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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71674b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51646 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51646) diff --git a/old/51646-0.txt b/old/51646-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index ac324ea..0000000 --- a/old/51646-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6225 +0,0 @@ -Project Gutenberg's The War Book of the German General Staff, by J. H. Morgan - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The War Book of the German General Staff - Being "The Usages of War on Land" Issued by the Great General Staff of - -Author: J. H. Morgan - -Release Date: April 3, 2016 [EBook #51646] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR BOOK OF GERMAN GENERAL STAFF *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - - - - - THE WAR BOOK OF THE - GERMAN GENERAL STAFF - - - - - THE WAR BOOK OF THE - GERMAN GENERAL STAFF - - BEING “THE USAGES OF WAR ON LAND” - ISSUED BY THE GREAT GENERAL - STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY - - TRANSLATED WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION - - BY - J. H. MORGAN, M.A. - - PROFESSOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE, LONDON, LATE SCHOLAR OF BALLIOL - COLLEGE, OXFORD; JOINT AUTHOR OF - “WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND ITS - LEGAL RESULTS” - - - NEW YORK - McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY - 1915 - - - - - Copyright, 1915, by - MCBRIDE, NAST & CO. - - - Published March, 1915 - - - - - TO - THE LORD FITZMAURICE - IN TOKEN OF - FOURTEEN YEARS OF FRIENDSHIP - AND OF - MUCH WISE COUNSEL IN THE STUDY - OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - - - - -PREFATORY NOTE - - -The text of this book is a literal and integral translation of the -_Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege_ issued and re-issued by the German -General Staff for the instruction of German officers. It is the most -authoritative work of its kind in Germany and takes precedence over -all other publications whether military or legal, alike over the works -of Bernhardi the soldier and of Holtzendorff the jurist. As will be -shown in detail in the critical introduction, The Hague Conventions are -treated by the authors as little more than “scraps of paper”--the only -“laws” recognized by the German Staff are the military usages laid down -in the pages of the Manual, and resting upon “a calculating egotism” -and injudicious “form of reprisals.” - -I have treated the original text with religious respect, seeking -neither to extenuate nor to set down aught in malice. The text is by -no means elegant, but, having regard to the profound significance of -the views therein expressed or suggested, I have thought it my duty -as a translator to sacrifice grace to fidelity. Text, footnotes, and -capital headlines are all literally translated in their entirety. When -I have added footnotes of my own they are enclosed in square brackets. -The marginal notes have been added in order to supply the reader with -a continuous clue. In the Critical Introduction which precedes the -text I have attempted to show the intellectual pedigree of the book as -the true child of the Prussian military tradition, and to exhibit its -degrees of affinity with German morals and with German policy--with -“Politik” and “Kultur.” I have therefore attempted a short study of -German diplomacy, politics, and academic teaching since 1870, with -some side glances at the writings of German soldiers and jurists. All -these, it must be remembered, are integrally related; they all envisage -the same problem. That problem is War. In the German imagination the -Temple of Janus is never closed. Peace is but a suspension of the -state of war instead of war being a rude interruption of a state of -peace. The temperament of the German is saturated with this belligerent -emotion and every one who is not with him is against him. An unbroken -chain links together Clausewitz, Bismarck, Treitschke, von der Goltz, -Bernhardi, and the official exponents of German policy to-day. The -teaching of Clausewitz that war is a continuation of policy has sunk -deeply into the German mind, with the result that their conception of -foreign policy is to provoke a constant apprehension of war. - -The first part of the Introduction appears in print for the first time. -In the second and third parts I have incorporated a short essay on -Treitschke which has appeared in the pages of the _Nineteenth Century_ -(in October last), a criticism of German diplomacy and politics which -was originally contributed to the _Spectator_ in 1906 and a study of -the German professors which was published, under the title of “The -Academic Garrison,” in the _Times_ Supplement of Sept. 1st, 1914. I -desire to thank the respective Editors for their kindness in allowing -me to reproduce here what I had already written there. - - J. H. M. - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGE - - DEDICATION v - - PREFATORY NOTE vii - - INTRODUCTION-- - - I THE GERMAN VIEW OF WAR 1 - - II GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 16 - - III GERMAN CULTURE: THE ACADEMIC GARRISON 44 - - IV GERMAN THOUGHT: TREITSCHKE 53 - - V CONCLUSION 65 - - - CONTENTS OF THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF-- - - INTRODUCTION 67 - - - PART I - - USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS THE ENEMY’S ARMY - - I WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE ARMY 75 - - Regular Army--Irregular Troops--People’s Wars and National - Wars. - - II THE MEANS OF CONDUCTING WAR 84 - - A.--MEANS OF WAR DEPENDING ON FORCE 85 - - 1. Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of hostile - combatants. - - 2. Capture of Enemy combatants: - Modern conception of war captivity--Who is subject - to it?--Point of view for treatment of prisoners of - war--Right to put prisoners to death--Termination - of the captivity--Transport of Prisoners. - - 3. Sieges and Bombardments: - (_a_) Fortresses, strong places and fortified - places. Notification of bombardment--Scope of - bombardment--Treatment of civil population within - an enemy’s fortress--Diplomatists of neutral - States within a besieged fortress--Treatment of - the fortress after storming it. (_b_) Open towns, - villages, buildings and the like, which, however, - are occupied or used for military purposes. - - B.--METHODS NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE 110 - Cunning and deceit--Lawful and unlawful stratagem. - - III TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SICK SOLDIERS 115 - Modern view of non-effective combatants--Geneva - Convention--Hyenas of the battlefield. - - IV INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BELLIGERENT ARMIES 117 - Bearers of flags of truce--Treatment of them--Forms - as to their reception. - - V SCOUTS AND SPIES 124 - The notion of a spy--Treatment. - - VI DESERTERS AND RENEGADES 127 - - VII CIVILIANS IN THE TRAIN OF AN ARMY 128 - General--Authorizations--The representatives of the - Press. - - VIII THE EXTERNAL MARK OF INVIOLABILITY 133 - - IX WAR TREATIES 135 - - A.--TREATIES OF EXCHANGE 135 - - B.--TREATIES OF CAPITULATION 136 - - C.--SAFE-CONDUCTS 140 - - D.--TREATIES OF ARMISTICE 141 - - - PART II - - USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO ENEMY TERRITORY AND ITS INHABITANTS - - I RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS 147 - General Notions--Rights--Duties--Hostages--Jurisdiction - in enemy’s provinces when occupied--War rebellion and War - treason. - - II PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR 161 - - III BOOTY AND PLUNDERING 167 - Real and Personal State Property--Real and Personal - Private Property. - - IV REQUISITIONS AND WAR LEVIES 174 - - V ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY 180 - General--Legislation--Relation of inhabitants to the - Provisional Government--Courts--Officials--Administration-- - Railways. - - - PART III - - USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS NEUTRAL STATES 187 - Idea of neutrality--Duties of neutral States--Contraband - of war--Rights of neutral States. - - - - -CONTENTS - -OF EDITOR’S MARGINAL COMMENTARY - - - PAGE - - What is a State of War 67 - - Active Persons and Passive 67 - - That War is no respector of Persons 68 - - The Usages of War 69 - - Of the futility of Written Agreements as Scraps of Paper 70 - - The “flabby emotion” of Humanitarianism 71 - - That Cruelty is often “the truest humanity” 72 - - The perfect Officer 72 - - Who are Combatants and who are not 75 - - The Irregular 76 - - Each State must decide for itself 77 - - The necessity of Authorization 77 - - Exceptions which prove the rule 77 - - The Free Lance 78 - - Modern views 79 - - The German Military View 80 - - The _Levée en masse_ 81 - - The Hague Regulations will not do 83 - - A short way with the Defender of his Country 83 - - Violence and Cunning 84 - - How to make an end of the Enemy 85 - - The Rules of the Game 85 - - Colored Troops are Blacklegs 87 - - Prisoners of War 88 - - _Væ Victis!_ 89 - - The Modern View 89 - - Prisoners of War are to be Honorably treated 90 - - Who may be made Prisoners 91 - - The treatment of Prisoners of War 92 - - Their confinement 92 - - The Prisoner and his Taskmaster 93 - - Flight 94 - - Diet 95 - - Letters 95 - - Personal belongings 95 - - The Information Bureau 96 - - When Prisoners may be put to Death 97 - - “Reprisals” 97 - - One must not be too scrupulous 98 - - The end of Captivity 99 - - Parole 100 - - Exchange of Prisoners 102 - - Removal of Prisoners 102 - - Sieges and Bombardments: Fair Game 103 - - Of making the most of one’s opportunity 104 - - Spare the Churches 105 - - A Bombardment is no Respector of Persons 105 - - A timely severity 106 - - “Undefended Places” 108 - - Stratagems 110 - - What are “dirty tricks”? 111 - - The apophthegm of Frederick the Great 111 - - Of False Uniforms 112 - - The Corruption of others may be useful 113 - - And Murder is one of the Fine Arts 114 - - That the ugly is often expedient, and that it is a mistake to - be too “nice-minded” 114 - - The Sanctity of the Geneva Convention 115 - - The “Hyenas of the Battlefield” 116 - - Flags of Truce 117 - - The Etiquette of Flags of Truce 119 - - The Envoy 120 - - His approach 120 - - The Challenge--“Wer da?” 120 - - His reception 120 - - He dismounts 121 - - Let his Yea be Yea, and his Nay, Nay 121 - - The duty of his Interlocutor 121 - - The Impatient Envoy 122 - - The French again 122 - - The Scout 124 - - The Spy and his short shrift 124 - - What is a Spy? 125 - - Of the essentials of Espionage 126 - - Accessories are Principals 126 - - The Deserter is faithless, and the Renegade false 127 - - But both may be useful 127 - - “Followers” 128 - - The War Correspondent: his importance. His presence is desirable 129 - - The ideal War Correspondent 130 - - The Etiquette of the War Correspondent 131 - - How to tell a Non-Combatant 133 - - War Treaties 135 - - That Faith must be kept even with an enemy 135 - - Exchange of Prisoners 135 - - Capitulations--they cannot be too meticulous 136 - - Of the White Flag 139 - - Of Safe-Conducts 140 - - Of Armistice 141 - - The Civil Population is not to be regarded as an enemy 147 - - They must not be molested 148 - - Their duty 149 - - Of the humanity of the Germans and the barbarity of the French 149 - - What the Invader may do 151 - - A man may be compelled to Betray his Country 153 - - And worse 153 - - Of forced labor 154 - - Of a certain harsh measure and its justification 154 - - Hostages 155 - - A “harsh and cruel” measure 156 - - But it was “successful” 156 - - War Rebellion 157 - - War Treason and Unwilling Guides 159 - - Another deplorable necessity 159 - - Of Private Property and its immunities 161 - - Of German behavior 163 - - The gentle Hun and the looking-glass 165 - - Booty 167 - - The State realty may be used but must not be wasted 168 - - State Personalty is at the mercy of the victor 169 - - Private realty 170 - - Private personalty 170 - - “Choses in action” 171 - - Plundering is wicked 171 - - Requisitions 174 - - How the docile German learnt the “better way” 175 - - To exhaust the country is deplorable, but we mean to do it 175 - - Buccaneering levies 177 - - How to administer an invaded country 180 - - The Laws remain--with qualification 181 - - The Inhabitants must obey 182 - - Martial Law 182 - - Fiscal Policy 184 - - Occupation must be real, not fictitious 185 - - What neutrality means 187 - - A neutral cannot be all things to all men; therefore he must be - nothing to any of them 187 - - But there are limits to this detachment 188 - - Duties of the neutral--belligerents must be warned off 188 - - The neutral must guard its inviolable frontiers. It must intern - the trespassers 189 - - Unneutral service 191 - - The “sinews of war”--loans to belligerents 191 - - Contraband of War 191 - - Good business 192 - - Foodstuffs 192 - - Contraband on a small scale 193 - - And on a large scale 194 - - The practise differs 194 - - Who may pass--the Sick and the Wounded 195 - - Who may not pass--Prisoners of War 196 - - Rights of the neutral 196 - - The neutral has the right to be left alone 197 - - Neutral territory is sacred 197 - - The neutral may resist a violation of its territory “with all - the means in his power” 197 - - Neutrality is presumed 198 - - The Property of Neutrals 198 - - Diplomatic intercourse 199 - - - - -THE WAR BOOK OF THE - -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF - - - - -INTRODUCTION - - - - -CHAPTER I - -THE GERMAN VIEW OF WAR - - -The ideal Prince, so Machiavelli has told us, need not, and indeed -should not, possess virtuous qualities, but he should always contrive -to appear to possess them.[1] The somber Florentine has been studied in -Germany as he has been studied nowhere else and a double portion of his -spirit has descended on the authors of this book. Herein the perfect -officer, like the perfect Prince, is taught that it is more important -to be thought humane than to practise humanity; the former may probably -be useful but the latter is certainly inconvenient. - -Hence the peculiar logic of this book which consists for the most part -in ostentatiously laying down unimpeachable rules and then quietly -destroying them by debilitating exceptions. The civil population of -an invaded country--the young officer is reminded on one page--is to -be left undisturbed in mind, body, and estate, their honor is to -be inviolate, their lives protected, and their property secure. To -compel them to assist the enemy is brutal, to make them betray their -own country is inhuman. Such is the general proposition. Yet a little -while and the Manual descends to particulars. Can the officer compel -the peaceful inhabitants to give information about the strength and -disposition of his country’s forces?[2] Yes, answers the German War -Book, it is doubtless regrettable but it is often necessary. Should -they be exposed to the fire of their own troops?[3] Yes; it may be -indefensible, but its “main justification” is that it is “successful.” -Should the tribute of supplies levied upon them be proportioned to -their ability to pay it?[4] No; “this is all very well in theory but -it would rarely be observed in practise.” Should the forced labor of -the inhabitants be limited to works which are not designed to injure -their own country?[5] No; this is an absurd distinction and impossible. -Should prisoners of war be put to death? It is always “ugly” but it is -sometimes expedient. May one hire an assassin, or corrupt a citizen, or -incite an incendiary? Certainly; it may not be reputable (_anständig_), -and honor may fight shy of it, but the law of war is less “touchy” -(_empfindlich_). Should the women and children--the old and the -feeble--be allowed to depart before a bombardment begins? On the -contrary; their presence is greatly to be desired (_ein Vortheil_)--it -makes the bombardment all the more effective. Should the civil -population of a small and defenseless country be entitled to claim the -right, provided they carry their arms openly and use them honorably, -to defend their native land from the invader?[6] No; they act at their -peril and must, however sudden and wanton the invasion, elaborate an -organization or they will receive no quarter.[7] - -We might multiply examples. But these are sufficient. It will be -obvious that the German Staff are nothing if not casuists. In their -brutality they are the true descendants of Clausewitz, the father of -Prussian military tradition. - - “Laws of war are self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible - and hardly worth mentioning, termed ‘usages of war.’ Now - philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method - of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great - bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. - However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must - be extirpated, for in such dangerous things as war the errors - which proceed from the spirit of benevolence are the worst.... - To introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of - moderation would be an absurdity.... War is an act of violence - which in its application knows no bounds.”[8] - -The only difference between Clausewitz and his lineal successors is not -that they are less brutal but that they are more disingenuous. When he -comes to discuss that form of living on the country which is dignified -by the name of requisitions, he roundly says they should be enforced. - - “by the fear of responsibility, punishment, and ill-treatment - which in such cases presses like a general weight on the whole - population.... This resource has no limits except those of - the exhaustion, impoverishment, and devastation of the whole - country.”[9] - -Our War Book is more discreet but not more merciful. Private property, -it begins by saying, should always be respected. To take a man’s -property when he is present is robbery; when he is absent it is -“downright burglary.” But if the “necessity of war” makes it advisable, -“every sequestration, every appropriation, temporary or permanent, -every use, every injury and all destruction are permissible.” - -It is, indeed, unfortunate that the War Book when it inculcates -“frightfulness” is never obscure, and that when it advises forbearance -it is always ambiguous. The reader must bear in mind that the authors, -in common with their kind in Germany, always enforce a distinction -between _Kriegsmanier_ and _Kriegsraison_,[10] between theory and -practise, between the rule and the exception. That in extreme cases -such distinctions may be necessary is true; the melancholy thing is -that German writers make a system and indeed a virtue of them. In this -respect the jurists are not appreciably superior to their soldiers. -Brutality is bad, but a pedantic brutality is worse in proportion as it -is more reflective. Holtzendorff’s _Handbuch des Völkerrechts_, than -which there is no more authoritative book in the legal literature of -Germany, after pages of sanctification of “the natural right” to defend -one’s fatherland against invasion by a _levée en masse_, terminates -the argument for a generous recognition of the combatant status of the -enemy with the melancholy qualification, “unless _the Terrorism so -often necessary in war_ does not demand the contrary.”[11] - -To “terrorize” the civil population of the enemy is, indeed, a first -principle with German writers on the Art of War. Let the reader -ponder carefully on the sinister sentence in the third paragraph of -the War Book and the illuminating footnote from Moltke with which it -is supported. The doctrine--which is at the foundation of all such -progress as has been made by international law in regularizing and -humanizing the conduct of war--that the sole object of it should be -to disable the armed forces of the enemy, finds no countenance here. -No, say the German staff, we must seek just as much (_in gleicher -Weise_) to smash (_zerstören_) the total “intellectual” (_geistig_), -and material resources of the enemy. It is no exaggeration to interpret -this as a counsel not merely to destroy the body of a nation, but to -ruin its soul. The “Geist” of a people means in German its very spirit -and finer essence. It means a good deal more than intellect and but a -little less than religion. The “Geist” of a nation is “the partnership -in all science, the partnership in all art, the partnership in every -virtue, and in all perfection,” which Burke defined as the true -conception of the State. Hence it may be no accident but policy which -has caused the Germans in Belgium to stable their horses in churches, -to destroy municipal palaces, to defile the hearth, and bombard -cathedrals. All this is scientifically calculated “to smash the total -spiritual resources” of a people, to humiliate them, to stupefy them, -in a word to break their “spirit.” - -Let the reader also study carefully a dark sentence in that section of -the War Book which deals with “Cunning and Deceit.” There the German -officer is instructed that “there is nothing in international law -against” (_steht völkerrechtlich nichts entgegen_) the exploitation -of the crimes of third persons, “such as assassination, incendiarism, -robbery and the like,” to the disadvantage of the enemy. “There is -nothing in international law against it!” No, indeed. There are many -things upon which international law is silent for the simple reason -that it refuses to contemplate their possibility. It assumes that -it is dealing not with brutes but with men. International law is -the etiquette of international society, and society, as it has been -gravely said, is conducted on the assumption that murder will not be -committed. We do not carry revolvers in our pockets when we enter our -clubs, or finger them when we shake hands with a stranger. Nor, to -adopt a very homely illustration, does any hostess think it necessary -to put up a notice in her drawing-room that guests are not allowed to -spit upon the floor. But what should we think of a man who committed -this disgusting offense, and then pleaded that there was nothing to -show that the hostess had forbidden it? Human society, like political -society, advances in proportion as it rests on voluntary morality -rather than positive law. In primitive society everything is “taboo,” -because the only thing that will restrain the undisciplined passions -of men is fear. Can it be that this is why the traveler in Germany -finds everything “verboten,” and that things which in our own country -are left to the good sense and good breeding of the citizen have to -be officiously forbidden? Can it be that this people which is always -making an ostentatious parade of its “culture” is still red in tooth -and claw? When a man boasts his breeding we instinctively suspect -it; indeed the boast is itself ill-bred. If the reader thinks these -reflections uncharitable, let him ponder on the treatment of Belgium. - -It will be seen therefore that the writers of the War Book have taken -to heart the cynical maxim of Machiavelli that “a Prince should -understand how to use well both the man and the beast.” We shall have -occasion to observe later in this introduction that the same maxim -runs like Ariadne’s thread through the labyrinth of German diplomacy. -Machiavelli’s dark counsel finds a responsive echo in Bismarck’s -cynical declaration that a diplomatic pretext can always be found -for a war when you want one. When these things are borne in mind the -reader will be able to understand how it is that the nation which has -used the strongest language[12] about the eternal inviolability of the -neutrality of Belgium should be the first to violate it. - -The reader may ask, What of the Hague Conventions? They are -international agreements, to which Germany was a party, representing -the fruition of years of patient endeavor to ameliorate the horrors of -war. If they have any defect it is not that they go too far but that -they do not go far enough. But of them and the humanitarian movement -of which they are the expression, the German Staff has but a very poor -opinion. They are for it the crest of a wave of “Sentimentalism and -flabby emotion.” (_Sentimentalität und weichlicher Gefühlsschwärmerei._) -Such movements, our authors declare, are “in fundamental contradiction -with the nature and object of war itself.” They are rarely mentioned -in this book and never respectfully. The reader will look in vain -for such an incorporation of the Hague Regulations in this official -text-book as has been made by the English War Office in our own -_Manual of Military Law_. Nor is the reason far to seek. The German -Government has never viewed with favor attempts to codify the laws -and usages of war. Amiable sentiments, prolegomenous resolutions, -protestations of “culture” and “humanity,” she has welcomed with -evangelical fervor. But the moment attempts are made to subject -these volatile sentiments to pressure and liquefy them in the form -of an agreement, she has protested that to particularize would be -to “enfeeble humane and civilizing thoughts.”[13] Nothing is more -illuminating as to the respective attitudes of Germany and England to -such international agreements than the discussions which took place -at the Hague Conference of 1907 on the desirability of imposing in -express terms restrictions upon the laying of submarine mines in order -to protect innocent shipping in neutral waters. The representatives of -the two Powers agreed in admitting that it did not follow that because -the Convention had not prohibited a certain act it thereby sanctioned -it. But whereas the English representatives regarded this as a reason -why the Convention could never be too explicit,[14] the spokesman -of Germany urged it as a reason why it could never be too ambiguous. -In the view of the latter, not international law but “conscience, -good sense, and the sentiment of duties imposed by the principles -of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of soldiers -and sailors and the most efficacious guarantees against abuse.”[15] -Conscience, “the good German Conscience,” as a German newspaper has -recently called it, is, as we have seen, an accommodating monitor, -and in that forum there are only too many special pleaders. If the -German conscience is to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of German -practises, then it is a clear case of “the right arm strikes and -the left arm is called upon to decide the lawfulness of the blow.” -It is, indeed, difficult to see, if Baron von Bieberstein’s view of -international agreements be the right one, why there should be any such -agreements at all. The only rule which results from such an Economy of -Truth would be: All things are lawful but all are not expedient. And -such, indeed, is the conclusion of the German War Book. - -The cynicism of this book is not more remarkable than its affectation. -There are pages in it of the most admirable sentiment--witness -those about the turpitude of plundering and the inviolability of -neutral territory. Taken by themselves, they form the most scathing -denunciation of the conduct of the German army in Belgium that could -well be conceived. Let the reader weigh carefully the following: - - Movable private property which in earlier times was the - incontestable booty of the victor is held by modern opinion to be - inviolable. The carrying away of gold, watches, rings, trinkets, or - other objects of value is therefore to be regarded as robbery, and - correspondingly punishable. - - No plundering but downright burglary is it for a man to take away - things out of an unoccupied house or at a time when the occupant - happens to be absent. - -Forced contributions (_Kriegschatzungen_) are denounced as “a form of -plundering” rarely, if ever, to be justified, as requisitions may be, -by the plea of necessity. The victor has no right, the Book adds, to -practise them in order to recoup himself for the cost of the war, or -to subsidize an operation against the nation whose territory is in his -occupation. To extort them as a ransom from the violence of war is -equally unjustifiable: thus out of its own mouth is the German staff -condemned and its “buccaneering levies” upon the forlorn inhabitants of -Belgium held up to reprobation. - -Still more significant are the remarks on the right and duty of -neutrals. The inviolability of neutral territory and the sanctity of -the Geneva Convention are the only two principles of international law -which the German War Book admits to be laws of perfect obligation. A -neutral State, it declares, not only may, but must forbid the passage -of troops to the subjects of both belligerents. If either attempts it, -the neutral State has the right to resist “with all the means in its -power.” However overwhelming the necessity, no belligerent must succumb -to the temptation to trespass upon the neutral territory. If this be -true of a neutral State it is doubly true of a neutralized State. No -one has been so emphatic on this point as the German jurists whose -words the War Book is so fond of praying in aid. The Treaty of London -guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium is declared by them to be “a -landmark of progress in the formation of a European polity” and “up -till now no Power has dared to violate a guarantee of this kind.”[16] - - “He who injures a right does injury to the cause of right itself, - and in these guarantees lies the express obligation to prevent such - things.... Nothing could make the situation of Europe more insecure - than an egotistical repudiation by the great States of these duties - of international fellowship.”[17] - -The reader will, perhaps, hardly need to be cautioned against the -belligerent footnotes with which the General Staff has illuminated -the text. They are, as he will observe, mainly directed towards -illustrating the peculiar depravity of the French in 1870. They -are certainly suspect, and all the more so, because the notorious -malpractices of the Germans in that campaign are dismissed, where they -are noticed at all, with the airy remark that there were peculiar -circumstances, or that they were unauthorized, or that the “necessity -of war” afforded sufficient justification. All this is _ex parte_. So -too, to a large extent, is the parade of professors in the footnotes. -They are almost always German professors and, as we shall see later, -the German professor is, and is compelled to be, a docile instrument of -the State. - -The book has, of course, a permanent value apart from the light it -throws upon contemporary issues. Some of the chapters, such as that -on the right and duties of neutrals, represent a carefully considered -theory, little tainted by the cynicism which disfigures the rest of the -book. It should be of great interest and value to those of us who are -engaged in studying the problem of bringing economic pressure to bear -upon Germany, by enclosing her in the meshes of conditional contraband. -So, too, the chapter on the treatment of Prisoners of War will have -a special, and for some a poignant, interest just now. The chapter -on the treatment of occupied territory is, of course, of profound -significance in view of the present state of Belgium. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT - - -Bismarck, wrote Hohenlohe, who ultimately succeeded him as Imperial -Chancellor, “handles everything with a certain arrogance (_Uebermut_), -and this gives him a considerable advantage in dealing with the timid -minds of the older European diplomacy.” This native arrogance became -accentuated after the triumphs of 1870 until, in Hohenlohe’s words, -Bismarck became “the terror” of all European diplomatists. That word -is the clue to German diplomacy. The terrorism which the Germans -practise in war they indoctrinate in peace. It was a favorite saying -of Clausewitz, whose military writings enjoy an almost apostolic -authority in Germany, that War and Peace are but a continuation of one -another--“War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse -with a mixture of other means.”[18] The same lesson is written large -on every page of von der Goltz[19] and Bernhardi.[20] In other words, -war projects its dark shadow over the whole of German diplomacy. The -dominant postures in “shining armor” at critical moments in the peace -of Europe, and the menacing invocations of the “mailed fist” are not, -as is commonly supposed, a passionate idiosyncrasy of the present -Emperor. They are a legacy of the Bismarckian tradition. To keep Europe -in a perpetual state of nervous apprehension by somber hints of war -was, as we shall see, the favorite method by which Bismarck attained -his diplomatic ends. For the German Chancellerie rumors of wars are -of only less political efficacy than wars themselves. After 1870, -metaphors of war became part of the normal vocabulary of the German -Government in times of peace. Not only so but, as will be seen in the -two succeeding chapters, a belligerent emotion suffused the temperament -of the whole German people, and alike in the State Universities, and -the stipendiary Press, there was developed a cult of War for its own -sake. The very vocabulary of the Kaiser’s speeches has been coined in -the lecture-rooms of Berlin University. - -Now War is at best but a negative conception and its adoption as the -_Credo_ of German thinkers since 1870 explains why their contributions -to Political Science have been so sterile. More than that, it accounts -for the decline in public morality. Politically, Germany, as we -shall see, has remained absolutely stagnant. She is now no nearer -self-government than she was in 1870; she is much farther removed from -it than she was in 1848. The inevitable result has been, that politics -have for her come to mean little more than intrigues in high places, -the deadly struggle of one contending faction at court against another, -with the peace of Europe as pawns in the game. The German Empire, like -the Prussian kingdom, has little more than a paper constitution, a -_lex imperfecta_ as Gneist called it. The Reichstag has little power -and less prestige, and its authority as a representative assembly has -been so enervated by the shock tactics practised by the Government -in forcing, or threatening to force, a series of dissolutions to -punish contumacious behavior, that it is little better than a debating -society. A vote of censure on the Government has absolutely no -effect. Of the two powers, the Army and the Reichstag, the Army is -infinitely the stronger; there is no law such as our Army Annual Act -which subjects it to Parliamentary control. Even the Bundesrath[21] -(or Federal Council), strong as it is, is hardly stronger than the -German General Staff, for the real force which welds the German Empire -together is not so much this council of plenipotentiaries from the -States as the military hegemony of Prussia and the military conventions -between her and the Southern States by which the latter placed their -armies under her supreme control. In this shirt of steel the body -politic is enclosed as in a vice. - - * * * * * - -Nothing illustrates the political lifelessness of Germany, the -arrogance of its rulers and the docility of its people (for whom, -as will be seen, the former have frequently expressed the utmost -contempt) more than the tortuous course of German diplomacy during the -years 1870-1900. I shall attempt to sketch very briefly the political -history of those years, particularly in the light of the policy of -calculated Terrorism by which the German Chancellerie sought to impose -its yoke upon Europe. Well did Lord Odo Russell say that “Bismarck’s -sayings inspired respect” (he might, had he not been speaking as an -ambassador, have used, like Hohenlohe, a stronger word) “and his -silences apprehension.”[22] If it be true, as von der Goltz says it -is, that national strategy is the expression of national character and -that the German method is, to use his words, “a brutal offensive,” -nothing could bring out that amiable characteristic more clearly than -the study of Bismarck’s diplomacy. The German is brutal in war just -because he is insolent in peace. Count Herbert “can be very insolent,” -wrote the servile Busch of Bismarck’s son, “which in diplomacy is very -useful.”[23] - -Bismarck’s attitude towards treaty obligations is one of the chief -clues to the history of the years 1870-1900. International policy, -he once wrote, is “a fluid element which under certain conditions -will solidify, but on a change of atmosphere reverts to its original -condition.”[24] The process of solidification is represented by the -making of treaties; that of melting is a euphemism for the breaking of -them. To reinsure Germany’s future by taking out policies in different -countries in the form of secret treaties of alliance while concealing -the existence of other and conflicting treaties seemed to him not -only astute but admirable. Thus having persuaded Austria-Hungary to -enter into a Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy by holding out as -the inducement the promise of protection against Russia, Bismarck by -his own subsequent confession concluded a secret treaty with Russia -against Austria. To play off each of these countries against the -other by independent professions of exclusive loyalty to both was -the _Leit-motif_ of his diplomacy. Nor did he treat the collective -guarantees of European treaties with any greater respect. Good faith -was a negotiable security. Hence his skilful exploitation of the Black -Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) when he wished to secure the -friendly neutrality of Russia during the Franco-Prussian War. Russia, -it will be remembered, suddenly and to every one’s surprise, denounced -those clauses. The European Powers, on the initiative of England, -disputed Russia’s claim to denounce _motu proprio_ an international -obligation of so solemn a character, and Bismarck responded to Lord -Granville’s initiative in words of ostentatious propriety: - - “That the Russian Circular of the 19th October [denouncing the - clauses in question] had _taken him by surprise_. That while he had - always held that the Treaty of 1856 pressed with undue severity - upon Russia, he entirely disapproved of the manner adopted and the - time selected by the Russian Government to force the revision of - the Treaty.”[25] - -Nearly a generation later Bismarck confessed, and prided himself on the -confession, in his Reminiscences,[26] that he had himself instigated -Russia to denounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty; that he had not -only instigated this repudiation but had initiated it as affording “an -opportunity of improving our relations with Russia.” Russia succumbed -to the temptation, but, as Bismarck cheerfully admits, not without -reluctance. - -This, however, is not all: Europe “saved her face” by putting on record -in the Conference of London (1871) a Protocol, subscribed by the -Plenipotentiaries of all the Powers, in which it was laid down as - - “an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can - repudiate treaty engagements or modify treaty provisions, except - with the consent of the contracting parties by mutual agreement.” - -This instrument has been called, not inaptly, the foundation of the -public law of Europe. It was in virtue of this principle that Russia -was obliged to submit the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano, and -with it the fruits of her victories in 1877-8 to the arbitrament of -the Congress of Berlin. At that Congress Bismarck played his favorite -rôle of “honest broker,” and there is considerable ground for believing -that he sold the same stock several times over to different clients -and pocketed the “differences.” What kind of conflicting assurances he -gave to the different Powers will never be fully known, but there is -good ground for believing that in securing the temporary occupation -of Bosnia-Herzegovina he had in mind the ultimate Germanization -of the Adriatic, and that domination of the Mediterranean at the -expense of England which has long been the dream of German publicists -from Treitschke onward.[27] What, however, clearly emerged from the -Congress, and was embodied in Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty, was, -that Austria was to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina under a -European mandate. She acquired lordship without ownership; in other -words, the territory became a Protectorate. Her title, as it originated -in, so it was limited by, the Treaty of Berlin. Exactly thirty years -later, in the autumn of 1908, Austria, acting in concert with Germany, -abused her fiduciary position and without any mandate from the Powers -annexed the territory of which she had been made the guardian. This -arbitrary action was a violation of the principle to which she and -Germany had subscribed at the London Conference, and Sir Edward -Grey attempted, as Lord Granville had done before him, to preserve -the credit of the public law of Europe by a conference which should -consider the compensation due to Servia for an act which so gravely -compromised her security. Russia, France, and Italy joined with Great -Britain in this heroic, if belated, attempt to save the international -situation. It was at this moment (March; 1909) that Germany appeared -on the scene “in shining armor,” despatched a veiled ultimatum to -Russia, with a covert threat to mobilize, and forced her to abandon her -advocacy of the claims of Servia and, with them, of the public law of -Europe. - -Thus did History repeat itself. Germany stood forth once again as the -chartered libertine of Europe whom no faith could bind and no duty -oblige. May it not be said of her what Machiavelli said of Alexander -Borgia: “E non fu mai uomo che avesse maggiore efficacia in asseveraie, -e che con maggiori giuramenti affermasse una cosa, e che l’osservasse -meno.”[28] - - * * * * * - -It would carry me far beyond the limits of this Introduction to trace -in like detail the German policy of _Scharfmacherei_ which consisted, -to use the mordant phrase of M. Hanotaux, in putting up to auction that -which is not yours to sell and, not infrequently, knocking it down to -more than one bidder. That Bismarck encouraged Russian ambitions in -Asia and French ambitions in Africa with the view of making mischief -between each of them and England is notorious.[29] In his earlier -attitude he was content to play the rôle of _tertius gaudens_; in his -later he was an active _agent provocateur_--particularly during the -years 1883-1885, when he joined in the scramble for Africa. The earlier -attitude is well indicated in Hohenlohe’s revelations, that Bismarck -regarded French colonial operations as a timely diversion from the -Rhine, and would not be at all sorry “to see the English and French -locomotives come into collision,” and a French annexation of Morocco -would have had his benevolent approval. After 1883 his attitude was -less passive but not less mischievous. Ten years earlier he had told -Lord Odo Russell that colonies “would only be a cause of weakness” to -Germany. But by 1883 he had been slowly and reluctantly converted to -the militant policy of the Colonial party and the cry of _Weltpolitik_ -was as good as a war scare for electioneering purposes. It was in -these days that hatred of England, a hatred conceived in jealousy of -her world-Empire, was brought forth, and the obstetrics of Treitschke -materially assisted its birth. Bismarck, however, as readers of his -Reminiscences are well aware, had an intellectual dislike of England -based on her forms of government. He loved the darker ways of diplomacy -and he thought our Cabinet system fatal to them. He had an intense -dislike of Parliamentarism, he despised alliances “for which the Crown -is not answerable but only the fleeting cabinet of the day,” and above -all he hated plain dealing and publicity. “It is astonishing,” wrote -Lord Ampthill, “how cordially Bismarck hates our Blue Books.” - - * * * * * - -The story of Bismarck’s diplomatic relations with England during these -years exhibits the same features of duplicity tempered by violence as -marked his relations with the rest of Europe. He acquired Samoa by a -deliberate breach of faith, and his pretense of negotiations with this -country to delimit the frontiers of English and German acquisitions -while he stole a march upon us were properly stigmatized by the -Colonial Office as “shabby behavior.” Whether he really egged on France -to “take Tunis” in order to embroil her with England will perhaps never -be really known,[30] but it was widely suspected in France that his -motives in supporting, if not instigating,[31] the colonial policy of -Jules Ferry would not bear a very close examination. That he regarded -it as a timely diversion from the Rhine is certain; that he encouraged -it as a promising embarrassment to England is probable. There can be -no doubt that much the same construction is to be put on his attitude -towards Russia’s aspirations in Asia; that they should divert Russia -from Europe was necessary; that they might entangle her with England -was desirable. - -Fear of Russia has, in fact, always been an obsession of the German -Government. That fear is the just Nemesis of Frederick the Great’s -responsibility for the infamous Partition of Poland. The reader, who -wants to understand the causes of this, cannot do better than study an -old map of the kingdom of Poland, and compare it with a map of Poland -after the first and second Partitions. The effect of those cynical -transactions was to extinguish an ancient “buffer state,” separating -Prussia, Austria, and Russia, and by extinguishing it to bring them -into menacing contiguity with each other. Never has any crime so -haunted its perpetrators. Poland has been the permanent distraction -of the three nations who dismembered her, each perpetually suspicious -of the other two, and this fact is the main clue to the history of -Eastern Europe.[32] The fear of Russia, and of a Russo-French or -a Russo-Austrian Alliance, is the dominant feature of Bismarck’s -diplomacy. He was, indeed, the evil genius of Russia for, by his own -confession,[33] he intrigued to prevent her from pursuing a liberal -policy towards Poland, for fear that she would thereby be drawn into -friendship with France. To induce her to break faith with Russia, her -Polish subjects in one case, and with Europe in another--the former -by suppressing the Polish constitutional movement; the latter by -repudiating the Black Sea clauses--was to isolate her from Europe. -German writers to-day affect to speak of “Muscovite barbarism” and -“Oriental despotism,” but it has been the deliberate policy of Germany -to cut Russia off from the main stream of European civilization--to -turn her face Eastwards, thereby Bismarck hoped, to quote his own -words, to “weaken her pressure on our Eastern frontiers.” - -But Bismarck’s contempt for treaties and his love for setting other -Powers by the ears were venial compared with his policy of Terrorism. -His attitude to France from 1870 to the day of his retirement from -office--and it has been mis-stated many times by his successors--was -very much that which Newman ascribed to the Erastian view of the -treatment of the church--“to keep her low” and in a perpetual state -of terror-stricken servility. That this is no exaggeration will be -apparent from what follows here about the war scares with which he -terrified France, and with France Europe also, in the years 1873-5, -the years, when, as our ambassador at Paris, Lord Lytton, has put -it, he “played with her like a cat with a mouse.”[34] Perhaps the -most illuminating account of these tenebrous proceedings is to be -derived from Hohenlohe, who accepted the offer of the German Embassy -at Paris in May, 1874. The post was no easy one. There had already -been a “scare” in the previous December, when Bismarck menaced the -Duc de Broglie with war, using the attitude of the French Bishops as -a pretext;[35] and, although Hohenlohe’s appointment was at first -regarded as an eirenicon, there followed a period of extreme tension, -when, as the Duc Decazes subsequently confessed, French Ministers were -“living at the mercy of the smallest incident, the least mistake.” - -The truth about the subsequent war scare of 1875 is still a matter of -speculation, but the documents published of late years by de Broglie -and Hanotaux, and the despatches of Lord Odo Russell, have thrown -considerable suspicion of a very positive kind on Bismarck’s plea -that it was all a malicious invention of Gontaut-Biron, the French -Ambassador, and of Gortchakoff. A careful collation of the passages -in Hohenlohe’s Memoirs goes far to confirm these suspicions, and, -incidentally, to reveal Bismarck’s inner diplomacy in a very sinister -light. Hohenlohe was appointed to succeed the unhappy Arnim, who had -made himself obnoxious to Bismarck by his independence, and he was -instructed by the Chancellor, that it was to the interest of Germany -to see that France should become “a weak Republic and anarchical,” -so as to be a negligible quantity in European politics, on which the -Emperor William I remarked to Hohenlohe that “that was not a policy,” -and was not “decent,” subsequently confiding to Hohenlohe that -Bismarck was trying “to drive him more and more into war”; whereupon -Hohenlohe confidently remarked: “I know nothing of it, and I should be -the first to hear of it.” Hohenlohe soon found reason to change his -opinion. As Gortchakoff remarked to Decazes, “they have a difficult -way with diplomatists at Berlin,” and Hohenlohe was instructed to -press the French Ministry for the recall of Gontaut-Biron, against -whom Bismarck complained on account of his Legitimist opinions and -his friendship with the Empress Augusta. Thereupon, that supple and -elusive diplomat, the Duc Decazes, parried by inviting an explanation -of the menacing words which Gontaut-Biron declared had been uttered -to him by Radowitz, a Councilor of Legation in Berlin, to the effect -that “it would be both politic and Christian to declare war at once,” -the Duke adding shrewdly: “One doesn’t invent these things.” Hohenlohe -in his perplexity tried to get at the truth from Bismarck, and met -with what seems to us a most disingenuous explanation. Bismarck said -Radowitz denied the whole thing, but added that, even if he had said -it, Gontaut-Biron had no right to report it. He admitted, however, that -Radowitz made mischief and “egged on” Bülow, the Foreign Secretary. -“You may be sure,” he added, “that these two between them would land -us in a war in four weeks if I didn’t act as safety-valve.” Hohenlohe -took advantage of this confession to press for the despatch of Radowitz -to some distant Embassy “to cool himself.” To this Bismarck assented, -but a few days later declared that Radowitz was indispensable. When -Hohenlohe attempted to sound Bismarck on the subject the Chancellor -showed the utmost reserve. After the war scare had passed, Decazes -related to Hohenlohe an earlier example of Imperial truculence on the -part of Arnim, who, on leaving after a call, turned round as he reached -the door and called out: “I have forgotten one thing. Recollect that -I forbid you to get possession of Tunis”; and when Decazes affected -to regard the matter as a jest, Arnim repeated with emphasis: “Yes, -I forbid it.” Hohenlohe adds that an examination of his predecessor’s -papers convinced him that Arnim did not speak without express -authorization. When the elections for the French Chamber are imminent -in the autumn of 1877, Bismarck informs Hohenlohe that Germany will -adopt “a threatening attitude,” but “the scene will be laid in Berlin, -not in Paris.” The usual Press campaign followed, much to the vexation -of the Emperor, who complained to Hohenlohe that the result of these -“pin-pricks” (Nadelstiche) would provoke the French people beyond -endurance. - -In studying this calculated truculence we have to remember that in -Germany foreign and domestic policy are inextricably interwoven. A war -scare is with the German Government a favorite method of bringing the -Reichstag to a docile frame of mind and diverting it from inconvenient -criticism of the Government’s policy at home. Moreover, just as war is, -in von der Goltz’s words, a reflection of national character, so is -diplomacy. A nation’s character is revealed in its diplomacy just as a -man’s breeding is revealed in his conversation.[36] We must therefore -take into account the polity of Germany and its political standards. - -The picture of the Prussian autocracy in the later days of Bismarck’s -rule which we can reconstruct from different entries in Hohenlohe’s -Journal from the year 1885 onwards is a very somber one. It is a -picture of suspicion, treachery, vacillation, and calumny in high -places which remind one of nothing so much as the Court of the later -Bourbons. It is a régime of violence abroad and dissensions at home. -Bismarck’s health was failing him, and with his health his temper. He -complained to Hohenlohe that his head “grew hot” the moment he worked, -and the latter hardly dared to dispute with him on the gravest matters -of State. Readers of Busch will remember his frank disclosures of the -anarchy of the Foreign Office when Bismarck was away: “if the Chief -gives violent instructions, they are carried out with still greater -violence.” In Hohenlohe we begin to see all the grave implications -of this. Bismarck, with what Lord Odo Russell called his passion -for authority, was fond of sneering at English foreign policy as -liable to be blown about with every wind of political doctrine; but -if Parliamentary control has its defects, autocracy has defects more -insidious still. Will becomes caprice, and foreign relations are at -the mercy of bureaucrats who have no sense of responsibility so long -as they can adroitly flatter their master. When a bureaucrat trained -under this system arrives at power, the result may be nothing less -than disastrous. This was what happened when Bismarck’s instrument, -Holstein, concentrated power into his own hands at the Foreign Office; -and as the _Neue Freie Presse_[37] pointed out in its disclosures on -his fall (1906), the results are writ large in the narrowly averted -catastrophe of a war with France in 1905. Bismarck’s disciples had all -his calculated violence without its timeliness. In the Foreign Office, -Hohenlohe discovered a kind of anarchical “republicanism”--“nobody,” -in Bismarck’s frequent absence “will own responsibility to any one -else.” “Bismarck is nervously excitable,” writes Hohenlohe in March, -1885, “and harasses his subordinates and frightens them, so that -they see more behind his expression than there really is.” Like most -small men, in terror themselves, they terrorized others. Moreover, -the disinclination of the Prussian mind, which Bismarck himself -once noted, to accept any responsibility which is not covered by -instructions, tended to reduce the German Ambassadors abroad to the -level of mere aides-de-camp. Hohenlohe found himself involved in the -same embarrassments at Paris as Count Münster did in London. Any one -who has studied the inner history of German foreign policy must have -divined a secret diplomacy as devious of its kind as that of Louis XV. -Of its exact bearings little is known, but a great deal may reasonably -be suspected. There is always the triple diplomacy of the Court, the -Imperial Chancery, and lastly the Diplomatic Service, which is not -necessarily in the confidence of either. - -The same debilitating influences of a dictatorship were at work in -Ministerial and Parliamentary life. Bismarck had an equal contempt -for the collective responsibility of Ministers and for Parliamentary -control. Having done his best to deprive the Members of the -Reichstag of power, he was annoyed at their irresponsibility. He -called men like Bennigsen and Windhorst silly schoolboy politicians -(Karlchen-Miesnick-Tertianen) or “lying scoundrels” (verlogene -Halunken). He was surprised that representation without control -resulted in faction. It is the Nemesis of his own political doctrines. -When he met with opposition he clamored for repressive measures, and -could not understand some of the scruples of the Liberals as to the -exceptional laws against the Socialists. Moreover, having tried, like -another Richelieu, to reduce his fellow-Ministers to the position of -clerks, he was annoyed at their want of corporate spirit, and when they -refused to follow him into his retirement, he declaimed against their -apostasy in having “left him in the lurch.” He talked at one time of -abolishing the Reichstag; at another of having a special post created -for himself as “General-Adjutant.” He complained of overwork--and his -energy was Titanic--but he insisted on keeping his eye on everything, -conscientiously enough, because, he tells Hohenlohe, “he could not -put his name to things which did not reflect his own mind.” But -perhaps the gravest moral of it all is the Nemesis of deception. It -is difficult to be both loved and feared, said Machiavelli. There -is a somber irony in the remark of the Czar to the Emperor in 1892, -which the latter repeated to Hohenlohe. Bismarck had been compelled -to retire because he had failed to induce the Emperor to violate -Germany’s contractual obligations to Austria by renewing his secret -agreement with Russia, and he consoled himself in his retirement with -the somewhat unctuous reflection that he was a martyr to the cause of -Russo-German friendship, betrayed, according to him, by Caprivi. “Do -you know,” said the young Emperor (in August, 1892), “the Czar has -told me he has every trust in Caprivi; whereas when Bismarck has said -anything to him he has always had the conviction that ‘he is tricking -me.’” We are reminded of the occasion when Talleyrand told the truth so -frankly that his interlocutor persisted in regarding it as an elaborate -form of deception. After all, there are advantages, even in diplomacy, -in being what Schuvaloff called Caprivi, a “too honest man.” It was the -same with the domestic atmosphere. Bismarck, an adept at deceiving, -is always complaining of deception; a master of intrigue, he is always -declaiming against the intrigues of others. He inveighs against the -Empress Augusta: “for fifty years she has been my opponent with the -Emperor.” He lived in an atmosphere of distrust, he was often insolent, -and always suspicious. It affected all his diplomatic intercourse, -and was not at all to Hohenlohe’s taste. “He handles everything with -a certain arrogance (_Uebermut_),” once wrote Hohenlohe (as we have -already said) of a discussion with him over foreign affairs. “_This has -always been his way._” - -All these tendencies came to a head when the scepter passed from the -infirm hands of William I to those of a dying King, around whose -death-bed the military party and the Chancellor’s party began to -intrigue for influence over the young Prince whose advent to empire was -hourly expected. Of these intrigues Hohenlohe, who was now Statthalter -of Alsace-Lorraine, soon began to feel the effects without at first -discovering the cause. He loved the people of the Reichsland, was a -friend of France, and an advocate of liberal institutions, and in this -spirit he strove to administer the incorporated territories. But the -military party worked against him, hoping to secure the abolition of -the moderate measure of local government and Reichstag representation -which the Provinces possessed; and when the latter returned a hostile -majority to the Reichstag they redoubled their efforts for a policy -of “Thorough.” Bismarck gave but a lukewarm support to Hohenlohe and -insisted on the enforcement of drastic passport regulations, which, -combined with the Schnaebele affair (on which the Memoirs are very -reticent), almost provoked France to War--naturally enough, in the -opinion of Hohenlohe, and inevitably, according to the forebodings -of the German Military Attaché at Paris. To Hohenlohe’s imploring -representations Bismarck replied with grim jests about Alva’s rule in -the Netherlands, adding that it is all done to show the French “that -their noise doesn’t alarm us.” Meanwhile Switzerland was alienated, -France injured, and Austria suspicious. But Hohenlohe, after inquiries -in Berlin and Baden, began to discover the reason. Bismarck feared -the influence of the military party over the martial spirit of Prince -William, and was determined to show himself equally militant in order -to secure his dynasty. “His sole object is to get his son Herbert into -the saddle,” said Bleichroder; “so there is no hope of an improvement -in Alsace-Lorraine,”--although Prince Herbert alienated everybody -by his insolence, which was so gross that the Prince of Wales (King -Edward), at this time in Berlin, declared that he could scarcely -restrain himself from showing him the door. The leader of the military -party, Waldersee, was hardly more public-spirited. He had, according to -Bismarck, been made Chief of Staff by Moltke, over the heads of more -competent men, because he was more docile than they. Between these -military and civil autocracies the struggle for the possession of the -present Emperor raged remorselessly, and with appalling levity they -made the peace of two great nations the pawns in the game. The young -Emperor is seen in Hohenlohe’s Memoirs feeling his way, groping in the -dark; but those who, like the Grand Duke of Baden, knew the strength of -his character, foresaw the end. At first, he “doesn’t trust himself to -hold a different opinion from Bismarck”; but, “as soon as he perceives -that Bismarck doesn’t tell him everything,” predicted the Grand Duke, -“there will be trouble.” Meanwhile Waldersee was working for war, for -no better reason than that he was getting old, and spoiling for a fight -before it was too late for him to take the field. - -For Bismarck’s dismissal there were various causes: differences in -domestic policy and in foreign, and an absolute _impasse_ on the -question whether Bismarck’s fellow-Ministers were to be treated as -colleagues or subordinates. “Bismarck,” said Caprivi afterwards, “had -made a treaty with Russia by which we guaranteed her a free hand in -Bulgaria and Constantinople, and Russia bound herself to remain -neutral in a war with France. That would have meant the shattering of -the Triple Alliance.” Moreover, the relations of Emperor and Chancellor -were, at the last, disfigured by violent scenes, during which the -Kaiser, according to the testimony of every one, showed the most -astonishing dignity and restraint. But it may all be summed up in the -words of the Grand Duke of Baden, reechoed by the Emperor to Hohenlohe, -it had to be a choice between the dynasties of Hohenzollern and -Bismarck. The end came to such a period of fear, agony, irony, despair, -recrimination, and catastrophic laughter as only the pen of a Tacitus -could adequately describe. Bismarck’s last years, both of power and -retirement, were those of a lost soul. Having tried to intrigue with -foreign Ambassadors against his Sovereign before his retirement, he -tried to mobilize the Press against him after he had retired, and even -stooped to join hands with his old rival, Waldersee, for the overthrow -of his successor, Caprivi, being quite indifferent, complained the -Kaiser bitterly, to what might happen afterwards. “It is sad to think,” -said the Emperor of Austria to Hohenlohe, “that such a man can sink so -low.” - -When Bismarck was dismissed every one raised his head. It seemed to -Hohenlohe to be at last a case of the beatitude: “the meek shall -inherit the earth.” Holstein, the Under-Secretary, who, to the disgust -of Bismarck, refused to follow his chief and who now quietly made -himself the residuary legatee of the whole political inheritance of the -Foreign Office, intended by Bismarck for his son, freely criticized his -ex-chief’s policy in a conversation with Hohenlohe: - - “He adduced as errors of Bismarck’s policy: The Berlin Congress, - the mediation in China in favor of France, the prevention of the - conflict between England and Russia in Afghanistan, and the whole - of his _tracasseries_ with Russia. As to his recent plan of leaving - Austria in the lurch, he says we should then have made ourselves so - contemptible that we should have become isolated and dependent on - Russia.” - -Bismarck, whom Hohenlohe visited in his retirement, with a strange -want of patriotism and of perspicuity, pursued “his favorite theme” -and inveighed against the envy (_der Neid_) of the German people and -their incurable particularism. He never divined how much his jealous -autocracy had fostered these tendencies. One may hazard the opinion -that the Germans are no more wanting in public spirit and political -capacity than any other nation; but if they are deprived of the rights -of private judgment and the exercise of political ability, they are -no more likely to be immune from the corresponding disabilities. -Certainly, in no country where public men are accustomed to the -exercise of mutual tolerance and loyal cooperation by the practise of -Cabinet government, and where public opinion has healthy play, would -such an exhibition of disloyalty and slander as is here exhibited be -tolerated, or even possible. When in 1895 Caprivi succumbed to the -intrigues of the military caste and the Agrarian Party, Hohenlohe, now -in his seventy-sixth year, was entreated to come to the rescue, his -accession being regarded as the only security for German unity. To -his eternal credit, Hohenlohe accepted; but, if we may read between -the lines of the scanty extracts here vouchsafed from the record of -a Ministerial activity of six years, we may conjecture that it was -mostly labor and sorrow. He was opposed to agrarianism and repressive -measures, and anxious “to get on with the Reichstag,” seeing in the -forms of public discussion the only security for the public peace. But -“the Prussian Junkers could not tolerate South German Liberalism,” -and the most powerful political caste in the world, with the Army and -the King on their side, appear to have been too much for him. His -retirement in 1900 marks the end of a fugitive attempt at something -like a liberal policy in Germany, and during the fourteen years which -have elapsed since that event autocracy has held undisputed sway in -Germany. The history of these latter years is fresh in the minds of -most students of public affairs, and we will not attempt to pursue it -here. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -GERMAN CULTURE - -THE ACADEMIC GARRISON - - -Nothing is so characteristic of the German nation as its astonishing -single-mindedness--using that term in a mental and not a moral sense. -Since Prussia established her ascendency the nation has developed an -immense concentration of purpose. If the military men are not more -belligerent than the diplomatists, the diplomatists are not more -belligerent than the professors. A single purpose seems to animate -them: it is to proclaim the spiritual efficacy, and the eternal -necessity, of War. - -Already there are signs that the German professors are taking the -field. Their mobilization is apparently not yet complete, but we may -expect before long to see their whole force, from the oldest Professor -Emeritus down to the youngest _Privat-dozent_, sharpening their pens -against us. Professors Harnack, Haeckel, and Eucken have already made a -reconnaissance in force, and in language which might have come straight -from the armory of Treitschke have denounced the mingled cupidity -and hypocrisy with which we, so they say, have joined forces with -Muscovite “barbarism” against Teutonic culture. This, we may feel sure, -is only the beginning. - -German professors have a way of making history as well as writing -it, and the Prussian Government has always attached the greatest -importance to taking away its enemy’s character before it despoils -him of his goods. Long before the wars of 1866 and 1870 the seminars -of the Prussian universities were as busy forging title-deeds to -the smaller German states and to Alsace-Lorraine as any medieval -scriptorium, and not less ingenious. In the Franco-Prussian War -the professors--Treitschke, Mommsen, Sybel--were the first to take -the field and the last to quit it. Theirs it was to exploit the -secular hatreds of the past. Even Ranke, the nearest approach to “a -good European” of which German schools of history could boast, was -implacable. When asked by Thiers on whom, the Third Empire having -fallen, the Germans were continuing to make war, he replied, “On Louis -XIV.” - -Hardly were the results achieved before a casuistry was developed to -justify them. Sybel’s apologetics in “Die Begründung des deutschen -Reichs” began it; others have gone far beyond them. “Blessed be the -hand that traced those lines,” is Professor Delbrück’s benediction on -the forgery of the Ems telegram; and in language which is almost a -paraphrase of Bismarck’s cynical declaration that a diplomatic pretext -for a war can always be found when you want one, he has laid it down -that “a good diplomat” should always have his quiver full of such -barbed arrows. So, too, Sybel on Frederick’s complicity in the Second -Partition of an inoffensive Poland anticipates in almost so many words -the recent sophistry of the Imperial Chancellor on the violation of -the neutrality of Belgium. “Wrong? I grant you--a violation of law in -the most literal sense of the word.” But, he adds, necessity knows no -law, and, “to sum it up,” after all, Prussia “thereby gained a very -considerable territory.” And thus Treitschke on the question of the -duchies, or again, to go farther afield, Mommsen on the inexorable -“law” that the race is always to the swift and the battle to the -strong. Frederick the Great surely knew his fellow-countrymen when he -said with characteristic cynicism: “I begin by taking; I can always -find pedants to prove my rights afterwards.” Not the Chancelleries -only, but even the General Staff has worked hand in glove with the -lecture-room. When Bernhardi and von der Goltz exalt the spiritual -efficacy of war they are repeating almost word for word the language -of Treitschke. Not a faculty but ministers to German statecraft in its -turn. The economists, notably von Halle and Wagner, have been as busy -and pragmatical as the historians--theirs is the doctrine of Prussian -military hegemony upon a basis of agrarianism, of the absorption of -Holland, and of “the future upon the water.” The very vocabulary of -the Kaiser’s speeches has been coined in the lecture-rooms of Berlin -University. - -To understand the potency of these academic influences in German -policy one must know something of the constitution of the German -universities. In no country is the control of the Government over the -universities so strong; nowhere is it so vigilant. Political favor may -make or mar an academic career; the complaisant professor is decorated, -the contumacious is cashiered. German academic history is full of -examples. Treitschke, Sybel, even Mommsen all felt the weight of royal -displeasure at one period or another. The present Emperor vetoed the -award of the Verdun prize to Sybel because in his history of Prussian -policy he had exalted Bismarck at the expense of the Hohenzollerns, and -he threatened to close the archives to Treitschke. Even Mommsen had at -one time to learn the steepness of alien stairs. - -On the other hand, no Government recognizes so readily the value of -a professor who is docile--he is of more value than many Pomeranian -Grenadiers. Bismarck invited Treitschke to accompany the army of Sadowa -as a writer of military bulletins, and both he and Sybel were, after -due caution, commissioned to write those apologetics of Prussian -policy which are classics of their kind. Most German professors have -at one time or another been publicists, and the _Grenzboten_ and the -_Preussische Jahrbücher_ maintain the polemical traditions of Sybel’s -“Historische Zeitschrift.” Moreover, the German university system, with -the singular freedom in the choice of lectures and universities, which -it leaves to the student, tends to make a professor’s classes depend -for their success on his power of attracting a public by trenchant -oratory. Well has Acton said that the “garrison” of distinguished -historians that prepared the Prussian supremacy, together with their -own, “hold Berlin like a fortress.” They still hold it and their -science of fortification has not changed. - -It is not necessary to recapitulate here the earlier phases of this -politico-historical school whose motto found expression in Droysen’s -aphorism, “The statesman is the historian in practise,” and whose -moral was “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,” or, to put it less -pretentiously, “Nothing succeeds like success.” All of them, Niebuhr, -Mommsen, Droysen, Häusser, Sybel, Treitschke, have this in common: -that they are merciless to the rights of small nationalities. This was -no accident; it was due to the magnetism exercised upon their minds -by the hegemony of Prussia and by their opposition to the idea of a -loose confederation of small States. They were almost equally united -in a common detestation of France and could find no word too hard for -her polity, her literature, her ideals, and her people. “Sodom” and -“Babylon” were the best they could spare her. “Die Nation ist unser -Feind” wrote Treitschke in 1870, and “we must draw her teeth.” Even -Ranke declared that everything good in Germany had risen by way of -opposition to French influences. The intellectual war was carried into -every field and epoch of history, and all the institutions of modern -civilization were traced by writers like Waitz and Maurer to the early -German tribes uncorrupted by Roman influences. The same spirit was -apparent in Sybel’s hatred of the French Revolution and all its works. - -This is not the place to expound the intellectual revenge which French -scholars like Fustel de Coulanges in the one sphere, and Albert Sorel -in the other, afterwards took upon this insensate chauvinism of the -chair. Sufficient to say that this cult of war and gospel of hate have -narrowed the outlook of German thought ever since, as Renan warned -Strauss they would, and have left Germany in an intellectual isolation -from the rest of Europe only to be paralleled by her moral isolation -of to-day. It was useless for Renan to remind German scholars that -pride is the only vice which is punished in this world. “We Germans,” -retorted Mommsen, “are not modest and don’t pretend to be.” The words -are almost the echo of that “thrasonic brag” with which Bismarck one -day electrified the Reichstag. - -In the academic circles of to-day much of the hate formerly vented -upon France is now diverted to England. In this, Treitschke set the -fashion. Nothing delighted him more than to garnish his immensely -popular lectures with uproarious jests at England--“the hypocrite who, -with a Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the other, scatters over -the universe the benefits of civilization.” But there was always method -in his madness. Treitschke was one of the first to demand for Germany -“a place in the sun”--this commonplace of Imperial speeches was, I -believe, coined by Sybel--and to press for the creation of a German -Navy which should do what “Europe” had failed to do--set bounds to the -crushing domination of the British Fleet and “restore the Mediterranean -to the Mediterranean peoples” by snatching back Malta, Corfu, and -Gibraltar. The seed fell on fruitful soil. A young economist, the late -Professor von Halle, whose vehement lectures I used to attend when a -student at Berlin University, worked out the maritime possibilities -of German ambitions in “Volks-und Seewirthschaft,” and his method -is highly significant in view of the recent ultimatum delivered by -Germany to Belgium. It was nothing less than the seduction of Holland -by economic bribes into promising to Germany the abandonment of the -neutrality of her ports in the event of war. Thereby, and thereby -alone, he argued, Germany would be reconciled to the “monstrosity” -(_Unding_) of the mouth of the Rhine being in non-German hands. -In return Germany would take Holland and her colonies under her -“protection.” To the same effect writes Professor Karl Lamprecht in his -“Zur jüngsten deutschen Vergangenheit,” seizing upon the Boer war to -demonstrate to Holland that England is the enemy. The same argument was -put forward by Professor Lexis. This was in the true line of academic -tradition. Even the discreet and temperate Ranke once counseled -Bismarck to annex Switzerland. - -Such, in briefest outline, is the story of the academic “garrison.” -Of the lesser lansquenets, the horde of privat-dozents and obscurer -professors, whose intellectual folly is only equaled by their -audacity, and who are the mainstay of the Pan-German movement, I have -said nothing. It may be doubted whether the second generation can -show anything like the intellectual prestige which, with all their -intemperance, distinguished their predecessors. But they have all laid -to heart Treitschke’s maxim, “Be governmental,” honor the King, worship -the State, and “believe that no salvation is possible except by the -annihilation of the smaller States.” It is a strange ending to the -Germany of Kant and Goethe. - - Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben - Der täglich sie erobern muss-- - -The noble lines of Goethe have now a variant reading--“He alone -achieves freedom and existence who seeks to repeat his conquests at the -expense of others” might be the motto of the Germans of to-day. But as -they have appealed to History, so will History answer them. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -GERMAN THOUGHT - -TREITSCHKE - - -In a pamphlet of mordant irony addressed to “Messieurs les Ministres -du culte évangélique de l’armée du roi de Prusse” in the dark days of -1870, Fustel de Coulanges warned these evangelical camp-followers of -the consequences to German civilization of their doctrines of a Holy -War. “Your error is not a crime but it makes you commit one, for it -leads you to preach war which is the greatest of all crimes.” It was -not impossible, he added, that that very war might be the beginning -of the decadence of Germany, even as it would inaugurate the revival -of France. History has proved him a true prophet, but it has required -more than a generation to show with what subtlety the moral poison -of such teaching has penetrated into German life and character. The -great apostle of that teaching was Treitschke who, though not indeed -a theologian, was characteristically fond of praying in aid the -vocabulary of theology. “Every intelligent theologian understands -perfectly well,” he wrote, “that the Biblical saying ‘Thou shalt not -kill’ ought no more to be interpreted literally than the apostolic -injunction to give one’s goods to the poor.” He called in the Old -Testament to redress the balance of the New. “The doctrines of the -apple of discord and of original sin are the great facts which the -pages of History everywhere reveal.” - -To-day, everybody talks of Treitschke, though I doubt if half a dozen -people in England have read him. His brilliant essays, _Historische -und Politische Aufsätze_, illuminating almost every aspect of German -controversy, have never been translated; neither has his _Politik_, -a searching and cynical examination of the foundations of Political -Science which exalts the State at the expense of Society; and his -_Deutsche Geschichte_, which was designed to be the supreme apologetic -of Prussian policy, is also unknown in our tongue. But in Germany -their vogue has been and still is enormous; they are to Germans what -Carlyle and Macaulay were to us. Treitschke, indeed, has much in common -with Carlyle; the same contempt for Parliaments and constitutional -freedom; the same worship of the strong man armed; the same somber, -almost savage, irony, and, let it not be forgotten, the same deep -moral fervor. His character was irreproachable. At the age of fifteen -he wrote down this motto for his own: “To be always upright, honest, -moral, to become a man, a man useful to humanity, a brave man--these -are my ambitions.” This high ideal he strove manfully to realize. -But he was a doctrinaire, and of all doctrinaires the conscientious -doctrinaire is the most dangerous. Undoubtedly, in his case, as in that -of so many other enlightened Germans--Sybel, for example--his apostasy -from Liberalism dated from the moment of his conviction that the only -hope for German unity lay not in Parliaments but in the military -hegemony of Prussia. The bloody triumphs of the Austro-Prussian War -convinced him that the salvation of Germany was “only possible by the -annihilation of small States,” that States rest on force, not consent, -that success is the supreme test of merit, and that the issues of -war are the judgment of God. He was singularly free from sophistry -and never attempted, like Sybel, to defend the Ems telegram by the -disingenuous plea that “an abbreviation is not a falsification”; it -was enough for him that the trick achieved its purpose. And he had a -frank contempt for those Prussian jurists who attempted to find a legal -title to Schleswig-Holstein; the real truth of the matter he roundly -declared, was that the annexation of the duchies was necessary for the -realization of German aims. When he writes about war he writes without -any sanctimonious cant: - - It is not for Germans to repeat the commonplaces of the apostles of - peace or of the priests of Mammon, nor should they close their eyes - before the cruel necessities of the age. Yes, ours is an epoch of - war, our age is an age of iron. If the strong get the better of the - weak, it is an inexorable law of life. Those wars of hunger which - we still see to-day amongst negro tribes are as necessary for the - economic conditions of the heart of Africa as the sacred war which - a people undertakes to preserve the most precious belongings of its - moral culture. There as here it is a struggle for life, here for a - moral good, there for a material good. - -Readers of Bernhardi will recognize here the source of Bernhardi’s -inspiration. If Treitschke was a casuist at all--and as a rule he is -refreshingly, if brutally, frank--his was the supreme casuistry of the -doctrine that the end justifies the means. That the means may corrupt -the end or become an end in themselves he never saw, or only saw it -at the end of his life. He honestly believed that war was the nurse -of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise, he feared the commercialism -of modern times, and despised England because he judged her wars to -have always been undertaken with a view to the conquest of markets. He -sneers at the Englishman who “scatters the blessings of civilization -with a Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the other.” He honestly -believed that Germany exhibited a purity of domestic life, a pastoral -simplicity, and a deep religious faith to which no European country -could approach, and at the time he wrote the picture was not overdrawn. -He has written passages of noble and tender sentiment, in which he -celebrates the piety of the peasant, whose religious exercises were -hallowed, wherever the German tongue was spoken, by the massive -faith of Luther’s great Hymn. Writing of German Protestantism as the -corner-stone of German unity, he says: - - Everywhere it has been the solid rampart of our language and - customs. In Alsace, as in the mountains of Transylvania and on the - distant shores of the Baltic, as long as the peasant shall sing his - old canticle - - Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott - - German life shall not pass away. - -Those who would understand the strength of Treitschke’s influence on -his generation must not lose sight of these purer elements in his -teaching. - -But Treitschke was dazzled by the military successes of Prussia in -1866. With that violent reaction against culture which is so common -among its professional devotees, and which often makes the men of the -pen far more sanguinary than the men of the sword, he derided the -old Germany of Goethe and Kant as “a nation of poets and thinkers -without a polity” (“Ein staatloses Volk von Dichtern und Denkern”), -and almost despised his own intellectual vocation. “Each dragoon,” -he cried enviously, “who knocks a Croat on the head does far more -for the German cause than the finest political brain that ever -wielded a trenchant pen.” But for his grievous deafness he would, -like his father, have chosen the profession of arms. Failing that, -he chose to teach. “It is a fine thing,” he wrote, “to be master of -the younger generation,” and he set himself to indoctrinate it with -the aim of German unity. He taught from 1859 to 1875 successively at -Leipzig, Freiburg, Kiel, and Heidelberg. From 1875 till his death in -1896 he occupied with immense éclat the chair of modern history at -Berlin. And so, although a Saxon, he enlisted his pen in the service -of Prussia--Prussia which always knows how to attract men of ideas -but rarely produces them. In the great roll of German statesmen and -thinkers and poets--Stein, Hardenberg, Goethe, Hegel--you will look -almost in vain for one who is of Prussian birth. She may pervert them; -she cannot create them. - -Treitschke’s views were, of course, shared by many of his -contemporaries. The Seminars of the German Universities were the -arsenals that forged the intellectual weapons of the Prussian hegemony. -Niebuhr, Ranke, Mommsen, Sybel, Häusser, Droysen, Gneist--all -ministered to that ascendency, and they all have this in common--that -they are merciless to the claims of the small States whose existence -seemed to present an obstacle to Prussian aims. They are also united -in common hatred of France, for they feared not only the adventures of -Napoleon the Third but the leveling doctrines of the French Revolution. -Burke’s _Letters on a Regicide Peace_ are not more violent against -France than the writings of Sybel, Mommsen, and Treitschke. What, -however, distinguishes Treitschke from his intellectual confrères is -his thoroughness. They made reservations which he scorned to make. -Sybel, for example, is often apologetic when he comes to the more -questionable episodes in Prussian policy--the partition of Poland, the -affairs of the duchies, the Treaty of Bâle, the diplomacy of 1870; -Treitschke is disturbed by no such qualms. Bismarck who practised a -certain economy in giving Sybel access to official documents for his -semi-official history of Prussian policy, _Die Begründung des deutschen -Reichs_, had much greater confidence in Treitschke and told him he felt -sure he would not be disturbed to find that “our political linen is not -as white as it might be.” So, too, while others like Mommsen refused to -go the whole way with Bismarck in domestic policy, and clung to their -early Radicalism, Treitschke had no compunction about absolutism. He -ended, indeed, by becoming the champion of the Junkers, and his history -is a kind of hagiography of the Hohenzollerns. “Be governmental” -was his succinct maxim, and he rested his hopes for Germany on the -bureaucracy and the army. Indeed, if he had had his way, he would have -substituted a unity state for the federal system of the German Empire, -and would have liked to see all Germany an enlarged Prussia--“ein -erweitertes Preussen”--a view which is somewhat difficult to reconcile -with his attacks on France as being “politically in a state of -perpetual nonage,” and on the French Government as hostile to all forms -of provincial autonomy. - -By a quite natural transition he was led on from his championship of -the unity of Germany to a conception of her rôle as a world-power. -He is the true father of Weltpolitik. Much of what he writes on this -head is legitimate enough. Like Hohenlohe and Bismarck he felt the -humiliation of Germany’s weakness in the councils of Europe. Writing in -1863 he complains: - - One thing we still lack--the State. Our people is the only one - which has no common legislation, which can send no representatives - to the Concert of Europe. No salute greets the German flag in a - foreign port. Our Fatherland sails the high seas without colors - like a pirate. - -Germany, he declared, must become “a power across the sea.” This -conclusion, coupled with bitter recollections of the part played by -England in the affair of the Duchies, no doubt accounted for his -growing dislike of England. - - Among the English the love of money has killed every sentiment of - honor and every distinction between what is just and unjust. They - hide their poltroonery and their materialism behind grand phrases - of unctuous theology. When one sees the English press raising its - eyes to heaven, frightened by the audacity of these faithless - peoples in arms upon the Continent, one might imagine one heard a - venerable parson droning away. As if the Almighty God, in Whose - name Cromwell’s Ironsides fought their battles, commanded us - Germans to allow our enemy to march undisturbed upon Berlin. Oh, - what hypocrisy! Oh, cant, cant, cant! - -Europe, he says elsewhere, should have put bounds to the overweening -ambition of Britain by bringing to an end the crushing domination -of the English Fleet at Gibraltar, at Malta, and at Corfu, and by -“restoring the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean peoples.” Thus did he -sow the seeds of German maritime ambition. - -If I were asked to select the most characteristic of Treitschke’s -works I should be inclined to choose the vehement little pamphlet _Was -fordern wir von Frankreich?_ in which he insisted on the annexation -of Alsace-Lorraine. It is at once the vindication of Prussian policy, -and, in the light of the last forty-four years, its condemnation. -Like Mommsen, who wrote in much the same strain at the same time, he -insisted that the people of the conquered provinces must be “forced to -be free,” that Morality and History (which for him are much the same -thing) proclaim they are German without knowing it. - - We Germans, who know Germany and France, know better what is good - for Alsace than the unhappy people themselves, who through their - French associations have lived in ignorance of the new Germany. - We will give them back their own identity against their will. We - have in the enormous changes of these times too often seen in - glad astonishment the immortal working of the moral forces of - History (“das unsterbliche Fortwirken der sittlichen Mächte der - Geschichte”) to be able to believe in the unconditional value of a - plebiscite on this matter. We invoke the men of the past against - the present. - -The ruthless pedantry of this is characteristically Prussian. It is -easy to appeal to the past against the present, to the dead against -the living. Dead men tell no tales. It was, he admitted, true that the -Alsatians did not love the Germans. These “misguided people” betrayed -“that fatal impulse of Germans” to cleave to other nations than their -own. “Well may we Germans be horrified,” he adds, “when to-day we see -these German people rail in German speech like wild beasts against -their own flesh and blood as ‘German curs’ (‘deutschen Hunde’) and -‘stink-Prussians’ (‘Stinkpreussen’).” Treitschke was too honest to deny -it. There was, he ruefully admitted, something rather unlovely about -the “civilizing” methods of Prussia. “Prussia has perhaps not always -been guided by genial men.” But, he argued, Prussia united under the -new Empire to the rest of Germany would become humanized and would -in turn humanize the new subject-peoples. Well, the forty-four years -that have elapsed since Treitschke wrote have refuted him. Instead of -a Germanized Prussia, we see a Prussianized Germany. Her “geniality” -is the geniality of Zabern. The Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians -are still contumacious. Treitschke appealed to History and History has -answered him. - -Had he never any misgivings? Yes. After twenty-five years, and within -a month of his death, this Hebrew prophet looking round in the year -of grace 1895 on the “culture” of modern Germany was filled with -apprehension. On the twenty-fifth anniversary of Sedan he delivered an -address in the University of Berlin which struck his fond disciples -dumb. The Empire, he declared, had disarmed her enemies neither without -nor within. - - In every direction our manners have deteriorated. The respect - which Goethe declared to be the true end of all moral education - disappears in the new generation with a giddy rapidity: respect of - God, respect for the limits which nature and society have placed - between the two sexes; respect for the Fatherland, which is every - day disappearing before the will-of-the-wisp of an indulgent - humanity. The more culture extends, the more insipid it becomes; - men despise the profundity of the ancient world and consider only - that which subserves their immediate end. - -The things of the mind, he cried, had lost their hold on the German -people. Every one was eager to get rich and to relieve the monotony of -a vain existence by the cult of idle and meretricious pleasures. The -signs of the times were everywhere dark and gloomy. The new Emperor -(William the Second), he had already hinted, was a dangerous charlatan. - -The wheel had come full circle. Fustel de Coulanges was justified of -his prophecy. And the handwriting on the walls of Destiny was never -more legible than now. - - - - -CONCLUSION - - -The contemplation of History, so a great master of the art has told -us, may not make men wise but it is sure to make them sad. The austere -Muse has never had a sadder page to show than that which is even now -being added to her record. We see now the full fruition of the German -doctrine of the beatitude of War. In sorrow and in anguish, in anguish -and in darkness, Belgium is weeping for her children and will not be -comforted because they are not. The invader has spared neither age nor -sex, neither rank nor function, and every insult that malice could -invent, or insolence inspire, has been heaped upon her bowed head. -The hearths are cold, the altars desecrated, the fields untilled, the -granaries empty. The peasant watches the heavens but he may not sow, -he has regarded his fields but he might not reap. The very stones in -her cities cry out; hardly one of them is left upon another. No nation -had ever given Europe more blithe and winning pledges of her devotion -to the arts of peace. The Flemish school of painters had endowed the -world with portraits of a grave tenderness which posterity might always -admire but could never imitate. The chisels of her medieval craftsmen -had left us a legacy of buoyant fancy in stone whose characters were -alive for us with the animation of the Canterbury Tales. All this the -invader has stamped out like the plague. A once busy and thriving -community begs its bread in alien lands. Never since the captivity of -Babylon has there been so tragic an expatriation. Yet noble in her -sorrow and exalted in her anguish, Belgium, like some patient caryatid, -still supports the broken architrave of the violated Treaty. Her little -army is still unconquered, her spirit is never crushed. She will arise -purified by her sorrow and ennobled by her suffering, and generations -yet unborn shall rise up to call her blessed. - - - - -THE WAR BOOK OF THE - -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF - - -INTRODUCTION - -[Sidenote: What is a State of War.] - -The armies of belligerent States on the outbreak of hostilities, or -indeed the moment war is declared, enter into a certain relation with -one another which is known by the name of “A State of War.” This -relationship, which at the beginning only concerns the members of the -two armies, is extended, the moment the frontier is crossed, to all -inhabitants of the enemy’s State, so far as its territory is occupied; -indeed it extends itself ultimately to both the movable and immovable -property of the State and its citizens. - -[Sidenote: Active Persons and Passive.] - -A distinction is drawn between an “active” and a “passive” state of -war. By the first is to be understood the relation to one another of -the actual fighting organs of the two belligerents, that is to say, -of the persons forming the army, besides that of the representative -heads of the State and of the leaders. By the second term, _i.e._, the -“passive” state of war, on the other hand, is to be understood the -relationship of the hostile army to those inhabitants of the State, who -share in the actual conduct of war only in consequence of their natural -association with the army of their own State, and who on that account -are only to be regarded as enemies in a passive sense. As occupying an -intermediate position, one has often to take into account a number of -persons who while belonging to the army do not actually participate in -the conduct of hostilities but continue in the field to pursue what is -to some extent a peaceful occupation, such as Army Chaplains, Doctors, -Medical Officers of Health, Hospital Nurses, Voluntary Nurses, and -other Officials, Sutlers, Contractors, Newspaper Correspondents and the -like. - -[Sidenote: That War is no Respecter of Persons.] - -Now although according to the modern conception of war, it is -primarily concerned with the persons belonging to the opposing armies, -yet no citizen or inhabitant of a State occupied by a hostile army -can altogether escape the burdens, restrictions, sacrifices, and -inconveniences which are the natural consequence of a State of War. -A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the -combatants of the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but it -will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual[38] -and material resources of the latter.[39] Humanitarian claims such -as the protection of men and their goods can only be taken into -consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit. - -[Sidenote: The Usages of War.] - -Consequently the “argument of war” permits every belligerent State -to have recourse to all means which enable it to attain the object -of the war; still, practise has taught the advisability of allowing -in one’s own interest the introduction of a limitation in the use of -certain methods of war and a total renunciation of the use of others. -Chivalrous feelings, Christian thought, higher civilization and, by no -means least of all, the recognition of one’s own advantage, have led -to a voluntary and self-imposed limitation, the necessity of which is -to-day tacitly recognized by all States and their armies. They have -led in the course of time, in the simple transmission of knightly -usage in the passages of arms, to a series of agreements, hallowed by -tradition, and we are accustomed to sum these up in the words “usage -of war” (Kriegsbrauch), “custom of war” (Kriegssitte), “or fashion of -war” (Kriegsmanier). Customs of this kind have always existed, even in -the times of antiquity; they differed according to the civilization -of the different nations and their public economy, they were not -always identical, even in one and the same conflict, and they have in -the course of time often changed; they are older than any scientific -law of war, they have come down to us unwritten, and moreover they -maintain themselves in full vitality; they have therefore won an -assured position in standing armies according as these latter have been -introduced into the systems of almost every European State. - -[Sidenote: Of the futility of Written Agreements as Scraps of Paper.] - -The fact that such limitations of the unrestricted and reckless -application of all the available means for the conduct of war, and -thereby the humanization of the customary methods of pursuing war -really exist, and are actually observed by the armies of all civilized -States, has in the course of the nineteenth century often led to -attempts to develop, to extend, and thus to make universally binding -these preexisting usages of war; to elevate them to the level of -laws binding nations and armies, in other words to create a _codex -belli_; a law of war. All these attempts have hitherto, with some few -exceptions to be mentioned later, completely failed. If, therefore, in -the following work the expression “the law of war” is used, it must -be understood that by it is meant not a _lex scripta_ introduced by -international agreements; but only a reciprocity of mutual agreement; -a limitation of arbitrary behavior, which custom and conventionality, -human friendliness and a calculating egotism have erected, but for the -observance of which there exists no express sanction, but only “the -fear of reprisals” decides. - -[Sidenote: The “flabby emotion” of Humanitarianism.] - -Consequently the usage of war is even now the only means of regulating -the relations of belligerent States to one another. But with the idea -of the usages of war will always be bound up the character of something -transitory, inconstant, something dependent on factors outside the -army. Nowadays it is not only the army which influences the spirit -of the customs of war and assures recognition of its unwritten laws. -Since the almost universal introduction of conscription, the peoples -themselves exercise a profound influence upon this spirit. In the -modern usages of war one can no longer regard merely the traditional -inheritance of the ancient etiquette of the profession of arms, and the -professional outlook accompanying it, but there is also the deposit -of the currents of thought which agitate our time. But since the -tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by -humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into -sentimentality and flabby emotion (_Sentimentalität und weichlicher -Gefühlsschwärmerei_) there have not been wanting attempts to influence -the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental -contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this -kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these -agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of -the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences. - -[Sidenote: Cruelty is often “the truest humanity.”] - -[Sidenote: The perfect Officer.] - -Moreover the officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the -intellectual[40] tendencies which influence his own nation; the more -educated he is the more will this be the case. The danger that, in -this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character -of war must not be lost sight of. The danger can only be met by a -thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history -an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian -notions, it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable -to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a -ruthless application of them. It will also teach him how the rules -of belligerent intercourse in war have developed, how in the course -of time they have solidified into general usages of war, and finally -it will teach him whether the governing usages of war are justified -or not, whether they are to be modified or whether they are to be -observed. But for a study of military history in this light, knowledge -of the fundamental conceptions of modern international and military -movements is certainly necessary. To present this is the main purpose -of the following work. - - - - -PART I - -THE USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO THE HOSTILE ARMY - - - - -CHAPTER I - -WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE ARMY? - - -[Sidenote: Who are Combatants and who are not.] - -Since the subjects of enemy States have quite different rights and -duties according as they occupy an active or a passive position, the -question arises: Who is to be recognized as occupying the active -position, or what amounts to the same thing--Who belongs to the hostile -army? This is a question of particular importance. - -According to the universal usages of war, the following are to be -regarded as occupying an active position: - - 1. The heads of the enemy’s state and its ministers, even though - they possess no military rank. - - 2. The regular army, and it is a matter of indifference whether - the army is recruited voluntarily or by conscription; whether - the army consists of subjects or aliens (mercenaries); whether - it is brought together out of elements which were already in - the service in time of peace, or out of such as are enrolled - at the moment of mobilization (militia, reserve, national - guard and Landsturm). - - 3. Subject to certain assumptions, irregular combatants, also, - _i.e._, such as are not constituent parts of the regular army, - but have only taken up arms for the length of the war, or, - indeed, for a particular task of the war. - -[Sidenote: The Irregular.] - -Only the third class of persons need be more closely considered. In -their case the question how far the rights of an active position are -to be conceded to them has at all times been matter of controversy, -and the treatment of irregular troops has in consequence varied -considerably. Generally speaking the study of military history leads -to the conclusion that the Commanding Officers of regular armies -were always inclined to regard irregular troops of the enemy with -distrust, and to apply to them the contemporary laws of war with -peculiar severity. This unfavorable prejudice is based on the ground -that the want of a military education and of stern discipline among -irregular troops, easily leads to transgressions and to non-observance -of the usages of war, and that the minor skirmishes which they prefer -to indulge in, and which by their very nature lead to individual -enterprise, open the door to irregularity and savagery, and easily -deteriorate into robbery and unauthorized violence, so that in every -case the general insecurity which it develops engenders bitterness, -fury, and revengeful feelings in the harassed troops, and leads to -cruel reprisals. Let any one read the combats of the French troops in -the Spanish Peninsula in the years 1808 to 1814, in Tyrol in 1809, -in Germany in 1813, and also those of the English in their different -Colonial wars, or again the Carlist Wars, the Russo-Turkish War, -and the Franco-Prussian War,[41] and one will everywhere find this -experience confirmed. - -[Sidenote: Each State must decide for itself.] - -If these points of view are on the whole decisive against the -employment of irregular troops, yet on the other hand, it must be left -to each particular State to determine how far it will disregard such -considerations; from the point of view of international law no State -is compelled to limit the instruments of its military operations to -the standing army. It is, on the contrary, completely justified in -drawing upon all the inhabitants capable of bearing arms, entirely -according to its discretion, and in imparting to them an authorization -to participate in the war. - -[Sidenote: The necessity of Authorization.] - -This public authorization has therefore been until quite recently -regarded as the presumed necessary condition of any recognition of -combatant rights. - -[Sidenote: Exceptions which prove the rule.] - -[Sidenote: The Free Lance.] - -Of course there are numerous examples in military history in which -irregular combatants have been recognized as combatants by the enemy, -without any public authorization of the kind; thus in the latest wars -of North America, Switzerland, and Italy, and also in the case of the -campaign (without any kind of commission from a State) of Garibaldi -against Naples and Sicily in the year 1860. But in all these cases -the tacitly conceded recognition originated not out of any obligatory -principles of international law or of military usage, but simply and -solely out of the fear of reprisals. The power to prevent the entrance -on the scene of these irregular partizans did not exist, and it was -feared that by not recognizing their quality as combatants the war a -cruel character might be given, and consequently that more harm than -good might result to the parties themselves. On the other hand there -has always been a universal consensus of opinion against recognizing -irregulars who make their appearance individually or in small bands, -and who conduct war in some measure on their own account (auf eigene -Faust) detached from the army, and such opinion approves of the -punishment of these offenders with death. - -This legal attitude which denies every unauthorized rising and -identifies it with brigandage was taken up by the revolutionary armies -of France towards the insurrection in La Vendée, and again by Napoleon -in his proceedings against Schill and Dörnberg in the year 1809, and -again by Wellington, Schwarzenberg, and Blücher, in the Proclamations -issued by them in France in the year 1814, and the German Army adopted -the same standpoint in the year 1870-71, when it demanded that: “Every -prisoner who wishes to be treated as a prisoner of war must produce -a certificate as to his character as a French soldier, issued by the -legal authorities, and addressed to him personally, to the effect that -he has been called to the Colors and is borne on the Roll of a corps -organized on a military footing by the French Government.” - -[Sidenote: Modern views.] - -In the controversies which have arisen since the war of 1870-71 over -the different questions of international law and the laws of war, -decisive emphasis has no longer been placed upon the question of public -authorization, and it has been proposed, on grounds of expediency, -to recognize as combatants such irregulars as are indeed without an -express and immediate public authorization, but who are organized in -military fashion and are under a responsible leader. The view here -taken was that by a recognition of these kind of irregular troops the -dangers and horrors of war would be diminished, and that a substitute -for the legal authorization lacking in the case of individuals offers -itself in the military organization and in the existence of a leader -responsible to his own State. - -Moreover the Brussels Declaration of August 27, 1874, and in -consonance with it the _Manual of the Institute of International Law_, -desire as the first condition of recognition as combatants “that they -have at their head a personality who is responsible for the behavior of -those under him to his own Government.”[42] - -[Sidenote: The German Military View.] - -Considered from the military point of view there is not much objection -to the omission of the demand for public authorization, so soon as -it becomes a question of organized detachments of troops, but in the -case of hostile individuals who appear on the scene we shall none the -less be unable to dispense with the certificate of membership of an -organized band, if such individuals are to be regarded and treated as -lawful belligerents. - -But the organization of irregulars in military bands and their -subjection to a responsible leader are not by themselves sufficient -to enable one to grant them the status of belligerents; even more -important than these is the necessity of being able to recognize them -as such and of their carrying their arms openly. The soldier must know -who he has against him as an active opponent, he must be protected -against treacherous killing and against any military operation which is -prohibited by the usages of war among regular armies. The chivalrous -idea which rules in the regular armies of all civilized States always -seeks an open profession of one’s belligerent character. The demand -must, therefore, be insisted on that irregular troops, although not in -uniform, shall at least be distinguishable by visible signs which are -recognizable at a distance.[43] Only by such means can the occurrence -of misuse in the practise of war on the one side, and the tragic -consequences of the non-recognition of combatant status on the other, -be made impossible. The Brussels Declarations also therefore recommend, -in Art. 9 (2 and 3), that they, _i.e._, the irregular troops, should -wear a fixed sign which is visible from a distance, and that they -should carry their weapons openly. The Hague Convention adds to these -three conditions yet a fourth, “That they observe the laws and usages -of war in their military operations.” - -[Sidenote: The Levée en masse.] - -[Sidenote: The Hague Regulations will not do.] - -[Sidenote: A short way with the Defender of his Country.] - -This condition must also be maintained if it becomes a question -of the _levée en masse_, the arming of the whole population of the -country, province, or district; in other words the so-called people’s -war or national war.[44] Starting from the view that one can never -deny to the population of a country the natural right of defense of -one’s fatherland, and that the smaller and consequently less powerful -States can only find protection in such _levées en masse_, the -majority of authorities on International law have, in their proposals -for codification, sought to attain the recognition on principle of -the combatant status of all these kinds of people’s champions, and -in the Brussels declaration and the Hague Regulations the aforesaid -condition[45] is omitted. As against this one may nevertheless remark -that the condition requiring a military organization and a clearly -recognizable mark of being attached to the enemy’s troops, is not -synonymous with a denial of the natural right of defense of one’s -country. It is therefore not a question of restraining the population -from seizing arms but only of compelling it to do this in an organized -manner. Subjection to a responsible leader, a military organization, -and clear recognizability cannot be left out of account unless the -whole recognized foundation for the admission of irregulars is going -to be given up altogether, and a conflict of one private individual -against another is to be introduced again, with all its attendant -horrors, of which, for example, the proceedings in Bazeilles in -the last Franco-Prussian War afford an instance. If the necessary -organization does not really become established--a case which is by no -means likely to occur often--then nothing remains but a conflict of -individuals, and those who conduct it cannot claim the rights of an -active military status. The disadvantages and severities inherent in -such a state of affairs are more insignificant and less inhuman than -those which would result from recognition.[46] - - - - -CHAPTER II - -THE MEANS OF CONDUCTING WAR - - -[Sidenote: Violence and Cunning.] - -By the means of conducting war is to be understood all those measures -which can be taken by one State against the other in order to attain -the object of the war, to compel one’s opponent to submit to one’s -will; they may be summarized in the two ideas of Violence and Cunning, -and judgment as to their applicability may be embodied in the following -proposition: - - What is permissible includes every means of war without which the - object of the war cannot be obtained; what is reprehensible on the - other hand includes every act of violence and destruction which is - not demanded by the object of war. - -It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are -set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary judgment of the Commanding -Officer; the precepts of civilization, freedom and honor, the -traditions prevalent in the army, and the general usages of war, will -have to guide his decisions. - - -A.--MEANS OF WAR DEPENDING ON FORCE - -The most important instruments of war in the possession of the enemy -are his army, and his military positions; to make an end of them is the -first object of war. This can happen: - - 1. By the annihilation, slaughter, or wounding of the individual - combatants. - - 2. By making prisoners of the same. - - 3. By siege and bombardment. - - -1. _Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of the hostile combatants_ - -[Sidenote: How to make an end of the Enemy.] - -In the matter of making an end of the enemy’s forces by violence it -is an incontestable and self-evident rule that the right of killing -and annihilation in regard to the hostile combatants is inherent in -the war power and its organs, that all means which modern inventions -afford, including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means -of destruction, may be utilized; these last, just because they attain -the object of war as quickly as possible, are on that account to be -regarded as indispensable and, when closely considered, the most human. - -[Sidenote: The Rules of the Game.] - -As a supplement to this rule, the usages of war recognize the -desirability of not employing severer forms of violence if and when the -object of the war may be attained by milder means, and furthermore -that certain means of war which lead to unnecessary suffering are to be -excluded. To such belong: - - The use of poison both individually and collectively (such as - poisoning of streams and food supplies[47]) the propagation of - infectious diseases. - - Assassination, proscription, and outlawry of an opponent.[48] - - The use of arms which cause useless suffering, such as soft-nosed - bullets, glass, etc. - - The killing of wounded or prisoners who are no longer capable of - offering resistance.[49] - - The refusal of quarter to soldiers who have laid down their arms - and allowed themselves to be captured. - -The progress of modern invention has made superfluous the express -prohibition of certain old-fashioned but formerly legitimate -instruments of war (chain shot, red-hot shot, pitch balls, etc.), -since others, more effective, have been substituted for these; on the -other hand the use of projectiles of less than 400 grammes in weight -is prohibited by the St. Petersburg Convention of December 11th, 1868. -(This only in the case of musketry.[50]) - -He who offends against any of these prohibitions is to be held -responsible therefore by the State. If he is captured he is subject to -the penalties of military law. - -[Sidenote: Colored Troops are “Blacklegs.”] - -Closely connected with the unlawful instruments of war is the -employment of uncivilized and barbarous peoples in European wars. -Looked at from the point of view of law it can, of course, not be -forbidden to any State to call up armed forces from its extra-European -colonies, but the practise stands in express contradiction to the -modern movement for humanizing the conduct of war and for alleviating -its attendant sufferings, if men and troops are employed in war, who -are without the knowledge of civilized warfare and by whom, therefore, -the very cruelties and inhumanities forbidden by the usages of war are -committed. The employment of these kinds of troops is therefore to be -compared with the use of the instruments of war already described as -forbidden. The transplantation of African and Mohammedan Turcos to a -European seat of war in the year 1870 was, therefore, undoubtedly to be -regarded as a retrogression from civilized to barbarous warfare, since -these troops had and could have no conception of European-Christian -culture, or respect for property and for the honor of women, etc.[51] - - -2. _Capture of Enemy Combatants_ - -[Sidenote: Prisoners of War.] - -If individual members or parties of the army fall into the power of the -enemy’s forces, either through their being disarmed and defenseless, or -through their being obliged to cease from hostilities in consequence -of a formal capitulation, they are then in the position of “prisoners -of war,” and thereby in some measure exchange an active for a passive -position. - -[Sidenote: Vae Victis!] - -According to the older doctrine of international law all persons -belonging to the hostile State, whether combatants or non-combatants, -who happen to fall into the hands of their opponent, are in the -position of prisoners of war. He could deal with them according to his -pleasure, ill-treat them, kill them, lead them away into bondage, or -sell them into slavery. History knows but few exceptions to this rule, -these being the result of particular treaties. In the Middle Ages the -Church tried to intervene as mediator in order to ameliorate the lot -of the prisoners, but without success. Only the prospect of ransom, -and chivalrous ideas in the case of individuals, availed to give any -greater protection. It is to be borne in mind that the prisoners -belonged to him who had captured them, a conception which began to -disappear after the Thirty Years’ War. The treatment of prisoners of -war was mostly harsh and inhuman; still, in the seventeenth century, it -was usual to secure their lot by a treaty on the outbreak of a war. - -The credit of having opened the way to another conception of war -captivity belongs to Frederick the Great and Franklin, inasmuch as they -inserted in the famous Treaty of friendship, concluded in 1785 between -Prussia and North America, entirely new regulations as to the treatment -of prisoners of war. - -[Sidenote: The Modern View.] - -The complete change in the conception of war introduced in recent times -has in consequence changed all earlier ideas as to the position and -treatment of prisoners of war. Starting from the principle that only -States and not private persons are in the position of enemies in time -of war, and that an enemy who is disarmed and taken prisoner is no -longer an object of attack, the doctrine of war captivity is entirely -altered and the position of prisoners has become assimilated to that of -the wounded and the sick. - -[Sidenote: Prisoners of War are to be honorably treated.] - -The present position of international law and the law of war on the -subject of prisoners of war is based on the fundamental conception -that they are the captives not of private individuals, that is to say -of Commanders, Soldiers, or Detachments of Troops, but that they are -the captives of the State. But the State regards them as persons who -have simply done their duty and obeyed the commands of their superiors, -and in consequence views their captivity not as penal but merely as -precautionary. - -It therefore follows that the object of war captivity is simply to -prevent the captives from taking any further part in the war, and -that the State can, in fact, do everything which appears necessary -for securing the captives, but nothing beyond that. The captives have -therefore to submit to all those restrictions and inconveniences which -the purpose of securing them necessitates; they can collectively be -involved in a common suffering if some individuals among them have -provoked sterner treatment; but, on the other hand, they are protected -against unjustifiable severities, ill-treatment, and unworthy handling; -they do, indeed, lose their freedom, but not their rights; war -captivity is, in other words, no longer an act of grace on the part of -the victor but a right of the defenseless. - -[Sidenote: Who may be made Prisoners.] - -According to the notions of the laws of war to-day the following -persons are to be treated as prisoners of war: - - 1. The Sovereign, together with those members of his family who - were capable of bearing arms, the chief of the enemy’s State, - generally speaking, and the Ministers who conduct its policy - even though they are not among the individuals belonging to - the active army.[52] - - 2. All persons belonging to the armed forces. - - 3. All Diplomatists and Civil Servants attached to the army. - - 4. All civilians staying with the army, with the approval of its - Commanders, such as transport, sutlers, contractors, newspaper - correspondents, and the like. - - 5. All persons actively concerned with the war such as Higher - Officials, Diplomatists, Couriers, and the like, as also all - those persons whose freedom can be a danger to the army of the - other State, for example, Journalists of hostile opinions, - prominent and influential leaders of Parties, Clergy who - excite the people, and such like.[53] - - 6. The mass of the population of a province or a district if they - rise in defense of their country. - -The points of view regarding the treatment of prisoners of war may be -summarized in the following rules: - -Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the State which has -captured them. - -[Sidenote: The treatment of Prisoners of War.] - -The relation of the prisoners of war to their own former superiors -ceases during their captivity; a captured officer’s servant steps -into the position of a private servant. Captured officers are never -the superiors of soldiers of the State which has captured them; on -the contrary, they are under the orders of such of the latter as are -entrusted with their custody. - -The prisoners of war have, in the places in which they are quartered, -to submit to such restrictions of their liberty as are necessary for -their safe keeping. They have strictly to comply with the obligation -imposed upon them, not to move beyond a certain indicated boundary. - -[Sidenote: Their confinement.] - -These measures for their safe keeping are not to be exceeded; in -particular, penal confinement, fetters, and unnecessary restrictions -of freedom are only to be resorted to if particular reasons exist to -justify or necessitate them. - -The concentration camps in which prisoners of war are quartered must be -as healthy, clean, and decent as possible; they should not be prisons -or convict establishments. - -It is true that the French captives were transported by the Russians to -Siberia as malefactors in the years 1812 and 1813. This was a measure -which was not illegitimate according to the older practise of war, but -it is no longer in accordance with the legal conscience of to-day. -Similarly the methods which were adopted during the Civil War in North -America in a prison in the Southern States, against prisoners of war of -the Union Forces, whereby the men were kept without air and nourishment -and thus badly treated, were also against the practise of the law of -war. - -Freedom of movement within these concentration camps or within the -whole locality may be permitted if there are no special reasons against -it. But obviously prisoners of war are subject to the existing, or to -the appointed rules of the establishment or garrison. - -[Sidenote: The Prisoner and his Taskmaster.] - -Prisoners of war can be put to moderate work proportionate to their -position in life; work is a safeguard against excesses. Also on -grounds of health this is desirable. But these tasks should not -be prejudicial to health nor in any way dishonorable or such as -contribute directly or indirectly to the military operations against -the Fatherland of the captives. Work for the State is, according to the -Hague regulations, to be paid at the rates payable to members of the -army of the State itself. - -Should the work be done on account of other public authorities or of -private persons, then the conditions will be fixed by agreement with -the military authorities. The wages of the prisoners of war must be -expended in the improvement of their condition, and anything that -remains should be paid over to them after deducting the cost of their -maintenance when they are set free. Voluntary work in order to earn -extra wages is to be allowed, if there are no particular reasons -against it.[54] Insurrection, insubordination, misuse of the freedom -granted, will of course justify severer confinement in each case, also -punishment, and so will crimes and misdemeanors. - -[Sidenote: Flight.] - -Attempts at escape on the part of individuals who have not pledged -their word of honor might be regarded as the expression of a natural -impulse for liberty, and not as a crime. They are therefore to be -punished by restriction of the privileges granted and a sharper -supervision but not with death. But the latter punishment will follow -of course in the case of plots to escape, if only because of the danger -of them. In case of a breach of a man’s parole the punishment of death -may reasonably be incurred. In some circumstances, if necessity and -the behavior of the prisoners compel it, one is justified in taking -measures the effect of which is to involve the innocent with the -guilty.[55] - -[Sidenote: Diet.] - -The food of the prisoners must be sufficient and suitable to their -rank, yet they will have to be content with the customary food of the -country; luxuries which the prisoners wish to get at their own expense -are to be permitted if reasons of discipline do not forbid. - -[Sidenote: Letters.] - -Correspondence with one’s home is to be permitted, likewise visits and -intercourse, but these of course must be watched. - -[Sidenote: Personal belongings.] - -The prisoners of war remain in possession of their private property -with the exception of arms, horses, and documents of a military -purport. If for definite reasons any objects are taken away from them, -then these must be kept in suitable places and restored to them at the -end of their captivity. - -[Sidenote: The Information Bureau.] - -Article 14 of the Hague Regulations prescribes that on the outbreak -of hostilities there shall be established in each of the belligerent -States and in a given case in neutral States, which have received -into their territory any of the combatants, an information bureau for -prisoners of war. Its duty will be to answer all inquiries concerning -such prisoners and to receive the necessary particulars from the -services concerned in order to be able to keep a personal entry for -every prisoner. The information bureau must always be kept well -posted about everything which concerns a prisoner of war. Also this -information bureau must collect and assign to the legitimate persons -all personal objects, valuables, letters, and the like, which are found -on the field of battle or have been left behind by dead prisoners of -war in hospitals or field-hospitals. The information bureau enjoys -freedom from postage, as do generally all postal despatches sent to or -by prisoners of war. Charitable gifts for prisoners of war must be free -of customs duty and also of freight charges on the public railways. - -The prisoners of war have, in the event of their being wounded or sick, -a claim to medical assistance and care as understood by the Geneva -Convention and, so far as is possible, to spiritual ministrations also. - -These rules may be shortly summarized as follows: - -Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the country in which they -find themselves, particularly the rules in force in the army of the -local State; they are to be treated like one’s own soldiers, neither -worse nor better. - -[Sidenote: When Prisoners may be put to Death.] - -The following considerations hold good as regard the imposition of a -death penalty in the case of prisoners; they can be put to death: - - 1. In case they commit offenses or are guilty of practises which - are punishable by death by civil or military laws. - - 2. In case of insubordination, attempts at escape, etc., deadly - weapons can be employed. - - 3. In case of overwhelming necessity, as reprisals, either against - similar measures, or against other irregularities on the part - of the management of the enemy’s army. - - 4. In case of overwhelming necessity, when other means of - precaution do not exist and the existence of the prisoners - becomes a danger to one’s own existence. - -[Sidenote: “Reprisals.”] - -As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to be remarked that -these are objected to by numerous teachers of international law on -grounds of humanity. To make this a matter of principle, and apply it -to every case exhibits, however, “a misconception due to intelligible -but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings of humanity, of the -significance, the seriousness and the right of war. It must not be -overlooked that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of the -State are the first consideration, and not regard for the unconditional -freedom of prisoners from molestation.”[56] - -[Sidenote: One must not be too scrupulous.] - -That prisoners should only be killed in the event of extreme necessity, -and that only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one’s -own State can justify a proceeding of this kind is to-day universally -admitted. But that these considerations have not always been decisive -is proved by the shooting of 2,000 Arabs at Jaffa in 1799 by Napoleon; -of the prisoners in the rising of La Vendée; in the Carlist War; in -Mexico, and in the American War of Secession, where it was generally a -case of deliverance from burdensome supervision and the difficulties -of maintenance; whereas peoples of a higher morality such as the -Boers in our own days, finding themselves in a similar position, have -preferred to let their prisoners go. For the rest, calamities such -as might lead to the shooting of prisoners are scarcely likely to -happen under the excellent conditions of transport in our own time and -the correspondingly small difficulty of feeding them--in a European -campaign.[57] - -[Sidenote: The end of Captivity.] - -The captivity of war comes to an end: - - 1. By force of circumstances which _de facto_ determine it, for - example, successful escape, cessation of the war, or death. - - 2. By becoming the subject of the enemy’s state. - - 3. By release, whether conditional or unconditional, unilateral or - reciprocal. - - 4. By exchange. - -As to 1. With the cessation of the war every reason for the captivity -ceases, provided there exist no special grounds for another view. It -is on that account that care should be taken to discharge prisoners -immediately. There remain only prisoners sentenced to punishment or -awaiting trial, _i.e._, until the expiation of their sentence or the -end of their trial as the case may be. - -As to 2. This pre-supposes the readiness of the State to accept the -prisoner as a subject. - -[Sidenote: Parole.] - -As to 3. A man released under certain conditions has to fulfil them -without question. If he does not do this, and again falls into the -hands of his enemy, then he must expect to be dealt with by military -law, and indeed according to circumstances with the punishment of -death. A conditional release cannot be imposed on the captive; still -less is there any obligation upon the state to discharge a prisoner on -conditions--for example, on his parole. The release depends entirely -on the discretion of the State, as does also the determination of its -limits and the persons to whom it shall apply. - -The release of whole detachments on their parole is not usual. It is -rather to be regarded as an arrangement with each particular individual. - -Arrangements of this kind, every one of which is as a rule made a -conditional discharge, must be very precisely formulated and the -wording of them most carefully scrutinized. In particular it must be -precisely expressed whether the person released is only bound no longer -to fight directly with arms against the State which releases him, in -the present war, whether he is justified in rendering services to his -own country in other positions or in the colonies, etc., or whether all -and every kind of service is forbidden him. - -The question whether the parole given by an officer or a soldier is -recognized as binding or not by his own State depends on whether the -legislation or even the military instructions permit or forbid the -giving of one’s parole.[58] In the first case his own State must not -command him to do services the performance of which he has pledged -himself not to undertake.[59] But personally the man released on parole -is under all circumstances bound to observe it. He destroys his honor -if he breaks his word, and is liable to punishment if recaptured, even -though he has been hindered by his own State from keeping it.[60] -According to the Hague Regulations a Government can demand no services -which are in conflict with a man’s parole. - -[Sidenote: Exchange of Prisoners.] - -As to 4. The exchange of prisoners in a single case can take place -between two belligerents without its being necessary in every case to -make circumstantial agreements. As regards the scope of the exchange -and the forms in which it is to be completed the Commanding Officers -on both sides alone decide. Usually the exchange is man for man, in -which case the different categories of military persons are taken -into account and certain ratios established as to what constitutes -equivalents. - -[Sidenote: Removal of Prisoners.] - -Transport of Prisoners.--Since no Army makes prisoners in order to -let them escape again afterwards, measures must be taken for their -transport in order to prevent attempts at escape. If one recalls that -in the year 1870-71, no fewer than 11,160 officers and 333,885 men -were brought from France to Germany, and as a result many thousands -often had to be guarded by a proportionately small company, one -must admit that in such a position only the most zealous energy and -ruthless employment of all the means at one’s disposal can avail, and -although it is opposed to military sentiment to use weapons against the -defenseless, none the less in such a case one has no other choice. The -captive who seeks to free himself by flight does so at his peril and -can complain of no violence which the custody of prisoners directs in -order to prevent behavior of that kind. Apart from these apparently -harsh measures against attempt at escape, the transport authorities -must do everything they can to alleviate the lot of the sick and -wounded prisoners, in particular they are to protect them against -insults and ill-treatment from an excited mob. - - -3. _Sieges and Bombardments_ - -[Sidenote: Fair Game.] - -War is waged not merely with the hostile combatants but also with the -inanimate military resources of the enemy. This includes not only the -fortresses but also every town and every village which is an obstacle -to military progress. All can be besieged and bombarded, stormed and -destroyed, if they are defended by the enemy, and in some cases even if -they are only occupied. There has always been a divergence of views, -among Professors of International Law, as to the means which are -permissible for waging war against these inanimate objects, and these -views have frequently been in strong conflict with those of soldiers; -it is therefore necessary to go into this question more closely. - -We have to distinguish: - - (_a_) Fortresses, strong places, and fortified places. - - (_b_) Open towns, villages, buildings, and the like, which, - however, are occupied or used for military purposes. - -Fortresses and strong places are important centers of defense, not -merely in a military sense, but also in a political and economic sense. -They furnish a principal resource to the enemy and can therefore be -bombarded just like the hostile army itself. - -[Sidenote: Of making the most of one’s opportunity.] - -A preliminary notification of bombardment is just as little to be -required as in the case of a sudden assault. The claims to the contrary -put forward by some jurists are completely inconsistent with war and -must be repudiated by soldiers; the cases in which a notification has -been voluntarily given do not prove its necessity. The besieger will -have to consider for himself the question whether the very absence -of notification may not be itself a factor of success, by means of -surprise, and indeed whether notification will not mean a loss of -precious time. If there is no danger of this then humanity no doubt -demands such a notification. - -Since town and fortifications belong together and form an inseparable -unity, and can seldom in a military sense, and never in an economic and -political sense, be separated, the bombardment will not limit itself to -the actual fortification, but it will and must extend over the whole -town; the reason for this lies in the fact that a restriction of the -bombardment to the fortifications is impracticable; it would jeopardize -the success of the operation, and would quite unjustifiably protect -the defenders who are not necessarily quartered in the works. - -[Sidenote: Spare the Churches.] - -But this does not preclude the exemption by the besieger of certain -sections and buildings of the fortress or town from bombardment, such -as churches, schools, libraries, museums, and the like, so far as this -is possible. - -But of course it is assumed that buildings seeking this protection will -be distinguishable and that they are not put to defensive uses. Should -this happen, then every humanitarian consideration must give way. -The utterances of French writers about the bombardments of Strasburg -Cathedral in the year 1870, are therefore quite without justification, -since it only happened after an observatory for officers of artillery -had been erected on the tower. - -The only exemption from bombardment recognized by international law, -through the medium of the Geneva Convention, concerns hospitals and -convalescent establishments. Their extension is left to the discretion -of the besieger. - -[Sidenote: A Bombardment is no Respecter of Persons.] - -As regards the civil population of a fortified place the rule is: All -the inhabitants, whether natives or foreigners, whether permanent or -temporary residents, are to be treated alike. - -No exception need be made in regard to the diplomatists of neutral -States who happen to be in the town; if before or during the investment -by the besieger their attention is drawn to the fate to which they -expose themselves by remaining, and if days of grace in which to -leave are afforded them, that simply rests on the courtesy of the -besieger. No such duty is incumbent upon him in international law. Also -permission to send out couriers with diplomatic despatches depends -entirely upon the discretion of the besieger. In any case it will -always depend on whether the necessary security against misuse is -provided.[61] - -[Sidenote: A timely severity.] - -If the commandant of a fortress wishes to strengthen its defensive -capacity by expelling a portion of the population such as women, -children, old people, wounded, etc., then he must take these steps in -good time, _i.e._, before the investment begins. If the investment is -completed, no claim to the free passage of these classes can be made -good. All juristic demands to the contrary are as a matter of principle -to be repudiated, as being in fundamental conflict with the principles -of war. The very presence of such persons may accelerate the surrender -of the place in certain circumstances, and it would therefore be -foolish of a besieger to renounce voluntarily this advantage.[62] - -Once the surrender of a fortress is accomplished, then, by the usages -of war to-day, any further destruction, annihilation, incendiarism, -and the like, are completely excluded. The only further injuries that -are permitted are those demanded or necessitated by the object of the -war, _e.g._, destruction of fortifications, removal of particular -buildings, or in some circumstances of complete quarters, rectification -of the foreground and so on. - -[Sidenote: “Undefended Places.”] - -A prohibition by international law of the bombardment of open towns and -villages which are not occupied by the enemy, or defended, was, indeed, -put into words by the Hague Regulations, but appears superfluous, since -modern military history knows of hardly any such case. - -But the matter is different where open towns are occupied by the enemy -or are defended. In this case, naturally all the rules stated above -as to fortified places hold good, and the simple rules of tactics -dictate that fire should be directed not merely against the bounds of -the place, so that the space behind the enemy’s firing line and any -reserves that may be there shall not escape. A bombardment is indeed -justified, and unconditionally dictated by military consideration, if -the occupation of the village is not with a view to its defense but -only for the passage of troops, or to screen an approach or retreat, or -to prepare or cover a tactical movement, or to take up supplies, etc. -The only criterion is the value which the place possesses for the enemy -in the existing situation. - -Regarding it from this point of view, the bombardment of Kehl by the -French in 1870 was justified by military necessity, although the place -bombarded was an open town and not directly defended. “Kehl offered -the attacking force the opportunity of establishing itself in its -buildings, and of bringing up and placing there its personnel and -material, unseen by the defenders. It became a question of making Kehl -inaccessible to the enemy and of depriving it of the characteristics -which made its possession advantageous to the enemy. The aforesaid -justification was not very evident.”[63] - -Also the bombardment of the open town of Saarbrücken cannot from the -military point of view be the subject of reproach against the French. -On August 2nd a Company of the Fusilier Regiment No. 40 had actually -occupied the railway station and several others had taken up a position -in the town. It was against these troops that the fire of the French -was primarily directed. If havoc was spread in the town, that could -scarcely be avoided. In the night of August 3rd to 4th, the fire of the -French batteries was again directed on the railway station in order to -prevent the despatch of troops and material. Against this proceeding -also no objection can be made, since the movement of trains had -actually taken place. - -If, therefore, on the German side[64] energetic protest were made in -both cases, and the bombardment of Kehl and Saarbrücken were declared -a violation of international law, this only proves that in 1870 a -proper comprehension of questions of the laws of war of this kind -was not always to be found even in the highest military and official -circles. But still less was this the case on the French side as is -clear from the protests against the German bombardment of Dijon, -Chateaudun, Bazeilles, and other places, the military justification for -which is still clearer and incontestable.[65] - - -B.--METHODS NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. CUNNING, AND DECEIT - -[Sidenote: Stratagems.] - -Cunning in war has been permissible from the earliest times, and was -esteemed all the more as it furthered the object of war without -entailing the loss of men. Surprises, laying of ambushes, feigned -attacks and retreats, feigned flight, pretense of inactivity, spreading -of false news as to one’s strength and dispositions, use of the enemy’s -parole--all this was permitted and prevalent ever since war begun, and -so it is to-day.[66] - -[Sidenote: What are “dirty tricks”?] - -As to the limits between recognized stratagems and those forms of -cunning which are reprehensible, contemporary opinion, national -culture, the practical needs of the moment, and the changing military -situation, are so influential that it is prima facie proportionately -difficult to draw any recognized limit, as difficult as between -criminal selfishness and taking a justifiable advantage. Some forms -of artifice are, however, under all circumstances irreconcilable -with honorable fighting, especially all those which take the form of -faithlessness, fraud, and breach of one’s word. Among these are breach -of a safe-conduct; of a free retirement; or of an armistice, in order -to gain by a surprise attack an advantage over the enemy; feigned -surrender in order to kill the enemy who then approach unsuspiciously; -misuse of a flag of truce, or of the Red Cross, in order to secure -one’s approach, or in case of attack, deliberate violation of a -solemnly concluded obligation, _e.g._, of a war treaty; incitement to -crime, such as murder of the enemy’s leaders, incendiarism, robbery, -and the like. This kind of outrage was an offense against the law of -nations even in the earliest times. The natural conscience of mankind -whose spirit is chivalrously alive in the armies of all civilized -States, has branded it as an outrage upon human right, and enemies who -in such a public manner violate the laws of honor and justice have been -regarded as no longer on an equality.[67] - -[Sidenote: Of False Uniforms.] - -The views of military authorities about methods of this kind, as also -of those which are on the borderline, frequently differ from the views -held by notable jurists. So also the putting on of enemy’s uniforms, -the employment of enemy or neutral flags and marks, with the object -of deception are as a rule declared permissible by the theory of the -laws of war,[68] while military writers[69] have expressed themselves -unanimously against them. The Hague Conference has adopted the latter -view in forbidding the employment of enemy’s uniforms and military -marks equally with the misuse of flags of truce and of the Red -Cross.[70] - -[Sidenote: The Corruption of others may be useful.] - -[Sidenote: And murder is one of the Fine Arts.] - -Bribery of the enemy’s subjects with the object of obtaining military -advantages, acceptance of offers of treachery, reception of deserters, -utilization of the discontented elements in the population, support of -pretenders and the like, are permissible, indeed international law -is in no way opposed[71] to the exploitation of the crimes of third -parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the like) to the -prejudice of the enemy. - -[Sidenote: The ugly is often expedient, and that it is a mistake to be -too “nice-minded.”] - -Considerations of chivalry, generosity, and honor may denounce in such -cases a hasty and unsparing exploitation of such advantages as indecent -and dishonorable, but law which is less touchy allows it.[72] “The -ugly and inherently immoral aspect of such methods cannot affect the -recognition of their lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the -belligerent the right and imposes upon him, according to circumstances, -the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the decisive, -advantages to be gained by such means.[73] - - - - -CHAPTER III - -TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SICK SOLDIERS - - -The generally accepted principle that in war one should do no more harm -to one’s enemy than the object of the war unconditionally requires, -has led to treating the wounded and sick combatants as being no longer -enemies, but merely sick men who are to be taken care of and as much -as possible protected from the tragic results of wounds and illness. -Although endeavors to protect the wounded soldiers from arbitrary -slaughter, mutilation, ill-treatment, or other brutalities go back -to the oldest times, yet the credit of systematizing these endeavors -belongs to the nineteenth century, and this system was raised to the -level of a principle of international law by the Geneva Convention of -1864. - -[Sidenote: The sanctity of the Geneva Convention.] - -With the elevation of the Geneva Agreements to the level of laws -binding peoples and armies, the question of the treatment of wounded -and sick combatants, as well as that of the persons devoted to the -healing and care of them, is separated from the usages of war. -Moreover, and discussion of the form of this international law must be -regarded from the military point of view as aimless and unprofitable. -The soldier may still be convinced that some of the Articles are -capable of improvement, that others need supplementing, and that yet -others should be suppressed, but he has not the right to deviate from -the stipulations; it is his duty to contribute as far as he can to the -observance of the whole code. - -[Sidenote: The “Hyenas of the Battlefield.”] - -No notice is taken in the Geneva Convention of the question of the -protection of fallen or wounded combatants from the front, from the -rabble usually known as “The Hyenas of the battlefield,” who are -accustomed to rob, ill-treat, or slay soldiers lying defenseless on the -field of battle. This is a matter left to the initiative of the troops. -Persons of this kind, whether they be soldiers or not, are undoubtedly -to be dealt with in the sternest possible manner. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BELLIGERENT ARMIES - - -[Sidenote: Flags of Truce.] - -Hostile armies are in frequent intercourse with one another. This -takes place so long as it is practised openly, that is to say, with -the permission of the commanders on both sides, by means of bearers of -flags of truce. In this class are included those who have to conduct -the official intercourse between the belligerent armies or divisions -thereof, and who appear as authorized envoys of one army to the other, -in order to conduct negotiations and to transmit communications. As to -the treatment of bearers of flags of truce there exist regular usages -of war, an intimate acquaintance with which is of the highest practical -importance. This knowledge is not merely indispensable for the higher -officers, but also for all inferior officers, and to a certain extent -for the private in the ranks. - -Since a certain degree of intercourse between the two belligerents is -unavoidable, and indeed desirable, the assurance of this intercourse -is in the interests of both parties; it has held good as a custom from -the earliest times, and even among uncivilized people, whereby these -envoys and their assistants (trumpeter, drummer, interpreter, and -orderly) are to be regarded as inviolable; a custom which proceeds on -the presumption that these persons, although drawn from the ranks of -the combatants, are no longer, during the performance of these duties, -to be regarded as active belligerents. They must, therefore, neither -be shot nor captured; on the contrary, everything must be done to -assure the performance of their task and to permit their return on its -conclusion. - -But it is a fundamental condition of this procedure: - - 1. That the envoy be quite distinguishable as such by means of - universally recognized and well-known marks; distinguishable - both by sight and by hearing (flags of truce, white flags, or, - if need be, white pocket-handkerchiefs) and signals (horns or - bugles). - - 2. That the envoy behave peaceably, and - - 3. That he does not abuse his position in order to commit any - unlawful act. - -Of course any contravention of the last two conditions puts an end -to his inviolability; it may justify his immediate capture, and, in -extreme cases (espionage, hatching of plots), his condemnation by -military law. Should the envoy abuse his mission for purposes of -observation, whereby the army he is visiting is imperiled, then also -he may be detained, but not longer than is necessary. In all cases of -this kind it is recommended that prompt and detailed information be -furnished to the head of the other army. - -It is the right of every army: - - 1. To accept, or to refuse such envoys. An envoy who is not - received must immediately rejoin his own army; he must not, of - course, be shot at on his way. - - 2. To declare that it will not during a fixed period entertain any - envoys. Should any appear in spite of this declaration; they - cannot claim to be inviolable. - - 3. To determine in what forms and under what precautions envoys - shall be received. The envoys have to submit to any commands - even though entailing personal inconvenience such as - blindfolding or going out of their way on coming or returning, - and such like. - -[Sidenote: The Etiquette of Flags of Truce.] - -The observance of certain forms in the reception of envoys is of the -greatest importance, as a parley may serve as a cloak for obtaining -information or for the temporary interruption of hostilities and the -like. Such a danger is particularly likely to occur if the combatants -have been facing one another, as in the case of a war of positions, -for a long time without any particular result. These forms are also -important because their non-observance, as experience shows, gives -rise to recrimination and charges of violation of the usages of war. -The following may, therefore, be put forward as the chief rules for the -behavior of an envoy and as the forms to be observed in his reception. - -[Sidenote: The Envoy.] - - 1. The envoy (who is usually selected as being a man skilled in - languages and the rules, and is mounted on horseback) makes for - the enemy’s outpost or their nearest detachment, furnished with - the necessary authorization, in the company of a trumpeter and - a flag-bearer on horseback. If the distance between the two - outposts of the respective lines is very small, then the envoy - may go on foot in the company of a bugler or a drummer. - -[Sidenote: His approach.] - - 2. When he is near enough to the enemy’s outposts or their lines - to be seen and heard, he has the trumpet or bugle blown and - the white flag unfurled by the bearer. The bearer will seek to - attract the attention of the enemy’s outposts or detachments - whom he has approached, by waving the flag to and fro. - - From this moment the envoy and his company are inviolable, in - virtue of a general usage of war. The appearance of a flag of - truce in the middle of a fight, however, binds no one to cease - fire. Only the envoy and his companions are not to be shot at. - -[Sidenote: The challenge--“Wer da?”] - - 3. The envoy now advances with his escort at a slow walk to the - nearest posted officer. He must obey the challenge of the - enemy’s outposts and patrol. - -[Sidenote: His reception.] - - 4. Since it is not befitting to receive an envoy at just that - place which he prefers, he has to be ready to be referred to a - particular place of admission. He must keep close to the way - prescribed for him. It is advisable for the enemy whenever this - is possible to give the envoy an escort on the way. - -[Sidenote: He dismounts.] - - 5. On arriving at the place indicated, the envoy dismounts along - with his attendants; leaves them at a moderate distance behind - him, and proceeds on foot to the officer on duty, or highest in - command, at that place, in order to make his wishes known. - -[Sidenote: Let his Yea be Yea, and his Nay, Nay.] - - 6. Intercourse with the enemy’s officer must be courteously - conducted. The envoy has always to bear in mind the discharge - of his mission, to study the greatest circumspection in his - conversations, neither to attempt to sound the enemy or to - allow himself to be sounded.... The best thing is to refuse to - enter into any conversation on military matters beforehand. - -[Sidenote: The duty of his Interlocutor.] - - 7. For less important affairs the officer at the place of - admission will possess the necessary instructions, in order - either to discharge them himself, or to promise their discharge - in a fixed period. But in most cases the decision of a superior - will have to be taken; in this case the envoy has to wait until - the latter arrives. - - 8. If the envoy has a commission to deal personally with the - Commander-in-Chief or a high officer, or if the officer on duty - at the place of admission considers it desirable for any reason - to send the envoy back, then, if it be necessary, the eyes - of the envoy may be blindfolded; to take away his weapons is - hardly necessary. If the officer at the place of admission is - in any doubt what attitude to adopt towards the requests of the - envoy, he will for the time being detain him at his post, and - send an intimation to his immediate superior in case the affair - appears to him of particular importance, and at the same time - to the particular officer to whom the envoy is or should be - sent. - -[Sidenote: The impatient Envoy.] - - 9. If an envoy will not wait, he may be permitted, according to - circumstances, to return to his own army if the observation - made by him or any communications received can no longer do any - harm. - -From the foregoing it follows that intercourse with the envoys of an -enemy presupposes detailed instructions and a certain intelligence on -the part of the officers and men if it is to proceed peaceably. But -before all things it must be made clear to the men that the intentional -wounding or killing of an envoy is a serious violation of international -law, and that even an unfortunate accident which leads to such a -violation may have the most disagreeable consequences. - -[Sidenote: The French again.] - -A despatch of Bismarck’s of January 9th, 1871, demonstrates by express -mention of their names, that twenty-one German envoys were shot by -French soldiers while engaged on their mission. Ignorance and defective -teaching of the troops may have been the principal reason for this -none too excusable behavior. In many cases transgressions on the part -of the rawer elements of the army may have occurred, as has been many -times offered as an excuse in higher quarters. Nevertheless, this state -of affairs makes clear the necessity of detailed instruction and a -sharp supervision of the troops by the officers. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -SCOUTS AND SPIES - - -[Sidenote: The Scout.] - -[Sidenote: The Spy and his short shrift.] - -Scouting resolves itself into a question of getting possession of -important information about the position, strength, plans, etc., -of the enemy, and thereby promoting the success of one’s own side. -The existence of scouting has been closely bound up with warfare -from the earliest times; it is to be regarded as an indispensable -means of warfare and consequently is undoubtedly permissible. If -the scouting takes place publicly by recognizable combatants then -it is a perfectly regular form of activity, against which the enemy -can only use the regular means of defense, that is to say, killing -in battle, and capture. If the scouting takes the form of secret -or surreptitious methods, then it is espionage, and is liable to -particularly severe and ruthless measures by way of precaution and -exemplary punishment--usually death by shooting or hanging. This severe -punishment is not inflicted on account of dishonorable disposition -on the part of the spy--there need exist nothing of the kind, and -the motive for the espionage may arise from the highest patriotism -and sentiment of military duty quite as often as from avarice and -dishonorable cupidity[74]--but principally on account of the particular -danger which lies in such secret methods. It is as it were a question -of self-defense. - -Having regard to this severe punishment introduced by the usages of -war, it is necessary to define the conception of espionage and of spies -as precisely as possible. - -[Sidenote: What is a Spy?] - -A spy was defined by the German army staff in 1870 as one “who seeks -to discover by clandestine methods, in order to favor the enemy, the -position of troops, camps, etc.; on the other hand enemies who are -soldiers are only to be regarded as spies if they have violated the -rules of military usages, by denial or concealment of their military -character.” - -The Brussels Declaration of 1874 defines the conception as follows: “By -a spy is to be understood he who clandestinely or by illicit pretenses -enters or attempts to enter into places in the possession of the enemy -with the intention of obtaining information to be brought to the -knowledge of the other side.” The Hague Conference puts it in the same -way. - -[Sidenote: Of the essentials of Espionage.] - -The emphasis in both declarations is to be laid on the idea of -“secrecy” or “deception.” If regular combatants make enquiries in -this fashion, for example in disguise, then they also come under -the category of spies, and can lawfully be treated as such. Whether -the espionage was successful or not makes no difference. The motive -which has prompted the spy to accept his commission, whether noble or -ignoble, is, as we have already said, indifferent; likewise, whether -he has acted on his own impulse or under a commission from his own -State or army. The military jurisdiction in this matter cuts across -the territorial principle and that of allegiance, in that it makes no -difference whether the spy is the subject of the belligerent country or -of another State. - -It is desirable that the heavy penalty which the spy incurs should be -the subject not of mere suspicion but of actual proof of existence -of the offense, by means of a trial, however summary (if the swift -course of the war permits), and therefore the death penalty will not be -enforced without being preceded by a judgment. - -[Sidenote: Accessories are Principals.] - -Participation in espionage, favoring it, harboring a spy, are equally -punishable with espionage itself. - - - - -CHAPTER VI - -DESERTERS AND RENEGADES - - -[Sidenote: The Deserter is faithless and the Renegade false.] - -The difference between these two is this--the first class are untrue -to the colors, their intention being to withdraw altogether from the -conflict, to leave the seat of war, and, it may be, to escape into a -country outside it; but the second class go over to the enemy in order -to fight in his ranks against their former comrades. According to the -general usages of war, deserters and renegades, if they are caught, are -to be subjected to martial law and may be punished with death. - -Although some exponents of the laws of war claim that deserters and -renegades should be handed back to one’s opponent, and on the other -hand exactly the opposite is insisted on by others, namely, the -obligation to accept them--all we can say is that a soldier cannot -admit any such obligation. - -[Sidenote: But both may be useful.] - -Deserters and renegades weaken the power of the enemy, and therefore to -hand them over is not in the interest of the opposite party, and as for -the right to accept them or reject them, that is a matter for one’s own -decision. - - - - -CHAPTER VII - -CIVILIANS IN THE TRAIN OF AN ARMY - - -[Sidenote: “Followers.”] - -In the train of an army it is usual to find, temporarily or -permanently, a mass of civilians who are indispensable to the -satisfaction of the wants of officers and soldiers or to the connection -of the army with the native population. To this category belong all -kinds of contractors, carriers of charitable gifts, artists, and the -like, and, above all, newspaper correspondents whether native or -foreign. If they fall into the hands of the enemy, they have the right, -should their detention appear desirable, to be treated as prisoners of -war, assuming that they are in possession of an adequate authorization. - -For all these individuals, therefore, the possession of a pass issued -by the military authorities concerned, in accordance with the forms -required by international intercourse, is an indispensable necessity, -in order that in the case of a brush with the enemy, or of their being -taken captive they may be recognized as occupying a passive position -and may not be treated as spies.[75] - -In the grant of these authorizations the utmost circumspection should -be shown by the military authorities; this privilege should only be -extended to those whose position, character, and intentions are fully -known, or for whom trustworthy persons will act as sureties. - -[Sidenote: The War Correspondent: his importance. His presence is -desirable.] - -This circumspection must be observed most scrupulously in the case of -newspaper correspondents whether native or foreign. Since the component -parts of a modern army are drawn from all grades of the population, the -intervention of the Press for the purpose of intellectual intercourse -between the army and the population at home can no longer be dispensed -with. The army also derives great advantages from this intellectual -intercourse; it has had to thank the stimulus of the Press in recent -campaigns for an unbroken chain of benefits, quite apart from the -fact that news of the war in the newspapers is a necessity for every -soldier. The importance of this intervention, and on the other hand -the dangers and disadvantages which may arise from its misuse, make it -obviously necessary that the military authorities should control the -whole of the Press when in the field. In what follows we shall briefly -indicate the chief rules which are customary, in the modern usages of -war, as regards giving permission to newspaper correspondents. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: The ideal War Correspondent.] - -The first thing necessary in a war correspondent is a sense of honor; -in other words, he must be trustworthy. Only a man who is known to be -absolutely trustworthy, or who can produce a most precise official -certificate or references from unimpeachable persons, can be granted -permission to attach himself to headquarters. - -An honorable correspondent will be anxious to adhere closely to the -duties he owes to his paper on the one hand, and the demands of the -army whose hospitality he enjoys on the other. To do both is not -always easy, and in many cases tact and refinement on the part of -the correspondent can alone indicate the right course; a censorship -is proved by experience to be of little use; the certificates and -recommendations required must therefore be explicit as to the -possession of these qualities by the applicant; and according as he -possesses them or not his personal position at headquarters and the -degree of support extended to him in the discharge of his duties will -be decided. - -It is therefore undoubtedly in the interest of the army as of the -Press, that the latter shall only despatch such representatives -as really are equal to the high demands which the profession of -correspondent requires. - -[Sidenote: The Etiquette of the War Correspondent.] - -The correspondent admitted on the strength of satisfactory pledges has -therefore to promise on his word of honor to abide by the following -obligations: - - 1. To spread no news as to the disposition, numbers, or movements - of troops, and, moreover, the intentions and plans of the - staff, unless he has permission to publish them. (This - concerns principally correspondents of foreign newspapers - since one’s own newspapers are already subject to a - prohibition of this kind by the Imperial Press Law of April - 7th, 1874.) - - 2. To report himself on arrival at the headquarters of a division - immediately to the commanding officer, and to ask his - permission to stay, and to remove himself immediately and - without making difficulties if the o.c. deems his presence - inexpedient on military grounds. - - 3. To carry with him always, and to produce on demand, his - authorization (certificate, armlet, photograph) and his pass - for horses, transport, and servants. - - 4. To take care that his correspondence and articles are - submitted at headquarters. - - 5. To carry out all instructions of the officers at headquarters - who supervise the press. - -Contraventions of the orders from headquarters, indiscretions, and -tactlessness, are punished in less serious cases with a caution, in -grave cases by expulsion; where the behavior of the correspondent or -his correspondence has not amounted to a military offense, and is -therefore not punishable by martial law. - -A journalist who has been expelled not only loses his privileges but -also his passive character; and if he disregards his exclusion he will -be held responsible. - -Foreign journalists are subject to the same obligations; they must -expressly recognize their authority and in case of punishment cannot -claim any personal immunity.[76] - -Journalists who accompany the army without the permission of the staff, -and whose reports therefore cannot be subject to military control, -are to be proceeded against with inexorable severity. They are to be -expelled ruthlessly as dangerous, since they only get in the way of -the troops and devour their subsistence, and may under the mask of -friendship do harm to the army. - - - - -CHAPTER VIII - -THE EXTERNAL MARK OF INVIOLABILITY - - -[Sidenote: How to tell a Non-combatant.] - -Those persons and objects who in war are to be treated as inviolable -must be recognizable by some external mark. Such is the so-called -Geneva Cross (a red cross on a white ground) introduced by -international agreement.[77] - -Attention is to be attracted in the case of persons by armlets, in the -case of buildings by flags, in the case of wagons and other objects by -a corresponding paint mark. - -If the mark is to receive adequate respect it is essential: - - 1. That it should be clearly visible and recognizable. - - 2. That it should only be worn by such persons or attached to such - objects as can lawfully claim it. - -As to 1. Banners and flags must be sufficiently large to be both -distinguishable and recognizable at a far distance; they are to be so -attached that they will not be masked by any national flag that may be -near them, otherwise unintentional violations will be unavoidable. - -As to 2. Abuse will result in the protective mark being no longer -respected, and a further result would be to render illusory, and to -endanger, the whole of the Geneva Convention. Measures must therefore -be taken to prevent such abuses and to require every member of the -army to draw attention to any one who wears these marks without being -entitled to do so.[78] - -Regulations of international law to prevent and punish misuse of the -Red Cross do not exist.[79] - - - - -CHAPTER IX - -WAR TREATIES - - -[Sidenote: That Faith must be kept even with an Enemy.] - -In the following pages we have only to do with war treaties in the -narrower sense, that is such as are concluded during the war itself and -have as their object either the regulation of certain relations during -the period of the war, or only an isolated and temporary measure. It -is a principle of all such treaties that: Etiam hosti fides servanda. -Every agreement is to be strictly observed by both sides in the spirit -and in the letter. Should this rule not be observed by one side then -the other has the right to regard the treaty as denounced. - -How a treaty is to be concluded depends on the discretion of those who -conclude it. Drafts or models of treaties do not exist. - - -A.--_Treaties of Exchange_ - -[Sidenote: Exchange of Prisoners.] - -These have for their object the mutual discharge or exchange of -prisoners of war. Whether the opponent will agree to an offer of this -kind or not, depends entirely upon himself. - -The usual stipulation is: An equal number on both sides. That is only -another way of saying that a surplus of prisoners on the one side need -not be handed over. - -The restitution of a greater number of common soldiers against officers -can be stipulated; in that case, the relative value of different grades -must be precisely fixed in the treaty. - - -B.--_Treaties of Capitulation_ - -[Sidenote: Capitulations--they cannot be too meticulous.] - -The object of these is the surrender of fortresses or strong places as -also of troops in the open field. Here again there can be no talk of a -generally accepted model. The usages of war have, however, displayed -some rules for capitulations, the observance of which is to be -recommended: - - 1. Before any capitulation is concluded, the authority of the - Commander who concludes it should be formally and unequivocally - authenticated. How necessary a precaution of this kind is, is - shown by the capitulations of Rapp at Danzig, and of Gouvion - St. Cyr at Dresden, in 1813, which were actually annulled by - the refusal of the General Staff of the Allies to ratify them. - At the trial of Bazaine the indictment by General Rivière - denied the title of the Marshal to conclude a capitulation. - - 2. If one of the parties to the treaty makes it a condition that - the confirmation of the monarch, or the Commander-in-Chief, - or even the national assembly is to be obtained, then this - circumstance must be made quite clear. Also care is to be - taken that in the event of ratification being refused every - advantage that might arise from an ambiguous proceeding on the - part of one opponent, be made impossible. - - 3. The chief effect of a capitulation is to prevent that portion - of the enemy’s force which capitulates from taking any part - in the conflict during the rest of the war, or it may be for - a fixed period. The fate of the capitulating troops or of the - surrendered fortress differs in different cases.[80] In the - Treaty of Capitulation every condition agreed upon both as to - time and manner must be expressed in precise and unequivocable - words. Conditions which violate the military honor of those - capitulated are not permissible according to modern views. - Also, if the capitulation is an unconditional one or, to use - the old formula, is “at discretion,” the victor does not - thereby, according to the modern laws of war, acquire a right - of life and death over the persons capitulating. - - 4. Obligations which are contrary to the laws of nations, such - as, for example, to fight against one’s own Fatherland during - the continuation of the war, cannot be imposed upon the troops - capitulating. Likewise, also, obligations such as are forbidden - them by their own civil or military laws or terms of service, - cannot be imposed. - - 5. Since capitulations are treaties of war they cannot contain, - for those contracting them, either rights or duties which - extend beyond the period of the war, nor can they include - dispositions as to matters of constitutional law such as, for - example, a cession of territory. - - 6. A violation of any of the obligations of the treaty of - capitulation justifies an opponent in immediately renewing - hostilities without further ceremony. - -[Sidenote: Of the White Flag.] - -The external indication of a desire to capitulate is the raising of a -white flag. There exists no obligation to cease firing immediately on -the appearance of this sign (or to cease hostilities). The attainment -of a particular important, possibly decisive, point, the utilization of -a favorable moment, the suspicion of an illicit purpose in raising the -white flag, the saving of time, and the like, may induce the commanding -officer to disregard the sign until these reasons have disappeared. - -If, however, no such considerations exist, then humanity imposes an -immediate cessation of hostilities. - - -C.--_Safe-conducts_ - -[Sidenote: Of Safe-Conducts.] - -The object of these is to secure persons or things from hostile -treatment. The usages of war in this matter furnish the following rules: - - 1. Letters of safe-conduct, for persons, can only be given to such - persons as are certain to behave peaceably and not to misuse - them for hostile purposes; letters of safe-conduct for things - are only to be granted under a guarantee of their not being - employed for warlike purposes. - - 2. The safe-conducts granted to persons are personal to them, - _i.e._, they are not available for others. They do not extend - to their companions unless they are expressly mentioned. - - An exception is only to be made in the case of diplomatists of - neutral States, in whose case their usual entourage is assumed - to be included even though the members are not specifically - named. - - 3. The safe-conduct is revocable at any time; it can even be - altogether withdrawn or not recognized by another superior, if - the military situation has so altered that its use is attended - with unfavorable consequences for the party which has granted - it. - - 4. A safe-conduct for things on the other hand is not confined to - the person of the bearer. It is obvious that if the person of - the bearer appears at all suspicious, the safe-conduct can - be withdrawn. This can also happen in the case of an officer - who does not belong to the authority which granted it. The - officer concerned is in this case fully responsible for his - proceedings, and should report accordingly. - - -D.--_Treaties of Armistice_ - -[Sidenote: Of Armistices.] - -By armistice is understood a temporary cessation of hostilities by -agreement. It rests upon the voluntary agreement of both parties. The -object is either the satisfaction of a temporary need such as carrying -away the dead, collecting the wounded, and the like, or the preparation -of a surrender or of negotiations for peace. - -A general armistice must accordingly be distinguished from a local or -particular one. The general armistice extends to the whole seat of war, -to the whole army, and to allies; it is therefore a formal cessation -of the war. A particular armistice on the contrary relates only to -a part of the seat of war, to a single part of the opposing army. -Thus the armistice of Poischwitz in the autumn of 1813 was a general -armistice; that of January 28th, 1871, between Germany and France, was -a particular or local one, since the South-Eastern part of the theater -of war was not involved. - -The right to conclude an armistice, whether general or -particular, belongs only to a person in high command, _i.e._, the -Commander-in-Chief. Time to go and obtain the consent of the ruling -powers may be wanting. However, if the object of the armistice is -to begin negotiations for peace, it is obvious that this can only be -determined by the highest authorities of the State. - -If an agreement is concluded, then both sides must observe its -provisions strictly in the letter and the spirit. A breach of the -obligations entered into on the one side can only lead to the immediate -renewal of hostilities on the other side.[81] A notification is in this -case only necessary if the circumstances admit of the consequent loss -of time. If the breach of the armistice is the fault of individuals, -then the party to whom they belong is not immediately responsible and -cannot be regarded as having broken faith. If, therefore, the behavior -of these individuals is not favored or approved by their superiors, -there is no ground for a resumption of hostilities. But the guilty -persons ought, in such case, to be punished by the party concerned. - -Even though the other party does not approve the behavior of the -trespassers but is powerless to prevent such trespasses, then the -opponent is justified in regarding the armistice as at an end. In -order to prevent unintentional violation both parties should notify -the armistice as quickly as possible to all, or at any rate to the -divisions concerned. Delay in the announcement of the armistice through -negligence or bad faith lies, of course, at the door of him whose -duty it was to announce it. A violation due to the bad faith of an -individual is to be sternly punished. - -No one can be compelled to give credit to a communication from the -enemy to the effect that an armistice has been concluded; the teaching -of military history is full of warnings against lightly crediting such -communications.[82] - -A fixed form for the conclusion of an armistice is not prescribed. -A definite and clear declaration is sufficient. It is usual and is -advisable to have treaties of this kind in writing in order to exclude -all complication, and, in the case of differences of opinion later on, -to have a firm foundation to go upon. - -During the armistice nothing must occur which could be construed -as a continuation of hostilities, the _status quo_ must rather be -observed as far as possible, provided that the wording of the treaty -does not particularize anything to the contrary. On the other hand -the belligerents are permitted to do everything which betters or -strengthens their position after the expiry of the armistice and -the continuation of hostilities. Thus, for example, troops may -unhesitatingly be exercised, fresh ones recruited, arms and munitions -manufactured, and food supplies brought up, troops shifted and -reenforcements brought on the scene. Whether destroyed or damaged -fortifications may also be restored is a question to which different -answers are given by influential teachers of the law of nations. It is -best settled by express agreement in concrete cases, and so with the -revictualing of a besieged fortress. - -As regards its duration, an armistice can be concluded either for a -determined or an undetermined period, and with or without a time for -giving notice. If no fixed period is agreed upon, then hostilities can -be recommenced at any time. This, however, is to be made known to the -enemy punctually, so that the resumption does not represent a surprise. -If a fixed time is agreed on, then hostilities can be recommenced the -very moment it expires, and without any previous notification. The -commencement of an armistice is, in the absence of an express agreement -fixing another time, to date from the moment of its conclusion; the -armistice expires at dawn of the day to which it extends. Thus an -armistice made to last until January 1st comes to an end on the last -hour of December 31st, and a shorter armistice with the conclusion -of the number of hours agreed upon; thus, for example, an armistice -concluded on May 1st at 6 P.M. for 48 hours last until May 3rd at 6 -P.M. - - - - -PART II - -USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO ENEMY TERRITORY AND ITS INHABITANTS - - - - -CHAPTER I - -RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS - - -[Sidenote: The Civil Population is not to be regarded as an enemy.] - -It has already been shown in the introduction that war concerns not -merely the active elements, but that also the passive elements are -involved in the common suffering, _i.e._, the inhabitants of the -occupied territory who do not belong to the army. Opinions as to the -relations between these peaceable inhabitants of the occupied territory -and the army in hostile possession have fundamentally altered in the -course of the last century. Whereas in earlier times the devastation of -the enemy’s territory, the destruction of property, and, in some cases -indeed, the carrying away of the inhabitants into bondage or captivity, -were regarded as a quite natural consequence of the state of war, and -whereas in later times milder treatment of the inhabitants took place -although destruction and annihilation as a military resource still -continued to be entertained, and the right of plundering the private -property of the inhabitants remained completely unlimited--to-day, -the universally prevalent idea is that the inhabitants of the enemy’s -territory are no longer to be regarded, generally speaking, as enemies. -It will be admitted, as a matter of law, that the population is, in -the exceptional circumstances of war, subjected to the limitations, -burdens, and measures of compulsion conditioned by it, and owes -obedience for the time being to the power _de facto_, but may continue -to exist otherwise undisturbed and protected as in time of peace by the -course of law. - -[Sidenote: They must not be molested.] - -It follows from all this, as a matter of right, that, as regards the -personal position of the inhabitants of the occupied territory, neither -in life or in limb, in honor or in freedom, are they to be injured, -and that every unlawful killing; every bodily injury, due to fraud -or negligence; every insult; every disturbance of domestic peace; -every attack on family, honor, and morality and, generally, every -unlawful and outrageous attack or act of violence, are just as strictly -punishable as though they had been committed against the inhabitants -of one’s own land. There follows, also, as a right of the inhabitants -of the enemy territory, that the invading army can only limit their -personal independence in so far as the necessity of war unconditionally -demands it, and that any infliction that needlessly goes beyond this is -to be avoided. - -[Sidenote: Their duty.] - -As against this right, there is naturally a corresponding duty on the -part of the inhabitants to conduct themselves in a really peaceable -manner, in no wise to participate in the conflict, to abstain from -every injury to the troops of the power in occupation, and not to -refuse obedience to the enemy’s government. If this presumption is not -fulfilled, then there can no longer be any talk of violations of the -immunities of the inhabitants, rather they are treated and punished -strictly according to martial law. - -[Sidenote: Of the humanity of the Germans and the barbarity of the -French.] - -The conception here put forward as to the relation between the army -and the inhabitants of an enemy’s territory, corresponds to that of -the German Staff in the years 1870-71. It was given expression in -numerous proclamations, and in still more numerous orders of the -day, of the German Generals. In contrast to this the behavior of the -French authorities more than once betrays a complete ignorance of the -elementary rules of the law of nations, alike in their diplomatic -accusations against the Germans and in the words used towards their -own subjects. Thus, on the outbreak of the war, a threat was addressed -to the Grand Duchy of Baden, not only by the French Press but also -officially (von amtlicher Stelle),[83] “that even its women would not -be protected.” So also horses of Prussian officers, who had been shot -by the peasants, were publicly put up to auction by the murderers. So -also the Franctireurs threatened the inhabitants of villages occupied -by the Germans that they would be shot and their houses burnt down -if they received the enemy in their houses or “were to enter into -intercourse with them.” So also the prefect of the Cote d’Or, in an -official circular of November 21st, urges the sub-prefects and mayors -of his Department to a systematic pursuit of assassination, when he -says: “The Fatherland does not demand of you that you should assemble -_en masse_ and openly oppose the enemy, it only expects that three -or four determined men should leave the village every morning and -conceal themselves in a place indicated by nature, from which, without -danger, they can shoot the Prussians; above all, they are to shoot at -the enemy’s mounted men whose horses they are to deliver up at the -principal place of the Arrondissement. I will award a bonus to them -(for the delivery of such horses), and will publish their heroic deed -in all the newspapers of the Department, as well as in the _Moniteur_.” -But this conception of the relation between the inhabitants and the -hostile army not only possessed the minds of the provincial authorities -but also the central government at Tours itself, as is clear from the -fact that it held it necessary to stigmatize publicly the members of -the municipal commission at Soissons who, after an attempt on the life -of a Prussian sentry by an unknown hand, prudently warned their members -against a repetition of such outrages, when it [the central government] -ordered “that the names of the men who had lent themselves to the -assistance and interpretation of the enemy’s police be immediately -forthcoming.”[84] And if, on the French side, the proclamation of -General von Falckenstein is cited as a proof of similar views on the -German side--the proclamation wherein the dwellers on the coast of the -North Sea and the Baltic are urged to participate in the defense of -the coast, and are told: “Let every Frenchman who sets foot on your -coast be forfeit”--as against this all that need be said is that this -incitement, as is well known, had no effect in Germany and excited the -greatest surprise and was properly condemned. - - * * * * * - -[Sidenote: What the Invader may do.] - -Having thus developed the principles governing the relation between -the hostile army and the inhabitants, we will now consider somewhat -more closely the duties of the latter and the burdens which, in a -given case, it is allowable to impose upon it. Obviously a precise -enumeration of every kind of service which may be demanded from them is -impossible, but the following of the most frequent occurrence are: - - 1. Restriction of post, railway and letter communication, - supervision, or, indeed, total prohibition of the same. - - 2. Limitation of freedom of movement within the country, - prohibition to frequent certain parts of the seat of war, or - specified places. - - 3. Surrender of arms. - - 4. Obligation to billet the enemy’s soldiers; prohibition of - illumination of windows at night and the like. - - 5. Production of conveyances. - - 6. Performance of work on streets, bridges, trenches (_Gräben_), - railways, buildings, etc. - - 7. Production of hostages. - -As to 1, the necessity of interrupting, in many cases, railway, postal, -and telegraph communication, of stopping them or, at the least, -stringently supervising them, hardly calls for further proof. Human -feeling on the part of the commanding officer will know what limits to -fix, where the needs of the war and the necessities of the population -permit of mutual accommodation. - -As to 2, if according to modern views no inhabitant of occupied -territory can be compelled to participate directly in the fight -against his own Fatherland, so, conversely, he can be prevented from -reenforcing his own army. Thus the German staff in 1870, where it had -acquired authority, in particular in Alsace-Lorraine, sought to prevent -the entrance of the inhabitants into the French army, even as in the -Napoleonic wars the French authorities sought to prevent the adherence -of the States of the Rhine Confederation to the army of the Allies. - -[Sidenote: A man may be compelled to betray his Country.] - -The view that no inhabitant of occupied territory can be compelled to -participate directly in the struggle against his own country is subject -to an exception by the general usages of war which must be recorded -here: the calling up and employment of the inhabitants as guides on -unfamiliar ground. However much it may ruffle human feeling, to compel -a man to do harm to his own Fatherland, and indirectly to fight his -own troops, none the less no army operating in an enemy’s country will -altogether renounce this expedient.[85] - -[Sidenote: And Worse.] - -But a still more severe measure is the compulsion of the inhabitants to -furnish information about their own army, its strategy, its resources, -and its military secrets. The majority of writers of all nations are -unanimous in their condemnation of this measure. Nevertheless it cannot -be entirely dispensed with; doubtless it will be applied with regret, -but the argument of war will frequently make it necessary.[86] - -[Sidenote: Of forced labor.] - -[Sidenote: Of a certain harsh measure and its justification.] - -As to 5 and 6, the summoning of the inhabitants to supply vehicles and -perform works has also been stigmatized as an unjustifiable compulsion -upon the inhabitants to participate in “Military operations.” But it is -clear that an officer can never allow such a far-reaching extension of -this conception, since otherwise every possibility of compelling work -would disappear, while every kind of work to be performed in war, every -vehicle to be furnished in any connection with the conduct of war, -is or may be bound up with it. Thus the argument of war must decide. -The German Staff, in the War of 1870, moreover, rarely made use of -compulsion in order to obtain civilian workers for the performance of -necessary works. It paid high wages and, therefore, almost always had -at its disposal sufficient offers. This procedure should, therefore, -be maintained in future cases. The provision of a supply of labor is -best arranged through the medium of the local authorities. In case of -refusal of workers punishment can, of course, be inflicted. Therefore -the conduct of the German civil commissioner, Count Renard--so strongly -condemned by French jurists and jurists with French sympathies--who, in -order to compel labor for the necessary repair of a bridge, threatened, -in case of further refusal, after stringent threats of punishment -had not succeeded in getting the work done, to punish the workers by -shooting some of them, was in accordance with the actual laws of war; -_the main thing was that it attained its object_, without its being -necessary to practise it. The accusation made by the French that, on -the German side, Frenchmen were compelled to labor at the siege works -before Strassburg, has been proved to be incorrect. - -[Sidenote: Hostages.] - -7. By hostages are understood those persons who, as security or bail -for the fulfilment of treaties, promises or other claims, are taken or -detained by the opposing State or its army. Their provision has been -less usual in recent wars, as a result of which some Professors of the -law of nations have wrongly decided that the taking of hostages has -disappeared from the practise of civilized nations. As a matter of fact -it was frequently practised in the Napoleonic wars; also in the wars -of 1848, 1849, and 1859 by the Austrians in Italy; in 1864 and 1866 by -Prussia; in the campaigns of the French in Algiers; of the Russians in -the Caucasus; of the English in their Colonial wars, as being the usual -thing. The unfavorable criticisms of it by the German Staff in isolated -cases is therefore to be referred to different grounds of applied -expedients.[87] - -[Sidenote: A “harsh and cruel” measure.] - -A new application of “hostage-right” was practised by the German Staff -in the war of 1870, when it compelled leading citizens from French -towns and villages to accompany trains and locomotives in order to -protect the railways communications which were threatened by the -people. Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were without any -fault on their part thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer -outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law -of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of the country. -As against this unfavorable criticism it must be pointed out that -this measure, which was also recognized on the German side as harsh -and cruel, was only resorted to after declarations and instructions -of the occupying[88] authorities had proved ineffective, and that in -the particular circumstance it was the only method which promised to -be effective against the doubtless unauthorized, indeed the criminal, -behavior of a fanatical population. - -[Sidenote: But it was “successful.”] - -Herein lies its justification under the laws of war, but still more -in the fact that it proved completely successful, and that wherever -citizens were thus carried on the trains (whether result was due -to the increased watchfulness of the communes or to the immediate -influence on the population), the security of traffic was restored.[89] - -To protect oneself against attack and injuries from the inhabitants and -to employ ruthlessly the necessary means of defense and intimidation -is obviously not only a right but indeed a duty of the staff of the -army. The ordinary law will in this matter generally not suffice, it -must be supplemented by the law of the enemy’s might. Martial law and -courts-martial must take the place of the ordinary jurisdiction.[90] - -To Martial law are subject in particular: - - 1. All attacks, violations, homicides, and robberies, by soldiers - belonging to the army of occupation. - - 2. All attacks on the equipment of this army, its supplies, - ammunition, and the like. - - 3. Every destruction of communication, such as bridges, canals, - roads, railways and telegraphs. - - 4. War rebellion and war treason. - -Only the fourth point requires explanation. - -[Sidenote: War Rebellion.] - -By war rebellion is to be understood the taking up of arms by the -inhabitants against the occupation; by war treason on the other hand -the injury or imperiling of the enemy’s authority through deceit or -through communication of news to one’s own army as to the disposition, -movement, and intention, etc., of the army in occupation, whether the -person concerned has come into possession of his information by lawful -or unlawful means (_i.e._, by espionage). - -Against both of these only the most ruthless measures are effective. -Napoleon wrote to his brother Joseph, when, after the latter ascended -the throne of Naples, the inhabitants of lower Italy made various -attempts at revolt: “The security of your dominion depends on how -you behave in the conquered province. Burn down a dozen places which -are not willing to submit themselves. Of course, not until you have -first looted them; my soldiers must not be allowed to go away with -their hands empty. Have three to six persons hanged in every village -which has joined the revolt; pay no respect to the cassock. Simply -bear in mind how I dealt with them in Piacenza and Corsica.” The Duke -of Wellington, in 1814, threatened the South of France; “he will, -if leaders of factions are supported, burn the villages and have -their inhabitants hanged.” In the year 1815, he issued the following -proclamation: “All those who after the entry of the (English) army -into France leave their dwellings and all those who are found in the -service of the usurper will be regarded as adherents of his and as -enemies; their property will be used for the maintenance of the army.” -“These are the expressions in the one case of one of the great masters -of war and of the dominion founded upon war power, and in the other, -of a commander-in-chief who elsewhere had carried the protection of -private property in hostile lands to the extremest possible limit. Both -men as soon as a popular rising takes place resort to terrorism.”[91] - -[Sidenote: “War Treason” and Unwilling Guides.] - -A particular kind of war treason, which must be briefly gone into here, -inasmuch as the views of the jurists about it differ very strongly -from the usages of war, is the case of deception in leading the way, -perpetrated in the form of deliberate guiding of the enemy’s troops by -an inhabitant on a false or disadvantageous road. If he has offered -his services, then the fact of his treason is quite clear, but also -in case he was forced to act as guide his offense cannot be judged -differently, for he owed obedience to the power in occupation, he durst -in no case perpetrate an act of open resistance and positive harm but -should have, if the worst came to the worst, limited himself to passive -disobedience, and he must therefore bear the consequence.[92] - -[Sidenote: Another deplorable necessity.] - -However intelligible the inclination to treat and to judge an offense -of this kind from a milder standpoint may appear, none the less the -leader of the troops thus harmed cannot do otherwise than punish the -offender with death, since only by harsh measures of defense and -intimidation can the repetition of such offenses be prevented. In this -case a court-martial must precede the infliction of the penalty. The -court-martial must however be on its guard against imputing hastily -a treasonable intent to the guide. The punishment of misdirection -requires in every case proof of evil intention. - -Also it is not allowable to diplomatic agents to make communications -from the country which they inhabit during the war to any side as -to the military situation or proceedings. Persons contravening this -universally recognized usage of war may be immediately expelled or in -the case of great danger arrested. - - - - -CHAPTER II - -PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR - - -[Sidenote: Of Private Property and its immunities.] - -Since, according to the law of nations and the law of war to-day, war -makes enemies of States and not of private persons, it follows that -every arbitrary devastation of the country and every destruction of -private property, generally speaking every unnecessary (_i.e._, not -required by the necessity of war) injury to alien property is contrary -to the law of nations. Every inhabitant of the territory occupied is -therefore to be protected alike in his person and in his property. - -In this sense spoke King William to the French at the beginning of the -Campaign of 1870: “I wage war with the French soldiers and not with the -French citizens. The latter will therefore continue to enjoy security -for their person and their goods, so long as they do not by hostile -undertakings against German troops deprive me of the right to afford -them my protection.” - -The question stands in quite another position if the necessity of war -demands the requisition of the stranger’s property, whether public or -private. In this case of course every sequestration, every temporary -or permanent deprivation, every use, every injury and all destruction -are permitted. - -The following principles therefore result: - - 1. Prohibited unconditionally are all aimless destructions, - devastations, burnings, and ravages of the enemy’s country. The - soldier who practises such things is punished as an offender - according to the appropriate laws.[93] - - 2. Permissible on the other hand are all destructions and injuries - dictated by military considerations; and, indeed, - - (_a_) All demolitions of houses and other buildings, bridges, - railways, and telegraphic establishments, due to the - necessity of military operations. - - (_b_) All injuries which are required through military - movements in the country or for earthworks for attack or - defense. - - -Hence the double rule: No harm must be done, not even the very -slightest, which is not dictated by military consideration; every kind -of harm may be done, even the very utmost, which the conduct of war -requires or which comes in the natural course of it. - -Whether the natural justification exists or not is a subject for -decision in each individual case. The answer to this question lies -entirely in the power of the Commanding Officer, from whose conscience -our times can expect and demand as far-reaching humanity as the object -of war permits. - -On similar principles must be answered the question as to the temporary -use of property, dispositions as to houses and the like: no inhabitant -of the occupied territory is to be disturbed in the use and free -disposition of his property, on the other hand the necessity of war -justifies the most far-reaching disturbance, restriction, and even -imperiling of his property. In consequence there are permitted: - - 1. Requisitions of houses and their furniture for the purpose of - billeting troops. - - 2. Use of houses and their furniture for the care of the sick and - wounded. - - 3. Use of buildings for observation, shelter, defense, - fortification, and the like. - -Whether the property owners are subjects of the occupied territory -or of a Foreign State is a matter of complete indifference; also the -property of the Sovereign and his family is subject to no exception, -although to-day it is usually treated with courtesy. - -[Sidenote: Of German behavior.] - -The conception of the inviolability of private property here depicted -was shared by the Germans in 1870 and was observed. If on the French -side statements to the contrary are even to-day given expression, -they rest either on untruth or exaggeration. It certainly cannot be -maintained that no illegitimate violations of private property by -individuals ever occurred. But that kind of thing can never be entirely -avoided even among the most highly cultivated nations, and the best -disciplined armies. In every case the strictest respect for private -property was enjoined[94] upon the soldiers by the German Military -Authorities after crossing the frontier, and strong measures were taken -in order to make this injunction effective; the property of the French -was indeed, as might be shown in numerous cases, protected against the -population itself, and was even in several cases saved at the risk of -our own lives.[95] - -[Sidenote: The gentle Hun and the looking-glass.] - -In like manner arbitrary destructions and ravages of buildings and -the like did not occur on the German side where they were not called -forth by the behavior of the inhabitants themselves. They scarcely -ever occurred except where the inhabitants had foolishly left their -dwellings and the soldiers were excited by closed doors and want of -food. “If the soldier finds the doors of his quarters shut, and the -food intentionally concealed or buried, then necessity impels him to -burst open the doors and to track the stores, and he then, in righteous -anger, destroys a mirror, and with the broken furniture heats the -stove.”[96] - -If minor injuries explain themselves in this fashion in the eyes of -every reasonable and thinking man, so the result of a fundamental and -unprejudiced examination has shown that the destructions and ravages -on a greater scale, which were made a reproach against the German -Army, have in no case overstepped the necessity prescribed by the -military situation. Thus the much talked of and, on the French side, -enormously exaggerated, burning down of twelve houses in Bazeilles, -together with the shooting of an inhabitant, were completely justified -and, indeed, in harmony with the laws of war; indeed one may maintain -that the conduct of the inhabitants would have called for the complete -destruction of the village and the condemnation of all the adult -inhabitants by martial law. - - - - -CHAPTER III - -BOOTY AND PLUNDERING - - -[Sidenote: Booty.] - -In section 1, the inhabitant of the enemy’s territory was described -as a subject of legal rights and duties, who, so far as the nature of -war allows, may continue to live protected as in time of peace by the -course of law; further, in section 2, property, whether it be public -or private, was likewise, so far as war allows it, declared to be -inviolable--it therefore follows logically that there can exist no -right to the appropriation of the property, _i.e._, a right to booty -or plundering. Opinions as to this have, in the course of the last -century, undergone a complete change; the earlier unlimited right of -appropriation in war is to-day recognized in regard to public property -as existing only in defined circumstances. - -In the development of the principles recognized to-day we have to -distinguish. - -1. State property and unquestionably: - - (_a_) immovable,[97] - - (_b_) movable.[97] - -2. Private property: - - (_a_) immovable, - - (_b_) movable. - -Immovable State property is now no longer forfeited as booty; it may, -however, be used if such use is in the interests of military operation, -and even destroyed, or temporarily administered. While in the wars of -the First French Empire, Napoleon, in numerous cases, even during the -war itself, disposed of the public property of the enemy (domains, -castles, mines, salt-works) in favor of his Marshals and diplomatists, -to-day an appropriation of this kind is considered by international -opinion to be unjustified and, in order to be valid, requires a formal -treaty between the conqueror and the conquered. - -[Sidenote: The State realty may be used but must not be wasted.] - -The Military Government by the army of occupation is only a -Usufructuary _pro tempore_. It must, therefore, avoid every purposeless -injury, it has no right to sell or dispose of the property. According -to this juristic view the military administration of the conqueror -disposes of the public revenue and taxes which are raised in the -occupied territory, with the understanding, however, that the regular -and unavoidable expenses of administration continue to be defrayed. The -military authority controls the railways and telegraphs of the enemy’s -State, but here also it possesses only the right of use and has to give -back the material after the end of the war. In the administration of -the State forests, it is not bound to follow the mode of administration -of the enemy’s Forest authorities, but it must not damage the woods by -excessive cutting, still less may it cut them down altogether. - -[Sidenote: State Personalty is at the mercy of the victor.] - -Movable State property on the other hand can, according to modern -views, be unconditionally appropriated by the conqueror. - -This includes public funds,[98] arms, and munition stores, magazines, -transport, material supplies useful for the war and the like. Since -the possession of things of this kind is of the highest importance for -the conduct of the war, the conqueror is justified in destroying and -annihilating them if he is not able to keep them. - -On the other hand an exception is made as to all objects which serve -the purposes of religious worship, education, the sciences and arts, -charities and nursing. Protection must therefore be extended to: -the property of churches and schools, of libraries and museums, -of almshouses and hospitals. The usual practise of the Napoleonic -campaigns[99] so ruthlessly resorted to of carrying off art treasures, -antiquities, and whole collections, in order to incorporate them in -one’s own art galleries, is no longer allowed by the law of nations -to-day.[100] - -[Sidenote: Private realty.] - -Immovable private property may well be the object of military -operations and military policy, but cannot be appropriated as booty, -nor expended for fiscal or private purposes of acquisition. This also -includes, of course, the private property of the ruling family, in so -far as it really possesses this character and is not Crown Lands, whose -fruits are expended as a kind of Civil List or serve to supplement the -same. - -[Sidenote: Private personalty.] - -Movable private property, finally, which in earlier times was the -undeniable booty of the conqueror, is to-day regarded as inviolable. -The carrying off of money, watches, rings, trinkets, or other objects -of value, is therefore to be regarded as criminal robbery and to be -punished accordingly. - -The appropriation of private property is regarded as partially -permissible in the case of those objects which the conquered combatant -carries on his own person. Still here also, opinions against the -practise make it clear that the taking away of objects of value, money, -and such-like is not permissible, and only those required for the -equipment of troops are declared capable of appropriation. - -The recognition of the inviolability of private property does not of -course exclude the sequestration of such objects as can, although they -are private property, at the same time be regarded as of use in war. -This includes, for example, warehouses of supplies, stores of arms -in factories, depots of conveyances or other means of traffic, as -bicycles, motor cars, and the like, or other articles likely to be of -use with advantage to the army, as telescopes, etc. In order to assure -to the possessors compensation from their government, equity enjoins -that a receipt be given for the sequestration. - -[Sidenote: “Choses in action.”] - -Logically related to movable property are the so-called “incorporeal -things.” When Napoleon, for example, appropriated the debts due to -the Elector of Hesse and thus compelled the Elector’s debtors to pay -their debts to him; when he furthermore in 1807 allowed the debts owed -by the inhabitants of the Duchy of Warsaw to Prussian banks and other -public institutions, and indeed even to private persons in Prussia, to -be assigned by the King of Prussia, and then sold them to the King of -Saxony for 200 million francs, this was, according to the modern view, -nothing better than robbery. - -[Sidenote: Plundering is wicked.] - -Plundering is to be regarded as the worst form of appropriation of -a stranger’s property. By this is to be understood the robbing of -inhabitants by the employment of terror and the abuse of a military -superiority. The main point of the offense thus consists in the fact -that the perpetrator, finding himself in the presence of the browbeaten -owner, who feels defenseless and can offer no opposition, appropriates -things, such as food and clothing, which he does not want for his own -needs. It is not plundering but downright burglary if a man pilfers -things out of uninhabited houses or at times when the owner is absent. - -Plundering is by the law of nations to-day to be regarded as invariably -unlawful. If it may be difficult sometimes in the very heat of the -fight to restrain excited troops from trespasses, yet unlawful -plundering, extortion, or other violations of property, must be -most sternly punished, it matters not whether it be done by members -of unbroken divisions of troops or by detached soldiers, so-called -marauders, or by the “hyenas of the battlefield.” To permit such -transgressions only leads, as experience shows, to bad discipline and -the demoralization of the Army.[101] - -In the Franco-Prussian War, plundering and taking of booty were on -the German side sternly forbidden. The Articles of War in question -were repeatedly recalled to every soldier just as in time of peace, -also numerous orders of the day were issued on the part of the higher -authorities. Transgressions were ruthlessly punished, in some cases -even after the War. - - - - -CHAPTER IV - -REQUISITIONS AND WAR LEVIES - - -[Sidenote: Requisitions.] - -By requisitions is to be understood the compulsory appropriation of -certain objects necessary for the army which is waging war. What things -belong to this category is quite undetermined. They were primarily -the means to feed man and beast, next to clothe and equip the members -of the army, _i.e._, to substitute clothing and equipment for that -which has worn out or become insufficient in view of the altered -circumstances and also to supplement it; furthermore, there will be -such objects as serve for the transport of necessaries, and finally all -objects may be demanded which serve to supply a temporary necessity, -such as material and tools for the building of fortifications, -bridges, railways and the like. That requisitions of this kind are -unconditionally necessary and indispensable for the existence of the -army, no one has yet denied; and whether one bases it legally upon -necessity or merely upon the might of the stronger is a matter of -indifference as far as the practise is concerned. - -[Sidenote: How the docile German learnt the “better way.”] - -The right generally recognized by the law of nations of to-day to -requisition is a child of the French Revolution and its wars. It is -known that as late as in the year 1806, Prussian battalions camped -close to big stacks of corn and bivouacked on potato fields without -daring to appease their hunger with the property of the stranger; the -behavior of the French soon taught them a better way. Every one knows -the ruthless fashion in which the army of the French Republic and of -Napoleon satisfied their wants, but of late opinion laying stress -upon the protection of private property has asserted itself. Since a -prohibition of requisitions would, considering what war is, have no -prospect of acceptance under the law of nations, the demand has been -put forward that the objects supplied should at least be paid for. -This idea has indeed up till now not become a principle of war, the -right of requisitioning without payment exists as much as ever and will -certainly be claimed in the future by the armies in the field, and -also, considering the size of modern armies, must be claimed; but it -has at least become the custom to requisition with as much forbearance -as possible, and to furnish a receipt for what is taken, the discharge -of which is then determined on the conclusion of peace. - -[Sidenote: To exhaust the country is deplorable but we mean to do it.] - -In order to avoid overdoing it, as may easily happen in the case of -requisitions, it is often arranged that requisitions may never be -demanded by subordinates but only by the higher officers, and that the -local civil authorities shall be employed for the purpose. It cannot, -however, be denied that this is not always possible in war; that on the -contrary the leader of a small detachment and in some circumstances -even a man by himself may be under the necessity to requisition what -is indispensable to him. Article 40 of the Declaration of Brussels -requires that the requisitions (being written out) shall bear a direct -relation to the capacity and resources of a country, and, indeed, the -justification for this condition would be willingly recognized by every -one in theory, but it will scarcely ever be observed in practise. In -cases of necessity the needs of the army will alone decide, and a man -does well generally to make himself familiar with the reflection that, -in the changing and stormy course of a war, observance of the orderly -conduct of peaceful times is, with the best will, impossible. - -In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870: much was requisitioned on the -German side. According to the opinion of all impartial writers it was -done with moderation and the utmost tenderness for the inhabitants, -even if in isolated cases excesses occurred. Receipts were always -furnished. Later, in the case of the army on the Meuse, as early as -the middle of October requisitions were, wherever it was possible, -entirely left out of account and everything was paid for in cash. Later -proceedings were frequently and indeed studiously conducted with a -precise estimate of the value in thalers or francs.[102] “Moreover, -military history knows of no campaign in which the victualing of an -army at such a distance from home was so largely conducted with its own -stores.”[103] - -[Sidenote: “Buccaneering Levies.”] - -By war levies or contributions is to be understood the raising of -larger or smaller sums of money from the parishes of the occupied -territory. They are thus to be distinguished from requisitions -since they do not serve for the satisfaction of a momentary want -of the army and consequently can only in the rarest cases be based -upon the necessity of war. These levies originated as so-called -“Brandschatzungen,” _i.e._, as a ransom from plundering and -devastation, and thus constituted, compared with the earlier looting -system, a step in the humanizing of war. Since the law of nations -to-day no longer recognizes any right to plundering and devastation, -and inasmuch as the principle that war is conducted only against -States, and not against private persons, is uncontested, it follows -logically that levies which can be characterized as simply booty-making -or plundering, that is to say, as arbitrary enrichment of the -conquerors, are not permitted by modern opinion. The conqueror is, in -particular, not justified in recouping himself for the cost of the war -by inroads upon the property of private persons, even though the war -was forced upon him. - -War levies are therefore only allowed: - - 1. As a substitute for taxes. - - 2. As a substitute for the supplies to be furnished as - requisitions by the population. - - 3. As punishments. - -As to 1: This rests upon the right of the power in occupation to raise -and utilize taxes. - -As to 2: In cases where the provision of prescribed objects in a -particular district is impossible, and in consequence the deficiency -has to be met by purchase in a neighboring district. - -As to 3: War levies as a means of punishing individuals or whole -parishes were very frequently employed in the Franco-Prussian War. -If French writers accuse the German staff of excessive severity -in this respect, on the other hand it is to be remarked that the -embittered character which the war took on in its latest stage, and -the lively participation of the population therein, necessitated the -sternest measures. But a money tax, judging by experience, operates, -in most cases, on the civil population. The total sum of all the -money contributions raised in the War of 1870 may be called a minimum -compared with the sums which Napoleon was accustomed to draw from the -territories occupied by him. According to official estimates, havoc -amounting to about six milliards of francs was visited upon the four -million inhabitants of Prussia in the years 1807-13. - -In regard to the raising of war levies it should be noted that they -should only be decreed by superior officers and only raised with the -cooperation of the local authorities. Obviously an acknowledgment of -every sum raised is to be furnished. - - 1. In the military laws of different countries the right of - levying contributions is exclusively reserved to the - Commander-in-Chief. - - 2. The usual method of raising taxes would, in consequence of - their slowness, not be in harmony with the demands of the War; - usually, therefore, the Civil Authorities provide themselves - with the necessary money by a loan, the repayment of which is - provided for later by law. - - - - -CHAPTER V - -ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY - - -[Sidenote: How to administer an Invaded Country.] - -According to earlier views right up to the last century, a Government -whose army had victoriously forced itself into the territory of a -foreign State could do exactly as it pleased in the part occupied. -No regard was to be paid to the constitution, laws, and rights of -the inhabitants. Modern times have now introduced, in this respect, -a change in the dominant conceptions, and have established a certain -legal relationship between the inhabitants and the army of occupation. -If, in the following pages, we develop briefly the principles which are -applied to the government of territory in occupation, it must none the -less be clearly emphasized that the necessities of war not only allow a -deviation from these principles in many cases but in some circumstances -make it a positive duty of the Commander. - -The occupation of a portion of the enemy’s territory does not amount -to an annexation of it. The right of the original State authority -consequently remains in existence; it is only suspended when it comes -into collision with the stronger power of the conqueror during the -term of the occupation, _i.e._, only for the time being.[104] - -But the administration of a country itself cannot be interrupted by -war; it is therefore in the interest of the country and its inhabitants -themselves, if the conqueror takes it in hand, to let it be carried on -either with the help of the old, or, if this is not feasible, through -the substitution of the new, authorities. - -From this fundamental conception now arises a series of rights and -duties of the conqueror on the one side and of the inhabitants on the -other. - -[Sidenote: The Laws remain--with qualification.] - -Since the conqueror is only the substitute for the real Government, he -will have to establish the continuation of the administration of the -country with the help of the existing laws and regulations. The issue -of new laws, the abolition or alteration of old ones, and the like, -are to be avoided if they are not excused by imperative requirements -of war; only the latter permit legislation which exceeds the need of -a provisional administration. The French Republic, at the end of the -eighteenth century, frequently abolished the preexisting constitution -in the States conquered by it, and substituted a Republican one, but -this is none the less contrary to the law of nations to-day. On the -other hand, a restriction of the freedom of the Press, of the right -of association, and of public meeting, the suspension of the right of -election to the Parliament and the like, are in some circumstances a -natural and unavoidable consequence of the state of war. - -[Sidenote: The Inhabitants must obey.] - -The inhabitants of the occupied territory owe the same obedience to the -organs of Government and administration of the conqueror as they owed -before the occupation to their own. An act of disobedience cannot be -excused by reference to the laws or commands of one’s own Government; -even so an attempt to remain associated with the old Government or -to act in agreement with it is punishable. On the other hand, the -provisional Government can demand nothing which can be construed as -an offense against one’s own Fatherland or as a direct or indirect -participation in the war. - -[Sidenote: Martial Law.] - -The civil and criminal jurisdiction continues in force as before. The -introduction of an extraordinary administration of justice--martial law -and courts-martial--is therefore only to take place if the behavior of -the inhabitants makes it necessary. The latter are, in this respect, -to be cautioned, and any such introduction is to be made known by -appropriate means. The courts-martial must base any sentence on -the fundamental laws of justice, after they have first impartially -examined, however summarily, the facts and have allowed the accused a -free defense. - -The conqueror can, as administrator of the country and its Government, -depose or appoint officials. He can put on their oath the civil -servants, who continue to act, as regards the scrupulous discharge of -their duties. But to compel officials to continue in office against -their will does not appear to be in the interest of the army of -occupation. Transgressions by officials are punished by the laws of -their country, but an abuse of their position to the prejudice of the -army of occupation will be punished by martial law. - -Also judicial officers can be deposed if they permit themselves to -oppose publicly the instructions of the provisional Government. Thus -it would not have been possible, if the occupation of Lorraine in the -year 1870-71 had been protracted, to avoid deposing the whole bench -of Judges at Nancy and substituting German Judges, since they could -not agree with the German demands in regard to the promulgation of -sentence.[105] - -[Sidenote: Fiscal Policy.] - -The financial administration of the occupied territory passes into -the hands of the conqueror. The taxes are raised in the preexisting -fashion. Any increase in them due to the war is enforced in the -form of “War levies.” Out of the revenue of the taxes the costs of -the administration are to be defrayed, as, generally speaking, the -foundations of the State property are to be kept undisturbed. Thus the -domains, forests, woodlands, public buildings and the like, although -utilized, leased, or let out, are not to be sold or rendered valueless -by predatory management. On the other hand it is permitted to apply all -surplus from the revenues of administration to the use of the conqueror. - -The same thing holds good of railways, telegraphs, telephones, canals, -steamships, submarine cables and similar things; the conqueror has the -right of sequestration, of use and of appropriation of any receipts, as -against which it is incumbent upon him to keep them in good repair. - -If these establishments belong to private persons, then he has indeed -the right to use them to the fullest extent; on the other hand he -has not the right to sequestrate the receipts. As regards the right -of annexing the rolling-stock of the railways, the opinions of -authoritative teachers of the law of nations differ from one another. -Whilst one section regard all rolling-stock as one of the most -important war resources of the enemy’s State, and in consequence claim -for the conqueror the right of unlimited sequestration, even if the -railways belonged to private persons or private companies,[106] on the -other hand the other section incline to a milder interpretation of -the question, in that they start from the view that the rolling-stock -forms, along with the immovable material of the railways, an -inseparable whole, and that one without the other is worthless and is -therefore subject to the same laws as to appropriation.[107] The latter -view in the year 1871 found practical recognition in so far as the -rolling-stock captured in large quantities by the Germans on the French -railways was restored at the end of the war; a corresponding regulation -was also adopted by the Hague Conference in 1899. - -[Sidenote: Occupation must be real not fictitious.] - -These are the chief principles for the administration of an occupied -country or any portion of it. From them emerges quite clearly on the -one hand the duties of the population, but also on the other the limits -of the power of the conqueror. But the enforcement of all these laws -presupposes the actual occupation of the enemy’s territory and the -possibility of really carrying them out.[108] So-called “fictitious -occupation,” such as frequently occurred in the eighteenth century -and only existed in a declaration of the claimant, without the -country concerned being actually occupied, are no longer recognized -by influential authorities on the law of nations as valid. If the -conqueror is compelled by the vicissitudes of war to quit an occupied -territory, or if it is voluntarily given up by him, then his military -sovereignty immediately ceases and the old State authority of itself -again steps into its rights and duties. - - - - -PART III - -USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS NEUTRAL STATES - - -[Sidenote: What neutrality means.] - -By the neutrality of a State is to be understood non-participation -in the war by third parties; the duly attested intention not to -participate in the conduct of the war either in favor of, or to the -prejudice of, either one of the two belligerents. This relationship -gives rise in the case of the neutral State to certain rights but also -to fixed duties. These are not laid down by international regulations -or international treaties; we have therefore here also to do with -“Usages of War.” - -[Sidenote: A neutral cannot be all things to all men; therefore he must -be nothing to any of them.] - -What is principally required of a neutral State is equal treatment -of both belligerents. If, therefore, the neutral State could support -the belligerents at all, it would have to give its support in equal -measure to both parties. As this is quite impossible and as one of the -two parties--and probably every one of them--would regard itself as -injured in any case, it therefore follows as a practical and empirical -principle “not to support the two [_i.e._, either or both] belligerents -is the fundamental condition of neutrality.” - -[Sidenote: But there are limits to this detachment.] - -But this principle would scarcely be maintained in its entirety, -because in that case the trade and intercourse of the neutral -State would in some circumstances be more injured than that of the -belligerents themselves. But no State can be compelled to act against -its own vital interests, therefore it is necessary to limit the above -principle as follows: “No neutral State can support the belligerents as -far as military operations are concerned. This principle sounds very -simple and lucid, its content is, however, when closely considered very -ambiguous and in consequence the danger of dissensions between neutral -and belligerent States is very obvious.” - -In the following pages the chief duties of neutral States are to be -briefly developed. It is here assumed that neutrality is not to be -regarded as synonymous with indifference and impartiality towards the -belligerents and the continuance of the war. As regards the expression -of partizanship all that is required of neutral States is the -observance of international courtesies; so long as these are observed -there is no occasion for interference. - -[Sidenote: Duties of the neutral.] - -The chief duties of neutral States are to be regarded as: - -[Sidenote: Belligerents must be warned off.] - - 1. The territory of neutral States is available for none of the - belligerents for the conduct of its military operations.[109] - The Government of the neutral State has therefore, once War is - declared, to prevent the subjects of both parties from marching - through it; it has likewise to prevent the laying out of - factories and workshops for the manufacture of War requisites - for one or other of the parties. Also the organization of - troops and the assembling of “Freelances” on the territory of - neutral States is not allowed by the law of nations.[110] - -[Sidenote: The neutral must guard its inviolable frontiers. It must - intern the Trespassers.] - - 2. If the frontiers of the neutral State march with those of the - territory where the War is being waged, its Government must - take care to occupy its own frontiers in sufficient strength to - prevent any portions of the belligerent Armies stepping across - it with the object of marching through or of recovering after - a Battle, or of withdrawing from War captivity. Every member - of the belligerent Army who trespasses upon the territory of - the neutral State is to be disarmed and to be put out of action - till the end of the War. If whole detachments step across, they - must likewise be dealt with. They are, indeed, not prisoners of - War, but, nevertheless, are to be prevented from returning to - the seat of War. A discharge before the end of the War would - presuppose a particular arrangement of all parties concerned. - - If a convention to cross over is concluded, then, according to - the prevalent usages of War, a copy of the conditions is to - be sent to the Victor.[111] If the troops passing through - are taking with them prisoners of War, then these are to be - treated in like fashion. Obviously, the neutral State can later - demand compensation for the maintenance and care of the troops - who have crossed over, or it can keep back War material as a - provisional payment. Material which is liable to be spoilt, or - the keeping of which would be disproportionately costly, as, - for example, a considerable number of horses, can be sold, and - the net proceeds set off against the cost of internment. - -[Sidenote: Unneutral service.] - -[Sidenote: The “sinews of war”--loans to belligerents.] - - 3. A neutral State can support no belligerent by furnishing - military resources of any kind whatsoever, and is bound to - prevent as much as possible the furnishing of such wholesale on - the part of its subjects. The ambiguity of the notion - “Kriegsmittel” has often led to complications. The most - indispensable means for the conduct of a War is money. For this - very reason it is difficult to prevent altogether the support of - one or other party by citizens of neutral States, since there - will always be Bankers who, in the interest of the State in whose - success they put confidence, and whose solvency in the case - of a defeat they do not doubt, will promote a loan. Against - this nothing can be said from the point of view of the law of - nations; rather the Government of a country cannot be made - responsible for the actions of individual citizens, it could - only accept responsibility if business of this kind was done by - Banks immediately under the control of the State or on public - Stock Exchanges. - -[Sidenote: Contraband of War.] - - It is otherwise with the supply of contraband of war, that is - to say, such things as are supplied to a belligerent for - the immediate support of war as being warlike resources and - equipment. These may include: - - (_a_) Weapons of war (guns, rifles, sabers, etc., ammunition, - powder and other explosives, and military conveyances, - etc.). - - (_b_) Any materials out of which this kind of war supplies - can be manufactured, such as saltpeter, sulphur, coal, - leather, and the like. - - (_c_) Horses and mules. - - (_d_) Clothing and equipment (such as uniforms of all kinds, - cooking utensils, leather straps, and footwear). - - (_e_) Machines, motor-cars, bicycles, telegraphic apparatus, - and the like. - -[Sidenote: Good business.] - - All these things are indispensable for the conduct of war, - their supply in great quantities means a proportionately - direct support of the belligerent. On the other hand, it - cannot be left out of account that many of the above-mentioned - objects also pertain to the peaceable needs of men, _i.e._, - to the means without which the practise of any industry - would be impossible, and the feeding of great masses of the - population doubtful. The majority of European States are, even - in time of peace, dependent on the importation from other - countries of horses, machines, coal, and the like, even as - they are upon that of corn, preserved foods, store cattle, - and other necessaries of life. The supply of such articles by - subjects of a neutral State may, therefore, be just as much an - untainted business transaction and pacific, as a support of - a belligerent. The question whether the case amounts to the - one or the other is therefore to be judged each time upon its - merits. In practise, the following conceptions have developed - themselves in the course of time: - -[Sidenote: Foodstuffs.] - - (_a_) The purchase of necessaries of life, store cattle, - preserved foods, etc., in the territory of a neutral, even - if it is meant, as a matter of common knowledge, for the - revictualing of the Army, is not counted a violation of - neutrality, provided only that such purchases are equally - open to both parties. - -[Sidenote: Contraband on a small scale.] - - (_b_) The supply of contraband of war, in small quantities, - on the part of subjects of a neutral State to one of - the belligerents is, so far as it bears the character - of a peaceable business transaction and not that of an - intentional aid to the war, not a violation of neutrality. - No Government can be expected to prevent it in isolated - and trivial cases, since it would impose on the States - concerned quite disproportionate exertions, and on their - citizens countless sacrifices of money and time. He who - supplies a belligerent with contraband does so on his own - account and at his own peril, and exposes himself to the - risk of Prize.[112] - -[Sidenote: And on a large scale.] - - (_c_) The supply of war resources on a large scale stands in - a different position. Undoubtedly this presents a case of - actual promotion of a belligerent’s cause, and generally - of a warlike succor. If, therefore, a neutral State wishes - to place its detachment from the war beyond doubt, and to - exhibit it clearly, it must do its utmost to prevent such - supplies being delivered. The instructions to the Customs - authorities must thus be clearly and precisely set out, - that on the one hand they notify the will of the Government - to set their face against such wanton bargains with all - their might, but that on the other, they do not arbitrarily - restrict and cripple the total home trade. - -[Sidenote: The practise differs.] - - In accordance with this view many neutral States, such - as Switzerland, Belgium, Japan, etc., did, during the - Franco-Prussian War, forbid all supply or transit of arms to a - belligerent, whilst England and the United States put no kind - of obstacles whatsoever in the way of the traffic in arms, - and contented themselves with drawing the attention of their - commercial classes to the fact that arms were contraband, and - were therefore exposed to capture on the part of the injured - belligerent.[113] - - It is evident, therefore, that the views of this particular - relation of nations with each other still need clearing up, - and that the unanimity which one would desire on this question - does not exist. - -[Sidenote: Who may pass--the Sick and the Wounded.] - - 4. The neutral State may allow the passage or transport of wounded - or sick through its territory without thereby violating its - neutrality; it has, however, to watch that hospital trains do - not carry with them either war personnel or war material with - the exception of that which is necessary for the care of the - sick.[114] - -[Sidenote: Who may not pass--Prisoners of War.] - - 5. The passage or transport of prisoners of war through neutral - territory is, on the other hand, not to be allowed, since this - would be an open favoring of the belligerent who happened to be - in a position to make prisoners of war on a large scale, while - his own railways, water highways, and other means of transport - remained free for exclusively military purposes. - -These are the most important duties of neutral States so far as land -warfare is concerned. If they are disregarded by the neutral State -itself, then it has to give satisfaction or compensation to the -belligerent who is prejudiced thereby. This case may also occur if the -Government of the neutral State, with the best intentions to abstain -from proceedings which violate neutrality, has, through domestic or -foreign reasons, not the power to make its intentions good. If, for -example, one of the two belligerents by main force marches through the -territory of a neutral State and this State is not in a position to put -an end to this violation of its neutrality, then the other belligerent -has the right to engage the enemy on the hitherto neutral territory. - -[Sidenote: Rights of the neutral.] - -The duties of neutral States involve corresponding rights, such as: - -[Sidenote: The neutral has the right to be left alone.] - - 1. The neutral State has the right to be regarded as still at - peace with the belligerents as with others. - -[Sidenote: Neutral territory is sacred.] - - 2. The belligerent States have to respect the inviolability of the - neutral and the undisturbed exercise of its sovereignty in its - home affairs, to abstain from any attack upon the same, even - if the necessity of war should make such an attack desirable. - Neutral States, therefore, possess also the right of asylum for - single members or adherents of the belligerent Powers, so far - as no favor to one or other of them is thereby implied. Even - the reception of a smaller or larger detachment of troops which - is fleeing from pursuit does not give the pursuer the right - to continue his pursuit across the frontier of the neutral - territory. It is the business of the neutral State to prevent - troops crossing over in order to reassemble in the chosen - asylum, reform, and sally out to a new attack. - -[Sidenote: The neutral may resist a violation of its territory - “with all the means in its power.”] - - 3. If the territory of a neutral State is trespassed upon by one - of the belligerent parties for the purpose of its military - operations, then this State has the right to proceed against - this violation of its territory with all the means in its - power and to disarm the trespassers. If the trespass has been - committed on the orders of the Army Staff, then the State - concerned is bound to give satisfaction and compensation; if - it has been committed on their own responsibility, then the - individual offenders can be punished as criminals. If the - violation of the neutral territory is due to ignorance of its - frontiers and not to evil intention, then the neutral State - can demand the immediate removal of the wrong, and can insist - on necessary measures being taken to prevent a repetition of - such contempts. - -[Sidenote: Neutrality is presumed.] - - 4. Every neutral State can, so long as it itself keeps faith, - demand that the same respect shall be paid to it as in time of - peace. It is entitled to the presumption that it will observe - strict neutrality and will not make use of any declarations - or other transactions as a cloak for an injustice against - one belligerent in favor of the other, or will use them - indifferently for both. This is particularly important in - regard to Passes, Commissions, and credentials issued by a - neutral State.[115] - -[Sidenote: The property of neutrals.] - - 5. The property of the neutral State, as also that of its - citizens, is, even if it lies within the seat of war, to - be respected so far as the necessity of war allows. It - can obviously be attacked and even destroyed in certain - circumstances by the belligerents, but only if complete - compensation be afterwards made to the injured owners. Thus--to - make this clear by an example from the year 1870--the capture - and sinking of six English colliers at Duclaix was both - justified and necessary on military grounds, but it was, for - all that, a violent violation of English property, for which on - the English side compensation was demanded, and on the German - side was readily forthcoming. - -[Sidenote: Diplomatic Intercourse.] - - 6. Neutral States may continue to maintain diplomatic intercourse - with the belligerent Powers undisturbed, so far as military - measures do not raise obstacles in the way of it. - - -THE END - - - - -FOOTNOTES - -[1] _Il Principe_, cap. 18. - -[2] No! the Hague Regulations, Art. 44: “Any compulsion by a -belligerent on the population of occupied territory to give information -as to the army of the other belligerent, or as to his means of defense, -is prohibited.” - -[3] No! the English _Manual of Military Law_, ch. xiv, sec. 463. - -[4] Yes! the Hague Regulations, Art. 52: “They must be in proportion -to the resources of the country”; and to the same effect the English -_Manual of Military Law_, sec. 416, and the British Requisitioning -Instructions. - -[5] Yes! the Hague Regulations, Arts. 23 and 52; also _Actes et -Documents_ (of the Conference), III, p. 120. - -[6] Yes! the Hague Regulations, Art. 2: “The population of a territory -which has not been occupied who on the approach of the enemy -spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops, without -having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article I, -shall be regarded as belligerents.” - -[7] The whole of these propositions, revolting as they may appear, are -taken almost literally from the text of the War Book, to which I refer -the reader for their context. - -[8] Clausewitz: _Vom Kriege_, I, Kap. 1 (2). - -[9] _Ibid._ V, Kap. 14 (3). Clausewitz’s definition of requisitions is -“seizing everything which is to be found in the country, without regard -to _meum_ and _tuum_.” The German War Book after much prolegomenous -sentiment arrives at the same conclusion eventually. - -[10] _Kriegsraison_ I have translated as “the argument of war.” -“Necessity of war” is too free a rendering, and when necessity is -urged “_nötig_” or “_Notwendigkeit_” is the term used in the original. -_Kriegsmanier_ is literally the “fashion of war” and means the -customary rules of which _Kriegsraison_ makes havoc by exceptions. - -[11] Holtzendorff, IV, 378. - -[12] In Holtzendorff’s _Handbuch des Völkerrechts_, _passim_. - -[13] Baron Marshall von Bieberstein. _Actes et Documents_ (1907), J. 86. - -[14] _Actes et Documents_ (1907), I, 281 (Sir Edward Satow). - -[15] _Ibid._, p. 282 (Baron Marschall von Bieberstein), and p. 86. - -[16] Holtzendorff, III, pp. 93, 108, 109. - -[17] _Ibid._ The whole subject (of the neutrality of Belgium) is -examined by the present writer in _War, its Conduct and its Legal -Results_ (John Murray). - -[18] _Vom Kriege_, VIII, Kap. 6 (B). - -[19] _The Nation in Arms_, sec. 3: “Policy _creates_ the total -situation in which the State engages in the struggle”; and again, “it -is clear that the political action and military action ought always to -be closely united.” - -[20] _Germany and the Next War_: “The appropriate and conscious -employment of war as a political means has always led to happy -results.” And again, “The relations between two States must often be -termed _a latent war_ which is provisionally being waged in peaceful -rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile methods, -just as war itself does, since in such a case both parties are -determined to employ them.” - -[21] The Bundesrath is a Second Chamber, a Cabinet or Executive -Council, and a Federal Congress of State Governments all in one. -Indeed, its resemblance to a Second Chamber is superficial. It can -dissolve the Reichstag when it pleases. See Laband, _Die Entwickelung -des Bundesraths, Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts_, 1907, Vol. I, p. -18, and also his _Deutsches Staatsrecht_, Vol. I, _passim_. - -[22] I have based the remarks which follow on a close study of German, -French, and English authorities--among others upon the following: -Bismarck, _Gedanken und Erinnerungen_; Hohenlohe, _Denkwürdigkeiten_; -Hanotaux, _Histoire de la France Contemporaine_; de Broglie, _Mission -de M. de Gontaut-Biron_; Fitzmaurice, _The Life of Lord Granville_. All -these are the works of statesmen who could legitimately say of their -times _quorum pars magna fui_. Lord Fitzmaurice’s book, apart from its -being the work of a statesman, whose knowledge of foreign affairs is -equaled by few and surpassed by none, is indispensable to a study of -Anglo-German relations since 1850, being based on diplomatic sources, -in particular the despatches of Lord Odo Russell. Some passages in _The -Life of Lord Lytton_ are also illuminating, likewise the essays of that -prince of French historians, Albert Sorel. But I have, of course, also -gone to the text of treaties and original documents. - -[23] The study which follows is based on cosmopolitan materials: The -reader must exercise great caution in using political memories such as -those of Bismarck. In autobiography, of all forms of history, as Goethe -observes in the preface to _Wahrheit und Dichtung_, it is supremely -difficult for the writer to escape self-deception; he is so apt to -read himself backwards and to mistake society’s influence upon him for -his influence upon society. In the case of Bismarck in particular, his -autobiography often took the form of apologetics, and he invests his -actions with a foresight which they did not always possess, while, on -the other hand, he is so anxious to depreciate his rivals (particularly -Gortchakoff) that he often robs himself of the prestige of victory. -Hohenlohe is, in this respect, a far safer guide. He was not as great a -man as Bismarck, but he was an infinitely more honest one. - -[24] _Gedanken und Erinnerungen_, Bd. II, Kap. 29, p. 287. - -[25] Notes of Lord Odo Russell, British Ambassador at Berlin, of a -conversation with Bismarck, reported in a despatch of November 22nd, -1870, to Lord Granville, and published in the Parliamentary Papers of -1871 [Cd. 245]. - -[26] _Gedanken und Erinnerungen_, II, Kap. 23. - -[27] See the remarkable articles, based on unpublished documents by -M. Hanotaux, in the _Revue des deux Mondes_, Sept. 15th and Oct. 1st, -1908, on “Le Congrès de Berlin.” - -[28] “No man ever had a more effective manner of asseverating, or made -promises with more solemn protestations, or observed them less,” _Il -Principe_, Cap. 18. - -[29] Cf. Lord Ampthill’s despatch (Aug. 25th, 1884). “He has discovered -an unexplored mine of popularity in starting a colonial policy which -public opinion persuades itself to be anti-English, and the slumbering -theoretical envy of the Germans at our wealth and our freedom has taken -the form of abuse of everything English in the Press.”--Fitzmaurice’s -_Granville_, II, 358. - -[30] For a careful examination of the story see Fitzmaurice, II, 234 -and 429. - -[31] There is a spirited, but not altogether convincing, vindication -of Ferry in Rambaud’s _Jules Ferry_, p. 395. It is not Ferry’s honesty -that is in question, but his perspicacity. - -[32] Its profound reactions have been worked out by the hand of a -master in Sorel’s _L’Europe et la Révolution française_, and, in -particular, in his _La Question d’Orient_, which is a searching -analysis of these tortuous intrigues. - -[33] Cf. Bismarck’s _Erinnerungen_ (the chapter on the Alvensleben -Convention): “It was our interest to oppose the party in the Russian -Cabinet which had Polish proclivities ... because a Polish-Russian -policy was calculated to vitalize that Russo-French sympathy against -which Prussia’s effort had been directed since the peace of Paris.” - -[34] _Life of Lord Lytton_, II, pp. 260 _seq._ On the whole story see -Hohenlohe _passim_; also Hanotaux, Vol. III, ch. iv; de Broglie’s -_Gontaut-Biron_ and Fitzmaurice’s _Granville_. The cheerfully -malevolent Busch is also sometimes illuminating. - -[35] It was on this occasion that, according to Hanotaux, quoting from -a private document of the Duc Decazes, Lord Odo Russell reported an -interview with Bismarck, in which the latter said he wanted “to finish -France off.” - -[36] Cf. Albert Sorel: “La diplomatie est l’expression des moeurs -politiques”; and cf. his remarkable essay, “La Diplomatie et le -progrés,” in _Essais d’histoire et de critique_. - -[37] June 3rd, 1906, in a remarkable article entitled “Holstein,” which -is a close study of the inner organization of the German Foreign Office -and its traditions. - -[38] [The word used is “geistig,” as to the exact meaning of which -see translator’s footnote to page 72. What the passage amounts to is -that the belligerent should seek to break the spirit of the civil -population, terrorize them, humiliate them, and reduce them to -despair.--J. H. M.] - -[39] Moltke, in his well-known correspondence with Professor -Bluntschli, is moved to denounce the St. Petersburg Convention which -designs as “le seul but légitime” of waging war, “l’affaiblissement -des forces militaires,” and this he denies most energetically on the -ground that, on the contrary, all the resources of the enemy, country, -finances, railways, means of subsistence, even the prestige of the -enemy’s government, ought to be attacked. [This, of course, means the -policy of “Terrorismus,” _i.e._, terrorization.--J. H. M.] - -[40] [“Den geistigen Strömungen.” “Intellectual” is the nearest -equivalent in English, but it barely conveys the spiritual aureole -surrounding the word.--J. H. M.] - -[41] [The General Staff always refers to the war of 1870 as “the -German-French War.”--J. H. M.] - -[42] Art. 9 (1). - -[43] The necessity of an adequate mark of distinction was not denied -even on the part of the French in the violent controversy which -blazed up between the German and French Governments on the subject -of the Franctireurs in the war of 1870-1. The dispute was mainly -concerned with the question whether the marks worn by the Franctireurs -were sufficient or not. This was denied on the German side in many -cases with all the greater justification as the usual dress of the -Franctireurs, the national blue, was not to be distinguished from the -customary national dress, as it was merely a blouse furnished with a -red armlet. Besides which, on the approach of German troops, the armlet -was often taken off and the weapons were concealed, thereby offending -against the principle of open bearing. These kind of offenses, as also -the lack of a firm organization and the consequent irregularities, -were the simple reason why stern treatment of the Franctireurs in the -Franco-Prussian War was practised and had necessarily to be practised. - -[44] The effacement of the distinction between fighting forces and -peaceful population on the part of the Boers no doubt made many of the -severities practised by the English necessary. - -[45] [_i.e._, the condition as to having a distinctive mark. So too, -the Hague Regulations dispense with the other condition (of having a -responsible leader and an organization) in such a case of a _levée en -masse_. See Regulations, Art. II.--J. H. M.] - -[46] Professor Dr. C. Lüder, _Das Landkriegsrecht_, Hamburg, 1888. -[This is the amiable professor who writes in Holtzendorff’s _Handbuch -des Völkerrechts_ (IV, 378) of “the terrorism so often necessary in -war.”--J. H. M.] - -[The above paragraph, it will be observed, completely throws over -Article II of the Hague Regulations extending protection to the -defenders of their country.--J. H. M.] - -[47] Notoriously resorted to very often in the war of the Spanish -against Napoleon. - -[48] Napoleon was, in the year 1815, declared an outlaw by the Allies. -Such a proceeding is not permissible by the International Law of to-day -since it involves an indirect invitation to assassination. Also the -offer of a reward for the capture of a hostile prince or commander as -occurred in August, 1813, on the part of the Crown Prince of Sweden in -regard to Napoleon, is no longer in harmony with the views of to-day -and the usages of war. [But to hire a third person to assassinate one’s -opponent is claimed by the German General Staff (see II, b, below) as -quite legitimate.--J. H. M.] - -[49] As against this there have been many such offenses committed -in the wars of recent times, principally on the Turkish side in the -Russo-Turkish War. - -[50] This prohibition was often sinned against by the French in the -war of 1870-71. Cp. Bismarck’s despatches of Jan. 9th and Feb. 7th, -1871; also Bluntschli in _Holtzendorff’s Jahrbuch_, I, p. 279, where a -similar reproach brought against the Baden troops is refuted. - -[51] If we have principally in view the employment of uncivilized and -barbarous troops on a European seat of war, that is simply because -the war of 1870 lies nearest to us in point of time and of space. -On a level with it is the employment of Russo-Asiatic nationalities -in the wars of emancipation, of Indians in the North-American War, -of the Circassians in the Polish Rising, of the Bashi-bazouks in -the Russo-Turkish War, etc. As regards the Turcos, a Belgian writer -Rolin-Jacquémyns said of them in regard to the war of 1859, “les -allures et le conduite des Turcos avaient soulevé d’universels -dégoûts.” On the other side it is not to be forgotten that a section -of the French Press in 1870 praised them precisely because of their -bestialities and incited them to such things, thus in the _Independance -algerienne_: “Arrière la pitié! arrière les sentiments d’humanité! -Mort, pillage et incendie!” - -[52] Recent examples: the capture of the King of Saxony by the Allies -after the Battle of Leipzig, and also of Napoleon, that of the Elector -of Hesse, 1866, Napoleon III, 1870, Abdel-Kader, 1847, and Schamyl, -1859. - -[53] In this light must be judged the measures taken in 1866 by General -Vogel von Falckenstein against certain Hanoverian citizens although -these measures have often been represented in another light. - -[54] Thus the French prisoners in 1870-1 were very thankful to find -employment in great numbers as harvest workers, or in the counting -houses of merchants or in the factories of operatives or wherever an -opportunity occurred, and were thereby enabled to earn extra wages. - -[55] Thus General von Falckenstein in 1870, in order to check the -prevalent escaping of French officers, commanded that for every -escape ten officers whose names were to be determined by drawing lots -should be sent off, with the loss of all privileges of rank, to close -confinement in a Prussian fortress, a measure which was, indeed, often -condemned but against which nothing can be said on the score of the law -of nations. - -[56] [Professor] Lueder, _Das Landkriegsrecht_, p. 73. - -[57] What completely false notions about the right of killing prisoners -of war are prevalent even among educated circles in France is shown -by the widely-circulated novel _Les Braves Gens_, by Margueritte, in -which, on page 360 of the chapter “Mon Premier,” is told the story, -based apparently on an actual occurrence, of the shooting of a captured -Prussian soldier, and it is excused simply because the information -given by him as to the movements of his own people turned out to be -untrue. The cowardly murder of a defenseless man is regarded by the -author as a stern duty, due to war, and is thus declared to be in -accordance with the usages of war. [The indignation of the German -General Staff is somewhat overdone, as a little further on (see the -chapter on treatment of inhabitants of occupied territory) in the War -Book they advocate the ruthless shooting or hanging of an inhabitant -who, being _forced_ to guide an enemy army against his own, leads them -astray.--J. H. M.] - -[58] In Austria the giving of one’s parole whether by troops or -officers is forbidden. - -[59] Monod, _Allemands et Français, Souvenirs de Campagne_, p. 39: “I -saw again at Tours some faces which I had met before Sedan; among them -were, alas! officers who had sworn not to take up arms again, and who -were preparing to violate their parole, encouraged by a Government in -whom the sense of honor was as blunted as the sense of truth.” - -[60] In the year 1870, 145 French officers, including three Generals, -one Colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels, three Commandants, thirty -Captains (Bismarck’s Despatch of December 14th, 1870), were guilty -of breaking their parole. The excuses, afterwards put forward, were -generally quite unsound, though perhaps there may have been an element -of doubt in some of the cases so positively condemned on the German -side. The proceedings of the French Government who allowed these -persons without scruple to take service again were subsequently -energetically denounced by the National Assembly. - -[61] To a petition of the diplomatists shut up in Paris to be allowed -to send a courier at least once a week, Bismarck answered in a document -of September 27th, 1870, as follows: “The authorization of exchange of -correspondence in the case of a fortress is not generally one of the -usages of war; and although we would authorize willingly the forwarding -of open letters from diplomatic agents, in so far as their contents -be not inconvenient from a military point of view, I cannot recognize -as well founded the opinion of those who should consider the interior -of the fortifications of Paris as a suitable center for diplomatic -relations.” - -[62] “In the year 1870 the greatest mildness was practised on the -German side towards the French fortresses. At the beginning of the -siege of Strassburg it was announced to the French Commander that free -passage was granted to the women, the children, and the sick, a favor -which General Uhrich rejected, and the offer of which he very wisely -did not make known to the population. And when later three delegates -of the Swiss Federal Council sought permission in accordance with the -resolution of the Conference at Olten, of September 7th, to carry food -to the civil population in Strassburg and to conduct non-combatants out -of the town over the frontier, both requests were willingly granted -by the besieger and four thousand inhabitants left the fortress as a -result of this permission. Lastly, the besiegers of Belfort granted to -the women, children, aged, and sick, free passage to Switzerland, not -indeed immediately at the moment chosen by the commander Denfert, but -indeed soon after” (_Dahn_, I, p. 89). Two days after the bombardment -of Bitsch had begun (September 11th) the townsfolk begged for free -passage out of the town. This was, indeed, officially refused; but, -none the less, by the indulgence of the besieger, it was effected by a -great number of townspeople. Something like one-half of the 2,700 souls -of the civil population, including the richest and most respectable, -left the town (_Irle, die Festung Bitsch. Beiträge zur Landes- und -Völkerkunde von Elsass-Lothringen_). - -[63] Hartmann, _Krit. Versuche_, II, p. 83. - -[64] _Staatsanzeiger_, August 26th, 1870. - -[65] Considering the many unintelligible things written on the French -side about this, the opinion of an objective critic is doubly valuable. -Monod, p. 55, _op. cit._, says: “I have seen Bazeilles burning; I have -informed myself with the greatest care as to how things happened. -I have questioned French soldiers, Bavarian soldiers, and Bavarian -inhabitants present at this terrible drama; I am able to see in it -only one of the frightful, but inevitable, consequences of the war.” -As to the treatment of Chateaudun, stigmatized generally on the French -side as barbarous, the author writes (p. 56): “The inhabitants of -Chateaudun, regularly organized as part of the National Guard, aided -by the franctireurs of Paris, do not defend themselves by preparing -ambushes but by fighting as soldiers. Chateaudun is bombarded; nothing -could be more legitimate, since the inhabitants made a fortress of it; -but once they got the upper hand the Bavarians set fire to more than -one hundred houses.” The picture of outrages by Germans which follows -may be countered by what the author writes in another place about -the French soldiers: “The frightful scenes at the taking of Paris by -our troops at the end of May, 1871, may enable us to understand what -violences soldiers allow themselves to be drawn into, when both excited -and exhausted by the conflict.” - -[66] - -[Sidenote: The apophthegm of Frederick the Great.] - -“One makes use in war of the skin of the lion or the fox indifferently. -Cunning often succeeds where force would fail; it is therefore -absolutely necessary to make use of both; sometimes force can be -countered by force, while on the other hand force has often to yield -to cunning.”--Frederick the Great, in his _General Principles of War_, -Art. xi. - -[67] Also the pretense of false facts, as, for example, practised by -Murat on November 13th, 1805, against Prince Auersperg, in order to -get possession of the passage of the Danube at Florisdorf; the like -stratagem which a few days later Bagration practised against Murat -at Schongraben; the deceptions under cover of their word of honor -practised by the French Generals against the Prussian leaders in 1806 -at Prenzlau; these are stratagems which an officer in the field would -scarcely dare to employ to-day without being branded by the public -opinion of Europe. - -[68] In the most recent times a change of opinion seems to have -taken place. Bluntschli in his time holds (sec. 565) the use of the -distinguishing marks of the enemy’s army--uniforms, standards, and -flags--with the object of deception, to be a doubtful practise, and -thinks that this kind of deception should not extend beyond the -preparations for battle. “In battle the opponents should engage one -another openly, and should not fall on an enemy from behind in the -mask of a friend and brother in arms.” The Manual of the Institute of -International Law goes further. It says in 8 (_c_ and _d_): “Il est -interdit d’attaquer l’ennemi en dissimulant les signes distinctifs de -la force armée; d’user indûment du pavillon national, des insignes -militaires ou de l’uniforme de l’ennemi.” The Declaration of Brussels -altered the original proposition, “L’emploi du pavillon national ou des -insignes militaires et de l’uniforme de l’ennemi est interdit” into -“L’abus du pavillon national.” - -[69] Cp. Boguslawski, _Der kleine Krieg_, 1881, pp. 26, 27. - -[70] [The Hague Regulations, Art. 23, to which Germany was a party, -declares it is prohibited: “To make improper use of a flag of truce, -the national flag, or military ensigns and the enemy’s uniform, as well -as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.”--J. H. M.] - -[71] [This represents the German War Book in its most disagreeable -light, and is casuistry of the worst kind. There are certain things -on which International Law is silent because it will not admit the -possibility of their existence. As Professor Holland well puts it -(_The Laws of War on Land_, p. 61), in reference to the subject -of reprisals the Hague Conference “declined to seem to add to the -authority of a practise so repulsive” by legislating on the subject. -And so with assassination. It can never be presumed from the Hague or -other international agreements that what is not expressly forbidden is -thereby approved.] - -[72] [Professor] Bluntschli, _Völkerrecht_, p. 316. - -[73] [Professor] Lüder, _Handbuch des Völkerrechts_, p. 90. - -[74] To judge espionage with discrimination according to motives does -not seem to be feasible in war. “Whether it be a patriot who devotes -himself, or a wretch who sells himself, the danger they run at the -hands of the enemy will be the same. One will respect the first and -despise the second, but one will shoot both.”--_Quelle_ I, 126. -This principle is very ancient. As early as 1780 a North-American -court-martial condemned Major André, an Englishman, to death by -hanging, and in vain did the English Generals intercede for him, in -vain did he plead himself, that he be shot as a soldier. - -[75] The want of an adequate authorization led in 1874 to the -shooting of the Prussian newspaper correspondent Captain Schmidt by -the Carlists, which raised a great outcry. Schmidt was armed with -a revolver, with maps of the seat of war, and also with plans and -sketches of the Carlists’ positions, as against which he had only an -ordinary German passport as a Prussian Captain and was seized within -the Carlists’ outpost, and since he could not defend himself, verbally, -on account of his ignorance of the Spanish language, he was convicted -as a spy by court-martial and shot. - -[76] In the Egyptian Campaign in 1882 the English War Office published -the following regulations for newspaper correspondents. [The translator -does not think it necessary to reproduce these.] - -[77] In Turkey, in place of the Red Cross a red half-moon was -introduced, and was correspondingly respected by the Russians in the -campaign of 1877. Japan, on the contrary, has waived its original -objection to the cross. - -[78] That in the war of 1870 the Red Cross was frequently abused on -the French side is well known, and has been the subject of documentary -proof. The escape of Bourbaki from Metz, under cover of the misuse -of the Geneva Convention, proves that even in the highest circles -people were not clear as to the binding obligation of International -Regulations, and disregarded them in the most frivolous manner. - -[79] [But the English legislature has, by the Geneva Convention Act, -1911 (1 and 2 Geo. V, c. 20) made it a statutory offense, punishable -on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding £10, to use the heraldic -emblem of the Red Cross or the words “Red Cross” for any purpose -whatsoever, if the person so using it has not the authority of the Army -Council for doing so.--J. H. M.] - -[80] How different the conditions of capitulation may be the following -examples will show: - -Sedan: (1) The French army surrender as prisoners of war. (2) In -consideration of the brave defense all Generals, Officers, and -Officials occupying the rank of Officers, will receive their freedom -so soon as they give their word of honor in writing not to take up -arms again until the end of the war, and not to behave in a manner -prejudicial to the interests of Germany. The officers and officials who -accept these conditions are to keep their arms and their own personal -effects. (3) All arms and all war material consisting of flags, eagles, -cannons, munitions, etc., are to be surrendered and to be handed over -by a French military commission to German commissioners. (4) The -fortress of Sedan is to be immediately placed at the disposition (of -the Germans) exactly as it stands. (5) The officers who have refused -the obligation not to take up arms again, as well as the troops, shall -be disarmed and organized according to their regiments or corps to go -over in military fashion. The medical staff are without exception to -remain behind to look after the wounded. - -Metz: The capitulation of Metz allowed the disarmed soldiers to keep -their knapsacks, effects, and camp equipment, and allowed the officers -who preferred to go into captivity, rather than give their word of -honor, to take with them their swords, or sabers, and their personal -property. - -Belfort: The garrison were to receive all the honors of war, to keep -their arms, their transport, and their war material. Only the fortress -material was to be surrendered. - -Bitsch (concluded after the settlement of peace): (1) The garrison -retires with all the honors of war, arms, banners, artillery, and -field pieces. (2) As to siege material and munitions of war a double -inventory is to be prepared. (3) In the same way an inventory is to -be taken of administrative material. (4) The material referred to -in Articles 2 and 3 is to be handed over to the Commandant of the -German forces. (5) The archives of the fortress, with the exception -of the Commandant’s own register, are left behind. (6) The customs -officers are to be disarmed and discharged to their own homes. (7) The -canteen-keepers who wish to depart in the ordinary way receive from -the local commandant a pass viséd by the German local authorities. (8) -The local Commandant remains after the departure of the troops at the -disposal of the German higher authorities till the final settlement; he -binds himself on his word of honor not to leave the fortress. (9) The -troops are transported with their horses and baggage by the railroad. -(10) The baggage left behind in Bitsch by the officers of the 1st and -5th Corps will be sent later to an appointed place in France, two -non-commissioned officers remain to guard it and later to send it back -under their supervision. - -Nisch (January 10th, 1878): [The translator has not thought it -necessary to reproduce this.] - -[81] Thus, in August, 1813, the numerous trespasses across the frontier -on the part of French detachments and patrols led to the entry of the -Silesian army into the neutral territory and therewith to a premature -commencement of hostilities. Later inquiries show that these trespasses -were committed without the orders of a superior and that, therefore, -the French staff cannot be reproached with a breach of the compact; but -the behavior of Blücher was justified in the circumstances and in any -case was based upon good faith. - -[82] We have here in mind not exclusively intentionally untrue -communications, although these also, especially in the Napoleonic war, -very frequently occur; very often the untrue communication is made in -good faith. - -During the fight which took place at Chaffois on January 29th, 1871, -when the village was stormed, the cry of Armistice was raised on the -French side. A French officer of the General Staff communicated to -the Commander of the 14th Division by the presentation of a written -declaration the news of an armistice concluded at Versailles for the -whole of France. The document presented, which was directed by the -Commander-in-Chief of the French Army in the East, General Clinchant, -to the Commander of the French Division engaged at Chaffois, ran as -follows: - - “An armistice of twenty-one days has been signed on the 27th. - I have this evening received the official news. Cease fire in - consequence and inform the enemy, according to the forms followed - in war, that the armistice exists and that you are charged to bring - it to his knowledge. - - (_Signed_) CLINCHANT.” - Pontarlier, January, 29th, 1871. - -Of the conclusion of this armistice no one on the German side had any -knowledge. None the less hostilities ceased for the time being, pending -the decision of the higher authorities. Since on the enemy’s side -it was asserted that a portion of the French troops in Chaffois had -been made prisoners after the news of the existence of the armistice -was communicated, and the order to cease fire had been given, some -thousand French prisoners were set free again in recognition of this -possibility, and the arms which had been originally kept back from them -were later restored to them again. When the proceedings at Chaffois -were reported, General von Manteuffel decided on the 30th January as -follows: - - “The news of an armistice for the Army of the South is false; the - operations are to be continued, and the gentlemen in command are on - no other condition to negotiate with the enemy than that of laying - down their arms. All other negotiations are, without any cessation - of hostilities, to be referred to the Commander-in-Chief.” - -[83] [It will be observed that no authority is given for this -statement.--J. H. M.] - -[84] See as to this: _Rolin-Jacquemyns_, II, 34; and Dahn, _Der -Deutsch-Französische Krieg und das Völkerrecht_. - -[85] [See Editor’s Introduction for criticism of this -brutality.--J. H. M.] - -[86] [_Ibid._] - -[87] For example, the carrying off of forty leading citizens from -Dijon and neighboring towns as reprisals against the making prisoners -of the crew of German merchantmen by the French (undoubtedly contrary -to the law of nations), the pretense being that the crews could serve -to reenforce the German navy (a pretense strikingly repudiated by -Bismarck’s Notes of October 4th and November 16th, 1870). Lüder, _Das -Landkriegsrecht_, p. 111. - -[88] Proclamation of the Governor-General of Alsace, and to the same -effect the Governor-General of Lorraine of October 18th, 1870. - -[89] See Loning, _Die Verwaltung des General-gouvernements im Elsass_, -p. 107. - -[90] For a state of war the provisions of the Prussian Law of June 4th, -1861, still hold good to-day. According to this law all the inhabitants -of the territory in a state of siege are subject to military courts in -regard to certain punishable proceedings. - -[91] J. von Hartmann, _Kritische Versuche_, II, p. 73. - -[92] Lüder, _Das Landkriegsrecht_, p. 103. - -[93] Obviously we are only speaking of a war between civilized people -since, in the case of savages and barbarians, humanity is not advanced -very far, and one cannot act otherwise toward them than by devastation -of their grain fields, driving away their herds, taking of hostages, -and the like. - -[94] Army Order of August 8th, 1870, on crossing the frontier: - -“Soldiers! the pursuit of the enemy who has been thrust back after -bloody struggles has already led a great part of our army across -the frontier. Several corps will to-day and to-morrow set foot upon -French soil. I expect that the discipline by which you have hitherto -distinguished yourselves will be particularly observed on the enemy’s -territory. We wage no war against the peaceable inhabitants of the -country; it is rather the duty of every honor-loving soldier to protect -private property and not to allow the good name of our army to be -soiled by a single example of bad discipline. I count upon the good -spirit which animates the army, but at the same time also upon the -sternness and circumspection of all leaders. - - Headquarters, Homburg, August 8th, 1870. - (_Signed_) WILHELM.” - - -[95] “It is well known that the vineyards in France were guarded and -protected by the German troops, but the same thing happened in regard -to the art treasures of Versailles, and the German soldiers protected -French property at the risk of their lives against the incendiary bombs -of the Paris Commune.”--Lüder, _Landkriegsrecht_, p. 118. - -[96] Bluntschli, _Völkerrecht_, sec. 652. - -[97] [These terms are translated literally. They are roughly -equivalent to the English distinction between “real” and “personal” -property.--J. H. M.] - -[98] To be entirely distinguished from municipal funds which are -regarded as private property. - -[99] How sensitive, indeed, how utterly sentimental, public opinion has -become to-day in regard to this question, is shown by the attitude of -the French and German Press in regard to some objects of art carried -away from China. - -[100] As to booty in the shape of horses, the Prussian instructions -say: “Horses taken as booty belong to the State and are therefore to -be handed over to the horse depot. For every horse which is still -serviceable he who has captured it receives a bonus of 18 dollars out -of the exchequer, and for every unserviceable horse half this sum.” - -[101] Napoleon, who actually permitted his soldiers to plunder in -numerous cases and in others, at least, did not do his best to prevent -it, spoke of it at St. Helena: “Policy and morality are in complete -agreement in their opposition to pillage. I have meditated a good deal -on this subject; I have often been in a position to gratify my soldiers -thereby; I would have done it if I had found it advantageous. But -nothing is more calculated to disorganize and completely ruin an army. -From the moment he is allowed to pillage, a soldier’s discipline is -gone.” - -[102] Dahn, _Jahrbuch f. A.u.M._, III, 1876. Jacquemyns Revue. - -[103] Dahn, _ibid._, III, 1871. - -[104] The King of Denmark in 1715, whilst Charles XII, after the -Battle of Pultawa, stayed for years in Bender, sold the conquered -principalities of Bremen and Verden to the King of England, Elector -of Hanover, before England had yet declared war on Sweden. This -undoubtedly unlawful act of England first received formal recognition -in the Peace of Stockholm, 1720. - -[105] The German administration desired that, as hitherto, justice -should be administered in the name of the Emperor (Napoleon III). The -Court, on the contrary, desired, after the revolution of September -4th, 1870, to use the formula: “In the name of the French Republic.” -The Court no longer recognized the Emperor as Sovereign, the German -authorities did not yet recognize the Republic. Finally the Court, -unfortunately for the inhabitants, ceased its activities. The proper -solution would have been, according to Bluntschli (547), either the use -of a neutral formula, as, for example, “In the name of the law,” or the -complete omission of the superfluous formula. - -[106] Stein, _Revue 17_, Declaration of Brussels, Article 6. - -[107] _Manuel 51_; Moynier, _Revue_, XIX, 165. - -[108] Article 42 of the Hague Regulations runs: “Territory is -considered to be occupied when it is placed as a matter of fact under -the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to -territories where that authority is established and capable of being -exercised.” - -[109] The passage of French troops through Prussian territory in -October, 1805, was a contempt of Prussian neutrality.--The moment the -Swiss Government permitted the Allies to march through its territory in -the year 1814, it thereby renounced the rights of a neutral State.--In -the Franco-Prussian War the Prussian Government complained of the -behavior of Luxemburg in not stopping a passage _en masse_ of fugitive -French soldiers after the fall of Metz through the territory of the -Grand Duchy. - -[110] The considerable reenforcement of the Servian Army in the year -1876 by Russian Freelances was an open violation of neutrality, the -more so as the Government gave the officers permission, as the Emperor -himself confessed later to the English Ambassador in Livadia. The -English Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, Art. 4,[A] forbids all English -subjects during a war in which England remains neutral, to enter the -army or the navy of a belligerent State, or the enlistment for the -purpose, without the express permission of the Government. Similarly -the American law of 1818. The United States complained energetically -during the Crimean War of English recruiting on their territory. - - [A] [This Act applies to British subjects wherever they may be, - and it also applies to aliens, but only if they enlisted or - promoted enlistment on British territory. For a full discussion - of the scope of the Act see _R. v. Jameson_ (1896), 2 Q.B. - 425.--J. H. M.] - -[111] At the end of August, 1870, some French detachments, without its -being known, marched through Belgian territory; others in large numbers -fled after the Battle at Sedan to Belgium, and were there disarmed. In -February, 1871, the hard-pressed French Army of the East crossed into -Switzerland and were there likewise disarmed. - -[112] In the negotiations in 1793, as to the neutrality of North -America in the Anglo-French War, Jefferson declared: “The right of the -citizens to fashion, sell, and export arms cannot be suspended by a -foreign war, but American citizens pursue it on their own account and -at their own risk.”--Bluntschli, sec. 425 (2). Similarly in the famous -treaty between Prussia and the United States of September 10th, 1785, -it was expressly fixed in Article 13 that if one of the two States was -involved in war and the other State should remain neutral, the traders -of the latter should not be prevented from selling arms and munitions -to the enemy of the other. Thus the contraband articles were not to be -confiscated, but the merchants were to be paid the value of their goods -by the belligerent who had seized them. This arrangement was, however, -not inserted in the newer treaties between Prussia and the Union in -1799 and 1828. - -[113] In the exchange of despatches between England and Germany -which arose out of the English deliveries of arms, the English -Minister, Lord Granville, declares, in reply to the complaints of the -German Ambassador in London, Count Bernstorff, that this behavior -is authorized by the preexisting practise, but adds that “with the -progress of civilization the obligations of neutrals have become more -stringent, and declares his readiness to consult with other nations -as to the possibility of introducing in concert more stringent rules, -although his expectations of a practical result are, having regard to -the declarations of the North-American Government, not very hopeful.” -President Grant had, it is true, already in the Neutrality Proclamation -of August 22nd, 1870, declared the trade in contraband in the United -States to be permitted, but had uttered a warning that the export of -the same over sea was forbidden by international law. He had later -expressly forbidden the American arsenal administration to sell arms to -a belligerent, an ordinance which was of course self-evident and was -observed even in England, but he did not attempt to prevent dealers -taking advantage of the public sale of arms out of the State arsenals -to buy them for export to the French. - -[114] Belgium allowed itself, in August, 1870, owing to the opposition -of France, to be talked into forbidding the transport of wounded after -the Battle of Sedan, through Belgian territory, and out of excessive -caution interpreted its decree of August 27th as amounting to a -prohibition of the transport even of individual wounded. The French -protest was based on the contention that by the transport of wounded -through Belgium, the military communication of the enemy with Germany -was relieved from a serious hindrance. “On such a ground”--thinks -Bluntschli (p. 434)--“one might set one’s face against the transport -of large numbers but not the transport of individuals. These -considerations of humanity should decide.” - -[115] Dr. A. W. Heffter, _Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart_ -(7th ed.), 1882, p. 320. - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes - - -Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a -predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not -changed. - -Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained. - -Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained. - -Page xii: The page number for “Treatment of Wounded and Sick Soldiers” -was misprinted as “87”. The chapter actually begins on page 115 and -that number has been used in this eBook. - -The “Contents of Editor’s Marginal Summary” includes an entry for “War -Treaties,” but there is no corresponding Sidenote. It also includes an -entry for “Duties of the neutral--belligerents must be warned off”, but -this actually refers to two separate Sidenotes. - -Page 114: Opening quotation mark before “The ugly and inherently” has -no matching closing mark. - -Page 116: “do no more harm” was misprinted as “do more harm”. - -Page 135: “Etiam hosti fides servanda” was misprinted as “Etiam Zosti -fides servanda”. - -Footnote 23, originally footnote 6 on page 21: “an infinitely more -honest one” was misprinted as “an infinitely more honest me”. - -Some misprinted German words have been corrected: “Uebermut” was -“Uebernut”, “Jahrbücher” was “Jahrücher”, “zur Landes-” was “zur -Lander”, “weichlicher” was “weicheler”, “Weltpolitik” was “Welt -politik”, “das unsterbliche” was “dasunsterbliche”, “Fortwirken” -was “Fortwirkung”, “Gefühlsschwärmerei” was “Gefühlschwarmerei”, -“Kriegsmittel” was “Kriegs mittel”, “Kriegsmanier” was “Kreigsmanier”, -“Kriegsraison” was “Kreigsraison”, “Landkriegsrecht” was -“Landekriegsrecht”, and “im Elsass” was “en Elsass”. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War Book of the German General -Staff, by J. 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- text-indent: -.5em; - padding-right: 0; - } - - .sidenote { - float: left; - clear: both; - font-weight: bold; - min-width: 100%; - max-width: 100%; - width: 100%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: .5em; - } - - .main blockquote .sidenote {margin-left: 0;} - .main blockquote blockquote .sidenote {margin-left: 0} - .main blockquote.hang .sidenote {margin-left: -3em;} - .main blockquote.hang blockquote .sidenote {margin-left: 0;} - .main {margin-left: 0;} - .main .sidenote {margin-left: 0;} - .footnotes .sidenote { - float: left; - clear: both; - margin-left: 0; - margin-right: 0; - } - div.hideb {display: block; visibility: visible; font-size: 1%;} - .div.hideb+.main .sidenote {margin-top: 0;} - .hidetn {display: block; visibility: visible;} - - -} - -@media handheld -{ - body {margin: 0;} - - hr { - margin-top: .1em; - margin-bottom: .1em; - visibility: hidden; - color: white; - width: .01em; - display: none; - } - - blockquote {margin: 1.5em 3% 1.5em 3%;} - - .poem-container {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%;} - .poem {display: block;} - .poem .tb {text-align: left; padding-left: 2em;} - .poem .stanza {page-break-inside: avoid;} - - .hang {margin: .5em 3% 2em 3%;} - - .transnote { - page-break-inside: avoid; - margin-left: 2%; - margin-right: 2%; - margin-top: 1em; - margin-bottom: 1em; - padding: .5em; - } -} - </style> - </head> - -<body> - - -<pre> - -Project Gutenberg's The War Book of the German General Staff, by J. H. Morgan - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most -other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions -whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of -the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at -www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you'll have -to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this ebook. - -Title: The War Book of the German General Staff - Being "The Usages of War on Land" Issued by the Great General Staff of - -Author: J. H. Morgan - -Release Date: April 3, 2016 [EBook #51646] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR BOOK OF GERMAN GENERAL STAFF *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Coe, Charlie Howard, and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="hidetn transnote"> -<p class="center">Transcriber’s Note:<br />In some versions of this eBook, -sidenotes are shown in boldface, above the paragraphs, rather than next to them. -</p></div> - -<h1 class="wspace"><span class="gesperrt3">THE WAR BOOK OF THE</span><br /> -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</h1> - -<hr /> -<div class="center"> -<p class="newpage p4 xlarge"> -<span class="gesperrt2">THE WAR BOOK OF THE</span><br /> -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</p> - -<p class="p1 larger">BEING “THE USAGES OF WAR ON LAND”<br /> -ISSUED BY THE GREAT GENERAL<br /> -STAFF OF THE GERMAN ARMY</p> - -<p class="p2 smaller">TRANSLATED WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION</p> - -<p class="p1"><span class="smaller">BY</span><br /> -<span class="large">J. H. MORGAN, M.A.</span><br /> - -<span class="small">PROFESSOR OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT UNIVERSITY<br /> -COLLEGE, LONDON, LATE SCHOLAR OF BALLIOL<br /> -COLLEGE, OXFORD; JOINT AUTHOR OF<br /> -“WAR: ITS CONDUCT AND ITS<br /> -LEGAL RESULTS”</span></p> - -<p class="p2 larger">NEW YORK<br /> -McBRIDE, NAST & COMPANY<br /> -<span class="smaller">1915</span> -</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<div class="center"> -<p class="newpage p4"> -<span class="wspace">Copyright, 1915, by</span><br /> -<span class="smcap">McBride, Nast & Co.</span></p> - -<p class="p2">Published March, 1915</p> -</div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_v">v</a></span></p> - -<p id="h_v" class="newpage p4 center vspace wspace larger bold"> -TO<br /> -THE LORD FITZMAURICE<br /> -IN TOKEN OF<br /> -FOURTEEN YEARS OF FRIENDSHIP<br /> -AND OF<br /> -MUCH WISE COUNSEL IN THE STUDY<br /> -OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS -</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_vii">vii</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_vii">PREFATORY NOTE</h2> -</div> - -<p>The text of this book is a literal and integral translation -of the <cite>Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege</cite> issued and -re-issued by the German General Staff for the instruction -of German officers. It is the most authoritative -work of its kind in Germany and takes -precedence over all other publications whether military -or legal, alike over the works of Bernhardi the -soldier and of Holtzendorff the jurist. As will be -shown in detail in the critical introduction, The -Hague Conventions are treated by the authors as -little more than “scraps of paper”—the only -“laws” recognized by the German Staff are the military -usages laid down in the pages of the Manual, -and resting upon “a calculating egotism” and injudicious -“form of reprisals.”</p> - -<p>I have treated the original text with religious respect, -seeking neither to extenuate nor to set down -aught in malice. The text is by no means elegant, -but, having regard to the profound significance of the -views therein expressed or suggested, I have thought -it my duty as a translator to sacrifice grace to fidelity. -Text, footnotes, and capital headlines are all literally -translated in their entirety. When I have added<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_viii">viii</a></span> -footnotes of my own they are enclosed in square -brackets. The marginal notes have been added in -order to supply the reader with a continuous clue. -In the Critical Introduction which precedes the text -I have attempted to show the intellectual pedigree of -the book as the true child of the Prussian military -tradition, and to exhibit its degrees of affinity with -German morals and with German policy—with -“Politik” and “Kultur.” I have therefore attempted -a short study of German diplomacy, politics, -and academic teaching since 1870, with some side -glances at the writings of German soldiers and jurists. -All these, it must be remembered, are integrally related; -they all envisage the same problem. That -problem is War. In the German imagination the -Temple of Janus is never closed. Peace is but a -suspension of the state of war instead of war being -a rude interruption of a state of peace. The temperament -of the German is saturated with this belligerent -emotion and every one who is not with him -is against him. An unbroken chain links together -Clausewitz, Bismarck, Treitschke, von der Goltz, -Bernhardi, and the official exponents of German -policy to-day. The teaching of Clausewitz that war -is a continuation of policy has sunk deeply into the -German mind, with the result that their conception -of foreign policy is to provoke a constant apprehension -of war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_ix">ix</a></span> -The first part of the Introduction appears in print -for the first time. In the second and third parts I -have incorporated a short essay on Treitschke which -has appeared in the pages of the <cite>Nineteenth Century</cite> -(in October last), a criticism of German diplomacy -and politics which was originally contributed to the -<cite>Spectator</cite> in 1906 and a study of the German professors -which was published, under the title of “The -Academic Garrison,” in the <cite>Times</cite> Supplement of -Sept. 1st, 1914. I desire to thank the respective -Editors for their kindness in allowing me to reproduce -here what I had already written there.</p> - -<p class="sigright">J. H. M.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xi">xi</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="toc">CONTENTS</h2> -</div> - -<table border="0" summary="Contents"> -<tr class="smaller"><td colspan="2"> </td><td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdl" colspan="2">DEDICATION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_v">v</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdl" colspan="2">PREFATORY NOTE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_vii">vii</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl" colspan="2">INTRODUCTION—</td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdr top">I</td><td class="tdl">THE GERMAN VIEW OF WAR</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_1">1</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdr top">II</td><td class="tdl">GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_16">16</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdr top">III</td><td class="tdl">GERMAN CULTURE: THE ACADEMIC GARRISON</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_44">44</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdr top">IV</td><td class="tdl">GERMAN THOUGHT: TREITSCHKE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_53">53</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdr top">V</td><td class="tdl">CONCLUSION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_65">65</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdl in3" colspan="2">CONTENTS OF THE WAR BOOK OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF—</td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl in2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Introduction</span></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_67">67</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdc" colspan="3">PART I</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdc" colspan="3">USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS THE ENEMY’S ARMY</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">I</td><td class="tdl">WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE ARMY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_75">75</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Regular Army—Irregular Troops—People’s Wars and National Wars.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">II</td><td class="tdl">THE MEANS OF CONDUCTING WAR</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_84">84</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td> </td><td class="tdl in1">A.—MEANS OF WAR DEPENDING ON FORCE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_85">85</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in2">1. Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of hostile combatants.</td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in2">2. Capture of Enemy combatants:</td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in2 smaller">Modern conception of war captivity—Who is subject to it?—Point of view for treatment of prisoners of war—Right to put prisoners to death—Termination of the captivity—Transport of Prisoners.</td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in2">3. Sieges and Bombardments:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xii">xii</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in2 smaller">(<i>a</i>) Fortresses, strong places and fortified places. Notification of bombardment—Scope of bombardment—Treatment of civil population within an enemy’s fortress—Diplomatists of neutral States within a besieged fortress—Treatment of the fortress after storming it. (<i>b</i>) Open towns, villages, buildings and the like, which, however, are occupied or used for military purposes.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td> </td><td class="tdl in1">B.—METHODS NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_110">110</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Cunning and deceit—Lawful and unlawful stratagem.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">III</td><td class="tdl">TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SICK SOLDIERS</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_115">115</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Modern view of non-effective combatants—Geneva Convention—Hyenas of the battlefield.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">IV</td><td class="tdl">INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BELLIGERENT ARMIES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_117">117</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Bearers of flags of truce—Treatment of them—Forms as to their reception.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">V</td><td class="tdl">SCOUTS AND SPIES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_124">124</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">The notion of a spy—Treatment.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">VI</td><td class="tdl">DESERTERS AND RENEGADES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_127">127</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">VII</td><td class="tdl">CIVILIANS IN THE TRAIN OF AN ARMY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_128">128</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">General—Authorizations—The representatives of the Press.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">VIII</td><td class="tdl">THE EXTERNAL MARK OF INVIOLABILITY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_133">133</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">IX</td><td class="tdl">WAR TREATIES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_135">135</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">A.—TREATIES OF EXCHANGE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_135a">135</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">B.—TREATIES OF CAPITULATION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_136">136</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">C.—SAFE-CONDUCTS</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_140">140</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">D.—TREATIES OF ARMISTICE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_141">141</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdc" colspan="3">PART II</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdc" colspan="3">USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO ENEMY TERRITORY AND ITS INHABITANTS</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">I</td><td class="tdl">RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_147">147</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">General Notions—Rights—Duties—Hostages—Jurisdiction in enemy’s provinces when occupied—War rebellion and War treason.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">II</td><td class="tdl">PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_161">161</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiii">xiii</a></span></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">III</td><td class="tdl">BOOTY AND PLUNDERING</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_167">167</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Real and Personal State Property—Real and Personal Private Property.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">IV</td><td class="tdl">REQUISITIONS AND WAR LEVIES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_174">174</a></td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdr top">V</td><td class="tdl">ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_180">180</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">General—Legislation—Relation of inhabitants to the Provisional Government—Courts—Officials—Administration—Railways.</td></tr> -<tr class="space"><td class="tdc" colspan="3">PART III</td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="2">USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS NEUTRAL STATES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#h_187">187</a></td></tr> -<tr><td> </td><td class="tdl in1 smaller">Idea of neutrality—Duties of neutral States—Contraband of war—Rights of neutral States.</td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xiv">xiv</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="cemc" class="vspace">CONTENTS<br /> - -OF EDITOR’S MARGINAL COMMENTARY</h2> -</div> - -<table summary="Contents of Editor’s Marginal Commentary"> -<tr class="smaller"><td> </td><td class="tdr">PAGE</td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">What is a State of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_1">67</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Active Persons and Passive</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_2">67</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">That War is no respector of Persons</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_3">68</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Usages of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_4">69</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of the futility of Written Agreements as Scraps of Paper</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_5">70</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The “flabby emotion” of Humanitarianism</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_6">71</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">That Cruelty is often “the truest humanity”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_7">72</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The perfect Officer</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_8">72</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Who are Combatants and who are not</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_9">75</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Irregular</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_10">76</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Each State must decide for itself</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_11">77</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The necessity of Authorization</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_12">77</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Exceptions which prove the rule</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_13">77</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Free Lance</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_14">78</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Modern views</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_15">79</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The German Military View</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_16">80</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Levée en masse</i></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_17">81</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Hague Regulations will not do</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_18">83</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A short way with the Defender of his Country</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_19">83</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Violence and Cunning</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_20">84</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">How to make an end of the Enemy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_21">85</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Rules of the Game</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_22">85</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Colored Troops are Blacklegs</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_23">87</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Prisoners of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_24">88</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl"><i xml:lang="la" lang="la">Væ Victis!</i></td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_25">89</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Modern View</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_26">89</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Prisoners of War are to be Honorably treated</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_27">90</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Who may be made Prisoners</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_28">91</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The treatment of Prisoners of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_29">92</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Their confinement</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_30">92</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Prisoner and his Taskmaster</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_31">93</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Flight</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_32">94</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Diet</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_33">95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Letters</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_34">95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Personal belongings</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_35">95</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Information Bureau</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_36">96</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">When Prisoners may be put to Death</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_37">97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">“Reprisals”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_38">97</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">One must not be too scrupulous</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_39">98</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The end of Captivity</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_40">99</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Parole</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_41">100</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Exchange of Prisoners</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_42">102</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Removal of Prisoners</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_43">102</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Sieges and Bombardments: Fair Game</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_44">103</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of making the most of one’s opportunity</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_45">104</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Spare the Churches</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_46">105</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A Bombardment is no Respector of Persons</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_47">105</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A timely severity</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_48">106</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">“Undefended Places”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_49">108</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Stratagems</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_50">110</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">What are “dirty tricks”?</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_51">111</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The apophthegm of Frederick the Great</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_52">111</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of False Uniforms</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_53">112</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Corruption of others may be useful</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_54">113</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">And Murder is one of the Fine Arts</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_55">114</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">That the ugly is often expedient, and that it is a mistake to be too “nice-minded”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_56">114</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Sanctity of the Geneva Convention</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_57">115</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The “Hyenas of the Battlefield”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_58">116</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Flags of Truce</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_59">117</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Etiquette of Flags of Truce</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_60">119</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Envoy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_61">120</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">His approach</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_62">120</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Challenge—“Wer da?”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_63">120</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">His reception</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_64">120</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">He dismounts</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_65">121</a><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_xv">xv</a></span></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Let his Yea be Yea, and his Nay, Nay</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_66">121</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The duty of his Interlocutor</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_67">121</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Impatient Envoy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_68">122</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The French again</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_69">122</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Scout</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_70">124</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Spy and his short shrift</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_71">124</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">What is a Spy?</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_72">125</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of the essentials of Espionage</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_73">126</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Accessories are Principals</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_74">126</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Deserter is faithless, and the Renegade false</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_75">127</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">But both may be useful</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_76">127</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">“Followers”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_77">128</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The War Correspondent: his importance. His presence is desirable</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_78">129</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The ideal War Correspondent</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_79">130</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Etiquette of the War Correspondent</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_80">131</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">How to tell a Non-Combatant</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_81">133</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">War Treaties</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_82">135</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">That Faith must be kept even with an enemy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_82">135</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Exchange of Prisoners</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_83">135</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Capitulations—they cannot be too meticulous</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_84">136</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of the White Flag</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_85">139</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of Safe-Conducts</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_86">140</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of Armistice</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_87">141</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Civil Population is not to be regarded as an enemy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_88">147</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">They must not be molested</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_89">148</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Their duty</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_90">149</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of the humanity of the Germans and the barbarity of the French</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_91">149</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">What the Invader may do</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_92">151</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A man may be compelled to Betray his Country</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_93">153</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">And worse</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_94">153</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of forced labor</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_95">154</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of a certain harsh measure and its justification</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_96">154</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Hostages</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_97">155</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A “harsh and cruel” measure</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_98">156</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">But it was “successful”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_99">156</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">War Rebellion</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_100">157</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">War Treason and Unwilling Guides</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_101">159</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Another deplorable necessity</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_102">159</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of Private Property and its immunities</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_103">161</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Of German behavior</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_104">163</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The gentle Hun and the looking-glass</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_105">165</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Booty</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_106">167</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The State realty may be used but must not be wasted</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_107">168</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">State Personalty is at the mercy of the victor</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_108">169</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Private realty</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_109">170</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Private personalty</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_110">170</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">“Choses in action”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_111">171</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Plundering is wicked</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_112">171</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Requisitions</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_113">174</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">How the docile German learnt the “better way”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_114">175</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">To exhaust the country is deplorable, but we mean to do it</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_115">175</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Buccaneering levies</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_116">177</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">How to administer an invaded country</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_117">180</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Laws remain—with qualification</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_118">181</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Inhabitants must obey</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_119">182</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Martial Law</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_120">182</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Fiscal Policy</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_121">184</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Occupation must be real, not fictitious</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_122">185</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">What neutrality means</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_123">187</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">A neutral cannot be all things to all men; therefore he must be nothing to any of them</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_124">187</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">But there are limits to this detachment</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_125">188</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Duties of the neutral—belligerents must be warned off</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_127">188</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The neutral must guard its inviolable frontiers. It must intern the trespassers</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_128">189</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Unneutral service</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_129">191</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The “sinews of war”—loans to belligerents</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_130">191</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Contraband of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_131">191</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Good business</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_132">192</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Foodstuffs</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_133">192</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Contraband on a small scale</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_134">193</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">And on a large scale</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_135">194</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The practise differs</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_136">194</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Who may pass—the Sick and the Wounded</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_137">195</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Who may not pass—Prisoners of War</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_138">196</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Rights of the neutral</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_139">196</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The neutral has the right to be left alone</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_140">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Neutral territory is sacred</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_141">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The neutral may resist a violation of its territory “with all the means in his power”</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_142">197</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Neutrality is presumed</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_143">198</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">The Property of Neutrals</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_144">198</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="tdl">Diplomatic intercourse</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#sn_145">199</a></td></tr> -</table> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2><span class="larger vspace wspace"><span class="gesperrt3">THE WAR BOOK OF THE</span><br /> - -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</span></h2> -</div> - -<hr /> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_1">CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE GERMAN VIEW OF WAR</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The ideal Prince, so Machiavelli has told us, need -not, and indeed should not, possess virtuous qualities, -but he should always contrive to appear to possess -them.<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> The somber Florentine has been studied -in Germany as he has been studied nowhere -else and a double portion of his spirit has descended -on the authors of this book. Herein the -perfect officer, like the perfect Prince, is taught that -it is more important to be thought humane than to -practise humanity; the former may probably be useful -but the latter is certainly inconvenient.</p> - -<p>Hence the peculiar logic of this book which consists -for the most part in ostentatiously laying down -unimpeachable rules and then quietly destroying -them by debilitating exceptions. The civil population -of an invaded country—the young officer is reminded -on one page—is to be left undisturbed in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_2">2</a></span> -mind, body, and estate, their honor is to be inviolate, -their lives protected, and their property secure. To -compel them to assist the enemy is brutal, to make -them betray their own country is inhuman. Such is -the general proposition. Yet a little while and the -Manual descends to particulars. Can the officer compel -the peaceful inhabitants to give information about -the strength and disposition of his country’s forces?<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> -Yes, answers the German War Book, it is doubtless -regrettable but it is often necessary. Should they be -exposed to the fire of their own troops?<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> Yes; it -may be indefensible, but its “main justification” is -that it is “successful.” Should the tribute of supplies -levied upon them be proportioned to their ability -to pay it?<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> No; “this is all very well in theory -but it would rarely be observed in practise.” Should -the forced labor of the inhabitants be limited to -works which are not designed to injure their own -country?<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> No; this is an absurd distinction and -impossible. Should prisoners of war be put to death?<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_3">3</a></span> -It is always “ugly” but it is sometimes expedient. -May one hire an assassin, or corrupt a citizen, or incite -an incendiary? Certainly; it may not be -reputable (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">anständig</i>), and honor may fight shy -of it, but the law of war is less “touchy” (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">empfindlich</i>). -Should the women and children—the -old and the feeble—be allowed to depart before a -bombardment begins? On the contrary; their presence -is greatly to be desired (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">ein Vortheil</i>)—it -makes the bombardment all the more effective. -Should the civil population of a small and defenseless -country be entitled to claim the right, provided -they carry their arms openly and use them honorably, -to defend their native land from the invader?<a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> -No; they act at their peril and must, however sudden -and wanton the invasion, elaborate an organization -or they will receive no quarter.<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">7</a></p> - -<p>We might multiply examples. But these are sufficient. -It will be obvious that the German Staff -are nothing if not casuists. In their brutality they -are the true descendants of Clausewitz, the father of -Prussian military tradition.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_4">4</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“Laws of war are self-imposed restrictions, almost -imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed -‘usages of war.’ Now philanthropists may easily -imagine that there is a skilful method of disarming -and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, -and that this is the proper tendency of the art -of war. However plausible this may appear, still it -is an error which must be extirpated, for in such -dangerous things as war the errors which proceed from -the spirit of benevolence are the worst.... To introduce -into the philosophy of war itself a principle -of moderation would be an absurdity.... War is -an act of violence which in its application knows no -bounds.”<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>The only difference between Clausewitz and his -lineal successors is not that they are less brutal but -that they are more disingenuous. When he comes -to discuss that form of living on the country which -is dignified by the name of requisitions, he roundly -says they should be enforced.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“by the fear of responsibility, punishment, and ill-treatment -which in such cases presses like a general -weight on the whole population.... This resource -has no limits except those of the exhaustion, impoverishment, -and devastation of the whole country.”<a id="FNanchor_9" href="#Footnote_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_5">5</a></span> -Our War Book is more discreet but not more -merciful. Private property, it begins by saying, -should always be respected. To take a man’s property -when he is present is robbery; when he is absent -it is “downright burglary.” But if the “necessity -of war” makes it advisable, “every sequestration, -every appropriation, temporary or permanent, every -use, every injury and all destruction are permissible.”</p> - -<p>It is, indeed, unfortunate that the War Book when -it inculcates “frightfulness” is never obscure, and -that when it advises forbearance it is always ambiguous. -The reader must bear in mind that the authors, -in common with their kind in Germany, always enforce -a distinction between <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegsmanier</i> and -<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegsraison</i>,<a id="FNanchor_10" href="#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> between theory and practise, between -the rule and the exception. That in extreme cases -such distinctions may be necessary is true; the melancholy -thing is that German writers make a system -and indeed a virtue of them. In this respect the -jurists are not appreciably superior to their soldiers. -Brutality is bad, but a pedantic brutality is worse in -proportion as it is more reflective. Holtzendorff’s<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_6">6</a></span> -<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Handbuch des Völkerrechts</cite>, than which there is no -more authoritative book in the legal literature of Germany, -after pages of sanctification of “the natural -right” to defend one’s fatherland against invasion by -a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">levée en masse</i>, terminates the argument for a generous -recognition of the combatant status of the enemy -with the melancholy qualification, “unless <em>the Terrorism -so often necessary in war</em> does not demand -the contrary.”<a id="FNanchor_11" href="#Footnote_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<p>To “terrorize” the civil population of the enemy -is, indeed, a first principle with German writers on -the Art of War. Let the reader ponder carefully on -the sinister sentence in the third paragraph of the -War Book and the illuminating footnote from -Moltke with which it is supported. The doctrine—which -is at the foundation of all such progress as -has been made by international law in regularizing -and humanizing the conduct of war—that the sole -object of it should be to disable the armed forces of -the enemy, finds no countenance here. No, say the -German staff, we must seek just as much (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">in gleicher -Weise</i>) to smash (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">zerstören</i>) the total “intellectual” -(<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">geistig</i>), and material resources of the enemy. It -is no exaggeration to interpret this as a counsel not -merely to destroy the body of a nation, but to ruin -its soul. The “Geist” of a people means in German -its very spirit and finer essence. It means a<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_7">7</a></span> -good deal more than intellect and but a little less -than religion. The “Geist” of a nation is “the -partnership in all science, the partnership in all art, -the partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection,” -which Burke defined as the true conception of -the State. Hence it may be no accident but policy -which has caused the Germans in Belgium to stable -their horses in churches, to destroy municipal palaces, -to defile the hearth, and bombard cathedrals. All -this is scientifically calculated “to smash the total -spiritual resources” of a people, to humiliate them, -to stupefy them, in a word to break their “spirit.”</p> - -<p>Let the reader also study carefully a dark sentence -in that section of the War Book which deals with -“Cunning and Deceit.” There the German officer -is instructed that “there is nothing in international -law against” (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">steht völkerrechtlich nichts entgegen</i>) -the exploitation of the crimes of third persons, “such -as assassination, incendiarism, robbery and the like,” -to the disadvantage of the enemy. “There is nothing -in international law against it!” No, indeed. -There are many things upon which international law -is silent for the simple reason that it refuses to contemplate -their possibility. It assumes that it is dealing -not with brutes but with men. International law -is the etiquette of international society, and society, -as it has been gravely said, is conducted on the assumption -that murder will not be committed. We<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_8">8</a></span> -do not carry revolvers in our pockets when we enter -our clubs, or finger them when we shake hands with -a stranger. Nor, to adopt a very homely illustration, -does any hostess think it necessary to put up a -notice in her drawing-room that guests are not allowed -to spit upon the floor. But what should we -think of a man who committed this disgusting offense, -and then pleaded that there was nothing to -show that the hostess had forbidden it? Human -society, like political society, advances in proportion -as it rests on voluntary morality rather than -positive law. In primitive society everything is -“taboo,” because the only thing that will restrain -the undisciplined passions of men is fear. Can it -be that this is why the traveler in Germany finds -everything “verboten,” and that things which in our -own country are left to the good sense and good -breeding of the citizen have to be officiously forbidden? -Can it be that this people which is always -making an ostentatious parade of its “culture” is -still red in tooth and claw? When a man boasts his -breeding we instinctively suspect it; indeed the boast -is itself ill-bred. If the reader thinks these reflections -uncharitable, let him ponder on the treatment -of Belgium.</p> - -<p>It will be seen therefore that the writers of the -War Book have taken to heart the cynical maxim of -Machiavelli that “a Prince should understand how<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_9">9</a></span> -to use well both the man and the beast.” We shall -have occasion to observe later in this introduction -that the same maxim runs like Ariadne’s thread -through the labyrinth of German diplomacy. -Machiavelli’s dark counsel finds a responsive echo -in Bismarck’s cynical declaration that a diplomatic -pretext can always be found for a war when you -want one. When these things are borne in mind -the reader will be able to understand how it is that -the nation which has used the strongest language<a id="FNanchor_12" href="#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> -about the eternal inviolability of the neutrality of -Belgium should be the first to violate it.</p> - -<p>The reader may ask, What of the Hague Conventions? -They are international agreements, to which -Germany was a party, representing the fruition of -years of patient endeavor to ameliorate the horrors -of war. If they have any defect it is not that they -go too far but that they do not go far enough. But -of them and the humanitarian movement of which -they are the expression, the German Staff has but a -very poor opinion. They are for it the crest -of a wave of “Sentimentalism and flabby emotion.” -(<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Sentimentalität und weichlicher Gefühlsschwärmerei.</i>) -Such movements, our authors declare, -are “in fundamental contradiction with the nature -and object of war itself.” They are rarely mentioned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_10">10</a></span> -in this book and never respectfully. The -reader will look in vain for such an incorporation -of the Hague Regulations in this official text-book as -has been made by the English War Office in our own -<cite>Manual of Military Law</cite>. Nor is the reason far to -seek. The German Government has never viewed -with favor attempts to codify the laws and usages of -war. Amiable sentiments, prolegomenous resolutions, -protestations of “culture” and “humanity,” -she has welcomed with evangelical fervor. But the -moment attempts are made to subject these volatile -sentiments to pressure and liquefy them in the form -of an agreement, she has protested that to particularize -would be to “enfeeble humane and civilizing -thoughts.”<a id="FNanchor_13" href="#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Nothing is more illuminating as to -the respective attitudes of Germany and England to -such international agreements than the discussions -which took place at the Hague Conference of 1907 -on the desirability of imposing in express terms restrictions -upon the laying of submarine mines in -order to protect innocent shipping in neutral waters. -The representatives of the two Powers agreed in admitting -that it did not follow that because the Convention -had not prohibited a certain act it thereby -sanctioned it. But whereas the English representatives -regarded this as a reason why the Convention<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_11">11</a></span> -could never be too explicit,<a id="FNanchor_14" href="#Footnote_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> the spokesman of Germany -urged it as a reason why it could never be too -ambiguous. In the view of the latter, not international -law but “conscience, good sense, and the sentiment -of duties imposed by the principles of humanity -will be the surest guides for the conduct of soldiers -and sailors and the most efficacious guarantees -against abuse.”<a id="FNanchor_15" href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> Conscience, “the good German -Conscience,” as a German newspaper has recently -called it, is, as we have seen, an accommodating monitor, -and in that forum there are only too many special -pleaders. If the German conscience is to be the -sole judge of the lawfulness of German practises, -then it is a clear case of “the right arm strikes and -the left arm is called upon to decide the lawfulness of -the blow.” It is, indeed, difficult to see, if Baron -von Bieberstein’s view of international agreements -be the right one, why there should be any such agreements -at all. The only rule which results from such -an Economy of Truth would be: All things are lawful -but all are not expedient. And such, indeed, is -the conclusion of the German War Book.</p> - -<p>The cynicism of this book is not more remarkable -than its affectation. There are pages in it of the -most admirable sentiment—witness those about the -turpitude of plundering and the inviolability of neutral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_12">12</a></span> -territory. Taken by themselves, they form the -most scathing denunciation of the conduct of the -German army in Belgium that could well be conceived. -Let the reader weigh carefully the following:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Movable private property which in earlier times was -the incontestable booty of the victor is held by modern -opinion to be inviolable. The carrying away of gold, -watches, rings, trinkets, or other objects of value is -therefore to be regarded as robbery, and correspondingly -punishable.</p> - -<p>No plundering but downright burglary is it for a man -to take away things out of an unoccupied house or at a -time when the occupant happens to be absent.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Forced contributions (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegschatzungen</i>) are denounced -as “a form of plundering” rarely, if ever, -to be justified, as requisitions may be, by the plea of -necessity. The victor has no right, the Book adds, -to practise them in order to recoup himself for the -cost of the war, or to subsidize an operation against -the nation whose territory is in his occupation. To -extort them as a ransom from the violence of war is -equally unjustifiable: thus out of its own mouth is -the German staff condemned and its “buccaneering -levies” upon the forlorn inhabitants of Belgium held -up to reprobation.</p> - -<p>Still more significant are the remarks on the right -and duty of neutrals. The inviolability of neutral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_13">13</a></span> -territory and the sanctity of the Geneva Convention -are the only two principles of international law which -the German War Book admits to be laws of perfect -obligation. A neutral State, it declares, not only -may, but must forbid the passage of troops to the -subjects of both belligerents. If either attempts it, -the neutral State has the right to resist “with all the -means in its power.” However overwhelming the -necessity, no belligerent must succumb to the temptation -to trespass upon the neutral territory. If this -be true of a neutral State it is doubly true of a neutralized -State. No one has been so emphatic on this -point as the German jurists whose words the War -Book is so fond of praying in aid. The Treaty of -London guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium is -declared by them to be “a landmark of progress in -the formation of a European polity” and “up till -now no Power has dared to violate a guarantee of -this kind.”<a id="FNanchor_16" href="#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">16</a></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“He who injures a right does injury to the cause of -right itself, and in these guarantees lies the express obligation -to prevent such things.... Nothing could make -the situation of Europe more insecure than an egotistical -repudiation by the great States of these duties of international -fellowship.”<a id="FNanchor_17" href="#Footnote_17" class="fnanchor">17</a></p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_14">14</a></span> -The reader will, perhaps, hardly need to be cautioned -against the belligerent footnotes with which -the General Staff has illuminated the text. They -are, as he will observe, mainly directed towards illustrating -the peculiar depravity of the French in 1870. -They are certainly suspect, and all the more so, because -the notorious malpractices of the Germans in -that campaign are dismissed, where they are noticed -at all, with the airy remark that there were peculiar -circumstances, or that they were unauthorized, or -that the “necessity of war” afforded sufficient justification. -All this is <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">ex parte</i>. So too, to a large -extent, is the parade of professors in the footnotes. -They are almost always German professors and, as -we shall see later, the German professor is, and -is compelled to be, a docile instrument of the -State.</p> - -<p>The book has, of course, a permanent value apart -from the light it throws upon contemporary issues. -Some of the chapters, such as that on the right and -duties of neutrals, represent a carefully considered -theory, little tainted by the cynicism which disfigures -the rest of the book. It should be of great interest -and value to those of us who are engaged in studying -the problem of bringing economic pressure to bear -upon Germany, by enclosing her in the meshes of -conditional contraband. So, too, the chapter on the -treatment of Prisoners of War will have a special,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_15">15</a></span> -and for some a poignant, interest just now. The -chapter on the treatment of occupied territory is, of -course, of profound significance in view of the present -state of Belgium.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_16">16</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_16">CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">GERMAN DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Bismarck, wrote Hohenlohe, who ultimately succeeded -him as Imperial Chancellor, “handles everything -with a certain arrogance (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Uebermut</i>), and this -gives him a considerable advantage in dealing with -the timid minds of the older European diplomacy.” -This native arrogance became accentuated after the -triumphs of 1870 until, in Hohenlohe’s words, Bismarck -became “the terror” of all European diplomatists. -That word is the clue to German diplomacy. -The terrorism which the Germans practise -in war they indoctrinate in peace. It was a favorite -saying of Clausewitz, whose military writings enjoy -an almost apostolic authority in Germany, that War -and Peace are but a continuation of one another—“War -is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse -with a mixture of other means.”<a id="FNanchor_18" href="#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> The -same lesson is written large on every page of von der -Goltz<a id="FNanchor_19" href="#Footnote_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> and Bernhardi.<a id="FNanchor_20" href="#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> In other words, war projects<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_17">17</a></span> -its dark shadow over the whole of German -diplomacy. The dominant postures in “shining -armor” at critical moments in the peace of Europe, -and the menacing invocations of the “mailed fist” -are not, as is commonly supposed, a passionate -idiosyncrasy of the present Emperor. They are a -legacy of the Bismarckian tradition. To keep Europe -in a perpetual state of nervous apprehension by -somber hints of war was, as we shall see, the favorite -method by which Bismarck attained his diplomatic -ends. For the German Chancellerie rumors of wars -are of only less political efficacy than wars themselves. -After 1870, metaphors of war became part of the normal -vocabulary of the German Government in times -of peace. Not only so but, as will be seen in the two -succeeding chapters, a belligerent emotion suffused -the temperament of the whole German people, and -alike in the State Universities, and the stipendiary -Press, there was developed a cult of War for its own -sake. The very vocabulary of the Kaiser’s speeches -has been coined in the lecture-rooms of Berlin University.</p> - -<p>Now War is at best but a negative conception and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_18">18</a></span> -its adoption as the <em>Credo</em> of German thinkers since -1870 explains why their contributions to Political -Science have been so sterile. More than that, it accounts -for the decline in public morality. Politically, -Germany, as we shall see, has remained -absolutely stagnant. She is now no nearer self-government -than she was in 1870; she is much farther -removed from it than she was in 1848. The inevitable -result has been, that politics have for her come to -mean little more than intrigues in high places, the -deadly struggle of one contending faction at court -against another, with the peace of Europe as pawns -in the game. The German Empire, like the Prussian -kingdom, has little more than a paper constitution, -a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">lex imperfecta</i> as Gneist called it. The -Reichstag has little power and less prestige, and its -authority as a representative assembly has been so -enervated by the shock tactics practised by the Government -in forcing, or threatening to force, a series -of dissolutions to punish contumacious behavior, that -it is little better than a debating society. A vote of -censure on the Government has absolutely no effect. -Of the two powers, the Army and the Reichstag, the -Army is infinitely the stronger; there is no law such -as our Army Annual Act which subjects it to Parliamentary -control. Even the Bundesrath<a id="FNanchor_21" href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> (or<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_19">19</a></span> -Federal Council), strong as it is, is hardly stronger -than the German General Staff, for the real force -which welds the German Empire together is not so -much this council of plenipotentiaries from the -States as the military hegemony of Prussia and the -military conventions between her and the Southern -States by which the latter placed their armies under -her supreme control. In this shirt of steel the body -politic is enclosed as in a vice.</p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<p>Nothing illustrates the political lifelessness of Germany, -the arrogance of its rulers and the docility of -its people (for whom, as will be seen, the former -have frequently expressed the utmost contempt) -more than the tortuous course of German diplomacy -during the years 1870–1900. I shall attempt to -sketch very briefly the political history of those years, -particularly in the light of the policy of calculated -Terrorism by which the German Chancellerie sought -to impose its yoke upon Europe. Well did Lord -Odo Russell say that “Bismarck’s sayings inspired -respect” (he might, had he not been speaking as an -ambassador, have used, like Hohenlohe, a stronger -word) “and his silences apprehension.”<a id="FNanchor_22" href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> If it be<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_20">20</a></span> -true, as von der Goltz says it is, that national strategy -is the expression of national character and that the -German method is, to use his words, “a brutal offensive,” -nothing could bring out that amiable characteristic -more clearly than the study of Bismarck’s -diplomacy. The German is brutal in war just because -he is insolent in peace. Count Herbert “can -be very insolent,” wrote the servile Busch of Bismarck’s -son, “which in diplomacy is very useful.”<a id="FNanchor_23" href="#Footnote_23" class="fnanchor">23</a></p> - -<p>Bismarck’s attitude towards treaty obligations is -one of the chief clues to the history of the years -1870–1900. International policy, he once wrote, is -“a fluid element which under certain conditions will -solidify, but on a change of atmosphere reverts to its<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_21">21</a></span> -original condition.”<a id="FNanchor_24" href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> The process of solidification -is represented by the making of treaties; that of -melting is a euphemism for the breaking of them. -To reinsure Germany’s future by taking out policies -in different countries in the form of secret treaties -of alliance while concealing the existence of other -and conflicting treaties seemed to him not only astute -but admirable. Thus having persuaded Austria-Hungary -to enter into a Triple Alliance with Germany -and Italy by holding out as the inducement -the promise of protection against Russia, Bismarck -by his own subsequent confession concluded a secret -treaty with Russia against Austria. To play off -each of these countries against the other by independent -professions of exclusive loyalty to both was -the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Leit-motif</i> of his diplomacy. Nor did he treat -the collective guarantees of European treaties with -any greater respect. Good faith was a negotiable -security. Hence his skilful exploitation of the Black -Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris (1856) when he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_22">22</a></span> -wished to secure the friendly neutrality of Russia -during the Franco-Prussian War. Russia, it will be -remembered, suddenly and to every one’s surprise, -denounced those clauses. The European Powers, on -the initiative of England, disputed Russia’s claim to -denounce <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">motu proprio</i> an international obligation -of so solemn a character, and Bismarck responded -to Lord Granville’s initiative in words of ostentatious -propriety:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“That the Russian Circular of the 19th October -[denouncing the clauses in question] had <em>taken him -by surprise</em>. That while he had always held that the -Treaty of 1856 pressed with undue severity upon Russia, -he entirely disapproved of the manner adopted -and the time selected by the Russian Government to -force the revision of the Treaty.”<a id="FNanchor_25" href="#Footnote_25" class="fnanchor">25</a></p></blockquote> - -<p>Nearly a generation later Bismarck confessed, and -prided himself on the confession, in his Reminiscences,<a id="FNanchor_26" href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> -that he had himself instigated Russia to denounce -the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty; that he -had not only instigated this repudiation but had -initiated it as affording “an opportunity of improving -our relations with Russia.” Russia succumbed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_23">23</a></span> -to the temptation, but, as Bismarck cheerfully admits, -not without reluctance.</p> - -<p>This, however, is not all: Europe “saved her -face” by putting on record in the Conference of -London (1871) a Protocol, subscribed by the Plenipotentiaries -of all the Powers, in which it was laid -down as</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“an essential principle of the law of nations that no -Power can repudiate treaty engagements or modify -treaty provisions, except with the consent of the contracting -parties by mutual agreement.”</p></blockquote> - -<p class="in0">This instrument has been called, not inaptly, the -foundation of the public law of Europe. It was in -virtue of this principle that Russia was obliged to -submit the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano, -and with it the fruits of her victories in 1877–8 to the -arbitrament of the Congress of Berlin. At that Congress -Bismarck played his favorite rôle of “honest -broker,” and there is considerable ground for believing -that he sold the same stock several times over to -different clients and pocketed the “differences.” -What kind of conflicting assurances he gave to the -different Powers will never be fully known, but there -is good ground for believing that in securing the -temporary occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina he had -in mind the ultimate Germanization of the Adriatic, -and that domination of the Mediterranean at the expense<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_24">24</a></span> -of England which has long been the dream of -German publicists from Treitschke onward.<a id="FNanchor_27" href="#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> What, -however, clearly emerged from the Congress, and was -embodied in Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty, was, -that Austria was to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina -under a European mandate. She acquired -lordship without ownership; in other words, -the territory became a Protectorate. Her title, as it -originated in, so it was limited by, the Treaty of -Berlin. Exactly thirty years later, in the autumn -of 1908, Austria, acting in concert with Germany, -abused her fiduciary position and without any mandate -from the Powers annexed the territory of which -she had been made the guardian. This arbitrary action -was a violation of the principle to which she and -Germany had subscribed at the London Conference, -and Sir Edward Grey attempted, as Lord Granville -had done before him, to preserve the credit of the -public law of Europe by a conference which should -consider the compensation due to Servia for an act -which so gravely compromised her security. Russia, -France, and Italy joined with Great Britain in -this heroic, if belated, attempt to save the international -situation. It was at this moment (March; -1909) that Germany appeared on the scene “in -shining armor,” despatched a veiled ultimatum to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_25">25</a></span> -Russia, with a covert threat to mobilize, and forced -her to abandon her advocacy of the claims of Servia -and, with them, of the public law of Europe.</p> - -<p>Thus did History repeat itself. Germany stood -forth once again as the chartered libertine of Europe -whom no faith could bind and no duty oblige. May -it not be said of her what Machiavelli said of Alexander -Borgia: “E non fu mai uomo che avesse maggiore -efficacia in asseveraie, e che con maggiori giuramenti -affermasse una cosa, e che l’osservasse meno.”<a id="FNanchor_28" href="#Footnote_28" class="fnanchor">28</a></p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<p>It would carry me far beyond the limits of this -Introduction to trace in like detail the German policy -of <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Scharfmacherei</i> which consisted, to use the mordant -phrase of M. Hanotaux, in putting up to auction -that which is not yours to sell and, not infrequently, -knocking it down to more than one bidder. That -Bismarck encouraged Russian ambitions in Asia and -French ambitions in Africa with the view of making -mischief between each of them and England is notorious.<a id="FNanchor_29" href="#Footnote_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> -In his earlier attitude he was content to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_26">26</a></span> -play the rôle of <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">tertius gaudens</i>; in his later he was -an active <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">agent provocateur</i>—particularly during the -years 1883–1885, when he joined in the scramble for -Africa. The earlier attitude is well indicated in -Hohenlohe’s revelations, that Bismarck regarded -French colonial operations as a timely diversion from -the Rhine, and would not be at all sorry “to see the -English and French locomotives come into collision,” -and a French annexation of Morocco would have had -his benevolent approval. After 1883 his attitude -was less passive but not less mischievous. Ten years -earlier he had told Lord Odo Russell that colonies -“would only be a cause of weakness” to Germany. -But by 1883 he had been slowly and reluctantly converted -to the militant policy of the Colonial party -and the cry of <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Weltpolitik</i> was as good as a war scare -for electioneering purposes. It was in these -days that hatred of England, a hatred conceived in -jealousy of her world-Empire, was brought forth, -and the obstetrics of Treitschke materially assisted -its birth. Bismarck, however, as readers of his -Reminiscences are well aware, had an intellectual -dislike of England based on her forms of government. -He loved the darker ways of diplomacy and -he thought our Cabinet system fatal to them. He -had an intense dislike of Parliamentarism, he despised -alliances “for which the Crown is not answerable -but only the fleeting cabinet of the day,”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_27">27</a></span> -and above all he hated plain dealing and publicity. -“It is astonishing,” wrote Lord Ampthill, “how -cordially Bismarck hates our Blue Books.”</p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<p>The story of Bismarck’s diplomatic relations with -England during these years exhibits the same features -of duplicity tempered by violence as marked -his relations with the rest of Europe. He acquired -Samoa by a deliberate breach of faith, and his pretense -of negotiations with this country to delimit the -frontiers of English and German acquisitions while -he stole a march upon us were properly stigmatized -by the Colonial Office as “shabby behavior.” -Whether he really egged on France to “take Tunis” -in order to embroil her with England will perhaps -never be really known,<a id="FNanchor_30" href="#Footnote_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> but it was widely suspected -in France that his motives in supporting, if not instigating,<a id="FNanchor_31" href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> -the colonial policy of Jules Ferry would -not bear a very close examination. That he regarded -it as a timely diversion from the Rhine is -certain; that he encouraged it as a promising embarrassment -to England is probable. There can be -no doubt that much the same construction is to be -put on his attitude towards Russia’s aspirations in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_28">28</a></span> -Asia; that they should divert Russia from Europe -was necessary; that they might entangle her with -England was desirable.</p> - -<p>Fear of Russia has, in fact, always been an obsession -of the German Government. That fear is the -just Nemesis of Frederick the Great’s responsibility -for the infamous Partition of Poland. The reader, -who wants to understand the causes of this, cannot -do better than study an old map of the kingdom of -Poland, and compare it with a map of Poland after -the first and second Partitions. The effect of those -cynical transactions was to extinguish an ancient -“buffer state,” separating Prussia, Austria, and Russia, -and by extinguishing it to bring them into -menacing contiguity with each other. Never has -any crime so haunted its perpetrators. Poland has -been the permanent distraction of the three nations -who dismembered her, each perpetually suspicious -of the other two, and this fact is the main clue to the -history of Eastern Europe.<a id="FNanchor_32" href="#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> The fear of Russia, and -of a Russo-French or a Russo-Austrian Alliance, is -the dominant feature of Bismarck’s diplomacy. He -was, indeed, the evil genius of Russia for, by his -own confession,<a id="FNanchor_33" href="#Footnote_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> he intrigued to prevent her from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_29">29</a></span> -pursuing a liberal policy towards Poland, for fear -that she would thereby be drawn into friendship -with France. To induce her to break faith with -Russia, her Polish subjects in one case, and with -Europe in another—the former by suppressing the -Polish constitutional movement; the latter by repudiating -the Black Sea clauses—was to isolate her -from Europe. German writers to-day affect to speak -of “Muscovite barbarism” and “Oriental despotism,” -but it has been the deliberate policy of -Germany to cut Russia off from the main stream of -European civilization—to turn her face Eastwards, -thereby Bismarck hoped, to quote his own words, to -“weaken her pressure on our Eastern frontiers.”</p> - -<p>But Bismarck’s contempt for treaties and his love -for setting other Powers by the ears were venial compared -with his policy of Terrorism. His attitude to -France from 1870 to the day of his retirement from -office—and it has been mis-stated many times by his -successors—was very much that which Newman -ascribed to the Erastian view of the treatment of the -church—“to keep her low” and in a perpetual state -of terror-stricken servility. That this is no exaggeration -will be apparent from what follows here about<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_30">30</a></span> -the war scares with which he terrified France, and -with France Europe also, in the years 1873–5, the -years, when, as our ambassador at Paris, Lord Lytton, -has put it, he “played with her like a cat with a -mouse.”<a id="FNanchor_34" href="#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> Perhaps the most illuminating account of -these tenebrous proceedings is to be derived from -Hohenlohe, who accepted the offer of the German -Embassy at Paris in May, 1874. The post was no -easy one. There had already been a “scare” in the -previous December, when Bismarck menaced the -Duc de Broglie with war, using the attitude of the -French Bishops as a pretext;<a id="FNanchor_35" href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> and, although Hohenlohe’s -appointment was at first regarded as an eirenicon, -there followed a period of extreme tension, when, -as the Duc Decazes subsequently confessed, French -Ministers were “living at the mercy of the smallest -incident, the least mistake.”</p> - -<p>The truth about the subsequent war scare of 1875 -is still a matter of speculation, but the documents -published of late years by de Broglie and Hanotaux, -and the despatches of Lord Odo Russell, have thrown -considerable suspicion of a very positive kind on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_31">31</a></span> -Bismarck’s plea that it was all a malicious invention -of Gontaut-Biron, the French Ambassador, and of -Gortchakoff. A careful collation of the passages in -Hohenlohe’s Memoirs goes far to confirm these suspicions, -and, incidentally, to reveal Bismarck’s inner -diplomacy in a very sinister light. Hohenlohe was -appointed to succeed the unhappy Arnim, who had -made himself obnoxious to Bismarck by his independence, -and he was instructed by the Chancellor, -that it was to the interest of Germany to see that -France should become “a weak Republic and anarchical,” -so as to be a negligible quantity in European -politics, on which the Emperor William I remarked -to Hohenlohe that “that was not a policy,” -and was not “decent,” subsequently confiding to -Hohenlohe that Bismarck was trying “to drive him -more and more into war”; whereupon Hohenlohe -confidently remarked: “I know nothing of it, and -I should be the first to hear of it.” Hohenlohe soon -found reason to change his opinion. As Gortchakoff -remarked to Decazes, “they have a difficult way with -diplomatists at Berlin,” and Hohenlohe was instructed -to press the French Ministry for the recall of -Gontaut-Biron, against whom Bismarck complained -on account of his Legitimist opinions and his friendship -with the Empress Augusta. Thereupon, that -supple and elusive diplomat, the Duc Decazes, parried -by inviting an explanation of the menacing<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_32">32</a></span> -words which Gontaut-Biron declared had been uttered -to him by Radowitz, a Councilor of Legation -in Berlin, to the effect that “it would be both politic -and Christian to declare war at once,” the Duke -adding shrewdly: “One doesn’t invent these -things.” Hohenlohe in his perplexity tried to get -at the truth from Bismarck, and met with what -seems to us a most disingenuous explanation. Bismarck -said Radowitz denied the whole thing, but -added that, even if he had said it, Gontaut-Biron had -no right to report it. He admitted, however, that -Radowitz made mischief and “egged on” Bülow, the -Foreign Secretary. “You may be sure,” he added, -“that these two between them would land us in a -war in four weeks if I didn’t act as safety-valve.” -Hohenlohe took advantage of this confession to press -for the despatch of Radowitz to some distant Embassy -“to cool himself.” To this Bismarck assented, -but a few days later declared that Radowitz was indispensable. -When Hohenlohe attempted to sound -Bismarck on the subject the Chancellor showed the -utmost reserve. After the war scare had passed, -Decazes related to Hohenlohe an earlier example of -Imperial truculence on the part of Arnim, who, on -leaving after a call, turned round as he reached the -door and called out: “I have forgotten one thing. -Recollect that I forbid you to get possession of -Tunis”; and when Decazes affected to regard the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_33">33</a></span> -matter as a jest, Arnim repeated with emphasis: -“Yes, I forbid it.” Hohenlohe adds that an examination -of his predecessor’s papers convinced him that -Arnim did not speak without express authorization. -When the elections for the French Chamber are -imminent in the autumn of 1877, Bismarck informs -Hohenlohe that Germany will adopt “a threatening -attitude,” but “the scene will be laid in Berlin, not -in Paris.” The usual Press campaign followed, -much to the vexation of the Emperor, who complained -to Hohenlohe that the result of these “pin-pricks” -(Nadelstiche) would provoke the French people beyond -endurance.</p> - -<p>In studying this calculated truculence we have to -remember that in Germany foreign and domestic -policy are inextricably interwoven. A war scare is -with the German Government a favorite method of -bringing the Reichstag to a docile frame of mind -and diverting it from inconvenient criticism of the -Government’s policy at home. Moreover, just as -war is, in von der Goltz’s words, a reflection of national -character, so is diplomacy. A nation’s character -is revealed in its diplomacy just as a man’s -breeding is revealed in his conversation.<a id="FNanchor_36" href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> We must -therefore take into account the polity of Germany -and its political standards.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_34">34</a></span> -The picture of the Prussian autocracy in the later -days of Bismarck’s rule which we can reconstruct -from different entries in Hohenlohe’s Journal from -the year 1885 onwards is a very somber one. It is -a picture of suspicion, treachery, vacillation, and -calumny in high places which remind one of nothing -so much as the Court of the later Bourbons. It is -a régime of violence abroad and dissensions at home. -Bismarck’s health was failing him, and with his -health his temper. He complained to Hohenlohe -that his head “grew hot” the moment he worked, -and the latter hardly dared to dispute with him on -the gravest matters of State. Readers of Busch will -remember his frank disclosures of the anarchy of -the Foreign Office when Bismarck was away: “if -the Chief gives violent instructions, they are carried -out with still greater violence.” In Hohenlohe we -begin to see all the grave implications of this. Bismarck, -with what Lord Odo Russell called his passion -for authority, was fond of sneering at English -foreign policy as liable to be blown about with every -wind of political doctrine; but if Parliamentary control -has its defects, autocracy has defects more insidious -still. Will becomes caprice, and foreign relations -are at the mercy of bureaucrats who have no -sense of responsibility so long as they can adroitly -flatter their master. When a bureaucrat trained -under this system arrives at power, the result may<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_35">35</a></span> -be nothing less than disastrous. This was what happened -when Bismarck’s instrument, Holstein, concentrated -power into his own hands at the Foreign -Office; and as the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Neue Freie Presse</i><a id="FNanchor_37" href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> pointed out -in its disclosures on his fall (1906), the results are -writ large in the narrowly averted catastrophe of a -war with France in 1905. Bismarck’s disciples had -all his calculated violence without its timeliness. In -the Foreign Office, Hohenlohe discovered a kind of -anarchical “republicanism”—“nobody,” in Bismarck’s -frequent absence “will own responsibility -to any one else.” “Bismarck is nervously excitable,” -writes Hohenlohe in March, 1885, “and harasses -his subordinates and frightens them, so that -they see more behind his expression than there really -is.” Like most small men, in terror themselves, they -terrorized others. Moreover, the disinclination of -the Prussian mind, which Bismarck himself once -noted, to accept any responsibility which is not covered -by instructions, tended to reduce the German -Ambassadors abroad to the level of mere aides-de-camp. -Hohenlohe found himself involved in the -same embarrassments at Paris as Count Münster did -in London. Any one who has studied the inner history -of German foreign policy must have divined a -secret diplomacy as devious of its kind as that of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_36">36</a></span> -Louis XV. Of its exact bearings little is known, but -a great deal may reasonably be suspected. There is -always the triple diplomacy of the Court, the Imperial -Chancery, and lastly the Diplomatic Service, -which is not necessarily in the confidence of either.</p> - -<p>The same debilitating influences of a dictatorship -were at work in Ministerial and Parliamentary life. -Bismarck had an equal contempt for the collective -responsibility of Ministers and for Parliamentary -control. Having done his best to deprive the Members -of the Reichstag of power, he was annoyed at -their irresponsibility. He called men like Bennigsen -and Windhorst silly schoolboy politicians (Karlchen-Miesnick-Tertianen) -or “lying scoundrels” -(verlogene Halunken). He was surprised that representation -without control resulted in faction. It -is the Nemesis of his own political doctrines. When -he met with opposition he clamored for repressive -measures, and could not understand some of the -scruples of the Liberals as to the exceptional laws -against the Socialists. Moreover, having tried, like -another Richelieu, to reduce his fellow-Ministers to -the position of clerks, he was annoyed at their want -of corporate spirit, and when they refused to follow -him into his retirement, he declaimed against their -apostasy in having “left him in the lurch.” He -talked at one time of abolishing the Reichstag; at -another of having a special post created for himself<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_37">37</a></span> -as “General-Adjutant.” He complained of overwork—and -his energy was Titanic—but he insisted -on keeping his eye on everything, conscientiously -enough, because, he tells Hohenlohe, “he -could not put his name to things which did not reflect -his own mind.” But perhaps the gravest moral of it -all is the Nemesis of deception. It is difficult to be -both loved and feared, said Machiavelli. There is -a somber irony in the remark of the Czar to the Emperor -in 1892, which the latter repeated to Hohenlohe. -Bismarck had been compelled to retire because -he had failed to induce the Emperor to violate -Germany’s contractual obligations to Austria by renewing -his secret agreement with Russia, and he consoled -himself in his retirement with the somewhat -unctuous reflection that he was a martyr to the cause -of Russo-German friendship, betrayed, according to -him, by Caprivi. “Do you know,” said the young -Emperor (in August, 1892), “the Czar has told me -he has every trust in Caprivi; whereas when Bismarck -has said anything to him he has always had -the conviction that ‘he is tricking me.’” We are -reminded of the occasion when Talleyrand told the -truth so frankly that his interlocutor persisted in -regarding it as an elaborate form of deception. -After all, there are advantages, even in diplomacy, -in being what Schuvaloff called Caprivi, a “too honest -man.” It was the same with the domestic atmosphere.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_38">38</a></span> -Bismarck, an adept at deceiving, is always -complaining of deception; a master of intrigue, he -is always declaiming against the intrigues of others. -He inveighs against the Empress Augusta: “for -fifty years she has been my opponent with the Emperor.” -He lived in an atmosphere of distrust, he -was often insolent, and always suspicious. It affected -all his diplomatic intercourse, and was not at -all to Hohenlohe’s taste. “He handles everything -with a certain arrogance (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Uebermut</i>),” once wrote -Hohenlohe (as we have already said) of a discussion -with him over foreign affairs. “<em>This has always -been his way.</em>”</p> - -<p>All these tendencies came to a head when the scepter -passed from the infirm hands of William I to -those of a dying King, around whose death-bed the -military party and the Chancellor’s party began to -intrigue for influence over the young Prince whose -advent to empire was hourly expected. Of these intrigues -Hohenlohe, who was now Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, -soon began to feel the effects without -at first discovering the cause. He loved the people -of the Reichsland, was a friend of France, and an -advocate of liberal institutions, and in this spirit he -strove to administer the incorporated territories. -But the military party worked against him, hoping -to secure the abolition of the moderate measure of -local government and Reichstag representation which<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_39">39</a></span> -the Provinces possessed; and when the latter returned -a hostile majority to the Reichstag they -redoubled their efforts for a policy of “Thorough.” -Bismarck gave but a lukewarm support to Hohenlohe -and insisted on the enforcement of drastic passport -regulations, which, combined with the Schnaebele -affair (on which the Memoirs are very reticent), almost -provoked France to War—naturally enough, -in the opinion of Hohenlohe, and inevitably, according -to the forebodings of the German Military Attaché -at Paris. To Hohenlohe’s imploring representations -Bismarck replied with grim jests about -Alva’s rule in the Netherlands, adding that it is all -done to show the French “that their noise doesn’t -alarm us.” Meanwhile Switzerland was alienated, -France injured, and Austria suspicious. But Hohenlohe, -after inquiries in Berlin and Baden, began to -discover the reason. Bismarck feared the influence -of the military party over the martial spirit of Prince -William, and was determined to show himself equally -militant in order to secure his dynasty. “His sole -object is to get his son Herbert into the saddle,” -said Bleichroder; “so there is no hope of an improvement -in Alsace-Lorraine,”—although Prince Herbert -alienated everybody by his insolence, which was -so gross that the Prince of Wales (King Edward), -at this time in Berlin, declared that he could -scarcely restrain himself from showing him the door.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_40">40</a></span> -The leader of the military party, Waldersee, was -hardly more public-spirited. He had, according to -Bismarck, been made Chief of Staff by Moltke, over -the heads of more competent men, because he was -more docile than they. Between these military and -civil autocracies the struggle for the possession of -the present Emperor raged remorselessly, and with -appalling levity they made the peace of two great -nations the pawns in the game. The young Emperor -is seen in Hohenlohe’s Memoirs feeling his -way, groping in the dark; but those who, like the -Grand Duke of Baden, knew the strength of his -character, foresaw the end. At first, he “doesn’t -trust himself to hold a different opinion from Bismarck”; -but, “as soon as he perceives that Bismarck -doesn’t tell him everything,” predicted the -Grand Duke, “there will be trouble.” Meanwhile -Waldersee was working for war, for no better reason -than that he was getting old, and spoiling for a fight -before it was too late for him to take the field.</p> - -<p>For Bismarck’s dismissal there were various -causes: differences in domestic policy and in foreign, -and an absolute <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">impasse</i> on the question whether -Bismarck’s fellow-Ministers were to be treated as -colleagues or subordinates. “Bismarck,” said Caprivi -afterwards, “had made a treaty with Russia -by which we guaranteed her a free hand in Bulgaria -and Constantinople, and Russia bound herself to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_41">41</a></span> -remain neutral in a war with France. That would -have meant the shattering of the Triple Alliance.” -Moreover, the relations of Emperor and Chancellor -were, at the last, disfigured by violent scenes, during -which the Kaiser, according to the testimony of every -one, showed the most astonishing dignity and restraint. -But it may all be summed up in the words -of the Grand Duke of Baden, reechoed by the Emperor -to Hohenlohe, it had to be a choice between -the dynasties of Hohenzollern and Bismarck. The -end came to such a period of fear, agony, irony, -despair, recrimination, and catastrophic laughter as -only the pen of a Tacitus could adequately describe. -Bismarck’s last years, both of power and retirement, -were those of a lost soul. Having tried to intrigue -with foreign Ambassadors against his Sovereign before -his retirement, he tried to mobilize the Press -against him after he had retired, and even stooped -to join hands with his old rival, Waldersee, for the -overthrow of his successor, Caprivi, being quite indifferent, -complained the Kaiser bitterly, to what -might happen afterwards. “It is sad to think,” -said the Emperor of Austria to Hohenlohe, “that -such a man can sink so low.”</p> - -<p>When Bismarck was dismissed every one raised -his head. It seemed to Hohenlohe to be at last a -case of the beatitude: “the meek shall inherit the -earth.” Holstein, the Under-Secretary, who, to the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_42">42</a></span> -disgust of Bismarck, refused to follow his chief and -who now quietly made himself the residuary legatee -of the whole political inheritance of the Foreign -Office, intended by Bismarck for his son, freely criticized -his ex-chief’s policy in a conversation with -Hohenlohe:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“He adduced as errors of Bismarck’s policy: The -Berlin Congress, the mediation in China in favor of -France, the prevention of the conflict between England -and Russia in Afghanistan, and the whole of his -<em>tracasseries</em> with Russia. As to his recent plan of leaving -Austria in the lurch, he says we should then have -made ourselves so contemptible that we should have become -isolated and dependent on Russia.”</p></blockquote> - -<p>Bismarck, whom Hohenlohe visited in his retirement, -with a strange want of patriotism and of perspicuity, -pursued “his favorite theme” and inveighed -against the envy (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">der Neid</i>) of the German -people and their incurable particularism. He never -divined how much his jealous autocracy had fostered -these tendencies. One may hazard the opinion that -the Germans are no more wanting in public spirit -and political capacity than any other nation; but if -they are deprived of the rights of private judgment -and the exercise of political ability, they are no more -likely to be immune from the corresponding disabilities. -Certainly, in no country where public men -are accustomed to the exercise of mutual tolerance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_43">43</a></span> -and loyal cooperation by the practise of Cabinet government, -and where public opinion has healthy play, -would such an exhibition of disloyalty and slander -as is here exhibited be tolerated, or even possible. -When in 1895 Caprivi succumbed to the intrigues of -the military caste and the Agrarian Party, Hohenlohe, -now in his seventy-sixth year, was entreated to -come to the rescue, his accession being regarded as -the only security for German unity. To his eternal -credit, Hohenlohe accepted; but, if we may read between -the lines of the scanty extracts here vouchsafed -from the record of a Ministerial activity of -six years, we may conjecture that it was mostly -labor and sorrow. He was opposed to agrarianism -and repressive measures, and anxious “to get on -with the Reichstag,” seeing in the forms of public -discussion the only security for the public peace. -But “the Prussian Junkers could not tolerate South -German Liberalism,” and the most powerful political -caste in the world, with the Army and the King on -their side, appear to have been too much for him. -His retirement in 1900 marks the end of a fugitive -attempt at something like a liberal policy in Germany, -and during the fourteen years which have -elapsed since that event autocracy has held undisputed -sway in Germany. The history of these latter -years is fresh in the minds of most students of public -affairs, and we will not attempt to pursue it here.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_44">44</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_44">CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">GERMAN CULTURE<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE ACADEMIC GARRISON</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>Nothing is so characteristic of the German nation -as its astonishing single-mindedness—using that -term in a mental and not a moral sense. Since Prussia -established her ascendency the nation has developed -an immense concentration of purpose. If the -military men are not more belligerent than the diplomatists, -the diplomatists are not more belligerent -than the professors. A single purpose seems to animate -them: it is to proclaim the spiritual efficacy, -and the eternal necessity, of War.</p> - -<p>Already there are signs that the German professors -are taking the field. Their mobilization is apparently -not yet complete, but we may expect before -long to see their whole force, from the oldest Professor -Emeritus down to the youngest <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Privat-dozent</i>, -sharpening their pens against us. Professors Harnack, -Haeckel, and Eucken have already made a -reconnaissance in force, and in language which might -have come straight from the armory of Treitschke -have denounced the mingled cupidity and hypocrisy<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_45">45</a></span> -with which we, so they say, have joined forces with -Muscovite “barbarism” against Teutonic culture. -This, we may feel sure, is only the beginning.</p> - -<p>German professors have a way of making history -as well as writing it, and the Prussian Government -has always attached the greatest importance to taking -away its enemy’s character before it despoils -him of his goods. Long before the wars of 1866 -and 1870 the seminars of the Prussian universities -were as busy forging title-deeds to the smaller German -states and to Alsace-Lorraine as any medieval -scriptorium, and not less ingenious. In the Franco-Prussian -War the professors—Treitschke, Mommsen, -Sybel—were the first to take the field and the -last to quit it. Theirs it was to exploit the secular -hatreds of the past. Even Ranke, the nearest approach -to “a good European” of which German -schools of history could boast, was implacable. -When asked by Thiers on whom, the Third Empire -having fallen, the Germans were continuing to make -war, he replied, “On Louis XIV.”</p> - -<p>Hardly were the results achieved before a casuistry -was developed to justify them. Sybel’s apologetics -in “Die Begründung des deutschen Reichs” began -it; others have gone far beyond them. “Blessed be -the hand that traced those lines,” is Professor Delbrück’s -benediction on the forgery of the Ems telegram; -and in language which is almost a paraphrase<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_46">46</a></span> -of Bismarck’s cynical declaration that a diplomatic -pretext for a war can always be found when you -want one, he has laid it down that “a good diplomat” -should always have his quiver full of such -barbed arrows. So, too, Sybel on Frederick’s complicity -in the Second Partition of an inoffensive -Poland anticipates in almost so many words the recent -sophistry of the Imperial Chancellor on the -violation of the neutrality of Belgium. “Wrong? -I grant you—a violation of law in the most literal -sense of the word.” But, he adds, necessity knows -no law, and, “to sum it up,” after all, Prussia -“thereby gained a very considerable territory.” -And thus Treitschke on the question of the duchies, -or again, to go farther afield, Mommsen on the inexorable -“law” that the race is always to the swift -and the battle to the strong. Frederick the Great -surely knew his fellow-countrymen when he said with -characteristic cynicism: “I begin by taking; I can -always find pedants to prove my rights afterwards.” -Not the Chancelleries only, but even the General -Staff has worked hand in glove with the lecture-room. -When Bernhardi and von der Goltz exalt the -spiritual efficacy of war they are repeating almost -word for word the language of Treitschke. Not a -faculty but ministers to German statecraft in its -turn. The economists, notably von Halle and Wagner, -have been as busy and pragmatical as the historians—theirs<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_47">47</a></span> -is the doctrine of Prussian military -hegemony upon a basis of agrarianism, of the absorption -of Holland, and of “the future upon the -water.” The very vocabulary of the Kaiser’s -speeches has been coined in the lecture-rooms of -Berlin University.</p> - -<p>To understand the potency of these academic influences -in German policy one must know something -of the constitution of the German universities. In -no country is the control of the Government over -the universities so strong; nowhere is it so vigilant. -Political favor may make or mar an academic career; -the complaisant professor is decorated, the contumacious -is cashiered. German academic history is full -of examples. Treitschke, Sybel, even Mommsen all -felt the weight of royal displeasure at one period or -another. The present Emperor vetoed the award of -the Verdun prize to Sybel because in his history of -Prussian policy he had exalted Bismarck at the expense -of the Hohenzollerns, and he threatened to -close the archives to Treitschke. Even Mommsen -had at one time to learn the steepness of alien stairs.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, no Government recognizes so -readily the value of a professor who is docile—he -is of more value than many Pomeranian Grenadiers. -Bismarck invited Treitschke to accompany the army -of Sadowa as a writer of military bulletins, and -both he and Sybel were, after due caution, commissioned<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_48">48</a></span> -to write those apologetics of Prussian policy -which are classics of their kind. Most German professors -have at one time or another been publicists, -and the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Grenzboten</i> and the <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Preussische Jahrbücher</i> -maintain the polemical traditions of Sybel’s “Historische -Zeitschrift.” Moreover, the German university -system, with the singular freedom in the -choice of lectures and universities, which it leaves -to the student, tends to make a professor’s classes -depend for their success on his power of attracting a -public by trenchant oratory. Well has Acton said -that the “garrison” of distinguished historians that -prepared the Prussian supremacy, together with their -own, “hold Berlin like a fortress.” They still hold -it and their science of fortification has not changed.</p> - -<p>It is not necessary to recapitulate here the earlier -phases of this politico-historical school whose motto -found expression in Droysen’s aphorism, “The -statesman is the historian in practise,” and whose -moral was “Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht,” -or, to put it less pretentiously, “Nothing -succeeds like success.” All of them, Niebuhr, -Mommsen, Droysen, Häusser, Sybel, Treitschke, -have this in common: that they are merciless to the -rights of small nationalities. This was no accident; -it was due to the magnetism exercised upon their -minds by the hegemony of Prussia and by their -opposition to the idea of a loose confederation of<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_49">49</a></span> -small States. They were almost equally united in -a common detestation of France and could find no -word too hard for her polity, her literature, her -ideals, and her people. “Sodom” and “Babylon” -were the best they could spare her. “Die Nation -ist unser Feind” wrote Treitschke in 1870, and “we -must draw her teeth.” Even Ranke declared that -everything good in Germany had risen by way of -opposition to French influences. The intellectual -war was carried into every field and epoch of history, -and all the institutions of modern civilization -were traced by writers like Waitz and Maurer to the -early German tribes uncorrupted by Roman influences. -The same spirit was apparent in Sybel’s -hatred of the French Revolution and all its works.</p> - -<p>This is not the place to expound the intellectual -revenge which French scholars like Fustel de -Coulanges in the one sphere, and Albert Sorel in the -other, afterwards took upon this insensate chauvinism -of the chair. Sufficient to say that this cult of -war and gospel of hate have narrowed the outlook of -German thought ever since, as Renan warned Strauss -they would, and have left Germany in an intellectual -isolation from the rest of Europe only to be paralleled -by her moral isolation of to-day. It was useless for -Renan to remind German scholars that pride is the -only vice which is punished in this world. “We -Germans,” retorted Mommsen, “are not modest and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_50">50</a></span> -don’t pretend to be.” The words are almost the echo -of that “thrasonic brag” with which Bismarck one -day electrified the Reichstag.</p> - -<p>In the academic circles of to-day much of the hate -formerly vented upon France is now diverted to England. -In this, Treitschke set the fashion. Nothing -delighted him more than to garnish his immensely -popular lectures with uproarious jests at -England—“the hypocrite who, with a Bible in one -hand and an opium pipe in the other, scatters over -the universe the benefits of civilization.” But there -was always method in his madness. Treitschke was -one of the first to demand for Germany “a place in -the sun”—this commonplace of Imperial speeches -was, I believe, coined by Sybel—and to press for -the creation of a German Navy which should do -what “Europe” had failed to do—set bounds to -the crushing domination of the British Fleet and -“restore the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean -peoples” by snatching back Malta, Corfu, and -Gibraltar. The seed fell on fruitful soil. A young -economist, the late Professor von Halle, whose vehement -lectures I used to attend when a student at -Berlin University, worked out the maritime possibilities -of German ambitions in “Volks-und Seewirthschaft,” -and his method is highly significant in -view of the recent ultimatum delivered by Germany -to Belgium. It was nothing less than the seduction<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_51">51</a></span> -of Holland by economic bribes into promising -to Germany the abandonment of the neutrality of -her ports in the event of war. Thereby, and thereby -alone, he argued, Germany would be reconciled to -the “monstrosity” (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Unding</i>) of the mouth of the -Rhine being in non-German hands. In return Germany -would take Holland and her colonies under her -“protection.” To the same effect writes Professor -Karl Lamprecht in his “Zur jüngsten deutschen -Vergangenheit,” seizing upon the Boer war to demonstrate -to Holland that England is the enemy. The -same argument was put forward by Professor Lexis. -This was in the true line of academic tradition. -Even the discreet and temperate Ranke once counseled -Bismarck to annex Switzerland.</p> - -<p>Such, in briefest outline, is the story of the academic -“garrison.” Of the lesser lansquenets, the -horde of privat-dozents and obscurer professors, -whose intellectual folly is only equaled by their -audacity, and who are the mainstay of the Pan-German -movement, I have said nothing. It may be -doubted whether the second generation can show -anything like the intellectual prestige which, with -all their intemperance, distinguished their predecessors. -But they have all laid to heart Treitschke’s -maxim, “Be governmental,” honor the King, worship -the State, and “believe that no salvation is -possible except by the annihilation of the smaller<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_52">52</a></span> -States.” It is a strange ending to the Germany of -Kant and Goethe.</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben<br /></span> -<span class="i0">Der täglich sie erobern muss—<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="in0">The noble lines of Goethe have now a variant reading—“He -alone achieves freedom and existence -who seeks to repeat his conquests at the expense of -others” might be the motto of the Germans of to-day. -But as they have appealed to History, so will -History answer them.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_53">53</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_53">CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">GERMAN THOUGHT<br /> - -<span class="subhead">TREITSCHKE</span></span></h2> -</div> - -<p>In a pamphlet of mordant irony addressed to “Messieurs -les Ministres du culte évangélique de l’armée -du roi de Prusse” in the dark days of 1870, Fustel -de Coulanges warned these evangelical camp-followers -of the consequences to German civilization of -their doctrines of a Holy War. “Your error is not -a crime but it makes you commit one, for it leads -you to preach war which is the greatest of all crimes.” -It was not impossible, he added, that that very war -might be the beginning of the decadence of Germany, -even as it would inaugurate the revival of France. -History has proved him a true prophet, but it has -required more than a generation to show with what -subtlety the moral poison of such teaching has penetrated -into German life and character. The great -apostle of that teaching was Treitschke who, though -not indeed a theologian, was characteristically fond -of praying in aid the vocabulary of theology. -“Every intelligent theologian understands perfectly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_54">54</a></span> -well,” he wrote, “that the Biblical saying -‘Thou shalt not kill’ ought no more to be interpreted -literally than the apostolic injunction to give one’s -goods to the poor.” He called in the Old Testament -to redress the balance of the New. “The doctrines -of the apple of discord and of original sin are the -great facts which the pages of History everywhere -reveal.”</p> - -<p>To-day, everybody talks of Treitschke, though I -doubt if half a dozen people in England have read -him. His brilliant essays, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Historische und Politische -Aufsätze</cite>, illuminating almost every aspect of -German controversy, have never been translated; -neither has his <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Politik</cite>, a searching and cynical examination -of the foundations of Political Science -which exalts the State at the expense of Society; and -his <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Deutsche Geschichte</cite>, which was designed to be -the supreme apologetic of Prussian policy, is also -unknown in our tongue. But in Germany their -vogue has been and still is enormous; they are to -Germans what Carlyle and Macaulay were to us. -Treitschke, indeed, has much in common with Carlyle; -the same contempt for Parliaments and constitutional -freedom; the same worship of the strong -man armed; the same somber, almost savage, irony, -and, let it not be forgotten, the same deep moral -fervor. His character was irreproachable. At the -age of fifteen he wrote down this motto for his own:<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_55">55</a></span> -“To be always upright, honest, moral, to become a -man, a man useful to humanity, a brave man—these -are my ambitions.” This high ideal he strove -manfully to realize. But he was a doctrinaire, and -of all doctrinaires the conscientious doctrinaire is -the most dangerous. Undoubtedly, in his case, as -in that of so many other enlightened Germans—Sybel, -for example—his apostasy from Liberalism -dated from the moment of his conviction that the -only hope for German unity lay not in Parliaments -but in the military hegemony of Prussia. The -bloody triumphs of the Austro-Prussian War convinced -him that the salvation of Germany was “only -possible by the annihilation of small States,” that -States rest on force, not consent, that success is the -supreme test of merit, and that the issues of war -are the judgment of God. He was singularly free -from sophistry and never attempted, like Sybel, to -defend the Ems telegram by the disingenuous plea -that “an abbreviation is not a falsification”; it -was enough for him that the trick achieved its purpose. -And he had a frank contempt for those Prussian -jurists who attempted to find a legal title to -Schleswig-Holstein; the real truth of the matter -he roundly declared, was that the annexation of the -duchies was necessary for the realization of German -aims. When he writes about war he writes without -any sanctimonious cant:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_56">56</a></span></p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>It is not for Germans to repeat the commonplaces of -the apostles of peace or of the priests of Mammon, nor -should they close their eyes before the cruel necessities -of the age. Yes, ours is an epoch of war, our age is an -age of iron. If the strong get the better of the weak, -it is an inexorable law of life. Those wars of hunger -which we still see to-day amongst negro tribes are as -necessary for the economic conditions of the heart of -Africa as the sacred war which a people undertakes to -preserve the most precious belongings of its moral culture. -There as here it is a struggle for life, here for a -moral good, there for a material good.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Readers of Bernhardi will recognize here the -source of Bernhardi’s inspiration. If Treitschke -was a casuist at all—and as a rule he is refreshingly, -if brutally, frank—his was the supreme -casuistry of the doctrine that the end justifies the -means. That the means may corrupt the end or -become an end in themselves he never saw, or only -saw it at the end of his life. He honestly believed -that war was the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic -enterprise, he feared the commercialism of modern -times, and despised England because he judged -her wars to have always been undertaken with a view -to the conquest of markets. He sneers at the Englishman -who “scatters the blessings of civilization -with a Bible in one hand and an opium pipe in the -other.” He honestly believed that Germany exhibited -a purity of domestic life, a pastoral simplicity,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_57">57</a></span> -and a deep religious faith to which no European -country could approach, and at the time he -wrote the picture was not overdrawn. He has written -passages of noble and tender sentiment, in which -he celebrates the piety of the peasant, whose religious -exercises were hallowed, wherever the German tongue -was spoken, by the massive faith of Luther’s great -Hymn. Writing of German Protestantism as the -corner-stone of German unity, he says:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Everywhere it has been the solid rampart of our -language and customs. In Alsace, as in the mountains -of Transylvania and on the distant shores of the Baltic, -as long as the peasant shall sing his old canticle</p> - -<div class="poem-container"> -<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> -<span class="i0">Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott<br /></span> -</div></div> -</div> - -<p class="in0">German life shall not pass away.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Those who would understand the strength of Treitschke’s -influence on his generation must not lose sight -of these purer elements in his teaching.</p> - -<p>But Treitschke was dazzled by the military successes -of Prussia in 1866. With that violent reaction -against culture which is so common among its -professional devotees, and which often makes the men -of the pen far more sanguinary than the men of the -sword, he derided the old Germany of Goethe and -Kant as “a nation of poets and thinkers without a -polity” (“Ein staatloses Volk von Dichtern und -Denkern”), and almost despised his own intellectual -vocation. “Each dragoon,” he cried enviously,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_58">58</a></span> -“who knocks a Croat on the head does far more for -the German cause than the finest political brain that -ever wielded a trenchant pen.” But for his grievous -deafness he would, like his father, have chosen -the profession of arms. Failing that, he chose to -teach. “It is a fine thing,” he wrote, “to be master -of the younger generation,” and he set himself to -indoctrinate it with the aim of German unity. He -taught from 1859 to 1875 successively at Leipzig, -Freiburg, Kiel, and Heidelberg. From 1875 till his -death in 1896 he occupied with immense éclat the -chair of modern history at Berlin. And so, although -a Saxon, he enlisted his pen in the service -of Prussia—Prussia which always knows how to -attract men of ideas but rarely produces them. In -the great roll of German statesmen and thinkers and -poets—Stein, Hardenberg, Goethe, Hegel—you -will look almost in vain for one who is of Prussian -birth. She may pervert them; she cannot create -them.</p> - -<p>Treitschke’s views were, of course, shared by many -of his contemporaries. The Seminars of the German -Universities were the arsenals that forged the -intellectual weapons of the Prussian hegemony. -Niebuhr, Ranke, Mommsen, Sybel, Häusser, Droysen, -Gneist—all ministered to that ascendency, -and they all have this in common—that they are -merciless to the claims of the small States whose<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_59">59</a></span> -existence seemed to present an obstacle to Prussian -aims. They are also united in common hatred of -France, for they feared not only the adventures of -Napoleon the Third but the leveling doctrines of -the French Revolution. Burke’s <cite>Letters on a Regicide -Peace</cite> are not more violent against France than -the writings of Sybel, Mommsen, and Treitschke. -What, however, distinguishes Treitschke from his intellectual -confrères is his thoroughness. They made -reservations which he scorned to make. Sybel, for -example, is often apologetic when he comes to the -more questionable episodes in Prussian policy—the -partition of Poland, the affairs of the duchies, -the Treaty of Bâle, the diplomacy of 1870; Treitschke -is disturbed by no such qualms. Bismarck -who practised a certain economy in giving Sybel access -to official documents for his semi-official history -of Prussian policy, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Die Begründung des deutschen -Reichs</cite>, had much greater confidence in Treitschke -and told him he felt sure he would not be disturbed -to find that “our political linen is not as white as -it might be.” So, too, while others like Mommsen -refused to go the whole way with Bismarck in domestic -policy, and clung to their early Radicalism, -Treitschke had no compunction about absolutism. -He ended, indeed, by becoming the champion of the -Junkers, and his history is a kind of hagiography -of the Hohenzollerns. “Be governmental” was his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_60">60</a></span> -succinct maxim, and he rested his hopes for Germany -on the bureaucracy and the army. Indeed, if -he had had his way, he would have substituted a -unity state for the federal system of the German -Empire, and would have liked to see all Germany an -enlarged Prussia—“ein erweitertes Preussen”—a -view which is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his -attacks on France as being “politically in a state of -perpetual nonage,” and on the French Government -as hostile to all forms of provincial autonomy.</p> - -<p>By a quite natural transition he was led on from -his championship of the unity of Germany to a conception -of her rôle as a world-power. He is the true -father of Weltpolitik. Much of what he writes on -this head is legitimate enough. Like Hohenlohe and -Bismarck he felt the humiliation of Germany’s weakness -in the councils of Europe. Writing in 1863 -he complains:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>One thing we still lack—the State. Our people is -the only one which has no common legislation, which can -send no representatives to the Concert of Europe. No -salute greets the German flag in a foreign port. Our -Fatherland sails the high seas without colors like a pirate.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Germany, he declared, must become “a power -across the sea.” This conclusion, coupled with bitter -recollections of the part played by England in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_61">61</a></span> -affair of the Duchies, no doubt accounted for his -growing dislike of England.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>Among the English the love of money has killed every -sentiment of honor and every distinction between what -is just and unjust. They hide their poltroonery and -their materialism behind grand phrases of unctuous -theology. When one sees the English press raising its -eyes to heaven, frightened by the audacity of these faithless -peoples in arms upon the Continent, one might imagine -one heard a venerable parson droning away. As -if the Almighty God, in Whose name Cromwell’s Ironsides -fought their battles, commanded us Germans to -allow our enemy to march undisturbed upon Berlin. -Oh, what hypocrisy! Oh, cant, cant, cant!</p></blockquote> - -<p>Europe, he says elsewhere, should have put bounds -to the overweening ambition of Britain by bringing -to an end the crushing domination of the English -Fleet at Gibraltar, at Malta, and at Corfu, and by -“restoring the Mediterranean to the Mediterranean -peoples.” Thus did he sow the seeds of German -maritime ambition.</p> - -<p>If I were asked to select the most characteristic of -Treitschke’s works I should be inclined to choose -the vehement little pamphlet <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Was fordern wir von -Frankreich?</cite> in which he insisted on the annexation -of Alsace-Lorraine. It is at once the vindication of -Prussian policy, and, in the light of the last forty-four -years, its condemnation. Like Mommsen, who -wrote in much the same strain at the same time, he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_62">62</a></span> -insisted that the people of the conquered provinces -must be “forced to be free,” that Morality and History -(which for him are much the same thing) -proclaim they are German without knowing it.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>We Germans, who know Germany and France, know -better what is good for Alsace than the unhappy people -themselves, who through their French associations have -lived in ignorance of the new Germany. We will give -them back their own identity against their will. We -have in the enormous changes of these times too often -seen in glad astonishment the immortal working of the -moral forces of History (“das unsterbliche Fortwirken -der sittlichen Mächte der Geschichte”) to be able to believe -in the unconditional value of a plebiscite on this -matter. We invoke the men of the past against the -present.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The ruthless pedantry of this is characteristically -Prussian. It is easy to appeal to the past against -the present, to the dead against the living. Dead -men tell no tales. It was, he admitted, true that the -Alsatians did not love the Germans. These “misguided -people” betrayed “that fatal impulse of Germans” -to cleave to other nations than their own. -“Well may we Germans be horrified,” he adds, -“when to-day we see these German people rail in -German speech like wild beasts against their own -flesh and blood as ‘German curs’ (‘deutschen -Hunde’) and ‘stink-Prussians’ (‘Stinkpreussen’).” -Treitschke was too honest to deny it. There was, he<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_63">63</a></span> -ruefully admitted, something rather unlovely about -the “civilizing” methods of Prussia. “Prussia has -perhaps not always been guided by genial men.” -But, he argued, Prussia united under the new Empire -to the rest of Germany would become humanized -and would in turn humanize the new subject-peoples. -Well, the forty-four years that have elapsed since -Treitschke wrote have refuted him. Instead of a -Germanized Prussia, we see a Prussianized Germany. -Her “geniality” is the geniality of Zabern. -The Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians are still contumacious. -Treitschke appealed to History and History -has answered him.</p> - -<p>Had he never any misgivings? Yes. After -twenty-five years, and within a month of his death, -this Hebrew prophet looking round in the year of -grace 1895 on the “culture” of modern Germany -was filled with apprehension. On the twenty-fifth -anniversary of Sedan he delivered an address in the -University of Berlin which struck his fond disciples -dumb. The Empire, he declared, had disarmed her -enemies neither without nor within.</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>In every direction our manners have deteriorated. -The respect which Goethe declared to be the true end of -all moral education disappears in the new generation -with a giddy rapidity: respect of God, respect for the -limits which nature and society have placed between the -two sexes; respect for the Fatherland, which is every<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_64">64</a></span> -day disappearing before the will-of-the-wisp of an indulgent -humanity. The more culture extends, the more -insipid it becomes; men despise the profundity of the -ancient world and consider only that which subserves -their immediate end.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The things of the mind, he cried, had lost their -hold on the German people. Every one was eager -to get rich and to relieve the monotony of a vain existence -by the cult of idle and meretricious pleasures. -The signs of the times were everywhere dark -and gloomy. The new Emperor (William the Second), -he had already hinted, was a dangerous charlatan.</p> - -<p>The wheel had come full circle. Fustel de -Coulanges was justified of his prophecy. And the -handwriting on the walls of Destiny was never more -legible than now.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_65">65</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_65">CONCLUSION</h2> -</div> - -<p>The contemplation of History, so a great master of -the art has told us, may not make men wise but it is -sure to make them sad. The austere Muse has never -had a sadder page to show than that which is even -now being added to her record. We see now the -full fruition of the German doctrine of the beatitude -of War. In sorrow and in anguish, in anguish and -in darkness, Belgium is weeping for her children -and will not be comforted because they are not. The -invader has spared neither age nor sex, neither rank -nor function, and every insult that malice could invent, -or insolence inspire, has been heaped upon -her bowed head. The hearths are cold, the altars -desecrated, the fields untilled, the granaries empty. -The peasant watches the heavens but he may not -sow, he has regarded his fields but he might not reap. -The very stones in her cities cry out; hardly one of -them is left upon another. No nation had ever given -Europe more blithe and winning pledges of her devotion -to the arts of peace. The Flemish school of -painters had endowed the world with portraits of a -grave tenderness which posterity might always admire -but could never imitate. The chisels of her<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_66">66</a></span> -medieval craftsmen had left us a legacy of buoyant -fancy in stone whose characters were alive for us -with the animation of the Canterbury Tales. All -this the invader has stamped out like the plague. A -once busy and thriving community begs its bread in -alien lands. Never since the captivity of Babylon -has there been so tragic an expatriation. Yet noble -in her sorrow and exalted in her anguish, Belgium, -like some patient caryatid, still supports the broken -architrave of the violated Treaty. Her little army -is still unconquered, her spirit is never crushed. She -will arise purified by her sorrow and ennobled by -her suffering, and generations yet unborn shall rise -up to call her blessed.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_67">67</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>THE WAR BOOK OF THE<br /> - -GERMAN GENERAL STAFF</h2> -</div> - -<div class="main"> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_67">INTRODUCTION</h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_1">What is a -State of War.</div> - -<p>The armies of belligerent States on the outbreak of -hostilities, or indeed the moment war is declared, -enter into a certain relation with one another which -is known by the name of “A State of War.” This -relationship, which at the beginning only concerns -the members of the two armies, is extended, the moment -the frontier is crossed, to all inhabitants of -the enemy’s State, so far as its territory is occupied; -indeed it extends itself ultimately to both the movable -and immovable property of the State and its -citizens.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_2">Active -Persons and -Passive.</div> - -<p>A distinction is drawn between an “active” and a -“passive” state of war. By the first is to be understood -the relation to one another of the actual fighting -organs of the two belligerents, that is to say, of -the persons forming the army, besides that of the -representative heads of the State and of the leaders. -By the second term, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, the “passive” state -of war, on the other hand, is to be understood the -relationship of the hostile army to those inhabitants -of the State, who share in the actual conduct of war -only in consequence of their natural association with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_68">68</a></span> -the army of their own State, and who on that account -are only to be regarded as enemies in a passive -sense. As occupying an intermediate position, one -has often to take into account a number of persons -who while belonging to the army do not actually participate -in the conduct of hostilities but continue in -the field to pursue what is to some extent a peaceful -occupation, such as Army Chaplains, Doctors, Medical -Officers of Health, Hospital Nurses, Voluntary -Nurses, and other Officials, Sutlers, Contractors, -Newspaper Correspondents and the like.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_3">That War is -no Respecter -of Persons.</div> - -<p>Now although according to the modern conception -of war, it is primarily concerned with the persons -belonging to the opposing armies, yet no citizen or -inhabitant of a State occupied by a hostile army can -altogether escape the burdens, restrictions, sacrifices, -and inconveniences which are the natural consequence -of a State of War. A war conducted with energy -cannot be directed merely against the combatants of -the Enemy State and the positions they occupy, but -it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the -total intellectual<a id="FNanchor_38" href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> and material resources of the latter.<a id="FNanchor_39" href="#Footnote_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> -Humanitarian claims such as the protection<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_69">69</a></span> -of men and their goods can only be taken into consideration -in so far as the nature and object of the -war permit.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_4">The Usages -of War.</div> - -<p>Consequently the “argument of war” permits -every belligerent State to have recourse to all means -which enable it to attain the object of the war; still, -practise has taught the advisability of allowing in -one’s own interest the introduction of a limitation -in the use of certain methods of war and a total renunciation -of the use of others. Chivalrous feelings, -Christian thought, higher civilization and, by -no means least of all, the recognition of one’s own -advantage, have led to a voluntary and self-imposed -limitation, the necessity of which is to-day tacitly -recognized by all States and their armies. They -have led in the course of time, in the simple transmission -of knightly usage in the passages of arms, -to a series of agreements, hallowed by tradition, and -we are accustomed to sum these up in the words -“usage of war” (Kriegsbrauch), “custom of war” -(Kriegssitte), “or fashion of war” (Kriegsmanier). -Customs of this kind have always existed, even in the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_70">70</a></span> -times of antiquity; they differed according to the -civilization of the different nations and their public -economy, they were not always identical, even in one -and the same conflict, and they have in the course -of time often changed; they are older than any scientific -law of war, they have come down to us unwritten, -and moreover they maintain themselves in -full vitality; they have therefore won an assured -position in standing armies according as these latter -have been introduced into the systems of almost -every European State.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_5">Of the -futility of -Written -Agreements -as Scraps of -Paper.</div> - -<p>The fact that such limitations of the unrestricted -and reckless application of all the available means -for the conduct of war, and thereby the humanization -of the customary methods of pursuing war really -exist, and are actually observed by the armies of all -civilized States, has in the course of the nineteenth -century often led to attempts to develop, to extend, -and thus to make universally binding these preexisting -usages of war; to elevate them to the level -of laws binding nations and armies, in other words to -create a <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">codex belli</i>; a law of war. All these attempts -have hitherto, with some few exceptions to be mentioned -later, completely failed. If, therefore, in the -following work the expression “the law of war” is -used, it must be understood that by it is meant not a -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">lex scripta</i> introduced by international agreements; -but only a reciprocity of mutual agreement; a limitation<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_71">71</a></span> -of arbitrary behavior, which custom and conventionality, -human friendliness and a calculating -egotism have erected, but for the observance of which -there exists no express sanction, but only “the fear -of reprisals” decides.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_6">The “flabby -emotion” of -Human­itar­ian­ism.</div> - -<p>Consequently the usage of war is even now the only -means of regulating the relations of belligerent States -to one another. But with the idea of the usages of -war will always be bound up the character of something -transitory, inconstant, something dependent -on factors outside the army. Nowadays it is not -only the army which influences the spirit of the customs -of war and assures recognition of its unwritten -laws. Since the almost universal introduction of -conscription, the peoples themselves exercise a profound -influence upon this spirit. In the modern -usages of war one can no longer regard merely the -traditional inheritance of the ancient etiquette of -the profession of arms, and the professional outlook -accompanying it, but there is also the deposit of the -currents of thought which agitate our time. But -since the tendency of thought of the last century was -dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations -which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality -and flabby emotion (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Sentimentalität und -weichlicher Gefühlsschwärmerei</i>) there have not been -wanting attempts to influence the development of -the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_72">72</a></span> -contradiction with the nature of war and its object. -Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in -the future, the more so as these agitations have found -a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the -Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_7">Cruelty is -often “the -truest humanity.”</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_8">The perfect -Officer.</div> - -<p>Moreover the officer is a child of his time. He is -subject to the intellectual<a id="FNanchor_40" href="#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> tendencies which influence -his own nation; the more educated he is the -more will this be the case. The danger that, in this -way, he will arrive at false views about the essential -character of war must not be lost sight of. The danger -can only be met by a thorough study of war itself. -By steeping himself in military history an -officer will be able to guard himself against excessive -humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain -severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that -the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless -application of them. It will also teach him how the -rules of belligerent intercourse in war have developed, -how in the course of time they have solidified -into general usages of war, and finally it will teach -him whether the governing usages of war are justified -or not, whether they are to be modified or -whether they are to be observed. But for a study<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_73">73</a></span> -of military history in this light, knowledge of the -fundamental conceptions of modern international -and military movements is certainly necessary. To -present this is the main purpose of the following -work.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_75">75</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>PART I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO THE HOSTILE ARMY</span></h2> -</div> - -<hr /> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_75">CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">WHO BELONGS TO THE HOSTILE ARMY?</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_9">Who are -Combatants -and who are -not.</div> - -<p>Since the subjects of enemy States have quite different -rights and duties according as they occupy an -active or a passive position, the question arises: Who -is to be recognized as occupying the active position, or -what amounts to the same thing—Who belongs to -the hostile army? This is a question of particular -importance.</p> - -<p>According to the universal usages of war, the following -are to be regarded as occupying an active -position:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. The heads of the enemy’s state and its ministers, -even though they possess no military rank.</p> - -<p>2. The regular army, and it is a matter of indifference -whether the army is recruited voluntarily or -by conscription; whether the army consists of -subjects or aliens (mercenaries); whether it is -brought together out of elements which were -already in the service in time of peace, or out of -such as are enrolled at the moment of mobilization<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_76">76</a></span> -(militia, reserve, national guard and Landsturm).</p> - -<p>3. Subject to certain assumptions, irregular combatants, -also, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, such as are not constituent -parts of the regular army, but have only taken -up arms for the length of the war, or, indeed, -for a particular task of the war.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_10">The Irregular.</div> - -<p>Only the third class of persons need be more -closely considered. In their case the question how -far the rights of an active position are to be conceded -to them has at all times been matter of controversy, -and the treatment of irregular troops has -in consequence varied considerably. Generally -speaking the study of military history leads to the -conclusion that the Commanding Officers of regular -armies were always inclined to regard irregular -troops of the enemy with distrust, and to apply to -them the contemporary laws of war with peculiar -severity. This unfavorable prejudice is based on -the ground that the want of a military education and -of stern discipline among irregular troops, easily -leads to transgressions and to non-observance of the -usages of war, and that the minor skirmishes which -they prefer to indulge in, and which by their very -nature lead to individual enterprise, open the door -to irregularity and savagery, and easily deteriorate -into robbery and unauthorized violence, so that in -every case the general insecurity which it develops<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_77">77</a></span> -engenders bitterness, fury, and revengeful feelings -in the harassed troops, and leads to cruel reprisals. -Let any one read the combats of the French troops -in the Spanish Peninsula in the years 1808 to 1814, -in Tyrol in 1809, in Germany in 1813, and also -those of the English in their different Colonial wars, -or again the Carlist Wars, the Russo-Turkish War, -and the Franco-Prussian War,<a id="FNanchor_41" href="#Footnote_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> and one will everywhere -find this experience confirmed.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_11">Each State -must decide -for itself.</div> - -<p>If these points of view are on the whole decisive -against the employment of irregular troops, yet on -the other hand, it must be left to each particular -State to determine how far it will disregard such -considerations; from the point of view of international -law no State is compelled to limit the instruments -of its military operations to the standing -army. It is, on the contrary, completely justified -in drawing upon all the inhabitants capable of bearing -arms, entirely according to its discretion, and in -imparting to them an authorization to participate in -the war.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_12">The necessity -of Authorization.</div> - -<p>This public authorization has therefore been until -quite recently regarded as the presumed necessary -condition of any recognition of combatant rights.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_13">Exceptions -which prove -the rule.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_14">The Free Lance.</div> - -<p>Of course there are numerous examples in military -history in which irregular combatants have been<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_78">78</a></span> -recognized as combatants by the enemy, without any -public authorization of the kind; thus in the latest -wars of North America, Switzerland, and Italy, and -also in the case of the campaign (without any kind -of commission from a State) of Garibaldi against -Naples and Sicily in the year 1860. But in all these -cases the tacitly conceded recognition originated not -out of any obligatory principles of international law -or of military usage, but simply and solely out of -the fear of reprisals. The power to prevent the entrance -on the scene of these irregular partizans did -not exist, and it was feared that by not recognizing -their quality as combatants the war a cruel character -might be given, and consequently that more harm -than good might result to the parties themselves. -On the other hand there has always been a universal -consensus of opinion against recognizing irregulars -who make their appearance individually or in small -bands, and who conduct war in some measure on -their own account (auf eigene Faust) detached -from the army, and such opinion approves of the punishment -of these offenders with death.</p> - -<p>This legal attitude which denies every unauthorized -rising and identifies it with brigandage was -taken up by the revolutionary armies of France towards -the insurrection in La Vendée, and again by -Napoleon in his proceedings against Schill and -Dörnberg in the year 1809, and again by Wellington,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_79">79</a></span> -Schwarzenberg, and Blücher, in the Proclamations -issued by them in France in the year 1814, -and the German Army adopted the same standpoint -in the year 1870–71, when it demanded that: -“Every prisoner who wishes to be treated as a prisoner -of war must produce a certificate as to his character -as a French soldier, issued by the legal authorities, -and addressed to him personally, to the effect -that he has been called to the Colors and is borne on -the Roll of a corps organized on a military footing -by the French Government.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_15">Modern -views.</div> - -<p>In the controversies which have arisen since the -war of 1870–71 over the different questions of international -law and the laws of war, decisive emphasis -has no longer been placed upon the question of public -authorization, and it has been proposed, on -grounds of expediency, to recognize as combatants -such irregulars as are indeed without an express -and immediate public authorization, but who are -organized in military fashion and are under a responsible -leader. The view here taken was that by -a recognition of these kind of irregular troops the -dangers and horrors of war would be diminished, -and that a substitute for the legal authorization lacking -in the case of individuals offers itself in the military -organization and in the existence of a leader -responsible to his own State.</p> - -<p>Moreover the Brussels Declaration of August 27,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_80">80</a></span> -1874, and in consonance with it the <cite>Manual of the -Institute of International Law</cite>, desire as the first -condition of recognition as combatants “that they -have at their head a personality who is responsible -for the behavior of those under him to his own Government.”<a id="FNanchor_42" href="#Footnote_42" class="fnanchor">42</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_16">The German -Military -View.</div> - -<p>Considered from the military point of view there -is not much objection to the omission of the demand -for public authorization, so soon as it becomes a -question of organized detachments of troops, but in -the case of hostile individuals who appear on the -scene we shall none the less be unable to dispense -with the certificate of membership of an organized -band, if such individuals are to be regarded and -treated as lawful belligerents.</p> - -<p>But the organization of irregulars in military -bands and their subjection to a responsible leader -are not by themselves sufficient to enable one to -grant them the status of belligerents; even more important -than these is the necessity of being able to -recognize them as such and of their carrying their -arms openly. The soldier must know who he has -against him as an active opponent, he must be protected -against treacherous killing and against any -military operation which is prohibited by the usages -of war among regular armies. The chivalrous idea -which rules in the regular armies of all civilized<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_81">81</a></span> -States always seeks an open profession of one’s belligerent -character. The demand must, therefore, be -insisted on that irregular troops, although not in -uniform, shall at least be distinguishable by visible -signs which are recognizable at a distance.<a id="FNanchor_43" href="#Footnote_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> Only -by such means can the occurrence of misuse in the -practise of war on the one side, and the tragic consequences -of the non-recognition of combatant status -on the other, be made impossible. The Brussels -Declarations also therefore recommend, in Art. 9 -(2 and 3), that they, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, the irregular troops, should -wear a fixed sign which is visible from a distance, -and that they should carry their weapons openly. -The Hague Convention adds to these three conditions -yet a fourth, “That they observe the laws and usages -of war in their military operations.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_17">The Levée -en masse.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_18">The Hague -Regulations -will not do.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_19">A short way -with the -Defender of -his Country.</div> - -<p>This condition must also be maintained if it becomes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_82">82</a></span> -a question of the <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">levée en masse</i>, the arming -of the whole population of the country, province, or -district; in other words the so-called people’s war -or national war.<a id="FNanchor_44" href="#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Starting from the view that one -can never deny to the population of a country the -natural right of defense of one’s fatherland, and -that the smaller and consequently less powerful -States can only find protection in such <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">levées en -masse</i>, the majority of authorities on International -law have, in their proposals for codification, sought -to attain the recognition on principle of the combatant -status of all these kinds of people’s champions, -and in the Brussels declaration and the Hague Regulations -the aforesaid condition<a id="FNanchor_45" href="#Footnote_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> is omitted. As -against this one may nevertheless remark that the -condition requiring a military organization and a -clearly recognizable mark of being attached to the -enemy’s troops, is not synonymous with a denial of -the natural right of defense of one’s country. It is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_83">83</a></span> -therefore not a question of restraining the population -from seizing arms but only of compelling it to -do this in an organized manner. Subjection to a -responsible leader, a military organization, and clear -recognizability cannot be left out of account unless -the whole recognized foundation for the admission -of irregulars is going to be given up altogether, and -a conflict of one private individual against another -is to be introduced again, with all its attendant horrors, -of which, for example, the proceedings in -Bazeilles in the last Franco-Prussian War afford an -instance. If the necessary organization does not -really become established—a case which is by no -means likely to occur often—then nothing remains -but a conflict of individuals, and those who conduct -it cannot claim the rights of an active military status. -The disadvantages and severities inherent in such a -state of affairs are more insignificant and less inhuman -than those which would result from recognition.<a id="FNanchor_46" href="#Footnote_46" class="fnanchor">46</a></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_84">84</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_84">CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE MEANS OF CONDUCTING WAR</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_20">Violence and -Cunning.</div> - -<p>By the means of conducting war is to be understood -all those measures which can be taken by one State -against the other in order to attain the object of the -war, to compel one’s opponent to submit to one’s will; -they may be summarized in the two ideas of Violence -and Cunning, and judgment as to their applicability -may be embodied in the following proposition:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>What is permissible includes every means of -war without which the object of the war cannot be -obtained; what is reprehensible on the other hand -includes every act of violence and destruction -which is not demanded by the object of war.</p></blockquote> - -<p>It follows from these universally valid principles -that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and -arbitrary judgment of the Commanding Officer; the -precepts of civilization, freedom and honor, the traditions -prevalent in the army, and the general usages -of war, will have to guide his decisions.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_85">85</a></span></p> - -<h3 id="h_85">A.—MEANS OF WAR DEPENDING ON FORCE</h3> - -<p>The most important instruments of war in the possession -of the enemy are his army, and his military -positions; to make an end of them is the first object -of war. This can happen:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. By the annihilation, slaughter, or wounding of the -individual combatants.</p> - -<p>2. By making prisoners of the same.</p> - -<p>3. By siege and bombardment.</p></blockquote> - -<p class="p1 in0">1. <i>Annihilation, slaughter, and wounding of the hostile -combatants</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_21">How to -make an end -of the -Enemy.</div> - -<p>In the matter of making an end of the enemy’s -forces by violence it is an incontestable and self-evident -rule that the right of killing and annihilation -in regard to the hostile combatants is inherent -in the war power and its organs, that all means which -modern inventions afford, including the fullest, most -dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, -may be utilized; these last, just because they attain -the object of war as quickly as possible, are on that -account to be regarded as indispensable and, when -closely considered, the most human.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_22">The Rules of -the Game.</div> - -<p>As a supplement to this rule, the usages of war -recognize the desirability of not employing severer -forms of violence if and when the object of the war -may be attained by milder means, and furthermore<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_86">86</a></span> -that certain means of war which lead to unnecessary -suffering are to be excluded. To such belong:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>The use of poison both individually and collectively -(such as poisoning of streams and food supplies<a id="FNanchor_47" href="#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">47</a>) the -propagation of infectious diseases.</p> - -<p>Assassination, proscription, and outlawry of an opponent.<a id="FNanchor_48" href="#Footnote_48" class="fnanchor">48</a></p> - -<p>The use of arms which cause useless suffering, such as -soft-nosed bullets, glass, etc.</p> - -<p>The killing of wounded or prisoners who are no longer -capable of offering resistance.<a id="FNanchor_49" href="#Footnote_49" class="fnanchor">49</a></p> - -<p>The refusal of quarter to soldiers who have laid down -their arms and allowed themselves to be captured.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The progress of modern invention has made superfluous -the express prohibition of certain old-fashioned -but formerly legitimate instruments of war (chain -shot, red-hot shot, pitch balls, etc.), since others, -more effective, have been substituted for these; on the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_87">87</a></span> -other hand the use of projectiles of less than 400 -grammes in weight is prohibited by the St. Petersburg -Convention of December 11th, 1868. (This -only in the case of musketry.<a id="FNanchor_50" href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">50</a>)</p> - -<p>He who offends against any of these prohibitions is -to be held responsible therefore by the State. If he -is captured he is subject to the penalties of military -law.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_23">Colored -Troops are -“Blacklegs.”</div> - -<p>Closely connected with the unlawful instruments -of war is the employment of uncivilized and barbarous -peoples in European wars. Looked at from the -point of view of law it can, of course, not be forbidden -to any State to call up armed forces from its -extra-European colonies, but the practise stands in -express contradiction to the modern movement for -humanizing the conduct of war and for alleviating -its attendant sufferings, if men and troops are employed -in war, who are without the knowledge of -civilized warfare and by whom, therefore, the very -cruelties and inhumanities forbidden by the usages -of war are committed. The employment of these -kinds of troops is therefore to be compared with the -use of the instruments of war already described as<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_88">88</a></span> -forbidden. The transplantation of African and -Mohammedan Turcos to a European seat of war in -the year 1870 was, therefore, undoubtedly to be regarded -as a retrogression from civilized to barbarous -warfare, since these troops had and could have no -conception of European-Christian culture, or respect -for property and for the honor of women, etc.<a id="FNanchor_51" href="#Footnote_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></p> - -<p class="p1 in0">2. <i>Capture of Enemy Combatants</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_24">Prisoners of -War.</div> - -<p>If individual members or parties of the army fall -into the power of the enemy’s forces, either through -their being disarmed and defenseless, or through -their being obliged to cease from hostilities in consequence -of a formal capitulation, they are then in -the position of “prisoners of war,” and thereby in -some measure exchange an active for a passive position.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_89">89</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_25">Vae -Victis!</div> - -<p>According to the older doctrine of international -law all persons belonging to the hostile State, whether -combatants or non-combatants, who happen to fall -into the hands of their opponent, are in the position -of prisoners of war. He could deal with them according -to his pleasure, ill-treat them, kill them, lead -them away into bondage, or sell them into slavery. -History knows but few exceptions to this rule, these -being the result of particular treaties. In the Middle -Ages the Church tried to intervene as mediator -in order to ameliorate the lot of the prisoners, but -without success. Only the prospect of ransom, and -chivalrous ideas in the case of individuals, availed to -give any greater protection. It is to be borne in -mind that the prisoners belonged to him who had -captured them, a conception which began to disappear -after the Thirty Years’ War. The treatment of -prisoners of war was mostly harsh and inhuman; -still, in the seventeenth century, it was usual to -secure their lot by a treaty on the outbreak of a war.</p> - -<p>The credit of having opened the way to another -conception of war captivity belongs to Frederick the -Great and Franklin, inasmuch as they inserted in -the famous Treaty of friendship, concluded in 1785 -between Prussia and North America, entirely new -regulations as to the treatment of prisoners of war.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_26">The Modern -View.</div> - -<p>The complete change in the conception of war introduced -in recent times has in consequence changed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_90">90</a></span> -all earlier ideas as to the position and treatment of -prisoners of war. Starting from the principle that -only States and not private persons are in the position -of enemies in time of war, and that an enemy -who is disarmed and taken prisoner is no longer an -object of attack, the doctrine of war captivity is entirely -altered and the position of prisoners has become -assimilated to that of the wounded and the -sick.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_27">Prisoners of -War are to -be honorably -treated.</div> - -<p>The present position of international law and the -law of war on the subject of prisoners of war is -based on the fundamental conception that they are -the captives not of private individuals, that is to -say of Commanders, Soldiers, or Detachments of -Troops, but that they are the captives of the State. -But the State regards them as persons who have -simply done their duty and obeyed the commands -of their superiors, and in consequence views their -captivity not as penal but merely as precautionary.</p> - -<p>It therefore follows that the object of war captivity -is simply to prevent the captives from taking -any further part in the war, and that the State can, -in fact, do everything which appears necessary for -securing the captives, but nothing beyond that. The -captives have therefore to submit to all those restrictions -and inconveniences which the purpose of securing -them necessitates; they can collectively be -involved in a common suffering if some individuals<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_91">91</a></span> -among them have provoked sterner treatment; but, -on the other hand, they are protected against unjustifiable -severities, ill-treatment, and unworthy -handling; they do, indeed, lose their freedom, but -not their rights; war captivity is, in other words, no -longer an act of grace on the part of the victor but -a right of the defenseless.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_28">Who may be -made Prisoners.</div> - -<p>According to the notions of the laws of war to-day -the following persons are to be treated as prisoners -of war:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. The Sovereign, together with those members of his -family who were capable of bearing arms, the -chief of the enemy’s State, generally speaking, -and the Ministers who conduct its policy even -though they are not among the individuals belonging -to the active army.<a id="FNanchor_52" href="#Footnote_52" class="fnanchor">52</a></p> - -<p>2. All persons belonging to the armed forces.</p> - -<p>3. All Diplomatists and Civil Servants attached to -the army.</p> - -<p>4. All civilians staying with the army, with the approval -of its Commanders, such as transport, -sutlers, contractors, newspaper correspondents, -and the like.</p> - -<p>5. All persons actively concerned with the war such as -Higher Officials, Diplomatists, Couriers, and the -like, as also all those persons whose freedom can -be a danger to the army of the other State, for<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_92">92</a></span> -example, Journalists of hostile opinions, prominent -and influential leaders of Parties, Clergy -who excite the people, and such like.<a id="FNanchor_53" href="#Footnote_53" class="fnanchor">53</a></p> - -<p>6. The mass of the population of a province or a district -if they rise in defense of their country.</p></blockquote> - -<p>The points of view regarding the treatment of -prisoners of war may be summarized in the following -rules:</p> - -<p>Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the -State which has captured them.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_29">The treatment -of Prisoners -of War.</div> - -<p>The relation of the prisoners of war to their own -former superiors ceases during their captivity; a captured -officer’s servant steps into the position of a private -servant. Captured officers are never the superiors -of soldiers of the State which has captured -them; on the contrary, they are under the orders -of such of the latter as are entrusted with their -custody.</p> - -<p>The prisoners of war have, in the places in which -they are quartered, to submit to such restrictions of -their liberty as are necessary for their safe keeping. -They have strictly to comply with the obligation imposed -upon them, not to move beyond a certain indicated -boundary.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_30">Their confinement.</div> - -<p>These measures for their safe keeping are not to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_93">93</a></span> -be exceeded; in particular, penal confinement, fetters, -and unnecessary restrictions of freedom are -only to be resorted to if particular reasons exist to -justify or necessitate them.</p> - -<p>The concentration camps in which prisoners of -war are quartered must be as healthy, clean, and decent -as possible; they should not be prisons or convict -establishments.</p> - -<p>It is true that the French captives were transported -by the Russians to Siberia as malefactors in -the years 1812 and 1813. This was a measure -which was not illegitimate according to the older -practise of war, but it is no longer in accordance -with the legal conscience of to-day. Similarly the -methods which were adopted during the Civil War -in North America in a prison in the Southern States, -against prisoners of war of the Union Forces, whereby -the men were kept without air and nourishment and -thus badly treated, were also against the practise of -the law of war.</p> - -<p>Freedom of movement within these concentration -camps or within the whole locality may be permitted -if there are no special reasons against it. But obviously -prisoners of war are subject to the existing, -or to the appointed rules of the establishment or -garrison.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_31">The Prisoner -and his -Taskmaster.</div> - -<p>Prisoners of war can be put to moderate work proportionate -to their position in life; work is a safeguard<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_94">94</a></span> -against excesses. Also on grounds of health -this is desirable. But these tasks should not be -prejudicial to health nor in any way dishonorable or -such as contribute directly or indirectly to the military -operations against the Fatherland of the captives. -Work for the State is, according to the -Hague regulations, to be paid at the rates payable to -members of the army of the State itself.</p> - -<p>Should the work be done on account of other public -authorities or of private persons, then the conditions -will be fixed by agreement with the military authorities. -The wages of the prisoners of war must -be expended in the improvement of their condition, -and anything that remains should be paid over to -them after deducting the cost of their maintenance -when they are set free. Voluntary work in order -to earn extra wages is to be allowed, if there are no -particular reasons against it.<a id="FNanchor_54" href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Insurrection, insubordination, -misuse of the freedom granted, will of -course justify severer confinement in each case, also -punishment, and so will crimes and misdemeanors.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_32">Flight.</div> - -<p>Attempts at escape on the part of individuals who -have not pledged their word of honor might be regarded<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_95">95</a></span> -as the expression of a natural impulse for -liberty, and not as a crime. They are therefore to -be punished by restriction of the privileges granted -and a sharper supervision but not with death. But -the latter punishment will follow of course in the -case of plots to escape, if only because of the danger -of them. In case of a breach of a man’s parole the -punishment of death may reasonably be incurred. -In some circumstances, if necessity and the behavior -of the prisoners compel it, one is justified in taking -measures the effect of which is to involve the innocent -with the guilty.<a id="FNanchor_55" href="#Footnote_55" class="fnanchor">55</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_33">Diet.</div> - -<p>The food of the prisoners must be sufficient and -suitable to their rank, yet they will have to be content -with the customary food of the country; luxuries -which the prisoners wish to get at their own -expense are to be permitted if reasons of discipline -do not forbid.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_34">Letters.</div> - -<p>Correspondence with one’s home is to be permitted, -likewise visits and intercourse, but these of course -must be watched.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_35">Personal -belongings.</div> - -<p>The prisoners of war remain in possession of their -private property with the exception of arms, horses,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_96">96</a></span> -and documents of a military purport. If for definite -reasons any objects are taken away from them, -then these must be kept in suitable places and restored -to them at the end of their captivity.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_36">The Information -Bureau.</div> - -<p>Article 14 of the Hague Regulations prescribes -that on the outbreak of hostilities there shall be established -in each of the belligerent States and in a -given case in neutral States, which have received -into their territory any of the combatants, an -information bureau for prisoners of war. Its duty -will be to answer all inquiries concerning such prisoners -and to receive the necessary particulars from -the services concerned in order to be able to keep a -personal entry for every prisoner. The information -bureau must always be kept well posted about everything -which concerns a prisoner of war. Also this -information bureau must collect and assign to the -legitimate persons all personal objects, valuables, letters, -and the like, which are found on the field of -battle or have been left behind by dead prisoners -of war in hospitals or field-hospitals. The information -bureau enjoys freedom from postage, as do generally -all postal despatches sent to or by prisoners -of war. Charitable gifts for prisoners of war must -be free of customs duty and also of freight charges -on the public railways.</p> - -<p>The prisoners of war have, in the event of their -being wounded or sick, a claim to medical assistance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_97">97</a></span> -and care as understood by the Geneva Convention -and, so far as is possible, to spiritual ministrations -also.</p> - -<p>These rules may be shortly summarized as follows:</p> - -<p>Prisoners of war are subject to the laws of the -country in which they find themselves, particularly -the rules in force in the army of the local State; -they are to be treated like one’s own soldiers, neither -worse nor better.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_37">When Prisoners -may -be put to -Death.</div> - -<p>The following considerations hold good as regard -the imposition of a death penalty in the case of prisoners; -they can be put to death:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. In case they commit offenses or are guilty of practises -which are punishable by death by civil or -military laws.</p> - -<p>2. In case of insubordination, attempts at escape, etc., -deadly weapons can be employed.</p> - -<p>3. In case of overwhelming necessity, as reprisals, -either against similar measures, or against other -irregularities on the part of the management of -the enemy’s army.</p> - -<p>4. In case of overwhelming necessity, when other -means of precaution do not exist and the existence -of the prisoners becomes a danger to one’s -own existence.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_38">“Reprisals.”</div> - -<p>As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to -be remarked that these are objected to by numerous -teachers of international law on grounds of humanity.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_98">98</a></span> -To make this a matter of principle, and apply it to -every case exhibits, however, “a misconception due -to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings -of humanity, of the significance, the seriousness -and the right of war. It must not be overlooked -that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of -the State are the first consideration, and not regard -for the unconditional freedom of prisoners from -molestation.”<a id="FNanchor_56" href="#Footnote_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_39">One must -not be too -scrupulous.</div> - -<p>That prisoners should only be killed in the event -of extreme necessity, and that only the duty of self-preservation -and the security of one’s own State can -justify a proceeding of this kind is to-day universally -admitted. But that these considerations have not -always been decisive is proved by the shooting of -2,000 Arabs at Jaffa in 1799 by Napoleon; of the -prisoners in the rising of La Vendée; in the Carlist -War; in Mexico, and in the American War of Secession, -where it was generally a case of deliverance -from burdensome supervision and the difficulties of -maintenance; whereas peoples of a higher morality -such as the Boers in our own days, finding themselves -in a similar position, have preferred to let -their prisoners go. For the rest, calamities such as -might lead to the shooting of prisoners are scarcely -likely to happen under the excellent conditions of -transport in our own time and the correspondingly<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_99">99</a></span> -small difficulty of feeding them—in a European -campaign.<a id="FNanchor_57" href="#Footnote_57" class="fnanchor">57</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_40">The end of -Captivity.</div> - -<p>The captivity of war comes to an end:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. By force of circumstances which <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i> determine -it, for example, successful escape, cessation of -the war, or death.</p> - -<p>2. By becoming the subject of the enemy’s state.</p> - -<p>3. By release, whether conditional or unconditional, -unilateral or reciprocal.</p> - -<p>4. By exchange.</p></blockquote> - -<p>As to 1. With the cessation of the war every reason -for the captivity ceases, provided there exist no -special grounds for another view. It is on that account -that care should be taken to discharge prisoners -immediately. There remain only prisoners<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_100">100</a></span> -sentenced to punishment or awaiting trial, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, until -the expiation of their sentence or the end of their -trial as the case may be.</p> - -<p>As to 2. This pre-supposes the readiness of the -State to accept the prisoner as a subject.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_41">Parole.</div> - -<p>As to 3. A man released under certain conditions -has to fulfil them without question. If he does not -do this, and again falls into the hands of his enemy, -then he must expect to be dealt with by military law, -and indeed according to circumstances with the punishment -of death. A conditional release cannot be -imposed on the captive; still less is there any obligation -upon the state to discharge a prisoner on conditions—for -example, on his parole. The release depends -entirely on the discretion of the State, as does -also the determination of its limits and the persons -to whom it shall apply.</p> - -<p>The release of whole detachments on their parole -is not usual. It is rather to be regarded as an arrangement -with each particular individual.</p> - -<p>Arrangements of this kind, every one of which is -as a rule made a conditional discharge, must be very -precisely formulated and the wording of them most -carefully scrutinized. In particular it must be precisely -expressed whether the person released is only -bound no longer to fight directly with arms against -the State which releases him, in the present war, -whether he is justified in rendering services to his<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_101">101</a></span> -own country in other positions or in the colonies, etc., -or whether all and every kind of service is forbidden -him.</p> - -<p>The question whether the parole given by an officer -or a soldier is recognized as binding or not by -his own State depends on whether the legislation or -even the military instructions permit or forbid the -giving of one’s parole.<a id="FNanchor_58" href="#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> In the first case his own -State must not command him to do services the performance -of which he has pledged himself not to -undertake.<a id="FNanchor_59" href="#Footnote_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> But personally the man released on -parole is under all circumstances bound to observe -it. He destroys his honor if he breaks his word, -and is liable to punishment if recaptured, even -though he has been hindered by his own State from -keeping it.<a id="FNanchor_60" href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> According to the Hague Regulations a -Government can demand no services which are in -conflict with a man’s parole.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_102">102</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_42">Exchange of -Prisoners.</div> - -<p>As to 4. The exchange of prisoners in a single -case can take place between two belligerents without -its being necessary in every case to make circumstantial -agreements. As regards the scope of the exchange -and the forms in which it is to be completed -the Commanding Officers on both sides alone decide. -Usually the exchange is man for man, in which case -the different categories of military persons are taken -into account and certain ratios established as to what -constitutes equivalents.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_43">Removal of -Prisoners.</div> - -<p>Transport of Prisoners.—Since no Army makes -prisoners in order to let them escape again afterwards, -measures must be taken for their transport in order -to prevent attempts at escape. If one recalls that in -the year 1870–71, no fewer than 11,160 officers -and 333,885 men were brought from France to Germany, -and as a result many thousands often had to -be guarded by a proportionately small company, one -must admit that in such a position only the most -zealous energy and ruthless employment of all the -means at one’s disposal can avail, and although it is -opposed to military sentiment to use weapons against -the defenseless, none the less in such a case one has -no other choice. The captive who seeks to free himself -by flight does so at his peril and can complain<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_103">103</a></span> -of no violence which the custody of prisoners directs -in order to prevent behavior of that kind. Apart -from these apparently harsh measures against attempt -at escape, the transport authorities must do -everything they can to alleviate the lot of the sick -and wounded prisoners, in particular they are to -protect them against insults and ill-treatment from -an excited mob.</p> - -<p class="p1 in0">3. <i>Sieges and Bombardments</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_44">Fair Game.</div> - -<p>War is waged not merely with the hostile combatants -but also with the inanimate military resources -of the enemy. This includes not only the fortresses -but also every town and every village which is an -obstacle to military progress. All can be besieged -and bombarded, stormed and destroyed, if they are -defended by the enemy, and in some cases even if they -are only occupied. There has always been a divergence -of views, among Professors of International Law, -as to the means which are permissible for waging -war against these inanimate objects, and these views -have frequently been in strong conflict with those of -soldiers; it is therefore necessary to go into this -question more closely.</p> - -<p>We have to distinguish:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Fortresses, strong places, and fortified places.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Open towns, villages, buildings, and the like, -which, however, are occupied or used for military -purposes.</p></blockquote> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_104">104</a></span> -Fortresses and strong places are important centers -of defense, not merely in a military sense, but -also in a political and economic sense. They furnish -a principal resource to the enemy and can therefore -be bombarded just like the hostile army itself.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_45">Of making -the most of -one’s opportunity.</div> - -<p>A preliminary notification of bombardment is just -as little to be required as in the case of a sudden -assault. The claims to the contrary put forward by -some jurists are completely inconsistent with war -and must be repudiated by soldiers; the cases in -which a notification has been voluntarily given do -not prove its necessity. The besieger will have to -consider for himself the question whether the very -absence of notification may not be itself a factor of -success, by means of surprise, and indeed whether -notification will not mean a loss of precious time. -If there is no danger of this then humanity no doubt -demands such a notification.</p> - -<p>Since town and fortifications belong together and -form an inseparable unity, and can seldom in a military -sense, and never in an economic and political -sense, be separated, the bombardment will not limit -itself to the actual fortification, but it will and must -extend over the whole town; the reason for this lies -in the fact that a restriction of the bombardment -to the fortifications is impracticable; it would -jeopardize the success of the operation, and would<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_105">105</a></span> -quite unjustifiably protect the defenders who are -not necessarily quartered in the works.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_46">Spare the -Churches.</div> - -<p>But this does not preclude the exemption by the -besieger of certain sections and buildings of the fortress -or town from bombardment, such as churches, -schools, libraries, museums, and the like, so far as -this is possible.</p> - -<p>But of course it is assumed that buildings seeking -this protection will be distinguishable and that -they are not put to defensive uses. Should this happen, -then every humanitarian consideration must -give way. The utterances of French writers about the -bombardments of Strasburg Cathedral in the year -1870, are therefore quite without justification, since -it only happened after an observatory for officers of -artillery had been erected on the tower.</p> - -<p>The only exemption from bombardment recognized -by international law, through the medium of the -Geneva Convention, concerns hospitals and convalescent -establishments. Their extension is left to the -discretion of the besieger.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_47">A Bombardment -is no -Respecter of -Persons.</div> - -<p>As regards the civil population of a fortified place -the rule is: All the inhabitants, whether natives or -foreigners, whether permanent or temporary residents, -are to be treated alike.</p> - -<p>No exception need be made in regard to the diplomatists -of neutral States who happen to be in the -town; if before or during the investment by the besieger<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_106">106</a></span> -their attention is drawn to the fate to which -they expose themselves by remaining, and if days of -grace in which to leave are afforded them, that simply -rests on the courtesy of the besieger. No such duty -is incumbent upon him in international law. Also -permission to send out couriers with diplomatic despatches -depends entirely upon the discretion of the -besieger. In any case it will always depend on -whether the necessary security against misuse is provided.<a id="FNanchor_61" href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">61</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_48">A timely -severity.</div> - -<p>If the commandant of a fortress wishes to -strengthen its defensive capacity by expelling a portion -of the population such as women, children, old -people, wounded, etc., then he must take these steps -in good time, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, before the investment begins. If -the investment is completed, no claim to the free -passage of these classes can be made good. All juristic -demands to the contrary are as a matter of principle -to be repudiated, as being in fundamental conflict -with the principles of war. The very presence<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_107">107</a></span> -of such persons may accelerate the surrender of -the place in certain circumstances, and it would -therefore be foolish of a besieger to renounce voluntarily -this advantage.<a id="FNanchor_62" href="#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></p> - -<p>Once the surrender of a fortress is accomplished, -then, by the usages of war to-day, any further destruction, -annihilation, incendiarism, and the like, -are completely excluded. The only further injuries -that are permitted are those demanded or necessitated -by the object of the war, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">e.g.</i>, destruction of fortifications,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_108">108</a></span> -removal of particular buildings, or in some circumstances -of complete quarters, rectification of the -foreground and so on.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_49">“Undefended -Places.”</div> - -<p>A prohibition by international law of the bombardment -of open towns and villages which are not occupied -by the enemy, or defended, was, indeed, put -into words by the Hague Regulations, but appears -superfluous, since modern military history knows of -hardly any such case.</p> - -<p>But the matter is different where open towns are -occupied by the enemy or are defended. In this -case, naturally all the rules stated above as to fortified -places hold good, and the simple rules of tactics -dictate that fire should be directed not merely against -the bounds of the place, so that the space behind the -enemy’s firing line and any reserves that may be -there shall not escape. A bombardment is indeed -justified, and unconditionally dictated by military -consideration, if the occupation of the village is not -with a view to its defense but only for the passage of -troops, or to screen an approach or retreat, or to prepare -or cover a tactical movement, or to take up supplies, -etc. The only criterion is the value which the -place possesses for the enemy in the existing situation.</p> - -<p>Regarding it from this point of view, the bombardment -of Kehl by the French in 1870 was justified by -military necessity, although the place bombarded was<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_109">109</a></span> -an open town and not directly defended. “Kehl -offered the attacking force the opportunity of establishing -itself in its buildings, and of bringing up and -placing there its personnel and material, unseen by -the defenders. It became a question of making Kehl -inaccessible to the enemy and of depriving it of the -characteristics which made its possession advantageous -to the enemy. The aforesaid justification was -not very evident.”<a id="FNanchor_63" href="#Footnote_63" class="fnanchor">63</a></p> - -<p>Also the bombardment of the open town of Saarbrücken -cannot from the military point of view be the -subject of reproach against the French. On August -2nd a Company of the Fusilier Regiment No. 40 -had actually occupied the railway station and several -others had taken up a position in the town. It was -against these troops that the fire of the French was -primarily directed. If havoc was spread in the town, -that could scarcely be avoided. In the night of -August 3rd to 4th, the fire of the French batteries -was again directed on the railway station in order to -prevent the despatch of troops and material. -Against this proceeding also no objection can be -made, since the movement of trains had actually -taken place.</p> - -<p>If, therefore, on the German side<a id="FNanchor_64" href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> energetic protest -were made in both cases, and the bombardment<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_110">110</a></span> -of Kehl and Saarbrücken were declared a violation -of international law, this only proves that in 1870 a -proper comprehension of questions of the laws of -war of this kind was not always to be found even -in the highest military and official circles. But still -less was this the case on the French side as is clear -from the protests against the German bombardment -of Dijon, Chateaudun, Bazeilles, and other places, -the military justification for which is still clearer -and incontestable.<a id="FNanchor_65" href="#Footnote_65" class="fnanchor">65</a></p> - -<h3 id="h_110">B.—METHODS NOT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. -CUNNING, AND DECEIT</h3> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_50">Stratagems.</div> - -<p>Cunning in war has been permissible from the -earliest times, and was esteemed all the more as it<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_111">111</a></span> -furthered the object of war without entailing the -loss of men. Surprises, laying of ambushes, feigned -attacks and retreats, feigned flight, pretense of inactivity, -spreading of false news as to one’s strength -and dispositions, use of the enemy’s parole—all this -was permitted and prevalent ever since war begun, -and so it is to-day.<a id="FNanchor_66" href="#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">66</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_51">What are -“dirty -tricks”?</div> - -<p>As to the limits between recognized stratagems and -those forms of cunning which are reprehensible, contemporary -opinion, national culture, the practical -needs of the moment, and the changing military situation, -are so influential that it is prima facie proportionately -difficult to draw any recognized limit, -as difficult as between criminal selfishness and taking -a justifiable advantage. Some forms of artifice -are, however, under all circumstances irreconcilable -with honorable fighting, especially all those which -take the form of faithlessness, fraud, and breach of -one’s word. Among these are breach of a safe-conduct; -of a free retirement; or of an armistice, in -order to gain by a surprise attack an advantage over<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_112">112</a></span> -the enemy; feigned surrender in order to kill the -enemy who then approach unsuspiciously; misuse of -a flag of truce, or of the Red Cross, in order to secure -one’s approach, or in case of attack, deliberate -violation of a solemnly concluded obligation, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">e.g.</i>, of -a war treaty; incitement to crime, such as murder -of the enemy’s leaders, incendiarism, robbery, and -the like. This kind of outrage was an offense -against the law of nations even in the earliest times. -The natural conscience of mankind whose spirit is -chivalrously alive in the armies of all civilized States, -has branded it as an outrage upon human right, and -enemies who in such a public manner violate the -laws of honor and justice have been regarded as no -longer on an equality.<a id="FNanchor_67" href="#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">67</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_53">Of False -Uniforms.</div> - -<p>The views of military authorities about methods -of this kind, as also of those which are on the borderline, -frequently differ from the views held by notable -jurists. So also the putting on of enemy’s uniforms, -the employment of enemy or neutral flags and marks, -with the object of deception are as a rule declared<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_113">113</a></span> -permissible by the theory of the laws of war,<a id="FNanchor_68" href="#Footnote_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> while -military writers<a id="FNanchor_69" href="#Footnote_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> have expressed themselves unanimously -against them. The Hague Conference -has adopted the latter view in forbidding the employment -of enemy’s uniforms and military marks -equally with the misuse of flags of truce and of the -Red Cross.<a id="FNanchor_70" href="#Footnote_70" class="fnanchor">70</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_54">The -Corruption -of others -may be -useful.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_55">And murder -is one of the -Fine Arts.</div> - -<p>Bribery of the enemy’s subjects with the object of -obtaining military advantages, acceptance of offers of -treachery, reception of deserters, utilization of the -discontented elements in the population, support of -pretenders and the like, are permissible, indeed international<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_114">114</a></span> -law is in no way opposed<a id="FNanchor_71" href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> to the exploitation -of the crimes of third parties (assassination, -incendiarism, robbery, and the like) to the -prejudice of the enemy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_56">The ugly -is often expedient, -and -that it is a -mistake to -be too “nice-minded.”</div> - -<p>Considerations of chivalry, generosity, and honor -may denounce in such cases a hasty and unsparing -exploitation of such advantages as indecent and -dishonorable, but law which is less touchy allows -it.<a id="FNanchor_72" href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> “The ugly and inherently immoral aspect of -such methods cannot affect the recognition of their -lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the belligerent -the right and imposes upon him, according to -circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, -it may be the decisive, advantages to be gained by -such means.<a id="FNanchor_73" href="#Footnote_73" class="fnanchor">73</a></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_115">115</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_115">CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">TREATMENT OF WOUNDED AND SICK SOLDIERS</span></h2> -</div> - -<p>The generally accepted principle that in war one -should do no more harm to one’s enemy than the object -of the war unconditionally requires, has led to treating -the wounded and sick combatants as being no -longer enemies, but merely sick men who are to be -taken care of and as much as possible protected from -the tragic results of wounds and illness. Although -endeavors to protect the wounded soldiers from arbitrary -slaughter, mutilation, ill-treatment, or other -brutalities go back to the oldest times, yet the credit -of systematizing these endeavors belongs to the nineteenth -century, and this system was raised to the -level of a principle of international law by the -Geneva Convention of 1864.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_57">The sanctity -of the -Geneva Convention.</div> - -<p>With the elevation of the Geneva Agreements to -the level of laws binding peoples and armies, the -question of the treatment of wounded and sick combatants, -as well as that of the persons devoted to the -healing and care of them, is separated from the -usages of war. Moreover, and discussion of the -form of this international law must be regarded from<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_116">116</a></span> -the military point of view as aimless and unprofitable. -The soldier may still be convinced that some -of the Articles are capable of improvement, that -others need supplementing, and that yet others should -be suppressed, but he has not the right to deviate -from the stipulations; it is his duty to contribute as -far as he can to the observance of the whole code.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_58">The -“Hyenas of -the Battlefield.”</div> - -<p>No notice is taken in the Geneva Convention of -the question of the protection of fallen or wounded -combatants from the front, from the rabble usually -known as “The Hyenas of the battlefield,” who are -accustomed to rob, ill-treat, or slay soldiers lying -defenseless on the field of battle. This is a matter -left to the initiative of the troops. Persons of this -kind, whether they be soldiers or not, are undoubtedly -to be dealt with in the sternest possible manner.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_117">117</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_117">CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">INTERCOURSE BETWEEN BELLIGERENT ARMIES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_59">Flags of -Truce.</div> - -<p>Hostile armies are in frequent intercourse with one -another. This takes place so long as it is practised -openly, that is to say, with the permission of the -commanders on both sides, by means of bearers of -flags of truce. In this class are included those who -have to conduct the official intercourse between the -belligerent armies or divisions thereof, and who appear -as authorized envoys of one army to the other, in -order to conduct negotiations and to transmit communications. -As to the treatment of bearers of -flags of truce there exist regular usages of war, an -intimate acquaintance with which is of the highest -practical importance. This knowledge is not merely -indispensable for the higher officers, but also for all -inferior officers, and to a certain extent for the private -in the ranks.</p> - -<p>Since a certain degree of intercourse between the -two belligerents is unavoidable, and indeed desirable, -the assurance of this intercourse is in the interests -of both parties; it has held good as a custom from -the earliest times, and even among uncivilized people,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_118">118</a></span> -whereby these envoys and their assistants -(trumpeter, drummer, interpreter, and orderly) are -to be regarded as inviolable; a custom which proceeds -on the presumption that these persons, although -drawn from the ranks of the combatants, are -no longer, during the performance of these duties, -to be regarded as active belligerents. They must, -therefore, neither be shot nor captured; on the contrary, -everything must be done to assure the performance -of their task and to permit their return on its -conclusion.</p> - -<p>But it is a fundamental condition of this procedure:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. That the envoy be quite distinguishable as such by -means of universally recognized and well-known -marks; distinguishable both by sight and by -hearing (flags of truce, white flags, or, if need -be, white pocket-handkerchiefs) and signals -(horns or bugles).</p> - -<p>2. That the envoy behave peaceably, and</p> - -<p>3. That he does not abuse his position in order to -commit any unlawful act.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Of course any contravention of the last two conditions -puts an end to his inviolability; it may justify -his immediate capture, and, in extreme cases (espionage, -hatching of plots), his condemnation by military -law. Should the envoy abuse his mission for -purposes of observation, whereby the army he is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_119">119</a></span> -visiting is imperiled, then also he may be detained, -but not longer than is necessary. In all cases of -this kind it is recommended that prompt and detailed -information be furnished to the head of the -other army.</p> - -<p>It is the right of every army:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. To accept, or to refuse such envoys. An envoy who -is not received must immediately rejoin his own -army; he must not, of course, be shot at on his -way.</p> - -<p>2. To declare that it will not during a fixed period -entertain any envoys. Should any appear in -spite of this declaration; they cannot claim to -be inviolable.</p> - -<p>3. To determine in what forms and under what precautions -envoys shall be received. The envoys -have to submit to any commands even though -entailing personal inconvenience such as blindfolding -or going out of their way on coming or -returning, and such like.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_60">The -Etiquette of -Flags of -Truce.</div> - -<p>The observance of certain forms in the reception of -envoys is of the greatest importance, as a parley may -serve as a cloak for obtaining information or for the -temporary interruption of hostilities and the like. -Such a danger is particularly likely to occur if the -combatants have been facing one another, as in the -case of a war of positions, for a long time without -any particular result. These forms are also important -because their non-observance, as experience<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_120">120</a></span> -shows, gives rise to recrimination and charges of -violation of the usages of war. The following may, -therefore, be put forward as the chief rules for the -behavior of an envoy and as the forms to be observed -in his reception.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_61">The Envoy.</div> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. The envoy (who is usually selected as being a man -skilled in languages and the rules, and is -mounted on horseback) makes for the enemy’s -outpost or their nearest detachment, furnished -with the necessary authorization, in the company -of a trumpeter and a flag-bearer on horseback. -If the distance between the two outposts of the -respective lines is very small, then the envoy -may go on foot in the company of a bugler or a -drummer.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_62">His approach.</div> - -<p>2. When he is near enough to the enemy’s outposts or -their lines to be seen and heard, he has the -trumpet or bugle blown and the white flag unfurled -by the bearer. The bearer will seek to -attract the attention of the enemy’s outposts or -detachments whom he has approached, by waving -the flag to and fro.</p> - -<p class="in1">From this moment the envoy and his company are -inviolable, in virtue of a general usage of war. -The appearance of a flag of truce in the middle -of a fight, however, binds no one to cease fire. -Only the envoy and his companions are not to -be shot at.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_63">The challenge—“Wer -da?”</div> - -<p>3. The envoy now advances with his escort at a slow -walk to the nearest posted officer. He must -obey the challenge of the enemy’s outposts and -patrol.</p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_121">121</a></span></p> -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_64">His reception.</div> - -<p>4. Since it is not befitting to receive an envoy at just -that place which he prefers, he has to be ready -to be referred to a particular place of admission. -He must keep close to the way prescribed for -him. It is advisable for the enemy whenever -this is possible to give the envoy an escort on -the way.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_65">He dismounts.</div> - -<p>5. On arriving at the place indicated, the envoy dismounts -along with his attendants; leaves them at -a moderate distance behind him, and proceeds on -foot to the officer on duty, or highest in command, -at that place, in order to make his wishes -known.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_66">Let his Yea -be Yea, and -his Nay, Nay.</div> - -<p>6. Intercourse with the enemy’s officer must be courteously -conducted. The envoy has always to bear -in mind the discharge of his mission, to study -the greatest circumspection in his conversations, -neither to attempt to sound the enemy or to allow -himself to be sounded.... The best thing -is to refuse to enter into any conversation on -military matters beforehand.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_67">The duty of -his Interlocutor.</div> - -<p>7. For less important affairs the officer at the place -of admission will possess the necessary instructions, -in order either to discharge them himself, -or to promise their discharge in a fixed period. -But in most cases the decision of a superior will -have to be taken; in this case the envoy has to -wait until the latter arrives.</p> - -<p>8. If the envoy has a commission to deal personally -with the Commander-in-Chief or a high officer, -or if the officer on duty at the place of admission -considers it desirable for any reason to send -the envoy back, then, if it be necessary, the eyes<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_122">122</a></span> -of the envoy may be blindfolded; to take away -his weapons is hardly necessary. If the officer -at the place of admission is in any doubt what -attitude to adopt towards the requests of the envoy, -he will for the time being detain him at his -post, and send an intimation to his immediate -superior in case the affair appears to him of particular -importance, and at the same time to the -particular officer to whom the envoy is or should -be sent.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_68">The impatient -Envoy.</div> - -<p>9. If an envoy will not wait, he may be permitted, -according to circumstances, to return to his own -army if the observation made by him or any -communications received can no longer do any -harm.</p></blockquote> - -<p>From the foregoing it follows that intercourse with -the envoys of an enemy presupposes detailed instructions -and a certain intelligence on the part of the -officers and men if it is to proceed peaceably. But -before all things it must be made clear to the men that -the intentional wounding or killing of an envoy is a -serious violation of international law, and that even -an unfortunate accident which leads to such a violation -may have the most disagreeable consequences.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_69">The French -again.</div> - -<p>A despatch of Bismarck’s of January 9th, 1871, -demonstrates by express mention of their names, that -twenty-one German envoys were shot by French soldiers -while engaged on their mission. Ignorance and -defective teaching of the troops may have been the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_123">123</a></span> -principal reason for this none too excusable behavior. -In many cases transgressions on the part of the -rawer elements of the army may have occurred, as -has been many times offered as an excuse in higher -quarters. Nevertheless, this state of affairs makes -clear the necessity of detailed instruction and a sharp -supervision of the troops by the officers.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_124">124</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_124">CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead">SCOUTS AND SPIES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_70">The Scout.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_71">The Spy -and his short -shrift.</div> - -<p>Scouting resolves itself into a question of getting -possession of important information about the position, -strength, plans, etc., of the enemy, and thereby -promoting the success of one’s own side. The existence -of scouting has been closely bound up with warfare -from the earliest times; it is to be regarded as -an indispensable means of warfare and consequently -is undoubtedly permissible. If the scouting takes -place publicly by recognizable combatants then it is -a perfectly regular form of activity, against which -the enemy can only use the regular means of defense, -that is to say, killing in battle, and capture. If the -scouting takes the form of secret or surreptitious -methods, then it is espionage, and is liable to particularly -severe and ruthless measures by way of -precaution and exemplary punishment—usually -death by shooting or hanging. This severe punishment -is not inflicted on account of dishonorable disposition -on the part of the spy—there need exist -nothing of the kind, and the motive for the espionage -may arise from the highest patriotism and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_125">125</a></span> -sentiment of military duty quite as often as from -avarice and dishonorable cupidity<a id="FNanchor_74" href="#Footnote_74" class="fnanchor">74</a>—but principally -on account of the particular danger which lies in -such secret methods. It is as it were a question of -self-defense.</p> - -<p>Having regard to this severe punishment introduced -by the usages of war, it is necessary to define -the conception of espionage and of spies as precisely -as possible.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_72">What is a -Spy?</div> - -<p>A spy was defined by the German army staff in -1870 as one “who seeks to discover by clandestine -methods, in order to favor the enemy, the position of -troops, camps, etc.; on the other hand enemies who -are soldiers are only to be regarded as spies if they -have violated the rules of military usages, by denial -or concealment of their military character.”</p> - -<p>The Brussels Declaration of 1874 defines the conception -as follows: “By a spy is to be understood -he who clandestinely or by illicit pretenses enters or -attempts to enter into places in the possession of the -enemy with the intention of obtaining information<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_126">126</a></span> -to be brought to the knowledge of the other side.” -The Hague Conference puts it in the same way.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_73">Of the -essentials of -Espionage.</div> - -<p>The emphasis in both declarations is to be laid on -the idea of “secrecy” or “deception.” If regular -combatants make enquiries in this fashion, for example -in disguise, then they also come under the -category of spies, and can lawfully be treated as -such. Whether the espionage was successful or not -makes no difference. The motive which has -prompted the spy to accept his commission, whether -noble or ignoble, is, as we have already said, indifferent; -likewise, whether he has acted on his own -impulse or under a commission from his own State -or army. The military jurisdiction in this matter -cuts across the territorial principle and that of allegiance, -in that it makes no difference whether the spy -is the subject of the belligerent country or of another -State.</p> - -<p>It is desirable that the heavy penalty which the -spy incurs should be the subject not of mere suspicion -but of actual proof of existence of the offense, by -means of a trial, however summary (if the swift -course of the war permits), and therefore the death -penalty will not be enforced without being preceded -by a judgment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_74">Accessories -are -Principals.</div> - -<p>Participation in espionage, favoring it, harboring -a spy, are equally punishable with espionage itself.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_127">127</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_127">CHAPTER VI<br /> - -<span class="subhead">DESERTERS AND RENEGADES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_75">The Deserter -is faithless -and the -Renegade -false.</div> - -<p>The difference between these two is this—the first -class are untrue to the colors, their intention being to -withdraw altogether from the conflict, to leave the -seat of war, and, it may be, to escape into a country -outside it; but the second class go over to the enemy -in order to fight in his ranks against their former -comrades. According to the general usages of war, -deserters and renegades, if they are caught, are to -be subjected to martial law and may be punished -with death.</p> - -<p>Although some exponents of the laws of war claim -that deserters and renegades should be handed back -to one’s opponent, and on the other hand exactly the -opposite is insisted on by others, namely, the obligation -to accept them—all we can say is that a soldier -cannot admit any such obligation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_76">But both -may be -useful.</div> - -<p>Deserters and renegades weaken the power of the -enemy, and therefore to hand them over is not in the -interest of the opposite party, and as for the right -to accept them or reject them, that is a matter for -one’s own decision.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_128">128</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_128">CHAPTER VII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">CIVILIANS IN THE TRAIN OF AN ARMY</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_77">“Followers.”</div> - -<p>In the train of an army it is usual to find, temporarily -or permanently, a mass of civilians who are -indispensable to the satisfaction of the wants of -officers and soldiers or to the connection of the army -with the native population. To this category belong -all kinds of contractors, carriers of charitable gifts, -artists, and the like, and, above all, newspaper correspondents -whether native or foreign. If they fall -into the hands of the enemy, they have the right, -should their detention appear desirable, to be treated -as prisoners of war, assuming that they are in possession -of an adequate authorization.</p> - -<p>For all these individuals, therefore, the possession -of a pass issued by the military authorities concerned, -in accordance with the forms required by international -intercourse, is an indispensable necessity, in -order that in the case of a brush with the enemy, or -of their being taken captive they may be recognized -as occupying a passive position and may not be -treated as spies.<a id="FNanchor_75" href="#Footnote_75" class="fnanchor">75</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_129">129</a></span> -In the grant of these authorizations the utmost -circumspection should be shown by the military authorities; -this privilege should only be extended to -those whose position, character, and intentions are -fully known, or for whom trustworthy persons will -act as sureties.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_78">The War -Correspondent: -his importance. -His presence -is desirable.</div> - -<p>This circumspection must be observed most scrupulously -in the case of newspaper correspondents -whether native or foreign. Since the component -parts of a modern army are drawn from all grades -of the population, the intervention of the Press for -the purpose of intellectual intercourse between the -army and the population at home can no longer be -dispensed with. The army also derives great advantages -from this intellectual intercourse; it has -had to thank the stimulus of the Press in recent campaigns -for an unbroken chain of benefits, quite apart -from the fact that news of the war in the newspapers -is a necessity for every soldier. The importance of -this intervention, and on the other hand the dangers -and disadvantages which may arise from its misuse, -make it obviously necessary that the military authorities -should control the whole of the Press when in<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_130">130</a></span> -the field. In what follows we shall briefly indicate -the chief rules which are customary, in the modern -usages of war, as regards giving permission to newspaper -correspondents.</p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_79">The ideal -War Correspondent.</div> - -<p>The first thing necessary in a war correspondent -is a sense of honor; in other words, he must be trustworthy. -Only a man who is known to be absolutely -trustworthy, or who can produce a most precise official -certificate or references from unimpeachable -persons, can be granted permission to attach himself -to headquarters.</p> - -<p>An honorable correspondent will be anxious to -adhere closely to the duties he owes to his paper on -the one hand, and the demands of the army whose -hospitality he enjoys on the other. To do both is -not always easy, and in many cases tact and refinement -on the part of the correspondent can alone indicate -the right course; a censorship is proved by -experience to be of little use; the certificates and -recommendations required must therefore be explicit -as to the possession of these qualities by the applicant; -and according as he possesses them or not his -personal position at headquarters and the degree of -support extended to him in the discharge of his duties -will be decided.</p> - -<p>It is therefore undoubtedly in the interest of the -army as of the Press, that the latter shall only despatch<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_131">131</a></span> -such representatives as really are equal to the -high demands which the profession of correspondent -requires.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_80">The Etiquette -of the War -Correspondent.</div> - -<p>The correspondent admitted on the strength of -satisfactory pledges has therefore to promise on his -word of honor to abide by the following obligations:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. To spread no news as to the disposition, numbers, -or movements of troops, and, moreover, the intentions -and plans of the staff, unless he has -permission to publish them. (This concerns -principally correspondents of foreign newspapers -since one’s own newspapers are already subject to -a prohibition of this kind by the Imperial Press -Law of April 7th, 1874.)</p> - -<p>2. To report himself on arrival at the headquarters of -a division immediately to the commanding officer, -and to ask his permission to stay, and to remove -himself immediately and without making -difficulties if the o.c. deems his presence inexpedient -on military grounds.</p> - -<p>3. To carry with him always, and to produce on demand, -his authorization (certificate, armlet, -photograph) and his pass for horses, transport, -and servants.</p> - -<p>4. To take care that his correspondence and articles -are submitted at headquarters.</p> - -<p>5. To carry out all instructions of the officers at headquarters -who supervise the press.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Contraventions of the orders from headquarters, -indiscretions, and tactlessness, are punished in less<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_132">132</a></span> -serious cases with a caution, in grave cases by expulsion; -where the behavior of the correspondent or -his correspondence has not amounted to a military -offense, and is therefore not punishable by martial -law.</p> - -<p>A journalist who has been expelled not only loses -his privileges but also his passive character; and if -he disregards his exclusion he will be held responsible.</p> - -<p>Foreign journalists are subject to the same obligations; -they must expressly recognize their authority -and in case of punishment cannot claim any personal -immunity.<a id="FNanchor_76" href="#Footnote_76" class="fnanchor">76</a></p> - -<p>Journalists who accompany the army without the -permission of the staff, and whose reports therefore -cannot be subject to military control, are to be proceeded -against with inexorable severity. They are -to be expelled ruthlessly as dangerous, since they -only get in the way of the troops and devour their -subsistence, and may under the mask of friendship -do harm to the army.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_133">133</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_133">CHAPTER VIII<br /> - -<span class="subhead">THE EXTERNAL MARK OF INVIOLABILITY</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_81">How to tell -a Non-combatant.</div> - -<p>Those persons and objects who in war are to be -treated as inviolable must be recognizable by some -external mark. Such is the so-called Geneva Cross -(a red cross on a white ground) introduced by international -agreement.<a id="FNanchor_77" href="#Footnote_77" class="fnanchor">77</a></p> - -<p>Attention is to be attracted in the case of persons -by armlets, in the case of buildings by flags, in the -case of wagons and other objects by a corresponding -paint mark.</p> - -<p>If the mark is to receive adequate respect it is -essential:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. That it should be clearly visible and recognizable.</p> - -<p>2. That it should only be worn by such persons or -attached to such objects as can lawfully claim it.</p></blockquote> - -<p>As to 1. Banners and flags must be sufficiently -large to be both distinguishable and recognizable at -a far distance; they are to be so attached that they<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_134">134</a></span> -will not be masked by any national flag that may be -near them, otherwise unintentional violations will -be unavoidable.</p> - -<p>As to 2. Abuse will result in the protective mark -being no longer respected, and a further result would -be to render illusory, and to endanger, the whole of -the Geneva Convention. Measures must therefore -be taken to prevent such abuses and to require every -member of the army to draw attention to any one -who wears these marks without being entitled to do -so.<a id="FNanchor_78" href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">78</a></p> - -<p>Regulations of international law to prevent and -punish misuse of the Red Cross do not exist.<a id="FNanchor_79" href="#Footnote_79" class="fnanchor">79</a></p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_135">135</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_135">CHAPTER IX<br /> - -<span class="subhead">WAR TREATIES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_82">That Faith -must be kept -even with an -Enemy.</div> - -<p>In the following pages we have only to do with war -treaties in the narrower sense, that is such as are -concluded during the war itself and have as their -object either the regulation of certain relations during -the period of the war, or only an isolated and -temporary measure. It is a principle of all such -treaties that: Etiam hosti fides servanda. Every -agreement is to be strictly observed by both sides in -the spirit and in the letter. Should this rule not -be observed by one side then the other has the right -to regard the treaty as denounced.</p> - -<p>How a treaty is to be concluded depends on the -discretion of those who conclude it. Drafts or -models of treaties do not exist.</p> - -<p class="p1 in0" id="h_135a"><span class="smcap smaller">A.</span>—<i>Treaties of Exchange</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_83">Exchange of -Prisoners.</div> - -<p>These have for their object the mutual discharge -or exchange of prisoners of war. Whether the opponent -will agree to an offer of this kind or not, depends -entirely upon himself.</p> - -<p>The usual stipulation is: An equal number on<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_136">136</a></span> -both sides. That is only another way of saying that -a surplus of prisoners on the one side need not be -handed over.</p> - -<p>The restitution of a greater number of common -soldiers against officers can be stipulated; in that -case, the relative value of different grades must be -precisely fixed in the treaty.</p> - -<p class="p1 in0" id="h_136"><span class="smcap smaller">B.</span>—<i>Treaties of Capitulation</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_84">Capitulations—they -cannot be too -meticulous.</div> - -<p>The object of these is the surrender of fortresses or -strong places as also of troops in the open field. -Here again there can be no talk of a generally accepted -model. The usages of war have, however, -displayed some rules for capitulations, the observance -of which is to be recommended:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. Before any capitulation is concluded, the authority -of the Commander who concludes it should be -formally and unequivocally authenticated. How -necessary a precaution of this kind is, is shown -by the capitulations of Rapp at Danzig, and of -Gouvion St. Cyr at Dresden, in 1813, which were -actually annulled by the refusal of the General -Staff of the Allies to ratify them. At the trial -of Bazaine the indictment by General Rivière -denied the title of the Marshal to conclude a -capitulation.</p> - -<p>2. If one of the parties to the treaty makes it a condition -that the confirmation of the monarch, or -the Commander-in-Chief, or even the national -assembly is to be obtained, then this circumstance<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_137">137</a></span> -must be made quite clear. Also care is to be -taken that in the event of ratification being refused -every advantage that might arise from an -ambiguous proceeding on the part of one opponent, -be made impossible.</p> - -<p>3. The chief effect of a capitulation is to prevent that -portion of the enemy’s force which capitulates -from taking any part in the conflict during the -rest of the war, or it may be for a fixed period. -The fate of the capitulating troops or of the surrendered -fortress differs in different cases.<a id="FNanchor_80" href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> In<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_138">138</a></span> -the Treaty of Capitulation every condition -agreed upon both as to time and manner must -be expressed in precise and unequivocable words. -Conditions which violate the military honor of -those capitulated are not permissible according -to modern views. Also, if the capitulation is an -unconditional one or, to use the old formula, is -“at discretion,” the victor does not thereby, according -to the modern laws of war, acquire a -right of life and death over the persons capitulating.</p> - -<p>4. Obligations which are contrary to the laws of nations,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_139">139</a></span> -such as, for example, to fight against -one’s own Fatherland during the continuation -of the war, cannot be imposed upon the troops -capitulating. Likewise, also, obligations such -as are forbidden them by their own civil or -military laws or terms of service, cannot be imposed.</p> - -<p>5. Since capitulations are treaties of war they cannot -contain, for those contracting them, either rights -or duties which extend beyond the period of the -war, nor can they include dispositions as to matters -of constitutional law such as, for example, a -cession of territory.</p> - -<p>6. A violation of any of the obligations of the treaty -of capitulation justifies an opponent in immediately -renewing hostilities without further ceremony.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_85">Of the White -Flag.</div> - -<p>The external indication of a desire to capitulate is -the raising of a white flag. There exists no obligation -to cease firing immediately on the appearance -of this sign (or to cease hostilities). The attainment -of a particular important, possibly decisive, -point, the utilization of a favorable moment, the -suspicion of an illicit purpose in raising the white -flag, the saving of time, and the like, may induce the -commanding officer to disregard the sign until these -reasons have disappeared.</p> - -<p>If, however, no such considerations exist, then -humanity imposes an immediate cessation of hostilities.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_140">140</a></span></p> - -<p class="p1 in0" id="h_140"><span class="smcap smaller">C</span>.—<i>Safe-conducts</i></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_86">Of Safe-Conducts.</div> - -<p>The object of these is to secure persons or things -from hostile treatment. The usages of war in this -matter furnish the following rules:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. Letters of safe-conduct, for persons, can only be -given to such persons as are certain to behave -peaceably and not to misuse them for hostile -purposes; letters of safe-conduct for things are -only to be granted under a guarantee of their not -being employed for warlike purposes.</p> - -<p>2. The safe-conducts granted to persons are personal -to them, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, they are not available for others. -They do not extend to their companions unless -they are expressly mentioned.</p> - -<p>An exception is only to be made in the case of -diplomatists of neutral States, in whose case their -usual entourage is assumed to be included even -though the members are not specifically named.</p> - -<p>3. The safe-conduct is revocable at any time; it can -even be altogether withdrawn or not recognized -by another superior, if the military situation has -so altered that its use is attended with unfavorable -consequences for the party which has -granted it.</p> - -<p>4. A safe-conduct for things on the other hand is not -confined to the person of the bearer. It is obvious -that if the person of the bearer appears at -all suspicious, the safe-conduct can be withdrawn. -This can also happen in the case of an -officer who does not belong to the authority which -granted it. The officer concerned is in this case<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_141">141</a></span> -fully responsible for his proceedings, and should -report accordingly.</p></blockquote> - -<h3 id="h_141"><span class="smcap smaller">D.</span>—<i>Treaties of Armistice</i></h3> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_87">Of Armistices.</div> - -<p>By armistice is understood a temporary cessation -of hostilities by agreement. It rests upon the voluntary -agreement of both parties. The object is either -the satisfaction of a temporary need such as carrying -away the dead, collecting the wounded, and the like, -or the preparation of a surrender or of negotiations -for peace.</p> - -<p>A general armistice must accordingly be distinguished -from a local or particular one. The general -armistice extends to the whole seat of war, to -the whole army, and to allies; it is therefore a -formal cessation of the war. A particular armistice -on the contrary relates only to a part of the seat of -war, to a single part of the opposing army. Thus -the armistice of Poischwitz in the autumn of 1813 -was a general armistice; that of January 28th, 1871, -between Germany and France, was a particular or -local one, since the South-Eastern part of the theater -of war was not involved.</p> - -<p>The right to conclude an armistice, whether general -or particular, belongs only to a person in high -command, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, the Commander-in-Chief. Time to -go and obtain the consent of the ruling powers may -be wanting. However, if the object of the armistice<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_142">142</a></span> -is to begin negotiations for peace, it is obvious that -this can only be determined by the highest authorities -of the State.</p> - -<p>If an agreement is concluded, then both sides must -observe its provisions strictly in the letter and the -spirit. A breach of the obligations entered into on -the one side can only lead to the immediate renewal -of hostilities on the other side.<a id="FNanchor_81" href="#Footnote_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> A notification is in -this case only necessary if the circumstances admit -of the consequent loss of time. If the breach of -the armistice is the fault of individuals, then the -party to whom they belong is not immediately responsible -and cannot be regarded as having broken -faith. If, therefore, the behavior of these individuals -is not favored or approved by their superiors, -there is no ground for a resumption of hostilities. -But the guilty persons ought, in such case, to be punished -by the party concerned.</p> - -<p>Even though the other party does not approve the -behavior of the trespassers but is powerless to prevent -such trespasses, then the opponent is justified<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_143">143</a></span> -in regarding the armistice as at an end. In order -to prevent unintentional violation both parties should -notify the armistice as quickly as possible to all, or -at any rate to the divisions concerned. Delay in the -announcement of the armistice through negligence -or bad faith lies, of course, at the door of him whose -duty it was to announce it. A violation due to the -bad faith of an individual is to be sternly punished.</p> - -<p>No one can be compelled to give credit to a communication -from the enemy to the effect that an -armistice has been concluded; the teaching of military -history is full of warnings against lightly -crediting such communications.<a id="FNanchor_82" href="#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">82</a></p> - -<p>A fixed form for the conclusion of an armistice is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_144">144</a></span> -not prescribed. A definite and clear declaration is -sufficient. It is usual and is advisable to have -treaties of this kind in writing in order to exclude -all complication, and, in the case of differences of -opinion later on, to have a firm foundation to go -upon.</p> - -<p>During the armistice nothing must occur which -could be construed as a continuation of hostilities, -the <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">status quo</i> must rather be observed as far as -possible, provided that the wording of the treaty does -not particularize anything to the contrary. On the -other hand the belligerents are permitted to do everything -which betters or strengthens their position after<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_145">145</a></span> -the expiry of the armistice and the continuation of -hostilities. Thus, for example, troops may unhesitatingly -be exercised, fresh ones recruited, arms and -munitions manufactured, and food supplies brought -up, troops shifted and reenforcements brought on the -scene. Whether destroyed or damaged fortifications -may also be restored is a question to which different -answers are given by influential teachers of the law -of nations. It is best settled by express agreement in -concrete cases, and so with the revictualing of a besieged -fortress.</p> - -<p>As regards its duration, an armistice can be concluded -either for a determined or an undetermined -period, and with or without a time for giving notice. -If no fixed period is agreed upon, then hostilities can -be recommenced at any time. This, however, is to -be made known to the enemy punctually, so that the -resumption does not represent a surprise. If a fixed -time is agreed on, then hostilities can be recommenced -the very moment it expires, and without any -previous notification. The commencement of an -armistice is, in the absence of an express agreement -fixing another time, to date from the moment of its -conclusion; the armistice expires at dawn of the day -to which it extends. Thus an armistice made to -last until January 1st comes to an end on the last -hour of December 31st, and a shorter armistice with<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_146">146</a></span> -the conclusion of the number of hours agreed upon; -thus, for example, an armistice concluded on May -1st at 6 <span class="smcap smaller">P.M.</span> for 48 hours last until May 3rd at -6 <span class="smcap smaller">P.M.<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_147">147</a></span></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2>PART II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">USAGES OF WAR IN REGARD TO ENEMY TERRITORY -AND ITS INHABITANTS</span></h2> -</div> - -<hr /> -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_147">CHAPTER I<br /> - -<span class="subhead">RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE INHABITANTS</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_88">The Civil -Population -is not to be -regarded as -an enemy.</div> - -<p>It has already been shown in the introduction that -war concerns not merely the active elements, but that -also the passive elements are involved in the common -suffering, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, the inhabitants of the occupied -territory who do not belong to the army. Opinions as -to the relations between these peaceable inhabitants -of the occupied territory and the army in hostile -possession have fundamentally altered in the course -of the last century. Whereas in earlier times the -devastation of the enemy’s territory, the destruction -of property, and, in some cases indeed, the carrying -away of the inhabitants into bondage or captivity, -were regarded as a quite natural consequence of the -state of war, and whereas in later times milder treatment -of the inhabitants took place although destruction -and annihilation as a military resource still continued -to be entertained, and the right of plundering -the private property of the inhabitants remained<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_148">148</a></span> -completely unlimited—to-day, the universally prevalent -idea is that the inhabitants of the enemy’s -territory are no longer to be regarded, generally -speaking, as enemies. It will be admitted, as a matter -of law, that the population is, in the exceptional -circumstances of war, subjected to the limitations, -burdens, and measures of compulsion conditioned by -it, and owes obedience for the time being to the -power <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">de facto</i>, but may continue to exist otherwise -undisturbed and protected as in time of peace by the -course of law.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_89">They must -not be -molested.</div> - -<p>It follows from all this, as a matter of right, that, -as regards the personal position of the inhabitants of -the occupied territory, neither in life or in limb, in -honor or in freedom, are they to be injured, and that -every unlawful killing; every bodily injury, due to -fraud or negligence; every insult; every disturbance -of domestic peace; every attack on family, honor, -and morality and, generally, every unlawful and outrageous -attack or act of violence, are just as strictly -punishable as though they had been committed -against the inhabitants of one’s own land. There -follows, also, as a right of the inhabitants of the -enemy territory, that the invading army can only -limit their personal independence in so far as the -necessity of war unconditionally demands it, and that -any infliction that needlessly goes beyond this is to -be avoided.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_149">149</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_90">Their duty.</div> - -<p>As against this right, there is naturally a corresponding -duty on the part of the inhabitants to conduct -themselves in a really peaceable manner, in no -wise to participate in the conflict, to abstain from -every injury to the troops of the power in occupation, -and not to refuse obedience to the enemy’s government. -If this presumption is not fulfilled, then -there can no longer be any talk of violations of -the immunities of the inhabitants, rather they are -treated and punished strictly according to martial -law.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_91">Of the humanity -of -the Germans -and the barbarity -of the -French.</div> - -<p>The conception here put forward as to the relation -between the army and the inhabitants of an enemy’s -territory, corresponds to that of the German Staff -in the years 1870–71. It was given expression in -numerous proclamations, and in still more numerous -orders of the day, of the German Generals. In contrast -to this the behavior of the French authorities -more than once betrays a complete ignorance of the -elementary rules of the law of nations, alike in their -diplomatic accusations against the Germans and in -the words used towards their own subjects. Thus, -on the outbreak of the war, a threat was addressed -to the Grand Duchy of Baden, not only by the -French Press but also officially (von amtlicher -Stelle),<a id="FNanchor_83" href="#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> “that even its women would not be protected.”<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_150">150</a></span> -So also horses of Prussian officers, who -had been shot by the peasants, were publicly put up -to auction by the murderers. So also the Franctireurs -threatened the inhabitants of villages occupied -by the Germans that they would be shot and their -houses burnt down if they received the enemy in their -houses or “were to enter into intercourse with them.” -So also the prefect of the Cote d’Or, in an official circular -of November 21st, urges the sub-prefects and -mayors of his Department to a systematic pursuit of -assassination, when he says: “The Fatherland -does not demand of you that you should assemble -<i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">en masse</i> and openly oppose the enemy, it only expects -that three or four determined men should leave -the village every morning and conceal themselves in -a place indicated by nature, from which, without -danger, they can shoot the Prussians; above all, they -are to shoot at the enemy’s mounted men whose -horses they are to deliver up at the principal place -of the Arrondissement. I will award a bonus to -them (for the delivery of such horses), and will publish -their heroic deed in all the newspapers of the -Department, as well as in the <cite>Moniteur</cite>.” But this -conception of the relation between the inhabitants -and the hostile army not only possessed the minds of -the provincial authorities but also the central government -at Tours itself, as is clear from the fact that -it held it necessary to stigmatize publicly the members<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_151">151</a></span> -of the municipal commission at Soissons who, -after an attempt on the life of a Prussian sentry by -an unknown hand, prudently warned their members -against a repetition of such outrages, when it [the -central government] ordered “that the names of the -men who had lent themselves to the assistance and -interpretation of the enemy’s police be immediately -forthcoming.”<a id="FNanchor_84" href="#Footnote_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> And if, on the French side, the -proclamation of General von Falckenstein is cited -as a proof of similar views on the German side—the -proclamation wherein the dwellers on the coast -of the North Sea and the Baltic are urged to participate -in the defense of the coast, and are told: “Let -every Frenchman who sets foot on your coast be -forfeit”—as against this all that need be said is that -this incitement, as is well known, had no effect in -Germany and excited the greatest surprise and was -properly condemned.</p> - -<div class="tb">* <span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">* </span><span class="in2">*</span></div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_92">What the -Invader may -do.</div> - -<p>Having thus developed the principles governing -the relation between the hostile army and the inhabitants, -we will now consider somewhat more -closely the duties of the latter and the burdens which, -in a given case, it is allowable to impose upon it. -Obviously a precise enumeration of every kind of -service which may be demanded from them is impossible,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_152">152</a></span> -but the following of the most frequent occurrence -are:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. Restriction of post, railway and letter communication, -supervision, or, indeed, total prohibition of -the same.</p> - -<p>2. Limitation of freedom of movement within the -country, prohibition to frequent certain parts of -the seat of war, or specified places.</p> - -<p>3. Surrender of arms.</p> - -<p>4. Obligation to billet the enemy’s soldiers; prohibition -of illumination of windows at night and the -like.</p> - -<p>5. Production of conveyances.</p> - -<p>6. Performance of work on streets, bridges, trenches -(<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gräben</i>), railways, buildings, etc.</p> - -<p>7. Production of hostages.</p></blockquote> - -<p>As to 1, the necessity of interrupting, in many -cases, railway, postal, and telegraph communication, -of stopping them or, at the least, stringently supervising -them, hardly calls for further proof. Human -feeling on the part of the commanding officer will -know what limits to fix, where the needs of the war -and the necessities of the population permit of mutual -accommodation.</p> - -<p>As to 2, if according to modern views no inhabitant -of occupied territory can be compelled to -participate directly in the fight against his own -Fatherland, so, conversely, he can be prevented from -reenforcing his own army. Thus the German staff<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_153">153</a></span> -in 1870, where it had acquired authority, in particular -in Alsace-Lorraine, sought to prevent the entrance -of the inhabitants into the French army, even -as in the Napoleonic wars the French authorities -sought to prevent the adherence of the States of the -Rhine Confederation to the army of the Allies.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_93">A man may be -compelled -to betray his -Country.</div> - -<p>The view that no inhabitant of occupied territory -can be compelled to participate directly in the struggle -against his own country is subject to an exception -by the general usages of war which must be recorded -here: the calling up and employment of the -inhabitants as guides on unfamiliar ground. However -much it may ruffle human feeling, to compel -a man to do harm to his own Fatherland, and indirectly -to fight his own troops, none the less no -army operating in an enemy’s country will altogether -renounce this expedient.<a id="FNanchor_85" href="#Footnote_85" class="fnanchor">85</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_94">And Worse.</div> - -<p>But a still more severe measure is the compulsion -of the inhabitants to furnish information about their -own army, its strategy, its resources, and its military -secrets. The majority of writers of all nations are -unanimous in their condemnation of this measure. -Nevertheless it cannot be entirely dispensed with; -doubtless it will be applied with regret, but the argument -of war will frequently make it necessary.<a id="FNanchor_86" href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">86</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_154">154</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_95">Of forced -labor.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_96">Of a certain -harsh measure -and its -justification.</div> - -<p>As to 5 and 6, the summoning of the inhabitants -to supply vehicles and perform works has also been -stigmatized as an unjustifiable compulsion upon the -inhabitants to participate in “Military operations.” -But it is clear that an officer can never allow such a -far-reaching extension of this conception, since otherwise -every possibility of compelling work would disappear, -while every kind of work to be performed in -war, every vehicle to be furnished in any connection -with the conduct of war, is or may be bound up -with it. Thus the argument of war must decide. -The German Staff, in the War of 1870, moreover, -rarely made use of compulsion in order to obtain -civilian workers for the performance of necessary -works. It paid high wages and, therefore, almost always -had at its disposal sufficient offers. This procedure -should, therefore, be maintained in future -cases. The provision of a supply of labor is best -arranged through the medium of the local authorities. -In case of refusal of workers punishment can, of -course, be inflicted. Therefore the conduct of the -German civil commissioner, Count Renard—so -strongly condemned by French jurists and jurists -with French sympathies—who, in order to compel -labor for the necessary repair of a bridge, threatened, -in case of further refusal, after stringent threats of -punishment had not succeeded in getting the work -done, to punish the workers by shooting some of them,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_155">155</a></span> -was in accordance with the actual laws of war; <em>the -main thing was that it attained its object</em>, without -its being necessary to practise it. The accusation -made by the French that, on the German side, -Frenchmen were compelled to labor at the siege -works before Strassburg, has been proved to be incorrect.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_97">Hostages.</div> - -<p>7. By hostages are understood those persons who, -as security or bail for the fulfilment of treaties, promises -or other claims, are taken or detained by the -opposing State or its army. Their provision has -been less usual in recent wars, as a result of which -some Professors of the law of nations have wrongly -decided that the taking of hostages has disappeared -from the practise of civilized nations. As a matter -of fact it was frequently practised in the Napoleonic -wars; also in the wars of 1848, 1849, and 1859 by -the Austrians in Italy; in 1864 and 1866 by Prussia; -in the campaigns of the French in Algiers; of the -Russians in the Caucasus; of the English in their -Colonial wars, as being the usual thing. The unfavorable -criticisms of it by the German Staff in -isolated cases is therefore to be referred to different -grounds of applied expedients.<a id="FNanchor_87" href="#Footnote_87" class="fnanchor">87</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_156">156</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_98">A “harsh -and cruel” -measure.</div> - -<p>A new application of “hostage-right” was practised -by the German Staff in the war of 1870, when -it compelled leading citizens from French towns and -villages to accompany trains and locomotives in order -to protect the railways communications which -were threatened by the people. Since the lives of -peaceable inhabitants were without any fault on their -part thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer -outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as -contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified towards -the inhabitants of the country. As against -this unfavorable criticism it must be pointed out that -this measure, which was also recognized on the German -side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to -after declarations and instructions of the occupying<a id="FNanchor_88" href="#Footnote_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> -authorities had proved ineffective, and that in -the particular circumstance it was the only method -which promised to be effective against the doubtless -unauthorized, indeed the criminal, behavior of a -fanatical population.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_99">But it was -“successful.”</div> - -<p>Herein lies its justification under the laws of war, -but still more in the fact that it proved completely -successful, and that wherever citizens were thus carried<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_157">157</a></span> -on the trains (whether result was due to the increased -watchfulness of the communes or to the immediate -influence on the population), the security of -traffic was restored.<a id="FNanchor_89" href="#Footnote_89" class="fnanchor">89</a></p> - -<p>To protect oneself against attack and injuries -from the inhabitants and to employ ruthlessly the -necessary means of defense and intimidation is obviously -not only a right but indeed a duty of the -staff of the army. The ordinary law will in this matter -generally not suffice, it must be supplemented -by the law of the enemy’s might. Martial law and -courts-martial must take the place of the ordinary -jurisdiction.<a id="FNanchor_90" href="#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">90</a></p> - -<p>To Martial law are subject in particular:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. All attacks, violations, homicides, and robberies, by -soldiers belonging to the army of occupation.</p> - -<p>2. All attacks on the equipment of this army, its supplies, -ammunition, and the like.</p> - -<p>3. Every destruction of communication, such as -bridges, canals, roads, railways and telegraphs.</p> - -<p>4. War rebellion and war treason.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Only the fourth point requires explanation.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_100">War Rebellion.</div> - -<p>By war rebellion is to be understood the taking<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_158">158</a></span> -up of arms by the inhabitants against the occupation; -by war treason on the other hand the injury or imperiling -of the enemy’s authority through deceit or -through communication of news to one’s own army -as to the disposition, movement, and intention, etc., -of the army in occupation, whether the person concerned -has come into possession of his information -by lawful or unlawful means (<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, by espionage).</p> - -<p>Against both of these only the most ruthless measures -are effective. Napoleon wrote to his brother -Joseph, when, after the latter ascended the throne of -Naples, the inhabitants of lower Italy made various -attempts at revolt: “The security of your dominion -depends on how you behave in the conquered -province. Burn down a dozen places which are not -willing to submit themselves. Of course, not until -you have first looted them; my soldiers must not be -allowed to go away with their hands empty. Have -three to six persons hanged in every village which -has joined the revolt; pay no respect to the cassock. -Simply bear in mind how I dealt with them in -Piacenza and Corsica.” The Duke of Wellington, in -1814, threatened the South of France; “he will, if -leaders of factions are supported, burn the villages -and have their inhabitants hanged.” In the year -1815, he issued the following proclamation: “All -those who after the entry of the (English) army into -France leave their dwellings and all those who are<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_159">159</a></span> -found in the service of the usurper will be regarded -as adherents of his and as enemies; their property -will be used for the maintenance of the army.” -“These are the expressions in the one case of one of -the great masters of war and of the dominion founded -upon war power, and in the other, of a commander-in-chief -who elsewhere had carried the protection of -private property in hostile lands to the extremest -possible limit. Both men as soon as a popular rising -takes place resort to terrorism.”<a id="FNanchor_91" href="#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">91</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_101">“War Treason” -and -Unwilling -Guides.</div> - -<p>A particular kind of war treason, which must be -briefly gone into here, inasmuch as the views of the -jurists about it differ very strongly from the usages -of war, is the case of deception in leading the way, -perpetrated in the form of deliberate guiding of the -enemy’s troops by an inhabitant on a false or disadvantageous -road. If he has offered his services, -then the fact of his treason is quite clear, but also in -case he was forced to act as guide his offense cannot -be judged differently, for he owed obedience to the -power in occupation, he durst in no case perpetrate -an act of open resistance and positive harm but -should have, if the worst came to the worst, limited -himself to passive disobedience, and he must therefore -bear the consequence.<a id="FNanchor_92" href="#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">92</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_102">Another -deplorable -necessity.</div> - -<p>However intelligible the inclination to treat and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_160">160</a></span> -to judge an offense of this kind from a milder standpoint -may appear, none the less the leader of the -troops thus harmed cannot do otherwise than punish -the offender with death, since only by harsh measures -of defense and intimidation can the repetition of -such offenses be prevented. In this case a court-martial -must precede the infliction of the penalty. -The court-martial must however be on its guard -against imputing hastily a treasonable intent to the -guide. The punishment of misdirection requires in -every case proof of evil intention.</p> - -<p>Also it is not allowable to diplomatic agents to -make communications from the country which they -inhabit during the war to any side as to the military -situation or proceedings. Persons contravening this -universally recognized usage of war may be immediately -expelled or in the case of great danger arrested.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_161">161</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_161">CHAPTER II<br /> - -<span class="subhead">PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_103">Of Private -Property and -its immunities.</div> - -<p>Since, according to the law of nations and the law -of war to-day, war makes enemies of States and not -of private persons, it follows that every arbitrary -devastation of the country and every destruction of -private property, generally speaking every unnecessary -(<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, not required by the necessity of war) injury -to alien property is contrary to the law of nations. -Every inhabitant of the territory occupied is -therefore to be protected alike in his person and in -his property.</p> - -<p>In this sense spoke King William to the French at -the beginning of the Campaign of 1870: “I wage -war with the French soldiers and not with the -French citizens. The latter will therefore continue -to enjoy security for their person and their goods, -so long as they do not by hostile undertakings against -German troops deprive me of the right to afford them -my protection.”</p> - -<p>The question stands in quite another position if -the necessity of war demands the requisition of the -stranger’s property, whether public or private. In<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_162">162</a></span> -this case of course every sequestration, every temporary -or permanent deprivation, every use, every injury -and all destruction are permitted.</p> - -<p>The following principles therefore result:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. Prohibited unconditionally are all aimless destructions, -devastations, burnings, and ravages of the -enemy’s country. The soldier who practises such -things is punished as an offender according to -the appropriate laws.<a id="FNanchor_93" href="#Footnote_93" class="fnanchor">93</a></p> - -<p>2. Permissible on the other hand are all destructions -and injuries dictated by military considerations; -and, indeed,</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) All demolitions of houses and other buildings, -bridges, railways, and telegraphic -establishments, due to the necessity of military -operations.</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) All injuries which are required through -military movements in the country or for -earthworks for attack or defense.</p></blockquote> -</blockquote> - -<p>Hence the double rule: No harm must be done, -not even the very slightest, which is not dictated by -military consideration; every kind of harm may be -done, even the very utmost, which the conduct of war -requires or which comes in the natural course of it.</p> - -<p>Whether the natural justification exists or not is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_163">163</a></span> -a subject for decision in each individual case. The -answer to this question lies entirely in the power of -the Commanding Officer, from whose conscience our -times can expect and demand as far-reaching humanity -as the object of war permits.</p> - -<p>On similar principles must be answered the question -as to the temporary use of property, dispositions -as to houses and the like: no inhabitant of the occupied -territory is to be disturbed in the use and -free disposition of his property, on the other hand -the necessity of war justifies the most far-reaching -disturbance, restriction, and even imperiling of his -property. In consequence there are permitted:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. Requisitions of houses and their furniture for the -purpose of billeting troops.</p> - -<p>2. Use of houses and their furniture for the care of -the sick and wounded.</p> - -<p>3. Use of buildings for observation, shelter, defense, -fortification, and the like.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Whether the property owners are subjects of the -occupied territory or of a Foreign State is a matter -of complete indifference; also the property of the -Sovereign and his family is subject to no exception, -although to-day it is usually treated with courtesy.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_104">Of German -behavior.</div> - -<p>The conception of the inviolability of private property -here depicted was shared by the Germans in -1870 and was observed. If on the French side statements -to the contrary are even to-day given expression,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_164">164</a></span> -they rest either on untruth or exaggeration. -It certainly cannot be maintained that no illegitimate -violations of private property by individuals ever -occurred. But that kind of thing can never be entirely -avoided even among the most highly cultivated -nations, and the best disciplined armies. In every -case the strictest respect for private property was enjoined<a id="FNanchor_94" href="#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> -upon the soldiers by the German Military -Authorities after crossing the frontier, and strong -measures were taken in order to make this injunction -effective; the property of the French was indeed, -as might be shown in numerous cases, protected -against the population itself, and was even -in several cases saved at the risk of our own -lives.<a id="FNanchor_95" href="#Footnote_95" class="fnanchor">95</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_165">165</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_105">The gentle -Hun and the -looking-glass.</div> - -<p>In like manner arbitrary destructions and ravages -of buildings and the like did not occur on the German -side where they were not called forth by the -behavior of the inhabitants themselves. They -scarcely ever occurred except where the inhabitants -had foolishly left their dwellings and the soldiers -were excited by closed doors and want of food. “If -the soldier finds the doors of his quarters shut, and -the food intentionally concealed or buried, then necessity -impels him to burst open the doors and to track -the stores, and he then, in righteous anger, destroys -a mirror, and with the broken furniture heats the -stove.”<a id="FNanchor_96" href="#Footnote_96" class="fnanchor">96</a></p> - -<p>If minor injuries explain themselves in this -fashion in the eyes of every reasonable and thinking -man, so the result of a fundamental and unprejudiced -examination has shown that the destructions and -ravages on a greater scale, which were made a reproach -against the German Army, have in no case -overstepped the necessity prescribed by the military -situation. Thus the much talked of and, on the -French side, enormously exaggerated, burning down -of twelve houses in Bazeilles, together with the shooting -of an inhabitant, were completely justified and, -indeed, in harmony with the laws of war; indeed<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_166">166</a></span> -one may maintain that the conduct of the inhabitants -would have called for the complete destruction of -the village and the condemnation of all the adult inhabitants -by martial law.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_167">167</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_167">CHAPTER III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">BOOTY AND PLUNDERING</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_106">Booty.</div> - -<p>In section 1, the inhabitant of the enemy’s territory -was described as a subject of legal rights and duties, -who, so far as the nature of war allows, may -continue to live protected as in time of peace by the -course of law; further, in section 2, property, -whether it be public or private, was likewise, so far -as war allows it, declared to be inviolable—it therefore -follows logically that there can exist no right to -the appropriation of the property, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, a right to -booty or plundering. Opinions as to this have, in -the course of the last century, undergone a complete -change; the earlier unlimited right of appropriation -in war is to-day recognized in regard to public property -as existing only in defined circumstances.</p> - -<p>In the development of the principles recognized -to-day we have to distinguish.</p> - -<p>1. State property and unquestionably:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) immovable,<a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a></p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) movable.<a id="FNanchor_97" href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">97</a></p></blockquote> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_168">168</a></span> -2. Private property:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) immovable,</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) movable.</p></blockquote> - -<p>Immovable State property is now no longer forfeited -as booty; it may, however, be used if such use -is in the interests of military operation, and even -destroyed, or temporarily administered. While in -the wars of the First French Empire, Napoleon, in -numerous cases, even during the war itself, disposed -of the public property of the enemy (domains, castles, -mines, salt-works) in favor of his Marshals and -diplomatists, to-day an appropriation of this kind is -considered by international opinion to be unjustified -and, in order to be valid, requires a formal treaty -between the conqueror and the conquered.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_107">The State -realty may -be used but -must not be -wasted.</div> - -<p>The Military Government by the army of occupation -is only a Usufructuary <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">pro tempore</i>. It must, -therefore, avoid every purposeless injury, it has no -right to sell or dispose of the property. According -to this juristic view the military administration of -the conqueror disposes of the public revenue and -taxes which are raised in the occupied territory, with -the understanding, however, that the regular and unavoidable -expenses of administration continue to be -defrayed. The military authority controls the railways -and telegraphs of the enemy’s State, but here -also it possesses only the right of use and has to give -back the material after the end of the war. In the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_169">169</a></span> -administration of the State forests, it is not bound -to follow the mode of administration of the enemy’s -Forest authorities, but it must not damage the woods -by excessive cutting, still less may it cut them down -altogether.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_108">State Personalty -is at -the mercy of -the victor.</div> - -<p>Movable State property on the other hand can, according -to modern views, be unconditionally appropriated -by the conqueror.</p> - -<p>This includes public funds,<a id="FNanchor_98" href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> arms, and munition -stores, magazines, transport, material supplies useful -for the war and the like. Since the possession of -things of this kind is of the highest importance for -the conduct of the war, the conqueror is justified in -destroying and annihilating them if he is not able to -keep them.</p> - -<p>On the other hand an exception is made as to all -objects which serve the purposes of religious worship, -education, the sciences and arts, charities and nursing. -Protection must therefore be extended to: the -property of churches and schools, of libraries and -museums, of almshouses and hospitals. The usual -practise of the Napoleonic campaigns<a id="FNanchor_99" href="#Footnote_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> so ruthlessly -resorted to of carrying off art treasures, antiquities,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_170">170</a></span> -and whole collections, in order to incorporate them -in one’s own art galleries, is no longer allowed by the -law of nations to-day.<a id="FNanchor_100" href="#Footnote_100" class="fnanchor">100</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_109">Private -realty.</div> - -<p>Immovable private property may well be the object -of military operations and military policy, but -cannot be appropriated as booty, nor expended for -fiscal or private purposes of acquisition. This also -includes, of course, the private property of the ruling -family, in so far as it really possesses this character -and is not Crown Lands, whose fruits are expended -as a kind of Civil List or serve to supplement the -same.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_110">Private -personalty.</div> - -<p>Movable private property, finally, which in earlier -times was the undeniable booty of the conqueror, is -to-day regarded as inviolable. The carrying off of -money, watches, rings, trinkets, or other objects of -value, is therefore to be regarded as criminal robbery -and to be punished accordingly.</p> - -<p>The appropriation of private property is regarded -as partially permissible in the case of those objects -which the conquered combatant carries on his own -person. Still here also, opinions against the practise -make it clear that the taking away of objects of value, -money, and such-like is not permissible, and only<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_171">171</a></span> -those required for the equipment of troops are declared -capable of appropriation.</p> - -<p>The recognition of the inviolability of private -property does not of course exclude the sequestration -of such objects as can, although they are private -property, at the same time be regarded as of use in -war. This includes, for example, warehouses of supplies, -stores of arms in factories, depots of conveyances -or other means of traffic, as bicycles, motor -cars, and the like, or other articles likely to be of use -with advantage to the army, as telescopes, etc. In -order to assure to the possessors compensation from -their government, equity enjoins that a receipt be -given for the sequestration.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_111">“Choses in -action.”</div> - -<p>Logically related to movable property are the so-called -“incorporeal things.” When Napoleon, for -example, appropriated the debts due to the Elector -of Hesse and thus compelled the Elector’s debtors to -pay their debts to him; when he furthermore in 1807 -allowed the debts owed by the inhabitants of the -Duchy of Warsaw to Prussian banks and other public -institutions, and indeed even to private persons in -Prussia, to be assigned by the King of Prussia, and -then sold them to the King of Saxony for 200 million -francs, this was, according to the modern view, nothing -better than robbery.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_112">Plundering -is wicked.</div> - -<p>Plundering is to be regarded as the worst form of -appropriation of a stranger’s property. By this is<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_172">172</a></span> -to be understood the robbing of inhabitants by the -employment of terror and the abuse of a military -superiority. The main point of the offense thus consists -in the fact that the perpetrator, finding himself -in the presence of the browbeaten owner, who feels -defenseless and can offer no opposition, appropriates -things, such as food and clothing, which he does not -want for his own needs. It is not plundering but -downright burglary if a man pilfers things out of -uninhabited houses or at times when the owner is -absent.</p> - -<p>Plundering is by the law of nations to-day to be regarded -as invariably unlawful. If it may be difficult -sometimes in the very heat of the fight to restrain -excited troops from trespasses, yet unlawful plundering, -extortion, or other violations of property, -must be most sternly punished, it matters not whether -it be done by members of unbroken divisions of -troops or by detached soldiers, so-called marauders, -or by the “hyenas of the battlefield.” To permit -such transgressions only leads, as experience shows, -to bad discipline and the demoralization of the -Army.<a id="FNanchor_101" href="#Footnote_101" class="fnanchor">101</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_173">173</a></span> -In the Franco-Prussian War, plundering and taking -of booty were on the German side sternly forbidden. -The Articles of War in question were repeatedly -recalled to every soldier just as in time of -peace, also numerous orders of the day were issued -on the part of the higher authorities. Transgressions -were ruthlessly punished, in some cases even -after the War.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_174">174</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_174">CHAPTER IV<br /> - -<span class="subhead">REQUISITIONS AND WAR LEVIES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_113">Requisitions.</div> - -<p>By requisitions is to be understood the compulsory -appropriation of certain objects necessary for the -army which is waging war. What things belong to -this category is quite undetermined. They were -primarily the means to feed man and beast, next to -clothe and equip the members of the army, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, to -substitute clothing and equipment for that which has -worn out or become insufficient in view of the altered -circumstances and also to supplement it; furthermore, -there will be such objects as serve for the transport -of necessaries, and finally all objects may be demanded -which serve to supply a temporary necessity, -such as material and tools for the building of fortifications, -bridges, railways and the like. That requisitions -of this kind are unconditionally necessary -and indispensable for the existence of the army, no -one has yet denied; and whether one bases it legally -upon necessity or merely upon the might of the -stronger is a matter of indifference as far as the practise -is concerned.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_175">175</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_114">How the -docile German -learnt -the “better -way.”</div> - -<p>The right generally recognized by the law of nations -of to-day to requisition is a child of the French -Revolution and its wars. It is known that as late as -in the year 1806, Prussian battalions camped close -to big stacks of corn and bivouacked on potato fields -without daring to appease their hunger with the property -of the stranger; the behavior of the French -soon taught them a better way. Every one knows the -ruthless fashion in which the army of the French -Republic and of Napoleon satisfied their wants, but -of late opinion laying stress upon the protection of -private property has asserted itself. Since a prohibition -of requisitions would, considering what war is, -have no prospect of acceptance under the law of nations, -the demand has been put forward that the -objects supplied should at least be paid for. This -idea has indeed up till now not become a principle -of war, the right of requisitioning without payment -exists as much as ever and will certainly be claimed -in the future by the armies in the field, and also, -considering the size of modern armies, must be -claimed; but it has at least become the custom to -requisition with as much forbearance as possible, and -to furnish a receipt for what is taken, the discharge -of which is then determined on the conclusion of -peace.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_115">To exhaust -the country -is deplorable -but we mean -to do it.</div> - -<p>In order to avoid overdoing it, as may easily happen -in the case of requisitions, it is often arranged<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_176">176</a></span> -that requisitions may never be demanded by subordinates -but only by the higher officers, and that -the local civil authorities shall be employed for the -purpose. It cannot, however, be denied that this is -not always possible in war; that on the contrary the -leader of a small detachment and in some circumstances -even a man by himself may be under the necessity -to requisition what is indispensable to him. -Article 40 of the Declaration of Brussels requires -that the requisitions (being written out) shall bear -a direct relation to the capacity and resources of -a country, and, indeed, the justification for this condition -would be willingly recognized by every one in -theory, but it will scarcely ever be observed in practise. -In cases of necessity the needs of the army will -alone decide, and a man does well generally to make -himself familiar with the reflection that, in the changing -and stormy course of a war, observance of the -orderly conduct of peaceful times is, with the best -will, impossible.</p> - -<p>In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870: much was -requisitioned on the German side. According to the -opinion of all impartial writers it was done with moderation -and the utmost tenderness for the inhabitants, -even if in isolated cases excesses occurred. Receipts -were always furnished. Later, in the case of -the army on the Meuse, as early as the middle of -October requisitions were, wherever it was possible,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_177">177</a></span> -entirely left out of account and everything was paid -for in cash. Later proceedings were frequently and -indeed studiously conducted with a precise estimate -of the value in thalers or francs.<a id="FNanchor_102" href="#Footnote_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> “Moreover, military -history knows of no campaign in which the victualing -of an army at such a distance from home was -so largely conducted with its own stores.”<a id="FNanchor_103" href="#Footnote_103" class="fnanchor">103</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_116">“Buccaneering -Levies.”</div> - -<p>By war levies or contributions is to be understood -the raising of larger or smaller sums of money from -the parishes of the occupied territory. They are thus -to be distinguished from requisitions since they do not -serve for the satisfaction of a momentary want of the -army and consequently can only in the rarest cases -be based upon the necessity of war. These levies -originated as so-called “Brandschatzungen,” <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, as -a ransom from plundering and devastation, and thus -constituted, compared with the earlier looting system, -a step in the humanizing of war. Since the -law of nations to-day no longer recognizes any right -to plundering and devastation, and inasmuch as the -principle that war is conducted only against States, -and not against private persons, is uncontested, it -follows logically that levies which can be characterized -as simply booty-making or plundering, that is to -say, as arbitrary enrichment of the conquerors, are -not permitted by modern opinion. The conqueror is,<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_178">178</a></span> -in particular, not justified in recouping himself for -the cost of the war by inroads upon the property of -private persons, even though the war was forced upon -him.</p> - -<p>War levies are therefore only allowed:</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. As a substitute for taxes.</p> - -<p>2. As a substitute for the supplies to be furnished as -requisitions by the population.</p> - -<p>3. As punishments.</p></blockquote> - -<p>As to 1: This rests upon the right of the power -in occupation to raise and utilize taxes.</p> - -<p>As to 2: In cases where the provision of prescribed -objects in a particular district is impossible, -and in consequence the deficiency has to be met by -purchase in a neighboring district.</p> - -<p>As to 3: War levies as a means of punishing individuals -or whole parishes were very frequently employed -in the Franco-Prussian War. If French -writers accuse the German staff of excessive severity -in this respect, on the other hand it is to be remarked -that the embittered character which the war -took on in its latest stage, and the lively participation -of the population therein, necessitated the sternest -measures. But a money tax, judging by experience, -operates, in most cases, on the civil population. The -total sum of all the money contributions raised in -the War of 1870 may be called a minimum compared -with the sums which Napoleon was accustomed to<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_179">179</a></span> -draw from the territories occupied by him. According -to official estimates, havoc amounting to about six -milliards of francs was visited upon the four million -inhabitants of Prussia in the years 1807–13.</p> - -<p>In regard to the raising of war levies it should be -noted that they should only be decreed by superior -officers and only raised with the cooperation of the -local authorities. Obviously an acknowledgment of -every sum raised is to be furnished.</p> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. In the military laws of different countries the right -of levying contributions is exclusively reserved -to the Commander-in-Chief.</p> - -<p>2. The usual method of raising taxes would, in consequence -of their slowness, not be in harmony -with the demands of the War; usually, therefore, -the Civil Authorities provide themselves with the -necessary money by a loan, the repayment of -which is provided for later by law.</p></blockquote> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_180">180</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_180">CHAPTER V<br /> - -<span class="subhead">ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORY</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_117">How to -administer -an Invaded -Country.</div> - -<p>According to earlier views right up to the last century, -a Government whose army had victoriously -forced itself into the territory of a foreign State -could do exactly as it pleased in the part occupied. -No regard was to be paid to the constitution, laws, -and rights of the inhabitants. Modern times have -now introduced, in this respect, a change in the dominant -conceptions, and have established a certain legal -relationship between the inhabitants and the army of -occupation. If, in the following pages, we develop -briefly the principles which are applied to the government -of territory in occupation, it must none the -less be clearly emphasized that the necessities of war -not only allow a deviation from these principles in -many cases but in some circumstances make it a -positive duty of the Commander.</p> - -<p>The occupation of a portion of the enemy’s territory -does not amount to an annexation of it. The -right of the original State authority consequently remains -in existence; it is only suspended when it -comes into collision with the stronger power of the<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_181">181</a></span> -conqueror during the term of the occupation, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, -only for the time being.<a id="FNanchor_104" href="#Footnote_104" class="fnanchor">104</a></p> - -<p>But the administration of a country itself cannot -be interrupted by war; it is therefore in the interest -of the country and its inhabitants themselves, if the -conqueror takes it in hand, to let it be carried on -either with the help of the old, or, if this is not -feasible, through the substitution of the new, authorities.</p> - -<p>From this fundamental conception now arises a -series of rights and duties of the conqueror on the -one side and of the inhabitants on the other.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_118">The Laws -remain—with -qualification.</div> - -<p>Since the conqueror is only the substitute for the -real Government, he will have to establish the continuation -of the administration of the country with -the help of the existing laws and regulations. The -issue of new laws, the abolition or alteration of old -ones, and the like, are to be avoided if they are not -excused by imperative requirements of war; only the -latter permit legislation which exceeds the need of -a provisional administration. The French Republic, -at the end of the eighteenth century, frequently abolished -the preexisting constitution in the States conquered<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_182">182</a></span> -by it, and substituted a Republican one, but -this is none the less contrary to the law of nations -to-day. On the other hand, a restriction of the freedom -of the Press, of the right of association, and of -public meeting, the suspension of the right of election -to the Parliament and the like, are in some circumstances -a natural and unavoidable consequence of the -state of war.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_119">The Inhabitants -must -obey.</div> - -<p>The inhabitants of the occupied territory owe the -same obedience to the organs of Government and administration -of the conqueror as they owed before -the occupation to their own. An act of disobedience -cannot be excused by reference to the laws or commands -of one’s own Government; even so an attempt -to remain associated with the old Government or to -act in agreement with it is punishable. On the other -hand, the provisional Government can demand nothing -which can be construed as an offense against one’s -own Fatherland or as a direct or indirect participation -in the war.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_120">Martial Law.</div> - -<p>The civil and criminal jurisdiction continues in -force as before. The introduction of an extraordinary -administration of justice—martial law and -courts-martial—is therefore only to take place if -the behavior of the inhabitants makes it necessary. -The latter are, in this respect, to be cautioned, and -any such introduction is to be made known by appropriate -means. The courts-martial must base any<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_183">183</a></span> -sentence on the fundamental laws of justice, after -they have first impartially examined, however summarily, -the facts and have allowed the accused a free -defense.</p> - -<p>The conqueror can, as administrator of the country -and its Government, depose or appoint officials. -He can put on their oath the civil servants, who continue -to act, as regards the scrupulous discharge of -their duties. But to compel officials to continue in -office against their will does not appear to be in the -interest of the army of occupation. Transgressions -by officials are punished by the laws of their country, -but an abuse of their position to the prejudice of the -army of occupation will be punished by martial law.</p> - -<p>Also judicial officers can be deposed if they permit -themselves to oppose publicly the instructions of the -provisional Government. Thus it would not have -been possible, if the occupation of Lorraine in the -year 1870–71 had been protracted, to avoid deposing -the whole bench of Judges at Nancy and substituting -German Judges, since they could not agree -with the German demands in regard to the promulgation -of sentence.<a id="FNanchor_105" href="#Footnote_105" class="fnanchor">105</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_184">184</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_121">Fiscal Policy.</div> - -<p>The financial administration of the occupied territory -passes into the hands of the conqueror. The -taxes are raised in the preexisting fashion. Any increase -in them due to the war is enforced in the form -of “War levies.” Out of the revenue of the taxes -the costs of the administration are to be defrayed, as, -generally speaking, the foundations of the State property -are to be kept undisturbed. Thus the domains, -forests, woodlands, public buildings and the like, although -utilized, leased, or let out, are not to be sold -or rendered valueless by predatory management. On -the other hand it is permitted to apply all surplus -from the revenues of administration to the use of the -conqueror.</p> - -<p>The same thing holds good of railways, telegraphs, -telephones, canals, steamships, submarine cables and -similar things; the conqueror has the right of sequestration, -of use and of appropriation of any receipts, -as against which it is incumbent upon him to -keep them in good repair.</p> - -<p>If these establishments belong to private persons, -then he has indeed the right to use them to the fullest -extent; on the other hand he has not the right to -sequestrate the receipts. As regards the right of annexing -the rolling-stock of the railways, the opinions<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_185">185</a></span> -of authoritative teachers of the law of nations differ -from one another. Whilst one section regard all -rolling-stock as one of the most important war resources -of the enemy’s State, and in consequence -claim for the conqueror the right of unlimited sequestration, -even if the railways belonged to private -persons or private companies,<a id="FNanchor_106" href="#Footnote_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> on the other hand the -other section incline to a milder interpretation of -the question, in that they start from the view that -the rolling-stock forms, along with the immovable -material of the railways, an inseparable whole, and -that one without the other is worthless and is therefore -subject to the same laws as to appropriation.<a id="FNanchor_107" href="#Footnote_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> -The latter view in the year 1871 found practical recognition -in so far as the rolling-stock captured in -large quantities by the Germans on the French railways -was restored at the end of the war; a corresponding -regulation was also adopted by the Hague Conference -in 1899.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_122">Occupation -must be real -not fictitious.</div> - -<p>These are the chief principles for the administration -of an occupied country or any portion of it. -From them emerges quite clearly on the one hand -the duties of the population, but also on the other -the limits of the power of the conqueror. But the -enforcement of all these laws presupposes the actual -occupation of the enemy’s territory and the possibility<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_186">186</a></span> -of really carrying them out.<a id="FNanchor_108" href="#Footnote_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> So-called “fictitious -occupation,” such as frequently occurred in -the eighteenth century and only existed in a declaration -of the claimant, without the country concerned -being actually occupied, are no longer recognized by -influential authorities on the law of nations as valid. -If the conqueror is compelled by the vicissitudes of -war to quit an occupied territory, or if it is voluntarily -given up by him, then his military sovereignty -immediately ceases and the old State authority of -itself again steps into its rights and duties.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_187">187</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<h2 id="h_187">PART III<br /> - -<span class="subhead">USAGES OF WAR AS REGARDS NEUTRAL STATES</span></h2> -</div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_123">What neutrality -means.</div> - -<p>By the neutrality of a State is to be understood non-participation -in the war by third parties; the duly -attested intention not to participate in the conduct of -the war either in favor of, or to the prejudice of, -either one of the two belligerents. This relationship -gives rise in the case of the neutral State to certain -rights but also to fixed duties. These are not laid -down by international regulations or international -treaties; we have therefore here also to do with -“Usages of War.”</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_124">A neutral -cannot be all -things to all -men; therefore -he must -be nothing to -any of them.</div> - -<p>What is principally required of a neutral State is -equal treatment of both belligerents. If, therefore, -the neutral State could support the belligerents at all, -it would have to give its support in equal measure to -both parties. As this is quite impossible and as one -of the two parties—and probably every one of them—would -regard itself as injured in any case, it -therefore follows as a practical and empirical principle -“not to support the two [<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, either or both] -belligerents is the fundamental condition of neutrality.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_188">188</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_125">But there -are limits to -this detachment.</div> - -<p>But this principle would scarcely be maintained in -its entirety, because in that case the trade and intercourse -of the neutral State would in some circumstances -be more injured than that of the belligerents -themselves. But no State can be compelled to act -against its own vital interests, therefore it is necessary -to limit the above principle as follows: “No -neutral State can support the belligerents as far as -military operations are concerned. This principle -sounds very simple and lucid, its content is, however, -when closely considered very ambiguous and in -consequence the danger of dissensions between neutral -and belligerent States is very obvious.”</p> - -<p>In the following pages the chief duties of neutral -States are to be briefly developed. It is here assumed -that neutrality is not to be regarded as synonymous -with indifference and impartiality towards -the belligerents and the continuance of the war. As -regards the expression of partizanship all that is required -of neutral States is the observance of international -courtesies; so long as these are observed -there is no occasion for interference.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_126">Duties of the -neutral.</div> - -<p>The chief duties of neutral States are to be regarded -as:</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_127">Belligerents -must be -warned off.</div> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. The territory of neutral States is available for none -of the belligerents for the conduct of its military -operations.<a id="FNanchor_109" href="#Footnote_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> The Government of the neutral<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_189">189</a></span> -State has therefore, once War is declared, to -prevent the subjects of both parties from marching -through it; it has likewise to prevent the -laying out of factories and workshops for the -manufacture of War requisites for one or -other of the parties. Also the organization of -troops and the assembling of “Freelances” on -the territory of neutral States is not allowed by -the law of nations.<a id="FNanchor_110" href="#Footnote_110" class="fnanchor">110</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_128">The neutral -must guard -its inviolable -frontiers. It -must intern -the Trespassers.</div> - -<p>2. If the frontiers of the neutral State march with -those of the territory where the War is being -waged, its Government must take care to occupy -its own frontiers in sufficient strength to prevent<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_190">190</a></span> -any portions of the belligerent Armies stepping -across it with the object of marching -through or of recovering after a Battle, or of -withdrawing from War captivity. Every member -of the belligerent Army who trespasses upon -the territory of the neutral State is to be disarmed -and to be put out of action till the end of -the War. If whole detachments step across, they -must likewise be dealt with. They are, indeed, -not prisoners of War, but, nevertheless, are to be -prevented from returning to the seat of War. A -discharge before the end of the War would presuppose -a particular arrangement of all parties -concerned.</p> - -<p class="nohang">If a convention to cross over is concluded, -then, according to the prevalent usages of War, -a copy of the conditions is to be sent to the Victor.<a id="FNanchor_111" href="#Footnote_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> -If the troops passing through are taking -with them prisoners of War, then these are to -be treated in like fashion. Obviously, the neutral -State can later demand compensation for the -maintenance and care of the troops who have -crossed over, or it can keep back War material -as a provisional payment. Material which is -liable to be spoilt, or the keeping of which would -be disproportionately costly, as, for example, a -considerable number of horses, can be sold, and<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_191">191</a></span> -the net proceeds set off against the cost of internment.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_129">Unneutral -service.</div> - -<div class="hideb"> </div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_130">The “sinews -of war”—loans -to -belligerents.</div> - -<p>3. A neutral State can support no belligerent by furnishing -military resources of any kind whatsoever, -and is bound to prevent as much as possible -the furnishing of such wholesale on the part -of its subjects. The ambiguity of the notion -“Kriegsmittel” has often led to complications. -The most indispensable means for the conduct -of a War is money. For this very reason it is -difficult to prevent altogether the support of one -or other party by citizens of neutral States, since -there will always be Bankers who, in the interest -of the State in whose success they put confidence, -and whose solvency in the case of a defeat they -do not doubt, will promote a loan. Against this -nothing can be said from the point of view of -the law of nations; rather the Government of a -country cannot be made responsible for the actions -of individual citizens, it could only accept -responsibility if business of this kind was done -by Banks immediately under the control of the -State or on public Stock Exchanges.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_131">Contraband -of War.</div> - -<p class="nohang">It is otherwise with the supply of contraband -of war, that is to say, such things as are supplied -to a belligerent for the immediate support -of war as being warlike resources and equipment. -These may include:</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) Weapons of war (guns, rifles, sabers, etc., -ammunition, powder and other explosives, -and military conveyances, etc.).</p> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) Any materials out of which this kind of -war supplies can be manufactured, such as -<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_192">192</a></span>saltpeter, sulphur, coal, leather, and the -like.</p> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) Horses and mules.</p> - -<p>(<i>d</i>) Clothing and equipment (such as uniforms -of all kinds, cooking utensils, leather -straps, and footwear).</p> - -<p>(<i>e</i>) Machines, motor-cars, bicycles, telegraphic -apparatus, and the like.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_132">Good -business.</div> - -<p class="nohang">All these things are indispensable for the conduct -of war, their supply in great quantities -means a proportionately direct support of the -belligerent. On the other hand, it cannot be -left out of account that many of the above-mentioned -objects also pertain to the peaceable needs -of men, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, to the means without which the -practise of any industry would be impossible, -and the feeding of great masses of the population -doubtful. The majority of European -States are, even in time of peace, dependent on -the importation from other countries of horses, -machines, coal, and the like, even as they are -upon that of corn, preserved foods, store cattle, -and other necessaries of life. The supply of -such articles by subjects of a neutral State may, -therefore, be just as much an untainted business -transaction and pacific, as a support of a belligerent. -The question whether the case amounts to -the one or the other is therefore to be judged -each time upon its merits. In practise, the following -conceptions have developed themselves in -the course of time:</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_133">Foodstuffs.</div> - -<blockquote> - -<p>(<i>a</i>) The purchase of necessaries of life, store -cattle, preserved foods, etc., in the territory<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_193">193</a></span> -of a neutral, even if it is meant, as a -matter of common knowledge, for the revictualing -of the Army, is not counted a -violation of neutrality, provided only that -such purchases are equally open to both -parties.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_134">Contraband -on a small -scale.</div> - -<p>(<i>b</i>) The supply of contraband of war, in small -quantities, on the part of subjects of a -neutral State to one of the belligerents is, -so far as it bears the character of a peaceable -business transaction and not that of -an intentional aid to the war, not a violation -of neutrality. No Government can be -expected to prevent it in isolated and trivial -cases, since it would impose on the States -concerned quite disproportionate exertions, -and on their citizens countless sacrifices -of money and time. He who supplies -a belligerent with contraband does so on -his own account and at his own peril, and -exposes himself to the risk of Prize.<a id="FNanchor_112" href="#Footnote_112" class="fnanchor">112</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_194">194</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_135">And on a -large scale.</div> - -<p>(<i>c</i>) The supply of war resources on a large -scale stands in a different position. Undoubtedly -this presents a case of actual -promotion of a belligerent’s cause, and generally -of a warlike succor. If, therefore, -a neutral State wishes to place its detachment -from the war beyond doubt, and to -exhibit it clearly, it must do its utmost to -prevent such supplies being delivered. -The instructions to the Customs authorities -must thus be clearly and precisely set -out, that on the one hand they notify the -will of the Government to set their face -against such wanton bargains with all their -might, but that on the other, they do not -arbitrarily restrict and cripple the total -home trade.</p></blockquote> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_136">The practise -differs.</div> - -<p class="nohang">In accordance with this view many neutral -States, such as Switzerland, Belgium, Japan, etc., -did, during the Franco-Prussian War, forbid all -supply or transit of arms to a belligerent, whilst -England and the United States put no kind of -obstacles whatsoever in the way of the traffic -in arms, and contented themselves with drawing -the attention of their commercial classes to the -fact that arms were contraband, and were therefore -exposed to capture on the part of the injured -belligerent.<a id="FNanchor_113" href="#Footnote_113" class="fnanchor">113</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_195">195</a></span></p> - -<p class="nohang">It is evident, therefore, that the views of this -particular relation of nations with each other -still need clearing up, and that the unanimity -which one would desire on this question does not -exist.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_137">Who may -pass—the -Sick and the -Wounded.</div> - -<p>4. The neutral State may allow the passage or transport -of wounded or sick through its territory -without thereby violating its neutrality; it has, -however, to watch that hospital trains do not -carry with them either war personnel or war -material with the exception of that which is -necessary for the care of the sick.<a id="FNanchor_114" href="#Footnote_114" class="fnanchor">114</a></p> -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_196">196</a></span></p> -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_138">Who may -not pass—Prisoners -of -War.</div> - -<p>5. The passage or transport of prisoners of war -through neutral territory is, on the other hand, -not to be allowed, since this would be an open -favoring of the belligerent who happened to be -in a position to make prisoners of war on a large -scale, while his own railways, water highways, -and other means of transport remained free for -exclusively military purposes.</p></blockquote> - -<p>These are the most important duties of neutral -States so far as land warfare is concerned. If they -are disregarded by the neutral State itself, then it -has to give satisfaction or compensation to the belligerent -who is prejudiced thereby. This case may -also occur if the Government of the neutral State, -with the best intentions to abstain from proceedings -which violate neutrality, has, through domestic or -foreign reasons, not the power to make its intentions -good. If, for example, one of the two belligerents -by main force marches through the territory of a -neutral State and this State is not in a position to -put an end to this violation of its neutrality, then -the other belligerent has the right to engage the -enemy on the hitherto neutral territory.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_139">Rights of -the neutral.</div> - -<p>The duties of neutral States involve corresponding -rights, such as:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_197">197</a></span></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_140">The neutral -has the right -to be left -alone.</div> - -<blockquote class="hang"> - -<p>1. The neutral State has the right to be regarded as -still at peace with the belligerents as with -others.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_141">Neutral -territory is -sacred.</div> - -<p>2. The belligerent States have to respect the inviolability -of the neutral and the undisturbed exercise -of its sovereignty in its home affairs, to abstain -from any attack upon the same, even if the -necessity of war should make such an attack desirable. -Neutral States, therefore, possess also -the right of asylum for single members or adherents -of the belligerent Powers, so far as no -favor to one or other of them is thereby implied. -Even the reception of a smaller or larger detachment -of troops which is fleeing from pursuit does -not give the pursuer the right to continue his -pursuit across the frontier of the neutral territory. -It is the business of the neutral State -to prevent troops crossing over in order to reassemble -in the chosen asylum, reform, and sally -out to a new attack.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_142">The neutral -may resist a -violation of -its territory -“with all -the means -in its -power.”</div> - -<p>3. If the territory of a neutral State is trespassed -upon by one of the belligerent parties for the -purpose of its military operations, then this -State has the right to proceed against this violation -of its territory with all the means in its -power and to disarm the trespassers. If the -trespass has been committed on the orders of the -Army Staff, then the State concerned is bound -to give satisfaction and compensation; if it has -been committed on their own responsibility, then -the individual offenders can be punished as -criminals. If the violation of the neutral territory -is due to ignorance of its frontiers and not<span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_198">198</a></span> -to evil intention, then the neutral State can demand -the immediate removal of the wrong, and -can insist on necessary measures being taken to -prevent a repetition of such contempts.</p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_143">Neutrality -is presumed.</div> - -<p>4. Every neutral State can, so long as it itself keeps -faith, demand that the same respect shall be -paid to it as in time of peace. It is entitled -to the presumption that it will observe strict -neutrality and will not make use of any declarations -or other transactions as a cloak for an injustice -against one belligerent in favor of the -other, or will use them indifferently for both. -This is particularly important in regard to -Passes, Commissions, and credentials issued by -a neutral State.<a id="FNanchor_115" href="#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">115</a></p> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_144">The property -of neutrals.</div> - -<p>5. The property of the neutral State, as also that of -its citizens, is, even if it lies within the seat of -war, to be respected so far as the necessity of war -allows. It can obviously be attacked and even -destroyed in certain circumstances by the belligerents, -but only if complete compensation be -afterwards made to the injured owners. Thus—to -make this clear by an example from the -year 1870—the capture and sinking of six English -colliers at Duclaix was both justified and -necessary on military grounds, but it was, for -all that, a violent violation of English property, -for which on the English side compensation was -demanded, and on the German side was readily -forthcoming.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="Page_199">199</a></span></p> -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_145">Diplomatic -Intercourse.</div> - -<p>6. Neutral States may continue to maintain diplomatic -intercourse with the belligerent Powers -undisturbed, so far as military measures do -not raise obstacles in the way of it.</p></blockquote> -</div> - -<p class="p2 center smaller">THE END</p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="footnotes"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1">FOOTNOTES</h2> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="fnanchor">1</a> <cite xml:lang="it" lang="it">Il Principe</cite>, cap. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="fnanchor">2</a> No! the Hague Regulations, Art. 44: “Any compulsion by -a belligerent on the population of occupied territory to give -information as to the army of the other belligerent, or as to -his means of defense, is prohibited.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> No! the English <cite>Manual of Military Law</cite>, ch. xiv, sec. 463.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> Yes! the Hague Regulations, Art. 52: “They must be in -proportion to the resources of the country”; and to the same -effect the English <cite>Manual of Military Law</cite>, sec. 416, and the -British Requisitioning Instructions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> Yes! the Hague Regulations, Arts. 23 and 52; also <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Actes et -Documents</cite> (of the Conference), III, p. 120.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="fnanchor">6</a> Yes! the Hague Regulations, Art. 2: “The population of -a territory which has not been occupied who on the approach -of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading -troops, without having had time to organize themselves -in accordance with Article I, shall be regarded as belligerents.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> The whole of these propositions, revolting as they may -appear, are taken almost literally from the text of the War -Book, to which I refer the reader for their context.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="fnanchor">8</a> Clausewitz: <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Vom Kriege</cite>, I, Kap. 1 (2).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_9" href="#FNanchor_9" class="fnanchor">9</a> <cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</cite> V, Kap. 14 (3). Clausewitz’s definition of requisitions -is “seizing everything which is to be found in the country, -without regard to <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">meum</i> and <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">tuum</i>.” The German War -Book after much prolegomenous sentiment arrives at the same -conclusion eventually.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_10" href="#FNanchor_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegsraison</i> I have translated as “the argument of war.” -“Necessity of war” is too free a rendering, and when necessity -is urged “<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">nötig</i>” or “<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Notwendigkeit</i>” is the term used in -the original. <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegsmanier</i> is literally the “fashion of war” -and means the customary rules of which <i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kriegsraison</i> makes -havoc by exceptions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_11" href="#FNanchor_11" class="fnanchor">11</a> Holtzendorff, IV, 378.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_12" href="#FNanchor_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> In Holtzendorff’s <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Handbuch des Völkerrechts</cite>, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_13" href="#FNanchor_13" class="fnanchor">13</a> Baron Marshall von Bieberstein. <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Actes et Documents</cite> -(1907), J. 86.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_14" href="#FNanchor_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Actes et Documents</cite> (1907), I, 281 (Sir Edward Satow).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_15" href="#FNanchor_15" class="fnanchor">15</a> <cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</cite>, p. 282 (Baron Marschall von Bieberstein), and p. 86.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_16" href="#FNanchor_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> Holtzendorff, III, pp. 93, 108, 109.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_17" href="#FNanchor_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> <cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</cite> The whole subject (of the neutrality of Belgium) is -examined by the present writer in <cite>War, its Conduct and its -Legal Results</cite> (John Murray).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_18" href="#FNanchor_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Vom Kriege</cite>, VIII, Kap. 6 (<span class="smcap smaller">B</span>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_19" href="#FNanchor_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> <cite>The Nation in Arms</cite>, sec. 3: “Policy <em>creates</em> the total -situation in which the State engages in the struggle”; and -again, “it is clear that the political action and military action -ought always to be closely united.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_20" href="#FNanchor_20" class="fnanchor">20</a> <cite>Germany and the Next War</cite>: “The appropriate and conscious -employment of war as a political means has always led -to happy results.” And again, “The relations between two -States must often be termed <em>a latent war</em> which is provisionally -being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such a position justifies -the employment of hostile methods, just as war itself does, -since in such a case both parties are determined to employ -them.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_21" href="#FNanchor_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> The Bundesrath is a Second Chamber, a Cabinet or Executive -Council, and a Federal Congress of State Governments -all in one. Indeed, its resemblance to a Second Chamber is -superficial. It can dissolve the Reichstag when it pleases. -See Laband, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Die Entwickelung des Bundesraths, Jahrbuch des -Oeffentlichen Rechts</cite>, 1907, Vol. I, p. 18, and also his <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Deutsches -Staatsrecht</cite>, Vol. I, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">passim</i>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_22" href="#FNanchor_22" class="fnanchor">22</a> I have based the remarks which follow on a close study of -German, French, and English authorities—among others upon -the following: Bismarck, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gedanken und Erinnerungen</cite>; Hohenlohe, -<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Denkwürdigkeiten</cite>; Hanotaux, <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Histoire de la France -Contemporaine</cite>; de Broglie, <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron</cite>; -Fitzmaurice, <cite>The Life of Lord Granville</cite>. All these are the -works of statesmen who could legitimately say of their times -<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">quorum pars magna fui</i>. Lord Fitzmaurice’s book, apart from -its being the work of a statesman, whose knowledge of foreign -affairs is equaled by few and surpassed by none, is indispensable -to a study of Anglo-German relations since 1850, -being based on diplomatic sources, in particular the despatches -of Lord Odo Russell. Some passages in <cite>The Life of Lord Lytton</cite> -are also illuminating, likewise the essays of that prince -of French historians, Albert Sorel. But I have, of course, also -gone to the text of treaties and original documents.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_23" href="#FNanchor_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> The study which follows is based on cosmopolitan materials: -The reader must exercise great caution in using political -memories such as those of Bismarck. In autobiography, -of all forms of history, as Goethe observes in the preface to -<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Wahrheit und Dichtung</cite>, it is supremely difficult for the writer -to escape self-deception; he is so apt to read himself backwards -and to mistake society’s influence upon him for his influence -upon society. In the case of Bismarck in particular, -his autobiography often took the form of apologetics, and he -invests his actions with a foresight which they did not always -possess, while, on the other hand, he is so anxious to depreciate -his rivals (particularly Gortchakoff) that he often robs -himself of the prestige of victory. Hohenlohe is, in this respect, -a far safer guide. He was not as great a man as Bismarck, -but he was an infinitely more honest one.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_24" href="#FNanchor_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gedanken und Erinnerungen</cite>, Bd. II, Kap. 29, p. 287.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_25" href="#FNanchor_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> Notes of Lord Odo Russell, British Ambassador at Berlin, -of a conversation with Bismarck, reported in a despatch of -November 22nd, 1870, to Lord Granville, and published in the -Parliamentary Papers of 1871 [Cd. 245].</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_26" href="#FNanchor_26" class="fnanchor">26</a> <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Gedanken und Erinnerungen</cite>, II, Kap. 23.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_27" href="#FNanchor_27" class="fnanchor">27</a> See the remarkable articles, based on unpublished documents -by M. Hanotaux, in the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Revue des deux Mondes</cite>, Sept. -15th and Oct. 1st, 1908, on “Le Congrès de Berlin.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_28" href="#FNanchor_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> “No man ever had a more effective manner of asseverating, -or made promises with more solemn protestations, or observed -them less,” <cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">Il Principe</cite>, Cap. 18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_29" href="#FNanchor_29" class="fnanchor">29</a> Cf. Lord Ampthill’s despatch (Aug. 25th, 1884). “He -has discovered an unexplored mine of popularity in starting a -colonial policy which public opinion persuades itself to be anti-English, -and the slumbering theoretical envy of the Germans -at our wealth and our freedom has taken the form of abuse -of everything English in the Press.”—Fitzmaurice’s <cite>Granville</cite>, -II, 358.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_30" href="#FNanchor_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> For a careful examination of the story see Fitzmaurice, -II, 234 and 429.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_31" href="#FNanchor_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> There is a spirited, but not altogether convincing, vindication -of Ferry in Rambaud’s <cite>Jules Ferry</cite>, p. 395. It is not -Ferry’s honesty that is in question, but his perspicacity.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_32" href="#FNanchor_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> Its profound reactions have been worked out by the hand -of a master in Sorel’s <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">L’Europe et la Révolution française</cite>, -and, in particular, in his <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">La Question d’Orient</cite>, which is a -searching analysis of these tortuous intrigues.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_33" href="#FNanchor_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> Cf. Bismarck’s <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Erinnerungen</cite> (the chapter on the Alvensleben -Convention): “It was our interest to oppose the party -in the Russian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities ... because -a Polish-Russian policy was calculated to vitalize that -Russo-French sympathy against which Prussia’s effort had -been directed since the peace of Paris.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_34" href="#FNanchor_34" class="fnanchor">34</a> <cite>Life of Lord Lytton</cite>, II, pp. 260 <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">seq.</i> On the whole story -see Hohenlohe <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">passim</i>; also Hanotaux, Vol. III, ch. iv; de -Broglie’s <cite>Gontaut-Biron</cite> and Fitzmaurice’s <cite>Granville</cite>. The -cheerfully malevolent Busch is also sometimes illuminating.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_35" href="#FNanchor_35" class="fnanchor">35</a> It was on this occasion that, according to Hanotaux, -quoting from a private document of the Duc Decazes, Lord -Odo Russell reported an interview with Bismarck, in which -the latter said he wanted “to finish France off.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_36" href="#FNanchor_36" class="fnanchor">36</a> Cf. Albert Sorel: “La diplomatie est l’expression des -moeurs politiques”; and cf. his remarkable essay, “La Diplomatie -et le progrés,” in <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Essais d’histoire et de critique</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_37" href="#FNanchor_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> June 3rd, 1906, in a remarkable article entitled “Holstein,” -which is a close study of the inner organization of -the German Foreign Office and its traditions.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_38" href="#FNanchor_38" class="fnanchor">38</a> [The word used is “geistig,” as to the exact meaning of -which see translator’s <a href="#Footnote_40">footnote to page 72</a>. What the passage -amounts to is that the belligerent should seek to break the -spirit of the civil population, terrorize them, humiliate them, -and reduce them to despair.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_39" href="#FNanchor_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> Moltke, in his well-known correspondence with Professor -Bluntschli, is moved to denounce the St. Petersburg Convention -which designs as “le seul but légitime” of waging war, -“l’affaiblissement des forces militaires,” and this he denies -most energetically on the ground that, on the contrary, all -the resources of the enemy, country, finances, railways, means -of subsistence, even the prestige of the enemy’s government, -ought to be attacked. [This, of course, means the policy of -“Terrorismus,” <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, terrorization.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_40" href="#FNanchor_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> [“Den geistigen Strömungen.” “Intellectual” is the nearest -equivalent in English, but it barely conveys the spiritual -aureole surrounding the word.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_41" href="#FNanchor_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> [The General Staff always refers to the war of 1870 as “the -German-French War.”—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_42" href="#FNanchor_42" class="fnanchor">42</a> Art. 9 (1).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_43" href="#FNanchor_43" class="fnanchor">43</a> The necessity of an adequate mark of distinction was not -denied even on the part of the French in the violent controversy -which blazed up between the German and French Governments -on the subject of the Franctireurs in the war of -1870–1. The dispute was mainly concerned with the question -whether the marks worn by the Franctireurs were sufficient -or not. This was denied on the German side in many -cases with all the greater justification as the usual dress of -the Franctireurs, the national blue, was not to be distinguished -from the customary national dress, as it was merely -a blouse furnished with a red armlet. Besides which, on the -approach of German troops, the armlet was often taken off -and the weapons were concealed, thereby offending against the -principle of open bearing. These kind of offenses, as also the -lack of a firm organization and the consequent irregularities, -were the simple reason why stern treatment of the Franctireurs -in the Franco-Prussian War was practised and had necessarily -to be practised.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_44" href="#FNanchor_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> The effacement of the distinction between fighting forces -and peaceful population on the part of the Boers no doubt -made many of the severities practised by the English necessary.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_45" href="#FNanchor_45" class="fnanchor">45</a> [<i xml:lang="la" lang="la">i.e.</i>, the condition as to having a distinctive mark. So -too, the Hague Regulations dispense with the other condition -(of having a responsible leader and an organization) in such -a case of a <i xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">levée en masse</i>. See Regulations, Art. II.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_46" href="#FNanchor_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> Professor Dr. C. Lüder, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Das Landkriegsrecht</cite>, Hamburg, -1888. [This is the amiable professor who writes in Holtzendorff’s -<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Handbuch des Völkerrechts</cite> (IV, 378) of “the terrorism -so often necessary in war.”—J. H. M.] -</p> -<p> -[The above paragraph, it will be observed, completely throws -over Article II of the Hague Regulations extending protection -to the defenders of their country.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_47" href="#FNanchor_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> Notoriously resorted to very often in the war of the Spanish -against Napoleon.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_48" href="#FNanchor_48" class="fnanchor">48</a> Napoleon was, in the year 1815, declared an outlaw by the -Allies. Such a proceeding is not permissible by the International -Law of to-day since it involves an indirect invitation -to assassination. Also the offer of a reward for the capture -of a hostile prince or commander as occurred in August, -1813, on the part of the Crown Prince of Sweden in regard -to Napoleon, is no longer in harmony with the views of to-day -and the usages of war. [But to hire a third person to -assassinate one’s opponent is claimed by the German General -Staff (see II, b, below) as quite legitimate.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_49" href="#FNanchor_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> As against this there have been many such offenses committed -in the wars of recent times, principally on the Turkish -side in the Russo-Turkish War.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_50" href="#FNanchor_50" class="fnanchor">50</a> This prohibition was often sinned against by the French -in the war of 1870–71. Cp. Bismarck’s despatches of Jan. 9th -and Feb. 7th, 1871; also Bluntschli in <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Holtzendorff’s Jahrbuch</cite>, -I, p. 279, where a similar reproach brought against the Baden -troops is refuted.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_51" href="#FNanchor_51" class="fnanchor">51</a> If we have principally in view the employment of uncivilized -and barbarous troops on a European seat of war, that is -simply because the war of 1870 lies nearest to us in point of -time and of space. On a level with it is the employment of -Russo-Asiatic nationalities in the wars of emancipation, of -Indians in the North-American War, of the Circassians in the -Polish Rising, of the Bashi-bazouks in the Russo-Turkish War, -etc. As regards the Turcos, a Belgian writer Rolin-Jacquémyns -said of them in regard to the war of 1859, “les allures -et le conduite des Turcos avaient soulevé d’universels dégoûts.” -On the other side it is not to be forgotten that a section of the -French Press in 1870 praised them precisely because of their -bestialities and incited them to such things, thus in the <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Independance -algerienne</cite>: “Arrière la pitié! arrière les sentiments -d’humanité! Mort, pillage et incendie!”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_52" href="#FNanchor_52" class="fnanchor">52</a> Recent examples: the capture of the King of Saxony by -the Allies after the Battle of Leipzig, and also of Napoleon, -that of the Elector of Hesse, 1866, Napoleon III, 1870, Abdel-Kader, -1847, and Schamyl, 1859.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_53" href="#FNanchor_53" class="fnanchor">53</a> In this light must be judged the measures taken in 1866 -by General Vogel von Falckenstein against certain Hanoverian -citizens although these measures have often been represented -in another light.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_54" href="#FNanchor_54" class="fnanchor">54</a> Thus the French prisoners in 1870–1 were very thankful -to find employment in great numbers as harvest workers, or -in the counting houses of merchants or in the factories of -operatives or wherever an opportunity occurred, and were -thereby enabled to earn extra wages.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_55" href="#FNanchor_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> Thus General von Falckenstein in 1870, in order to check -the prevalent escaping of French officers, commanded that for -every escape ten officers whose names were to be determined -by drawing lots should be sent off, with the loss of all privileges -of rank, to close confinement in a Prussian fortress, a -measure which was, indeed, often condemned but against -which nothing can be said on the score of the law of nations.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_56" href="#FNanchor_56" class="fnanchor">56</a> [Professor] Lueder, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Das Landkriegsrecht</cite>, p. 73.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_57" href="#FNanchor_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> What completely false notions about the right of killing -prisoners of war are prevalent even among educated circles in -France is shown by the widely-circulated novel <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Les Braves -Gens</cite>, by Margueritte, in which, on page 360 of the chapter -“Mon Premier,” is told the story, based apparently on an -actual occurrence, of the shooting of a captured Prussian soldier, -and it is excused simply because the information given -by him as to the movements of his own people turned out -to be untrue. The cowardly murder of a defenseless man is -regarded by the author as a stern duty, due to war, and is -thus declared to be in accordance with the usages of war. -[The indignation of the German General Staff is somewhat -overdone, as a little further on (see the chapter on treatment -of inhabitants of occupied territory) in the War Book they -advocate the ruthless shooting or hanging of an inhabitant -who, being <em>forced</em> to guide an enemy army against his own, -leads them astray.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_58" href="#FNanchor_58" class="fnanchor">58</a> In Austria the giving of one’s parole whether by troops -or officers is forbidden.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_59" href="#FNanchor_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> Monod, <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Allemands et Français, Souvenirs de Campagne</cite>, -p. 39: “I saw again at Tours some faces which I had met -before Sedan; among them were, alas! officers who had sworn -not to take up arms again, and who were preparing to violate -their parole, encouraged by a Government in whom the -sense of honor was as blunted as the sense of truth.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_60" href="#FNanchor_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> In the year 1870, 145 French officers, including three -Generals, one Colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels, three Commandants, -thirty Captains (Bismarck’s Despatch of December -14th, 1870), were guilty of breaking their parole. The excuses, -afterwards put forward, were generally quite unsound, -though perhaps there may have been an element of doubt in -some of the cases so positively condemned on the German side. -The proceedings of the French Government who allowed these -persons without scruple to take service again were subsequently -energetically denounced by the National Assembly.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_61" href="#FNanchor_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> To a petition of the diplomatists shut up in Paris to be -allowed to send a courier at least once a week, Bismarck -answered in a document of September 27th, 1870, as follows: -“The authorization of exchange of correspondence in the case -of a fortress is not generally one of the usages of war; and -although we would authorize willingly the forwarding of open -letters from diplomatic agents, in so far as their contents be -not inconvenient from a military point of view, I cannot recognize -as well founded the opinion of those who should consider -the interior of the fortifications of Paris as a suitable center -for diplomatic relations.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_62" href="#FNanchor_62" class="fnanchor">62</a> “In the year 1870 the greatest mildness was practised -on the German side towards the French fortresses. At the -beginning of the siege of Strassburg it was announced to the -French Commander that free passage was granted to the -women, the children, and the sick, a favor which General -Uhrich rejected, and the offer of which he very wisely did -not make known to the population. And when later three -delegates of the Swiss Federal Council sought permission in -accordance with the resolution of the Conference at Olten, of -September 7th, to carry food to the civil population in Strassburg -and to conduct non-combatants out of the town over the -frontier, both requests were willingly granted by the besieger -and four thousand inhabitants left the fortress as a result of -this permission. Lastly, the besiegers of Belfort granted to -the women, children, aged, and sick, free passage to Switzerland, -not indeed immediately at the moment chosen by the -commander Denfert, but indeed soon after” (<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Dahn</cite>, I, p. 89). -Two days after the bombardment of Bitsch had begun (September -11th) the townsfolk begged for free passage out of -the town. This was, indeed, officially refused; but, none the -less, by the indulgence of the besieger, it was effected by a -great number of townspeople. Something like one-half of the -2,700 souls of the civil population, including the richest and -most respectable, left the town (<i xml:lang="de" lang="de">Irle, die Festung Bitsch. -Beiträge zur Landes- und Völkerkunde von Elsass-Lothringen</i>).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_63" href="#FNanchor_63" class="fnanchor">63</a> Hartmann, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Krit. Versuche</cite>, II, p. 83.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_64" href="#FNanchor_64" class="fnanchor">64</a> <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Staatsanzeiger</cite>, August 26th, 1870.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_65" href="#FNanchor_65" class="fnanchor">65</a> Considering the many unintelligible things written on the -French side about this, the opinion of an objective critic is -doubly valuable. Monod, p. 55, <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">op. cit.</i>, says: “I have seen -Bazeilles burning; I have informed myself with the greatest -care as to how things happened. I have questioned French -soldiers, Bavarian soldiers, and Bavarian inhabitants present -at this terrible drama; I am able to see in it only one of the -frightful, but inevitable, consequences of the war.” As to the -treatment of Chateaudun, stigmatized generally on the French -side as barbarous, the author writes (p. 56): “The inhabitants -of Chateaudun, regularly organized as part of the National -Guard, aided by the franctireurs of Paris, do not defend -themselves by preparing ambushes but by fighting as soldiers. -Chateaudun is bombarded; nothing could be more legitimate, -since the inhabitants made a fortress of it; but once they got -the upper hand the Bavarians set fire to more than one hundred -houses.” The picture of outrages by Germans which follows -may be countered by what the author writes in another -place about the French soldiers: “The frightful scenes at -the taking of Paris by our troops at the end of May, 1871, -may enable us to understand what violences soldiers allow -themselves to be drawn into, when both excited and exhausted -by the conflict.”</p></div> - -<div class="sidenote" id="sn_52">The apophthegm -of -Frederick -the Great.</div> -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_66" href="#FNanchor_66" class="fnanchor">66</a> “One makes use in war of the skin of the lion or the fox -indifferently. Cunning often succeeds where force would fail; -it is therefore absolutely necessary to make use of both; sometimes -force can be countered by force, while on the other hand -force has often to yield to cunning.”—Frederick the Great, in -his <cite>General Principles of War</cite>, Art. xi.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_67" href="#FNanchor_67" class="fnanchor">67</a> Also the pretense of false facts, as, for example, practised -by Murat on November 13th, 1805, against Prince Auersperg, -in order to get possession of the passage of the Danube at -Florisdorf; the like stratagem which a few days later Bagration -practised against Murat at Schongraben; the deceptions -under cover of their word of honor practised by the French -Generals against the Prussian leaders in 1806 at Prenzlau; -these are stratagems which an officer in the field would scarcely -dare to employ to-day without being branded by the public -opinion of Europe.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_68" href="#FNanchor_68" class="fnanchor">68</a> In the most recent times a change of opinion seems to -have taken place. Bluntschli in his time holds (sec. 565) the -use of the distinguishing marks of the enemy’s army—uniforms, -standards, and flags—with the object of deception, to -be a doubtful practise, and thinks that this kind of deception -should not extend beyond the preparations for battle. “In -battle the opponents should engage one another openly, and -should not fall on an enemy from behind in the mask of a -friend and brother in arms.” The Manual of the Institute of -International Law goes further. It says in 8 (<i>c</i> and <i>d</i>): -“Il est interdit d’attaquer l’ennemi en dissimulant les signes -distinctifs de la force armée; d’user indûment du pavillon -national, des insignes militaires ou de l’uniforme de l’ennemi.” -The Declaration of Brussels altered the original proposition, -“L’emploi du pavillon national ou des insignes militaires et -de l’uniforme de l’ennemi est interdit” into “L’abus du -pavillon national.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_69" href="#FNanchor_69" class="fnanchor">69</a> Cp. Boguslawski, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Der kleine Krieg</cite>, 1881, pp. 26, 27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_70" href="#FNanchor_70" class="fnanchor">70</a> [The Hague Regulations, Art. 23, to which Germany was -a party, declares it is prohibited: “To make improper use -of a flag of truce, the national flag, or military ensigns and -the enemy’s uniform, as well as the distinctive badges of the -Geneva Convention.”—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_71" href="#FNanchor_71" class="fnanchor">71</a> [This represents the German War Book in its most disagreeable -light, and is casuistry of the worst kind. There are -certain things on which International Law is silent because -it will not admit the possibility of their existence. As Professor -Holland well puts it (<cite>The Laws of War on Land</cite>, p. 61), -in reference to the subject of reprisals the Hague Conference -“declined to seem to add to the authority of a practise so -repulsive” by legislating on the subject. And so with assassination. -It can never be presumed from the Hague or other -international agreements that what is not expressly forbidden -is thereby approved.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_72" href="#FNanchor_72" class="fnanchor">72</a> [Professor] Bluntschli, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Völkerrecht</cite>, p. 316.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_73" href="#FNanchor_73" class="fnanchor">73</a> [Professor] Lüder, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Handbuch des Völkerrechts</cite>, p. 90.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_74" href="#FNanchor_74" class="fnanchor">74</a> To judge espionage with discrimination according to motives -does not seem to be feasible in war. “Whether it be a -patriot who devotes himself, or a wretch who sells himself, -the danger they run at the hands of the enemy will be the -same. One will respect the first and despise the second, but -one will shoot both.”—<cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Quelle</cite> I, 126. This principle is very -ancient. As early as 1780 a North-American court-martial -condemned Major André, an Englishman, to death by hanging, -and in vain did the English Generals intercede for him, in -vain did he plead himself, that he be shot as a soldier.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_75" href="#FNanchor_75" class="fnanchor">75</a> The want of an adequate authorization led in 1874 to the -shooting of the Prussian newspaper correspondent Captain -Schmidt by the Carlists, which raised a great outcry. Schmidt -was armed with a revolver, with maps of the seat of war, and -also with plans and sketches of the Carlists’ positions, as -against which he had only an ordinary German passport as a -Prussian Captain and was seized within the Carlists’ outpost, -and since he could not defend himself, verbally, on account of -his ignorance of the Spanish language, he was convicted as a -spy by court-martial and shot.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_76" href="#FNanchor_76" class="fnanchor">76</a> In the Egyptian Campaign in 1882 the English War Office -published the following regulations for newspaper correspondents. -[The translator does not think it necessary to reproduce -these.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_77" href="#FNanchor_77" class="fnanchor">77</a> In Turkey, in place of the Red Cross a red half-moon was -introduced, and was correspondingly respected by the Russians -in the campaign of 1877. Japan, on the contrary, has waived -its original objection to the cross.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_78" href="#FNanchor_78" class="fnanchor">78</a> That in the war of 1870 the Red Cross was frequently -abused on the French side is well known, and has been the -subject of documentary proof. The escape of Bourbaki from -Metz, under cover of the misuse of the Geneva Convention, -proves that even in the highest circles people were not clear -as to the binding obligation of International Regulations, and -disregarded them in the most frivolous manner.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_79" href="#FNanchor_79" class="fnanchor">79</a> [But the English legislature has, by the Geneva Convention -Act, 1911 (1 and 2 Geo. V, c. 20) made it a statutory -offense, punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding -£10, to use the heraldic emblem of the Red Cross or -the words “Red Cross” for any purpose whatsoever, if the -person so using it has not the authority of the Army Council -for doing so.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_80" href="#FNanchor_80" class="fnanchor">80</a> How different the conditions of capitulation may be the -following examples will show: -</p> -<p> -Sedan: (1) The French army surrender as prisoners of -war. (2) In consideration of the brave defense all Generals, -Officers, and Officials occupying the rank of Officers, will receive -their freedom so soon as they give their word of honor -in writing not to take up arms again until the end of the -war, and not to behave in a manner prejudicial to the interests -of Germany. The officers and officials who accept these -conditions are to keep their arms and their own personal -effects. (3) All arms and all war material consisting of -flags, eagles, cannons, munitions, etc., are to be surrendered -and to be handed over by a French military commission to -German commissioners. (4) The fortress of Sedan is to be -immediately placed at the disposition (of the Germans) exactly -as it stands. (5) The officers who have refused the obligation -not to take up arms again, as well as the troops, shall -be disarmed and organized according to their regiments or -corps to go over in military fashion. The medical staff are -without exception to remain behind to look after the wounded. -</p> -<p> -Metz: The capitulation of Metz allowed the disarmed soldiers -to keep their knapsacks, effects, and camp equipment, -and allowed the officers who preferred to go into captivity, -rather than give their word of honor, to take with them their -swords, or sabers, and their personal property. -</p> -<p> -Belfort: The garrison were to receive all the honors of war, -to keep their arms, their transport, and their war material. -Only the fortress material was to be surrendered. -</p> -<p> -Bitsch (concluded after the settlement of peace): (1) The -garrison retires with all the honors of war, arms, banners, artillery, -and field pieces. (2) As to siege material and munitions -of war a double inventory is to be prepared. (3) In the -same way an inventory is to be taken of administrative material. -(4) The material referred to in Articles 2 and 3 is to -be handed over to the Commandant of the German forces. (5) -The archives of the fortress, with the exception of the Commandant’s -own register, are left behind. (6) The customs -officers are to be disarmed and discharged to their own homes. -(7) The canteen-keepers who wish to depart in the ordinary -way receive from the local commandant a pass viséd by the German -local authorities. (8) The local Commandant remains -after the departure of the troops at the disposal of the German -higher authorities till the final settlement; he binds himself -on his word of honor not to leave the fortress. (9) The -troops are transported with their horses and baggage by the -railroad. (10) The baggage left behind in Bitsch by the officers -of the 1st and 5th Corps will be sent later to an appointed -place in France, two non-commissioned officers remain to guard -it and later to send it back under their supervision. -</p> -<p> -Nisch (January 10th, 1878): [The translator has not -thought it necessary to reproduce this.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_81" href="#FNanchor_81" class="fnanchor">81</a> Thus, in August, 1813, the numerous trespasses across the -frontier on the part of French detachments and patrols led -to the entry of the Silesian army into the neutral territory -and therewith to a premature commencement of hostilities. -Later inquiries show that these trespasses were committed -without the orders of a superior and that, therefore, the French -staff cannot be reproached with a breach of the compact; but -the behavior of Blücher was justified in the circumstances and -in any case was based upon good faith.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_82" href="#FNanchor_82" class="fnanchor">82</a> We have here in mind not exclusively intentionally untrue -communications, although these also, especially in the Napoleonic -war, very frequently occur; very often the untrue communication -is made in good faith. -</p> -<p> -During the fight which took place at Chaffois on January -29th, 1871, when the village was stormed, the cry of Armistice -was raised on the French side. A French officer of the General -Staff communicated to the Commander of the 14th Division -by the presentation of a written declaration the news of an -armistice concluded at Versailles for the whole of France. -The document presented, which was directed by the Commander-in-Chief -of the French Army in the East, General Clinchant, -to the Commander of the French Division engaged at Chaffois, -ran as follows: -</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“An armistice of twenty-one days has been signed on the -27th. I have this evening received the official news. Cease -fire in consequence and inform the enemy, according to the -forms followed in war, that the armistice exists and that you -are charged to bring it to his knowledge. -</p> - -<p class="sigright">(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">Clinchant</span>.”</p> -<p class="p0 in2">Pontarlier, January, 29th, 1871. -</p></blockquote> - -<p> -Of the conclusion of this armistice no one on the German -side had any knowledge. None the less hostilities ceased for -the time being, pending the decision of the higher authorities. -Since on the enemy’s side it was asserted that a portion of -the French troops in Chaffois had been made prisoners after -the news of the existence of the armistice was communicated, -and the order to cease fire had been given, some thousand -French prisoners were set free again in recognition of this -possibility, and the arms which had been originally kept back -from them were later restored to them again. When the proceedings -at Chaffois were reported, General von Manteuffel decided -on the 30th January as follows: -</p> - -<blockquote> - -<p>“The news of an armistice for the Army of the South is -false; the operations are to be continued, and the gentlemen -in command are on no other condition to negotiate with the -enemy than that of laying down their arms. All other negotiations -are, without any cessation of hostilities, to be referred -to the Commander-in-Chief.”</p></blockquote> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_83" href="#FNanchor_83" class="fnanchor">83</a> [It will be observed that no authority is given for this -statement.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_84" href="#FNanchor_84" class="fnanchor">84</a> See as to this: <cite>Rolin-Jacquemyns</cite>, II, 34; and Dahn, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Der -Deutsch-Französische Krieg und das Völkerrecht</cite>.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_85" href="#FNanchor_85" class="fnanchor">85</a> [See Editor’s Introduction for criticism of this brutality.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_86" href="#FNanchor_86" class="fnanchor">86</a> [<cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">Ibid.</cite>]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_87" href="#FNanchor_87" class="fnanchor">87</a> For example, the carrying off of forty leading citizens from -Dijon and neighboring towns as reprisals against the making -prisoners of the crew of German merchantmen by the French -(undoubtedly contrary to the law of nations), the pretense -being that the crews could serve to reenforce the German navy -(a pretense strikingly repudiated by Bismarck’s Notes of -October 4th and November 16th, 1870). Lüder, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Das Landkriegsrecht</cite>, -p. 111.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_88" href="#FNanchor_88" class="fnanchor">88</a> Proclamation of the Governor-General of Alsace, and to -the same effect the Governor-General of Lorraine of October -18th, 1870.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_89" href="#FNanchor_89" class="fnanchor">89</a> See Loning, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Die Verwaltung des General-gouvernements im -Elsass</cite>, p. 107.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_90" href="#FNanchor_90" class="fnanchor">90</a> For a state of war the provisions of the Prussian Law of -June 4th, 1861, still hold good to-day. According to this law -all the inhabitants of the territory in a state of siege are -subject to military courts in regard to certain punishable proceedings.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_91" href="#FNanchor_91" class="fnanchor">91</a> J. von Hartmann, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Kritische Versuche</cite>, II, p. 73.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_92" href="#FNanchor_92" class="fnanchor">92</a> Lüder, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Das Landkriegsrecht</cite>, p. 103.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_93" href="#FNanchor_93" class="fnanchor">93</a> Obviously we are only speaking of a war between civilized -people since, in the case of savages and barbarians, humanity -is not advanced very far, and one cannot act otherwise toward -them than by devastation of their grain fields, driving away -their herds, taking of hostages, and the like.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_94" href="#FNanchor_94" class="fnanchor">94</a> Army Order of August 8th, 1870, on crossing the frontier: -</p> -<p> -“Soldiers! the pursuit of the enemy who has been thrust -back after bloody struggles has already led a great part of our -army across the frontier. Several corps will to-day and to-morrow -set foot upon French soil. I expect that the discipline -by which you have hitherto distinguished yourselves will be -particularly observed on the enemy’s territory. We wage no -war against the peaceable inhabitants of the country; it is -rather the duty of every honor-loving soldier to protect private -property and not to allow the good name of our army -to be soiled by a single example of bad discipline. I count -upon the good spirit which animates the army, but at the same -time also upon the sternness and circumspection of all leaders. -</p> - -<p class="sigright"> -<span class="l1">Headquarters, Homburg, August 8th, 1870.</span><br /> -(<i>Signed</i>) <span class="smcap">Wilhelm</span>.” -</p> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_95" href="#FNanchor_95" class="fnanchor">95</a> “It is well known that the vineyards in France were -guarded and protected by the German troops, but the same -thing happened in regard to the art treasures of Versailles, -and the German soldiers protected French property at the risk -of their lives against the incendiary bombs of the Paris Commune.”—Lüder, -<cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Landkriegsrecht</cite>, p. 118.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_96" href="#FNanchor_96" class="fnanchor">96</a> Bluntschli, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Völkerrecht</cite>, sec. 652.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_97" href="#FNanchor_97" class="fnanchor">97</a> [These terms are translated literally. They are roughly -equivalent to the English distinction between “real” and -“personal” property.—J. H. M.]</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_98" href="#FNanchor_98" class="fnanchor">98</a> To be entirely distinguished from municipal funds which -are regarded as private property.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn2"><a id="Footnote_99" href="#FNanchor_99" class="fnanchor">99</a> How sensitive, indeed, how utterly sentimental, public -opinion has become to-day in regard to this question, is shown -by the attitude of the French and German Press in regard to -some objects of art carried away from China.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_100" href="#FNanchor_100" class="fnanchor">100</a> As to booty in the shape of horses, the Prussian instructions -say: “Horses taken as booty belong to the State and -are therefore to be handed over to the horse depot. For every -horse which is still serviceable he who has captured it receives -a bonus of 18 dollars out of the exchequer, and for every unserviceable -horse half this sum.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_101" href="#FNanchor_101" class="fnanchor">101</a> Napoleon, who actually permitted his soldiers to plunder -in numerous cases and in others, at least, did not do his best -to prevent it, spoke of it at St. Helena: “Policy and morality -are in complete agreement in their opposition to pillage. I -have meditated a good deal on this subject; I have often been -in a position to gratify my soldiers thereby; I would have -done it if I had found it advantageous. But nothing is more -calculated to disorganize and completely ruin an army. From -the moment he is allowed to pillage, a soldier’s discipline is -gone.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_102" href="#FNanchor_102" class="fnanchor">102</a> Dahn, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Jahrbuch f. A.u.M.</cite>, III, 1876. Jacquemyns Revue.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_103" href="#FNanchor_103" class="fnanchor">103</a> Dahn, <cite xml:lang="la" lang="la">ibid.</cite>, III, 1871.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_104" href="#FNanchor_104" class="fnanchor">104</a> The King of Denmark in 1715, whilst Charles XII, after -the Battle of Pultawa, stayed for years in Bender, sold the -conquered principalities of Bremen and Verden to the King -of England, Elector of Hanover, before England had yet -declared war on Sweden. This undoubtedly unlawful act of -England first received formal recognition in the Peace of Stockholm, -1720.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_105" href="#FNanchor_105" class="fnanchor">105</a> The German administration desired that, as hitherto, justice -should be administered in the name of the Emperor (Napoleon -III). The Court, on the contrary, desired, after the -revolution of September 4th, 1870, to use the formula: “In -the name of the French Republic.” The Court no longer recognized -the Emperor as Sovereign, the German authorities did -not yet recognize the Republic. Finally the Court, unfortunately -for the inhabitants, ceased its activities. The proper -solution would have been, according to Bluntschli (547), either -the use of a neutral formula, as, for example, “In the name of -the law,” or the complete omission of the superfluous formula.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_106" href="#FNanchor_106" class="fnanchor">106</a> Stein, <cite>Revue 17</cite>, Declaration of Brussels, Article 6.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_107" href="#FNanchor_107" class="fnanchor">107</a> <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Manuel 51</cite>; Moynier, <cite xml:lang="fr" lang="fr">Revue</cite>, XIX, 165.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_108" href="#FNanchor_108" class="fnanchor">108</a> Article 42 of the Hague Regulations runs: “Territory is -considered to be occupied when it is placed as a matter of fact -under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends -only to territories where that authority is established -and capable of being exercised.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_109" href="#FNanchor_109" class="fnanchor">109</a> The passage of French troops through Prussian territory in -October, 1805, was a contempt of Prussian neutrality.—The -moment the Swiss Government permitted the Allies to march -through its territory in the year 1814, it thereby renounced -the rights of a neutral State.—In the Franco-Prussian War -the Prussian Government complained of the behavior of Luxemburg -in not stopping a passage <i xml:lang="la" lang="la">en masse</i> of fugitive French -soldiers after the fall of Metz through the territory of the -Grand Duchy.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_110" href="#FNanchor_110" class="fnanchor">110</a> The considerable reenforcement of the Servian Army in the -year 1876 by Russian Freelances was an open violation of -neutrality, the more so as the Government gave the officers -permission, as the Emperor himself confessed later to the English -Ambassador in Livadia. The English Foreign Enlistment -Act of 1870, Art. 4,<a id="FNanchor_A" href="#Footnote_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> forbids all English subjects during a war -in which England remains neutral, to enter the army or the -navy of a belligerent State, or the enlistment for the purpose, -without the express permission of the Government. Similarly -the American law of 1818. The United States complained -energetically during the Crimean War of English recruiting -on their territory.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn1"><a id="Footnote_A" href="#FNanchor_A" class="fnanchor">A</a> [This Act applies to British subjects wherever they may -be, and it also applies to aliens, but only if they enlisted or -promoted enlistment on British territory. For a full discussion -of the scope of the Act see <cite>R. v. Jameson</cite> (1896), 2 Q.B. -425.—J. H. M.]</p></div> -</div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_111" href="#FNanchor_111" class="fnanchor">111</a> At the end of August, 1870, some French detachments, without -its being known, marched through Belgian territory; -others in large numbers fled after the Battle at Sedan to -Belgium, and were there disarmed. In February, 1871, the -hard-pressed French Army of the East crossed into Switzerland -and were there likewise disarmed.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_112" href="#FNanchor_112" class="fnanchor">112</a> In the negotiations in 1793, as to the neutrality of North -America in the Anglo-French War, Jefferson declared: “The -right of the citizens to fashion, sell, and export arms cannot -be suspended by a foreign war, but American citizens pursue -it on their own account and at their own risk.”—Bluntschli, -sec. 425 (2). Similarly in the famous treaty between Prussia -and the United States of September 10th, 1785, it was expressly -fixed in Article 13 that if one of the two States was involved -in war and the other State should remain neutral, the traders -of the latter should not be prevented from selling arms and -munitions to the enemy of the other. Thus the contraband -articles were not to be confiscated, but the merchants were to -be paid the value of their goods by the belligerent who had -seized them. This arrangement was, however, not inserted -in the newer treaties between Prussia and the Union in 1799 -and 1828.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_113" href="#FNanchor_113" class="fnanchor">113</a> In the exchange of despatches between England and Germany -which arose out of the English deliveries of arms, the -English Minister, Lord Granville, declares, in reply to the complaints -of the German Ambassador in London, Count Bernstorff, -that this behavior is authorized by the preexisting practise, -but adds that “with the progress of civilization the obligations -of neutrals have become more stringent, and declares -his readiness to consult with other nations as to the possibility -of introducing in concert more stringent rules, although his -expectations of a practical result are, having regard to the -declarations of the North-American Government, not very hopeful.” -President Grant had, it is true, already in the Neutrality -Proclamation of August 22nd, 1870, declared the trade in -contraband in the United States to be permitted, but had -uttered a warning that the export of the same over sea was -forbidden by international law. He had later expressly forbidden -the American arsenal administration to sell arms to a -belligerent, an ordinance which was of course self-evident and -was observed even in England, but he did not attempt to -prevent dealers taking advantage of the public sale of arms -out of the State arsenals to buy them for export to the French.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_114" href="#FNanchor_114" class="fnanchor">114</a> Belgium allowed itself, in August, 1870, owing to the opposition -of France, to be talked into forbidding the transport of -wounded after the Battle of Sedan, through Belgian territory, -and out of excessive caution interpreted its decree of August -27th as amounting to a prohibition of the transport even of -individual wounded. The French protest was based on the -contention that by the transport of wounded through Belgium, -the military communication of the enemy with Germany was -relieved from a serious hindrance. “On such a ground”—thinks -Bluntschli (p. 434)—“one might set one’s face against -the transport of large numbers but not the transport of individuals. -These considerations of humanity should decide.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p class="fn3"><a id="Footnote_115" href="#FNanchor_115" class="fnanchor">115</a> Dr. A. W. Heffter, <cite xml:lang="de" lang="de">Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart</cite> -(7th ed.), 1882, p. 320.</p></div> -</div></div> - -<div class="chapter"> -<div class="transnote"> -<h2 class="nobreak p1">Transcriber’s Notes</h2> - -<p>Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant -preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.</p> - -<p>Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced -quotation marks retained.</p> - -<p>Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_xii">xii</a>: The page number for “Treatment of Wounded and Sick -Soldiers” was misprinted as “87”. The chapter actually begins -on page 115 and that number has been used in this eBook.</p> - -<p>The “<a href="#cemc">Contents of Editor’s Marginal Summary</a>” includes an entry -for “War Treaties,” but there is no corresponding Sidenote. It -also includes an entry for “Duties of the neutral—belligerents -must be warned off”, but this actually refers to two separate -Sidenotes.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_114">114</a>: Opening quotation mark before “The ugly and inherently” -has no matching closing mark.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_116">116</a>: “do no more harm” was misprinted as “do more harm”.</p> - -<p>Page <a href="#Page_135">135</a>: “Etiam hosti fides servanda” was misprinted as “Etiam Zosti fides servanda”.</p> - -<p>Footnote <a href="#FNanchor_23">23</a>, originally footnote 6 on page <a href="#Page_21">21</a>: “an infinitely more honest one” -was misprinted as “an infinitely more honest me”.</p> - -<p>Some misprinted German words have been corrected: “Uebermut” was -“Uebernut”, “Jahrbücher” was “Jahrücher”, “zur Landes-” was “zur -Lander”, “weichlicher” was “weicheler”, “Weltpolitik” was “Welt -politik”, “das unsterbliche” was “dasunsterbliche”, “Fortwirken” -was “Fortwirkung”, “Gefühlsschwärmerei” was “Gefühlschwarmerei”, -“Kriegsmittel” was “Kriegs mittel”, “Kriegsmanier” was “Kreigsmanier”, -“Kriegsraison” was “Kreigsraison”, “Landkriegsrecht” was -“Landekriegsrecht”, and “im Elsass” was “en Elsass”.</p> - -</div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The War Book of the German General -Staff, by J. 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