smcap">Messines</span>, and it was pathetic to see +how they clung to their devastated patches of ground, +regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from +the Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with +their last scrap of property, preferring to die by the +shell that destroyed their homes.</p> + +<p>A small wood north-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, called the +Park, was still a dangerous point. This dense copse +was surrounded by a system of trenches and several +rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully sited +flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it +had been turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, +and cost us many days of heavy fighting before +it was finally taken.</p> + +<p>The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of +<span class="smcap">Messines</span>, immediately put the high ground into a +state of defence. Its left brigade, the 51st, which +was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November +by the 11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade, and sent back to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> +Army Reserve. The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing +of the division, in co-operation with the 3rd Infantry +Division, advanced across the <span class="smcap">Steenbeek</span> stream. +However, no progress of importance could be made +there, as every movement could be immediately +brought under most effective artillery fire from the +commanding positions on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>.<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> + +<p>On the 3rd November the formation of a ‘Group +Urach’ was ordered, consisting of the 3rd and 26th +Infantry Divisions, to continue the attack against +the high ground east of <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>; but in the following +days it was unable to make any essential alteration +in the general situation in this sector.</p> + +<p>A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south +of, and co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, +in spite of the small force of artillery and engineers +included in it. On the 2nd November it made a +surprise attack on foot against the farm <span class="smcap">Klein Douve</span> +with complete success.<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> On the 4th November the +I Cavalry Corps was relieved by the II, consisting of +the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.</p> + +<p>In the early days of November the conduct of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> +enemy’s operations against the Army Group Fabeck +underwent a very noticeable change. The German +attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the +big offensive movement which had been planned. +The British troops, especially the I and IV Corps,<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> +were so played out that they had to be relieved by +parts of the French Army. The enemy’s commanders, +however, realised that even these fresh troops would +be unable to make much headway against our men, +and they therefore decided to remain on the defensive +and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The +heavy fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, +or at least had badly damaged them. The civil population +and all other available labour, therefore, were +now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward +positions for a long way westwards.<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> These preparations +were soon discovered by our airmen.</p> + +<p>During the early days of November the commander +of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the +offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> +decisive results. The forces available were still too +weak to break through the enemy’s strongly entrenched +positions, particularly as he was continually bringing +up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front.</p> + +<p>If the attempt to break through south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was +not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive +war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more +troops would have to be brought up for the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning +the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were +affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian +Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and +the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. +The German General Staff also placed the II Corps +and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General +von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at <span class="smcap">Lille</span> on +the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the +25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth +Army, west of <span class="smcap">Lille</span>; and this was followed by an +order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the +Guard Corps available from their positions, and for +their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV +Corps at <span class="smcap">Arras</span>. Accordingly a composite Division +of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th +Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General +von Winckler, marched for <span class="smcap">Roubaix</span>, which was reached +on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed +over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all +the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army. +The intention of the German General Staff, communicated +to the commander of the Sixth Army on +the 4th November, was: to push the attack to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +immediate north (of the elbow) of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal, and to put in all available forces to break +through there. In the meantime, however, General +von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously +issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had +placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve +Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, +and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for +the offensive north of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal there +were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division +and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides +the XV Corps which was already in position there. +The fighting continued along the front of the Army +Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready +to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to +recover, or to strengthen his positions.</p> + +<p>The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended +its left wing to the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal, won ground +daily, especially on the 6th November, when the 39th +Division delivered a heavy attack near <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span> +and drove the recently arrived French troops +from their position, capturing four hundred prisoners in +the farm buildings. The troops, advancing with their +bands playing, also stormed parts of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>, a +village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. +The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the +November mist made observation impossible at any +distance. French counter-attacks and an attack +by British cavalry, which attempted to make good +the retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their +casualties were heavy, the 1st and 2nd British Life +Guards being decimated. The enemy’s counter-attacks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much +weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, +took part, had also no success. On the 8th November +the 148th Infantry Regiment captured the fortified +position along the western edge of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>; with +a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to +recover the lost ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, +the gallant regimental commander, hastily gathered together +all the supports within reach, including <i>Landwehr</i> +men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward +to meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally +wounded at the head of his victorious followers. The +French hurriedly retired, suffering considerable loss.<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed +by the hostile counter-attacks near the canal; the +enemy offered very stubborn resistance in order to +keep possession of the high ground from which <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained +their positions, but, by an irresistible attack on +the 9th and 10th November, took the high ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> +on which <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> is situated.<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> To the 5th Bavarian +Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. +The enemy remained for a long time in the houses of +<span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>, but the high ground was of primary, perhaps +even decisive, importance; for it gave us a bird’s-eye +view of the country east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, where the mass of +the British field artillery was in position.</p> + +<p>The fighting further south which the troops of the +Group Gerok had in and north of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> was +equally heavy. The northern edge formed the dividing +line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The +enemy kept the village under heavy fire in order to +hinder the work of our observers, the mere sight of a +man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery +fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through +loopholes in the ruins or at the chimney openings, +and the observers were often far safer on such lofty +perches than our reserves in the cellars of the battered +village. Only slow progress could be made in the +woods lying to the north-west.</p> + +<p>The Group Urach also was unable to make much +headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Division +struggled hard to get possession of the Park +north-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. After a whole day’s +fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way +into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern +entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had +been able to get a splendid view of our positions in +the valley south of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. In spite of a most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> +thorough bombardment our attack was very costly, +and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it +was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of +wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the +6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches +of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was +surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire +entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being +entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with +machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of +the trees, and they were found dead hanging from +the shell-torn stumps when the Park of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +was finally stormed on the 13th November by the +21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian +Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers +of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend connected +with <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> Park, and the scene was +worthy of it.<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> + +<p>The 26th Infantry Division during these days had +advanced its lines to the western slopes of the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge, and in places across the +valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, +as the British on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> were able to watch +every movement in our trenches, and could immediately +bring them under the fire of field or heavy artillery, +or even of long-range naval guns, and they were by +no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately +our losses were for the most part only in the +front lines, but our shortage of ammunition compelled +us to husband it.<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> Owing to the conformation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> +of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, +we were unable to range accurately +on the enemy’s artillery, and the most we could do +was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their +observation posts on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> were soon discovered, +and the fight now began against the observers +there as well as against those posted in the towers of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. So the blame must not be laid on us for the +gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, which gave such a fine view of the whole +countryside.</p> + +<p>Further to the south no noteworthy progress was +made either by the Cavalry Corps, or on the front of +the Sixth Army.</p> + +<p>Such then was the general situation when, on the +10th November, the new forces lay ready to take the +offensive in their positions north of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal. Before going further, however, the +operations of the Fourth Army from the last days +of October must for a moment be touched on.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2" id="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2"><span class="smcap">THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY +FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE +9th NOVEMBER 1914</span></a></h2> + +<p>Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under +General von Fabeck was engaged in the heavy fighting +just described, the Fourth Army of Duke Albert +of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means +of constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from +withdrawing any troops from his front to support +his endangered positions near <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. By 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> +on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German +forces rendered necessary by the inundation of the +front between the coast and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> had been sufficiently +completed to enable an offensive to be delivered +on this day, on the line <span class="smcap">Dixmude-Gheluvelt</span>. The +right flank, from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> to the coast, was secured +by the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade, 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the +orders of the general officer commanding the XXII +Reserve Corps. The dispositions of the attacking +troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve Corps +in the sector <span class="smcap">Noordschoote-Bixschoote</span>; the III +Reserve Corps, including the 44th Reserve Division, +on both sides of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, facing the front <span class="smcap">Het +Sas-St. Julien</span> (this was the most important group +in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +Corps were to the south again, with the left flank +resting on the <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Ypres</span> main road.<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a></p> + +<p>By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps +had been able to gain ground at and north of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, +while the 5th Reserve Division advancing +from the north had forced its way close up to the +western edge of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. But all our efforts +to capture this place by attacks from north and east, +in spite of reinforcements being brought up, failed. +It became evident that the enemy’s skilfully placed +and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired +infantry positions in a country so favourable +for defence, were more than a match for our guns, +especially at a time when ammunition was scarce, +and the misty weather prevented observation from +aeroplanes. A continuation of the offensive here +would only have meant a useless sacrifice of life. It +was therefore decided with deep regret to resort to +the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to +hold the enemy. The situation of the Fourth Army +indeed was no enviable one. Here in the plains of +Flanders, operations were effected by the November +weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country +east and south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. The troops had to endure +great hardships; their trenches rapidly filled with +water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give insufficient +protection against artillery fire. In several +places they had to be evacuated altogether, and the +men lay out in the open with only a hastily constructed +wire entanglement in front to secure them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most +difficult in this water-logged district. Frequently it +could only be carried on by piling up sand-bag parapets, +and these being easily seen by the enemy were promptly +shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular +reliefs for the troops in the front line were out of +the question, for the units available at that time were +too weak; and in any case, the men found relief time +a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to +observe every movement, especially where he still +held good observation points, as at <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>.</p> + +<p>A very extensive system of espionage served to complete +his knowledge of our intentions. Individual soldiers +were left behind in civilian clothing, with concealed +telephonic communication; they kept hidden during +the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our +movements and dispositions quickly and accurately +to their headquarters.<a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> A great deal of information +was also given away by the Belgian population, who +crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent +news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. +Although the punishment meted out to espionage +was severe, the Belgians always kept up this form +of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, +and its effect could be diminished only by maintaining +thorough surveillance of the country in rear +of our lines. Our reserves, about which the enemy +was always well informed, had for the above reasons +to be kept close up behind the front lines in order to +be near at hand at the critical moment. Their movements, +as well as the sending up of all the necessary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty. +Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden +meadows, the farms in the neighbourhood being +insufficient to provide shelter for them all. The +troops who were withdrawn from the front line and +put in reserve had therefore small opportunity for +either rest or recreation.</p> + +<p>The insecurity of our communications back into +the interior of Belgium must be passed over almost +without mention, except to say that here too a colossal +task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the +General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, +but to provide observation posts along the Dutch +frontier. In carrying out these duties, the old <i>Landsturm</i> +troops showed a spirit of endurance which said +much for the military training they had received +many years before. The work of keeping watch over +the excited population was not without its dangers, +and all praise is due to these garrison troops and to +the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their +assistance. Thanks to them, the long lines of communication +through conquered Belgium were not +disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our +army suffered no interruption from the enemy. For +the honour of all concerned this must be put on record.</p> + +<p>On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made +attacks on a larger scale along the coast. On the 4th, +believing that we had left only weak outposts behind, +even opposite <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, when we retired to the +eastern bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments +advanced through <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span>. At first +they gained a slight success, but were shortly afterwards +attacked by part of the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> +from the east, and by the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade from +the south, and driven back. Detachments of the +Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The +second attack made by about five thousand French +troops, which took place on the 7th, fared far worse; +the whole of <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span> was taken by our counter-attack, +and the enemy losses were very heavy.<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> + +<p>On the 9th November the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade +was relieved by parts of the Marine Division, for the +10th November was the day on which the new offensive +was to be made with fresh troops against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +from the south-east.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_LAST_PHASE" id="THE_LAST_PHASE">THE LAST PHASE</a></h2> + +<p>When the 4th Division and von Winckler’s Guard +Division were sent forward on the 9th November into +the northern part of the fighting line, formerly occupied +by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from the +heights of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> it had just stormed, was able to +look right down on <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. The orders of the Sixth +Army commander, dated the 7th and 8th November, +had given all the necessary instructions for the employment +of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division +and von Winckler’s Guard Division were placed +under the commander of the Guard Corps, General +Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called Plettenberg’s +Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg’s Corps +formed the Army Group Linsingen.<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> + +<p>The task set the troops of General von Linsingen +was ‘to drive back and crush the enemy lying north +of the canal (<span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span>); the main weight of +the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The +Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west +of the canal, its task being to continue pressing forward +and at the same time to support the attack of the +left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as powerful +enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.’ +The decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, +when another strong reinforcement of engineers would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> +have arrived. All the other units of the Sixth Army +and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according +to arrangement, to attack on this day with increased +energy, so that the enemy should be allowed +no rest, and held to his positions along the whole +front.</p> + +<p>On the stroke of 7 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the Fourth Army advanced +to the attack. This tenth day of November was to be +a famous one in its history. The sectors of attack +for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, +the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII +Reserve Corps had been closed in slightly to the north. +Strengthened by the Guard <i>Jäger</i> Battalion, a Guard +Machine-Gun Detachment<a name="FNanchor_101" id="FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> and the 9th Machine-Gun +Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards +the <span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood.</p> + +<p>The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as +follows: ‘The XXII Reserve Corps<a name="FNanchor_102" id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> in co-operation +with the Marine Division will secure the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +canal front, and will take <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>.’ Immediately +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division was in position, +with the 43rd Reserve Division to the east and +south, the two divisions together making a semicircle +of steel round the objective. This time our +troops were determined to take the town so stubbornly +defended by the French infantry. The enemy fully +realised the importance of this bridge-head. Besides +holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, +it covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> +the 9th its garrison was further reinforced by the +arrival of fresh French troops.</p> + +<p>The rain of the previous days had made the ground +over which the attack on <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was to be carried +out very heavy going. The <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> canal, +running east and west, divides it into two parts, the +northerly one being particularly swampy and difficult +to cross. The main attack had therefore to be +made from the east and south-east on a comparatively +narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern +and obsolete fortifications, but the first strongholds +of the defenders were the railway buildings and +cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway +embankment had been transformed into a very strong +defensive position, and a heavy fire was expected +from it when we advanced from the high embankments +of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. Under the cover of darkness +the division was able to push its front line to an +assault position within two hundred yards of the enemy, +and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment +began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless +shells from our <i>Minenwerfer</i> did their utmost to +break down the enemy’s resistance. By 7.40 <span class="small">A.M.</span> +our first attempt to take the enemy’s advanced positions +had failed, and another artillery bombardment +against his obstacles and flanking posts was ordered. +At 9.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the advanced stronghold at the cemetery +was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into +position there before the artillery observers arrived +to direct the fire of their batteries from the front line +on to the next strong point. The artillery bombardment +lasted throughout the morning until 1 <span class="small">P.M.</span> +when the general assault was ordered. The infantry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> +with detachments of sappers carrying hand-grenades +and various material useful in an assault, had worked +its way forward close up to the line of obstacles.</p> + +<p>The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced +rapidly at first by frontal attack. North of it, the +15th Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion under Captain Hameln +worked forward across the deep marshes between the +canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry +Regiment came under a heavy enfilade fire from the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> embankment, and at 1.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span> orders were +issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, +consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd +Reserve Division and of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, to +be brought up into the line. Its task was to help +carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment +against the railway embankment, and to secure the +left flank of the advance. The nearer the attack +approached to the town, the more desperate became +the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander +of the 201st Reserve Regiment, General von +Seydewitz, always in the front line encouraging his +men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment +and the <i>Jäger</i> entered the devastated town at +about 3.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span> Our well-directed artillery fire had +cleared the front at the critical moment, and the +enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +but did not cease to offer resistance. He held the +railway embankment south of the town with particular +tenacity. Even when this had been finally +stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the +fight, with heavy loss, among the burning houses in +the southern part of the town, until the 201st Regiment +by a wheel southwards were able to give assist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>ance. +Teetzmann’s brigade in its attack on the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> embankment, to protect the flank of the division, +had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it +pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so +that the enemy’s retreat was threatened. In spite +of this, however, he gave nothing up without a +struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: +in fact the street fighting that ensued was +hardly less bitter and terrible than at <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +and <span class="smcap">Messines</span>.</p> + +<p>During the struggle in <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, the French +artillery fired into the place regardless of friend or +foe, and both suffered alike. The fight was still +raging among the houses at the northern exit, where +von Beerst was only making slow progress with the +advanced detachments of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +when our reserves were assembled in the market-square +to deliver the final blow. The French infantry +and Marine Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but +finally had to give way, for though not numerically +superior, the offensive spirit of the German troops +overcame all resistance. It was not until the west +bank of the canal had been reached, that the mass +of the enemy put up another defence.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was captured, and the French had been +driven back across the canal. A combined counter-attack +by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which began +during the evening and continued into the night, +was unable to alter the situation, and though <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +in consequence was under the heaviest fire, +our troops held their ground. Weak detachments +of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division were even able to cross +the river north of the town under cover of darkness,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> +though the extreme swampiness of the ground prevented +them carrying their success any further. The +enemy had prepared the bridges, west of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +for demolition some time before and had constructed +strong positions along the west bank of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. +These were especially good, as the ground there is +higher and overlooks that on the east bank. Our +artillery had therefore to make another preparatory +bombardment. The spoils taken at <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> were +considerable, and in spite of the fact that the British +assert that the Allies only lost a few hundred men, +we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 men.<a name="FNanchor_103" id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span></p><div class="center"> +<a name="map_5" id="map_5"></a><img src="images/i132.png" width="409" height="337" alt="The CAPTURE of DIXMUDE. on November 10TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>Our allied enemies had also been driven back over +the canal, south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, on the 10th November. +The XXIII Reserve Corps had made a successful +attack on <span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> and through <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> +against <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>. A long and bitter struggle took +place for the high ground south-west of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>; +but by evening the canal had been reached along +almost its whole length between <span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, whilst about a brigade of the 45th +Reserve Division and weak detachments of the 46th +had crossed it. The inundation had however gradually +extended southwards as far as this district, and put +any far-reaching extension of this success out of the +question. The XXIII Reserve Corps took prisoner +about 1000 men and captured a considerable number +of machine-guns in this operation.</p> + +<p>The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly +hard fight on both sides of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. Throughout +the 9th November and during the following night +the French delivered heavy attacks there and had +been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in +front of the III Reserve Corps, on the left wing of +which the 9th Reserve Division, now affiliated to +the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the +line. Making every use of the element of surprise, +General von Beseler had ordered the assault to begin +at 6.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> Punctually at this moment, as dawn +was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On +the right wing the 44th Reserve Division pushed +forward till close up to <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>, taking prisoner +14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, +in reporting this advance, says: ‘West of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> +our young regiments advanced against the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> +enemy’s front line singing “<i>Deutschland, Deutschland +über alles</i>,” and captured it.’ The left wing of +the division hung a good way back, as the 5th Reserve +Division on its left was unable to push on so rapidly. +It had broken into the enemy’s first position, but its +eastern wing was completely held up in front of +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. The 6th Reserve Division had attacked +the place from north and east, without being able to +take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove +that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here +for a big attack that he himself intended to make on +the 10th, and these were now defending every yard +of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th +Reserve Division had at first made good progress in +the direction of <span class="smcap">St. Julien</span>, but it came under a heavy +cross-fire, and was thereby compelled to give up a +large part of the ground gained. General von Beseler +therefore decided to pull out the main body of the +9th Reserve Division, and move it to his right wing, +where the 44th and 5th Reserve Divisions had had a +decided success in the direction of <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>.</p> + +<p>After the first line of trenches had been taken, the +attack of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was +very soon held up by wire entanglements which had +not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line +of trenches provided with every modern device. +The XXVII Reserve Corps spent most of the day +in making such disposition of its forces as would +enable it to give the utmost support to the Army +Group Linsingen, which was getting ready to attack +further south on the morrow.</p> + +<p>In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations +of Plettenberg’s Corps for an offensive on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> +the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently advanced +to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the +dense autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. +With the concurrence of General von +Linsingen, and after arrangement with the neighbouring +troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore +decided to attack on the 11th November. On +the front of Deimling’s (XV) Corps the 10th November, +up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a preparatory +artillery bombardment; especially good work was +done by means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, +carried out by a massed group of artillery consisting +of three batteries of heavy howitzers, three batteries +of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery +of long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel +Gartmayr, commanding the 1st Bavarian Field +Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both +divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, +in co-operation with the II Bavarian Corps fighting +on the high ground of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>, were able to gain +some hundreds of yards.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_6" id="map_6"></a><img src="images/i136.png" width="404" height="600" alt="The ATTACK of the SIXTH ARMY. on November 11TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>On the 11th November the combined offensive of +the Fourth Army and the Army Groups Linsingen +and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the Fourth +and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The +great efforts made by the Fourth Army on the 10th +had considerably weakened it, and further handicapped +by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces +of the attacking troops, no special success was gained +by it on the 11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere +held to his ground and prevented from transferring +any troops to other parts of the front. On the +extreme right wing the Marine Division made a suc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>cessful +attack on <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, capturing several hundred +prisoners. At the same time the Guard Cavalry Division, +affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to +the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, in order to relieve part of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division, which went into Army Reserve. On the +left wing of the Army, the XXVI and XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> +Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions +by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south +flank of the XXVII Reserve Corps attacked in close +co-operation with Plettenberg’s Corps.</p> + +<p>On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups +Linsingen and Fabeck began the last phase of this +severe and terrible struggle for <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>; and it was +destined to fix the general line on which the opposing +armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915.</p> + +<p>Von Winckler’s Guard Division fought on the right +wing of the Army Group Linsingen, and for us the +day was to be a historic, though costly one. In +former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of +the fray at its most critical stages, and the sons were +to show themselves worthy of their fathers. The +spirit of Frederick the Great and the glory of St. +Privat shone again on the battlefield of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. +The British speak of the attack of the Guard as a +most brilliant feat of arms.</p> + +<p>Before the infantry of the Division could come into +immediate contact with the enemy, a broad zone had +to be crossed under his artillery fire: through the +hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the Guard +brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the +German batteries opened, and a furious bombardment +continued for two and a half hours, and then +the infantry attack began. It struck against two +divisions of the I British Corps, a war experienced +foe, whose fighting methods were well adapted to +the country.<a name="FNanchor_104" id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> The artillery preparation however had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy’s +superiority in numbers the advance made good progress, +so that shortly after 10 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the strong position +along the southern edge of the <span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood was +in the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.<a name="FNanchor_105" id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> + +<p>At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of +H.M. the Emperor’s 1st Guard Regiment had forced +a way through the wire entanglements and trenches +in front of <span class="smcap">Verbeck</span> farm, and it was taken in the +first assault. The regiment had thereby captured +an excellent position from which to support the right +wing of the attack.<a name="FNanchor_106" id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> Led by its fearless commander, +Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed on +without a moment’s delay into the wood north-west +of the farm. Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment +was still engaged along the southern edges of the woods<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> +west of <span class="smcap">Reutel</span>, with its front facing north, and it +put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing +of the 54th Reserve Division.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_7" id="map_7"></a><img src="images/i139.png" width="412" height="493" alt="The ATTACK of the 2ND. GUARD DIVISION. on November 11TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>At 10 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, on the last artillery salvo, the battalions +of the 4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on +both sides of the <span class="smcap">Ypres-Gheluvelt</span> main road, +and they took the front British trenches in their +stride.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Francis’ 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment +attacked from <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span> against the corner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> +of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood, north of the <span class="smcap">Ypres-Gheluvelt</span> +road, and took its edge. The wood itself +gave the infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible +to see a yard ahead in its thick undergrowth, which +was over six feet high.<a name="FNanchor_107" id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Suddenly at a few paces’ +distance, machine-guns would open on our troops +from behind a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task +set the Grenadiers proved to be an extremely difficult +one, the more so as they had lost many of their officers +and N.C.O.’s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, +the defence-works inside the wood were quickly +taken one after another, but more strong points protected +by wire entanglements untouched by our +artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion +forced its way through to the château of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>, +which was surrounded by a marsh and an impenetrable +hedge. The men were trying to work their +way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in +it, when suddenly a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun +burst upon them. It came from the château on +their right, from some flanking trenches on their left, +and from trees behind the line. A number of the +few remaining officers fell, and finally the battalion +had to retire a short distance in order to reorganise. +But it soon came forward once more, and the companies +pressed on till they were close up to the château +itself, when another annihilating fusillade was opened +on them from all sides. Simultaneously the British +made a flank attack along the hedge in order to cut +off the men who had got through. Machine-guns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> +firing from trees and from the château windows +completely stopped any communication with them. +Very few only of these foremost troops, who were +commanded by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in +getting away. Those who did were assembled by +Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the +wood and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led +forward again to the relief of the Fusiliers who were +surrounded. The attack of Captain von Sell developed +however into small isolated combats, and though the +boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château +again, they were received there with such heavy fire +from right and left that it appeared that they would +have to retire again and reorganise. Before this +could be carried out, a British counter-attack was +launched; but our men, disorganised and mixed up +as they were, held fast to their ground and stopped +the attack, although at first both their flanks were in +the air.<a name="FNanchor_108" id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a></p> + +<p>Queen Augusta’s 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, +advancing south of the main road, at once suffered +such heavy losses that the first two attacks made no +headway. When however part of the regiment near +the main road pushed forward along it, echeloned +behind its sister-regiment on the right, and then +turned southwards, the advance made good progress, +and a firm footing was gained in <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood +south of the road. The reverses met with by the +Emperor Francis’ 2nd Grenadiers unfortunately enabled +the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire to bear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +on Queen Augusta’s 4th Grenadiers, that their advance +had to be stopped.<a name="FNanchor_109" id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> + +<p>At 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> German Guard troops had a tussle with +the British Guards. The King’s Liverpool Regiment +made a counter-attack from the <span class="smcap">Nun’s</span> Wood (Nonne +Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot +Regiment and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard +Grenadiers. The point of attack was well chosen, +and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st Guard +Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, +and held up in the woods (<span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood and the eastern +part of the <span class="smcap">Nonne Bosch</span>), with its front facing +north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having +spent all its energies against the château of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>, +lay with its front facing west.<a name="FNanchor_110" id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> However, the British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +troops ran into their own artillery fire near the <span class="smcap">Nonne +Bosch</span>, and the attack broke up and came to a standstill +in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any +further advance on the 11th November by our Guard +troops north of the road was now out of the question.</p> + +<p>In the southern part of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood the +4th Infantry Division pushed on, though here too +great difficulties were encountered. Deep trenches, +broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined +to make our progress slow, especially on the +right wing.</p> + +<p>The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left +wing of the Pomeranians gained ground in the woods +near and around <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>; the capture of Hill +60 near <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span> was of exceptional importance. +From this elevation another direct view over the +country round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was obtained.</p> + +<p>South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much +thinned ranks stormed forward again. The bit of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +wood north-east of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, which had already +changed hands several times, was now taken by it. +The heavy artillery again rendered invaluable services. +Several strong hostile counter-attacks were held up +chiefly owing to the way in which at the critical +moment our guns always protected the infantry lines +by a barrage.</p> + +<p>In the area near <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, the 11th November +was the day of the heaviest fighting. In the woods +north of it, Bavarians and Hessians pressed forward +together, slowly but surely. A French battery and +four machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry +Regiment at a farm about 150 yards north of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +but the guns were so firmly embedded in +the sodden ground, that they could not be got away +by the infantry. When the buildings were evacuated +again, owing to the heavy fire of the French on them, +the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a +neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded +here that in the fight for one single farm the +Hessians took prisoners belonging to three different +regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy +had put in to the fight on the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> front, and to +what an extent he had to concentrate his units to +ward off our attacks.</p> + +<p>On and to the west of the <span class="smcap">Messines</span> ridge the line +remained almost unaltered during the 11th November. +The very severe effect of the enemy’s artillery fire +from Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> on this front and the enfilade +fire of artillery and machine-guns from <span class="smcap">Ploegsteert</span> +Wood compelled our men to remain in their trenches.</p> + +<p>Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November +were a great success. A series of brilliant feats,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> +many of which it has been impossible even to mention +in this short account, far less adequately describe, +gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which +any concentration of the enemy near <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> could +be seen, and immediately opened on by artillery. +It is true, however, that no break through of the +enemy’s lines had been accomplished: his numerical +superiority and, more especially, the strength of his +positions held up our offensive. The weather conditions, +storm and rain, had also contributed towards +the result.<a name="FNanchor_111" id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> + +<p>The furious character of the fighting on the 11th +November did not abate on the following day, but +on the whole the situation remained unaltered. The +general character of the operations on the entire front +of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, +and sapping was eventually resorted to, though here +and there successes in open warfare were gained. +For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to +strengthen its detachments across the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> at <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +and on the 12th the 201st Reserve Infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed +the enemy’s defences opposite it on the western bank +of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, and held them under great difficulties. +Constant rain had filled the badly constructed trenches +with mud so that our troops had to support the enemy’s +bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying +in the open.</p> + +<p>At <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> the enemy again attempted strong +counter-attacks, but they were stopped largely by +the muddy state of the country. On the 14th +November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. +Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops +occupied a reserve position instead of the original +front line; by the time the error was discovered, our +watchful opponents were already in the front German +position. Our men, however, gave them no rest +there, for their honour would not suffer the surrender +in this manner of their success of the 10th November. +Without waiting for any orders from higher authority +or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the +strong position on the rising ground south-west of +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. On the front of the Sixth Army <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +Wood was completely taken by the Guard on +the 14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.<a name="FNanchor_112" id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> +After the artillery had prepared the way as far as +was possible in that difficult and wooded neighbourhood, +the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by no +means damped by the events of the 11th November, +advanced to the assault. In the château of <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +a large number of British snipers surrendered. +The XV Corps had another success in the wooded +district of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span> after being reinforced by +Hofmann’s composite Division. A strong system of +trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large +number of prisoners.</p> + +<p>On the 13th November the Park of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +was captured from the French by the Pomeranians +and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which the +French advanced against our positions shouting, +‘Don’t shoot,’ in German, cost them heavy losses; +and the Bavarians, whose tempers were roused by +this treachery, drove them back to their original +positions.</p> + +<p>On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north +of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, for which such a severe fight had +been made on the 11th, was finally captured by us. +We thereby obtained a position in the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +salient which, although overlooked from Mount +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, gave us such a commanding view of all +the ground between Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> and the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge that surprise attacks by the +enemy in this district were now out of the question.<a name="FNanchor_113" id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> +On the rest of the Flanders front only small fights +took place, and on the 17th November the commander +of the Fourth Army decided to give up any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> +idea of continuing the offensive; a decision to which +he was compelled by the low fighting strength of his +troops and the bad autumn weather, which was +affecting their health.<a name="FNanchor_114" id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> The frequent downpours of +rain during November had caused a constant rising +of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary +to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were +worn out by the constant fighting under such bad +weather conditions. Clear signs of exhaustion in the +enemy’s ranks on the front opposite the Fourth and +Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our +gallant Fourth Army gradually to construct a good +line of trenches and erect wire entanglements. As +soon as these were completed rest-billets were +allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet +and pleasant quarters in the villages of Flanders +untouched by war, with a not unfriendly population. +The German General Staff fully concurred +in the decision of the commander of the Fourth +Army made on the 17th November. They at the +same time expressed the hope that the Army +would be prepared to hold its positions even +against superior hostile forces. This expectation +was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and +although at that time there were four and one-half +French Corps, as well as the 25,000 Belgian +troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert of Wür<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>temburg, +they never obtained a success of any consequence.</p> + +<p>The threat against our right flank ceased soon +afterwards. British monitors appeared a few times +towards the end of November off the roadstead of +<span class="smcap">Ostend</span>. They bombarded the canal exit and our +positions near by: but their fire was as ineffective +as before. The ‘glorious’ activities of the British +Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to a speedy +end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, +began to put in an appearance there.<a name="FNanchor_115" id="FNanchor_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> + +<p>The developments on the front of the Sixth Army +during the second half of November 1914 were similar +to those of the Fourth Army. For some time the +sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards +strong detachments were taken from it and entrained +for the Eastern Front, where General von Hindenburg +was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to bring the +Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make +it roll back again.</p> + +<p>From this time onwards the line of demarcation +between the Fourth and Sixth Armies was the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION</a></h2> + +<p>As the November storms passed and frost and icy +winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the +approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of +both sides were being slowly strengthened. The +effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover +in good trenches and behind thick breast-works. +As the armament in use became more and more powerful, +artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed +it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. +At first passive defence was little understood by the +German troops, as instruction in the offensive had +dominated all other in their peace-training, and in +the short period available after they were called up +the volunteers had only been trained in the principles +of attack. Their sense of superiority over their +opponents did not let them rest content with merely +holding positions. The high sense of duty in each +individual was of assistance, and the methods of +defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The continuous +bad weather in the autumn and winter in +this water-logged country caused great suffering; +and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the +great victor of <span class="smcap">Tannenburg</span> were much envied. The +despatch of men eastward showed those left behind +that any hope of a final decision at <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> had disappeared.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> + +<p>The first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was a German victory,<a name="FNanchor_116" id="FNanchor_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> +for it marked the failure of the enemy’s intention to +fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich +districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium +(thus preventing us from making use of their valuable +resources), and to use the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> area as a base for +the Belgian, French and British advance on the <span class="smcap">Rhine</span>. +The Belgian coast was now firmly in our possession, +and offered a good starting-place for naval operations +against England. But we had not succeeded in +making the decisive break-through, and the dream of +ending the campaign in the west in our favour during +1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only +natural that the German General Staff found it difficult +thoroughly to realise this unpleasant fact, and +only did so with reluctance; but endeavour has been +made in this account to bring out the main reasons +which led to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, +great things had been accomplished. The Army of +Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance and +determined attack, had prevented the big offensive +planned by the enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies +together had forced a superior opponent into the +defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the sea +to his assistance, had driven him back continually, +until positions had been reached which enabled +German troops to be spared to carry out an offensive +on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of +the Marne, so now the spectre of a Russian invasion +appeared threateningly before the German Nation, +and the whole country knew what it would mean if +it should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> +Front were far too weak, and even the genius of a +Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the masses +of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. +Thus it came about that we had to lie and wait in +front of the gates of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, while all the available +men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, +to help Hindenburg pave the way to victory.</p> + +<p>There was never peace on the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> front. The +belt of steel with which we had invested the town by +our operations in October and November 1914, was +a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst +our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins +across the Channel like an apparition whose shadow +lay over the British Isles and especially menaced the +traffic-routes between England and France. The +British therefore continually tried their utmost to +free themselves of this menace and their pressure +produced counter measures. Thus in December 1914 +heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea +at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, and also at <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>. +On Christmas Eve the French vainly +attacked <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>: their hope of catching the +Germans dreaming heavily on that evening was of +no avail. When spring lifted the mist that hung +over Flanders, a German offensive took place during +April and May that forced the northern part of the +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient back to within three miles of the town.<a name="FNanchor_117" id="FNanchor_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> +After this the positions only altered very slightly. +In March 1916 the British blew up our front trench +positions at <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> by five colossal mines, but were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> +unable to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In +1917 the death-agony of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was renewed, and for +months war raged over the plains of Flanders; the +fighting was as furious as in October and November +1914. The young soldiers of those days have now +become veterans, who know war and do not fear it +even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are those +same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria, in exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, +once said: ‘Therefore when you are fighting this +particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for having +occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the +Germans are not so easy to wipe out of the world’s +history as he imagines, show it by redoubling the +strength behind your blows. In front of you is the +opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! +at him!’</p> + +<p>He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who +were so jealous of us, who brought on the war for the +sake of their money-bags and spread the conflagration +all over the world, who at first hoped that it would +be but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to +annihilate Germany: all this steeled the hearts of our +warriors in Flanders, whose creed was the justice of +the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest +Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and +in blood. The fighting in 1917 was perhaps more +severe than that of those stormy autumn days of +1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: +to keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this +we succeeded in 1917 as in 1914.</p> + +<p>Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the +German Fatherland with a silent shudder, but also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +with just and intense pride. It was there that the +British were made to realise that German heroism +was not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the +war material which the whole world had been manufacturing +for years. When we read that up to the +14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put +into the battle round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> by the Western Allies, +whilst only 25 German divisions were opposed to +them,<a name="FNanchor_118" id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> and that in the course of the Flanders battle +of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled +in vain against a greatly inferior German force, it +says much for our troops. But far from all. For +the enemy’s superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, +machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, +three, and even fourfold. Who can doubt but that +a nation whose sons know how to fight like this, +must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds +of blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and +splendid fruit for the German Fatherland. This +indeed would be the highest reward that could be +bestowed on those of us who fought there.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></h2> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_1" id="Appendix_1"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY<br /> +from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Fourth Army"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General Duke Albert of Würtemburg.</td></tr> +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Major-General Ilse.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">III Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Beseler).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">5th Reserve Division.<br /> +6th Reserve Division.<br /> +4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXII Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">43rd Reserve Division.<br /> +44th Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXIII Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von Kleist).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">45th Reserve Division.<br /> +46th Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXVI Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Hügel).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">51st Reserve Division.<br /> +52nd Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXVII Reserve Corps.</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General von Carlowitz,<br /> +relieved on 27th Oct. by +General of Artillery von Schubert).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division.<br /> +54th (Würtemburg) Reserve Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> + +<p>The following units were also attached at various times:—</p> + +<ul> +<li>9th Reserve Division.</li> +<li>6th Bavarian Reserve Division.</li> +<li>Marine Division.</li> +<li>38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>37th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>Guard Cavalry Division.</li> +</ul> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_2" id="Appendix_2"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK<br /> +from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Army Group Fabeck"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding XIII (Würtemburg) Corps.</td></tr> +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XV Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General von Deimling).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">30th Infantry Division.<br /> +39th Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl">(This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">II Bavarian Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Martini,<br /> +relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914 +by General of Cavalry von Stetten).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">3rd Bavarian Infantry Division.<br /> +4th Bavarian Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">26th (Würtemburg) Infantry Division</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach).</td></tr> +</table> + +<p>Group <span class="smcap">Gerok</span> was also temporarily in the Army +Group <span class="smcap">Fabeck</span>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_3" id="Appendix_3"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Group Gerok"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Gerok,<br /> +Commanding Reserve Corps.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">1st Cavalry Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General von Richthofen).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">2 Cavalry Divisions.<a name="FNanchor_119" id="FNanchor_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">2nd Cavalry Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von der Marwitz).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">2 Cavalry Divisions.<a name="FNanchor_120" id="FNanchor_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">6th Bavarian Reserve Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">3rd Infantry Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">25th Reserve Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">2nd Cavalry Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">Bavarian Cavalry Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_4" id="Appendix_4"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN<br /> +from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Army Group Linsingen"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Linsingen,<br /> +Commanding II Corps.</td></tr> + +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XV Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Deimling).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">30th Infantry Division.<br /> +39th Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl">also from 16th Nov., Hofmann’s Composite Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">Plettenberg’s Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Plettenberg,<br /> +Commanding Guard Corps).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">4th Infantry Division.<br /> +Winckler’s Composite Guard Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>See <a href="#Page_115">p. 115</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Fourth Army Cavalry.</i> +</p> + +<table class="valt" summary="Fourth Army Cavalry"> +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>I.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc"><i>Cavalry Corps</i></td> +<td class="padl"><i>Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_64">p. 64</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>II.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc">"</td> +<td class="padl"><i>3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_90">p. 90</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>IV.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc">"</td> +<td class="padl"><i>3 Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_25">p. 25</a>.</i><br /> +<i>2nd Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_92">p. 92</a>.</i><br /> +<i>Bavarian Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_92">p. 92</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions.</i></td></tr> +</table> + +<p> +<i>The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on <a href="#Page_56">p. 56</a> to have +been eight divisions, among which, according to <a href="#Page_57">p. 57</a>, were the 3rd, +7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army +Cavalry of the Fourth Army.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>It may be noted that in ‘Liège-Namur’ in the same series of +General Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry +Corps is given as the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>There is a further mistake (see <a href="#Footnote_110">footnote 110</a>): the King’s were +not present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The +honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion +was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire +and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th +September.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing +but between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French +attacks south of Laon in the middle of September.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>‘2000 British’ belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division +which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the +resistance of that fortress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions +were available to oppose them.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>These ‘considerable hostile forces’ consisted of the 7th Division and +Byng’s Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after +having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army +from Antwerp.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Needless to point out that General Joffre was never ‘Allied +Commander.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British +army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th October, +and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the 18th it +had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after considerable +fighting.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the 4th, astride +the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, while the 6th Division on +the right had reached the line Premesques-Ennettières-Radinghem (S.E. +of Armentières). General Conneau’s French Cavalry Corps filled the +gap between its right and the left of the II Corps.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is +superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as Gheluvelt: +its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading +Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till +19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck +area on 18th October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>‘Armée’ in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>This statement as to Sir J. French’s intentions is inaccurate. The +II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the orders +issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Between Armentières and the sea the British had only the I Corps, +less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps (composed +of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps and two +Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced to about +one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the Allied forces +outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of the statement +that ‘the relative strength of the opposing forces never appreciably +altered in our favour’ will become apparent as the book is read, and +as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only by a weak +composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by a succession +of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed the +attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt on +31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. +See also <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>‘The heights of St. Eloi’ is a phrase which suggests that the +author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of +the area round Ypres.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own +country.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>British torpedo boats do not carry ‘heavy artillery.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the +Monitors ‘Severn,’ ‘Humber,’ and ‘Mersey.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin, +19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on +account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the +eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the line +Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing +to press their pursuit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of very +hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it is +to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood’s squadron that reference is made.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>There was no British artillery present in this quarter.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> See pages <a href="#Page_23">23</a>-24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See <i>Les pages de gloire de l’Armée Belge: à Dixmuide</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the opposition +which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the Allied +force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry’s French +Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and Territorials. +These were driven back without being able to offer much resistance, and +in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British Corps just as it began +its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle and Passchendaele +(21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to divert his reserves +to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend his attack which had +been making good progress on a line south-east from Langemarck to +Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the 7th Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding the +line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the 1st +Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, the +1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to +Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with +the 3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen’s, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and +2nd Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck. +The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, +and only one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available +to support the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the +2nd Division carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th +Infantry Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. +This division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: +it repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and +night 21st-22nd.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the +Hazebrouck area.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On the afternoon +of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in breaking +through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron Highlanders, +and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote +road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward; +however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black +Watch, arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all +further German advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements +came up, the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. +of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from +the 6th Infantry Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen’s of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, +the Queen’s retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven +right back, nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on +them. The old trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually +recovered, but late in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the +advanced position reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken +up about the line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during +this action, in which less than two British infantry brigades had +defeated the 46th Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck +had been heavily attacked, apparently (cf. <a href="#Page_40">p. 40</a>) by the 51st +Reserve Division, which had been completely worsted. In this part +of the action very notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters +just north of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 +rounds a man, and though attacked in front and flank by very superior +numbers, maintained their position intact. The British accounts +testify to the gallantry with which the German attacks were pressed, +officers carrying regimental colours ran on ahead of the men and +planted the colours in the ground to give their men a point to make for, +a mounted officer rode forward, exposing himself recklessly, to encourage +his soldiers, but the musketry of the British infantry was too much +for the Germans, and the attack was completely repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the repeated +reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, except for +a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the Ypres salient +before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial battalions, the +Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry regiments, the +North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards, +the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were added to the force, +while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division were replaced by three +composite brigades from the II Corps, set free after three weeks of +strenuous fighting near La Bassée by the arrival of the Meerut Division, +and greatly below strength.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim at +doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not +an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate +object.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde to +Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the line +being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The +German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were +thus faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect +of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven the +French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank exposed +and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing back its left +flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and the expulsion +of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines below) after +heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender foundation that a +British reconnaissance was made in the direction of Gheluwe covered by +two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back without being seriously +pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening from Becelaere were +sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of the 7th Division east of +Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October on the front from +Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over in this narrative. +Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all along the line of the 7th +Division without success except on the left, where by enfilade fire from +Passchendaele they forced the left of the 22nd Infantry Brigade to fall +back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. Meanwhile the advance of the +I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, as already explained (see +<a href="#Footnote_29">footnote 29</a>), the uncovering of the left of the I Corps prevented the +advance being pressed beyond the line Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line +was made good and the German efforts to advance successfully repulsed. +On 22nd October the Germans attacked the line of the 2nd Division +north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily repulsed, while further to their +left they renewed their attacks on the 21st Infantry Brigade east of +Polygon Wood with equal ill-success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin +relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>The ‘well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements’ +would have been most welcome to the British. Unfortunately +there had been no time or opportunity to do more than dig in hastily +where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, while such trenches +as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were hastily prepared in such +loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when bombarded; wire was +conspicuous by its absence.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>The only thing in the nature of a ‘fortress’ at Langemarck was a +small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of +22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The +relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not take +place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved by a +division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th October it +was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of the morning +of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of the 21st Infantry +Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through north of Reutel, +penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a counter-attack +by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd R. +Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was +made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation +with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the +6th Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road. +Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all attacks +were repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were +much below establishment.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> See <i>Les pages de gloire de l’Armée Belge: à Dixmuide</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>This testimony to the effective character of the help given by Admiral +Hood’s squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in the +narrative on <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th +October (<a href="#Footnote_39">footnote 39</a>), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division +had re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and +between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes +there were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of +the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress +east of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX +Corps which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the +showing of this narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly +superior in numbers to those engaged in the attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th French +Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a German +battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French unit +with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, however, +less progress was made, but the implication that the British reached +Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve Division at the +point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on this quarter +only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support available was +insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it was therefore +abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>The British who were streaming down from the high ground about +Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps +4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the +period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the +south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was +obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which +held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably +on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd Reserve +Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into +Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots +Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, +and succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, +but a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid +of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was +successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding +a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division +connected it up with the left of General Allenby’s Cavalry Corps on the +Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>This account does not tell the story of 29th October very intelligibly. +The British front had been readjusted, and was now held by the 2nd +Division on the left, from the junction with the French to west of Reutel, +thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by the 1st Division, +thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the 3rd Cavalry Division +on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans (apparently the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force against the junction +of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the 9th kilo cross-roads, and +rolled up the battalions to right and left after very severe fighting, in +which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd Gordon Highlanders of the +7th Division distinguished themselves greatly by repeated counter-attacks. +The resistance of the troops in the front line delayed the +Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st Division to be put +in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the most advanced trenches. +The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as Gheluvelt, and their final +gain of ground was inconsiderable.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting on the +La Bassée-Armentières front as quite distinct from the main battle for +Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III Corps had +a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they received being +on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade and the divisional +troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced General Conneau’s +French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. As the net +result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced back to a line +running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve Chapelle, past +Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentières to the Lys at Houplines, part +of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left bank of the Lys to the +junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of Messines. The German +attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and the strain on the II and +III Corps was very severe.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers +of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by itself +amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the British +forces engaged between La Bassée and Zonnebeke. For its <a href="#Appendix_2">Order of +Battle</a> see at end of book.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the further +advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered the +German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, and +enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the Belgians, +however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the assistance of +their Allies.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st October. +It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here as though +it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in action on the +Zonnebeke area since 24th October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British Commander-in-Chief +amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, six +of 60-pounders, and three of 4·7-inch guns, a total of forty-four guns +and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held +by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the +I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the +XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions +of the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged +for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at +full war establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to +one.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>See <a href="#Footnote_51">footnote 51</a>. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third +time as a new arrival.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> See <a href="#Page_62">page 62</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the statements +previously given, even apart from the fact that the German units +were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous heavy +losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds is no more +than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division who had held +up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of Langemarck on +23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian Guard attacked +on 11th November—or rather a scanty remnant of them was: in the +interval they had fought and held up a succession of attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only +had been given a day’s rest, but the division as a whole had not been +relieved.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of +which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed. +None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of the +Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the +very thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a +front of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete +and St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a +brigade of French infantry.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Messines ridge.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing +the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of time +and want of labour. ‘Deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements’ +is a much exaggerated statement.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time, +but was decisively repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <i>I and II Cavalry Corps. See <a href="#Appendix_3">Order of Battle</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry Brigade +on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were dislodged +by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and +1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy fighting, the +1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by a very +stubborn resistance.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines +canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde +was brought to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st +Division under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division +under Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a +new line to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde +the 7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but +east of Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some +of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front +east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve +Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long spell +of rest.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>The ‘reinforcements’ which the Allies had received on 29th-30th +October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them. +(See <a href="#Footnote_66">footnote 66</a>.)</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, +at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account +put in about eight battalions.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> <i>It would not be gathered from this account that the British artillery +had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to ammunition +expenditure.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>The statement that ‘many attacks had to be delivered against fresh +troops in good sheltered entrenchments’ is almost ludicrous in its travesty +of the facts.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>It was not in ‘long colonial wars’ but in careful training on the +ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that +mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the defence. +Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the outbreak of +war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active service.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> <i>The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st October, +the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division holding on +successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had been pierced at +Gheluvelt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the British +possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war establishments +allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that by +31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns to +increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one or +both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for +machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original +Expeditionary Force could maintain.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an +hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The ‘château and +park,’ north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales Borderers, who +maintained their ground, although their right was left in the air by the +loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came up and delivered their +celebrated counter-attack past the right of the S.W.B. This apparently +occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, however, accurate in saying +that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the Worcesters did was that they +completely checked the German efforts to push forward; the position their +counter-attack reached enabled them to flank any advance west of Gheluvelt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> <i>The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem +founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was +subsequently retaken.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the detachments +under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the right +of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury Forest, +was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground, and at one +point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans back a long +way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> <i>The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General +Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General +Munro, commanding the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was +killed, but the former died many months after of his wounds.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> <i>During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the +XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held by +the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades north-west +of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, however, +unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and further +to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily pressed. It was +here that the London Scottish were put in to recover trenches which had +been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> <i>Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the night +of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely difficult +to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade was forced out +of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that the advance of the +Germans was then held up west of the village, counter-attacks by two +battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just arrived from La Bassée-Neuve +Chapelle area, assisting to check them. Subsequently these +battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st Lincolnshires) were +also forced back, but by this time more French reinforcements were +coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and their counter-attacks, +though not wholly successful, prevented further German progress. +But the admission of this account that two whole German regiments +(six battalions) were engaged in the attack is a fine testimony to +the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division and attached infantry +at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one against them.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> <i>The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st Cavalry +Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by portions +of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the 5th Division +(the 2nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire +L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve Chapelle and +much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th (Würtemburg) +Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only artillery +available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the R.H.A. +batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>i.e. Würtemburg.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Château had to be evacuated +during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal +of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans +did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts as +they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward beyond +Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give the +impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily +pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> <i>The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was +in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under +Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as +were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position +south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day’s +fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting +as infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts +of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of +Zandvoorde).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> <i>The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th +Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, +and were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This +account of the ‘treacherous methods of the Indians’ smacks of the conventional; +it is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections +of the German Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against +the British for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of ‘Kultur.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French +had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division +assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> <i>These ‘reinforcements of newly arrived British troops’ are +imaginary.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in breaking +our line at this point and captured two guns which had been pushed +up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards, though taken +in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack by the 1st Black +Watch re-established the line, while south of the road a counter-attack +by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared the Herenthage +Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches a little eastward. +Further to the right Lord Cavern’s detachment (Brigadier-General +Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his battalions had come +under Lord Cavan’s orders) and the remnants of the 1st Grenadiers +and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their own successfully +and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. Deimling’s left +wing.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> <i>The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day belongs +solely to the French; no British troops were in action there.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of the +fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some +attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture +Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the British +Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east of Wulverghem. +Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it maintained +itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th Division about +the middle of November.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <i>The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, ‘Hofprediger’ Dr. +Vogel, in his book ‘3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie’ (p. 212), +says the attack was made and failed, but ‘next day the English abandoned +the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our +8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard +Dragoons.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> <i>What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient except +the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for the simple +reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, though some +French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek; but in the +course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the 7th Division +was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II Corps composed +of battalions which had had three weeks’ fighting near La Bassée and +had then to be thrust in after only two or three days’ rest to hold some of +the most difficult parts of the line south-east of Ypres. The 7th Infantry +Division when relieved amounted to less than a third of their original +strength, without taking into account the drafts that had joined since +they landed, which amounted to 2000 or more. Most of the battalions +of the 1st Division were in scarcely better case.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> <i>These ‘successive lines of rearward positions’ did not exist except +on paper during the period to be included in the ‘Battle of Ypres,’ i.e. +to 17th November.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> <i>During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting on +the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the +Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which +was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry +Brigade (cf. <a href="#Page_93">page 93</a>, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the 22nd +Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out for a rest, +and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the line next day. +On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd Division, which +had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, gained a little +ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the line was again +attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was broken near Veldhoek, +but was restored after some sharp fighting and several counter-attacks. +Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to the east of it, the +2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than held its own. In +the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken by two battalions +of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the 1st Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> <i>St. Eloi is hardly situated ‘on high ground,’ as it is on the down +slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the low ground +after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the Messines-Wytschaete +ridge.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> <i>The allusion is not understood.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> <i>The heavy artillery at Sir John French’s disposal at this period +was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered +by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed on +the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for +the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among +the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the +vast ammunition expenditure which had been incurred.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> <i>The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was +defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the +Broodseinde cross-roads.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> <i>The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> <i>However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917 +Lombartzyde was in Allied possession.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> For Order of Battle, see <a href="#APPENDIX">Appendix</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_101" id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> <i>A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery +with six guns.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_102" id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Consisting of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division and the 43rd Reserve +Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_103" id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> <i>It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of Dixmude +should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this assertion can have +taken, as no British troops were concerned in the Dixmude fighting, nor +could there have been any occasion for any official British announcement +about Dixmude.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jäger Regt. +read Res. Infantry Regt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_104" id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> <i>The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von +Winckler’s Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions +was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced +to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of the +3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the 3rd +Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the +main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the +Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently +pronounced.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_105" id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon +Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British line +was marked by a ‘strong point’ which had been erected near the south-west +corner of the wood, known later as ‘Black Watch Corner’: this was +successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the Black Watch. +Attacks were made on the 1st King’s lining the southern edge of the +wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also further eastward +and to the left of the King’s, on the 2nd Coldstream Guards. The +Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the 54th Reserve +Division: at neither of these points did the attackers meet with any +success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_106" id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> <i>A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line +trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important +part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed +appreciably to its success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_107" id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> <i>This is the eastern part of the wood known later as ‘Inverness +Copse.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_108" id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <i>This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the +1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington’s.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_109" id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> <i>The 4th (Queen Augusta’s) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked +the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been +repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. +Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were +also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the +Germans made no progress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_110" id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> <i>This part of the German account is not borne out by the British +versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke +through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on north-west +into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and coming +out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was arrested +mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them up with +rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, orderlies +from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of the 1st Brigade, +assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was critical until about +noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I. arrived on the scene. +This battalion had been engaged for several days near Zwarteleen, and +had just been brought up to Westhoek to act as Divisional Reserve. +Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly counter-attacked the +Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out headlong. Many of +them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and southern sides by +the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western edge of Polygon +Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come up to Glencorse +Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other units of the +2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which extended thence +to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment who had +pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating any +further. The King’s, to whom this account gives the credit for the +Oxfordshire’s counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard +Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on the +Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling that +at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd Oxford +and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief part +in the defeat of Napoleon’s Guard.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have +been the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, +chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were +pushed forward rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness +Copse.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_111" id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> <i>The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon +11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek +was trifling in extent and value, and though ‘Hill 60’ and the +wood north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt +that the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been +expected to produce a break-through. The ‘numerical superiority’ +once again attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged +strength of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost +wholly lacking supporting points and communications, which had such +a much more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they +ever possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the +German Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the +honours of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three +weeks of incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous +troops.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_112" id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> <i>This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November in +which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th +and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the +Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th +November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage +Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered +by the 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack +by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of +the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of the +Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry +Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_113" id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> <i>The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_114" id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> <i>One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on +17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on +this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, +holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven +the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the +first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception +undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_115" id="Footnote_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> <i>It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_116" id="Footnote_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> <i>See remarks in <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_117" id="Footnote_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <i>The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have been +mentioned.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_118" id="Footnote_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <i>It is not to be read in this monograph. See <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_119" id="Footnote_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> <i>4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see <a href="#Page_64">page 64</a>).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_120" id="Footnote_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> <i>3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see <a href="#Page_90">page 90</a>).</i></p></div></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX">INDEX</a></h2> + +<ul class="index"><li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Albert of Würtemburg</span>, Duke, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see also</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Fourth">Army, Fourth</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Antwerp</span>: value of, to Entente, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">retreat from, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Army_Fourth"></a>Army, Fourth</span> (German): formation of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">advance of, through <span class="smcap">Belgium</span>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">dispositions on 20th Oct., <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">task of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 3rd Nov., <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 10th Nov., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- <span class="smcap">Sixth</span> (German): position of right wing of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">failure of attacks of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Army_Group_Fabeck"></a>Army Group Fabeck</span>: constitution of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">plan for, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">assembly of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">artillery of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 30th Oct., <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 31st Oct., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">alteration of plan,<a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">reinforcement of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">offensive on 11th Nov. of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Army_Group_Linsingen"></a>---- —— <i>Linsingen</i>: composition of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">task of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">offensive of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Army Headquarters</span> (German), meetings at, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>: Anglo-French counter-attacks at, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">XXVII Res. Corps takes, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Belgian</span> population, patriotism of, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Beseler</span>, General von, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see also</i> <a href="#C3R"><span class="smcap">Corps</span>, III Reserve</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">British Fleet</span>, co-operation of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">British</span> force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Calais</i>: concentration about, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">German objective, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Cavalry, Army</span> (German): objective of, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">relief of, near <span class="smcap">Lille</span>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Cavalry, Fourth</span> (German) Army, composition of, <a href="#Page_xvii">xvii</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx">---- <span class="smcap">Sixth</span> (German) Army: composition of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="C3R"></a>Corps</span> (German), III Reserve: captures Antwerp, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">screens Fourth Army, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">crosses the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="C15"></a>---- —— XV: attack on <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack and capture of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">captures Hill <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XIX, captures <span class="smcap">Lille</span>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXII Res.-XXVII Res.: formation of, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">transport of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXII Res., attacks on <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXIII Res.: attack on <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXVI Res., takes <span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXVII Res., takes <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— II Bavarian, dispositions of, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- (French) II, arrival of, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— IX, arrival of, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Deimling</span>, General von, wounded,<a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see</i> <a href="#C15"><span class="smcap">Corps</span> (German), XV</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack by French Marine division on, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Eastern Front</span>, German units leave for, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Emperor</span>, German: proclamation to Fourth Army, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">watches attack on <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Fabeck</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Group_Fabeck">Army Group Fabeck</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">French</span> force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Gerok</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Group_Gerok">Group Gerok</a></span>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>: attack on, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">British force holding, <a href="#Page_72">72</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Gloucestershire</span> Regiment at <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Group_Gerok"></a>Group Gerok</span>: formation of, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Group_Urach"></a>---- <span class="smcap">Urach</span>: formation of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> Park, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Guard</span> (German) Division (von <span class="smcap">Winckler</span>): marches to <span class="smcap">Roubaix</span>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Guards</span>, British Life, cut up, <a href="#Page_68">68</a> <i>and note</i>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, Mount, topography and importance of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">King’s Liverpool</span> Regiment, counter-attack by, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> <i>and note</i> <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Lille</span>: value to Entente, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Linsingen</span>, General Baron von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Group_Linsingen">Army Group Linsingen</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Messines</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">British force holding, <a href="#Page_80">80</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire L.I.</span>, counter-attack German Guard, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> (<i>note</i> 2).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Plettenberg’s</span> Corps, attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Urach</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Group_Urach">Group Urach</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Worcestershire</span> Regiment, counter-attack at <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a> <i>and note</i> <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">German attack on, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Anglo-French counter-attack on, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">second German attack, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">third attack and capture of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of Park of, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">gallant defence by French troops, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Yorkshire L.I.</span> retake <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Château, <a href="#Page_124">124</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Ypres</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">historical, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack from the north against, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attempt to break through south of, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">battle of, begins, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Yser</span>, canal: topographical, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">flooding the, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">crossed by III Res. Corps, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li></ul> + +<hr class="r65" /> +<p class="center small">Printed by T. and A. <span class="smcap">Constable</span>, Printers to His Majesty<br /> +at the Edinburgh University Press +</p> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 44234 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/44234-h/images/cover.jpg b/44234-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a6ccde --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/44234-h/images/i044.png b/44234-h/images/i044.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..082531f --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i044.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i091.png b/44234-h/images/i091.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..567d747 --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i091.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i097.png b/44234-h/images/i097.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..825a198 --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i097.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i105.png b/44234-h/images/i105.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d0cde2 --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i105.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i132.png b/44234-h/images/i132.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f07492 --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i132.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i136.png b/44234-h/images/i136.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5012bf --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i136.png diff --git a/44234-h/images/i139.png b/44234-h/images/i139.png Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d7ee0f --- /dev/null +++ b/44234-h/images/i139.png diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..398898d --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #44234 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44234) diff --git a/old/44234-8.txt b/old/44234-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f97707 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/44234-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4894 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Ypres 1914, by Otto Schwink + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Ypres 1914 + An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff + +Author: Otto Schwink + +Translator: Graeme Chamley Wynne + +Release Date: November 19, 2013 [EBook #44234] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YPRES 1914 *** + + + + +Produced by Brian Coe, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by Cornell +University Digital Collections) + + + + + + + Transcriber's Note: + + Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as + possible. + + On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth + Army," "from" is a correction of "fron". + + Italic text has been marked with _underscores_. + Bold text has been marked with =equals signs=. + OE ligatures have been expanded. + + + + +YPRES, 1914 + + +MONS, AND THE RETREAT + +By Captain G. S. GORDON + +With an Introduction by Field-Marshal LORD FRENCH + + 1/6 _net_. + + =The Evening News.=--'... The true history of those amazing and + heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a soldier and an expert.' + + +THE MARNE CAMPAIGN + +By Lieut. Col. F. E. WHITTON, C.M.G. + + 10/6 _net_. + + =Saturday Review.=--'... Clear and concise ... gives a much better + general impression of the Battle of the Marne than any other we + know.' + + +1914 + +By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc. + +With a Preface by MARÉCHAL FOCH + + 21/- _net_. + + +CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON. + + + + + YPRES, 1914 + + AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY + ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + + TRANSLATION BY G. C. W. + + WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE + HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) + COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE + + LONDON + CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD + 1919 + + + _Printed in Great Britain_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + INTRODUCTION ix + + GERMAN PREFACE xxiii + + PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1 + + THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 13 + + THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 19 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, 20TH-31ST + OCTOBER 1914 26 + + THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES 59 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END + OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1914 98 + + THE LAST PHASE 103 + + CONCLUSION 126 + + + APPENDIX + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 131 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK 132 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK 133 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN 133 + + + INDEX 135 + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + + + SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT + + PAGE + + DISPOSITIONS ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914 20 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30TH OCTOBER 1914 67 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 73 + + THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 81 + + THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON 10TH NOVEMBER 1914 108 + + THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 112 + + THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 115 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The German book of which a translation is here given was written in +the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto Schwink, a General Staff Officer, +by order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is +stated to be founded on official documents. It forms one of a series +of monographs, partly projected, partly published, on the various +phases of the war, but is the only one that is available dealing with +operations in which the British Army was engaged. Several concerned +with the Eastern theatre of war have already appeared, and one other +entitled 'LIÈGE-NAMUR,' relating to the Western. + +Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book '1914,' has said that the +period 27th to 31st October during the first battle of YPRES was +'more momentous and fateful than any other which I directed during my +period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. 31st October +and 1st November will remain for ever memorable in the history of our +country, for during those two days no more than a thin and straggling +line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its +practical ruin as an independent first-class Power.' The German account +accentuates the truth of Lord French's appreciation of the great peril +in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells us of the enemy's +plans, and of the large forces that he brought up with great skill +and secrecy to carry them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch's +expression, lets us 'know what was going on in the other fellow's +house.' But it does more than that: unconsciously perhaps, it bears +convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army, +the determination of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness +of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and +the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly credits Field-Marshal +Sir John French with 'reinforcements in abundance,' insists that our +troops 'fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of +bricks before abandoning them,' and definitely records that 'the fact +that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops gave way under +the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us the opportunity to +acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did +their duty thoroughly.' We are further told that the effect of our +artillery was such that 'it was not possible to push up reserves owing +to heavy artillery fire'; that 'all roads leading to the rear were +continuously shelled for a long way back'; that the German 'advancing +columns were under accurate artillery fire at long range'; that our +shells 'blocked streets and bridges and devastated villages so far +back that any regular transport of supplies became impossible.' As +regards rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with 'quantities of +machine-guns,' 'large numbers of machine-guns,' etc.; with the result +that 'the roads were swept by machine-guns'; and that 'over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a +machine-gun rattling out bullets.' At that date we had no machine-gun +units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of +a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, and had not yet been +replaced; actually machine-guns were few and far between. The only +inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, +were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, was mistaken for machine-gun +fire both as regards volume and effect. Our simple defences, to +complete which both time and labour had been lacking, became in German +eyes 'a well-planned maze of trenches,' 'a maze of obstacles and +entrenchments'; and we had 'turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point'; 'the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES ... +had been converted into fortresses' (_Festungen_); as also the edge +of a wood near GHELUVELT and LANGEMARCK. As at the last-named place +there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of two platoons, and the +'broad wire entanglements' described by the German General Staff were +in reality but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans 'took +in their stride,'[1] the lavish praise, were it not for the result of +the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. +It is fair, however, to deduce that the German nation had to be given +some explanation why the 'contemptible little Army' had not been pushed +straightway into the sea. + +The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German +General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent, +as their Preface says, the currency of 'the legends and rumours +which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so +difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards.' One cannot +naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not +will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed +by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1--to their future +financial advantage--'It can't be done yet. Too many highly placed +personages (_hohe Herrschaften_) would suffer in their reputations.' +It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War +that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other German military historians who had +been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil +a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began +even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient +to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties +that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous +number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy +artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench +warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly +attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French +and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit +defeat. + +The German General Staff specially claim that the first battle of +YPRES was a German victory, 'for it marked the failure of the enemy's +intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich +districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc. etc. +Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that General Staff's +own evidence, be regarded as a drawn one. For it is definitely stated +in the monograph that the object of the operations was 'successfully +closing with the enemy ... and gaining CALAIS, the aim and object +of the 1914 campaign'--this the German Army notoriously did not do. +The intention to break through is repeatedly stated: 'although fresh +reinforcements had been sent up by the German General Staff ... a +break-through had not been possible.' 'Another effort to break through +should be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's Army +Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry divisions) was formed +'as a strong new army of attack ... for breaking through on the front +WERWICQ-WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divisions) after the +failure of von Fabeck was formed 'to drive back and crush the enemy +lying north of the (COMINES-YPRES) canal ... and to break through +there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that 'no break-through of the +enemy's lines had been accomplished.... We had not succeeded in making +the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in +the west in our favour had to be consigned to its grave.' In fact, the +book is largely an apologia and a confession of failure which mere +protestations of victory cannot alter. + +The effects of a German victory on the course of the war, with the +Channel ports in German hands, as compared with those of an Allied +victory in Flanders, which at that period of the war and at that season +of the year could have resulted in little more than pushing the enemy +back into Belgium a few miles, may be easily imagined. If the battle +was a tactical draw, at least we had a strategic balance in our favour. + +The principal reasons advanced for the German ill-success are 'the +enemy's numerical superiority, and the strength of his positions,' and +of course the drastic course taken by the Belgians of 'calling in the +sea to their aid.' + +There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout the book. To +those who were there and saw our 'thin and straggling line' and the +hastily constructed and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and +broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin belts of wire, and +none of the communication trenches of a later date, they provoke only +amazement. Even German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements. + +As regards the superiority of numbers, the following appears to be +the approximate state of the case as regards the infantry on the +battle front from ARMENTIÈRES (inclusive) to the sea dealt with +in the monograph. It is necessary to count in battalions, as the +Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, and the British +Commander-in-Chief enumerates the reinforcements sent up to YPRES from +the II and Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial battalions, +London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also took part. The total figures +are:-- + + British, French, Belgian 263 battalions. + German 426 battalions. + +That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans of 13 to 21. Viscount +French in his '1914' says 7 to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52 +to 84 as against 49 to 84, and very different from the German claim +of '40 divisions to 25.' Actually in infantry divisions the Allies +had only 22, even counting as complete the Belgian six, which had +only the strength of German brigades. Any future correction of the +figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, will probably +emphasise the German superiority in numbers still more, and the +enemy indisputably had the advantage of united command, homogeneous +formations and uniform material which were lacking in the Allied force. + +As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had six divisions, including +one of three brigades. The enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, +the Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is not clear from +the German account how much cavalry was transferred from the Sixth Army +to the Fourth Army.[2] It may be noted that a German cavalry division +included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, horse artillery +batteries and the two or three _Jäger_ battalions, three or more +machine-gun batteries and two or more companies of cyclists; and was +thus, unlike ours, a force of all arms. + +The German General Staff reveal nothing about the exact strength of the +artillery. In a footnote it is mentioned that in addition to infantry +divisions the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, _Pionier_ +formations and other technical troops; and in the text that 'all the +available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist +the Fourth Army) for the break-through.' The Germans had trench-mortars +(_Minenwerfer_) which are several times mentioned, whilst our first +ones were still in the process of improvisation by the Engineers of the +Indian Corps at BETHUNE. + +The statement that 'the enemy's' (_i.e._ British, French and Belgian) +'superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns and +aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, even fourfold' is palpably nonsense +when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when the monograph was +written. + +The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot understand defeat in war +except on the premise that the victor had superiority of numbers. To +show to what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie's _Henry +V._, vol. II. page 216, will be found an account of a German theory, +accepted by the well-known historian Delbrück, that the English won at +Agincourt on account of superior numbers, although contemporary history +is practically unanimous that the French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie +sums it up thus: + + 'Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French is + inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered the + English, and finding that all contemporary authorities, both French + and English, are agreed that they did, the writer builds up a + theory that all the known facts can be explained on the supposition + that the French were really much inferior to us in numbers ... and + concludes that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number + of French (the English being 6000) at something between 4000 and + 7000.' + +It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff Officer +captured during the Ypres fighting said to his escort as he was being +taken away: 'Now I am out of it, do tell me where your reserves are +concealed; in what woods are they?' and he refused to believe that we +had none. Apparently it was inconceivable to the German General Staff +that we should stand to fight unless we had superior numbers; and these +not being visible in the field, they must be hidden away somewhere. + +Further light on what the Germans imagined is thrown by prisoners, +who definitely stated that their main attack was made south of YPRES, +because it was thought that our main reserves were near ST. JEAN, +north-east of that town. From others it was gathered that what could +be seen of our army in that quarter was in such small and scattered +parties that it was taken to be an outpost line covering important +concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, fearing a trap. + +It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation of the number +of formations engaged may not be altogether due to imaginary reserves, +as regards the British Army. Before the war the Great General Staff +knew very little about us. The collection of 'intelligence' with +regard to the British Empire was dealt with by a Section known in the +Moltkestrasse as the 'Demi-monde Section,' because it was responsible +for so many countries; and this Section admittedly had little time +to devote to us. Our organisation was different from that of any of +the great European armies. Their field artillery brigades contained +seventy-two guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or howitzers; +their infantry brigades consisted of two regiments, each of three +battalions, that is six battalions, not four as in the original British +Expeditionary Force. To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant +six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he belonged to +the Blankshire Regiment, the German might possibly believe he had +identified three battalions, whereas only one would be present. This +is actually brought out on page 118, when the author speaks of the 1st +Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment as the _Königsregiment +Liverpool_, and indicates his ignorance of the British Army, when +this single battalion engages the German _Garde Regiment zu Fuss_, by +describing the fight not only as one of regiment against regiment, but +as _Garde gegen Garde_ (Guard against Guards).[3] Such is the fighting +value of an English Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly +claimed, but the significant sentence immediately follows: 'any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question.' + +It may be as well to point out that the 'volunteers' who it is said +flocked to the barracks to form the Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were +not all volunteers in our sense of the word. The General Staff only +claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different state of +affairs from our New Armies, which had not 1 per cent. of trained +soldiers. Many of the 'volunteers' were fully trained men liable +to service, who merely anticipated their recall to the colours. It +was well known before the war that in each army corps area Germany +intended to form one 'Active' Corps and one or more 'Reserve' Corps. +The original armies of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the +IV Reserve of von Kluck's Army, which marched and fought just as the +active ones did. These first formed Reserve Corps were, it is believed, +entirely made up of trained men, but those with the higher numbers +XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in the Fourth Army, probably +did contain a good percentage of men untrained before the war. + +_Ersatz_ divisions were formed of the balance of reservists after the +Reserve divisions had been organised, and of untrained men liable for +service. After a time the words 'Active,' 'Reserve,' and '_Ersatz_' +applied to formations lost their significance, as the same classes of +men were to be found in all of them. + +No attempt has been made to tone down the author's patriotic sentiments +and occasional lapses from good taste; the general nature of the +narrative is too satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions +necessary when presenting it to the British public. + +The footnotes deal with a number of the more important points raised, +but are not exhaustive. + + * * * * * + + _Note._--The German time, at the period of the year in question one + hour earlier than ours, has been adhered to. + + The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished from those of + the Author by being printed in italics. + + In preparing the translation for issue it has not been thought + necessary to supply all the maps provided in the original, as the + general lie of the country must be fairly well known to British + readers. + + (_Translation of Title Page_) + + + Monographs on the Great War + + THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF + YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914 + + (DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND + BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914) + + FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES + + PUBLISHED + BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING + + + + +PREFACE + +BY GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS + + +The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison with those of +the past, and battles which formerly held the world in suspense are +now almost forgotten. The German people have been kept informed of the +progress of events on all fronts since the 4th August 1914, by the +daily official reports of the German General Staff, but the general +public will have been unable to gather from these a coherent and +continuous story of the operations. + +For this reason the General Staff of the German Field Army has decided +to permit the publication of a series of monographs which will give the +German people a general knowledge of the course of the most important +operations in this colossal struggle of nations. + +These monographs cannot be called histories of the war; years, even +decades, must pass before all the true inwardness and connection of +events will be completely revealed. This can only be done when the +archives of our opponents have been opened to the world as well as our +own and those of the General Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the +German people will be given descriptions of the most important of +the battles, written by men who took part in them, and have had the +official records at their disposal. + +It is possible that later research may make alterations here and there +necessary, but this appears no reason for delaying publications based +on official documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster +the legends and rumours which so easily take hold of the popular +imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct +afterwards. + +This series of monographs is not therefore intended as an addition to +military science, but has been written for all classes of the German +public who have borne the burden of the war, and especially for those +who have fought in the operations, in order to increase their knowledge +of the great events for the success of which they have so gladly +offered their lives. + + GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY. + + GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _Autumn, 1917_. + + + + +PRELIMINARY REMARKS + + +There is no more brilliant campaign in history than the advance of +our armies against the Western Powers in August and early September +1914. The weak French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to +beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, the active +defence of the Allied hostile armies and the passive resistance of the +great Belgian and French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal +march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage of each individual +German soldier, combined with the able leading of his commanders, +overcame all opposition and sent home the news of countless German +victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts of Paris were +trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy which half the world +had been weaving against us for so many years was to be brought to a +rapid conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, in the course of +which the centre and right wings of the German Western Army were, it +is true, withdrawn, but only to fight again as soon as possible, under +more favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting our +withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th September[4] our troops +brought him to a standstill along a line extending from the Swiss +frontier to the Aisne, north-east of Compiègne. In the trench warfare +which now began our pursuers soon discovered that our strength had been +by no means broken, or even materially weakened, by the hard fighting. + +As early as 5th September, before the battle of the Marne, the Chief +of the German General Staff had ordered the right wing should be +reinforced by the newly-formed Seventh Army.[5] It soon became clear +to the opposing commanders that any attempt to break through the +new German front was doomed to failure, and that a decisive success +could only be obtained by making an outflanking movement on a large +scale against the German right wing. Thus began what our opponents +have called the 'Race to the Sea,' in which each party tried to +gain a decision by outflanking the other's western wing. The good +communications of France, especially in the north, enabled the Allied +troops to be moved far more rapidly than our own, for the German +General Staff had at their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian +railways which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened +with transport of material of every description. In spite of this, +however, the French and British attacks failed to drive back the German +right wing at any point. Not only did they find German troops ready to +meet them in every case, but we were also generally able to keep the +initiative in our hands. + +In this manner by the end of September the opposing flanks had been +extended to the district north of the Somme, about Péronne-Albert. A +few days later began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens, +and by the middle of October our advanced troops were near Lille, +marching through the richest industrial country of France. The Army +Cavalry was placed so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to +bring pressure against the communications with England. Our cavalry +patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel and Hazebrouck, the pivots of +the enemy's movements, but they had to retire eastwards again when +superior hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The reports which +they brought back with them all pointed to preparations by the enemy +for an attack on a large scale, and for another effort to turn the +fortunes of the campaign to his favour. With this in view all available +troops, including newly-arrived detachments from England, were to be +used to break through the gap between Lille and Antwerp against our +right wing, roll it up and begin the advance against the northern Rhine. + +It must be remembered that at the time this plan was conceived +the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were still in French and +Belgian possession. It was hoped that Lille, with its well-built +fortifications, even though they were not quite up-to-date, would at +least hold up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was defended by +the whole Belgian Army of from five to six divisions which were to be +reinforced by British troops, and it was confidently expected that this +garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the most modern fortress +in Western Europe against any attack, especially if, as was generally +believed, this could only be carried out by comparatively weak forces. +Thus it seemed that the area of concentration for the Franco-Belgian +masses was secure until all preparations were ready for the blow to be +delivered through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the German +armies in the west. The plan was a bold one, but it was countered by a +big attack of considerable German forces in the same neighbourhood and +at the same time. The two opponents met and held each other up on the +Yser and at Ypres, and here the last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium +and gain possession of the rich provinces of Northern France before the +end of the year was frustrated. The question arises how the Germans +were able to find the men to do this, since it had been necessary to +send considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the Russian +advance. + +Whoever has lived through those great days of August 1914, and +witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm of the German nation, will never +forget that within a few days more than a million volunteers entered +German barracks to prepare to fight the enemies who were hemming in +Germany. Workmen, students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders, +officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. There was +such a constant stream of men that finally they had to be sent away, +and put off till a later date, for there was neither equipment nor +clothing left for them. By 16th August, before the advance in the +west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin had ordered the +formation of five new Reserve Corps to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, +whilst Bavaria formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony and +Würtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve Corps into being. Old and +young had taken up arms in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend +their country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted of these +volunteers, the remainder being trained men of both categories of the +_Landwehr_ and the _Landsturm_, as well as some reservists from the +depôts, who joined up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen +to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the moment, and the +need of their country: they were anxious to become useful soldiers as +quickly as possible to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. +Some regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes of the +higher educational schools came with their teachers and joined the same +company or battery. Countless retired officers placed themselves at the +disposal of the Government, and the country will never forget these +patriots who took over commands in the new units, the formation of +which was mainly due to their willing and unselfish work. + +The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to +the Western Front began on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division followed shortly after. Only comparatively few experienced +commanders were available for the units, and it was left to their keen +and patriotic spirit to compensate as far as possible for what the men +still lacked to play their part in the great struggle. + +The situation of the armies on the Western Front at this time was as +follows. In the neighbourhood of Lille the northern wing of the Sixth +Army was fighting against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October, +Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and garrison, was +taken after a twelve days' siege directed by General von Beseler, +commanding the III Reserve Corps, and well known in peace time as +Chief of the Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications. +The victorious besiegers had carried all before them. As they were +numerically insufficient to invest Antwerp on the west, south and +east, a break-through was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. +It was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; but the main +body of the Belgian army, in good fighting order, was able to escape +westwards along the coast, to await the arrival of British and French +reinforcements behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians were taken +prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 British troops[6] were +forced into Holland. In consequence of this new situation, and of the +reports of hostile concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, +the German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth Army under Duke +Albert of Würtemburg. It was to be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, +and XXVII Reserve Corps,[7] and was joined later on by the III Reserve +Corps with the 4th _Ersatz_ Division. By 13th October the detainment of +this new Army was in full progress west and south-west of Brussels. On +the evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began their march +to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of Bruges)--Deynze--point four +miles west of Audenarde. + +In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town of Lille. It had +been entered on 12th October by part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some +_Landwehr_ troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing to +the useless efforts of French territorial troops to defend it. The +order to the garrison was: 'The town is to be held till the Tenth +French Army arrives'; it resulted in the capture of 4500 French +prisoners, who were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing of the +Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Würtemburg and XIX Saxon Corps, +pushed forward to the Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.[8] +They took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through Comines to +Warneton and thence east of Armentières, where they came into touch +with the 14th Infantry Division which was further south near the +western forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the III Reserve +Corps, with its three divisions from Antwerp, was advancing westwards +on a broad front. By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards +and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen and reconnaissance +detachments had recognised movements of large bodies of troops about +Hazebrouck, Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations on a big +scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to this, considerable hostile +forces had reached Ypres, and appeared to be facing more or less +southwards opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.[9] + +An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the German General +Staff, gave the following instructions for the German forces between +Lille and the sea. The Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on +the defensive along the line Menin-Armentières-La Bassée and to await +the attack of our new Fourth Army against the left flank of the enemy. +The offensive action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was to +be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which now belonged to it, +should move as its right wing in echelon along the coast, whilst its +left was to advance through Menin. + +In accordance with these orders the III Reserve Corps occupied Ostend +on the 15th, its left wing reaching the line of the Thourout-Roulers +road. The Corps was then ordered not to advance further for a few +days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and French, who +were advancing against the north wing of the Sixth Army, being drawn +prematurely to movements in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore +were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and the canal south of +it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached +the line Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt--point six miles east of +Courtrai. On the advance of these four new Corps, the III Reserve +Corps was to draw away to the right wing, and during the 17th and the +following morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted to it +immediately south of the coast, and cleared the front of the Fourth +Army. The reconnaissance activity of the previous days had in places +led to severe fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of the +6th Reserve Division. It was found that the Belgian rearguards still +held part of the ground east of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any +attempt to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the question, +as the bridges had been blown up and the whole line put in a state of +defence. + +The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the III Reserve Corps +was a brilliant success. At midday on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, +who was to direct the enemy's attack from the line of the Yser, was +still in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had time to prepare +for his attack, and his only immediate care was to secure the line +from Armentières to the sea for the deployment. After the events on +the Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested General +Joffre, the Allied commander,[10] that he might be placed on the +northern flank of the line. He would then be close to Calais, which had +already become an English town,[11] he would be able to protect the +communications to his country; and, further, the fame to be gained by +a decisive and final victory attracted this ambitious commander to the +north. As a result the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien was +now in action against the strong German positions between Vermelles +(four miles south-west of La Bassée) and Laventie (west of Lille).[12] +Further to the north the III British Corps was fighting against the +Saxons advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry Corps.[13] +The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the hostile advance on the +line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east of Ypres.[14] Immediately to the +north again, the newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th +Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had arrived in the area +Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in its retreat by von Beseler's columns +(III Reserve Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched up to +Bixschoote,[15] and the gap between this place and Dixmude had been +closed by a French Cavalry Division which connected up with the Belgian +Army. The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, was +engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up to the sea for the most +stubborn defence. These strong forces were to cover the arrival of the +VIII and X French Corps[16] and were to deliver the first blow against +our supposed right wing. + +On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone out far in +advance of its Corps was surrounded near Roulers, and it was only by +its capture that the enemy definitely discovered the arrival of the +new German Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown to +him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. Field-Marshal French +was now confronted with a new situation. The preparations for his big +attack were not yet completed. The superiority of the masses already +concentrated did not yet appear to him to be sufficient to guarantee +success against the enemy's advance. The British commander therefore +decided to remain on the defensive[17] against our new Fourth Army, +until the completion of the French concentration. His line was already +closed up to the sea, it was naturally strong, and fresh troops were +arriving daily. The danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the +effect of making England put forth her full energy; the British troops +fought desperately to defend every inch of ground, using every possible +means to keep up the sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and +received rapid assistance from the French, and were backed up by fresh +reinforcements from England. + +From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm and unconditional +determination to win the war which pervaded the new Fourth Army +gave every prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who was +apparently still engaged in concentrating and reorganising his forces, +and gaining Calais, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign. + +Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful army, fully deployed +and ready to meet us. The British boast that they held up our attack +with a great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true in the +case of the 7th Division during the first two days in the small sector +ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT. On 22nd October between ARMENTIÈRES and the sea +there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking German Corps; +and, besides, the enemy had prepared a series of lines of strong +trenches covered by an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In +the course of the operations that developed, the relative strength of +the opposing forces never appreciably altered in our favour.[18] The +moral strength of our troops made up for the numerical superiority of +the enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back and destroyed, +it is hoped for ever, the ambition of our opponent to regain Belgium by +force of arms. + +The great desire of the Germans to defeat the hostile northern wing, +and to hit hardest the most hated of all our enemies, and, on the other +side, the obstinate determination of the British to hold on to the +passages to their country, and to carry out the offensive to the Rhine +with all their resources, resulted in this battle being one of the most +severe of the whole war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the +battle on the YSER and of YPRES can never be sufficiently praised, and +in spite of great losses their enthusiasm remained unchecked and their +offensive spirit unbroken. + + + + +THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS + + +The country in which it was hoped to bring about the final decision of +the campaign of 1914 was not favourable to an attack from east to west. + +Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, is almost +completely flat, and lies only slightly above sea-level, and in some +parts is even below it. Mount KEMMEL, in the south, is the only +exception; rising to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower +of Western Flanders. Before the war it was a well-wooded ridge with +pretty enclosures and villages. From its slopes and summits could be +seen the whole countryside from LILLE to MENIN and DIXMUDE. + +The possession of this hill was of great importance. Our cavalry +actually occupied it during the early days of October, but when the +enemy advanced he immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was +still too far away to help, and so Mount KEMMEL fell into the enemy's +hands. During the battle of YPRES it was his best observation post, and +of the utmost assistance to his artillery. + +We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern crest +of the ridge in front of YPRES, but in the autumn of 1914, as also +later in the war, this was always the signal for the most desperate +fighting. It was thus that the heights of ST. ELOI,[19] the high-lying +buildings of HOOGE and the village of WYTSCHAETE won their sanguinary +fame. + +Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its high ramparts and +fine buildings, YPRES was formerly one of the most picturesque towns in +Flanders. In the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance, +and became the centre of the cloth-weaving trade on its introduction +from Italy. BRUGES, lying close to the coast, became the market for its +wares. The Clothweavers' Guild, which accumulated great wealth, erected +in YPRES a fine Gothic hall, whose towers with those of St. Martin's +Church were landmarks for miles round. In modern times, however, the +importance of the town greatly diminished. The cloth-weaving industry +drifted away to the factories of MENIN and COURTRAI; and YPRES, like +its dead neighbour BRUGES, remained only a half-forgotten memory of its +former brilliance. + +The war has brought fresh importance to the town, but of a mournful +kind. On the impact of the German and Anglo-French masses in Flanders +in the autumn of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations. +The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front of it; for, as +an Englishman has written, it had become a point of honour to hold the +town. YPRES lay so close to the front that our advance could be seen +from its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing his +batteries and sheltering his reserves. For the sake of our troops we +had to bring it under fire; for German life is more precious than the +finest Gothic architecture. Thus the mythical death of YPRES became a +reality: no tower now sends forth its light across the countryside, and +a wilderness of wrecked and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town +so full of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders. + +The streams which run northwards from the hills about YPRES unite +for the most part near the town and flow into the YSER canal, which +connects the LYS at COMINES with the sea at NIEUPORT. This canal passes +through the YPRES ridge near HOLLEBEKE and, following northwards the +course of a small canalised tributary of the YSER, meets the YSER +itself south of DIXMUDE. The dunes at NIEUPORT have been cut through by +engineers for its exit to the sea. It is only from DIXMUDE northwards +that the canal becomes an obstacle which requires proper bridging +equipment for its passage. Its high embankments to the south of +DIXMUDE, however, give excellent cover in the otherwise flat country +and greatly simplify the task of the defender. + +The canal acquired a decisive importance when the hard-pressed +Belgians, during the battle on the night of 29th-30th October, let +in the sea at flood-tide through the sluices into the canal, and +then by blowing up the sluice-gates at NIEUPORT, allowed it to flood +the battlefield along the lower YSER. By this means they succeeded +in placing broad stretches of country under water, so much so that +any extensive military operations in that district became out of the +question. The high water-level greatly influenced all movements over +a very large area. By his order the King of the Belgians destroyed +for years the natural wealth of a considerable part of his fertile +country, for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation down to its +very roots. + +The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and difficult for +observation purposes. The high level of the water necessitates drainage +of the meadows, which for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes +which have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are bordered with +willows, and thick-set hedges form the boundaries of the cultivated +areas. Generally speaking, the villages do not consist of groups of +houses: the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming a +single street. The country is densely populated and is consequently +well provided with roads. But these are only good where they have been +made on embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, which begin +towards the end of October, rapidly turn the other roads into mere mud +tracks and in many cases make them quite useless for long columns of +traffic. + +The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by rain and +surface-water. The loam soil was on the whole easy to work in; but it +was only on the high ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to +give sufficient cover against the enemy's artillery fire; on the flat, +low-lying ground they could not in many cases be made more than two +feet deep. + +A few miles south of the coast the country assumes quite another +character: there are no more hedges and canals: instead gently rolling +sand-hills separate the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is +not fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes prevents the +sea encroaching on the land. + +The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of Flanders is the +difficulty of observation. The enemy, fighting in his own country,[20] +had every advantage, while our artillery observation posts were only +found with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed from the +front line, and it frequently happened that our brave artillerymen +had to bring up their guns into the front infantry lines in order to +use them effectively. Although the enemy was able to range extremely +accurately on our guns which were thus quickly disclosed, nothing could +prevent the German gunners from following the attacking infantry. + +Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult by the many hedges +and villages, so that it took a long time to discover the enemy's +dispositions and give our artillery good targets. + +Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent limitations +of view were all to the advantage of the defenders, who were everywhere +able to surprise the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh +defensive lines in front of them without knowing whether they were +occupied or not. The British, many of whom had fought in a colonial +war against the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country, +allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and then opened a +devastating fire at point-blank range from rifles and machine-guns +concealed in houses and trees. + +In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the German attacks so that +even the biggest operations degenerated into disconnected actions which +made the greatest demands on the powers of endurance and individual +skill of our volunteers. In spite of all these difficulties our men, +both old and young, even when left to act on their own initiative, +showed a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle on +the YSER a sacred memory both for the Army and the Nation, and every +one who took part in it may say with pride, 'I was there.' + + + + +THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + + +An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the following instructions for +the 18th:-- + + The III Reserve Corps to march to the line COXYDE-FURNES-OEREN, + west of the YSER. + + The XXII Reserve Corps to the line AERTRYCKE-THOUROUT. + + The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line LICHTERVELDE-ARDOYE. + + The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area EMELGHEM-ISEGHEM, and, on the + left wing, the XXVII Reserve Corps to the line LENDELEDE-COURTRAI. + +The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps all reached their +appointed destinations on the evening of the 18th without meeting any +strong resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced guards +and patrols came into touch with weak hostile detachments who were +awaiting our advance well entrenched, and surprised us with infantry +and artillery fire. At ROULERS a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes +circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, and cavalry patrols +pushing well forward showed that the British now realised the strength +of the new German forces. + +[Illustration: DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914. + +_On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right of +the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. It is also +inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps as north of +Armentières--only one of its Divisions was--while the II Corps was +certainly too closely pressed to detach any troops to the north as +depicted in the diagram._] + +In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the Army, the troops +of General von Beseler had opened the battle on the Yser. During +its advance northwards to cross the Yser at the appointed places +the III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition east of the +river-barrier. The men knew they were on the decisive wing of the +attack, and they pushed ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid +assault the 4th _Ersatz_ Division captured WESTENDE from the Belgians, +although a gallant defence was put up, and in spite of the fact that +British torpedo-boats and cruisers took part in the action from the +sea with their heavy artillery[21] both during the advance and the +fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve Division deployed to +attack a strongly entrenched hostile position. The 3rd Reserve _Jäger_ +Battalion captured the obstinately defended village of ST. PIERRE +CAPPELLE after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the main body of +the division succeeded in pushing forward to the neighbourhood of +SCHOORE. The 6th Reserve Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, +also closed with the enemy. It captured LEKE, and KEYEM, defended by +the 4th Belgian Division; but even this Brandenburg Division, for all +its war experience, found the task of forcing the crossings over the +YSER too much for it. + +The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing us a thousand or two +thousand yards nearer the YSER, but it had shown that the fight for +the river line was to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined +to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the highest possible +price. Four lines of trenches had been dug, and it could be seen that +every modern scientific resource had been employed in putting the +villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state of defence. A +great number of guns, very skilfully placed and concealed, shelled the +ground for a considerable distance east of the river, and in addition +to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy naval guns from the +sea. Battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division with their fire, and the British had even +brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats close inshore.[22] They +used a great quantity of ammunition, but the effect of it all was only +slight, for the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and indicated +bad observation. It became still more erratic when our long-range guns +were brought into action against the British Fleet. Detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division had to be echeloned back as far as Ostend, +in order to defend the coast against hostile landings. During the day +the General Commanding the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the +4th _Ersatz_ Division to cross the YSER at NIEUPORT, on account of +the heavy fire from the British naval guns, but to make it pass with +the main body of the Corps behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose +area the fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The _Ersatz_ +Division was informed accordingly. On the 19th another effort would +have to be made to force the crossings of the river by frontal attack, +for everywhere to the south strong opposition had been encountered. +From near DIXMUDE French troops carried on the line of the compact +Belgian Army. It was against these that the new Reserve Corps were now +advancing. + +On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th October a strong +attack was delivered from the west by the 4th Belgian Division, and +from the south-west by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a +brigade of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, against +KEYEM, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. They were driven +back after heavy fighting. During the 19th the southern wing of the +Brandenburg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing nearer the river +and, on its left, part of the artillery of the XXII Reserve Corps came +into action in support of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve +Corps, which until that day had been fighting unassisted. + +On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed on the whole front +of the Fourth Army. The XXII Reserve Corps advanced on BEERST and +DIXMUDE and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve Corps. +In front of it lay the strong bridge-head of DIXMUDE, well provided +with heavy guns. The whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed +into battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended +by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th Reserve Division the 209th +Reserve Regiment late in the evening took HANDZAEME after severe +street fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the village of +GITS, whilst CORTEMARCK was evacuated by the enemy during the attack. +The 46th Reserve Division in a running fight crossed the main road to +THOUROUT, north of ROULERS, and by the evening had arrived close to +STADEN. Heavy street fighting in the latter place continued during +the night: the enemy, supported by the population, offered strong +resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued behind +our front lines, endangering the cohesion of the attacking troops, but +never to a serious extent. + +The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition at RUMBEKE, +south-east of ROULERS; but all the enemy's efforts were in vain, +and the 233rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its +Corps Commander, General von Hügel, forced its way through the rows +of houses, many of which were defended with light artillery and +machine-guns. A very heavy fight took place for the possession of +ROULERS, which was stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were +put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from holes in the roofs +and windows, and concealed mines exploded among the advancing troops. +In spite of all this, by 5 P.M. ROULERS was taken by the 233rd, 234th +and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking from north, east and +south respectively. Further to the south, after a small skirmish with +British cavalry, the 52nd Reserve Division reached MORSLEDE, its +objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII Reserve Corps had +come into contact with the 3rd British Cavalry Division which tried to +hold up the Corps in an advanced position at ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE. After +a lively encounter the British cavalry was thrown back on to the 7th +British Division, which held a strong position about DADIZEELE.[23] + +Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation had been considerably +cleared up, in so far as we now knew that the Belgians, French and +British not only held the YSER and the YPRES canal, but also the high +ground east and north-east of YPRES. Everything pointed to the fact +that an unexpectedly strong opponent was awaiting us in this difficult +country, and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively +untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. In the meantime +the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, after +a discussion at Army Headquarters with General von Falkenhayn, Chief +of the General Staff, decided to renew the attack, as the left wing of +the Fourth Army had now come up on his immediate right. In consequence +of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved from its position on the +line MENIN-WARNETON and replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the +IV Cavalry Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of the +Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were continued with frequent +reinforcements of fresh troops, had the effect of holding the enemy and +drawing a strong force to meet them. They were not, however, destined +to have any decisive success, for the offensive strength of the Sixth +Army had been reduced by previous fighting, and it was not sufficient +to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions.[24] All the +more therefore were the hopes of Germany centred in the Fourth Army, +which was fighting further northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of +the campaign in Western Europe at this period. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM 20TH OCTOBER TO 31ST OCTOBER 1914 + + +On 20th October the battle broke out along the whole line, on a front +of about sixty miles. The enemy had got into position, and was prepared +to meet the attack of Duke Albert of Würtemburg's Army. On the very +day that the British, French and Belgians intended to begin their +advance they found themselves compelled to exert all their strength to +maintain their positions against our offensive. The British and French +had to bring up constant reinforcements, and a hard and bitter struggle +began for every yard of ground. The spirit in which our opponents +were fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian Division, +picked up in PERVYSE on 16th October. This ran: 'The fate of the whole +campaign probably depends on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore +officers and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be called upon +to make, to do even more than their mere duty. The salvation of the +country and therefore of each individual among us depends on it. Let us +then resist to our utmost.' + +We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, opposed to such +a determined and numerically superior enemy, were able to justify the +confidence which had been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the +following proclamations by their highest commanders on their arrival in +Belgium: + + GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _14th October 1914_. + + TO THE FOURTH ARMY,--I offer my welcome to the Fourth Army, and + especially to its newly-formed Reserve Corps, and I am confident + that these troops will act with the same devotion and bravery as + the rest of the German Army. + + Advance, with the help of God--my watchword. + + (Signed) WILLIAM, I. R. + + + _ARMY ORDER._ + + I am pleased to take over the command of the Army entrusted to me + by the Emperor. I am fully confident that the Corps which have been + called upon to bring about the final decision in this theatre of + war will do their duty to their last breath with the old German + spirit of courage and trust, and that every officer and every man + is ready to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred + cause of our Fatherland. With God's assistance victory will then + crown our efforts. + + Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor. + + (Signed) DUKE ALBERT OF WÜRTEMBURG, + _General and Army Commander_. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, + _15th October 1914_. + +Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army was not an infinitely +difficult one. It would have probably been achieved nevertheless if the +Belgians at the moment of their greatest peril had not called the sea +to their aid to bring the German attack to a halt. Let us, however, now +get down to the facts. + +On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering ram of the Fourth +Army, began an attack with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by +almost the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of the Yser +west of the line MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORBAKKE. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division +to the north and the 6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. +By the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had +driven the enemy back across the river in spite of the support given +him by British and French heavy batteries.[25] In front of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division the enemy still held a bridge-head at LOMBARTZYDE. +At 8.15 A.M. on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the Staff of the 6th +Reserve Division, that part of the 26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had +crossed the YSER. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd Battalions +of this regiment had worked their way up to the north-eastern part of +the bend of the YSER, south of SCHOORE, and had got into the enemy's +outposts on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a shot had been +fired, and not an unnecessary noise had disturbed the quiet of the +dawning day. Volunteers from the engineers silently and rapidly laid +bridging material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge west of +KEYEM, which had been blown up and lay in the water, was very quickly +made serviceable again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians had +considered their position sufficiently protected by the river, and by +the outposts along the eastern bank. By 6 A.M. German patrols were on +the far side of the YSER, and the enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire +began only when they started to make a further advance. Three companies +of the 1st and two companies of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as +part of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already crossed the +temporary bridges at the double and taken up a position on the western +bank: so that, in all, 2½ battalions and a machine-gun company were now +on the western bank. + +The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, and prepared a +thoroughly unpleasant day for those who had crossed. Heavy and light +guns of the British and French artillery[26] hammered incessantly +against the narrow German bridge-head and the bridges to it. Lying +without cover in the swampy meadows the infantry was exposed beyond +all help to the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from west and +south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks again and again, +but to attempt sending reinforcements across to it was hopeless. Some +gallant gunners, however, who had brought their guns close up to the +eastern bank, were able to give great help to their friends in their +critical situation. Thus assisted the infantry succeeded in holding +the position, and during the following night was able to make it +sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of success to any +further hostile efforts. During the night several Belgian attacks +with strong forces were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve +Division was able to put a further 2½ battalions across to the western +bank of the YSER bend. On the 23rd we gained possession of TERVAETE, +and the dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was thereby +considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th October saw all the infantry +of the 6th Reserve Division west of the river. A pontoon bridge was +thrown across the north-eastern part of the YSER bend, but it was +still impossible to bring guns forward on account of the enemy's +heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve Division still lay in its battle +positions along the river bank north of SCHOORBAKKE, but every time +attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian artillery smashed +the bridges to pieces. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division suffered heavily, +as it was subjected to constant artillery fire from three sides, and +to entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands and the +high level of the ground water. Whenever fire ceased during the night +strong hostile attacks soon followed; but they were all repulsed. +The withdrawal of the main body of the _Ersatz_ Division behind the +6th Reserve Division to cross the YSER, as General von Beseler had +once planned, had become impracticable for the moment, for it had +been discovered through the statements of prisoners that the 42nd +French Division had arrived in NIEUPORT to assist the Belgians. The +4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been weakened on the 18th by the +transfer of one of its three brigades to the 5th Reserve Division, +could not be expected to bring the new enemy to his knees by the +running fight that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone was +sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; in addition, the fire +of the enemy's naval guns from the sea prevented any large offensive +operations in the area in question. Thus the _Ersatz_ troops were +compelled to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining their +positions under the cross-fire of guns of every calibre, to driving +back the hostile attacks, and to holding the Belgian and French forces +off in front of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. +It was not until some long-range batteries were placed at the disposal +of the division that its position improved. A couple of direct hits +on the enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no longer carry +on their good work undisturbed. Their activity at once noticeably +decreased, and the more the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from +the dunes, the further the ships moved away from the coast and the less +were they seen. + +General von Beseler never for a moment doubted that the decision lay +with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions, especially as the four Corps of +the Fourth Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able to reach +the canal-barrier with any considerable forces. + +The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, +had in the meantime come into line south of General von Beseler's +troops, and had already fought some successful actions. It had arrived +on the 19th in the district east of BEERST and about VLADSLOO, just +in time to help in driving back the Franco-Belgian attack against the +southern flank of the 6th Reserve Division.[27] That same evening +it was ordered to attack from north and south against the DIXMUDE +bridge-head, an exceptionally difficult task. In addition to the fact +that the swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom of movement +to an enormous extent, the HANDZAEME canal, running at right angles to +it from east to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIXMUDE lay +at the junction of these two waterways, and behind its bridge-head +lines were the Belgian 'Iron' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French +Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and part of the 5th +Belgian Division, determined to defend the place at all costs. About +eighty guns of every calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire +the ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have to attack. On the +20th, in spite of all these difficulties, the 44th Reserve Division, +on the northern wing of the Corps, captured BEERST and reached the +canal bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's Corps. +The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the left wing, took VLADSLOO +and several villages south-east of it on the northern bank of the +HANDZAEME Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those villages +the reach of the canal between EESSEN and ZARREN was crossed on hastily +constructed footbridges, and a further advance made in a south-westerly +direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and the attack brought us to +within a hundred yards of the enemy. He realised his extremely critical +situation,[28] and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand +were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile artillery fire +the German losses were by no means slight. On one occasion when our +advancing infantry units were losing touch with one another in this +difficult country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered from +DIXMUDE. After a heavy struggle the onrush of the enemy was held up, +mainly owing to our artillery, which heroically brought its guns up +into position immediately behind the infantry front line. + +During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised in order to +recommence its attack on the bridge-head from east and south-east +on the following morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The +garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to hold out to the +last man, and had been informed that any one who attempted to desert +would be shot without mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard +all the exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting for +their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless by the 21st October +the 43rd Reserve Division, which consisted of volunteers from the +Guard Corps Reservists, had taken the château south of DIXMUDE, and +WOUMEN. The opposing sides lay within a hundred yards of each other. +Artillery preparation, attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. +Our artillery did fearful havoc and DIXMUDE was in flames. The +Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly reinforced, and +conducted itself most gallantly. From the north the battalions of the +44th Reserve Division were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy +back on to the town, and German batteries were brought up into, and +at times even in front of, the infantry front line. Although we were +unable to force our way into DIXMUDE, on the evening of the 23rd our +troops were in position all round it. + +On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII Reserve Corps, under +General of Cavalry von Kleist, had advanced at 9 A.M. on 20th October +on the front HANDZAEME-STADEN in order to reach the canal on the line +NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE. The 45th Reserve Division was on the right +and the 46th Reserve Division on the left. After some hours of street +fighting STADEN was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th Reserve +Division. By nightfall a line from CLERCKEN to the eastern edge of +HOUTHULST Forest was reached. On the 21st the Corps had to cross a +stretch of country which put these partially trained troops and their +inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great forest of +HOUTHULST with its dense undergrowth made it exceedingly difficult to +keep direction in the attack and to maintain communication between +units fighting an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such as the +STEENEBECK offered favourable opportunities to the enemy to put up a +strong defence behind a succession of depressions. Thus our gallant +troops after every successful assault found themselves confronted by +another strong position: but unwavering and regardless of loss, they +continued their advance. + +By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Division had completely +driven the enemy out of HOUTHULST Forest,[29] whilst its sister-division +had advanced north of the STEENEBECK, and with its northern wing +supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of it, had pushed +forward to beyond WOUMEN. On the morning of the 22nd the heavy +artillery opened fire against the French positions on the YSER canal +to prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however only the northern +Division was able to reach the sector allotted to the Corps, and an +Army Order directed the 46th Reserve Division to the south-west against +the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK, in order to help carry forward the +attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which was completely held up in front +of the latter place. As a result of this the advance of von Kleist's +Corps also came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable +fame during the day. In spite of a desperate resistance the 210th +Reserve Regiment stormed the strongly entrenched village of MERCKEM and +the village of LUYGHEM lying north of it; a daring attack by the 209th +and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through the enemy's positions on the +MURTJE VAART, whilst the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the +KORTEBECK sector, supported by the concentrated fire of its artillery +in position along the south-western edge of HOUTHULST Forest. The 216th +Reserve Regiment took MANGELAERE by storm, in doing which its gallant +commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed at the head of his troops. +The 1st British Division held a strong position along the KORTEBECK, in +touch with the French, and artillery of every calibre near NOORDSCHOOTE +enfiladed the German attack.[30] The British themselves speak of our +attack as a magnificent feat of arms carried out with infinite courage +and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they charged through +a hail of bullets in closed ranks up to the enemy's defences. The +212th Reserve Regiment under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried +forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve Regiment, pushed its +way into the strongly fortified village of BIXSCHOOTE. The enemy on +our side of the canal, on the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE, +was threatened with annihilation. BIXSCHOOTE commanded the main road +and the canal-crossing to POPERINGHE, where the enemy was detraining +his reinforcements.[31] The British therefore fought with the courage +of desperation: for not only was the fate of the high ground east +and north-east of YPRES now in the balance, but also the chance of +being able to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which had +been planned. YPRES and the high ground east of the canal were on +no account to be lost, and furious counter-attacks were therefore +delivered against the intermingled German units. Nevertheless our +gallant volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the butts of +their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand fighting was finally +decided in our favour. At 6.30 that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours. +Unfortunately, however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it was +lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking troops were to +be relieved under cover of darkness, but they assembled and marched +back before the relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, +immediately advanced into the evacuated village and took position +among the ruins. Simultaneously a big hostile counter-attack drove the +46th Reserve Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK, which it +had captured, and pressed it back beyond the stream again. The spirit +and strength of the young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, +and only a few of the subordinate commanders had yet learnt how to deal +with critical situations. Officers of the General Staff and Divisional +Staffs had to help to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and +followed their new leaders, and were taken forward again to the attack. +Thus on the 23rd the high ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back +by the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained lost to us, and +LANGEMARCK could not be captured.[32] + +On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was directed from the +north against YPRES. If the British and French did not intend to give +up their offensive plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking +Belgium and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from the hated +German, they would have to maintain their positions along the YPRES +bridge-head east of the canal between COMINES and the coast. For this +reason the country round YPRES was the central area of the Anglo-French +defence from the beginning to the end of the battle. Our opponents +defended this position on a wide semicircle by successive lines of +trenches and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, every +farm and even every large copse has won for itself a fame of blood. +The reinforcements which Field-Marshal French received in abundance +he placed round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes; they were +more often used to deliver attack after attack against our young troops +who had been weakened by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they +were already being employed in this manner against the 46th Reserve +Division.[33] He hoped to use the opportunity of our retirement behind +the KORTEBECK to break through our line and to roll up the part of the +front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and thus to regain +the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre on this extreme wing.[34] +However, the blow was parried by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, +badly placed lines the German units, which had scarcely had time to +reorganise, brought the hostile masses to a standstill and won back in +a counter-attack the ground which they had lost during the night. On +this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry the honours +of the day. The fire of the guns, brought up into the foremost lines, +made wide gaps in the attacking columns and the enemy's losses must +have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered severely in the +constant fighting and under the everlasting hostile artillery fire. +Some of our regiments had been reduced to half their strength. But in +spite of it the British did not succeed in breaking through between the +XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps. + +The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this time completely +held up in front of strongly entrenched positions on the line +LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT and opposed to an enemy who was +becoming stronger every day and making the most desperate efforts to +regain his freedom of action and begin a big offensive himself. The +XXVI Reserve Corps, which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the +51st Reserve Division from the area west of ROULERS, and the other +Division from MORSLEDE, encountered a stubborn resistance along the +ridge WESTROOSEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE-KEIBERG. Fighting under the eyes +of their general, who was himself in the thick of the struggle, the +51st Reserve Division stormed the slope on to the ridge and entered +WESTROOSEBEKE. The French division defending it was driven out at +four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the gallant 51st, +supported by the 23rd Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion, reached a line from +the railway-station north-west of POELCAPPELLE to POELCAPPELLE itself +during the evening. The attack was all the more daring through the fact +that HOUTHULST Forest was still in the enemy's hands, and the flank +of the division therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the +52nd Reserve Division had taken PASSCHENDAELE, KEIBERG and the high +ground between them from the British; the artillery again deserving +the highest praise for its co-operation.[35] The attack, however, was +brought to a standstill in front of the enemy's main position at the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE. The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by +General von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in close touch +with the 52nd Reserve Division on the evening of the 20th. Advancing in +four columns and by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards. +The Würtemburg Division had succeeded in driving the 7th British +Division out of BECELAERE after heavy street fighting, and the left +wing was bent back on TERHAND. Communication was there obtained with +the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of the Sixth Army, +which had captured a hostile position north-east of KRUISEIK. + +On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to our immediate front. +It followed a line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-REUTEL-GHELUVELT; +and the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,[36] +all picked troops, had already been located there. They had dug a +well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements before +a single German shell arrived to disturb their work.[37] The few +stretches of rising ground in the district had been included in the +skilfully selected positions as observation posts, and the defenders +were thus able to bring our advancing columns under accurate artillery +fire at long range. This was especially the case from the high ground +near ZONNEBEKE, whence the whole ground in front of the position as +far as LANGEMARCK could be enfiladed. All these difficulties, however, +were not sufficient to deter the offensive spirit of the German +troops, and '_Vorwärts_' was still their watchword: forwards and back +with the enemy, so that the rigid western front might once more be +mobile. The main body of the XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress +of LANGEMARCK[38] from north and east, whilst the XXVII Reserve Corps +fought for the upper hand in the woods between ZONNEBEKE and BECELAERE. +The great efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen +with its guns and support them with their fire were in vain, owing +to the difficult country, and the well-aimed fire from the enemy's +prepared positions reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were +killed, and officers of high rank took their places and reorganised the +intermingled units. + +With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to gain a decisive +victory between BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK on 22nd and 23rd October +the fate of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. For +the time being any further thought of a break-through was out of the +question. The troops up till now had met the enemy full of a keen +fighting spirit, and had stormed his positions singing '_Deutschland, +Deutschland über alles'_ regardless of casualties, and had been one and +all ready to die for their country; but they had suffered heavily in +the contest against a war-experienced and numerically superior opponent +entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when the last reserves +of the Army, the 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, +had been placed at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could +only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night of 23rd-24th +October the expected Anglo-French counter-attacks began, and continued +throughout the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right wing +of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary local successes and +putting in fresh forces the enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a +break-through; but the German troops though weakened held up all these +furious onslaughts from positions which had never been selected for +defence, but were merely those reached at the close of the attack.[39] + +The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced to continue ordering all +his Corps to attack, in order to co-operate with the Sixth Army which +was attacking and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed +to him to their ground: for in the north a decision appeared to be +imminent on the front of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps: in +addition to the entire infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had +crossed the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry of the +5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the 44th Reserve Division +succeeded in crossing the YSER during that day. The enemy was compelled +to evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST. GEORGE to south-east +of STUYVEKENSKERKE, in spite of the fact that there had been one French +and four Belgian Divisions[40] opposing the III Reserve Corps, and +that the ten howitzer batteries had proved insufficient to engage the +Belgian, French and British artillery successfully. In consequence of +this inferiority the old and new canal crossings lay under constant +concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport guns over the +waterway failed. Many a fine piece of engineering carried out by our +indefatigable sappers was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply +of ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of the greatest +difficulty, as all the roads leading to the rear across the swampy +meadows were continuously shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our +front troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next operation +was to break through the enemy's position here once and for all, though +it was clear from the beginning that the attack would be a very severe +one. Belgian and French working parties had dug a series of positions +between the YSER and the NIEUPORT-BIXSCHOOTE railway, from which the +ground in front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade fire from +skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed batteries. On both +wings, according to the latest information at hand, strong hostile +attacks were threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well as +near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these the Army Commander had +replaced the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been echeloned back along +the coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by detachments of +the Marine Division, and a few troops placed at his disposition by the +Governor of Belgium, and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the +same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range guns were placed +to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT +district. However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood +of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those battalions of the 44th +Reserve Division which had crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy +realised the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from the +north-west, and put all available Belgian and French reserves into +the attack. Thus between five and six battalions from three Belgian +regiments and the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a strong +force of artillery, advanced to the attack of our southern flank. The +Belgians themselves describe this attack in the following words: 'One +saw the companies doubling forward in small groups, lying down on +the officers' signal, and then getting up to go forward again until +they finally deployed into their attacking lines. But unfortunately +they were asked to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of +the men were mown down by the machine-guns. Company after company was +decimated, and in spite of the energy of their leaders they had to give +way, death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. The Marine +Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon gallantry, soon shared the same +fate. But all this sacrifice was not in vain--it stopped the enemy's +advance.'[41] + +It will be understood then that the first thing for the weak and widely +separated battalions of the 44th Reserve Division to do on the 25th was +to get breathing space and reorganise, even though they were exposed +all the time to the heaviest fire from west, south and south-east. +Further to the north, however, on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and +6th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries +across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of these two +divisions had been concentrated under the expert leadership of General +von Ziethen, it began to prepare the way for the infantry attack. By +midday both the divisions were advancing steadily towards the railway +embankment on the line RAMSCAPPELLE-PERVYSE. The Belgians had to +evacuate position after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire was +poured in by the enemy's artillery about NIEUPORT; and simultaneously +a brigade of the 6th Reserve Division south-east of PERVYSE had to be +directed southwards in order not to lose touch with the right wing of +the 44th Reserve Division. There were no reinforcements to fill up the +gaps, and thus the attack came shortly afterwards to a standstill. + +A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly from the south: the +German artillery, including 42-centimetre guns, had bombarded DIXMUDE +throughout the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and now the 43rd +Reserve Division had begun its assault on the town. It resulted in +the most violent street fighting; fast and furious came the bullets +from the machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of the town, +and from the shells from the batteries massed west of the YSER, but +nothing could hold up our attack. The Belgians have given the following +description of the power of the German assault: 'What plunder must not +they have been promised, to allow themselves to be killed in such a +way? What drink must they not have taken to give themselves such animal +courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, they storm forward with the +howls of wild beasts; lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under +foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot down in hundreds, they +keep coming on. Then follow isolated fights with bayonets and the butts +of rifles: some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls +bashed in.' The fight swayed backwards and forwards till well into the +night: guns brought up into the front line fired at point-blank range: +both sides put in their last reserves. + +During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets fixed, and we attacked +again. A small German detachment of about fifty men advanced across +the YSER bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the enemy's batteries, +it succumbed to greatly superior numbers. Thus the morning of 26th +October found the attackers back in their assault-positions: their +courage, spirit and indifference to death having added another leaf of +fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It was clear, however, that another +artillery bombardment was indispensable to success, and it was carried +out on the 26th and 27th. + +That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and the French Marine +Fusiliers in the fighting just described is shown by the fact that +on the morning of the 26th Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly +brought up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A German attack on +the 28th was able to make some progress on the southern flank against +these fresh troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No further +effort was made on the 29th, for there was a shortage of artillery +ammunition. The eastern edge of the town was, however, bombarded by +trench-mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect. + +Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII Reserve Corps should +only leave a weak force of from three to four battalions on the eastern +bank of the Yser opposite DIXMUDE; that DIXMUDE should be kept under +heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder of the 43rd Reserve +Division should cross the YSER, north of DIXMUDE, in order to attack +the town from the rear. + +North-west of DIXMUDE, by the evening of the 29th, the troops of +General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve Division had worked their +way forward some 300 yards towards the railway embankment. Only one +brigade of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was still north-east of NIEUPORT: +all the rest were taking part in the struggle further south, and west +of the YSER. NIEUPORT was shut in on the south: the left wing of the +44th Reserve Division lay west of BEERST, as protection against the +strong hostile forces near the river about DIXMUDE: the Belgians and +recently-arrived French forces held the railway embankment between +NIEUPORT and DIXMUDE. Broad stretches of wire entanglements lay in +front of this strong position, and the efforts of our troops had been +almost superhuman in their advance over this ground: it was intersected +with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards broad, and thick, +wired hedges. So strong, however, was the pressure against the enemy +that the French were compelled to reduce their forces about NIEUPORT +and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant reinforcements +to the area PERVYSE-RAMSCAPPELLE. A German airman, who was killed on +the morning of the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that +the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault began at 6.30 A.M., +though the ground in the area of the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions +had become extraordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the +recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water to such +an extent. Nevertheless the attack made considerable progress. The +11th Brigade of the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way +into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village of PERVYSE, +whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the 48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments +reached the railway embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it +towards RAMSCAPPELLE. Although every house had to be attacked, it +succeeded in reaching the western end of the village. The 12th Reserve +Regiment also made considerable advance. + +The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when the 33rd _Ersatz_ +Brigade on the northern wing advanced from the north-east against +NIEUPORT, the enemy retired. Airmen reported enemy's columns retreating +towards FURNES. Nothing could stop the victorious advance of General +von Beseler's troops, not even the heaviest guns of the British +battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, +enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 yards, nor the +incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian Divisions. On the +evening of the 30th RAMSCAPPELLE was completely in German possession, +the railway embankment south of it had been reached and even crossed in +places; in PERVYSE the fight was progressing favourably, and south of +it the 12th Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad dykes, was +working forward to the railway. Still further south the 44th Reserve +Division was in full advance towards the railway embankment east of +OOSTKERKE, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve Division had +crossed the YSER, without casualties, and had been sent forward in the +direction of CAESKERKE. + +The attack was to have been continued on the following morning, and +General von Beseler intended to withdraw the last part of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade, from the area north-east +of NIEUPORT, for the fire of the enemy's naval guns from the sea[42] +and the difficulties of the country appeared to militate against any +prospects of a rapid success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General +Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported that the attack +could be continued no further owing to the constant rising of the +water. What had happened? On the morning of the 30th the advancing +troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it had gradually +risen until they were now wading up to their knees, and they could +scarcely drag their feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down +for a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, he +was lost. The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain +of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry +weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off. But +the rising flood soon prevented the movement of wagons with ammunition +and supplies, and when the attackers looked back from the railway +embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole country had sunk behind +them: the green meadows were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the +general line of the roads was only indicated by the houses and the rows +of partly covered trees. It soon became evident that the enemy must +have blown up the canal-sluices, and called in the sea to his aid. +The advance of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps had been the +culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his reserves had been +put in to stop it, but in vain. If the Germans could only succeed in +pushing the exhausted Belgians and French out of their way, the road to +DUNKIRK and CALAIS was open. Warnings, friendly and otherwise, had been +given by the Allies to the Belgians that they must 'hold out'; but they +were no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of ANTWERP now +than when behind fortress ramparts. Their fighting spirit was broken; +so, influenced by the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert +finally decided to employ this last desperate means of defence, and +place a wide expanse of his fair country under water. The water-level +rose slowly and insidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the +YSER north of DIXMUDE had almost everywhere overflowed its banks. The +inundation destroyed buildings as well as soil, but it enabled the +worn-out defenders to recover their sore-threatened security. + +General von Beseler quickly realised the danger which now awaited +his attacking troops on the far side of the canal, behind whom a +sheet of water, 2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. +The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to make, yet it had +to be done. The attack would have to be given up and the greater +part of the western bank of the river evacuated. The order was +issued and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st October. In +spite of the dangers due to the altered appearance of the country +and the consequent difficulty in finding the way, and although the +Franco-Belgian artillery kept the YSER crossings under constant +heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. Not a wounded +man nor rifle fell into the enemy's hands, and the movement was so +well covered that the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until +it was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers under +Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind for a long time in PERVYSE. In +front of them the enemy was sweeping the village with artillery +and infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an apparently +boundless sea. A French colonel offered Lieutenant Buchholz honourable +conditions if he would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the +offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off with his little +band of followers. They rejoined their unit successfully. The enemy +only followed up slowly along the roads, with weak detachments of +infantry. Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the line ST. +GEORGE-STUYVEKENSKERKE, whilst the main body on the 31st took up its +new position east of the YSER as follows: the 5th Reserve Division +north of the main road ST. PIERRE CAPPELLE-MANNEKENSVERE; the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division in the area MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE; and the 6th +Reserve Division to the south of it. One battalion and one battery +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division remained facing NIEUPORT, extending +northwards to the coast. A new defensive position was selected along +the line WESTENDE-MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE-KASTEELHOEK: a continuation of +the attack was now out of the question, as the water was still rising +west of the YSER. On 31st October and 1st November, however, the XXII +Reserve Corps again tried to press its attack southwards on the east +bank of the river, in order to isolate the DIXMUDE bridge-head, but +here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented movement, and on the +evening of the 1st these brave troops also had to yield to the forces +of nature and withdraw behind the YSER. This operation was carried out +in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, and was unmolested by +the enemy, for he lay in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for +the time being DIXMUDE remained in possession of the French. + +The Army Commander had issued definite instructions on the evening of +the 24th October to the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the +effect that they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, and +take every opportunity of seizing important points on their immediate +front. In the execution of this order the German troops experienced +a good deal of heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The XXVII +Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing REUTEL and holding it;[43] +but in the meantime heavy hostile attacks were begun against the +XXIII, XXVI and the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. +The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of French units, +endeavoured to break through, and used all their strength. Indeed, +in many places the situation of these German volunteer corps became +critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the enemy was able to +keep our roads of advance and communications under artillery fire. As +the roads were already broken up by the constant rain, the ammunition +supply of our artillery, inferior in any case to our opponents', +failed. Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties our counter-attacks +continued. The fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th October. In this sector +the British and French made a succession of attacks in the direction +POELKAPPELLE, PASSCHENDAELE and east of ZONNEBEKE. The 37th _Landwehr_ +Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, under the command of General +von Meyer, had to be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to +detachments of the Marine Division and of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. +These _Landwehr_ men, far from being weighed down by their years, +gave effective support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger +friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of the fighting on the +evening of the 26th General von Meyer was mortally wounded: may his +memory be duly honoured. + +An exceptionally heavy British and French attack was delivered on the +24th and 25th near ZONNEBEKE, against the inner flanks of the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations are always +the weakest parts of the defence, and when the General Staff Officer +of the XXVII Reserve Corps asked for the support of the Corps on his +right, he received the reply that no infantry could be spared 'for the +enemy....' And at that moment the telephone circuit failed. There was +nothing to do but close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery +barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and their leaders. +The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve Division shelled the advancing +enemy as fast as they were able, and by this aid the infantry was +finally enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the same time +the enemy made a strong attack further to the south. The report came in +that he had surrounded BECELAERE; but before his supports could assist +him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division had driven back his +assaulting troops.[44] The Corps was able to hold its old line from the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE through REUTEL to POEZELHOEK. Comparative +quiet followed on the 28th and morning of the 29th, for both sides were +very exhausted. On the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived +at DADIZEELE as Army Reserve. + +The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of eight Cavalry +Divisions and several _Jäger_ battalions under General von der Marwitz, +was in action on the left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between +the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which lay half-way +between WARNETON and ARMENTIÈRES. The enemy could not be attacked +here by any form of mounted action; so far from this being possible, +ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting on foot, to which the +cavalrymen were unaccustomed. Nevertheless they carried out this task +in brilliant fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position +and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held up the British who were +streaming down from the high ground about WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES,[45] +the 3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the 4th, 9th and 10th +_Jäger_ battalions and five battalions of the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade +brought forward from Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the +assault of the line KRUISEIK-ZANDVOORDE and west of it. This direction +was taken in order to be able to attack from the south against the +rear of the enemy holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to +29th October were memorable and glorious days for this Cavalry Corps. +Among other achievements, the 3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture +KRUISEIK on the 26th after heavy street fighting.[46] In co-operation +with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, next to which the +16th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in the fighting under +Colonel List, General von Stetten, on the 29th, carried forward the +attack against GHELUVELT, the key of the enemy's position. More than +600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken by our victorious +cavalry.[47] Simultaneously on this day, the troops of General von +Stetten filled another rôle. They were covering the concentration of +new German forces which was in the course of completion behind their +battle-front. + + + + +THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES + + +Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during October, the Sixth +Army under Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria had remained on the offensive +on the line ARRAS-LA BASSÉE--east of ARMENTIÈRES;[48] but although +fresh reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the front by the +German General Staff, a break-through had not been possible. Both sides +had gradually changed their objectives and now merely sought to prevent +any movement of the opposing forces from that front to the decisive +zone of operations between NIEUPORT and YPRES. Any weakness in the +enemy's line, however, was utilised to gain new and improved positions +from which another effort to break through might be made as soon as +possible. Owing to the failure of the offensive south of NIEUPORT, +a decision under the conditions existing there could not be hoped +for; the German General Staff therefore began considering a plan for +concentrating a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and the +Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the Army Cavalry, and for +breaking through with it on the front WERWICQ-WARNETON, south of YPRES. + +On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn arrived at the +Headquarters of the Sixth Army to discuss this operation. The plan was +arranged and orders were issued accordingly. A new 'Army Group' was +to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the command of General von +Fabeck, commander of the XIII Würtemburg Corps.[49] It would consist +of the II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up from the south +to join the Sixth Army), the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (still in +reserve to the Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division (of the +Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by the 48th Reserve Division +recently arrived from the Fifth Army). In addition to these formations +all the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would be brought +up to assist, and if necessary the attacks further south would be +partially discontinued. The offensive was to take place on the 30th +October from the general line WERWICQ-DEULEMONT in a north-easterly +direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division of the II Corps was also +to be brought up by rail to LILLE. The orders of the German General +Staff pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth and Sixth +Armies was an essential condition for the success of the operation. +Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing +and centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding attacks, and +Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a general attack of his Army for the +30th October. + +How the flooding of the YSER on the front of the right wing of the +Fourth Army brought the offensive of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to +a standstill has already been described. From the 1st November the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division took over the protection of the line of the flooded +area from the coast to TERVAETE, whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved +southwards to the district ZARREN-STADEN in order to reinforce the +XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation might require.[50] To +the XXII Reserve Corps was allotted the task of holding the two French +divisions stationed in the DIXMUDE bridge-head, which formed a constant +threat to the German front. The Corps carried out this task admirably. + +On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve +Corps advanced to the attack as ordered. The first-named under General +von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the ruins of BIXSCHOOTE. +After five hours' desperate fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve +Infantry Regiments entered the devastated village which had been +occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying situation, +and the hopelessness of finding cover among the battered houses, +resulted in the victorious German regiments being exposed to a very +heavy artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties in the +village were greater than during the assault. In consequence the +commander decided to withdraw and take up a line along the northern +edge of BIXSCHOOTE, leaving in the village itself only sufficient +outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The division on the +left wing of the Corps also made progress and reached the main road +BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked +LANGEMARCK with its right wing, but was unable to take it. In spite of +gallant efforts only a few hundred yards of ground were gained by the +evening of the 31st, when these useless attacks were stopped by order. +The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the right wing of the +XXVII Reserve Corps were held to their positions by superior hostile +artillery fire, and also by mass attacks of the British and French +during the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had just arrived, +and in the presence of General Joffre an attempt to break through +our line was to be made on this sector of the front.[51] The German +defenders, however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus enabled +the offensive of the Army Group of General von Fabeck to take place. +In conjunction with this the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve +Corps, under its new commander, General von Schubert, simultaneously +advanced in the direction of GHELUVELT. + +During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th Infantry Division +was relieved in its battle-position west of LILLE by the 48th Reserve +Division, and by the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army Group +Fabeck was completed without disturbance. + +The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted +of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each +of 3 batteries, and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to +the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four _Jäger_ +battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade were +put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th +October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry +Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the +offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked +south of the MENIN-YPRES road, with its left wing on ZANDVOORDE, the +II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on WAMBEKE; +further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing +on MESSINES. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the +4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the +XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered +to advance on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division moved to the line MENIN-WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had +been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one +Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at +hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and +the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary. + +The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th +Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before +the advance of von Fabeck's Army; the II and IX French Corps had also +recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the YPRES salient.[55] +Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was +the second and severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British +in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were +brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the YSER and at YPRES, both +at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as +to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers +the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go +further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat +into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds, +gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during +the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the +Rhine. + +The character of the fighting which began with the appearance of the +new German Army Group on the scene had almost the savagery of the +Middle Ages in it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point, and each of them had to be stormed by our +men with heavy loss. Even when the first line of these fortifications +had been taken they were confronted by a second one immediately behind +it; for the enemy showed great skill in taking every advantage of the +ground, unfavourable in any case to the attacker. To the east and +south-east of YPRES, even more developed than in the north, there were +thick hedges, wire fences and broad dykes. Numerous woods also of +all sizes with dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable +and most difficult for observation purposes. Our movements were +constantly being limited to the roads which were swept by the enemy's +machine-guns. Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments the +villages were mostly in ruins by the time the infantry reached them, +but the enemy fought desperately for every heap of stones and every +pile of bricks before abandoning them. In the few village streets +that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally developed +into isolated individual combats, and no description can do adequate +justice to the bravery of the German troops on such occasions. Our men +advanced to the attack as if they were back on the barrack square, and +an Englishman writes: 'They advanced towards us singing patriotic songs +and with their bands playing.' There was such enthusiasm that even the +weakest were carried along by it, and made regardless of losses. The +battle of YPRES in the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German +heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long remain a source +of inspiration for the historian and the poet. + +By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the importance of the +attacks developing from the south-east against YPRES. They threatened +his position along the high ground on the line GHELUVELT-PASSCHENDAELE +and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way to, the town, the pivot +on which all the Franco-British offensive plans rested. On this day, +therefore, the British commander sent up the 7th Division into the +line again, although it had only just been relieved owing to its heavy +losses.[57] + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 30TH. 1914.] + +Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. Our heavy guns +began the bombardment of the enemy's well-constructed lines at about +7.45 A.M., but observation was made very difficult by the weather +conditions, and could only be carried out from the foremost infantry +lines. The telephonic communication rendered necessary was frequently +cut by the enemy's shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries +were able to make such excellent practice that at the most vital points +of the enemy's position the spirit of the defenders appeared to be +completely broken. The high ground about ZANDVOORDE offers a typical +case. Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of the British +defence and one of the main observation posts for the artillery. At +9 A.M. our troops charged the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M. +ZANDVOORDE itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; +the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian _Jäger_ battalions of the Army Cavalry +took a great share in the success. Soon afterwards the high ground +north-east and immediately west of the village fell into German hands. +Two whole British squadrons with their machine-guns lay, dead and +wounded, completely annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.[58] +Further south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British cavalry +supported by part of the III British Corps. After a severe hand-to-hand +encounter it took possession of the château, and finally also of the +village of HOLLEBEKE. The left wing of the Corps pushed forward as +far as the WAMBEKE stream, north of the village of the same name, but +had here to put in all its reserves to hold its ground against strong +hostile counter-attacks.[59] + +On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division was engaged +in heavy fighting, the position confronting it being a particularly +strong one. It lay along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet +high,[60] running north and south, eastwards of Mount KEMMEL, and gave +the enemy an extensive view eastwards over our lines. The defence +of this ridge was greatly facilitated by the villages of WYTSCHAETE +and MESSINES on it. These had been turned into fortresses, and were +connected by deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements.[61] +Owing to observation difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing +the airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was unable from its +positions in the valley to bring a sufficiently heavy bombardment on +the enemy's lines; and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with +great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for the assault. On +the right wing the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of +Austria) took the fortified village of WAMBEKE, and on the left wing +the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly towards MESSINES. The +ridge north-east of the last-named village was stormed, but the assault +on the locality itself, which was to have been delivered at 7.10 in +the evening, could not get on owing to heavy enfilade fire from the +south which held back the attackers some hundred yards away from its +edge.[62] The Cavalry Corps[63] had gained ground at first, but, in +consequence of their weakness in artillery, they had been unable to +take ST. YVES or to make progress against the strongly fortified wood +south-west of it. The same story describes the day's work of the XIX +Corps[64] fighting to the south of the cavalry. + +On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the +30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts +of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division +had not been able to carry us into GHELUVELT.[65] General von Deimling +and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the +front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions +desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another +artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary. + +From the enemy's point of view, however, the situation was anything +but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von +Deimling's troops into ZANDVOORDE endangered the southern side of the +YPRES salient, and the capture of HOLLEBEKE brought the Germans within +three miles of YPRES itself. YPRES was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal +French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he +now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the +line ZANDVOORDE-HOLLEBEKE in order to support the 7th British Division, +which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore, +the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued +along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable +Würtemburg troops again tried to storm MESSINES. + +On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops +to meet the enemy's reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division was brought up in readiness north of the LYS behind the II +Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that +the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge was of decisive importance, and that +every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main +pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the +II Bavarian Corps. + +According to the enemy's accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of +the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of +great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of +the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is +true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us +YPRES, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it +was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there +could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the YPRES +district. The fact that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops +gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to +fight the battle round YPRES, though their situation was most perilous, +gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real +worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly. + +At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery +bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten +and a half miles. The enemy's batteries were not long in replying; +being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous +fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning, +the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines, +blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far +back as the LYS, so that any regular transport of supplies became +impossible. At GHELUVELT, however, the important northern corner of the +Army Group Fabeck, the enemy's hail of shells had but little result, +because our capture of the high ground at ZANDVOORDE had made the work +of observation very difficult. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914.] + +After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of +GHELUVELT was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously. +Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was +to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own +regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the +143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th +Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and +the 26th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to +make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of +the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks +were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our +converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and +30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the +general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines, +though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by +a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His +Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of +the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze +of the enemy's obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by +artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line. +The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69] +and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of +smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of +no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds +were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of +importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, +so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good +sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant +men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the +assault, were the special target of the enemy's sharpshooters, well +trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy's +position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his +superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy's counter-attacks, +delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some +of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general +success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the +dense woods near REUTEL,[72] which were defended by a strong system of +obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in +trees.[73] + +While this was in progress the last assault on GHELUVELT was taking +place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village, +and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its château and park was in German +possession.[74] Colonel von Hügel took his storming parties of the +54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while +Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then, +however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against GHELUVELT. +The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was +hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a +hero's death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery +fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing +caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the +enemy's counter-attack failed and GHELUVELT became and remained ours, +and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75] +The enemy prevented our further advance beyond GHELUVELT by a heavy +fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west +of GHELUVELT. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to +be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the +left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of +some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th +Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it +took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an +accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the +enemy's staff work for some time. During the bombardment of HOOGE, a +direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British +Division were working: one general and several staff officers were +killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian +Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on +the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the +woods west of HOLLEBEKE, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far +as OOSTTAVERNE. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into +line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on WYTSCHAETE. + +We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the +victor in the fight for the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge? The 6th Bavarian +Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards WYTSCHAETE, +regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground +on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left +wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to +break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the +Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve +Infantry Regiment was to enter WYTSCHAETE from the east and the 21st +from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men +wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters +with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the +haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to +take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in +the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the +night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that +our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have +helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians +advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the +enemy's artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of +the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly +outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry +Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village +and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and +numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either +killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately, +however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news +of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them +sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore +decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern +edge of WYTSCHAETE, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the +21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at +this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire +from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim +light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards +among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in +spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment +held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was +quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and +communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with +the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six +regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night, +and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground. + +The fighting around MESSINES on the 31st had been equally severe. On +the 30th the 26th Infantry Division under Duke William of Urach had +already got its patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any +assault could be made an artillery preparation was required, especially +against the northern sector. On the morning of the 31st October our +howitzers and trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, and +by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the Würtemburg troops to +advance. + +The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge north of MESSINES, +along which runs the road to WYTSCHAETE, whilst the 125th Infantry +Regiment was to advance against MESSINES itself, and the 119th +Grenadier Regiment against the enemy's trenches immediately south of +it. The hostile position was so strong that a force greatly inferior in +strength would be able to hold it against an attack coming up from the +valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and only a few hedges +limited the field of view, so that every advance and assembly position +for miles round could be seen. A strong British garrison held MESSINES: +the trenches had been well made, and were covered by a continuous and +broad system of obstacles.[80] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914 BY THE 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION.] + +The way in which the Swabian troops[81] broke down the enemy's +resistance was indeed a masterpiece. Neither the enemy's artillery +fire, which imperilled the advance of the reserves, nor the British +machine-guns, a large number of which enfiladed the attack from the +south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg troops. At 11 A.M. the +125th Stuttgart Infantry Regiment had got possession of the north-east +corner of MESSINES. The road entering the village from GAPAARD was +blocked by a barricade; and after storming it, another one, a hundred +yards further inside the village, closed the way. The streets could +not be used for our advance, being choked with debris, and under heavy +rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers had to make their way +through or over the walls. There are a number of large, well-built +houses in MESSINES, which the enemy had turned into a succession of +strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up by our sappers. The convent +looked especially impregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong +towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. Captain +Heinrich's Würtemburg battery of the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was +therefore brought up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, +as horses could not move along them, and the infantry carrying up +the ammunition. The convent was soon in flames, burying its stubborn +defenders under its ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry +Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens and backyards, +was the first to make an entry into the market-square. With a few +stout-hearted followers he occupied a large building there which he +defended without any support till the evening against great odds. Not +until nightfall were others of his regiment able to reach him, and +secure the position he had held so courageously. This day of street +fighting had cost very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A +part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of MESSINES had also +had to be directed on to the village, and by the evening a continuous +line had been successfully formed through the centre of it. Isolated +fighting continued throughout the night, and in order to keep up +communication amidst the ruins and recognise one another in the dark, +the Würtemburg troops sang folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with +the rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the streets, and +the crackle of the burning and falling houses, all combined to make a +magnificent and unsurpassed piece of battle-music. + +North of the village the left wing of the 122nd Infantry Regiment +established itself on the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road: but its right wing +was unable to capture the high ground, as WYTSCHAETE itself was still +in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered severely: the progress +of the other regiment of their brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, +had roused their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their ranks +from the south where the Cavalry Corps were still unable to advance. +They were compelled by heavy losses to be content with the task of +securing the left flank of their division. + +On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers were rewarded for +their deeds of immortal fame by a message of warm praise from the +Emperor. + +The final objective, however, had not yet been attained, although in +the south the high ground had been reached and artillery observers sent +forward there, so that the enemy's positions could be accurately ranged +on right up to Mount KEMMEL. The main pressure of the attack would +therefore have to be continued here, on the left wing of the Army Group +Fabeck. + +During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the area +COMINES-WARNETON, north of the LYS, as reserve to the Army Group. + +On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist lay over the country, +so that the infantry got a few hours' rest before the continuous +shelling of the enemy's artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, +the battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the north the +Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the XXVII Reserve Corps further +extended their successes of the previous days. The line was advanced +up to the château of POEZELHOEK, which was taken from the 1st British +Division after a heavy fight.[82] + +The divisions of Deimling's XV Corps attacked with the right wing on +the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road and the left on KLEIN ZILLEBEKE. They +advanced but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, dense +woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again made progress very +difficult. The 30th Division managed to reach the eastern edge of the +HERENTHAGE Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, supported +by infantry, was in position. The wood north of ZANDVOORDE gave +exceptional trouble, but it was finally outflanked on both sides, and +its defenders taken prisoner.[83] + +The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on both sides of the +COMINES-YPRES canal, and drove the enemy back as far as the sharp bend +in it. The left wing captured the small wood west of OOSTTAVERNE which +was defended by Indian and British troops. The treacherous methods of +the Indians greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, and +with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated Asiatics allowed +our troops to pass them, and then got up and stabbed them in the back +with their knives.[84] The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, +on the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of the previous +evening, and at midday began its attack once more. Confidence and +enthusiasm served to obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and +the dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions as if on +parade. Very many of their dead or wounded still lay at the foot of the +heights, but the gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by 4 +P.M. had reached the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE. It was not possible to +push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire, and at this moment the +enemy counter-attacked with two fresh divisions.[85] The Bavarians, who +had become disorganised during the assault, were forced to evacuate the +village again under cover of darkness, after having actually entered +it at about 5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the attack, +being fired at from flank and rear, for the right wing of the 26th +Infantry Division was unable to take all the high ground north-west of +MESSINES until the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting +had gone on in MESSINES throughout the day, till finally the Würtemburg +troops gained the upper hand and cleared the enemy out of the village +to its western edge. The British were driven back down the western +slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in the valley, +losing heavily in the operation. As soon as its right wing reached the +MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held +almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary condition +for the capture of WYTSCHAETE was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division, however, was not able to carry out a third assault without +assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night of the 1st-2nd +therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian Division from its assembly area +WAMBEKE-GARDE DIEU into the fighting line, in order to carry forward +the attack through and beyond WYTSCHAETE towards KEMMEL. + +After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened again on the +morning of the 2nd November along the whole front of the Army Group +Fabeck. His indefatigable troops, some of whom had already endured +twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken place in the +campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched opponent once more. The +enemy was at least as strong as they were in fighting units on the +battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements of newly +arrived British and French troops.[86] + +On the eastern side of the _Ypres_ salient General von Deimling +attacked on a front of nearly four miles. His Corps, which had won its +laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine and in Northern France, again, in spite +of heavy casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. The +30th Division entered VELDHOEK and established itself firmly in the +north-eastern corner of the HERENTHAGE WOOD.[87] The attack had been +facilitated by a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +which had pressed forward some hundred yards north of VELDHOEK. Von +Deimling's left wing had advanced in the direction of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE, +but was held up by the difficult wooded country east of ZWARTELEEN. It +had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring troops on its +left. + +The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on the morning of the +2nd November by strong hostile counter-attacks in the sector west of +HOLLEBEKE. They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was even able +to make a slight advance on the right wing during the day. + +WYTSCHAETE was again the centre of the heaviest fighting on this +day.[88] The Bavarian Reserve Division was, at its own request, to +attack the village; the enemy's position immediately south of it +was allotted as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry +Regiment and an _Abtheilung_ (3 batteries) of the 17th Field Artillery +Regiment remained in Army Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel +began, and the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening him, +hurried up strong reserves to WYTSCHAETE. Kiefhaber's brigade of the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division rose to the assault. Under a hail of +shrapnel the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern slopes of the +WYTSCHAETE ridge for the third time, though with considerable loss, +the enemy's machine-guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon +as the foremost of them had reached the windmill the enemy launched +a counter-attack; but this time the Bavarians were not content with +simply holding their ground; their supports were brought up at the +critical moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious street +fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having to deal with every house +became greatly disorganised. Taking advantage of this the British and +French commanders sent forward fresh masses into the line, trying to +turn the balance in their favour at this important point by employing +every available man. It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the +Pomeranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, and it was +not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the Stettin Grenadier Regiment +had captured the long-coveted high ground south-west of WYTSCHAETE, +the struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been especially +severe. Without possession of this the south flank of the village +could not be held. Count Gneisenau's Colberg Grenadiers were then sent +forward to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable to hold +out in WYTSCHAETE against the rifle-butts and bayonets of the united +Pomeranians and Bavarians. Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its +western edge, was in German hands, although the fighting continued till +well into the night among the ruins with detachments of the enemy who +would not surrender. + +By the capture of WYTSCHAETE a fine commanding position had been +obtained, but the village itself, once so pleasant to the view, was +now terrible to look upon. The church was in flames, and the windmill +flared like a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded +side by side among the smouldering ruins. The enemy was fully aware +of the importance of WYTSCHAETE, but he had been so weakened that he +was unable to recover for another big counter-attack. He therefore +contented himself with small and fruitless efforts, only one of +which succeeded in temporarily entering the village during the 3rd. +Nevertheless for the next few days it lay under the constant fire of +heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not allow this to +interfere with their work. + +Many of the inhabitants still remained in WYTSCHAETE, as in MESSINES, +and it was pathetic to see how they clung to their devastated patches +of ground, regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from the +Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with their last scrap of +property, preferring to die by the shell that destroyed their homes. + +A small wood north-west of WYTSCHAETE, called the Park, was still +a dangerous point. This dense copse was surrounded by a system of +trenches and several rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully +sited flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it had been +turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, and cost us many days of +heavy fighting before it was finally taken. + +The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of MESSINES, immediately +put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the +51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November +by the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve. +The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation +with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the STEENBEEK stream. +However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every +movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery +fire from the commanding positions on Mount KEMMEL.[89] + +On the 3rd November the formation of a 'Group Urach' was ordered, +consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the +attack against the high ground east of KEMMEL; but in the following +days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general +situation in this sector. + +A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and +co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small +force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November +it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm KLEIN DOUVE with +complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was +relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions. + +In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy's operations +against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change. +The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the +big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops, +especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had +to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy's commanders, +however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make +much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on +the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy +fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly +damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour, +therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward +positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon +discovered by our airmen. + +During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army +came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck +could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still +too weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions, +particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to +the battle-front. + +If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was not to be entirely +abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby +avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES battle +from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, +the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the +2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General +Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the +disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on +the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered +the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from +the Sixth Army, west of LILLE; and this was followed by an order on +the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from +their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by +the IV Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard +Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under +Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached +on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group +Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the +Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated +to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push +the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES +canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. +In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with +instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, +had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on +the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group +Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for +the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there were left the II +Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von +Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. +The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the +10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given +the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions. + +The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to +the COMINES-YPRES canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th +November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near KLEIN +ZILLEBEKE and drove the recently arrived French troops from their +position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The +troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of +ZWARTELEEN, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. +The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made +observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and +an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the +retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy, +the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy's +counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much +weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part, +had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment +captured the fortified position along the western edge of VELDHOEK; +with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost +ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander, +hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including +_Landwehr_ men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to +meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head +of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering +considerable loss.[93] + +The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile +counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn +resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which +YPRES can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their +positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November, +took the high ground on which ST. ELOI is situated.[94] To the 5th +Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The +enemy remained for a long time in the houses of ST. ELOI, but the high +ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave +us a bird's-eye view of the country east of YPRES, where the mass of +the British field artillery was in position. + +The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in +and north of WYTSCHAETE was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the +dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the +village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers, +the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery +fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in +the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far +safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the +battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying +to the north-west. + +The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right +wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the +Park north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's fighting the 34th +Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent +at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had +been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south +of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was +very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was +found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade +fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, +and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was +surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the +impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen +with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and +they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park +of WYTSCHAETE was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st +Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd +Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is +a legend connected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was worthy of +it.[95] + +The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines +to the western slopes of the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places +across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, +as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch every movement in +our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field +or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were +by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses +were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of +ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation +of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, +we were unable to range accurately on the enemy's artillery, and the +most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their +observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon discovered, and the fight +now began against the observers there as well as against those posted +in the towers of YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the +gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of YPRES, which gave +such a fine view of the whole countryside. + +Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the +Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army. + +Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the +new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of +the COMINES-YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the operations +of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be +touched on. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH +NOVEMBER 1914 + + +Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under General von Fabeck +was engaged in the heavy fighting just described, the Fourth Army +of Duke Albert of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means of +constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing any troops from +his front to support his endangered positions near YPRES. By 11 A.M. +on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German forces rendered +necessary by the inundation of the front between the coast and DIXMUDE +had been sufficiently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered +on this day, on the line DIXMUDE-GHELUVELT. The right flank, from +DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured by the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade, 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the +orders of the general officer commanding the XXII Reserve Corps. The +dispositions of the attacking troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve +Corps in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE; the III Reserve Corps, +including the 44th Reserve Division, on both sides of LANGEMARCK, +facing the front HET SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group +in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were to the south +again, with the left flank resting on the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road.[97] + +By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps had been able +to gain ground at and north of BIXSCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve +Division advancing from the north had forced its way close up to the +western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts to capture this place +by attacks from north and east, in spite of reinforcements being +brought up, failed. It became evident that the enemy's skilfully +placed and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired +infantry positions in a country so favourable for defence, were more +than a match for our guns, especially at a time when ammunition was +scarce, and the misty weather prevented observation from aeroplanes. +A continuation of the offensive here would only have meant a useless +sacrifice of life. It was therefore decided with deep regret to resort +to the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to hold the enemy. +The situation of the Fourth Army indeed was no enviable one. Here +in the plains of Flanders, operations were effected by the November +weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country east and south +of YPRES. The troops had to endure great hardships; their trenches +rapidly filled with water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give +insufficient protection against artillery fire. In several places they +had to be evacuated altogether, and the men lay out in the open with +only a hastily constructed wire entanglement in front to secure them +against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most difficult in this +water-logged district. Frequently it could only be carried on by piling +up sand-bag parapets, and these being easily seen by the enemy were +promptly shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular reliefs +for the troops in the front line were out of the question, for the +units available at that time were too weak; and in any case, the men +found relief time a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to +observe every movement, especially where he still held good observation +points, as at BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK. + +A very extensive system of espionage served to complete his knowledge +of our intentions. Individual soldiers were left behind in civilian +clothing, with concealed telephonic communication; they kept hidden +during the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our movements +and dispositions quickly and accurately to their headquarters.[98] +A great deal of information was also given away by the Belgian +population, who crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent +news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. Although the +punishment meted out to espionage was severe, the Belgians always kept +up this form of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, and its +effect could be diminished only by maintaining thorough surveillance +of the country in rear of our lines. Our reserves, about which the +enemy was always well informed, had for the above reasons to be kept +close up behind the front lines in order to be near at hand at the +critical moment. Their movements, as well as the sending up of all +the necessary supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty. +Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden meadows, the farms in +the neighbourhood being insufficient to provide shelter for them all. +The troops who were withdrawn from the front line and put in reserve +had therefore small opportunity for either rest or recreation. + +The insecurity of our communications back into the interior of Belgium +must be passed over almost without mention, except to say that here +too a colossal task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the +General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, but to provide +observation posts along the Dutch frontier. In carrying out these +duties, the old _Landsturm_ troops showed a spirit of endurance which +said much for the military training they had received many years +before. The work of keeping watch over the excited population was not +without its dangers, and all praise is due to these garrison troops and +to the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their assistance. Thanks +to them, the long lines of communication through conquered Belgium were +not disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our army suffered +no interruption from the enemy. For the honour of all concerned this +must be put on record. + +On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made attacks on a larger scale +along the coast. On the 4th, believing that we had left only weak +outposts behind, even opposite NIEUPORT, when we retired to the eastern +bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments advanced through +LOMBARTZYDE. At first they gained a slight success, but were shortly +afterwards attacked by part of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade from the +east, and by the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade from the south, and driven back. +Detachments of the Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The +second attack made by about five thousand French troops, which took +place on the 7th, fared far worse; the whole of LOMBARTZYDE was taken +by our counter-attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.[99] + +On the 9th November the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade was relieved by parts +of the Marine Division, for the 10th November was the day on which the +new offensive was to be made with fresh troops against YPRES from the +south-east. + + + + +THE LAST PHASE + + +When the 4th Division and von Winckler's Guard Division were sent +forward on the 9th November into the northern part of the fighting +line, formerly occupied by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from +the heights of ST. ELOI it had just stormed, was able to look right +down on YPRES. The orders of the Sixth Army commander, dated the +7th and 8th November, had given all the necessary instructions for +the employment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division and von +Winckler's Guard Division were placed under the commander of the +Guard Corps, General Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called +Plettenberg's Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg's Corps formed the +Army Group Linsingen.[100] + +The task set the troops of General von Linsingen was 'to drive back +and crush the enemy lying north of the canal (COMINES-YPRES); the +main weight of the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The +Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west of the canal, +its task being to continue pressing forward and at the same time to +support the attack of the left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as +powerful enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.' The +decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, when another strong +reinforcement of engineers would have arrived. All the other units of +the Sixth Army and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according to +arrangement, to attack on this day with increased energy, so that the +enemy should be allowed no rest, and held to his positions along the +whole front. + +On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced to the attack. This +tenth day of November was to be a famous one in its history. The +sectors of attack for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, +the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps had been +closed in slightly to the north. Strengthened by the Guard _Jäger_ +Battalion, a Guard Machine-Gun Detachment[101] and the 9th Machine-Gun +Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards the POLYGON Wood. + +The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as follows: 'The XXII Reserve +Corps[102] in co-operation with the Marine Division will secure the +YSER canal front, and will take DIXMUDE.' Immediately north of DIXMUDE +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was in position, with the 43rd Reserve +Division to the east and south, the two divisions together making a +semicircle of steel round the objective. This time our troops were +determined to take the town so stubbornly defended by the French +infantry. The enemy fully realised the importance of this bridge-head. +Besides holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, it +covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On the 9th its garrison +was further reinforced by the arrival of fresh French troops. + +The rain of the previous days had made the ground over which the attack +on DIXMUDE was to be carried out very heavy going. The HANDZAEME canal, +running east and west, divides it into two parts, the northerly one +being particularly swampy and difficult to cross. The main attack had +therefore to be made from the east and south-east on a comparatively +narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern and obsolete +fortifications, but the first strongholds of the defenders were the +railway buildings and cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway +embankment had been transformed into a very strong defensive position, +and a heavy fire was expected from it when we advanced from the high +embankments of the YSER. Under the cover of darkness the division was +able to push its front line to an assault position within two hundred +yards of the enemy, and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment +began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless shells from our +_Minenwerfer_ did their utmost to break down the enemy's resistance. +By 7.40 A.M. our first attempt to take the enemy's advanced positions +had failed, and another artillery bombardment against his obstacles and +flanking posts was ordered. At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at +the cemetery was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into position +there before the artillery observers arrived to direct the fire of +their batteries from the front line on to the next strong point. The +artillery bombardment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M. when +the general assault was ordered. The infantry, with detachments of +sappers carrying hand-grenades and various material useful in an +assault, had worked its way forward close up to the line of obstacles. + +The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced rapidly at first by +frontal attack. North of it, the 15th Reserve _Jäger_ Battalion under +Captain Hameln worked forward across the deep marshes between the +canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry Regiment came under +a heavy enfilade fire from the YSER embankment, and at 1.30 P.M. +orders were issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, +consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division and of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division, to be brought up into the line. Its task was +to help carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment against the +railway embankment, and to secure the left flank of the advance. The +nearer the attack approached to the town, the more desperate became +the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander of the 201st +Reserve Regiment, General von Seydewitz, always in the front line +encouraging his men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment +and the _Jäger_ entered the devastated town at about 3.30 P.M. Our +well-directed artillery fire had cleared the front at the critical +moment, and the enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind DIXMUDE, but +did not cease to offer resistance. He held the railway embankment south +of the town with particular tenacity. Even when this had been finally +stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the fight, with heavy loss, +among the burning houses in the southern part of the town, until the +201st Regiment by a wheel southwards were able to give assistance. +Teetzmann's brigade in its attack on the YSER embankment, to protect +the flank of the division, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it +pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so that the enemy's +retreat was threatened. In spite of this, however, he gave nothing +up without a struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: +in fact the street fighting that ensued was hardly less bitter and +terrible than at WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES. + +During the struggle in DIXMUDE, the French artillery fired into the +place regardless of friend or foe, and both suffered alike. The fight +was still raging among the houses at the northern exit, where von +Beerst was only making slow progress with the advanced detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, when our reserves were assembled in the +market-square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry and Marine +Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but finally had to give way, for +though not numerically superior, the offensive spirit of the German +troops overcame all resistance. It was not until the west bank of the +canal had been reached, that the mass of the enemy put up another +defence. + +DIXMUDE was captured, and the French had been driven back across the +canal. A combined counter-attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which +began during the evening and continued into the night, was unable to +alter the situation, and though DIXMUDE in consequence was under the +heaviest fire, our troops held their ground. Weak detachments of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division were even able to cross the river north of the +town under cover of darkness, though the extreme swampiness of the +ground prevented them carrying their success any further. The enemy had +prepared the bridges, west of DIXMUDE, for demolition some time before +and had constructed strong positions along the west bank of the YSER. +These were especially good, as the ground there is higher and overlooks +that on the east bank. Our artillery had therefore to make another +preparatory bombardment. The spoils taken at DIXMUDE were considerable, +and in spite of the fact that the British assert that the Allies only +lost a few hundred men, we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 +men.[103] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE. + ON NOVEMBER 10TH. 1914.] + +Our allied enemies had also been driven back over the canal, south +of DIXMUDE, on the 10th November. The XXIII Reserve Corps had made +a successful attack on NOORDSCHOOTE and through BIXSCHOOTE against +HET SAS. A long and bitter struggle took place for the high ground +south-west of BIXSCHOOTE; but by evening the canal had been reached +along almost its whole length between NOORDSCHOOTE and BIXSCHOOTE, +whilst about a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division and weak +detachments of the 46th had crossed it. The inundation had however +gradually extended southwards as far as this district, and put any +far-reaching extension of this success out of the question. The XXIII +Reserve Corps took prisoner about 1000 men and captured a considerable +number of machine-guns in this operation. + +The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight +on both sides of LANGEMARCK. Throughout the 9th November and during +the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had +been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III +Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division, +now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line. +Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had +ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as +dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the +44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to HET SAS, taking +prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting +this advance, says: 'West of LANGEMARCK our young regiments advanced +against the enemy's front line singing "_Deutschland, Deutschland +über alles_," and captured it.' The left wing of the division hung a +good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to +push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy's first position, +but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of LANGEMARCK. +The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east, +without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove +that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack +that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now +defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th +Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of +ST. JULIEN, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby +compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von +Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve +Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve +Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of HET SAS. + +After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements +which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of +trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps +spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would +enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which +was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow. + +In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg's +Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently +advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense +autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the +concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the +neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided +to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling's (XV) +Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a +preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by +means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed +group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers, +three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of +long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding +the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both +divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with +the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of ST. ELOI, were +able to gain some hundreds of yards. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +On the 11th November the combined offensive of the Fourth Army and +the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the +Fourth and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The great efforts +made by the Fourth Army on the 10th had considerably weakened it, and +further handicapped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces +of the attacking troops, no special success was gained by it on the +11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere held to his ground and +prevented from transferring any troops to other parts of the front. On +the extreme right wing the Marine Division made a successful attack +on NIEUPORT, capturing several hundred prisoners. At the same time the +Guard Cavalry Division, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to +the YSER, in order to relieve part of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which +went into Army Reserve. On the left wing of the Army, the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions +by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south flank of the XXVII +Reserve Corps attacked in close co-operation with Plettenberg's Corps. + +On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck +began the last phase of this severe and terrible struggle for YPRES; +and it was destined to fix the general line on which the opposing +armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915. + +Von Winckler's Guard Division fought on the right wing of the Army +Group Linsingen, and for us the day was to be a historic, though costly +one. In former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of the fray +at its most critical stages, and the sons were to show themselves +worthy of their fathers. The spirit of Frederick the Great and the +glory of St. Privat shone again on the battlefield of YPRES. The +British speak of the attack of the Guard as a most brilliant feat of +arms. + +Before the infantry of the Division could come into immediate contact +with the enemy, a broad zone had to be crossed under his artillery +fire: through the hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the +Guard brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the German batteries +opened, and a furious bombardment continued for two and a half hours, +and then the infantry attack began. It struck against two divisions of +the I British Corps, a war experienced foe, whose fighting methods were +well adapted to the country.[104] The artillery preparation however +had been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy's superiority in +numbers the advance made good progress, so that shortly after 10 A.M. +the strong position along the southern edge of the POLYGON Wood was in +the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.[105] + +At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of H.M. the Emperor's +1st Guard Regiment had forced a way through the wire entanglements +and trenches in front of VERBECK farm, and it was taken in the first +assault. The regiment had thereby captured an excellent position +from which to support the right wing of the attack.[106] Led by its +fearless commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed +on without a moment's delay into the wood north-west of the farm. +Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment was still engaged along the southern +edges of the woods west of REUTEL, with its front facing north, and +it put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing of the 54th +Reserve Division. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND. GUARD DIVISION. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +At 10 A.M., on the last artillery salvo, the battalions of the +4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on both sides of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT main road, and they took the front British trenches in +their stride. + +The Emperor Francis' 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from +VELDHOEK against the corner of the HERENTHAGE Wood, north of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the +infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in +its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a +few paces' distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind +a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be +an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their +officers and N.C.O.'s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, +the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another, +but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by +our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced +its way through to the château of VELDHOEK, which was surrounded by +a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their +way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly +a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came +from the château on their right, from some flanking trenches on their +left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining +officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance +in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the +companies pressed on till they were close up to the château itself, +when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides. +Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order +to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees +and from the château windows completely stopped any communication +with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded +by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were +assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood +and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the +relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von +Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the +boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château again, they +were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it +appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before +this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but +our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their +ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were +in the air.[108] + +Queen Augusta's 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the +main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two +attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the +main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment +on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good +progress, and a firm footing was gained in HERENTHAGE Wood south of +the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis' 2nd Grenadiers +unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire +to bear on Queen Augusta's 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to +be stopped.[109] + +At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The +King's Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the NUN'S Wood +(Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment +and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack +was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st +Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in +the woods (POLYGON Wood and the eastern part of the NONNE BOSCH), with +its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having +spent all its energies against the château of VELDHOEK, lay with its +front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own +artillery fire near the NONNE BOSCH, and the attack broke up and came +to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question. + +In the southern part of the HERENTHAGE Wood the 4th Infantry Division +pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep +trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to +make our progress slow, especially on the right wing. + +The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the +Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around ZWARTELEEN; the +capture of Hill 60 near ZWARTELEEN was of exceptional importance. From +this elevation another direct view over the country round YPRES was +obtained. + +South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks +stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of WYTSCHAETE, which +had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy +artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile +counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the +critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a +barrage. + +In the area near WYTSCHAETE, the 11th November was the day of the +heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians +pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four +machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about +150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, but the guns were so firmly embedded in +the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry. +When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of +the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a +neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in +the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to +three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had +put in to the fight on the YPRES front, and to what an extent he had to +concentrate his units to ward off our attacks. + +On and to the west of the MESSINES ridge the line remained almost +unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the +enemy's artillery fire from Mount KEMMEL on this front and the enfilade +fire of artillery and machine-guns from PLOEGSTEERT Wood compelled our +men to remain in their trenches. + +Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great +success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been +impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately +describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any +concentration of the enemy near YPRES could be seen, and immediately +opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of +the enemy's lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and, +more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive. +The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards +the result.[111] + +The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not +abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained +unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire +front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was +eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare +were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen +its detachments across the YSER at DIXMUDE, and on the 12th the 201st +Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed +the enemy's defences opposite it on the western bank of the YSER, and +held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly +constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the +enemy's bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open. + +At BIXSCHOOTE the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks, +but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country. +On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. +Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve +position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was +discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German +position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour +would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the +10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority +or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position +on the rising ground south-west of BIXSCHOOTE. On the front of the +Sixth Army HERENTHAGE Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the +14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the +artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult +and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by +no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the +assault. In the château of HERENTHAGE a large number of British snipers +surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of +ZWARTELEEN after being reinforced by Hofmann's composite Division. A +strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large +number of prisoners. + +On the 13th November the Park of WYTSCHAETE was captured from the +French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which +the French advanced against our positions shouting, 'Don't shoot,' in +German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were +roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions. + +On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, for which +such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by +us. We thereby obtained a position in the WYTSCHAETE salient which, +although overlooked from Mount KEMMEL, gave us such a commanding view +of all the ground between Mount KEMMEL and the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES +ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out +of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small +fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the +Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive; +a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength +of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their +health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused +a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary +to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by +the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs +of exhaustion in the enemy's ranks on the front opposite the Fourth +and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth +Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire +entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were +allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant +quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not +unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in +the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th +November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would +be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces. +This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and +although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as +well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert +of Würtemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence. + +The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British +monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the +roadstead of OSTEND. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions +near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The 'glorious' +activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to +a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to +put in an appearance there.[115] + +The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second +half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For +some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong +detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front, +where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to +bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it +roll back again. + +From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and +Sixth Armies was the COMINES-YPRES canal. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to +the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken +defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The +effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches +and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and +more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed +it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive +defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in +the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in +the short period available after they were called up the volunteers +had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of +superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with +merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual +was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly +learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this +water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to +Russia to fight under the great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied. +The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of +a final decision at YPRES had disappeared. + +The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,[116] for it marked the +failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western +Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole +of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable +resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for the Belgian, French +and British advance on the RHINE. The Belgian coast was now firmly in +our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations +against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive +break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our +favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural +that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise +this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour +has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led +to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been +accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance +and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the +enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior +opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the +sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions +had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out +an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne, +so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before +the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it +should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak, +and even the genius of a Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the +masses of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. Thus it came +about that we had to lie and wait in front of the gates of YPRES, while +all the available men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, to +help Hindenburg pave the way to victory. + +There was never peace on the YPRES front. The belt of steel with which +we had invested the town by our operations in October and November +1914, was a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst +our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins across the +Channel like an apparition whose shadow lay over the British Isles and +especially menaced the traffic-routes between England and France. The +British therefore continually tried their utmost to free themselves +of this menace and their pressure produced counter measures. Thus in +December 1914 heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea at +NIEUPORT, and also at BIXSCHOOTE and ZWARTELEEN. On Christmas Eve the +French vainly attacked BIXSCHOOTE: their hope of catching the Germans +dreaming heavily on that evening was of no avail. When spring lifted +the mist that hung over Flanders, a German offensive took place during +April and May that forced the northern part of the YPRES salient back +to within three miles of the town.[117] After this the positions only +altered very slightly. In March 1916 the British blew up our front +trench positions at ST. ELOI by five colossal mines, but were unable +to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In 1917 the death-agony +of YPRES was renewed, and for months war raged over the plains of +Flanders; the fighting was as furious as in October and November 1914. +The young soldiers of those days have now become veterans, who know +war and do not fear it even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are +those same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in +exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, once said: 'Therefore when you +are fighting this particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for +having occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the Germans +are not so easy to wipe out of the world's history as he imagines, show +it by redoubling the strength behind your blows. In front of you is the +opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! at him!' + +He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who were so jealous of us, +who brought on the war for the sake of their money-bags and spread the +conflagration all over the world, who at first hoped that it would be +but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to annihilate Germany: +all this steeled the hearts of our warriors in Flanders, whose creed +was the justice of the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest +Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and in blood. The +fighting in 1917 was perhaps more severe than that of those stormy +autumn days of 1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: to +keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this we succeeded in 1917 as +in 1914. + +Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the German Fatherland +with a silent shudder, but also with just and intense pride. It was +there that the British were made to realise that German heroism was +not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the war material which +the whole world had been manufacturing for years. When we read that up +to the 14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put into the battle +round YPRES by the Western Allies, whilst only 25 German divisions +were opposed to them,[118] and that in the course of the Flanders +battle of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled in vain +against a greatly inferior German force, it says much for our troops. +But far from all. For the enemy's superiority in material, in guns, +trench-mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, and +even fourfold. Who can doubt but that a nation whose sons know how to +fight like this, must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds of +blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and splendid fruit for the +German Fatherland. This indeed would be the highest reward that could +be bestowed on those of us who fought there. + + + + +APPENDIX + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + +from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General Duke Albert of Würtemburg. + _Chief of Staff_ Major-General Ilse. + + III Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Beseler). + + 5th Reserve Division. + 6th Reserve Division. + 4th _Ersatz_ Division. + + XXII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn). + + 43rd Reserve Division. + 44th Reserve Division. + + XXIII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Kleist). + + 45th Reserve Division. + 46th Reserve Division. + + XXVI Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Hügel). + + 51st Reserve Division. + 52nd Reserve Division. + + XXVII Reserve Corps. (Lieut.-General von Carlowitz, + relieved on 27th Oct. by + General of Artillery von Schubert). + + 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division. + 54th (Würtemburg) Reserve Division. + +The following units were also attached at various times:-- + + 9th Reserve Division. + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + Marine Division. + 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade. + Guard Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK + +from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding + XIII (Würtemburg) Corps. + _Chief of Staff_ Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg. + + XV Corps (General von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + + (This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.) + + II Bavarian Corps (General of Infantry von Martini, + relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914 + by General of Cavalry von Stetten). + + 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division. + 4th Bavarian Infantry Division. + + 26th (Würtemburg) (Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach). + Infantry Division + + Group GEROK was also temporarily in the Army Group FABECK. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Gerok, + Commanding Reserve Corps. + + 1st Cavalry Corps (Lieut.-General von Richthofen). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[119] + + 2nd Cavalry Corps (General of Cavalry von der Marwitz). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[120] + + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + + 3rd Infantry Division. + + 25th Reserve Division. + + 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + + 2nd Cavalry Division. + + Bavarian Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN + +from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Linsingen, + Commanding II Corps. + + _Chief of Staff_ Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold. + + XV Corps (General of Infantry von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + also from 16th Nov., Hofmann's Composite Division. + + Plettenberg's Corps (General of Infantry von Plettenberg, + Commanding Guard Corps). + + 4th Infantry Division. + Winckler's Composite Guard Division. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _See p. 115._ + +[2] _Fourth Army Cavalry._ + + _I._ _Cavalry Corps_ _Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, p. 64._ + _II._ " _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, p. 90._ + _IV._ " _3 Cavalry Divisions, p. 25._ + _2nd Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + _Bavarian Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + + _Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions._ + +_The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on p. 56 to have been +eight divisions, among which, according to p. 57, were the 3rd, 7th and +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army Cavalry of the +Fourth Army._ + +_It may be noted that in 'Liège-Namur' in the same series of General +Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry Corps is given as +the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions._ + +[3] _There is a further mistake (see footnote 110): the King's were not +present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The +honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion +was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire +and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry._ + +[4] _The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th +September._ + +[5] The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing but +between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French attacks south +of Laon in the middle of September. + +[6] _'2000 British' belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division +which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the +resistance of that fortress._ + +[7] The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz. + +[8] _Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions were +available to oppose them._ + +[9] _These 'considerable hostile forces' consisted of the 7th Division +and Byng's Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after +having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army +from Antwerp._ + +[10] _Needless to point out that General Joffre was never 'Allied +Commander.'_ + +[11] _At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British +army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there._ + +[12] _The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th +October, and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the +18th it had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after +considerable fighting._ + +[13] _On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the +4th, astride the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, +while the 6th Division on the right had reached the line +Premesques-Ennettières-Radinghem (S.E. of Armentières). General +Conneau's French Cavalry Corps filled the gap between its right and the +left of the II Corps._ + +[14] _The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is +superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as +Gheluvelt: its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem._ + +[15] _The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading +Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till +19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck +area on 18th October._ + +[16] _'Armée' in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint._ + +[17] _This statement as to Sir J. French's intentions is inaccurate. +The II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the +orders issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack._ + +[18] _Between Armentières and the sea the British had only the I +Corps, less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps +(composed of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps +and two Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced +to about one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the +Allied forces outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of +the statement that 'the relative strength of the opposing forces never +appreciably altered in our favour' will become apparent as the book is +read, and as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only +by a weak composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by +a succession of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed +the attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt +on 31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. See +also Introduction._ + +[19] _'The heights of St. Eloi' is a phrase which suggests that the +author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of +the area round Ypres._ + +[20] _The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own +country._ + +[21] _British torpedo boats do not carry 'heavy artillery.'_ + +[22] _The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the +Monitors 'Severn,' 'Humber,' and 'Mersey.'_ + +[23] _This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin, +19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on +account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the +eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the +line Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing +to press their pursuit._ + +[24] _The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of +very hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature._ + +[25] _There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it +is to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood's squadron that reference is made._ + +[26] _There was no British artillery present in this quarter._ + +[27] See pages 23-24. + +[28] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_. + +[29] _The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the +opposition which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the +Allied force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry's +French Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and +Territorials. These were driven back without being able to offer much +resistance, and in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British +Corps just as it began its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle +and Passchendaele (21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to +divert his reserves to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend +his attack which had been making good progress on a line south-east +from Langemarck to Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the +7th Division._ + +[30] _By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding +the line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the +1st Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, +the 1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to +Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with the +3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen's, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and 2nd +Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck. +The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, and only +one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available to support +the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the 2nd Division +carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th Infantry +Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. This +division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: it +repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and +night 21st-22nd._ + +[31] _The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the +Hazebrouck area._ + +[32] _This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On +the afternoon of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in +breaking through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron +Highlanders, and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote +road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward; +however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black Watch, +arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all further German +advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements came up, +the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. of the 2nd Infantry +Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from the 6th Infantry +Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen's of the 3rd Infantry +Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, the Queen's +retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven right back, +nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on them. The old +trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually recovered, but late +in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the advanced position +reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken up about the +line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during this action, +in which less than two British infantry brigades had defeated the 46th +Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck had been +heavily attacked, apparently (cf. p. 40) by the 51st Reserve Division, +which had been completely worsted. In this part of the action very +notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters just north +of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 rounds a man, and though +attacked in front and flank by very superior numbers, maintained their +position intact. The British accounts testify to the gallantry with +which the German attacks were pressed, officers carrying regimental +colours ran on ahead of the men and planted the colours in the ground +to give their men a point to make for, a mounted officer rode forward, +exposing himself recklessly, to encourage his soldiers, but the +musketry of the British infantry was too much for the Germans, and the +attack was completely repulsed._ + +[33] _Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the +repeated reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, +except for a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the +Ypres salient before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial +battalions, the Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry +regiments, the North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd +Dragoon Guards, the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were +added to the force, while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division +were replaced by three composite brigades from the II Corps, set free +after three weeks of strenuous fighting near La Bassée by the arrival +of the Meerut Division, and greatly below strength._ + +[34] _The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim +at doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not +an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate +object._ + +[35] _On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde +to Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the +line being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The +German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were thus +faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect +of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven +the French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank +exposed and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing +back its left flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and +the expulsion of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines +below) after heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender +foundation that a British reconnaissance was made in the direction +of Gheluwe covered by two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back +without being seriously pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening +from Becelaere were sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of +the 7th Division east of Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October +on the front from Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over +in this narrative. Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all +along the line of the 7th Division without success except on the left, +where by enfilade fire from Passchendaele they forced the left of the +22nd Infantry Brigade to fall back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. +Meanwhile the advance of the I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, +as already explained (see footnote 29), the uncovering of the left +of the I Corps prevented the advance being pressed beyond the line +Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line was made good and the German efforts +to advance successfully repulsed. On 22nd October the Germans attacked +the line of the 2nd Division north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily +repulsed, while further to their left they renewed their attacks on the +21st Infantry Brigade east of Polygon Wood with equal ill-success._ + +[36] _The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin +relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October._ + +[37] _The 'well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire +entanglements' would have been most welcome to the British. +Unfortunately there had been no time or opportunity to do more than +dig in hastily where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, +while such trenches as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were +hastily prepared in such loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when +bombarded; wire was conspicuous by its absence._ + +[38] _The only thing in the nature of a 'fortress' at Langemarck was +a small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of +22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters._ + +[39] _This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The +relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not +take place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved +by a division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th +October it was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of +the morning of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of +the 21st Infantry Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through +north of Reutel, penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a +counter-attack by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd +R. Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was +made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation +with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the 6th +Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road. +Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all +attacks were repulsed._ + +[40] _It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were +much below establishment._ + +[41] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armée Belge: à Dixmuide_. + +[42] _This testimony to the effective character of the help given by +Admiral Hood's squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in +the narrative on page 22._ + +[43] _The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th October +(footnote 39), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division had +re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and +between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes there +were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of +the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress east +of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX Corps +which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the showing of this +narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly superior in +numbers to those engaged in the attacks._ + +[44] _The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th +French Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a +German battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French +unit with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, +however, less progress was made, but the implication that the British +reached Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve +Division at the point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on +this quarter only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support +available was insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it +was therefore abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made._ + +[45] _The British who were streaming down from the high ground about +Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps +4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division._ + +[46] _There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the +period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the +south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was +obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which +held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably +on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd +Reserve Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into +Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots +Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, and +succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, but +a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid +of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was +successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding +a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division +connected it up with the left of General Allenby's Cavalry Corps on the +Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground._ + +[47] _This account does not tell the story of 29th October very +intelligibly. The British front had been readjusted, and was now held +by the 2nd Division on the left, from the junction with the French to +west of Reutel, thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by +the 1st Division, thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the +3rd Cavalry Division on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans +(apparently the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force +against the junction of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the +9th kilo cross-roads, and rolled up the battalions to right and left +after very severe fighting, in which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd +Gordon Highlanders of the 7th Division distinguished themselves greatly +by repeated counter-attacks. The resistance of the troops in the front +line delayed the Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st +Division to be put in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the +most advanced trenches. The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as +Gheluvelt, and their final gain of ground was inconsiderable._ + +[48] _It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting +on the La Bassée-Armentières front as quite distinct from the main +battle for Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III +Corps had a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they +received being on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade +and the divisional troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced +General Conneau's French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. +As the net result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced +back to a line running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve +Chapelle, past Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentières to the Lys at +Houplines, part of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left +bank of the Lys to the junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of +Messines. The German attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and +the strain on the II and III Corps was very severe._ + +[49] _In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers +of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by +itself amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the +British forces engaged between La Bassée and Zonnebeke. For its Order +of Battle see at end of book._ + +[50] _If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the +further advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered +the German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, +and enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the +Belgians, however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the +assistance of their Allies._ + +[51] _No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st +October. It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here +as though it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in +action on the Zonnebeke area since 24th October._ + +[52] _The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British +Commander-in-Chief amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch +howitzers, six of 60-pounders, and three of 4·7-inch guns, a total of +forty-four guns and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns)._ + +[53] _At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held +by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the +I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the +XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions of +the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged +for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at full war +establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to one._ + +[54] _See footnote 51. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third +time as a new arrival._ + +[55] See page 62. + +[56] _It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the +statements previously given, even apart from the fact that the German +units were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous +heavy losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds +is no more than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division +who had held up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of +Langemarck on 23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian +Guard attacked on 11th November--or rather a scanty remnant of them +was: in the interval they had fought and held up a succession of +attacks._ + +[57] _The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only +had been given a day's rest, but the division as a whole had not been +relieved._ + +[58] _These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of +which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed. +None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of +the Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines._ + +[59] _There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the very +thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a front +of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete and +St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a brigade +of French infantry._ + +[60] Messines ridge. + +[61] _The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing +the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of +time and want of labour. 'Deep trenches protected by broad wire +entanglements' is a much exaggerated statement._ + +[62] _An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time, +but was decisively repulsed._ + +[63] _I and II Cavalry Corps. See Order of Battle._ + +[64] _The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry +Brigade on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were +dislodged by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders and 1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy +fighting, the 1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by +a very stubborn resistance._ + +[65] _Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines +canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde was brought +to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st Division +under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division under +Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a new line +to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde the +7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but east of +Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress._ + +[66] _The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some +of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front +east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve +Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long +spell of rest._ + +[67] _The 'reinforcements' which the Allies had received on 29th-30th +October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them. +(See footnote 66.)_ + +[68] _The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, +at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account put in +about eight battalions._ + +[69] _It would not be gathered from this account that the British +artillery had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to +ammunition expenditure._ + +[70] _The statement that 'many attacks had to be delivered against +fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments' is almost ludicrous in +its travesty of the facts._ + +[71] _It was not in 'long colonial wars' but in careful training on +the ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that +mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the +defence. Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the +outbreak of war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active +service._ + +[72] _The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st +October, the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division +holding on successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had +been pierced at Gheluvelt._ + +[73] _The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the +British possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war +establishments allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that +by 31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns +to increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one +or both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for +machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original +Expeditionary Force could maintain._ + +[74] _The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an +hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The 'château +and park,' north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales +Borderers, who maintained their ground, although their right was left +in the air by the loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came +up and delivered their celebrated counter-attack past the right of the +S.W.B. This apparently occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, +however, accurate in saying that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the +Worcesters did was that they completely checked the German efforts to +push forward; the position their counter-attack reached enabled them to +flank any advance west of Gheluvelt._ + +[75] _The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem +founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was +subsequently retaken._ + +[76] _The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the +detachments under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the +right of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury +Forest, was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground, +and at one point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans +back a long way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken._ + +[77] _The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General +Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General Munro, commanding +the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was killed, but the former died +many months after of his wounds._ + +[78] _During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the +XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held +by the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades +north-west of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, +however, unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and +further to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily +pressed. It was here that the London Scottish were put in to recover +trenches which had been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road._ + +[79] _Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the +night of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely +difficult to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade +was forced out of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that +the advance of the Germans was then held up west of the village, +counter-attacks by two battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just +arrived from La Bassée-Neuve Chapelle area, assisting to check them. +Subsequently these battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st +Lincolnshires) were also forced back, but by this time more French +reinforcements were coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, +and their counter-attacks, though not wholly successful, prevented +further German progress. But the admission of this account that two +whole German regiments (six battalions) were engaged in the attack is +a fine testimony to the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division +and attached infantry at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one +against them._ + +[80] _The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st +Cavalry Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by +portions of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the +5th Division (the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King's Own +Yorkshire L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve +Chapelle and much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th +(Würtemburg) Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only +artillery available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the +R.H.A. batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps._ + +[81] _i.e. Würtemburg._ + +[82] _This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Château had to be evacuated +during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal +of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans +did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts +as they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward +beyond Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give +the impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily +pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground._ + +[83] _The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was +in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under +Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as +were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position +south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day's +fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting as +infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts +of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of +Zandvoorde)._ + +[84] _The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th +Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, and +were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This account of +the 'treacherous methods of the Indians' smacks of the conventional; it +is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections of the German +Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against the British +for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of 'Kultur.'_ + +[85] _French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French +had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division +assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem._ + +[86] _These 'reinforcements of newly arrived British troops' are +imaginary._ + +[87] _The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in +breaking our line at this point and captured two guns which had been +pushed up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards, +though taken in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack +by the 1st Black Watch re-established the line, while south of the road +a counter-attack by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared +the Herenthage Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches +a little eastward. Further to the right Lord Cavern's detachment +(Brigadier-General Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his +battalions had come under Lord Cavan's orders) and the remnants of +the 1st Grenadiers and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their +own successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. +Deimling's left wing._ + +[88] _The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day +belongs solely to the French; no British troops were in action there._ + +[89] _After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of +the fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some +attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture +Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the +British Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east +of Wulverghem. Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it +maintained itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th +Division about the middle of November._ + +[90] _The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, 'Hofprediger' Dr. +Vogel, in his book '3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie' (p. +212), says the attack was made and failed, but 'next day the English +abandoned the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our +8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard +Dragoons.'_ + +[91] _What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient +except the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for +the simple reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, +though some French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek; +but in the course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the +7th Division was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II +Corps composed of battalions which had had three weeks' fighting near +La Bassée and had then to be thrust in after only two or three days' +rest to hold some of the most difficult parts of the line south-east +of Ypres. The 7th Infantry Division when relieved amounted to less +than a third of their original strength, without taking into account +the drafts that had joined since they landed, which amounted to 2000 +or more. Most of the battalions of the 1st Division were in scarcely +better case._ + +[92] _These 'successive lines of rearward positions' did not exist +except on paper during the period to be included in the 'Battle of +Ypres,' i.e. to 17th November._ + +[93] _During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting +on the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the +Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which +was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry +Brigade (cf. page 93, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the +22nd Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out +for a rest, and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the +line next day. On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd +Division, which had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, +gained a little ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the +line was again attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was +broken near Veldhoek, but was restored after some sharp fighting and +several counter-attacks. Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to +the east of it, the 2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than +held its own. In the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken +by two battalions of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the +1st Division._ + +[94] _St. Eloi is hardly situated 'on high ground,' as it is on +the down slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the +low ground after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the +Messines-Wytschaete ridge._ + +[95] _The allusion is not understood._ + +[96] _The heavy artillery at Sir John French's disposal at this period +was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered +by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed +on the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for +the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among +the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the vast +ammunition expenditure which had been incurred._ + +[97] _The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was +defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the +Broodseinde cross-roads._ + +[98] _The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks._ + +[99] _However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917 +Lombartzyde was in Allied possession._ + +[100] For Order of Battle, see Appendix. + +[101] _A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery with +six guns._ + +[102] Consisting of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division and the 43rd Reserve +Division. + +[103] _It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of +Dixmude should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this +assertion can have taken, as no British troops were concerned in the +Dixmude fighting, nor could there have been any occasion for any +official British announcement about Dixmude._ + +_In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jäger Regt. +read Res. Infantry Regt._ + +[104] _The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von +Winckler's Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions +was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced +to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of +the 3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the +3rd Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the +main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the +Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently +pronounced._ + +[105] _The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon +Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British +line was marked by a 'strong point' which had been erected near the +south-west corner of the wood, known later as 'Black Watch Corner': +this was successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the +Black Watch. Attacks were made on the 1st King's lining the southern +edge of the wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also +further eastward and to the left of the King's, on the 2nd Coldstream +Guards. The Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the +54th Reserve Division: at neither of these points did the attackers +meet with any success._ + +[106] _A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line +trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important +part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed +appreciably to its success._ + +[107] _This is the eastern part of the wood known later as 'Inverness +Copse.'_ + +[108] _This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the +1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington's._ + +[109] _The 4th (Queen Augusta's) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked +the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been +repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. +Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were +also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the +Germans made no progress._ + +[110] _This part of the German account is not borne out by the British +versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke +through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on +north-west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and +coming out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was +arrested mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them +up with rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, +orderlies from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of +the 1st Brigade, assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was +critical until about noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks +L.I. arrived on the scene. This battalion had been engaged for several +days near Zwarteleen, and had just been brought up to Westhoek to act +as Divisional Reserve. Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly +counter-attacked the Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out +headlong. Many of them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and +southern sides by the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western +edge of Polygon Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come +up to Glencorse Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other +units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which +extended thence to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment +who had pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating +any further. The King's, to whom this account gives the credit for +the Oxfordshire's counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard +Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on +the Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling +that at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd +Oxford and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief +part in the defeat of Napoleon's Guard._ + +_The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have been +the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, +chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were pushed forward +rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse._ + +[111] _The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon +11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek +was trifling in extent and value, and though 'Hill 60' and the wood +north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that +the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected +to produce a break-through. The 'numerical superiority' once again +attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength +of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly +lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much +more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever +possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German +Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours +of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of +incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops._ + +[112] _This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November +in which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th +and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the +Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th +November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage +Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered by +the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack +by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of +the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of +the Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry +Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks._ + +[113] _The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this._ + +[114] _One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on +17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on +this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, +holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven +the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the +first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception +undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision._ + +[115] _It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end._ + +[116] _See remarks in Introduction._ + +[117] _The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have +been mentioned._ + +[118] _It is not to be read in this monograph. See Introduction._ + +[119] _4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see page 64)._ + +[120] _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see page 90)._ + + + + +INDEX + + + ALBERT OF WÜRTEMBURG, Duke, 6; + _see also_ ARMY, FOURTH. + + ANTWERP: value of, to Entente, 3; + capture of, 5; + retreat from, 7 (_note_). + + ARMY, FOURTH (German): formation of, 6; + advance of, through BELGIUM, 19; + dispositions on 20th Oct., 20; + task of, 25, 27; + attack on 3rd Nov., 98; + attack on 10th Nov., 104; + order of battle of, 131. + + ---- SIXTH (German): position of right wing of, 7; + failure of attacks of, 25; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + ARMY GROUP FABECK: constitution of, 60; + plan for, 60; + assembly of, 63; + artillery of, 63; + attack on 30th Oct., 67; + attack on 31st Oct., 73; + alteration of plan,91; + reinforcement of, 92; + offensive on 11th Nov. of, 111; + order of battle of, 132. + + ---- ---- _Linsingen_: composition of, 103; + task of, 103; + offensive of, 111; + order of battle of, 133. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS (German), meetings at, 25, 26. + + + BECELAERE: Anglo-French counter-attacks at, 55; + XXVII Res. Corps takes, 41. + + BELGIAN population, patriotism of, 100. + + ---- force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + BESELER, General von, 5; + _see also_ CORPS, III Reserve. + + BRITISH FLEET, co-operation of, 22 _and note_, 51 _and note_, + 28 (_note_), 125. + + BRITISH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + _Calais_: concentration about, 6; + German objective, 11. + + CAVALRY, ARMY (German): objective of, 3; + relief of, near LILLE, 64. + + CAVALRY, FOURTH (German) Army, composition of, xvii (_note_). + + ---- SIXTH (German) Army: composition of, 56, 57; + capture KRUISEIK, 57. + + CORPS (German), III Reserve: captures Antwerp, 5; + screens Fourth Army, 19; + crosses the YSER, 30. + + ---- ---- XV: attack on ZANDVOORDE, 63; + attack and capture of GHELUVELT, 72; + captures Hill 60, 119. + + ---- ---- XIX, captures LILLE, 7. + + ---- ---- XXII Res.-XXVII Res.: formation of, 4; + transport of, 5. + + ---- ---- XXII Res., attacks on DIXMUDE, 31, 53. + + ---- ---- XXIII Res.: attack on HOUTHULST Forest, 34; + attack on LANGEMARCK, 99. + + ---- ---- XXVI Res., takes PASSCHENDAELE, 40. + + ---- ---- XXVII Res., takes BECELAERE, 41. + + ---- ---- II Bavarian, dispositions of, 64. + + ---- (French) II, arrival of, 62, 64. + + ---- ---- IX, arrival of, 41, 62, 64. + + + DEIMLING, General von, wounded,73; + _see_ CORPS (German), XV. + + DIXMUDE: topographical, 15; + attack by French Marine division on, 45; + capture of, 108. + + + EASTERN FRONT, German units leave for, 125. + + EMPEROR, German: proclamation to Fourth Army, 27; + watches attack on GHELUVELT, 73. + + + FABECK, General von, _see_ ARMY GROUP FABECK. + + FRENCH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + GEROK, General von, _see_ GROUP GEROK. + + GHELUVELT: attack on, 72; + capture of, 75; + British force holding, 72 (_note_). + + GLOUCESTERSHIRE Regiment at LANGEMARCK, 37 (_note_). + + GROUP GEROK: formation of, 93; + order of battle of, 133. + + ---- URACH: formation of, 90; + attack on WYTSCHAETE Park, 95. + + GUARD (German) Division (von WINCKLER): marches to ROUBAIX, 92; + attack of, 116. + + GUARDS, British Life, cut up, 68 _and note_. + + + KEMMEL, Mount, topography and importance of, 13, 68, 96, 123. + + KING'S LIVERPOOL Regiment, counter-attack by, 118 _and note_ 2. + + + LILLE: value to Entente, 3; + capture of, 6. + + LINSINGEN, General Baron von, _see_ ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN. + + + MESSINES: importance of, 68; + attack on, 79; + British force holding, 80 (_note_). + + + NIEUPORT: topographical, 15; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + + OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE L.I., counter-attack German Guard, + 118 (_note_ 2). + + + PLETTENBERG'S Corps, attack on 11th Nov., 111. + + + URACH, General von, _see_ GROUP URACH. + + + WORCESTERSHIRE Regiment, counter-attack at GHELUVELT, 75 _and note_ 3. + + WYTSCHAETE: importance of, 68; + German attack on, 78; + Anglo-French counter-attack on, 79; + second German attack, 85; + third attack and capture of, 88; + capture of Park of, 123; + gallant defence by French troops, 87 (_note_). + + + YORKSHIRE L.I. retake HERENTHAGE Château, 124 (_note_). + + YPRES: topographical, 15; + historical, 14; + attack from the north against, 38; + attempt to break through south of, 59; + battle of, begins, 113. + + YSER, canal: topographical, 16; + flooding the, 51; + crossed by III Res. Corps, 30. + + + ZANDVOORDE: importance of, 67; + capture of, 67. + + + Printed by T. and A. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Ypres 1914 + An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff + +Author: Otto Schwink + +Translator: Graeme Chamley Wynne + +Release Date: November 19, 2013 [EBook #44234] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YPRES 1914 *** + + + + +Produced by Brian Coe, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by Cornell +University Digital Collections) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<div class="transnote"> +<p>Transcriber's Note:</p> + +<p>Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as +possible.</p> + +<p>On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth +Army," "from" is a correction of "fron".</p></div> + +<div class="center"> +<img id="coverpage" src="images/cover.jpg" width="395" height="600" alt="" /> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i">[Pg i]</a></span></p> + +<h1>YPRES, 1914</h1> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii">[Pg ii]</a></span></p> + +<h3>MONS, AND THE RETREAT</h3> + +<p class="center">By Captain <span class="smcap">G. S. Gordon</span></p> + +<p class="center">With an Introduction by +Field-Marshal <span class="smcap">Lord French</span></p> + +<p class="right">1/6 <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p><b>The Evening News.</b>—‘... The true history of those +amazing and heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a +soldier and an expert.’</p></blockquote> + +<h3>THE MARNE CAMPAIGN</h3> + +<p class="center">By Lieut. Col. <span class="smcap">F. E. Whitton</span>, C.M.G.</p> + +<p class="right">10/6 <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p><b>Saturday Review.</b>—‘... Clear and concise ... gives +a much better general impression of the Battle of the +Marne than any other we know.’</p></blockquote> + +<h3>1914</h3> + +<p class="center">By Field-Marshal <span class="smcap">Viscount French</span> +of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc.</p> + +<p class="center">With a Preface by <span class="smcap">Maréchal Foch</span></p> + +<p class="right">21/- <i>net</i>. +</p> + +<hr class="r5" /> + +<p class="center">CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii">[Pg iii]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><span class="xlarge">YPRES, 1914</span><br /> +AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY<br /> +ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</p> + +<p class="center p2">TRANSLATION BY G. C. W.</p> + +<p class="center p2">WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE<br /> +HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH)<br /> +COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE</p> + +<p class="center p4">LONDON<br /> +CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD<br /> +1919 +</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv">[Pg iv]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center"><i>Printed in Great Britain</i></p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">[Pg v]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</a></h2> + +<table class="TOC" summary="Contents"> +<tr><td> </td><td class="tdr small">PAGE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">ix</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#PREFACE">German Preface</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">xxiii</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#PRELIMINARY_REMARKS">Preliminary Remarks</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">1</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS">The Theatre of Operations</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">13</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY">The Advance of the Fourth Army</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">19</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1">The Operations of the Fourth Army, 20th-31st +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">26</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH">The Attempt to break through south of Ypres</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">59</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2">The Operations of the Fourth Army from the end +of October to the 9th November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">98</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#THE_LAST_PHASE">The Last Phase</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">103</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#CONCLUSION">Conclusion</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">126</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2"><h3><a href="#APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></h3></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_1">Order of Battle of the Fourth Army</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">131</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_2">Order of Battle of the Army Group Fabeck</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">132</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_3">Order of Battle of the Group Gerok</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">133</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#Appendix_4">Order of Battle of the Army Group Linsingen</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">133</td></tr> + +<tr><td><a href="#INDEX">INDEX</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">135</td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">[Pg vi]</a><br /><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">[Pg vii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="ILLUSTRATIONS" id="ILLUSTRATIONS">ILLUSTRATIONS</a><br /> +<span class="smaller">SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT</span></h2> + +<table class="TOC" summary="Illustrations"> +<tr><td> </td><td class="tdr small">PAGE</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_1">Dispositions on 20th October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">20</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_2">The Attack of the Army Group Fabeck on 30th +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">67</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_3">The Attack of the Army Group Fabeck on 31st +October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">73</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_4">The Capture of Messines on 31st October 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">81</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_5">The Capture of Dixmude on 10th November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">108</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_6">The Attack of the Sixth Army on 11th November +1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">112</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdh smcap"><a href="#map_7">The Attack of the 2nd Guard Division on 11th +November 1914</a></td> +<td class="tdr padl">115</td></tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">[Pg viii]</a><br /><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">[Pg ix]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="INTRODUCTION" id="INTRODUCTION">INTRODUCTION</a></h2> + +<p>The German book of which a translation is here given +was written in the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto +Schwink, a General Staff Officer, by order of the Chief +of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is stated +to be founded on official documents. It forms one +of a series of monographs, partly projected, partly +published, on the various phases of the war, but is +the only one that is available dealing with operations +in which the British Army was engaged. Several +concerned with the Eastern theatre of war have +already appeared, and one other entitled ‘<span class="smcap">Liège-Namur</span>,’ +relating to the Western.</p> + +<p>Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book ‘1914,’ +has said that the period 27th to 31st October during +the first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was ‘more momentous and +fateful than any other which I directed during my +period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. +31st October and 1st November will remain for ever +memorable in the history of our country, for during +those two days no more than a thin and straggling +line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the +Empire and its practical ruin as an independent first-class +Power.’ The German account accentuates the +truth of Lord French’s appreciation of the great peril +in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells +us of the enemy’s plans, and of the large forces that +he brought up with great skill and secrecy to carry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">[Pg x]</a></span> +them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch’s expression, +lets us ‘know what was going on in the other +fellow’s house.’ But it does more than that: unconsciously +perhaps, it bears convincing testimony to +the fighting powers of the British Army, the determination +of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness +of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and +infantry, and the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly +credits Field-Marshal Sir John French with +‘reinforcements in abundance,’ insists that our troops +‘fought desperately for every heap of stones and +every pile of bricks before abandoning them,’ and +definitely records that ‘the fact that neither the +enemy’s commanders nor their troops gave way under +the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us +the opportunity to acknowledge that there were men +of real worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly.’ +We are further told that the effect of our +artillery was such that ‘it was not possible to push +up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire’; that ‘all +roads leading to the rear were continuously shelled +for a long way back’; that the German ‘advancing +columns were under accurate artillery fire at long +range’; that our shells ‘blocked streets and bridges +and devastated villages so far back that any regular +transport of supplies became impossible.’ As regards +rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with ‘quantities +of machine-guns,’ ‘large numbers of machine-guns,’ +etc.; with the result that ‘the roads were +swept by machine-guns’; and that ‘over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of +smoke betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets.’ +At that date we had no machine-gun units, and there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> +were only two machine-guns on the establishment of +a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, +and had not yet been replaced; actually machine-guns +were few and far between. The only inference +to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, +were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, +was mistaken for machine-gun fire both as regards +volume and effect. Our simple defences, to complete +which both time and labour had been lacking, became +in German eyes ‘a well-planned maze of trenches,’ ‘a +maze of obstacles and entrenchments’; and we had +‘turned every house, every wood and every wall into +a strong point’; ‘the villages of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and +<span class="smcap">Messines</span> ... had been converted into fortresses’ +(<i>Festungen</i>); as also the edge of a wood near <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> +and <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. As at the last-named place +there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of +two platoons, and the ‘broad wire entanglements’ +described by the German General Staff were in reality +but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans +‘took in their stride,’<a name="FNanchor_1" id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> the lavish praise, were it not +for the result of the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. +Part of it undoubtedly is. It is fair, however, +to deduce that the German nation had to be +given some explanation why the ‘contemptible little +Army’ had not been pushed straightway into the +sea.</p> + +<p>The monograph is frankly intended to present the +views that the German General Staff wish should be +held as regards the battles, and prevent, as their +Preface says, the currency of ‘the legends and rumours +which take such an easy hold on the popular imagina<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span>tion +and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct +afterwards.’ One cannot naturally expect the whole +truth to be revealed yet; that it is not will be seen +from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when +pressed by his nephews to write a true account of +1870-1—to their future financial advantage—‘It can’t +be done yet. Too many highly placed personages +(<i>hohe Herrschaften</i>) would suffer in their reputations.’ +It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian +War that Fritz Hönig, Kunz and other +German military historians who had been given access +to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil a +little. The publication of the French General Staff +account began even later. What is now given to +us is, however, amply sufficient to follow the main +German plans and movements; but the difficulties +that prevented the enemy from making successful +use of the enormous number of troops at his disposal +and his superior equipment in heavy artillery, machine-guns, +aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench +warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more +we may fairly attribute our victory to the military +qualities of the British, French and Belgian troops, +and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit defeat.</p> + +<p>The German General Staff specially claim that the +first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was a German victory, ‘for it +marked the failure of the enemy’s intention to fall on +the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich districts +of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,’ etc. +etc. Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that +General Staff’s own evidence, be regarded as a drawn +one. For it is definitely stated in the monograph +that the object of the operations was ‘successfully<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span> +closing with the enemy ... and gaining <span class="smcap">Calais</span>, the +aim and object of the 1914 campaign’—this the +German Army notoriously did not do. The intention +to break through is repeatedly stated: ‘although +fresh reinforcements had been sent up by the German +General Staff ... a break-through had not been +possible.’ ‘Another effort to break through should +be made as soon as possible.’ We are told that Fabeck’s +Army Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry +divisions) was formed ‘as a strong new army of attack +... for breaking through on the front <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Warneton</span>.’ +Linsingen’s Army Group (five divisions) +after the failure of von Fabeck was formed ‘to +drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the +(<span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span>) canal ... and to break through +there.’ Finally, however, it is admitted that ‘no +break-through of the enemy’s lines had been accomplished.... +We had not succeeded in making the +decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the +campaign in the west in our favour had to be consigned +to its grave.’ In fact, the book is largely an +apologia and a confession of failure which mere protestations +of victory cannot alter.</p> + +<p>The effects of a German victory on the course of the +war, with the Channel ports in German hands, as +compared with those of an Allied victory in Flanders, +which at that period of the war and at that season of +the year could have resulted in little more than pushing +the enemy back into Belgium a few miles, may be +easily imagined. If the battle was a tactical draw, +at least we had a strategic balance in our favour.</p> + +<p>The principal reasons advanced for the German +ill-success are ‘the enemy’s numerical superiority,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> +and the strength of his positions,’ and of course the +drastic course taken by the Belgians of ‘calling in +the sea to their aid.’</p> + +<p>There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout +the book. To those who were there and saw our +‘thin and straggling line’ and the hastily constructed +and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and +broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin +belts of wire, and none of the communication trenches +of a later date, they provoke only amazement. Even +German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements.</p> + +<p>As regards the superiority of numbers, the following +appears to be the approximate state of the case +as regards the infantry on the battle front from <span class="smcap">Armentières</span> +(inclusive) to the sea dealt with in the monograph. +It is necessary to count in battalions, as the +Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, +and the British Commander-in-Chief enumerates +the reinforcements sent up to <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> from the II and +Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial +battalions, London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also +took part. The total figures are:—</p> + +<table summary="Numbers of battalions"> +<tr><td>British, French, Belgian</td> +<td class="tdr padl">263 battalions.</td></tr> +<tr><td>German</td> +<td class="tdr padl">426 battalions.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p>That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans +of 13 to 21. Viscount French in his ‘1914’ says 7 +to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52 to 84 as +against 49 to 84, and very different from the German +claim of ‘40 divisions to 25.’ Actually in infantry +divisions the Allies had only 22, even counting as +complete the Belgian six, which had only the strength<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> +of German brigades. Any future correction of the +figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, +will probably emphasise the German superiority in +numbers still more, and the enemy indisputably had +the advantage of united command, homogeneous +formations and uniform material which were lacking +in the Allied force.</p> + +<p>As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had +six divisions, including one of three brigades. The +enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, the +Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is +not clear from the German account how much cavalry +was transferred from the Sixth Army to the Fourth +Army.<a name="FNanchor_2" id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> It may be noted that a German cavalry +division included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, +horse artillery batteries and the two or three <i>Jäger</i> +battalions, three or more machine-gun batteries and +two or more companies of cyclists; and was thus, +unlike ours, a force of all arms.</p> + +<p>The German General Staff reveal nothing about +the exact strength of the artillery. In a footnote it +is mentioned that in addition to infantry divisions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> +the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, <i>Pionier</i> +formations and other technical troops; and in the +text that ‘all the available heavy artillery of the +Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist the Fourth +Army) for the break-through.’ The Germans had +trench-mortars (<i>Minenwerfer</i>) which are several times +mentioned, whilst our first ones were still in the process +of improvisation by the Engineers of the Indian Corps +at <span class="smcap">Bethune</span>.</p> + +<p>The statement that ‘the enemy’s’ (<i>i.e.</i> British, +French and Belgian) ‘superiority in material, in guns, +trench-mortars, machine-guns and aeroplanes, etc., +was two, three, even fourfold’ is palpably nonsense +when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when +the monograph was written.</p> + +<p>The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot +understand defeat in war except on the premise that +the victor had superiority of numbers. To show to +what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie’s +<i>Henry V.</i>, vol. <span class="small">II</span>. page 216, will be found an account +of a German theory, accepted by the well-known +historian Delbrück, that the English won at Agincourt +on account of superior numbers, although contemporary +history is practically unanimous that the +French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie sums it up thus:</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>‘Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French +is inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered +the English, and finding that all contemporary +authorities, both French and English, are agreed that they +did, the writer builds up a theory that all the known facts +can be explained on the supposition that the French were +really much inferior to us in numbers ... and concludes +that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xvii" id="Page_xvii">[Pg xvii]</a></span> +of French (the English being 6000) at something between +4000 and 7000.’</p></blockquote> + +<p>It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff +Officer captured during the Ypres fighting said to his +escort as he was being taken away: ‘Now I am out +of it, do tell me where your reserves are concealed; +in what woods are they?’ and he refused to believe +that we had none. Apparently it was inconceivable +to the German General Staff that we should stand to +fight unless we had superior numbers; and these not +being visible in the field, they must be hidden away +somewhere.</p> + +<p>Further light on what the Germans imagined is +thrown by prisoners, who definitely stated that their +main attack was made south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, because it +was thought that our main reserves were near <span class="smcap">St. +Jean</span>, north-east of that town. From others it was +gathered that what could be seen of our army in that +quarter was in such small and scattered parties that +it was taken to be an outpost line covering important +concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, +fearing a trap.</p> + +<p>It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation +of the number of formations engaged may not +be altogether due to imaginary reserves, as regards +the British Army. Before the war the Great General +Staff knew very little about us. The collection of +‘intelligence’ with regard to the British Empire was +dealt with by a Section known in the Moltkestrasse as +the ‘Demi-monde Section,’ because it was responsible +for so many countries; and this Section admittedly +had little time to devote to us. Our organisation was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xviii" id="Page_xviii">[Pg xviii]</a></span> +different from that of any of the great European +armies. Their field artillery brigades contained seventy-two +guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or +howitzers; their infantry brigades consisted of two +regiments, each of three battalions, that is six battalions, +not four as in the original British Expeditionary Force. +To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant +six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he +belonged to the Blankshire Regiment, the German +might possibly believe he had identified three battalions, +whereas only one would be present. This is actually +brought out on <a href="#Page_118">page 118</a>, when the author speaks of +the 1st Battalion of the King’s (Liverpool) Regiment +as the <i>Königsregiment Liverpool</i>, and indicates his +ignorance of the British Army, when this single battalion +engages the German <i>Garde Regiment zu Fuss</i>, by +describing the fight not only as one of regiment against +regiment, but as <i>Garde gegen Garde</i> (Guard against +Guards).<a name="FNanchor_3" id="FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> Such is the fighting value of an English +Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly claimed, +but the significant sentence immediately follows: +‘any further advance on the 11th November by our +Guard troops north of the road was now out of the +question.’</p> + +<p>It may be as well to point out that the ‘volunteers’ +who it is said flocked to the barracks to form the +Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were not all volunteers +in our sense of the word. The General Staff only<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xix" id="Page_xix">[Pg xix]</a></span> +claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different +state of affairs from our New Armies, which had not +1 per cent. of trained soldiers. Many of the ‘volunteers’ +were fully trained men liable to service, who merely +anticipated their recall to the colours. It was well +known before the war that in each army corps area +Germany intended to form one ‘Active’ Corps and +one or more ‘Reserve’ Corps. The original armies +of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the +IV Reserve of von Kluck’s Army, which marched and +fought just as the active ones did. These first formed +Reserve Corps were, it is believed, entirely made up +of trained men, but those with the higher numbers +XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in +the Fourth Army, probably did contain a good percentage +of men untrained before the war.</p> + +<p><i>Ersatz</i> divisions were formed of the balance of +reservists after the Reserve divisions had been organised, +and of untrained men liable for service. After a time +the words ‘Active,’ ‘Reserve,’ and ‘<i>Ersatz</i>’ applied +to formations lost their significance, as the same classes +of men were to be found in all of them.</p> + +<p>No attempt has been made to tone down the author’s +patriotic sentiments and occasional lapses from good +taste; the general nature of the narrative is too +satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions +necessary when presenting it to the British public.</p> + +<p>The footnotes deal with a number of the more +important points raised, but are not exhaustive.</p> + +<blockquote> +<div class="hanging"> +<p><span class="notespace"><i>Note.</i>—</span>The German time, at the period of the year in +question one hour earlier than ours, has been +adhered to.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xx" id="Page_xx">[Pg xx]</a></span></p> + +<p><span class="notespace"> </span>The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished +from those of the Author by being +printed in italics.</p> + +<p><span class="notespace"> </span>In preparing the translation for issue it has not +been thought necessary to supply all the +maps provided in the original, as the general +lie of the country must be fairly well known +to British readers.</p></div></blockquote> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxi" id="Page_xxi">[Pg xxi]</a></span></p> + +<p class="center">(<i>Translation of Title Page</i>)</p> + +<p class="center p4"><b>Monographs on the Great War</b></p> + +<hr class="r5" /> + +<p class="center large">THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF<br /> +YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914</p> + +<p class="center large p2">(DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND<br /> +BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914)</p> + +<p class="center p2">FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES</p> + +<p class="center p2">PUBLISHED<br /> +BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF<br /> +OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING +</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxii" id="Page_xxii">[Pg xxii]</a><br /><a name="Page_xxiii" id="Page_xxiii">[Pg xxiii]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE">PREFACE</a><br /> +<span class="smaller smcap">By German Great Headquarters</span></h2> + +<p>The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison +with those of the past, and battles which +formerly held the world in suspense are now almost +forgotten. The German people have been kept +informed of the progress of events on all fronts since +the 4th August 1914, by the daily official reports of +the German General Staff, but the general public +will have been unable to gather from these a coherent +and continuous story of the operations.</p> + +<p>For this reason the General Staff of the German +Field Army has decided to permit the publication of +a series of monographs which will give the German +people a general knowledge of the course of the most +important operations in this colossal struggle of +nations.</p> + +<p>These monographs cannot be called histories of +the war; years, even decades, must pass before all +the true inwardness and connection of events will +be completely revealed. This can only be done when +the archives of our opponents have been opened to +the world as well as our own and those of the General +Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the German<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xxiv" id="Page_xxiv">[Pg xxiv]</a></span> +people will be given descriptions of the most important +of the battles, written by men who took part in them, +and have had the official records at their disposal.</p> + +<p>It is possible that later research may make alterations +here and there necessary, but this appears no +reason for delaying publications based on official +documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster +the legends and rumours which so easily take hold +of the popular imagination and are so difficult, if +not impossible, to correct afterwards.</p> + +<p>This series of monographs is not therefore intended +as an addition to military science, but has been written +for all classes of the German public who have borne +the burden of the war, and especially for those who +have fought in the operations, in order to increase +their knowledge of the great events for the success of +which they have so gladly offered their lives.</p> + +<p class="p2 right">GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY.</p> + +<div> +<p class="p2 ilb center"><span class="smcap">German Great Headquarters</span>,<br /> +<i>Autumn, 1917</i>. +</p></div> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="PRELIMINARY_REMARKS" id="PRELIMINARY_REMARKS">PRELIMINARY REMARKS</a></h2> + +<p>There is no more brilliant campaign in history than +the advance of our armies against the Western Powers +in August and early September 1914. The weak +French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to +beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, +the active defence of the Allied hostile armies +and the passive resistance of the great Belgian and +French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal +march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage +of each individual German soldier, combined with the +able leading of his commanders, overcame all opposition +and sent home the news of countless German +victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts +of Paris were trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy +which half the world had been weaving against +us for so many years was to be brought to a rapid +conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, +in the course of which the centre and right wings of +the German Western Army were, it is true, withdrawn, +but only to fight again as soon as possible, under more +favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting +our withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th +September<a name="FNanchor_4" id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> our troops brought him to a standstill +along a line extending from the Swiss frontier to the +Aisne, north-east of Compiègne. In the trench warfare<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span> +which now began our pursuers soon discovered that +our strength had been by no means broken, or even +materially weakened, by the hard fighting.</p> + +<p>As early as 5th September, before the battle of the +Marne, the Chief of the German General Staff had +ordered the right wing should be reinforced by the +newly-formed Seventh Army.<a name="FNanchor_5" id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> It soon became clear +to the opposing commanders that any attempt to +break through the new German front was doomed to +failure, and that a decisive success could only be +obtained by making an outflanking movement on a +large scale against the German right wing. Thus +began what our opponents have called the ‘Race to +the Sea,’ in which each party tried to gain a decision +by outflanking the other’s western wing. The good +communications of France, especially in the north, +enabled the Allied troops to be moved far more rapidly +than our own, for the German General Staff had at +their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian railways +which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened +with transport of material of every description. +In spite of this, however, the French and +British attacks failed to drive back the German right +wing at any point. Not only did they find German +troops ready to meet them in every case, but we were +also generally able to keep the initiative in our hands.</p> + +<p>In this manner by the end of September the opposing +flanks had been extended to the district north of the +Somme, about Péronne-Albert. A few days later +began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span> +and by the middle of October our advanced troops +were near Lille, marching through the richest industrial +country of France. The Army Cavalry was placed +so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to bring +pressure against the communications with England. +Our cavalry patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel +and Hazebrouck, the pivots of the enemy’s movements, +but they had to retire eastwards again when superior +hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The +reports which they brought back with them all pointed +to preparations by the enemy for an attack on a large +scale, and for another effort to turn the fortunes of +the campaign to his favour. With this in view all +available troops, including newly-arrived detachments +from England, were to be used to break through the +gap between Lille and Antwerp against our right wing, +roll it up and begin the advance against the northern +Rhine.</p> + +<p>It must be remembered that at the time this plan +was conceived the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were +still in French and Belgian possession. It was hoped +that Lille, with its well-built fortifications, even though +they were not quite up-to-date, would at least hold +up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was +defended by the whole Belgian Army of from five to +six divisions which were to be reinforced by British +troops, and it was confidently expected that this +garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the +most modern fortress in Western Europe against any +attack, especially if, as was generally believed, this +could only be carried out by comparatively weak +forces. Thus it seemed that the area of concentration +for the Franco-Belgian masses was secure until<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> +all preparations were ready for the blow to be delivered +through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the +German armies in the west. The plan was a bold +one, but it was countered by a big attack of considerable +German forces in the same neighbourhood and +at the same time. The two opponents met and held +each other up on the Yser and at Ypres, and here the +last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium and gain +possession of the rich provinces of Northern France +before the end of the year was frustrated. The +question arises how the Germans were able to find the +men to do this, since it had been necessary to send +considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the +Russian advance.</p> + +<p>Whoever has lived through those great days of +August 1914, and witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm +of the German nation, will never forget that +within a few days more than a million volunteers +entered German barracks to prepare to fight the +enemies who were hemming in Germany. Workmen, +students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders, +officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. +There was such a constant stream of men that finally +they had to be sent away, and put off till a later date, +for there was neither equipment nor clothing left for +them. By 16th August, before the advance in the +west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin +had ordered the formation of five new Reserve Corps +to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, whilst Bavaria +formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony +and Würtemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve +Corps into being. Old and young had taken up arms +in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span> +country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted +of these volunteers, the remainder being trained men +of both categories of the <i>Landwehr</i> and the <i>Landsturm</i>, +as well as some reservists from the depôts, who joined +up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen +to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the +moment, and the need of their country: they were +anxious to become useful soldiers as quickly as possible +to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. Some +regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes +of the higher educational schools came with their +teachers and joined the same company or battery. +Countless retired officers placed themselves at the +disposal of the Government, and the country will +never forget these patriots who took over commands +in the new units, the formation of which was mainly +due to their willing and unselfish work.</p> + +<p>The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps to the Western Front began +on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division +followed shortly after. Only comparatively few +experienced commanders were available for the units, +and it was left to their keen and patriotic spirit to +compensate as far as possible for what the men still +lacked to play their part in the great struggle.</p> + +<p>The situation of the armies on the Western Front +at this time was as follows. In the neighbourhood of +Lille the northern wing of the Sixth Army was fighting +against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October, +Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and +garrison, was taken after a twelve days’ siege directed +by General von Beseler, commanding the III Reserve +Corps, and well known in peace time as Chief of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> +Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications. +The victorious besiegers had carried all before +them. As they were numerically insufficient to invest +Antwerp on the west, south and east, a break-through +was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. It +was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; +but the main body of the Belgian army, in good fighting +order, was able to escape westwards along the +coast, to await the arrival of British and French reinforcements +behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians +were taken prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 +British troops<a name="FNanchor_6" id="FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> were forced into Holland. In consequence +of this new situation, and of the reports of hostile +concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, the +German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth +Army under Duke Albert of Würtemburg. It was to +be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, and XXVII +Reserve Corps,<a name="FNanchor_7" id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> and was joined later on by the III +Reserve Corps with the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division. By 13th +October the detainment of this new Army was in full +progress west and south-west of Brussels. On the +evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began +their march to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of +Bruges)—Deynze—point four miles west of Audenarde.</p> + +<p>In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town +of Lille. It had been entered on 12th October by +part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some <i>Landwehr</i> +troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing +to the useless efforts of French territorial troops to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> +defend it. The order to the garrison was: ‘The town +is to be held till the Tenth French Army arrives’; it +resulted in the capture of 4500 French prisoners, who +were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing +of the Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Würtemburg +and XIX Saxon Corps, pushed forward to the +Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.<a name="FNanchor_8" id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> They +took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through +Comines to Warneton and thence east of Armentières, +where they came into touch with the 14th Infantry +Division which was further south near the western +forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the +III Reserve Corps, with its three divisions from +Antwerp, was advancing westwards on a broad front. +By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards +and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen +and reconnaissance detachments had recognised movements +of large bodies of troops about Hazebrouck, +Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations +on a big scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to +this, considerable hostile forces had reached Ypres, +and appeared to be facing more or less southwards +opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.<a name="FNanchor_9" id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a></p> + +<p>An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the +German General Staff, gave the following instructions +for the German forces between Lille and the sea. The +Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on the +defensive along the line Menin-Armentières-La Bassée<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> +and to await the attack of our new Fourth Army +against the left flank of the enemy. The offensive +action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was +to be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which +now belonged to it, should move as its right wing in +echelon along the coast, whilst its left was to advance +through Menin.</p> + +<p>In accordance with these orders the III Reserve +Corps occupied Ostend on the 15th, its left wing reaching +the line of the Thourout-Roulers road. The Corps +was then ordered not to advance further for a few +days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and +French, who were advancing against the north wing +of the Sixth Army, being drawn prematurely to movements +in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore +were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and +the canal south of it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached the line +Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt—point six miles +east of Courtrai. On the advance of these four new +Corps, the III Reserve Corps was to draw away to +the right wing, and during the 17th and the following +morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted +to it immediately south of the coast, and cleared the +front of the Fourth Army. The reconnaissance +activity of the previous days had in places led to severe +fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of +the 6th Reserve Division. It was found that the +Belgian rearguards still held part of the ground east +of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any attempt +to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the +question, as the bridges had been blown up and the +whole line put in a state of defence.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span></p> + +<p>The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the +III Reserve Corps was a brilliant success. At midday +on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, who was to direct +the enemy’s attack from the line of the Yser, was still +in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had +time to prepare for his attack, and his only immediate +care was to secure the line from Armentières to the +sea for the deployment. After the events on the +Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested +General Joffre, the Allied commander,<a name="FNanchor_10" id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> that he might +be placed on the northern flank of the line. He would +then be close to Calais, which had already become an +English town,<a name="FNanchor_11" id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> he would be able to protect the communications +to his country; and, further, the fame to +be gained by a decisive and final victory attracted +this ambitious commander to the north. As a result +the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien +was now in action against the strong German positions +between Vermelles (four miles south-west of La Bassée) +and Laventie (west of Lille).<a name="FNanchor_12" id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Further to the north +the III British Corps was fighting against the Saxons +advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry +Corps.<a name="FNanchor_13" id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> +hostile advance on the line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east +of Ypres.<a name="FNanchor_14" id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> Immediately to the north again, the +newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th +Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had +arrived in the area Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in +its retreat by von Beseler’s columns (III Reserve +Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched +up to Bixschoote,<a name="FNanchor_15" id="FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> and the gap between this place and +Dixmude had been closed by a French Cavalry Division +which connected up with the Belgian Army. +The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, +was engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up +to the sea for the most stubborn defence. These +strong forces were to cover the arrival of the VIII and +X French Corps<a name="FNanchor_16" id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and were to deliver the first blow +against our supposed right wing.</p> + +<p>On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone +out far in advance of its Corps was surrounded near +Roulers, and it was only by its capture that the enemy +definitely discovered the arrival of the new German +Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown +to him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. +Field-Marshal French was now confronted with a new +situation. The preparations for his big attack were not +yet completed. The superiority of the masses already +concentrated did not yet appear to him to be suffi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>cient +to guarantee success against the enemy’s advance. +The British commander therefore decided to remain +on the defensive<a name="FNanchor_17" id="FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> against our new Fourth Army, until +the completion of the French concentration. His line +was already closed up to the sea, it was naturally +strong, and fresh troops were arriving daily. The +danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the effect +of making England put forth her full energy; the +British troops fought desperately to defend every inch +of ground, using every possible means to keep up the +sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and +received rapid assistance from the French, and were +backed up by fresh reinforcements from England.</p> + +<p>From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm +and unconditional determination to win the +war which pervaded the new Fourth Army gave every +prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who +was apparently still engaged in concentrating and +reorganising his forces, and gaining Calais, the aim +and object of the 1914 campaign.</p> + +<p>Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful +army, fully deployed and ready to meet us. The +British boast that they held up our attack with a +great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true +in the case of the 7th Division during the first two +days in the small sector <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt</span>. On +22nd October between <span class="smcap">Armentières</span> and the sea +there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking +German Corps; and, besides, the enemy had prepared +a series of lines of strong trenches covered by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> +an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In the +course of the operations that developed, the relative +strength of the opposing forces never appreciably +altered in our favour.<a name="FNanchor_18" id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> The moral strength of our +troops made up for the numerical superiority of the +enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back +and destroyed, it is hoped for ever, the ambition of +our opponent to regain Belgium by force of arms.</p> + +<p>The great desire of the Germans to defeat the +hostile northern wing, and to hit hardest the most +hated of all our enemies, and, on the other side, the +obstinate determination of the British to hold on to +the passages to their country, and to carry out the +offensive to the Rhine with all their resources, resulted +in this battle being one of the most severe of the whole +war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the +battle on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> can never be sufficiently +praised, and in spite of great losses their +enthusiasm remained unchecked and their offensive +spirit unbroken.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS" id="THE_THEATRE_OF_OPERATIONS">THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS</a></h2> + +<p>The country in which it was hoped to bring about +the final decision of the campaign of 1914 was not +favourable to an attack from east to west.</p> + +<p>Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, +is almost completely flat, and lies only slightly above +sea-level, and in some parts is even below it. Mount +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, in the south, is the only exception; rising +to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower +of Western Flanders. Before the war it was +a well-wooded ridge with pretty enclosures and +villages. From its slopes and summits could be +seen the whole countryside from <span class="smcap">Lille</span> to <span class="smcap">Menin</span> and +<span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>.</p> + +<p>The possession of this hill was of great importance. +Our cavalry actually occupied it during the early +days of October, but when the enemy advanced he +immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was +still too far away to help, and so Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> fell +into the enemy’s hands. During the battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +it was his best observation post, and of the utmost +assistance to his artillery.</p> + +<p>We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on +the eastern crest of the ridge in front of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but +in the autumn of 1914, as also later in the war, this +was always the signal for the most desperate fighting.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span> +It was thus that the heights of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>,<a name="FNanchor_19" id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> the high-lying +buildings of <span class="smcap">Hooge</span> and the village of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +won their sanguinary fame.</p> + +<p>Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its +high ramparts and fine buildings, <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was formerly +one of the most picturesque towns in Flanders. In +the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance, +and became the centre of the cloth-weaving +trade on its introduction from Italy. <span class="smcap">Bruges</span>, lying +close to the coast, became the market for its wares. +The Clothweavers’ Guild, which accumulated great +wealth, erected in <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> a fine Gothic hall, whose +towers with those of St. Martin’s Church were landmarks +for miles round. In modern times, however, +the importance of the town greatly diminished. The +cloth-weaving industry drifted away to the factories +of <span class="smcap">Menin</span> and <span class="smcap">Courtrai</span>; and <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, like its dead +neighbour <span class="smcap">Bruges</span>, remained only a half-forgotten +memory of its former brilliance.</p> + +<p>The war has brought fresh importance to the town, +but of a mournful kind. On the impact of the German +and Anglo-French masses in Flanders in the autumn +of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations. +The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front +of it; for, as an Englishman has written, it had become +a point of honour to hold the town. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> lay so +close to the front that our advance could be seen from +its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing +his batteries and sheltering his reserves. For +the sake of our troops we had to bring it under fire;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> +for German life is more precious than the finest Gothic +architecture. Thus the mythical death of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +became a reality: no tower now sends forth its light +across the countryside, and a wilderness of wrecked +and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town so full +of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders.</p> + +<p>The streams which run northwards from the hills +about <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> unite for the most part near the town +and flow into the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal, which connects the +<span class="smcap">Lys</span> at <span class="smcap">Comines</span> with the sea at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>. This +canal passes through the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> ridge near <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span> +and, following northwards the course of a small canalised +tributary of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, meets the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> itself south +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. The dunes at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> have been cut +through by engineers for its exit to the sea. It is +only from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> northwards that the canal becomes +an obstacle which requires proper bridging equipment +for its passage. Its high embankments to the +south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, however, give excellent cover in +the otherwise flat country and greatly simplify the +task of the defender.</p> + +<p>The canal acquired a decisive importance when the +hard-pressed Belgians, during the battle on the night +of 29th-30th October, let in the sea at flood-tide +through the sluices into the canal, and then by blowing +up the sluice-gates at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, allowed it to +flood the battlefield along the lower <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. By this +means they succeeded in placing broad stretches of +country under water, so much so that any extensive +military operations in that district became out of the +question. The high water-level greatly influenced all +movements over a very large area. By his order the +King of the Belgians destroyed for years the natural<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span> +wealth of a considerable part of his fertile country, +for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation +down to its very roots.</p> + +<p>The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and +difficult for observation purposes. The high level of +the water necessitates drainage of the meadows, which +for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes which +have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are +bordered with willows, and thick-set hedges form the +boundaries of the cultivated areas. Generally speaking, +the villages do not consist of groups of houses: +the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming +a single street. The country is densely populated +and is consequently well provided with roads. But +these are only good where they have been made on +embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, +which begin towards the end of October, rapidly turn +the other roads into mere mud tracks and in many +cases make them quite useless for long columns of +traffic.</p> + +<p>The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by +rain and surface-water. The loam soil was on the +whole easy to work in; but it was only on the high +ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to +give sufficient cover against the enemy’s artillery fire; +on the flat, low-lying ground they could not in many +cases be made more than two feet deep.</p> + +<p>A few miles south of the coast the country assumes +quite another character: there are no more hedges +and canals: instead gently rolling sand-hills separate +the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is not +fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes +prevents the sea encroaching on the land.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span></p> + +<p>The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of +Flanders is the difficulty of observation. The enemy, +fighting in his own country,<a name="FNanchor_20" id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> had every advantage, +while our artillery observation posts were only found +with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed +from the front line, and it frequently happened that +our brave artillerymen had to bring up their guns +into the front infantry lines in order to use them +effectively. Although the enemy was able to range +extremely accurately on our guns which were thus +quickly disclosed, nothing could prevent the German +gunners from following the attacking infantry.</p> + +<p>Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult +by the many hedges and villages, so that it took a +long time to discover the enemy’s dispositions and +give our artillery good targets.</p> + +<p>Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent +limitations of view were all to the advantage +of the defenders, who were everywhere able to surprise +the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh +defensive lines in front of them without knowing +whether they were occupied or not. The British, +many of whom had fought in a colonial war against +the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country, +allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and +then opened a devastating fire at point-blank range +from rifles and machine-guns concealed in houses and +trees.</p> + +<p>In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the +German attacks so that even the biggest operations +degenerated into disconnected actions which made the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> +greatest demands on the powers of endurance and +individual skill of our volunteers. In spite of all +these difficulties our men, both old and young, even +when left to act on their own initiative, showed a spirit +of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle +on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> a sacred memory both for the Army and +the Nation, and every one who took part in it may say +with pride, ‘I was there.’</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY" id="THE_ADVANCE_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY">THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY</a></h2> + +<p>An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the +following instructions for the 18th:—</p> + +<blockquote> + +<p>The III Reserve Corps to march to the line +<span class="smcap">Coxyde-Furnes-Oeren</span>, west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Aertrycke-Thourout</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Lichtervelde-Ardoye</span>.</p> + +<p>The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area <span class="smcap">Emelghem-Iseghem</span>, +and, on the left wing, the +XXVII Reserve Corps to the line <span class="smcap">Lendelede-Courtrai</span>.</p></blockquote> + +<p>The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve +Corps all reached their appointed destinations on the +evening of the 18th without meeting any strong +resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced +guards and patrols came into touch with weak hostile +detachments who were awaiting our advance well +entrenched, and surprised us with infantry and artillery +fire. At <span class="smcap">Roulers</span> a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes +circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, +and cavalry patrols pushing well forward showed +that the British now realised the strength of the new +German forces.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_1" id="map_1"></a><img src="images/i044.png" width="491" height="592" alt="DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914." /> + +<p class="fignote"><i>On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right +of the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. +It is also inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps +as north of Armentières—only one of its Divisions was—while +the II Corps was certainly too closely pressed to detach +any troops to the north as depicted in the diagram.</i></p> +</div> + +<p>In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a><br /><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> +Army, the troops of General von Beseler had opened +the battle on the Yser. During its advance northwards +to cross the Yser at the appointed places the +III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition +east of the river-barrier. The men knew they were +on the decisive wing of the attack, and they pushed +ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid +assault the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division captured <span class="smcap">Westende</span> +from the Belgians, although a gallant defence was put +up, and in spite of the fact that British torpedo-boats +and cruisers took part in the action from the sea with +their heavy artillery<a name="FNanchor_21" id="FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> both during the advance and +the fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve +Division deployed to attack a strongly entrenched +hostile position. The 3rd Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion +captured the obstinately defended village of <span class="smcap">St. Pierre +Cappelle</span> after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the +main body of the division succeeded in pushing forward +to the neighbourhood of <span class="smcap">Schoore</span>. The 6th Reserve +Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, also +closed with the enemy. It captured <span class="smcap">Leke</span>, and <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, +defended by the 4th Belgian Division; but even this +Brandenburg Division, for all its war experience, found +the task of forcing the crossings over the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> too +much for it.</p> + +<p>The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing +us a thousand or two thousand yards nearer the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +but it had shown that the fight for the river line was +to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined +to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the +highest possible price. Four lines of trenches had +been dug, and it could be seen that every modern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> +scientific resource had been employed in putting the +villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state +of defence. A great number of guns, very skilfully +placed and concealed, shelled the ground for a considerable +distance east of the river, and in addition +to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy +naval guns from the sea. Battleships, cruisers and +torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank of the 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division with their fire, and the British had +even brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats +close inshore.<a name="FNanchor_22" id="FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> They used a great quantity of ammunition, +but the effect of it all was only slight, for +the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and +indicated bad observation. It became still more +erratic when our long-range guns were brought into +action against the British Fleet. Detachments of the +4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division had to be echeloned back as far +as Ostend, in order to defend the coast against hostile +landings. During the day the General Commanding +the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division to cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, on +account of the heavy fire from the British naval guns, +but to make it pass with the main body of the Corps +behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose area the +fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The +<i>Ersatz</i> Division was informed accordingly. On the +19th another effort would have to be made to force +the crossings of the river by frontal attack, for everywhere +to the south strong opposition had been encountered. +From near <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> French troops carried +on the line of the compact Belgian Army. It was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> +against these that the new Reserve Corps were now +advancing.</p> + +<p>On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th +October a strong attack was delivered from the west +by the 4th Belgian Division, and from the south-west +by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a brigade +of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, +against <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. +They were driven back after heavy fighting. +During the 19th the southern wing of the Brandenburg +(III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing +nearer the river and, on its left, part of the artillery +of the XXII Reserve Corps came into action in support +of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve Corps, +which until that day had been fighting unassisted.</p> + +<p>On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed +on the whole front of the Fourth Army. The XXII +Reserve Corps advanced on <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve +Corps. In front of it lay the strong bridge-head +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, well provided with heavy guns. The +whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed into +battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended +by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th +Reserve Division the 209th Reserve Regiment late in +the evening took <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> after severe street +fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the +village of <span class="smcap">Gits</span>, whilst <span class="smcap">Cortemarck</span> was evacuated by +the enemy during the attack. The 46th Reserve +Division in a running fight crossed the main road to +<span class="smcap">Thourout</span>, north of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, and by the evening +had arrived close to <span class="smcap">Staden</span>. Heavy street fighting +in the latter place continued during the night: the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> +enemy, supported by the population, offered strong +resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued +behind our front lines, endangering the cohesion +of the attacking troops, but never to a serious extent.</p> + +<p>The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition +at <span class="smcap">Rumbeke</span>, south-east of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>; but all +the enemy’s efforts were in vain, and the 233rd Reserve +Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its Corps Commander, +General von Hügel, forced its way through +the rows of houses, many of which were defended with +light artillery and machine-guns. A very heavy fight +took place for the possession of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, which was +stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were +put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from +holes in the roofs and windows, and concealed mines +exploded among the advancing troops. In spite of +all this, by 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> <span class="smcap">Roulers</span> was taken by the 233rd, +234th and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking +from north, east and south respectively. Further +to the south, after a small skirmish with British cavalry, +the 52nd Reserve Division reached <span class="smcap">Morslede</span>, its +objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII +Reserve Corps had come into contact with the 3rd +British Cavalry Division which tried to hold up the +Corps in an advanced position at <span class="smcap">Rolleghem-Cappelle</span>. +After a lively encounter the British cavalry was +thrown back on to the 7th British Division, which +held a strong position about <span class="smcap">Dadizeele</span>.<a name="FNanchor_23" id="FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span></p> + +<p>Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation +had been considerably cleared up, in so far as we now +knew that the Belgians, French and British not only +held the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> canal, but also the high +ground east and north-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. Everything +pointed to the fact that an unexpectedly strong +opponent was awaiting us in this difficult country, +and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively +untrained troops of Duke Albert of Würtemburg’s +Army. In the meantime the Commander of +the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, +after a discussion at Army Headquarters with General +von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, decided +to renew the attack, as the left wing of the Fourth +Army had now come up on his immediate right. In +consequence of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved +from its position on the line <span class="smcap">Menin-Warneton</span> and +replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the IV Cavalry +Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of +the Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were +continued with frequent reinforcements of fresh troops, +had the effect of holding the enemy and drawing a +strong force to meet them. They were not, however, +destined to have any decisive success, for the offensive +strength of the Sixth Army had been reduced by +previous fighting, and it was not sufficient to break +through the enemy’s strongly entrenched positions.<a name="FNanchor_24" id="FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> +All the more therefore were the hopes of Germany +centred in the Fourth Army, which was fighting further +northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of the campaign +in Western Europe at this period.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1" id="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY1"><span class="smcap">THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY +FROM 20th OCTOBER TO 31st OCTOBER 1914</span></a></h2> + +<p>On 20th October the battle broke out along the +whole line, on a front of about sixty miles. The enemy +had got into position, and was prepared to meet the +attack of Duke Albert of Würtemburg’s Army. On +the very day that the British, French and Belgians +intended to begin their advance they found themselves +compelled to exert all their strength to maintain +their positions against our offensive. The British +and French had to bring up constant reinforcements, +and a hard and bitter struggle began for every yard of +ground. The spirit in which our opponents were +fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian +Division, picked up in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> on 16th October. This +ran: ‘The fate of the whole campaign probably depends +on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore officers +and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be +called upon to make, to do even more than their mere +duty. The salvation of the country and therefore of +each individual among us depends on it. Let us then +resist to our utmost.’</p> + +<p>We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, +opposed to such a determined and numerically superior +enemy, were able to justify the confidence which had +been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the +following proclamations by their highest commanders +on their arrival in Belgium:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> + +<blockquote> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">Great Headquarters</span>,<br /> +<i>14th October 1914</i>. +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">To the Fourth Army</span>,—I offer my welcome to the +Fourth Army, and especially to its newly-formed Reserve +Corps, and I am confident that these troops will act with the +same devotion and bravery as the rest of the German Army.</p> + +<p>Advance, with the help of God—my watchword.</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap">William, I. R.</span> +</p> + +<h3 class="left"><i>ARMY ORDER.</i></h3> + +<p>I am pleased to take over the command of the Army +entrusted to me by the Emperor. I am fully confident +that the Corps which have been called upon to bring about +the final decision in this theatre of war will do their duty +to their last breath with the old German spirit of courage +and trust, and that every officer and every man is ready +to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred cause +of our Fatherland. With God’s assistance victory will +then crown our efforts.</p> + +<p>Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor.</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Duke Albert of Würtemburg</span>,<br /> +<i>General and Army Commander</i>. +</p> + +<div> +<p class="ilb center"><span class="smcap">Army Headquarters, Brussels</span>,<br /> +<i>15th October 1914</i>. +</p></div></blockquote> + +<p>Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army +was not an infinitely difficult one. It would have +probably been achieved nevertheless if the Belgians +at the moment of their greatest peril had not called +the sea to their aid to bring the German attack to a +halt. Let us, however, now get down to the facts.</p> + +<p>On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering +ram of the Fourth Army, began an attack +with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by almost +the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of +the Yser west of the line <span class="smcap">Mannekensvere-Schoor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>bakke</span>. +The 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division to the north and the +6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. By +the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions had driven the enemy back across the river +in spite of the support given him by British and French +heavy batteries.<a name="FNanchor_25" id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> In front of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division +the enemy still held a bridge-head at <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span>. +At 8.15 <span class="small">A.M.</span> on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the +Staff of the 6th Reserve Division, that part of the +26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had crossed the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span>. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd +Battalions of this regiment had worked their way up +to the north-eastern part of the bend of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +south of <span class="smcap">Schoore</span>, and had got into the enemy’s outposts +on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a +shot had been fired, and not an unnecessary noise had +disturbed the quiet of the dawning day. Volunteers +from the engineers silently and rapidly laid bridging +material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge +west of <span class="smcap">Keyem</span>, which had been blown up and +lay in the water, was very quickly made serviceable +again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians +had considered their position sufficiently protected by +the river, and by the outposts along the eastern bank. +By 6 <span class="small">A.M.</span> German patrols were on the far side of the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span>, and the enemy’s infantry and machine-gun fire +began only when they started to make a further +advance. Three companies of the 1st and two companies +of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as part +of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already +crossed the temporary bridges at the double and taken<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span> +up a position on the western bank: so that, in all, +2½ battalions and a machine-gun company were +now on the western bank.</p> + +<p>The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, +and prepared a thoroughly unpleasant day for +those who had crossed. Heavy and light guns of +the British and French artillery<a name="FNanchor_26" id="FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> hammered incessantly +against the narrow German bridge-head and +the bridges to it. Lying without cover in the swampy +meadows the infantry was exposed beyond all help +to the enemy’s rifle and machine-gun fire from west +and south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks +again and again, but to attempt sending reinforcements +across to it was hopeless. Some gallant +gunners, however, who had brought their guns close +up to the eastern bank, were able to give great help +to their friends in their critical situation. Thus +assisted the infantry succeeded in holding the position, +and during the following night was able to make +it sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of +success to any further hostile efforts. During the +night several Belgian attacks with strong forces were +repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve Division +was able to put a further 2½ battalions across +to the western bank of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> bend. On the +23rd we gained possession of <span class="smcap">Tervaete</span>, and the +dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was +thereby considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th +October saw all the infantry of the 6th Reserve Division +west of the river. A pontoon bridge was thrown +across the north-eastern part of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> bend, but +it was still impossible to bring guns forward on account<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span> +of the enemy’s heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve +Division still lay in its battle positions along the +river bank north of <span class="smcap">Schoorbakke</span>, but every time +attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian +artillery smashed the bridges to pieces. The 4th +<i>Ersatz</i> Division suffered heavily, as it was subjected +to constant artillery fire from three sides, and to +entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands +and the high level of the ground water. Whenever +fire ceased during the night strong hostile attacks soon +followed; but they were all repulsed. The withdrawal +of the main body of the <i>Ersatz</i> Division behind the +6th Reserve Division to cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, as General +von Beseler had once planned, had become impracticable +for the moment, for it had been discovered through +the statements of prisoners that the 42nd French +Division had arrived in <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> to assist the Belgians. +The 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, which had been weakened +on the 18th by the transfer of one of its three brigades +to the 5th Reserve Division, could not be expected to +bring the new enemy to his knees by the running fight +that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone +was sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; +in addition, the fire of the enemy’s naval guns from the +sea prevented any large offensive operations in the +area in question. Thus the <i>Ersatz</i> troops were compelled +to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining +their positions under the cross-fire of guns of +every calibre, to driving back the hostile attacks, and +to holding the Belgian and French forces off in front +of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. +It was not until some long-range batteries +were placed at the disposal of the division that its<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> +position improved. A couple of direct hits on the +enemy’s ships soon taught them that they could no +longer carry on their good work undisturbed. Their +activity at once noticeably decreased, and the more +the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from +the dunes, the further the ships moved away from +the coast and the less were they seen.</p> + +<p>General von Beseler never for a moment doubted +that the decision lay with the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions, especially as the four Corps of the Fourth +Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able +to reach the canal-barrier with any considerable forces.</p> + +<p>The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General +of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, had in the meantime +come into line south of General von Beseler’s troops, +and had already fought some successful actions. It +had arrived on the 19th in the district east of <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> +and about <span class="smcap">Vladsloo</span>, just in time to help in driving +back the Franco-Belgian attack against the southern +flank of the 6th Reserve Division.<a name="FNanchor_27" id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> That same evening +it was ordered to attack from north and south +against the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, an exceptionally +difficult task. In addition to the fact that the +swampy meadows of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal limited freedom +of movement to an enormous extent, the <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> +canal, running at right angles to it from east +to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +lay at the junction of these two waterways, +and behind its bridge-head lines were the Belgian +‘Iron’ Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French +Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and +part of the 5th Belgian Division, determined to defend<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span> +the place at all costs. About eighty guns of every +calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire the +ground over which Falkenhayn’s Corps would have +to attack. On the 20th, in spite of all these difficulties, +the 44th Reserve Division, on the northern wing of +the Corps, captured <span class="smcap">Beerst</span> and reached the canal +bank west of <span class="smcap">Kasteelhoek</span> in touch with von Beseler’s +Corps. The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the +left wing, took <span class="smcap">Vladsloo</span> and several villages south-east +of it on the northern bank of the <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> +Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those +villages the reach of the canal between <span class="smcap">Eessen</span> and +<span class="smcap">Zarren</span> was crossed on hastily constructed footbridges, +and a further advance made in a south-westerly +direction. <span class="smcap">Eessen</span> itself was occupied, and +the attack brought us to within a hundred yards of +the enemy. He realised his extremely critical situation,<a name="FNanchor_28" id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> +and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand +were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile +artillery fire the German losses were by no means +slight. On one occasion when our advancing infantry +units were losing touch with one another in this difficult +country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered +from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. After a heavy struggle the onrush of +the enemy was held up, mainly owing to our artillery, +which heroically brought its guns up into position +immediately behind the infantry front line.</p> + +<p>During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised +in order to recommence its attack on the +bridge-head from east and south-east on the following +morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The +garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> +hold out to the last man, and had been informed that +any one who attempted to desert would be shot without +mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard all the +exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting +for their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless +by the 21st October the 43rd Reserve Division, +which consisted of volunteers from the Guard Corps +Reservists, had taken the château south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +and <span class="smcap">Woumen</span>. The opposing sides lay within a +hundred yards of each other. Artillery preparation, +attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. Our +artillery did fearful havoc and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was in flames. +The Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly +reinforced, and conducted itself most gallantly. From +the north the battalions of the 44th Reserve Division +were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy +back on to the town, and German batteries were +brought up into, and at times even in front of, the +infantry front line. Although we were unable to force +our way into <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, on the evening of the 23rd +our troops were in position all round it.</p> + +<p>On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII +Reserve Corps, under General of Cavalry von Kleist, +had advanced at 9 <span class="small">A.M.</span> on 20th October on the front +<span class="smcap">Handzaeme-Staden</span> in order to reach the canal on +the line <span class="smcap">Noordschoote-Bixschoote</span>. The 45th Reserve +Division was on the right and the 46th Reserve +Division on the left. After some hours of street fighting +<span class="smcap">Staden</span> was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th +Reserve Division. By nightfall a line from <span class="smcap">Clercken</span> +to the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest was reached. +On the 21st the Corps had to cross a stretch of country +which put these partially trained troops and their<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> +inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great +forest of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> with its dense undergrowth made +it exceedingly difficult to keep direction in the attack +and to maintain communication between units fighting +an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such +as the <span class="smcap">Steenebeck</span> offered favourable opportunities +to the enemy to put up a strong defence behind a +succession of depressions. Thus our gallant troops +after every successful assault found themselves confronted +by another strong position: but unwavering +and regardless of loss, they continued their advance.</p> + +<p>By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Division +had completely driven the enemy out of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> +Forest,<a name="FNanchor_29" id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> whilst its sister-division had advanced +north of the <span class="smcap">Steenebeck</span>, and with its northern wing +supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of +it, had pushed forward to beyond <span class="smcap">Woumen</span>. On the +morning of the 22nd the heavy artillery opened fire +against the French positions on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> canal to +prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however +only the northern Division was able to reach the sector +allotted to the Corps, and an Army Order directed the +46th Reserve Division to the south-west against the line +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck</span>, in order to help carry for<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>ward +the attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which +was completely held up in front of the latter place. As +a result of this the advance of von Kleist’s Corps also +came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable +fame during the day. In spite of a desperate +resistance the 210th Reserve Regiment stormed the +strongly entrenched village of <span class="smcap">Merckem</span> and the village +of <span class="smcap">Luyghem</span> lying north of it; a daring attack by the +209th and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through +the enemy’s positions on the <span class="smcap">Murtje Vaart</span>, whilst +the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the +<span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> sector, supported by the concentrated +fire of its artillery in position along the south-western +edge of <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest. The 216th Reserve Regiment +took <span class="smcap">Mangelaere</span> by storm, in doing which its +gallant commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed +at the head of his troops. The 1st British Division +held a strong position along the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span>, in touch +with the French, and artillery of every calibre near +<span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> enfiladed the German attack.<a name="FNanchor_30" id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> The +British themselves speak of our attack as a magni<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>ficent +feat of arms carried out with infinite courage +and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they +charged through a hail of bullets in closed ranks up +to the enemy’s defences. The 212th Reserve Regiment +under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried +forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve +Regiment, pushed its way into the strongly fortified +village of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. The enemy on our side of +the canal, on the line <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck-Zonnebeke</span>, +was threatened with annihilation. <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> +commanded the main road and the canal-crossing +to <span class="smcap">Poperinghe</span>, where the enemy was detraining +his reinforcements.<a name="FNanchor_31" id="FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> The British therefore fought +with the courage of desperation: for not only was the +fate of the high ground east and north-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +now in the balance, but also the chance of being able +to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which +had been planned. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> and the high ground east +of the canal were on no account to be lost, and furious +counter-attacks were therefore delivered against the +intermingled German units. Nevertheless our gallant +volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the +butts of their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand +fighting was finally decided in our favour. At 6.30 +that evening <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> was ours. Unfortunately, +however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it +was lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking +troops were to be relieved under cover of darkness, +but they assembled and marched back before the +relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, +immediately advanced into the evacuated village and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> +took position among the ruins. Simultaneously a +big hostile counter-attack drove the 46th Reserve +Division from the high ground south of <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span>, +which it had captured, and pressed it back beyond +the stream again. The spirit and strength of the +young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, +and only a few of the subordinate commanders had +yet learnt how to deal with critical situations. Officers +of the General Staff and Divisional Staffs had to help +to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and +followed their new leaders, and were taken forward +again to the attack. Thus on the 23rd the high +ground south of the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> was won back by +the 46th Reserve Division, but <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> remained +lost to us, and <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> could not be captured.<a name="FNanchor_32" id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span></p> + +<p>On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was +directed from the north against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. If the British +and French did not intend to give up their offensive +plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking Belgium +and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from +the hated German, they would have to maintain their +positions along the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> bridge-head east of the +canal between <span class="smcap">Comines</span> and the coast. For this reason +the country round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was the central area of the +Anglo-French defence from the beginning to the end +of the battle. Our opponents defended this position +on a wide semicircle by successive lines of trenches +and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, +every farm and even every large copse has won for +itself a fame of blood. The reinforcements which +Field-Marshal French received in abundance he placed +round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but not only for defensive purposes; +they were more often used to deliver attack after +attack against our young troops who had been weakened +by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they were +already being employed in this manner against the +46th Reserve Division.<a name="FNanchor_33" id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> He hoped to use the oppor<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>tunity +of our retirement behind the <span class="smcap">Kortebeck</span> to +break through our line and to roll up the part of the +front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and +thus to regain the initiative and freedom of manœuvre +on this extreme wing.<a name="FNanchor_34" id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> However, the blow was parried +by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, badly +placed lines the German units, which had scarcely +had time to reorganise, brought the hostile masses to +a standstill and won back in a counter-attack the +ground which they had lost during the night. On +this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry +the honours of the day. The fire of the guns, +brought up into the foremost lines, made wide gaps +in the attacking columns and the enemy’s losses must +have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered +severely in the constant fighting and under the everlasting +hostile artillery fire. Some of our regiments +had been reduced to half their strength. But in spite +of it the British did not succeed in breaking through +between the XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps.</p> + +<p>The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this +time completely held up in front of strongly entrenched +positions on the line <span class="smcap">Langemarck-Zonnebeke-Gheluvelt</span> +and opposed to an enemy who was becoming +stronger every day and making the most desperate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +efforts to regain his freedom of action and begin a +big offensive himself. The XXVI Reserve Corps, +which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the 51st +Reserve Division from the area west of <span class="smcap">Roulers</span>, +and the other Division from <span class="smcap">Morslede</span>, encountered +a stubborn resistance along the ridge <span class="smcap">Westroosebeke-Passchendaele-Keiberg</span>. +Fighting under the +eyes of their general, who was himself in the thick of +the struggle, the 51st Reserve Division stormed the +slope on to the ridge and entered <span class="smcap">Westroosebeke</span>. +The French division defending it was driven out at +four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the +gallant 51st, supported by the 23rd Reserve <i>Jäger</i> +Battalion, reached a line from the railway-station +north-west of <span class="smcap">Poelcappelle</span> to <span class="smcap">Poelcappelle</span> itself +during the evening. The attack was all the more +daring through the fact that <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest was +still in the enemy’s hands, and the flank of the division +therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the +52nd Reserve Division had taken <span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span>, +<span class="smcap">Keiberg</span> and the high ground between them from +the British; the artillery again deserving the highest +praise for its co-operation.<a name="FNanchor_35" id="FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> The attack, however,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> +was brought to a standstill in front of the enemy’s +main position at the cross-roads east of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>. +The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by General +von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in +close touch with the 52nd Reserve Division on the +evening of the 20th. Advancing in four columns and +by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards. +The Würtemburg Division had succeeded in driving +the 7th British Division out of <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span> after heavy +street fighting, and the left wing was bent back on +<span class="smcap">Terhand</span>. Communication was there obtained with +the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of +the Sixth Army, which had captured a hostile position +north-east of <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span>.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to +our immediate front. It followed a line <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck-Zonnebeke-Reutel-Gheluvelt</span>; +and +the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,<a name="FNanchor_36" id="FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span> +all picked troops, had already been located there. +They had dug a well-planned maze of trenches behind +broad wire entanglements before a single German shell +arrived to disturb their work.<a name="FNanchor_37" id="FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> The few stretches +of rising ground in the district had been included in +the skilfully selected positions as observation posts, +and the defenders were thus able to bring our advancing +columns under accurate artillery fire at long range. +This was especially the case from the high ground near +<span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>, whence the whole ground in front of +the position as far as <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> could be enfiladed. +All these difficulties, however, were not sufficient to +deter the offensive spirit of the German troops, and +‘<i>Vorwärts</i>’ was still their watchword: forwards and +back with the enemy, so that the rigid western front +might once more be mobile. The main body of the +XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span><a name="FNanchor_38" id="FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> +from north and east, whilst the XXVII +Reserve Corps fought for the upper hand in the woods +between <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span> and <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>. The great +efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen +with its guns and support them with their fire +were in vain, owing to the difficult country, and the +well-aimed fire from the enemy’s prepared positions +reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> +killed, and officers of high rank took their places and +reorganised the intermingled units.</p> + +<p>With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to +gain a decisive victory between <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> on 22nd and 23rd October the fate of +the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. +For the time being any further thought of a break-through +was out of the question. The troops up till +now had met the enemy full of a keen fighting spirit, +and had stormed his positions singing ‘<i>Deutschland, +Deutschland über alles’</i> regardless of casualties, and +had been one and all ready to die for their country; +but they had suffered heavily in the contest against a +war-experienced and numerically superior opponent +entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when +the last reserves of the Army, the 37th <i>Landwehr</i> +Brigade and the 2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, had been placed +at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could +only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night +of 23rd-24th October the expected Anglo-French +counter-attacks began, and continued throughout +the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right +wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary +local successes and putting in fresh forces the +enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a break-through; +but the German troops though weakened +held up all these furious onslaughts from positions +which had never been selected for defence, but were +merely those reached at the close of the attack.<a name="FNanchor_39" id="FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> + +<p>The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced +to continue ordering all his Corps to attack, in order +to co-operate with the Sixth Army which was attacking +and, besides this, to pin the enemy’s forces opposed +to him to their ground: for in the north a decision +appeared to be imminent on the front of General von +Beseler’s III Reserve Corps: in addition to the entire +infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had crossed +the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry +of the 5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the +44th Reserve Division succeeded in crossing the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +during that day. The enemy was compelled to +evacuate the western bank of the canal from <span class="smcap">St. +George</span> to south-east of <span class="smcap">Stuyvekenskerke</span>, in +spite of the fact that there had been one French and +four Belgian Divisions<a name="FNanchor_40" id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> opposing the III Reserve +Corps, and that the ten howitzer batteries had proved +insufficient to engage the Belgian, French and British +artillery successfully. In consequence of this inferiority +the old and new canal crossings lay under constant +concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport +guns over the waterway failed. Many a fine piece of +engineering carried out by our indefatigable sappers<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> +was destroyed by the enemy’s shells. The supply of +ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of +the greatest difficulty, as all the roads leading to the +rear across the swampy meadows were continuously +shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our front +troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next +operation was to break through the enemy’s position +here once and for all, though it was clear from +the beginning that the attack would be a very severe +one. Belgian and French working parties had dug +a series of positions between the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and the <span class="smcap">Nieuport-Bixschoote</span> +railway, from which the ground in +front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade +fire from skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed +batteries. On both wings, according to the +latest information at hand, strong hostile attacks were +threatening us, that is to say, near <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> as well +as near and to the south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. To meet these +the Army Commander had replaced the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division, which had been echeloned back along the +coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by +detachments of the Marine Division, and a few troops +placed at his disposition by the Governor of Belgium, +and had ordered it to march to <span class="smcap">Thourout</span>. At the +same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range +guns were placed to prevent the enemy from +concentrating for an attack in the <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> district. +However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood +of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, and was directed against those +battalions of the 44th Reserve Division which had +crossed to the west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. The enemy realised +the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from +the north-west, and put all available Belgian and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> +French reserves into the attack. Thus between five +and six battalions from three Belgian regiments and +the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a +strong force of artillery, advanced to the attack of +our southern flank. The Belgians themselves describe +this attack in the following words: ‘One saw the +companies doubling forward in small groups, lying +down on the officers’ signal, and then getting up to go +forward again until they finally deployed into their +attacking lines. But unfortunately they were asked +to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of +the men were mown down by the machine-guns. +Company after company was decimated, and in spite +of the energy of their leaders they had to give way, +death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. +The Marine Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon +gallantry, soon shared the same fate. But all this +sacrifice was not in vain—it stopped the enemy’s +advance.’<a name="FNanchor_41" id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a></p> + +<p>It will be understood then that the first thing for +the weak and widely separated battalions of the 44th +Reserve Division to do on the 25th was to get breathing +space and reorganise, even though they were +exposed all the time to the heaviest fire from west, +south and south-east. Further to the north, however, +on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and 6th Reserve +Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries +across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of +these two divisions had been concentrated under the +expert leadership of General von Ziethen, it began to +prepare the way for the infantry attack. By midday<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> +both the divisions were advancing steadily towards +the railway embankment on the line <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle-Pervyse</span>. +The Belgians had to evacuate position +after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire +was poured in by the enemy’s artillery about <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>; +and simultaneously a brigade of the 6th Reserve +Division south-east of <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> had to be directed +southwards in order not to lose touch with the right +wing of the 44th Reserve Division. There were no +reinforcements to fill up the gaps, and thus the attack +came shortly afterwards to a standstill.</p> + +<p>A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly +from the south: the German artillery, including 42-centimetre +guns, had bombarded <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> throughout +the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and +now the 43rd Reserve Division had begun its assault +on the town. It resulted in the most violent street +fighting; fast and furious came the bullets from the +machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of +the town, and from the shells from the batteries +massed west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, but nothing could hold up +our attack. The Belgians have given the following +description of the power of the German assault: +‘What plunder must not they have been promised, +to allow themselves to be killed in such a way? What +drink must they not have taken to give themselves +such animal courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, +they storm forward with the howls of wild beasts; +lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under +foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot +down in hundreds, they keep coming on. Then follow +isolated fights with bayonets and the butts of rifles: +some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> +bashed in.’ The fight swayed backwards and forwards +till well into the night: guns brought up into the +front line fired at point-blank range: both sides put +in their last reserves.</p> + +<p>During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets +fixed, and we attacked again. A small German +detachment of about fifty men advanced across the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the +enemy’s batteries, it succumbed to greatly superior +numbers. Thus the morning of 26th October found +the attackers back in their assault-positions: their +courage, spirit and indifference to death having added +another leaf of fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It +was clear, however, that another artillery bombardment +was indispensable to success, and it was carried +out on the 26th and 27th.</p> + +<p>That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and +the French Marine Fusiliers in the fighting just described +is shown by the fact that on the morning of the 26th +Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly brought +up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A +German attack on the 28th was able to make some +progress on the southern flank against these fresh +troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No +further effort was made on the 29th, for there was a +shortage of artillery ammunition. The eastern edge +of the town was, however, bombarded by trench-mortars, +which had just arrived, with good effect.</p> + +<p>Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII +Reserve Corps should only leave a weak force of from +three to four battalions on the eastern bank of the +Yser opposite <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>; that <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> should be +kept under heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> +of the 43rd Reserve Division should cross the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, in order to attack the town from +the rear.</p> + +<p>North-west of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, by the evening of the 29th, +the troops of General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve +Division had worked their way forward some 300 +yards towards the railway embankment. Only one +brigade of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division was still north-east +of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>: all the rest were taking part in the +struggle further south, and west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> +was shut in on the south: the left wing of the +44th Reserve Division lay west of <span class="smcap">Beerst</span>, as protection +against the strong hostile forces near the river +about <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>: the Belgians and recently-arrived +French forces held the railway embankment between +<span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>. Broad stretches of wire +entanglements lay in front of this strong position, and +the efforts of our troops had been almost superhuman +in their advance over this ground: it was intersected +with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards +broad, and thick, wired hedges. So strong, however, +was the pressure against the enemy that the French +were compelled to reduce their forces about <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> +and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant +reinforcements to the area <span class="smcap">Pervyse-Ramscappelle</span>. +A German airman, who was killed on the morning of +the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that +the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault +began at 6.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, though the ground in the area of +the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had become extraordinarily +swampy. It seemed impossible that the +recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water +to such an extent. Nevertheless the attack<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> +made considerable progress. The 11th Brigade of +the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way +into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village +of <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span>, whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the +48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments reached the railway +embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it +towards <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle</span>. Although every house had +to be attacked, it succeeded in reaching the western +end of the village. The 12th Reserve Regiment +also made considerable advance.</p> + +<p>The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when +the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade on the northern wing advanced +from the north-east against <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, the enemy +retired. Airmen reported enemy’s columns retreating +towards <span class="smcap">Furnes</span>. Nothing could stop the victorious +advance of General von Beseler’s troops, not +even the heaviest guns of the British battleships, +cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, +enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 +yards, nor the incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian +Divisions. On the evening of the 30th <span class="smcap">Ramscappelle</span> +was completely in German possession, the +railway embankment south of it had been reached and +even crossed in places; in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span> the fight was +progressing favourably, and south of it the 12th +Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad +dykes, was working forward to the railway. Still +further south the 44th Reserve Division was in full +advance towards the railway embankment east of +<span class="smcap">Oostkerke</span>, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve +Division had crossed the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, without casualties, +and had been sent forward in the direction of <span class="smcap">Caeskerke</span>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span></p> + +<p>The attack was to have been continued on the following +morning, and General von Beseler intended to +withdraw the last part of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, from the area north-east +of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, for the fire of the enemy’s naval guns +from the sea<a name="FNanchor_42" id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> and the difficulties of the country +appeared to militate against any prospects of a rapid +success there. At 11.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span>, however, a General +Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported +that the attack could be continued no further owing +to the constant rising of the water. What had happened? +On the morning of the 30th the advancing +troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it +had gradually risen until they were now wading up +to their knees, and they could scarcely drag their +feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down for +a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun +and rifle fire, he was lost. The rise of the waters was +attributed to the torrential rain of the previous few +days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry +weather the excellent system of canals would soon +drain it off. But the rising flood soon prevented the +movement of wagons with ammunition and supplies, +and when the attackers looked back from the railway +embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole +country had sunk behind them: the green meadows +were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the general +line of the roads was only indicated by the houses +and the rows of partly covered trees. It soon became +evident that the enemy must have blown up the canal-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>sluices, +and called in the sea to his aid. The advance +of General von Beseler’s III Reserve Corps had been +the culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his +reserves had been put in to stop it, but in vain. If the +Germans could only succeed in pushing the exhausted +Belgians and French out of their way, the road to +<span class="smcap">Dunkirk</span> and <span class="smcap">Calais</span> was open. Warnings, friendly +and otherwise, had been given by the Allies to the +Belgians that they must ‘hold out’; but they were +no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of +<span class="smcap">Antwerp</span> now than when behind fortress ramparts. +Their fighting spirit was broken; so, influenced by +the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert +finally decided to employ this last desperate means +of defence, and place a wide expanse of his fair country +under water. The water-level rose slowly and insidiously +until, on the evening of the 30th, the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> had almost everywhere overflowed +its banks. The inundation destroyed buildings as +well as soil, but it enabled the worn-out defenders to +recover their sore-threatened security.</p> + +<p>General von Beseler quickly realised the danger +which now awaited his attacking troops on the far +side of the canal, behind whom a sheet of water, +2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. +The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to +make, yet it had to be done. The attack would have +to be given up and the greater part of the western +bank of the river evacuated. The order was issued +and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st +October. In spite of the dangers due to the altered +appearance of the country and the consequent difficulty +in finding the way, and although the Franco-<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>Belgian +artillery kept the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> crossings under constant +heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. +Not a wounded man nor rifle fell into the enemy’s +hands, and the movement was so well covered that +the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until it +was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers +under Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind +for a long time in <span class="smcap">Pervyse</span>. In front of them the +enemy was sweeping the village with artillery and +infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an +apparently boundless sea. A French colonel offered +Lieutenant Buchholz honourable conditions if he +would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the +offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off +with his little band of followers. They rejoined their +unit successfully. The enemy only followed up slowly +along the roads, with weak detachments of infantry. +Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the +line <span class="smcap">St. George-Stuyvekenskerke</span>, whilst the main +body on the 31st took up its new position east of the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> as follows: the 5th Reserve Division north of +the main road <span class="smcap">St. Pierre Cappelle-Mannekensvere</span>; +the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division in the area <span class="smcap">Mannekensvere-Schoore</span>; +and the 6th Reserve Division to the south +of it. One battalion and one battery of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division remained facing <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, extending northwards +to the coast. A new defensive position was +selected along the line <span class="smcap">Westende-Mannekensvere-Schoore-Kasteelhoek</span>: +a continuation of the attack +was now out of the question, as the water was still +rising west of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. On 31st October and 1st +November, however, the XXII Reserve Corps again +tried to press its attack southwards on the east bank<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> +of the river, in order to isolate the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, +but here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented +movement, and on the evening of the 1st these brave +troops also had to yield to the forces of nature and +withdraw behind the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. This operation was +carried out in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, +and was unmolested by the enemy, for he lay +in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for the +time being <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> remained in possession of the +French.</p> + +<p>The Army Commander had issued definite instructions +on the evening of the 24th October to the XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the effect that +they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, +and take every opportunity of seizing important points +on their immediate front. In the execution of this +order the German troops experienced a good deal of +heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The +XXVII Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing <span class="smcap">Reutel</span> +and holding it;<a name="FNanchor_43" id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> but in the meantime heavy hostile +attacks were begun against the XXIII, XXVI and +the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. +The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of +French units, endeavoured to break through, and +used all their strength. Indeed, in many places the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> +situation of these German volunteer corps became +critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the +enemy was able to keep our roads of advance and +communications under artillery fire. As the roads +were already broken up by the constant rain, the +ammunition supply of our artillery, inferior in any +case to our opponents’, failed. Nevertheless, in spite +of all difficulties our counter-attacks continued. The +fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th +October. In this sector the British and French made +a succession of attacks in the direction <span class="smcap">Poelkappelle</span>, +<span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span> and east of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>. The +37th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade and the 2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade, +under the command of General von Meyer, had to +be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to detachments +of the Marine Division and of the 38th +<i>Landwehr</i> Brigade. These <i>Landwehr</i> men, far from +being weighed down by their years, gave effective +support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger +friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of +the fighting on the evening of the 26th General von +Meyer was mortally wounded: may his memory be +duly honoured.</p> + +<p>An exceptionally heavy British and French attack +was delivered on the 24th and 25th near <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span>, +against the inner flanks of the XXVI and XXVII +Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations +are always the weakest parts of the defence, and when +the General Staff Officer of the XXVII Reserve Corps +asked for the support of the Corps on his right, he +received the reply that no infantry could be spared +‘for the enemy....’ And at that moment the tele<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>phone +circuit failed. There was nothing to do but +close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery +barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and +their leaders. The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve +Division shelled the advancing enemy as fast as they +were able, and by this aid the infantry was finally +enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the +same time the enemy made a strong attack further +to the south. The report came in that he had surrounded +<span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>; but before his supports could +assist him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division +had driven back his assaulting troops.<a name="FNanchor_44" id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> The Corps +was able to hold its old line from the cross-roads east +of <span class="smcap">Zonnebeke</span> through <span class="smcap">Reutel</span> to <span class="smcap">Poezelhoek</span>. +Comparative quiet followed on the 28th and morning +of the 29th, for both sides were very exhausted. On +the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived +at <span class="smcap">Dadizeele</span> as Army Reserve.</p> + +<p>The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of +eight Cavalry Divisions and several <i>Jäger</i> battalions +under General von der Marwitz, was in action on the +left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between +the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which +lay half-way between <span class="smcap">Warneton</span> and <span class="smcap">Armentières</span>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span> +The enemy could not be attacked here by any form +of mounted action; so far from this being possible, +ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting +on foot, to which the cavalrymen were unaccustomed. +Nevertheless they carried out this task in brilliant +fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position +and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held +up the British who were streaming down from the +high ground about <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and <span class="smcap">Messines</span>,<a name="FNanchor_45" id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> the +3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the +4th, 9th and 10th <i>Jäger</i> battalions and five battalions +of the 11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade brought forward from +Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the +assault of the line <span class="smcap">Kruiseik-Zandvoorde</span> and west +of it. This direction was taken in order to be able +to attack from the south against the rear of the enemy +holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to +29th October were memorable and glorious days for +this Cavalry Corps. Among other achievements, the +3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span> +on the 26th after heavy street fighting.<a name="FNanchor_46" id="FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> In co-operation +with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> +Corps, next to which the 16th Bavarian Reserve +Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in +the fighting under Colonel List, General von Stetten, +on the 29th, carried forward the attack against <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, +the key of the enemy’s position. More than +600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken +by our victorious cavalry.<a name="FNanchor_47" id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> Simultaneously on this +day, the troops of General von Stetten filled another +rôle. They were covering the concentration of new +German forces which was in the course of completion +behind their battle-front.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH" id="THE_ATTEMPT_TO_BREAK_THROUGH">THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH +SOUTH OF YPRES</a></h2> + +<p>Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during +October, the Sixth Army under Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria had remained on the offensive on the +line <span class="smcap">Arras-La Bassée</span>—east of <span class="smcap">Armentières</span>;<a name="FNanchor_48" id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> but +although fresh reinforcements had been sent up to +that part of the front by the German General Staff, +a break-through had not been possible. Both sides +had gradually changed their objectives and now +merely sought to prevent any movement of the opposing +forces from that front to the decisive zone of +operations between <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span> and <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. Any weakness +in the enemy’s line, however, was utilised to gain +new and improved positions from which another effort +to break through might be made as soon as possible.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span> +Owing to the failure of the offensive south of <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, +a decision under the conditions existing there +could not be hoped for; the German General Staff +therefore began considering a plan for concentrating +a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and +the Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the +Army Cavalry, and for breaking through with it on +the front <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Warneton</span>, south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>.</p> + +<p>On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn +arrived at the Headquarters of the Sixth Army to +discuss this operation. The plan was arranged and +orders were issued accordingly. A new ‘Army Group’ +was to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the +command of General von Fabeck, commander of the +XIII Würtemburg Corps.<a name="FNanchor_49" id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> It would consist of the +II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up +from the south to join the Sixth Army), the 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division (still in reserve to the +Fourth Army), and the 26th Würtemburg Division +(of the Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by +the 48th Reserve Division recently arrived from the +Fifth Army). In addition to these formations all +the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would +be brought up to assist, and if necessary the attacks +further south would be partially discontinued. The +offensive was to take place on the 30th October from +the general line <span class="smcap">Werwicq-Deulemont</span> in a north-easterly +direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span> +of the II Corps was also to be brought up by rail to +<span class="smcap">Lille</span>. The orders of the German General Staff +pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth +and Sixth Armies was an essential condition for the +success of the operation. Crown Prince Rupert of +Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing and +centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding +attacks, and Duke Albert of Würtemburg ordered a +general attack of his Army for the 30th October.</p> + +<p>How the flooding of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> on the front of the +right wing of the Fourth Army brought the offensive +of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to a standstill +has already been described. From the 1st November +the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division took over the protection of +the line of the flooded area from the coast to <span class="smcap">Tervaete</span>, +whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved southwards +to the district <span class="smcap">Zarren-Staden</span> in order to reinforce +the XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation +might require.<a name="FNanchor_50" id="FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> To the XXII Reserve Corps was +allotted the task of holding the two French divisions +stationed in the <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> bridge-head, which formed +a constant threat to the German front. The Corps +carried out this task admirably.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, +XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps advanced to the +attack as ordered. The first-named under General +von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the +ruins of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. After five hours’ desperate<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> +fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve Infantry Regiments +entered the devastated village which had been +occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying +situation, and the hopelessness of finding cover +among the battered houses, resulted in the victorious +German regiments being exposed to a very heavy +artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties +in the village were greater than during the assault. +In consequence the commander decided to withdraw +and take up a line along the northern edge of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, +leaving in the village itself only sufficient +outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The +division on the left wing of the Corps also made progress +and reached the main road <span class="smcap">Bixschoote-Langemarck</span> +in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> +with its right wing, but was unable to take it. +In spite of gallant efforts only a few hundred yards +of ground were gained by the evening of the 31st, +when these useless attacks were stopped by order. +The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the +right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps were held to +their positions by superior hostile artillery fire, and +also by mass attacks of the British and French during +the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had +just arrived, and in the presence of General Joffre an +attempt to break through our line was to be made on +this sector of the front.<a name="FNanchor_51" id="FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> The German defenders, +however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus +enabled the offensive of the Army Group of General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> +von Fabeck to take place. In conjunction with this +the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +under its new commander, General von Schubert, +simultaneously advanced in the direction of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>.</p> + +<p>During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th +Infantry Division was relieved in its battle-position +west of <span class="smcap">Lille</span> by the 48th Reserve Division, and by +the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army +Group Fabeck was completed without disturbance.</p> + +<p>The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the +Army Group consisted of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 +battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each of 3 batteries, +and a 30·5 cm. coast defence mortar.<a name="FNanchor_52" id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> In addition +to the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, +the four <i>Jäger</i> battalions of the Army Cavalry and the +11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade were put under the command +of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th +October this new army of attack relieved the two +northern Cavalry Corps, and took over their outpost +lines. On the following morning the offensive began.<a name="FNanchor_53" id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> +The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked +south of the <span class="smcap">Menin-Ypres</span> road, with its left wing on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> +<span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>, the II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with +its left wing on <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span>; further south again was the +26th Infantry Division with its left wing on <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. +In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with +the 4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened +by two battalions of the XIX Saxon Corps, which +was attacking to the left of it, was ordered to advance +on <span class="smcap">St. Yves</span> and <span class="smcap">Ploegsteert</span> Wood. The 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division moved to the line <span class="smcap">Menin-Werwicq</span>. +The Army Cavalry which had been relieved +was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth +Army, one Cavalry Corps being placed behind the +right wing of the Army to be at hand to fill up a slight +gap which existed between the Fourth Army and the +Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary.</p> + +<p>The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French +Corps between the 7th Division of the IV British +Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before the advance +of von Fabeck’s Army; the II and IX French +Corps had also recently arrived<a name="FNanchor_54" id="FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> on the northern side of +the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient.<a name="FNanchor_55" id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> Again, therefore, the enemy had +a numerical superiority<a name="FNanchor_56" id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a> in what was the second and +severest part of the battle on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. The British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> +in their reports have added together all the German +Corps which were brought up piecemeal for the fighting +on the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> and at <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, both at this period +and later on; and they describe the situation so as +to give the impression that they had held up with +inferior numbers the simultaneous attacks of all these +Corps from the outset. They go further and use the +figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat into +a victory. They boast of having held out against +great odds, gladly forgetting that their original intention +both before and during the battle had been to +overrun our positions and drive us back to the Rhine.</p> + +<p>The character of the fighting which began with the +appearance of the new German Army Group on the +scene had almost the savagery of the Middle Ages in +it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and +every wall into a strong point, and each of them had +to be stormed by our men with heavy loss. Even +when the first line of these fortifications had been +taken they were confronted by a second one immediately +behind it; for the enemy showed great skill +in taking every advantage of the ground, unfavourable +in any case to the attacker. To the east and +south-east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, even more developed than in +the north, there were thick hedges, wire fences and +broad dykes. Numerous woods also of all sizes with +dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable +and most difficult for observation purposes. Our +movements were constantly being limited to the roads +which were swept by the enemy’s machine-guns. +Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments +the villages were mostly in ruins by the time the +infantry reached them, but the enemy fought desper<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>ately +for every heap of stones and every pile of bricks +before abandoning them. In the few village streets +that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally +developed into isolated individual combats, and +no description can do adequate justice to the bravery +of the German troops on such occasions. Our men +advanced to the attack as if they were back on the +barrack square, and an Englishman writes: ‘They +advanced towards us singing patriotic songs and with +their bands playing.’ There was such enthusiasm +that even the weakest were carried along by it, and +made regardless of losses. The battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> in +the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German +heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long +remain a source of inspiration for the historian and +the poet.</p> + +<p>By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the +importance of the attacks developing from the south-east +against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. They threatened his position along +the high ground on the line <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Passchendaele</span> +and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way +to, the town, the pivot on which all the Franco-British +offensive plans rested. On this day, therefore, the +British commander sent up the 7th Division into the +line again, although it had only just been relieved +owing to its heavy losses.<a name="FNanchor_57" id="FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_2" id="map_2"></a><img src="images/i091.png" width="418" height="401" alt="The ATTACK of the ARMY GROUP FABECK. on October 30TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. +Our heavy guns began the bombardment of the enemy’s +well-constructed lines at about 7.45 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, but observation +was made very difficult by the weather condi<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>tions, +and could only be carried out from the foremost +infantry lines. The telephonic communication rendered +necessary was frequently cut by the enemy’s +shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries were +able to make such excellent practice that at the most +vital points of the enemy’s position the spirit of the +defenders appeared to be completely broken. The +high ground about <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> offers a typical case. +Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of +the British defence and one of the main observation +posts for the artillery. At 9 <span class="small">A.M.</span> our troops charged +the hostile position there, and by 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> +itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; +the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian <i>Jäger</i> battalions +of the Army Cavalry took a great share in the success.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span> +Soon afterwards the high ground north-east and +immediately west of the village fell into German +hands. Two whole British squadrons with their +machine-guns lay, dead and wounded, completely +annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.<a name="FNanchor_58" id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> Further +south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British +cavalry supported by part of the III British Corps. +After a severe hand-to-hand encounter it took possession +of the château, and finally also of the village +of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>. The left wing of the Corps pushed +forward as far as the <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span> stream, north of the +village of the same name, but had here to put in all +its reserves to hold its ground against strong hostile +counter-attacks.<a name="FNanchor_59" id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a></p> + +<p>On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division +was engaged in heavy fighting, the position confronting +it being a particularly strong one. It lay +along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet high,<a name="FNanchor_60" id="FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> +running north and south, eastwards of Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, +and gave the enemy an extensive view eastwards over +our lines. The defence of this ridge was greatly +facilitated by the villages of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> and <span class="smcap">Messines</span> +on it. These had been turned into fortresses, +and were connected by deep trenches protected by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span> +broad wire entanglements.<a name="FNanchor_61" id="FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> Owing to observation +difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing the +airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was +unable from its positions in the valley to bring a +sufficiently heavy bombardment on the enemy’s lines; +and, though the Würtemburg troops attacked with +great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for +the assault. On the right wing the 122nd Fusilier +Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria) took +the fortified village of <span class="smcap">Wambeke</span>, and on the left wing +the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly +towards <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. The ridge north-east of the last-named +village was stormed, but the assault on the +locality itself, which was to have been delivered at +7.10 in the evening, could not get on owing to heavy +enfilade fire from the south which held back the +attackers some hundred yards away from its edge.<a name="FNanchor_62" id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> +The Cavalry Corps<a name="FNanchor_63" id="FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> had gained ground at first, but, +in consequence of their weakness in artillery, they +had been unable to take <span class="smcap">St. Yves</span> or to make progress +against the strongly fortified wood south-west of it. +The same story describes the day’s work of the XIX +Corps<a name="FNanchor_64" id="FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> fighting to the south of the cavalry.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also +the attack on the 30th October had not had the success +expected. The combined efforts of the 54th Reserve +Division and the right wing of the 30th Division had +not been able to carry us into <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>.<a name="FNanchor_65" id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> General +von Deimling and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn +went forward themselves into the front line to +encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions +desperately, and held on firmly to the main +points of his line. Another artillery bombardment +was therefore considered necessary.</p> + +<p>From the enemy’s point of view, however, the +situation was anything but rosy on the evening of the +30th October. The entry of General von Deimling’s +troops into <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> endangered the southern +side of the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient, and the capture of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span> +brought the Germans within three miles of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span> itself. <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal +French had put Indian troops into the fighting +line on the 30th, and he now brought all the available +British and French reserves towards the line +<span class="smcap">Zandvoorde-Hollebeke</span> in order to support the +7th British Division, which had been fought to a standstill.<a name="FNanchor_66" id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> +During the night, therefore, the fighting never<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> +ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued along the +whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable +Würtemburg troops again tried to storm <span class="smcap">Messines</span>.</p> + +<p>On the 31st October the Germans had at first but +few fresh troops to meet the enemy’s reinforcements;<a name="FNanchor_67" id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> +so the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was brought up +in readiness north of the <span class="smcap">Lys</span> behind the II Bavarian +Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset +realised that the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> ridge was +of decisive importance, and that every effort must +be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main +pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector +of attack of the II Bavarian Corps.</p> + +<p>According to the enemy’s accounts the 31st October +1914 was one of the most critical days at his headquarters. +For us it was a day of great glory, and the +British state unreservedly in their reports of the fighting, +that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. +It is true that this last October day of the first war-year +did not give us <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, but our semicircle around +the town became so reduced that it was brought within +range of our artillery from three sides, and there could +be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on +the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> district. The fact that neither the enemy’s +commanders nor their troops gave way under the +strong pressure we put on them, but continued to +fight the battle round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, though their situation +was most perilous, gives us an opportunity to acknow<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>ledge +that there were men of real worth opposed to +us who did their duty thoroughly.</p> + +<p>At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, +a heavy artillery bombardment of the new hostile positions +was begun on a front of ten and a half miles. The +enemy’s batteries were not long in replying; being so +difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the +previous fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout +the morning, the British and French shells fell long +distances behind our lines, blocking streets and bridges, +and devastating the villages as far back as the <span class="smcap">Lys</span>, +so that any regular transport of supplies became impossible. +At <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, however, the important +northern corner of the Army Group Fabeck, the enemy’s +hail of shells had but little result, because our capture +of the high ground at <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> had made the +work of observation very difficult.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_3" id="map_3"></a><img src="images/i097.png" width="404" height="513" alt="The ATTACK of the ARMY GROUP FABECK. on October 31ST. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>After sufficient artillery preparation the British +stronghold of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> was to be attacked from +south and east simultaneously. Colonel von Aldershausen, +commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, +was to direct the attack from the east. Besides two +battalions of his own regiment, there were placed under +his command the 1st Battalion of the 143rd Infantry +Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the +54th Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th +Reserve Regiment and the 26th Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion. +The 99th Infantry Regiment was to make the attack +from the south.<a name="FNanchor_68" id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> During the morning, in spite of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated +attacks were repulsed by British counter-movements. +At about 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> our converging attack was begun. +The commanders of the 54th Reserve and 30th Infantry +Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as +the general commanding the XV Corps, were again in +the foremost lines, though the last, General von Deimling, +was wounded almost at once by a shell-splinter. +Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. +His Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> +headquarters of the Sixth Army, watched the infantry +working its way through the maze of the enemy’s +obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported +by artillery, some of the guns being moved forward +with the front line. The British and French artillery +fired as rapidly as they knew how,<a name="FNanchor_69" id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> and over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke, +betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it +was all of no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. +More hostile strongholds were constantly being discovered; +even all the points known to be of importance +could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, +so that many attacks had to be delivered against +fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments untouched +by our guns.<a name="FNanchor_70" id="FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> Many of our gallant men were killed, +and the officers, who were the first to rise in the assault, +were the special target of the enemy’s sharpshooters, +well trained in long colonial wars.<a name="FNanchor_71" id="FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> Once our troops +entered an enemy’s position, the resistance was only +slight, and the German showed his superiority in single +combat. It was only the enemy’s counter-attacks, +delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that +regained some of his lost ground, but they did not, +however, compromise the general success of the day.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> +The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the +dense woods near <span class="smcap">Reutel</span>,<a name="FNanchor_72" id="FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> which were defended by +a strong system of obstacles and by a quantity of +machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in trees.<a name="FNanchor_73" id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> + +<p>While this was in progress the last assault on <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> +was taking place. The attacks from east and +south both broke into the village, and by 3 <span class="small">P.M.</span> the +whole place with its château and park was in German +possession.<a name="FNanchor_74" id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a> Colonel von Hügel took his storming +parties of the 54th Reserve Division northwards through +and beyond the village, while Captain Reiner galloped +his batteries close up to it. It was then, however, +that fresh hostile reserves were launched against <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>. +The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian +Reserve Division was hurried up to meet them, its +gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a hero’s death<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span> +during the movement. For a short time our own +artillery fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: +for the men were wearing caps and were thus mistaken +for British troops. Nevertheless the enemy’s counter-attack +failed and <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> became and remained +ours, and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 +men, and 3 guns.<a name="FNanchor_75" id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> The enemy prevented our further +advance beyond <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span> by a heavy fire from a +new and strong position along the edge of the woods +west of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>. Here a new fortress had been +made, which would have to be broken down by our +artillery before it could be attacked. On the left wing +of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in +front of some small woods which had been turned into +strong points; the 39th Infantry Division was able +to advance only some 500 yards, though it took a +number of prisoners.<a name="FNanchor_76" id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a> The artillery of the XV Corps +had an accidental success on this day which must +have interfered with the enemy’s staff work for some +time. During the bombardment of <span class="smcap">Hooge</span>, a direct +hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st +British Division were working: one general and +several staff officers were killed.<a name="FNanchor_77" id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> After heavy fighting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span> +at close quarters the II Bavarian Corps gained ground +along the whole of its wide sector of attack on the 31st +October. The right wing took possession of the edges +of the woods west of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>, whilst the left of +the Corps advanced as far as <span class="smcap">Oosttaverne</span>. The 6th +Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into line +immediately south of it, in order to make the attack +on <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>.</p> + +<p>We now come to the most vital point of the battle: +who was to be the victor in the fight for the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge? The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had worked forward by daylight towards +<span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, regardless of the heavy artillery fire +directed from the high ground on our troops moving +up from the valley.<a name="FNanchor_78" id="FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> At nightfall the left wing of the +II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to +break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite +of this the Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make +its attack. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment +was to enter <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> from the east and the 21st +from the south. All the preparations had been carefully +made. The men wore white arm-bands as a +distinguishing mark when at close quarters with the +enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed +away in the haversacks; rifles were unloaded and +bayonets fixed. It was hoped to take the enemy by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span> +surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in the +assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened +during the night, but frequent star-shells lighted up +the darkness and showed that our opponents were +keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have +helped them to see our movements. At 2 <span class="small">A.M.</span> (1st +Nov.) the Bavarians advanced from their assembly +positions, taking little notice of the enemy’s artillery +which began to open on them. The general direction of +the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, +which was clearly outlined in the moonlight against +the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry Regiment under +Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the +village and pushed through to the western exit. The +surprise had succeeded, and numbers of the enemy +who still held out in isolated ruins were either killed +in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.<a name="FNanchor_79" id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> Unfortunately, +however, our own guns continued to bombard +the village, as the news of the victory of the 17th +Regiment was not communicated to them sufficiently +quickly. At about 6 <span class="small">A.M.</span> Colonel Hofmann there<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>fore +decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily +to the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, and to reorganise +there. It so happened that the 21st Reserve +Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village +at this moment, its advance having been delayed by +a heavy enfilade fire from the south-west. When the +men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim light of +dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running +eastwards among the ruins, they immediately opened +fire on them. Nevertheless, in spite of the losses +incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment +held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. +The error was quickly remedied by singing patriotic +songs and by flag-signals, and communication was +regained with the neighbouring infantry and with the +artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now +made by six regiments of the XVI French Corps, which +had arrived during the night, and the gallant 17th had +slowly to withdraw again from the high ground.</p> + +<p>The fighting around <span class="smcap">Messines</span> on the 31st had been +equally severe. On the 30th the 26th Infantry Division +under Duke William of Urach had already got its +patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any +assault could be made an artillery preparation was +required, especially against the northern sector. On +the morning of the 31st October our howitzers and +trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, +and by 10.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the moment had arrived for the +Würtemburg troops to advance.</p> + +<p>The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge +north of <span class="smcap">Messines</span>, along which runs the road to +<span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, whilst the 125th Infantry Regiment +was to advance against <span class="smcap">Messines</span> itself, and the 119th<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span> +Grenadier Regiment against the enemy’s trenches +immediately south of it. The hostile position was so +strong that a force greatly inferior in strength would +be able to hold it against an attack coming up from +the valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and +only a few hedges limited the field of view, so that +every advance and assembly position for miles round +could be seen. A strong British garrison held <span class="smcap">Messines</span>: +the trenches had been well made, and were covered +by a continuous and broad system of obstacles.<a name="FNanchor_80" id="FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_4" id="map_4"></a><img src="images/i105.png" width="412" height="463" alt="The CAPTURE of MESSINES. on October 31ST. 1914 by the 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION." /> +</div> + +<p>The way in which the Swabian troops<a name="FNanchor_81" id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> broke down +the enemy’s resistance was indeed a masterpiece. +Neither the enemy’s artillery fire, which imperilled the +advance of the reserves, nor the British machine-guns, +a large number of which enfiladed the attack from +the south, could restrain the dash of the Würtemburg +troops. At 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the 125th Stuttgart Infantry +Regiment had got possession of the north-east corner +of <span class="smcap">Messines</span>. The road entering the village from +<span class="smcap">Gapaard</span> was blocked by a barricade; and after storming +it, another one, a hundred yards further inside +the village, closed the way. The streets could not be +used for our advance, being choked with debris, and +under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers +had to make their way through or over the walls.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span> +There are a number of large, well-built houses in +<span class="smcap">Messines</span>, which the enemy had turned into a succession +of strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up +by our sappers. The convent looked especially impregnable +with its walls a yard thick, and strong +towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. +Captain Heinrich’s Würtemburg battery of +the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was therefore brought +up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, as +horses could not move along them, and the infantry +carrying up the ammunition. The convent was soon +in flames, burying its stubborn defenders under its +ruins. Lieutenant Mösner of the 125th Infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span> +Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens +and backyards, was the first to make an entry into the +market-square. With a few stout-hearted followers +he occupied a large building there which he defended +without any support till the evening against great +odds. Not until nightfall were others of his regiment +able to reach him, and secure the position he had held +so courageously. This day of street fighting had cost +very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A +part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of +<span class="smcap">Messines</span> had also had to be directed on to the village, +and by the evening a continuous line had been successfully +formed through the centre of it. Isolated fighting +continued throughout the night, and in order to +keep up communication amidst the ruins and recognise +one another in the dark, the Würtemburg troops sang +folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with the +rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the +streets, and the crackle of the burning and falling +houses, all combined to make a magnificent and unsurpassed +piece of battle-music.</p> + +<p>North of the village the left wing of the 122nd +Infantry Regiment established itself on the <span class="smcap">Messines-Wytschaete</span> +road: but its right wing was unable to +capture the high ground, as <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> itself was +still in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered +severely: the progress of the other regiment of their +brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, had roused +their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their +ranks from the south where the Cavalry Corps were +still unable to advance. They were compelled by +heavy losses to be content with the task of securing +the left flank of their division.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span></p> + +<p>On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers +were rewarded for their deeds of immortal fame by a +message of warm praise from the Emperor.</p> + +<p>The final objective, however, had not yet been +attained, although in the south the high ground had +been reached and artillery observers sent forward there, +so that the enemy’s positions could be accurately +ranged on right up to Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>. The main +pressure of the attack would therefore have to be continued +here, on the left wing of the Army Group Fabeck.</p> + +<p>During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division +arrived in the area <span class="smcap">Comines-Warneton</span>, north of the +<span class="smcap">Lys</span>, as reserve to the Army Group.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist +lay over the country, so that the infantry got a few +hours’ rest before the continuous shelling of the enemy’s +artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, the +battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the +north the Saxon and Würtemburg divisions of the +XXVII Reserve Corps further extended their successes +of the previous days. The line was advanced +up to the château of <span class="smcap">Poezelhoek</span>, which was taken +from the 1st British Division after a heavy fight.<a name="FNanchor_82" id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> + +<p>The divisions of Deimling’s XV Corps attacked with +the right wing on the <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Ypres</span> main road +and the left on <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span>. They advanced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span> +but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, +dense woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again +made progress very difficult. The 30th Division +managed to reach the eastern edge of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, +supported by infantry, was in position. The wood +north of <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span> gave exceptional trouble, but it +was finally outflanked on both sides, and its defenders +taken prisoner.<a name="FNanchor_83" id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a></p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on +both sides of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal, and drove +the enemy back as far as the sharp bend in it. The +left wing captured the small wood west of <span class="smcap">Oosttaverne</span> +which was defended by Indian and British +troops. The treacherous methods of the Indians +greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, +and with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated +Asiatics allowed our troops to pass them, and then +got up and stabbed them in the back with their knives.<a name="FNanchor_84" id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">[84]</a> +The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span> +the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of +the previous evening, and at midday began its attack +once more. Confidence and enthusiasm served to +obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and the +dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions +as if on parade. Very many of their dead or +wounded still lay at the foot of the heights, but the +gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by +4 <span class="small">P.M.</span> had reached the eastern edge of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. +It was not possible to push up reserves owing to heavy +artillery fire, and at this moment the enemy counter-attacked +with two fresh divisions.<a name="FNanchor_85" id="FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">[85]</a> The Bavarians, +who had become disorganised during the assault, were +forced to evacuate the village again under cover of +darkness, after having actually entered it at about +5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> They had suffered very heavily during the +attack, being fired at from flank and rear, for the right +wing of the 26th Infantry Division was unable to +take all the high ground north-west of <span class="smcap">Messines</span> until +the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting +had gone on in <span class="smcap">Messines</span> throughout the day, till +finally the Würtemburg troops gained the upper hand +and cleared the enemy out of the village to its western +edge. The British were driven back down the western +slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in +the valley, losing heavily in the operation. As soon +as its right wing reached the <span class="smcap">Messines-Wytschaete</span> +road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held +almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary +condition for the capture of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span></span> +was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, however, +was not able to carry out a third assault without +assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night +of the 1st-2nd therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian +Division from its assembly area <span class="smcap">Wambeke-Garde +Dieu</span> into the fighting line, in order to carry forward +the attack through and beyond <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> towards +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>.</p> + +<p>After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened +again on the morning of the 2nd November along the +whole front of the Army Group Fabeck. His indefatigable +troops, some of whom had already endured +twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken +place in the campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched +opponent once more. The enemy was at +least as strong as they were in fighting units on the +battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements +of newly arrived British and French +troops.<a name="FNanchor_86" id="FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a></p> + +<p>On the eastern side of the <i>Ypres</i> salient General +von Deimling attacked on a front of nearly four miles. +His Corps, which had won its laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine +and in Northern France, again, in spite of heavy +casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. +The 30th Division entered <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span> and established +itself firmly in the north-eastern corner of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage +Wood</span>.<a name="FNanchor_87" id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">[87]</a> The attack had been facilitated by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span> +a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +which had pressed forward some hundred yards north +of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>. Von Deimling’s left wing had advanced +in the direction of <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span>, but was held up +by the difficult wooded country east of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>. +It had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring +troops on its left.</p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on +the morning of the 2nd November by strong hostile +counter-attacks in the sector west of <span class="smcap">Hollebeke</span>. +They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was +even able to make a slight advance on the right wing +during the day.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> was again the centre of the heaviest +fighting on this day.<a name="FNanchor_88" id="FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">[88]</a> The Bavarian Reserve Division +was, at its own request, to attack the village; the +enemy’s position immediately south of it was allotted +as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry +Regiment and an <i>Abtheilung</i> (3 batteries) of the +17th Field Artillery Regiment remained in Army +Reserve. At 7 <span class="small">A.M.</span> a fierce artillery duel began, and +the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening +him, hurried up strong reserves to <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. +Kiefhaber’s brigade of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division +rose to the assault. Under a hail of shrapnel<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span> +the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern +slopes of the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> ridge for the third time, +though with considerable loss, the enemy’s machine-guns +causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon as +the foremost of them had reached the windmill the +enemy launched a counter-attack; but this time the +Bavarians were not content with simply holding their +ground; their supports were brought up at the critical +moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious +street fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having +to deal with every house became greatly disorganised. +Taking advantage of this the British and French commanders +sent forward fresh masses into the line, +trying to turn the balance in their favour at this +important point by employing every available man. +It was 3.10 <span class="small">P.M.</span> when a cry for help reached the Pomeranian +(3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, +and it was not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the +Stettin Grenadier Regiment had captured the long-coveted +high ground south-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, the +struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been +especially severe. Without possession of this the +south flank of the village could not be held. Count +Gneisenau’s Colberg Grenadiers were then sent forward +to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable +to hold out in <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> against the rifle-butts and +bayonets of the united Pomeranians and Bavarians. +Soon after 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> the village, as far as its western edge, +was in German hands, although the fighting continued +till well into the night among the ruins with detachments +of the enemy who would not surrender.</p> + +<p>By the capture of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> a fine commanding +position had been obtained, but the village itself, once<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span> +so pleasant to the view, was now terrible to look upon. +The church was in flames, and the windmill flared like +a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded +side by side among the smouldering ruins. The +enemy was fully aware of the importance of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +but he had been so weakened that he was +unable to recover for another big counter-attack. +He therefore contented himself with small and fruitless +efforts, only one of which succeeded in temporarily +entering the village during the 3rd. Nevertheless for +the next few days it lay under the constant fire of +heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not +allow this to interfere with their work.</p> + +<p>Many of the inhabitants still remained in <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +as in <span class="smcap">Messines</span>, and it was pathetic to see +how they clung to their devastated patches of ground, +regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from +the Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with +their last scrap of property, preferring to die by the +shell that destroyed their homes.</p> + +<p>A small wood north-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, called the +Park, was still a dangerous point. This dense copse +was surrounded by a system of trenches and several +rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully sited +flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it +had been turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, +and cost us many days of heavy fighting before +it was finally taken.</p> + +<p>The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of +<span class="smcap">Messines</span>, immediately put the high ground into a +state of defence. Its left brigade, the 51st, which +was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November +by the 11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade, and sent back to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span> +Army Reserve. The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing +of the division, in co-operation with the 3rd Infantry +Division, advanced across the <span class="smcap">Steenbeek</span> stream. +However, no progress of importance could be made +there, as every movement could be immediately +brought under most effective artillery fire from the +commanding positions on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>.<a name="FNanchor_89" id="FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">[89]</a></p> + +<p>On the 3rd November the formation of a ‘Group +Urach’ was ordered, consisting of the 3rd and 26th +Infantry Divisions, to continue the attack against +the high ground east of <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>; but in the following +days it was unable to make any essential alteration +in the general situation in this sector.</p> + +<p>A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south +of, and co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, +in spite of the small force of artillery and engineers +included in it. On the 2nd November it made a +surprise attack on foot against the farm <span class="smcap">Klein Douve</span> +with complete success.<a name="FNanchor_90" id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a> On the 4th November the +I Cavalry Corps was relieved by the II, consisting of +the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions.</p> + +<p>In the early days of November the conduct of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span> +enemy’s operations against the Army Group Fabeck +underwent a very noticeable change. The German +attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the +big offensive movement which had been planned. +The British troops, especially the I and IV Corps,<a name="FNanchor_91" id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a> +were so played out that they had to be relieved by +parts of the French Army. The enemy’s commanders, +however, realised that even these fresh troops would +be unable to make much headway against our men, +and they therefore decided to remain on the defensive +and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The +heavy fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, +or at least had badly damaged them. The civil population +and all other available labour, therefore, were +now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward +positions for a long way westwards.<a name="FNanchor_92" id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a> These preparations +were soon discovered by our airmen.</p> + +<p>During the early days of November the commander +of the Sixth Army came to the conclusion that the +offensive of the Army Group Fabeck could lead to no<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span> +decisive results. The forces available were still too +weak to break through the enemy’s strongly entrenched +positions, particularly as he was continually bringing +up fresh reinforcements to the battle-front.</p> + +<p>If the attempt to break through south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was +not to be entirely abandoned, and a purely defensive +war on the Western Front thereby avoided, more +troops would have to be brought up for the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +battle from other sectors of the front. As a beginning +the 2nd and the Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were +affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, the Bavarian +Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and +the 2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. +The German General Staff also placed the II Corps +and the 4th Infantry Division at the disposal of General +von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at <span class="smcap">Lille</span> on +the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria ordered the XXIV Reserve Corps and the +25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth +Army, west of <span class="smcap">Lille</span>; and this was followed by an +order on the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the +Guard Corps available from their positions, and for +their sector of the front to be taken over by the IV +Corps at <span class="smcap">Arras</span>. Accordingly a composite Division +of the Guard Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th +Guard Infantry Brigades, under Lieutenant-General +von Winckler, marched for <span class="smcap">Roubaix</span>, which was reached +on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed +over to the Army Group Fabeck, and, in addition, all +the artillery ammunition allotted to the Sixth Army. +The intention of the German General Staff, communicated +to the commander of the Sixth Army on +the 4th November, was: to push the attack to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span> +immediate north (of the elbow) of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal, and to put in all available forces to break +through there. In the meantime, however, General +von Fabeck, in accordance with instructions previously +issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, had +placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve +Division on the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, +and had there formed a Group Gerok, to which the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for +the offensive north of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal there +were left the II Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division +and the mixed Division of von Winckler), besides +the XV Corps which was already in position there. +The fighting continued along the front of the Army +Group until the 10th, when these troops were ready +to attack. No time was to be given the enemy to +recover, or to strengthen his positions.</p> + +<p>The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended +its left wing to the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> canal, won ground +daily, especially on the 6th November, when the 39th +Division delivered a heavy attack near <span class="smcap">Klein Zillebeke</span> +and drove the recently arrived French troops +from their position, capturing four hundred prisoners in +the farm buildings. The troops, advancing with their +bands playing, also stormed parts of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>, a +village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. +The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the +November mist made observation impossible at any +distance. French counter-attacks and an attack +by British cavalry, which attempted to make good +the retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their +casualties were heavy, the 1st and 2nd British Life +Guards being decimated. The enemy’s counter-attacks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span> +on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much +weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, +took part, had also no success. On the 8th November +the 148th Infantry Regiment captured the fortified +position along the western edge of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>; with +a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to +recover the lost ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, +the gallant regimental commander, hastily gathered together +all the supports within reach, including <i>Landwehr</i> +men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward +to meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally +wounded at the head of his victorious followers. The +French hurriedly retired, suffering considerable loss.<a name="FNanchor_93" id="FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">[93]</a></p> + +<p>The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed +by the hostile counter-attacks near the canal; the +enemy offered very stubborn resistance in order to +keep possession of the high ground from which <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained +their positions, but, by an irresistible attack on +the 9th and 10th November, took the high ground<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span> +on which <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> is situated.<a name="FNanchor_94" id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a> To the 5th Bavarian +Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. +The enemy remained for a long time in the houses of +<span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>, but the high ground was of primary, perhaps +even decisive, importance; for it gave us a bird’s-eye +view of the country east of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, where the mass of +the British field artillery was in position.</p> + +<p>The fighting further south which the troops of the +Group Gerok had in and north of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> was +equally heavy. The northern edge formed the dividing +line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The +enemy kept the village under heavy fire in order to +hinder the work of our observers, the mere sight of a +man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery +fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through +loopholes in the ruins or at the chimney openings, +and the observers were often far safer on such lofty +perches than our reserves in the cellars of the battered +village. Only slow progress could be made in the +woods lying to the north-west.</p> + +<p>The Group Urach also was unable to make much +headway. On its right wing, the 3rd Infantry Division +struggled hard to get possession of the Park +north-west of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. After a whole day’s +fighting the 34th Fusilier Regiment forced its way +into the hospice, a fine old convent at the northern +entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had +been able to get a splendid view of our positions in +the valley south of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>. In spite of a most<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span> +thorough bombardment our attack was very costly, +and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it +was found impossible to enter it. From this patch of +wood heavy enfilade fire swept the positions of the +6th Bavarian Division to the north, and the trenches +of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was +surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire +entanglements, the impenetrable undergrowth being +entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen with +machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of +the trees, and they were found dead hanging from +the shell-torn stumps when the Park of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +was finally stormed on the 13th November by the +21st Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian +Division, with the 2nd Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers +of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is a legend connected +with <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> Park, and the scene was +worthy of it.<a name="FNanchor_95" id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">[95]</a></p> + +<p>The 26th Infantry Division during these days had +advanced its lines to the western slopes of the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge, and in places across the +valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, +as the British on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> were able to watch +every movement in our trenches, and could immediately +bring them under the fire of field or heavy artillery, +or even of long-range naval guns, and they were by +no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately +our losses were for the most part only in the +front lines, but our shortage of ammunition compelled +us to husband it.<a name="FNanchor_96" id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">[96]</a> Owing to the conformation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span> +of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, +we were unable to range accurately +on the enemy’s artillery, and the most we could do +was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their +observation posts on Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> were soon discovered, +and the fight now began against the observers +there as well as against those posted in the towers of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. So the blame must not be laid on us for the +gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, which gave such a fine view of the whole +countryside.</p> + +<p>Further to the south no noteworthy progress was +made either by the Cavalry Corps, or on the front of +the Sixth Army.</p> + +<p>Such then was the general situation when, on the +10th November, the new forces lay ready to take the +offensive in their positions north of the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal. Before going further, however, the +operations of the Fourth Army from the last days +of October must for a moment be touched on.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2" id="THE_OPERATIONS_OF_THE_FOURTH_ARMY2"><span class="smcap">THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY +FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE +9th NOVEMBER 1914</span></a></h2> + +<p>Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under +General von Fabeck was engaged in the heavy fighting +just described, the Fourth Army of Duke Albert +of Würtemburg had been doing its utmost, by means +of constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from +withdrawing any troops from his front to support +his endangered positions near <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. By 11 <span class="small">A.M.</span> +on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German +forces rendered necessary by the inundation of the +front between the coast and <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> had been sufficiently +completed to enable an offensive to be delivered +on this day, on the line <span class="smcap">Dixmude-Gheluvelt</span>. The +right flank, from <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> to the coast, was secured +by the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade, 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the +orders of the general officer commanding the XXII +Reserve Corps. The dispositions of the attacking +troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve Corps +in the sector <span class="smcap">Noordschoote-Bixschoote</span>; the III +Reserve Corps, including the 44th Reserve Division, +on both sides of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, facing the front <span class="smcap">Het +Sas-St. Julien</span> (this was the most important group +in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +Corps were to the south again, with the left flank +resting on the <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt-Ypres</span> main road.<a name="FNanchor_97" id="FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a></p> + +<p>By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps +had been able to gain ground at and north of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, +while the 5th Reserve Division advancing +from the north had forced its way close up to the +western edge of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. But all our efforts +to capture this place by attacks from north and east, +in spite of reinforcements being brought up, failed. +It became evident that the enemy’s skilfully placed +and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired +infantry positions in a country so favourable +for defence, were more than a match for our guns, +especially at a time when ammunition was scarce, +and the misty weather prevented observation from +aeroplanes. A continuation of the offensive here +would only have meant a useless sacrifice of life. It +was therefore decided with deep regret to resort to +the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to +hold the enemy. The situation of the Fourth Army +indeed was no enviable one. Here in the plains of +Flanders, operations were effected by the November +weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country +east and south of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. The troops had to endure +great hardships; their trenches rapidly filled with +water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give insufficient +protection against artillery fire. In several +places they had to be evacuated altogether, and the +men lay out in the open with only a hastily constructed +wire entanglement in front to secure them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span> +against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most +difficult in this water-logged district. Frequently it +could only be carried on by piling up sand-bag parapets, +and these being easily seen by the enemy were promptly +shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular +reliefs for the troops in the front line were out of +the question, for the units available at that time were +too weak; and in any case, the men found relief time +a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to +observe every movement, especially where he still +held good observation points, as at <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>.</p> + +<p>A very extensive system of espionage served to complete +his knowledge of our intentions. Individual soldiers +were left behind in civilian clothing, with concealed +telephonic communication; they kept hidden during +the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our +movements and dispositions quickly and accurately +to their headquarters.<a name="FNanchor_98" id="FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> A great deal of information +was also given away by the Belgian population, who +crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent +news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. +Although the punishment meted out to espionage +was severe, the Belgians always kept up this form +of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, +and its effect could be diminished only by maintaining +thorough surveillance of the country in rear +of our lines. Our reserves, about which the enemy +was always well informed, had for the above reasons +to be kept close up behind the front lines in order to +be near at hand at the critical moment. Their movements, +as well as the sending up of all the necessary<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span> +supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty. +Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden +meadows, the farms in the neighbourhood being +insufficient to provide shelter for them all. The +troops who were withdrawn from the front line and +put in reserve had therefore small opportunity for +either rest or recreation.</p> + +<p>The insecurity of our communications back into +the interior of Belgium must be passed over almost +without mention, except to say that here too a colossal +task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the +General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, +but to provide observation posts along the Dutch +frontier. In carrying out these duties, the old <i>Landsturm</i> +troops showed a spirit of endurance which said +much for the military training they had received +many years before. The work of keeping watch over +the excited population was not without its dangers, +and all praise is due to these garrison troops and to +the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their +assistance. Thanks to them, the long lines of communication +through conquered Belgium were not +disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our +army suffered no interruption from the enemy. For +the honour of all concerned this must be put on record.</p> + +<p>On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made +attacks on a larger scale along the coast. On the 4th, +believing that we had left only weak outposts behind, +even opposite <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, when we retired to the +eastern bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments +advanced through <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span>. At first +they gained a slight success, but were shortly afterwards +attacked by part of the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span> +from the east, and by the 33rd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade from +the south, and driven back. Detachments of the +Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The +second attack made by about five thousand French +troops, which took place on the 7th, fared far worse; +the whole of <span class="smcap">Lombartzyde</span> was taken by our counter-attack, +and the enemy losses were very heavy.<a name="FNanchor_99" id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">[99]</a></p> + +<p>On the 9th November the 38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade +was relieved by parts of the Marine Division, for the +10th November was the day on which the new offensive +was to be made with fresh troops against <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> +from the south-east.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="THE_LAST_PHASE" id="THE_LAST_PHASE">THE LAST PHASE</a></h2> + +<p>When the 4th Division and von Winckler’s Guard +Division were sent forward on the 9th November into +the northern part of the fighting line, formerly occupied +by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from the +heights of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> it had just stormed, was able to +look right down on <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. The orders of the Sixth +Army commander, dated the 7th and 8th November, +had given all the necessary instructions for the employment +of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division +and von Winckler’s Guard Division were placed +under the commander of the Guard Corps, General +Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called Plettenberg’s +Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg’s Corps +formed the Army Group Linsingen.<a name="FNanchor_100" id="FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">[100]</a></p> + +<p>The task set the troops of General von Linsingen +was ‘to drive back and crush the enemy lying north +of the canal (<span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span>); the main weight of +the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The +Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west +of the canal, its task being to continue pressing forward +and at the same time to support the attack of the +left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as powerful +enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.’ +The decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, +when another strong reinforcement of engineers would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span> +have arrived. All the other units of the Sixth Army +and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according +to arrangement, to attack on this day with increased +energy, so that the enemy should be allowed +no rest, and held to his positions along the whole +front.</p> + +<p>On the stroke of 7 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the Fourth Army advanced +to the attack. This tenth day of November was to be +a famous one in its history. The sectors of attack +for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, +the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII +Reserve Corps had been closed in slightly to the north. +Strengthened by the Guard <i>Jäger</i> Battalion, a Guard +Machine-Gun Detachment<a name="FNanchor_101" id="FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">[101]</a> and the 9th Machine-Gun +Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards +the <span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood.</p> + +<p>The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as +follows: ‘The XXII Reserve Corps<a name="FNanchor_102" id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">[102]</a> in co-operation +with the Marine Division will secure the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> +canal front, and will take <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>.’ Immediately +north of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division was in position, +with the 43rd Reserve Division to the east and +south, the two divisions together making a semicircle +of steel round the objective. This time our +troops were determined to take the town so stubbornly +defended by the French infantry. The enemy fully +realised the importance of this bridge-head. Besides +holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, +it covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span> +the 9th its garrison was further reinforced by the +arrival of fresh French troops.</p> + +<p>The rain of the previous days had made the ground +over which the attack on <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was to be carried +out very heavy going. The <span class="smcap">Handzaeme</span> canal, +running east and west, divides it into two parts, the +northerly one being particularly swampy and difficult +to cross. The main attack had therefore to be +made from the east and south-east on a comparatively +narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern +and obsolete fortifications, but the first strongholds +of the defenders were the railway buildings and +cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway +embankment had been transformed into a very strong +defensive position, and a heavy fire was expected +from it when we advanced from the high embankments +of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. Under the cover of darkness +the division was able to push its front line to an +assault position within two hundred yards of the enemy, +and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment +began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless +shells from our <i>Minenwerfer</i> did their utmost to +break down the enemy’s resistance. By 7.40 <span class="small">A.M.</span> +our first attempt to take the enemy’s advanced positions +had failed, and another artillery bombardment +against his obstacles and flanking posts was ordered. +At 9.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the advanced stronghold at the cemetery +was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into +position there before the artillery observers arrived +to direct the fire of their batteries from the front line +on to the next strong point. The artillery bombardment +lasted throughout the morning until 1 <span class="small">P.M.</span> +when the general assault was ordered. The infantry,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span> +with detachments of sappers carrying hand-grenades +and various material useful in an assault, had worked +its way forward close up to the line of obstacles.</p> + +<p>The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced +rapidly at first by frontal attack. North of it, the +15th Reserve <i>Jäger</i> Battalion under Captain Hameln +worked forward across the deep marshes between the +canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry +Regiment came under a heavy enfilade fire from the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> embankment, and at 1.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span> orders were +issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, +consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd +Reserve Division and of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, to +be brought up into the line. Its task was to help +carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment +against the railway embankment, and to secure the +left flank of the advance. The nearer the attack +approached to the town, the more desperate became +the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander +of the 201st Reserve Regiment, General von +Seydewitz, always in the front line encouraging his +men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment +and the <i>Jäger</i> entered the devastated town at +about 3.30 <span class="small">P.M.</span> Our well-directed artillery fire had +cleared the front at the critical moment, and the +enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +but did not cease to offer resistance. He held the +railway embankment south of the town with particular +tenacity. Even when this had been finally +stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the +fight, with heavy loss, among the burning houses in +the southern part of the town, until the 201st Regiment +by a wheel southwards were able to give assist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>ance. +Teetzmann’s brigade in its attack on the +<span class="smcap">Yser</span> embankment, to protect the flank of the division, +had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it +pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so +that the enemy’s retreat was threatened. In spite +of this, however, he gave nothing up without a +struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: +in fact the street fighting that ensued was +hardly less bitter and terrible than at <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +and <span class="smcap">Messines</span>.</p> + +<p>During the struggle in <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, the French +artillery fired into the place regardless of friend or +foe, and both suffered alike. The fight was still +raging among the houses at the northern exit, where +von Beerst was only making slow progress with the +advanced detachments of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division, +when our reserves were assembled in the market-square +to deliver the final blow. The French infantry +and Marine Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but +finally had to give way, for though not numerically +superior, the offensive spirit of the German troops +overcame all resistance. It was not until the west +bank of the canal had been reached, that the mass +of the enemy put up another defence.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> was captured, and the French had been +driven back across the canal. A combined counter-attack +by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which began +during the evening and continued into the night, +was unable to alter the situation, and though <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> +in consequence was under the heaviest fire, +our troops held their ground. Weak detachments +of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division were even able to cross +the river north of the town under cover of darkness,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span> +though the extreme swampiness of the ground prevented +them carrying their success any further. The +enemy had prepared the bridges, west of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +for demolition some time before and had constructed +strong positions along the west bank of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>. +These were especially good, as the ground there is +higher and overlooks that on the east bank. Our +artillery had therefore to make another preparatory +bombardment. The spoils taken at <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span> were +considerable, and in spite of the fact that the British +assert that the Allies only lost a few hundred men, +we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 men.<a name="FNanchor_103" id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span></p><div class="center"> +<a name="map_5" id="map_5"></a><img src="images/i132.png" width="409" height="337" alt="The CAPTURE of DIXMUDE. on November 10TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>Our allied enemies had also been driven back over +the canal, south of <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, on the 10th November. +The XXIII Reserve Corps had made a successful +attack on <span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> and through <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> +against <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>. A long and bitter struggle took +place for the high ground south-west of <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>; +but by evening the canal had been reached along +almost its whole length between <span class="smcap">Noordschoote</span> and +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>, whilst about a brigade of the 45th +Reserve Division and weak detachments of the 46th +had crossed it. The inundation had however gradually +extended southwards as far as this district, and put +any far-reaching extension of this success out of the +question. The XXIII Reserve Corps took prisoner +about 1000 men and captured a considerable number +of machine-guns in this operation.</p> + +<p>The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly +hard fight on both sides of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. Throughout +the 9th November and during the following night +the French delivered heavy attacks there and had +been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in +front of the III Reserve Corps, on the left wing of +which the 9th Reserve Division, now affiliated to +the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the +line. Making every use of the element of surprise, +General von Beseler had ordered the assault to begin +at 6.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> Punctually at this moment, as dawn +was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On +the right wing the 44th Reserve Division pushed +forward till close up to <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>, taking prisoner +14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, +in reporting this advance, says: ‘West of <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span> +our young regiments advanced against the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span> +enemy’s front line singing “<i>Deutschland, Deutschland +über alles</i>,” and captured it.’ The left wing of +the division hung a good way back, as the 5th Reserve +Division on its left was unable to push on so rapidly. +It had broken into the enemy’s first position, but its +eastern wing was completely held up in front of +<span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>. The 6th Reserve Division had attacked +the place from north and east, without being able to +take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove +that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here +for a big attack that he himself intended to make on +the 10th, and these were now defending every yard +of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th +Reserve Division had at first made good progress in +the direction of <span class="smcap">St. Julien</span>, but it came under a heavy +cross-fire, and was thereby compelled to give up a +large part of the ground gained. General von Beseler +therefore decided to pull out the main body of the +9th Reserve Division, and move it to his right wing, +where the 44th and 5th Reserve Divisions had had a +decided success in the direction of <span class="smcap">Het Sas</span>.</p> + +<p>After the first line of trenches had been taken, the +attack of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was +very soon held up by wire entanglements which had +not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line +of trenches provided with every modern device. +The XXVII Reserve Corps spent most of the day +in making such disposition of its forces as would +enable it to give the utmost support to the Army +Group Linsingen, which was getting ready to attack +further south on the morrow.</p> + +<p>In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations +of Plettenberg’s Corps for an offensive on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span> +the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently advanced +to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the +dense autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. +With the concurrence of General von +Linsingen, and after arrangement with the neighbouring +troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore +decided to attack on the 11th November. On +the front of Deimling’s (XV) Corps the 10th November, +up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a preparatory +artillery bombardment; especially good work was +done by means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, +carried out by a massed group of artillery consisting +of three batteries of heavy howitzers, three batteries +of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery +of long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel +Gartmayr, commanding the 1st Bavarian Field +Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both +divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, +in co-operation with the II Bavarian Corps fighting +on the high ground of <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span>, were able to gain +some hundreds of yards.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_6" id="map_6"></a><img src="images/i136.png" width="404" height="600" alt="The ATTACK of the SIXTH ARMY. on November 11TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>On the 11th November the combined offensive of +the Fourth Army and the Army Groups Linsingen +and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the Fourth +and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The +great efforts made by the Fourth Army on the 10th +had considerably weakened it, and further handicapped +by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces +of the attacking troops, no special success was gained +by it on the 11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere +held to his ground and prevented from transferring +any troops to other parts of the front. On the +extreme right wing the Marine Division made a suc<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>cessful +attack on <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, capturing several hundred +prisoners. At the same time the Guard Cavalry Division, +affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to +the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, in order to relieve part of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> +Division, which went into Army Reserve. On the +left wing of the Army, the XXVI and XXVII Reserve<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span> +Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions +by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south +flank of the XXVII Reserve Corps attacked in close +co-operation with Plettenberg’s Corps.</p> + +<p>On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups +Linsingen and Fabeck began the last phase of this +severe and terrible struggle for <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>; and it was +destined to fix the general line on which the opposing +armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915.</p> + +<p>Von Winckler’s Guard Division fought on the right +wing of the Army Group Linsingen, and for us the +day was to be a historic, though costly one. In +former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of +the fray at its most critical stages, and the sons were +to show themselves worthy of their fathers. The +spirit of Frederick the Great and the glory of St. +Privat shone again on the battlefield of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>. +The British speak of the attack of the Guard as a +most brilliant feat of arms.</p> + +<p>Before the infantry of the Division could come into +immediate contact with the enemy, a broad zone had +to be crossed under his artillery fire: through the +hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the Guard +brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the +German batteries opened, and a furious bombardment +continued for two and a half hours, and then +the infantry attack began. It struck against two +divisions of the I British Corps, a war experienced +foe, whose fighting methods were well adapted to +the country.<a name="FNanchor_104" id="FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">[104]</a> The artillery preparation however had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span> +been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy’s +superiority in numbers the advance made good progress, +so that shortly after 10 <span class="small">A.M.</span> the strong position +along the southern edge of the <span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood was +in the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.<a name="FNanchor_105" id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">[105]</a></p> + +<p>At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of +H.M. the Emperor’s 1st Guard Regiment had forced +a way through the wire entanglements and trenches +in front of <span class="smcap">Verbeck</span> farm, and it was taken in the +first assault. The regiment had thereby captured +an excellent position from which to support the right +wing of the attack.<a name="FNanchor_106" id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">[106]</a> Led by its fearless commander, +Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed on +without a moment’s delay into the wood north-west +of the farm. Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment +was still engaged along the southern edges of the woods<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span> +west of <span class="smcap">Reutel</span>, with its front facing north, and it +put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing +of the 54th Reserve Division.</p> + +<div class="center"> +<a name="map_7" id="map_7"></a><img src="images/i139.png" width="412" height="493" alt="The ATTACK of the 2ND. GUARD DIVISION. on November 11TH. 1914." /> +</div> + +<p>At 10 <span class="small">A.M.</span>, on the last artillery salvo, the battalions +of the 4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on +both sides of the <span class="smcap">Ypres-Gheluvelt</span> main road, +and they took the front British trenches in their +stride.</p> + +<p>The Emperor Francis’ 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment +attacked from <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span> against the corner<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span> +of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood, north of the <span class="smcap">Ypres-Gheluvelt</span> +road, and took its edge. The wood itself +gave the infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible +to see a yard ahead in its thick undergrowth, which +was over six feet high.<a name="FNanchor_107" id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">[107]</a> Suddenly at a few paces’ +distance, machine-guns would open on our troops +from behind a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task +set the Grenadiers proved to be an extremely difficult +one, the more so as they had lost many of their officers +and N.C.O.’s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, +the defence-works inside the wood were quickly +taken one after another, but more strong points protected +by wire entanglements untouched by our +artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion +forced its way through to the château of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>, +which was surrounded by a marsh and an impenetrable +hedge. The men were trying to work their +way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in +it, when suddenly a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun +burst upon them. It came from the château on +their right, from some flanking trenches on their left, +and from trees behind the line. A number of the +few remaining officers fell, and finally the battalion +had to retire a short distance in order to reorganise. +But it soon came forward once more, and the companies +pressed on till they were close up to the château +itself, when another annihilating fusillade was opened +on them from all sides. Simultaneously the British +made a flank attack along the hedge in order to cut +off the men who had got through. Machine-guns<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span> +firing from trees and from the château windows +completely stopped any communication with them. +Very few only of these foremost troops, who were +commanded by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in +getting away. Those who did were assembled by +Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the +wood and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led +forward again to the relief of the Fusiliers who were +surrounded. The attack of Captain von Sell developed +however into small isolated combats, and though the +boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château +again, they were received there with such heavy fire +from right and left that it appeared that they would +have to retire again and reorganise. Before this +could be carried out, a British counter-attack was +launched; but our men, disorganised and mixed up +as they were, held fast to their ground and stopped +the attack, although at first both their flanks were in +the air.<a name="FNanchor_108" id="FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">[108]</a></p> + +<p>Queen Augusta’s 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, +advancing south of the main road, at once suffered +such heavy losses that the first two attacks made no +headway. When however part of the regiment near +the main road pushed forward along it, echeloned +behind its sister-regiment on the right, and then +turned southwards, the advance made good progress, +and a firm footing was gained in <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood +south of the road. The reverses met with by the +Emperor Francis’ 2nd Grenadiers unfortunately enabled +the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire to bear<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span> +on Queen Augusta’s 4th Grenadiers, that their advance +had to be stopped.<a name="FNanchor_109" id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">[109]</a></p> + +<p>At 5 <span class="small">P.M.</span> German Guard troops had a tussle with +the British Guards. The King’s Liverpool Regiment +made a counter-attack from the <span class="smcap">Nun’s</span> Wood (Nonne +Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot +Regiment and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard +Grenadiers. The point of attack was well chosen, +and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st Guard +Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, +and held up in the woods (<span class="smcap">Polygon</span> Wood and the eastern +part of the <span class="smcap">Nonne Bosch</span>), with its front facing +north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having +spent all its energies against the château of <span class="smcap">Veldhoek</span>, +lay with its front facing west.<a name="FNanchor_110" id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">[110]</a> However, the British<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span> +troops ran into their own artillery fire near the <span class="smcap">Nonne +Bosch</span>, and the attack broke up and came to a standstill +in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any +further advance on the 11th November by our Guard +troops north of the road was now out of the question.</p> + +<p>In the southern part of the <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Wood the +4th Infantry Division pushed on, though here too +great difficulties were encountered. Deep trenches, +broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined +to make our progress slow, especially on the +right wing.</p> + +<p>The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left +wing of the Pomeranians gained ground in the woods +near and around <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>; the capture of Hill +60 near <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span> was of exceptional importance. +From this elevation another direct view over the +country round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was obtained.</p> + +<p>South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much +thinned ranks stormed forward again. The bit of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span> +wood north-east of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, which had already +changed hands several times, was now taken by it. +The heavy artillery again rendered invaluable services. +Several strong hostile counter-attacks were held up +chiefly owing to the way in which at the critical +moment our guns always protected the infantry lines +by a barrage.</p> + +<p>In the area near <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, the 11th November +was the day of the heaviest fighting. In the woods +north of it, Bavarians and Hessians pressed forward +together, slowly but surely. A French battery and +four machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry +Regiment at a farm about 150 yards north of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, +but the guns were so firmly embedded in +the sodden ground, that they could not be got away +by the infantry. When the buildings were evacuated +again, owing to the heavy fire of the French on them, +the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a +neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded +here that in the fight for one single farm the +Hessians took prisoners belonging to three different +regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy +had put in to the fight on the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> front, and to +what an extent he had to concentrate his units to +ward off our attacks.</p> + +<p>On and to the west of the <span class="smcap">Messines</span> ridge the line +remained almost unaltered during the 11th November. +The very severe effect of the enemy’s artillery fire +from Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> on this front and the enfilade +fire of artillery and machine-guns from <span class="smcap">Ploegsteert</span> +Wood compelled our men to remain in their trenches.</p> + +<p>Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November +were a great success. A series of brilliant feats,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span> +many of which it has been impossible even to mention +in this short account, far less adequately describe, +gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which +any concentration of the enemy near <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> could +be seen, and immediately opened on by artillery. +It is true, however, that no break through of the +enemy’s lines had been accomplished: his numerical +superiority and, more especially, the strength of his +positions held up our offensive. The weather conditions, +storm and rain, had also contributed towards +the result.<a name="FNanchor_111" id="FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">[111]</a></p> + +<p>The furious character of the fighting on the 11th +November did not abate on the following day, but +on the whole the situation remained unaltered. The +general character of the operations on the entire front +of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, +and sapping was eventually resorted to, though here +and there successes in open warfare were gained. +For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to +strengthen its detachments across the <span class="smcap">Yser</span> at <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, +and on the 12th the 201st Reserve Infantry<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span> +Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed +the enemy’s defences opposite it on the western bank +of the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, and held them under great difficulties. +Constant rain had filled the badly constructed trenches +with mud so that our troops had to support the enemy’s +bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying +in the open.</p> + +<p>At <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> the enemy again attempted strong +counter-attacks, but they were stopped largely by +the muddy state of the country. On the 14th +November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. +Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops +occupied a reserve position instead of the original +front line; by the time the error was discovered, our +watchful opponents were already in the front German +position. Our men, however, gave them no rest +there, for their honour would not suffer the surrender +in this manner of their success of the 10th November. +Without waiting for any orders from higher authority +or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the +strong position on the rising ground south-west of +<span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>. On the front of the Sixth Army <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +Wood was completely taken by the Guard on +the 14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.<a name="FNanchor_112" id="FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">[112]</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span> +After the artillery had prepared the way as far as +was possible in that difficult and wooded neighbourhood, +the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by no +means damped by the events of the 11th November, +advanced to the assault. In the château of <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> +a large number of British snipers surrendered. +The XV Corps had another success in the wooded +district of <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span> after being reinforced by +Hofmann’s composite Division. A strong system of +trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large +number of prisoners.</p> + +<p>On the 13th November the Park of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +was captured from the French by the Pomeranians +and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which the +French advanced against our positions shouting, +‘Don’t shoot,’ in German, cost them heavy losses; +and the Bavarians, whose tempers were roused by +this treachery, drove them back to their original +positions.</p> + +<p>On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north +of <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>, for which such a severe fight had +been made on the 11th, was finally captured by us. +We thereby obtained a position in the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> +salient which, although overlooked from Mount +<span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, gave us such a commanding view of all +the ground between Mount <span class="smcap">Kemmel</span> and the <span class="smcap">Wytschaete-Messines</span> +ridge that surprise attacks by the +enemy in this district were now out of the question.<a name="FNanchor_113" id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">[113]</a> +On the rest of the Flanders front only small fights +took place, and on the 17th November the commander +of the Fourth Army decided to give up any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span> +idea of continuing the offensive; a decision to which +he was compelled by the low fighting strength of his +troops and the bad autumn weather, which was +affecting their health.<a name="FNanchor_114" id="FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">[114]</a> The frequent downpours of +rain during November had caused a constant rising +of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary +to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were +worn out by the constant fighting under such bad +weather conditions. Clear signs of exhaustion in the +enemy’s ranks on the front opposite the Fourth and +Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our +gallant Fourth Army gradually to construct a good +line of trenches and erect wire entanglements. As +soon as these were completed rest-billets were +allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet +and pleasant quarters in the villages of Flanders +untouched by war, with a not unfriendly population. +The German General Staff fully concurred +in the decision of the commander of the Fourth +Army made on the 17th November. They at the +same time expressed the hope that the Army +would be prepared to hold its positions even +against superior hostile forces. This expectation +was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and +although at that time there were four and one-half +French Corps, as well as the 25,000 Belgian +troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert of Wür<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>temburg, +they never obtained a success of any consequence.</p> + +<p>The threat against our right flank ceased soon +afterwards. British monitors appeared a few times +towards the end of November off the roadstead of +<span class="smcap">Ostend</span>. They bombarded the canal exit and our +positions near by: but their fire was as ineffective +as before. The ‘glorious’ activities of the British +Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to a speedy +end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, +began to put in an appearance there.<a name="FNanchor_115" id="FNanchor_115"></a><a href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a></p> + +<p>The developments on the front of the Sixth Army +during the second half of November 1914 were similar +to those of the Fourth Army. For some time the +sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards +strong detachments were taken from it and entrained +for the Eastern Front, where General von Hindenburg +was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to bring the +Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make +it roll back again.</p> + +<p>From this time onwards the line of demarcation +between the Fourth and Sixth Armies was the <span class="smcap">Comines-Ypres</span> +canal.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="CONCLUSION" id="CONCLUSION">CONCLUSION</a></h2> + +<p>As the November storms passed and frost and icy +winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the +approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of +both sides were being slowly strengthened. The +effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover +in good trenches and behind thick breast-works. +As the armament in use became more and more powerful, +artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed +it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. +At first passive defence was little understood by the +German troops, as instruction in the offensive had +dominated all other in their peace-training, and in +the short period available after they were called up +the volunteers had only been trained in the principles +of attack. Their sense of superiority over their +opponents did not let them rest content with merely +holding positions. The high sense of duty in each +individual was of assistance, and the methods of +defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The continuous +bad weather in the autumn and winter in +this water-logged country caused great suffering; +and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the +great victor of <span class="smcap">Tannenburg</span> were much envied. The +despatch of men eastward showed those left behind +that any hope of a final decision at <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> had disappeared.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span></p> + +<p>The first battle of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was a German victory,<a name="FNanchor_116" id="FNanchor_116"></a><a href="#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> +for it marked the failure of the enemy’s intention to +fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich +districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium +(thus preventing us from making use of their valuable +resources), and to use the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> area as a base for +the Belgian, French and British advance on the <span class="smcap">Rhine</span>. +The Belgian coast was now firmly in our possession, +and offered a good starting-place for naval operations +against England. But we had not succeeded in +making the decisive break-through, and the dream of +ending the campaign in the west in our favour during +1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only +natural that the German General Staff found it difficult +thoroughly to realise this unpleasant fact, and +only did so with reluctance; but endeavour has been +made in this account to bring out the main reasons +which led to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, +great things had been accomplished. The Army of +Duke Albert of Würtemburg, by its advance and +determined attack, had prevented the big offensive +planned by the enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies +together had forced a superior opponent into the +defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the sea +to his assistance, had driven him back continually, +until positions had been reached which enabled +German troops to be spared to carry out an offensive +on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of +the Marne, so now the spectre of a Russian invasion +appeared threateningly before the German Nation, +and the whole country knew what it would mean if +it should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span> +Front were far too weak, and even the genius of a +Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the masses +of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. +Thus it came about that we had to lie and wait in +front of the gates of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span>, while all the available +men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, +to help Hindenburg pave the way to victory.</p> + +<p>There was never peace on the <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> front. The +belt of steel with which we had invested the town by +our operations in October and November 1914, was +a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst +our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins +across the Channel like an apparition whose shadow +lay over the British Isles and especially menaced the +traffic-routes between England and France. The +British therefore continually tried their utmost to +free themselves of this menace and their pressure +produced counter measures. Thus in December 1914 +heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea +at <span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>, and also at <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span> and <span class="smcap">Zwarteleen</span>. +On Christmas Eve the French vainly +attacked <span class="smcap">Bixschoote</span>: their hope of catching the +Germans dreaming heavily on that evening was of +no avail. When spring lifted the mist that hung +over Flanders, a German offensive took place during +April and May that forced the northern part of the +<span class="smcap">Ypres</span> salient back to within three miles of the town.<a name="FNanchor_117" id="FNanchor_117"></a><a href="#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> +After this the positions only altered very slightly. +In March 1916 the British blew up our front trench +positions at <span class="smcap">St. Eloi</span> by five colossal mines, but were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span> +unable to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In +1917 the death-agony of <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> was renewed, and for +months war raged over the plains of Flanders; the +fighting was as furious as in October and November +1914. The young soldiers of those days have now +become veterans, who know war and do not fear it +even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are those +same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert +of Bavaria, in exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, +once said: ‘Therefore when you are fighting this +particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for having +occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the +Germans are not so easy to wipe out of the world’s +history as he imagines, show it by redoubling the +strength behind your blows. In front of you is the +opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! +at him!’</p> + +<p>He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who +were so jealous of us, who brought on the war for the +sake of their money-bags and spread the conflagration +all over the world, who at first hoped that it would +be but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to +annihilate Germany: all this steeled the hearts of our +warriors in Flanders, whose creed was the justice of +the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest +Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and +in blood. The fighting in 1917 was perhaps more +severe than that of those stormy autumn days of +1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: +to keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this +we succeeded in 1917 as in 1914.</p> + +<p>Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the +German Fatherland with a silent shudder, but also<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span> +with just and intense pride. It was there that the +British were made to realise that German heroism +was not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the +war material which the whole world had been manufacturing +for years. When we read that up to the +14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put +into the battle round <span class="smcap">Ypres</span> by the Western Allies, +whilst only 25 German divisions were opposed to +them,<a name="FNanchor_118" id="FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" class="fnanchor">[118]</a> and that in the course of the Flanders battle +of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled +in vain against a greatly inferior German force, it +says much for our troops. But far from all. For +the enemy’s superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, +machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, +three, and even fourfold. Who can doubt but that +a nation whose sons know how to fight like this, +must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds +of blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and +splendid fruit for the German Fatherland. This +indeed would be the highest reward that could be +bestowed on those of us who fought there.</p> + +<hr class="chap" /> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="APPENDIX" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX</a></h2> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_1" id="Appendix_1"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY<br /> +from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Fourth Army"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General Duke Albert of Würtemburg.</td></tr> +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Major-General Ilse.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">III Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Beseler).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">5th Reserve Division.<br /> +6th Reserve Division.<br /> +4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXII Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">43rd Reserve Division.<br /> +44th Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXIII Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von Kleist).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">45th Reserve Division.<br /> +46th Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXVI Reserve Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Hügel).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">51st Reserve Division.<br /> +52nd Reserve Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XXVII Reserve Corps.</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General von Carlowitz,<br /> +relieved on 27th Oct. by +General of Artillery von Schubert).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division.<br /> +54th (Würtemburg) Reserve Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span></p> + +<p>The following units were also attached at various times:—</p> + +<ul> +<li>9th Reserve Division.</li> +<li>6th Bavarian Reserve Division.</li> +<li>Marine Division.</li> +<li>38th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>37th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>2nd <i>Ersatz</i> Brigade.</li> +<li>Guard Cavalry Division.</li> +</ul> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_2" id="Appendix_2"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK<br /> +from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Army Group Fabeck"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding XIII (Würtemburg) Corps.</td></tr> +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XV Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General von Deimling).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">30th Infantry Division.<br /> +39th Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl">(This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.)</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">II Bavarian Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Martini,<br /> +relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914 +by General of Cavalry von Stetten).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">3rd Bavarian Infantry Division.<br /> +4th Bavarian Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">26th (Würtemburg) Infantry Division</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach).</td></tr> +</table> + +<p>Group <span class="smcap">Gerok</span> was also temporarily in the Army +Group <span class="smcap">Fabeck</span>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span></p> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_3" id="Appendix_3"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Group Gerok"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Gerok,<br /> +Commanding Reserve Corps.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">1st Cavalry Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(Lieut.-General von Richthofen).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">2 Cavalry Divisions.<a name="FNanchor_119" id="FNanchor_119"></a><a href="#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">2nd Cavalry Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Cavalry von der Marwitz).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">2 Cavalry Divisions.<a name="FNanchor_120" id="FNanchor_120"></a><a href="#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">6th Bavarian Reserve Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">3rd Infantry Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">25th Reserve Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">11th <i>Landwehr</i> Brigade.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">2nd Cavalry Division.</td></tr> +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padt">Bavarian Cavalry Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<h3><a name="Appendix_4" id="Appendix_4"></a>ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN<br /> +from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914.</h3> + +<table class="OB" summary="Army Group Linsingen"> +<tr><td><i>Commander</i></td> +<td class="padl">General of Infantry von Linsingen,<br /> +Commanding II Corps.</td></tr> + +<tr><td><i>Chief of Staff</i></td> +<td class="padl">Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">XV Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Deimling).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">30th Infantry Division.<br /> +39th Infantry Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl">also from 16th Nov., Hofmann’s Composite Division.</td></tr> + +<tr><td class="padt">Plettenberg’s Corps</td> +<td class="padt padl">(General of Infantry von Plettenberg,<br /> +Commanding Guard Corps).</td></tr> + +<tr><td colspan="2" class="padl4">4th Infantry Division.<br /> +Winckler’s Composite Guard Division.</td></tr> +</table> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_1" id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> <i>See <a href="#Page_115">p. 115</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_2" id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> <i>Fourth Army Cavalry.</i> +</p> + +<table class="valt" summary="Fourth Army Cavalry"> +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>I.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc"><i>Cavalry Corps</i></td> +<td class="padl"><i>Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_64">p. 64</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>II.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc">"</td> +<td class="padl"><i>3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_90">p. 90</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdr"><i>IV.</i> </td> +<td class="tdc">"</td> +<td class="padl"><i>3 Cavalry Divisions, <a href="#Page_25">p. 25</a>.</i><br /> +<i>2nd Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_92">p. 92</a>.</i><br /> +<i>Bavarian Cavalry Division, <a href="#Page_92">p. 92</a>.</i></td></tr> + +<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3"><i>Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions.</i></td></tr> +</table> + +<p> +<i>The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on <a href="#Page_56">p. 56</a> to have +been eight divisions, among which, according to <a href="#Page_57">p. 57</a>, were the 3rd, +7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army +Cavalry of the Fourth Army.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>It may be noted that in ‘Liège-Namur’ in the same series of +General Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry +Corps is given as the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_3" id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>There is a further mistake (see <a href="#Footnote_110">footnote 110</a>): the King’s were +not present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The +honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion +was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire +and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_4" id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> <i>The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th +September.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_5" id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing +but between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French +attacks south of Laon in the middle of September.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_6" id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>‘2000 British’ belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division +which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the +resistance of that fortress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_7" id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_8" id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions +were available to oppose them.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_9" id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> <i>These ‘considerable hostile forces’ consisted of the 7th Division and +Byng’s Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after +having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army +from Antwerp.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_10" id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> <i>Needless to point out that General Joffre was never ‘Allied +Commander.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_11" id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> <i>At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British +army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_12" id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> <i>The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th October, +and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the 18th it +had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after considerable +fighting.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_13" id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> <i>On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the 4th, astride +the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, while the 6th Division on +the right had reached the line Premesques-Ennettières-Radinghem (S.E. +of Armentières). General Conneau’s French Cavalry Corps filled the +gap between its right and the left of the II Corps.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_14" id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> <i>The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is +superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as Gheluvelt: +its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_15" id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> <i>The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading +Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till +19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck +area on 18th October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_16" id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> <i>‘Armée’ in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_17" id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> <i>This statement as to Sir J. French’s intentions is inaccurate. The +II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the orders +issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_18" id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> <i>Between Armentières and the sea the British had only the I Corps, +less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps (composed +of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps and two +Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced to about +one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the Allied forces +outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of the statement +that ‘the relative strength of the opposing forces never appreciably +altered in our favour’ will become apparent as the book is read, and +as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only by a weak +composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by a succession +of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed the +attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt on +31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. +See also <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_19" id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> <i>‘The heights of St. Eloi’ is a phrase which suggests that the +author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of +the area round Ypres.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_20" id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> <i>The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own +country.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_21" id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> <i>British torpedo boats do not carry ‘heavy artillery.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_22" id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> <i>The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the +Monitors ‘Severn,’ ‘Humber,’ and ‘Mersey.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_23" id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> <i>This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin, +19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on +account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the +eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the line +Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing +to press their pursuit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_24" id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> <i>The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of very +hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_25" id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> <i>There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it is +to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood’s squadron that reference is made.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_26" id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> <i>There was no British artillery present in this quarter.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_27" id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class="label">[27]</span></a> See pages <a href="#Page_23">23</a>-24.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_28" id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class="label">[28]</span></a> See <i>Les pages de gloire de l’Armée Belge: à Dixmuide</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_29" id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class="label">[29]</span></a> <i>The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the opposition +which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the Allied +force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry’s French +Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and Territorials. +These were driven back without being able to offer much resistance, and +in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British Corps just as it began +its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle and Passchendaele +(21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to divert his reserves +to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend his attack which had +been making good progress on a line south-east from Langemarck to +Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the 7th Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_30" id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class="label">[30]</span></a> <i>By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding the +line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the 1st +Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, the +1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to +Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with +the 3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen’s, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and +2nd Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck. +The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, +and only one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available +to support the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the +2nd Division carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th +Infantry Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. +This division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: +it repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and +night 21st-22nd.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_31" id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class="label">[31]</span></a> <i>The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the +Hazebrouck area.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_32" id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class="label">[32]</span></a> <i>This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On the afternoon +of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in breaking +through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron Highlanders, +and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote +road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward; +however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black +Watch, arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all +further German advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements +came up, the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. +of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from +the 6th Infantry Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen’s of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, +the Queen’s retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven +right back, nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on +them. The old trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually +recovered, but late in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the +advanced position reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken +up about the line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during +this action, in which less than two British infantry brigades had +defeated the 46th Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck +had been heavily attacked, apparently (cf. <a href="#Page_40">p. 40</a>) by the 51st +Reserve Division, which had been completely worsted. In this part +of the action very notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters +just north of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 +rounds a man, and though attacked in front and flank by very superior +numbers, maintained their position intact. The British accounts +testify to the gallantry with which the German attacks were pressed, +officers carrying regimental colours ran on ahead of the men and +planted the colours in the ground to give their men a point to make for, +a mounted officer rode forward, exposing himself recklessly, to encourage +his soldiers, but the musketry of the British infantry was too much +for the Germans, and the attack was completely repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_33" id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class="label">[33]</span></a> <i>Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the repeated +reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, except for +a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the Ypres salient +before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial battalions, the +Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry regiments, the +North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd Dragoon Guards, +the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were added to the force, +while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division were replaced by three +composite brigades from the II Corps, set free after three weeks of +strenuous fighting near La Bassée by the arrival of the Meerut Division, +and greatly below strength.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_34" id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class="label">[34]</span></a> <i>The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim at +doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not +an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate +object.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_35" id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class="label">[35]</span></a> <i>On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde to +Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the line +being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The +German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were +thus faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect +of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven the +French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank exposed +and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing back its left +flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and the expulsion +of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines below) after +heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender foundation that a +British reconnaissance was made in the direction of Gheluwe covered by +two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back without being seriously +pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening from Becelaere were +sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of the 7th Division east of +Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October on the front from +Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over in this narrative. +Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all along the line of the 7th +Division without success except on the left, where by enfilade fire from +Passchendaele they forced the left of the 22nd Infantry Brigade to fall +back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. Meanwhile the advance of the +I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, as already explained (see +<a href="#Footnote_29">footnote 29</a>), the uncovering of the left of the I Corps prevented the +advance being pressed beyond the line Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line +was made good and the German efforts to advance successfully repulsed. +On 22nd October the Germans attacked the line of the 2nd Division +north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily repulsed, while further to their +left they renewed their attacks on the 21st Infantry Brigade east of +Polygon Wood with equal ill-success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_36" id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class="label">[36]</span></a> <i>The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin +relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_37" id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class="label">[37]</span></a> <i>The ‘well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements’ +would have been most welcome to the British. Unfortunately +there had been no time or opportunity to do more than dig in hastily +where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, while such trenches +as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were hastily prepared in such +loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when bombarded; wire was +conspicuous by its absence.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_38" id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class="label">[38]</span></a> <i>The only thing in the nature of a ‘fortress’ at Langemarck was a +small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of +22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_39" id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class="label">[39]</span></a> <i>This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The +relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not take +place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved by a +division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th October it +was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of the morning +of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of the 21st Infantry +Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through north of Reutel, +penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a counter-attack +by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd R. +Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was +made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation +with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the +6th Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road. +Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all attacks +were repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_40" id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class="label">[40]</span></a> <i>It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were +much below establishment.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_41" id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class="label">[41]</span></a> See <i>Les pages de gloire de l’Armée Belge: à Dixmuide</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_42" id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class="label">[42]</span></a> <i>This testimony to the effective character of the help given by Admiral +Hood’s squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in the +narrative on <a href="#Page_22">page 22</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_43" id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class="label">[43]</span></a> <i>The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th +October (<a href="#Footnote_39">footnote 39</a>), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division +had re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and +between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes +there were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of +the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress +east of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX +Corps which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the +showing of this narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly +superior in numbers to those engaged in the attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_44" id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class="label">[44]</span></a> <i>The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th French +Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a German +battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French unit +with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, however, +less progress was made, but the implication that the British reached +Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve Division at the +point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on this quarter +only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support available was +insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it was therefore +abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_45" id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class="label">[45]</span></a> <i>The British who were streaming down from the high ground about +Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps +4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_46" id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class="label">[46]</span></a> <i>There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the +period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the +south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was +obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which +held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably +on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd Reserve +Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into +Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots +Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, +and succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, +but a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid +of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was +successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding +a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division +connected it up with the left of General Allenby’s Cavalry Corps on the +Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_47" id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class="label">[47]</span></a> <i>This account does not tell the story of 29th October very intelligibly. +The British front had been readjusted, and was now held by the 2nd +Division on the left, from the junction with the French to west of Reutel, +thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by the 1st Division, +thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the 3rd Cavalry Division +on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans (apparently the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force against the junction +of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the 9th kilo cross-roads, and +rolled up the battalions to right and left after very severe fighting, in +which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd Gordon Highlanders of the +7th Division distinguished themselves greatly by repeated counter-attacks. +The resistance of the troops in the front line delayed the +Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st Division to be put +in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the most advanced trenches. +The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as Gheluvelt, and their final +gain of ground was inconsiderable.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_48" id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class="label">[48]</span></a> <i>It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting on the +La Bassée-Armentières front as quite distinct from the main battle for +Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III Corps had +a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they received being +on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade and the divisional +troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced General Conneau’s +French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. As the net +result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced back to a line +running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve Chapelle, past +Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentières to the Lys at Houplines, part +of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left bank of the Lys to the +junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of Messines. The German +attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and the strain on the II and +III Corps was very severe.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_49" id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class="label">[49]</span></a> <i>In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers +of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by itself +amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the British +forces engaged between La Bassée and Zonnebeke. For its <a href="#Appendix_2">Order of +Battle</a> see at end of book.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_50" id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class="label">[50]</span></a> <i>If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the further +advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered the +German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, and +enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the Belgians, +however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the assistance of +their Allies.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_51" id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class="label">[51]</span></a> <i>No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st October. +It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here as though +it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in action on the +Zonnebeke area since 24th October.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_52" id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class="label">[52]</span></a> <i>The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British Commander-in-Chief +amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch howitzers, six +of 60-pounders, and three of 4·7-inch guns, a total of forty-four guns +and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_53" id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class="label">[53]</span></a> <i>At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held +by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the +I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the +XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions +of the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged +for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at +full war establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to +one.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_54" id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class="label">[54]</span></a> <i>See <a href="#Footnote_51">footnote 51</a>. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third +time as a new arrival.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_55" id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class="label">[55]</span></a> See <a href="#Page_62">page 62</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_56" id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class="label">[56]</span></a> <i>It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the statements +previously given, even apart from the fact that the German units +were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous heavy +losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds is no more +than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division who had held +up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of Langemarck on +23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian Guard attacked +on 11th November—or rather a scanty remnant of them was: in the +interval they had fought and held up a succession of attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_57" id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class="label">[57]</span></a> <i>The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only +had been given a day’s rest, but the division as a whole had not been +relieved.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_58" id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class="label">[58]</span></a> <i>These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of +which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed. +None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of the +Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_59" id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class="label">[59]</span></a> <i>There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the +very thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a +front of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete +and St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a +brigade of French infantry.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_60" id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class="label">[60]</span></a> Messines ridge.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_61" id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class="label">[61]</span></a> <i>The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing +the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of time +and want of labour. ‘Deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements’ +is a much exaggerated statement.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_62" id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class="label">[62]</span></a> <i>An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time, +but was decisively repulsed.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_63" id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class="label">[63]</span></a> <i>I and II Cavalry Corps. See <a href="#Appendix_3">Order of Battle</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_64" id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class="label">[64]</span></a> <i>The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry Brigade +on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were dislodged +by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and +1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy fighting, the +1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by a very +stubborn resistance.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_65" id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class="label">[65]</span></a> <i>Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines +canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde +was brought to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st +Division under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division +under Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a +new line to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde +the 7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but +east of Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_66" id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class="label">[66]</span></a> <i>The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some +of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front +east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve +Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long spell +of rest.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_67" id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class="label">[67]</span></a> <i>The ‘reinforcements’ which the Allies had received on 29th-30th +October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them. +(See <a href="#Footnote_66">footnote 66</a>.)</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_68" id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class="label">[68]</span></a> <i>The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, +at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account +put in about eight battalions.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_69" id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class="label">[69]</span></a> <i>It would not be gathered from this account that the British artillery +had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to ammunition +expenditure.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_70" id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class="label">[70]</span></a> <i>The statement that ‘many attacks had to be delivered against fresh +troops in good sheltered entrenchments’ is almost ludicrous in its travesty +of the facts.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_71" id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class="label">[71]</span></a> <i>It was not in ‘long colonial wars’ but in careful training on the +ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that +mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the defence. +Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the outbreak of +war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active service.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_72" id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class="label">[72]</span></a> <i>The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st October, +the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division holding on +successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had been pierced at +Gheluvelt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_73" id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class="label">[73]</span></a> <i>The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the British +possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war establishments +allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that by +31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns to +increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one or +both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for +machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original +Expeditionary Force could maintain.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_74" id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class="label">[74]</span></a> <i>The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an +hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The ‘château and +park,’ north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales Borderers, who +maintained their ground, although their right was left in the air by the +loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came up and delivered their +celebrated counter-attack past the right of the S.W.B. This apparently +occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, however, accurate in saying +that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the Worcesters did was that they +completely checked the German efforts to push forward; the position their +counter-attack reached enabled them to flank any advance west of Gheluvelt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_75" id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class="label">[75]</span></a> <i>The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem +founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was +subsequently retaken.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_76" id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class="label">[76]</span></a> <i>The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the detachments +under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the right +of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury Forest, +was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground, and at one +point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans back a long +way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_77" id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class="label">[77]</span></a> <i>The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General +Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General +Munro, commanding the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was +killed, but the former died many months after of his wounds.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_78" id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class="label">[78]</span></a> <i>During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the +XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held by +the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades north-west +of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, however, +unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and further +to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily pressed. It was +here that the London Scottish were put in to recover trenches which had +been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_79" id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class="label">[79]</span></a> <i>Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the night +of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely difficult +to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade was forced out +of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that the advance of the +Germans was then held up west of the village, counter-attacks by two +battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just arrived from La Bassée-Neuve +Chapelle area, assisting to check them. Subsequently these +battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st Lincolnshires) were +also forced back, but by this time more French reinforcements were +coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, and their counter-attacks, +though not wholly successful, prevented further German progress. +But the admission of this account that two whole German regiments +(six battalions) were engaged in the attack is a fine testimony to +the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division and attached infantry +at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one against them.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_80" id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class="label">[80]</span></a> <i>The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st Cavalry +Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by portions +of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the 5th Division +(the 2nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire +L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve Chapelle and +much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th (Würtemburg) +Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only artillery +available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the R.H.A. +batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_81" id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class="label">[81]</span></a> <i>i.e. Würtemburg.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_82" id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class="label">[82]</span></a> <i>This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Château had to be evacuated +during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal +of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans +did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts as +they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward beyond +Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give the +impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily +pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_83" id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class="label">[83]</span></a> <i>The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was +in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under +Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as +were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position +south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day’s +fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting +as infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts +of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of +Zandvoorde).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_84" id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class="label">[84]</span></a> <i>The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th +Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, +and were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This +account of the ‘treacherous methods of the Indians’ smacks of the conventional; +it is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections +of the German Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against +the British for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of ‘Kultur.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_85" id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class="label">[85]</span></a> <i>French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French +had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division +assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_86" id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class="label">[86]</span></a> <i>These ‘reinforcements of newly arrived British troops’ are +imaginary.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_87" id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class="label">[87]</span></a> <i>The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in breaking +our line at this point and captured two guns which had been pushed +up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards, though taken +in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack by the 1st Black +Watch re-established the line, while south of the road a counter-attack +by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared the Herenthage +Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches a little eastward. +Further to the right Lord Cavern’s detachment (Brigadier-General +Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his battalions had come +under Lord Cavan’s orders) and the remnants of the 1st Grenadiers +and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their own successfully +and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. Deimling’s left +wing.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_88" id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class="label">[88]</span></a> <i>The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day belongs +solely to the French; no British troops were in action there.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_89" id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class="label">[89]</span></a> <i>After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of the +fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some +attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture +Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the British +Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east of Wulverghem. +Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it maintained +itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th Division about +the middle of November.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_90" id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class="label">[90]</span></a> <i>The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, ‘Hofprediger’ Dr. +Vogel, in his book ‘3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie’ (p. 212), +says the attack was made and failed, but ‘next day the English abandoned +the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our +8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard +Dragoons.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_91" id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class="label">[91]</span></a> <i>What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient except +the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for the simple +reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, though some +French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek; but in the +course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the 7th Division +was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II Corps composed +of battalions which had had three weeks’ fighting near La Bassée and +had then to be thrust in after only two or three days’ rest to hold some of +the most difficult parts of the line south-east of Ypres. The 7th Infantry +Division when relieved amounted to less than a third of their original +strength, without taking into account the drafts that had joined since +they landed, which amounted to 2000 or more. Most of the battalions +of the 1st Division were in scarcely better case.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_92" id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class="label">[92]</span></a> <i>These ‘successive lines of rearward positions’ did not exist except +on paper during the period to be included in the ‘Battle of Ypres,’ i.e. +to 17th November.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_93" id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class="label">[93]</span></a> <i>During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting on +the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the +Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which +was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry +Brigade (cf. <a href="#Page_93">page 93</a>, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the 22nd +Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out for a rest, +and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the line next day. +On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd Division, which +had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, gained a little +ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the line was again +attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was broken near Veldhoek, +but was restored after some sharp fighting and several counter-attacks. +Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to the east of it, the +2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than held its own. In +the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken by two battalions +of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the 1st Division.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_94" id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class="label">[94]</span></a> <i>St. Eloi is hardly situated ‘on high ground,’ as it is on the down +slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the low ground +after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the Messines-Wytschaete +ridge.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_95" id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class="label">[95]</span></a> <i>The allusion is not understood.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_96" id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class="label">[96]</span></a> <i>The heavy artillery at Sir John French’s disposal at this period +was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered +by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed on +the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for +the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among +the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the +vast ammunition expenditure which had been incurred.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_97" id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class="label">[97]</span></a> <i>The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was +defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the +Broodseinde cross-roads.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_98" id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class="label">[98]</span></a> <i>The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_99" id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class="label">[99]</span></a> <i>However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917 +Lombartzyde was in Allied possession.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_100" id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class="label">[100]</span></a> For Order of Battle, see <a href="#APPENDIX">Appendix</a>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_101" id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class="label">[101]</span></a> <i>A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery +with six guns.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_102" id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class="label">[102]</span></a> Consisting of the 4th <i>Ersatz</i> Division and the 43rd Reserve +Division.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_103" id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class="label">[103]</span></a> <i>It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of Dixmude +should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this assertion can have +taken, as no British troops were concerned in the Dixmude fighting, nor +could there have been any occasion for any official British announcement +about Dixmude.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jäger Regt. +read Res. Infantry Regt.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_104" id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class="label">[104]</span></a> <i>The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von +Winckler’s Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions +was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced +to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of the +3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the 3rd +Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the +main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the +Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently +pronounced.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_105" id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class="label">[105]</span></a> <i>The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon +Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British line +was marked by a ‘strong point’ which had been erected near the south-west +corner of the wood, known later as ‘Black Watch Corner’: this was +successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the Black Watch. +Attacks were made on the 1st King’s lining the southern edge of the +wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also further eastward +and to the left of the King’s, on the 2nd Coldstream Guards. The +Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the 54th Reserve +Division: at neither of these points did the attackers meet with any +success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_106" id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class="label">[106]</span></a> <i>A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line +trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important +part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed +appreciably to its success.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_107" id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class="label">[107]</span></a> <i>This is the eastern part of the wood known later as ‘Inverness +Copse.’</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_108" id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class="label">[108]</span></a> <i>This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the +1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington’s.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_109" id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class="label">[109]</span></a> <i>The 4th (Queen Augusta’s) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked +the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been +repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. +Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were +also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the +Germans made no progress.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_110" id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class="label">[110]</span></a> <i>This part of the German account is not borne out by the British +versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke +through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on north-west +into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and coming +out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was arrested +mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them up with +rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, orderlies +from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of the 1st Brigade, +assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was critical until about +noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I. arrived on the scene. +This battalion had been engaged for several days near Zwarteleen, and +had just been brought up to Westhoek to act as Divisional Reserve. +Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly counter-attacked the +Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out headlong. Many of +them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and southern sides by +the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western edge of Polygon +Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come up to Glencorse +Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other units of the +2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which extended thence +to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment who had +pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating any +further. The King’s, to whom this account gives the credit for the +Oxfordshire’s counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard +Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on the +Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling that +at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd Oxford +and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief part +in the defeat of Napoleon’s Guard.</i> +</p> +<p> +<i>The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have +been the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, +chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were +pushed forward rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness +Copse.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_111" id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class="label">[111]</span></a> <i>The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon +11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek +was trifling in extent and value, and though ‘Hill 60’ and the +wood north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt +that the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been +expected to produce a break-through. The ‘numerical superiority’ +once again attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged +strength of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost +wholly lacking supporting points and communications, which had such +a much more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they +ever possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the +German Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the +honours of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three +weeks of incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous +troops.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_112" id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class="label">[112]</span></a> <i>This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November in +which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th +and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the +Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th +November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage +Château fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered +by the 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack +by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of +the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of the +Château. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry +Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_113" id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class="label">[113]</span></a> <i>The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_114" id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class="label">[114]</span></a> <i>One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on +17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on +this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, +holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven +the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the +first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception +undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_115" id="Footnote_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115"><span class="label">[115]</span></a> <i>It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_116" id="Footnote_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116"><span class="label">[116]</span></a> <i>See remarks in <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_117" id="Footnote_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117"><span class="label">[117]</span></a> <i>The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have been +mentioned.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_118" id="Footnote_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118"><span class="label">[118]</span></a> <i>It is not to be read in this monograph. See <a href="#INTRODUCTION">Introduction</a>.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_119" id="Footnote_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119"><span class="label">[119]</span></a> <i>4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see <a href="#Page_64">page 64</a>).</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a name="Footnote_120" id="Footnote_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120"><span class="label">[120]</span></a> <i>3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see <a href="#Page_90">page 90</a>).</i></p></div></div> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span></p> + +<h2><a name="INDEX" id="INDEX">INDEX</a></h2> + +<ul class="index"><li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Albert of Würtemburg</span>, Duke, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see also</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Fourth">Army, Fourth</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Antwerp</span>: value of, to Entente, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">retreat from, <a href="#Page_7">7</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Army_Fourth"></a>Army, Fourth</span> (German): formation of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">advance of, through <span class="smcap">Belgium</span>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">dispositions on 20th Oct., <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">task of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 3rd Nov., <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 10th Nov., <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- <span class="smcap">Sixth</span> (German): position of right wing of, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">failure of attacks of, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Army_Group_Fabeck"></a>Army Group Fabeck</span>: constitution of, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">plan for, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">assembly of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">artillery of, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 30th Oct., <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 31st Oct., <a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">alteration of plan,<a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">reinforcement of, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">offensive on 11th Nov. of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Army_Group_Linsingen"></a>---- —— <i>Linsingen</i>: composition of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">task of, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">offensive of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Army Headquarters</span> (German), meetings at, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>: Anglo-French counter-attacks at, <a href="#Page_55">55</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">XXVII Res. Corps takes, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Belgian</span> population, patriotism of, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Beseler</span>, General von, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see also</i> <a href="#C3R"><span class="smcap">Corps</span>, III Reserve</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">British Fleet</span>, co-operation of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a> <i>and note</i>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a> (<i>note</i>), <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">British</span> force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><i>Calais</i>: concentration about, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">German objective, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Cavalry, Army</span> (German): objective of, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">relief of, near <span class="smcap">Lille</span>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Cavalry, Fourth</span> (German) Army, composition of, <a href="#Page_xvii">xvii</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx">---- <span class="smcap">Sixth</span> (German) Army: composition of, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture <span class="smcap">Kruiseik</span>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="C3R"></a>Corps</span> (German), III Reserve: captures Antwerp, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">screens Fourth Army, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">crosses the <span class="smcap">Yser</span>, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="C15"></a>---- —— XV: attack on <span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack and capture of <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">captures Hill <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XIX, captures <span class="smcap">Lille</span>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXII Res.-XXVII Res.: formation of, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">transport of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXII Res., attacks on <span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXIII Res.: attack on <span class="smcap">Houthulst</span> Forest, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXVI Res., takes <span class="smcap">Passchendaele</span>, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— XXVII Res., takes <span class="smcap">Becelaere</span>, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— II Bavarian, dispositions of, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- (French) II, arrival of, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx">---- —— IX, arrival of, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_64">64</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Deimling</span>, General von, wounded,<a href="#Page_73">73</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1"><i>see</i> <a href="#C15"><span class="smcap">Corps</span> (German), XV</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Dixmude</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack by French Marine division on, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Eastern Front</span>, German units leave for, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Emperor</span>, German: proclamation to Fourth Army, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">watches attack on <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Fabeck</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Group_Fabeck">Army Group Fabeck</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">French</span> force, strength of, <a href="#Page_12">12</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Gerok</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Group_Gerok">Group Gerok</a></span>.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span></li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>: attack on, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">British force holding, <a href="#Page_72">72</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Gloucestershire</span> Regiment at <span class="smcap">Langemarck</span>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap"><a id="Group_Gerok"></a>Group Gerok</span>: formation of, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">order of battle of, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><a id="Group_Urach"></a>---- <span class="smcap">Urach</span>: formation of, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on <span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span> Park, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Guard</span> (German) Division (von <span class="smcap">Winckler</span>): marches to <span class="smcap">Roubaix</span>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack of, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Guards</span>, British Life, cut up, <a href="#Page_68">68</a> <i>and note</i>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Kemmel</span>, Mount, topography and importance of, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">King’s Liverpool</span> Regiment, counter-attack by, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> <i>and note</i> <a href="#Page_2">2</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Lille</span>: value to Entente, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Linsingen</span>, General Baron von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Army_Group_Linsingen">Army Group Linsingen</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Messines</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">British force holding, <a href="#Page_80">80</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Nieuport</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire L.I.</span>, counter-attack German Guard, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> (<i>note</i> 2).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Plettenberg’s</span> Corps, attack on 11th Nov., <a href="#Page_111">111</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Urach</span>, General von, <i>see</i> <span class="smcap"><a href="#Group_Urach">Group Urach</a></span>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Worcestershire</span> Regiment, counter-attack at <span class="smcap">Gheluvelt</span>, <a href="#Page_75">75</a> <i>and note</i> <a href="#Page_3">3</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Wytschaete</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">German attack on, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">Anglo-French counter-attack on, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">second German attack, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">third attack and capture of, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of Park of, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">gallant defence by French troops, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Yorkshire L.I.</span> retake <span class="smcap">Herenthage</span> Château, <a href="#Page_124">124</a> (<i>note</i>).</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Ypres</span>: topographical, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">historical, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attack from the north against, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">attempt to break through south of, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">battle of, begins, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>.</li> + +<li class="indx"><span class="smcap">Yser</span>, canal: topographical, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">flooding the, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">crossed by III Res. Corps, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="smcap">Zandvoorde</span>: importance of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>;</li> +<li class="isub1">capture of, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>.</li></ul> + +<hr class="r65" /> +<p class="center small">Printed by T. and A. <span class="smcap">Constable</span>, Printers to His Majesty<br /> +at the Edinburgh University Press +</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Ypres 1914, by Otto Schwink + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YPRES 1914 *** + +***** This file should be named 44234-h.htm or 44234-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/4/4/2/3/44234/ + +Produced by Brian Coe, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by Cornell +University Digital Collections) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Ypres 1914 + An Official Account Published by Order of the German General Staff + +Author: Otto Schwink + +Translator: Graeme Chamley Wynne + +Release Date: November 19, 2013 [EBook #44234] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK YPRES 1914 *** + + + + +Produced by Brian Coe, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was +produced from images generously made available by Cornell +University Digital Collections) + + + + + + + Transcriber's Note: + + Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as + possible. + + On page 92, in "the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from the Sixth + Army," "from" is a correction of "fron". + + Italic text has been marked with _underscores_. + Bold text has been marked with =equals signs=. + OE ligatures have been expanded. + + + + +YPRES, 1914 + + +MONS, AND THE RETREAT + +By Captain G. S. GORDON + +With an Introduction by Field-Marshal LORD FRENCH + + 1/6 _net_. + + =The Evening News.=--'... The true history of those amazing and + heroic days, briefly and clearly told by a soldier and an expert.' + + +THE MARNE CAMPAIGN + +By Lieut. Col. F. E. WHITTON, C.M.G. + + 10/6 _net_. + + =Saturday Review.=--'... Clear and concise ... gives a much better + general impression of the Battle of the Marne than any other we + know.' + + +1914 + +By Field-Marshal VISCOUNT FRENCH of Ypres, K.P., O.M., etc. + +With a Preface by MARECHAL FOCH + + 21/- _net_. + + +CONSTABLE AND CO. LTD., LONDON. + + + + + YPRES, 1914 + + AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT PUBLISHED BY + ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + + TRANSLATION BY G. C. W. + + WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY THE + HISTORICAL SECTION (MILITARY BRANCH) + COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE + + LONDON + CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD + 1919 + + + _Printed in Great Britain_ + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + INTRODUCTION ix + + GERMAN PREFACE xxiii + + PRELIMINARY REMARKS 1 + + THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS 13 + + THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 19 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY, 20TH-31ST + OCTOBER 1914 26 + + THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES 59 + + THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END + OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH NOVEMBER 1914 98 + + THE LAST PHASE 103 + + CONCLUSION 126 + + + APPENDIX + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY 131 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK 132 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK 133 + + ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN 133 + + + INDEX 135 + + + + +ILLUSTRATIONS + + + SKETCH MAPS IN TEXT + + PAGE + + DISPOSITIONS ON 20TH OCTOBER 1914 20 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 30TH OCTOBER 1914 67 + + THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 73 + + THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES ON 31ST OCTOBER 1914 81 + + THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE ON 10TH NOVEMBER 1914 108 + + THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 112 + + THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND GUARD DIVISION ON 11TH NOVEMBER 1914 115 + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +The German book of which a translation is here given was written in +the autumn of 1917 by Captain Otto Schwink, a General Staff Officer, +by order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army, and is +stated to be founded on official documents. It forms one of a series +of monographs, partly projected, partly published, on the various +phases of the war, but is the only one that is available dealing with +operations in which the British Army was engaged. Several concerned +with the Eastern theatre of war have already appeared, and one other +entitled 'LIEGE-NAMUR,' relating to the Western. + +Field-Marshal Viscount French, in his book '1914,' has said that the +period 27th to 31st October during the first battle of YPRES was +'more momentous and fateful than any other which I directed during my +period of service as Commander-in-Chief in the field. 31st October +and 1st November will remain for ever memorable in the history of our +country, for during those two days no more than a thin and straggling +line of tired-out British soldiers stood between the Empire and its +practical ruin as an independent first-class Power.' The German account +accentuates the truth of Lord French's appreciation of the great peril +in which the Army and the Nation stood. It tells us of the enemy's +plans, and of the large forces that he brought up with great skill +and secrecy to carry them out, and, generally, to use Marshal Foch's +expression, lets us 'know what was going on in the other fellow's +house.' But it does more than that: unconsciously perhaps, it bears +convincing testimony to the fighting powers of the British Army, +the determination of its leaders, the extraordinary effectiveness +of the fire of its artillery and of its cavalry and infantry, and +the skill of its engineers; for it repeatedly credits Field-Marshal +Sir John French with 'reinforcements in abundance,' insists that our +troops 'fought desperately for every heap of stones and every pile of +bricks before abandoning them,' and definitely records that 'the fact +that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops gave way under +the strong pressure we put on them ... gives us the opportunity to +acknowledge that there were men of real worth opposed to us who did +their duty thoroughly.' We are further told that the effect of our +artillery was such that 'it was not possible to push up reserves owing +to heavy artillery fire'; that 'all roads leading to the rear were +continuously shelled for a long way back'; that the German 'advancing +columns were under accurate artillery fire at long range'; that our +shells 'blocked streets and bridges and devastated villages so far +back that any regular transport of supplies became impossible.' As +regards rifle and machine-gun fire, we are credited with 'quantities of +machine-guns,' 'large numbers of machine-guns,' etc.; with the result +that 'the roads were swept by machine-guns'; and that 'over every bush, +hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of smoke betraying a +machine-gun rattling out bullets.' At that date we had no machine-gun +units, and there were only two machine-guns on the establishment of +a battalion, and of these many had been damaged, and had not yet been +replaced; actually machine-guns were few and far between. The only +inference to be drawn is that the rapid fire of the British rifleman, +were he infantryman, cavalryman or sapper, was mistaken for machine-gun +fire both as regards volume and effect. Our simple defences, to +complete which both time and labour had been lacking, became in German +eyes 'a well-planned maze of trenches,' 'a maze of obstacles and +entrenchments'; and we had 'turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point'; 'the villages of WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES ... +had been converted into fortresses' (_Festungen_); as also the edge +of a wood near GHELUVELT and LANGEMARCK. As at the last-named place +there was only a small redoubt with a garrison of two platoons, and the +'broad wire entanglements' described by the German General Staff were +in reality but trifling obstacles of the kind that the Germans 'took +in their stride,'[1] the lavish praise, were it not for the result of +the battle, might be deemed exaggerated. Part of it undoubtedly is. +It is fair, however, to deduce that the German nation had to be given +some explanation why the 'contemptible little Army' had not been pushed +straightway into the sea. + +The monograph is frankly intended to present the views that the German +General Staff wish should be held as regards the battles, and prevent, +as their Preface says, the currency of 'the legends and rumours +which take such an easy hold on the popular imagination and are so +difficult, if not impossible, to correct afterwards.' One cannot +naturally expect the whole truth to be revealed yet; that it is not +will be seen from the notes. The elder von Moltke said, when pressed +by his nephews to write a true account of 1870-1--to their future +financial advantage--'It can't be done yet. Too many highly placed +personages (_hohe Herrschaften_) would suffer in their reputations.' +It was not until twenty-five years after the Franco-Prussian War +that Fritz Hoenig, Kunz and other German military historians who had +been given access to the records, were allowed to draw back the veil +a little. The publication of the French General Staff account began +even later. What is now given to us is, however, amply sufficient +to follow the main German plans and movements; but the difficulties +that prevented the enemy from making successful use of the enormous +number of troops at his disposal and his superior equipment in heavy +artillery, machine-guns, aeroplanes, hand-grenades and other trench +warfare material, are untold. Until we learn more we may fairly +attribute our victory to the military qualities of the British, French +and Belgian troops, and the obstinate refusal of all ranks to admit +defeat. + +The German General Staff specially claim that the first battle of +YPRES was a German victory, 'for it marked the failure of the enemy's +intention to fall on the rear of our Western Armies, to free the rich +districts of Northern France and the whole of Belgium,' etc. etc. +Granted that we did so fail, the battle can, on that General Staff's +own evidence, be regarded as a drawn one. For it is definitely stated +in the monograph that the object of the operations was 'successfully +closing with the enemy ... and gaining CALAIS, the aim and object +of the 1914 campaign'--this the German Army notoriously did not do. +The intention to break through is repeatedly stated: 'although fresh +reinforcements had been sent up by the German General Staff ... a +break-through had not been possible.' 'Another effort to break through +should be made as soon as possible.' We are told that Fabeck's Army +Group (eventually nine infantry and five cavalry divisions) was formed +'as a strong new army of attack ... for breaking through on the front +WERWICQ-WARNETON.' Linsingen's Army Group (five divisions) after the +failure of von Fabeck was formed 'to drive back and crush the enemy +lying north of the (COMINES-YPRES) canal ... and to break through +there.' Finally, however, it is admitted that 'no break-through of the +enemy's lines had been accomplished.... We had not succeeded in making +the decisive break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in +the west in our favour had to be consigned to its grave.' In fact, the +book is largely an apologia and a confession of failure which mere +protestations of victory cannot alter. + +The effects of a German victory on the course of the war, with the +Channel ports in German hands, as compared with those of an Allied +victory in Flanders, which at that period of the war and at that season +of the year could have resulted in little more than pushing the enemy +back into Belgium a few miles, may be easily imagined. If the battle +was a tactical draw, at least we had a strategic balance in our favour. + +The principal reasons advanced for the German ill-success are 'the +enemy's numerical superiority, and the strength of his positions,' and +of course the drastic course taken by the Belgians of 'calling in the +sea to their aid.' + +There is constant repetition of these pleas throughout the book. To +those who were there and saw our 'thin and straggling line' and the +hastily constructed and lightly wired defences: mere isolated posts and +broken lengths of shallow holes with occasional thin belts of wire, and +none of the communication trenches of a later date, they provoke only +amazement. Even German myopia cannot be the cause of such statements. + +As regards the superiority of numbers, the following appears to be +the approximate state of the case as regards the infantry on the +battle front from ARMENTIERES (inclusive) to the sea dealt with +in the monograph. It is necessary to count in battalions, as the +Germans had two or three with each cavalry division, and the British +Commander-in-Chief enumerates the reinforcements sent up to YPRES from +the II and Indian Corps by battalions, and two Territorial battalions, +London Scottish and Hertfordshires, also took part. The total figures +are:-- + + British, French, Belgian 263 battalions. + German 426 battalions. + +That is roughly a proportion of Allies to Germans of 13 to 21. Viscount +French in his '1914' says 7 to 12 Corps, which is much the same: 52 +to 84 as against 49 to 84, and very different from the German claim +of '40 divisions to 25.' Actually in infantry divisions the Allies +had only 22, even counting as complete the Belgian six, which had +only the strength of German brigades. Any future correction of the +figures, when actual bayonets present can be counted, will probably +emphasise the German superiority in numbers still more, and the +enemy indisputably had the advantage of united command, homogeneous +formations and uniform material which were lacking in the Allied force. + +As regards the cavalry the Western Allies had six divisions, including +one of three brigades. The enemy had at least nine, possibly more (one, +the Guard Cavalry Division, of three brigades), as it is not clear from +the German account how much cavalry was transferred from the Sixth Army +to the Fourth Army.[2] It may be noted that a German cavalry division +included, with its two or three cavalry brigades, horse artillery +batteries and the two or three _Jaeger_ battalions, three or more +machine-gun batteries and two or more companies of cyclists; and was +thus, unlike ours, a force of all arms. + +The German General Staff reveal nothing about the exact strength of the +artillery. In a footnote it is mentioned that in addition to infantry +divisions the III Reserve Corps contained siege artillery, _Pionier_ +formations and other technical troops; and in the text that 'all the +available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army to be brought up (to assist +the Fourth Army) for the break-through.' The Germans had trench-mortars +(_Minenwerfer_) which are several times mentioned, whilst our first +ones were still in the process of improvisation by the Engineers of the +Indian Corps at BETHUNE. + +The statement that 'the enemy's' (_i.e._ British, French and Belgian) +'superiority in material, in guns, trench-mortars, machine-guns and +aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, even fourfold' is palpably nonsense +when said of 1914, though true perhaps in 1917 when the monograph was +written. + +The fact seems to be that the Germans cannot understand defeat in war +except on the premise that the victor had superiority of numbers. To +show to what extent this creed obtains: in the late Dr. Wylie's _Henry +V._, vol. II. page 216, will be found an account of a German theory, +accepted by the well-known historian Delbrueck, that the English won at +Agincourt on account of superior numbers, although contemporary history +is practically unanimous that the French were ten to one. Dr. Wylie +sums it up thus: + + 'Starting with the belief that the defeat of the French is + inexplicable on the assumption that they greatly outnumbered the + English, and finding that all contemporary authorities, both French + and English, are agreed that they did, the writer builds up a + theory that all the known facts can be explained on the supposition + that the French were really much inferior to us in numbers ... and + concludes that he cannot be far wrong if he puts the total number + of French (the English being 6000) at something between 4000 and + 7000.' + +It may not be out of place to add that a German Staff Officer +captured during the Ypres fighting said to his escort as he was being +taken away: 'Now I am out of it, do tell me where your reserves are +concealed; in what woods are they?' and he refused to believe that we +had none. Apparently it was inconceivable to the German General Staff +that we should stand to fight unless we had superior numbers; and these +not being visible in the field, they must be hidden away somewhere. + +Further light on what the Germans imagined is thrown by prisoners, +who definitely stated that their main attack was made south of YPRES, +because it was thought that our main reserves were near ST. JEAN, +north-east of that town. From others it was gathered that what could +be seen of our army in that quarter was in such small and scattered +parties that it was taken to be an outpost line covering important +concentrations, and the Germans did not press on, fearing a trap. + +It is, however, possible that the German miscalculation of the number +of formations engaged may not be altogether due to imaginary reserves, +as regards the British Army. Before the war the Great General Staff +knew very little about us. The collection of 'intelligence' with +regard to the British Empire was dealt with by a Section known in the +Moltkestrasse as the 'Demi-monde Section,' because it was responsible +for so many countries; and this Section admittedly had little time +to devote to us. Our organisation was different from that of any of +the great European armies. Their field artillery brigades contained +seventy-two guns, whereas ours had only eighteen guns or howitzers; +their infantry brigades consisted of two regiments, each of three +battalions, that is six battalions, not four as in the original British +Expeditionary Force. To a German, therefore, an infantry brigade meant +six battalions, not four, and if a prisoner said that he belonged to +the Blankshire Regiment, the German might possibly believe he had +identified three battalions, whereas only one would be present. This +is actually brought out on page 118, when the author speaks of the 1st +Battalion of the King's (Liverpool) Regiment as the _Koenigsregiment +Liverpool_, and indicates his ignorance of the British Army, when +this single battalion engages the German _Garde Regiment zu Fuss_, by +describing the fight not only as one of regiment against regiment, but +as _Garde gegen Garde_ (Guard against Guards).[3] Such is the fighting +value of an English Line battalion. A victory over it is certainly +claimed, but the significant sentence immediately follows: 'any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question.' + +It may be as well to point out that the 'volunteers' who it is said +flocked to the barracks to form the Reserve Corps XXII to XXVII were +not all volunteers in our sense of the word. The General Staff only +claims that 75 per cent. were untrained, a very different state of +affairs from our New Armies, which had not 1 per cent. of trained +soldiers. Many of the 'volunteers' were fully trained men liable +to service, who merely anticipated their recall to the colours. It +was well known before the war that in each army corps area Germany +intended to form one 'Active' Corps and one or more 'Reserve' Corps. +The original armies of invasion all contained Reserve Corps notably the +IV Reserve of von Kluck's Army, which marched and fought just as the +active ones did. These first formed Reserve Corps were, it is believed, +entirely made up of trained men, but those with the higher numbers +XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII, which appear in the Fourth Army, probably +did contain a good percentage of men untrained before the war. + +_Ersatz_ divisions were formed of the balance of reservists after the +Reserve divisions had been organised, and of untrained men liable for +service. After a time the words 'Active,' 'Reserve,' and '_Ersatz_' +applied to formations lost their significance, as the same classes of +men were to be found in all of them. + +No attempt has been made to tone down the author's patriotic sentiments +and occasional lapses from good taste; the general nature of the +narrative is too satisfactory to the British Army to make any omissions +necessary when presenting it to the British public. + +The footnotes deal with a number of the more important points raised, +but are not exhaustive. + + * * * * * + + _Note._--The German time, at the period of the year in question one + hour earlier than ours, has been adhered to. + + The Notes of the Historical Section are distinguished from those of + the Author by being printed in italics. + + In preparing the translation for issue it has not been thought + necessary to supply all the maps provided in the original, as the + general lie of the country must be fairly well known to British + readers. + + (_Translation of Title Page_) + + + Monographs on the Great War + + THE BATTLE ON THE YSER AND OF + YPRES IN THE AUTUMN 1914 + + (DIE SCHLACHT AN DER YSER UND + BEI YPERN IM HERBST 1914) + + FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES + + PUBLISHED + BY ORDER OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF + OLDENBURG, 1918, GERHARD STALLING + + + + +PREFACE + +BY GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS + + +The gigantic scale of the present war defies comparison with those of +the past, and battles which formerly held the world in suspense are +now almost forgotten. The German people have been kept informed of the +progress of events on all fronts since the 4th August 1914, by the +daily official reports of the German General Staff, but the general +public will have been unable to gather from these a coherent and +continuous story of the operations. + +For this reason the General Staff of the German Field Army has decided +to permit the publication of a series of monographs which will give the +German people a general knowledge of the course of the most important +operations in this colossal struggle of nations. + +These monographs cannot be called histories of the war; years, even +decades, must pass before all the true inwardness and connection of +events will be completely revealed. This can only be done when the +archives of our opponents have been opened to the world as well as our +own and those of the General Staffs of our Allies. In the meantime the +German people will be given descriptions of the most important of +the battles, written by men who took part in them, and have had the +official records at their disposal. + +It is possible that later research may make alterations here and there +necessary, but this appears no reason for delaying publications based +on official documents, indeed to do so would only serve to foster +the legends and rumours which so easily take hold of the popular +imagination and are so difficult, if not impossible, to correct +afterwards. + +This series of monographs is not therefore intended as an addition to +military science, but has been written for all classes of the German +public who have borne the burden of the war, and especially for those +who have fought in the operations, in order to increase their knowledge +of the great events for the success of which they have so gladly +offered their lives. + + GENERAL STAFF OF THE FIELD ARMY. + + GERMAN GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _Autumn, 1917_. + + + + +PRELIMINARY REMARKS + + +There is no more brilliant campaign in history than the advance of +our armies against the Western Powers in August and early September +1914. The weak French attacks into Alsace, the short-lived effort to +beat back the centre and right wing of our striking-force, the active +defence of the Allied hostile armies and the passive resistance of the +great Belgian and French fortresses, all failed to stop our triumphal +march. The patriotic devotion and unexampled courage of each individual +German soldier, combined with the able leading of his commanders, +overcame all opposition and sent home the news of countless German +victories. It was not long before the walls and hearts of Paris were +trembling, and it seemed as if the conspiracy which half the world +had been weaving against us for so many years was to be brought to a +rapid conclusion. Then came the battle of the Marne, in the course of +which the centre and right wings of the German Western Army were, it +is true, withdrawn, but only to fight again as soon as possible, under +more favourable strategic conditions. The enemy, not expecting our +withdrawal, only followed slowly, and on 13th September[4] our troops +brought him to a standstill along a line extending from the Swiss +frontier to the Aisne, north-east of Compiegne. In the trench warfare +which now began our pursuers soon discovered that our strength had been +by no means broken, or even materially weakened, by the hard fighting. + +As early as 5th September, before the battle of the Marne, the Chief +of the German General Staff had ordered the right wing should be +reinforced by the newly-formed Seventh Army.[5] It soon became clear +to the opposing commanders that any attempt to break through the +new German front was doomed to failure, and that a decisive success +could only be obtained by making an outflanking movement on a large +scale against the German right wing. Thus began what our opponents +have called the 'Race to the Sea,' in which each party tried to +gain a decision by outflanking the other's western wing. The good +communications of France, especially in the north, enabled the Allied +troops to be moved far more rapidly than our own, for the German +General Staff had at their disposal only the few Franco-Belgian +railways which had been repaired, and these were already overburdened +with transport of material of every description. In spite of this, +however, the French and British attacks failed to drive back the German +right wing at any point. Not only did they find German troops ready to +meet them in every case, but we were also generally able to keep the +initiative in our hands. + +In this manner by the end of September the opposing flanks had been +extended to the district north of the Somme, about Peronne-Albert. A +few days later began the interminable fighting round Arras and Lens, +and by the middle of October our advanced troops were near Lille, +marching through the richest industrial country of France. The Army +Cavalry was placed so as to threaten the hostile left flank, and to +bring pressure against the communications with England. Our cavalry +patrols pushed forward as far as Cassel and Hazebrouck, the pivots of +the enemy's movements, but they had to retire eastwards again when +superior hostile forces moved up to the north-east. The reports which +they brought back with them all pointed to preparations by the enemy +for an attack on a large scale, and for another effort to turn the +fortunes of the campaign to his favour. With this in view all available +troops, including newly-arrived detachments from England, were to be +used to break through the gap between Lille and Antwerp against our +right wing, roll it up and begin the advance against the northern Rhine. + +It must be remembered that at the time this plan was conceived +the fortresses of Lille and Antwerp were still in French and +Belgian possession. It was hoped that Lille, with its well-built +fortifications, even though they were not quite up-to-date, would at +least hold up the German right wing for a time. Antwerp was defended by +the whole Belgian Army of from five to six divisions which were to be +reinforced by British troops, and it was confidently expected that this +garrison would be sufficiently strong to hold the most modern fortress +in Western Europe against any attack, especially if, as was generally +believed, this could only be carried out by comparatively weak forces. +Thus it seemed that the area of concentration for the Franco-Belgian +masses was secure until all preparations were ready for the blow to be +delivered through weakly-held Belgium against the rear of the German +armies in the west. The plan was a bold one, but it was countered by a +big attack of considerable German forces in the same neighbourhood and +at the same time. The two opponents met and held each other up on the +Yser and at Ypres, and here the last hope of our enemy to seize Belgium +and gain possession of the rich provinces of Northern France before the +end of the year was frustrated. The question arises how the Germans +were able to find the men to do this, since it had been necessary to +send considerable forces to the Eastern front to stop the Russian +advance. + +Whoever has lived through those great days of August 1914, and +witnessed the wonderful enthusiasm of the German nation, will never +forget that within a few days more than a million volunteers entered +German barracks to prepare to fight the enemies who were hemming in +Germany. Workmen, students, peasants, townspeople, teachers, traders, +officials, high and low, all hastened to join the colours. There was +such a constant stream of men that finally they had to be sent away, +and put off till a later date, for there was neither equipment nor +clothing left for them. By 16th August, before the advance in the +west had begun, the Prussian War Minister in Berlin had ordered the +formation of five new Reserve Corps to be numbered from XXII to XXVI, +whilst Bavaria formed the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, and Saxony and +Wuertemburg together brought the XXVII Reserve Corps into being. Old and +young had taken up arms in August 1914, in their enthusiasm to defend +their country, and 75 per cent. of the new Corps consisted of these +volunteers, the remainder being trained men of both categories of the +_Landwehr_ and the _Landsturm_, as well as some reservists from the +depots, who joined up in September. All these men, ranging from sixteen +to fifty years of age, realised the seriousness of the moment, and the +need of their country: they were anxious to become useful soldiers as +quickly as possible to help in overthrowing our malicious enemies. +Some regiments consisted entirely of students; whole classes of the +higher educational schools came with their teachers and joined the same +company or battery. Countless retired officers placed themselves at the +disposal of the Government, and the country will never forget these +patriots who took over commands in the new units, the formation of +which was mainly due to their willing and unselfish work. + +The transport of the XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to +the Western Front began on 10th October, and the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division followed shortly after. Only comparatively few experienced +commanders were available for the units, and it was left to their keen +and patriotic spirit to compensate as far as possible for what the men +still lacked to play their part in the great struggle. + +The situation of the armies on the Western Front at this time was as +follows. In the neighbourhood of Lille the northern wing of the Sixth +Army was fighting against an ever-increasing enemy. On 9th October, +Antwerp, in spite of its strong fortifications and garrison, was +taken after a twelve days' siege directed by General von Beseler, +commanding the III Reserve Corps, and well known in peace time as +Chief of the Engineer Corps and Inspector-General of Fortifications. +The victorious besiegers had carried all before them. As they were +numerically insufficient to invest Antwerp on the west, south and +east, a break-through was attempted on a comparatively narrow front. +It was completely successful, and Antwerp was occupied; but the main +body of the Belgian army, in good fighting order, was able to escape +westwards along the coast, to await the arrival of British and French +reinforcements behind the Yser. Only about 5000 Belgians were taken +prisoner, but some 20,000 Belgian and 2000 British troops[6] were +forced into Holland. In consequence of this new situation, and of the +reports of hostile concentrations in the area Calais-Dunkirk-Lille, +the German General Staff decided to form a new Fourth Army under Duke +Albert of Wuertemburg. It was to be composed of the XXII, XXIII, XXVI, +and XXVII Reserve Corps,[7] and was joined later on by the III Reserve +Corps with the 4th _Ersatz_ Division. By 13th October the detainment of +this new Army was in full progress west and south-west of Brussels. On +the evening of 14th October the four Reserve Corps began their march +to the line Eecloo (fifteen miles east of Bruges)--Deynze--point four +miles west of Audenarde. + +In the meantime we had occupied the fortified town of Lille. It had +been entered on 12th October by part of the XIX Saxon Corps and some +_Landwehr_ troops, after the town had suffered considerably owing to +the useless efforts of French territorial troops to defend it. The +order to the garrison was: 'The town is to be held till the Tenth +French Army arrives'; it resulted in the capture of 4500 French +prisoners, who were sent to Germany. On the 14th the right wing of the +Sixth Army, consisting of the XIII Wuertemburg and XIX Saxon Corps, +pushed forward to the Lys, behind a screen of three Cavalry Corps.[8] +They took up a position covering Lille, from Menin through Comines to +Warneton and thence east of Armentieres, where they came into touch +with the 14th Infantry Division which was further south near the +western forts of Lille. To the north of the Sixth Army, the III Reserve +Corps, with its three divisions from Antwerp, was advancing westwards +on a broad front. By the 14th it had driven back the hostile rearguards +and reached a line from Bruges to near Ghent. Airmen and reconnaissance +detachments had recognised movements of large bodies of troops about +Hazebrouck, Lillers and St. Omer and reported disembarkations on a big +scale at Dunkirk and Calais. In addition to this, considerable hostile +forces had reached Ypres, and appeared to be facing more or less +southwards opposite the northern wing of the Sixth Army.[9] + +An order issued on 14th October, by the Chief of the German General +Staff, gave the following instructions for the German forces between +Lille and the sea. The Sixth Army was at first to remain entirely on +the defensive along the line Menin-Armentieres-La Bassee and to await +the attack of our new Fourth Army against the left flank of the enemy. +The offensive action of the Fourth Army after its deployment was to +be so directed that the III Reserve Corps, which now belonged to it, +should move as its right wing in echelon along the coast, whilst its +left was to advance through Menin. + +In accordance with these orders the III Reserve Corps occupied Ostend +on the 15th, its left wing reaching the line of the Thourout-Roulers +road. The Corps was then ordered not to advance further for a few +days, so as to avoid the attention of the British and French, who +were advancing against the north wing of the Sixth Army, being drawn +prematurely to movements in this neighbourhood. Only patrols therefore +were sent out to reconnoitre across the Yser and the canal south of +it. On the 17th the XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps reached +the line Oostcamp (south of Bruges)-Thielt--point six miles east of +Courtrai. On the advance of these four new Corps, the III Reserve +Corps was to draw away to the right wing, and during the 17th and the +following morning it moved up to the sector of attack allotted to it +immediately south of the coast, and cleared the front of the Fourth +Army. The reconnaissance activity of the previous days had in places +led to severe fighting, especially on the southern wing in front of the +6th Reserve Division. It was found that the Belgian rearguards still +held part of the ground east of the Yser and of the canal to Ypres. Any +attempt to advance beyond this water-barrier was out of the question, +as the bridges had been blown up and the whole line put in a state of +defence. + +The screening of the advancing Fourth Army by the III Reserve Corps +was a brilliant success. At midday on the 18th, Field-Marshal French, +who was to direct the enemy's attack from the line of the Yser, was +still in ignorance of our new Army. He believed he had time to prepare +for his attack, and his only immediate care was to secure the line +from Armentieres to the sea for the deployment. After the events on +the Marne, Field-Marshal French had particularly requested General +Joffre, the Allied commander,[10] that he might be placed on the +northern flank of the line. He would then be close to Calais, which had +already become an English town,[11] he would be able to protect the +communications to his country; and, further, the fame to be gained by +a decisive and final victory attracted this ambitious commander to the +north. As a result the II British Corps under General Smith-Dorrien was +now in action against the strong German positions between Vermelles +(four miles south-west of La Bassee) and Laventie (west of Lille).[12] +Further to the north the III British Corps was fighting against the +Saxons advancing from Lille and our I, II and IV Cavalry Corps.[13] +The I British Cavalry Corps was covering the hostile advance on the +line Messines-Gheluvelt, south-east of Ypres.[14] Immediately to the +north again, the newly formed IV British Corps, consisting of the 7th +Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, had arrived in the area +Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, pursued in its retreat by von Beseler's columns +(III Reserve Corps). On its left the I British Corps had marched up to +Bixschoote,[15] and the gap between this place and Dixmude had been +closed by a French Cavalry Division which connected up with the Belgian +Army. The last, reinforced by two French Territorial divisions, was +engaged in preparing the line of the Yser up to the sea for the most +stubborn defence. These strong forces were to cover the arrival of the +VIII and X French Corps[16] and were to deliver the first blow against +our supposed right wing. + +On the 18th one of our cyclist patrols which had gone out far in +advance of its Corps was surrounded near Roulers, and it was only by +its capture that the enemy definitely discovered the arrival of the +new German Corps, whose formation, however, had not been unknown to +him, thanks to his good Secret Service system. Field-Marshal French +was now confronted with a new situation. The preparations for his big +attack were not yet completed. The superiority of the masses already +concentrated did not yet appear to him to be sufficient to guarantee +success against the enemy's advance. The British commander therefore +decided to remain on the defensive[17] against our new Fourth Army, +until the completion of the French concentration. His line was already +closed up to the sea, it was naturally strong, and fresh troops were +arriving daily. The danger threatening Dunkirk and Calais had the +effect of making England put forth her full energy; the British troops +fought desperately to defend every inch of ground, using every possible +means to keep up the sinking spirits of the Belgians. They demanded and +received rapid assistance from the French, and were backed up by fresh +reinforcements from England. + +From the German point of view the patriotic enthusiasm and unconditional +determination to win the war which pervaded the new Fourth Army +gave every prospect of successfully closing with the enemy, who was +apparently still engaged in concentrating and reorganising his forces, +and gaining Calais, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign. + +Our offensive, however, struck against a powerful army, fully deployed +and ready to meet us. The British boast that they held up our attack +with a great inferiority of numbers, but this was only true in the +case of the 7th Division during the first two days in the small sector +ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT. On 22nd October between ARMENTIERES and the sea +there were eight Corps opposed to the seven attacking German Corps; +and, besides, the enemy had prepared a series of lines of strong +trenches covered by an extensive system of artificial obstacles. In +the course of the operations that developed, the relative strength of +the opposing forces never appreciably altered in our favour.[18] The +moral strength of our troops made up for the numerical superiority of +the enemy. Our attack drove the hostile lines well back and destroyed, +it is hoped for ever, the ambition of our opponent to regain Belgium by +force of arms. + +The great desire of the Germans to defeat the hostile northern wing, +and to hit hardest the most hated of all our enemies, and, on the other +side, the obstinate determination of the British to hold on to the +passages to their country, and to carry out the offensive to the Rhine +with all their resources, resulted in this battle being one of the most +severe of the whole war. The deeds of our troops, old and young, in the +battle on the YSER and of YPRES can never be sufficiently praised, and +in spite of great losses their enthusiasm remained unchecked and their +offensive spirit unbroken. + + + + +THE THEATRE OF OPERATIONS + + +The country in which it was hoped to bring about the final decision of +the campaign of 1914 was not favourable to an attack from east to west. + +Western Flanders, the most western part of Belgium, is almost +completely flat, and lies only slightly above sea-level, and in some +parts is even below it. Mount KEMMEL, in the south, is the only +exception; rising to a height of over 500 feet, it is the watch-tower +of Western Flanders. Before the war it was a well-wooded ridge with +pretty enclosures and villages. From its slopes and summits could be +seen the whole countryside from LILLE to MENIN and DIXMUDE. + +The possession of this hill was of great importance. Our cavalry +actually occupied it during the early days of October, but when the +enemy advanced he immediately attacked it. The XIX Saxon Corps was +still too far away to help, and so Mount KEMMEL fell into the enemy's +hands. During the battle of YPRES it was his best observation post, and +of the utmost assistance to his artillery. + +We repeatedly succeeded in gaining a footing on the eastern crest +of the ridge in front of YPRES, but in the autumn of 1914, as also +later in the war, this was always the signal for the most desperate +fighting. It was thus that the heights of ST. ELOI,[19] the high-lying +buildings of HOOGE and the village of WYTSCHAETE won their sanguinary +fame. + +Lying in the midst of luxuriant meadows, with its high ramparts and +fine buildings, YPRES was formerly one of the most picturesque towns in +Flanders. In the fourteenth century it had a considerable importance, +and became the centre of the cloth-weaving trade on its introduction +from Italy. BRUGES, lying close to the coast, became the market for its +wares. The Clothweavers' Guild, which accumulated great wealth, erected +in YPRES a fine Gothic hall, whose towers with those of St. Martin's +Church were landmarks for miles round. In modern times, however, the +importance of the town greatly diminished. The cloth-weaving industry +drifted away to the factories of MENIN and COURTRAI; and YPRES, like +its dead neighbour BRUGES, remained only a half-forgotten memory of its +former brilliance. + +The war has brought fresh importance to the town, but of a mournful +kind. On the impact of the German and Anglo-French masses in Flanders +in the autumn of 1914, it became the central pivot of the operations. +The enemy dug his heels into the high ground in front of it; for, as +an Englishman has written, it had become a point of honour to hold the +town. YPRES lay so close to the front that our advance could be seen +from its towers, and the enemy was able to use it for concealing his +batteries and sheltering his reserves. For the sake of our troops we +had to bring it under fire; for German life is more precious than the +finest Gothic architecture. Thus the mythical death of YPRES became a +reality: no tower now sends forth its light across the countryside, and +a wilderness of wrecked and burnt-out houses replaces the pretty town +so full of legend and tradition in the history of Flanders. + +The streams which run northwards from the hills about YPRES unite +for the most part near the town and flow into the YSER canal, which +connects the LYS at COMINES with the sea at NIEUPORT. This canal passes +through the YPRES ridge near HOLLEBEKE and, following northwards the +course of a small canalised tributary of the YSER, meets the YSER +itself south of DIXMUDE. The dunes at NIEUPORT have been cut through by +engineers for its exit to the sea. It is only from DIXMUDE northwards +that the canal becomes an obstacle which requires proper bridging +equipment for its passage. Its high embankments to the south of +DIXMUDE, however, give excellent cover in the otherwise flat country +and greatly simplify the task of the defender. + +The canal acquired a decisive importance when the hard-pressed +Belgians, during the battle on the night of 29th-30th October, let +in the sea at flood-tide through the sluices into the canal, and +then by blowing up the sluice-gates at NIEUPORT, allowed it to flood +the battlefield along the lower YSER. By this means they succeeded +in placing broad stretches of country under water, so much so that +any extensive military operations in that district became out of the +question. The high water-level greatly influenced all movements over +a very large area. By his order the King of the Belgians destroyed +for years the natural wealth of a considerable part of his fertile +country, for the sea-water must have ruined all vegetation down to its +very roots. + +The country on both sides of the canal is flat, and difficult for +observation purposes. The high level of the water necessitates drainage +of the meadows, which for this purpose are intersected by deep dykes +which have muddy bottoms. The banks of the dykes are bordered with +willows, and thick-set hedges form the boundaries of the cultivated +areas. Generally speaking, the villages do not consist of groups of +houses: the farms are dispersed either singly, or in rows forming a +single street. The country is densely populated and is consequently +well provided with roads. But these are only good where they have been +made on embankments and are paved. The frequent rains, which begin +towards the end of October, rapidly turn the other roads into mere mud +tracks and in many cases make them quite useless for long columns of +traffic. + +The digging of trenches was greatly complicated by rain and +surface-water. The loam soil was on the whole easy to work in; but it +was only on the high ground that trenches could be dug deep enough to +give sufficient cover against the enemy's artillery fire; on the flat, +low-lying ground they could not in many cases be made more than two +feet deep. + +A few miles south of the coast the country assumes quite another +character: there are no more hedges and canals: instead gently rolling +sand-hills separate the land from the sea, and this deposited sand is +not fertile like the plains south of them. A belt of dunes prevents the +sea encroaching on the land. + +The greatest trouble of the attacker in all parts of Flanders is the +difficulty of observation. The enemy, fighting in his own country,[20] +had every advantage, while our artillery observation posts were only +found with the utmost trouble. Our fire had to be directed from the +front line, and it frequently happened that our brave artillerymen +had to bring up their guns into the front infantry lines in order to +use them effectively. Although the enemy was able to range extremely +accurately on our guns which were thus quickly disclosed, nothing could +prevent the German gunners from following the attacking infantry. + +Observation from aeroplanes was made very difficult by the many hedges +and villages, so that it took a long time to discover the enemy's +dispositions and give our artillery good targets. + +Finally, the flat nature of the country and the consequent limitations +of view were all to the advantage of the defenders, who were everywhere +able to surprise the attackers. Our troops were always finding fresh +defensive lines in front of them without knowing whether they were +occupied or not. The British, many of whom had fought in a colonial +war against the most cunning of enemies in equally difficult country, +allowed the attacker to come to close quarters and then opened a +devastating fire at point-blank range from rifles and machine-guns +concealed in houses and trees. + +In many cases the hedges and dykes split up the German attacks so that +even the biggest operations degenerated into disconnected actions which +made the greatest demands on the powers of endurance and individual +skill of our volunteers. In spite of all these difficulties our men, +both old and young, even when left to act on their own initiative, +showed a spirit of heroism and self-sacrifice which makes the battle on +the YSER a sacred memory both for the Army and the Nation, and every +one who took part in it may say with pride, 'I was there.' + + + + +THE ADVANCE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + + +An Army Order of 16th October 1914 gave the following instructions for +the 18th:-- + + The III Reserve Corps to march to the line COXYDE-FURNES-OEREN, + west of the YSER. + + The XXII Reserve Corps to the line AERTRYCKE-THOUROUT. + + The XXIII Reserve Corps to the line LICHTERVELDE-ARDOYE. + + The XXVI Reserve Corps to the Area EMELGHEM-ISEGHEM, and, on the + left wing, the XXVII Reserve Corps to the line LENDELEDE-COURTRAI. + +The XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps all reached their +appointed destinations on the evening of the 18th without meeting any +strong resistance. Along almost the whole front our advanced guards +and patrols came into touch with weak hostile detachments who were +awaiting our advance well entrenched, and surprised us with infantry +and artillery fire. At ROULERS a hot skirmish took place. Aeroplanes +circling round, motor-lorries bustling about, and cavalry patrols +pushing well forward showed that the British now realised the strength +of the new German forces. + +[Illustration: DISPOSITIONS ON OCTOBER 20TH. 1914. + +_On 20th October none of the I British Corps were on the right of +the IV Corps; the map should read British Cavalry Corps. It is also +inaccurate to represent the whole III British Corps as north of +Armentieres--only one of its Divisions was--while the II Corps was +certainly too closely pressed to detach any troops to the north as +depicted in the diagram._] + +In the meantime, on the extreme right wing of the Army, the troops +of General von Beseler had opened the battle on the Yser. During +its advance northwards to cross the Yser at the appointed places +the III Reserve Corps had encountered strong opposition east of the +river-barrier. The men knew they were on the decisive wing of the +attack, and they pushed ahead everywhere regardless of loss. In a rapid +assault the 4th _Ersatz_ Division captured WESTENDE from the Belgians, +although a gallant defence was put up, and in spite of the fact that +British torpedo-boats and cruisers took part in the action from the +sea with their heavy artillery[21] both during the advance and the +fight for the town. Further south the 5th Reserve Division deployed to +attack a strongly entrenched hostile position. The 3rd Reserve _Jaeger_ +Battalion captured the obstinately defended village of ST. PIERRE +CAPPELLE after severe hand-to-hand fighting, whilst the main body of +the division succeeded in pushing forward to the neighbourhood of +SCHOORE. The 6th Reserve Division, commanded by General von Neudorff, +also closed with the enemy. It captured LEKE, and KEYEM, defended by +the 4th Belgian Division; but even this Brandenburg Division, for all +its war experience, found the task of forcing the crossings over the +YSER too much for it. + +The fighting on 18th October resulted in bringing us a thousand or two +thousand yards nearer the YSER, but it had shown that the fight for +the river line was to be a severe one. The Belgians seemed determined +to sell the last acres of their kingdom only at the highest possible +price. Four lines of trenches had been dug, and it could be seen that +every modern scientific resource had been employed in putting the +villages on the eastern bank of the river into a state of defence. A +great number of guns, very skilfully placed and concealed, shelled the +ground for a considerable distance east of the river, and in addition +to this our right flank was enfiladed by the heavy naval guns from the +sea. Battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats worried the rear and flank +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division with their fire, and the British had even +brought heavy artillery on flat-bottomed boats close inshore.[22] They +used a great quantity of ammunition, but the effect of it all was only +slight, for the fire of the naval guns was much dispersed and indicated +bad observation. It became still more erratic when our long-range guns +were brought into action against the British Fleet. Detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division had to be echeloned back as far as Ostend, +in order to defend the coast against hostile landings. During the day +the General Commanding the III Reserve Corps decided not to allow the +4th _Ersatz_ Division to cross the YSER at NIEUPORT, on account of +the heavy fire from the British naval guns, but to make it pass with +the main body of the Corps behind the 5th Reserve Division in whose +area the fight appeared to be progressing favourably. The _Ersatz_ +Division was informed accordingly. On the 19th another effort would +have to be made to force the crossings of the river by frontal attack, +for everywhere to the south strong opposition had been encountered. +From near DIXMUDE French troops carried on the line of the compact +Belgian Army. It was against these that the new Reserve Corps were now +advancing. + +On the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th October a strong +attack was delivered from the west by the 4th Belgian Division, and +from the south-west by a brigade of the 5th Belgian Division and a +brigade of French Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, against +KEYEM, held by part of the 6th Reserve Division. They were driven +back after heavy fighting. During the 19th the southern wing of the +Brandenburg (III) Reserve Corps succeeded in advancing nearer the river +and, on its left, part of the artillery of the XXII Reserve Corps came +into action in support of it, thereby partly relieving the III Reserve +Corps, which until that day had been fighting unassisted. + +On the 19th more or less heavy fighting developed on the whole front +of the Fourth Army. The XXII Reserve Corps advanced on BEERST and +DIXMUDE and fought its way up into line with the III Reserve Corps. +In front of it lay the strong bridge-head of DIXMUDE, well provided +with heavy guns. The whole XXIII Reserve Corps had to be deployed +into battle-formation, as every locality was obstinately defended +by the enemy. In the advance of the 45th Reserve Division the 209th +Reserve Regiment late in the evening took HANDZAEME after severe +street fighting, and the 212th Reserve Regiment took the village of +GITS, whilst CORTEMARCK was evacuated by the enemy during the attack. +The 46th Reserve Division in a running fight crossed the main road to +THOUROUT, north of ROULERS, and by the evening had arrived close to +STADEN. Heavy street fighting in the latter place continued during +the night: the enemy, supported by the population, offered strong +resistance in every house, so that isolated actions continued behind +our front lines, endangering the cohesion of the attacking troops, but +never to a serious extent. + +The XXVI Reserve Corps encountered strong opposition at RUMBEKE, +south-east of ROULERS; but all the enemy's efforts were in vain, +and the 233rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, under the eyes of its +Corps Commander, General von Huegel, forced its way through the rows +of houses, many of which were defended with light artillery and +machine-guns. A very heavy fight took place for the possession of +ROULERS, which was stubbornly defended by the French; barricades were +put up across the streets, machine-guns fired from holes in the roofs +and windows, and concealed mines exploded among the advancing troops. +In spite of all this, by 5 P.M. ROULERS was taken by the 233rd, 234th +and 235th Reserve Infantry Regiments, attacking from north, east and +south respectively. Further to the south, after a small skirmish with +British cavalry, the 52nd Reserve Division reached MORSLEDE, its +objective for the day. On its left again, the XXVII Reserve Corps had +come into contact with the 3rd British Cavalry Division which tried to +hold up the Corps in an advanced position at ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE. After +a lively encounter the British cavalry was thrown back on to the 7th +British Division, which held a strong position about DADIZEELE.[23] + +Thus by the evening of 19th October the situation had been considerably +cleared up, in so far as we now knew that the Belgians, French and +British not only held the YSER and the YPRES canal, but also the high +ground east and north-east of YPRES. Everything pointed to the fact +that an unexpectedly strong opponent was awaiting us in this difficult +country, and that a very arduous task confronted the comparatively +untrained troops of Duke Albert of Wuertemburg's Army. In the meantime +the Commander of the Sixth Army, Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, after +a discussion at Army Headquarters with General von Falkenhayn, Chief +of the General Staff, decided to renew the attack, as the left wing of +the Fourth Army had now come up on his immediate right. In consequence +of this decision, the XIII Corps was moved from its position on the +line MENIN-WARNETON and replaced by three Cavalry Divisions of the +IV Cavalry Corps. There can be no doubt that the attacks of the +Sixth Army, which began on the 20th and were continued with frequent +reinforcements of fresh troops, had the effect of holding the enemy and +drawing a strong force to meet them. They were not, however, destined +to have any decisive success, for the offensive strength of the Sixth +Army had been reduced by previous fighting, and it was not sufficient +to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions.[24] All the +more therefore were the hopes of Germany centred in the Fourth Army, +which was fighting further northwards, for in its hands lay the fate of +the campaign in Western Europe at this period. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM 20TH OCTOBER TO 31ST OCTOBER 1914 + + +On 20th October the battle broke out along the whole line, on a front +of about sixty miles. The enemy had got into position, and was prepared +to meet the attack of Duke Albert of Wuertemburg's Army. On the very +day that the British, French and Belgians intended to begin their +advance they found themselves compelled to exert all their strength to +maintain their positions against our offensive. The British and French +had to bring up constant reinforcements, and a hard and bitter struggle +began for every yard of ground. The spirit in which our opponents +were fighting is reflected in an order of the 4th Belgian Division, +picked up in PERVYSE on 16th October. This ran: 'The fate of the whole +campaign probably depends on our resistance. I (General Michel) implore +officers and men, notwithstanding what efforts they may be called upon +to make, to do even more than their mere duty. The salvation of the +country and therefore of each individual among us depends on it. Let us +then resist to our utmost.' + +We shall see how far the soldiers of the Fourth Army, opposed to such +a determined and numerically superior enemy, were able to justify the +confidence which had been placed in them, a confidence expressed in the +following proclamations by their highest commanders on their arrival in +Belgium: + + GREAT HEADQUARTERS, + _14th October 1914_. + + TO THE FOURTH ARMY,--I offer my welcome to the Fourth Army, and + especially to its newly-formed Reserve Corps, and I am confident + that these troops will act with the same devotion and bravery as + the rest of the German Army. + + Advance, with the help of God--my watchword. + + (Signed) WILLIAM, I. R. + + + _ARMY ORDER._ + + I am pleased to take over the command of the Army entrusted to me + by the Emperor. I am fully confident that the Corps which have been + called upon to bring about the final decision in this theatre of + war will do their duty to their last breath with the old German + spirit of courage and trust, and that every officer and every man + is ready to give his last drop of blood for the just and sacred + cause of our Fatherland. With God's assistance victory will then + crown our efforts. + + Up and at the enemy. Hurrah for the Emperor. + + (Signed) DUKE ALBERT OF WUeRTEMBURG, + _General and Army Commander_. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS, + _15th October 1914_. + +Who can deny that the task set to the Fourth Army was not an infinitely +difficult one. It would have probably been achieved nevertheless if the +Belgians at the moment of their greatest peril had not called the sea +to their aid to bring the German attack to a halt. Let us, however, now +get down to the facts. + +On 20th October the III Reserve Corps, the battering ram of the Fourth +Army, began an attack with its 5th Reserve Division, supported by +almost the whole of the Corps artillery, against the sector of the Yser +west of the line MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORBAKKE. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division +to the north and the 6th Reserve Division to the south co-operated. +By the early hours of the 22nd, the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions had +driven the enemy back across the river in spite of the support given +him by British and French heavy batteries.[25] In front of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division the enemy still held a bridge-head at LOMBARTZYDE. +At 8.15 A.M. on the 22nd the glad tidings reached the Staff of the 6th +Reserve Division, that part of the 26th Reserve Infantry Regiment had +crossed the YSER. Under cover of darkness the 1st and 2nd Battalions +of this regiment had worked their way up to the north-eastern part of +the bend of the YSER, south of SCHOORE, and had got into the enemy's +outposts on the eastern bank with the bayonet. Not a shot had been +fired, and not an unnecessary noise had disturbed the quiet of the +dawning day. Volunteers from the engineers silently and rapidly laid +bridging material over the canal. In addition an old footbridge west of +KEYEM, which had been blown up and lay in the water, was very quickly +made serviceable again with some planks and baulks. The Belgians had +considered their position sufficiently protected by the river, and by +the outposts along the eastern bank. By 6 A.M. German patrols were on +the far side of the YSER, and the enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire +began only when they started to make a further advance. Three companies +of the 1st and two companies of the 2nd Battalion, however, as well as +part of the 24th Reserve Infantry Regiment, had already crossed the +temporary bridges at the double and taken up a position on the western +bank: so that, in all, 21/2 battalions and a machine-gun company were now +on the western bank. + +The enemy realised the seriousness of the situation, and prepared a +thoroughly unpleasant day for those who had crossed. Heavy and light +guns of the British and French artillery[26] hammered incessantly +against the narrow German bridge-head and the bridges to it. Lying +without cover in the swampy meadows the infantry was exposed beyond +all help to the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire from west and +south-west. The small force repulsed counter-attacks again and again, +but to attempt sending reinforcements across to it was hopeless. Some +gallant gunners, however, who had brought their guns close up to the +eastern bank, were able to give great help to their friends in their +critical situation. Thus assisted the infantry succeeded in holding +the position, and during the following night was able to make it +sufficiently strong to afford very small prospect of success to any +further hostile efforts. During the night several Belgian attacks +with strong forces were repulsed with heavy loss, and the 6th Reserve +Division was able to put a further 21/2 battalions across to the western +bank of the YSER bend. On the 23rd we gained possession of TERVAETE, +and the dangerous enfilade fire on our new positions was thereby +considerably diminished. Dawn on 24th October saw all the infantry +of the 6th Reserve Division west of the river. A pontoon bridge was +thrown across the north-eastern part of the YSER bend, but it was +still impossible to bring guns forward on account of the enemy's +heavy artillery fire. The 5th Reserve Division still lay in its battle +positions along the river bank north of SCHOORBAKKE, but every time +attempts were made to cross the French and Belgian artillery smashed +the bridges to pieces. The 4th _Ersatz_ Division suffered heavily, +as it was subjected to constant artillery fire from three sides, and +to entrench was hopeless on account of the shifting sands and the +high level of the ground water. Whenever fire ceased during the night +strong hostile attacks soon followed; but they were all repulsed. +The withdrawal of the main body of the _Ersatz_ Division behind the +6th Reserve Division to cross the YSER, as General von Beseler had +once planned, had become impracticable for the moment, for it had +been discovered through the statements of prisoners that the 42nd +French Division had arrived in NIEUPORT to assist the Belgians. The +4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been weakened on the 18th by the +transfer of one of its three brigades to the 5th Reserve Division, +could not be expected to bring the new enemy to his knees by the +running fight that it had been hitherto conducting. The canal alone was +sufficient obstacle to make this impracticable; in addition, the fire +of the enemy's naval guns from the sea prevented any large offensive +operations in the area in question. Thus the _Ersatz_ troops were +compelled to resign themselves to the weary task of maintaining their +positions under the cross-fire of guns of every calibre, to driving +back the hostile attacks, and to holding the Belgian and French forces +off in front of them by continually threatening to take the offensive. +It was not until some long-range batteries were placed at the disposal +of the division that its position improved. A couple of direct hits +on the enemy's ships soon taught them that they could no longer carry +on their good work undisturbed. Their activity at once noticeably +decreased, and the more the German coast-guns gave tongue seawards from +the dunes, the further the ships moved away from the coast and the less +were they seen. + +General von Beseler never for a moment doubted that the decision lay +with the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions, especially as the four Corps of +the Fourth Army, fighting further south, had not yet been able to reach +the canal-barrier with any considerable forces. + +The XXII Reserve Corps, commanded by General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn, +had in the meantime come into line south of General von Beseler's +troops, and had already fought some successful actions. It had arrived +on the 19th in the district east of BEERST and about VLADSLOO, just +in time to help in driving back the Franco-Belgian attack against the +southern flank of the 6th Reserve Division.[27] That same evening +it was ordered to attack from north and south against the DIXMUDE +bridge-head, an exceptionally difficult task. In addition to the fact +that the swampy meadows of the YSER canal limited freedom of movement +to an enormous extent, the HANDZAEME canal, running at right angles to +it from east to west, formed a most difficult obstacle. DIXMUDE lay +at the junction of these two waterways, and behind its bridge-head +lines were the Belgian 'Iron' Brigade under Colonel Meiser, the French +Marine Fusilier Brigade under Admiral Ronarch, and part of the 5th +Belgian Division, determined to defend the place at all costs. About +eighty guns of every calibre commanded with frontal and enfilade fire +the ground over which Falkenhayn's Corps would have to attack. On the +20th, in spite of all these difficulties, the 44th Reserve Division, +on the northern wing of the Corps, captured BEERST and reached the +canal bank west of KASTEELHOEK in touch with von Beseler's Corps. +The 43rd Reserve Division, advancing on the left wing, took VLADSLOO +and several villages south-east of it on the northern bank of the +HANDZAEME Canal. By the light of the conflagration of those villages +the reach of the canal between EESSEN and ZARREN was crossed on hastily +constructed footbridges, and a further advance made in a south-westerly +direction. EESSEN itself was occupied, and the attack brought us to +within a hundred yards of the enemy. He realised his extremely critical +situation,[28] and his cyclists and all possible reserves at hand +were put in to the fight. Owing to the severe hostile artillery fire +the German losses were by no means slight. On one occasion when our +advancing infantry units were losing touch with one another in this +difficult country, a big hostile counter-attack was delivered from +DIXMUDE. After a heavy struggle the onrush of the enemy was held up, +mainly owing to our artillery, which heroically brought its guns up +into position immediately behind the infantry front line. + +During the night the 43rd Reserve Division reorganised in order to +recommence its attack on the bridge-head from east and south-east +on the following morning. Days of terrific fighting ensued. The +garrison of the bridge-head had received orders to hold out to the +last man, and had been informed that any one who attempted to desert +would be shot without mercy by men placed for this purpose to guard +all the exits from the town. The Belgians were indeed fighting for +their very existence as a nation. Nevertheless by the 21st October +the 43rd Reserve Division, which consisted of volunteers from the +Guard Corps Reservists, had taken the chateau south of DIXMUDE, and +WOUMEN. The opposing sides lay within a hundred yards of each other. +Artillery preparation, attack and counter-attack went on incessantly. +Our artillery did fearful havoc and DIXMUDE was in flames. The +Franco-Belgian garrison was, however, constantly reinforced, and +conducted itself most gallantly. From the north the battalions of the +44th Reserve Division were able to advance slightly and drive the enemy +back on to the town, and German batteries were brought up into, and +at times even in front of, the infantry front line. Although we were +unable to force our way into DIXMUDE, on the evening of the 23rd our +troops were in position all round it. + +On the left of the XXII Reserve Corps, the XXIII Reserve Corps, under +General of Cavalry von Kleist, had advanced at 9 A.M. on 20th October +on the front HANDZAEME-STADEN in order to reach the canal on the line +NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE. The 45th Reserve Division was on the right +and the 46th Reserve Division on the left. After some hours of street +fighting STADEN was finally surrounded and taken by the 46th Reserve +Division. By nightfall a line from CLERCKEN to the eastern edge of +HOUTHULST Forest was reached. On the 21st the Corps had to cross a +stretch of country which put these partially trained troops and their +inexperienced officers to a very severe test. The great forest of +HOUTHULST with its dense undergrowth made it exceedingly difficult to +keep direction in the attack and to maintain communication between +units fighting an invisible opponent. Small swampy streams such as the +STEENEBECK offered favourable opportunities to the enemy to put up a +strong defence behind a succession of depressions. Thus our gallant +troops after every successful assault found themselves confronted by +another strong position: but unwavering and regardless of loss, they +continued their advance. + +By the evening of the 21st the 46th Reserve Division had completely +driven the enemy out of HOUTHULST Forest,[29] whilst its sister-division +had advanced north of the STEENEBECK, and with its northern wing +supporting the Corps fighting immediately north of it, had pushed +forward to beyond WOUMEN. On the morning of the 22nd the heavy +artillery opened fire against the French positions on the YSER canal +to prepare the break-through. Unfortunately however only the northern +Division was able to reach the sector allotted to the Corps, and an +Army Order directed the 46th Reserve Division to the south-west against +the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK, in order to help carry forward the +attack of the XXVI Reserve Corps, which was completely held up in front +of the latter place. As a result of this the advance of von Kleist's +Corps also came to a standstill, although it had achieved considerable +fame during the day. In spite of a desperate resistance the 210th +Reserve Regiment stormed the strongly entrenched village of MERCKEM and +the village of LUYGHEM lying north of it; a daring attack by the 209th +and 212th Reserve Regiments broke through the enemy's positions on the +MURTJE VAART, whilst the 46th Reserve Division attempted to overrun the +KORTEBECK sector, supported by the concentrated fire of its artillery +in position along the south-western edge of HOUTHULST Forest. The 216th +Reserve Regiment took MANGELAERE by storm, in doing which its gallant +commander, Colonel von Grothe, was killed at the head of his troops. +The 1st British Division held a strong position along the KORTEBECK, in +touch with the French, and artillery of every calibre near NOORDSCHOOTE +enfiladed the German attack.[30] The British themselves speak of our +attack as a magnificent feat of arms carried out with infinite courage +and brilliant discipline. The men sang songs as they charged through +a hail of bullets in closed ranks up to the enemy's defences. The +212th Reserve Regiment under Colonel Basedow, reinforced and carried +forward by fresh detachments of the 209th Reserve Regiment, pushed its +way into the strongly fortified village of BIXSCHOOTE. The enemy on +our side of the canal, on the line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE, +was threatened with annihilation. BIXSCHOOTE commanded the main road +and the canal-crossing to POPERINGHE, where the enemy was detraining +his reinforcements.[31] The British therefore fought with the courage +of desperation: for not only was the fate of the high ground east +and north-east of YPRES now in the balance, but also the chance of +being able to carry out the great Anglo-French offensive which had +been planned. YPRES and the high ground east of the canal were on +no account to be lost, and furious counter-attacks were therefore +delivered against the intermingled German units. Nevertheless our +gallant volunteers pressed on, using their bayonets and the butts of +their rifles, until the furious hand-to-hand fighting was finally +decided in our favour. At 6.30 that evening BIXSCHOOTE was ours. +Unfortunately, however, owing to an order being misunderstood, it was +lost again during the night: the exhausted attacking troops were to +be relieved under cover of darkness, but they assembled and marched +back before the relieving force had arrived. The enemy, ever watchful, +immediately advanced into the evacuated village and took position +among the ruins. Simultaneously a big hostile counter-attack drove the +46th Reserve Division from the high ground south of KORTEBECK, which it +had captured, and pressed it back beyond the stream again. The spirit +and strength of the young and inexperienced troops seemed to be broken, +and only a few of the subordinate commanders had yet learnt how to deal +with critical situations. Officers of the General Staff and Divisional +Staffs had to help to reorganise the men; they immediately turned and +followed their new leaders, and were taken forward again to the attack. +Thus on the 23rd the high ground south of the KORTEBECK was won back +by the 46th Reserve Division, but BIXSCHOOTE remained lost to us, and +LANGEMARCK could not be captured.[32] + +On 22nd October, for the first time, our attack was directed from the +north against YPRES. If the British and French did not intend to give +up their offensive plans, and thereby their last hope of retaking +Belgium and the wealthy provinces of Northern France from the hated +German, they would have to maintain their positions along the YPRES +bridge-head east of the canal between COMINES and the coast. For this +reason the country round YPRES was the central area of the Anglo-French +defence from the beginning to the end of the battle. Our opponents +defended this position on a wide semicircle by successive lines of +trenches and with their best troops. Every wood, every village, every +farm and even every large copse has won for itself a fame of blood. +The reinforcements which Field-Marshal French received in abundance +he placed round YPRES, but not only for defensive purposes; they were +more often used to deliver attack after attack against our young troops +who had been weakened by the hard fighting; and on 23rd October they +were already being employed in this manner against the 46th Reserve +Division.[33] He hoped to use the opportunity of our retirement behind +the KORTEBECK to break through our line and to roll up the part of the +front lying to the north of it as far as the sea, and thus to regain +the initiative and freedom of manoeuvre on this extreme wing.[34] +However, the blow was parried by the 46th Reserve Division. In ragged, +badly placed lines the German units, which had scarcely had time to +reorganise, brought the hostile masses to a standstill and won back in +a counter-attack the ground which they had lost during the night. On +this occasion, also, the gunners shared with the infantry the honours +of the day. The fire of the guns, brought up into the foremost lines, +made wide gaps in the attacking columns and the enemy's losses must +have been terrible. Our own troops had also suffered severely in the +constant fighting and under the everlasting hostile artillery fire. +Some of our regiments had been reduced to half their strength. But in +spite of it the British did not succeed in breaking through between the +XXIII and XXVI Reserve Corps. + +The XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were by this time completely +held up in front of strongly entrenched positions on the line +LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-GHELUVELT and opposed to an enemy who was +becoming stronger every day and making the most desperate efforts to +regain his freedom of action and begin a big offensive himself. The +XXVI Reserve Corps, which advanced on the morning of the 20th, the +51st Reserve Division from the area west of ROULERS, and the other +Division from MORSLEDE, encountered a stubborn resistance along the +ridge WESTROOSEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE-KEIBERG. Fighting under the eyes +of their general, who was himself in the thick of the struggle, the +51st Reserve Division stormed the slope on to the ridge and entered +WESTROOSEBEKE. The French division defending it was driven out at +four in the afternoon and, attacking incessantly, the gallant 51st, +supported by the 23rd Reserve _Jaeger_ Battalion, reached a line from +the railway-station north-west of POELCAPPELLE to POELCAPPELLE itself +during the evening. The attack was all the more daring through the fact +that HOUTHULST Forest was still in the enemy's hands, and the flank +of the division therefore appeared to be threatened. Meanwhile the +52nd Reserve Division had taken PASSCHENDAELE, KEIBERG and the high +ground between them from the British; the artillery again deserving +the highest praise for its co-operation.[35] The attack, however, was +brought to a standstill in front of the enemy's main position at the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE. The XXVII Reserve Corps commanded by +General von Carlowitz, formerly Saxon War Minister, lay in close touch +with the 52nd Reserve Division on the evening of the 20th. Advancing in +four columns and by constant fighting it had forced its way westwards. +The Wuertemburg Division had succeeded in driving the 7th British +Division out of BECELAERE after heavy street fighting, and the left +wing was bent back on TERHAND. Communication was there obtained with +the 3rd Cavalry Division, fighting on the right wing of the Sixth Army, +which had captured a hostile position north-east of KRUISEIK. + +On the morning of the 22nd a strong position lay to our immediate front. +It followed a line BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK-ZONNEBEKE-REUTEL-GHELUVELT; +and the I and IV British, as well as the IX French Corps,[36] +all picked troops, had already been located there. They had dug a +well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire entanglements before +a single German shell arrived to disturb their work.[37] The few +stretches of rising ground in the district had been included in the +skilfully selected positions as observation posts, and the defenders +were thus able to bring our advancing columns under accurate artillery +fire at long range. This was especially the case from the high ground +near ZONNEBEKE, whence the whole ground in front of the position as +far as LANGEMARCK could be enfiladed. All these difficulties, however, +were not sufficient to deter the offensive spirit of the German +troops, and '_Vorwaerts_' was still their watchword: forwards and back +with the enemy, so that the rigid western front might once more be +mobile. The main body of the XXVI Reserve Corps attacked the fortress +of LANGEMARCK[38] from north and east, whilst the XXVII Reserve Corps +fought for the upper hand in the woods between ZONNEBEKE and BECELAERE. +The great efforts made by the artillery to follow up the infantrymen +with its guns and support them with their fire were in vain, owing +to the difficult country, and the well-aimed fire from the enemy's +prepared positions reaped a big harvest. Leaders of all grades were +killed, and officers of high rank took their places and reorganised the +intermingled units. + +With the failure of the 46th Reserve Division to gain a decisive +victory between BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK on 22nd and 23rd October +the fate of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was also settled. For +the time being any further thought of a break-through was out of the +question. The troops up till now had met the enemy full of a keen +fighting spirit, and had stormed his positions singing '_Deutschland, +Deutschland ueber alles'_ regardless of casualties, and had been one and +all ready to die for their country; but they had suffered heavily in +the contest against a war-experienced and numerically superior opponent +entrenched in strongly fortified positions. Even when the last reserves +of the Army, the 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, +had been placed at the disposal of the XXVI Reserve Corps, they could +only be used to stiffen the defence. During the night of 23rd-24th +October the expected Anglo-French counter-attacks began, and continued +throughout the 24th, against the front of the XXVI and the right wing +of the XXVII Reserve Corps. By utilising temporary local successes and +putting in fresh forces the enemy vainly hoped to prepare the way for a +break-through; but the German troops though weakened held up all these +furious onslaughts from positions which had never been selected for +defence, but were merely those reached at the close of the attack.[39] + +The Commander of the Fourth Army was forced to continue ordering all +his Corps to attack, in order to co-operate with the Sixth Army which +was attacking and, besides this, to pin the enemy's forces opposed +to him to their ground: for in the north a decision appeared to be +imminent on the front of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps: in +addition to the entire infantry of the 6th Reserve Division, which had +crossed the canal by the morning of 24th October, the infantry of the +5th Reserve Division and five battalions of the 44th Reserve Division +succeeded in crossing the YSER during that day. The enemy was compelled +to evacuate the western bank of the canal from ST. GEORGE to south-east +of STUYVEKENSKERKE, in spite of the fact that there had been one French +and four Belgian Divisions[40] opposing the III Reserve Corps, and +that the ten howitzer batteries had proved insufficient to engage the +Belgian, French and British artillery successfully. In consequence of +this inferiority the old and new canal crossings lay under constant +concentrated fire, and all our efforts to transport guns over the +waterway failed. Many a fine piece of engineering carried out by our +indefatigable sappers was destroyed by the enemy's shells. The supply +of ammunition and field-dressings became a matter of the greatest +difficulty, as all the roads leading to the rear across the swampy +meadows were continuously shelled for a long way back. Nevertheless our +front troops held on firmly to their new positions. The next operation +was to break through the enemy's position here once and for all, though +it was clear from the beginning that the attack would be a very severe +one. Belgian and French working parties had dug a series of positions +between the YSER and the NIEUPORT-BIXSCHOOTE railway, from which the +ground in front could be commanded with frontal and enfilade fire from +skilfully placed machine-guns and well-concealed batteries. On both +wings, according to the latest information at hand, strong hostile +attacks were threatening us, that is to say, near NIEUPORT as well as +near and to the south of DIXMUDE. To meet these the Army Commander had +replaced the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which had been echeloned back along +the coast as a precaution against hostile landings, by detachments of +the Marine Division, and a few troops placed at his disposition by the +Governor of Belgium, and had ordered it to march to THOUROUT. At the +same time, by order of General von Beseler, long-range guns were placed +to prevent the enemy from concentrating for an attack in the NIEUPORT +district. However, the expected attack took place in the neighbourhood +of DIXMUDE, and was directed against those battalions of the 44th +Reserve Division which had crossed to the west of the YSER. The enemy +realised the great danger that threatened his bridge-head from the +north-west, and put all available Belgian and French reserves into +the attack. Thus between five and six battalions from three Belgian +regiments and the Marine Fusiliers under Admiral Ronarch, with a strong +force of artillery, advanced to the attack of our southern flank. The +Belgians themselves describe this attack in the following words: 'One +saw the companies doubling forward in small groups, lying down on +the officers' signal, and then getting up to go forward again until +they finally deployed into their attacking lines. But unfortunately +they were asked to accomplish a superhuman task, and whole rows of +the men were mown down by the machine-guns. Company after company was +decimated, and in spite of the energy of their leaders they had to give +way, death having taken too heavy a toll of their ranks. The Marine +Fusiliers, who attacked with uncommon gallantry, soon shared the same +fate. But all this sacrifice was not in vain--it stopped the enemy's +advance.'[41] + +It will be understood then that the first thing for the weak and widely +separated battalions of the 44th Reserve Division to do on the 25th was +to get breathing space and reorganise, even though they were exposed +all the time to the heaviest fire from west, south and south-east. +Further to the north, however, on the morning of the 25th, the 5th and +6th Reserve Divisions had succeeded in bringing their field-batteries +across the river, and as soon as the whole artillery of these two +divisions had been concentrated under the expert leadership of General +von Ziethen, it began to prepare the way for the infantry attack. By +midday both the divisions were advancing steadily towards the railway +embankment on the line RAMSCAPPELLE-PERVYSE. The Belgians had to +evacuate position after position. Then suddenly heavy enfilade fire was +poured in by the enemy's artillery about NIEUPORT; and simultaneously +a brigade of the 6th Reserve Division south-east of PERVYSE had to be +directed southwards in order not to lose touch with the right wing of +the 44th Reserve Division. There were no reinforcements to fill up the +gaps, and thus the attack came shortly afterwards to a standstill. + +A very heavy thunder of guns rumbled incessantly from the south: the +German artillery, including 42-centimetre guns, had bombarded DIXMUDE +throughout the 24th October and morning of the 25th, and now the 43rd +Reserve Division had begun its assault on the town. It resulted in +the most violent street fighting; fast and furious came the bullets +from the machine-guns posted in the houses along the edge of the town, +and from the shells from the batteries massed west of the YSER, but +nothing could hold up our attack. The Belgians have given the following +description of the power of the German assault: 'What plunder must not +they have been promised, to allow themselves to be killed in such a +way? What drink must they not have taken to give themselves such animal +courage? Like devils, thirsting for blood, they storm forward with the +howls of wild beasts; lusting to massacre, they tread the wounded under +foot and stumble over the dead: and, though shot down in hundreds, they +keep coming on. Then follow isolated fights with bayonets and the butts +of rifles: some are impaled, others strangled or have their skulls +bashed in.' The fight swayed backwards and forwards till well into the +night: guns brought up into the front line fired at point-blank range: +both sides put in their last reserves. + +During the night, rifles were unloaded, bayonets fixed, and we attacked +again. A small German detachment of about fifty men advanced across +the YSER bridge, but in endeavouring to assault the enemy's batteries, +it succumbed to greatly superior numbers. Thus the morning of 26th +October found the attackers back in their assault-positions: their +courage, spirit and indifference to death having added another leaf of +fame to the chaplet of the Guards. It was clear, however, that another +artillery bombardment was indispensable to success, and it was carried +out on the 26th and 27th. + +That heavy losses were suffered by the Belgians and the French Marine +Fusiliers in the fighting just described is shown by the fact that +on the morning of the 26th Senegalese troops who had been hurriedly +brought up took over the defence of the bridge-head. A German attack on +the 28th was able to make some progress on the southern flank against +these fresh troops, but a decision could not be obtained. No further +effort was made on the 29th, for there was a shortage of artillery +ammunition. The eastern edge of the town was, however, bombarded by +trench-mortars, which had just arrived, with good effect. + +Army Orders for the 30th prescribed that the XXII Reserve Corps should +only leave a weak force of from three to four battalions on the eastern +bank of the Yser opposite DIXMUDE; that DIXMUDE should be kept under +heavy artillery fire; and that the remainder of the 43rd Reserve +Division should cross the YSER, north of DIXMUDE, in order to attack +the town from the rear. + +North-west of DIXMUDE, by the evening of the 29th, the troops of +General von Beseler and the 44th Reserve Division had worked their +way forward some 300 yards towards the railway embankment. Only one +brigade of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was still north-east of NIEUPORT: +all the rest were taking part in the struggle further south, and west +of the YSER. NIEUPORT was shut in on the south: the left wing of the +44th Reserve Division lay west of BEERST, as protection against the +strong hostile forces near the river about DIXMUDE: the Belgians and +recently-arrived French forces held the railway embankment between +NIEUPORT and DIXMUDE. Broad stretches of wire entanglements lay in +front of this strong position, and the efforts of our troops had been +almost superhuman in their advance over this ground: it was intersected +with patches of marsh, dykes often fifteen yards broad, and thick, +wired hedges. So strong, however, was the pressure against the enemy +that the French were compelled to reduce their forces about NIEUPORT +and north of it to weak detachments, and send constant reinforcements +to the area PERVYSE-RAMSCAPPELLE. A German airman, who was killed on +the morning of the 30th, had shortly before his death reported that +the enemy were beginning to withdraw. Our assault began at 6.30 A.M., +though the ground in the area of the 5th and 6th Reserve Divisions +had become extraordinarily swampy. It seemed impossible that the +recent rains could have raised the level of the ground-water to such +an extent. Nevertheless the attack made considerable progress. The +11th Brigade of the 6th Reserve Division succeeded in forcing its way +into the eastern part of the strongly-fortified village of PERVYSE, +whilst of the 5th Reserve Division, the 48th and 52nd Reserve Regiments +reached the railway embankment, and the 48th pushed on beyond it +towards RAMSCAPPELLE. Although every house had to be attacked, it +succeeded in reaching the western end of the village. The 12th Reserve +Regiment also made considerable advance. + +The resistance of the enemy was broken, and when the 33rd _Ersatz_ +Brigade on the northern wing advanced from the north-east against +NIEUPORT, the enemy retired. Airmen reported enemy's columns retreating +towards FURNES. Nothing could stop the victorious advance of General +von Beseler's troops, not even the heaviest guns of the British +battleships, cruisers and torpedo-boats, which, from far out at sea, +enfiladed the German attack at a range of 20,000 yards, nor the +incessant counter-attacks of the Franco-Belgian Divisions. On the +evening of the 30th RAMSCAPPELLE was completely in German possession, +the railway embankment south of it had been reached and even crossed in +places; in PERVYSE the fight was progressing favourably, and south of +it the 12th Reserve Brigade, delayed by the numerous broad dykes, was +working forward to the railway. Still further south the 44th Reserve +Division was in full advance towards the railway embankment east of +OOSTKERKE, whilst the main body of the 43rd Reserve Division had +crossed the YSER, without casualties, and had been sent forward in the +direction of CAESKERKE. + +The attack was to have been continued on the following morning, and +General von Beseler intended to withdraw the last part of the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade, from the area north-east +of NIEUPORT, for the fire of the enemy's naval guns from the sea[42] +and the difficulties of the country appeared to militate against any +prospects of a rapid success there. At 11.30 P.M., however, a General +Staff Officer of the 6th Reserve Division reported that the attack +could be continued no further owing to the constant rising of the +water. What had happened? On the morning of the 30th the advancing +troops had been up to their ankles in water; then it had gradually +risen until they were now wading up to their knees, and they could +scarcely drag their feet out of the clayey soil. If any one lay down +for a moment under the heavy artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire, he +was lost. The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain +of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on the approach of dry +weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off. But +the rising flood soon prevented the movement of wagons with ammunition +and supplies, and when the attackers looked back from the railway +embankment, it seemed to them as if the whole country had sunk behind +them: the green meadows were covered with dirty, yellow water, and the +general line of the roads was only indicated by the houses and the rows +of partly covered trees. It soon became evident that the enemy must +have blown up the canal-sluices, and called in the sea to his aid. +The advance of General von Beseler's III Reserve Corps had been the +culmination of the crisis for our opponent; all his reserves had been +put in to stop it, but in vain. If the Germans could only succeed in +pushing the exhausted Belgians and French out of their way, the road to +DUNKIRK and CALAIS was open. Warnings, friendly and otherwise, had been +given by the Allies to the Belgians that they must 'hold out'; but they +were no more able to resist the attacks of the victors of ANTWERP now +than when behind fortress ramparts. Their fighting spirit was broken; +so, influenced by the wishes of the British and the French, King Albert +finally decided to employ this last desperate means of defence, and +place a wide expanse of his fair country under water. The water-level +rose slowly and insidiously until, on the evening of the 30th, the +YSER north of DIXMUDE had almost everywhere overflowed its banks. The +inundation destroyed buildings as well as soil, but it enabled the +worn-out defenders to recover their sore-threatened security. + +General von Beseler quickly realised the danger which now awaited +his attacking troops on the far side of the canal, behind whom a +sheet of water, 2000 to 3000 yards broad, was constantly deepening. +The decision was an exceedingly hard one for him to make, yet it had +to be done. The attack would have to be given up and the greater +part of the western bank of the river evacuated. The order was +issued and carried out during the night of the 30th-31st October. In +spite of the dangers due to the altered appearance of the country +and the consequent difficulty in finding the way, and although the +Franco-Belgian artillery kept the YSER crossings under constant +heavy fire, the withdrawal was a brilliant success. Not a wounded +man nor rifle fell into the enemy's hands, and the movement was so +well covered that the enemy did not notice we had disengaged until +it was too late. A small detachment of gallant Brandenburgers under +Lieutenant Buchholz remained behind for a long time in PERVYSE. In +front of them the enemy was sweeping the village with artillery +and infantry fire and behind them was the edge of an apparently +boundless sea. A French colonel offered Lieutenant Buchholz honourable +conditions if he would surrender; but he indignantly rejected the +offer: his only answer to the colonel was to slip off with his little +band of followers. They rejoined their unit successfully. The enemy +only followed up slowly along the roads, with weak detachments of +infantry. Our rear-guards remained west of the canal on the line ST. +GEORGE-STUYVEKENSKERKE, whilst the main body on the 31st took up its +new position east of the YSER as follows: the 5th Reserve Division +north of the main road ST. PIERRE CAPPELLE-MANNEKENSVERE; the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division in the area MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE; and the 6th +Reserve Division to the south of it. One battalion and one battery +of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division remained facing NIEUPORT, extending +northwards to the coast. A new defensive position was selected along +the line WESTENDE-MANNEKENSVERE-SCHOORE-KASTEELHOEK: a continuation of +the attack was now out of the question, as the water was still rising +west of the YSER. On 31st October and 1st November, however, the XXII +Reserve Corps again tried to press its attack southwards on the east +bank of the river, in order to isolate the DIXMUDE bridge-head, but +here also the ever-rising flood soon prevented movement, and on the +evening of the 1st these brave troops also had to yield to the forces +of nature and withdraw behind the YSER. This operation was carried out +in bright moonlight on the night of the 1st-2nd, and was unmolested by +the enemy, for he lay in his position exhausted and heedless. Thus for +the time being DIXMUDE remained in possession of the French. + +The Army Commander had issued definite instructions on the evening of +the 24th October to the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps to the +effect that they were to maintain and strengthen their positions, and +take every opportunity of seizing important points on their immediate +front. In the execution of this order the German troops experienced +a good deal of heavy fighting during the subsequent days. The XXVII +Reserve Corps succeeded in capturing REUTEL and holding it;[43] +but in the meantime heavy hostile attacks were begun against the +XXIII, XXVI and the extreme right wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps. +The British, continually reinforced by the arrival of French units, +endeavoured to break through, and used all their strength. Indeed, +in many places the situation of these German volunteer corps became +critical. Thanks to his good observation posts the enemy was able to +keep our roads of advance and communications under artillery fire. As +the roads were already broken up by the constant rain, the ammunition +supply of our artillery, inferior in any case to our opponents', +failed. Nevertheless, in spite of all difficulties our counter-attacks +continued. The fighting was especially severe on the front of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps on 25th, 26th and 27th October. In this sector +the British and French made a succession of attacks in the direction +POELKAPPELLE, PASSCHENDAELE and east of ZONNEBEKE. The 37th _Landwehr_ +Brigade and the 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade, under the command of General +von Meyer, had to be sent up into the fighting line, in addition to +detachments of the Marine Division and of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. +These _Landwehr_ men, far from being weighed down by their years, +gave effective support to the terribly thinned ranks of their younger +friends, and the line was restored. In the heat of the fighting on the +evening of the 26th General von Meyer was mortally wounded: may his +memory be duly honoured. + +An exceptionally heavy British and French attack was delivered on the +24th and 25th near ZONNEBEKE, against the inner flanks of the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps. The points of junction of formations are always +the weakest parts of the defence, and when the General Staff Officer +of the XXVII Reserve Corps asked for the support of the Corps on his +right, he received the reply that no infantry could be spared 'for the +enemy....' And at that moment the telephone circuit failed. There was +nothing to do but close the gap between the two Corps by an artillery +barrage, and to trust to the skill of the troops and their leaders. +The Saxon gunners of the 53rd Reserve Division shelled the advancing +enemy as fast as they were able, and by this aid the infantry was +finally enabled to come up and close the gap again. At the same time +the enemy made a strong attack further to the south. The report came in +that he had surrounded BECELAERE; but before his supports could assist +him, the bayonets of the 54th Reserve Division had driven back his +assaulting troops.[44] The Corps was able to hold its old line from the +cross-roads east of ZONNEBEKE through REUTEL to POEZELHOEK. Comparative +quiet followed on the 28th and morning of the 29th, for both sides were +very exhausted. On the 28th the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division arrived +at DADIZEELE as Army Reserve. + +The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army, consisting of eight Cavalry +Divisions and several _Jaeger_ battalions under General von der Marwitz, +was in action on the left of the Fourth Army. It closed the gap between +the latter and the infantry of the Sixth Army, which lay half-way +between WARNETON and ARMENTIERES. The enemy could not be attacked +here by any form of mounted action; so far from this being possible, +ground could be gained only by wearisome fighting on foot, to which the +cavalrymen were unaccustomed. Nevertheless they carried out this task +in brilliant fashion, and whilst the southern wing, in a bad position +and scarcely entrenched at all, stubbornly held up the British who were +streaming down from the high ground about WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES,[45] +the 3rd, 7th and Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, with the 4th, 9th and 10th +_Jaeger_ battalions and five battalions of the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade +brought forward from Lille, advanced under General von Stetten to the +assault of the line KRUISEIK-ZANDVOORDE and west of it. This direction +was taken in order to be able to attack from the south against the +rear of the enemy holding up the XXVII Reserve Corps. The 25th to +29th October were memorable and glorious days for this Cavalry Corps. +Among other achievements, the 3rd Cavalry Division was able to capture +KRUISEIK on the 26th after heavy street fighting.[46] In co-operation +with the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps, next to which the +16th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division had been placed, taking a prominent part in the fighting under +Colonel List, General von Stetten, on the 29th, carried forward the +attack against GHELUVELT, the key of the enemy's position. More than +600 British prisoners and 5 machine-guns were taken by our victorious +cavalry.[47] Simultaneously on this day, the troops of General von +Stetten filled another role. They were covering the concentration of +new German forces which was in the course of completion behind their +battle-front. + + + + +THE ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH SOUTH OF YPRES + + +Throughout the fighting of the Fourth Army during October, the Sixth +Army under Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria had remained on the offensive +on the line ARRAS-LA BASSEE--east of ARMENTIERES;[48] but although +fresh reinforcements had been sent up to that part of the front by the +German General Staff, a break-through had not been possible. Both sides +had gradually changed their objectives and now merely sought to prevent +any movement of the opposing forces from that front to the decisive +zone of operations between NIEUPORT and YPRES. Any weakness in the +enemy's line, however, was utilised to gain new and improved positions +from which another effort to break through might be made as soon as +possible. Owing to the failure of the offensive south of NIEUPORT, +a decision under the conditions existing there could not be hoped +for; the German General Staff therefore began considering a plan for +concentrating a strong new army of attack between the Fourth and the +Sixth Armies behind the position occupied by the Army Cavalry, and for +breaking through with it on the front WERWICQ-WARNETON, south of YPRES. + +On 27th October Lieut.-General von Falkenhayn arrived at the +Headquarters of the Sixth Army to discuss this operation. The plan was +arranged and orders were issued accordingly. A new 'Army Group' was +to be affiliated to the Sixth Army, under the command of General von +Fabeck, commander of the XIII Wuertemburg Corps.[49] It would consist +of the II Bavarian and the XV Corps (now on its way up from the south +to join the Sixth Army), the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division (still in +reserve to the Fourth Army), and the 26th Wuertemburg Division (of the +Sixth Army, which was about to be relieved by the 48th Reserve Division +recently arrived from the Fifth Army). In addition to these formations +all the available heavy artillery of the Sixth Army would be brought +up to assist, and if necessary the attacks further south would be +partially discontinued. The offensive was to take place on the 30th +October from the general line WERWICQ-DEULEMONT in a north-easterly +direction. In the meantime the 3rd Division of the II Corps was also +to be brought up by rail to LILLE. The orders of the German General +Staff pointed out that the united co-operation of the Fourth and Sixth +Armies was an essential condition for the success of the operation. +Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria therefore ordered the entire right wing +and centre of the Sixth Army to continue their holding attacks, and +Duke Albert of Wuertemburg ordered a general attack of his Army for the +30th October. + +How the flooding of the YSER on the front of the right wing of the +Fourth Army brought the offensive of the III and XXII Reserve Corps to +a standstill has already been described. From the 1st November the 4th +_Ersatz_ Division took over the protection of the line of the flooded +area from the coast to TERVAETE, whilst the III Reserve Corps was moved +southwards to the district ZARREN-STADEN in order to reinforce the +XXIII or XXVI Reserve Corps, as the situation might require.[50] To +the XXII Reserve Corps was allotted the task of holding the two French +divisions stationed in the DIXMUDE bridge-head, which formed a constant +threat to the German front. The Corps carried out this task admirably. + +On the morning of the 30th October the XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve +Corps advanced to the attack as ordered. The first-named under General +von Kleist succeeded in storming and holding the ruins of BIXSCHOOTE. +After five hours' desperate fighting, the 211th and 216th Reserve +Infantry Regiments entered the devastated village which had been +occupied by two French infantry regiments. Its low-lying situation, +and the hopelessness of finding cover among the battered houses, +resulted in the victorious German regiments being exposed to a very +heavy artillery fire to such an extent, that the casualties in the +village were greater than during the assault. In consequence the +commander decided to withdraw and take up a line along the northern +edge of BIXSCHOOTE, leaving in the village itself only sufficient +outposts to repulse hostile counter-attacks. The division on the +left wing of the Corps also made progress and reached the main road +BIXSCHOOTE-LANGEMARCK in places. The XXVI Reserve Corps attacked +LANGEMARCK with its right wing, but was unable to take it. In spite of +gallant efforts only a few hundred yards of ground were gained by the +evening of the 31st, when these useless attacks were stopped by order. +The centre and left wing of this Corps as well as the right wing of the +XXVII Reserve Corps were held to their positions by superior hostile +artillery fire, and also by mass attacks of the British and French +during the 30th and 31st. The II and IX French Corps had just arrived, +and in the presence of General Joffre an attempt to break through +our line was to be made on this sector of the front.[51] The German +defenders, however, held stoutly to their positions, and thus enabled +the offensive of the Army Group of General von Fabeck to take place. +In conjunction with this the centre and left wing of the XXVII Reserve +Corps, under its new commander, General von Schubert, simultaneously +advanced in the direction of GHELUVELT. + +During the night of the 27th-28th October the 26th Infantry Division +was relieved in its battle-position west of LILLE by the 48th Reserve +Division, and by the evening of the 29th the assembly of the Army Group +Fabeck was completed without disturbance. + +The heavy artillery placed at the disposal of the Army Group consisted +of 8 batteries of mortars, 20 battalions of heavy field-howitzers, each +of 3 batteries, and a 30.5 cm. coast defence mortar.[52] In addition to +the troops already mentioned, the 1st Cavalry Corps, the four _Jaeger_ +battalions of the Army Cavalry and the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade were +put under the command of General von Fabeck. On the night of the 30th +October this new army of attack relieved the two northern Cavalry +Corps, and took over their outpost lines. On the following morning the +offensive began.[53] The XV Corps under General von Deimling attacked +south of the MENIN-YPRES road, with its left wing on ZANDVOORDE, the +II Bavarian Corps was on its left, with its left wing on WAMBEKE; +further south again was the 26th Infantry Division with its left wing +on MESSINES. In co-operation with these the 1st Cavalry Corps with the +4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions, strengthened by two battalions of the +XIX Saxon Corps, which was attacking to the left of it, was ordered +to advance on ST. YVES and PLOEGSTEERT Wood. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division moved to the line MENIN-WERWICQ. The Army Cavalry which had +been relieved was withdrawn to act as reserve to the Sixth Army, one +Cavalry Corps being placed behind the right wing of the Army to be at +hand to fill up a slight gap which existed between the Fourth Army and +the Army Group Fabeck should it be necessary. + +The enemy had intercalated part of the XVI French Corps between the 7th +Division of the IV British Corps and the British Cavalry Corps, before +the advance of von Fabeck's Army; the II and IX French Corps had also +recently arrived[54] on the northern side of the YPRES salient.[55] +Again, therefore, the enemy had a numerical superiority[56] in what was +the second and severest part of the battle on the YSER. The British +in their reports have added together all the German Corps which were +brought up piecemeal for the fighting on the YSER and at YPRES, both +at this period and later on; and they describe the situation so as +to give the impression that they had held up with inferior numbers +the simultaneous attacks of all these Corps from the outset. They go +further and use the figures obtained in this way to turn their defeat +into a victory. They boast of having held out against great odds, +gladly forgetting that their original intention both before and during +the battle had been to overrun our positions and drive us back to the +Rhine. + +The character of the fighting which began with the appearance of the +new German Army Group on the scene had almost the savagery of the +Middle Ages in it. The enemy turned every house, every wood and every +wall into a strong point, and each of them had to be stormed by our +men with heavy loss. Even when the first line of these fortifications +had been taken they were confronted by a second one immediately behind +it; for the enemy showed great skill in taking every advantage of the +ground, unfavourable in any case to the attacker. To the east and +south-east of YPRES, even more developed than in the north, there were +thick hedges, wire fences and broad dykes. Numerous woods also of +all sizes with dense undergrowth made the country almost impassable +and most difficult for observation purposes. Our movements were +constantly being limited to the roads which were swept by the enemy's +machine-guns. Owing to the preparatory artillery bombardments the +villages were mostly in ruins by the time the infantry reached them, +but the enemy fought desperately for every heap of stones and every +pile of bricks before abandoning them. In the few village streets +that remained worthy of the name the fighting generally developed +into isolated individual combats, and no description can do adequate +justice to the bravery of the German troops on such occasions. Our men +advanced to the attack as if they were back on the barrack square, and +an Englishman writes: 'They advanced towards us singing patriotic songs +and with their bands playing.' There was such enthusiasm that even the +weakest were carried along by it, and made regardless of losses. The +battle of YPRES in the autumn of 1914 will be a memorial to German +heroism and self-sacrifice for all time, and will long remain a source +of inspiration for the historian and the poet. + +By the 29th Field-Marshal French had realised the importance of the +attacks developing from the south-east against YPRES. They threatened +his position along the high ground on the line GHELUVELT-PASSCHENDAELE +and aimed directly at, and by the shortest way to, the town, the pivot +on which all the Franco-British offensive plans rested. On this day, +therefore, the British commander sent up the 7th Division into the +line again, although it had only just been relieved owing to its heavy +losses.[57] + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 30TH. 1914.] + +Daybreak on the 30th October was dull and misty. Our heavy guns +began the bombardment of the enemy's well-constructed lines at about +7.45 A.M., but observation was made very difficult by the weather +conditions, and could only be carried out from the foremost infantry +lines. The telephonic communication rendered necessary was frequently +cut by the enemy's shells; but, in spite of this, our heavy batteries +were able to make such excellent practice that at the most vital points +of the enemy's position the spirit of the defenders appeared to be +completely broken. The high ground about ZANDVOORDE offers a typical +case. Although only 130 feet high, it was a corner-stone of the British +defence and one of the main observation posts for the artillery. At +9 A.M. our troops charged the hostile position there, and by 11 A.M. +ZANDVOORDE itself was in the possession of the 30th Infantry Division; +the 4th, 10th and 1st Bavarian _Jaeger_ battalions of the Army Cavalry +took a great share in the success. Soon afterwards the high ground +north-east and immediately west of the village fell into German hands. +Two whole British squadrons with their machine-guns lay, dead and +wounded, completely annihilated in one meadow on the battlefield.[58] +Further south the II Bavarian Corps had driven back British cavalry +supported by part of the III British Corps. After a severe hand-to-hand +encounter it took possession of the chateau, and finally also of the +village of HOLLEBEKE. The left wing of the Corps pushed forward as +far as the WAMBEKE stream, north of the village of the same name, but +had here to put in all its reserves to hold its ground against strong +hostile counter-attacks.[59] + +On the left of the Bavarians the 26th Infantry Division was engaged +in heavy fighting, the position confronting it being a particularly +strong one. It lay along a prominent ridge from 180 to 250 feet +high,[60] running north and south, eastwards of Mount KEMMEL, and gave +the enemy an extensive view eastwards over our lines. The defence +of this ridge was greatly facilitated by the villages of WYTSCHAETE +and MESSINES on it. These had been turned into fortresses, and were +connected by deep trenches protected by broad wire entanglements.[61] +Owing to observation difficulties, and to the misty weather preventing +the airmen from giving assistance, our artillery was unable from its +positions in the valley to bring a sufficiently heavy bombardment on +the enemy's lines; and, though the Wuertemburg troops attacked with +great gallantry, the enemy was too well prepared for the assault. On +the right wing the 122nd Fusilier Regiment (Emperor Franz Joseph of +Austria) took the fortified village of WAMBEKE, and on the left wing +the 51st Infantry Brigade worked forward slowly towards MESSINES. The +ridge north-east of the last-named village was stormed, but the assault +on the locality itself, which was to have been delivered at 7.10 in +the evening, could not get on owing to heavy enfilade fire from the +south which held back the attackers some hundred yards away from its +edge.[62] The Cavalry Corps[63] had gained ground at first, but, in +consequence of their weakness in artillery, they had been unable to +take ST. YVES or to make progress against the strongly fortified wood +south-west of it. The same story describes the day's work of the XIX +Corps[64] fighting to the south of the cavalry. + +On the extreme right wing of the Army Group also the attack on the +30th October had not had the success expected. The combined efforts +of the 54th Reserve Division and the right wing of the 30th Division +had not been able to carry us into GHELUVELT.[65] General von Deimling +and Major-General Wild von Hohenborn went forward themselves into the +front line to encourage the men, but the enemy defended his positions +desperately, and held on firmly to the main points of his line. Another +artillery bombardment was therefore considered necessary. + +From the enemy's point of view, however, the situation was anything +but rosy on the evening of the 30th October. The entry of General von +Deimling's troops into ZANDVOORDE endangered the southern side of the +YPRES salient, and the capture of HOLLEBEKE brought the Germans within +three miles of YPRES itself. YPRES was indeed in danger. Field-Marshal +French had put Indian troops into the fighting line on the 30th, and he +now brought all the available British and French reserves towards the +line ZANDVOORDE-HOLLEBEKE in order to support the 7th British Division, +which had been fought to a standstill.[66] During the night, therefore, +the fighting never ceased: attacks and counter-attacks continued +along the whole front, and under cover of darkness the indefatigable +Wuertemburg troops again tried to storm MESSINES. + +On the 31st October the Germans had at first but few fresh troops +to meet the enemy's reinforcements;[67] so the 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division was brought up in readiness north of the LYS behind the II +Bavarian Corps. General von Fabeck had from the outset realised that +the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge was of decisive importance, and that +every effort must be made to take it; on the 31st, therefore, the main +pressure was to be exerted along the southern sector of attack of the +II Bavarian Corps. + +According to the enemy's accounts the 31st October 1914 was one of +the most critical days at his headquarters. For us it was a day of +great glory, and the British state unreservedly in their reports of +the fighting, that the bravery of our men was beyond all praise. It is +true that this last October day of the first war-year did not give us +YPRES, but our semicircle around the town became so reduced that it +was brought within range of our artillery from three sides, and there +could be no more threats of a big hostile offensive based on the YPRES +district. The fact that neither the enemy's commanders nor their troops +gave way under the strong pressure we put on them, but continued to +fight the battle round YPRES, though their situation was most perilous, +gives us an opportunity to acknowledge that there were men of real +worth opposed to us who did their duty thoroughly. + +At dawn on Sunday the 31st October, in fine weather, a heavy artillery +bombardment of the new hostile positions was begun on a front of ten +and a half miles. The enemy's batteries were not long in replying; +being so difficult to locate they had not suffered much in the previous +fighting. Terrific artillery fire lasted throughout the morning, +the British and French shells fell long distances behind our lines, +blocking streets and bridges, and devastating the villages as far +back as the LYS, so that any regular transport of supplies became +impossible. At GHELUVELT, however, the important northern corner of the +Army Group Fabeck, the enemy's hail of shells had but little result, +because our capture of the high ground at ZANDVOORDE had made the work +of observation very difficult. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914.] + +After sufficient artillery preparation the British stronghold of +GHELUVELT was to be attacked from south and east simultaneously. +Colonel von Aldershausen, commanding the 105th Infantry Regiment, was +to direct the attack from the east. Besides two battalions of his own +regiment, there were placed under his command the 1st Battalion of the +143rd Infantry Regiment and a strong mixed detachment from the 54th +Reserve Division, mainly belonging to the 245th Reserve Regiment and +the 26th Reserve _Jaeger_ Battalion. The 99th Infantry Regiment was to +make the attack from the south.[68] During the morning, in spite of +the heaviest fighting, no success was achieved, and isolated attacks +were repulsed by British counter-movements. At about 11 A.M. our +converging attack was begun. The commanders of the 54th Reserve and +30th Infantry Divisions with their artillery leaders, as well as the +general commanding the XV Corps, were again in the foremost lines, +though the last, General von Deimling, was wounded almost at once by +a shell-splinter. Towards midday the attack began to gain ground. His +Majesty the Kaiser, who had arrived at the battle headquarters of +the Sixth Army, watched the infantry working its way through the maze +of the enemy's obstacles and entrenchments. It was well supported by +artillery, some of the guns being moved forward with the front line. +The British and French artillery fired as rapidly as they knew how,[69] +and over every bush, hedge and fragment of wall floated a thin film of +smoke, betraying a machine-gun rattling out bullets. But it was all of +no avail: the attackers kept on advancing. More hostile strongholds +were constantly being discovered; even all the points known to be of +importance could not be given sufficient bombardments by our artillery, +so that many attacks had to be delivered against fresh troops in good +sheltered entrenchments untouched by our guns.[70] Many of our gallant +men were killed, and the officers, who were the first to rise in the +assault, were the special target of the enemy's sharpshooters, well +trained in long colonial wars.[71] Once our troops entered an enemy's +position, the resistance was only slight, and the German showed his +superiority in single combat. It was only the enemy's counter-attacks, +delivered with remarkable accuracy and rapidity, that regained some +of his lost ground, but they did not, however, compromise the general +success of the day. The XXVII Reserve Corps pressed forward into the +dense woods near REUTEL,[72] which were defended by a strong system of +obstacles and by a quantity of machine-guns, hidden in some cases up in +trees.[73] + +While this was in progress the last assault on GHELUVELT was taking +place. The attacks from east and south both broke into the village, +and by 3 P.M. the whole place with its chateau and park was in German +possession.[74] Colonel von Huegel took his storming parties of the +54th Reserve Division northwards through and beyond the village, while +Captain Reiner galloped his batteries close up to it. It was then, +however, that fresh hostile reserves were launched against GHELUVELT. +The 16th Reserve Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was +hurried up to meet them, its gallant commander, Colonel List, dying a +hero's death during the movement. For a short time our own artillery +fired into the backs of the Bavarian ranks: for the men were wearing +caps and were thus mistaken for British troops. Nevertheless the +enemy's counter-attack failed and GHELUVELT became and remained ours, +and we captured besides 17 officers and 1000 men, and 3 guns.[75] +The enemy prevented our further advance beyond GHELUVELT by a heavy +fire from a new and strong position along the edge of the woods west +of GHELUVELT. Here a new fortress had been made, which would have to +be broken down by our artillery before it could be attacked. On the +left wing of the XV Corps the German assaults also failed in front of +some small woods which had been turned into strong points; the 39th +Infantry Division was able to advance only some 500 yards, though it +took a number of prisoners.[76] The artillery of the XV Corps had an +accidental success on this day which must have interfered with the +enemy's staff work for some time. During the bombardment of HOOGE, a +direct hit was made on a house in which the Staff of the 1st British +Division were working: one general and several staff officers were +killed.[77] After heavy fighting at close quarters the II Bavarian +Corps gained ground along the whole of its wide sector of attack on +the 31st October. The right wing took possession of the edges of the +woods west of HOLLEBEKE, whilst the left of the Corps advanced as far +as OOSTTAVERNE. The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had been brought into +line immediately south of it, in order to make the attack on WYTSCHAETE. + +We now come to the most vital point of the battle: who was to be the +victor in the fight for the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge? The 6th Bavarian +Reserve Division had worked forward by daylight towards WYTSCHAETE, +regardless of the heavy artillery fire directed from the high ground +on our troops moving up from the valley.[78] At nightfall the left +wing of the II Bavarian Corps was still hanging back, unable to +break the strong resistance opposed to it, but in spite of this the +Bavarian Reserve Division dared to make its attack. The 17th Reserve +Infantry Regiment was to enter WYTSCHAETE from the east and the 21st +from the south. All the preparations had been carefully made. The men +wore white arm-bands as a distinguishing mark when at close quarters +with the enemy in the darkness. Water bottles were packed away in the +haversacks; rifles were unloaded and bayonets fixed. It was hoped to +take the enemy by surprise, and not a light betrayed our arrival in +the assembly positions. The hostile artillery fire slackened during the +night, but frequent star-shells lighted up the darkness and showed that +our opponents were keeping a careful watch. The clear moon must have +helped them to see our movements. At 2 A.M. (1st Nov.) the Bavarians +advanced from their assembly positions, taking little notice of the +enemy's artillery which began to open on them. The general direction of +the attack was given by the windmill of Wytschaete, which was clearly +outlined in the moonlight against the sky. The 17th Reserve Infantry +Regiment under Colonel Hofmann rapidly reached the edge of the village +and pushed through to the western exit. The surprise had succeeded, and +numbers of the enemy who still held out in isolated ruins were either +killed in a hand-to-hand fight, or taken prisoner.[79] Unfortunately, +however, our own guns continued to bombard the village, as the news +of the victory of the 17th Regiment was not communicated to them +sufficiently quickly. At about 6 A.M. Colonel Hofmann therefore +decided to withdraw his victorious troops temporarily to the eastern +edge of WYTSCHAETE, and to reorganise there. It so happened that the +21st Reserve Regiment arrived on the southern side of the village at +this moment, its advance having been delayed by a heavy enfilade fire +from the south-west. When the men of the 21st Regiment in the first dim +light of dawn saw the figures of men wearing caps running eastwards +among the ruins, they immediately opened fire on them. Nevertheless, in +spite of the losses incurred through this mistake, the 17th Regiment +held its ground at the eastern edge of the village. The error was +quickly remedied by singing patriotic songs and by flag-signals, and +communication was regained with the neighbouring infantry and with +the artillery. A strong counter-attack, however, was now made by six +regiments of the XVI French Corps, which had arrived during the night, +and the gallant 17th had slowly to withdraw again from the high ground. + +The fighting around MESSINES on the 31st had been equally severe. On +the 30th the 26th Infantry Division under Duke William of Urach had +already got its patrols up to the edge of the village, but before any +assault could be made an artillery preparation was required, especially +against the northern sector. On the morning of the 31st October our +howitzers and trench-mortars bombarded the enemy in his trenches, and +by 10.30 A.M. the moment had arrived for the Wuertemburg troops to +advance. + +The 122nd Fusilier Regiment was to attack the ridge north of MESSINES, +along which runs the road to WYTSCHAETE, whilst the 125th Infantry +Regiment was to advance against MESSINES itself, and the 119th +Grenadier Regiment against the enemy's trenches immediately south of +it. The hostile position was so strong that a force greatly inferior in +strength would be able to hold it against an attack coming up from the +valley. Bare sloping ground lay in front of it, and only a few hedges +limited the field of view, so that every advance and assembly position +for miles round could be seen. A strong British garrison held MESSINES: +the trenches had been well made, and were covered by a continuous and +broad system of obstacles.[80] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF MESSINES. + ON OCTOBER 31ST. 1914 BY THE 26TH. INFANTRY DIVISION.] + +The way in which the Swabian troops[81] broke down the enemy's +resistance was indeed a masterpiece. Neither the enemy's artillery +fire, which imperilled the advance of the reserves, nor the British +machine-guns, a large number of which enfiladed the attack from the +south, could restrain the dash of the Wuertemburg troops. At 11 A.M. the +125th Stuttgart Infantry Regiment had got possession of the north-east +corner of MESSINES. The road entering the village from GAPAARD was +blocked by a barricade; and after storming it, another one, a hundred +yards further inside the village, closed the way. The streets could +not be used for our advance, being choked with debris, and under heavy +rifle and machine-gun fire, so the attackers had to make their way +through or over the walls. There are a number of large, well-built +houses in MESSINES, which the enemy had turned into a succession of +strongholds, but they were rapidly blown up by our sappers. The convent +looked especially impregnable with its walls a yard thick, and strong +towers from which machine-guns and rifles fired frantically. Captain +Heinrich's Wuertemburg battery of the 65th Field Artillery Regiment was +therefore brought up, the men dragging the guns through the streets, +as horses could not move along them, and the infantry carrying up +the ammunition. The convent was soon in flames, burying its stubborn +defenders under its ruins. Lieutenant Moesner of the 125th Infantry +Regiment, following a narrow footpath through gardens and backyards, +was the first to make an entry into the market-square. With a few +stout-hearted followers he occupied a large building there which he +defended without any support till the evening against great odds. Not +until nightfall were others of his regiment able to reach him, and +secure the position he had held so courageously. This day of street +fighting had cost very dear, and our casualty list was a large one. A +part of the 122nd Fusilier Regiment fighting north of MESSINES had also +had to be directed on to the village, and by the evening a continuous +line had been successfully formed through the centre of it. Isolated +fighting continued throughout the night, and in order to keep up +communication amidst the ruins and recognise one another in the dark, +the Wuertemburg troops sang folk-songs. The chorus of voices mixed with +the rattle of machine-guns, the roar of artillery in the streets, and +the crackle of the burning and falling houses, all combined to make a +magnificent and unsurpassed piece of battle-music. + +North of the village the left wing of the 122nd Infantry Regiment +established itself on the MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road: but its right wing +was unable to capture the high ground, as WYTSCHAETE itself was still +in British hands. The 119th Grenadiers suffered severely: the progress +of the other regiment of their brigade, the 125th Infantry Regiment, +had roused their ambition, but a heavy enfilade fire swept their ranks +from the south where the Cavalry Corps were still unable to advance. +They were compelled by heavy losses to be content with the task of +securing the left flank of their division. + +On the evening of the 31st the gallant attackers were rewarded for +their deeds of immortal fame by a message of warm praise from the +Emperor. + +The final objective, however, had not yet been attained, although in +the south the high ground had been reached and artillery observers sent +forward there, so that the enemy's positions could be accurately ranged +on right up to Mount KEMMEL. The main pressure of the attack would +therefore have to be continued here, on the left wing of the Army Group +Fabeck. + +During the 1st November the 3rd Infantry Division arrived in the area +COMINES-WARNETON, north of the LYS, as reserve to the Army Group. + +On the morning of the 1st November a thick mist lay over the country, +so that the infantry got a few hours' rest before the continuous +shelling of the enemy's artillery began. As soon as the mist cleared, +the battle broke out anew, on a twelve-mile front. In the north the +Saxon and Wuertemburg divisions of the XXVII Reserve Corps further +extended their successes of the previous days. The line was advanced +up to the chateau of POEZELHOEK, which was taken from the 1st British +Division after a heavy fight.[82] + +The divisions of Deimling's XV Corps attacked with the right wing on +the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road and the left on KLEIN ZILLEBEKE. They +advanced but slowly, fighting hard the whole day. The small, dense +woods, defended with the utmost tenacity, again made progress very +difficult. The 30th Division managed to reach the eastern edge of the +HERENTHAGE Wood, where the 3rd British Cavalry Division, supported +by infantry, was in position. The wood north of ZANDVOORDE gave +exceptional trouble, but it was finally outflanked on both sides, and +its defenders taken prisoner.[83] + +The II Bavarian Corps advanced to the attack on both sides of the +COMINES-YPRES canal, and drove the enemy back as far as the sharp bend +in it. The left wing captured the small wood west of OOSTTAVERNE which +was defended by Indian and British troops. The treacherous methods of +the Indians greatly exasperated our men: crouching in the hedges, and +with machine-guns concealed up trees, the defeated Asiatics allowed +our troops to pass them, and then got up and stabbed them in the back +with their knives.[84] The 6th Bavarian Reserve Division had withdrawn, +on the morning of the 1st November, to its positions of the previous +evening, and at midday began its attack once more. Confidence and +enthusiasm served to obliterate the bad memories of the past night, and +the dense lines now rose simultaneously from their positions as if on +parade. Very many of their dead or wounded still lay at the foot of the +heights, but the gallant division stormed the slopes again, and by 4 +P.M. had reached the eastern edge of WYTSCHAETE. It was not possible to +push up reserves owing to heavy artillery fire, and at this moment the +enemy counter-attacked with two fresh divisions.[85] The Bavarians, who +had become disorganised during the assault, were forced to evacuate the +village again under cover of darkness, after having actually entered +it at about 5 P.M. They had suffered very heavily during the attack, +being fired at from flank and rear, for the right wing of the 26th +Infantry Division was unable to take all the high ground north-west of +MESSINES until the evening of the 1st November. Fierce street fighting +had gone on in MESSINES throughout the day, till finally the Wuertemburg +troops gained the upper hand and cleared the enemy out of the village +to its western edge. The British were driven back down the western +slope of the ridge, and had to entrench themselves in the valley, +losing heavily in the operation. As soon as its right wing reached the +MESSINES-WYTSCHAETE road that evening the 26th Infantry Division held +almost the whole of the famous ridge, and the preliminary condition +for the capture of WYTSCHAETE was obtained. The 6th Bavarian Reserve +Division, however, was not able to carry out a third assault without +assistance, and General von Fabeck during the night of the 1st-2nd +therefore advanced the 3rd Prussian Division from its assembly area +WAMBEKE-GARDE DIEU into the fighting line, in order to carry forward +the attack through and beyond WYTSCHAETE towards KEMMEL. + +After a comparatively quiet night the battle opened again on the +morning of the 2nd November along the whole front of the Army Group +Fabeck. His indefatigable troops, some of whom had already endured +twelve days of the heaviest fighting that had taken place in the +campaign, attacked their strongly entrenched opponent once more. The +enemy was at least as strong as they were in fighting units on the +battle-front, and besides was able to bring up reinforcements of newly +arrived British and French troops.[86] + +On the eastern side of the _Ypres_ salient General von Deimling +attacked on a front of nearly four miles. His Corps, which had won its +laurels in Alsace, in Lorraine and in Northern France, again, in spite +of heavy casualties, continued its advance of the previous days. The +30th Division entered VELDHOEK and established itself firmly in the +north-eastern corner of the HERENTHAGE WOOD.[87] The attack had been +facilitated by a simultaneous advance of the XXVII Reserve Corps, +which had pressed forward some hundred yards north of VELDHOEK. Von +Deimling's left wing had advanced in the direction of KLEIN ZILLEBEKE, +but was held up by the difficult wooded country east of ZWARTELEEN. It +had to wait here for assistance from the neighbouring troops on its +left. + +The II Bavarian Corps had been held up early on the morning of the +2nd November by strong hostile counter-attacks in the sector west of +HOLLEBEKE. They were all, however, repulsed and the Corps was even able +to make a slight advance on the right wing during the day. + +WYTSCHAETE was again the centre of the heaviest fighting on this +day.[88] The Bavarian Reserve Division was, at its own request, to +attack the village; the enemy's position immediately south of it +was allotted as objective to the 3rd Division. The 42nd Infantry +Regiment and an _Abtheilung_ (3 batteries) of the 17th Field Artillery +Regiment remained in Army Reserve. At 7 A.M. a fierce artillery duel +began, and the enemy, quickly realising the danger threatening him, +hurried up strong reserves to WYTSCHAETE. Kiefhaber's brigade of the +6th Bavarian Reserve Division rose to the assault. Under a hail of +shrapnel the youngsters stormed the eastern and southern slopes of the +WYTSCHAETE ridge for the third time, though with considerable loss, +the enemy's machine-guns causing great havoc in their ranks. As soon +as the foremost of them had reached the windmill the enemy launched +a counter-attack; but this time the Bavarians were not content with +simply holding their ground; their supports were brought up at the +critical moment and pressed forward into the village. Furious street +fighting now ensued, and the Bavarians having to deal with every house +became greatly disorganised. Taking advantage of this the British and +French commanders sent forward fresh masses into the line, trying to +turn the balance in their favour at this important point by employing +every available man. It was 3.10 P.M. when a cry for help reached the +Pomeranian (3rd) Division from their Bavarian neighbours, and it was +not uttered in vain. Shortly before, the Stettin Grenadier Regiment +had captured the long-coveted high ground south-west of WYTSCHAETE, +the struggle for a large farmhouse on it having been especially +severe. Without possession of this the south flank of the village +could not be held. Count Gneisenau's Colberg Grenadiers were then sent +forward to support the Bavarians, and the enemy was unable to hold +out in WYTSCHAETE against the rifle-butts and bayonets of the united +Pomeranians and Bavarians. Soon after 5 P.M. the village, as far as its +western edge, was in German hands, although the fighting continued till +well into the night among the ruins with detachments of the enemy who +would not surrender. + +By the capture of WYTSCHAETE a fine commanding position had been +obtained, but the village itself, once so pleasant to the view, was +now terrible to look upon. The church was in flames, and the windmill +flared like a beacon in the darkness. Friend and foe lay wounded +side by side among the smouldering ruins. The enemy was fully aware +of the importance of WYTSCHAETE, but he had been so weakened that he +was unable to recover for another big counter-attack. He therefore +contented himself with small and fruitless efforts, only one of +which succeeded in temporarily entering the village during the 3rd. +Nevertheless for the next few days it lay under the constant fire of +heavy artillery, though our heroic observers did not allow this to +interfere with their work. + +Many of the inhabitants still remained in WYTSCHAETE, as in MESSINES, +and it was pathetic to see how they clung to their devastated patches +of ground, regardless of danger. In spite of many offers from the +Germans, these Belgian inhabitants remained with their last scrap of +property, preferring to die by the shell that destroyed their homes. + +A small wood north-west of WYTSCHAETE, called the Park, was still +a dangerous point. This dense copse was surrounded by a system of +trenches and several rows of obstacles. With the help of skilfully +sited flanking arrangements and shell-proof shelters, it had been +turned into an almost impregnable stronghold, and cost us many days of +heavy fighting before it was finally taken. + +The 26th Infantry Division, after its capture of MESSINES, immediately +put the high ground into a state of defence. Its left brigade, the +51st, which was in position there, was relieved on the 2nd November +by the 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade, and sent back to the Army Reserve. +The 52nd Brigade, on the right wing of the division, in co-operation +with the 3rd Infantry Division, advanced across the STEENBEEK stream. +However, no progress of importance could be made there, as every +movement could be immediately brought under most effective artillery +fire from the commanding positions on Mount KEMMEL.[89] + +On the 3rd November the formation of a 'Group Urach' was ordered, +consisting of the 3rd and 26th Infantry Divisions, to continue the +attack against the high ground east of KEMMEL; but in the following +days it was unable to make any essential alteration in the general +situation in this sector. + +A part of the Army Cavalry was still in action south of, and +co-operating with, the 26th Infantry Division, in spite of the small +force of artillery and engineers included in it. On the 2nd November +it made a surprise attack on foot against the farm KLEIN DOUVE with +complete success.[90] On the 4th November the I Cavalry Corps was +relieved by the II, consisting of the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions. + +In the early days of November the conduct of the enemy's operations +against the Army Group Fabeck underwent a very noticeable change. +The German attacks had destroyed any prospect of success for the +big offensive movement which had been planned. The British troops, +especially the I and IV Corps,[91] were so played out that they had +to be relieved by parts of the French Army. The enemy's commanders, +however, realised that even these fresh troops would be unable to make +much headway against our men, and they therefore decided to remain on +the defensive and to create a deep zone of trench-systems. The heavy +fighting had made havoc of their front trenches, or at least had badly +damaged them. The civil population and all other available labour, +therefore, were now called upon to dig successive lines of rearward +positions for a long way westwards.[92] These preparations were soon +discovered by our airmen. + +During the early days of November the commander of the Sixth Army +came to the conclusion that the offensive of the Army Group Fabeck +could lead to no decisive results. The forces available were still +too weak to break through the enemy's strongly entrenched positions, +particularly as he was continually bringing up fresh reinforcements to +the battle-front. + +If the attempt to break through south of YPRES was not to be entirely +abandoned, and a purely defensive war on the Western Front thereby +avoided, more troops would have to be brought up for the YPRES battle +from other sectors of the front. As a beginning the 2nd and the +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions were affiliated to the Army Group Fabeck, +the Bavarian Cavalry Division being allotted to the XV Corps and the +2nd Cavalry Division to the II Bavarian Corps. The German General +Staff also placed the II Corps and the 4th Infantry Division at the +disposal of General von Fabeck, and they began to detrain at LILLE on +the 5th November. On the 3rd Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered +the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division to be taken from +the Sixth Army, west of LILLE; and this was followed by an order on +the 4th to withdraw all the troops of the Guard Corps available from +their positions, and for their sector of the front to be taken over by +the IV Corps at ARRAS. Accordingly a composite Division of the Guard +Corps, consisting of the 1st and 4th Guard Infantry Brigades, under +Lieutenant-General von Winckler, marched for ROUBAIX, which was reached +on the 7th. More heavy artillery was also handed over to the Army Group +Fabeck, and, in addition, all the artillery ammunition allotted to the +Sixth Army. The intention of the German General Staff, communicated +to the commander of the Sixth Army on the 4th November, was: to push +the attack to the immediate north (of the elbow) of the COMINES-YPRES +canal, and to put in all available forces to break through there. +In the meantime, however, General von Fabeck, in accordance with +instructions previously issued by the commander of the Sixth Army, +had placed the XXIV Reserve Corps and the 25th Reserve Division on +the left wing of the II Bavarian Corps, and had there formed a Group +Gerok, to which the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division was added. Thus for +the offensive north of the COMINES-YPRES canal there were left the II +Corps and Guard Corps (the 4th Division and the mixed Division of von +Winckler), besides the XV Corps which was already in position there. +The fighting continued along the front of the Army Group until the +10th, when these troops were ready to attack. No time was to be given +the enemy to recover, or to strengthen his positions. + +The XV Corps, which in the meantime had extended its left wing to +the COMINES-YPRES canal, won ground daily, especially on the 6th +November, when the 39th Division delivered a heavy attack near KLEIN +ZILLEBEKE and drove the recently arrived French troops from their +position, capturing four hundred prisoners in the farm buildings. The +troops, advancing with their bands playing, also stormed parts of +ZWARTELEEN, a village widely scattered among the woods and meadows. +The artillery fired at point-blank range, as the November mist made +observation impossible at any distance. French counter-attacks and +an attack by British cavalry, which attempted to make good the +retirement of the French, were repulsed. Their casualties were heavy, +the 1st and 2nd British Life Guards being decimated. The enemy's +counter-attacks on the 7th and 8th November, in which the much +weakened 7th British Division, as well as the Zouaves, took part, +had also no success. On the 8th November the 148th Infantry Regiment +captured the fortified position along the western edge of VELDHOEK; +with a strong counter-attack the French made a bid to recover the lost +ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Linker, the gallant regimental commander, +hastily gathered together all the supports within reach, including +_Landwehr_ men of the 54th Reserve Division, and led them forward to +meet the advancing enemy; he himself was mortally wounded at the head +of his victorious followers. The French hurriedly retired, suffering +considerable loss.[93] + +The II Bavarian Corps was kept busily employed by the hostile +counter-attacks near the canal; the enemy offered very stubborn +resistance in order to keep possession of the high ground from which +YPRES can be seen. The Bavarians, however, not only maintained their +positions, but, by an irresistible attack on the 9th and 10th November, +took the high ground on which ST. ELOI is situated.[94] To the 5th +Bavarian Infantry Brigade is due all the credit for this fine feat. The +enemy remained for a long time in the houses of ST. ELOI, but the high +ground was of primary, perhaps even decisive, importance; for it gave +us a bird's-eye view of the country east of YPRES, where the mass of +the British field artillery was in position. + +The fighting further south which the troops of the Group Gerok had in +and north of WYTSCHAETE was equally heavy. The northern edge formed the +dividing line between the Groups Gerok and Urach. The enemy kept the +village under heavy fire in order to hinder the work of our observers, +the mere sight of a man anywhere being sufficient to draw his artillery +fire. Our stereo-telescopes were therefore used through loopholes in +the ruins or at the chimney openings, and the observers were often far +safer on such lofty perches than our reserves in the cellars of the +battered village. Only slow progress could be made in the woods lying +to the north-west. + +The Group Urach also was unable to make much headway. On its right +wing, the 3rd Infantry Division struggled hard to get possession of the +Park north-west of WYTSCHAETE. After a whole day's fighting the 34th +Fusilier Regiment forced its way into the hospice, a fine old convent +at the northern entrance to the village; from its roof the enemy had +been able to get a splendid view of our positions in the valley south +of WYTSCHAETE. In spite of a most thorough bombardment our attack was +very costly, and although the Park was enveloped on two sides, it was +found impossible to enter it. From this patch of wood heavy enfilade +fire swept the positions of the 6th Bavarian Division to the north, +and the trenches of the 3rd Prussian Division to the south. It was +surrounded by a wall and moat as well as by wire entanglements, the +impenetrable undergrowth being entangled with a maze of wire. Frenchmen +with machine-guns were roped to the trunks of some of the trees, and +they were found dead hanging from the shell-torn stumps when the Park +of WYTSCHAETE was finally stormed on the 13th November by the 21st +Reserve Infantry Regiment of the 6th Bavarian Division, with the 2nd +Grenadiers and 34th Fusiliers of the 3rd Prussian Division. There is +a legend connected with WYTSCHAETE Park, and the scene was worthy of +it.[95] + +The 26th Infantry Division during these days had advanced its lines +to the western slopes of the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES ridge, and in places +across the valley, by sapping. This operation cost many casualties, +as the British on Mount KEMMEL were able to watch every movement in +our trenches, and could immediately bring them under the fire of field +or heavy artillery, or even of long-range naval guns, and they were +by no means sparing with their ammunition. Fortunately our losses +were for the most part only in the front lines, but our shortage of +ammunition compelled us to husband it.[96] Owing to the conformation +of the ground and to the weather preventing any air-reconnaissances, +we were unable to range accurately on the enemy's artillery, and the +most we could do was to disturb their means of fire-direction. Their +observation posts on Mount KEMMEL were soon discovered, and the fight +now began against the observers there as well as against those posted +in the towers of YPRES. So the blame must not be laid on us for the +gradual destruction of those magnificent buildings of YPRES, which gave +such a fine view of the whole countryside. + +Further to the south no noteworthy progress was made either by the +Cavalry Corps, or on the front of the Sixth Army. + +Such then was the general situation when, on the 10th November, the +new forces lay ready to take the offensive in their positions north of +the COMINES-YPRES canal. Before going further, however, the operations +of the Fourth Army from the last days of October must for a moment be +touched on. + + + + +THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH ARMY FROM THE END OF OCTOBER TO THE 9TH +NOVEMBER 1914 + + +Whilst the northern wing of the Sixth Army under General von Fabeck +was engaged in the heavy fighting just described, the Fourth Army +of Duke Albert of Wuertemburg had been doing its utmost, by means of +constant attacks, to prevent the enemy from withdrawing any troops from +his front to support his endangered positions near YPRES. By 11 A.M. +on the 3rd November the reorganisation of the German forces rendered +necessary by the inundation of the front between the coast and DIXMUDE +had been sufficiently completed to enable an offensive to be delivered +on this day, on the line DIXMUDE-GHELUVELT. The right flank, from +DIXMUDE to the coast, was secured by the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade, 4th +_Ersatz_ Division, and part of the 43rd Reserve Division, all under the +orders of the general officer commanding the XXII Reserve Corps. The +dispositions of the attacking troops were as follows: the XXIII Reserve +Corps in the sector NOORDSCHOOTE-BIXSCHOOTE; the III Reserve Corps, +including the 44th Reserve Division, on both sides of LANGEMARCK, +facing the front HET SAS-ST. JULIEN (this was the most important group +in the offensive); the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps were to the south +again, with the left flank resting on the GHELUVELT-YPRES main road.[97] + +By the evening of the 5th the XXIII Reserve Corps had been able +to gain ground at and north of BIXSCHOOTE, while the 5th Reserve +Division advancing from the north had forced its way close up to the +western edge of LANGEMARCK. But all our efforts to capture this place +by attacks from north and east, in spite of reinforcements being +brought up, failed. It became evident that the enemy's skilfully +placed and more numerous artillery, combined with his well-wired +infantry positions in a country so favourable for defence, were more +than a match for our guns, especially at a time when ammunition was +scarce, and the misty weather prevented observation from aeroplanes. +A continuation of the offensive here would only have meant a useless +sacrifice of life. It was therefore decided with deep regret to resort +to the long and wearisome task of sapping in order to hold the enemy. +The situation of the Fourth Army indeed was no enviable one. Here +in the plains of Flanders, operations were effected by the November +weather and heavy rains, far more than in the country east and south +of YPRES. The troops had to endure great hardships; their trenches +rapidly filled with water, and were necessarily so shallow as to give +insufficient protection against artillery fire. In several places they +had to be evacuated altogether, and the men lay out in the open with +only a hastily constructed wire entanglement in front to secure them +against surprise attacks. Sapping too proved most difficult in this +water-logged district. Frequently it could only be carried on by piling +up sand-bag parapets, and these being easily seen by the enemy were +promptly shelled. Thus the attack made slow progress. Regular reliefs +for the troops in the front line were out of the question, for the +units available at that time were too weak; and in any case, the men +found relief time a very dangerous moment, as the enemy was able to +observe every movement, especially where he still held good observation +points, as at BIXSCHOOTE and LANGEMARCK. + +A very extensive system of espionage served to complete his knowledge +of our intentions. Individual soldiers were left behind in civilian +clothing, with concealed telephonic communication; they kept hidden +during the daytime in attics and cellars, and reported our movements +and dispositions quickly and accurately to their headquarters.[98] +A great deal of information was also given away by the Belgian +population, who crossed the German lines by secret bypaths, or sent +news across by carrier-pigeons, or by lights and signals. Although the +punishment meted out to espionage was severe, the Belgians always kept +up this form of patriotic work. It was extremely harmful to us, and its +effect could be diminished only by maintaining thorough surveillance +of the country in rear of our lines. Our reserves, about which the +enemy was always well informed, had for the above reasons to be kept +close up behind the front lines in order to be near at hand at the +critical moment. Their movements, as well as the sending up of all +the necessary supplies, were often matters of extreme difficulty. +Generally the reserves had to bivouac on sodden meadows, the farms in +the neighbourhood being insufficient to provide shelter for them all. +The troops who were withdrawn from the front line and put in reserve +had therefore small opportunity for either rest or recreation. + +The insecurity of our communications back into the interior of Belgium +must be passed over almost without mention, except to say that here +too a colossal task had been set; for the weak force allotted to the +General-Governor had not only to garrison Belgium, but to provide +observation posts along the Dutch frontier. In carrying out these +duties, the old _Landsturm_ troops showed a spirit of endurance which +said much for the military training they had received many years +before. The work of keeping watch over the excited population was not +without its dangers, and all praise is due to these garrison troops and +to the auxiliary troops sent from Germany to their assistance. Thanks +to them, the long lines of communication through conquered Belgium were +not disturbed, and the supply of the northern wing of our army suffered +no interruption from the enemy. For the honour of all concerned this +must be put on record. + +On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made attacks on a larger scale +along the coast. On the 4th, believing that we had left only weak +outposts behind, even opposite NIEUPORT, when we retired to the eastern +bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments advanced through +LOMBARTZYDE. At first they gained a slight success, but were shortly +afterwards attacked by part of the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade from the +east, and by the 33rd _Ersatz_ Brigade from the south, and driven back. +Detachments of the Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The +second attack made by about five thousand French troops, which took +place on the 7th, fared far worse; the whole of LOMBARTZYDE was taken +by our counter-attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.[99] + +On the 9th November the 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade was relieved by parts +of the Marine Division, for the 10th November was the day on which the +new offensive was to be made with fresh troops against YPRES from the +south-east. + + + + +THE LAST PHASE + + +When the 4th Division and von Winckler's Guard Division were sent +forward on the 9th November into the northern part of the fighting +line, formerly occupied by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from +the heights of ST. ELOI it had just stormed, was able to look right +down on YPRES. The orders of the Sixth Army commander, dated the +7th and 8th November, had given all the necessary instructions for +the employment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division and von +Winckler's Guard Division were placed under the commander of the +Guard Corps, General Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called +Plettenberg's Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg's Corps formed the +Army Group Linsingen.[100] + +The task set the troops of General von Linsingen was 'to drive back +and crush the enemy lying north of the canal (COMINES-YPRES); the +main weight of the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The +Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west of the canal, +its task being to continue pressing forward and at the same time to +support the attack of the left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as +powerful enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.' The +decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, when another strong +reinforcement of engineers would have arrived. All the other units of +the Sixth Army and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according to +arrangement, to attack on this day with increased energy, so that the +enemy should be allowed no rest, and held to his positions along the +whole front. + +On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced to the attack. This +tenth day of November was to be a famous one in its history. The +sectors of attack for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, +the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps had been +closed in slightly to the north. Strengthened by the Guard _Jaeger_ +Battalion, a Guard Machine-Gun Detachment[101] and the 9th Machine-Gun +Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards the POLYGON Wood. + +The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as follows: 'The XXII Reserve +Corps[102] in co-operation with the Marine Division will secure the +YSER canal front, and will take DIXMUDE.' Immediately north of DIXMUDE +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division was in position, with the 43rd Reserve +Division to the east and south, the two divisions together making a +semicircle of steel round the objective. This time our troops were +determined to take the town so stubbornly defended by the French +infantry. The enemy fully realised the importance of this bridge-head. +Besides holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, it +covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On the 9th its garrison +was further reinforced by the arrival of fresh French troops. + +The rain of the previous days had made the ground over which the attack +on DIXMUDE was to be carried out very heavy going. The HANDZAEME canal, +running east and west, divides it into two parts, the northerly one +being particularly swampy and difficult to cross. The main attack had +therefore to be made from the east and south-east on a comparatively +narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern and obsolete +fortifications, but the first strongholds of the defenders were the +railway buildings and cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway +embankment had been transformed into a very strong defensive position, +and a heavy fire was expected from it when we advanced from the high +embankments of the YSER. Under the cover of darkness the division was +able to push its front line to an assault position within two hundred +yards of the enemy, and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment +began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless shells from our +_Minenwerfer_ did their utmost to break down the enemy's resistance. +By 7.40 A.M. our first attempt to take the enemy's advanced positions +had failed, and another artillery bombardment against his obstacles and +flanking posts was ordered. At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at +the cemetery was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into position +there before the artillery observers arrived to direct the fire of +their batteries from the front line on to the next strong point. The +artillery bombardment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M. when +the general assault was ordered. The infantry, with detachments of +sappers carrying hand-grenades and various material useful in an +assault, had worked its way forward close up to the line of obstacles. + +The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced rapidly at first by +frontal attack. North of it, the 15th Reserve _Jaeger_ Battalion under +Captain Hameln worked forward across the deep marshes between the +canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry Regiment came under +a heavy enfilade fire from the YSER embankment, and at 1.30 P.M. +orders were issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, +consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division and of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division, to be brought up into the line. Its task was +to help carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment against the +railway embankment, and to secure the left flank of the advance. The +nearer the attack approached to the town, the more desperate became +the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander of the 201st +Reserve Regiment, General von Seydewitz, always in the front line +encouraging his men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment +and the _Jaeger_ entered the devastated town at about 3.30 P.M. Our +well-directed artillery fire had cleared the front at the critical +moment, and the enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind DIXMUDE, but +did not cease to offer resistance. He held the railway embankment south +of the town with particular tenacity. Even when this had been finally +stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the fight, with heavy loss, +among the burning houses in the southern part of the town, until the +201st Regiment by a wheel southwards were able to give assistance. +Teetzmann's brigade in its attack on the YSER embankment, to protect +the flank of the division, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it +pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so that the enemy's +retreat was threatened. In spite of this, however, he gave nothing +up without a struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: +in fact the street fighting that ensued was hardly less bitter and +terrible than at WYTSCHAETE and MESSINES. + +During the struggle in DIXMUDE, the French artillery fired into the +place regardless of friend or foe, and both suffered alike. The fight +was still raging among the houses at the northern exit, where von +Beerst was only making slow progress with the advanced detachments of +the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, when our reserves were assembled in the +market-square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry and Marine +Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but finally had to give way, for +though not numerically superior, the offensive spirit of the German +troops overcame all resistance. It was not until the west bank of the +canal had been reached, that the mass of the enemy put up another +defence. + +DIXMUDE was captured, and the French had been driven back across the +canal. A combined counter-attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which +began during the evening and continued into the night, was unable to +alter the situation, and though DIXMUDE in consequence was under the +heaviest fire, our troops held their ground. Weak detachments of the +4th _Ersatz_ Division were even able to cross the river north of the +town under cover of darkness, though the extreme swampiness of the +ground prevented them carrying their success any further. The enemy had +prepared the bridges, west of DIXMUDE, for demolition some time before +and had constructed strong positions along the west bank of the YSER. +These were especially good, as the ground there is higher and overlooks +that on the east bank. Our artillery had therefore to make another +preparatory bombardment. The spoils taken at DIXMUDE were considerable, +and in spite of the fact that the British assert that the Allies only +lost a few hundred men, we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 +men.[103] + + [Illustration: THE CAPTURE OF DIXMUDE. + ON NOVEMBER 10TH. 1914.] + +Our allied enemies had also been driven back over the canal, south +of DIXMUDE, on the 10th November. The XXIII Reserve Corps had made +a successful attack on NOORDSCHOOTE and through BIXSCHOOTE against +HET SAS. A long and bitter struggle took place for the high ground +south-west of BIXSCHOOTE; but by evening the canal had been reached +along almost its whole length between NOORDSCHOOTE and BIXSCHOOTE, +whilst about a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division and weak +detachments of the 46th had crossed it. The inundation had however +gradually extended southwards as far as this district, and put any +far-reaching extension of this success out of the question. The XXIII +Reserve Corps took prisoner about 1000 men and captured a considerable +number of machine-guns in this operation. + +The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight +on both sides of LANGEMARCK. Throughout the 9th November and during +the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had +been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III +Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division, +now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line. +Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had +ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as +dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the +44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to HET SAS, taking +prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting +this advance, says: 'West of LANGEMARCK our young regiments advanced +against the enemy's front line singing "_Deutschland, Deutschland +ueber alles_," and captured it.' The left wing of the division hung a +good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to +push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy's first position, +but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of LANGEMARCK. +The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east, +without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove +that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack +that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now +defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th +Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of +ST. JULIEN, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby +compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von +Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve +Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve +Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of HET SAS. + +After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI +and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements +which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of +trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps +spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would +enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which +was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow. + +In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg's +Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently +advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense +autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the +concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the +neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided +to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling's (XV) +Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a +preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by +means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed +group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers, +three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of +long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding +the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both +divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with +the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of ST. ELOI, were +able to gain some hundreds of yards. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE SIXTH ARMY. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +On the 11th November the combined offensive of the Fourth Army and +the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck took place. The remainder of the +Fourth and Sixth Armies continued their attacks. The great efforts +made by the Fourth Army on the 10th had considerably weakened it, and +further handicapped by a heavy rain-storm which beat in the faces +of the attacking troops, no special success was gained by it on the +11th; nevertheless the enemy was everywhere held to his ground and +prevented from transferring any troops to other parts of the front. On +the extreme right wing the Marine Division made a successful attack +on NIEUPORT, capturing several hundred prisoners. At the same time the +Guard Cavalry Division, affiliated to the Fourth Army, was sent up to +the YSER, in order to relieve part of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division, which +went into Army Reserve. On the left wing of the Army, the XXVI and +XXVII Reserve Corps worked their way towards the hostile positions +by sapping, whilst the units on the extreme south flank of the XXVII +Reserve Corps attacked in close co-operation with Plettenberg's Corps. + +On the 11th, in pouring rain, the Army Groups Linsingen and Fabeck +began the last phase of this severe and terrible struggle for YPRES; +and it was destined to fix the general line on which the opposing +armies were to remain rooted till the spring of 1915. + +Von Winckler's Guard Division fought on the right wing of the Army +Group Linsingen, and for us the day was to be a historic, though costly +one. In former wars the Guard had always been in the heat of the fray +at its most critical stages, and the sons were to show themselves +worthy of their fathers. The spirit of Frederick the Great and the +glory of St. Privat shone again on the battlefield of YPRES. The +British speak of the attack of the Guard as a most brilliant feat of +arms. + +Before the infantry of the Division could come into immediate contact +with the enemy, a broad zone had to be crossed under his artillery +fire: through the hail of shell the pride and iron discipline of the +Guard brought its regiments unshaken. At 7.30 A.M. the German batteries +opened, and a furious bombardment continued for two and a half hours, +and then the infantry attack began. It struck against two divisions of +the I British Corps, a war experienced foe, whose fighting methods were +well adapted to the country.[104] The artillery preparation however +had been a thorough one, and in spite of the enemy's superiority in +numbers the advance made good progress, so that shortly after 10 A.M. +the strong position along the southern edge of the POLYGON Wood was in +the possession of the 3rd Guard Regiment.[105] + +At the same time the butt ends and bayonets of H.M. the Emperor's +1st Guard Regiment had forced a way through the wire entanglements +and trenches in front of VERBECK farm, and it was taken in the first +assault. The regiment had thereby captured an excellent position +from which to support the right wing of the attack.[106] Led by its +fearless commander, Prince Eitel Friedrich of Prussia, it then pressed +on without a moment's delay into the wood north-west of the farm. +Meanwhile the 3rd Guard Regiment was still engaged along the southern +edges of the woods west of REUTEL, with its front facing north, and +it put in its last reserves to help forward the left wing of the 54th +Reserve Division. + + [Illustration: THE ATTACK OF THE 2ND. GUARD DIVISION. + ON NOVEMBER 11TH. 1914.] + +At 10 A.M., on the last artillery salvo, the battalions of the +4th Guard Brigade advanced to the assault on both sides of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT main road, and they took the front British trenches in +their stride. + +The Emperor Francis' 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from +VELDHOEK against the corner of the HERENTHAGE Wood, north of the +YPRES-GHELUVELT road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the +infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in +its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a +few paces' distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind +a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be +an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their +officers and N.C.O.'s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, +the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another, +but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by +our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced +its way through to the chateau of VELDHOEK, which was surrounded by +a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their +way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly +a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came +from the chateau on their right, from some flanking trenches on their +left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining +officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance +in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the +companies pressed on till they were close up to the chateau itself, +when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides. +Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order +to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees +and from the chateau windows completely stopped any communication +with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded +by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were +assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood +and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the +relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von +Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the +boldest followed their leader nearly up to the chateau again, they +were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it +appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before +this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but +our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their +ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were +in the air.[108] + +Queen Augusta's 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the +main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two +attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the +main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment +on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good +progress, and a firm footing was gained in HERENTHAGE Wood south of +the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis' 2nd Grenadiers +unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire +to bear on Queen Augusta's 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to +be stopped.[109] + +At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The +King's Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the NUN'S Wood +(Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment +and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack +was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st +Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in +the woods (POLYGON Wood and the eastern part of the NONNE BOSCH), with +its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having +spent all its energies against the chateau of VELDHOEK, lay with its +front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own +artillery fire near the NONNE BOSCH, and the attack broke up and came +to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further +advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was +now out of the question. + +In the southern part of the HERENTHAGE Wood the 4th Infantry Division +pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep +trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to +make our progress slow, especially on the right wing. + +The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the +Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around ZWARTELEEN; the +capture of Hill 60 near ZWARTELEEN was of exceptional importance. From +this elevation another direct view over the country round YPRES was +obtained. + +South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks +stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of WYTSCHAETE, which +had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy +artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile +counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the +critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a +barrage. + +In the area near WYTSCHAETE, the 11th November was the day of the +heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians +pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four +machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about +150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, but the guns were so firmly embedded in +the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry. +When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of +the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a +neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in +the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to +three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had +put in to the fight on the YPRES front, and to what an extent he had to +concentrate his units to ward off our attacks. + +On and to the west of the MESSINES ridge the line remained almost +unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the +enemy's artillery fire from Mount KEMMEL on this front and the enfilade +fire of artillery and machine-guns from PLOEGSTEERT Wood compelled our +men to remain in their trenches. + +Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great +success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been +impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately +describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any +concentration of the enemy near YPRES could be seen, and immediately +opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of +the enemy's lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and, +more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive. +The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards +the result.[111] + +The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not +abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained +unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire +front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was +eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare +were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen +its detachments across the YSER at DIXMUDE, and on the 12th the 201st +Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed +the enemy's defences opposite it on the western bank of the YSER, and +held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly +constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the +enemy's bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open. + +At BIXSCHOOTE the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks, +but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country. +On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. +Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve +position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was +discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German +position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour +would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the +10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority +or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position +on the rising ground south-west of BIXSCHOOTE. On the front of the +Sixth Army HERENTHAGE Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the +14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the +artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult +and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by +no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the +assault. In the chateau of HERENTHAGE a large number of British snipers +surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of +ZWARTELEEN after being reinforced by Hofmann's composite Division. A +strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large +number of prisoners. + +On the 13th November the Park of WYTSCHAETE was captured from the +French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which +the French advanced against our positions shouting, 'Don't shoot,' in +German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were +roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions. + +On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of WYTSCHAETE, for which +such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by +us. We thereby obtained a position in the WYTSCHAETE salient which, +although overlooked from Mount KEMMEL, gave us such a commanding view +of all the ground between Mount KEMMEL and the WYTSCHAETE-MESSINES +ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out +of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small +fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the +Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive; +a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength +of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their +health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused +a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary +to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by +the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs +of exhaustion in the enemy's ranks on the front opposite the Fourth +and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth +Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire +entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were +allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant +quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not +unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in +the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th +November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would +be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces. +This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and +although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as +well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert +of Wuertemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence. + +The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British +monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the +roadstead of OSTEND. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions +near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The 'glorious' +activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to +a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to +put in an appearance there.[115] + +The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second +half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For +some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong +detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front, +where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to +bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it +roll back again. + +From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and +Sixth Armies was the COMINES-YPRES canal. + + + + +CONCLUSION + + +As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to +the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken +defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The +effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches +and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and +more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed +it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive +defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in +the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in +the short period available after they were called up the volunteers +had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of +superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with +merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual +was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly +learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this +water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to +Russia to fight under the great victor of TANNENBURG were much envied. +The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of +a final decision at YPRES had disappeared. + +The first battle of YPRES was a German victory,[116] for it marked the +failure of the enemy's intention to fall on the rear of our Western +Armies, to free the rich districts of Northern France and the whole +of Belgium (thus preventing us from making use of their valuable +resources), and to use the YPRES area as a base for the Belgian, French +and British advance on the RHINE. The Belgian coast was now firmly in +our possession, and offered a good starting-place for naval operations +against England. But we had not succeeded in making the decisive +break-through, and the dream of ending the campaign in the west in our +favour during 1914 had to be consigned to its grave. It is only natural +that the German General Staff found it difficult thoroughly to realise +this unpleasant fact, and only did so with reluctance; but endeavour +has been made in this account to bring out the main reasons which led +to this result of the battle. Nevertheless, great things had been +accomplished. The Army of Duke Albert of Wuertemburg, by its advance +and determined attack, had prevented the big offensive planned by the +enemy; the Fourth and Sixth Armies together had forced a superior +opponent into the defensive, and, in spite of his having called in the +sea to his assistance, had driven him back continually, until positions +had been reached which enabled German troops to be spared to carry out +an offensive on the Eastern Front. As during the battle of the Marne, +so now the spectre of a Russian invasion appeared threateningly before +the German Nation, and the whole country knew what it would mean if it +should materialise. Our forces on the Eastern Front were far too weak, +and even the genius of a Hindenburg could not decisively defeat the +masses of the Grand Duke Nicolas without reinforcements. Thus it came +about that we had to lie and wait in front of the gates of YPRES, while +all the available men from Flanders were hurried across to Poland, to +help Hindenburg pave the way to victory. + +There was never peace on the YPRES front. The belt of steel with which +we had invested the town by our operations in October and November +1914, was a source of constant annoyance to the British, whilst +our position on the Belgian coast seemed to our cousins across the +Channel like an apparition whose shadow lay over the British Isles and +especially menaced the traffic-routes between England and France. The +British therefore continually tried their utmost to free themselves +of this menace and their pressure produced counter measures. Thus in +December 1914 heavy fighting again occurred, especially near the sea at +NIEUPORT, and also at BIXSCHOOTE and ZWARTELEEN. On Christmas Eve the +French vainly attacked BIXSCHOOTE: their hope of catching the Germans +dreaming heavily on that evening was of no avail. When spring lifted +the mist that hung over Flanders, a German offensive took place during +April and May that forced the northern part of the YPRES salient back +to within three miles of the town.[117] After this the positions only +altered very slightly. In March 1916 the British blew up our front +trench positions at ST. ELOI by five colossal mines, but were unable +to hold on to the ground thus destroyed. In 1917 the death-agony +of YPRES was renewed, and for months war raged over the plains of +Flanders; the fighting was as furious as in October and November 1914. +The young soldiers of those days have now become veterans, who know +war and do not fear it even in its most terrible forms. The enemy are +those same British against whom Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria, in +exhorting the troops to battle in 1914, once said: 'Therefore when you +are fighting this particular enemy retaliate for his deceit and for +having occasioned all this great sacrifice; show him that the Germans +are not so easy to wipe out of the world's history as he imagines, show +it by redoubling the strength behind your blows. In front of you is the +opponent who is the greatest obstacle to peace. On! at him!' + +He spoke as a prophet. Hate of the British who were so jealous of us, +who brought on the war for the sake of their money-bags and spread the +conflagration all over the world, who at first hoped that it would be +but necessary to pour out their silver bullets to annihilate Germany: +all this steeled the hearts of our warriors in Flanders, whose creed +was the justice of the German cause. And the British efforts to wrest +Flanders away from us again were stifled in mud and in blood. The +fighting in 1917 was perhaps more severe than that of those stormy +autumn days of 1914, but the objective for us was ever the same: to +keep the enemy far, far from our homes. In this we succeeded in 1917 as +in 1914. + +Flanders! The word is heard by every one in the German Fatherland +with a silent shudder, but also with just and intense pride. It was +there that the British were made to realise that German heroism was +not to be vanquished, not even by the use of the war material which +the whole world had been manufacturing for years. When we read that up +to the 14th November 1914, 40 divisions had been put into the battle +round YPRES by the Western Allies, whilst only 25 German divisions +were opposed to them,[118] and that in the course of the Flanders +battle of 1917, 99 British and French divisions struggled in vain +against a greatly inferior German force, it says much for our troops. +But far from all. For the enemy's superiority in material, in guns, +trench-mortars, machine-guns, aeroplanes, etc., was two, three, and +even fourfold. Who can doubt but that a nation whose sons know how to +fight like this, must win? Let us only hold the hope that the seeds of +blood sown in Flanders will bring forth rich and splendid fruit for the +German Fatherland. This indeed would be the highest reward that could +be bestowed on those of us who fought there. + + + + +APPENDIX + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FOURTH ARMY + +from 10th Oct. 1914 to 16th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General Duke Albert of Wuertemburg. + _Chief of Staff_ Major-General Ilse. + + III Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Beseler). + + 5th Reserve Division. + 6th Reserve Division. + 4th _Ersatz_ Division. + + XXII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Falkenhayn). + + 43rd Reserve Division. + 44th Reserve Division. + + XXIII Reserve Corps (General of Cavalry von Kleist). + + 45th Reserve Division. + 46th Reserve Division. + + XXVI Reserve Corps (General of Infantry von Huegel). + + 51st Reserve Division. + 52nd Reserve Division. + + XXVII Reserve Corps. (Lieut.-General von Carlowitz, + relieved on 27th Oct. by + General of Artillery von Schubert). + + 53rd (Saxon) Reserve Division. + 54th (Wuertemburg) Reserve Division. + +The following units were also attached at various times:-- + + 9th Reserve Division. + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + Marine Division. + 38th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 37th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + 2nd _Ersatz_ Brigade. + Guard Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP FABECK + +from 27th Oct. 1914 to 20th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Fabeck, Commanding + XIII (Wuertemburg) Corps. + _Chief of Staff_ Lieut.-Colonel von Lossberg. + + XV Corps (General von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + + (This Corps left the Army Group Fabeck on the 8th Nov. 1914.) + + II Bavarian Corps (General of Infantry von Martini, + relieved on the 5th Nov. 1914 + by General of Cavalry von Stetten). + + 3rd Bavarian Infantry Division. + 4th Bavarian Infantry Division. + + 26th (Wuertemburg) (Lieut.-General William, Duke of Urach). + Infantry Division + + Group GEROK was also temporarily in the Army Group FABECK. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GROUP GEROK + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Gerok, + Commanding Reserve Corps. + + 1st Cavalry Corps (Lieut.-General von Richthofen). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[119] + + 2nd Cavalry Corps (General of Cavalry von der Marwitz). + + 2 Cavalry Divisions.[120] + + 6th Bavarian Reserve Division. + + 3rd Infantry Division. + + 25th Reserve Division. + + 11th _Landwehr_ Brigade. + + 2nd Cavalry Division. + + Bavarian Cavalry Division. + + +ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN + +from 8th Nov. 1914 to 18th Nov. 1914. + + _Commander_ General of Infantry von Linsingen, + Commanding II Corps. + + _Chief of Staff_ Colonel von Hammerstein-Gesmold. + + XV Corps (General of Infantry von Deimling). + + 30th Infantry Division. + 39th Infantry Division. + + also from 16th Nov., Hofmann's Composite Division. + + Plettenberg's Corps (General of Infantry von Plettenberg, + Commanding Guard Corps). + + 4th Infantry Division. + Winckler's Composite Guard Division. + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _See p. 115._ + +[2] _Fourth Army Cavalry._ + + _I._ _Cavalry Corps_ _Guard and 4th Cavalry Divisions, p. 64._ + _II._ " _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions, p. 90._ + _IV._ " _3 Cavalry Divisions, p. 25._ + _2nd Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + _Bavarian Cavalry Division, p. 92._ + + _Total, 9 Cavalry Divisions._ + +_The Army Cavalry of the Sixth Army is stated on p. 56 to have been +eight divisions, among which, according to p. 57, were the 3rd, 7th and +Bavarian Cavalry Divisions, included above in the Army Cavalry of the +Fourth Army._ + +_It may be noted that in 'Liege-Namur' in the same series of General +Staff Monographs the composition of the II Cavalry Corps is given as +the 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions._ + +[3] _There is a further mistake (see footnote 110): the King's were not +present at the place referred to, but in another part of the field. The +honour of fighting the German Guards at one to eight, for the battalion +was under four hundred strong, appears to belong to the 2nd Oxfordshire +and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry._ + +[4] _The British advance was checked on the Aisne on 14th not 13th +September._ + +[5] The Seventh Army was not put in on the extreme right wing but +between the First and Third Armies after the heavy French attacks south +of Laon in the middle of September. + +[6] _'2000 British' belonged to the newly raised Royal Naval Division +which had been thrown into Antwerp in the endeavour to prolong the +resistance of that fortress._ + +[7] The XXIV Reserve Corps was sent to the neighbourhood of Metz. + +[8] _Only the British III Corps and Cavalry Corps of two Divisions were +available to oppose them._ + +[9] _These 'considerable hostile forces' consisted of the 7th Division +and Byng's Cavalry Division, which reached Ypres on 14th October, after +having moved up to Ghent to help cover the retreat of the Belgian army +from Antwerp._ + +[10] _Needless to point out that General Joffre was never 'Allied +Commander.'_ + +[11] _At this date Calais had not yet become a base for the British +army, and there were no British establishments of any kind there._ + +[12] _The II Corps completed its detrainment at Abbeville on 8th +October, and moved forward, covered by the cavalry, on the 11th; by the +18th it had reached the line Givenchy-Villaines-Lorgies-Herlies after +considerable fighting._ + +[13] _On 18th October the III Corps had its left Division, the +4th, astride the Lys from Ploegsteert Wood to Frelinghien, +while the 6th Division on the right had reached the line +Premesques-Ennettieres-Radinghem (S.E. of Armentieres). General +Conneau's French Cavalry Corps filled the gap between its right and the +left of the II Corps._ + +[14] _The British Cavalry Corps (there was only one, the number is +superfluous and suggests there were more) did not extend as far as +Gheluvelt: its left was on the Ypres-Comines canal near Houthem._ + +[15] _The I Corps did not reach Bixschoote on 18th October: its leading +Division, the 2nd, did not reach the area Poperinghe-Boeschepe till +19th October: the 1st Division was still detraining in the Hazebrouck +area on 18th October._ + +[16] _'Armee' in the original, but this is no doubt a misprint._ + +[17] _This statement as to Sir J. French's intentions is inaccurate. +The II and III Corps were ordered to stand on the defensive, but the +orders issued to the I Corps on 20th October were for an attack._ + +[18] _Between Armentieres and the sea the British had only the I +Corps, less than half the III Corps, the Cavalry Corps, the IV Corps +(composed of one Division only), the French had a weak Cavalry Corps +and two Territorial Divisions, the six Belgian Divisions were reduced +to about one half of their establishment, so that the claim that the +Allied forces outnumbered the Germans is hardly tenable. The value of +the statement that 'the relative strength of the opposing forces never +appreciably altered in our favour' will become apparent as the book is +read, and as it is shown that the same British units, reinforced only +by a weak composite Division drawn from the II Corps, were attacked by +a succession of fresh German Corps, that the same units who repulsed +the attacks at Langemarck on 23rd October, were in line at Gheluvelt +on 31st October when the Prussian Guard attacked on 11th November. See +also Introduction._ + +[19] _'The heights of St. Eloi' is a phrase which suggests that the +author cannot have visited the ground nor studied a contoured map of +the area round Ypres._ + +[20] _The British and French in Belgium were hardly in their own +country._ + +[21] _British torpedo boats do not carry 'heavy artillery.'_ + +[22] _The vessels described as flat-bottomed boats were presumably the +Monitors 'Severn,' 'Humber,' and 'Mersey.'_ + +[23] _This narrative omits the advance of the 7th Division on Menin, +19th October, which was going well when it had to be suspended on +account of the threatening advance of strong German columns from the +eastward. The division was skilfully extricated and fell back to the +line Kruseik-Noordwesthoek-Broodseinde-Zonnebeke, the Germans failing +to press their pursuit._ + +[24] _The constant exaggeration by this narrative of the strength of +very hastily constructed British trenches is a noteworthy feature._ + +[25] _There were no British heavy batteries in this quarter, unless it +is to the guns of Rear-Admiral Hood's squadron that reference is made._ + +[26] _There was no British artillery present in this quarter._ + +[27] See pages 23-24. + +[28] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armee Belge: a Dixmuide_. + +[29] _The narrative omits to state precisely the nature of the +opposition which was encountered in the Houthulst area. Actually the +Allied force in this quarter merely consisted of General de Mitry's +French Cavalry Corps and a few battalions of French Cyclists and +Territorials. These were driven back without being able to offer much +resistance, and in consequence uncovered the flank of the I British +Corps just as it began its advance north-east of Ypres on Poelcapelle +and Passchendaele (21st October). This forced Sir Douglas Haig to +divert his reserves to protect his left flank, and therefore to suspend +his attack which had been making good progress on a line south-east +from Langemarck to Zonnebeke, where he linked up with the left of the +7th Division._ + +[30] _By no means the whole of the 1st British Division was holding +the line of the Kortebeck. From Steenstraate, which was held by the +1st Scots Guards, who were never seriously pressed on 22nd October, +the 1st Cameron Highlanders were extended over a wide front nearly to +Langemarck, where the 1st Coldstream Guards connected them up with the +3rd Infantry Brigade (1st Queen's, 1st S.W.B., 1st Gloucesters, and 2nd +Welsh) which was holding a position north and north-east of Langemarck. +The rest of the infantry of the 1st Division was in reserve, and only +one 18-pounder battery (46th Batty. R.F.A.) was available to support +the Camerons. On the rigid of the 3rd Infantry Brigade the 2nd Division +carried on the line south-east to Zonnebeke with the 5th Infantry +Brigade on its left and the 4th (Guards) Brigade on its right. This +division was about on the line of the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road: it +repulsed several counter-attacks on the afternoon of 21st October and +night 21st-22nd._ + +[31] _The British troops had not detrained at Poperinghe, but in the +Hazebrouck area._ + +[32] _This account is altogether at variance with the facts. On +the afternoon of 22nd October the Germans at length succeeded in +breaking through the thin and widely extended line of the 1st Cameron +Highlanders, and pushed them back south of the Langemarck-Bixschoote +road, capturing the Kortekeer Cabaret. They failed to press forward; +however reinforcements, the 1st Northamptonshires and 1st Black Watch, +arrived, and counter-attacks were made which checked all further German +advance. Next morning (23rd October) further reinforcements came up, +the 1st Loyal North Lancashires and 2nd K.R.R.C. of the 2nd Infantry +Brigade, part of the 2nd South Staffordshires from the 6th Infantry +Brigade. Finally, on the arrival of 1st Queen's of the 3rd Infantry +Brigade, a most successful counter-attack was launched, the Queen's +retook the Kortekeer Cabaret, and the Germans were driven right back, +nearly 500 being taken and very heavy losses inflicted on them. The old +trenches 800 yards north of the road were actually recovered, but late +in the evening a fresh German attack recovered the advanced position +reached by our counter-attack, and a new line was taken up about the +line of the Langemarck-Bixschoote road. Meanwhile during this action, +in which less than two British infantry brigades had defeated the 46th +Reserve Division, the rest of the 1st Division at Langemarck had been +heavily attacked, apparently (cf. p. 40) by the 51st Reserve Division, +which had been completely worsted. In this part of the action very +notable service was done by two platoons of the Gloucesters just north +of Langemarck, who expended an average of 400 rounds a man, and though +attacked in front and flank by very superior numbers, maintained their +position intact. The British accounts testify to the gallantry with +which the German attacks were pressed, officers carrying regimental +colours ran on ahead of the men and planted the colours in the ground +to give their men a point to make for, a mounted officer rode forward, +exposing himself recklessly, to encourage his soldiers, but the +musketry of the British infantry was too much for the Germans, and the +attack was completely repulsed._ + +[33] _Throughout this narrative it is astonishing to read of the +repeated reinforcements which Sir John French received. Actually, +except for a few drafts, no reinforcements joined the British in the +Ypres salient before the end of October: subsequently two Territorial +battalions, the Hertfordshires and the London Scottish, two Yeomanry +regiments, the North Somersets and the Leicestershires, and the 3rd +Dragoon Guards, the belated last unit of the 3rd Cavalry Division, were +added to the force, while the exhausted infantry of the 7th Division +were replaced by three composite brigades from the II Corps, set free +after three weeks of strenuous fighting near La Bassee by the arrival +of the Meerut Division, and greatly below strength._ + +[34] _The British counter-attack at the Kortekeer Cabaret did not aim +at doing more than recover the ground lost on 22nd October: it was not +an attempt at break-through, and was quite successful in its immediate +object._ + +[35] _On 20th October the 7th Division held the line from Zandvoorde +to Kruiseik, thence to Broodseinde cross-roads east of Zonnebeke, the +line being continued by the 3rd Cavalry Division to Passchendaele. The +German 52nd Reserve Division and the XXVII Reserve Corps were thus +faced by less than half their numbers. Nevertheless the only effect +of their attack was that after the 51st Reserve Division had driven +the French out of Westroosebeke, the British Cavalry found its flank +exposed and had to retire on St. Julien, the 7th Division throwing +back its left flank to conform. There was no fighting for Keiberg, and +the expulsion of the 7th Division from Becelaere (mentioned nine lines +below) after heavy street fighting, seems to be based on the slender +foundation that a British reconnaissance was made in the direction +of Gheluwe covered by two battalions nearer Terhand, which fell back +without being seriously pressed. The Germans advancing in the evening +from Becelaere were sharply repulsed by the centre infantry brigade of +the 7th Division east of Polygon Wood. The events of 21st-22nd October +on the front from Langemarck to Kruiseik are somewhat slurred over +in this narrative. Briefly, on 21st October the Germans pressed all +along the line of the 7th Division without success except on the left, +where by enfilade fire from Passchendaele they forced the left of the +22nd Infantry Brigade to fall back to the south-west of Zonnebeke. +Meanwhile the advance of the I Corps relieved the pressure, and though, +as already explained (see footnote 29), the uncovering of the left +of the I Corps prevented the advance being pressed beyond the line +Zonnebeke-Langemarck, this line was made good and the German efforts +to advance successfully repulsed. On 22nd October the Germans attacked +the line of the 2nd Division north-west of Zonnebeke, but were easily +repulsed, while further to their left they renewed their attacks on the +21st Infantry Brigade east of Polygon Wood with equal ill-success._ + +[36] _The IX French Corps was not yet up at the front. It did not begin +relieving the 2nd Division till the afternoon of 23rd October._ + +[37] _The 'well-planned maze of trenches behind broad wire +entanglements' would have been most welcome to the British. +Unfortunately there had been no time or opportunity to do more than +dig in hastily where the advance of the I Corps had been checked, +while such trenches as the 7th Division had dug at Zonnebeke were +hastily prepared in such loose and sandy soil that they collapsed when +bombarded; wire was conspicuous by its absence._ + +[38] _The only thing in the nature of a 'fortress' at Langemarck was +a small redoubt, built by the 26th Field Company R.E. on the night of +22nd-23rd October, and held by two platoons of the Gloucesters._ + +[39] _This is hardly a recognisable account of what took place. The +relief of the 1st Division by a French Territorial division did not +take place till the night 24th-25th, but the 2nd Division was relieved +by a division of the French IX Corps, and by the morning of 24th +October it was concentrated at St. Jean in reserve. In the course of +the morning of 24th October the Reserve Division attacked the line of +the 21st Infantry Brigade in overwhelming strength, and broke through +north of Reutel, penetrating into Polygon Wood. It was cleared out by a +counter-attack by the 5th Infantry Brigade, 2nd Division, and the 2nd +R. Warwicks of the 7th Division, and in the afternoon an advance was +made north of Polygon Wood by the 6th Infantry Brigade in co-operation +with the French IX Corps on the left. Fair progress was made, the 6th +Infantry Brigade crossing to the east of the Werwicq-Staden road. +Further south the 7th Division held its own successfully and all +attacks were repulsed._ + +[40] _It has already been pointed out that the Belgian divisions were +much below establishment._ + +[41] See _Les pages de gloire de l'Armee Belge: a Dixmuide_. + +[42] _This testimony to the effective character of the help given by +Admiral Hood's squadron is noteworthy, and contradicts what was said in +the narrative on page 22._ + +[43] _The hamlet of Reutel had fallen into German hands on 24th October +(footnote 39), but the counter-attacks of the 2nd Division had +re-established the line on the eastern border of Polygon Wood, and +between 24th October and the morning of 29th October what changes there +were on the eastern face of the Ypres salient had been in favour of +the British. The 6th Infantry Brigade made considerable progress east +of the Werwicq-Staden road in co-operation with the French IX Corps +which pushed east and north-east from Zonnebeke. By the showing of this +narrative the German forces in this area were decidedly superior in +numbers to those engaged in the attacks._ + +[44] _The above account presumably refers to the attack of the 18th +French Division and 2nd British Division on 25th October, when a +German battery was captured by the 1st Royal Berkshires and the French +unit with which they were co-operating. Further to the British right, +however, less progress was made, but the implication that the British +reached Becelaere and were then thrust back by the 54th Reserve +Division at the point of the bayonet is unfounded; the force engaged on +this quarter only consisted of two battalions and the artillery support +available was insufficient to allow the advance to be pressed home; it +was therefore abandoned after a small gain of ground had been made._ + +[45] _The British who were streaming down from the high ground about +Wytschaete and Messines consisted of five brigades of cavalry (perhaps +4000) and one brigade of the newly arrived Lahore Division._ + +[46] _There was very severe fighting south of the Menin road during the +period 25th-28th October, particularly at Kruiseik, which formed the +south-eastern angle of the east face of the salient. This position was +obstinately defended by the 20th Infantry Brigade, 7th Division, which +held on under heavy bombardments and repulsed many attacks, notably +on the night of the 27th-28th October when over 200 of the 242nd +Reserve Infantry Regiment (XXVII Reserve Corps) who had penetrated into +Kruiseik were captured by a counter-attack of one company 2nd Scots +Guards. The Germans renewed their attack in great force next day, and +succeeded in dislodging the 20th Infantry Brigade from Kruiseik, but +a new line was formed in rear, blunting the salient, and with the aid +of the 1st Division (in reserve since 24th October) the position was +successfully maintained. Elsewhere the 7th Division, which was holding +a line reaching back to Zandvoorde where the 3rd Cavalry Division +connected it up with the left of General Allenby's Cavalry Corps on the +Ypres-Comines canal, held its ground._ + +[47] _This account does not tell the story of 29th October very +intelligibly. The British front had been readjusted, and was now held +by the 2nd Division on the left, from the junction with the French to +west of Reutel, thence to the 9th kilometre on the Ypres-Menin road by +the 1st Division, thence to Zandvoorde by the 7th Division with the +3rd Cavalry Division on their right. Under cover of a mist the Germans +(apparently the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division) attacked in force +against the junction of the 1st and 7th Divisions, broke through at the +9th kilo cross-roads, and rolled up the battalions to right and left +after very severe fighting, in which the 1st Grenadier Guards and 2nd +Gordon Highlanders of the 7th Division distinguished themselves greatly +by repeated counter-attacks. The resistance of the troops in the front +line delayed the Germans long enough to allow the reserves of the 1st +Division to be put in, and their counter-attacks recovered all but the +most advanced trenches. The Germans did not ever penetrate as far as +Gheluvelt, and their final gain of ground was inconsiderable._ + +[48] _It is interesting to notice that this account treats the fighting +on the La Bassee-Armentieres front as quite distinct from the main +battle for Ypres. During the period 20th-29th October the II and III +Corps had a hard defensive battle to fight, the only assistance they +received being on the arrival on 23rd October of the Jullundur Brigade +and the divisional troops of the Lahore Division, which replaced +General Conneau's French Cavalry at the junction between the two Corps. +As the net result of this fighting the II and III Corps were forced +back to a line running north by east from Givenchy, west of Neuve +Chapelle, past Bois Grenier, south-east of Armentieres to the Lys at +Houplines, part of the 4th Division continuing the line on the left +bank of the Lys to the junction with the Cavalry Corps just south of +Messines. The German attacks on this front were strongly pressed, and +the strain on the II and III Corps was very severe._ + +[49] _In view of the reiterated statements about the superior numbers +of the Allies, it is worth pointing out that this new Army Group by +itself amounted to about two-thirds of the original strength of the +British forces engaged between La Bassee and Zonnebeke. For its Order +of Battle see at end of book._ + +[50] _If the flooding of the country by the Belgians had barred the +further advance of the Germans along the coast, it had equally covered +the German extreme right against any chance of a counter-attack, +and enabled them to divert the III Reserve Corps to the south; the +Belgians, however, were in no position to deflect any forces to the +assistance of their Allies._ + +[51] _No mass attacks were made by the British on 30th and 31st +October. It will be noticed that the French IX Corps is spoken of here +as though it had been an additional reinforcement; it had been in +action on the Zonnebeke area since 24th October._ + +[52] _The heavy artillery at the disposal of the British +Commander-in-Chief amounted at this time to two batteries of 6-inch +howitzers, six of 60-pounders, and three of 4.7-inch guns, a total of +forty-four guns and howitzers in all (each battery having four guns)._ + +[53] _At this time the Allied line from the Menin road south was held +by the 7th Division, supported by about two infantry brigades of the +I Corps, the line being carried on thence to Messines by part of the +XVI French Corps and British Cavalry Divisions, and two battalions of +the Lahore Division. Nearly all these units had been heavily engaged +for a week or more, and were much under strength, but even at full war +establishment would have been outnumbered by nearly two to one._ + +[54] _See footnote 51. The IX French Corps is mentioned for the third +time as a new arrival._ + +[55] See page 62. + +[56] _It is difficult to see how this assertion can be supported on the +statements previously given, even apart from the fact that the German +units were fresh and the British troops facing them reduced by previous +heavy losses. The British claim to have held out against great odds +is no more than the bare truth. The battalions of the 1st Division +who had held up the attack of the 46th Reserve Division north-west of +Langemarck on 23rd October were still in the line when the Prussian +Guard attacked on 11th November--or rather a scanty remnant of them +was: in the interval they had fought and held up a succession of +attacks._ + +[57] _The 7th Division had never left the line; a few battalions only +had been given a day's rest, but the division as a whole had not been +relieved._ + +[58] _These squadrons belonged to the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, each of +which regiments had a squadron cut off when Zandvoorde was stormed. +None of the III British Corps were in this area, the extreme left of +the Corps being about the river Douve, south of Messines._ + +[59] _There was no strong counter-attack in the Wambeke area: the very +thin line of the 2nd Cavalry Division (perhaps 3000 rifles on a front +of two miles) was forced back to a position much nearer Wytschaete and +St. Eloi, where it received reinforcements amounting to about a brigade +of French infantry._ + +[60] Messines ridge. + +[61] _The amount of work it had been possible to do there in preparing +the position for defence had been very much restricted by lack of +time and want of labour. 'Deep trenches protected by broad wire +entanglements' is a much exaggerated statement._ + +[62] _An attack was made by the Germans on Messines about this time, +but was decisively repulsed._ + +[63] _I and II Cavalry Corps. See Order of Battle._ + +[64] _The Germans at one time broke the line of the 19th Infantry +Brigade on the right of the III Corps near Bois Grenier, but were +dislodged by a counter-attack by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland +Highlanders and 1st Middlesex. In Ploegsteert Wood there was also heavy +fighting, the 1st Hampshires distinguishing themselves in particular by +a very stubborn resistance._ + +[65] _Except at Zandvoorde the German attacks north of the Ypres-Comines +canal were not successful, and their success at Zandvoorde was brought +to a standstill by the arrival of two battalions of the 1st Division +under Brigadier-General Bulfin, and three of the 2nd Division under +Brigadier-General Lord Cavan, whose intervention enabled a new line +to be formed north-west of Zandvoorde. To the east of Zandvoorde the +7th Division was forced to fall back nearer to Gheluvelt, but east of +Gheluvelt itself the Germans made no progress._ + +[66] _The arrival of the Meerut Division on 29th October allowed some +of the most exhausted units of the II Corps to be relieved on the front +east of Festubert, south-east of Richebourg St. Vaast, west of Neuve +Chapelle, but these battalions were not destined to enjoy a very long +spell of rest._ + +[67] _The 'reinforcements' which the Allies had received on 29th-30th +October were not even sufficient to redress the balance against them. +(See footnote 66.)_ + +[68] _The troops holding Gheluvelt consisted of two battalions of the +3rd Infantry Brigade, with portions of two of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, +at most 2000 men. Against these the Germans by their own account put in +about eight battalions._ + +[69] _It would not be gathered from this account that the British +artillery had, as was the case, already been severely restricted as to +ammunition expenditure._ + +[70] _The statement that 'many attacks had to be delivered against +fresh troops in good sheltered entrenchments' is almost ludicrous in +its travesty of the facts._ + +[71] _It was not in 'long colonial wars' but in careful training on +the ranges that the majority of the defenders of Ypres had learnt that +mastery of the rifle which was the mainstay of the success of the +defence. Between the close of the South African War (1902) and the +outbreak of war in 1914, scarcely any British troops had been on active +service._ + +[72] _The position west of Reutel was maintained intact on 31st +October, the right of the 2nd Division and left of the 1st Division +holding on successfully even after the centre of the 1st Division had +been pierced at Gheluvelt._ + +[73] _The picture of the great profusion of machine-guns in the +British possession is a little dimmed by the recollection that the war +establishments allowed two machine-guns per infantry battalion, that +by 31st October there had been no time to produce enough machine-guns +to increase the establishment; indeed, most battalions had already one +or both their guns put out of action. The Germans clearly took for +machine-gun fire the rapid fire which the infantry of the original +Expeditionary Force could maintain._ + +[74] _The capture of Gheluvelt was earlier than 3 p.m. by at least an +hour, 1 or 1.30 p.m. seems more like the correct time. The 'chateau +and park,' north of Gheluvelt, were held by the 1st South Wales +Borderers, who maintained their ground, although their right was left +in the air by the loss of the village, until the 2nd Worcesters came +up and delivered their celebrated counter-attack past the right of the +S.W.B. This apparently occurred about 2 p.m. The German account is, +however, accurate in saying that Gheluvelt was not retaken; what the +Worcesters did was that they completely checked the German efforts to +push forward; the position their counter-attack reached enabled them to +flank any advance west of Gheluvelt._ + +[75] _The German claim to have captured three guns does not seem +founded on fact: one gun of the 117th Field Battery was lost, but was +subsequently retaken._ + +[76] _The left of the XV Corps, which was in action against the +detachments under Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan, and the +right of the 7th Division, in the woods later known as Shrewsbury +Forest, was successfully held in check: it gained but a little ground, +and at one point a most successful counter-attack drove the Germans +back a long way, many casualties being inflicted and prisoners taken._ + +[77] _The Staffs of both 1st and 2nd Divisions were there. Major-General +Lomax, commanding the 1st Division, and Major-General Munro, commanding +the 2nd Division, were wounded. Neither was killed, but the former died +many months after of his wounds._ + +[78] _During the course of 31st October French reinforcements of the +XVI Corps had arrived and were taking over the left of the line held +by the Cavalry Corps, relieving the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades +north-west of Hollebeke and south-east of St. Eloi. The French were, +however, unable to make much ground by their counter-attacks, and +further to the British right the 4th Cavalry Brigade was heavily +pressed. It was here that the London Scottish were put in to recover +trenches which had been lost east of the Messines-Wytschaete road._ + +[79] _Accurate details of the fighting which went on through the +night of 31st October-1st November round Wytschaete are extremely +difficult to disentangle. It seems that the 4th Cavalry Brigade +was forced out of the village somewhere between 2 and 3 a.m., that +the advance of the Germans was then held up west of the village, +counter-attacks by two battalions of the 3rd Division, which had just +arrived from La Bassee-Neuve Chapelle area, assisting to check them. +Subsequently these battalions (1st Northumberland Fusiliers and 1st +Lincolnshires) were also forced back, but by this time more French +reinforcements were coming up with some of the 5th Cavalry Brigade, +and their counter-attacks, though not wholly successful, prevented +further German progress. But the admission of this account that two +whole German regiments (six battalions) were engaged in the attack is +a fine testimony to the resistance made by the 2nd Cavalry Division +and attached infantry at Wytschaete with odds of more than two to one +against them._ + +[80] _The forces available for the defence of Messines were the 1st +Cavalry Division, much reduced by the previous fighting, assisted by +portions of the 57th Rifles (Lahore Division) and two battalions of the +5th Division (the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd King's Own +Yorkshire L.I., both recently relieved from the trenches near Neuve +Chapelle and much below strength). The twelve battalions of the 26th +(Wuertemburg) Division were thus in overwhelming superiority. The only +artillery available to assist the defence were the 13-pounders of the +R.H.A. batteries attached to the Cavalry Corps._ + +[81] _i.e. Wuertemburg._ + +[82] _This is not accurate. Poezelhoek Chateau had to be evacuated +during the night of 31st October-1st November, owing to the withdrawal +of the line made necessary by the loss of Gheluvelt; but the Germans +did not molest the retirement to the new position, and such attempts +as they made in the course of 1st November to press on westward +beyond Gheluvelt were unsuccessful. The British accounts do not give +the impression that the German attacks on this day were very heavily +pressed in this quarter; at any rate they failed to make any ground._ + +[83] _The hardest fighting of 1st November in the Ypres salient was +in the area north-west of Zandvoorde where the detachments under +Brigadier-Generals Bulfin and Lord Cavan were sharply engaged, as +were also the remnants of the 7th Division, now holding a position +south-east and south of the Herenthage Wood. A feature of this day's +fighting was a counter-attack by the 26th Field Company R.E., acting as +infantry in default of any infantry reserves, which checked the efforts +of the Germans to advance north of Groenenburg Farm (north-west of +Zandvoorde)._ + +[84] _The Indian units hitherto employed under the Cavalry Corps (57th +Rifles and 129th Baluchis) had already been withdrawn to Kemmel, and +were not in action near Oosttaverne on 1st November. This account of +the 'treacherous methods of the Indians' smacks of the conventional; it +is what was attributed to the Ghurkhas in some sections of the German +Press, and seems inserted rather to excite odium against the British +for calling in Asiatics to oppose the disciples of 'Kultur.'_ + +[85] _French Divisions. By the afternoon of 1st November the French +had taken over the defence of Wytschaete. The 2nd Cavalry Division +assembled on a line east of Kemmel and Wulverghem._ + +[86] _These 'reinforcements of newly arrived British troops' are +imaginary._ + +[87] _The Germans, attacking along the Menin road, succeeded in +breaking our line at this point and captured two guns which had been +pushed up into the front trenches. However, the 1st Scots Guards, +though taken in flank, held on north of the road till a counter-attack +by the 1st Black Watch re-established the line, while south of the road +a counter-attack by the remnants of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade cleared +the Herenthage Wood completely, but did not regain the front trenches +a little eastward. Further to the right Lord Cavern's detachment +(Brigadier-General Bulfin had been wounded on 1st November, and his +battalions had come under Lord Cavan's orders) and the remnants of +the 1st Grenadiers and 2nd Border Regiment (7th Division) held their +own successfully and inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, i.e. +Deimling's left wing._ + +[88] _The credit for the gallant defence of Wytschaete on this day +belongs solely to the French; no British troops were in action there._ + +[89] _After the capture of Messines and Wytschaete the severity of +the fighting in this quarter died down rapidly. The French made some +attempts to recover Wytschaete, while the Germans managed to capture +Hill 75 (Spanbroekmolen), but could advance no further, and the +British Cavalry Corps established itself firmly in trenches north-east +of Wulverghem. Supported by the artillery of the 5th Division, it +maintained itself on this line till relieved by the infantry of the 5th +Division about the middle of November._ + +[90] _The chaplain of the Guard Cavalry Division, 'Hofprediger' Dr. +Vogel, in his book '3000 Kilometer mit der Garde-Kavallerie' (p. +212), says the attack was made and failed, but 'next day the English +abandoned the farm: this may have been due either to the power of our +8-inch howitzers, or to the moral effect of the attack of the Guard +Dragoons.'_ + +[91] _What other British troops were present in the Ypres salient +except the I and IV Corps this narrative does not pause to state, for +the simple reason that there were none. The I Corps was not relieved, +though some French battalions were put into the line near Veldhoek; +but in the course of 5th November the remnant of the infantry of the +7th Division was relieved by the two composite brigades from the II +Corps composed of battalions which had had three weeks' fighting near +La Bassee and had then to be thrust in after only two or three days' +rest to hold some of the most difficult parts of the line south-east +of Ypres. The 7th Infantry Division when relieved amounted to less +than a third of their original strength, without taking into account +the drafts that had joined since they landed, which amounted to 2000 +or more. Most of the battalions of the 1st Division were in scarcely +better case._ + +[92] _These 'successive lines of rearward positions' did not exist +except on paper during the period to be included in the 'Battle of +Ypres,' i.e. to 17th November._ + +[93] _During the period 2nd-11th November the most serious fighting +on the British front was between 6th and 8th November. On the 6th the +Germans attacked near Zwarteleen and gained ground, some of which +was recovered by a fine counter-attack delivered by the 7th Cavalry +Brigade (cf. page 93, line 30), while further counter-attacks by the +22nd Infantry Brigade, brought back just as it had been drawn out +for a rest, and by portions of the 1st Division further improved the +line next day. On that day (7th November) a sharp attack on the 3rd +Division, which had now taken over the line south of the Menin road, +gained a little ground east of the Herenthage Wood. This part of the +line was again attacked in force on 8th November, and the line was +broken near Veldhoek, but was restored after some sharp fighting and +several counter-attacks. Further north again, in Polygon Wood and to +the east of it, the 2nd Division, though repeatedly attacked, more than +held its own. In the fighting near Veldhoek a prominent part was taken +by two battalions of Zouaves who had filled a gap in the line of the +1st Division._ + +[94] _St. Eloi is hardly situated 'on high ground,' as it is on +the down slope where the Warneton-Ypres road descends into the +low ground after crossing the north-easterly continuation of the +Messines-Wytschaete ridge._ + +[95] _The allusion is not understood._ + +[96] _The heavy artillery at Sir John French's disposal at this period +was still extremely limited, and its effectiveness was greatly hampered +by the lack of ammunition, stringent restrictions having to be placed +on the ammunition expenditure of guns of all calibres. Fortunately for +the Allies a similar handicap was beginning to make itself felt among +the Germans; even their preparations had been hardly equal to the vast +ammunition expenditure which had been incurred._ + +[97] _The portion of the Ypres salient attacked by the XXIII Corps was +defended by French troops alone; there were no British north of the +Broodseinde cross-roads._ + +[98] _The enemy is giving the Allies credit for his own tricks._ + +[99] _However, when British troops took over the coastal sector in 1917 +Lombartzyde was in Allied possession._ + +[100] For Order of Battle, see Appendix. + +[101] _A Machine-Gun Detachment (Abtheilung) is a mounted battery with +six guns._ + +[102] Consisting of the 4th _Ersatz_ Division and the 43rd Reserve +Division. + +[103] _It is not clear why a British assertion about the defence of +Dixmude should be quoted, nor indeed is it clear what shape this +assertion can have taken, as no British troops were concerned in the +Dixmude fighting, nor could there have been any occasion for any +official British announcement about Dixmude._ + +_In the diagram above, for 201st, 202nd, and 203rd Res. Jaeger Regt. +read Res. Infantry Regt._ + +[104] _The frontage attacked by the twelve battalions of General von +Winckler's Guard Division, far from being held by two British Divisions +was held from north to south by the 1st Infantry Brigade, now reduced +to some 800 bayonets, a battalion of Zouaves and the left brigade of +the 3rd Division, little over 1200 strong. Even if the whole of the +3rd Guard Regiment may have been absorbed in the task of covering the +main attack from the British troops lining the southern edge of the +Polygon Wood, the superiority of the attacking force was sufficiently +pronounced._ + +[105] _The Germans do not appear to have penetrated into the Polygon +Wood at any point. The northern end of the breach in the British +line was marked by a 'strong point' which had been erected near the +south-west corner of the wood, known later as 'Black Watch Corner': +this was successfully defended all day by a very weak company of the +Black Watch. Attacks were made on the 1st King's lining the southern +edge of the wood, apparently by the 3rd Guard Regiment, and also +further eastward and to the left of the King's, on the 2nd Coldstream +Guards. The Germans in this quarter would seem to have belonged to the +54th Reserve Division: at neither of these points did the attackers +meet with any success._ + +[106] _A thick mist which prevented the troops holding the front line +trenches from seeing far to their front undoubtedly played an important +part in concealing the advance of the German Guard, and contributed +appreciably to its success._ + +[107] _This is the eastern part of the wood known later as 'Inverness +Copse.'_ + +[108] _This counter-attack may be identified with one delivered by the +1st Scots Fusiliers and one company 2nd Duke of Wellington's._ + +[109] _The 4th (Queen Augusta's) Guard Grenadiers seem to have attacked +the right of the line held by the 9th Infantry Brigade and to have been +repulsed by the 1st Lincolnshires and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers. +Further to the British right the 15th and 7th Infantry Brigades were +also attacked, but by the 4th Division, not by the Guards. Here the +Germans made no progress._ + +[110] _This part of the German account is not borne out by the British +versions. The main body of the 1st Guard Regiment, which broke +through the thinly held line of the 1st Infantry Brigade, pressed on +north-west into the Nonne Bosch Wood, pushing right through it, and +coming out into the open on the western edge. Here their progress was +arrested mainly by the gunners of XLI Brigade, R.F.A., who held them +up with rifle fire at short range. Various details of Royal Engineers, +orderlies from Headquarters, transport men, rallied stragglers of +the 1st Brigade, assisted to stop the Germans, but the situation was +critical until about noon or a little later the 2nd Oxford and Bucks +L.I. arrived on the scene. This battalion had been engaged for several +days near Zwarteleen, and had just been brought up to Westhoek to act +as Divisional Reserve. Though under 400 strong the battalion promptly +counter-attacked the Nonne Bosch Wood and drove the Germans out +headlong. Many of them were caught as they escaped on the eastern and +southern sides by the fire of the 2nd Highland L.I., now on the western +edge of Polygon Wood, and of the 1st Northamptonshires, who had come +up to Glencorse Wood, south-west of the Nonne Bosch, and with other +units of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades had filled the gap which +extended thence to the Menin road. Thus those of the 1st Guard Regiment +who had pushed straight on westward were prevented from penetrating +any further. The King's, to whom this account gives the credit for +the Oxfordshire's counter-attack, had been engaged with the 3rd Guard +Regiment further to the north, completely defeating their attacks on +the Polygon, but not making any counter-attack. It is worth recalling +that at the critical moment of the battle of Waterloo it was the 2nd +Oxford and Bucks L.I., then 52nd Light Infantry, who played the chief +part in the defeat of Napoleon's Guard._ + +_The defeat of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers does not appear to have been +the work of the 2nd Oxford and Bucks L.I., but of the other battalions, +chiefly from the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, who were pushed forward +rather earlier between Glencorse Wood and Inverness Copse._ + +[111] _The author must be thankful for minor mercies if he can reckon +11th November as a day of great success. The gain of ground at Veldhoek +was trifling in extent and value, and though 'Hill 60' and the wood +north of Wytschaete were more important points, there is no doubt that +the throwing of the German Guard into the struggle had been expected +to produce a break-through. The 'numerical superiority' once again +attributed to the Allies was about as unreal as the alleged strength +of the positions, hastily dug, imperfectly wired and almost wholly +lacking supporting points and communications, which had such a much +more formidable character in the eyes of the Germans than they ever +possessed in reality. The gallantry and vigour with which the German +Guard pushed its attack will be readily admitted, but the honours +of 11th November 1914 go to the weary men who after three weeks of +incessant fighting met and drove back these fresh and famous troops._ + +[112] _This statement is not true. After an attack on 13th November +in which prisoners were taken from the 4th (German) Division, the 9th +and 15th Infantry Brigades drew back from the eastern edge of the +Herenthage Wood to a line about 200 yards in rear (night 13th-14th +November). This line was strongly attacked next day, and the Herenthage +Chateau fell for the time into German hands, only to be recovered by +the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire L.I., while a further counter-attack +by a company of the Northumberland Fusiliers, assisted by a gun of +the 54th Battery R.F.A., ousted the Germans also from the stables of +the Chateau. Further to the British right the 7th and 15th Infantry +Brigades successfully repulsed vigorous attacks._ + +[113] _The surprise came in 1917 in spite of this._ + +[114] _One reason why the G.O.C. Fourth Army came to this decision on +17th November is omitted. An attack in force had been attempted on +this day by his 4th Division, but the 7th and 15th Infantry Brigades, +holding the line attacked, had proved equal to the occasion, had driven +the Germans back, recovering some advanced trenches carried by the +first rush and inflicting heavy losses. This discouraging reception +undoubtedly assisted Duke Albert in making his decision._ + +[115] _It was the U-boats that came to a speedy end._ + +[116] _See remarks in Introduction._ + +[117] _The first use of gas by the Germans on this occasion might have +been mentioned._ + +[118] _It is not to be read in this monograph. See Introduction._ + +[119] _4th and Guard Cavalry Divisions (see page 64)._ + +[120] _3rd and 7th Cavalry Divisions (see page 90)._ + + + + +INDEX + + + ALBERT OF WUeRTEMBURG, Duke, 6; + _see also_ ARMY, FOURTH. + + ANTWERP: value of, to Entente, 3; + capture of, 5; + retreat from, 7 (_note_). + + ARMY, FOURTH (German): formation of, 6; + advance of, through BELGIUM, 19; + dispositions on 20th Oct., 20; + task of, 25, 27; + attack on 3rd Nov., 98; + attack on 10th Nov., 104; + order of battle of, 131. + + ---- SIXTH (German): position of right wing of, 7; + failure of attacks of, 25; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + ARMY GROUP FABECK: constitution of, 60; + plan for, 60; + assembly of, 63; + artillery of, 63; + attack on 30th Oct., 67; + attack on 31st Oct., 73; + alteration of plan,91; + reinforcement of, 92; + offensive on 11th Nov. of, 111; + order of battle of, 132. + + ---- ---- _Linsingen_: composition of, 103; + task of, 103; + offensive of, 111; + order of battle of, 133. + + ARMY HEADQUARTERS (German), meetings at, 25, 26. + + + BECELAERE: Anglo-French counter-attacks at, 55; + XXVII Res. Corps takes, 41. + + BELGIAN population, patriotism of, 100. + + ---- force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + BESELER, General von, 5; + _see also_ CORPS, III Reserve. + + BRITISH FLEET, co-operation of, 22 _and note_, 51 _and note_, + 28 (_note_), 125. + + BRITISH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + _Calais_: concentration about, 6; + German objective, 11. + + CAVALRY, ARMY (German): objective of, 3; + relief of, near LILLE, 64. + + CAVALRY, FOURTH (German) Army, composition of, xvii (_note_). + + ---- SIXTH (German) Army: composition of, 56, 57; + capture KRUISEIK, 57. + + CORPS (German), III Reserve: captures Antwerp, 5; + screens Fourth Army, 19; + crosses the YSER, 30. + + ---- ---- XV: attack on ZANDVOORDE, 63; + attack and capture of GHELUVELT, 72; + captures Hill 60, 119. + + ---- ---- XIX, captures LILLE, 7. + + ---- ---- XXII Res.-XXVII Res.: formation of, 4; + transport of, 5. + + ---- ---- XXII Res., attacks on DIXMUDE, 31, 53. + + ---- ---- XXIII Res.: attack on HOUTHULST Forest, 34; + attack on LANGEMARCK, 99. + + ---- ---- XXVI Res., takes PASSCHENDAELE, 40. + + ---- ---- XXVII Res., takes BECELAERE, 41. + + ---- ---- II Bavarian, dispositions of, 64. + + ---- (French) II, arrival of, 62, 64. + + ---- ---- IX, arrival of, 41, 62, 64. + + + DEIMLING, General von, wounded,73; + _see_ CORPS (German), XV. + + DIXMUDE: topographical, 15; + attack by French Marine division on, 45; + capture of, 108. + + + EASTERN FRONT, German units leave for, 125. + + EMPEROR, German: proclamation to Fourth Army, 27; + watches attack on GHELUVELT, 73. + + + FABECK, General von, _see_ ARMY GROUP FABECK. + + FRENCH force, strength of, 12 (_note_). + + + GEROK, General von, _see_ GROUP GEROK. + + GHELUVELT: attack on, 72; + capture of, 75; + British force holding, 72 (_note_). + + GLOUCESTERSHIRE Regiment at LANGEMARCK, 37 (_note_). + + GROUP GEROK: formation of, 93; + order of battle of, 133. + + ---- URACH: formation of, 90; + attack on WYTSCHAETE Park, 95. + + GUARD (German) Division (von WINCKLER): marches to ROUBAIX, 92; + attack of, 116. + + GUARDS, British Life, cut up, 68 _and note_. + + + KEMMEL, Mount, topography and importance of, 13, 68, 96, 123. + + KING'S LIVERPOOL Regiment, counter-attack by, 118 _and note_ 2. + + + LILLE: value to Entente, 3; + capture of, 6. + + LINSINGEN, General Baron von, _see_ ARMY GROUP LINSINGEN. + + + MESSINES: importance of, 68; + attack on, 79; + British force holding, 80 (_note_). + + + NIEUPORT: topographical, 15; + attack on 11th Nov., 112. + + + OXFORDSHIRE AND BUCKINGHAMSHIRE L.I., counter-attack German Guard, + 118 (_note_ 2). + + + PLETTENBERG'S Corps, attack on 11th Nov., 111. + + + URACH, General von, _see_ GROUP URACH. + + + WORCESTERSHIRE Regiment, counter-attack at GHELUVELT, 75 _and note_ 3. + + WYTSCHAETE: importance of, 68; + German attack on, 78; + Anglo-French counter-attack on, 79; + second German attack, 85; + third attack and capture of, 88; + capture of Park of, 123; + gallant defence by French troops, 87 (_note_). + + + YORKSHIRE L.I. retake HERENTHAGE Chateau, 124 (_note_). + + YPRES: topographical, 15; + historical, 14; + attack from the north against, 38; + attempt to break through south of, 59; + battle of, begins, 113. + + YSER, canal: topographical, 16; + flooding the, 51; + crossed by III Res. Corps, 30. + + + ZANDVOORDE: importance of, 67; + capture of, 67. + + + Printed by T. and A. 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