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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/4583-h.zip b/4583-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..9349bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/4583-h.zip diff --git a/4583-h/4583-h.htm b/4583-h/4583-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..796fd9b --- /dev/null +++ b/4583-h/4583-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,4509 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> +<HTML> +<HEAD> + +<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"> + +<TITLE> +The Project Gutenberg E-text of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, +by David Hume +</TITLE> + +<STYLE TYPE="text/css"> +BODY { color: Black; + background: White; + margin-right: 10%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; + text-align: justify } + +P {text-indent: 4% } + +P.noindent {text-indent: 0% } + +P.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: small } + +P.letter {text-indent: 0%; + font-size: small ; + margin-left: 10% ; + margin-right: 10% } + +P.footnote {font-size: small ; + text-indent: 0% ; + margin-left: 0% ; + margin-right: 0% } + +P.finis { font-size: larger ; + text-align: center ; + text-indent: 0% ; + margin-left: 0% ; + margin-right: 0% } + +</STYLE> + +</HEAD> + +<BODY> + + +<pre> + +Project Gutenberg's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by David Hume + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion + +Author: David Hume + +Posting Date: June 20, 2009 [EBook #4583] +Release Date: Unknown +First Posted: February 12, 2002 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DIALOGUES--NATURAL RELIGION *** + + + + +Produced by Col Choat. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + +</pre> + + +<BR><BR> + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion +</H1> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +by +</H3> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +David Hume +</H2> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<TABLE ALIGN="center" WIDTH="80%"> +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="25%"> +<A HREF="#chap01">PART 1</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="25%"> +<A HREF="#chap02">PART 2</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="25%"> +<A HREF="#chap03">PART 3</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="25%"> +<A HREF="#chap04">PART 4</A> +</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap05">PART 5</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap06">PART 6</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap07">PART 7</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap08">PART 8</A> +</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap09">PART 9</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap10">PART 10</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap11">PART 11</A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#chap12">PART 12</A> +</TD> +</TR> + +</TABLE> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS +</H3> + +<P> +It has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers +conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method +of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom +succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and +regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical +inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic +manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point +at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce +the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in +conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer +desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a +freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and +Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the +image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the +natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and +preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much +time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely +think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, +brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them. +</P> + +<P> +There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly +adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method +of composition. +</P> + +<P> +Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of +dispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often +inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the +novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where +the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the +variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may +appear neither tedious nor redundant. +</P> + +<P> +Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so OBSCURE and +UNCERTAIN, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard +to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into +the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to +differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, +even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the +subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, +into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human +life, study and society. +</P> + +<P> +Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of +NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a +God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most +refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and +arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all +our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of +society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent +from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and +important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of +that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? +These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning +these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these +are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry +with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and +contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate +researches. +</P> + +<P> +This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of +the summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations +of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect +account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, +of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and +display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so +delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast +in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you +opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless +scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the +rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor +of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of +life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection +of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any +considerable part of them in the recital. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap01"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 1 +</H3> + +<P> +After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library, +DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of +my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his +friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: +The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, +were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every +useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am +persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate +to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children, +that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I +follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That +students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next +physics, last of all the nature of the gods." [Chrysippus apud Plut: de +repug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him, +being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest +judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other +sciences, can safely be entrusted with it. +</P> + +<P> +Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of +religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether +those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course +of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to +human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural +Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and +by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I +imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the +principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I +still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of +men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous +conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the +principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper +submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening +to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from +that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the +most established doctrines and opinions. +</P> + +<P> +Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children's minds early +with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite +in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your +plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very +principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and +self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive +to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are +unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless +disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for +philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great +points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little +into study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in +doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult +for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, +profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope, +agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest +remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane +liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become +thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of +human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless +contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the +errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable +difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the +contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and +effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all +kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any +certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full +light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can +retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any +regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote +from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a +stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when +these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain +circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we +decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from +eternity to eternity? +</P> + +<P> +While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the +countenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an +unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's +features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some +raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO. +</P> + +<P> +You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on +philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be +expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these +theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. +Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we +shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, +whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really +doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according +to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more +fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, +fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. +If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world +with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they +are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to +the state, to philosophy, or to religion. +</P> + +<P> +In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in +a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions +and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and +opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, +or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press +in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy +dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be +able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And +for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in +which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently +with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be +more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in +reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the +same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their +schools, and which they ought to have confined to them. +</P> + +<P> +In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the +STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them +seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform +sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every +disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a +sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of +honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not +prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by +its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this +sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a +philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to +such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most +calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support +this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be +recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him +unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian. +</P> + +<P> +I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied +PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind +cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even +when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; +and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in +common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient +schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and +constancy which seem astonishing to present times. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="poem"> + Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy.<BR> + Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm<BR> + Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite<BR> + Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast<BR> + With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel.<BR> +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical +considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will +not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; +but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in +his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either +never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments +more favourable to human reason. +</P> + +<P> +To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of +scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; +and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the +absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his +speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and +philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a +certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself +after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common +life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from +our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general +principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we +acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our +principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call +philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the +same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially +different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater +stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its +exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding. +</P> + +<P> +But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the +surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two +eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the +creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of +spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing +without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, +infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest +tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got +quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our +speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make +appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen +our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the +suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning +that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have +not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon +objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of +all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are +like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem +suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against +the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We +know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in +such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is +peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are +entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them. +</P> + +<P> +All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, +it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never +retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the +sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to +counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the +senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose +this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined +scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose +and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The +mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense +or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism. +</P> + +<P> +But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all +speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at +variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of +common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, +notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some +of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of +certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who +pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of +the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays +of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And +what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to +the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, +should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these +subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow +and fallacious reason of mankind? +</P> + +<P> +There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well +observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do +not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which +requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of +scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that +those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not +only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the +most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to +them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor +attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and +philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. +They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and +their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence +which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most +abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by +philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the +heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of +bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the +parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are +obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, +and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which +occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and +political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and +religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the +general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any +particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a +plain proof of prejudice and passion? +</P> + +<P> +Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our +ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, +full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the +difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I +have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: +I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, +refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the +received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour. +</P> + +<P> +I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated +writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of +philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm +(I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers. +But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, +I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse +nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural +recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions. +</P> + +<P> +In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common +life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, +if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and +evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies +entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of +mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any +pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to +entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system +contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our +natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even +monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to +it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive +knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to +the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most +obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has +such easy access and admission into the mind of man? +</P> + +<P> +And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a +pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the +union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first +establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all +religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, +against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. +All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and +thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout +Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or +rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were +sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural +reason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion, +a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of +Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils +of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the +first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but +a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and +that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in +morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the +principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and +other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and +first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr. +LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning +and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it +is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter +principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain +the former. +</P> + +<P> +Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on +this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an +Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious +remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage, +where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no +God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a +double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts +there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and +are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such +people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be +very formidable. +</P> + +<P> +But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear +communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the +religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. +It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the +whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which +followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, +that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the +presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that +human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty +influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those +suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most +determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, +when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more +open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular +principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have +changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of +STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and +ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to +lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; +whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in +giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their +favourite principle, and established tenet. +</P> + +<P> +It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles, +by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have +any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. +And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of +principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they +tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the +cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap02"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 2 +</H3> + +<P> +I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, +than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the +whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were +maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and +Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental +principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a +question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am +persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so +certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but +the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human +understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The +essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his +existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular +which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and +blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; +and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite +perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it +entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep +cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating +through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his +existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees +and attributes. +</P> + +<P> +But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my +philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very +great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation +of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological +subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated +for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus +expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not +so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively +what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being +infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as +we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed +with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that +that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine +that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our +spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. +We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of +matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of +created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: +That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without +restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal." +</P> + +<P> +After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have +produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear +ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your +doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the +question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the +Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and +self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of +this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him +every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, +deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to +wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all +perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we +comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his +perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human +creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to +him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other +language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of +him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond +to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these +qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and +comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of +disputation in the schools. +</P> + +<P> +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse +to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at +this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We +have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not +conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a +pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound +piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the +adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being. +</P> + +<P> +Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing +himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of +PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the +world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be +nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of +lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond +what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various +machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other +with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever +contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all +nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of +human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. +Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, +by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the +Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed +of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which +he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument +alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity +to human mind and intelligence. +</P> + +<P> +I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the +beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the +similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums +by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the +Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which +have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all +sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and +probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: +But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, +which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning. +</P> + +<P> +What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that +all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that +they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that +inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the +earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and +when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without +hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases +gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence +is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, +from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the +evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is +confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the +circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it +takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and +fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that +it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much +weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our +experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily +followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, +to have been mistaken. +</P> + +<P> +If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, +that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that +species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species +of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a +resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a +similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The +dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is +a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how +that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider. +</P> + +<P> +It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be +deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity +amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole +adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a +resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and +arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that +human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and +infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and +this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the +dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name +only of presumption or conjecture? +</P> + +<P> +Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders +of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect +evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the +adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these +extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? +or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by +such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS? +</P> + +<P> +You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in +his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his +tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most +with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of +the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to +escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you +can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I +may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of +CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and +I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain +no further scruples with regard to it. +</P> + +<P> +Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he +would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine +what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one +state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he +clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, +every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he +assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects +the others which are equally possible. +</P> + +<P> +Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really +is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any +one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might +set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety +of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being +all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory +account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can +point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon. +</P> + +<P> +Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, +indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, +or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; +but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that +principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source +or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and +there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, +from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite +arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal +mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The +equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by +experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference +between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or +form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, +and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the +ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, +arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. +Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of +order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar +causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a +machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling. +</P> + +<P> +I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, +which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must +conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound +Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall +endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of +the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided +he allows that I have made a fair representation of it. +</P> + +<P> +When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the +following manner. +</P> + +<P> +That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on +experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the +supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar +effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But +observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners +proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the +cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying +their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of +circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new +experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no +moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, +disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars +may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the +objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect +with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that +which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of +philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate +march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are +incapable of all discernment or consideration. +</P> + +<P> +But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have +been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to +the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their +similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? +Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other +animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the +universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred +others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by +which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on +other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred +from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all +comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we +learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a +leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction +concerning the vegetation of a tree? +</P> + +<P> +But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature +upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin +of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so +weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is +found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little +agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it +the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does +indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully +to guard against so natural an illusion. +</P> + +<P> +So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can +afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will +not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be +very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, +that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, +reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has +so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can +we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a +universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to +this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, +with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all +things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the +rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable +sophism. +</P> + +<P> +But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling +the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its +activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in +this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, +arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which +is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and +arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and +nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution +that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to +the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, +we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number +of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every +change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles +would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the +formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend +to determine. +</P> + +<P> +A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very +imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively +concerning the origin of the whole? +</P> + +<P> +Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this +time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without +human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally +attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. +But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? +Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? +Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another +situation vastly different from the former? +</P> + +<P> +And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of +SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO, +What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and +after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing +in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had +answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this +subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out +sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many +other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even +contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from +its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the +sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been +observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence +of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an +argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the +objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without +parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will +any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must +arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have +experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we +had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, +that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance... +</P> + +<P> +PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and +earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience +in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, +said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of +popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that +the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the +question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is +found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a +species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe +from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the +motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise +all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged +against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you +have seen to move? Have... +</P> + +<P> +Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon +another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus +another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the +revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same +theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the +sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, +and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and +resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs +of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you +have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory. +</P> + +<P> +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is +now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part +even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous +in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a +matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who +had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn +their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and +convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the +system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the +sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that +there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between +elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the +illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had +established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, +unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to +the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity +in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness +when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, +the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and +moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. +After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men +plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and +that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same +arguments and phenomena from one to the other. +</P> + +<P> +In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own +condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you +are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show +any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of +a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles +the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under +your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the +phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? +If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap03"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 3 +</H3> + +<P> +How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of +ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not +aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first +disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial +matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and +supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but +that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the +similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this +similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; +what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to +ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? +Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse +cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted +in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather +than by serious argument and philosophy. +</P> + +<P> +Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, +much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: +Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all +nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: +Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and +meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent +Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment +concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it +to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections +(if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, +may also be produced against this inference. +</P> + +<P> +Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on +experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence +infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to +conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this +extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all +languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no +reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a +rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some +accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or +intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I +hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in +the one case than in the other. +</P> + +<P> +But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I +shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or +impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable +language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are +natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with +animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions +of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a +natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own +species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in +the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body, +the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that +of any plant or animal. +</P> + +<P> +Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by +natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite +beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original +cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it +reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its +views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, +sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every +consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that +all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first +formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded +not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that +degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be +abashed at so glaring an absurdity. +</P> + +<P> +But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the +real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The +anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the +perusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the +former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene +as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the +supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO, +without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no +proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works +of nature. +</P> + +<P> +Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious +argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected +by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and +undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either +affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable +sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to +adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, +wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, +without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural +Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, +obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; +survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, +if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a +force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in +favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon +up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support +Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the +correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole +course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that +the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and +millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the +universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible +meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, +therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such +natural and such convincing arguments? +</P> + +<P> +Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, +and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition +to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established +masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, +contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible +influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular +nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a +coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable +proof of design and intention. +</P> + +<P> +It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their +due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are +obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question +with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? +From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? +A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are +lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to +trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but +stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive +disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You +can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors +proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too +luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a +profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. +</P> + +<P> +Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and +confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for +him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance. +</P> + +<P> +Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being +familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is +there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not +render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and +have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a +volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, +in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and +conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while +employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can +make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, +but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and +inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning. +</P> + +<P> +The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of +all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, +expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed +to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in +acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain +mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. +These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be +acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and +comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the +grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the +whole universe. +</P> + +<P> +All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, +friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain +reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for +preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in +such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such +sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; +and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a +theory. All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and +illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme +intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of +the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, +we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect +similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the +manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or +suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, +fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these +circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such +a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. +At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still +to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to +acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally +incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us +to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable +sublimity of the Divine attributes. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap04"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 4 +</H3> + +<P> +It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so +sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious, +incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously +that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The +Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which +we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not +just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what +there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any +meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain +the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or +Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and +unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting +the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know +of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific +intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, +if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to +bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you +shall please to require of them. +</P> + +<P> +Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical +CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname +to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have +recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he +not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that +Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous +consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In +reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the +Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of +man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; +united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each +other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, +arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved +entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. +New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which +continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest +variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with +that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe +to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and +future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual +operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every +instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no +diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or +diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, +without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in +one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that +this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or +idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any +different judgement or idea. +</P> + +<P> +I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect +simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have +explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the +consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, +Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity +possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we +never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible +with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and +sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly +simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, +no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at +all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as +well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without +composition. +</P> + +<P> +Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against. +You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox +divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last +be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist +in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be +asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the +argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of +mankind? +</P> + +<P> +But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I +shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences +of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that +there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the +Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the +same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which +he intends to execute. +</P> + +<P> +It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether +we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged +to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had +assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. +</P> + +<P> +If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be +not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, +this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, +or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, +or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require +a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion +a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are +entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is +not common to both of them. +</P> + +<P> +Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence, +even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she +perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two +kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and +to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have +specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a +vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from +these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, +than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the +same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor +indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different +periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of +weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these +particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious +machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and +operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not +more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more +curious adjustment of springs and principles. +</P> + +<P> +How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that +Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system +of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? +Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal +world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; +why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy +ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what +satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the +story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more +applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon +a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so +on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the +present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its +order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we +arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step +beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it +is impossible ever to satisfy. +</P> + +<P> +To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme +Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really +to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain +know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material +world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one +opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? +</P> + +<P> +We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, +and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger +experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of +generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause +exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular +systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in +madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that +order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause +in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of +objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make +leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our +inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction +can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the +narrow bounds of human understanding. +</P> + +<P> +It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause +of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or +occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its +nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been +discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of +ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really +said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed +that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it +is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; +can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it +is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why +a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the +order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent +creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to +say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all +originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only +more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the +one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater +conformity to vulgar prejudices. +</P> + +<P> +You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: +You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, +if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I +cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question +which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly +submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to +be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles +into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as +these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement +of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and +intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest +language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join +in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the +praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general +harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, +what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns +not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go +further, who are wiser or more enterprising. +</P> + +<P> +I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I +should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am +sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same +answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the +beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can +absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any +advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, +must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed +very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though +these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally +inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a +particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be +accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of +itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a +material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any +more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap05"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 5 +</H3> + +<P> +But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your +Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like +effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, +you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that +the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which +are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either +side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less +conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to +reject its consequences. +</P> + +<P> +All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur +and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments +for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to +your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, +by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects +of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even +following the old system of the world, could exclaim, +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> + Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi<BR> + Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?<BR> + Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes<BR> + Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces?<BR> + Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto?<BR> +</P> + +<P> +If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, +as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN: +</P> + +<P> +"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam +tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae +molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti +muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti +aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?" +</P> + +<P> +If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater +must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely +enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more +unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience +of the narrow productions of human design and invention. +</P> + +<P> +The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, +are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The +further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer +the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from +any object of human experience and observation. +</P> + +<P> +And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... +These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new +instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected +on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I +know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted +PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES. +</P> + +<P> +Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the +consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim +to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause +ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it +falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, +upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? +You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity +to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at +the same time weaken all proofs of his existence. +</P> + +<P> +Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to +the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from +every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many +inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a +perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only +seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace +infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these +difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new +instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must +acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited +views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any +considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real +systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that +poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank +among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other +production? +</P> + +<P> +But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain +uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed +to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of +the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and +beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a +stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a +long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, +deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many +worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere +this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; +and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in +the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the +truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great +number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may +be imagined? +</P> + +<P> +And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from +your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men +join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a +commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and +framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human +affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit +the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and +knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to +you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such +foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing +and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we +may suppose several degrees more perfect! +</P> + +<P> +To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true +philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one +deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every +attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be +needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity +existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes +are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, +by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? +Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the +opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight +equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an +aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if +the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen +conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more +probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and +capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the +language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all +analogy, and even comprehension. +</P> + +<P> +But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by +generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great +sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this +circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous +and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought +back upon us. +</P> + +<P> +And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity +or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? +EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human +figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, +which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to +you, solid and philosophical. +</P> + +<P> +In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps +to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from +something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one +single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his +theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for +aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior +standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who +afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work +only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to +his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some +superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, +from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You +justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but +these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's +suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are +supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think +that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, +preferable to none at all. +</P> + +<P> +These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me, +however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in +which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I +see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get +rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every +turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and +this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap06"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 6 +</H3> + +<P> +It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on +so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one +deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our +existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or +alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or +worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all +the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: +and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, +according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory. +</P> + +<P> +To render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me +another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the +method of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects +arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all +religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less +certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where +several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will +also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we +conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. +Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we +conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In +short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no +scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity. +</P> + +<P> +Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, +it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems +actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual +circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in +every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived +throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its +proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the +whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the +SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it. +</P> + +<P> +You have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this +opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of +antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For +though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as +if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather +their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation +renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the +universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art +and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, +be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour +of the ancient than the modern theory. +</P> + +<P> +There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which +recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all +their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than +mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their +senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single +instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they +felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in +both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but +seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to +suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of +them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable +from them. +</P> + +<P> +Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on +which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any +considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to +systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an +animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, +possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to +belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always +to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely +neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which +you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you +assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to +judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own +hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, +and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. +</P> + +<P> +This theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me, +though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an +examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You +are very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of +yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in +starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur +to you, you will oblige us by proposing it. +</P> + +<P> +Why then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does, +in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also +defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no +seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In +short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an +animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the +soul of the world. +</P> + +<P> +But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the +world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the +strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this +purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, +who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their +inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations +derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual +revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches +and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited +experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be +expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger +of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and +had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more +violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a +few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the +Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the +appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been +utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, +would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language +and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of +CONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the +mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily +imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later +origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the +eternity of the world, seems a little precarious. +</P> + +<P> +But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was +the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree +thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods +without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no +EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so +delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once +transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires +may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and +knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain +in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by +the revolutions of human society. +</P> + +<P> +It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE, +though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is +not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were +known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole +eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication +between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men +would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to +think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the +youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation +of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society +is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the +elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which +are now to be found in the Western world. +</P> + +<P> +And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO. +Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole +earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely +covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from +matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and +great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The +incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate +some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is +observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever +had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor +can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the +parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of +reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to +defend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly +should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an +eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with +great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all +difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely +complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or +later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have +been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order +somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which +of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, +sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, +inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, +we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no +idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly +see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, +ever to admit of any other disposition. +</P> + +<P> +Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which +maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by +30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would +naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; +and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, +but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the +same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of +deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within +himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these +systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on +your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any +advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your +principles. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap07"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 7 +</H3> + +<P> +But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of +the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, +must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first +inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a +greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of +human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the +former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be +ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your +conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and +defective. +</P> + +<P> +Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not +rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed +it. +</P> + +<P> +Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that +since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the +existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The +world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its +cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the +operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very +small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the +rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he +measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual +standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, +that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human +invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the +world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the +universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. +The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a +watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, +resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation +or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be +something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation. +</P> + +<P> +But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any +thing similar to vegetation or generation? +</P> + +<P> +Very easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into +the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great +vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself +certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, +vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world; +and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star +to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every +where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new +system. +</P> + +<P> +Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should +suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: +and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without +any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so... +</P> + +<P> +I understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are +these! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the +slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal +sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects, +which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for +each other? +</P> + +<P> +Right, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. +I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of +cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in +extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the +whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what +rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule +than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant +or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a +stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, +which arises from reason and design? +</P> + +<P> +But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA. +Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal +structure on which they depend? +</P> + +<P> +As much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations +of reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But +without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer, +that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you +conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, +reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects +are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these +principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a +standard to the whole of nature. +</P> + +<P> +In reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the +views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our +conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. +In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, +reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each +other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other +principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of +the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to +system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of +these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie +open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the +origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to +confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds +operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a +partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal +fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or +vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to +which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more +inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from +experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, +are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to +experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed +by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or +contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it. +</P> + +<P> +But methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and +could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power +would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For +whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can +order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it +bestows? +</P> + +<P> +You need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with +regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that +tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the +same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this +kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise +from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and +vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor +can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori, +both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and +that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong +to matter. +</P> + +<P> +But further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use +of by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made +against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of +that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; +he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could +never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. "We must +stop somewhere", says he; "nor is it ever within the reach of human +capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any +objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported +by experience and observation." Now, that vegetation and generation, as +well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is +undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to +the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And +when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or +generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his +great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on +both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to +stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, +generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the +latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter. +</P> + +<P> +Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, +resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from +generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small +appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles +a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The +steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he +pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or +reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, +with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his +hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle +of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the +utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in +innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of +generation, and never to arise from any other principle. +</P> + +<P> +HESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this +analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an +animal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible, +seems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS. +</P> + +<P> +The BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who +spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates +afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and +resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which +appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible +animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the +whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our +globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is +very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and +irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all +things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an +orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, +it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason. +</P> + +<P> +I must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the +task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits +you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So +great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to +acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such +out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I +clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but +you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution +so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense +and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have +delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap08"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 8 +</H3> + +<P> +What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is +entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the +narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, +which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound +judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd +and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred +contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and +invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort +of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems +of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it +is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be +the true system. +</P> + +<P> +For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This +is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that +has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it +might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead +of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite. +A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: +and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or +position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, +with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and +destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds +and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, +in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination. +</P> + +<P> +But this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without +any voluntary agent or first mover. +</P> + +<P> +And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every +event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and +every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, +in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, +begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose +always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; +and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in +matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind +and intelligence. +</P> + +<P> +Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all +eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld +in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is +gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is +certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as +far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at +present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest. +</P> + +<P> +And this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled +on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, +that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an +order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual +agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in +the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this +is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of +matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce +this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once +established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But +wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in +perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its +situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and +contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must +have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself +must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element +in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its +waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A +defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of +which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular +motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular +form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great +quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is +entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its +first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one +languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; +till finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms, +whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a +continued succession of matter. +</P> + +<P> +Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were +thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that +this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and +most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of +human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an +adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the +actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever +in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or +activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still +continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a +second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the +first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No +particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The +original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual +restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and +instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, +it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force +which actuates every part of matter. +</P> + +<P> +Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of +chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so +as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed +inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, +amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to +be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually +changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, +in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather +be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and +may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which +is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall +find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability +in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, +affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty. +</P> + +<P> +It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals +or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain +know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do +we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment +ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens +indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some +regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it +were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the +animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but +finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order? +</P> + +<P> +It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was +suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure +to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections +to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess +those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or +economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some +order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But +according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and +advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not +absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might +have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, +and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction +and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the +sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? +If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful +direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been +immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very +frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one +of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, +which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe. +</P> + +<P> +At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis +is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. +But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this +nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be +liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to +our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your +theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though +you have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity +to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances +which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are +ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse +this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we +have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that +matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence +upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its +own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an +universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this +experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to +collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought +that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); +these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each +other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be +received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on +account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which +we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted. +</P> + +<P> +All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and +insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he +carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, +and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, +prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no +system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this +plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard +to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable +resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, +among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who +remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no +fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged +to defend? +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap09"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 9 +</H3> + +<P> +But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA, +had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, +which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all +doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of +the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with +certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is +finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, +prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very +difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from +contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the +plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. +Whereas the argument a priori ... +</P> + +<P> +You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages +and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its +solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what +argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, +from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to +determine what value we ought to put upon it. +</P> + +<P> +The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. +Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being +absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of +its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we +must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate +cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that +is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may +be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and +effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and +efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal +chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any +thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much +as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is +still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from +eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there +be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is +equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having +existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which +constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something +to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular +possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed +to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that +can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a +necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in +himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express +contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a +Deity. +</P> + +<P> +I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the +starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of +this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, +and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety +and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it. +</P> + +<P> +I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in +pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any +arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies +a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a +contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as +non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a +contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is +demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am +willing to rest the whole controversy upon it. +</P> + +<P> +It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this +necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, +that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be +as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But +it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the +same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to +conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor +can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain +always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always +conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary +existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is +consistent. +</P> + +<P> +But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily +existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We +dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught +we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, +would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that +twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the +material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument +is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the +world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived +to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an +annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems +a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends +equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that +the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes +to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which +can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes +unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not +belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they +can never be proved incompatible with it. +</P> + +<P> +Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems +absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, +that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a +priority in time, and a beginning of existence? +</P> + +<P> +In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by +that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is +the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the +uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct +countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is +performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on +the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each +individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think +it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of +the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause +of the parts. +</P> + +<P> +Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse +me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot +forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by +arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some +lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any +of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are +products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is +a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser +product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may +be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful +algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and +demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these +numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the +universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can +furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the +order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into +the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was +absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So +dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present +question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite +to the religious hypothesis! +</P> + +<P> +But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining +ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, +that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except +to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to +abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the +understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary +to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to +subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good +sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in +such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly +where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive +their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap10"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 10 +</H3> + +<P> +It is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner, +the truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of +his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek +protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So +anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is +still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, +and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those +unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and +oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst +the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of +atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly +agitated and tormented? +</P> + +<P> +I am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only +method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just +representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose +a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of +reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels +within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, +more intimately and sensibly. +</P> + +<P> +The people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this +great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; +the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of +pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial +in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their +own immediate feeling and experience? +</P> + +<P> +In this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the +vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery +has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and +melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a +system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in +images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired +tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things +would suit the feeling and observation of each individual. +</P> + +<P> +As to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this +library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of +particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to +treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, +from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, +extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is +entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can +recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it. +</P> + +<P> +There you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is +perhaps the first [That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King and some +few others before Leibniz; though by none of so great a fame as that +German philosopher] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; +at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system. +</P> + +<P> +And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of +his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to +make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a +simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear +down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness? +</P> + +<P> +And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all +other animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and +polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. +Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, +anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into +life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: +Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is +at last finished in agony and horror. +</P> + +<P> +Observe too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to +embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the +weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in +their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without +relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are +bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in +him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment +them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every +animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and +destruction. +</P> + +<P> +Man alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. +For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and +bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey +upon him. +</P> + +<P> +On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and +equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by +combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the +whole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself +imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with +superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, +as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give +them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials +to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, +presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the +wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious +breast of wretched mortals. +</P> + +<P> +Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those +wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to +us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy +of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, +war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each +other; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, +were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their +separation. +</P> + +<P> +But though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men, +from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of +woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within +ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many +lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic +enumeration of the great poet. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="poem"> + Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,<BR> + Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,<BR> + And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,<BR> + Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.<BR> + Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair<BR> + Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.<BR> + And over them triumphant death his dart<BR> + Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd<BR> + With vows, as their chief good and final hope.<BR> +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not +perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, +disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed +through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have +scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred +by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those +few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach +contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make +a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and +any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often +the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to +render life ineligible. +</P> + +<P> +Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as +a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded +with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a +fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, +famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him +a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an +opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a +diversity of distress and sorrow. +</P> + +<P> +There is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by +apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I +ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?... +They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from +their discontented, repining, anxious disposition...And can there +possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a +wretched temper? +</P> + +<P> +But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, +why do they remain in life?... +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> + Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.<BR> +</P> + +<P> +This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not +bribed to the continuance of our existence. +</P> + +<P> +It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits +indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of +mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it +any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of +life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more +alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what +judgement must we form in general of human life? +</P> + +<P> +Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They +are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious +languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their +activity and ambition. +</P> + +<P> +I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied +CLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and +hope that it is not so common as you represent it. +</P> + +<P> +If you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on +so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not +been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let +us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired +with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the +hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable +occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had +ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might +truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did +the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater +happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced +the very day of his resignation. +</P> + +<P> +CICERO's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and +renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar +letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to +his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO, +protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would +reject the present. +</P> + +<P> +Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over +again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next +twenty, they say, will be better: +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="poem"> + And from the dregs of life, hope to receive<BR> + What the first sprightly running could not give.<BR> +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it +reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the +shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow. +</P> + +<P> +And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these +reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still +persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of +the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the +same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is +infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other +animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom +is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But +the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it +is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human +knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than +these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the +benevolence and mercy of men? +</P> + +<P> +EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, +but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he +malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? +</P> + +<P> +You ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to +Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice +and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation +alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for +her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any +care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No +resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure +or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some +want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this +nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. +</P> + +<P> +Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives +satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and +propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, +arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the +injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, +laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no +further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains +of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, +in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were +pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by +deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible. +</P> + +<P> +And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions, +PHILO? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me; +but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against +me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of +your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the +present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an +end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural +attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and +uncertain? +</P> + +<P> +You take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most +innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and +devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a +topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged +with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and +preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have +they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may +attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this +life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, +therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of +existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of +things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with +adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the +mazes and intricacies of his providence. +</P> + +<P> +No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be +admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence +can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any +hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one +hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost +we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the +bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, +establish its reality. +</P> + +<P> +The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I +willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of +man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly +fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is +more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And +for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a +hundred enjoyments. +</P> + +<P> +Admitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful, +you must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than +pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is +often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid +enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several +in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever +able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue +for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate, +the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly +degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how +often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it +becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, +courage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our +misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole +cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still +greater horror and consternation. +</P> + +<P> +But not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most +obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you, +CLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue, +and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential +articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a +just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human +life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our +present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and +desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: It +is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No +decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it +possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all +the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by +your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its +very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that +system is equally uncertain. +</P> + +<P> +But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never +possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this +life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by +any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and +infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by +chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the +Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? +But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so +short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects +exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and +falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along +insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn +and indignation. +</P> + +<P> +But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I +deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery +in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even +in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these +concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must +prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present +mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful +undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being +finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where +they are also so jarring and discordant! +</P> + +<P> +Here, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. +Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of +intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical +subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its +parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes +strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what +I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then +imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But +there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from +which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, +or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and +infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is +your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical +subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap11"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 11 +</H3> + +<P> +I scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect +the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all +theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and +that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better +served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate +expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, +and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing +beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the +affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all +human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all +religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. +If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to +reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; +much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the +Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a +satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and +every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then +be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, +in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated +by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the +present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and +reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without +interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our +attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form. +</P> + +<P> +My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and +therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with +regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a +very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted +with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very +good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his +conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find +it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these +attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could +be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. +Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still +assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent +Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would +never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; +since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness +and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those +phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, +which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not +antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and +powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of +things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason +for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of +his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference +concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that +inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more +you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render +him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the +reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him +merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition +or conjecture. +</P> + +<P> +Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment +convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, +stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, +confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you +would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. +The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that +if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What +he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the +other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. +But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had +skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, +and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have +remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your +own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the +impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in +the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn +the architect. +</P> + +<P> +In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and +as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a +limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and +benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. +And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, +allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a +Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The +consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, +especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may +perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be +foundations for any inference. +</P> + +<P> +There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest +part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not +impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. +We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with +regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however +wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may +not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep +ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and +not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is +supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the +case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on +which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree +necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the +utmost license of imagination. +</P> + +<P> +The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or +economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are +employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the +great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various +degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All +animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by +any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; +instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they +might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their +subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least +they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly +possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is +any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can +be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; +and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce +that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. +Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any +appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the +most certain truth? +</P> + +<P> +But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the +second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; +and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if +everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature +would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the +conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this +inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, +wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any +preparation, or long progress of causes and effects? +</P> + +<P> +Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the +world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us +appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our +expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite +number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a +great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the +prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, +depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret +springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all +these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, +without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes +were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good +princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and +authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few +such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the +face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of +nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, +where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small +touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted +him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying +CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored +liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, +be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they +are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons +exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine +attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that +conclusion. +</P> + +<P> +If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if +animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but +some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various +concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very +rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to +mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are +distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs +and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, +that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any +single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every +animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed +with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must +entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is +a proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness +are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either +imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving +wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, +is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily +advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, +without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill +and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation +of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has +afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly +sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have +bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure +the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate +concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so +surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, +by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some +reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor +would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an +economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is +supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, +as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his +dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power +extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed +these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder +is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock +will enable him to finish. +</P> + +<P> +In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man +should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force +of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or +rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I +am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his +soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and +labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent +to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an +equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by +habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any +allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. +Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from +idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their +frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of +land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of +every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully +reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best +regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable +of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow +it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for +his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so +contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can +oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at +least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of +a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our +demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If +we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a +more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and +friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the +order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of +being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our +state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I +dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of +wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our +foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to +struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone +fence against these multiplied evils. +</P> + +<P> +The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the +universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles +of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are +few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and +whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the +whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without +affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it +must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, +are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in +which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every +occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, +that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; +so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with +which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours +along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how +oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? +Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: +but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite +to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due +proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the +body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts +perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all +the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do +they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? +There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently +becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with +the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The +irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is +often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery. +</P> + +<P> +On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the +greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable +of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil +never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed +with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity +requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so +accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; +there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at +present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that +these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have +been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too +presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest +in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I +mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable +reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be +sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown +manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this +goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the +phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are +so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have +been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on +such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, +notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes +as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a +conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the +phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from +these phenomena. +</P> + +<P> +Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated +and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety +and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living +existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive +to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How +contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but +the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, +and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her +maimed and abortive children! +</P> + +<P> +Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the +difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has +more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible +account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But +if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement +of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of +the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an +opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: +but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of +principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true +conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely +indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above +ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light +above heavy. +</P> + +<P> +There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the +universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have +perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and +malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can +never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and +steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, +therefore, seems by far the most probable. +</P> + +<P> +What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little +or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude +of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence +resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater +cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since +moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral +good than natural evil above natural good. +</P> + +<P> +But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which +is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so +long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much +puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a +cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every +effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry +on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who +is the ultimate cause of all things... +</P> + +<P> +Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I +joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible +nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who +would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you +running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and +betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, +then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself? +</P> + +<P> +And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, +DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at +both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious +reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of +ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute +incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, +and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to +be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of +stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; +and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, +than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and +melancholy of mankind. But at present... +</P> + +<P> +Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend +gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly +it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was +vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are +incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract +this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that +there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this +life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was +thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have +recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men +have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is +necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as +will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the +same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with +regard to Scepticism. +</P> + +<P> +Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure +of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all +relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, +on some pretence or other, to leave the company. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="chap12"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PART 12 +</H3> + +<P> +After DEMEA's departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation +in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will +have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are +in company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with +either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit +of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries +you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so +sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that +occasion. +</P> + +<P> +I must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of +Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, +on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and +because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common +sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES, +with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that +notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular +arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, +or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers +himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of +nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most +careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in +absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in +vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the +contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, +from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new +organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its +use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the +maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most +proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, +lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is +observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost +lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their +authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess +that intention. +</P> + +<P> +It is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the +human body. The anatomy of a man, says he [De formatione foetus], discovers +above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, +that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different +circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper +figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and +lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, +veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several +views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he +calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of +each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these +simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, +vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; +how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and +intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance +in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry +still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine +internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the +fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every +different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact +propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each +species. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences +were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to +what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have +attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence! +</P> + +<P> +Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), +I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself +immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger +proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? +What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of +things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could +mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which +demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; +and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, +according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for +undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature +admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very +numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human +imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their +cogency! +</P> + +<P> +I shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that +one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only +system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and +yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and +experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of +human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many +instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike +all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. +Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by +establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It +is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote +and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is +here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of +mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained +against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the +religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the +force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and +perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported +by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early +education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend. +</P> + +<P> +So little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the +present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters +somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is +usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the +productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good +reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that +their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also +considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional +difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much +higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have +ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly +ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account +of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, +notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed +between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? +No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves +from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this +inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an +analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme +cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call +him but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a +considerable resemblance? +</P> + +<P> +All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound +so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that +the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from +the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the +strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a +species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of +human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any +precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or +precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any +quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL +be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of +beauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is +entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The +disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or +vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into +each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, +like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which +may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning +Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, +if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the +slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is +a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the +human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he +assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify +the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature +which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I +assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I +ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the +parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether +the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure +of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy +to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily +acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further +in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle +which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears +not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of +nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. +However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both +these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, +that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The +Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote +analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter +into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor +consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I +should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the +Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the +Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal +creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every +position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if +you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure +yourselves of your animosity. +</P> + +<P> +And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature +have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, +than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, +that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to +those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the +consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more +defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme +Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs +most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of +rectitude and perfection. +</P> + +<P> +It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists +is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and +assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such +disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise +determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are +difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that +these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely +insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, +notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and +reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently +assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between +these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, +caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, +for like reasons, on the necessity. +</P> + +<P> +These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these +sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in +proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar +superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing +such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And +you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion +to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both. +</P> + +<P> +My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, +however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine +of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that +we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary +rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how +much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal? +</P> + +<P> +How happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to +society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious +consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, +subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal +consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If +the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we +are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend +it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those +in which it is never regarded or heard of. +</P> + +<P> +The reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper +office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their +conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as +its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and +justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these +other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate +principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has +become only a cover to faction and ambition. +</P> + +<P> +And so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and +rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The +inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and +punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite +and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the +attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which +we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are +declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they +always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed +it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence +of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their +religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their +speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so +powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to +subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is +certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and +benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views +suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural +inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the +mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas +religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and +bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether +habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the +philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least +impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, +prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be +repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation. +</P> + +<P> +Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and +ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious +principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is +almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account +for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy +themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their +religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools +ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and +philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to +theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a +great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon +several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they +be cheated and deceived by him? +</P> + +<P> +We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and +reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the +restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are +utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be +pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations +to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous +observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not +run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances +of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that +atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of +declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a +sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be +laid upon it. +</P> + +<P> +But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in +direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the +raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous +distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most +pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the +natural motives of justice and humanity. +</P> + +<P> +Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar +motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must +be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot +satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. +Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the +heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is +by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant +principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest +zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being +inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual +character. +</P> + +<P> +The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; +but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be +forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the +cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it. +</P> + +<P> +The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal +salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a +narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it +easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. +</P> + +<P> +Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on +general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the +instances where they predominate. +</P> + +<P> +Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that +both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very +narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his +fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular +religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. +The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, +will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the +guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of +life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set +apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and +who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, +that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to +popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, +and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? +Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with +inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he +must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every +consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his +own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the +wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of +them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; +otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, +persecutions, and civil commotions. +</P> + +<P> +True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must +treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I +any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a +species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that +principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of +being always confined to very few persons. +</P> + +<P> +Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question +whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the +solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and +the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief +restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but +little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and +religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same +footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS +[Lib. vi. cap. 54.] ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of +the EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a +reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we +cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to +mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean +philosophy; and EURIPIDES [Iphigenia in Tauride], in a passage which I +shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against +his nation, with regard to this circumstance. +</P> + +<P> +Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far: +allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration +for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great +comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of +adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for +human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents +us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who +created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable +desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will +transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those +desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a +Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we +can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection. +</P> + +<P> +These appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with +regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it +happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater +part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of +religion commonly prevail above its comforts. +</P> + +<P> +It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as +when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, +that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? +</P> + +<P> +But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES. +Sometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form +a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and +melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the +contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to +predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the +most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the +flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely +superior in number to the elect. +</P> + +<P> +I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which +represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render +it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine +models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies +between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking +to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond +it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and +FURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone. +</P> + +<P> +It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these +passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them +forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a +cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or +entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and +thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to +do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge +himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he +has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his +thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or +circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful +prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and +triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the +primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always +predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure. +</P> + +<P> +Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by +exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of +superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so +happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to +support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and +uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. +No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, +and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is +seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it +is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that +gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people. +</P> + +<P> +It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon +account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk +hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both +an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the +Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a +restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, +since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in +particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior. +</P> + +<P> +To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed +absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low +condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, +presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which +superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the +condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who +exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that +Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly +mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the +votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit +his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or +rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine +perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and +indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally +rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or +endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such +extraordinary subjects. +</P> + +<P> +If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, +resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least +undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe +probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this +proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular +explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can +be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect +as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and +cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other +qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most +inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, +philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and +believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the +objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will +naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from +its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no +solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and +magnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural +sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a +longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, +at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more +particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, +attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, +seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will +fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty +Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by +the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this +adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of +letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, +believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to +the attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for +interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil. +</P> + +<P> +CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as +nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of +that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I +cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's; +but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR><BR> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by +David Hume + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DIALOGUES--NATURAL RELIGION *** + +***** This file should be named 4583-h.htm or 4583-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/4/5/8/4583/ + +Produced by Col Choat. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion + +Author: David Hume + +Posting Date: June 20, 2009 [EBook #4583] +Release Date: Unknown +First Posted: February 12, 2002 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DIALOGUES--NATURAL RELIGION *** + + + + +Produced by Col Choat. HTML version by Al Haines. + + + + + + + + + +Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion + + +by + +David Hume + + + + +PAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS + + +It has been remarked, my HERMIPPUS, that though the ancient philosophers +conveyed most of their instruction in the form of dialogue, this method +of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom +succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and +regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical +inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic +manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point +at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce +the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in +conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer +desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a +freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and +Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the +image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the +natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and +preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much +time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely +think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, +brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them. + +There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly +adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method +of composition. + +Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of +dispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often +inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the +novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where +the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the +variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may +appear neither tedious nor redundant. + +Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so OBSCURE and +UNCERTAIN, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard +to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into +the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to +differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, +even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the +subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, +into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human +life, study and society. + +Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of +NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a +God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most +refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and +arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all +our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of +society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent +from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and +important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of +that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? +These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning +these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these +are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry +with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and +contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate +researches. + +This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of +the summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations +of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect +account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, +of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and +display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so +delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast +in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you +opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless +scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the +rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor +of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of +life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection +of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any +considerable part of them in the recital. + + + + +PART 1 + + +After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library, +DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of +my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his +friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: +The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, +were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every +useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am +persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate +to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children, +that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I +follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That +students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next +physics, last of all the nature of the gods." [Chrysippus apud Plut: de +repug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him, +being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest +judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other +sciences, can safely be entrusted with it. + +Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of +religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether +those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course +of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to +human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural +Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and +by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I +imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the +principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I +still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of +men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous +conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the +principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper +submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening +to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from +that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the +most established doctrines and opinions. + +Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children's minds early +with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite +in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your +plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very +principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and +self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive +to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are +unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless +disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for +philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great +points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little +into study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in +doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult +for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, +profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope, +agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest +remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane +liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become +thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of +human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless +contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the +errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable +difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the +contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and +effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all +kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any +certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full +light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can +retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any +regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote +from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a +stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when +these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain +circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we +decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from +eternity to eternity? + +While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the +countenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an +unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's +features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some +raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO. + +You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on +philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be +expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these +theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. +Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we +shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, +whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really +doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according +to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more +fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, +fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. +If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world +with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they +are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to +the state, to philosophy, or to religion. + +In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in +a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions +and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and +opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, +or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press +in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy +dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be +able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And +for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in +which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently +with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be +more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in +reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the +same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their +schools, and which they ought to have confined to them. + +In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the +STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them +seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform +sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every +disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a +sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of +honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not +prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by +its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this +sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a +philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to +such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most +calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support +this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be +recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him +unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian. + +I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied +PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind +cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even +when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; +and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in +common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient +schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and +constancy which seem astonishing to present times. + + + Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy. + Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm + Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite + Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast + With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel. + + +In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical +considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will +not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; +but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in +his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either +never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments +more favourable to human reason. + +To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of +scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; +and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the +absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his +speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and +philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a +certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself +after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common +life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from +our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general +principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we +acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our +principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call +philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the +same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially +different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater +stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its +exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding. + +But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the +surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two +eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the +creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of +spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing +without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, +infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest +tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got +quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our +speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make +appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen +our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the +suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning +that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have +not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon +objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of +all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are +like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem +suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against +the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We +know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in +such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is +peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are +entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them. + +All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, +it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never +retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the +sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to +counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the +senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose +this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined +scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose +and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The +mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense +or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism. + +But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all +speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at +variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of +common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, +notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some +of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of +certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who +pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of +the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays +of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And +what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to +the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, +should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these +subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow +and fallacious reason of mankind? + +There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well +observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do +not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which +requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of +scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that +those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not +only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the +most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to +them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor +attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and +philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. +They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and +their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence +which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most +abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by +philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the +heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of +bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the +parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are +obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, +and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which +occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and +political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and +religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the +general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any +particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a +plain proof of prejudice and passion? + +Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our +ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, +full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the +difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I +have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: +I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, +refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the +received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour. + +I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated +writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of +philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm +(I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers. +But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, +I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse +nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural +recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions. + +In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common +life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, +if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and +evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies +entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of +mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any +pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to +entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system +contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our +natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even +monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to +it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive +knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to +the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most +obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has +such easy access and admission into the mind of man? + +And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a +pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the +union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first +establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all +religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, +against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. +All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and +thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout +Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or +rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were +sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural +reason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion, +a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of +Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils +of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the +first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but +a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and +that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in +morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the +principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and +other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and +first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr. +LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning +and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it +is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter +principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain +the former. + +Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on +this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an +Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious +remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage, +where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no +God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a +double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts +there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and +are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such +people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be +very formidable. + +But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear +communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the +religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. +It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the +whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which +followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, +that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the +presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that +human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty +influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those +suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most +determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, +when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more +open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular +principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have +changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of +STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and +ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to +lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; +whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in +giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their +favourite principle, and established tenet. + +It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles, +by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have +any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. +And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of +principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they +tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the +cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations. + + + + +PART 2 + + +I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, +than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the +whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were +maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and +Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental +principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a +question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am +persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so +certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but +the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human +understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The +essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his +existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular +which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and +blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; +and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite +perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it +entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep +cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating +through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his +existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees +and attributes. + +But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my +philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very +great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation +of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological +subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated +for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus +expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not +so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively +what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being +infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as +we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed +with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that +that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine +that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our +spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. +We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of +matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of +created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: +That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without +restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal." + +After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have +produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear +ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your +doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the +question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the +Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and +self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of +this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him +every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, +deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to +wit, the greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all +perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we +comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his +perfections have any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human +creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to +him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other +language or other conceptions by which we can express our adoration of +him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond +to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these +qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and +comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of +disputation in the schools. + +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse +to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at +this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We +have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not +conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a +pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound +piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the +adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being. + +Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing +himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of +PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the +world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be +nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of +lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond +what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various +machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other +with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever +contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all +nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of +human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. +Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, +by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the +Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed +of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which +he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument +alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity +to human mind and intelligence. + +I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the +beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the +similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums +by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the +Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which +have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all +sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and +probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: +But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, +which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning. + +What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that +all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that +they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that +inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the +earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and +when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without +hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases +gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence +is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, +from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the +evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is +confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the +circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it +takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and +fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that +it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much +weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our +experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily +followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, +to have been mistaken. + +If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, +that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that +species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species +of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a +resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a +similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The +dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is +a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how +that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider. + +It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be +deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity +amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole +adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a +resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and +arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that +human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and +infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and +this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the +dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name +only of presumption or conjecture? + +Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders +of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect +evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the +adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these +extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? +or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by +such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS? + +You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in +his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his +tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most +with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of +the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to +escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you +can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I +may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of +CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and +I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain +no further scruples with regard to it. + +Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he +would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine +what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one +state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he +clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, +every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he +assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects +the others which are equally possible. + +Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really +is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any +one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might +set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety +of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being +all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory +account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can +point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon. + +Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, +indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, +or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; +but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that +principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source +or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and +there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, +from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite +arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal +mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The +equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by +experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference +between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or +form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, +and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the +ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, +arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. +Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of +order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar +causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a +machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling. + +I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, +which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must +conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound +Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall +endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of +the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided +he allows that I have made a fair representation of it. + +When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the +following manner. + +That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on +experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the +supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar +effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But +observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners +proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the +cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying +their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of +circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new +experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no +moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, +disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars +may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the +objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect +with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that +which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of +philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate +march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are +incapable of all discernment or consideration. + +But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have +been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to +the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their +similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? +Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other +animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the +universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred +others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by +which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on +other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred +from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all +comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we +learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a +leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction +concerning the vegetation of a tree? + +But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature +upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin +of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so +weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is +found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little +agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it +the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does +indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully +to guard against so natural an illusion. + +So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can +afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will +not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be +very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, +that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, +reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has +so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can +we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a +universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to +this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, +with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all +things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the +rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable +sophism. + +But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling +the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its +activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in +this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, +arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which +is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and +arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and +nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution +that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to +the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, +we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number +of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every +change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles +would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the +formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend +to determine. + +A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very +imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively +concerning the origin of the whole? + +Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this +time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without +human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally +attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. +But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? +Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? +Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another +situation vastly different from the former? + +And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of +SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO, +What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and +after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing +in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had +answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this +subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out +sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many +other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even +contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from +its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the +sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been +observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence +of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an +argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the +objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without +parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will +any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must +arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have +experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we +had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, +that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance... + +PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and +earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience +in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, +said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of +popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that +the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the +question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is +found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a +species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe +from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the +motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise +all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged +against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you +have seen to move? Have... + +Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon +another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus +another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the +revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same +theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the +sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, +and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and +resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs +of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you +have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory. + +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is +now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part +even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous +in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a +matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who +had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn +their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and +convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the +system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the +sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that +there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between +elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the +illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had +established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, +unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to +the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity +in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness +when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, +the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and +moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. +After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men +plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and +that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same +arguments and phenomena from one to the other. + +In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own +condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you +are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show +any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of +a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles +the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under +your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the +phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? +If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory. + + + + +PART 3 + + +How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of +ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not +aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first +disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial +matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and +supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but +that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the +similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this +similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; +what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to +ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? +Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse +cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted +in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather +than by serious argument and philosophy. + +Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, +much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: +Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all +nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: +Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and +meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent +Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment +concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it +to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections +(if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, +may also be produced against this inference. + +Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on +experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence +infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to +conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this +extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all +languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no +reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a +rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some +accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or +intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I +hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in +the one case than in the other. + +But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I +shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or +impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable +language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are +natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with +animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions +of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a +natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own +species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in +the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body, +the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that +of any plant or animal. + +Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by +natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite +beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original +cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it +reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its +views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, +sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every +consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that +all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first +formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded +not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that +degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be +abashed at so glaring an absurdity. + +But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the +real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The +anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the +perusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the +former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene +as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the +supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO, +without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no +proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works +of nature. + +Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious +argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected +by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and +undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either +affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable +sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to +adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, +wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, +without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural +Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, +obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; +survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, +if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a +force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in +favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon +up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support +Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the +correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole +course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that +the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and +millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the +universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible +meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, +therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such +natural and such convincing arguments? + +Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, +and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition +to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established +masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, +contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible +influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular +nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a +coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable +proof of design and intention. + +It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their +due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are +obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question +with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? +From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? +A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are +lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to +trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but +stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive +disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You +can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors +proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too +luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a +profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. + +Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and +confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for +him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance. + +Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being +familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is +there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not +render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and +have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a +volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, +in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and +conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while +employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can +make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, +but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and +inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning. + +The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of +all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, +expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed +to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in +acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain +mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. +These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be +acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and +comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the +grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the +whole universe. + +All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, +friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain +reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for +preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in +such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such +sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; +and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a +theory. All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and +illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme +intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of +the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, +we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect +similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the +manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or +suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, +fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these +circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such +a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. +At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still +to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to +acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally +incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us +to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable +sublimity of the Divine attributes. + + + + +PART 4 + + +It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so +sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious, +incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously +that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The +Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which +we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not +just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what +there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any +meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain +the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or +Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and +unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting +the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know +of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific +intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, +if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to +bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you +shall please to require of them. + +Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical +CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname +to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have +recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he +not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that +Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous +consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In +reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the +Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of +man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; +united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each +other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, +arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved +entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. +New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which +continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest +variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with +that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe +to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and +future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual +operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every +instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no +diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or +diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, +without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in +one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that +this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or +idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any +different judgement or idea. + +I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect +simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have +explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the +consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, +Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity +possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we +never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible +with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and +sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly +simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, +no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at +all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as +well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without +composition. + +Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against. +You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox +divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last +be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist +in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be +asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the +argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of +mankind? + +But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I +shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences +of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that +there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the +Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the +same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which +he intends to execute. + +It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether +we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged +to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had +assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. + +If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be +not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, +this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, +or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, +or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require +a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion +a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are +entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is +not common to both of them. + +Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence, +even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she +perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two +kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and +to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have +specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a +vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from +these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, +than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the +same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor +indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different +periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of +weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these +particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious +machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and +operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not +more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more +curious adjustment of springs and principles. + +How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that +Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system +of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? +Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal +world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; +why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy +ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what +satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the +story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more +applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon +a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so +on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the +present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its +order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we +arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step +beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it +is impossible ever to satisfy. + +To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme +Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really +to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain +know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material +world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one +opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? + +We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, +and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger +experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of +generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause +exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular +systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in +madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that +order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause +in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of +objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make +leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our +inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction +can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the +narrow bounds of human understanding. + +It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause +of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or +occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its +nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been +discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of +ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really +said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed +that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it +is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; +can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it +is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why +a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the +order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent +creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to +say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all +originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only +more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the +one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater +conformity to vulgar prejudices. + +You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: +You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, +if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I +cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question +which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly +submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to +be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles +into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as +these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement +of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and +intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest +language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join +in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the +praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general +harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, +what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns +not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go +further, who are wiser or more enterprising. + +I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I +should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am +sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same +answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the +beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can +absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any +advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, +must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed +very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though +these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally +inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a +particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be +accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of +itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a +material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any +more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former. + + + + +PART 5 + + +But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your +Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like +effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, +you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that +the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which +are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either +side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less +conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to +reject its consequences. + +All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur +and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments +for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to +your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, +by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects +of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even +following the old system of the world, could exclaim, + + Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi + Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? + Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes + Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces? + Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto? + +If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, +as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN: + +"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam +tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae +molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti +muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti +aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?" + +If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater +must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely +enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more +unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience +of the narrow productions of human design and invention. + +The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, +are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The +further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer +the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from +any object of human experience and observation. + +And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... +These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new +instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected +on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I +know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted +PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES. + +Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the +consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim +to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause +ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it +falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, +upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? +You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity +to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at +the same time weaken all proofs of his existence. + +Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to +the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from +every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many +inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a +perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only +seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace +infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these +difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new +instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must +acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited +views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any +considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real +systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that +poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank +among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other +production? + +But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain +uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed +to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of +the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and +beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a +stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a +long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, +deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many +worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere +this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; +and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in +the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the +truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great +number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may +be imagined? + +And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from +your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men +join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a +commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and +framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human +affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit +the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and +knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to +you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such +foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing +and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we +may suppose several degrees more perfect! + +To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true +philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one +deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every +attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be +needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity +existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes +are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, +by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? +Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the +opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight +equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an +aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if +the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen +conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more +probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and +capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the +language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all +analogy, and even comprehension. + +But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by +generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great +sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this +circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous +and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought +back upon us. + +And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity +or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? +EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human +figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, +which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to +you, solid and philosophical. + +In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps +to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from +something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one +single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his +theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for +aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior +standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who +afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work +only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to +his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some +superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, +from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You +justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but +these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's +suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are +supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think +that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, +preferable to none at all. + +These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me, +however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in +which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I +see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get +rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every +turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and +this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion. + + + + +PART 6 + + +It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on +so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one +deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our +existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or +alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or +worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all +the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: +and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, +according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory. + +To render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me +another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the +method of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects +arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all +religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less +certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where +several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will +also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we +conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. +Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we +conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In +short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no +scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity. + +Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, +it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems +actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual +circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in +every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived +throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its +proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the +whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the +SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it. + +You have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this +opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of +antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For +though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as +if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather +their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation +renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the +universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art +and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, +be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour +of the ancient than the modern theory. + +There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which +recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all +their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than +mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their +senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single +instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they +felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in +both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but +seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to +suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of +them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable +from them. + +Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on +which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any +considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to +systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an +animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, +possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to +belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always +to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely +neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which +you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you +assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to +judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own +hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, +and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. + +This theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me, +though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an +examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You +are very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of +yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in +starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur +to you, you will oblige us by proposing it. + +Why then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does, +in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also +defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no +seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In +short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an +animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the +soul of the world. + +But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the +world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the +strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this +purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, +who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their +inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations +derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual +revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches +and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited +experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be +expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger +of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and +had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more +violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a +few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the +Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the +appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been +utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, +would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language +and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of +CONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the +mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily +imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later +origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the +eternity of the world, seems a little precarious. + +But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was +the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree +thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods +without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no +EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so +delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once +transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires +may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and +knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain +in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by +the revolutions of human society. + +It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE, +though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is +not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were +known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole +eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication +between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men +would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to +think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the +youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation +of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society +is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the +elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which +are now to be found in the Western world. + +And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO. +Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole +earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely +covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from +matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and +great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The +incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate +some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is +observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever +had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor +can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the +parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of +reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to +defend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly +should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an +eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with +great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all +difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely +complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or +later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have +been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order +somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which +of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, +sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, +inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, +we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no +idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly +see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, +ever to admit of any other disposition. + +Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which +maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by +30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would +naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; +and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, +but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the +same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of +deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within +himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these +systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on +your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any +advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your +principles. + + + + +PART 7 + + +But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of +the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, +must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first +inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a +greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of +human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the +former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be +ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your +conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and +defective. + +Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not +rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed +it. + +Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that +since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the +existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The +world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its +cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the +operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very +small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the +rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he +measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual +standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, +that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human +invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the +world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the +universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. +The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a +watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, +resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation +or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be +something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation. + +But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any +thing similar to vegetation or generation? + +Very easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into +the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great +vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself +certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, +vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world; +and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star +to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every +where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new +system. + +Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should +suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: +and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without +any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so... + +I understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are +these! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the +slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal +sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects, +which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for +each other? + +Right, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. +I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of +cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in +extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the +whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what +rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule +than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant +or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a +stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, +which arises from reason and design? + +But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA. +Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal +structure on which they depend? + +As much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations +of reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But +without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer, +that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you +conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, +reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects +are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these +principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a +standard to the whole of nature. + +In reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the +views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our +conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. +In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, +reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each +other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other +principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of +the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to +system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of +these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie +open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the +origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to +confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds +operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a +partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal +fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or +vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to +which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more +inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from +experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, +are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to +experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed +by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or +contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it. + +But methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and +could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power +would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For +whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can +order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it +bestows? + +You need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with +regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that +tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the +same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this +kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise +from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and +vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor +can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori, +both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and +that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong +to matter. + +But further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use +of by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made +against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of +that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; +he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could +never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. "We must +stop somewhere", says he; "nor is it ever within the reach of human +capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any +objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported +by experience and observation." Now, that vegetation and generation, as +well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is +undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to +the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And +when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or +generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his +great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on +both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to +stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, +generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the +latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter. + +Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, +resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from +generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small +appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles +a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The +steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he +pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or +reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, +with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his +hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle +of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the +utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in +innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of +generation, and never to arise from any other principle. + +HESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this +analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an +animal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible, +seems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS. + +The BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who +spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates +afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and +resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which +appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible +animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the +whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our +globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is +very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and +irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all +things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an +orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, +it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason. + +I must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the +task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits +you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So +great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to +acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such +out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I +clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but +you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution +so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense +and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have +delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us. + + + + +PART 8 + + +What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is +entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the +narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, +which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound +judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd +and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred +contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and +invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort +of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems +of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it +is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be +the true system. + +For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This +is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that +has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it +might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead +of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite. +A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: +and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or +position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, +with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and +destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds +and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, +in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination. + +But this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without +any voluntary agent or first mover. + +And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every +event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and +every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, +in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, +begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose +always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; +and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in +matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind +and intelligence. + +Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all +eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld +in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is +gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is +certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as +far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at +present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest. + +And this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled +on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, +that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an +order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual +agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in +the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this +is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of +matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce +this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once +established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But +wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in +perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its +situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and +contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must +have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself +must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element +in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its +waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A +defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of +which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular +motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular +form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great +quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is +entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its +first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one +languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; +till finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms, +whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a +continued succession of matter. + +Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were +thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that +this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and +most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of +human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an +adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the +actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever +in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or +activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still +continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a +second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the +first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No +particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The +original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual +restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and +instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, +it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force +which actuates every part of matter. + +Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of +chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so +as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed +inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, +amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to +be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually +changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, +in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather +be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and +may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which +is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall +find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability +in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, +affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty. + +It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals +or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain +know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do +we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment +ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens +indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some +regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it +were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the +animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but +finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order? + +It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was +suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure +to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections +to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess +those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or +economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some +order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But +according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and +advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not +absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might +have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, +and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction +and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the +sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? +If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful +direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been +immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very +frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one +of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, +which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe. + +At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis +is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. +But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this +nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be +liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to +our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your +theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though +you have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity +to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances +which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are +ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse +this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we +have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that +matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence +upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its +own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an +universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this +experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to +collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought +that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); +these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each +other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be +received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on +account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which +we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted. + +All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and +insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he +carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, +and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, +prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no +system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this +plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard +to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable +resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, +among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who +remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no +fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged +to defend? + + + + +PART 9 + + +But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA, +had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, +which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all +doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of +the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with +certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is +finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, +prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very +difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from +contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the +plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. +Whereas the argument a priori ... + +You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages +and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its +solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what +argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, +from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to +determine what value we ought to put upon it. + +The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. +Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being +absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of +its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we +must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate +cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that +is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may +be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and +effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and +efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal +chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any +thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much +as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is +still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from +eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there +be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is +equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having +existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which +constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something +to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular +possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed +to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that +can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a +necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in +himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express +contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a +Deity. + +I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the +starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of +this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, +and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety +and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it. + +I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in +pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any +arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies +a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a +contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as +non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a +contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is +demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am +willing to rest the whole controversy upon it. + +It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this +necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, +that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be +as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But +it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the +same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to +conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor +can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain +always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always +conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary +existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is +consistent. + +But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily +existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We +dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught +we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, +would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that +twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the +material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument +is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the +world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived +to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an +annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems +a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends +equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that +the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes +to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which +can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes +unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not +belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they +can never be proved incompatible with it. + +Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems +absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, +that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a +priority in time, and a beginning of existence? + +In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by +that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is +the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the +uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct +countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is +performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on +the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each +individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think +it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of +the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause +of the parts. + +Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse +me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot +forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by +arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some +lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any +of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are +products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is +a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser +product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may +be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful +algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and +demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these +numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the +universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can +furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the +order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into +the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was +absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So +dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present +question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite +to the religious hypothesis! + +But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining +ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, +that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except +to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to +abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the +understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary +to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to +subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good +sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in +such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly +where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive +their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. + + + + +PART 10 + + +It is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner, +the truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of +his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek +protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So +anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is +still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, +and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those +unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and +oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst +the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of +atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly +agitated and tormented? + +I am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only +method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just +representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose +a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of +reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels +within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, +more intimately and sensibly. + +The people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this +great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; +the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of +pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial +in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their +own immediate feeling and experience? + +In this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the +vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery +has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and +melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a +system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in +images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired +tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things +would suit the feeling and observation of each individual. + +As to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this +library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of +particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to +treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, +from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, +extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is +entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can +recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it. + +There you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is +perhaps the first [That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King and some +few others before Leibniz; though by none of so great a fame as that +German philosopher] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; +at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system. + +And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of +his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to +make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a +simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear +down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness? + +And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all +other animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and +polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. +Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, +anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into +life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: +Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is +at last finished in agony and horror. + +Observe too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to +embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the +weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in +their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without +relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are +bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in +him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment +them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every +animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and +destruction. + +Man alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. +For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and +bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey +upon him. + +On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and +equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by +combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the +whole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself +imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with +superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, +as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give +them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials +to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, +presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the +wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious +breast of wretched mortals. + +Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those +wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to +us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy +of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, +war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each +other; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, +were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their +separation. + +But though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men, +from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of +woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within +ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many +lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic +enumeration of the great poet. + + + Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs, + Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, + And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, + Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence. + Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair + Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch. + And over them triumphant death his dart + Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd + With vows, as their chief good and final hope. + + +The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not +perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, +disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed +through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have +scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred +by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those +few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach +contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make +a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and +any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often +the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to +render life ineligible. + +Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as +a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded +with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a +fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, +famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him +a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an +opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a +diversity of distress and sorrow. + +There is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by +apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I +ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?... +They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from +their discontented, repining, anxious disposition...And can there +possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a +wretched temper? + +But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, +why do they remain in life?... + + Not satisfied with life, afraid of death. + +This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not +bribed to the continuance of our existence. + +It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits +indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of +mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it +any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of +life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more +alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what +judgement must we form in general of human life? + +Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They +are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious +languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their +activity and ambition. + +I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied +CLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and +hope that it is not so common as you represent it. + +If you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on +so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not +been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let +us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired +with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the +hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable +occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had +ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might +truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did +the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater +happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced +the very day of his resignation. + +CICERO's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and +renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar +letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to +his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO, +protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would +reject the present. + +Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over +again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next +twenty, they say, will be better: + + + And from the dregs of life, hope to receive + What the first sprightly running could not give. + + +Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it +reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the +shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow. + +And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these +reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still +persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of +the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the +same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is +infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other +animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom +is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But +the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it +is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human +knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than +these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the +benevolence and mercy of men? + +EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, +but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he +malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? + +You ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to +Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice +and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation +alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for +her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any +care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No +resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure +or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some +want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this +nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. + +Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives +satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and +propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, +arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the +injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, +laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no +further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains +of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, +in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were +pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by +deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible. + +And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions, +PHILO? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me; +but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against +me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of +your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the +present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an +end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural +attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and +uncertain? + +You take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most +innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and +devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a +topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged +with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and +preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have +they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may +attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this +life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, +therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of +existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of +things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with +adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the +mazes and intricacies of his providence. + +No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be +admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence +can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any +hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one +hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost +we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the +bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, +establish its reality. + +The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I +willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of +man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly +fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is +more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And +for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a +hundred enjoyments. + +Admitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful, +you must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than +pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is +often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid +enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several +in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever +able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue +for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate, +the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly +degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how +often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it +becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, +courage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our +misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole +cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still +greater horror and consternation. + +But not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most +obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you, +CLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue, +and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential +articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a +just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human +life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our +present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and +desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: It +is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No +decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it +possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all +the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by +your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its +very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that +system is equally uncertain. + +But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never +possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this +life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by +any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and +infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by +chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the +Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? +But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so +short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects +exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and +falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along +insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn +and indignation. + +But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I +deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery +in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even +in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these +concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must +prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present +mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful +undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being +finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where +they are also so jarring and discordant! + +Here, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. +Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of +intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical +subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its +parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes +strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what +I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then +imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But +there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from +which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, +or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and +infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is +your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical +subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience. + + + + +PART 11 + + +I scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect +the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all +theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and +that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better +served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate +expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, +and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing +beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the +affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all +human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all +religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. +If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to +reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; +much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the +Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a +satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and +every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then +be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, +in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated +by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the +present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and +reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without +interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our +attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form. + +My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and +therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with +regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a +very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted +with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very +good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his +conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find +it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these +attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could +be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. +Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still +assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent +Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would +never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; +since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness +and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those +phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, +which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not +antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and +powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of +things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason +for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of +his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference +concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that +inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more +you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render +him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the +reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him +merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition +or conjecture. + +Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment +convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, +stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, +confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you +would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. +The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that +if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What +he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the +other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. +But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had +skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, +and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have +remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your +own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the +impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in +the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn +the architect. + +In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and +as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a +limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and +benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. +And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, +allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a +Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The +consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, +especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may +perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be +foundations for any inference. + +There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest +part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not +impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. +We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with +regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however +wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may +not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep +ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and +not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is +supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the +case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on +which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree +necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the +utmost license of imagination. + +The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or +economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are +employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the +great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various +degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All +animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by +any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; +instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they +might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their +subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least +they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly +possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is +any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can +be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; +and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce +that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. +Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any +appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the +most certain truth? + +But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the +second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; +and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if +everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature +would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the +conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this +inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, +wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any +preparation, or long progress of causes and effects? + +Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the +world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us +appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our +expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite +number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a +great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the +prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, +depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret +springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all +these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, +without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes +were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good +princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and +authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few +such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the +face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of +nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, +where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small +touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted +him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying +CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored +liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, +be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they +are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons +exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine +attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that +conclusion. + +If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if +animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but +some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various +concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very +rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to +mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are +distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs +and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, +that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any +single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every +animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed +with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must +entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is +a proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness +are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either +imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving +wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, +is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily +advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, +without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill +and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation +of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has +afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly +sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have +bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure +the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate +concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so +surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, +by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some +reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor +would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an +economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is +supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, +as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his +dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power +extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed +these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder +is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock +will enable him to finish. + +In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man +should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force +of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or +rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I +am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his +soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and +labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent +to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an +equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by +habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any +allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. +Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from +idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their +frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of +land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of +every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully +reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best +regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable +of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow +it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for +his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so +contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can +oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at +least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of +a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our +demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If +we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a +more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and +friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the +order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of +being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our +state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I +dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of +wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our +foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to +struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone +fence against these multiplied evils. + +The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the +universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles +of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are +few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and +whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the +whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without +affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it +must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, +are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in +which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every +occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, +that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; +so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with +which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours +along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how +oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? +Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: +but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite +to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due +proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the +body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts +perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all +the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do +they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? +There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently +becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with +the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The +irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is +often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery. + +On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the +greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable +of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil +never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed +with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity +requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so +accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; +there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at +present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that +these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have +been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too +presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest +in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I +mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable +reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be +sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown +manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this +goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the +phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are +so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have +been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on +such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, +notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes +as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a +conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the +phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from +these phenomena. + +Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated +and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety +and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living +existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive +to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How +contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but +the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, +and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her +maimed and abortive children! + +Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the +difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has +more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible +account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But +if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement +of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of +the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an +opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: +but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of +principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true +conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely +indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above +ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light +above heavy. + +There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the +universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have +perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and +malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can +never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and +steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, +therefore, seems by far the most probable. + +What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little +or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude +of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence +resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater +cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since +moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral +good than natural evil above natural good. + +But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which +is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so +long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much +puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a +cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every +effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry +on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who +is the ultimate cause of all things... + +Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I +joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible +nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who +would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you +running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and +betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, +then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself? + +And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, +DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at +both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious +reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of +ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute +incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, +and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to +be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of +stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; +and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, +than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and +melancholy of mankind. But at present... + +Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend +gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly +it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was +vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are +incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract +this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that +there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this +life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was +thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have +recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men +have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is +necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as +will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the +same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with +regard to Scepticism. + +Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure +of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all +relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, +on some pretence or other, to leave the company. + + + + +PART 12 + + +After DEMEA's departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation +in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will +have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are +in company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with +either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit +of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries +you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so +sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that +occasion. + +I must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of +Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, +on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and +because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common +sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES, +with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that +notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular +arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, +or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers +himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of +nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most +careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in +absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in +vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the +contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, +from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new +organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its +use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the +maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most +proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, +lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is +observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost +lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their +authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess +that intention. + +It is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the +human body. The anatomy of a man, says he [De formatione foetus], discovers +above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, +that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different +circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper +figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and +lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, +veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several +views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he +calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of +each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these +simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, +vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; +how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and +intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance +in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry +still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine +internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the +fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every +different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact +propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each +species. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences +were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to +what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have +attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence! + +Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), +I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself +immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger +proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? +What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of +things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could +mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which +demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; +and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, +according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for +undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature +admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very +numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human +imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their +cogency! + +I shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that +one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only +system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and +yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and +experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of +human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many +instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike +all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. +Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by +establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It +is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote +and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is +here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of +mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained +against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the +religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the +force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and +perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported +by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early +education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend. + +So little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the +present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters +somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is +usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the +productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good +reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that +their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also +considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional +difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much +higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have +ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly +ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account +of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, +notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed +between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? +No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves +from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this +inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an +analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme +cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call +him but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a +considerable resemblance? + +All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound +so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that +the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from +the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the +strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a +species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of +human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any +precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or +precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any +quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL +be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of +beauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is +entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The +disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or +vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into +each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, +like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which +may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning +Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, +if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the +slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is +a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the +human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he +assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify +the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature +which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I +assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I +ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the +parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether +the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure +of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy +to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily +acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further +in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle +which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears +not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of +nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. +However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both +these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, +that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The +Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote +analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter +into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor +consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I +should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the +Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the +Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal +creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every +position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if +you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure +yourselves of your animosity. + +And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature +have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, +than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, +that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to +those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the +consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more +defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme +Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs +most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of +rectitude and perfection. + +It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists +is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and +assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such +disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise +determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are +difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that +these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely +insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, +notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and +reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently +assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between +these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, +caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, +for like reasons, on the necessity. + +These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these +sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in +proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar +superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing +such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And +you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion +to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both. + +My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, +however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine +of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that +we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary +rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how +much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal? + +How happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to +society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious +consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, +subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal +consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If +the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we +are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend +it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those +in which it is never regarded or heard of. + +The reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper +office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their +conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as +its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and +justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these +other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate +principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has +become only a cover to faction and ambition. + +And so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and +rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The +inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and +punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite +and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the +attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which +we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are +declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they +always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed +it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence +of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their +religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their +speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so +powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to +subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is +certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and +benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views +suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural +inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the +mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas +religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and +bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether +habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the +philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least +impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, +prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be +repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation. + +Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and +ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious +principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is +almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account +for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy +themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their +religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools +ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and +philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to +theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a +great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon +several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they +be cheated and deceived by him? + +We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and +reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the +restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are +utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be +pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations +to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous +observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not +run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances +of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that +atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of +declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a +sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be +laid upon it. + +But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in +direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the +raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous +distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most +pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the +natural motives of justice and humanity. + +Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar +motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must +be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot +satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. +Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the +heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is +by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant +principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest +zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being +inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual +character. + +The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; +but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be +forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the +cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it. + +The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal +salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a +narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it +easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. + +Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on +general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the +instances where they predominate. + +Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that +both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very +narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his +fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular +religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. +The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, +will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the +guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of +life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set +apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and +who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, +that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to +popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, +and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? +Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with +inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he +must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every +consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his +own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the +wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of +them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; +otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, +persecutions, and civil commotions. + +True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must +treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I +any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a +species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that +principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of +being always confined to very few persons. + +Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question +whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the +solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and +the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief +restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but +little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and +religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same +footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS +[Lib. vi. cap. 54.] ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of +the EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a +reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we +cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to +mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean +philosophy; and EURIPIDES [Iphigenia in Tauride], in a passage which I +shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against +his nation, with regard to this circumstance. + +Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far: +allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration +for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great +comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of +adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for +human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents +us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who +created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable +desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will +transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those +desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a +Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we +can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection. + +These appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with +regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it +happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater +part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of +religion commonly prevail above its comforts. + +It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as +when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, +that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? + +But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES. +Sometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form +a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and +melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the +contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to +predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the +most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the +flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely +superior in number to the elect. + +I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which +represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render +it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine +models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies +between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking +to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond +it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and +FURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone. + +It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these +passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them +forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a +cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or +entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and +thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to +do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge +himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he +has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his +thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or +circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful +prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and +triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the +primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always +predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure. + +Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by +exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of +superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so +happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to +support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and +uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. +No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, +and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is +seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it +is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that +gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people. + +It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon +account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk +hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both +an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the +Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a +restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, +since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in +particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior. + +To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed +absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low +condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, +presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which +superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the +condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who +exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that +Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly +mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the +votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit +his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or +rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine +perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and +indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally +rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or +endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such +extraordinary subjects. + +If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, +resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least +undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe +probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this +proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular +explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can +be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect +as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and +cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other +qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most +inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, +philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and +believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the +objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will +naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from +its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no +solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and +magnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural +sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a +longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, +at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more +particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, +attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, +seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will +fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty +Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by +the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this +adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of +letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, +believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to +the attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for +interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil. + +CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as +nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of +that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I +cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's; +but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth. + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by +David Hume + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DIALOGUES--NATURAL RELIGION *** + +***** This file should be named 4583.txt or 4583.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/4/5/8/4583/ + +Produced by Col Choat. 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Accurate and +regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical +inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic +manner; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point +at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce +the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a SYSTEM in +conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer +desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a +freer air to his performance, and avoid the appearance of Author and +Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the +image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or, if he carries on the dispute in the +natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and +preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much +time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely +think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, +brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them. + +There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue-writing is peculiarly +adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method +of composition. + +Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of +dispute, but at the same time so important that it cannot be too often +inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the +novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where +the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the +variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may +appear neither tedious nor redundant. + +Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so OBSCURE and +UNCERTAIN, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard +to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into +the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be allowed to +differ, where no one can reasonably be positive. Opposite sentiments, +even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement; and if the +subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, +into company; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human +life, study and society. + +Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of +NATURAL RELIGION. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a +God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most +refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and +arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all +our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of +society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent +from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and +important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of +that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? +These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning +these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these +are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry +with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and +contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate +researches. + +This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of +the summer season with CLEANTHES, and was present at those conversations +of his with PHILO and DEMEA, of which I gave you lately some imperfect +account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must, +of necessity, enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and +display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so +delicate a subject as that of natural religion. The remarkable contrast +in their characters still further raised your expectations; while you +opposed the accurate philosophical turn of CLEANTHES to the careless +scepticism of PHILO, or compared either of their dispositions with the +rigid inflexible orthodoxy of DEMEA. My youth rendered me a mere auditor +of their disputes; and that curiosity, natural to the early season of +life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection +of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any +considerable part of them in the recital. + + + + +PART 1 + + + +After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in CLEANTHES's library, +DEMEA paid CLEANTHES some compliments on the great care which he took of +my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his +friendships. The father of PAMPHILUS, said he, was your intimate friend: +The son is your pupil; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, +were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying to him every +useful branch of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am +persuaded, in prudence, than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate +to you a maxim, which I have observed with regard to my own children, +that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I +follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, "That +students of philosophy ought first to learn logics, then ethics, next +physics, last of all the nature of the gods." [Chrysippus apud Plut: de +repug: Stoicorum] This science of natural theology, according to him, +being the most profound and abstruse of any, required the maturest +judgement in its students; and none but a mind enriched with all the other +sciences, can safely be entrusted with it. + +Are you so late, says PHILO, in teaching your children the principles of +religion? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether +those opinions of which they have heard so little during the whole course +of their education? It is only as a science, replied DEMEA, subjected to +human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural +Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care; and +by continual precept and instruction, and I hope too by example, I +imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the +principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I +still remark the uncertainty of each part; the eternal disputations of +men; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous +conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the +principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper +submission and self-diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening +to them the greatest mysteries of religion; nor apprehend any danger from +that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the +most established doctrines and opinions. + +Your precaution, says PHILO, of seasoning your children's minds early +with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite +in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your +plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very +principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and +self-sufficiency, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive +to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are +unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless +disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for +philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great +points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little +into study and study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in +doctrines the newest and most extraordinary, think nothing too difficult +for human reason; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, +profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But CLEANTHES will, I hope, +agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest +remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane +liberty. Let DEMEA's principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become +thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of +human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless +contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the +errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the insuperable +difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the +contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and +effect, extension, space, time, motion; and in a word, quantity of all +kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend to any +certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full +light, as they are by some philosophers and almost all divines; who can +retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any +regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote +from common life and experience? When the coherence of the parts of a +stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when +these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain +circumstances so repugnant and contradictory; with what assurance can we +decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from +eternity to eternity? + +While PHILO pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the +countenance both of DEMEA and CLEANTHES. That of DEMEA seemed to imply an +unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered: But, in CLEANTHES's +features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some +raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of PHILO. + +You propose then, PHILO, said CLEANTHES, to erect religious faith on +philosophical scepticism; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be +expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these +theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. +Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we +shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, +whether you go out at the door or the window; and whether you really +doubt if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according +to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses, and more +fallacious experience. And this consideration, DEMEA, may, I think, +fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. +If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world +with their doubts, cavils, and disputes: If they be only in jest, they +are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to +the state, to philosophy, or to religion. + +In reality, PHILO, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in +a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions +and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and +opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, +or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press +in upon him; passions solicit him; his philosophical melancholy +dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be +able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And +for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in +which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently +with his sceptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be +more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient PYRRHONIANS; if in +reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the +same scepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their +schools, and which they ought to have confined to them. + +In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the +STOICS and PYRRHONIANS, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them +seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform +sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every +disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a +sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of +honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not +prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by +its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this +sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a +philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to +such an enthusiasm, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most +calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support +this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be +recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him +unawares; and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian. + +I allow of your comparison between the STOICS and SKEPTICS, replied +PHILO. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind +cannot, in Stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy, yet, even +when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; +and the effects of the Stoic's reasoning will appear in his conduct in +common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient +schools, particularly that of ZENO, produced examples of virtue and +constancy which seem astonishing to present times. + + + Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy. + Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm + Pain, for a while, or anguish; and excite + Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast + With stubborn Patience, as with triple steel. + + +In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical +considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will +not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; +but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in +his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either +never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments +more favourable to human reason. + +To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of +scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men; +and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the +absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his +speculations further than this necessity constrains him, and +philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a +certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself +after that manner. He considers besides, that every one, even in common +life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy; that from +our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general +principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we +acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our +principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call +philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the +same kind. To philosophise on such subjects, is nothing essentially +different from reasoning on common life; and we may only expect greater +stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its +exacter and more scrupulous method of proceeding. + +But when we look beyond human affairs and the properties of the +surrounding bodies: when we carry our speculations into the two +eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the +creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of +spirits; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit existing +without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, +infinite, and incomprehensible: We must be far removed from the smallest +tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive, that we have here got +quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our +speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make +appeals, every moment, to common sense and experience, which strengthen +our philosophical conclusions, and remove, at least in part, the +suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning +that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have +not this advantage; while, at the same time, we are employed upon +objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and of +all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are +like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem +suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against +the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We +know not how far we ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in +such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is +peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are +entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them. + +All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, +it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never +retain any conviction or assurance, on any subject, were not the +sceptical reasonings so refined and subtle, that they are not able to +counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the +senses and experience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose +this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined +scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose +and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The +mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense +or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism. + +But I observe, says CLEANTHES, with regard to you, PHILO, and all +speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at +variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of +common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, +notwithstanding your pretended scepticism; and I can observe, too, some +of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of +certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who +pretended to reject NEWTON's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of +the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays +of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And +what would you say to one, who, having nothing particular to object to +the arguments of COPERNICUS and GALILEO for the motion of the earth, +should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these +subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow +and fallacious reason of mankind? + +There is indeed a kind of brutish and ignorant scepticism, as you well +observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do +not easily understand, and makes them reject every principle which +requires elaborate reasoning to prove and establish it. This species of +scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that +those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not +only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the +most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to +them. They firmly believe in witches, though they will not believe nor +attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and +philosophical sceptics fall into an inconsistence of an opposite nature. +They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; and +their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence +which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most +abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by +philosophy. Light is in reality anatomised. The true system of the +heavenly bodies is discovered and ascertained. But the nourishment of +bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery. The cohesion of the +parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, therefore, are +obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, +and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which +occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and +political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and +religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the +general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any +particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a +plain proof of prejudice and passion? + +Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous; our +ideas, even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, +full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the +difficulties, or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I +have not capacity for so great an undertaking: I have not leisure for it: +I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, +refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the +received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour. + +I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated +writer [L'Arte de penser], who says, that the Sceptics are not a sect of +philosophers: They are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm +(I hope without offence), that they are a sect of jesters or raillers. +But for my part, whenever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, +I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse +nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural +recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions. + +In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common +life, or between one science and another. The arguments employed in all, +if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and +evidence. Or if there be any difference among them, the advantage lies +entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of +mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any +pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to +entertain the least doubt with regard to them. The COPERNICAN system +contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our +natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses: yet even +monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to +it. And shall PHILO, a man of so liberal a genius and extensive +knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with regard to +the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most +obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has +such easy access and admission into the mind of man? + +And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards DEMEA, a +pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the +union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first +establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all +religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, +against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. +All the topics of the ancient academics were adopted by the fathers; and +thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout +Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or +rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excellency of faith, were +sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural +reason. A celebrated prelate [Monsr. Huet] too, of the Romish communion, +a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of +Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils +of the boldest and most determined PYRRHONISM. LOCKE seems to have been the +first Christian who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but +a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and +that a chain of arguments, similar to that which established any truth in +morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the +principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which BAYLE and +other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and +first reformers, still further propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr. +LOCKE: And it is now in a manner avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning +and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it +is certain that no man is in earnest when he professes the latter +principle, I would fain hope that there are as few who seriously maintain +the former. + +Don't you remember, said PHILO, the excellent saying of LORD BACON on +this head? That a little philosophy, replied CLEANTHES, makes a man an +Atheist: A great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious +remark too, said PHILO. But what I have in my eye is another passage, +where, having mentioned DAVID's fool, who said in his heart there is no +God, this great philosopher observes, that the Atheists nowadays have a +double share of folly; for they are not contented to say in their hearts +there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips, and +are thereby guilty of multiplied indiscretion and imprudence. Such +people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be +very formidable. + +But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear +communicating a remark that occurs to me, from the history of the +religious and irreligious scepticism with which you have entertained us. +It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the +whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which +followed the dissolution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, +that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only proceed from the +presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that +human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty +influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those +suggestions of the senses and common understanding, by which the most +determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, +when the influence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more +open commerce of the world, have learned to compare the popular +principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have +changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of +STOICS, PLATONISTS, and PERIPATETICS, not that of PYRRHONIANS and +ACADEMICS. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to +lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; +whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in +giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their +favourite principle, and established tenet. + +It is very natural, said CLEANTHES, for men to embrace those principles, +by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have +any recourse to priestcraft to account for so reasonable an expedient. +And, surely nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of +principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they +tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the +cavils of Atheists, Libertines, and Freethinkers of all denominations. + + + + +PART 2 + + + +I must own, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, that nothing can more surprise me, +than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the +whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were +maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and +Infidels; and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental +principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not by any means a +question among us. No man, no man at least of common sense, I am +persuaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so +certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the being, but +the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human +understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The +essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his +existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular +which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and +blind creatures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; +and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence his infinite +perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it +entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep +cloud from human curiosity. It is profaneness to attempt penetrating +through these sacred obscurities. And, next to the impiety of denying his +existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees +and attributes. + +But lest you should think that my piety has here got the better of my +philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very +great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation +of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological +subject: But I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated +for piety and philosophy. It is Father MALEBRANCHE, who, I remember, thus +expresses himself [Recherche de la Verite. Liv. 3. Chap.9]. "One ought not +so much," says he, "to call God a spirit, in order to express positively +what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being +infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as +we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed +with a human body, as the ANTHROPOMORPHITES asserted, under colour that +that figure was the most perfect of any; so, neither ought we to imagine +that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our +spirit, under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. +We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of +matter without being material.... he comprehends also the perfections of +created spirits without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit: +That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without +restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal." + +After so great an authority, DEMEA, replied PHILO, as that which you have +produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear +ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your +doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the +question can never be concerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the +Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self- +evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this +universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every +species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, deserves +every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the +greatest ridicule, contempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is +entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the +attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have +any analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, +Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these +words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other +conceptions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us +beware, lest we think that our ideas anywise correspond to his +perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these +qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and +comprehension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of +disputation in the schools. + +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, there is no need of having recourse +to that affected scepticism so displeasing to you, in order to come at +this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We +have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not +conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself. And it is a +pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound +piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them establish the +adorably mysterious and incomprehensible nature of the Supreme Being. + +Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said CLEANTHES, addressing +himself to DEMEA, much less in replying to the pious declamations of +PHILO; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the +world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be +nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of +lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond +what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various +machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other +with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever +contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all +nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of +human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. +Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, +by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the +Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed +of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which +he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument +alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity +to human mind and intelligence. + +I shall be so free, CLEANTHES, said DEMEA, as to tell you, that from the +beginning, I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the +similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums +by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the +Being of God! No abstract arguments! No proofs a priori! Are these, which +have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all +sophism? Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and +probability? I will not say that this is betraying the cause of a Deity: +But surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, +which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning. + +What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said PHILO, is not so much that +all religious arguments are by CLEANTHES reduced to experience, as that +they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that +inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the +earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times; and +when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without +hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases +gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence +is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, +from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the +evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is +confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the +circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it +takes place in TITIUS and MAEVIUS. But from its circulation in frogs and +fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from analogy, that +it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much +weaker, when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our +experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily +followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experiments, +to have been mistaken. + +If we see a house, CLEANTHES, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, +that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that +species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species +of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a +resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a +similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The +dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is +a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how +that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider. + +It would surely be very ill received, replied CLEANTHES; and I should be +deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow, that the proofs of a Deity +amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole +adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a +resemblance? The economy of final causes? The order, proportion, and +arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that +human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and +infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mounting; and +this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the +dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name +only of presumption or conjecture? + +Good God! cried DEMEA, interrupting him, where are we? Zealous defenders +of religion allow, that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect +evidence! And you, PHILO, on whose assistance I depended in proving the +adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these +extravagant opinions of CLEANTHES? For what other name can I give them? +or, why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by +such an authority, before so young a man as PAMPHILUS? + +You seem not to apprehend, replied PHILO, that I argue with CLEANTHES in +his own way; and, by showing him the dangerous consequences of his +tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most +with you, I observe, is the representation which CLEANTHES has made of +the argument a posteriori; and finding that that argument is likely to +escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised, that you +can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I +may dissent, in other respects, from the dangerous principles of +CLEANTHES, I must allow that he has fairly represented that argument; and +I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain +no further scruples with regard to it. + +Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he +would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine +what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one +state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he +clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, +every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he +assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects +the others which are equally possible. + +Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really +is, it would be impossible for him at first to assign the cause of any +one event, much less of the whole of things, or of the universe. He might +set his fancy a rambling; and she might bring him in an infinite variety +of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being +all equally possible, he would never of himself give a satisfactory +account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can +point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon. + +Now, according to this method of reasoning, DEMEA, it follows, (and is, +indeed, tacitly allowed by CLEANTHES himself,) that order, arrangement, +or the adjustment of final causes, is not of itself any proof of design; +but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that +principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source +or spring of order originally within itself, as well as mind does; and +there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements, +from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite +arrangement, than to conceive that their ideas, in the great universal +mind, from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The +equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But, by +experience, we find, (according to CLEANTHES), that there is a difference +between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or +form; they will never arrange themselves so as to compose a watch. Stone, +and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the +ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, +arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. +Experience, therefore, proves, that there is an original principle of +order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar +causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a +machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resembling. + +I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, +which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures; and must +conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound +Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, DEMEA, I shall +endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of +the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of CLEANTHES, provided +he allows that I have made a fair representation of it. + +When CLEANTHES had assented, PHILO, after a short pause, proceeded in the +following manner. + +That all inferences, CLEANTHES, concerning fact, are founded on +experience; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the +supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar +effects similar causes; I shall not at present much dispute with you. But +observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners +proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the +cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying +their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of +circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new +experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no +moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, +disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars +may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: And unless the +objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to expect +with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that +which before fell under our observation. The slow and deliberate steps of +philosophers here, if any where, are distinguished from the precipitate +march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are +incapable of all discernment or consideration. + +But can you think, CLEANTHES, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have +been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to +the universe houses, ships, furniture, machines, and, from their +similarity in some circumstances, inferred a similarity in their causes? +Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other +animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the +universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred +others, which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by +which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on +other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred +from parts to the whole? Does not the great disproportion bar all +comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we +learn any thing concerning the generation of a man? Would the manner of a +leaf's blowing, even though perfectly known, afford us any instruction +concerning the vegetation of a tree? + +But, allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature +upon another, for the foundation of our judgement concerning the origin +of the whole, (which never can be admitted,) yet why select so minute, so +weak, so bounded a principle, as the reason and design of animals is +found to be upon this planet? What peculiar privilege has this little +agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it +the model of the whole universe? Our partiality in our own favour does +indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully +to guard against so natural an illusion. + +So far from admitting, continued PHILO, that the operations of a part can +afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will +not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be +very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, +that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, +reason, or any thing similar to these faculties in men? When nature has +so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe, can +we imagine that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a +universe? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to +this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action, +with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all +things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the +rule for the government of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable +sophism. + +But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling +the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its +activity elsewhere vastly greater and more commanding than it appears in +this globe; yet I cannot see, why the operations of a world constituted, +arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which +is in its embryo state, and is advancing towards that constitution and +arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and +nourishment of a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution +that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to +the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, +we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number +of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every +change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles +would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the +formation of a universe, we cannot, without the utmost temerity, pretend +to determine. + +A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very +imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively +concerning the origin of the whole? + +Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this +time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without +human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally +attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. +But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? +Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? +Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another +situation vastly different from the former? + +And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of +SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO, +What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and +after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing +in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had +answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this +subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out +sceptic and railler, as much as you pleased: but having found, in so many +other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even +contradictions of human reason, I never should expect any success from +its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the +sphere of our observation. When two species of objects have always been +observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence +of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an +argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the +objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without +parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will +any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must +arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have +experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we +had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, +that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance... + +PHILO was proceeding in this vehement manner, somewhat between jest and +earnest, as it appeared to me, when he observed some signs of impatience +in CLEANTHES, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, +said CLEANTHES, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of +popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that +the vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the +question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is +found, where that reason is properly analysed, that it is nothing but a +species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe +from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the +motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise +all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged +against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you +have seen to move? Have... + +Yes! cried PHILO, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon +another earth, which we see to turn round its centre? Is not Venus +another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon? Are not the +revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same +theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the +sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, +and along with these primary planets round the sun? These analogies and +resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs +of the COPERNICAN system; and to you it belongs to consider, whether you +have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory. + +In reality, CLEANTHES, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is +now so much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part +even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous +in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a +matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who +had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn +their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and +convincing. But if we peruse GALILEO's famous Dialogues concerning the +system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the +sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that +there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between +elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the +illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had +established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, +unalterable, impassable; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to +the former. But GALILEO, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity +in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness +when not illuminated, its density, its distinction into solid and liquid, +the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and +moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, &c. +After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men +plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and +that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same +arguments and phenomena from one to the other. + +In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own +condemnation, CLEANTHES; or rather may see, that the subject in which you +are engaged exceeds all human reason and inquiry. Can you pretend to show +any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of +a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles +the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under +your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the +phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? +If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory. + + + + +PART 3 + + + +How the most absurd argument, replied CLEANTHES, in the hands of a man of +ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not +aware, PHILO, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first +disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial +matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and +supported by some sensible appearances, had denied this similarity? but +that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the +similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this +similarity is self-evident and undeniable? The same matter, a like form; +what more is requisite to show an analogy between their causes, and to +ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? +Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the abstruse +cavils of those philosophers who denied motion; and ought to be refuted +in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather +than by serious argument and philosophy. + +Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, +much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach: +Suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all +nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: +Suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and +meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent +Being, superior to mankind: Could you possibly hesitate a moment +concerning the cause of this voice? and must you not instantly ascribe it +to some design or purpose? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections +(if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, +may also be produced against this inference. + +Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on +experience: that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence +infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to +conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this +extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all +languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no +reason to suppose any analogy in their causes: and consequently, that a +rational, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you know not whence, from some +accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or +intelligence? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils, and I +hope too you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in +the one case than in the other. + +But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I +shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or +impossibility. Suppose that there is a natural, universal, invariable +language, common to every individual of human race; and that books are +natural productions, which perpetuate themselves in the same manner with +animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions +of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a +natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelligible to their own +species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in +the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organised body, +the propagation of an Iliad or Aeneid is an easier supposition than that +of any plant or animal. + +Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by +natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite +beauty; could you possibly open one of them, and doubt, that its original +cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelligence? When it +reasons and discourses; when it expostulates, argues, and enforces its +views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, +sometimes to the affections; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every +consideration suited to the subject; could you persist in asserting, that +all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first +formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded +not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that +degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wantonness would be +abashed at so glaring an absurdity. + +But if there be any difference, PHILO, between this supposed case and the +real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The +anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the +perusal of LIVY or TACITUS; and any objection which you start in the +former case, by carrying me back to so unusual and extraordinary a scene +as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the +supposition of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, PHILO, +without ambiguity or evasion; assert either that a rational volume is no +proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works +of nature. + +Let me here observe too, continued CLEANTHES, that this religious +argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected +by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and +undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either +affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable +sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to +adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, +wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force that he cannot, +without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for Natural +Religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, +obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomise the eye; +survey its structure and contrivance; and tell me, from your own feeling, +if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a +force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in +favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon +up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support +Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the +correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole +course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that +the propagation of the species is intended by Nature? Millions and +millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the +universe; and no language can convey a more intelligible irresistible +meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, +therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such +natural and such convincing arguments? + +Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, +and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition +to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established +masters of art. And if the argument for Theism be, as you pretend, +contradictory to the principles of logic; its universal, its irresistible +influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular +nature. Whatever cavils may be urged, an orderly world, as well as a +coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontestable +proof of design and intention. + +It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their +due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian; not because they are +obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question +with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal? +From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents? +A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are +lost in darkness and confusion; nor is he actuated by any curiosity to +trace them further. But this is neither dogmatism nor scepticism, but +stupidity: a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive +disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects: You +can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors +proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention, but from too +luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a +profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. + +Here I could observe, HERMIPPUS, that PHILO was a little embarrassed and +confounded: But while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for +him, DEMEA broke in upon the discourse, and saved his countenance. + +Your instance, CLEANTHES, said he, drawn from books and language, being +familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is +there not some danger too in this very circumstance; and may it not +render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and +have some adequate idea of his nature and attributes? When I read a +volume, I enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, +in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and +conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while +employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can +make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, +but incomprehensible. And this volume of nature contains a great and +inexplicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning. + +The ancient PLATONISTS, you know, were the most religious and devout of +all the Pagan philosophers; yet many of them, particularly PLOTINUS, +expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be ascribed +to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in +acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain +mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. +These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched; but still it must be +acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and +comprehensible, and so similar to a human mind, we are guilty of the +grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the +whole universe. + +All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, +friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain +reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for +preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in +such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such +sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; +and the phenomena besides of the universe will not support us in such a +theory. All our ideas, derived from the senses, are confessedly false and +illusive; and cannot therefore be supposed to have place in a supreme +intelligence: And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of +the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, +we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect +similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now, as to the +manner of thinking; how can we make any comparison between them, or +suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, +fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these +circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such +a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. +At least if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still +to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being, we ought to +acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally +incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us +to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable +sublimity of the Divine attributes. + + + + +PART 4 + + + +It seems strange to me, said CLEANTHES, that you, DEMEA, who are so +sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious, +incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously +that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The +Deity, I can readily allow, possesses many powers and attributes of which +we can have no comprehension: But if our ideas, so far as they go, be not +just, and adequate, and correspondent to his real nature, I know not what +there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any +meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you mystics, who maintain +the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or +Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and +unintelligible? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting +the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know +of no other,) they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific +intelligible cause: And their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, +if they refuse to call the universal unknown cause a God or Deity; and to +bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and unmeaning epithets as you +shall please to require of them. + +Who could imagine, replied DEMEA, that CLEANTHES, the calm philosophical +CLEANTHES, would attempt to refute his antagonists by affixing a nickname +to them; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have +recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning? Or does he +not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that +Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous +consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us? In +reality, CLEANTHES, consider what it is you assert when you represent the +Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of +man? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas; +united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each +other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, +arrange themselves in a certain form or order; which is not preserved +entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. +New opinions, new passions, new affections, new feelings arise, which +continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest +variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with +that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe +to the Deity? By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and +future: His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual +operation: He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every +instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no +diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction or +diversity. And what he is this moment he ever has been, and ever will be, +without any new judgement, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in +one simple, perfect state: nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that +this act of his is different from that other; or that this judgement or +idea has been lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any +different judgement or idea. + +I can readily allow, said CLEANTHES, that those who maintain the perfect +simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have +explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the +consequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, +Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity +possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension, yet ought we +never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible +with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and +sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive; one, that is wholly +simple, and totally immutable, is a mind which has no thought, no reason, +no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or, in a word, is no mind at +all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as +well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without +composition. + +Pray consider, said PHILO, whom you are at present inveighing against. +You are honouring with the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox +divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last +be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist +in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be +asserted, and Christian Theologians the same, what becomes of the +argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of +mankind? + +But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I +shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniences +of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that +there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the +Divine mind, consisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged, in the +same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which +he intends to execute. + +It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether +we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged +to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had +assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. + +If Reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be +not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect, +this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, +or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much, as does a material world, +or universe of objects; and, if similar in its arrangement, must require +a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occasion +a different conclusion or inference? In an abstract view, they are +entirely alike; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is +not common to both of them. + +Again, when we will needs force Experience to pronounce some sentence, +even on these subjects which lie beyond her sphere, neither can she +perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two +kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and +to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have +specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one; a +vegetable or animal body the other. Let experience, therefore, judge from +these samples. Nothing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, +than thought; and as these causes never operate in two persons after the +same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor +indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different +periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of +weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these +particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious +machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different movements and +operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not +more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more +curious adjustment of springs and principles. + +How, therefore, shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that +Being whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system +of Anthropomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material? +Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal +world, or new intelligent principle? But if we stop, and go no further; +why go so far? why not stop at the material world? How can we satisfy +ourselves without going on in infinitum? And, after all, what +satisfaction is there in that infinite progression? Let us remember the +story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more +applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon +a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other; and so +on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the +present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its +order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we +arrive at that Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step +beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour which it +is impossible ever to satisfy. + +To say, that the different ideas which compose the reason of the Supreme +Being, fall into order of themselves, and by their own nature, is really +to talk without any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain +know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the parts of the material +world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one +opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so? + +We have, indeed, experience of ideas which fall into order of themselves, +and without any known cause. But, I am sure, we have a much larger +experience of matter which does the same; as, in all instances of +generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause +exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular +systems of thought and of matter which have no order; of the first in +madness, of the second in corruption. Why, then, should we think, that +order is more essential to one than the other? And if it requires a cause +in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of +objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step which we make +leads us on for ever. It were, therefore, wise in us to limit all our +inquiries to the present world, without looking further. No satisfaction +can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the +narrow bounds of human understanding. + +It was usual with the PERIPATETICS, you know, CLEANTHES, when the cause +of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or +occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its +nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative. But it has been +discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of +ignorance; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really +said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed +that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it +is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; +can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it +is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity? But why +a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for the +order of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent +creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to +say, that such is the nature of material objects, and that they are all +originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only +more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the +one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater +conformity to vulgar prejudices. + +You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied CLEANTHES: +You seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, +if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, PHILO, that I +cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question +which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly +submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers, who confess ultimate causes to +be totally unknown; and are sensible, that the most refined principles +into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexplicable as +these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement +of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and +intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest +language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join +in the same testimony: The whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the +praises of its Creator. You alone, or almost alone, disturb this general +harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections: You ask me, +what is the cause of this cause? I know not; I care not; that concerns +not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my inquiry. Let those go +further, who are wiser or more enterprising. + +I pretend to be neither, replied PHILO: And for that very reason, I +should never perhaps have attempted to go so far; especially when I am +sensible, that I must at last be contented to sit down with the same +answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the +beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can +absolutely give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any +advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty, which, you acknowledge, +must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed +very justly explain particular effects by more general causes, though +these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally +inexplicable; but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a +particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be +accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of +itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a +material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any +more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former. + + + + +PART 5 + + + +But to show you still more inconveniences, continued PHILO, in your +Anthropomorphism, please to take a new survey of your principles. Like +effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, +you say too, is the sole theological argument. Now, it is certain, that +the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which +are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either +side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less +conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle; neither ought you to +reject its consequences. + +All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur +and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments +for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism; but, according to +your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, +by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects +of human art and contrivance. For, if LUCRETIUS[Lib. II. 1094], even +following the old system of the world, could exclaim, + + Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi + Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas? + Quis pariter coelos omnes convertere? et omnes + Ignibus aetheriis terras suffire feraces? + Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore praesto? + +If TULLY [De. nat. Deor. Lib. I] esteemed this reasoning so natural, +as to put it into the mouth of his EPICUREAN: + +"Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit vester Plato fabricam illam +tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque aedificari mundum facit? quae +molitio? quae ferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui ministri tanti +muneris fuerunt? quemadmodum autem obedire et parere voluntati architecti +aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt?" + +If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages, how much greater +must it have at present, when the bounds of Nature are so infinitely +enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us? It is still more +unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience +of the narrow productions of human design and invention. + +The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, +are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The +further we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer +the universal cause of all to be vastly different from mankind, or from +any object of human experience and observation. + +And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany?... +These surely are no objections, replied CLEANTHES; they only discover new +instances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected +on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said PHILO. I +know of no other, replied CLEANTHES. And the liker the better, insisted +PHILO. To be sure, said CLEANTHES. + +Now, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the +consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim +to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause +ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it +falls under our cognisance, is not infinite; what pretensions have we, +upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? +You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity +to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at +the same time weaken all proofs of his existence. + +Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to +the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free from +every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many +inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a +perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only +seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace +infinite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these +difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new +instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must +acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited +views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any +considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real +systems. Could a peasant, if the Aeneid were read to him, pronounce that +poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper rank +among the productions of human wit, he, who had never seen any other +production? + +But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain +uncertain, whether all the excellences of the work can justly be ascribed +to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of +the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so complicated, useful, and +beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a +stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a +long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, +deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many +worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere +this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; +and a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in +the art of world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the +truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great +number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater which may +be imagined? + +And what shadow of an argument, continued PHILO, can you produce, from +your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men +join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a +commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and +framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human +affairs. By sharing the work among several, we may so much further limit +the attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and +knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to +you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such +foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite in framing +and executing one plan, how much more those deities or demons, whom we +may suppose several degrees more perfect! + +To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true +philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one +deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every +attribute requisite to the production of the universe; it would be +needless, I own, (though not absurd,) to suppose any other deity +existent. But while it is still a question, Whether all these attributes +are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings, +by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy? +Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the +opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight +equal to it; but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an +aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if +the weight requisite very much exceeds any thing which we have ever seen +conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more +probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and +capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the +language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal exceeds all +analogy, and even comprehension. + +But further, CLEANTHES: men are mortal, and renew their species by +generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great +sexes of male and female, says MILTON, animate the world. Why must this +circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous +and limited deities? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought +back upon us. + +And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite? Why not assert the deity +or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c.? +EPICURUS maintained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a human +figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, +which is deservedly so much ridiculed by CICERO, becomes, according to +you, solid and philosophical. + +In a word, CLEANTHES, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps +to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from +something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one +single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his +theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for +aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior +standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who +afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work +only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to +his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some +superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, +from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You +justly give signs of horror, DEMEA, at these strange suppositions; but +these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are CLEANTHES's +suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are +supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think +that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, +preferable to none at all. + +These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried CLEANTHES: they strike me, +however, with no horror, especially when proposed in that rambling way in +which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I +see, that, by the utmost indulgence of your imagination, you never get +rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe, but are obliged at every +turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily; and +this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion. + + + + +PART 6 + + + +It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said DEMEA, which can be erected on +so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain whether there is one +deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our +existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or +alive, what trust or confidence can we repose in them? What devotion or +worship address to them? What veneration or obedience pay them? To all +the purposes of life the theory of religion becomes altogether useless: +and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, +according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory. + +To render it still more unsatisfactory, said PHILO, there occurs to me +another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the +method of reasoning so much insisted on by CLEANTHES. That like effects +arise from like causes: this principle he supposes the foundation of all +religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less +certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where +several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the unknown will +also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we +conclude that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. +Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we +conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In +short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no +scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity. + +Now, if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, +it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organised body, and seems +actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual +circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: a continual waste in +every part is incessantly repaired: the closest sympathy is perceived +throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its +proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the +whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the +SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it. + +You have too much learning, CLEANTHES, to be at all surprised at this +opinion, which, you know, was maintained by almost all the Theists of +antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For +though, sometimes, the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as +if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather +their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organisation +renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that, as the +universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art +and contrivance, if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, +be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour +of the ancient than the modern theory. + +There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which +recommended it to the ancient theologians. Nothing more repugnant to all +their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than +mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their +senses nor comprehension, and of which they had not observed one single +instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they +felt both: an order, arrangement, organisation, or internal machinery, in +both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but +seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to +suppose the divine mind and body to be also coeval, and to have, both of +them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and inseparable +from them. + +Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomorphism, CLEANTHES, on +which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any +considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to +systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in supposing an +animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, +possessed of order and organisation, than in supposing a similar order to +belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always +to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely +neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which +you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you +assert, that our limited experience is an unequal standard, by which to +judge of the unlimited extent of nature; you entirely abandon your own +hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, +and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. + +This theory, I own, replied CLEANTHES, has never before occurred to me, +though a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an +examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You +are very scrupulous, indeed, said PHILO: were I to examine any system of +yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in +starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if any thing occur +to you, you will oblige us by proposing it. + +Why then, replied CLEANTHES, it seems to me, that, though the world does, +in many circumstances, resemble an animal body; yet is the analogy also +defective in many circumstances the most material: no organs of sense; no +seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In +short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an +animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the +soul of the world. + +But, in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the +world; and that is a principle, which, I think, can be refuted by the +strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this +purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those, +who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their +inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations +derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual +revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches +and poverty; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited +experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be +expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger +of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations; and +had these convulsions continued a little longer, or been a little more +violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a +few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the +Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the +appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been +utterly lost; in which case, the Western world, being totally barbarous, +would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the GREEK language +and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of +CONSTANTINOPLE. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the +mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily +imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later +origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the +eternity of the world, seems a little precarious. + +But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. LUCULLUS was +the first that brought cherry-trees from ASIA to EUROPE; though that tree +thrives so well in many EUROPEAN climates, that it grows in the woods +without any culture. Is it possible, that throughout a whole eternity, no +EUROPEAN had ever passed into ASIA, and thought of transplanting so +delicious a fruit into his own country? Or if the tree was once +transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish? Empires +may rise and fall, liberty and slavery succeed alternately, ignorance and +knowledge give place to each other; but the cherry-tree will still remain +in the woods of GREECE, SPAIN, and ITALY, and will never be affected by +the revolutions of human society. + +It is not two thousand years since vines were transplanted into FRANCE, +though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is +not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were +known in AMERICA. Is it possible, that during the revolutions of a whole +eternity, there never arose a COLUMBUS, who might open the communication +between EUROPE and that continent? We may as well imagine, that all men +would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to +think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the +youth, or rather infancy, of the world; as being founded on the operation +of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society +is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the +elements will ever destroy all the EUROPEAN animals and vegetables which +are now to be found in the Western world. + +And what argument have you against such convulsions? replied PHILO. +Strong and almost incontestable proofs may be traced over the whole +earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely +covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from +matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and +great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The +incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate +some such general transformations; though, at the same time, it is +observable, that all the changes and corruptions of which we have ever +had experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor +can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the +parts, we may infer in the whole; at least, that is the method of +reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to +defend any particular system of this nature, which I never willingly +should do, I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an +eternal inherent principle of order to the world, though attended with +great and continual revolutions and alterations. This at once solves all +difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely +complete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must sooner or +later have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have +been as they are, were there not an original inherent principle of order +somewhere, in thought or in matter? And it is very indifferent to which +of these we give the preference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, +sceptical or religious. Every thing is surely governed by steady, +inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, +we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no +idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly +see that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, +ever to admit of any other disposition. + +Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which +maintained, as we learn from HESIOD, that this globe was governed by +30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature: you would +naturally object, CLEANTHES, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis; +and that it is as easy to suppose all men animals, beings more numerous, +but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the +same inference a step further, and you will find a numerous society of +deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses within +himself the powers and perfections of the whole society. All these +systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on +your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any +advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your +principles. + + + + +PART 7 + + + +But here, continued PHILO, in examining the ancient system of the soul of +the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, +must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first +inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a +greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of +human art, it is more probable that its cause resembles the cause of the +former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be +ascribed to generation or vegetation, than to reason or design. Your +conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and +defective. + +Pray open up this argument a little further, said DEMEA, for I do not +rightly apprehend it in that concise manner in which you have expressed +it. + +Our friend CLEANTHES, replied PHILO, as you have heard, asserts, that +since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the +existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The +world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance; therefore its +cause must also resemble that of the other. Here we may remark, that the +operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very +small part, to wit that inanimate matter lying within his reach, is the +rule by which CLEANTHES judges of the origin of the whole; and he +measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual +standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic, I affirm, +that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human +invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the +world, and which, therefore, afford a better conjecture concerning the +universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. +The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a +watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, +resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation +or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be +something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation. + +But how is it conceivable, said DEMEA, that the world can arise from any +thing similar to vegetation or generation? + +Very easily, replied PHILO. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into +the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees; so the great +vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself +certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, +vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world; +and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star +to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which every +where surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new +system. + +Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should +suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal: +and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without +any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so... + +I understand you, says DEMEA: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions are +these! What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions? And is the +slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal +sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both? Objects, +which are in general so widely different, ought they to be a standard for +each other? + +Right, cries PHILO: This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. +I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of +cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in +extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the +whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what +rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice? Is there any other rule +than the greater similarity of the objects compared? And does not a plant +or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a +stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, +which arises from reason and design? + +But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk? said DEMEA. +Can you explain their operations, and anatomise that fine internal +structure on which they depend? + +As much, at least, replied PHILO, as CLEANTHES can explain the operations +of reason, or anatomise that internal structure on which it depends. But +without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer, +that it sprang from generation; and that with as great certainty as you +conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, +reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects +are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible; and one of these +principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a +standard to the whole of nature. + +In reality, DEMEA, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the +views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our +conclusions concerning such extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. +In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, +reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each +other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other +principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of +the universe, could we travel from planet to planet, and from system to +system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric? Any one of +these four principles above mentioned, (and a hundred others which lie +open to our conjecture,) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the +origin of the world; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality to +confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds +operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a +partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal +fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or +vegetation; and, perhaps, even that vague, indeterminate word, Nature, to +which the vulgar refer every thing, is not at the bottom more +inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from +experience; but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, +are totally unknown; nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to +experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation, from a seed shed +by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or +contrivance, according to the sense in which CLEANTHES understands it. + +But methinks, said DEMEA, if the world had a vegetative quality, and +could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power +would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For +whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design? Or how can +order spring from any thing which perceives not that order which it +bestows? + +You need only look around you, replied PHILO, to satisfy yourself with +regard to this question. A tree bestows order and organisation on that +tree which springs from it, without knowing the order; an animal in the +same manner on its offspring; a bird on its nest; and instances of this +kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise +from reason and contrivance. To say, that all this order in animals and +vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question; nor +can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori, +both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and +that it can never of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong +to matter. + +But further, DEMEA; this objection which you urge can never be made use +of by CLEANTHES, without renouncing a defence which he has already made +against one of my objections. When I inquired concerning the cause of +that supreme reason and intelligence into which he resolves every thing; +he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could +never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. "We must +stop somewhere", says he; "nor is it ever within the reach of human +capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any +objects. It is sufficient, if any steps, so far as we go, are supported +by experience and observation." Now, that vegetation and generation, as +well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is +undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to +the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And +when CLEANTHES asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or +generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his +great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on +both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to +stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, +generation has some privileges above reason: for we see every day the +latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter. + +Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, +resembles an animal; therefore it is an animal, therefore it arose from +generation. The steps, I confess, are wide; yet there is some small +appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says CLEANTHES, resembles +a machine; therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The +steps are here equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he +pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step further, and to infer design or +reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, +with better authority, use the same freedom to push further his +hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle +of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the +utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. Reason, in +innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of +generation, and never to arise from any other principle. + +HESIOD, and all the ancient mythologists, were so struck with this +analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an +animal birth, and copulation. PLATO too, so far as he is intelligible, +seems to have adopted some such notion in his TIMAEUS. + +The BRAHMINS assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who +spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates +afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and +resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which +appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible +animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the +whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our +globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is +very possible,) this inference would there appear as natural and +irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all +things to design and intelligence, as explained by CLEANTHES. Why an +orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, +it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason. + +I must confess, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, that of all men living, the +task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits +you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So +great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to +acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such +out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me: though I +clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but +you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution +so ready as the objection: while you must be sensible, that common sense +and reason are entirely against you; and that such whimsies as you have +delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us. + + + + +PART 8 + + + +What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention, replied PHILO, is +entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects adapted to the +narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one determination, +which carries probability or conviction with it; and to a man of sound +judgement, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd +and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred +contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy; and +invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort +of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems +of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth, though it +is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be +the true system. + +For instance, what if I should revive the old EPICUREAN hypothesis? This +is commonly, and I believe justly, esteemed the most absurd system that +has yet been proposed; yet I know not whether, with a few alterations, it +might not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead +of supposing matter infinite, as EPICURUS did, let us suppose it finite. +A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: +and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or +position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, therefore, +with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and +destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds +and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, +in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination. + +But this supposes, said DEMEA, that matter can acquire motion, without +any voluntary agent or first mover. + +And where is the difficulty, replied PHILO, of that supposition? Every +event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and +every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, +in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, +begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose +always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; +and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in +matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind +and intelligence. + +Besides, why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all +eternity, and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld +in the universe? As much is lost by the composition of motion, as much is +gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is +certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as +far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at +present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest. + +And this very consideration too, continued PHILO, which we have stumbled +on in the course of the argument, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, +that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an +order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual +agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in +the forms which it produces? There certainly is such an economy; for this +is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of +matter, therefore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce +this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once +established, supports itself, for many ages, if not to eternity. But +wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in +perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its +situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and +contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must +have a relation to each other, and to the whole; and the whole itself +must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element +in which the form subsists; to the materials with which it repairs its +waste and decay; and to every other form which is hostile or friendly. A +defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter of +which it is composed is again set loose, and is thrown into irregular +motions and fermentations, till it unite itself to some other regular +form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great +quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is +entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its +first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcass of one +languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; +till finite, though innumerable revolutions produce at last some forms, +whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a +continued succession of matter. + +Suppose (for we shall endeavour to vary the expression), that matter were +thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force; it is evident that +this first position must, in all probability, be the most confused and +most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of +human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts, discover an +adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the +actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever +in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or +activity. But suppose that the actuating force, whatever it be, still +continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a +second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the +first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No +particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The +original force, still remaining in activity, gives a perpetual +restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and +instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, +it is instantly hurried away, and confounded, by that never-ceasing force +which actuates every part of matter. + +Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued succession of +chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so +as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed +inherent in it), yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, +amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find to +be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually +changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, +in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather +be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and +may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which +is in the universe? Let us contemplate the subject a little, and we shall +find, that this adjustment, if attained by matter of a seeming stability +in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, +affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty. + +It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals +or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain +know, how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted? Do +we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment +ceases, and that its matter corrupting tries some new form? It happens +indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some +regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it +were not so, could the world subsist? Must it not dissolve as well as the +animal, and pass through new positions and situations, till in great, but +finite succession, it falls at last into the present or some such order? + +It is well, replied CLEANTHES, you told us, that this hypothesis was +suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure +to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections +to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist, unless it possess +those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence: some new order or +economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission; till at last some +order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But +according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and +advantages which men and all animals possess? Two eyes, two ears, are not +absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might +have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, +and those innumerable fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction +and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the +sandy deserts of AFRICA and ARABIA, would the world have been dissolved? +If no lodestone had been framed to give that wonderful and useful +direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been +immediately extinguished? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very +frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one +of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, +which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe. + +At least, you may safely infer, said PHILO, that the foregoing hypothesis +is so far incomplete and imperfect, which I shall not scruple to allow. +But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this +nature? Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be +liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to +our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature? Your +theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage, even though +you have run into Anthropomorphism, the better to preserve a conformity +to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances +which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are +ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms: You reverse +this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we +have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that +matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence +upon it. No animal can move immediately any thing but the members of its +own body; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seems to be an +universal law of nature: But your theory implies a contradiction to this +experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to +collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought +that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); +these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each +other, and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be +received from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to be rejected on +account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which +we can justly pronounce no one to be exempted. + +All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and +insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in his turn; while he +carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, +and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, +prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic; who tells them, that no +system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects: For this +plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard +to any subject. A total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable +resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, +among Theologians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who +remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no +fixed station or abiding city, which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged +to defend? + + + + +PART 9 + + + +But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said DEMEA, +had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, +which, by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all +doubt and difficulty? By this argument, too, we may prove the infinity of +the Divine attributes, which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with +certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is +finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, +prove an infinite cause? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very +difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from +contemplating the works of nature; nor will the uniformity alone of the +plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. +Whereas the argument a priori ... + +You seem to reason, DEMEA, interposed CLEANTHES, as if those advantages +and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its +solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what +argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, +from itself, better than from its useful consequences, endeavour to +determine what value we ought to put upon it. + +The argument, replied DEMEA, which I would insist on, is the common one. +Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being +absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of +its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we +must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate +cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that +is necessarily existent: Now, that the first supposition is absurd, may +be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of causes and +effects, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and +efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal +chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by any +thing; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much +as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is +still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from +eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there +be no necessarily existent being, any supposition which can be formed is +equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing's having +existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which +constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something +to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular +possibility, exclusive of the rest? External causes, there are supposed +to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that +can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a +necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in +himself, and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express +contradiction. There is, consequently, such a Being; that is, there is a +Deity. + +I shall not leave it to PHILO, said CLEANTHES, though I know that the +starting objections is his chief delight, to point out the weakness of +this metaphysical reasoning. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, +and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety +and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it. + +I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in +pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any +arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies +a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a +contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as +non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a +contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is +demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am +willing to rest the whole controversy upon it. + +It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarily existent being; and this +necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, +that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be +as impossible for him not to exist, as for twice two not to be four. But +it is evident that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the +same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to +conceive the non-existence of what we formerly conceived to exist; nor +can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain +always in being; in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always +conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary +existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is +consistent. + +But further, why may not the material universe be the necessarily +existent Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We +dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught +we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, +would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that +twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove, that the +material world is not the necessarily existent Being: and this argument +is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the +world. "Any particle of matter," it is said[]Dr. Clarke, "may be conceived +to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an +annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible." But it seems +a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends +equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that +the mind can at least imagine him to be non-existent, or his attributes +to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which +can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attributes +unalterable: And no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not +belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they +can never be proved incompatible with it. + +Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems +absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can any thing, +that exists from eternity, have a cause, since that relation implies a +priority in time, and a beginning of existence? + +In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by +that which preceded it, and causes that which succeeds it. Where then is +the difficulty? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the +uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct +countries into one kingdom, or several distinct members into one body, is +performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on +the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each +individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think +it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of +the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause +of the parts. + +Though the reasonings which you have urged, CLEANTHES, may well excuse +me, said PHILO, from starting any further difficulties, yet I cannot +forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by +arithmeticians, that the products of 9, compose always either 9, or some +lesser product of 9, if you add together all the characters of which any +of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are +products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, 369 is +a product also of 9; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser +product of 9. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may +be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful +algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity, and +demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these +numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the +universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can +furnish a key which solves the difficulty? And instead of admiring the +order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into +the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was +absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition? So +dangerous is it to introduce this idea of necessity into the present +question! and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite +to the religious hypothesis! + +But dropping all these abstractions, continued PHILO, and confining +ourselves to more familiar topics, I shall venture to add an observation, +that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except +to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to +abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the +understanding frequently leads to truth through obscurity, and, contrary +to first appearances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to +subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good +sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in +such arguments, though they are not perhaps able to explain distinctly +where it lies; a certain proof that men ever did, and ever will derive +their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. + + + + +PART 10 + + + +It is my opinion, I own, replied DEMEA, that each man feels, in a manner, +the truth of religion within his own breast, and, from a consciousness of +his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek +protection from that Being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So +anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is +still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, +and endeavour, by prayers, adoration, and sacrifice, to appease those +unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and +oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are! what resource for us amidst +the innumerable ills of life, did not religion suggest some methods of +atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly +agitated and tormented? + +I am indeed persuaded, said PHILO, that the best, and indeed the only +method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just +representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose +a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of +reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove what every one feels +within himself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, +more intimately and sensibly. + +The people, indeed, replied DEMEA, are sufficiently convinced of this +great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; +the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of +pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial +in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their +own immediate feeling and experience? + +In this point, said PHILO, the learned are perfectly agreed with the +vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery +has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and +melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a +system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in +images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr. Young, the whole inspired +tribe have ever been sensible, that no other representation of things +would suit the feeling and observation of each individual. + +As to authorities, replied DEMEA, you need not seek them. Look round this +library of CLEANTHES. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of +particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to +treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, +from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, +extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is +entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can +recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it. + +There you must excuse me, said PHILO: LEIBNIZ has denied it; and is +perhaps the first [That sentiment had been maintained by Dr. King and some +few others before Leibniz; though by none of so great a fame as that +German philosopher] who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; +at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system. + +And by being the first, replied DEMEA, might he not have been sensible of +his error? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to +make discoveries especially in so late an age? And can any man hope by a +simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning), to bear +down the united testimony of mankind, founded on sense and consciousness? + +And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all +other animals? The whole earth, believe me, PHILO, is cursed and +polluted. A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. +Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, +anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into +life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: +Weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is +at last finished in agony and horror. + +Observe too, says PHILO, the curious artifices of Nature, in order to +embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the +weaker, and keep them in perpetual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in +their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without +relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are +bred on the body of each animal, or, flying about, infix their stings in +him. These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment +them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every +animal is surrounded with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and +destruction. + +Man alone, said DEMEA, seems to be, in part, an exception to this rule. +For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and +bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey +upon him. + +On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried PHILO, that the uniform and +equal maxims of Nature are most apparent. Man, it is true, can, by +combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the +whole animal creation: but does he not immediately raise up to himself +imaginary enemies, the demons of his fancy, who haunt him with +superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life? His pleasure, +as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give +them umbrage and offence: his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials +to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, +presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the +wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious +breast of wretched mortals. + +Besides, consider, DEMEA: This very society, by which we surmount those +wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to +us? What woe and misery does it not occasion? Man is the greatest enemy +of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, +war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each +other; and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, +were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their +separation. + +But though these external insults, said DEMEA, from animals, from men, +from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of +woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within +ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many +lie under the lingering torment of diseases? Hear the pathetic +enumeration of the great poet. + + + Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs, + Demoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, + And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, + Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence. + Dire was the tossing, deep the groans: despair + Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch. + And over them triumphant death his dart + Shook: but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd + With vows, as their chief good and final hope. + + +The disorders of the mind, continued DEMEA, though more secret, are not +perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, +disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed +through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors? How many have +scarcely ever felt any better sensations? Labour and poverty, so abhorred +by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number; and those +few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach +contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make +a very happy man; but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed; and +any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one?) nay often +the absence of one good (and who can possess all?) is sufficient to +render life ineligible. + +Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as +a specimen of its ills, a hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded +with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a +fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, +famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him, and give him +a notion of its pleasures; whither should I conduct him? to a ball, to an +opera, to court? He might justly think, that I was only showing him a +diversity of distress and sorrow. + +There is no evading such striking instances, said PHILO, but by +apologies, which still further aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I +ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life?... +They have no just reason, says one: these complaints proceed only from +their discontented, repining, anxious disposition...And can there +possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a +wretched temper? + +But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, says my antagonist, +why do they remain in life?... + + Not satisfied with life, afraid of death. + +This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not +bribed to the continuance of our existence. + +It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits +indulge, and which has spread these complaints among the whole race of +mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame? Is it +any thing but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of +life? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more +alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy, what +judgement must we form in general of human life? + +Let men remain at rest, says our adversary, and they will be easy. They +are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No! reply I: an anxious +languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble, their +activity and ambition. + +I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied +CLEANTHES: but I confess I feel little or nothing of it in myself, and +hope that it is not so common as you represent it. + +If you feel not human misery yourself, cried DEMEA, I congratulate you on +so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not +been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let +us attend to the great, the fortunate emperor, CHARLES V, when, tired +with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the +hands of his son. In the last harangue which he made on that memorable +occasion, he publicly avowed, that the greatest prosperities which he had +ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might +truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentment. But did +the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater +happiness? If we may credit his son's account, his repentance commenced +the very day of his resignation. + +CICERO's fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and +renown; yet what pathetic complaints of the ills of life do his familiar +letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain? And suitably to +his own experience, he introduces CATO, the great, the fortunate CATO, +protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would +reject the present. + +Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over +again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No! but the next +twenty, they say, will be better: + + + And from the dregs of life, hope to receive + What the first sprightly running could not give. + + +Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery, it +reconciles even contradictions), that they complain at once of the +shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow. + +And is it possible, CLEANTHES, said PHILO, that after all these +reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still +persevere in your Anthropomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of +the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the +same nature with these virtues in human creatures? His power we allow is +infinite: whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other +animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom +is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But +the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity: therefore it +is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human +knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than +these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the +benevolence and mercy of men? + +EPICURUS's old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, +but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he +malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil? + +You ascribe, CLEANTHES (and I believe justly), a purpose and intention to +Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice +and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? The preservation +alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for +her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any +care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No +resource for this purpose: no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure +or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some +want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few phenomena of this +nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. + +Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives +satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and +propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, +arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheumatisms, where the +injury to the animal machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, +laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no +further tendency: spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains +of the same nature. How then does the Divine benevolence display itself, +in the sense of you Anthropomorphites? None but we Mystics, as you were +pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by +deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible. + +And have you at last, said CLEANTHES smiling, betrayed your intentions, +PHILO? Your long agreement with DEMEA did indeed a little surprise me; +but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against +me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of +your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the +present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an +end at once of all religion. For to what purpose establish the natural +attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and +uncertain? + +You take umbrage very easily, replied DEMEA, at opinions the most +innocent, and the most generally received, even amongst the religious and +devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a +topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged +with no less than Atheism and profaneness. Have not all pious divines and +preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have +they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may +attend it? This world is but a point in comparison of the universe; this +life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, +therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of +existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of +things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace with +adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the +mazes and intricacies of his providence. + +No! replied CLEANTHES, No! These arbitrary suppositions can never be +admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence +can any cause be known but from its known effects? Whence can any +hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena? To establish one +hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air; and the utmost +we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to ascertain the +bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, +establish its reality. + +The only method of supporting Divine benevolence, and it is what I +willingly embrace, is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of +man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly +fictitious; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is +more common than sickness; pleasure than pain; happiness than misery. And +for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a +hundred enjoyments. + +Admitting your position, replied PHILO, which yet is extremely doubtful, +you must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent than +pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is +often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid +enjoyments; and how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several +in the most acute torments? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever +able to reach ecstasy and rapture; and in no one instance can it continue +for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate, +the nerves relax, the fabric is disordered, and the enjoyment quickly +degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, good God, how +often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it +becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted, +courage languishes, melancholy seizes us, and nothing terminates our +misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole +cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still +greater horror and consternation. + +But not to insist upon these topics, continued PHILO, though most +obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you, +CLEANTHES, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue, +and are unawares introducing a total scepticism into the most essential +articles of natural and revealed theology. What! no method of fixing a +just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human +life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our +present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to be eligible and +desirable! But this is contrary to every one's feeling and experience: It +is contrary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No +decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it +possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all +the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals: And thus, by +your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its +very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that +system is equally uncertain. + +But allowing you what never will be believed, at least what you never +possibly can prove, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this +life, exceeds its misery, you have yet done nothing: For this is not, by +any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and +infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by +chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the +Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? +But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so +short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects +exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and +falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic which I have all along +insisted on, but which you have, from the beginning, rejected with scorn +and indignation. + +But I will be contented to retire still from this entrenchment, for I +deny that you can ever force me in it. I will allow, that pain or misery +in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even +in your sense of these attributes: What are you advanced by all these +concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must +prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present +mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful +undertaking! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being +finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where +they are also so jarring and discordant! + +Here, CLEANTHES, I find myself at ease in my argument. Here I triumph. +Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of +intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical +subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its +parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes +strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what +I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then +imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But +there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from +which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, +or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and +infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is +your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical +subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience. + + + + +PART 11 + + + +I scruple not to allow, said CLEANTHES, that I have been apt to suspect +the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all +theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and +that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better +served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate +expressions. The terms, admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, +and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and any thing +beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the +affections or sentiments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all +human analogy, as seems your intention, DEMEA, I am afraid we abandon all +religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. +If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to +reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes; +much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the +Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind, a +satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and +every untoward phenomenon be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then +be chosen, in order to avoid a greater; inconveniences be submitted to, +in order to reach a desirable end; and in a word, benevolence, regulated +by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the +present. You, PHILO, who are so prompt at starting views, and +reflections, and analogies, I would gladly hear, at length, without +interruption, your opinion of this new theory; and if it deserve our +attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form. + +My sentiments, replied PHILO, are not worth being made a mystery of; and +therefore, without any ceremony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with +regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a +very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted +with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very +good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from his +conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find +it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these +attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could +be so full of vice and misery and disorder, as it appears in this life. +Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still +assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent +Being; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; but would +never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; +since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness +and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those +phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, +which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not +antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent, and +powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of +things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason +for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of +his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference +concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that +inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more +you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render +him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the +reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him +merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition +or conjecture. + +Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment +convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, +stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, +confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you +would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. +The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that +if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What +he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the +other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. +But still you would assert in general, that, if the architect had had +skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, +and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have +remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your +own ignorance of such a plan, will never convince you of the +impossibility of it. If you find any inconveniences and deformities in +the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn +the architect. + +In short, I repeat the question: Is the world, considered in general, and +as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a +limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and +benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. +And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, +allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a +Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The +consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, +especially where infinity is excluded from the Divine attributes, may +perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence, but can never be +foundations for any inference. + +There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest +part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures; and it is not +impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. +We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with +regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however +wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may +not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep +ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious, and +not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is +supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the +case with regard to all the causes of evil, and the circumstances on +which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree +necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the +utmost license of imagination. + +The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or +economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are +employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the +great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various +degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All +animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by +any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; +instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they +might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their +subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain; at least +they might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly +possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is +any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If animals can +be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; +and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce +that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. +Shall we conjecture, that such a contrivance was necessary, without any +appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the +most certain truth? + +But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the +second circumstance, viz. the conducting of the world by general laws; +and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true, if +everything were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature +would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the +conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this +inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, +wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any +preparation, or long progress of causes and effects? + +Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the +world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us +appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our +expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite +number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a +great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons and on the +prosperity of public societies; and indeed all human life, in a manner, +depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret +springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all +these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, +without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes +were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind. Good +princes enjoy sound health and long life. Persons born to power and +authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few +such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the +face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of +nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, +where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded. Some small +touches given to CALIGULA's brain in his infancy, might have converted +him into a TRAJAN. One wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying +CAESAR and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored +liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, +be good reasons why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they +are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons +exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the Divine +attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that +conclusion. + +If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if +animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but +some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various +concurrence and opposition of general laws; but this ill would be very +rare, were it not for the third circumstance, which I proposed to +mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are +distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs +and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, +that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any +single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe. Every +animal has the requisite endowments; but these endowments are bestowed +with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminution must +entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is +a proportional abatement in the others. Animals which excel in swiftness +are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both are either +imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving +wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, +is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily +advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, +without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill +and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation +of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has +afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly +sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have +bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure +the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate +concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so +surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, +by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some +reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor +would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an +economy. The Author of Nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is +supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, +as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in his +dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power +extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed +these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder +is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock +will enable him to finish. + +In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man +should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force +of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or +rhinoceros; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I +am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his +soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and +labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent +to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an +equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by +habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any +allay of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. +Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from +idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their +frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of +land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of +every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully +reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best +regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable +of any, Nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow +it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for +his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so +contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can +oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at +least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of +a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our +demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If +we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgement, of a +more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to benevolence and +friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the +order of Nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of +being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our +state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard; I +dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of +wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our +foe or refuses its assistance ... we should also have our own temper to +struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone +fence against these multiplied evils. + +The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the +universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles +of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are +few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and +whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the +whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without +affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it +must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, +are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in +which their utility consists; but they are, all of them, apt, on every +occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, +that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; +so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with +which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours +along the surface of the globe, and to assist men in navigation: but how +oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious? +Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: +but how often are they defective? how often excessive? Heat is requisite +to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due +proportion. On the mixture and secretion of the humours and juices of the +body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts +perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all +the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger? But how oft do +they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society? +There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently +becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with +the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The +irregularity is never perhaps so great as to destroy any species; but is +often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery. + +On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the +greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable +of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil +never could have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed +with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity +requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so +accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; +there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at +present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion? Shall we say that +these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have +been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too +presumptuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest +in our conclusions. Let us allow, that, if the goodness of the Deity (I +mean a goodness like the human) could be established on any tolerable +reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be +sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown +manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this +goodness is not antecedently established, but must be inferred from the +phenomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are +so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have +been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on +such a subject. I am Sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, +notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes +as you suppose; but surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a +conclusion cannot result from Scepticism, but must arise from the +phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from +these phenomena. + +Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated +and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety +and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living +existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive +to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How +contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but +the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, +and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her +maimed and abortive children! + +Here the MANICHAEAN system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the +difficulty: and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has +more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible +account of the strange mixture of good and ill which appears in life. But +if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement +of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of +the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an +opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures: +but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of +principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true +conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely +indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above +ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light +above heavy. + +There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the +universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have +perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and +malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can +never prove the two former unmixed principles; and the uniformity and +steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, +therefore, seems by far the most probable. + +What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little +or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude +of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence +resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater +cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since +moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral +good than natural evil above natural good. + +But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which +is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so +long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much +puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a +cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every +effect must have a cause, and that cause another, you must either carry +on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who +is the ultimate cause of all things... + +Hold! hold! cried DEMEA: Whither does your imagination hurry you? I +joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible +nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of CLEANTHES, who +would measure every thing by human rule and standard. But I now find you +running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels, and +betraying that holy cause which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, +then, a more dangerous enemy than CLEANTHES himself? + +And are you so late in perceiving it? replied CLEANTHES. Believe me, +DEMEA, your friend PHILO, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at +both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious +reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of +ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute +incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery, +and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to +be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of +stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; +and perhaps no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, +than such as encourage the blind amazement, the diffidence, and +melancholy of mankind. But at present... + +Blame not so much, interposed PHILO, the ignorance of these reverend +gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly +it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was +vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are +incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract +this position; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that +there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than pains, even in this +life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was +thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed mankind never have +recourse to superior powers so readily as in that disposition. But as men +have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is +necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such arguments as +will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the +same (and from the same causes) with that which I formerly remarked with +regard to Scepticism. + +Thus PHILO continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure +of established opinions. But I could observe that DEMEA did not at all +relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, +on some pretence or other, to leave the company. + + + + +PART 12 + + + +After DEMEA's departure, CLEANTHES and PHILO continued the conversation +in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said CLEANTHES, will +have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are +in company; and to tell truth, PHILO, I should rather wish to reason with +either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit +of controversy, joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries +you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so +sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that +occasion. + +I must confess, replied PHILO, that I am less cautious on the subject of +Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, +on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and +because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common +sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You, in particular, CLEANTHES, +with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that +notwithstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular +arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, +or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers +himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of +nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most +careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in +absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in +vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the +contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, +from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new +organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also discovered its +use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the +maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most +proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, +lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is +observable in other parts of philosophy: And thus all the sciences almost +lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their +authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess +that intention. + +It is with pleasure I hear GALEN reason concerning the structure of the +human body. The anatomy of a man, says he [De formatione foetus], discovers +above 600 different muscles; and whoever duly considers these, will find, +that, in each of them, Nature must have adjusted at least ten different +circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper +figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and +lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, +veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several +views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he +calculates to be 284: The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of +each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these +simple and homogeneous parts! But if we consider the skin, ligaments, +vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; +how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and +intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted! The further we advance +in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry +still, at a distance, further scenes beyond our reach; in the fine +internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the +fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every +different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact +propriety, suited to the different intentions of Nature in framing each +species. And if the infidelity of GALEN, even when these natural sciences +were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances, to +what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have +attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence! + +Could I meet with one of this species (who, I thank God, are very rare), +I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not discover himself +immediately to our senses, were it possible for him to give stronger +proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? +What indeed could such a Divine Being do, but copy the present economy of +things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could +mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which +demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; +and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, +according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for +undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature +admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very +numerous or forcible: How much more, in the present case, where no human +imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their +cogency! + +I shall further add, said CLEANTHES, to what you have so well urged, that +one great advantage of the principle of Theism, is, that it is the only +system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and +yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and +experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of +human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many +instances of order and design in Nature, that it must immediately strike +all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. +Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by +establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate: It +is sufficient for him if he start doubts and difficulties; and by remote +and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgement, which is +here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But, besides that this state of +mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained +against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the +religious hypothesis. A false, absurd system, human nature, from the +force of prejudice, is capable of adhering to with obstinacy and +perseverance: But no system at all, in opposition to a theory supported +by strong and obvious reason, by natural propensity, and by early +education, I think it absolutely impossible to maintain or defend. + +So little, replied PHILO, do I esteem this suspense of judgement in the +present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters +somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is +usually imagined. That the works of Nature bear a great analogy to the +productions of art, is evident; and according to all the rules of good +reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that +their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also +considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional +difference in the causes; and in particular, ought to attribute a much +higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have +ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a DEITY is plainly +ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, whether, on account +of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, +notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed +between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal controversy? +No man can deny the analogies between the effects: To restrain ourselves +from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this +inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an +analogy: And if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme +cause a GOD or DEITY, but desire to vary the expression; what can we call +him but MIND or THOUGHT, to which he is justly supposed to bear a +considerable resemblance? + +All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound +so much in philosophical and theological inquiries; and it is found, that +the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from +the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the +strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a +species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of +human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any +precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or +precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any +quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether HANNIBAL +be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man, what degree of +beauty CLEOPATRA possessed, what epithet of praise LIVY or THUCYDIDES is +entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The +disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or +vice versa; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into +each other's meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, +like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which +may be the standard in the controversy. That the dispute concerning +Theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, +if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the +slightest inquiry. I ask the Theist, if he does not allow, that there is +a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible difference between the +human and the divine mind: The more pious he is, the more readily will he +assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify +the difference: He will even assert, that the difference is of a nature +which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the Atheist, who, I +assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I +ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the +parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every situation and in every age; whether +the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure +of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy +to each other: It is impossible he can deny it: He will readily +acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still further +in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle +which first arranged, and still maintains order in this universe, bears +not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of +nature, and, among the rest, to the economy of human mind and thought. +However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where then, cry I to both +these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute? The Theist allows, +that the original intelligence is very different from human reason: The +Atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote +analogy to it. Will you quarrel, Gentlemen, about the degrees, and enter +into a controversy, which admits not of any precise meaning, nor +consequently of any determination? If you should be so obstinate, I +should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the +Theist, on the one hand, exaggerates the dissimilarity between the +Supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal +creatures; and the Atheist, on the other, magnifies the analogy among all +the operations of Nature, in every period, every situation, and every +position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies; and if +you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure +yourselves of your animosity. + +And here I must also acknowledge, CLEANTHES, that as the works of Nature +have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, +than to those of our benevolence and justice, we have reason to infer, +that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to +those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the +consequence? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more +defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For, as the Supreme +Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect, whatever differs +most from him, departs the furthest from the supreme standard of +rectitude and perfection. + +It seems evident that the dispute between the Skeptics and Dogmatists +is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and +assurance which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning; and such +disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise +determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies that there are +difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science, and that +these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely +insolvable. No Skeptic denies that we lie under an absolute necessity, +notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and +reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently +assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between +these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, +caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dogmatist, +for like reasons, on the necessity. + +These, CLEANTHES, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these +sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in +proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar +superstitions; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing +such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And +you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion +to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both. + +My inclination, replied CLEANTHES, lies, I own, a contrary way. Religion, +however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine +of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that +we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary +rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find; how +much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal? + +How happens it then, said PHILO, if vulgar superstition be so salutary to +society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious +consequences on public affairs? Factions, civil wars, persecutions, +subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal +consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If +the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we +are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend +it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those +in which it is never regarded or heard of. + +The reason of this observation, replied CLEANTHES, is obvious. The proper +office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanise their +conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience; and as +its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and +justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these +other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate +principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has +become only a cover to faction and ambition. + +And so will all religion, said PHILO, except the philosophical and +rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The +inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and +punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite +and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the +attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which +we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are +declaiming against the common behaviour and conduct of the world, they +always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed +it is); and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence +of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their +religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their +speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so +powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to +subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is +certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and +benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views +suggested by theological theories and systems. A man's natural +inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the +mind, and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas +religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and +bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether +habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the +philosophers, is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least +impulse: yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, +prevail above a great impulse; because no strokes or blows can be +repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation. + +Another advantage of inclination: It engages on its side all the wit and +ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious +principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them: In which it is +almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account +for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy +themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their +religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools +ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that from study and +philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to +theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a +great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon +several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they +be cheated and deceived by him? + +We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and +reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the +restraint of morals; and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are +utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be +pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations +to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous +observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not +run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances +of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that +atrociousness, unknown to the Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of +declaiming in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a +sure forfeiture of the Divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be +laid upon it. + +But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in +direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the +raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous +distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most +pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the +natural motives of justice and humanity. + +Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar +motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must +be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot +satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. +Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the +heart, at the time, feels cold and languid: A habit of dissimulation is +by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant +principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest +zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being +inconsistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual +character. + +The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, are easily imagined; +but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be +forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the +cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it. + +The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal +salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a +narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it +easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. + +Thus, the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on +general conduct; nor is their operation favourable to morality, in the +instances where they predominate. + +Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that +both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very +narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his +fasces and axes from such dangerous hands? But if the spirit of popular +religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. +The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, +will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the +guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of +life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set +apart for religion, who are continually inculcating it upon others, and +who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it? Whence comes it then, +that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to +popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, +and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society? +Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with +inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he +must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every +consideration of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his +own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the +wiser maxim, he must preserve a very philosophical indifference to all of +them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; +otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, +persecutions, and civil commotions. + +True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious consequences: but we must +treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world; nor have I +any thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a +species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that +principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of +being always confined to very few persons. + +Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a question +whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the +solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and +the reflecting on the general interests of society, which are the chief +restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but +little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and +religion; and a Quaker's asseveration is with us justly put upon the same +footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that POLYBIUS +[Lib. vi. cap. 54.] ascribes the infamy of GREEK faith to the prevalency of +the EPICUREAN philosophy: but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a +reputation in ancient times as Irish evidence has in modern; though we +cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to +mention that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean +philosophy; and EURIPIDES [Iphigenia in Tauride], in a passage which I +shall point out to you, has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against +his nation, with regard to this circumstance. + +Take care, PHILO, replied CLEANTHES, take care: push not matters too far: +allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration +for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great +comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of +adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for +human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents +us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who +created us for happiness; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable +desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will +transfer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those +desires, and render our felicity complete and durable. Next to such a +Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we +can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection. + +These appearances, said PHILO, are most engaging and alluring; and with +regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it +happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater +part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of +religion commonly prevail above its comforts. + +It is allowed, that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as +when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, +that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow? + +But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied CLEANTHES. +Sometimes, said PHILO: but it is natural to imagine, that they will form +a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and +melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the +contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to +predominate in all religions; and we ourselves, after having employed the +most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the +flattest contradiction in affirming that the damned are infinitely +superior in number to the elect. + +I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which +represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render +it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine +models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies +between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking +to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond +it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of CERBERUS and +FURIES; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone. + +It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these +passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them +forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a +cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or +entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and +thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to +do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge +himself still deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he +has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his +thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or +circumstances, which may restore his good humour, and raising cheerful +prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and +triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the +primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always +predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure. + +Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by +exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of +superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so +happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to +support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and +uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. +No wonder that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, +and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is +seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it +is apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that +gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people. + +It is contrary to common sense to entertain apprehensions or terrors upon +account of any opinion whatsoever, or to imagine that we run any risk +hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies both +an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the +Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a +restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, +since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also; and, in +particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior. + +To know God, says SENECA, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed +absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low +condition of mankind, who are delighted with entreaty, solicitation, +presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which +superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the +condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious DEMON, who +exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that +Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly +mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the +votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit +his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or +rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his Divine +perfections: As the only persons entitled to his compassion and +indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally +rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or +endeavour to suspend, all judgement with regard to such sublime and such +extraordinary subjects. + +If the whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, +resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least +undefined proposition, That the cause or causes of order in the universe +probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this +proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular +explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can +be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect +as it is, can be carried no further than to the human intelligence, and +cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other +qualities of the mind; if this really be the case, what can the most +inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, +philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and +believe that the arguments on which it is established exceed the +objections which lie against it? Some astonishment, indeed, will +naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from +its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it can give no +solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and +magnificent a question. But believe me, CLEANTHES, the most natural +sentiment which a well-disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a +longing desire and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, +at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more +particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries of the nature, +attributes, and operations of the Divine object of our faith. A person, +seasoned with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will +fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty +Dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system of Theology by +the mere help of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this +adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical Sceptic is, in a man of +letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, +believing Christian; a proposition which I would willingly recommend to +the attention of PAMPHILUS: And I hope CLEANTHES will forgive me for +interposing so far in the education and instruction of his pupil. + +CLEANTHES and PHILO pursued not this conversation much further: and as +nothing ever made greater impression on me, than all the reasonings of +that day, so I confess, that, upon a serious review of the whole, I +cannot but think, that PHILO's principles are more probable than DEMEA's; +but that those of CLEANTHES approach still nearer to the truth. + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg Etext of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion +by David Hume + diff --git a/old/dlgnr10.zip b/old/dlgnr10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fcd32a --- /dev/null +++ b/old/dlgnr10.zip |