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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f86255c --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51761 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51761) diff --git a/old/51761-0.txt b/old/51761-0.txt deleted file mode 100644 index f29c51f..0000000 --- a/old/51761-0.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13199 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Turks and Europe, by Gaston Gaillard - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Turks and Europe - -Author: Gaston Gaillard - -Release Date: April 14, 2016 [EBook #51761] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TURKS AND EUROPE *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Wilcox, Turgut Dincer and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. Bold text is denoted =thus=. - -See further notes at the end of the book. - - - - -THE TURKS AND EUROPE - - - - -BY THE SAME AUTHOR - - - =Culture et Kultur.= 1 vol. gr. in-8, 242 p. Berger-Levrault, - Paris, 1916. - - =Judaïsme et Kultur.= 38 p. Giard et Brière, Paris, 1917. - - =Le Germanisme et les Cultures antiques.= _Revue des Nations - latines_, Florence, décembre 1917. - - =Les Jésuites et le Germanisme.= 29 p. Giard et Brière, - Paris, 1918. - - =Amérique Latine et Europe occidentale.= 1 vol. in-12, 301 p. - Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1918. - - =L’Allemagne et le Baltikum.= 1 vol. in-8 raisin, 279 p. et 7 - cartes. Chapelot, Paris, 1919. - - =Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes.= 1 vol. in-8 raisin, - 79 p. Chapelot, Paris, 1919. - - =Les Turcs et l’Europe.= 1 vol. in-12, 384 p. Chapelot, 1920. - - =La Beauté d’une Femme.= _Roman._ 1 vol. in 12. P.-V. Stock, - Paris, 1907. - - =La Fille nue.= _Roman._ 1 vol. in-12. Albin Michel, Paris, - 1914. - - =Recherches sur le temps que la précipitation met à apparaître - dans les solutions d’hyposulfite de soude.= 1 vol. in-8. - Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1905. - - =Nobilisme.= _Essai sur les fondements de la culture._ 1 vol. - in-12. Société française d’imprimerie et de librairie, Paris, 1909. - - - - -THE TURKS AND EUROPE - -BY - -GASTON GAILLARD - - LONDON: THOMAS MURBY & CO. - 1 FLEET LANE, E.C. - 1921 - - - - -CONTENTS - - - PAGES - - I. THE TURKS 1-8 - - II. THE TURKISH EMPIRE: - - Its History—The Capitulations—The East, a - Fashion in Europe—The Turkish Empire and - the War 9-28 - - III. TURKEY AND THE WAR 29-42 - - IV. TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE: - - The Agreements before the - Armistice—Occupation of Smyrna - by Greece—The First Ottoman - Delegation—Dismissal of the First - Delegation—Situation of the Ottoman - Government and the Nationalist - Movement—Foreign Interests in - Turkey—Resources of Turkey—The Damad - Ferid Cabinet resigns—The Ali Riza - Ministry—The Marash Incidents—The - Urfa and Aintab Incidents—The Silence - of the United States—The Turkish - Question Resumed—The Anglo-American - Protestant Campaign—Repercussions in - India—Repercussions in Northern Africa—The - Indian Caliphate Delegation—Value of - Islam—Union of the Churches—Islam _versus_ - Orthodoxy—The Persian National Movement 43-150 - - V. THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE: - - The Treaty before the London and Paris - Parliaments—Resignation of the Salih Pasha - Cabinet—The New Damad Ferid Cabinet 151-168 - - VI. THE TREATY WITH TURKEY: - - Mustafa Kemal’s Protest—Protests of - Ahmed Riza and Galib Kemaly—Protest of - the Indian Caliphate Delegation—Survey - of the Treaty—The Turkish Press and the - Treaty—Jafer Tayar at Adrianople—Operations - of the Government Forces against the - Nationalists—French Armistice in - Cilicia—Mustafa Kemal’s Operations—Greek - Operations in Asia Minor—The Ottoman - Delegation’s Observations at the Peace - Conference—The Allies’ Answer—Greek - Operations in Thrace—The Ottoman Government - decides to sign the Treaty—Italo-Greek - Incident, and Protests of Armenia, - Yugo-Slavia, and King Hussein—Signature of - the Treaty 169-271 - - VII. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: - - 1. _The Turco-Armenian Question_ 274-304 - - 2. _The Pan-Turanian and Pan-Arabian Movements_: - - Origin of Pan-Turanism—The Turks and - the Arabs—The Hejaz—The Emir Feisal—The - Question of Syria—French Operations in - Syria—Restoration of Greater Lebanon—The - Arabian World and the Caliphate—The Part - played by Islam 304-356 - - VIII. THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE - AND TURKEY: - - The Republic of Northern Caucasus—Georgia - and Azerbaïjan—The Bolshevists in - the Republics of Caucasus and of the - Transcaspian Isthmus—Armenians and Moslems 357-369 - - IX. TURKEY AND THE SLAVS: - - Slavs _versus_ Turks—Constantinople and - Russia 370-408 - - - - -THE TURKS AND EUROPE - - - - -I - -THE TURKS - - -The peoples who speak the various Turkish dialects and who bear the -generic name of Turcomans, or Turco-Tatars, are distributed over huge -territories occupying nearly half of Asia and an important part of -Eastern Europe. But as we are only considering the Turkish question -from the European point of view, no lengthy reference is needed to -such Eastern groups as those of Turkish or Mongol descent who are -connected with the Yenisseians of Northern Asia and the Altaians. The -Russians call these peoples Tatars, and they, no doubt, constituted -the “Tubbat” nation, referred to by the Chinese historians under the -name of “Tou-Kiou” up to the seventh century after Christ. These very -brief facts show the importance of the race and are also sufficient -to emphasise the point that these people are akin to those Turks of -Western Asia who are more closely connected with the Europeans. - -The Western Turkish group includes the Turcomans of Persia and Russian -or Afghan Turkistan; the Azerbaïjanians, who are probably Turkisised -Iranians, living between the Caucasus Mountains and Persia; and, -lastly, the Osmanli Turks, who are subjects of the Sultan, speak the -Turkish language, and profess Islam. - -Close to this group, but farther to the East, the central group also -concerns us, for some of its representatives who now inhabit the -boundaries of Europe made repeated incursions into Europe in various -directions. In the plains lying between the River Irtish and the -Caspian Sea live the Kirghiz-Kazaks, and in the Tien-Shien Mountains -the Kara-Kirghiz, who have preserved many ancient Old Turkish customs, -and seem to have been only slightly Mohammedanised. The Usbegs and -the Sartis of Russian Turkistan, on the other hand, have been more or -less Iranised. Finally, on the banks of the Volga are to be found the -Tatars of European Russia. Among them the Tatars of Kazan, who are -descended from the Kiptchaks, came to the banks of the Volga in the -thirteenth century and mingled with the Bulgars. These Tatars differ -from the Tatars of Astrakhan, who are descendants of the Turco-Mongols -of the Golden Horde, and are connected with the Khazars, and from the -Nogaïs of the Crimea, who are Tatars of the steppes who more or less -inter-married with other races—the Tatars of the Tauris coast being the -hybrid descendants of the Adriatic race and the Indo-Afghan race. They -are to be found near Astrakhan and in the Caucasus Mountains, and even, -perhaps, as far as Lithuania, “where, though still being Mohammedans, -they have adopted the language and costume of the Poles.”[1] - - * * * * * - -The invasion of Europe by the Turks appears as the last great ethnic -movement that followed the so-called period of migration of peoples -(second to sixth centuries A.D.) and the successive movements -it entailed. - -Let us consider only the migrations of those who concern us most -closely, and with whom the Turks were to come into contact later on. -First the Slavs spread westward towards the Baltic and beyond the Elbe, -and southward to the valley of the Danube and the Balkan Peninsula. -This movement brought about the advance of the Germans towards the -west, and consequently the advance of the Celts towards Iberia and as -far as Spain. Owing to the invasion of the Huns in the fifth century -and in the sixth of the Avars, who, after coming as far as Champagne, -settled down in the plains of Hungary and the territories lying farther -to the south which had already been occupied by the Dacians for several -centuries, the Slavs were cut into two groups. About the same time, the -Bulgars came from the banks of the Volga and settled on the banks of -the Danube. - -In the ninth century, owing to a new migration of masses of Slavonic -descent, the Hungarians, driven by tribes of Petchenegs and Polovts -into Southern Russia, crossed the Carpathian Mountains and took up -their abode in the valley of the Tirzah. While the Magyar Turks settled -in Hungary, the Kajar Turks occupied the hinterland of Thessalonica in -Macedonia. In the twelfth century, the Germans, driving the Western -Slavs as far as the banks of the Vistula, brought about a reaction -towards the north-east of the Eastern Slavs, whose expansion took place -at the expense of the Finnish tribes that lived there. - -Only in the thirteenth century did the Turco-Mongols begin to migrate -in their turn; they occupied the whole of Russia, as far as Novgorod -to the north, and reached Liegnitz in Silesia. But, although they soon -drew back from Western Europe, they remained till the fifteenth century -in Eastern Russia, and in the eighteenth century they were still in the -steppes of Southern Russia, and in the Crimea. - -Finally, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Osmanli Turks -invaded the Balkan Peninsula, where they met such of their kindred -as the Kajars, the Tchitaks, and the Pomaks, who were heathens or -Christians, and later on embraced Islam. They invaded Hungary and made -incursions into Lower Austria. - -Then began the migration of the Little Russians into the upper valley -of the Dnieper, and in the sixteenth century they set off towards the -steppes of Southern Russia, while the Great Russians began to advance -beyond the Volga towards the Ural, a movement which reached Siberia, -and still continues. - -It follows, necessarily, that in the course of these huge migrations, -the so-called Turkish race was greatly modified; the Turks of the -Eastern group mixed with the Mongols, the Tunguses, and the Ugrians; -and those of the Western group in Asia and Europe with various -Indo-Afghan, Assyrian, Arab, and European elements, especially with -those living near the Adriatic: the Greeks, the Genoese, the Goths, -etc. Thus the Osmanli Turks became a mixture of many races. - -Though ethnologists do not agree about the various ethnic elements of -the Turco-Tatar group, it is certain, all the same, that those who came -to Asia Minor early associated for a long time with the people of -Central Asia, and Vambéry considers that a Turkish element penetrated -into Europe at a very early date.[2] - -Though the Arabs in the seventh century subdued the Turks of Khiva, -they did not prevent them from penetrating into Asia Minor, and the -Kajars, who were not Mohammedans, founded an empire there in the eighth -century. At that period the Turks, among whom Islam was gaining ground, -enlisted in the Khalifa’s armies, but were not wholly swallowed up by -the Arab and Moslem civilisation of the Seljukian dynasty, the first -representatives of which had possibly embraced Nestorian Christianity -or Islam. Henceforth Asia Minor, whence the previous Turkish elements -had almost disappeared, began to turn into a Turkish country. - -All the Turks nowadays are Mohammedans, except the Chuvashes (Ugrians) -who are Christians, and some Shamanist Yakuts. - -As will be shown later on, these ethnographic considerations should not -be neglected in settling the future conditions of the Turks and Slavs -in Europe, in the interest of European civilisation. - - * * * * * - -About half a century ago Elisée Reclus wrote as follows: - - “For many years has the cry ‘Out of Europe’ been uttered not only - against the Osmanli leaders, but also against the Turks as a - whole, and it is well known that this cruel wish has partly been - fulfilled; hundreds of thousands of Muslim emigrants from Greek - Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and Bulgaria have sought refuge - in Asia Minor, and these fugitives are only the remnants of the - wretched people who had to leave their ancestral abodes; the exodus - is still going on, and, most likely, will not leave off till the - whole of Lower Rumelia has become European in language and customs. - But now the Turks are being threatened even in Asia. A new cry - arises, ‘Into the Steppes,’ and to our dismay we wonder whether - this wish will not be carried out too. Is no conciliation possible - between the hostile races, and must the unity of civilisation be - obtained by the sacrifice of whole peoples, especially those that - are the most conspicuous for the noblest qualities—uprightness, - self-respect, courage, and tolerance?”[3] - -For a long time this state of affairs did not seem to change much, but -after the recent upheaval of Europe it has suddenly become worse. - -Very different races, who have more or less intermingled, live on -either side of the Bosphorus, for Elisée Reclus says: - - “The Peninsula, the western end of the fore part of the continent, - was a place where the warlike, wandering, or trading tribes, - coming from the south-east and north-east, converged naturally. - Semitic peoples inhabited the southern parts of Anatolia, and in - the centre of that country their race, dialects, and names seem to - have prevailed among numerous populations; in the south-west they - seem to have intermingled with coloured men, perhaps the Kushits. - In the eastern provinces the chief ethnic elements seem to have - been connected with the Persians, and spoke languages akin to Zend; - others represented the northern immigrants that bore the generic - name of Turanians. In the West migrations took place in a contrary - direction to those that came down from the Armenian uplands; - Thracians were connected by their trade and civilisation with the - coastlands of Europe and Asia sloping towards the Propontis, and - between both parts of the world Greeks continually plied across the - Ægean Sea.”[4] - -Thus the common name of “Turks” is wrongly given to some Moslem -elements of widely different origin, who are to be found in Rumelia and -Turkey-in-Asia, such as the Albanians, who are akin to Greeks through -their common ancestors, the Pelasgians, the Bosnians, and the Moslem -Bulgars, the offspring of the Georgian and Circassian women who filled -the harems, and the descendants of Arabs or even of African negroes. - -After the internal conflicts between some of these elements, the -quarrels with other foreign elements, and the keen rivalry which -existed generally, each section seems to have held the Turk responsible -for whatever wrong was done, and the Turk was charged with being the -cause of all misfortunes—almost in the same way as the Jews: the Turks -have become, as it were, the scapegoats. - -Yet, in 1665, in his account of his travels in the East, M. de -Thévenot, who died at Mianeh in 1667, praised Turkish morality and -tolerance. - -Elisée Reclus wrote: - - “Turkish domination is merely outward, and does not reach, so to - say, the inner soul; so, in many respects, various ethnic groups in - Turkey enjoy a fuller autonomy than in the most advanced countries - of Western Europe.” - -Ubicini speaks in the same manner, and Sir H. Bulwer states that: - - “As to freedom of faith and conscience, the prevailing religion in - Turkey grants the other religions a tolerance that is seldom met - with in Christian countries.” - -Unfortunately the Turk’s mentality, in spite of what his enemies say, -does not help him. Owing to his nature, he is quite unable to defend -himself and to silence his slanderers. - -For, as E. Reclus remarked: - - “They are not able to cope with the Greeks, who, under pretence of - pacific dealings, take vengeance for the war of extermination, - the traces of which are still to be seen in Cydonia and Chio. They - do not stand an equal chance of winning; most of them only know - their own language, while a Greek speaks several languages; they - are ignorant and artless by the side of clever, shrewd adversaries. - Though he is not lazy, the Turk does not like to hurry; ‘Haste - is devilish, patience is godly,’ he will often say. He cannot do - without his ‘kief,’ an idle dream in which he lives like a mere - plant, without any exertion of his mind and will, whereas his - rival, always in earnest, can derive profit even from his hours - of rest. The very qualities of the Turk do him harm: honest, - trustworthy, he will work to the end of his life to pay off a - debt, and the business man takes advantage of this to offer him - long credits that shall make a slave of him for ever. There is an - axiom among business men in Asia Minor: ‘If you wish to thrive, do - not grant a Christian more credit than one-tenth of his fortune; - risk ten times as much with a Mohammedan.’ Encumbered with such a - credit, the Turk no longer possesses anything of his own; all the - produce of his work will go to the usurer. His carpets, his wares, - his flocks, even his land, will pass gradually into the hands of - the foreigner.”[5] - -But since the time when this was written the Turkish mind has changed. -The Turks have set to work to learn languages, especially French. A -large part of the younger generation concern themselves with what takes -place in the West, and this transformation, which the Greeks and other -Europeans looked upon as endangering their situation in Turkey, may be -one of the factors of the present conflict. - -Besides, E. Reclus added: “The Greeks already hold, to the great -prejudice of the Turks, numerous industries and all the so-called -liberal professions, and as dragomans and journalists they are the only -informers of the Europeans, and control public opinion in the West.”[6] - - -Footnotes: - - 1: J. Deniker, _Les Races et les peuples de la terre_ (Paris, - 1900), p. 438. Zaborowski, _Tartares de la Lithuanie_ (1913). - - 2: Deguignes, _Histoire générale des Huns_ (1750 and 1756); L. - Cahun, _Turcs et Mongols, des origins à 1405_ (Paris, 1896); - Vambéry, _Das Turkenvolk_ (1885). - - 3: Elisée Reclus, _Nouvelle géographie universelle_ (1884), ix., p. - 547. - - 4: _Ibid._, p. 536. - - 5: Elisée Reclus, _Nouvelle géographie universelle_ (1884), ix., p. - 546. - - 6: _Ibid._, p. 550. - - - - -II - -THE TURKISH EMPIRE - - -The Turks who lived in Turkistan and territories lying to the north of -China arrived in the tenth century and settled down in Persia and Asia -Minor, together with some allied or subject races, such as the Tatars. -There they founded several dynasties. Out of the numerous branches -of the Turkish race we will only deal with the Ottomans, who were to -establish their rule in Asia Minor and Europe. - -People too often forget the wonderful rise of the Turkish Empire, -which for nearly three centuries increased its power and enlarged its -territories; and they lay too much stress on its decline, which began -two centuries and a half ago. - -The Oghouz tribe of Kaï, following the Seljuks more or less closely -in their migrations, reached the uplands of Asia Minor about the end -of the tenth century. While part of the latter retraced their steps -towards the territories from which they had started, the others settled -down and founded the Empire of Rum. The Seljukian chief, Ala Eddin -Kaï Kobad I, gave to Erthoghrul, a son of Suleiman Khan, the ancestor -of the Seljukian dynasty of Konia, the summer pasturage of Mount -Toumanitch, south of Brusa, on the boundaries of the Roman Empire of -Byzantium. Erthoghrul and his successors strengthened and enlarged -their dominions and laid the foundation of Ottoman power. - -Othman, or Osman, settled at Karahissar about the end of the thirteenth -century, at the time when the Seljukian Empire of Rum was destroyed by -Mongol inroads, and he conquered several of its principalities. - -Orkhan conquered the rest of Asia Minor and set foot in Europe in -1355. Amurath I took Adrianople, subjugated Macedonia and Albania, and -defeated the Serbs at the battle of Kossowo in 1389. By the victory -of Nicopolis in 1396 Bajazet I conquered Bulgaria and threatened -Constantinople, but Tamerlain’s invasion and Bajazet’s defeat in -1402 at Ancyra postponed the downfall of the Byzantine Empire. The -Turkish Empire recovered under Mohammed I and Amurath II, who made -new conquests and entirely subdued the Serbians in 1459, Mohammed II -took Constantinople in 1453, quickly subdued the Greek peninsula, and -annihilated the Byzantine Empire. He also took Carmania, the Empire -of Trebizond in 1461, Bosnia, Wallachia in 1462, and Lesser Tartary, -and even made an incursion into Italy. The Turkish Empire continued -to expand for nearly another century. In 1517 Selim I turned Syria, -Palestine, and Egypt into Ottoman provinces; he took Mecca and acquired -Algiers in 1520. Soliman II made new conquests. In Asia he added to -the Empire Aldjeziresh and parts of Armenia, Kurdistan, and Arabia; in -Europe, after capturing part of Hungary, Transylvania, Esclavonia, and -Moldavia, and taking Rhodes from the Knights, he came to the gates of -Vienna in 1529, and in 1534 added Tunis to his empire, and Tripoli in -1551. At the beginning of his reign Selim II conquered the Yemen, and -in 1571 took Cyprus from the Venetians; but next year the Turkish fleet -was utterly destroyed at the battle of Lepanto. - -Turkish domination then reached its climax, and from this time began -its downfall. Internal difficulties soon showed that the Ottoman Empire -was beginning to decline. From 1595 to 1608 Turkey lost territory in -Hungary, though, on the other hand, by the battle of Choczim, she -conquered new districts in Poland. After a few perturbed years, in 1669 -Mohammed IV took Candia, which Ibrahim had vainly attempted to conquer. - -But henceforth the decline of the Empire was rapid, and its territories -were dislocated and dismembered. The regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and -Tripoli became practically independent. By the fall of Carlovitz, which -put an end to the 1682-1699 war, the Turks lost nearly the whole of -Hungary. By the treaty of Passarovitz, they lost Temesvar and a part -of Serbia, which was restored to them by the peace of Belgrade in -1740. The Russians, with whom they had been fighting since 1672, and -who began to get the upper hand during the 1770-74 war, took from them -Bukovina and Lesser Tartary, the independence of which was recognised -by the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. After a new war from 1809 to 1812, -the treaty of Bukharest gave to Russia the provinces lying between -the Dnieper and the Danube. In 1809 Turkey lost the Ionian Islands, -which became independent under an English protectorate. The victory -of Navarino made Greece free in 1827. The Turks were obliged to cede -Turkish Armenia to Russia in 1829, and, after a new war with Russia, -Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia were put under Russian protection by -the treaty of Adrianople. France conquered Algeria in 1831. In 1833 -the pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, rebelled, captured Syria, defeated -the Turks at Konia, and threatened Constantinople. Turkey, lying at -the mercy of Russia, opened the Bosphorus to her ships and closed the -Dardanelles to the other Powers by the treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi in -1833. - -Yet a reaction took place, and it seemed that Mehemet Ali, who helped -the Sultan to subdue the insurgent Greeks, was likely to stop the -downfall of Turkey. But his fleet was annihilated at Navarino, October -20, 1827, by the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia. He -received Candia from the Sultan as a reward for his co-operation, but, -not having been able to obtain Syria, he broke off with the Sublime -Porte. An intervention of the European Powers put an end to his -triumph. Turkey recovered the territories she had lost, and, in return -for this restitution and for giving back the Turkish fleet, he obtained -the hereditary government of Egypt under the suzerainty of the Porte. - -Turkey then attempted to revive and to strengthen her condition by -organisation on European lines. - -As early as 1830 a liberal movement had made itself felt in Turkey as -in many other States. The Ottoman Government realised, too, that it was -necessary to get rid of the Russian influence imposed upon her by the -treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi, and so was compelled to institute reforms. - -As early as 1861 Midhat Pasha, first as vali of the Danubian -province, then as vali of Baghdad in 1869, and later on in Arabia, -showed much enterprise and evinced great qualities of organisation and -administration. When recalled to Constantinople, he became the leader -of the Young Turk party. - -Mahmoud II and Abdul Mejid renewed the attempts already made by Selim -III at the end of the eighteenth century, with a view to putting an end -to the utter confusion of the Empire, and instituted various reforms -borrowed from Europe. In 1853 France and England helped Turkey to repel -a new Russian aggression, and the treaty of March 30, 1856, after the -Crimean war, guaranteed her independence. - -But the reign of Abdul Aziz, which had begun in such a brilliant way, -proved unfortunate later on. A rising in Crete was suppressed with -great difficulty in 1867; in 1875 Herzegovina and Bosnia, urged on by -Russia, rebelled, and Serbia, who backed the rebels, was defeated in -1876. Abdul Aziz, on account of his wasteful financial administration -as well as his leaning towards Russia, which he considered the -only State to be favoured because it was an autocratic government, -unconsciously aided the Tsar’s policy against his own country, and -uselessly exhausted the resources of Turkey. Yet under his reign the -judicial system, the army, and the administration were reorganised, -the legislation was secularised, and Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans -were set on a footing of equality. These reforms, prepared by his two -predecessors, were carried out by him. He was forced to abdicate by an -insurrection in 1876, and committed suicide. - -His successor, Mourad V, became mad and reigned only a few months. -He was dethroned and replaced by his brother Abdul Hamid, who, on -December 23, 1876, suspended the liberal constitution that the Grand -Vizier Midhat Pasha had promulgated. On February 5, 1877, he disgraced -Midhat Pasha, who left the country and lived abroad. Midhat Pasha was -allowed to come back to Turkey later, and ordered to reside in the Isle -of Crete. He was then appointed governor of the vilayet of Smyrna, -but was charged with the murder of Abdul Aziz, imprisoned in the -fortress of Taïf in Arabia, and assassinated on February 26, 1883.[7] -A rising of Bulgaria, which the Turks put down ruthlessly, caused -European intervention and a new war with Russia backed by Rumania and -Montenegro. The Turks, beaten in 1877, had to sign the preliminaries of -San Stefano, modified by the treaty of Berlin in 1878. Rumania, Serbia, -and Montenegro became independent States; Eastern Rumelia an autonomous -country; and Bulgaria a tributary principality. Austria occupied Bosnia -and Herzegovina, England Cyprus, and in Asia the Russians received -Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. The Berlin Conference in 1880 allowed Greece -to occupy Larissa, Metzovo, and Janina.[8] - -In 1898 Turkey slightly recovered, and in seventeen days her armies -routed Greece, and the country would have ceased to exist but for the -Tsar’s intervention with the Sultan. - -However, as the condition of Turkey at the end of Abdul Hamid’s reign -was growing more and more critical, the old ambitions entertained by -several Great Powers revived. At the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas -II at Reval, the question of the extension of the European control -which already existed in Macedonia was discussed. - -The revolution of July 23, 1908, which put an end to Abdul Hamid’s -autocratic rule, instituted constitutional government in Turkey. -The Great Powers were at first taken aback, but without troubling -themselves about Turkey’s chance of regeneration, they carried on their -rivalries, all trying to derive some profit from Turkey in case she -should become prosperous and powerful, and at the same time doing their -best to prevent her from reviving in order to be able to domineer over -her and exhaust her the more easily. - -For a long time previously many Turks of the younger generation, -who regretted the condition of the Empire, and were acquainted with -European ideas, had realised that, if Turkey was not to die, she must -reform herself. They had tried to further this aim by literary methods -and had carried on propaganda work abroad, being unable to do so in -Turkey. The reign of Abdul Hamid, during which the old régime had -become more and more intolerable, was to bring about its overthrow, -and in this respect the revolutionary movement was the outcome of -Turkey’s corruption. Among the numerous instigators of this movement, -Enver Bey and Niazi Bey, who were then only captains garrisoned in -Macedonia, soon became the most prominent. The revolutionary elements -were chiefly recruited from the university students, especially those -of the School of Medicine and of the Mulkieh School. Officers of the -highest rank, such as Marshal Redjeb Pasha, who, when governor of -Tripoli, had plotted against Abdul Hamid, were on the committee; but -the masses, among whom the Young Turk propaganda had not penetrated, -at first stood aloof, as they did not know the views of the members of -the committee, who, before the revolution, had been obliged to carry on -their propaganda very cautiously and among few people, for fear of the -Sultan’s reprisals. - -The movement started from Albania. Macedonia, the province which was -most likely to be wrested from the Empire, and Syria immediately -followed the lead, and the revolutionary movement soon met with -unanimous approval. - -On April 13, 1909, a reactionary movement set in which failed only -because of Abdul Hamid’s irresolute, tottering mind. It was supported -by the garrison of Constantinople, which comprised Albanian troops, -the very men who had lent their aid to the revolution at first, but -had been brought back to the Sultan’s party by the lower clergy and -politicians whose interest it was to restore Abdul Hamid’s autocratic -rule, or whose personal ambitions had been baulked. Troops, comprising -Albanians, Bosnians, and Turkish elements, and reinforced by Greek, -Bulgarian, and Serbian volunteers, old komitadjis, were summoned to -Salonika. - -The reaction of April 13 seems to have been partly due to foreign -intrigue, especially on the part of England, who, anxious at seeing -Turkey attempt to gain a new life, tried to raise internal difficulties -by working up the fanaticism of the hodjas, most of whom were paid -and lodged in seminaries, and so were interested in maintaining Abdul -Hamid’s autocratic government. These manœuvres may even have been the -original cause of the reactionary movement. - -Mr. Fitzmaurice, dragoman of the English embassy, was one of the -instigators of the movement, and the chief distributor of the money -raised for that purpose. He seems to have succeeded in fomenting the -first internal difficulties of the new Turkish Government. After -the failure of the reactionary movement, the Committee of Union and -Progress demanded the dismissal of Mr. Fitzmaurice, who later on -settled at Sofia, where he continued his intrigues. - -Then the government passed into the hands of the Committee of Union and -Progress which had brought on the revolution, and which practically -governed the country from 1908 till the signing of the armistice -between the Allies and Turkey. - -The Committee of Union and Progress, which at the outset had shown a -liberal and enlightened spirit, soon became very powerful; but, being -the only ruling power in the country, they soon left the straight -path and began to indulge in corrupt practices. The leaders’ heads -were turned by their sudden success, and they were not sufficiently -strong-minded to resist the temptations of office in a time of crisis. -All the power was soon concentrated in the hands of a few: Talaat, -Enver, and Jemal, all three men of very humble origin, who, when still -young, had risen rapidly to the highest eminence in the State. - -Enver, born on December 8, 1883, was the son of a road-surveyor. At -twenty he left the cadet school of Pancaldi, and became a prominent -figure at the time of the revolution. After Abdul Hamid’s downfall, -he was sent to Berlin, whence he returned an enthusiastic admirer of -Germany. After distinguishing himself in Tripoli, he was made War -Minister at the end of the Balkan war. He was naturally very bold; his -brilliant political career made him vain, and soon a story arose round -him. He became rich by marrying a princess of the Imperial Family, the -Sultan’s niece, but it was wrongly said that he married a daughter of -the Sultan—a mistake which is easily accounted for as in Turkey anybody -who marries a princess of the Imperial Family bears the title of -imperial son-in-law, Damad-i-Hazret-i-Shehriyari. At any rate, Enver’s -head was turned by his good fortune. - -Talaat is supposed to be the son of a _pomak_—that is to say, his -ancestors were of Bulgarian descent and had embraced Islam. He was born -at Adrianople in 1870, received an elementary education at the School -of the Jewish Alliance, then became a clerk in a post-office and later -on in a telegraph-office. Owing to the liberal ideas he propounded -and the people he associated with, he was sentenced to imprisonment. -Two years after, in 1896, when he came out of prison, he was exiled -to Salonika, a centre of propaganda of the Young Turks who were then -attempting to overthrow Abdul Hamid. He had learned very little at -school, but had a quick wit and great abilities; so he soon obtained a -prominent place among the leaders of the revolutionary movement, and in -a short time became a moving spirit in the party, together with Enver, -Marniassi Zadé Refik Bey, and Javid Bey. Very strongly built, with -huge, square fists on which he always leant in a resolute attitude of -defiance, Talaat was a man of great will power. When the constitution -was granted to the Turkish people, he went to Adrianople, where he was -returned Member of Parliament. Soon after he became Vice-President of -the Chamber, then Minister of the Interior. But he always remained an -unassuming man and led a quiet life in a plain house. He was among -those who desired to turn his country into a modern State, in the -Anglo-Saxon sense of the word, with the help of Germany and by using -German methods, which was perhaps his greatest mistake. When war broke -out, Talaat was Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet in which the -Egyptian prince Said Halim was Grand Vizier. On February 4, 1917, when -this Ministry resigned, he became Grand Vizier, and on February 17, in -the course of the sitting of the Constantinople Parliament, he declared -that he intended to maintain the alliance with Germany to the end. - -Jemal Pasha is of Turkish descent. He left the War Academy as Captain -of the Staff, and married the daughter of Bekir Pasha, who commanded a -division of the second army garrisoned at Adrianople. This Bekir Pasha -had risen from the ranks, and when he was still a non-commissioned -officer had throttled Midhat Pasha with his own hands. It has -been wrongly stated that his father was the public executioner at -Constantinople during the reign of Mahmoud II. Whereas Talaat’s and -Enver’s manners were distant, Jemal professed to be affable and strove -to please, though he was very cruel at heart. He was looked upon as a -friend of France when he came to Paris in 1914 to raise the Ottoman -loan. He was appointed military governor of Constantinople after Nazim -Pasha’s murder, January 10, 1913, in which he and Talaat and Enver had -a share; then he became Minister of Marine. - -Talaat fully represented the Committee of Union and Progress, and -was supported by it, but Enver and Jemal, though also members, did -not make use of their connection with the party. Indeed Enver, who -disagreed with Talaat, had nothing to do with the party after he had -been appointed War Minister, and when he was called upon to resign -during the war, he retained his office with the support of Germany. -Only the difficulties which the Empire experienced could have brought -together three men who were actuated by such widely different motives; -at any rate the omnipotence of the Union and Progress Committee, which -even caused some liberals to regret the passing of the old régime, was -contrary to the constitutional system which the party had purposed to -institute in Turkey. - -Though the leaders of the Unionist movement drove Turkey to the verge -of ruin, yet the movement itself to a certain extent aroused in the -Turkish people a consciousness of their rights, which they had nearly -given up under the control of foreign countries; the movements of -opinion brought about, and even the reaction that set in finally, -roused that national feeling, which found expression soon after the -events of the last war. - - * * * * * - -It must be acknowledged that the Capitulations, the extension of -which led to the improper interference of foreign nations in the -home affairs of the Ottoman State and gave them a paramount power -over it, formed one of the chief causes of the modern ruin of Turkey, -by weakening and disintegrating it. The extension of the economic -Capitulations was made possible by the carelessness of the Mussulmans -in commercial matters, and by their natural indolence, while the -extension of the judicial Capitulations, which originated in a Moslem -custom dating from the Middle Ages, seems to have been due to the -condescension of the Sultans. - -It is a well-known fact that Mehmet II, by the treaty he signed in -1434, granted to the Republic of Venice extra-territorial privileges -consisting of commercial immunities, the benefit of which was claimed -afterwards by the Powers the Porte had then to deal with. Those -immunities, renewed with slight alterations, constituted what was later -on called the Capitulations. - -In 1528 Soliman II officially ratified the privileges which French and -Catalonian merchants living in Constantinople had been enjoying for -a long time, according to an old custom. The treaty signed by this -monarch in 1535 confirmed the old state of affairs. By this treaty the -French king, Francis I, both secured the help of Turkey against his -enemies, and promised the Ottoman Empire the protection of France; at -the same time he obtained for French merchants the privilege of trading -in the Eastern seas, preferential customs duties on their goods, the -obligation for all foreigners trading in the East to sail under the -French flag, and the privilege of appointing consuls in the Levant who -had jurisdiction over their fellow-countrymen. Lastly, the treaty -not only secured to France the protectorate of the Holy Places, but -also entrusted her with the defence of all the Latin religious orders, -of whatever nationality, which were beginning at that time to found -establishments in the East. - -These stipulations, renewed in 1569, 1581, 1604, and 1673, secured -to France both commercial supremacy and much prestige throughout the -Ottoman Empire, and gave a permanent character to the concessions made -by Turkey. The agreement that sealed them and seemed unchangeable soon -induced other foreign nations to claim further privileges. - -By the end of the sixteenth century Turkey had to grant similar -privileges to Great Britain, and the contest between the British -representative, Sir Thomas Glover, and Jean de Gontaut-Biron, the -French ambassador, has become historical. Nevertheless France for -nearly two centuries maintained her position and influence. - -So it was with Russia in 1711 and the United States in 1830. The -Ottoman Empire had even to concede almost equal advantages to Greece -and Rumania, countries which had enlarged their boundaries at her -expense. - -Such privileges, which were justifiable at the outset, soon brought -on unrestricted and unjustifiable interference by foreign Powers in -Turkish affairs. The Powers attempted to justify the establishment -and maintenance of this régime by alleging they had to protect their -subjects against the delays or evil practices of the Turkish courts of -justice, though the Powers that had managed to gain great influence in -Turkey were already able, through their embassies, to defend fully the -rights and interests of their own subjects. - -In virtue of the judicial privileges, all differences or misdemeanours -concerning foreigners of the same nationality were amenable to the -consuls of the country concerned, whose right of jurisdiction included -that of arrest and imprisonment; cases between foreigners of different -nationalities were heard in the court of the defendant, this applying -to both lawsuits and criminal cases; while, in lawsuits between Turkish -subjects and foreigners, the jurisdiction belonged to the Ottoman -tribunals; but, as the Consul was represented in court by an assessor -or a dragoman, the sentence depended chiefly on the latter. As a matter -of fact, these privileges only favoured the worst class of foreigners, -and merely served to make fraud easier. - -Lastly, from an economic point of view, the Capitulations injured the -Turkish treasury by binding the Ottoman State and preventing it from -establishing differential duties, at a time when a war of tariffs was -being carried on between all States. - -During the reign of Abdul Hamid, owing to the facilities given by this -state of things, the interference of the Powers in Turkish affairs -reached such a climax that they succeeded not only in bringing Turkey -into a condition of subjection, but in disposing of her territories, -after dividing them into regions where their respective influence was -paramount. The greediness of the Powers was only restrained by the -conflicts their rivalry threatened to raise. If one of them obtained -a concession, such as the building of a railway line in the region -assigned to it, the others at once demanded compensation, such as the -opening of harbours on the sea-fronts assigned to them. Things went so -far that Russia, though she could not compete with the Powers whose -rivalry gave itself free scope at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, -intervened to hinder Turkey from constructing a system of railways in -Eastern Asia Minor, alleging that the building of these lines would -endanger her zone of influence. The railway concessions had to be given -to her, though she never attempted to construct any of the lines. - -In addition, by laying stress on the Capitulations, in which nothing -could be found that supported their demands, the Great Powers -established foreign post-offices in the ports of the Empire. These -post-offices, which enjoyed the privilege of extra-territoriality, were -only used by foreign merchants and persons of note to smuggle in small -parcels, and by native agitators to correspond safely with agitators -living abroad. - -Of course Turkey, being thus brought into subjection, did not develop -so rapidly as the nations which, not being under any foreign tutelage, -enjoyed independence; and it is unfair to reproach her with keeping -behind them. - -After the revolution, and owing to many requests of the Turkish -Government, some economic alterations were made in the Capitulations, -such as the paying of the tradesman’s licence tax by foreigners, and -the right of the State to establish monopolies. Austria-Hungary, when -the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled, consented to give up -her privilege concerning the customs duties, on condition that other -Powers did the same. A short time after Germany promised to do so, but, -among the other Powers, some refused, and others laid down conditions -that would have brought more servitude to Turkey and would have cost -her new sacrifices. - -The Unionist Government, as will be shown later, cancelled the -Capitulations during the last war. - - * * * * * - -After recalling the wonderful political fortune of the Turkish Empire, -we should remember that, after bringing Eastern influences to Western -countries, it had also an influence of its own which was plainly felt -in Europe. Western art drew its inspiration from Eastern subjects, and -at the end of the eighteenth century everything that was Turkish became -the fashion for a time. - -This influence was the natural outcome of the close intercourse with -the Levant from the Renaissance till the eighteenth century, and of the -receptions given in honour of Eastern men of mark during their visits -to European courts. It is not intended to discuss the question of the -relation between Turkish art and Arabian art, and its repercussion on -Western art, or of Eastern influence in literature; but it will be -well to show how much attraction all Turkish and Eastern things had -for the people of the time, and how happily the imitation of the East -influenced decorative art and style, as if the widely different tastes -of societies so far apart had reached the same stage of refinement and -culture. - -Records are still extant of the famous embassy sent by the Grand Turk -during the reign of Louis XIV, and the embassy sent by the Sultan of -Morocco to ask for the hand of the Princess de Conti, for in Coypel’s -painting in the Versailles Museum can be seen the ambassadors of the -Sultan of Morocco witnessing a performance of Italian comedy in Paris -in 1682. Later on the Turkish embassy of Mehemet Effendi in 1721 was -painted by Ch. Parrocel. - -Lievins’ “Soliman” in the Royal Palace of Berlin, a few faces drawn -by Rembrandt, his famous portrait known as “The Turk with the Stick” -in MacK. Tomby’s collection, which is more likely to be the portrait -of an aristocratic Slav, the carpet in “Bethsabe’s Toilet after a -Bath,” bear witness to the Eastern influence. So do the Turkish -buildings of Peter Koeck d’Aelst, who was the director of a Flemish -manufactory of tapestry at Constantinople during Soliman’s reign; -the scenes of Turkish life and paintings of Melchior Lorch, who also -lived at Constantinople about the same time and drew the Sultan’s and -the Sultana’s portraits; and the pictures of J.-B. van Mour, born at -Valenciennes, who died in Constantinople, where he had been induced to -come by M. de Ferriol, the French King’s Ambassador; of A. de Favray; -and of Melling, the Sultana Hadidge’s architect, who was called the -painter of the Bosphorus.[9] - -There may also be mentioned Charles Amédée van Loo’s pictures: “A -Sultana’s Toilet,” “The Sultana ordering the Odalisks some Fancy Work,” -“The Favourite Sultana with her Women attended by White and Black -Eunuchs,” “Odalisks dancing before the Sultan and Sultana,” most of -which were drawn for the king from 1775 to 1777, and were intended as -models for tapestries; and also the portrait of Madame de Pompadour -as an odalisk, “The Odalisk before her Embroidery Frame,” and “A -Negress bringing the Sultana’s Coffee,” by the same painter. To these -may be added Lancret’s Turkish sketches, the drawings and pastels of -Liotard, who left Geneva for Paris about 1762, then lived in the ports -of the Levant and Constantinople, and came back to Vienna, London, -and Holland, and whose chief pictures are: “A Frankish Lady of Pera -receiving a Visit,” “A Frankish Lady of Galata attended by her Slave”; -and also Fragonard’s “New Odalisks introduced to the Pasha,” his sepia -drawings, Marie Antoinette’s so-called Turkish furniture, etc. - -In music any sharp, brisk rhythm was styled _alla turca_—that is, in -the Turkish style. We also know a Turkish roundelay by Mozart, and a -Turkish march in Beethoven’s “Ruins of Athens.” - -At the end of the eighteenth century, not only did people imitate the -gorgeousness and vivid colours of Turkish costumes, but every Turkish -whim was the fashion of the day. Ingres, too, took from Turkey the -subjects of some of his best and most famous paintings: “The Odalisk -lying on her Bed,” “The Turkish Bath,” etc. - - * * * * * - -Lastly, the Great War should teach us, in other respects too, not -to underrate those who became our adversaries owing to the mistake -they made in joining the Central Powers. For the “Sick Man” raised -an army of nearly 1,600,000 men, about a million of whom belonged to -fighting units, and the alliance of Turkey with Germany was a heavy -blow to the Allied Powers: Russia was blockaded, the Tsar Ferdinand -was enabled to attack Serbia, the blockade of Rumania brought on the -peace of Bukharest, Turkish troops threatened Persia, owing to which -German emissaries found their way into Afghanistan, General Kress von -Kressenstein and his Ottoman troops attacked the Suez Canal, etc. All -this gave the Allies a right to enforce on Turkey heavy terms of peace, -but did not justify either the harsh treatment inflicted upon her -before the treaty was signed, or some of the provisions of that treaty. -It would be a great mistake to look upon Turkey as of no account in the -future, and to believe that the nation can no longer play an important -part in Europe. - - -Footnotes: - - 7: _Midhat Pacha, Sa vie et son œuvre_, by his son - Ali-Haydar-Midhat Bey (Paris, 1908). - - 8: Janina was occupied by Greece in 1912-18. - - 9: Cf. A. Boppe, _Les Peintres du Bosphore au dix-huitième siècle_ - (Paris, 1919). - - - - -III - -TURKEY AND THE WAR - - -It is a well-known fact that Germany, while carefully organising -the conflict that was to lay waste the whole world and give her the -hegemony of the globe, had not neglected Turkey. Her manœuvres ended, -before the war, in concluding a Turco-German treaty of alliance, signed -in Constantinople at four o’clock in the afternoon of August 2, 1914, -by Baron von Wangenheim and the Grand Vizier Said Halim, an Egyptian -prince, cousin to the former Khedive of Egypt and Mehemet Ali’s -grandson. It seems that the Turkish negotiators had plainly told the -German representatives that they only meant to fight against Russia, -and they did not even require any guarantee against the action of -France and England. - -The spirit in which these negotiations were carried on has been lately -corroborated by a statement of M. Bompard, former French Ambassador at -Constantinople, who, in answer to a newspaper article concerning the -circumstances under which Turkey entered into the war, and the episode -of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_,[10] wrote in the same newspaper:[11] - - “Owing to the treaty of August 2, Turkey was ipso facto a - belligerent; yet though the military authorities acted in - conformity with the treaty, the civil authorities—_i.e._, the - Government, properly speaking—had a somewhat different attitude. In - the first place, the Government denied it was at war with France - and England. The Grand Vizier had even made a formal declaration - of neutrality in Paris and London; it only had to do with Russia; - besides, the thing was not urgent, as the Russian decree of - mobilisation had just been issued.” - -In the first article of the treaty it was stated that both Powers -should maintain a strict neutrality in the conflict between -Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This clause, however, was only intended to -give the treaty a pacific appearance, for it was said in Clause 2 that -if Russia intervened and thus compelled Germany to support her ally, -Austria-Hungary, Turkey should be under the same obligation. - -Now, on the previous day, Germany had declared war on Russia, and thus -the second article came into effect immediately. So by this treaty -Germany really wanted to throw Turkey into the war by the side of the -Central Powers. - -The other clauses laid down the conditions of a military co-operation. -The most important one was that Turkey pledged herself to let the -German military mission have the control in the conduct of operations, -“according to what was agreed between His Excellency the War Minister -and the President of the Military Mission.” Theoretically the treaty -was to come to an end on December 31, 1918, but, if not denounced six -months before that date, it was to be renewed for five years more. - -Clause 8 and last expressly said that the agreement was to be kept -secret. - -On October 29, 1914, two Turkish torpedo-boats entered the port of -Odessa, sank a Russian gun-boat, and fired at the French liner -_Portugal_, and a Turco-German squadron made a surprise attack upon -Theodosia and Novorossisk. Then the Allied Powers declared war on -Turkey on November 5. - -Yet, after keeping neutral during the first three months of the war, -Turkey seems to have had some hesitation in entering the conflict, -notwithstanding German pressure. Most of her statesmen, who had weighed -the financial and political consequences of her intervention, did not -seem to consider they were to the advantage of their country; but -the ambitious aims of Enver Pasha, who was devoted to Germany, for -his success depended on her triumph, prevailed upon Turkey to yield. -On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, pointed out -on October 2, 1914, to the Austrian ambassador, who urged Turkey to -utilise her fleet, that if the latter was ever defeated by the Russian -fleet, Constantinople would be endangered. But a few days after, on -October 15, he declared that the only obstacle to Turkish intervention -was the penury of the treasury. Indeed, it is probable that Javid Bey, -Minister of Finance, who had just signed an agreement with France -concerning Turkish railways and finance, was not very eager to declare -war on a country whose financial help was indispensable. He had even -made overtures on several occasions to the ambassadors of the Entente, -on behalf of the moderate members of the Ministry. In August, 1914, -he offered to come to an agreement with the Entente providing that -the Capitulations were suppressed, and in September he asked them to -recognise the suppression of the Capitulations in order to be able to -demobilise the Ottoman army. He resigned after the declaration of war, -but consented to be member of a new Cabinet the next year. - -It seems probable, too, that Talaat for rather a long time favoured -an attitude of neutrality in order to obtain for Turkey, among -other political and economic advantages, the suppression of the -Capitulations, and that only later on he finally, like Jemal, Minister -of Marine, sided with Enver Pasha and the Germans. On September 6 -Talaat Bey told Sir L. du Pan Mallet that there was no question of -Turkey entering the war,[12] and on September 9 he declared to the same -ambassador, with regard to the Capitulations, that the time had come to -free Turkey from foreign trammels.[13] - -Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish Minister at Athens, in a telegram addressed -to Said Halim Pasha on June 15, 1914, had informed him he had just -learnt that “Greece, by raising a conflict, expected a general -conflagration would ensue which might bring on the opening of the -question of Turkey-in-Asia.” On August 7, 1914, he stated in another -dispatch sent from Athens to the Sublime Porte: - - “In the present war England, according to all probabilities, will - have the last word. So if we are not absolutely certain to triumph - finally, it would be a highly venturesome thing for us to rush - into an adventure, the consequences of which might be—which God - forbid—fatal to our country.” - -In a long report dated September 9, 1914, he added: - - “The present circumstances are so critical and so fraught with - danger that I take the liberty humbly to advise the Imperial - Government to keep a strict neutrality in the present conflicts, - and to endeavour to soothe Russia.... - - “The compact lately signed in London by the Allies shows that the - war is expected to last long.... A State like the Ottoman Empire, - which has enormous unprotected sea-coasts and remote provinces open - to foreign intrigues, should certainly beware of the enmity of a - malignant and vindictive country like England....” - -So it appears that the decision of Turkey was not taken unanimously and -only after much hesitation. - -Henceforth the operations engaged in by both sides followed their due -course. - -In Europe the Franco-British squadrons under the command of Admiral -Carden began on November 3 to bombard the forts which guarded the -entrance of the Dardanelles. On February 25, 1915, a combined attack of -the Allied fleets took place, and on March 18 a general attack was made -by the Franco-British squadrons, in which three of their ironclads were -sunk, four were severely damaged, and other ships were disabled. - -On April 25 to 27 the English and French troops landed in Gallipoli, -and after driving back the Turks advanced on May 6 to 8. But when the -expeditionary corps had failed to reach Krithia and the Kareves-Dere, -then, after a violent offensive of the Turks, which was repulsed -on June 21, and the failure of a diversion against the Sari-Bair -Mountains, it was withdrawn on January 8, 1916. - -In Asia, after the Turkish naval action in the Black Sea, and the -march of the Turkish troops against Kars and Tiflis, the Russians -invaded Armenia, in Asia Minor, on November 4, 1914, and took Ardost. -On November 8 they captured Bayazid and Kuprikeui; Ardahan and -Sary-Kamysh, where, as will be seen later on, the Armenians were partly -responsible for the Turkish retreat, December 21 and 22; on May 19, -1915, Van fell; then, in the following year, Erzerum (February 16, -1916), Mush (February 18), Bitlis (March 2), Trebizond (April 18), -Baiburt (July 16), and Erzinjan (July 25). Thus the Russian troops had -conquered the four provinces of Erzerum, Van, Trebizond, and Bitlis, -extending over an area of 75,000 square miles. - -In Mesopotamia the British brigade of Indian troops came into action on -November 8, 1914, and captured the little fort at Fao, which commands -the entrance of the Shatt-el-Arab. On November 17 it was victorious -at Sihan, took Basra on the 22nd, and Korna on December 9 of the same -year. Next year, on July 3, 1915, the British troops captured Amara, -Suk-esh-Shuyukh on July 21, Naseriya on the 25th of the same month, and -on September 29 they occupied Kut-el-Amara, which the Turks recaptured -on April 18, 1916, taking General Townshend prisoner. On February 28, -1917, Kut-el-Amara fell again to British arms, then Baghdad on March -11. On April 2, 1917, the English and Russian forces joined together at -Kizilrobat on the main road to Persia, and all the Indian frontier was -wholly freed from the Turco-German pressure. - -But after the Russian revolution, the Turks successively recaptured all -the towns the Russian troops had conquered in Transcaucasia and Asia -Minor, and soon threatened Caucasus. - -Meanwhile in Arabia the Turks had suddenly invaded the Aden area, where -they were beaten on the 21st by the British at Sheikh-Othman and on -the 25th at Bir-Ahmed. - -On June 10, 1916, the Arab rising broke out. On June 14 they were -masters of Mecca. On July 1 they took Jeddah, then Rabagh, then -Yambo on the Red Sea. On November 6, 1916, the Sherif of Mecca, the -Emir Hussein, was proclaimed King of the Hejaz, under the name of -Hussein-Ibn-Ali. - -As early as November 3, 1914, Turkey, which occupied all the Sinai -Peninsula, threatened Egypt. A first Turkish offensive against the -Suez Canal was checked from February 2 to 4 simultaneously before -El-Kantara, Al-Ferdan, Toussoun, and Serapeum. A second Turkish -offensive, started on July 29, 1916, was also crushed before Romani -near the Suez Canal, on the 5th at Katia and on the 11th at Bir-el-Abd. - -The British army then launched a great offensive in December, 1916, -which resulted, on December 21, in the capture of El-Arish, on the -boundary of the Sinaitic desert, and in the occupation of Aleppo on -October 26, 1918. On January 9, 1917, they took Rafa, then Beersheba on -October 31, 1917, Gaza on November 7, and Jaffa on November 17; and on -December 11, 1917, General Allenby entered Jerusalem. - -In September, 1918, a new offensive took place, backed by the French -troops that took Nablus, and the French navy that made the British -advance possible by bombarding the coast. General Allenby entered Haïfa -and Acre on September 23 and Tiberias on the 24th, and on the 28th he -effected his junction with the troops of the King of the Hejaz. He -entered Damascus on October 1 with the Emir Feisal, who commanded the -Arabian army. On October 6 the French squadron sailed into the port -of Beyrut, which was occupied on the 7th. Tripoli was captured on the -13th, Homs on the 15th, Aleppo on the 26th of October, 1918. By this -time Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia, and Arabia had fallen into the hands -of the Allies. - -Meanwhile the disintegration of the Turkish troop was completed -by General Franchet d’Espérey’s offensive and the capitulation of -Bulgaria. Turkey applied to General Townshend—who had been taken -prisoner at Kut-el-Amara—to treat with her victors. The negotiations of -the armistice were conducted by Rauf Bey, Minister of the Navy; Reshad -Hikmet Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Sadullah -Bey, head of the general staff of the Third Army. - -As early as 1916 Turkey of her own authority had suppressed the -Capitulations—_i.e._, the conventions through which the Powers, as has -been seen, had a right, amongst other privileges, to have their own -tribunals and post-offices; and by so doing she had freed herself from -the invidious tutelage of Europe. - -The Ottoman Government, in a note sent on November 1, 1916, by the -Turkish ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna to the German and Austrian -Ministers of Foreign Affairs, notified to their respective Governments -and the neutrals that henceforth they looked upon the two international -treaties of Paris and Berlin as null and void. - -Now the treaties of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in 1878 were the most -important deeds that had hitherto regulated the relations between -the Ottoman Empire and the other European Powers. The treaty of -Paris confirmed the treaty of 1841, according to which the question -of the closing of the Straits to foreign warships was considered as -an international question which did not depend only on the Turkish -Government. - -The Berlin treaty of 1878, too, asserted a right of control and -tutelage of the Powers over Turkey, and in it Turkey solemnly promised -to maintain the principle of religious liberty, to allow Christians to -bear evidence in law-courts, and to institute reforms in Armenia. - -As the King of Prussia and the Emperor had signed the treaty of Paris, -and the Austrian Emperor and the German Emperor had signed the treaty -of Berlin, Turkey could not denounce these treaties without the assent -of these two allied countries, which thus gave up the patrimonial -rights and privileges wrested from the Sultan by Western Europe in the -course of the last three centuries. This consideration accounts for the -support Turkey consented to give the Central Powers and the sacrifices -she engaged to make. - -In order to understand the succession of events and the new policy -of Turkey, the reader must be referred to the note of the Ottoman -Government abrogating the treaties of Paris and Berlin which was handed -on November 1, 1916, by the Turkish ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna -to the German and Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This note, -recalling the various events which had taken place, pointed out that -they justified Turkey in casting off the tutelage of both the Allied -Powers and the Central Powers: - -“Owing to the events that took place in the second half of the last -century, the Imperial Ottoman Empire was compelled, at several times, -to sign two important treaties, the Paris treaty on March 30, 1866, -and the Berlin treaty on August 3, 1878. The latter had, in most -respects, broken the balance established by the former, and they were -both trodden underfoot by the signatories that openly or secretly broke -their engagements. These Powers, after enforcing the clauses that were -to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire, not only did not care for -those that were to its advantage, but even continually opposed their -carrying out. - -“The Paris treaty laid down the principle of the territorial integrity -and independence of the Ottoman Empire; it also stipulated that this -clause should be fully guaranteed by all the Powers, and forbade any -meddling, either with the relations between the Imperial Government and -its subjects, or with the interior administration of the Ottoman Empire. - -“Nevertheless, the French Government kept on interfering by force -of arms in Ottoman territory, and demanded the institution of a new -administrative organisation in Lebanon. Then the Powers signatory to -the treaty were compelled to participate in this action by diplomatic -ways, in order not to let France have a free hand in carrying out her -plans, which were contrary to the Paris treaty and paved the way to -territorial encroachments. - -“On the other hand, the Russian Government, pursuing a similar policy, -held in check by an ultimatum the action of the Porte against the -principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, where it had raised an -insurrection, and which it had fully provided with arms, supplies, -officers, and soldiers; and after demanding the institution of a new -foreign administration in some Ottoman provinces and of a foreign -control over their home affairs, it finally declared war against Turkey. - -“In the same manner the clauses of the Paris treaty did not hinder -either the French Government from occupying Tunis and turning this -province of the Ottoman Empire into a French protectorate—or the -English from occupying Egypt to become the ruling power there, and -from encroaching upon Ottoman sovereignty in the south of the Yemen, -in Nejed, Koweit, Elfytyr, and the Persian Gulf. In spite of the same -clauses the four Powers now at war against Turkey have also recently -modified the condition of Crete and instituted a new state of things -inconsistent with the territorial integrity that they had guaranteed. - -“Finally Italy, without any serious reason, merely in order to have -territorial compensations after the new political situation created in -Northern Africa, did not hesitate to declare war against the Ottoman -Empire, and did not even comply with the engagement she had taken, in -case of a contention with the Imperial Government, to refer the case to -the mediation of the Powers signatory of the treaty before resorting to -war. - -“It is not necessary to mention all the other cases of interference in -the home affairs of the Ottoman Empire. - -“The Berlin treaty, concluded after the events of 1877-78, completely -remodelled the Paris treaty by creating in European Turkey a new state -of things, which was even modified by posterior treaties. But soon -after the Berlin treaty the Russian Government showed how little it -cared for its engagements. Even before capturing Batum it managed to -annex that fortified place by declaring openly and officially its -intention to turn it into a free trade port. The British Government -consented to renew some of its engagements. Yet the Cabinet of -Petrograd, after fulfilling its aspirations, simply declared that the -clause relating to this case was no longer valid, and turned the town -into a naval station. As for the British Government, it did not carry -out any of the protective measures it had hinted at, which shows how -little it cared for the régime instituted by the Berlin treaty. - -“Though the Imperial Ottoman Government scrupulously submitted to -the harsh, heavy clauses of the treaty, a few previsions that were -favourable to it were never carried out, in spite of its own insistence -and that of its protectors, because one of the Powers thought it its -own interest to raise difficulties to the Ottoman Empire. - -“It ensues from all this that the fundamental and general clauses -of the treaties of Paris and Berlin, concerning the Ottoman Empire, -were annulled _ipso facto_ by some of the signatories. Now, since the -clauses of an international deed that are to the advantage of one of -the contracting parties have never been carried out, it is impossible -that the obligations contracted by this party should be considered as -valid still. Such a state of things makes it necessary, as far as the -aforesaid party is concerned, to annul such a treaty. It should also -be borne in mind that, since the conclusion of these two treaties, the -situation has completely changed. - - “Since the Imperial Government is at war with four of the signatory - Powers, to whose advantage and at whose eager request the - aforesaid treaties were concluded, it follows that these treaties - have become null and void, as far as the relations between Turkey - and these Powers are concerned. - - “Besides, the Imperial Government has concluded an alliance on a - footing of complete equality with the other two signatory Powers. - Henceforth the Ottoman Empire, being definitely freed from its - condition of inferiority and from the international tutelage some - of the Great Powers had an interest in maintaining, now sits in the - European concert with all the rights and privileges of a completely - independent State; and this new situation cancels even the causes - of the aforesaid international agreements. - - “All these considerations deprive the aforesaid contracts of any - binding value. - - “Nevertheless, that there may lurk no uncertainty on this head in - the mind of the contracting Powers that have turned their friendly - relations into an alliance with Turkey, the Imperial Government - begs to inform the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments that it - has annulled the treaties of 1856 and 1878. - - “It also feels bound to declare that, in accordance with the - principles of international law, it will certainly avail itself - of such rights as are to its advantage, and have not yet been - recognised. - - “On the other hand, the Imperial Government, under the pressure - of France, had been compelled to grant the sanjaks of Lebanon a - strictly administrative and restricted autonomy, that might be - a pretext to a certain extent to the intervention of the Great - Powers. Though this situation was never sanctioned by a regular - treaty, but by interior laws in 1861 and 1864, the Imperial Ottoman - Government, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, feels bound to - declare that it puts an end to that state of things, and, for the - reasons mentioned above, it institutes in this sandjak the same - administrative organisation as in the other parts of the Empire.” - -After the military defeat of autumn, 1918, the leaders of the Committee -of Union and Progress who had governed the Ottoman Empire since 1905 -disappeared, and the statesmen of the former régime came into office -again. In the very first days of October, 1918, the Talaat Pasha -Cabinet had offered its resignation, which had not been accepted at -first by the Sultan. - -The new Ottoman Cabinet made a declaration of policy to Parliament on -Wednesday, October 23, 1918. In the opening address, read by the Grand -Vizier Izzet Pasha, an amnesty was promised to all political offenders. -Turkey stated she was quite ready to accept a peace, based on Mr. -Wilson’s fourteen points, and to grant at once to all the elements of -the population, without any distinction of nationality or religion, -full political rights and the right to a share in the administration -of the country. She also promised to solve the question of the Arabian -vilayets, to take into consideration their national aspirations, and to -grant them an autonomous administration, provided the bonds existing -between them, the Caliphate, and the Sultan, should be maintained. The -whole Chamber, with the exception of ten deputies who refused to vote, -passed a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet. - -After the French victory in the East and the capitulation of Bulgaria, -the political changes, which had already begun in Turkey, soon became -quite pronounced. Talaat Pasha, whose ideas differed utterly from those -of Enver Pasha, and who had more and more confined his activity to the -war department, had gradually lost his influence over the policy of -the Empire since the death of Mehmed V. After having taken his share, -together with Enver and Jemal, in bringing Turkey into the war by the -side of the Central Powers in 1914, he now realised that the game was -up. Besides, the Ottoman Press now openly attacked the Cabinets of -the two Empires, and reproached them with neglecting the interests of -the Porte when the additional treaty of Brest-Litovsk was drafted, -during the negotiations of Bukharest, and later on in the course of the -negotiations with the Cabinet of Sofia. - -Talaat, Javid, and Enver sought shelter in Berlin. Their flight greatly -affected the new Constantinople Government on account of some financial -malversations which had occurred while the leaders of the Committee of -Union and Progress were in office. So the Sublime Porte in December, -1918, demanded their extradition, which Germany refused to grant. In -April, 1919, Talaat, who lived in Berlin under the name of Sali Ali -Bey, and who later on opened a public-house in that city, was sentenced -to death by default in Constantinople, and a year later, in March, -1920, England, according to a clause of the Versailles treaty, put him -down on the list of the war-criminals[14] whose extradition might be -demanded. - - -Footnotes: - -10: _L’Éclair:_ “Comment le Goeben et le Breslau échappèrent aux -flottes alliées,” by Henry Miles, June 16, 1921. - -11: M. Bompard’s letter to the editor of the _Éclair_, June 23, 1921. - -12: Blue Book, No. 64. - -13: _Ibid._, No. 70. - -14: Since the publication of the French edition of this book Talaat -was murdered on March 15, 1921, at Charlottenburg, by an Armenian -student named Solomon Teilirian, aged twenty-four, a native of Salmas -in Persia. - - - - -IV - -TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE - - -As early as 1916 the Allies seem to have come to an agreement over the -principle of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In their answer to -President Wilson they mentioned among their war aims “to enfranchise -the populations enslaved to the sanguinary Turks,” and “to drive out -of Europe the Ottoman Empire, which is decidedly alien to Western -civilisation.” - -According to the conventions about the impending partition of Turkey -concluded between the Allies in April and May, 1916, and August, 1917, -Russia was to take possession of the whole of Armenia and Eastern -Anatolia, Constantinople, and the Straits. In virtue of the treaty -signed in London on May 16, 1916, fixing the boundaries of two zones of -British influence and two zones of French influence, France and England -were to share Mesopotamia and Syria, France getting the northern part -with Alexandretta and Mosul, and England the southern part with Haïfa -and Baghdad. According to the treaty of August 21, 1917, Italy was -to have Western Asia Minor with Smyrna and Adalia. Palestine was to -be internationalised and Arabia raised to the rank of an independent -kingdom. - -But, following the breakdown of Russia and the entrance of America -into the war, the conventions of 1916 and 1917 were no longer held -valid. President Wilson declared in the fourteenth of his world-famous -points that: “The Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire should be -assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nations now under Turkish -rule should be assured security of life and autonomous development.” - -It follows that the partition of Turkish territories such as -Mesopotamia or Syria between Powers that had no right to them, as was -foreshadowed in the conventions of 1916, was no longer admitted; and -the Conference in February, 1919, decided, at Mr. Wilson’s suggestion, -that all territories that belonged to the Ottoman Empire before should -be put under the control of the League of Nations, which was to assign -mandates to certain Great Powers. - -According to the decisions taken at that time, and at the special -request of M. Venizelos, the Greeks obtained all the western coast -of Asia Minor between Aivali and the Gulf of Kos, with Pergamus, -Smyrna, Phocœa, Magnesia, Ephesus, and Halicarnassus, and a hinterland -including all the vilayet of Aidin, except the sanjak of Denizli and -part of that of Mentesha (Mughla). - -The Italian delegation thought fit to make reservations about the -assignment of Smyrna to Greece. - -It seems that in the course of the conversations at -St-Jean-de-Maurienne—Greece being still neutral at the time—M. Ribot -asked Baron Sonnino whether Italy, to facilitate the conclusion of -a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, would eventually consent to -give up Trieste in exchange for Smyrna. The Italian delegation had -merely noted down the offer, without giving an answer. The Italian -diplomats now recalled that offer as an argument, not so much to lay -a claim to Smyrna—as their subsequent attitude showed—as to prevent a -change to Italy’s disadvantage in the balance of power in the Eastern -Mediterranean, and an infringement of the London treaty that guaranteed -her definite possession of the Dodecanese. - -Moreover, according to Article 9 of the London treaty, in case of a -partition of Asia Minor, or merely in case zones of influence should -be marked out in it, Italy was to have the same share as the other -Powers and receive, together with the province of Adalia, where she had -acquired a paramount influence and obtained a recognition of her rights -from Turkey in 1912, the neighbouring regions. In accordance with this -article, the Conference seemed inclined to give Italy an international -mandate for all the part of Asia Minor that was to be left to the -Turks—namely, all the Anatolian plateau, including the vilayets of -Kastamuni, Brusa, Angora, Konia, and Sivas. It is obvious that the -difficulties raised by the assignment of Smyrna to Greece could not -but be aggravated by the new political situation in case this mandate -should be given to the Italians. - -Consequently, when the Italians saw Smyrna assigned to Greece, they -were all the more anxious to give to their new zone of influence in -Asia Minor an outlet to the sea that should not depend on the great -port of Western Asia Minor. After considering Adalia, Makri, and -Marmaris, which are good harbours but do not communicate with the -interior and are not connected with the chief commercial routes of -the continent, their attention was drawn to Kush-Adassi, called by the -Greeks New Ephesus and by themselves Scala Nuova, a port that numbered -about 6,000 souls before the war, lying opposite to Samos, in the Gulf -of Ephesus, about ten miles from the ruin of the old town of the same -name and the Smyrna-Aidin railway. - -This port, which is situated on the mouth of the Meander, might easily -be connected by a few miles of railroad with the main railway line -to the south of Ayasaluk which brings towards the Ægean Sea all the -produce of Asia Minor; then it would divert from Smyrna much of the -trade of Aidin, Denizli, and the lake region. To the merchants of -Asia Minor—who deal with Syria, Egypt, Greece, Italy, and all Western -Europe, excepting those who trade with the Black Sea—the Kush-Adassi -line would be both faster and cheaper, if this port was as well -equipped as Smyrna. - -But, as Kush-Adassi happened to be in the zone which at first had been -assigned to Greece and whose frontier goes down to the south as far as -Hieronda Bay, Italy endeavoured in every way to carry farther to the -north the boundaries of the Italian zone, in order to include this port -in it. For this purpose, Italy took advantage of the troubled condition -of the area round Aidin, Sokia, and Cape Mycale to send a police -force up the Meander and the railway line along it, in order to carry -her control up to the Gulf of Ephesus. Of course the territory lying -between Hieronda and Kush-Adassi still remained part of the Greek zone -of occupation, but, all the same, Italy set foot in it. Her diplomats -soon turned this fact into a right of possession. - -M. Tittoni soon after agreed to play the part of arbiter in the -question of the southern frontier of Bulgaria; and in July, 1919, it -was announced that after some conversations between M. Venizelos and -M. Tittoni an understanding had been reached about Thrace and Northern -Epirus, whereby Greece agreed to enlarge the northern part of the -Italian zone of occupation in Asia Minor, and gave up to Italy the -valley of the Meander. So, though on the whole M. Tittoni’s arbitration -was in favour of Greece, Italy obtained the territorial triangle -included between Hieronda, Nazili, and Kush-Adassi, the control over -the Meander, and to a certain extent over the railway. In return for -this, Italy promised to cede to Greece the Dodecanese except one, -captured by Italy in 1912 during her war with Turkey, together with the -Isle of Rhodes, though she had a right to keep the latter for at least -five years. In case England should grant the inhabitants of Cyprus the -right to pass under Greek sovereignty, Italy was to hold a plebiscite -in Rhodes and let the native population become Greeks if they wished. -By supporting the Greek claims in Thrace, Italy won the sympathies of -Greece at a time when the latter both consolidated the rights of Italy -on the continent and strengthened her own situation in the Dodecanese. - -The control over the eastern part of Asia Minor which was to fall to -the lot of the Armenians and included the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, -Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, and probably Trebizond—the population -of the latter vilayet consisting chiefly of Moslems with a Greek -minority—was to be assumed, so the Great Powers thought, by the United -States. - -It should be remembered that the question of the eastern vilayets -was raised for the first time by the Tsars of Russia, and gave them -a pretext for intervening in the domestic affairs of Turkey and thus -carrying out their plans of expansion in Asia Minor. As a matter of -fact, those vilayets were not really Armenian. The Armenians were in a -minority there, except in two or three districts where, as throughout -the Ottoman Empire, they were mixed up with Turks. They had lived -peaceably together till the Powers thought fit to support the claims -of the Armenians and incite them to rebel, in order to further their -own aims in Turkey, by a misuse of the privileges granted them by the -Capitulations. - -Constantinople and the Straits seemed likely to be internationalised. - -Lastly, the Arabian part of the Turkish Empire was to be cut off from -it, though nobody could tell expressly in what manner, but in a way -which it was easy to foresee. - -We shall deal later on with the negotiations that took place during -the war between the British Government and Hussein, Grand Sherif of -Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, and we have already mentioned the -help given to the British army by the Emir Feisal’s troops, after the -aforesaid negotiations. These facts throw a light on the policy pursued -by England later on; and besides, immediately after the hostilities, -in a speech made in London on Friday, November 1, 1918, Mr. Barnes, a -Labour member of the British Cabinet, while speaking on the armistice -with Turkey, acknowledged: - - “We could have signed it before, for we held the Turks at our - discretion. For the last fortnight the Turks had been suing for - peace, but we were on the way to Aleppo, which is to be the capital - of the future independent Arab State, established in an Arab - country and governed by Arabs. So we did not want to have done with - the Turks till we had taken Aleppo.” - -Such was the condition of the Turkish problem when the Peace Conference -took it in hand for the first time. - -Rivalries naturally soon arose. - -The Emir Feisal, supported by England, laid claim not only to the -whole of Arabia, but also to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia to -make up a huge Arab Empire, under his father’s rule. France, who -opposed that plan, convened a Syrian Congress in Marseilles, to raise -a protest against the partition of Syria as had been laid down by the -Franco-English agreement of 1916. - -Soon after the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna on the morning of May -15, 1919, brought about a serious conflict. - -It is noteworthy that after General Allenby’s victories in Palestine -and the resignation and flight of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, General -Izzet Pasha, who had been appointed Grand Vizier, had signed, on -October 31, 1918, a convention of armistice, which put Turkish ports -and railways under the Allies’ provisional control and allowed them “in -case things should become alarming for them” to occupy “all strategic -points.” This armistice had been concluded on the basis of Mr. Wilson’s -principle that “to the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire an -unqualified sovereignty should be ensured.” In no respect had the -Turks broken the agreement when the Allies infringed it by allowing -the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. This occupation, carried on in spite of -France, who was not energetic enough, and one might almost say in spite -of Italy, created a very serious situation. - -Indeed, no good reason could be given in support of this decision. By -the help of misleading or false information cleverly worded and widely -distributed by a propaganda which overwhelmed the Press—and was only -equalled by the propaganda carried on by Poland—political manœuvres -induced the Allies to allow Greece, who wished to become “Greater -Greece” and wanted Epirus, Thrace, Constantinople, Smyrna, Trebizond, -and Adana, to occupy a region belonging to Anatolia, where the Turkish -element predominates more than in all the rest of the Ottoman Empire, -for there are only 300,000 Greeks against about 1,300,000 Turks. This -permission granted to Greece was the more surprising as it seems to -have been obtained because the Greek Government had informed the -Supreme Council that the disorder prevailing in the vilayet of Smyrna -was a danger to the non-Turkish populations. - -Now the report of the Inter-allied Commission about the Greek -occupation of Smyrna and the neighbouring territories which was sent -later on and was dated from Constantinople, October 12, 1919, began as -follows: - - “The inquiry has proved that since the armistice the general - condition of the Christians of the vilayet of Aidin has been - satisfactory, and their security has not been threatened. - - “If the occupation of Smyrna was ordered by the Peace Conference - owing to inaccurate information, the primary responsibility lies - with the individuals or governments that gave or transmitted - inconsiderately such information as is mentioned in No. 1 of the - established facts. - - “It is obvious, therefore, that this occupation was not at all - justifiable, and violated the terms of the armistice concluded - between the Powers and Turkey.” - -Moreover, to quote the very words of that report, the Greek occupation, -“far from appearing as carrying out a civilising mission, has -immediately put on the aspect of a conquest and a crusade.” - -This inquiry, on the one hand, acknowledged that the responsibility -for the events that took place at Smyrna on May 15 and 16 and in the -immediate neighbourhood during the first days following the landing, -lay with the Greek headquarters and some officers who did not perform -their duty. On the other hand it stated that part of the responsibility -rested with the Turkish authorities at Smyrna, who took no step to -prevent the escape and arming of common law prisoners before the coming -of the Greeks. Then it went on as follows: - - “In the person of the high civil authority that represents it - at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the serious - disturbances that ended in bloodshed in the interior of the country - during the advance of the Greek troops.... The Greeks alone are - responsible for the bloodshed at Menemen.... The Greek officers who - were at Menemen quite neglected their duty.” - -And the Commission wound up its report with this: - - “In the occupied region, putting aside the towns of Smyrna—where - the number of Christians is high, but the number of Greek - Christians much inferior to that of the Turks—and Aivali, the - predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek element is - undeniable.” - - -So we easily understand the violent and justifiable indignation felt by -the Turks when the Greek troops landed, for they could not forget that -now there were no Turks in Thessaly, where they numbered 150,000 in -1878, or in the Morea, where there had once been 300,000, and that in -Greece only about 20,000 were left of the 100,000 that had once lived -there. - -M. Venizelos, in a letter addressed on May 29 to the President of the -Conference, thought it his duty to give particulars about the way -the occupation had been effected. After setting right what he styled -“the wrong and misleading information given by newspapers,” he stated -that the Greeks had “arrived at Aidin, on the southern side, east -of Nymphaton and north of the River Ermos.” The Great Powers having -asked the Greek Government, as he said expressly in his letter, “to -occupy Smyrna and its environs” without stating exactly how far the -environs of Smyrna reached, he thought he had a right to look upon this -operation—which had been attended with a few incidents and had not -been received everywhere with unmixed joy—as the outcome of a settled -policy. After this occupation public meetings of protest took place in -Constantinople. - -An important Crown Council was held in the afternoon of May 26 at -Yildiz-Kiosk, in order to enable the various political groups to -express their opinion concerning the recent events. - -The Sultan, attended by the princes of the Imperial Family, opened the -meeting, and stated it had been thought necessary to call together the -most eminent men of Turkey that they might express their opinion about -the critical condition of the country. - -The Grand Vizier, after recalling the events that had taken place in -Turkey since the beginning of the war, asked the audience to let him -have their opinions. - -The Unionist group said they were dissatisfied with the composition of -the Ministry, and demanded a Coalition Government, in which all parties -should be represented. - -Another political group asked the Crown Council to form itself into a -National Assembly. - -Somebody else showed the inanity of such suggestions and proposed -to entrust the mandate of the administration of Turkey to a Great -Power—without mentioning which Power. He added: “Otherwise Turkey will -be dismembered, which would be her ruin.” - -As the assembly had merely consultative powers, no decision was reached. - -At the beginning of June, 1919, the Ottoman League sent from Geneva to -Mr. Montagu, British Secretary for India, the following note: - - “The Ottoman League has examined the statements which your - Excellency was so kind as to make at the Peace Conference, - regarding the subsequent fate of the Ottoman Empire. - - “We have always been convinced that His Britannic Majesty’s - Government in its relations with our country would resume its - traditional policy, which was started and advocated by the most - famous English statesmen, and that, after obtaining the guarantees - required for the safety of its huge dominions, it would refuse to - countenance any measure aiming at the oppression and persecution of - Moslems. - - - “The British Government can realise better than any other Power the - disastrous consequences that would necessarily follow throughout - Islam on the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and any blow struck at - its vital parts, especially at its capital, the universally revered - seat of the Khilafat, where the best works of Moslem civilisation - have been gathered for centuries. - - “We feel certain that your Excellency will also realise better - than anybody else of what importance would be to Great Britain the - loyalty, not only of the Ottoman Moslems without any distinction of - race, but of all the Mohammedans whose destiny is presided over by - His Britannic Majesty.” - -At last, about the end of the month, the treaty with Turkey was drafted -by the Conference, and on June 11 the Turkish representatives were -brought to France on board the French ironclad _Démocratie_. - -The delegation included Tewfik Pasha, Riza Tewfik Bey, with Reshid Bey, -former Minister of the Interior, as adviser. At its head was Damad -Ferid Pasha, the Sultan’s brother-in-law, who, after the resignation of -the Tewfik Pasha Cabinet at the beginning of March, 1919, had formed a -new Ministry. - -As was stated in the Allies’ answer to the Porte in the letter -addressed to the Turkish Premier, Damad Ferid Pasha, Turkey had not -attempted in the memorandum handed to the Conference to excuse the -Germano-Turkish intrigues which had paved the way for her to take part -in the war on the side of the Germans; neither had she attempted to -clear herself of all the crimes she was charged with. Damad Ferid Pasha -had simply pleaded that only the “Young Turks” of the Committee of -Union and Progress were responsible for the Ottoman policy during the -last five years, and that, if they had governed the Empire, as it were, -in the name of the Germans, the whole Turkish nation could not be held -responsible for this. - -The Allies pointed out in their reply that they could not accept the -distinction which cast all the blame on the Government and alleged the -misdeeds were not imputable to the Turkish people merely because these -misdeeds were abhorrent to Turkish ideas, as shown in the course of -centuries. So the Allies informed the delegation they could not grant -their request to restore Ottoman sovereignty over territories that had -been taken away from them before. - -Yet the Council, though they declared they could not accept such views -or enter upon such a controversy, launched into considerations on -Turkish ideas and Turkish influence in the world which, to say the -least, were most questionable, as will be seen later on. - -They stated, for instance, that no section of the Turkish people had -ever been able to build up a lasting political organisation, the huge -Empires of the Hioung-nous, the Ouigours, and the Kiptchaks having been -of short duration. The Supreme Council also asserted that the lack -of stability of the Ottoman Empire—which was represented as unable -to develop—was due to the various origins of its elements. But other -influences were laid aside, which have been at work, especially during -the modern period, since the beginning of the decline. It should be -borne in mind that three centuries ago the civilisation and prosperity -of the Ottoman Empire were not inferior to those of the Western -nations, and its inferiority appeared only nowadays, when Germany -and Italy founded their unity, while the European States did not do -anything in Turkey to improve—or even did much to aggravate—a condition -of things that left to Turkey no possibility of recovery. If Moslem -civilisation is quite different from Western civilisation, it does not -follow necessarily that it is inferior to it. For several centuries -its religious and social ideals safeguarded and ruled, to their -satisfaction, the lives of numerous populations in the Levant, whereas -more modern ideals in the West have not yet succeeded in bringing about -conditions of life that can meet the requirements of man’s mind and -physical nature. As to the so-called combativeness of the Turks and -their supposed fanaticism—which may be only due, considering they were -nomads at first, to their quick and headstrong nature—they both were -certainly lessened by their intercourse and especially intermarriages -with the Mongols, a quiet and peaceful people largely influenced by -Buddhism and Lamaism, which they all profess, except a few Bouriate -tribes that are still Shamanist. Moreover, even if such suppositions -were true, their mixing with Western people could only have a good -influence in soothing their original nature, whereas their eviction to -Asia, by depriving them of any direct and close contact with Europe, -would have the effect of reviving their former propensities. - -Finally, the aforesaid document, though it was really superficial and -rather vague on this point, purposed to give a crushing answer to the -arguments of the Ottoman memorandum about the religious rivalries; yet -these arguments were well grounded and most important, as appeared when -the Protestant campaign broke out and Anglo-American opinion demanded -the ejection of the Turks. - -On June 27, 1919, the President of the Peace Conference in Paris -addressed a second letter to Damad Ferid Pasha to inform him that the -solution of the Turkish problem was postponed. - -After stating that the declarations made before the Peace Conference -by the Ottoman delegation “have been, and will continue to be, -examined most attentively, as they deserve to be,” the letter went -on to say that “they involve other interests than those of Turkey, -and raise international questions, the immediate solution of which is -unfortunately impossible; and it ended thus: - -“Therefore, though the members of the Supreme Council -are eager to restore peace definitely and fully realise it is a -dangerous thing to protract the present period of uncertainty, -yet a sound study of the situation has convinced them that -some delay is unavoidable. - -“They are of opinion, therefore, that a longer stay in Paris of the -Ottoman delegation, which the Ottoman Government had asked to be -allowed to send to France, would not be conducive to any good. - -“Yet a time will come when an exchange of views will be profitable -again; then the Allied and Associated Powers will not fail to -communicate with the Ottoman Government as to the best means to settle -the question easily and rapidly.” - -One of the reasons given for this adjournment was the protest handed to -Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, by the Maharaja of Bikanir -in the name of the Moslems of India, a protest which is supposed to -have shaken the decisions already taken by the British Government. - -At any rate, instead of maintaining the negotiations on a sound basis, -and dealing squarely with the difficulties of the Turkish question, -which would have made it possible to reach a better and more permanent -solution, the Allies seemed to wish to break off the debates, or -at least to postpone the discussion, in order to manœuvre and gain -time. Perhaps they did it on purpose, or the negotiations came to an -untimely end because, among the men who had assumed the charge of -European affairs, some meant to intervene in them all the more eagerly -because they did not know anything about them. They were not aware -or had forgotten that in dealing with Eastern affairs or in pursuing -negotiations with people of ancient civilisation, a great deal of -delicacy, discretion, and shrewdness is required at the same time, -and that generally diplomatists must expect plenty of haggling and -procrastination, must avoid clashing with the adversary, and be able -repeatedly to drop and resume a discussion smoothly, sometimes after -long delays. - -Somebody then quoted the words of the well-known French traveller -Chardin in regard to Chevalier Quirini who, about 1671, carried on -negotiations in Constantinople with the Vizier Ahmed Küprüli on behalf -of the Republic of Venice: - - “I heard M. Quirini say, when I had the honour of calling upon - him, that the policy of the Turks far excelled that of the - Europeans; that it was not restrained by maxims and regulations, - but was wholly founded on, and regulated by, discernment. This - policy, depending on no art or principles, was almost beyond - anybody’s reach. So he candidly confessed that the vizier’s conduct - was an utter mystery to him, and he was unable to fathom its - discrimination, depth, secrecy, shrewdness, and artfulness.” - -It is noteworthy that the same vizier was also able to cope -successively with three ambassadors of Louis XIV. - -The direction taken from the outset by the deliberations of the -Conference, and the standpoint it took to settle the Turkish question, -showed it was about to give up the traditional policy of the French -kings in the East, which had been started by Francis I, and the last -representatives of which had been the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s -ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval. - -As early as the end of the eighteenth century Voltaire, though he -extolled Turkish tolerance throughout his “Essai sur la tolérance,” -and wrote that “two hundred thousand Greeks lived in security -in Constantinople,” advocated quite a different policy in his -“Correspondance,” and took sides with the Russians against the Turks. -After confessing that “he had no turn for politics,” and stating in -“Candide” that he only cared for the happiness of peoples, he wrote to -Frederick II: - - “I devoutly hope the barbarous Turks will be driven out of the - land of Xenophon, Socrates, Plato, Sophocles, and Euripides. If - Europe really cared, that would soon be done. But seven crusades of - superstition were once undertaken, and no crusade of honour will - ever be undertaken; all the burden will be left to Catherine.” - -He did not conceal how highly pleased he was with the events of -1769-71, and he wrote to the “Northern Semiramis,” as he styled her: - - “It is not sufficient to carry on a fortunate war against such - barbarians; it is not enough to humble their pride; they ought to - be driven away to Asia for ever. Your Imperial Majesty restores me - to life by killing the Turks. It has always been my opinion that if - their empire is ever destroyed, it will be by yours.” - - -Indeed, some people maliciously hinted at the time that Voltaire’s -opinion of the Turks was due to his disappointment at the failure -of his play “Mahomet, ou le fanatisme,” and that it was for the same -reason he wrote in his “Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations” -while he was Madame du Chatelet’s guest: - - “Force and rapine built up the Ottoman Empire, and the quarrels - between Christians have kept it up. Hardly any town has ever been - built by the Turks. They have allowed the finest works of antiquity - to fall to decay; they rule over ruins.” - -It seems that the members of the Supreme Council, in their answer to -the Turkish delegation, only harped upon this old theme, and amplified -it, and that in their settlement of the question they were inspired -by similar considerations, evincing the same misunderstanding of -Turkey and the same political error. The Supreme Council might have -remembered J. J. Rousseau’s prophecy in his “Contrat Social,” which -might very well be fulfilled now: “The Russian Empire will endeavour to -subjugate Europe, but will be subjugated. The Tatars, its subjects and -neighbours, will become its masters and ours too.”[15] - - * * * * * - -The negotiations which had just been broken off could only have been -usefully carried on if the Allies had quite altered their policy and -had realised the true condition of the Ottoman Empire and the interests -of the Western nations, especially those of France. - -The condition of the Ottoman Empire, as will be seen later on, when -we shall dwell upon the slow and deep disintegration which had taken -place among the Turkish and Arabian populations, was on the whole as -follows: The Young Turk revolution, on which great hopes were built, -had ended lamentably: the Austrians had wrested Bosnia-Herzegovina from -Turkey; the Turco-Italian war had taken from her another slice of her -territory; then the coalition of the Balkan States had arisen, which -seems to have been prepared and supported by England and by the other -nations which followed her policy. Finally, the treaty of Bukharest -confirmed the failure of the principle—once solemnly proclaimed by -France and England—of the territorial integrity of Turkey. So the Turks -no longer had any confidence in Europe, and, being sacrificed once more -in the Balkan war, and as they could no longer trust England, they were -necessarily thrown into the arms of Germany. - -After Abdul Hamid, Mehmed V, with his weak, religious mind, allowed -himself to be led by Enver, and his reign, disturbed by three wars, -cost Turkey huge territorial losses. Mehmed VI, being more energetic -and straightforward, tried to restore order in the State, and to put an -end to the doings of the Committee of Union and Progress. - -Then, too, the Crown Prince, Abdul Mejid, a man about fifty, who -speaks French very well, evinces the same turn of mind. After seeing -what Germany could do with the Turkish Empire, such men, who had not -kept aloof from modern ideas, and to whom European methods were not -unfamiliar, had made up their mind that the Turks should not be driven -out of Europe. But Mejid Effendi was soon deprived of influence through -intrigues, and henceforth engaged in his favourite hobby, painting, in -his palace on Skutari Hill, and kept away from politics. - -Mustafa Kemal, who had been sent to Amasia as Inspector-General of the -Eastern army, had secretly raised an army on his own account, with the -help of Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine in the Izzet Cabinet. When -recalled to Constantinople by the Turkish Government in July, 1919, he -had refused to obey, and had proclaimed himself his own master. Though -he had once gone to Berlin with the Sultan, who was only Crown Prince -at the time, the latter degraded him and deprived him of the right of -wearing his decorations—which could only have been a political measure -intended to show that the throne and the Government could not openly -countenance the movement that was taking place in Anatolia. - -Mustafa Kemal, brought up at Salonika, had only become well known in -Constantinople during the Revolution of 1908. During the war in the -Balkan Peninsula he had distinguished himself at Chatalja, and after -being promoted colonel he was sent as military attaché to Sofia, and -then charged with a mission in Paris. He came back to Constantinople in -1914, a short time before war broke out. - -Of course, when he had started his career a long time previously, -Mustafa Kemal had been connected indirectly with the Union and -Progress party, as he was at the head of the revolutionary group -in which this association originated, but he was never a member of -the Merkez-i-Oumimi, the central seat of the Committee of Union and -Progress. He was a good officer, very fond of his profession, and, as -he loathed politics, he had soon kept away from them, and consequently -never played any part in them, and was hardly ever influenced by them. -Yet the supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, who have -made great mistakes, but have always been patriots, have necessarily -been compelled lately to co-operate with him, though they did not like -to do so at the outset. - -Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly the real leader of the movement which had -already spread over the whole of Anatolian Turkey. As his influence -was enormous and he had an undeniable ascendancy over the Turkish -troops he had recruited, his power was soon acknowledged from Cartal, -close to Constantinople to the Persian frontier. He had compelled -Liman von Sanders to give him command of a sector at a moment when the -Turks seemed to be in a critical situation during the attack of the -Anglo-French fleet in the Dardanelles, and by not complying with his -orders he had saved the Turkish army by the victory of Anafarta, and -perhaps prevented the capture of Constantinople, for two hours after -the Allies, whose casualties had been heavy, retired. - -But he had soon come into conflict with Enver Pasha. Their disagreement -had begun during the war of Tripoli; it had increased during the Balkan -war, and had now reached an acute state. The chief reason seems to be -that they held quite different opinions about the organisation of the -army and the conduct of the war operations. Mustafa Kemal having always -refused to take part in politics after the Young Turk revolution of -1908, it seems difficult to believe this hostility could be accounted -for by political reasons, though the situation had now completely -changed. As to Mustafa Kemal’s bickerings and petty quarrels with -several German generals during the war, they seem to have had no other -cause than a divergence of views on technical points. - -In consequence of this disagreement Mustafa Kemal was sent to -Mesopotamia in disgrace. He came back to Constantinople a few weeks -before the armistice. After the occupation of Smyrna he was appointed -Inspector-General of Anatolia, where he organised the national movement. - -By Mustafa Kemal’s side there stood Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine, -who, during the Balkan war, as commander of the cruiser _Hamidié_, -had made several raids in Greek waters, had then been one of the -signatories of the Moudros armistice, and now was able to bring over -to the Anatolian movement many naval officers and sailors, and General -Ali Fuad Pasha, the defender of Fort Pisani at Janina during the Balkan -war, who had a great prestige among the troops. - -Bekir Sami Bey, once Governor-General, and Ahmed Rustem Bey, formerly -ambassador at Washington, were the first political men of note who -joined the nationalist movement. On Mustafa Kemal’s arrival at Erzerum, -Kiazim Karabekir, together with the other commanders, acknowledged -him as their chief, and pledged themselves to support him against -Constantinople. - -Mustafa Kemal openly charged the Government with betraying Turkey to -the Allies, and asked all those who wanted to defend their country -and their religion to join him. At that time he only had at his -disposal two divisions of regular troops; he sent an appeal to the -populations of Sivas and Ushak, and many volunteers joined his colours. -Colonel Bekir Sami, who commanded the Panderma-Smyrna line and all the -district, also rebelled against the Constantinople Government, and soon -his 10,000 soldiers joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, who assumed the -general command of all the insurgent troops. On the other hand, Kiazim -Bey threatened to resume hostilities, in case too heavy conditions -should be forced on Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, as he refused to make any -concessions to the victors of Turkey, and opposed any separatist idea -or the cession of any Ottoman territories, of course had with him -a large section of public opinion, which was roused by the Allies’ -threat to take from Turkey half her possessions, Thrace, Smyrna, and -Kurdistan, and to drive the Sultan into Asia. - -On July 23, a Congress of the committees which had been established in -various parts of the Empire for the defence of the national rights was -held at Erzerum. - -The proceedings were secret, but at the end of the congress an -official report was sent to the High Commissioners of the Allies in -Constantinople. - -An “Anatolian and Rumelian League for the Defence of the National -Rights” was formed, which later on was called the “National -Organisation.” According to what has become known about the sittings -of the Congress, the principles that were to control the action of -the National Organisation and to constitute its programme were the -following: (1) Grouping of the various Moslem nationalities of the -Empire into a whole politically and geographically indivisible and -administered so as to ensure the respect of their ethnic and social -differences. (2) Equality of rights for non-Moslem communities so -far as consistent with the principle of the political unity of the -State. (3) Integrity of the Empire within the boundaries of Turkish -sovereignty as they were in September, 1918, when the armistice was -concluded—which are almost the same as the ethnic boundaries of Turkey. -(4) No infringement whatever on the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire. -A special article expressed the sincere wish on the part of the Turkish -nation, with a view to the general restoration of Turkey, to accept the -support of any Western country, providing the latter did not aim at an -economic or political subjection of any kind. - -This programme was sanctioned in the course of a second Congress which -was held at Sivas at the beginning of September, 1919, to allow the -local committees which had not been able to send delegates to Erzerum -to give their approbation to it and to adhere to the national movement. - -The executive functions of the Congress were entrusted to a -representative committee presided over by Mustafa Kemal, and consisting -of members chosen by the Congress, who were: Reouf Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, -Hoja Raif Effendi, Mazhar Bey, once vali of Bitlis, and later on Ahmed -Rustem Bey, once Turkish ambassador at Washington, Haidar Bey, once -vali of Kharput, and Hakki Behij Bey. - -The local militias which had been raised took the name of national -forces; and when they had been linked with the regular army, they were -put by Mustafa Kemal under the command of Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha, who -became commander-in-chief in Eastern Anatolia, and Ali Fuad Pasha, who -had the command of the forces of Western Anatolia. - -Two delegates of the “Liberal Entente,” some leaders of which group -seemed open to foreign influence, were sent to Constantinople to ask -the Central Committee what attitude was to be taken, and were prudently -ordered to enjoin the supporters of the Liberal Entente to be most -careful. - -But though part of the Constantinople Press seemed to deny any -importance to the Anatolian movement, the Stambul Government deemed it -proper to send missions to Trebizond, Angora, and Eskishehr, headed by -influential men, in order to restore order in those regions. It also -directed two of its members to go to the rebellious provinces to see -how things stood, and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal. Some of these -missions never reached the end of their journey; most of them had to -retrace their steps, some did not even set out. In September, 1919, -Marshal Abdullah Pasha, who had instructions to reach Mustafa Kemal at -Trebizond, and enjoin him to give up his self-assumed command, did not -stir from Constantinople. The Government also sent General Kemal Pasha, -commander of the gendarmerie, to scatter the nationalist irregular -troops, but nothing was heard of him after a while, and he was supposed -to have been taken prisoner by, or gone over to, the rebels. The -Anatolian valis and commanders who had been summoned to Constantinople -did not come, protesting they could not do so or were ill. - -On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal sent back to Constantinople Jemal -Bey, vali of Konia, and a few functionaries, who had remained loyal -to the Stambul Government. Ismaïl Bey, vali of Brusa, one of the most -important leaders of the Liberal Entente, was driven out of office by -both Governments. - -In addition, the cleavages already existing in the Ottoman Empire, -which since 1913 only included the prominently Moslem provinces, had -widened, and endangered the unity of the Empire. In the provinces where -the Arabic-speaking Moslems were in a majority the authority of the -Turkish Government dwindled every day; they meant to shake off the -Ottoman yoke, and at the same time to keep off any Western influence; -they also wished more and more eagerly to part from the provinces -where the Turks and Ottoman Kurds—who aim at uniting together—are in a -majority. - - * * * * * - -For the last four centuries France had enjoyed an exceptional situation -in Turkey. Her intellectual influence was paramount; French was not -only known among the upper classes, but it was also in current use in -politics and business, and even a good many clerks in post-offices and -booking-offices at Constantinople understood it. - -French schools, owing to their very tolerant spirit, were very popular -among nearly all classes of the Turkish population, and the sympathies -we had thus acquired and the intellectual prestige we enjoyed were -still more important than our material interests. Nearly 25,000 -children attended the French elementary schools, most of them religious -schools, which bears witness both to the confidence the Mahommedans -had in us, and the tolerance they showed. The Grammar School of -Galata-Serai, established in 1868 by Sultan Abdul Aziz with the -co-operation of Duruy, French Minister of Public Education, and several -other secondary schools which are now closed, diffused French culture -and maintained sympathy between the two peoples. The Jesuits’ school of -medicine at Beyrut also spread our influence. - -The material interests of France in Turkey were also of great -importance; and it was, therefore, a great mistake for France to -follow a policy that was bound to ruin the paramount influence she -had acquired. The other Western States had as important interests as -France; and it was necessary to take all these facts into account if an -equitable settlement of the Turkish question was to be reached. - -France, England, and Germany were, before the war, the three Powers -that owned the most important financial concerns in Turkey, France -easily holding the premier position, owing to the amount of French -capital invested in Turkish securities, Government stocks, and private -companies. - -From 1854 to 1875 thirteen loans—almost one every year—were issued by -the Ottoman Government, ten being entrusted to the care of French banks -or financial establishments controlled by French capital. - -These thirteen loans have only an historical interest now, except the -three loans issued in 1854, 1855, and 1871, secured on the Egyptian -tribute, which still exist with some modifications, but may be looked -upon as Egyptian or rather English securities, and were not included -in the settlement effected in 1881 which converted them into new bonds, -and the 1870-71 loan, styled “Lots Turcs,” the whole of which at the -time was subscribed by Baron Hirsch in return for the concession of -railways in Europe. To them let us add another financial operation -effected about 1865, consisting in the unification of the various bonds -of the interior debt and their conversion into bonds representing a -foreign debt. - -Most of these operations were controlled by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, -founded by the most influential English and French financial groups, to -which the Ottoman Government by its firmans of 1863 and 1875 granted -the privilege of being the State bank. It thus has the exclusive right -of issuing banknotes, and has the privilege of being the general -paymaster of the Empire and the financial agent of the Government, both -at home and abroad. - -The financial activity of the French companies was only interrupted by -the 1870 war. The only competition met with was that of a few English -banks, which no doubt intended to second the views of the British -Government in Egypt, and of an Austrian syndicate for the building -of the Balkan railways which, later on, furthered the penetration of -Austria-Hungary in Eastern Europe. - -In 1875 the nominal capital of the Ottoman debt rose to 5,297,676,500 -francs. The Ottoman Government, finding it impossible to pay the -interest on the Government stocks, announced its decision on October -6, 1875, to give only one-half in cash in the future. The Imperial -Ottoman Bank, which was practically under French control owing to the -importance of the French capital invested in it, raised a protest on -behalf of the bondholders. - -The Porte then agreed to make arrangements with the French, the -Italians, the Austrians, the Germans, and the Belgians. The claims -of the bondholders were laid before the plenipotentiaries who had -met at Berlin to revise the preliminaries of San Stefano, and were -sanctioned by the Berlin treaty signed on July 13, 1878. They had three -chief objects: First, to secure the right of first mortgage which the -creditors of the Empire held from the loans secured on the Russian war -indemnity; secondly, to appoint the contributive share of the Ottoman -debt incumbent on the provinces detached from the Empire; thirdly, to -decide what was to be done to restore Turkish finance. - -After the conversations with the plenipotentiaries assembled at Berlin, -and chiefly owing to the intervention of the French representative, M. -Waddington, the Congress embodied the following clauses in the treaty -in order to protect the interests of the bond-holders: Bulgaria was to -pay the Sultan a tribute; part of the revenue of Eastern Rumelia was -to be assigned to the payment of the Ottoman Public Debt; Bulgaria, -Serbia, and Montenegro were to assume a part of the Ottoman debt -proportionately to the Turkish territories annexed by each of them; all -the rights and duties of the Porte relating to the railways of Eastern -Rumelia were to be wholly maintained; finally, the Powers advised the -Sublime Porte to establish an international financial commission in -Constantinople. - -In this way the Berlin treaty laid down the principles on which every -financial reorganisation was to be based whenever a province should be -detached from the Ottoman Empire. - -Then the mandatories of the bondholders began to negotiate directly -with the Ottoman Empire, but as the various schemes that were proferred -failed, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, supported by the Galata bankers, -proposed an arrangement that was sanctioned by the Convention of -November 10 to 22, 1879. In this way the administration of the Six -Contributions was created, to which were farmed out for a period of -ten years the revenues derived from stamp duties, spirits in some -provinces, the fisheries of Constantinople and the suburbs, and the -silk tax within the same area and in the suburbs of Adrianople, -Brusa, and Samsun; it was also entrusted with the collection and -administration of the revenues proceeding from the monopolies in salt -and tobacco. - -At the request of the Imperial Ottoman Bank the revenues of this -administration, first allocated to the Priority Bonds, of which -she owned the greater part, were divided later on between all the -bondholders. - -In this way the important agreement known as the decree of Muharrem, in -which the French played a paramount part, was made possible (December -8 to 20, 1881), according to which the original capital of the foreign -Turkish loans was brought down to the average price of issue, plus 10 -per cent. of this new capital as a compensation for the interest that -had not been paid since 1876. The old bonds were stamped, converted, -and exchanged for new bonds called Bonds of the Unified Converted -Debt, except the “Lots Turcs,” which, being premium bonds, were -treated separately. - -The interest of the Converted Debt was fixed at from 1 to 4 per cent. -of the new capital. - -As to the amortisation, the decree divided the various foreign -loans into several series according to the value of the mortgage; -this classification stated in what order they would be subject to -amortisation. - -The outcome of these negotiations, the decree of Muharrem, also -established a set of concessions which could not be revoked before the -extinction of the debt, and organised the administration of the Ottoman -Public Debt, which was to collect and administer, on behalf of the -Ottoman bondholders, the revenues conceded as guarantee of the debt. - -The Ottoman Government pledged itself to allocate to the payment -of the interest and to the amortisation of the reduced debt till -its extinction the following revenues: the monopolies in salt and -tobacco; the Six Contributions (tobacco, salt, spirits, stamps, -fisheries, silk); any increase in the customs duties resulting from -the modification of the commercial treaties; any increase of the -revenues resulting from new regulations affecting patents and licences -(_temettu_); the tribute of the principality of Bulgaria; any surplus -of the Cyprus revenues; the tribute of Eastern Rumelia; the produce of -the tax on pipe tobacco (_tumbeki_); any sums which might be fixed as -contributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for the -service of the debt. - -The administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was entrusted to “the -Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt,” commonly -known as “the Public Debt,” consisting of delegates of Ottoman -bondholders of all nations. The French owned by far the greater part -of the debt. The English represented the Belgians in the Council, the -shares of these two countries in the debt being about equal. - -This international council, who attended to the strict execution of -the provisions of the decree, deducted all the sums required for -the interest and the sinking fund, and made over the balance to the -Imperial treasury. - -The decree of Muharrem also entrusted to the Public Debt the control -of the cultivation and the monopoly of the sale of tobacco throughout -the Turkish Empire. Later on, in 1883, the Public Debt farmed out its -rights to an Ottoman limited company, the “Régie Co-intéressée des -Tabacs de l’Empire,” formed by a financial consortium including three -groups: the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was a Franco-English concern; -the German group of the B. Bleichröder Bank; and the Austrian group of -the Kredit Anstalt with a capital of 100 million francs. Only one-half -of this capital was paid up—_i.e._, 50 million francs—which was cut -down to 40 million francs on November 28, 1899, to make up for the -losses of the first three years. It is thought in French financial -circles that half this capital—viz., 20 million francs—is French, and -the rest chiefly Austrian. - -The “Régie,” whose activities extend throughout the Empire, may be -looked upon as one of the most important financial concerns of the -Ottoman Empire. It has branches in all the chief centres, controls -the cultivation of tobacco, records the production, buys native and -foreign tobaccos, issues licences for the sale of tobacco, and advances -money to the growers; its chief factories are at Samsun, Aleppo, Adana, -Smyrna, etc. In return for the monopoly it enjoys, it owes the Public -Debt a fixed yearly payment, and has to divide a fixed proportion of -its net profits between the Public Debt and the Ottoman Government. - -The share of France in the Council of the Public Debt, in which French -was the official language, gave her a paramount influence and prestige -in the Ottoman Empire. Owing to the importance and extent of the part -played by the Council of the Debt, in which the influence of France -was paramount, the latter country indirectly acquired an influence in -the administration of the _Malié_—_i.e._, in the administration of -the Turkish treasury—and in this way Turkey was obliged on several -occasions to call for the advice of French specialists for her -financial reorganisation. - -But the Ottoman Government, in order to consolidate its floating debt, -which had not been included in the previous liquidation, was soon -compelled to borrow money abroad. Besides, it wanted to construct a -system of railways at that time. - -The loan guaranteed by the customs duties in 1886, the Osmanie loan in -1890, the 4 per cent. Tombac preferential loan in 1893, the Eastern -Railway loan in 1894, the 5 per cent. 1896 loan, and the 4 per cent. -1901 loan, were all floated in France, and the English had no share in -the financial operations between 1881 and 1904. - -During the same period Germany, through the Deutsche Bank, took up the -Fishery loan in 1888 and the 4 per cent. Baghdad Railway loan in 1903. -Later on the German financial companies, together with the Deutsche -Bank, gave Turkey as much support as the French banks, in order to -promote Pan-Germanism in the East and oust French influence. The chief -financial operations carried on by these companies were the Baghdad -Railway loan, the Tejhizat loan for the payment of military supplies, -and the 1911 loan, which were both a guarantee and an encouragement -for the German policy of penetration in Turkey, and paved the way to a -Germano-Ottoman understanding. - -France continued to subscribe all the same, from 1903 to 1914, to six -of the twelve Turkish loans raised by the Ottoman Government; four -others were taken up by Germany, another by England, and the sixth—the -4 per cent. 1908 loan—was issued one-half in France, one-fourth in -Germany, and one-fourth in England. In 1914, as a reward for issuing -a loan of 800 million francs in Paris—the first slice being 500 -million—France obtained the settlement of several litigious cases and -new concessions of railways and ports. - -At the outbreak of the war, the external debt of Turkey, including the -Unified Debt and other loans, amounted to 3½ milliards of francs, -whereas the Turkish revenue hardly exceeded 500 million francs. -One-third of this sum went to the sinking fund of the external debt, -of which, roughly speaking, France alone owned nearly 60 per cent., -Germany nearly 26 per cent., and England a little more than 14 per cent. - -In addition to this, in the sums lent to Turkey by private companies, -the share of France was about 50 per cent.—_i.e._, over 830 million -francs; that of Germany rose to 35 per cent.; and that of England a -little more than 14 per cent. - -Foreign participation in the great works and the various economic or -financial concerns in Turkey may be summed up as follows: - - -------------------------+----------+----------+---------- - | _France._|_England._|_Germany._ - -------------------------+----------+----------+---------- - Banks | 37·7 | 33·3 | 28·0 - Railways | 46·9 | 10·4 | 46·6 - Ports and wharves | 67·9 | 12·2 | 19·7 - Water | 88·6 | — | 11·3 - Mines | 100·0 | — | — - Various concerns | 62·8 | 24·1 | 13·0 - -------------------------+----------+----------+---------- - Total per cent. | 50·5 | 14·3 | 35·0 - Capital (million Francs) | 830 | 235 | 575 - -------------------------+----------+----------+---------- - -Not only had France an important share in the organisation of Turkish -finances, but had opened three banks while the English established -but one, the National Bank of Turkey, which holds no privilege from -the State, and is merely a local bank for business men. Two German -banks—the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Deutsche Palästina Bank, founded -almost as soon as Germany began to show her policy regarding Turkish -Asia—had turned their activity towards Turkey, as we have just seen. - -France incurred an outlay of 550 million francs—not including the sums -invested in companies which were not predominantly French, such as the -Baghdad Railway—for the building of 1,500 miles of railway lines, while -the Germans built almost as many, and the English only 450 miles; and -France spent 58 million francs for the ports, whereas the English only -spent 10 million francs. - -The railway concessions worked by French capital included the -Damascus-Hama line, which afterwards reached Jaffa and Jerusalem; -the tramways of Lebanon; the Mudania-Brusa line; the Smyrna-Kassaba -railway; the Black Sea railways which, according to the 1914 agreement, -were to extend from Kastamuni to Erzerum, and from Trebizond to -Kharput, and be connected with the Rayak-Ramleh line—viz., 1,600 miles -of railway altogether in Syria; the Salonika-Constantinople line. - -Before the London treaty, the Eastern railways in European Turkey, -representing 600 miles, were worked by Austro-German capital, and the -Salonika-Monastir line, 136 miles in length, had a German capital of 70 -million francs. - -The concessions with German capital in Asia Minor formed a complete -system of railways, including the Anatolian railways, with a length of -360 miles and a capital of 344,500,000 francs; the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana -line, 42 miles, capital 9,200,000 francs; the Baghdad Railway, whose -concession was first given to the Anatolian railways but was ceded in -1903 to the Baghdad Railway Company, and which before the war was about -190 miles in length. - -[Illustration: MAP OF THE RAILWAYS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE -CHIEF MINING CONCERNS UNDER FOREIGN CONTROL BEFORE THE WAR.] - -As the building of this system of railways closely concerned the French -companies of the Smyrna-Kassaba and Beyrut-Damascus railways and the -English company of the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French companies and -the Ottoman Imperial Bank concluded arrangements with the holders of -the concessions to safeguard French interests as much as possible. -Thus a French financial group took up a good many of the Baghdad bonds -(22,500 and 21,155 bonds) and numerous shares of the “Société de -construction du chemin de fer” established in 1909. On the whole, the -share of the French consortium before the war amounted to 4,000,000 -francs on the one hand, and 1,950,000 francs on the other; the share of -the German consortium was 11,000,000 and 8,050,000 francs. - -The concessions controlled by English capital were the Smyrna-Aidin -line, 380 miles long, with a capital of 114,693,675 francs, and the -Smyrna-Kassaba line, which was ceded later on to the company controlled -by French capital which has already been mentioned. They were the first -two railway concessions given in Turkey (1856 and 1863). - -In Constantinople the port, the lighthouses, the gasworks, the -waterworks, and the tramways were planned and built by French capital -and labour. - -The port of Smyrna, whose concession was given in 1867 to an English -company and two years after passed into the hands of some Marseilles -contractors, was completed by the “Société des quais de Smyrne,” a -French limited company. The diversion of the Ghedis into the Gulf of -Phocea in order to prevent the port being blocked up with sand was the -work of a French engineer, Rivet. - -The Bay of Beyrut has also been equipped by a French company founded -in 1888 under the patronage of the Ottoman Bank by a group of the -chief French shareholders of the Beyrut-Damascus road and other French -financial companies. - -Moreover, according to the 1914 agreements, the ports of Ineboli and -Heraclea on the Black Sea, and the ports of Tripoli, Jaffa, and Haïfa -in Syria, were to be built exclusively by French capital. So it was -with the intended concessions of the ports of Samsun and Trebizond. - -At Beyrut a French group in 1909 bought up the English concession for -the building of the waterworks and pipelines, and formed a new company. -French capital, together with Belgian capital, also control the Gas -Company, Tramway Company, and Electric Company of Beyrut. Only at -Smyrna, where the gasworks are in the hands of an English company and -the waterworks are owned by a Belgian company has France not taken part -in the organisation of the municipal services. - -Only the port of Haïdar-Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian Railway, -has been ceded by this company to a financial company whose shares are -in German hands. - -To these public establishments should be added such purely private -industrial or commercial concerns as the Orosdi-Back establishments; -the Oriental Tobacco Company; the Tombac Company; the “Société -nationale pour le commerce, l’industrie et l’agriculture dans l’Empire -ottoman”; the concession of Shukur-ova, the only French concession of -landed property situated in the Gulf of Alexandretta on the intended -track of the Baghdad Railway, including about 150,000 acres of Imperial -land, which represent an entirely French capital of 64 million francs; -the Oriental Carpet Company, which is a Franco-British concern; the -Joint Stock Imperial Company of the Docks, Dockyards, and Shipbuilding -Yard, which is entirely under British control, etc. - -During the war, the share of France and that of England were increased, -as far as the Public Debt is concerned, by the amount of the coupons -which were not cashed by the stockholders of the Allied countries, -while the holders of Ottoman securities belonging to the Central Powers -cashed theirs. - -Beyond this, Turkey borrowed of Germany about 3½ milliards of francs. -An internal loan of 400 million francs had also been raised. To these -sums should be added 2 milliards of francs for buying war supplies -and war material, and the treasury bonds issued by Turkey for her -requisitions, which cannot be cashed but may amount to about 700 -million francs. As the requisitions already made during the Balkan -wars, which amounted to 300 or 400 million francs, have not yet been -liquidated, the whole Turkish debt may be valued at over 10 billion -francs. - -Finally, in the settlement of the Turkish question, the war damages -borne by the French in Turkey should also be taken into account, which -means an additional sum of about 2 milliards of francs. - -The French owned in Turkey great industrial or agricultural -establishments, which were wholly or partly destroyed. At -Constantinople and on the shores of the Marmora alone they had about -fifty religious or undenominational schools, which were half destroyed, -together with everything they contained, perhaps in compliance with the -wishes of Germany, who wanted to ruin French influence for ever in that -country. - -In order to keep up French influence in the East, the High -Commissioner of the Republic had, in the early days of the armistice, -warned his Government it was necessary to provide a fund at once to -defray the expenses of the schools and other institutions established -by the French in Turkey in pre-war time—which sums of money were to be -advanced on the outstanding indemnity. For want of any existing law, -this request could not be complied with; but, as will be seen later on, -the Peace Treaty, though it says nothing about this urgent question, -states that the indemnities due to the subjects of the Allied Powers -for damages suffered by them in their persons or in their property -shall be allotted by an inter-Allied financial commission, which alone -shall have a right to dispose of Turkish revenue and to sanction the -payment of war damages. But all this postpones the solution of the -question indefinitely. - -In the settlement of the Turkish question, the chief point is how -Turkey will be able to carry out her engagements, and so, in her -present condition, the policy which England and America, followed by -Italy and France, seem to advocate, is a most questionable one. - -Javid Bey has even published an account of the condition of Turkey, in -which he finds arguments to justify the adhesion of his country to the -policy of Germany. - -Nevertheless it seems that Turkey, where the average taxation is now -from 23 to 25 francs per head, can raise fresh taxes. The revenue -of the State will also necessarily increase owing to the increase -of production, as a tithe of 10 to 12 per cent. is levied on all -agricultural produce. Finally, the building of new railway lines and -the establishment of new manufactures—to which, it must be said, some -competing States have always objected for their own benefit but to the -prejudice of Turkey—would enable her to make herself the manufactured -goods she bought at a very high price before, instead of sending abroad -her raw materials: silk, wool, cotton, hemp, opium, etc. - -The soil of Turkey, on the other hand, contains a good deal of mineral -and other wealth, most of which has not been exploited yet. There is a -good deal of iron in Asia Minor, though there exists but one iron-mine, -at Ayasmat, opposite to Mitylene, the yearly output of which is only -30,000 tons. The most important beds now known are those of the Berut -Hills, north of the town of Zeitun, about fifty miles from the Gulf of -Alexandretta, which may produce 300,000 tons a year. Chrome, manganese, -and antimony are also found there. - -There is copper everywhere in the north, in thin but rich layers, -containing 20 per cent. of metal. The chief mine, which is at Argana, -in the centre of Anatolia, is a State property. A French company, the -Syndicate of Argana, founded for the prospecting and exploitation of -the copper concessions at Argana and Malatia, and the concessions of -argentiferous lead at Bulgar-Maden, had begun prospecting before the -war. - -Lead, zinc, and silver are found, too, in the Karahissar area, where -is the argentiferous lead mine of Bukar-Dagh, once a State property. -Before the war a French company of the same type as the one above -mentioned, the Syndicate of Ak-Dagh, had obtained the right to explore -the layers of zinc and argentiferous lead in the vilayet of Angora. -The mines of Balia-Karaidin (argentiferous lead and lignite) lying -north-east of the Gulf of Adramyti in the sanjak of Karassi, are -controlled by French capital. The English syndicate Borax Consolidated -has the concession of the boracite mines in the same sandjak. - -The range of Gumich-Dagh, or “Silver Mountain,” contains much emery. -At Eskishehr there are mines of meerschaum, and in the Brusa vilayet -quarries of white, pink, and old-blue marble, lapis-lazuli, etc. - -A few years ago gold layers were being exploited at Mender-Aidin, -near Smyrna, and others have been found at Chanak-Kale, near the -Dardanelles. Some gold-mines had been worked in Arabia in remote ages. - -There are oil-fields throughout the peninsula, lying in four parallel -lines from the north-west to the south-east. The best-known fields -are in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad, where nearly two hundred -have been identified; others have also been found near the Lake of -Van, and at Pulk, west of Erzerum, which are not inferior to those of -Mesopotamia; and others fifty miles to the south of Sinope. - -There are almost inexhaustible layers of excellent asphalt at Latakieh, -on the slopes of the Libanus, and others, quite as good, at Kerkuk, -Hit, and in several parts of Mesopotamia. - -Finally, some coal-mines are being worked at Heraclea which are -controlled by French capital, and coal outcrops have been found lately -in the Mosul area near the Persian frontier, between Bashkala and -Rowanduz and Zahku, close to the Baghdad Railway. But the treaty, as -will be shown later on, is to deprive Turkey of most of these sources -of wealth. - -Among the other products of Turkey may be mentioned carpets, furs (fox, -weasel, marten, and otter), and, particularly, silks. The silks of -Brusa are more valuable than those of Syria—the latter being difficult -to wind; their output has decreased because many mulberry-trees -were cut down during the war, but the industry will soon resume its -importance. - -Turkey also produces a great quantity of leather and hides, and various -materials used for tanning: valonia, nut-gall, acacia. It is well known -that for centuries the leather trade has been most important in the -East, numerous little tanyards are scattered about the country, and -there are large leather factories in many important towns. The Young -Turks, realising the bright prospects of that trade, had attempted to -prohibit the exportation of leathers and hides, and to develop the -leather manufacture. During the summer of 1917 the National Ottoman -Bank of Credit opened a leather factory at Smyrna, and appointed an -Austrian tanner as its director. Owing to recent events, it has been -impossible to establish other leather factories, but this scheme is -likely to be resumed with the protection of the Government, for the -leather industry may become one of the chief national industries. - - * * * * * - -The Peace Conference, by postponing the solution of the Turkish problem -indefinitely, endangered not only French interests in Turkey, but the -condition of Eastern Europe. - -The consequences of such a policy soon became obvious, and at the -beginning of August it was reported that a strong Unionist agitation -had started. The Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, after the answer given -by the Entente to the delegation he presided over, was discredited, as -it could not even give the main features of the forthcoming peace, or -state an approximate date for its conclusion. He could have remained -in office only if the Allies had supported him by quickly solving the -Turkish problem. Besides, he soon lost all control over the events that -hurried on. - -In the first days of summer, the former groups of Young Turks were -reorganised in Asia Minor; some congresses of supporters of the Union -and Progress Committee, who made no secret of their determination not -to submit to the decisions that the Versailles Congress was likely to -take later on, were held at Erzerum, Sivas, and Amasia, and openly -supported motions of rebellion against the Government. At the same -time the Turkish Army was being quickly reorganised, outside the -Government’s control, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf -Bey. An openly nationalist, or rather national, movement asserted -itself, which publicly protested both against the restoration of the -old régime and the dismemberment of Turkey. - -Even in Constantinople the Unionist Committee carried on an -unrestrained propaganda and plotted to overthrow Damad Ferid Pasha -and put in his place Izzet Pasha, a shrewd man, who had signed the -armistice with the Allies, and favoured a policy of compromise. - -This movement had started after the resignation of the Izzet Pasha -Cabinet, when the prominent men of the Unionist party had to leave -Constantinople. First, it had been chiefly a Unionist party, but had -soon become decidedly national in character. Everywhere, but chiefly -in Constantinople, it had found many supporters, and the majority of -the cultured classes sympathised with the leaders of the Anatolian -Government. - -Moreover, the Allies, by allowing the Greeks to land in Smyrna without -any valid reason, had started a current of opinion which strengthened -the nationalist movement, and raised the whole of Turkey against them. - -At the beginning of October, 1919, the Sultan replaced Damad Ferid -Pasha by Ali Riza Pasha as Prime Minister. Reshid Pasha, formerly -Minister of Public Works and ambassador at Vienna, who had been -ambassador at Rome till the revolution of 1908, and had been first -Turkish delegate in the Balkan Conference in London in 1912-13, became -Minister of Foreign Affairs. - -The Grand Vizier General Ali Riza had been Minister of War, and Reshid -Pasha Foreign Minister in the Tewfik Cabinet, which had come into -office in December, 1918, at a time when the Porte was anxious to -conciliate the Allies. Ali Riza had led the operations on the Balkan -front in 1912 and 1913, but had refused to assume any command during -the Great War, as he had always opposed the participation of Turkey in -this war. As he was rather a soldier than a diplomat, his policy seemed -likely to be led by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who -was said to be a friend of France. - -General Jemal Pasha Kushuk, who became War Minister, was quite a -Nationalist. He was called Jemal Junior, to distinguish him from the -other Jemal who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Turkish Army -during the war. He, too, had commanded in Palestine. He was popular in -the army and among the Unionists. Rightly or wrongly, he was supposed -to be in correspondence with Kemal, the leader of the Nationalist -movement in Asia Minor, and his appointment intimated that Ali Riza did -not want to break off with Kemal, whose rebellion had brought about -Damad Ferid’s resignation. - -Said Mollah, Under-Secretary of Justice, a friend of England, edited -the newspaper _Turkje Stambul_, in which he carried on a strong -pro-English propaganda. It was said he was paid by Abdul Hamid to spy -upon a former Sheik-ul-Islam, Jemal ed Din Effendi, his uncle and -benefactor. It seems that by appointing him the Sultan wished to create -a link within the new Government between the supporters of England and -those of France, in order to show that in his opinion Turkey’s interest -was, not to put these two nations in opposition to each other, but, on -the contrary, to collaborate closely with them both for the solution of -Eastern affairs. - -Sultan Mehemet VI, by doing so, endeavoured to restore calm and -order in Turkey, and also to enhance his prestige and authority over -the Nationalist rebels in Anatolia who, at the Congress of Sivas, -had plainly stated they refused to make any compromise either with -the Porte or the Allies. The choice of the new Ministers marked a -concession to the Nationalist and revolutionary spirit. - -About the end of 1919 there were serious indications that the -Nationalist movement was gaining ground in Cilicia, and in January, -1920, disturbances broke out in the Marash area. - -In September, 1919, some armed bands, wearing the khaki uniform of -the regular Turkish Army, had been recruited at Mustafa Kemal’s -instigation. A French officer had been sent to Marash for the first -time to watch over the Jebel Bereket district, which commands all the -tunnels of the Baghdad Railway between Mamurah and Islahie. In December -one of those armed bands, numbering about 200 men, occupied the road -leading from Islahie to Marash, and intercepted the mail. - -As the conditions that were likely to be enforced upon Turkey were -becoming known, discontent increased. General Dutieux, commanding -the French troops of Cilicia, determined to send a battalion as -reinforcement. The battalion set off at the beginning of January and -arrived at Marash on the 10th, after some pretty sharp fighting on -the way at El Oglo. As the attacks were getting more numerous and the -Nationalist forces increased in number, a new French detachment, more -important than the first, and provided with artillery, was dispatched -to Islahie, which it reached on the 14th. This column met with no -serious incident on the way from Islahie to Marash; it reached Marash -on the 17th, at which date it was stated that all the district of Urfa, -Aintab, Antioch, Marash, and Islahie was pacified. - -That was a mistake, for it soon became known that the chiefs of -Bazarjik, a place lying halfway between Marash and Aintab, had gone -over to the Kemalists, and had just sent an ultimatum to the French -commander demanding the evacuation of the country. - -On February 3 the French troops at Marash were attacked by Turkish and -Arabian troops coming from the East, who intended to drive them away, -and join the main body of the Arabian army. - -A French column under the command of Colonel Normand reached Marash, -and after a good deal of hard fighting with the Nationalists, who were -well armed, relieved the French. But Armenian legionaries had most -imprudently been sent; and after some squabbles, which might have been -foreseen, between Moslems and Armenians, the French commander had -bombarded the town, and then had been compelled to evacuate it. These -events, later on, led to the recall of Colonel Brémond, whose policy, -after the organisation of the Armenian legions, had displeased the -Moslem population. - -Two months after the Marash affair on February 10 the tribes in the -neighbourhood of Urfa, which the French, according to the Anglo-French -agreement of 1916, had occupied at the end of 1919 after about a year -of British occupation, attacked the stations of the Baghdad Railway -lying to the south, and cut off the town from the neighbouring posts. -The French detachment was first blocked up in the Armenian quarter, was -then attacked, and after two months’ fighting, being on the verge of -starvation, had to enter into a parley with the Turkish authorities and -evacuate the town on April 10. But while the French column retreated -southwards, it was assailed by forces far superior in number, and -had to surrender; some men were slaughtered, others marched back to -Urfa or reached the French posts lying farther south of Arab Punar or -Tel-Abiad. - -On April 1—that is to say, nearly at the same time—the Turks attacked -the American mission at Aintab. French troops were sent to their help -as soon as the American consul-general at Beyrut asked for help. They -arrived on April 17, and, after resisting for eighteen days, the few -members of the American mission were able to withdraw to Aleppo, where -they met with American refugees from Urfa, with the French column sent -to relieve them. - -In a speech made in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies about the -validation of the mandate of the members for Adana, Mersina, and other -districts of Asia Minor, Reouf Bey, a deputy and former Minister of -Marine, maintained that the occupation of Cilicia had not been allowed -in the armistice, and so the occupation of this province by the French -was a violation of the treaty. - -In the middle of February the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign -Affairs handed the Allied representatives a memorandum drawn up by the -Government to expound the situation brought about by the postponement -of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and chiefly requested: - -(1) That the Turkish inhabitants, in the districts where they were in -a majority, should be left under Turkish sovereignty, and that their -rights should be guaranteed. - -(2) That the position of the regions occupied by the Allies should be -altered. - -(3) That the Turkish delegation should be heard before irrevocable -decisions were taken. - -The Allies, too, felt it was necessary to come to a settlement; and -as they had waited too long since they had dismissed the Turkish -delegation in July of the previous year, the situation was getting -critical now. As the United States, which took less and less interest -in European affairs, did not seem anxious to intervene in the solution -of the Eastern problem, Mr. Lloyd George, on Thursday, December 18, -1919, in an important speech in which he gave some information about -the diplomatic conversations that were taking place in London, came to -the Turkish question and stated that the terms of the treaty would soon -be submitted to Turkey. - - “My noble friend said: Why could you not make peace with Turkey, - cutting out all the non-Turkish territories, and then leaving - Constantinople and Anatolia to be dealt with?’ I think on - consideration he will see that is not possible. What is to be done - with Constantinople? What is to be done with the Straits?... If - those doors had been open, and if our fleet and our merchant ships - had been free to go through ... the war would have been shortened - by two or three years. They were shut treacherously in our faces. - We cannot trust the same porter. As to what will remain much - depended on whether America came in.... Would America take a share, - and, if so, what share? France has great burdens, Britain has great - burdens, Italy has great burdens. Much depended on whether America, - which has no great extraneous burdens, and which has gigantic - resources, was prepared to take her share.... But until America - declared what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the position - might have led to misunderstandings with America and would have - caused a good deal of suspicion, and we regard a good understanding - with America as something vital. That is the reason why we could - not make peace with Turkey.... - - “We are entitled to say now: ‘We have waited up to the very limits - we promised, and we have waited beyond that.’ The decision of - America does not look promising.... Therefore we consider now, - without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference, - and without in the least wishing to deprive the United States of - America of sharing the honour of guardianship over these Christian - communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with - Turkey, and we propose to do so at the earliest possible moment. - We have had some preliminary discussions on the subject. As far as - they went they were very promising. They will be renewed, partly in - this country, partly probably in France, in the course of the next - few days, and I hope that it will be possible to submit to Turkey - the terms of peace at an early date.” - -But as the Allies, instead of dictating terms of peace to Turkey at -the end of 1918, had postponed the settlement of the Turkish question -for fourteen months, as they had dismissed the Ottoman delegation -after summoning it themselves, and as the question was now about to be -resumed under widely different circumstances and in quite another frame -of mind, the Paris Conference found itself in an awkward situation. - - * * * * * - -About the end of the first half of February, 1920, the Peace Conference -at last resumed the discussion of the Turkish question. - -The task of working out a first draft of the treaty of peace with -Turkey had been entrusted by the Supreme Council to three commissions. -The first was to draw up a report on the frontiers of the new Republic -of Armenia; the second was to hold an inquiry into the Ottoman debt and -the financial situation of Turkey; and the third was to examine the -claims of Greece to Smyrna. - -It had been definitely settled that the Dardanelles should be placed -under international control, and the Conference was to decide what kind -of control it would be, what forces would be necessary to enforce it, -and what nationalities would provide these forces. There remained for -settlement what the boundaries of the Constantinople area would be, and -what rights the Turks would have over Adrianople. - -The discussion of the Turkish question was resumed in an untoward way, -which at first brought about a misunderstanding. The English wanted -the debate to be held in London, and the French insisted upon Paris. -Finally it was decided that the principles should be discussed in -London, and the treaty itself should be drawn up in Paris. - -At the first meetings of the Allies concerning Constantinople, the -English strongly urged that the Turks should be turned out of Europe, -and the French held the contrary opinion. Later on a change seems to -have taken place in the respective opinions of the two Allies. The -English, who were far from being unanimous in demanding the eviction of -the Turks, gradually drew nearer to the opinion of the French, who now, -however, did not plead for the Turks quite so earnestly as before. - -This change in the English point of view requires an explanation. - -The English, who are prone to believe only what affects them, did not -seem to dread the Bolshevist peril for Europe, perhaps because they -fancied England was quite secure from it; on the contrary, they thought -this peril was more to be dreaded for the populations of Asia, no doubt -because it could have an easier access to the English possessions. The -success of Bolshevism with the Emir of Bokhara, close to the frontiers -of India, seemed to justify their fears. Bolshevism, however, is -something quite special to the Russian mind; other nations may be led -astray or perverted by it for a time, but on the whole they cannot -fully adhere to it permanently. Besides, it appears that Bolshevism has -been wrongly looked upon as something Asiatic. Of course, it has been -welcomed by the Slavs on the confines of Europe, and seems to agree -with their mentality; but in fact it does not come from Asia, but from -Europe. Lenin and Trotsky, who were sent by Germany from Berlin to St. -Petersburg in a sealed railway-carriage and had lived before in Western -Europe, imported no Asiatic ideas into Russia. They brought with them a -mixture of Marxist socialism and Tolstoist catholicism, dressed up in -Russian style to make it palatable to the moujik, and presented to the -intellectual class, to flatter Slav conceit, as about to renovate the -face of Europe. - -The English did not realise that their own policy, as well as that -of their Allies, had run counter to their own aims, that they had -actually succeeded in strengthening the position of the Soviets, and -that if they kept on encroaching upon the independence and territorial -integrity of the heterogeneous Eastern populations of Russia and -the peoples of Asia Minor, they would definitely bring them over to -Bolshevism. Of course, these peoples were playing a dangerous game, and -ran the risk of losing their liberty in another way, but they clung -to any force that might uphold them. Mustafa Kemal was thus induced -not to reject the offers the Moscow Government soon made him, but it -did not seem likely he would be so foolish as to keep in the wake of -the Soviets, for the latter are doomed to disappear sooner or later, -unless they consent to evolution, supposing they have time to change. -The Allies, on the other hand, especially the English, forgot that -their policy risked giving Constantinople indirectly to Russia, where -Tsarist imperialism had been replaced by Bolshevist imperialism, both -of which are actuated by the same covetous spirit. - -The fear of Bolshevism, however, had a fortunate consequence later -on, as it brought about in 1920 a complete change in British ideas -concerning Turkey and Constantinople. The London Cabinet realised -that the Turks were the first nation that the Bolshevist propaganda -could reach, and to which the Moscow Government could most easily and -effectually give its support against British policy in Asia Minor, -which would make the situation in the East still more complicated. So, -in order not to drive the Ottoman Government into open resistance, -England first showed an inclination to share the view, held by France -from the outset, that the Turks should be allowed to remain in -Constantinople. - -So the British Government instructed Admiral de Robeck, British High -Commissioner in Constantinople, to bring to the knowledge of the Turks -that the Allies had decided not to take Constantinople from them, but -also warn them that, should the Armenian persecutions continue, the -treaty of peace with Turkey might be remodelled. - -The Turkish Press did not conceal its satisfaction at seeing that -Constantinople was likely to remain the capital of the Empire, and -was thankful to France for proposing and supporting this solution. -Meanwhile a new party, “the Party of Defence and Deliverance of the -Country,” to which a certain number of deputies adhered, and which was -supposed to be accepted and supported by the whole nation, had solemnly -declared that no sacrifice could be made concerning the independence -of the Ottoman Empire, and the integrity of Constantinople and the -coast of the Marmora, merely recognising the freedom of passage of the -Straits for all nations. This party now held great demonstrations. - -At the end of February the Minister of the Interior at Constantinople -addressed to all the public authorities in the provinces the following -circular: - - “I have great pleasure in informing you that Constantinople, - the capital of the Khilafat and Sultanate, will remain ours, by - decision of the Peace Conference. - - “God be praised for this! This decision implies that, as we - earnestly hope, our rights will be safeguarded and maintained. - - “You should do the utmost in your power and take all proper - measures to prevent at all times and especially at the present - delicate juncture untoward incidents against the non-Moslem - population. Such incidents might lead to complaints, and affect the - good dispositions of the Allies towards us.” - -In the comments of the Ottoman Press on the deliberations of the -Peace Conference regarding the peace with Turkey, the more moderate -newspapers held the Nationalists responsible for the stern decisions -contemplated by the Powers, and asked the Government to resist them -earnestly. - -Great was the surprise, therefore, and deep the emotion among the -Turks, when, after the aforesaid declarations, on February 29, the -English fleet arrived and a large number of sailors and soldiers -marched along the main streets of Pera, with fixed bayonets, bands -playing, and colours flying. - -A similar demonstration took place at Stambul on the same day, and -another on the following Wednesday at Skutari. - - * * * * * - -A sudden wave of discussion spread over Great Britain at the news that -the Turks were going to keep Constantinople, and made an impression -on the Conference, in which there were still some advocates of the -eviction of the Turks. - -A memorandum signed by Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. J. H. Thomas, -requiring that the Turks should be driven out of Europe, raised some -discussion in the House of Commons. In answer to this memorandum some -members sent a circular to their colleagues, to ask them to avoid, -during the sittings of the Peace Conference, all manifestations that -might influence its decisions concerning foreign affairs. Another -group, in an appeal to Mr. Lloyd George, reminded him that in his -declaration of January 5, 1918, he had stated that the English did not -fight to wrest her capital from Turkey, and that any departure from -this policy would be deeply resented in India. - -Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Bryce proved the most determined adversaries -of the retention of the Turks in Europe. - -According to the _Daily Mail_, even within the British Cabinet widely -different views were held about Constantinople. One section of the -Cabinet, led by Lord Curzon, asked that the Turks should be evicted -from Europe; and another, led by Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, -favoured the retention of the Turks in Constantinople, provided they -should give up their internal struggles and submit to the decisions of -the Allies. - -_The Times_ severely blamed the Government for leaving the Turks in -Constantinople; it maintained it was not too late to reconsider their -decision; and it asked that Constantinople should in some way be placed -under international control. - -The _Daily Chronicle_ also stated that it would have been better if -the Turks had been evicted from Constantinople, and expressed the hope -that at any rate public opinion would not forget the Armenian question. -At the same time—_i.e._, at the end of February, 1920—American leaders -also asked that the Turks should be compelled to leave Constantinople, -and a strong Protestant campaign started a powerful current of opinion. - -On Sunday evening, February 29, a meeting of so-called “non-sectarians” -was held in New York, with the support of the dignitaries of St. John’s -Cathedral. - -The Bishop of Western Pennsylvania, after holding France responsible -for the present situation because it owned millions of dollars of -Turkish securities, declared: “Though I love England and France, we -must let these two countries know that we will not shake hands with -them so long as they hold out their hands to the sanguinary Turk.” - -Messages from Senator Lodge, the presidents of Harvard and Princeton -Universities, M. Myron, T. Herrick, and other Americans of mark were -read; asking President Wilson and the Supreme Council that the Ottoman -rule in Constantinople should come to an end. Motions were also carried -requesting that the Turks should be expelled from Europe, that the -Christians should no longer be kept under Moslem sway, and that the -Allies should carry out their engagements with regard to Armenia. - -Another movement, similar in character to the American one, was started -in England at the same time. - -The Archbishop of Canterbury, with the other Anglican bishops and some -influential men, addressed a similar appeal to the British Government. - -Twelve bishops belonging to the Holy Synod of Constantinople sent a -telegram to the Archbishop of Canterbury, entreating his support that -no Turk might be left in Constantinople. In his answer, the Archbishop -assured the Holy Synod that the Anglican Church would continue to do -everything conducive to that end. - -The Bishop of New York also telegraphed to the Archbishop of Canterbury -on behalf of about a hundred American bishops, to thank him for -taking the lead in the crusade against the retention of the Turks in -Constantinople. The Archbishop replied that he hoped America would -assume a share in the protection of the oppressed nationalities in the -East. - -The personality of the promoters plainly showed that religious -interests were the leading factors in this opposition, and played a -paramount part in it, for the instigators of the movement availed -themselves of the wrongs Turkey had committed in order to fight against -Islam and further their own interests under pretence of upholding the -cause of Christendom. - -So, in February, after the formidable campaign started in Great Britain -and the United States, at the very time when the treaty of peace with -Turkey was going to be discussed again, and definitely settled, the -retention of the Turkish Government in Constantinople was still an open -question. - -On February 12 the Anglo-Ottoman Society addressed to Mr. Lloyd George -an appeal signed by Lord Mowbray, Lord Lamington, General Sir Bryan -Mahon, Professor Browne, Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, and several other -well-known men, referring to the pledge he had made on January 5, 1918, -to leave Constantinople to the Turks. The appeal ran as follows: - -“We, the undersigned, being in touch with Oriental opinion, view with -shame the occupation of the vilayet of Aidin, a province ‘of which the -population is predominantly Turkish,’ by Hellenic troops; and have -noticed with alarm the further rumours in the Press to the effect that -part of Thrace—and even Constantinople itself—may be severed from the -Turkish Empire at the peace settlement, in spite of the solemn pledge -or declaration aforesaid, on the one hand, and, on the other, the -undeniable growth of anti-British feeling throughout the length and -breadth of Asia, and in Egypt, owing to such facts and rumours. - -“We beg you, in the interests not only of England or of India but of -the peace of the world, to make good that solemn declaration not to -deprive Turkey of Thrace and Asia Minor, with Constantinople as her -capital.” - - -The next week a memorandum was handed to Mr. Lloyd George and printed -in the issue of _The Times_ of February 23. It was signed by, among -others, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishop of London, -Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. A. G. Gardiner (late editor of the _Daily -News_), the socialist leader Hyndman, Lord Bryce (formerly ambassador -to the United States), the well-known writer Seton-Watson, Dr. Burrows, -Principal of King’s College, Professor Oman, and many professors -of universities. In it the same desires lurked behind the same -religious arguments, under cover of the same social and humanitarian -considerations—viz., that the Turks should no longer be allowed -to slaughter the Armenians, and that they should be expelled from -Constantinople. - - “As to Constantinople itself, it will be a misfortune and indeed - a scandal if this city is left in Turkish hands. It has been for - centuries a focus of intrigue and corruption; and it will so - continue as long as the Turkish Government has power there. If - Constantinople were transferred to the control of the League of - Nations, there would be no offence to genuine Moslem sentiment. - For the Khilafat is not, and never has been, attached to - Constantinople. The Sultan, if he retains the Khilafat, will be - just as much a Khalifa, in the eyes of Moslems all over the world, - at Brusa or Konia, as at Stambul.” - -Now the absurdity of such arguments is patent to all those who know -that “the focus of intrigue and corruption” denounced in this document -is the outcome of the political intrigues carried on by foreigners in -Constantinople, and kept up by international rivalries. As to the exile -of the Sultan to Brusa or Konia, it could only have raised a feeling of -discontent and resentment among Moslems and roused their religious zeal. - -Such a movement was resented by the Turks all the more deeply as, -it must be remembered, they have great reverence for any religious -feeling. For instance, they still look upon the Crusades with respect, -because they had a noble aim, a legitimate one for Catholics—viz., the -conquest of the Holy Places; though later on behind the Crusaders, -as behind all armies, there came all sorts of people eager to derive -personal profit from those migrations of men. But they cannot entertain -the least consideration or regard for a spurious religious movement, -essentially Protestant, behind which Anglo-Saxon covetousness is -lurking, and the real aim of which is to start huge commercial -undertakings. - -Moreover, the Greek claims which asserted themselves during the -settlement of the Turkish question partly originated in the connection -between the Orthodox Church, not with Hellenism in the old and -classical sense of the word, as has been wrongly asserted, but -with Greek aspirations. For the Œcumenical Patriarch, whose see is -Constantinople, is the head of the Eastern Church, and he still enjoys -temporal privileges owing to which he is, in the Sultan’s territory, -the real leader of the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Though the -countries of Orthodox faith in Turkey have long enjoyed religious -autonomy, their leaders keep their eyes bent on Constantinople, for in -their mind the religious cause is linked with that of the Empire, and -the eventual restoration of the Greek Empire in Constantinople would -both consolidate their religious faith and sanction their claims. - -In spite of what has often been said, it seems that the Christian -Church did not so much protect Hellenism against the Turks as the -Orthodox Church enhanced the prosperity of the Greeks within the -Turkish Empire. The Greek Church, thanks to the independence it enjoyed -in the Ottoman Empire, was a sort of State within the State, and had -a right to open and maintain schools which kept up moral unity among -the Greek elements. So it paved the way to the revolutionary movement -of 1821, which was to bring about the restoration of the Greek kingdom -with Athens as its capital; and now it serves the plans of the -advocates of Greater Greece. Let us add that nowadays the Greek Church, -like the Churches of all the States that have arisen on the ruins of -Turkey, has its own head, and has freed itself from the tutelage of the -Patriarch for the administration of its property. - -Lord Robert Cecil, who had taken the lead in that politico-religious -movement, wrote on February 23 in the _Evening Standard_ a strong -article in which he said something to this purpose: “Constantinople is -a trophy of victories, not the capital of a nation. From Constantinople -the Turks issue cruel orders against the Christian population. From the -point of view both of morality and of prudence, the Stambul Government -must not be strengthened by such an exorbitant concession on the part -of the Allies.” - -In the debate which took place on Wednesday, February 25, 1920, -in the House of Commons regarding the retention of the Turks in -Constantinople, after a question of Lord Edmund Talbot, Sir Donald -Maclean, who spoke first, urged that if the Turks were not expelled -from Constantinople all the worst difficulties of the past would occur -again, and would endanger the peace of the world. - - “The decision of the Peace Conference was a great surprise to most - people. We owed nothing to the Turks. They came into the war gladly - and without any provocation on our part. They became the willing - and most useful ally of Germany. If the Turks were left in the - gateway of the world, they would be at their old game again.”[16] - -Sir Edward Carson said just the reverse: - - “It was suggested that we should drive the Turks out of - Constantinople.... If the Allies wanted to drive the Turks out of - Constantinople, ... they would have to commence another war, and - it would not be a small war. You must not talk of cutting down the - Army and the Navy, and at the same moment censure the Government - because they had not settled the question of driving the Turks - out.”[17] - -Mr. Lloyd George, speaking after them both, began thus: - - “This is not a decision, whichever way you go, which is free from - difficulty and objection. I do not know whether my right hon. - friend is under the impression that if we decided to expel the - Turk from Constantinople the course would be absolutely clear. - As a matter of fact, it is a balancing of the advantages and the - disadvantages, and it is upon that balance and after weighing very - carefully and for some time all the arguments in favour and all - the arguments against, all the difficulties along the one path - and all the difficulties you may encounter on the other, and all - the obstacles and all the perils on both sides, that the Allied - Conference came to the conclusion that on the whole the better - course was to retain the Turk in Constantinople for achieving a - common end.” - -Then he explained that the agreement concerning the substitution of -the Russians for the Turks in Constantinople had become null and void -after the Russian revolution and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and that -at the present date the Bolshevists were not ready to assume such a -responsibility, should it be offered to them. - - “I will deal with two other pledges which are important. My right - hon. friend referred to a pledge I gave to the House in December - last, that there would not be the same gate-keeper, but there would - be a different porter at the gates.... It would have been the - height of folly to trust the guardianship of these gates to the - people who betrayed their trust. That will never be done. They will - never be closed by the Turk in the face of a British ship again.... - - “The second pledge, given in January, 1918, was given after full - consultation with all parties, and the right hon. member for - Paisley and Lord Grey acquiesced. There was a real desire to make - a national statement of war aims, a statement that would carry all - parties along with it, and they all agreed. It was a carefully - prepared declaration, which I read out, as follows: ‘Nor are we - fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its - capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and - Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race. Outside Europe - we believe that the same principle should be applied.... While - we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the - homeland of the Turkish race, with its capital in Constantinople, - the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being - internationalised and neutralised’ (as they will be), ‘Arabia, - Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment - entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions.’ - That declaration was specific, unqualified, and deliberate. It was - made with the consent of all parties in the community.... - - “The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting went up - appreciably from that very moment.... - - “Now we are told: ‘That was an offer you made to Turkey, and they - rejected it, and therefore you were absolutely free.’ It was more - than that. It was a statement of our war aims for the workers - of this country, a statement of our war aims for India. It is - too often forgotten that we are the greatest Mohammedan Power in - the world. One-fourth of the population of the British Empire is - Mohammedan.... We gave a solemn pledge and they accepted it, and - they are disturbed at the prospect of our not abiding by it.... - There is nothing which would damage British power in Asia more than - the feeling that you could not trust the British word. That is the - danger. Of course it would be a fatal reputation for us.... - - “When the peace terms are published there is no friend of the - Turk, should there be any left, who will not realise that he has - been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his crimes, - and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his Empire, his - country under the Allied guns, deprived of his army, his navy, - his prestige—the punishment will be terrible enough to satisfy - the bitterest foe of the Turkish Empire, drastic enough for the - sternest judge. My right hon. friend suggested that there was a - religious issue involved. That would be the most dangerous of all, - and the most fatal. I am afraid that underneath the agitation - there is not only the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but - there is something of the old feeling of Christendom against the - Crescent. If it is believed in the Mohammedan world that our terms - are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the Prophet - before that of Christendom, it will be fatal to our government - in India. It is an unworthy purpose to achieve by force. It is - unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of our faith. - - “Let us examine our legitimate peace aims in Turkey. The first - is the freedom of the Straits. I put that first for two reasons, - which I shall refer to later on. It was put first by my right - hon. friend, and I accept it. The second is the freeing of the - non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman sway; the preservation - for the Turk of self-government in communities which are mainly - Turkish, subject to two most important reservations. The first - is that there must be adequate safeguards within our power for - protecting the minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in - the past. The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power - of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule which - were once the granary of the Mediterranean.... - - “You can get the great power of Constantinople from its - geographical situation. That is the main point. It is the main - point for two reasons. The first is, when you consider the future - possibilities of the Black Sea. You have there six or seven - independent communities or nations to whom we want access. It - is essential that we should have a free road, a right-of-way to - these countries, whatever the opinion of the Turk may be. His - keeping of the gates prolonged the war, and we cannot have that - again. Therefore, for that reason, it is coming to an end. The - second reason why the guardianship of the gates is important is - because of its effect upon the protection of minorities. How do - we propose that that should be achieved? Turkey is to be deprived - entirely of the guardianship of the gates. Her forts are to be - dismantled. She is to have no troops anywhere within reach of these - waters. More than that, the Allies mean to garrison those gates - themselves.... I was going to say that we have been advised that, - with the assistance of the Navy, we shall be able to garrison the - Dardanelles and, if necessary, the Bosphorus, with a much smaller - force because of the assistance to be given by the Navy for that - purpose. Turkey will not be allowed a navy. What does she want with - a navy? It was never of the slightest use to her when she had it. - She never could handle it. That is the position in regard to the - Straits. - - “What is the alternative to that proposal? The alternative to - that proposal is international government of Constantinople and - the whole of the lands surrounding the Straits. It would mean - a population of 1,500,000 governed by the Allies—a committee - representing France, Italy, Great Britain, and, I suppose, some - day Russia might come in, and, it might be, other countries. - America, if she cared to come in. Can anyone imagine anything more - calculated to lead to that kind of mischievous intriguing, rivalry, - and trouble in Constantinople that my right hon. friend deprecated - and, rightly, feared? How would you govern it? Self-government - could not be conferred under those conditions. It would have to - be a military government.... It would require, according to every - advice we have had, a very considerable force, and it would add - very considerably to the burdensome expenditure of these countries, - and it would be the most unsatisfactory government that anyone - could possibly imagine. - - “We had hoped that two of the great countries of the world would - have been able to help us in sharing the responsibility for the - government of this troubled country; but for one reason or another - they have fallen out. There was first of all Russia. She is out of - the competition for a very unpleasant task. Then there was America. - We had hopes, and we had good reason for hoping, that America would - have shared these responsibilities. She might probably have taken - the guardianship of the Armenians, or she might have taken the - guardianship of Constantinople. But America is no claimant now, and - I am not going to express an opinion as to whether she ever will - be, because it would be dangerous to do so; but for the moment we - must reckon America as being entirely out of any arrangement which - we contemplate for the government of Turkey and for the protection - of the Christian minorities in that land.... I ask my noble friend, - if he were an Armenian would he feel more secure if he knew that - the Sultan and his Ministers were overlooked by a British garrison - on the Bosphorus, and that British ships were there within reach, - than if the Sultan were at Konia, with hundreds of miles across - the Taurus Mountains to the nearest Allied garrison, and the sea - with its great British ships and their guns out of sight and out of - mind? I know which I would prefer if I were an Armenian with a home - to protect.”[18] - -The Prime Minister concluded his speech by saying that the Allies -chiefly desired to take from the Turks the government of communities of -alien race and religion, which would feel adequately protected when -they knew that their former persecutors must sign the decree for their -liberation under the threat of English, French, and Italian guns. Yet -he could not dissemble his own misgivings. - -In the discussion that followed Lord Robert Cecil said that, in any -settlement with regard to Armenia, he trusted there would not only be a -considerable increase in the present area of the Armenian Republic, but -that Armenia would be given some access to the Black Sea in the north. -Without that he was satisfied that the Armenian Republic would have the -greatest difficulty in living. He earnestly hoped that every influence -of the British Government would be used to secure that Cilicia -should be definitely removed from Turkish sovereignty. He repeated -once more that he was sorry the Turks were going to be retained in -Constantinople, but that— - - “No one wished to turn the Sultan out; the central thing was to get - rid of the Sublime Porte as the governor of Constantinople. That - did not mean turning anybody out; it merely meant that we were not - to hand back Constantinople to the Turkish Government.” - - He had the greatest regard for the feelings of the Indians in - that matter, but was surprised they insisted upon the retention - of the Sultan in Constantinople. He thought that there was not - the slightest ground for maintaining the Sultan as Caliph of - Mohammedanism, and, even if there were, there was nothing at all - vital about his remaining in Constantinople. So far as the Turks - were concerned, what was Constantinople? It was not a national - capital; it had been occupied by the Turks as their great trophy - of victory. He entirely approved of the statement of 1918, and, - in the same circumstances, he would make it again. It seemed to - him perfectly fantastic to say that ever since 1918 we had held - out to our Indian fellow-subjects an absolute undertaking that - Constantinople should remain in the hands of the Turks. - - Then Mr. Bonar Law rose, and declared that it would be easier - to have control over the Turkish Government if it was left in - Constantinople, instead of transferring it to Konia, - - “Our fleet at Constantinople would be a visible emblem of power. - The Allies believed that the pressure they would be able to - exercise would have an effect throughout the Turkish Empire, but it - would not be so if we sent the Turks to Konia. An hon. member had - said that some Armenians had told him that they desired the Turks - to be sent out of Constantinople. Let the Armenians consider the - facts as they now were. - - “If there was one thing which more than another was likely to make - the League of Nations a failure it was to hand over this question - to them. In 1917 it was arranged that if we were victorious in the - war, Russia would become the possessor of Constantinople. But all - that fell to the ground, and in 1918 a new situation arose, and - a solemn document was put before the British people in which it - was stated that one of our war aims was not to turn the Turks out - of Constantinople. Overwhelming reasons were required to justify - departure from that declaration, and those overwhelming reasons had - not been forthcoming. When it was hoped and expected that America - would accept a mandate in regard to Turkey there was no question of - turning the Turks out of Constantinople.”[19] - -The debate, which came to an end after this statement by Mr. Bonar Law, -was not followed by a vote. - -Mr. Montagu, Secretary for India, stated in an interview printed in the -_Evening Standard_, February 25: - - “If one of the results of the war must needs be to take away - Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the liberty of - respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as president, of the Indian - delegation in the Peace Conference, that we ought not to have - asked Indians to take part in the war against Turkey. Throughout - India, all those who had to express their opinion on this subject, - whatever race or religion they may belong to, are of opinion that - Constantinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal - and external peace of India is to be preserved. - - “The Turks, who are the chief part of the population in - Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other community - to the possession of that city. So we have to choose between - the Turks and an international régime. Now in the history of - Constantinople examples have occurred of the latter régime, and - the results were not so good that it cannot be said a Turkish - government would not have done better.” - -This opinion was upheld by a good many British newspapers, -notwithstanding Lord Robert Cecil’s campaign. - -Yet under the pressure of a section of public opinion and the agitation -let loose against Turkey, England seemed more and more resolved to -occupy Constantinople, and _The Times_, though it had never been averse -to the eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, now showed some -anxiety: - - “We cannot imagine how the greatest lovers of political - difficulties in Europe should have ever dreamt that Constantinople - should be occupied exclusively by British troops, or that such a - decision may have been taken without previously taking the Allies’ - advice. - - “As things now stand, we are not at all surprised that such stories - may have given birth to a feeling of distrust towards us. These are - the fruits of a policy tainted with contradiction and weakness. The - Allied countries refuse to sacrifice any more gold or human lives, - unless their honour is concerned. They will not consent to go to - war in order to safeguard the interests of a few international - financiers, who want to dismember Turkey-in-Asia.” - -This movement was brought about by the explosion of very old feelings -which had been smouldering for nearly forty years, had been kept alive -by the Balkan war, and had been roused by the last conflict. Even at -the time of Catherine II the merchants of the City of London merely -looked upon Russia as a first-rate customer to whom they sold European -and Indian goods, and of whom in return they bought raw materials which -their ships brought to England. So they felt inclined to support the -policy of Russia, and, to quote the words of a French writer in the -eighteenth century, the English ambassador at Constantinople was “le -chargé d’affaires de la Russie.” So a party which took into account -only the material advantages to be drawn from a closer commercial -connection with Russia arose and soon became influential. William Pitt -inveighed against this party when, in one of his speeches, he refused -to argue with those who wanted to put an end to the Ottoman Empire. But -the opinion that England can only derive economic advantages from the -dismemberment of Turkey in favour of Russia soon found a new advocate -in Richard Cobden, the leader of the Manchester school, who expounded -it in a little book, _Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer_, printed -at Edinburgh in 1835. This dangerous policy was maintained, in spite -of David Urquhart’s campaign against the Tsarist policy in the East -in a periodical, _The Portfolio_, which he had founded in 1833, and, -notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by Blacque, a Frenchman, -editor of _The Ottoman Monitor_, to show that Europe was being cheated -by Russia, and was going the wrong way in her attitude towards Turkey. -And the same foolish policy consistently pursued by Fox, Gladstone, and -Grey towards Tsardom is still carried on by Britain towards Bolshevism. -The same narrowly utilitarian views, the typical economic principles -of the Manchester School, linked with Protestant ideas, and thus -strengthened and aggravated by religious feeling, seem still to inspire -the Russian policy of Britain as they once inspired the old “bag and -baggage” policy of Mr. Gladstone, the “Grand Old Man,” that the Turks -should be expelled from Constantinople with bag and baggage. Indeed, -this policy may be looked upon as an article of faith of the English -Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone’s religious mind, which was alien to the -Islamic spirit, together with the endeavours of the economists who -wanted to monopolise the Russian market, brought about an alliance with -Holy Orthodox Russia, and within the Anglican Church a movement for -union with the Holy Synod had even been started. - -That campaign was all the more out of place as the Turks have -repeatedly proclaimed their sympathy for England and turned towards -her. Just as after the first Balkan war the Kiamil Cabinet had made -overtures to Sir Edward Grey, after the armistice of November 11 Tewfik -Pasha, now Grand Vizier, had also made open proposals. England had -already laid hands on Arabia and Mesopotamia, but could not openly lay -claim to Constantinople without upsetting some nations with whom she -meant to keep on good terms, though some of her agents and part of -public opinion worked to that end. Generally she showed more diplomacy -in conforming her conduct with her interests, which she did not defend -so harshly and openly. - -But religious antagonism and religious intolerance were at the bottom -of that policy, and had always instigated and supported it. The -Anglicans, and more markedly the Nonconformists, had taken up the cry, -“The Turk out of Europe,” and it seems certain that the religious -influence was paramount and brought on the political action. Mr. -Lloyd George, who is a strong and earnest Nonconformist, must have -felt it slightly awkward to find himself in direct opposition to his -co-religionists on political grounds. Besides, the British Government, -which in varied circumstances had supported contradictory policies, -was in a difficult situation when brought face to face with such -contradictions. - -It also seems strange at first that the majority of American public -opinion should have suffered itself to be led by the campaign of -Protestant propaganda, however important the religious question -may be in the United States. Though since 1831 American Protestant -missionaries have defrayed the expenses of several centres of -propaganda among the Nestorians (who have preserved the Nazarene -creed), paid the native priests and supported the schools, America -has no interests in those countries, unless she thus means to support -her Russian policy. But her economic imperialism, which also aims at -a spiritual preponderance, would easily go hand in hand with a cold -religious imperialism which would spread its utilitarian formalism over -the life and manners of all nations. - -At any rate, the plain result of the two countries’ policy was -necessarily to reinforce the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian movements. - -Of course, Mr. Wilson’s puritanism and his ignorance of the complex -elements and real conditions of European civilisation could not -but favour such a movement, and on March 5 the _New York World_, a -semi-official organ, plainly said that Mr. Wilson would threaten again, -as he had already done about Italy, to withdraw from European affairs, -if the treaty of peace with Turkey left Constantinople to the Turks, -and gave up all protection of the Christian populations in Turkey. - -The traditional hostility of America towards Turkey—one of the -essential reasons of which has just been given—demanded that Turkey -should be expelled from Europe, and the Empire should be dismembered. -President Wilson, in Article 12 of his programme, had mentioned the -recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire; yet the American -leaders, though they pointed out that a state of war had never existed -between the United States and Turkey, were the first to demand the -eviction of the Turks; and the _Chicago Tribune_ of March 8 hinted -that an American cruiser might be sent to the Bosphorus. On March 6 -Senator Kling criticised in the Senate the Allies’ proposals aiming at -tolerating Turkish sway in Asia Minor. The United States even backed -the Greek claims, and on the same day Mr. Lodge moved that the Peace -Conference should give to Greece Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, and -the western coast of Asia Minor. - -Mr. Morgenthau, too, criticised the terms of the settlement which -allowed Constantinople to remain a Turkish city; he maintained that -such a solution could only be another inducement for America to keep -away from European affairs, and declared that Europe would fail -to do her duty if she did not punish Turkey. Yet at the same time -America, and shortly after England, were endeavouring to mitigate the -responsibility of Germany, objecting, not to her punishment, which had -never been demanded by France, but to the complete execution of the -most legitimate measures of reparation, and made concessions on all -points that did not affect their own interests. In fact, they merely -wanted to resume business with Germany at any cost and as soon as -possible. - -English newspapers printed an appeal to French and British public -opinion drawn up by some eminent American citizens, asking for the -eviction of the Turks from Constantinople and the autonomy of Armenia. - -The British Press, however, remarked that it was not sufficient to -express wishes, and it would have been better if the Americans had -assumed a share of responsibility in the reorganisation of Asia Minor. - -Now, why did a section of British and American public opinion want to -punish Turkey, whereas it refused to support the French and Belgian -claims to reparation? In order to form an impartial judgment on Turkey, -one should look for the motives and weigh the reasons that induced her -to take part in the war, and then ascertain why some members of her -political parties most preposterously stood by the side of Germany. -If the latter pursued such a policy, perhaps it was because Germany, -who aimed at extending her influence over the whole of Eastern Asia, -displayed more ability and skill than the Allies did in Turkey, and -because the policy of the Powers and their attitude towards the -Christians raised much enmity against them. - -On such a delicate point, one cannot do better than quote the words of -Suleyman Nazif Bey in a lecture delivered in honour of Pierre Loti at -the University of Stambul on January 23, 1920: - - “When we linked our fate with that of Germany and Austria, the - Kaiser’s army had already lost the first battle of the Marne. It - is under such untoward and dangerous circumstances that we joined - the fray. No judicious motive can be brought forward to excuse - and absolve the few men who drove us lightheartedly into the - conflagration of the world war. - - “If Kaiser Wilhelm found it possible to fool some men among us, and - if these men were able to draw the nation behind them, the reason - is to be found in the events of the time and in the teachings of - history. Russia, who, for the last two and a half centuries has - not given us a moment of respite, did not enter into the world war - in order to take Alsace-Lorraine from Prussia and give it back to - France. The Muscovites thought the time had come at last to carry - out the dream that had perpetually haunted the Tsars ever since - Peter the Great—that is to say, the conquest of Anatolia and the - Straits. - - “It is not to Europe but to our own country that we must be held - responsible for having entered into the war so foolishly, and still - more for having conducted it so badly, with so much ignorance - and deceit. The Ottoman nation alone has a right to call us to - account—the Great Powers had paid us so little regard, nay, they - had brought on us such calamities, that the shrewd Kaiser finally - managed to stir up our discontent and make us lay aside all - discretion and thoughtfulness by rousing the ancient legitimate - hatred of the Turks. - - “Read the book that the former Bulgarian Premier, Guéchoff, wrote - just after the Balkan war. You will see in it that the Tsar - Nicholas compelled, as it were by force, the Serbs and Bulgars, who - had been enemies for centuries, to conclude an alliance in order - to evict us from Europe. Of course, Montenegro followed suit. - France approved, then even urged them to do so; and then one of the - leading figures of the times intervened to make Greece join that - coalition intended to drive the Turks out of Europe. The rest is - but too well known. The Bulgarian statesman who owns all this is - noted for his hatred of Turkey. - - “Let us not forget this: so long as our victory was considered as - possible, the Powers declared that the principle of the _status quo - ante bellum_ should be religiously observed. As soon as we suffered - a defeat, a Power declared this principle no longer held good; it - was the ally of the nation that has been our enemy for two and a - half centuries, and yet it was also most adverse to the crafty - policy that meant to cheat us.... - - “Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us we have been - thankful for it. I know the history of my country full well; in her - annals, many mistakes and evil doings have occurred, but not one - line relates one act of ingratitude. After allowing the Moslems - of Smyrna to be slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having - hushed up this crime, Europe now wants—so it seems at least—to - drive us out of Constantinople and transfer the Moslem Khilafat - to an Anatolian town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve it - inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the antique - curios of the Museum. When the Turks shall have been expelled from - Constantinople, the country will be so convulsed that the whole - world will be shaken. Let nobody entertain any doubt about this: if - we go out of Constantinople a general conflagration will break out, - that will last for years or centuries, nobody knows, and will set - on fire the whole of the globe. - - “At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of - Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by Mohammed - to his people, the Moslem Empire of Andalusia was falling to - decay—that is to say, in the south-east of Europe a Moslem State - arose on the ruins of a Christian State, while in the south-west - of Europe a Christian State was putting an end to the life of a - Moslem State. The victor of Constantinople granted the Christian - population he found there larger religious privileges than those - granted to it by the Greek Empire. The ulcer of Phanar is still - the outcome of Sultan Mohammed’s generosity. What did Spain do - when she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of Europe? - She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens or sending to - the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who refused to embrace - Christianity. I mention this historical fact here, not to - criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give an instance of the - way in which the Spaniards availed themselves of the conqueror’s - right Heaven had awarded them. And I contrast the Christians’ - cruelty with the Turks’ gentleness and magnanimity when they - entered Constantinople!” - -To adopt the policy advocated by Anglo-American Protestants was -tantamount to throwing Islam again towards Germany, who had already -managed to derive profit from its defence. Yet Islamism has no natural -propensity towards Germanism; on the contrary, Islam in the sixteenth -century, at the time of its modern development, intervened in our -culture as the vehicle of Eastern influences. That policy also hurt the -religious feelings of the Mussulmans and roused their fanaticism not -only in Turkey, but even in a country of highly developed intellectual -life like Egypt, and in this respect it promoted the cause of the most -spirited and most legitimate Nationalism. - -Besides, in the note which the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs -handed in January, 1920, to the High Commissioners of the Allies, -together with a scheme of judicial reforms, it was said notably: - - “The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situation of - Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot deprive a - nation of her right to political existence, this right being based - on the principles of justice and humanity confirmed by President - Wilson’s solemn declaration and recognised by all the belligerents - as the basis of the peace of the world. It is in accordance with - these principles that an armistice was concluded between the Allied - Powers and Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene - shall restore order and peace to the East. - - “Any solution infringing upon Ottoman unity, far from ensuring - quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into a hotbed of - endless perturbation. Therefore the only way to institute stability - in the new state of things is to maintain Ottoman sovereignty. - - “Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute at - various times were not attended with the results she expected, this - is due to an unfavourable state of things both abroad and at home. - - “Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an unbearable - situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to modernise its - administration so as to open up an era of prosperity and - progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has firmly resolved, in - a broadminded spirit, to institute a new organisation, including - reforms in the judicial system, the finance, and the police, and - the protection of the minorities. - - “As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely - carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept - the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition its - independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride - shall not be wounded.” - - * * * * * - -As soon as it was known in what spirit the treaty of peace with Turkey -was going to be discussed between the Powers, and what clauses were -likely to be inserted in it, a clamour of protest arose throughout the -Moslem world. - -That treaty could not but affect the most important group of -Mohammedans, the Indian group, which numbers over 70 million men and -forms nearly one-fourth of the population of India. As soon as the -conditions that were to be forced on Turkey were known in India, they -roused deep resentment, which reached its climax after the Amritsar -massacre. Some of the clauses which the Allies meant to insert in the -treaty plainly ran counter to the principles of Mohammedanism; and as -they hurt the religious feelings of the Moslems and disregarded the -religious guarantees given to the Hindus and all the Moslem world by -the present British Cabinet and its predecessors, they could not but -bring on new conflicts in the future. Besides, the blunders of the -last five years had united Hindus and Mohammedans in India, as they -united Copts and Mohammedans in Egypt later on, and it was also feared -that the Arabs, whose hopes had been frustrated, would side with the -Turkish Nationalists. - -At the end of 1918, Dr. Ansari, M.D., M.S., chairman of the Committee -of the All-India Muslim League, in the course of the session held at -Delhi at that time, set forth the Muslim grievances. But the address he -read could not receive any publicity owing to the special repressive -measures taken by the Government of India. - -In September, 1919, a Congress of Mohammedans, who had come from all -parts of India and thus represented Muslim opinion as a whole, was -held at Lucknow, one of the chief Muslim centres. In November another -congress for the defence of the Caliphate met at Delhi; it included -some Hindu leaders, and thus assumed a national character. Next month a -third congress, held at Amritsar, in the Punjab, was presided over by -Shaukat Ali, founder and secretary of the Society of the Servants of -the Ka’ba, who had been imprisoned like his brother Mohammed Ali and -released three days before the congress; it was attended by over 20,000 -Hindus and Mussulmans. - -This meeting confirmed the resolution taken by the previous congress to -send to Europe and America a delegation from India for the defence of -the Caliphate. On January 19, 1920, a deputation of Indian Mussulmans -waited upon the Viceroy of India at Delhi, to request that a delegation -might repair to Europe and America, according to the decision of the -congress, in order to expound before the allied and associated nations -and their governments the Moslems’ religious obligations and Muslim and -Indian sentiment on the subject of the Caliphate and cognate questions, -and to be their representatives at the Peace Conference. - -The non-Mussulman Indians supported the claims which the 70 millions of -Indian Mussulmans, their fellow-countrymen, considered as a religious -obligation. In an address drawn up by the great Hindu leader, the -Mahatma Gandhi, and handed on January 19, 1920, by the deputation of -the General Congress of India for the Defence of the Caliphate to His -Excellency Baron Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor of India, in order to -lay their aims before him, they declared they raised a formal protest -lest the Caliphate should be deprived of the privilege of the custody -and wardenship of the Holy Places, and lest a non-Muslim control, in -any shape or form whatever, should be established over the Island of -Arabia, whose boundaries, as defined by Muslim religious authorities, -are: the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian -Gulf, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, thus including Syria, Palestine, -and Mesopotamia, beside the Peninsula of Arabia. - -This General Congress of India, according to the manifesto it adopted -during its sittings at Bombay on February 15, 16, and 17, 1920, gave to -the delegation sent to Europe the following mandate, with respect to -the Muslim claims regarding the Caliphate and the “Jazirat-ul-Arab”: - - “With respect to the Khilafat it is claimed that the Turkish Empire - should be left as it was when the war broke out; however, though - the alleged maladministration of Turks has not been proved, the - non-Turkish nationalities might, if they wished, have within the - Ottoman Empire all guarantees of autonomy compatible with the - dignity of a sovereign State.” - -And the manifesto continued thus: - - “The slightest reduction of the Muslim claims would not only hurt - the deepest religions feelings of the Moslems, but would plainly - violate the solemn declarations and pledges made or taken by - responsible statesmen representing the Allied and Associated Powers - at a time when they were most anxious to secure the support of the - Moslem peoples and soldiers.” - -The anti-Turkish agitation which had been let loose at the end of -December, 1919, and had reached its climax about March, 1920, had -an immediate repercussion not only in India, where the Caliphate -Conference, held at Calcutta, decided to begin a strike on March 19 and -boycott British goods, if the agitation for the expulsion of the Turks -from Constantinople did not come to an end in England. - -At Tunis, on March 11, after a summons had been posted in one of the -mosques calling upon the Muslim population to protest against the -occupation of Constantinople, a demonstration took place before the -Residency. M. Etienne Flandin received a delegation of native students -asking him that France should oppose the measures England was about -to take. The minister, after stating what reasons might justify the -intervention, evaded the question that was put him by declaring that -such measures were mere guarantees, and stated that even if France -were to take a share in them, the Mussulmans should feel all the more -certain that their religious creed would be respected. - -The measures that were being contemplated could not but raise much -anxiety and indignation among the Moslem populations and might have had -disastrous consequences for France in Northern Africa. This was clearly -pointed out by M. Bourgeois, President of the Committee of Foreign -Affairs, in his report read to the Senate when the conditions of the -peace that was going to be enforced on Turkey came under discussion. - - “We cannot ignore the deep repercussions which the intended - measures in regard to Turkey may have among the 25 million Moslems - who live under our rule in Northern Africa. Their reverence and - devotion have displayed themselves most strikingly in the course of - the war. Nothing must be done to alter these feelings.” - -Indeed, as M. Mouktar-el-Farzuk wrote in an article entitled “France, -Turkey, and Islam,” printed in the _Ikdam_, a newspaper of Algiers, on -May 7, 1920— - - “If the French Moslems fought heroically for France and turned - a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still - preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and they would be greatly - distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a - share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. - - “That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe as a - manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism or Pan-Islamism. - Yet it is nothing of the kind. The so-called Moslem fanaticism - is a mere legend whose insanity has been proved by history. - Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind of those who imagined - its existence. The independent Moslem populations, such as the - Persians and the Afghans, are most jealous of their independence, - and do not think in the least of becoming the Sultan’s subjects. - As to those who live under the dominion of a European Power, they - have no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their - material and moral condition, and of preserving their personality - as a race. - - “The true reasons of the Moslems’ sympathy for the Ottoman Empire - are historical, religious, and sentimental reasons.” - -The delegation of the Moslems of India for the defence of the Caliphate -sent to the Peace Conference was headed by Mohammed Ali, who, in 1914, -on behalf of the Government of India, had written to Talaat, Minister -of the Interior, to ask him not to side with the Central Empires, -and to show him how difficult the situation of the Indian Mussulmans -would be if Turkey entered into the war against England. On landing in -Venice, he told the correspondent of the _Giornale d’Italia_ that the -object of his journey was to convince the Allies that the dismemberment -of the Ottoman Empire would be a danger to the peace of the world. - - “The country we represent numbers 70 million Mohammedans and 230 - million men belonging to other religions but agreeing with us on - this point. So we hope that if the Allies really want to establish - the peace of the world, they will take our reasons into account. - Italy has hitherto supported us, and we hope the other nations will - follow her example.” - -This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher, representing -Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, to whom they explained the serious -consequences which the carrying out of the conditions of peace -contemplated for Turkey might have in their country. - -Mr. Lloyd George, in his turn, received the delegation on March 19, -before it was heard by the Supreme Council. Mohammed Ali, after -pointing to the bonds that link together the Mohammedans of India -and the Caliphate, because Islam is not only a set of doctrines and -dogmas but forms both a moral code and a social polity, recalled -that, according to the Muslim doctrine, the Commander of the Faithful -must always own a territory, an army, and resources to prevent the -aggression of adversaries who have not ceased to arm themselves; -he maintained, therefore, that the seat of the Sultan’s temporal -power must be maintained in Constantinople; that Turkey must not be -dismembered; and that Arabia must be left under Turkish sovereignty. - - “Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one and - the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph, or the - Khalifa, as we call him—the successor of the Prophet. Because - the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors, or - Khalifas, continue his tradition to this day. The local centre - is the region known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of - Arabia,’ the ‘Land of the Prophets.’ To Islam, Arabia has been not - a peninsula but an island, the fourth boundary being the waters of - the Euphrates and the Tigris.... - - “Islam required temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and - for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety and power - could not be achieved, the Muslims said, ‘Let us get hold of the - most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long - as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.’ That is why - we agreed to accept Muslim kings, the Omayyids and the Abbasids, - as Khalifas, now the Sultans of Turkey. They have a peculiar - succession of their own. We have accepted it for the time being - because we must have the strongest Mussulman Power at our disposal - to assist us in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have - accepted it. If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed - that the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community, no - matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen, as they - used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas, the - Khulafa-i-Rashideen, or truly guided Khalifas. - - “But of course we have to make allowances for human nature. The - Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part with his power any more - than the Mamluke rulers of Egypt liked to part with their power - when they gave asylum to a scion of the Abbasids after the sack of - Baghdad in 1258.” - -It follows that “the standard of temporal power necessary for the -preservation of the Caliphate must obviously, therefore, be a relative -one,” and— - - “Not going into the matter more fully, we would say that after the - various wars in which Turkey has been engaged recently, and after - the Balkan war particularly, the Empire of the Khalifa was reduced - to such narrow limits that Muslims considered the irreducible - minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to - be the restoration of the territorial _status quo ante bellum_.... - - “When asking for the restoration of the territorial _status - quo ante bellum_, Muslims do not rule out changes which would - guarantee to the Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans, within the - scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and property - and opportunities of autonomous development, so long as it is - consistent with the dignity and independence of the sovereign - State. It will not be a difficult matter. We have here an Empire - in which the various communities live together. Some already are - sufficiently independent and others hope—and here I refer to - India—to get a larger degree of autonomy than they possess at the - present moment; and consistently with our desire to have autonomous - development ourselves, we could not think of denying it to Arabs or - Jews or Christians within the Turkish Empire.” - -He went on as follows: - - “The third claim that the Mussulmans have charged us with putting - before you is based on a series of injunctions which require the - Khalifa to be the warden of the three sacred Harams of Mecca, - Medina, and Jerusalem; and overwhelming Muslim sentiment requires - that he should be the warden of the holy shrines of Nejef, Kerbela, - Kazimain, Samarra, and Baghdad, all of which are situated within - the confines of the ‘Island of Arabia.’ - - “Although Muslims rely on their religious obligations for the - satisfaction of the claims which I have specified above, they - naturally find additional support in your own pledge, Sir, with - regard to Constantinople, Thrace, and Asia Minor, the populations - of which are overwhelmingly Muslim. They trust that a pledge - so solemnly given and recently renewed will be redeemed in its - entirety. Although the same degree of sanctity cannot be claimed - for Constantinople as for the three sacred Harams—Mecca, Medina, - and Jerusalem—Constantinople is nevertheless held very sacred - by all the Muslims of the world, and the uninterrupted historic - tradition of nearly five centuries has created such an overwhelming - sentiment with regard to Islambol, or the ‘City of Islam’—a title - which no city has up to this time enjoyed—that an effort to drive - the Turks out ‘bag and baggage’ from the seat of the Khilafat is - bound to be regarded by the Muslims of the world as a challenge - of the modern Crusaders to Islam and of European rule to the - entire East, which cannot be taken up by the Muslim world or the - East without great peril to our own Empire, and, in fact, to the - Allied dominions in Asia and Africa. In this connection, Sir, I - might mention one point, that the Muslims cannot tolerate any - affront to Islam in keeping the Khalifa as a sort of hostage in - Constantinople. He is not the Pope at the Vatican, much less can - he be the Pope at Avignon, and I am bound to say that the recent - action of the Allied Powers is likely to give rise in the Muslim - world to feelings which it will be very difficult to restrain, and - which would be very dangerous to the peace of the world.” - -With regard to the question of the Caliphate and temporal power, on -which the Indian delegation had been instructed to insist particularly, -M. Mohammed Ali, in order to make the Moslem point of view quite clear, -wrote as follows:[20] - - “The moment this claim is put forward we are told that the West - has outgrown this stage of human development, and that people who - relieved the Head of a Christian Church of all temporal power are - not prepared to maintain the temporal power of the Head of the - Muslim Church. This idea is urged by the supporters of the Laic - Law of France with all the fanaticism of the days of the Spanish - Inquisition, and in England, too. Some of the most unprejudiced - people wonder at the folly and temerity of those who come to press - such an anachronistic claim. Others suggest that the Khalifa - should be ‘vaticanised’ even if he is to retain Constantinople, - while the Government of India, who should certainly have known - better, say that they cannot acquiesce in Muslim statements which - imply temporal allegiance to the Khilafat on the part of Indian - Muslims, or suggest that temporal power is of the essence of the - Khilafat. Where such criticisms and suggestions go astray is - in misunderstanding the very nature and ideal of Islam and the - Khilafat, and in relying on analogies from faiths which, whatever - their original ideals, have, for all practical purposes, ceased to - interpret life as Islam seeks to do.” - -As he had said in the course of his official interview with the British -Premier, as Islam is not “a set of doctrines and dogmas, but a way of -life, a moral code, and a social polity,”— - - “Muslims regard themselves as created to serve the one Divine - purpose that runs through the ages, owing allegiance to God in - the first place and acknowledging His authority alone in the last - resort. Their religion is not for Sabbaths and Sundays only, or - a matter for churches and temples. It is a workaday faith, and - meant even more for the market-place than the mosque. Theirs is - a federation of faith, a cosmopolitan brotherhood, of which the - personal centre is the Khalifa. He is not a Pope and is not even a - priest, and he certainly has no pretensions to infallibility. He - is the head of Islam’s Republic, and it is a mere accident, and an - unfortunate accident at that, that he happens to be a king. He is - the Commander of the Faithful, the President of their Theocratic - Commonwealth, and the Leader of all Mussulmans in all matters for - which the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet, whose successor - he is, provide guidance.” - -Therefore, according to the Moslem doctrine— - - “There is no such theory of ‘divided allegiance’ here, as - the Government of India consider to be ’subversive of the - constitutional basis on which all Governments are established.’ - ‘There is no government but God’s,’ says the Koran, ‘and Him alone - is a Mussulman to serve,’ and since He is the Sole Sovereign of all - mankind, there can be no divided allegiance. All Governments can - command the obedience of the Muslims in the same way as they can - command the obedience of other people, but they can do so only so - far as they command it, as Mr. H. G. Wells would say, in the name - of God and for God, and certainly no Christian Sovereign could - expect to exercise unquestioned authority over a Muslim against - the clear commandments of his Faith when no Muslim Sovereign could - dream of doing it. Mussulmans are required to obey God and His - Prophet and ‘the men in authority from amongst themselves,’ which - include the Khalifa; but they are also required, in case of every - dispute, to refer back to the Holy Koran and to the Traditions - of the Prophet, which are to act as arbitrator. Thus the Khalifa - himself will be disobeyed if he orders that which the Faith - forbids, and if he persists in such unauthorised conduct, he may - not only be disobeyed, but also be deposed. - - “But whatever he could or could not do, the Khalifa was certainly - not a pious old gentleman whose only function in life was to mumble - his prayers and repeat his beads. - - “The best way to understand what he is and what he is not is to go - back to the Prophet whose Khalifa or Successor he is. The Koran - regards man as the vicegerent of God on earth, and Adam was the - first Khalifa of God, and free-willed instrument of divine will. - This succession continued from prophet to prophet, and they were - the guides of the people in all the affairs of life. The fuller and - final revelation came with Mohammed, and since then the Commanders - of the Faithful have been his Khalifas or Successors. But as - religion is not a part of life but the whole of it, and since it - is not an affair of the next world but of this, which it teaches - us to make better, cleaner, and happier, so every Muslim religious - authority has laid it down unequivocally and emphatically that the - allegiance which Muslims owe to the Khalifa is both temporal and - spiritual. The only limits recognised to his authority are the - Commandments of God, which he is not allowed to disobey or defy.... - - “The Mussulmans, therefore, do not believe that Christ, for - instance, could have said that His was the kingdom not of this - earth but of Heaven alone; or that men were to render to Cæsar what - was due to Cæsar, and to God what was due to God. Cæsar could not - share the world with God or demand from mankind any allegiance, - even if only temporal, if he did not demand it for God and on - behalf of God. But the ordinary Christian conception has been that - the kingdom of Christ was not of this world, and no Pope or priest - could, consistently with this conception, demand temporal power. It - is doubtful if the Papacy is based on any saying of Christ Himself. - At any rate, the Pope has always claimed to be the successor of - St. Peter and the inheritor of _his_ prerogatives. As such he has - been looked upon as the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven, his - office being strictly and avowedly limited to the spiritual domain. - A study of history makes it only too apparent that the doctrine of - the Papacy grew in Christianity by the application to the Popes of - the epithets which are applied to St. Peter in the Gospels. Just - as St. Peter never had any temporal authority, so the Papacy also - remained, in the first stages of its growth, devoid of temporal - power for long centuries. It was only by a very slow development - that the Popes aspired to temporal power. Thus, without meaning - any offence, it may be said that the acquisition of temporal power - by the Popes was a mere accident, and they have certainly been - divested of it without doing the least violence to the religious - feelings of one half of the Christian world. - - “On the contrary, the temporal power of the Khilafat in Islam is of - the very essence of it, and is traceable not only to the earliest - Khalifas, but to the Prophet himself. This is obviously not the - religious belief of Christian Europe or America; but equally - obviously this is the religious Muslim belief, and after all it is - with the Muslim belief that we are concerned....” - -So, considering the ever-increasing armaments of European and American -nations, “even after the creation of a nebulous League of Nations,” he -asked himself: - - “How then can Islam dispense with temporal power? Others maintain - armies and navies and air forces for the defence of their - territories or their commerce, because they love these more than - they hate armaments. To Islam, its culture and ethics are dearer - than territory, and it regards faith as greater than finance. It - needs no army or navy to advance its boundaries or extend its - influence; but it certainly needs them to prevent the aggression of - others.” - -Then M. Mohammed Ali dealt separately with the chief clauses of the -Turkish treaty in the course of his interview with Mr. Lloyd George, -and made the following remarks: - - “As regards Thrace, it is not necessary to support the Turkish - claim for the retention of Thrace by any further argument than - that of the principle of self-determination. Its fair and honest - application will ensure the satisfaction of that claim. - - “As regards Smyrna, the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, who - were not even at war with Turkey, under the auspices of the Allies, - has shaken to a great extent the confidence which Muslims reposed - in the pledges given to them, and the atrocities perpetrated in - that region have driven them almost to desperation. Muslims can - discover no justification for this action except the desire of - Greek capitalists to exploit the rich and renowned lands of Asia - Minor, which are admittedly the homelands of the Turks. If this - state of affairs is allowed to continue, not only will the Turk - be driven out, ‘bag and baggage,’ from Europe, but he will have - no ‘bag and baggage’ left to him, even in Asia. He would be - paralysed, commercially and industrially, in a land-locked small - Emirate in Asia Minor, the speedy bankruptcy of which is certain. - The application of the principle of self-determination would - entirely rule out the Greek claim in this fertile region, which - obviously tempts the greed of the capitalist and the exploiter. - - “As regards Cilicia, reasons similar to those that have promoted - the action of Greeks in Smyrna seem clearly to prompt the outcry - of the Christian population in Cilicia, and obviously it is the - Gulf of Alexandretta which is attracting some people as the Gulf of - Smyrna is attracting others.” - -Afterwards, coming to the question of the massacres, M. Mohammed Ali -declared: - - “The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their utter - detestation of such conduct and their full sympathy for the - sufferers, whether they be Christian or Muslim. But, if the Turk - is to be punished as a criminal, and populations of other races - and creeds are to be released from their allegiance to the Ottoman - Sovereign on the assumption that the Turks have been tyrants in - the past and their rule is intolerable, then the delegation claim - that the whole question of these massacres must be impartially - investigated by an International Commission on which the All-India - Khilafat Conference should be adequately represented.” - -Moreover, the delegation had already said something similar in a -telegram sent to Mr. Lloyd George: - - “Where casualties have in fact taken place, not only should their - true extent be ascertained, but the Commission should go fully into - the so-called massacres and the intrigues of Tsarist Russia in Asia - Minor after the success of similar intrigues in the Balkans; it - should go into the question of the organisation of revolutionary - societies by the Christian subjects of the Sultan, the rebellious - character of which was subversive of his rule; it should go into - the provocation offered to the Muslim majority in this region, and - the nature of the struggle between the contending parties and the - character of the forces engaged on either side....” - -He went on: - - “I have no brief for them; I have no brief for the Turks; I have - only a brief for Islam and the India Muslims. What we say is this, - as I said to Mr. Fisher: let there be a thorough inquiry, and if - this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if it establishes to the - satisfaction of the world that the Turks really have been guilty of - unprovoked murders, and have been guilty of these atrocities and - horrible crimes, then we will wash our hands of the Turks. - - “To us it is much more important that not a single stain should - remain on the fair name of Islam. We want to convert the whole - world to our way of thinking, but with what face could we go before - the whole world and say we are the brethren of murderers and - massacrers? - - “But we know the whole history of these massacres to some extent. - It is only in Armenia that the Turk is said to be so intolerant; - there are other parts of the world where he deals with Christian - people, and where he deals with the Jewish community. No complaints - of massacres come from those communities. Then the Armenians - themselves lived under Turkish rule for centuries and never - complained. The farthest back that we can go to discover any trace - of this is the beginning of the last century. But in reality the - ‘massacres’ begin only in the last quarter of the last century. - - “It is pretty clear that they begin after the success of efforts - like those made in the Balkans by Russia, which has never disguised - its desire to take Constantinople since the time of Peter the - Great. It has always wanted to go to Tsargrad, as it called it—that - is, the city of the Tsars. They wanted to go there. They tried - these things in the Balkans, and they succeeded beyond their - expectation, only probably Bulgaria became too independent when - it became Greater Bulgaria. But in the case of the Armenians, - they had people who were not very warlike, who had no sovereign - ambitions themselves, and who were also to a great extent afraid - of conversion to another branch of the Orthodox Church, the - Russian branch, so that they were not very willing tools. Still, - they were egged on, and plots and intrigues went on all the time. - These people were incited, and they understood that if they made - a compromise with Tsarist Russia they would get something better. - It was then that these massacres came on the scene. No doubt there - have been several outcries about them; some evidence has been - produced; but there has been no thorough international inquiry - which would satisfy the entire world, Muslim as well as Christian. - It is in that connection that we earnestly appeal to you, to the - whole of Christendom, to the whole of Europe and America, that if - the Turk is to be punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, - that his rule is a blasting tyranny, and that he ought to be - punished, in that case the evidence should be of such a character - that it should be absolutely above suspicion.” - -Mr. Lloyd George in his reply upbraided Turkey with fighting by the -side of the Central Powers though Great Britain had never fought -against her, and protracting the hostilities by closing the Black Sea -to the British fleet; but he did not seem to realise that the Russian -policy of the Allies partly accounted for Turkey’s decision. Only at -the end of the interview, in answer to a remark of the leader of the -Indian delegation, he pleaded in defence of England “that she had made -no arrangement of any sort with Russia at the expense of Turkey at the -beginning of the war.” Then, before coming to the various points M. -Mohammed Ali had dealt with, Mr. Lloyd George, who had kept aloof for a -long time from the policy of understanding with France, said: - - “I do not understand M. Mohammed Ali to claim indulgence for - Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has - had justice. Germany has had justice—pretty terrible justice. Why - should Turkey escape? Turkey thought she had a feud with us. What - feud had Turkey with us? Why did she come in to try and stab us - and destroy liberty throughout the world when we were engaged in - this life-and-death struggle? Is there any reason why we should - apply a different measure to Turkey from that which we have meted - out to the Christian communities of Germany and Austria? I want - the Mohammedans in India to get it well into their minds that we - are not treating Turkey severely because she is Mohammedan: we are - applying exactly the same principle to her as we have applied to - Austria, which is a great Christian community.” - -As to Arabia—which will be dealt with later on together with the -Pan-Arabian movement—though M. Mohammed Ali had declared that “the -delegation felt no anxiety about the possibility of an understanding -between the Arabs and the Khalifa,” and that the Moslems “did not want -British bayonets to subject the Arabs to Turkey,” Mr. Lloyd George -answered: - - “The Arabs have claimed independence. They have proclaimed Feisal - King of Syria. They have claimed that they should be severed from - Turkish dominion. Is it suggested that the Arabs should remain - under Turkish dominion merely because they are Mohammedans? Is - not the same measure of independence and freedom to be given - to Mohammedans as is given to Christians? Croatia has demanded - freedom, and we have given it to her. It is a Christian community. - Syria has demanded it, and it is given to her. We are applying - exactly the same principles in Christian places, and to impose the - dominion of the Sultan upon Arabia, which has no desire for it, is - to impose upon Arabs something which we certainly would not dream - of imposing upon these Christian communities.” - -With regard to Thrace, after owning it was difficult to give reliable -figures and saying that according to the Greek census and the Turkish -census, which differ but little, the Moslem population was in “a -considerable minority,” Mr. Lloyd George stated that “it would -certainly be taken away from Turkish sovereignty.” As to Smyrna, he -asserted that according to his information “a great majority of the -population undoubtedly prefers the Greek rule to the Turkish rule.” - -Concerning the temporal power of the Khalifa, he seemed to have -forgotten the difference which had just been pointed out to him between -the Christian religion and Islam on this point, for he declared: - - “I am not going to interfere in a religious discussion where - men of the same faith take a different view. I know of - Mohammedans—sincere, earnest, zealous Mussulmans—who take a very - different view of the temporal power from the one which is taken - by M. Mohammed Ali to-day, just as I know of Catholics who take - one view and other Catholics who take a very different view of the - temporal power of the Pope. That is a controversy into which I do - not propose to enter.” - -And as if M. Mohammed Ali’s remarks had quite escaped him, he added: - - “All I know is this. The Turk will exercise temporal power in - Turkish lands. We do not propose to deprive him of Turkish lands. - Neither do we propose that he should retain power over lands which - are not Turkish. Why? Because that is the principle we are applying - to the Christian communities of Europe. The same principles must be - applied to the Turk.” - -Finally, without thoroughly investigating the question of the -massacres, he concluded that the responsibility lay with the Ottoman -Government, which “cannot, as it is now constituted, protect its own -subjects”; that Turkey is a “misgoverned country”—a reproach that -might be applied to many other countries, though nobody would think -of declaring they must be suppressed on that account; and that as the -Turks “have been intolerant and have proved bad and unworthy rulers,” -the solutions proposed by the Allies are the only remedy and therefore -are justified. - -And so the old argument that Turkey must be chastised was recapitulated -once more, and, through the mouth of her Prime Minister, England -resorted to threats again, whereas she did not mean to compel Germany -to carry out her engagements fully. This attitude seems to be accounted -for by the fact that Turkey was weak, and was not such a good customer -as Germany. England, while pretending to do justice and to settle -accounts, merely meant to take hold of the Straits. - -Islam has instituted a social polity and culture which, though widely -different from British and American civilisations, and leading to -different methods of life, is not necessarily inferior to them; and -all religious sects, whether Protestant or Catholic, are wrong when -they look upon their own moral conception as superior, and endeavour to -substitute it for that of Islam. - -If we refer to the letter which was written to Damad Ferid Pasha, -president of the Ottoman delegation, in answer to the memorandum -handed on June 17, 1919, to the Peace Conference, and which lacks -M. Clémenceau’s wit and style though his signature is appended to -it, we plainly feel a Puritan inspiration in it, together with the -above-mentioned state of mind. - -One cannot help being sorry to find in so important a document such a -complete ignorance or total lack of comprehension of the Muslim mind, -and of the difference existing between our modern civilisation and what -constitutes a culture. For instance, we read in it the following: - - “History records many Turkish victories and also many Turkish - defeats, many nations conquered and many set free. The memorandum - itself hints at a loss of territories which not long ago were still - under Ottoman sovereignty. - - “Yet, in all these changes not one instance occurs in Europe, Asia, - or Africa when the establishment of Turkish sovereignty was not - attended with a decrease of material prosperity or a lower standard - of culture; neither does an instance occur when the withdrawal of - Turkish domination was not attended with an increase of material - prosperity and a higher standard of culture. Whether among European - Christians or among Syrian, Arabian, or African Mussulmans, the - Turk has always brought destruction with him wherever he has - conquered; he has never proved able to develop in peace what he had - won by war. He is not gifted in this respect.” - -This stagnation, which to a certain extent has been noticed in modern -times, may proceed from the fact that the old Turkish spirit was -smothered and Islam was checked by the growth of foreign influence in -Turkey. This is probably due, not chiefly to foreign intrusion in the -affairs of the Ottoman State—for the latter needed the help of foreign -nations—but rather to the selfish rivalries between these nations and -to the mongrel solutions inherent in international régimes by which -Turkish interests were sacrificed. - -It is well known that the decadence of the Arabic-speaking countries -had begun long before they were subjected by the Turks. It has even -been noticed that Turkish domination in Arabia in 1513 checked the -decline of Arabian civilisation, and roused the Syrians, who were in a -similar predicament. - -Besides, the prevailing and paramount concern for material prosperity -which asserts itself in the above-mentioned document, together with -the way in which business men, especially Anglo-Saxons, understand -material prosperity, would account for the variance between the -two civilisations, for it enhances the difference between their -standpoints, and proves that the superiority conferred by spiritual -eminence does not belong to the nations who consider themselves -superior to the Turks. - -The Turkish mind, enriched both by Islamic ethics and by Arabian, -Persian, and Byzantine influences, has risen to a far more definite -and lofty outlook on life than the shallow Anglo-Saxon morality. There -is as much difference between the two as between the architecture -of the Yeshil-Jami, the green mosque of Brusa, the dome of the -Suleymanie, or the kiosk of Baghdad, and the art to which we owe -the “sky-scrapers,” the “flat-iron” buildings, the “Rhine bridges,” -and the “Leipzig buildings,” or between the taste of the man who -can appreciate “loukoums” or rose-jam, and the taste of the man who -prefers “chewing-gum” or the acidulated drops flavoured with amyl -acetate, or even the sweets flavoured with methyl salicylate provided -by the American Government for its army. In the same manner, a similar -confusion is often made between comfort—or what vulgar people call -comfort—and true ease and real welfare; or again between a set of -practical commodities inherent in the utilitarian conception of modern -life, and what makes up culture. The quality of culture evidently does -not depend on the percentage of water-closets or bath-rooms, or the -quantity of calico used per thousand of inhabitants, in a country where -the walls of the houses were once decorated with beautiful enamels, -where the interior courts were adorned with marble fountains, and where -women wore costly garments and silk veils. - -Before throwing contempt on Islam, despising the Arabian and Turkish -civilisations, and hoping that the Moslem outlook on life will make way -for the modern Anglo-Saxon ideal, Mr. Lloyd George and all those who -repeat after him that the Turks have no peculiar gift for governing -peoples, ought to have pondered over Lady Esther Stanhope’s words, -which apply so fittingly to recent events. Being tired of Europe, she -had travelled in the East, and, enticed by the beauty and grandeur of -the Orient, she led a retired life in a convent near Said, dressed as -a Moslem man. One day she was asked by the “Vicomte de Marcellus” -whether she would ever go back to Europe, and she answered in some such -words as these—we quote from memory: - - “Why should I go to Europe? To see nations that deserve to be in - bondage, and kings that do not deserve to reign? Before long the - very foundation of your old continent will be shaken. You have just - seen Athens, and will soon see Tyre. That’s all that remains of - those noble commonwealths so famed for art, of those empires that - had the mastery of the world’s trade and the seas. So will it be - with Europe. Everything in it is worn out. The races of kings are - getting extinct; they are swept away by death or their own faults, - and are getting more and more degenerate. Aristocracy will soon be - wiped out, making room for a petty, effete, ephemeral middle class. - Only the lower people, those who plough and delve, still have some - self-respect and some virtues. You will have to dread everything - if they ever become conscious of their strength. I am sick of your - Europe. I won’t listen to its distant rumours that die away on this - lonely beach. Let us not speak of Europe any more. I have done with - it.” - -Besides, all religions accord with the character of the people that -practise them and the climate in which they live. Most likely Islam -perfectly fitted the physical and moral nature of the Turkish race, -since the latter immediately embraced Mohammed’s religion, whereas -it had kept aloof from the great Christian movement which, 500 years -before, had perturbed a large part of the pagan world, and it has -remained faithful to it ever since. - -If the Allies tried to minimise the part played by that religion, which -perfectly suits the character and conditions of life of the people who -practise it, and attempted to injure it, they would really benefit the -domineering aims of Rome and the imperialistic spirit of Protestantism. -In fact, the Vatican tries to avail itself of the recent Protestant -effort, as has already been pointed out, and as various manifestations -will show, to bring about a Christian hegemony which would not be -beneficial either to the peoples of the East or to the civilisation of -the world. - -By doing so, the Allies would drive those peoples towards Germanism, -though they have no natural propensity for it, for they are averse -both to the Lutheran spirit and to the Catholic spirit; yet Germanism -has succeeded in finding its way and even gaining sympathy among them, -because it pretended to come in a friendly spirit. - -It cannot be denied that before the war the Turks endeavoured to -find support among other nations to counterbalance German influence. -But as, above all things, they dreaded the Russian sway—not without -reason, as the latter had already grasped several Turkish provinces -in Asia Minor and represented its advance as the revenge of Orthodoxy -over Islamism—they had turned towards Germany, who, though it secretly -favoured Tsardom, yet pursued an anti-Russian policy. - -Of course, they could not have any illusion about what a German -Protectorate might be to Turkey, for at a sitting of the Reichstag -a German deputy had openly declared: “In spite of our sympathy for -Turkey, we must not forget that the time of her partition has come.” -As early as 1898 the Pan-German League issued a manifesto under the -title _Deutschlands Ansprüche an das Türkische Erbe_ (_The Rights of -Germany to the Heritage of Turkey_). “As soon as the present events -shall bring about the dissolution of Turkey, no other Power will -seriously attempt to raise a protest if the German Empire lays a claim -to a share of it, for it has a right to a share as a great Power, and -it wants it infinitely more than any other great Power, in order to -maintain the national and economic life of hundreds of thousands of its -emigrants.” In the same manner, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia -and Herzegovina, von Aerenberg did not scruple to say: “The opening to -economic life of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia will always be looked upon -as a high deed of German enterprise.” And, alluding to the new field -of activity which was thus opened to Austria-Hungary, he added: “The -possession of Bosnia has made us a Balkan Power; it is our task and -duty to discern when the time shall come, and to turn it to account.” - -But if the Turks chose to side with Germany, it was because the Emperor -“Guilloun” represented himself as the protector of Islam, and promised -to leave the Ottoman Empire its religious sovereignty and the full -enjoyment of Muslim civilisation. Now, as the Turks acknowledge only -Allah’s will, it is foolish to ask a Christian sovereign or a Christian -community to exercise authority over them in order to ensure peace; and -yet the Western Powers, urged on by religious interests, have continued -to interfere in Ottoman affairs from the Christian point of view and in -order to further Christian interests. - -Now we see why Germany, in order not to lose the benefit of her -previous endeavours, readily welcomed the Central Committee for the -Defence of Islam, whose seat was in Berlin, whence it carried on a -vigorous propaganda throughout the Muslim world. - -At the beginning of December, 1919, that committee held a meeting in -Berlin; among the people present were: Talaat Pasha, representing the -Turanian movement; Hussein Bey Reshidof, representing the “Eastern -Central Committee” instituted by the Moscovite Foreign Commissariat for -the liberation of Islam—which is at the head of all the organisations -at work in Persia, the Transcaspian areas, Anatolia, Afghanistan, and -India; Kutchuk Talaat, a representative of the Union and Progress -Committee; Nuri Bedri Bey, representing the Anatolian Kurds; and -delegates from Persia and Afghanistan. There they discussed what -measures should be taken and what means of action should be resorted to -in Muslim countries, especially in Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco. - -It must be owned, on the other hand, that the Catholics in Turkey had -refused—as they have always tried to do in all countries—to acknowledge -the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, and had looked upon -themselves as above the laws of the land, though they laid a claim at -the same time to a share in the government of the country; in short, -they wanted to be both Roman legates and Turkish governors. - -All this does not suffice to justify the measures of oppression the -Turks resorted to, but explains how they were driven to take such -measures, and accounts for the state of mind now prevailing in Turkey, -which has brought about the present troubles. For the foreign Powers, -urged by the Eastern Christians, kept on meddling with Turkish home -affairs, which caused much resentment and anger among the Turks, and -roused religious fanaticism on both sides. - -If the liberal Western Powers carried on that policy—that is to say, if -they continued to support the Christians against the Moslems—they would -make a dangerous mistake. - -At the present time the Holy See, which has never given up its -ever-cherished dream of universal dominion, plainly shows by its -growing activity that it means to develop its religious influence and -avail itself of the war to strengthen and enlarge it. - -For some time the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, though always a staunch -supporter of the Papacy, restrained that tendency and became a -moderating influence in Rome; but now the Holy See aims at playing a -more important part than ever in all the affairs of Southern Germany -and the countries that have broken loose from the former dual monarchy. - -In order to strengthen the Church and to realise Catholic unity, the -Vatican at the present juncture is exerting all its power in Central -Europe and the Slavonic countries; and is doing its best at the same -time to get in touch with the Protestant world in order to reinforce -its own action by coupling it with the Protestant propaganda. - -Benedict XV has revived the scheme of the longed-for Union of the -Churches in order to win over to Catholicism part or the whole of the -former Orthodox Empire. - -In New Germany the Holy See is endeavouring to bring about an -understanding between Catholics and Protestants, with a view to a -common Christian—rather than strictly Catholic—action. In Austria, -after upholding all the elements of the old régime so long as a -monarchist movement seemed likely to triumph, it now gives its -support to Christian Democracy. In Hungary, where the Jesuits and the -Cistercians first worked hand in hand together with an Allied mission -in Budapest to maintain Friedrich, or at least a clerical government, -in power, the Primate, Mgr. Csernoch, and the Lutheran bishop, Mgr. -Sandar Raffaï, have now agreed to work for the same purpose. The Polish -Schlachta, of course, supports these schemes and intrigues, which are -being carried on at Fribourg, in Switzerland, where certain princes -connected with the Imperial House and Prince Louis of Windisch-Graetz -used to meet Waitz, Bishop of Innsbrück. - -Uniatism, or the rite of the United Greek Church, which, though -retaining the Slavonic liturgy, acknowledges the Pope as the supreme -head of the Church, and is paramount in the Carpathian Mountains, -Eastern Galicia, and the Ukraine, favours the extension of the Pope’s -sovereignty over these territories, and naturally the Holy See takes -advantage of this movement to support and reinforce the Church and -bring Orthodox countries under the dominion of Rome. - -Till these great schemes have been carried out, and in order to further -them, the Holy See means to establish between the Orthodox and the -Catholic world an intermediary zone which would be a favourable ground -for its penetration and conquest. To this intent Father Genocchi has -been sent as apostolic visitor to the Ukraine by Cardinal Marini, -prefect of the congregation newly established for the propaganda in the -East, with full powers over both Latin and Greek Catholics, or Uniates. -Father Genocchi is to act in close union with Mgr. Ratti, and both -stand out as powerful agents of the great scheme of the Roman Church. - -While pursuing this direct conquest, Rome endeavours in all countries -to gain the support of all believers in Christ, even the Protestants, -in order to be able to exert an influence on the policy of the -Governments, and thus serve Christian interests. - -At a recent conference of the Czecho-Slovak Catholics, Mgr. Kordatch, -Archbishop of Prague, declared the Catholics would go so far as -to resort to public political action and hold out the hand to the -Protestants, who believe, like them, in the Divinity of Christ and the -Decalogue. - -So any undertaking against Islam or any other Eastern religion cannot -but reinforce the power of Rome, for it aims at destroying the power of -the other creeds which, as well as Catholicism, gratify the aspirations -of the various peoples, and thus legitimately counterbalance its dream -of hegemony. - - * * * * * - -Finally, though any communist conception is abhorrent to the Moslem -spirit, which is essentially individualist and so has an aristocratic -trend, and though Bolshevism, as we have already pointed out, is a -specific doctrine which suits only the Russian mind, the attitude of -the Western nations threatened to drive Islam towards Bolshevism, -or at least to create a suitable ground for its expansion. In spite -of the enlightened leaders of Islam, the attitude of the Powers -risked inducing the Moslem masses to lend a willing ear to Bolshevist -promises and to adopt Bolshevism in order to defend the Moslem creed -and customs. Besides, Bolshevism, which was undergoing an evolution, -and was growing more wily, less brutal, but all the more dangerous, -no longer required other nations to adopt its social ideal. In order -to serve a political purpose, it now turned its efforts towards the -Caspian Sea to communicate with Asia Minor and create disturbances in -Central Asia, while, on the other side, it advanced as far as Mongolia. - -After the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement forced by Great -Britain upon Persia, which, in spite of what was officially said to -the contrary, deprived Persia of her independence, Bolshevism saw what -an easy prey was offered to it by the English policy, and concentrated -its efforts on Asia Minor, where it could most easily worry England. -It carried on a very active propaganda in all Asiatic languages in -Turkistan and even in Afghanistan—the result being that the latter -country sent a mission of inquiry to Moscow. - -According to the statement of a Persian reproduced in the _Journal des -Débats_ of April 4, 1920, the representatives of the Soviet Government -made advances to the Persian patriotic organisations and told them: - - “England despises your rights. Your Government is in her hand. To - organise your resistance, you need a help. We offer it to you, and - ask for nothing in return, not even for your adhesion to our social - doctrine. The reason that urges us to offer you our support is a - political one. Russia, whether she is Bolshevist or not, cannot - live by the side of an England ruling over nearly the whole of the - East. The real independence of your country is necessary to us.” - -Such suggestions could not but attract the attention of the Persians -at a time when, without even waiting for the opening of the Chamber -that had been elected under the influence of British troops in order to -sanction the Anglo-Persian agreement, some English administrators had -already settled in Teheran. - -The same Persian, in agreement with the main body of Persian opinion, -went on: - - “Shall we have to submit to that shameful régime? Nobody thinks - so in our country. Even those who were not bold enough to protest - openly against the deed of spoliation which the Anglo-Persian - agreement is, are secretly opposed to that agreement. But in order - to avail ourselves of that discontent, to concentrate our forces, - and chiefly to act fast and well, we need help from abroad, at - least at the outset. The Bolshevists offer it to us. I do not - know why we should discard the proposition at once. What makes us - hesitate is their communist doctrine; yet they declare they do not - want at all to ‘bolshevikise’ Persia. As soon as their promise - seems to be quite genuine, it will be our national duty to accept - their help. - - “Whether the Red Dictator’s action in Russia was good or bad is a - question that concerns the Russians alone. The only question for us - is how to find an ally. Now we have not to choose between many. - - “We should have been only too pleased to come to an understanding - with Great Britain, even at the cost of some concessions, provided - our independence were respected. But the British leaders have - preferred trampling upon our rights. Who is to be blamed for this?” - -In the same manner as the Kemalist movement, a Nationalist movement was -gaining ground in Persia, like the one which had already brought on the -Teheran events from 1906 to 1909. - -Now, while the Bolshevists, in order to expand and strengthen their -position, did their utmost to convince the Eastern nations that -Bolshevism alone could free them, the Germans, on the other hand, -seized the new opportunity that was given them to offer the Mohammedans -their help, and sent them German officers from Russia. In this way, -and through our fault, Bolshevism and Germanism united to foment -disturbances in the East, and join with it against us. That is why Mr. -Winston Churchill said, at the beginning of January: “New forces are -now rising in Asia Minor, and if Bolshevism and Turkish Nationalism -should unite, the outlook would be a serious one for Great Britain.” - - -Footnotes: - - 15: Chapter “Le Peuple.” - - 16: _The Times_, February 27, 1920, p. 8, col. 4. - - 17: _The Times_, February 27, 1920, p. 8, col. 4. - - 18: _The Times_, February 27, 1920, p. 9. - - 19: _The Times_, February 27, 1920. - - 20: _India and the Empire_, reprinted from _Foreign Affairs_, July - 1, 1920 (Orchard House, Great Smith Street, Westminster, London, - S.W. 1), pp. 3 f. - - - - -V - -THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE - - -The Allied intervention in Turkey continued to be the subject of -frequent diplomatic conversations between the Powers. - -Though Italy and France seemed to favour a strictly limited action, -England held quite a different opinion, and energetic measures seemed -likely to be resorted to. Lord Derby at the meeting of the Ambassadors’ -Council on March 10 read a telegram from his Government stating it -intended to demand of Germany the extradition of Enver Pasha and Talaat -Pasha, who were on the list of war criminals drawn up a few weeks -before by the British Government, and who at that time were in Berlin. - -As the Allies had not requested that these men should be handed over -to them at the time of the armistice, and as the war criminals whose -extradition had been previously demanded of the Central Powers did -not seem likely to be delivered up to them, this seemed rather an -idle request at a time when it was openly said the Allies wanted to -expel the Turks from Constantinople, when a deep agitation convulsed -the Moslem world and discontent was rife in it. What was the use of -this new threat to Germany if, like the previous one, it was not -to be carried into effect? What would Great Britain do if the two -“undesirables” thought of going to Holland, and why did she prepare -to punish Turkey when some of her statesmen seemed inclined to make -all sorts of concessions, instead of compelling Germany, the promoter -of the conflict, who had not yet delivered up any German subject, to -execute the treaty without any restriction whatever? - -At the beginning of the armistice England had deported the members and -chief supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, and later on -the high functionaries who had been arrested by Damad Ferid Pasha, -and were about to be court-martialled. One night fifty-four of the -latter out of about 130 were suddenly deported to Malta for fear they -should be set free by the population of Constantinople. Among them -were: Hairi Effendi, ex-Sheik-ul-Islam; the Egyptian prince, Said -Halim Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier; Ahmed Nessiny, ex-Minister of Foreign -Affairs; Halil Bey, ex-Minister of Justice; Prince Abbas Halim Pasha, -ex-Minister of Public Works; Fethy Bey, ex-Minister at Sofia; Rahmi -Bey, Governor-General of vilayet of Smyrna; Jambalat Bey, ex-Minister -of Interior; Ibrahim Bey, a former Minister; and four members of the -Committee: Midhat Shukri; Zia Geuk Alp; Kemal (Kutchuk Effendi); -and Bedreddin Bey, temporary vali of Diarbekir, who was deported as -responsible for the massacres that had taken place in that town, -though at that time he was out of office and had been discharged by -a court-martial. The British even evinced a desperate, undignified -animosity and an utter lack of generosity in regard to the Turkish -generals who had defeated them. They had, as it were, carried away the -spirit of Turkey. - -Italy, who had followed a most clever, shrewd, and far-sighted policy, -and who had kept some independence within the Supreme Council, had been -very reserved in regard to the Turkish question. - -In regard to Article 9 of the pact of London, which ascribed to Italy, -in case Turkey should be dismembered, a “fair part” of the province -of Adana in Asia Minor, the newspaper _Il Secolo_, in the middle of -January, 1920, expressed the opinion that Italy should give up that -acquisition. - - “Notwithstanding all that has been written for the last seven - or eight years about the Adalia area, we do not think that its - possession would improve our present economic condition. It would - only estrange from us a nation from which we might perhaps derive - great advantages through an open policy of friendship and liberty. - - “The most profitable scheme would have been to maintain the - national integrity of Turkey and to give Italy, not a mandate over - a reduced State, but a mere administrative control, and to assign - her a few zones of exploitation with mere economic privileges, for - instance, near Heraclea and Adalia. - - “But at the present stage of the Asiatic problem, such a scheme - could hardly be carried out. We must then lay aside all selfish - purposes, and openly and tenaciously defend the integrity and - independence of the Turkish State. - - “Let the Turks be driven away from the districts which are - predominantly Arabian, Greek, or Armenian. But let the Sultan - remain in Constantinople, till the League of Nations has become - stronger and able to assume control of the Straits. Let us not - forget that the Turks chiefly put their confidence in us now, and - that Germany, whose policy had never threatened Turkish territorial - integrity, had succeeded in gaining Turkish friendship and blind - devotion. - - “Italy has not many friends to-day, and so she should not despise a - hand which is willingly held out to her.” - -Italy therefore did not warmly approve an expedition against Turkey. -Her semi-official newspapers stated it was owing to Italy that the -Allies’ policy still showed some moderation, and they hinted that the -presence of Italian troops in the contingent landed at Constantinople -was to be looked upon as the best means to prevent extreme measures. - -On Tuesday, March 16, the Allied troops, consisting mostly of British -soldiers, under the command of General Milne, occupied the Ottoman -Government offices. - -It might seem strange that the Allied troops in Constantinople were -commanded by a British general, when the town was the residence of -General Franchet d’Espérey, commander-in-chief of the inter-Allied -troops on the Macedonian front, who, in the decisive battle in which -he broke through the Bulgarian front, had had General Milne under him. -But, after all, it was better for France that an English general should -stand responsible for carrying out the occupation. - -To the student of Eastern events this was but the logical outcome of -a patient manœuvre of England. The documents that have now been made -public plainly show how far-sighted her policy had been. - -General Franchet d’Espérey’s dispositions were suddenly reversed, for -he had not advocated an important military action against Russia or -Turkey when he had taken command of the Eastern army—_i.e._, before his -expedition from Salonika towards the Danube—and at the beginning of -October, 1918, he had arranged the French and English divisions so as -to march against Budapest and Vienna, foreseeing the ultimate advance -of the Italian left wing against Munich. - -On October 8, 1918, he was formally enjoined from Paris to send the -British divisions which made up his right wing against Constantinople -under the command of an English general. - -Thus, after the defeat of Bulgaria in October, 1918, the British -Government required that the troops sent to the Constantinople area -should be led by a British general. In this way General Milne assumed -command of the British troops stationed round and in Constantinople -when Admiral Calthorpe had concluded the armistice with Turkey, -and as a consequence General Franchet d’Espérey, though still -commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in European Turkey, was now -under the orders of General Milne, commander of the Constantinople -garrison and the forces in Asia Minor. - -Some time after receiving the aforesaid order, General Franchet -d’Espérey, on October 27, 1918, received a letter from the War -Minister, M. Clémenceau, No. 13644, B.S. 3,[21] forwarding him “copy of -a letter giving the outline of a scheme of action that was recommended -not only to carry on the war against the Central Powers in Russia, but -also to effect the economic blockade of Bolshevism, and thus bring -about its downfall.” This scheme, after being assented to by the -Allied Powers concerned in it, was to be “the natural outcome of the -operations entrusted to the Allied armies in the East.” - -Finally, in a telegram, No. 14041, B.S. 3, dated November 6, containing -some very curious recommendations, it was said: - -“The operations in Southern Russia should be carried on by means of -Greek elements, for instance, which it might be inexpedient to employ -in an offensive against Germany, or by means of the French army in -Palestine.”[22] - -Thus all the plans of the French headquarters were altered by England, -and to her advantage; at the same time part of our endeavours was -broken up and annihilated under the pressure of the Pan-Russian circles -that urged France to intervene in Russia, and the French policy in the -East was wholly at the mercy of England. By saying this, we do not mean -at all to belittle M. Clémenceau’s work during the war, but we only -mention one of the mistakes to which he was driven, in spite of his -energy and determination, by the English and American policy, which had -dazzled some of his collaborators. - -On March 16, at 9 a.m., some British _estafettes_ handed to the Sultan, -in his palace at Yildiz-Kiosk, and to the Sublime Porte a note of -General Milne, commanding the Allied troops in Asia Minor and the town -of Constantinople. It stated that at 10 a.m., with the agreement of the -Italian, French, and British High Commissioners, and according to the -orders of the British Imperial Headquarters, the Allied contingents -would occupy the offices of the Minister of War and the Minister of -Marine, the prefecture, the post and telegraph offices, the town gates, -and the new bridge of Galata. In fact, the town had been occupied at -daybreak by the Allied troops. - -The note added that for a short time the political administration would -be left to the Turks, but under the control of Allied officers. Martial -law was proclaimed, and, in case of resistance, force would be resorted -to. - -The Ottoman Government gave no answer, and an hour later all the -measures mentioned by General Milne were carried out. As these -operations took a whole day, all the means of transport and -communication were temporarily stopped. - -At the War Office the soldiers on duty attempted to resist the British -forces. A skirmish ensued, in which two British soldiers were killed, -and an officer and three soldiers wounded; nine Turks, including an -officer, were killed, and a few more wounded. - -At the same hour a Greek destroyer steamed into the Golden Horn, and -cast anchor opposite the Patriarch’s palace. - -Before this, General Milne had had a few deputies and senators -arrested, together with a few men considered as having a share in the -Nationalist movement, such as Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, ex-War Minister -in the Ali Riza Cabinet; Jevad Pasha, formerly head of the staff; -Tchourouk Soulou Mahmoud Pasha, a senator; Dr. Essad Pasha; Galatali -Shefket Pasha, commanding the Straits forces; Reouf Bey, Kara Vassif -Bey, Shevket Bey, Hassan Tahsin Bey, Nouman Ousta Effendi, Sheref Bey, -deputies. - -Reouf Bey and Kara Vassif Bey were considered as representing in the -Turkish Parliament Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the people who ensured the -transmission of his orders. - -All these men were arrested illegally and brutally, with the consent -of the French Governor, though they had always evinced much sympathy -for France, under the pretext that they corresponded with the national -army; and yet their intervention might have had favourable consequences. - -Among the men arrested that night, Jemal, Jevad, and Mahmoud Pasha, -all three former Ministers, were insulted and sent to prison in their -nightclothes, with their arms bound. Their doors and windows were -broken open, and their Moslem wives were threatened in the harem. Some -children of thirteen or fourteen were also arrested and thrashed. Eight -Turkish soldiers on duty at Shahzade-Bashi were killed in the morning -while they lay asleep on their camp-beds, and the censorship probably -suppressed other deeds of the same kind. - -The Ottoman Government could not understand how members of Parliament -could be imprisoned, especially by the English, the founders of the -parliamentary system. The deputy Jelal Noury Bey, who is neither a -Nationalist nor a Unionist, was apprehended, merely because he opposed -Ferid Pasha’s policy. - -England, to enhance her influence over public opinion, got control -over the chief newspapers which were not friendly to her. Jelal Noury -Bey, the director of the _Ileri_, a radical newspaper, and Ahmed Emin -Bey, the director of the _Vakit_, were deported. The _Alemdar_, the -_Peyam Sabah_, the _Stambul_, edited by Refi Jevad, Ali Kemal, and -Said Mollah, which, since the first days of the armistice, had praised -the English policy, fell into English hands; which accounts for the -varying attitudes successively assumed by those journals in their -comments on current events. Their editors were mostly members of the -“Club of the Friends of England,” and sought in every possible way -to increase the number of the adherents of that committee, which was -subsidised by the British High Commissioner, and whose chief aim was -that the Turkish mandate should be given to England. - -On March 21, 1920, the British at Skutari requisitioned the police -courts, the law courts, the police station, the town hall, and the -prison, thus almost completely disorganising the administration of the -town. - -In the note signed by the High Commissioners, this occupation was -described as a measure of guarantee, with a view to the execution -of the treaty that was going to be forced on Turkey. Yet it seemed -rather strange that such measures should be taken before the treaty -was concluded—or was it because the English, being aware the treaty -was unacceptable, thought it necessary to gag the Turks beforehand, or -even sought to exasperate them?—for if the Turks offered resistance, -then the English would have a right to intervene very sternly, and -thus could justify the most unjustifiable measures of repression. -What would England and the United States have answered if France had -proposed such coercive measures against Germany in addition to those -of the armistice? It was stated in this note that the occupation would -not last long, and was no infringement upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, -that it aimed at rallying the Turks in a common endeavour to restore -prosperity to Turkey in accordance with the Sultan’s orders; but it -also threatened that, should disorder last longer in Asia Minor, the -occupation might be extended and the provisions of the treaty might be -made harder, in which case Constantinople would be severed from Turkey. - -The _Daily Telegraph_ said about that time: - - “The political situation, which has evolved so rapidly, plainly - shows it is not enough for the Americans to keep aloof from the - present events. Their national honour is at stake. - - “Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side with France - in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France declares herself - willing to accept our co-operation. - - “We easily understand that the occupation of Constantinople came - rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially if we take - into account that this action closely followed another measure of a - similar kind taken by England within the last fortnight. - - “It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly - different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public - opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling is on - the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in the East - unimpaired, she must associate with any political, naval, or - military measure taken by England. - - “The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much from ours, - or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly advocate a - policy of non-intervention, or an intervention restricted to a - diplomatic action.” - -If such proceedings emanating from some American or English circles -were hardly a matter of surprise, the attitude of some Frenchmen of -note was not so easily accounted for. - -M. Hanotaux[23] was led by a strange political aberration and a curious -oblivion of all the traditional policy of France—unless he deliberately -meant to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice—when he -assigned Constantinople to Greece, because, according to him, to -give Constantinople to Greece was “to give it to Europe, and to her -worthiest, noblest offspring.” - -Now Hellenism owes nothing to Byzantium, and Byzantinism, imbued -with Christianity, is but remotely and indirectly connected with the -magnificent pagan bloom of Hellenism. Byzantium, as has been shown, was -not only the continuation of Rome in its decay: it had also a character -of its own. Neither was Byzantinism a mere continuation of Hellenism. -It was rather the propagator of Orthodoxy, so that when the Greeks -claimed Byzantium, they could not do so on behalf of Hellenism, but -merely on behalf of Christianity. There is a confusion here that many -people have sought to perpetuate because it serves numerous interests, -those of the Greeks, and also those of the Slavs, who owe their culture -to Byzantium. But whereas Byzantium chiefly taught barbarous Russia -a religion together with the rudiments of knowledge, and opened for -her a door to the Old World, she imparted to Arabian civilisation -knowledge of the works and traditions of antiquity. Russia, who only -borrowed the rites of the Byzantine Church and exaggerated them, did -not derive much profit from that initiation; the Turks and Arabs, on -the contrary, thanks to their own culture, were able to imbibe the old -knowledge bequeathed and handed down to them by Byzantium—leaving aside -the religious bequest. Thus they were enabled to exercise a wholesome -influence, driving out of Constantinople both Orthodoxy and the Slavs -who aimed at the possession of that town. - -As to the so-called Hellenism of Asia Minor, it is true that the -civilisation of ancient Greece spread over several districts on the -coast; but it should be borne in mind that, long before the Greeks, -the Egyptians and various Semitic peoples had settled on the coast of -Lydia—which up to the seventh century B.C. bore the name of -Meonia—and fought there for a long time; and that the Lydians, a hybrid -race akin to the Thracians and Pelasgi commingled with ethnic elements -coming from Syria and Cappadocia, kept up an intercourse between the -Greeks of the coast and Asia[24] till the Cimmerian invasion convulsed -Asia Minor in the eighth century. Lastly, the Medes, against whom the -Greeks waged three wars, are considered by Oppert,[25] owing to the -etymology of the name, to be of Turanian descent. - -In fact, the relations between the Turks and the Greeks and the -Byzantians are really most involved. We know to-day that some Turkish -elements, who were converted to the Greek Church long before the -Ottoman Turks embraced Islam, and whose origin is anterior by far to -the establishment of the Seljukian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, -faithfully served the Byzantine Empire from the fifth century -onwards, and were utilised by Justinian for the defence of the -Asiatic boundaries of the Empire—which were also the boundaries of -Christianity—against the attacks of Eastern nations. - -It is difficult to account for the sudden fervid enthusiasm of the -Allies for Greece. For two years she adhered to Constantine’s policy, -perpetrating many an act of treachery against both the Hellenic people -and the Allies, repeatedly violating the Constitution guaranteed by the -Powers that had protected her, and slaughtering many French sailors; -and then, after her unfriendly conduct towards the Allies under cover -of a pro-German neutrality, she had very tardily sided with them. -It was surprising, therefore, that Greece, who had displayed her -pro-German feelings during a great part of the war, would probably -receive some of the most thoroughly Turkish territories of the Ottoman -Empire, though she never fought against that Empire even after she -had deposed King Alexander’s father, in spite of the deplorable -complaisance of some of the Allies. - -Finally, the very day after the occupation of Constantinople, General -Milne, who commanded the British troops of occupation, enjoined the -Salih Pasha Cabinet to resign under pretence that it no longer enjoyed -the Sovereign’s confidence. The Grand Vizier refused to comply with -the English general’s request, as the Government had the confidence of -the Chamber and the Sovereign need not apply to the commander of the -forces of occupation for permission to communicate with his Ministers. -After incarcerating a good many deputies, senators, and political men, -as has just been seen, the general gave the Grand Vizier to understand -that orders had been given for the arrest of the Ministers in case -they should attempt to go to their departments. In order to spare his -country another humiliation, Salih Pasha handed in his resignation to -the Sultan, who, following the advice of England, charged Damad Ferid -to form another Cabinet. - -It requires all the reasons that have been previously given to enable -us to understand why England threatened and humbled Turkey to such -an extent—the only Power left in the East that could be a factor for -moderation and peace. - -Mustafa Kemal never recognised the Damad Ferid Cabinet, and only -after the latter had resigned and Ali Riza Pasha had been appointed -Grand Vizier did he consent, in order to avoid another conflict -with the Sultan, to enter into negotiations with the Constantinople -Government. Salih Pasha was charged by the Minister to carry on the -negotiations with the Nationalists, and repaired to Amasia. There it -was agreed—first, that the National Organisation should be officially -recognised as a lawful power which was necessary to the defence of the -rights of the country, and should have full liberty of action side -by side with the Government; secondly, that the Cabinet should avoid -taking any decision sealing the fate of the country before Parliament -met; thirdly, that some appointments should be made in agreement with -the National Organisation, after which the latter should not interfere -in the administration of the country. - -Besides, as Mustafa Kemal said later on in a speech made before the -Angora Assembly, though the Sultan had been represented by some as -lacking energy, not maintaining the dignity of the Imperial throne, and -not being a patriot, yet the reason why he had fallen under English -tutelage was that he had seen no other means to save both the existence -of Turkey and his throne. - -The question whether Parliament should meet at Constantinople or in -a province brought on a first disagreement between the Government and -Mustafa Kemal, who finally yielded. But, owing to the occupation of -Constantinople, Parliament soon found itself in a precarious condition, -and the National Organisation decided to hold its sittings at Angora. - -After all these events a deputy, Riza Nour, at the sitting of March 18, -1920, raised a protest against the occupation of Constantinople and -the incarceration of some members of Parliament by the Allies, which -measures were an insult to the dignity of the Turkish Parliament, and -a contravention of the constitutional laws and the law of nations. -This motion, carried unanimously by the Ottoman Chamber and signed -by the Vice-President, M. Hussein Kiazim—the President, for fear of -being prosecuted by the British authorities, having left his official -residence—was forwarded to the Allied and neutral Parliaments, and -the Ottoman Chamber adjourned _sine die_ till it was possible for the -deputies to carry out their mandate safely. - -Ahmed Riza, former President of the Chamber and Senate of the Ottoman -Empire—who, after the failure of Damad Ferid’s mission to Paris, had -addressed an open letter to M. Clémenceau on July 17, 1919, almost -the anniversary day of the Constitution—joined in that protest and -commented upon the treatment some members of Parliament had undergone, -as follows: - - “It is contrary to all parliamentary rights and principles - throughout the world and to the legal dispositions that guarantee - the inviolability and immunity of all members of the Turkish - Parliament to arrest representatives of the nation while they - are carrying out their mandate. So the armed Interference of - the foreigner with our Chamber cannot be in any way excused or - accounted for. - - “Such an arbitrary intrusion, especially on the part of England, - that is looked upon as the founder of the parliamentary system, - will bring everlasting shame to British civilisation. - - “After the illegal arrest of several of its members, the Turkish - Parliament adjourned _sine die_, as a token of protest, till the - deputies are able to carry out their mandate freely and safely. - - “A note communicated to the Press makes out that some deputies had - been returned under the pressure of the Nationalists and that, - as the Christian elements had had no share in the elections, the - session was illegal. - - “Now, it should be noticed that these elements abstained from - voting at the last elections of their own free will, and that since - the armistice no representative of the Christian communities has - taken an official part in the public functions in the Imperial - Palace. The Nationalist forces cannot be held responsible for this. - - “Neither is it the Nationalists’ fault if the French authorities in - Cilicia arbitrarily prevented the inhabitants of that district from - holding the parliamentary election, thus depriving the people of - their most sacred rights, and violating the terms of the armistice. - - “The acknowledgment of the validity of the mandates of the new - members by the unanimity of their colleagues, the official opening - of Parliament by the speech from the throne, the good wishes and - greetings of the Sultan to the deputies, bear witness that the - assembly legally represented the wishes of the nation and had the - Sovereign’s approbation. - - “Besides, these are strictly internal questions in which the - Allies’ interests are not at all concerned, and with which - foreigners have no right to interfere. - - “At such a solemn hour it would be an utter denial of justice if - the Ottoman deputies were not able to discuss the fundamental - stipulations of the intended Peace Treaty which is to seal the - future fate of their country. - - “Who is to examine the Peace Treaty to-day, and who is to - give its assent to it now the nation has been deprived of its - representatives? - - “Of what value will be a treaty thus worked out secretly, behind - closed doors, and concluded in such conditions? How can the - signature of the members of the Government be considered as binding - the nation? For the new Ministry does not yet represent the Ottoman - nation, since no motion of confidence has hitherto been carried by - a chamber which does not sit; and so it cannot be looked upon as - being legally constituted. - - “Whatever may happen, the nation alone can decide its own fate. If, - at such a serious juncture, when its very existence is at stake, - it were not able to defend its own cause and its own rights freely - through the peaceful vote of its own mandatories, it would be - looked upon by the whole of mankind as the victim of most unfair - treatment, the responsibility of which will one day be determined - by history.” - -During Abdul Hamid’s reign Ahmed Riza had of his own will gone into -exile, and from Paris he had wielded great influence over the movement -that led to the revolution of 1908. But when the Young Turk Government -had practically become dictatorial and had yielded to the pressure -that drove it towards Germany, he realised that policy was a failure -and was leading the Empire to ruin; then, though he had been one of -the promoters of the movement, he protested repeatedly in the Senate, -of which he was a member, against the illegal doings of the Government -and its foolhardy policy. As President of the “National Block”—which, -though not a political party properly speaking, aimed at grouping all -the conservative constitutional elements friendly to the Entente—he -seemed likely to play an important part in public life again when, -about the middle of August, 1919, it was rumoured that the Damad Ferid -Government was about to take action against him and his political -friends; and soon after it was made known that he intended to go to -Italy or France till the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament. After -staying in Rome, where he had conversations with some political men of -note in order to establish an intellectual entente between Italians and -Turks, he settled in Paris. - -The English censorship, which gagged the Turkish newspapers, went so -far as to prevent them from reprinting extracts from French newspapers -that were favourable to the Ottoman cause. It brought ridicule -upon itself by censuring the Bible; in an article in the _Univers -Israélite_, reprinted by the _Aurore_, which quoted and commented on -three verses of chapter xix. of Isaiah, the censor cut off the first -of these verses, which may be interpreted as foreshadowing a League of -Nations, but in which he was afraid the reader might find a hint at a -connection between Egypt and Asia and at the claims of the Turkish and -Egyptian Nationalists. This is the verse, which any reader could easily -restore: “In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, -and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt and the Egyptian into Assyria, -and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians.” - - -Footnotes: - - 21: Cf. the _Matin_, June 17, 1920, an interview of M. Paul - Benazet, ex-chairman of the Committee of War Estimates; and the - _Œuvre_, July 8, 1920. - - 22: Cf. the _Matin_, June 21, 1920, and M. Fribourg’s speech in the - second sitting of June 25, 1920. - - 23: _Figaro_, March 18, 1920. - - 24: Radet, _La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Mermnades_ - (Paris, 1893). - - 25: Oppert, _Le Peuple des Mèdes_. - - - - -VI - -THE TREATY WITH TURKEY - - -In the course of the debate on the foreign policy of England which -opened on Thursday, March 25, on the third reading of the Finance -Bill, Mr. Asquith, speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the -Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government should no longer hold -in Europe the political power that belonged to it before the war. He -urged, however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to Asia Minor, -where he would quite escape European control. He proposed, therefore, -that the Sultan should be, as it were, “vaticanised”—that is to say, he -should remain in Constantinople, but should only retain his spiritual -power as Caliph, as the Pope does in Rome. - -The Great Powers or the League of Nations would then be entrusted with -the political power in Constantinople, and if the Bosphorus or the -Dardanelles were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of the -Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended with any serious danger. - -As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the _status quo ante -bellum_. As the frontiers of that region were not quite definite, -sooner or later, he thought, if England remained there, she would be -driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even the Caspian -Sea, and she had not adequate means for the present to do so. So it was -better for her to confine her action within the Basra zone. - -The Prime Minister, rising in response, first remarked that the cause -of the delays in the negotiations with Turkey and the settlement -of peace was that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the -decision of America, as to the share she intended to take in the -negotiations. He recalled that the Allies had hoped the United States -would not only assume the protection of Armenia properly speaking, -but of Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits of -Constantinople, and went on as follows: - - “If we had not given time for America to make up her mind it - might have suspected the Allies wanted to take advantage of some - political difficulty to partition Turkey; and it is only when the - United States definitely stated she did not intend to take part in - the Conference that the Allies proceeded to take definite decisions - with regard to the Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the - Allies to make that explanation.” - -Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies had contemplated -maintaining only the spiritual power of the Sultan, but unfortunately -this scheme did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the -situation. For Constantinople had to be administered at the same -time, and it is easier to control the Sultan and his Ministers in -Constantinople than if they were relegated to Asia Minor. - -Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which bore such bad fruits -in the course of the Peace Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not -to shut out the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion, added -that if it was proved that the Allies’ control weakened the power of -the Sultan in Asia Minor, it would always be possible to consider the -question afresh—but he hoped that would not be necessary. - -As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribution of the mandates, -he declared: - - “If America had accepted the responsibility for controlling - Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the Sykes scheme, - had Cilicia assigned to their control, were quite willing to hand - it over to American control. The British, French, and Italians are - quite agreed on the subject, but we have not yet seen a sign. We - have only received telegrams from America, asking us to protect the - Armenians; we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the - responsibility.... We are hoping that France will undertake that - responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We have also - got our responsibility, but we cannot take too much upon our own - shoulders.... - - “With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it - depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether they protect - their independence.... I am told that they could easily organise - an army of above 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment, we shall - be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the - assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain - there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to - assist in that respect.”[26] - -Finally, with, respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd George urged “it would -be a mistake to give up Baghdad and Mosul.” - - “I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure which we have - incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of - the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take - no responsibility for its development, would be an act of folly - quite indefensible.... They have been consulted about their wishes - in this respect, and I think, almost without exception, they are - anxious that we should stay here, though they are divided about the - kind of independent Government they would like.... - - “We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the mandatory of - Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has not yet been signed. - It is only on the signing of that treaty that the question of - mandatories will be decided, but when that time comes we shall - certainly claim the right to be the mandatory power of Mesopotamia, - including Mosul.” - -In its leading article, _The Times_, criticising the attitude Mr. Lloyd -George had taken in the debate on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on -March 27: - - “The Prime Minister made statements, about the future of - Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said that when - the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally decided, the - British Government would ‘claim the right’ to be the ‘mandatory - Power’ for Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul.... - - “Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr. Lloyd George - himself has never grasped the full and dangerous significance of - the adventure he now advocates.... - - “The Prime Minister’s reply conveyed the impression that he has - only the very haziest idea about what he proposes to do in this - region, which has been the grave of empires ever since written - history began.” - -After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate over Mesopotamia, -including the vilayet of Mosul, _The Times_ thought, as had been -suggested by Mr. Asquith, that England should confine her direct -obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that it was only -incidentally and almost in spite of himself that Mr. Asquith had been -driven in 1915 to occupy the larger part of Mesopotamia. - - “Mr. Asquith says—and he is entirely right—that if we hold a line - in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall sooner or later - be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even to - the Caspian. His view is in complete accord with every lesson to - be derived from our history as an Empire. We have never drawn one - of these vague, unsatisfactory frontiers without being eventually - compelled to move beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the - Middle East, and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops - are alike prohibitive factors.”[27] - -The next day, in a similar debate in the French Chamber, M. Millerand, -being asked to give information about the leading principles of the -French Government in the negotiations that were being carried on in -regard to the Turkish treaty, made the following statement, which did -not throw much light on the question: - - “First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to organise - a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose—this is the only - resolution that was made public and the only one that the British - Government disclosed in the House of Commons—for this purpose it - has seemed fit to maintain a Sultan in Constantinople. - - “The same principle implies that Turkey will include, together with - the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems, the economic outlets - without which she could not thrive. - - “In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has been - enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the influence she is - entitled to by the important moral and economic interests she owns - in Turkey. - - “This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause—the - war has proved it—viz., the freedom of the Straits, which must - necessarily be safeguarded by an international organisation. It is - also consistent with the respect of nationalities, in conformity - with which some compact ethnic groups who could not possibly - develop under Turkish sovereignty will become independent, and - other guarantees will be given for the protection of minorities. - - “We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests of the first - order. We do not intend that any of them should be belittled; we - want them to develop safely and fully in the future. We shall see - to it especially that the war expenditures of Turkey shall not - curtail the previous rights of French creditors. - - “In the districts where France owns special interests, these - interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It goes without - saying that the Government intends to base its claims on the - agreements already concluded with the Allies.” - -At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which M. Bellet asked -that the Eastern question should be definitely settled by putting an -end to Turkish sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail -revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million francs a month from -the English Government and as much from the French Government; he -wondered why he was considered such an important man, and demanded the -execution of the 1916 agreements, which gave us a free hand in Cilicia, -Syria, and the Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these -agreements, rose to say: - - “It is time we should have a policy in Syria and Cilicia. If we are - not there, who will be there? The 1916 agreements were inspired, - not only by the wish of safeguarding the great interests of France - and maintaining her influence in the Mediterranean, but also - because the best qualified representatives of the peoples of those - countries, who groaned under the Turkish yoke, entreated us not - to forsake them. And it is under these circumstances that in the - middle of the war, urging that a long-sighted policy always proves - the best, we insisted on the settlement of these questions. - - “Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus, of course, - included in the French zone. - - “Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in those - countries? - - “If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing lands; and - who shall deny that we need our share of the petroleum of the world? - - “As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there - to-morrow, who will take our place? Cilicia has cotton, and many - other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States in our place, - then shall we realise what we have lost, but it will be too late! - - “It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle there. - As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are foreseen look - greater than they are really; and some of these difficulties may - have been put forward to dissuade us from going there. - - “It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are based on - our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friendships, and the - summons of the peoples that hold out their arms to us. The question - is whether they shall be countersigned by facts. - - “The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It is in - our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not among the - populations of that country at the time? If we had been there, the - Emir Feisal would have received his investiture from us by our - authority; instead of that, he was chosen by others. Who is to be - blamed for it? - - “Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples; if our - Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written treaties to - be respected, they will be respected.” - -Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed to him on March 12, -1920, to state his opinion about the draft of the Turkish settlement -worked out in London, and at the same time to appoint a plenipotentiary -to play a part in the final settlement. His answer was handed to M. -Jusserand, French ambassador, on March 24; he came to the conclusion -finally that Turkey should come to an end as a European Power. - -In this note President Wilson declared that though he fully valued the -arguments set forward for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he -thought that the arguments against the Turks, based on unimpeachable -considerations, were far superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled -that the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish sovereignty in -Europe was an anomalous thing that should come to an end. - -Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned to Turkey, he -thought they should follow the ethnographic boundaries of the Arabian -populations, unless it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which -case the American Government would be pleased—though that did not -imply any criticism—to be told for what reasons new frontiers had been -proposed. - -Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would one day be allowed -to be represented in the International Council that was going to be -instituted for the government of Constantinople and the Straits, as -he felt sure that any arrangement would be stillborn that did not -recognise what he thought was a vital interest to Russia. For the same -reason he was pleased that the condition of the Straits in wartime had -not yet been settled, and was still under discussion; he thought no -decision should be taken without Russia giving her consent. - -Turning to the territorial question, he said: - - “In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern Thrace - that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong to Greece, - with the exception of the northern part of this province; for the - latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian population, and so, for - the sake of justice and equity, the towns of Adrianople and Kirk - Kilisse, together with their surrounding areas, must be given to - Bulgaria. Not only are the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite - sound from an ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims - on this territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as - she had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by - thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that Serbia - might have a good strategic frontier.” - -He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia. He demanded for her -an outlet to the sea, and the possession of Trebizond. He went on thus: - - “With regard to the question whether Turkey should give up her - rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands, - the American Government recommends the method resorted to in the - case of Austria—namely, that Turkey should place these provinces - in the hands of the Great Powers, who would decide on their fate. - - “As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified to express - an opinion, for the question is too important to be solved with the - limited information possessed by the Government.” - -Finally, the President declared he did not think it necessary for his -ambassador to be present at the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he -insisted on being informed of the resolutions that would be taken. - -The _Philadelphia Ledger_, when this note was sent, commented on Mr. -Wilson’s opinion as to the Turkish problem, and especially the fate -of Constantinople, and did not disguise the fact that he favoured -the handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accordance with the -inter-Allied agreements of 1915, 1916, and 1917. - - “Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe, and the right - for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the Mediterranean to be - recognised. Thus, to a certain extent, Mr. Wilson will decide in - favour of the fulfilment of the secret promises made by the Allies - to Russia in the course of the war. - - “Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall, and - next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly longed for and - encouraged will come into being. It is calculated that if America - gives her support to Russia at this fateful juncture, Russia will - throw herself into the arms of America, and this understanding - between the two countries will be of immense importance.” - -After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and addressed to the -Porte a new collective note requesting the Ministry officially to -disown the Nationalist movement, affairs were very difficult for some -time. As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet’s answer to their note -was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans of the English, French, and -Italian commissioners on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the -Ottoman Premier. - -Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English, who made it -impossible for it to govern the country, the Ministry resigned. The -English required that the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad -Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely. - -Indeed, a secret agreement had already been concluded, on September -12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf -of Great Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the Imperial -Ottoman Government. The existence of this agreement was questioned at -the time, and was even officially denied in the _Stambul Journal_, -April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange of signatures -between them. According to this agreement,[28] the Sultan practically -acquiesced in the control of Great Britain over Turkey within the -limits fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople remained the seat -of the Caliphate, but the Straits were to be under British control. The -Sultan was to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on behalf of -Great Britain, to support British rule in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the -other zones of British influence, not to object to the creation of an -independent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over Egypt and Cyprus. - -Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-operation of the party of the -Liberal Entente. If the information given by the Press is reliable, -it seems that the composition of the new Cabinet was endangered at the -last moment through the opposition of one of the Allied Powers; yet it -was constituted at last. - -The members of the new Cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, who -was both Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, were: Abdullah Effendi, -Sheik-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an opponent of the Union -and Progress Committee, who was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed -Said Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provisionally Minister of -War. The last-named Ministry had been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, -son of the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the Committee of -Union and Progress in 1912, was dismissed from the army in 1914 by -Enver, and was ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of the -war; but he refused this post, and also handed in his resignation as a -member of the Paris delegation; so the Grand Vizier became War Minister -too. The Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey, one of -the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to negotiate the peace with Italy. -Dr. Jemil Pasha, who had once been prefect of Constantinople, became -Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister of Commerce. - -The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on Monday, April 5, in -the afternoon, with the usual ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as -follows: - - “After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha, - considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust - to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah Bey - Sheik-ul-Islam. - - “The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under the name of - nationalism, are endangering our political situation, which ever - since the armistice had been gradually improving. - - “The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this movement have - proved useless. Considering the recent events and the persistence - of this state of rebellion, which may give rise to the worst evils, - it is now our deliberate wish that all those who have organised - and still support these disturbances shall be dealt with according - to the rigour of the law; but, on the other hand, we want a free - pardon to be granted to all those who, having been led astray, - have joined and shared in the rebellion. Let quick and energetic - measures be taken in order to restore order and security throughout - our Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly - prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and the - throne. - - “It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour to - establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great Allied - Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and the nation, - founding them on the principles of righteousness and justice. Do - your utmost to obtain more lenient conditions of peace, to bring - about a speedy conclusion of peace, and to alleviate the public - distress by resorting to all adequate financial and economic - measures.” - -The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish people denounced -the promoters and instigators of the Nationalist movement, and called -upon all Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the “rebels.” - -The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree condemning the Nationalist -movement, pointing out to Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country -ran on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration of friendly -relations between Turkey and the Allies, and warning the leaders of -the movement that harsh measures would be taken against them. The -Ottoman Government, in a proclamation to the population—which had -no effect, for most of the Turks thought it was dictated by foreign -Powers—denounced all the leaders and supporters of the Nationalist -movement as guilty of high treason against the nation. The proclamation -stated: - - “The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still more - eager to save the nation, which is running into great danger. So - it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures against those - who might refuse to go back to their duty according to the high - prescriptions of the Sherif, as is ordered by the Imperial rescript. - - “With this view, the Government proclaims: - - “First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his act, - has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or misleading - instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the insurrectionist - movement, gives tokens of repentance within a week and declares his - loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy the benefit of the Imperial - pardon. - - “Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the movements, - together with whosoever shall continue to support them, shall be - punished according to the law and the Sherif’s orders. - - “Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any act of cruelty - or misdemeanour to be committed in any part of the Empire either - by the Moslem population against other elements, or by non-Moslem - subjects against the Moslem population. So it proclaims that - whosoever shall commit such acts, or countenance them, or be party - to them, shall be severely punished individually.” - -A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia in order to call upon -Mustafa Kemal to give up his hostility to the Entente and lay down arms -with the least delay. - -Moreover, the Government decided to send some delegates in order to -make inquiries and point out to the leaders of the Nationalist movement -the dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and open rebellion. - -The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp of the War -Minister, and an Allied superior officer. Another delegation was to -consist of members of Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey, -member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi; Abdulla Azmi Bey, -member for Kutahia; and Riza Nuri, member for Sinope, the very man -who had brought in a motion against the occupation of Constantinople -and the arrest of some members of the Ottoman Parliament, and who was -credited with having said: “Anatolia has a false conception of the -occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give clear explanations -of the seriousness of the situation in order to avoid disastrous -consequences. We are going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government -about the interests of the nation.” - -An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of the Chamber, and the -members before whom it was read left the Chamber quietly. - -But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet no longer -represented the country, and that in the mind of most Turks it could -no longer express or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose -hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner’s threat, were -given to the Nationalist movement. - - * * * * * - -It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist movement had at the -outset co-operated with some questionable elements and had been mixed -up with the intrigues of the former members of the Committee of Union -and Progress. But it now became impossible, in order to belittle it, -to look down upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement. In -consequence of the successive events that had taken place since the -armistice and of the attitude of the Allies, especially England, after -the occupation of Constantinople, carried out under British pressure -with the approbation of the French Government notwithstanding the -protest of the French Press, and in view of the provisions that were -likely to be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism, which -could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and meant to maintain her -traditional rights, had tacitly joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa -Kemal, who, at the very outset, had been a member of the Committee of -Union and Progress, had soon disagreed with Enver, and it should be -borne in mind that he was his enemy during the greater part of the war, -as he was an opponent of the German Marshal Falkenhayn. Some people -have tried to make out there was only personal enmity between them, and -have denied the possibility of political opposition; but the very fact -that their enmity would have ruined any common political designs they -might have had proves there were no such designs. - -So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved by the measures mentioned -in the manifesto issued by the Government under pressure of the foreign -occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by recent events. - -At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the Sultan that, in -consequence of the occupation of Constantinople, he broke off all -connection with the central Government, which henceforth was quite -under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to the Mussulmans, he -declared it was necessary to form a new independent Ottoman State in -Anatolia and to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason he -gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked upon as Caliph, -for it is a fundamental principle of Islam that the Caliph must -be an independent Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of -Constantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of action. In that -appeal, which was not intended for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis, -Morocco, and Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain alone, -he regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a new crusade against -Islam. - -According to news from Nationalist sources, Mustafa Kemal formed a -Cabinet, in which he was War Minister of the new Anatolian Government. - -It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy of Anatolia and -nahib—_i.e._, the Sultan’s representative in Anatolia—Prince Jemal ed -Din, a member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince Shevket -Effendi, and general inspector of the recruiting service; but the -official circles of Constantinople never believed that the prince had -allowed him to use his name. - -At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly elected, which he -intended to convene at Angora. This assembly consisted of the members -of Parliament who had been able to escape from Constantinople and of -deputies chosen by delegated electors and met on April 23 at Angora, -where all sorts of people had come from quite different regions: -Constantinople, Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National Assembly of -Angora meant to be looked upon as a Constituent Assembly, and strove -to introduce wide reforms into the administrative and financial -organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather large committee, which -styled itself the Government Council, and it included General Mustafa -Kemal, Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-President, and -Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second Vice-President, etc. - -The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora when the -Great National Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa Kemal -Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior; -General Feizi Pasha, National Defence; General Ismail Fazil Pasha, -Public Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy; Hakki Behij Bey, -Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of -Staff. - -The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the National movement, and -owing to his prestige had influenced public opinion in favour of this -movement, was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-ul-Islam; -religious affairs were entrusted to a member of a Muslim brotherhood -belonging to the National Assembly. - -According to the information it was possible to obtain, the political -line of conduct adopted by the Nationalists was not only to organise -armed resistance, but also to carry on a strong political and religious -propaganda, both in Turkey and in foreign countries. - -No official letter from Constantinople was to be opened by the -functionaries, who, if they obeyed the Constantinople Government, -were liable to capital punishment. The religious authorities in the -provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brotherhoods were called -upon to protest against the _fetva_ by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of -Constantinople had anathematised the Nationalists. - -But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was how to raise money. - -On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal addressed to M. -Millerand the following letter, in which he vehemently protested -against the occupation of Constantinople and laid down the claims of -the Ottoman people: - - “I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing - to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied - troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with - his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held, - and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first - sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present - and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her - Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of - foreigners. - - “The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour to charge me to - bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of - its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms - of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people - in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not - long ago our Parliament—though a Parliament has always been looked - upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in - the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were - wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like - evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic protest of the Parliament; - many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters, was arrested at - his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public - and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had - become right. - - “Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been - violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its - representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive - Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which - Council has taken in hand the government of the country. - - “I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desiderata - of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29, - 1920. - - “First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanry, - together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked - upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all - orders and _fetvas_ issued from Constantinople, so long as it - is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all - engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government - are looked upon by the nation as null and void. - - “Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and - composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries-old rights - as a free, independent State. It expresses its wish to conclude a - fair, honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have - the right to take engagements in its name and on its account. - - “Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign - elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the - nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the - general security of the country. - - “Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will meet with a - favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance - of the deep respect with which I have the honour to be Your - Excellency’s most humble, most obedient servant.” - -On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met on April 18, 1920, -Ahmed Riza Bey, ex-President of the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman -Empire, who kept a keen lookout on the events that were about to seal -the fate of his country, though he had been exiled by the Damad Ferid -Ministry, addressed another letter to the President of the Conference, -in which he said; - - “The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and - democracy, acknowledge a peace that would lower them to the level - of an inferior race and would treat them worse than the Hungarians - or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively small territories, - whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled. We want to be treated - as a vanquished people, not as an inferior people or a people - in tutelage. The victors may have a right to take from us the - territories they conquered by force of arms; they have no right to - intrude into our home affairs. The Turkish people will willingly - grant concessions of mines and public works to the foreigners who - offer it the most profitable conditions; but it will never allow - the arbitrary partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches - at the expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral; it is all the - more unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war is - comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-Germany and - Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and atrocities against Armenia - and Greece which the Turks are charged with, we deny them earnestly - and indignantly. Let a mixed international commission be formed, - and sent to hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge - ourselves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has - proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon all - charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies. - - “The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919, addressed to - the High Commissioners an official note requesting that neutral - States should appoint delegates charged to inquire into facts and - establish responsibilities; but the request of the Ottoman Cabinet - has hitherto been in vain, as well as that of the League for - National Ottoman Unity made on March 17 of the same year. - - “Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry - assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty brought - against the Turks were unfounded, should induce the Allies, in the - name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the massacres supposed to - have taken place in Cilicia and elsewhere. - - “I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is not - couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider that when - the life and rights of his nation are so grievously endangered it - is most difficult for a patriot to keep his thoughts and feelings - under control.” - -As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference, which seemed to have -come to an agreement about the main lines of the treaty to be submitted -to Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this treaty, decided to -summon the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to Paris on May 10. - -In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as president of the -San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, formerly Ottoman minister -plenipotentiary to Russia, now living in Rome, wrote: - - “In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire it has - been asserted that the Turks are not able to administer a large - country inhabited by various races, and they have been especially - charged with hating and oppressing the Christian element. But a - history extending over ten centuries at least plainly shows, by - innumerable facts and truths, the absurdity of such assertions. - - “If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts for the - last 130 years, has not been able to reform and renovate itself - as the other States have done, that is because, in addition to a - thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for the last two - centuries, either the power or the peacefulness that would have - been necessary to bring such a protracted task to a successful end; - for every ten, fifteen, or twenty years, it has been attacked by - its neighbours, and the events of the last twelve years testify - still more forcibly than any others to the fact that any step taken - by the Turks on the way to progress—in the European sense of the - word—was not only resented, but even violently opposed by their - merciless enemies. - - “As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are supposed to - have endured in the Empire, let us merely consider that, whereas in - Europe the Christians mutually slaughtered each other mercilessly - and unceasingly in the name of their sacred Faith, and the - unfortunate Jews were cruelly driven away and tortured in the name - of the same Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a - thousand years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only - tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large, - powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restriction, - under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all possibilities - to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the expense of the - ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal hospitality to many - wretched people banished from Christian Europe. - - “To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays an - iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace and - Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance, and give a - strict account of her home policy towards the non-Greek elements, - especially concerning the condition and fate of the 300,000 Turks - who, before 1883, peopled the wide, fertile plains of Thessaly, - of the hundreds of thousands of Moslem Albanians, subjects of - the Empire, of the 150,000 Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000 - Moslems in Macedonia, whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under - her dominion? - - “I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which will be - an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the victorious Powers - know a great deal more—after the inter-Allied inquiry held four - months ago in Smyrna—about the ‘gentle and fatherly’ manner in - which thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and exterminated by - the descendants of the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded - that essentially Turkish province during the armistice under - pretence of restoring order.” - -And after recalling the figures of the various elements of the -population of the Turkish Empire after the 1914 statistics, he -concluded: - - “Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful events - that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman land since the - armistice raise only too much horror. So the Turkish people most - proudly and serenely awaits the righteous, humane, and equitable - sanction of the victorious Powers that have assumed before history - the heavy responsibility of placing the whole world on a lasting - basis of justice, concord, and peace. - - “God grant they may choose the best way, the only way, that will - lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged themselves to do, - the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of the Ottoman nation - and its Sultan, who is, at the same time, the supreme head of the - 350 million Mussulmans throughout the world.” - -On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian Caliphate delegation -addressed a note to the president of the Allied Supreme Council at -San Remo, to the English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the -Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed up their mandate with the -Allied and Associated Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had -previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course of the interview -mentioned previously. - - “Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the vast majority - of their co-religionists throughout the world, ask that, inasmuch - as independent temporal sovereignty, with its concomitants of - adequate military and economic resources, is of the essence of - the institution of the Khilafat, the Empire of the Khalifa shall - not be dismembered under any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is - recognised by the vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what - is desired is that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be - maintained intact territorially on the basis of the _status quo - ante bellum_, but without prejudice to such political changes as - give all necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and - independence of the sovereign State for the security of life and - property, and opportunities of full autonomous development for - all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, - comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no account is a Muslim - majority to be placed under the rule of a non-Muslim minority - contrary to the principle of self-determination. In behalf of this - claim, the delegation draw the attention of the Supreme Council - to the declaration of the British Prime Minister, equally binding - on all the Allied and Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918, - he said: ‘Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, - or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which - are predominantly Turkish in race,’ and to President Wilson’s - twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1918, - on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was concluded, and - which required ‘that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman - Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty; that the other - nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured security of - life and autonomous development.’ The delegation submit that any - departure from the pledges and principles set forth above would be - regarded by the people of India, and the Muslim world generally, - as a breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar - assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were induced - to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of the Allied - cause. - - “Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious - obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known as the - Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ which includes, besides - the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, shall - continue to be, as heretofore for the last 1,300 years, under - exclusively Muslim control, and that the Khalifa shall similarly - continue to be the Warden and Custodian of the Holy Places and - Holy Shrines of Islam—namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef, - Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the - Jazirat-ul-Arab. - - Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by the - inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or form, - whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct violation of - the most binding religious injunctions of Islam and the deepest - sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and would, therefore, be - utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans of India and the rest of - the Indian community. In this connection, apart from the religious - obligations to which we refer, the delegation would draw the - attention of the Supreme Council to the proclamation issued by - the Government of India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s - Government, as also the Governments of France and Russia, on - November 2, 1914, in which it was specifically declared that ‘no - question of a religious character was involved’ in this war, and it - was further categorically promised that ‘the Holy Places of Arabia, - including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda, - will be immune from attack or molestation.’” - -After pointing out that these were the lowest possible claims the -Mussulmans could set forth, the note went on as follows: - - “But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted to the British - Government that a Turkish settlement made in disregard of their - religious obligations, on respect for which their loyalty has - always been strictly conditional, would be regarded by Indian - Mussulmans as incompatible with their allegiance to the British - Crown. This is a contingency which the Mussulmans of India, in - common with all their compatriots, constituting a population of - over three hundred millions, naturally view with the keenest - apprehension and anxiety, and are most earnestly desirous of - preventing by every means in their power. We believe that the - British Government, at any rate, is fully apprised of the range - and intensity of public feeling that has been aroused in India - on this question, and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply - stating here that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented - demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on March 19 - last, the day when the delegation was received by the British Prime - Minister, all business was suspended throughout the continent - of India by Mussulmans and Hindus alike, as a reminder and - reaffirmation of the Muslim case in respect of the future of the - Khilafat. This unprecedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a - loss of millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely - with the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned - with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the - question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal - representations which the Mussulmans of India have put forward - on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by their Faith, a - settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would be destructive of the - very essentials of the Khilafat, a situation would arise in which - it would be futile to expect peace and harmony to prevail in India - and the Muslim world. - - “The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly to - urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of endeavouring to - achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire which would - be in consonance with the most binding religious obligations and - overwhelming sentiments of so large and important a section of the - world community.” - -As a consequence of what has just been said: - - “The delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that the Supreme - Council will defer taking any final decisions on this question - in order to afford to them an opportunity, such as they have - repeatedly applied for, of laying their case before the Council. - In answer to our request to be allowed to appear before the - Supreme Council, the British Secretary to the Council intimated to - us that only the accredited Governments of the territories with - whose future the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear - before it, and that at the request of the British Government the - official delegation of India had already been heard. But we have - already represented that the Turkish settlement, involving as it - does the question on the Khilafat, in the preservation of which - the Mussulmans of the world are so vitally interested, does not - obviously seem to be a question on which the Peace Conference - should hear only the Governments of territories with whose future - they are dealing. In fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the - future of the Khilafat, which is the most essential institution - of Islam, transcends in importance the interests of the various - Governments that are being set up in different parts of the - Khilafat territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical - objection will be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice and - securing peace.” - - -And, finally, the note concluded: - - “With reference to the official delegation of India, which the - Supreme Council has already heard, the Indian Khilafat delegation - would invite the attention of the Council to the fact that, so far - at least, the State and the nation are not one in India, and the - delegation submit that a nation numbering more than 315 millions of - people is entitled to a hearing before a final decision is taken - on a question that has incontestably acquired a national status. - The delegation hope that they may, without may disrespect to the - members comprising the official delegation of India, also refer to - the fact that no Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation - in spite of Muslim protest.” - -In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the Indian Caliphate -delegation, after the reply made to them by the British secretary of -the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 20, expressed their deep -regret that— - - “the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of delegations - representing at best microscopic populations inhabiting meagre - areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which was not at war - with Turkey, to take part in the discussions relating to the - Turkish settlement, should have ignored the claims of a nation - numbering more than 315 millions of people inhabiting the vast - sub-continent of India even to a hearing, and should have denied - the right of several hundred millions more in the rest of the - world professing the Muslim Faith to express their views on the - question involving the disintegration of the Khilafat. In the name - of our compatriots and co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty - once more to point out to the Government of Great Britain and to - her Allies, that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and - tranquillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming - national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen the - value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian people, - is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few persons, - however exalted and eminent, who are now settling the fate of Islam - behind closed doors, a contemptuous disregard of the most binding - and solemn religious obligations imposed on the Muslims by their - Faith.” - -The delegation did not conceal their disappointment at the way they had -been received by the Allied representatives and the little attention -paid to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had viewed the -Ottoman question from a lofty standpoint, and had brought forward -powerful arguments in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation -were setting forth the Turkish claims before the Peace Conference, the -Press, public opinion, and political circles which had been influenced -in some degree by the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy for -Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference seemed likely to assume -a more favourable attitude towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this -case as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it had received, -kept to its first resolutions, though everything seemed to invite it to -modify them. - -On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in Paris. It comprised the -former Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior; -Fakhr ed Din Bey, Minister of Public Education; and Dr. Jemil Pasha, -Minister of Public Works, accompanied by seventeen advisers and five -secretaries. - -On the previous Thursday, before they left Constantinople, the Sultan -had received the delegates, and had a long conversation with each of -them. - -The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates on the expected -date, May 11. - -We refer the reader to this document, which contains thirteen chapters; -some of the most important provisions are so laboriously worded that -they may give rise to various interpretations, and it is impossible to -sum them up accurately. - -Several clauses of that draft called forth many objections, and we -shall only deal with the most important ones. - -The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish vilayet of Adrianople -or Eastern Thrace—that is to say, the territory which includes -Adrianople, the second town and former capital of the Ottoman Empire, -and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror. It only left to European -Turkey a mere strip of land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja -lines. Besides, this region is entirely included in the “Zone of the -Straits” to be controlled by a Commission of the Powers which includes -Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself. - -Now, according to the official census of March, 1914, the Adrianople -vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse, Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a -population of 360,400 Turks—_i.e._, 57 per cent. of the inhabitants—as -against 224,680 Greeks, or 35·5 per cent., and 19,888 Armenians. -In addition, though in Eastern Thrace the Moslem populations are -mingled with numerous Greek elements, the majority of the people are -Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of Thrace, 455,000 are -Mussulmans. - -It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number of the Greeks in that -vilayet emigrated into Macedonia, where they were replaced by the -Mussulmans expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of the -162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek Patriarch, 88,000 are -Gagavous—that is to say, are of Turkish descent and speak Turkish. - -Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make up the total area of -the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000 acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem -hands, and the Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres. - -The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which is no longer under -Turkish sovereignty, rises to 362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against -86,000 Greeks, or 16·5 per cent., and if the figures representing the -Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are counted, we get a total -number of 700,000 Mussulmans—_i.e._, 62·6 per cent.—against 310,000 -Greeks, or 26 per cent. - -Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to Turkey the possession of -that region on January 5, 1918, when he had solemnly declared: “Nor -are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and -renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly -Turkish in race,” and he had repeated this pledge in his speech of -February 25, 1920. - -Yet a month after he declared to the Indian Caliphate delegation, as -has been seen above, that the Turkish population in Thrace was in a -considerable minority, and so Thrace should be taken away from Turkish -rule. If such was the case, it would have been logical to take from -Turkey the whole of Thrace. - -As the Indian delegation inquired at once on what figures the Prime -Minister based his Statements he answered: - - “It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures - at the present moment, partly because all censuses taken since - about the beginning of the century are open to suspicion from - racial prejudice, and partly because of the policy of expulsion - and deportation pursued by the Turkish Government both during - and before the war. For instance, apart from the Greeks who were - evicted during the Balkan wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported - into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars, - while about 100,000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish - Thrace. These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But - after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best - estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the - population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313,000 Greeks and - 225,000 Turks.... This is confirmed by the study of the Turkish - official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before the - Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to races - in these parts became open to suspicion. According to these - statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the part of - Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of Neuilly was: - Greeks, 304,500: Mussulmans, 265,300; Bulgarians, 72,500.” - -On receipt of this communication, the delegation naturally asked to -what region the Greeks “who were evicted during the Balkan wars” -had migrated, and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office -estimates, “counter-migration of Turks had taken place into what is -the present Turkish Thrace,” when Macedonia was made, on the authority -of Englishmen themselves, “an empty egg-shell” and when the Greeks and -Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks in the occupied territories, -to make a “Turkish question” within the newly extended boundaries of -Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of the Turkish population -driven away from Macedonia should settle down in the Turkish territory -conterminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did. - -With regard to the “100,000” Greeks “deported into Anatolia from -Turkish Thrace during the course of these wars,” and the “100,000 -driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace,” the delegation asked -to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been taken, and to what -extent this deportation had affected the proportion of Turkish and -Greek populations in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly be -unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly Greek by including -in its Greek population figures of Greek deportees who had already -served to swell the figures of the Greek population in Anatolia. -Under such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime Minister -considered as reliable on January 5, 1918, had been discarded since -and as the figures of a quarter of a century ago were evidently open -to discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme Council should -be given a complete set of figures for every vilayet, and if possible -for every sanjak or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914. But -the Prime Minister’s secretary merely answered that it was impossible -to enter into a discussion “on the vexed question of the population -statistics in these areas.” - -As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that, though there is an -important Greek colony at Smyrna, all the region nevertheless is -essentially Turkish. The figures provided by the Turkish Government, -those of the French Yellow Book, and those given by Vital Cuinet agree -on this point. - -According to the French Yellow Book, the total population of the -vilayet included 78·05 per cent. Turks against 14·9 per cent. Greeks. - -M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417 inhabitants -(971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and for the town of Smyrna 96,250 -Turks against 57,000 Greeks. - -According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914 the town of -Smyrna, where the Greek population had increased, had 111,486 Turks -against 87,497 Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097 -Greeks—_i.e._, 18 per cent.—against 1,249,067 Turks, or 77 per cent., -and 20,766 Armenians. - -From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics we should deduct -the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who were expelled from the vilayet, by way -of reprisal after the events of Macedonia in January to June, 1914. The -latter, according to the agreement between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish -minister at Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under the same -head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna who were to be exchanged for -the Mussulmans of Macedonia. - -Mr. Lloyd George’s secretary, whom the Indian delegation also asked, in -reference to Smyrna, on what figures he based his statements, answered -on behalf of the Prime Minister: - - “The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according to the - American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and impartial, - give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussulmans, 325,000; - Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These figures only relate - to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are other kazas in the - neighbourhood which also show a majority of Greeks.” - -Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the sanjak of Smyrna -had, before the war, 377,000 Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks, -while during the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the -Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the kazas of Urla, -Shesmeh, Phocœa, and Kara-Burun in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there -Greek majorities; but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin, -or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. Moreover, the Greek -minority is important only in the kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin; -everywhere else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in -two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent. - -The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and independent State, and -the President of the United States is to arbitrate on the question of -the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of -Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Now, though everybody—including -the Turks—acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to form -an Armenian State, yet when we consider the nature of the population -of these vilayets, we cannot help feeling anxious at the condition of -things brought about by this decision. - -As a matter of fact, in Erzerum there are 673,000 Mussulmans, -constituting 82·5 per cent. of the population, as against 136,000 -Armenians, or 16·5 per cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number -921,000, or 82 per cent. of the population, as against 40,000 -Armenians, or 23·5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van the Muslim -population is 179,000, or 69 per cent., and the Armenian population -67,000, or 26 per cent. In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or -70·5 per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting 27 per cent. -Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussulmans number 2,083,000, and the -Armenians 362,000, the average being 80 per cent. against 13 per cent. - -On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that Turkey has -persistently colonised these territories. The only fact that might -countenance such an assertion is that at various times, especially -after the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in that part of the -Empire, and that in 1864, and again in 1878, Circassians, escaping from -the Russian yoke, took refuge there after defending their country. -The number of the families that immigrated is estimated about 70,000. -Turkey encouraged them to settle down there all the more willingly as -they were a safeguard to her against the constant threat of Russia. But -as early as 1514, at the time of the Turkish conquest, the Armenians -were inferior in number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure that -repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native population northwards -and westwards, and because some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish, -and Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country. In 1643 Abas -Schah, after his victorious campaign against Turkey, drove away nearly -100,000 Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians emigrated -into Russia of their own free will after the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in -1828. - -It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came into existence in -the second century before Christ. It consisted of two independent -States, Armenia Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of Tigrane, -King of Armenia Major, defeated by the Romans, Rome and Persia fought -for the possession of those regions, and, finally, divided them. -Later on there were various Armenian States, which were more or less -independent, but none of them lasted long except the State of Armenia -Minor, which lasted from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till -Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs, the Persians, the -Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines had already brought the Armenian -dominion to an end. - -Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans in Armenia has not -been obtained or maintained, as has been alleged, by the “Turkish -massacres”; it is the outcome of more complex causes—which, of course, -is no excuse for the tragic events that took place there. As the -Conference did not seem to pay any attention either to the figures of -M. Vital Cuinet (_Turquie d’Asie_, Paris, 1892), or to the figures -published by the French Government in the Yellow Book of 1897, based -upon the data furnished by the Christian Patriarchates, or to the -figures given by General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society -(_Zapiski_, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delegation asked -that a report should be drawn up by a mixed Moslem and non-Moslem -Commission, consisting of men whose integrity and ability were -recognised by their co-religionists; but this suggestion met with no -better success than the international inquiry already suggested by the -delegation in regard to the population of every vilayet in Thrace. - -The chapter dealing with the protection of minorities plainly shows how -much influence the aforesaid Protestant Anglo-American movement had on -the wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous treaties are -included such stipulations as those contained in the Turkish treaty, -and there is a great difference in this respect between the Bulgarian -treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under the term “minority,” -only considers the condition of the Christians, and ensures to them -privileges and power in every respect over the Mussulmans. - -As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne remarked -in its critical examination of the treaty: - - “Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience and religion - is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality and order, this - clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty. - - The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any religious - creed shall be punished in the same way; in the Bulgarian treaty - this clause is omitted, for here it would imply the protection of a - non-Christian religion.” - -In regard to Article 139, that “Turkey renounces formally all right of -suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject -to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State,” the Indian -Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter addressed to Mr. -Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920: - - “It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ‘rights of - suzerainty or jurisdiction’ over Mussulmans who am not her - subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of Turkey, as - Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as he holds that - office, his very considerable ‘jurisdiction’ over Muslims who are - ’subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State.’ - The law of Islam clearly prescribes the character and extent of the - ‘jurisdiction’ pertaining to the office of Khalifa, and we cannot - but protest most emphatically against this indirect, but none the - less palpable, attempt on the part of Great Britain and her allies - to force on the Khalifa a surrender of such ‘jurisdiction,’ which - must involve the abdication of the Khalifa.” - -The delegation also considered that Article 131, which lays down -that “Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges, which, -under the treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the -Sultan in Libya,” infringes “rights pertaining to the Sultan as -Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded and reserved under the -said treaty of Lausanne.” It also expressed its surprise that “this -categorical and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith, supported -as it is by the unbroken practice of over thirteen hundred years, was -totally disregarded by Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read -in conjunction with Articles 22 and 132,” which cannot admit of any -non-Muslim sovereignty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria, -Palestine, and Mesopotamia. - -Referring again to the objection the British Prime Minister pretended -to base on the proclamation of the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and -on the Arabs’ request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian -Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered Mr. Lloyd George, who -had asked them in the course of his reception “whether they were to -remain under Turkish domination merely because they were Mohammedans”: - - “We would take the liberty to remind you that if the Arabs, who are - an overwhelmingly large majority in these regions, have claimed - independence, they have clearly claimed it free from the incubus - of so-called mandates, and their claim to be freed from Turkish - dominion is not in any way a claim to be subjected to the ‘advice - and assistance’ of a mandatory of the principal Allied Powers. - If the principle of self-determination is to be applied at all, - it must be applied regardless of the wishes and interests of - foreign Powers covetously seeking to exploit regions and peoples - exposed to the danger of foreign domination on account of their - unprotected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally - declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates nor any - other form of political or economic control; and the delegation, - while reiterating their view that an amicable adjustment of Arab - and Turkish claims by the Muslims themselves in accordance with - Islamic law is perfectly feasible, must support the Arab demand for - complete freedom from the control of mandatories appointed by the - Allies. - - “With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires Turkey not - only to recognise it as a free and independent State, but to - renounce all rights and titles there, and Article 99, which makes - no mention of the rights and prerogatives of the Khalifa as Servant - of the Holy Places, are, and must ever be, equally unacceptable to - the Muslim world.” - -On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the Eastern question are -closely connected and have assumed still more importance owing to the -Zionist movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns the Jews in the -highest degree. - -It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism has been gradually -smothered by Turkish sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire has proved most -hospitable to the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and that -for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both tolerance and security, -and have even prospered in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like -the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old Ottoman Empire, when, -following the precedent of Salonika, they see Greece annex the region -of Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to ask whether Greece, -carried away by a wild imperialism, will not yield to her nationalist -feeling and revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the -Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece to take no -action to make the Jews regret the past; but as the Greek anti-Semitic -feeling is rather economic than religious in character, it is to be -feared that the competition of the two races in the commercial struggle -will keep up that feeling. The annexation of Thrace would probably -concern 20,000 Jews—13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at -Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica, etc. Great Britain -having received a mandate for Palestine—that is to say, virtually a -protectorate—on the condition of establishing “a national home for the -Jews”—whatever the various opinions of the Jews with regard to Zionism -may be—a question is now opened and an experiment is to be tried which -concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with Judaism. - -In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George of the Indian -Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed Ali told the British Prime Minister -in regard to the Jewish claims in Palestine: - - “The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to the Jewish - community, and I think Islam can look back with justifiable pride - on its treatment of this community in the past. No aspiration of - the Jewish community which is reasonable can be incompatible with - Muslim control of the Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman - Government will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such - aspirations of theirs as are reasonable. - - “Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement, with whom - I have had conversations, frankly admit: ‘We do not want political - sovereignty there; we want a home; the details can be arranged and - discussed.’ I asked them: ‘Do you mean that Great Britain herself - should be the sovereign Power there, or should be the mandatory?’ - and they said: ‘No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking - reasonable guarantee that opportunities of autonomous development - would be allowed to us.’ We, ourselves, who have been living in - India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of Faiths. I - think the Indian nationality, which is being built up to-day, will - probably be one of the first examples in the world of a Federation - of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possibility of development - in Palestine on the lines of ‘cultural autonomy.’ The Jews are, - after all, a very small minority there, and I do not believe for - one moment that Jews could be attracted there in such large numbers - as the Zionist enthusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same - thing of an Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which - would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because we, - ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not like - ourselves to say anything about other people that they would - resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians together and - placed them all in a contiguous position, excluding the present - Kurdish community from them, no matter what large slice of land you - gave them, I think they would very much like to go back to the old - status.... - - “In the same way I would say of the Jewish community, that they are - people who prosper very much in other lands, and although they have - a great hankering after their home, and no community is so much - bound up with a particular territory as the Jewish community is, - still, I must say that we do not fear there will be any great - migration of such a character that it will form a majority over - the Muslim population. The Jewish community has said: ‘We have no - objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of the - world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper there and - develop on our own lines, and have cultural autonomy.’” - -M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, -1920, also observed that— - - “With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation desire to - state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of the British - Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely vague, and it is not - clear in what relation the so-called national home for the Jewish - people, which is proposed to be established in Palestine, would - stand to the State proposed to be established there. The Mussulmans - of the world are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish - neighbours, and can challenge a comparison with others in this - respect; and the delegation, in the course of the interview with - you, endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood - of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being accepted - by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the very small Jewish - minority in Palestine is intended to exercise over the Muslim, who - constitute four-fifths of the population, a dominance now, or in - the future, when its numbers have swelled after immigration, then - the delegation must categorically and emphatically oppose any such - designs.” - - * * * * * - -The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed Damad Ferid of the -conditions of the treaty, and which the latter communicated to the -Press, was printed by the _Peyam Sabah_, surrounded with black mourning -lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a supporter of the Government and could -not be accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as follows: - - “Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not given up - all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of the world in - their hands and who have officially proclaimed their determination - to act equitably, will not allow this country, which has undergone - the direst misfortunes for years and has lost its most sacred - rights, to suffer a still more heinous injustice.” - -All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full length with the -conditions, unanimously declared that the treaty was unacceptable. The -_Alemdar_, another pro-English newspaper, said: - - “If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a man - willing to sign it.” - -Another newspaper, the _Ileri_, wrote: - - “The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously - waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we - read the treaty.” - -The aforesaid _Peyam Sabah_, after a survey of the conditions, came to -this conclusion: - - “Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people: - - “To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of - Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage - to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of - endless hostility between the various races. - - “To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the - condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty? - - “To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of - peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.” - -Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the -treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be -made. - -Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at -Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them -that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to -that effect had been given to the police. Then he is said to have -declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never -sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting -Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there -was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also -informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the -treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber. - -The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note -which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, -on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be -compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish -answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled. - -But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Gallipoli, by the Turkish -Nationalists, together with the Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia -and Asia Minor, made things worse, and soon became a matter of anxiety -to England. - -After the text of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Turks, -and when the latter had the certainty that their fears were but too -well grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken by the Allies -would be certain to bring about a coalition of the various parties, -and that all Turks, without any distinction of opinion, would combine -to organise a resistance against any operation aiming at taking from -them Eastern Thrace—where the Bulgarian population was also averse to -the expulsion of the Turkish authorities—at assigning Smyrna and the -Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the Turkish Empire. - -Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adrianople army corps and had -openly declared against the Sultan’s Government since the latter was at -war with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at the beginning -of May, and it was easy to guess for what purpose. Of course, it had -been rumoured, after he left Constantinople, that the Government was -going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of the kind had been -done, and he still kept his command. When he came back to Adrianople, -not only had no conflict broken out between him and the troops under -his command, but he had been given an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as -it was known that the San Remo Conference had decided to give Thrace to -Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resistance against Greek occupation -was quickly organised. Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth—he was born at -Prishtina—became the leader of the movement. He hurriedly gathered some -contingents made up of regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a -state of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western coast of -the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why Thrace was not granted the right -of self-determination like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy -under the protection of France, whose administration in Western Thrace -had proved equitable and had given satisfaction to that province. -In face of this denial of justice, he had resolved to fight for the -independence of Thrace. - -It was soon known that the Moslem population of Adrianople had held a -meeting at the beginning of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer -Tayar, all the people present had pledged themselves to fight for the -liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration took place at Gumuljina. A -congress including above two hundred representatives of the whole of -Western Thrace had been held about the same time at Adrianople. - -In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also started, and on Sunday, May -9, numerous patriotic demonstrations were held in all the provincial -towns. - -On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and refugees from Thrace, -Macedonia, and the Dobruja living at that time in the town, held a -meeting of several thousand people, and without any distinction of -religion, nationality, or political party carried the following motion -against the decision taken by the San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to -Greece: - - “They enter an energetic protest against the resolution to cede - Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice and an - act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as we, and to - the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the Bulgarian people - cannot, of their own free will, accept such a decision of the San - Remo Conference, which would be a cause of everlasting discord - in the Balkans—whereas the victorious Powers of the Entente have - always professed to fight in order to restore peace to those - regions; and they entreat the Governments, which have come to - this decision, to cancel it and to raise Thrace to the rank of - an autonomous, independent State under the protection of all the - Powers of the Entente, or one of them.” - -On May 25—that is to say, two days before the Greek occupation—a few -“Young Turk” and Bulgarian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western -Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to oppose the occupation. -At the head of this Government were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel -Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But the latter were -expelled by General Charpy before the Greek troops and authorities -arrived, and the Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest -against Greek domination. They set off to Adrianople, taking with them -the treasury and seals of the Moslem community, and were greeted by -Jafer Tayar. - -On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish Nationalists was -becoming organised, and as soon as the conditions of peace were known -new recruits joined Mustafa Kemal’s forces. - -The Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of the Allies -towards Turkey, were now almost thrown into the arms of the Russian -Bolshevists, who carried on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and -offered to help them to save their independence, though they did so to -serve their own interests. - -Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal’s personal enemy, who stood halfway between -the Allied Powers and the Nationalists, believed that if he did not -displease the Allies, he could pull his country out of its difficulties. - -Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the Turks, the Ottoman -Government had already begun to raise troops to fight the Nationalists. -They were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki, who had formerly -served under Abdul Hamid. It was soon known that this military -organisation had been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the care -of British officers at whose instigation the first contingents had been -sent to Ismid, which was to be the Turkish base. - -It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha’s troops, who had remained -loyal and were commanded by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik -Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in the Doghandkeui -and Geredi area, east of Adabazar, which they had occupied, and that -the Nationalists, whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated Bolu. -The information was soon contradicted, and at the beginning of the -last week of April it became known that Anzavour and his troops had -just been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this port on the -Marmora had fallen into the Nationalists’ hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had -to leave Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish gunboat, and -Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all the region round Brusa, Panderma, and -Balikesri. Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many officers -and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists in Anatolia. - -It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour, though he was of -Circassian descent, was unknown in his own country. He had been made -pasha to command the Government forces against the Nationalists with -the help of the Circassians, who are numerous in the Adabazar region, -and to co-operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen, who -merely wished to be independent. - -Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some defections took place among -the troops under his command. - -About the same time, the emergency military court had sentenced -to death by default Mustafa Kemal, Colonel Kara Yassif Bey, Ali -Fuad Pasha, who commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem Bey, -ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of -the sanitary service, and his wife, Halidé Edib Hanoum, all impeached -for high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement. - -Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad Ferid and the moral and -even material support given to him by the Allies, what could be the -outcome of a military action against the Nationalists? How could the -Ottoman Government compel the Turks to go and fight against their -Anatolian brethren in order to force on them a treaty of peace that -it seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned the ruin of -Turkey? - -In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a slightly Nationalist -Cabinet co-operating with the Chamber would not have stood a better -chance to come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce her to -admit the acceptable parts of the treaty; for should Damad Ferid, who -was not in a good position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail, -what would be the situation of the Government which remained in office -merely because the Allies occupied Constantinople? - -Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that foreign troops would -be maintained in every zone, and that the treaty would be carried -out at any cost. Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at -Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority did not extend -beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was cut off from the rest of the -Empire; it was at Sivas. As no Government force or Allied army was -strong enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it was only -in Anatolia that the latter Government could be crushed by those who, -with Great Britain, had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and were -ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach this end. - -On the other hand, it soon became known that at Angora the question -of the Caliph-Sultan had been set aside, and even the Sultan’s name -was now being mentioned again in the _namaz_, or public prayer offered -every Friday—that is to say, all the parties had practically arrived at -an understanding. - -Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face difficulties, if not -at once, at least in a comparatively short time, inspired information, -probably of Greek origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council -would decide whether France, England, and Italy would have to support -Greece—though one did not see why France and Italy should defray the -expenses of that new adventure by which England first, and Greece -afterwards, would benefit exclusively. - -On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a Crown Council met under -the Sultan’s presidency to examine the terms of the treaty, over -3,000 people held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan Ahmed -Square. Some journalists, who were well known for their pro-English -feelings—such as Ali Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the _Sabah_; -Refi Jevad, editor of the _Alemdar_; Mustafa Sabri, a former -Sheik-ul-Islam—and some politicians delivered speeches. The platform -was draped with black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners -were adorned with crêpe. After the various speakers had explained -the clauses of the treaty and showed they were not acceptable, the -following motions were passed: - - “First, in contradiction to the principle of nationalities, the - treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople, Smyrna, - and its area. In case the Allied Powers should maintain their - decisions—which seems most unlikely—we want these regions to be - given local autonomy. - - “Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off from the - Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the principle of - nationalities, should be freed from all fetters and bonds hindering - their economic development on the path to progress and peace. To - maintain the Capitulations and extend them to other nations is - tantamount to declaring the Turks are doomed to misery and slavery - for ever. - - “Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable feelings of - the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the same footing as the - other vanquished nations. - - “Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace - conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation, ask - that the treaty should be modified so as to be made more consistent - with right and justice. - - “Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to the - Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace Conference.” - -These resolutions were handed after the meeting to M. Defrance, the -senior Allied High Commissioner, who was to forward them to the Peace -Conference. - -As the difficulties increased, and more important and quicker -communications with the Ottoman delegation in Paris were becoming -necessary, the Cabinet thought of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris. -Upon the latter’s advice, and probably at the instigation of the -English, several members of the dissolved Chamber set off to Anatolia -in order to try and bring about an understanding between Damad -Ferid and the Nationalists, for the conditions of the treaty, as -was to be expected, had now nearly healed the rupture between the -Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists, especially as the -Anglo-Turkish Army was unable to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid -and his supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it. Even -the English had sent delegates to Mustafa Kemal, who had refused to -receive them. - -The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at Ismid, found they were -not strong enough, and requested the headquarters merely to stand on -the defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf of Ismid, the -Government forces found themselves in a critical condition, for the -Anatolian troops had occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and -Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that region. - -The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Constantinople, resumed its -sittings at Angora. It criticised the Allies’ policy with regard -to Turkey, especially the policy of England, at whose instigation -Constantinople had been occupied and military measures had been taken -on the coasts of the Black Sea. - -In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the Chamber, Mustafa -Kemal showed that the English occupation of Constantinople had been a -severe blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan. “We must do our -best,” he said, “to free the Sultan and his capital. If we do not obey -his orders just now, it is because we look upon them as null and void, -as he is not really free.” - -The same state of mind showed itself in a telegram of congratulation -addressed to the Sultan on his birthday by the provisional vali of -Angora, who, though he did not acknowledge the power of the Central -Government, stated that the population of Angora were deeply concerned -at the condition to which the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanry was -reduced owing to the occupation of Constantinople. This telegram ran -thus: - - “The people have made up their minds not to shrink from any - sacrifice to make the Empire free and independent. They feel - certain that their beloved Sovereign is with them at heart and that - their chief strength lies in a close union round the Khilafat.” - -Similar dispatches were sent from the most active Nationalist centres -such as Erzerum and Amasia, and by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commanding -the 15th army corps at Erzerum. - -It was plain that, through these demonstrations, Mustafa Kemal and the -Anatolian Nationalists aimed at nullifying the religious pretexts Damad -Ferid availed himself of to carry on the struggle against them. Mustafa -Kemal had even ordered all the ulemas in Anatolia to preach a series -of sermons with a view to strengthening the religious feeling among -the masses. He had also the same political purpose in view when he -sent a circular to the departments concerned to enjoin them to remind -all Mussulmans of the duty of keeping the Ramadhan strictly and of the -penalties they incurred if they publicly transgressed the Moslem fast. - -Besides, the Nationalists strove to turn to account the movement that -had taken place among all classes after the terms of the treaty had -been made known, and their activity continued to increase. Sali Pasha, -who was Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, had escaped to Anatolia in -order to put himself at the disposal of the Nationalists. So their -opposition to the Central Government was asserting itself more and more -strenuously, and the struggle that ensued assumed many forms. - -An armistice, which came into force on May 30, and was to last twenty -days, was concluded at Angora by M. Robert de Caix, secretary of the -High Commissionership in Syria, between the French authorities and the -Turkish Nationalists. Though the terms of this agreement were not made -public, it was known that they dealt chiefly with Cilicia and allowed -France to use the railway as far as Aleppo. Meanwhile, conversations -were being held on the Cilician front, and finally at Angora, to extend -the armistice. - -Indeed, it was difficult to understand why, after the Italians had -evacuated Konia, the French troops had not been withdrawn before the -treaty had been handed to Turkey, for it gave France no right to remain -in Cilicia; and now the situation of the French there was rather -difficult, and their retreat had, of course, become dangerous. It -seemed quite plain that the evacuation of Cilicia had become necessary, -and that henceforth only the coastlands of Syria properly so called -would be occupied. - -So the French policy at this juncture had lacked coherency, for it -seemed difficult to go on with the war and carry on peace negotiations -at the same time. - -This armistice was denounced on June 17 by Mustafa Kemal, who demanded -the evacuation of Adana, the withdrawal of the French detachments -from Heraclea and Zounguldak, and the surrender of the mines to the -Nationalists who lacked coal and wanted Constantinople not to have any. -Besides, some incidents had occurred in the course of the armistice: -some French soldiers who were being drilled near Adana had been fired -at, the railway track had been cut east of Toprak Kale, and telegraphic -communications interrupted repeatedly between Adana and Mersina. - -An encounter occurred on June 11 between the Nationalists and a company -which had been detached at the beginning of the month from a battalion -of a rifle corps that guarded the port and mining works of Zounguldak. -On June 18, after an inquiry, the French commander withdrew from the -spot which had been occupied near Heraclea and the company of riflemen -was brought back to Zounguldak. - -It was obvious that the staff of Cilicia did not seem to have approved -of the armistice which had been concluded by the French authorities -in order not to have anything to fear in this region, and to send all -their forces against the Arabs; and so the head of the Turkish staff, -Ismet Bey, naturally did not wish to renew it. - -As we had entered into a parley with Mustafa Kemal openly and -officially and signed an armistice with him, it seemed likely we meant -to pursue a policy that might bring about a local and provisional -agreement with the Nationalists, and perhaps a definite agreement -later on. If such an armistice was not concluded, a rupture was to be -feared on either side later on, in which case the condition of things -would remain as intricate as before, or military operations would be -resumed in worse conditions than before for both parties. In short, -after treating with Mustafa Kemal it was difficult to ignore him in the -general settlement that was to ensue. - -But no broad view had ever dominated the Allies’ policy since they had -signed the armistice with Turkey in October, 1918. Eastern affairs -had never been carefully sifted or clearly understood; so the Allies’ -action had been badly started. Conflicting ambitions had led them in -a confused way. The policy of England especially, which had proved -harsh and grasping, and also highly dangerous, was at the bottom of -the difficulties the Allies had experienced in the East. So France, -where public opinion and popular feeling were opposed to any Eastern -adventure or any action against Turkey, could not be called upon to -maintain troops in the East or to fight there alone for the benefit of -others. The operations that were being contemplated in the East would -have necessarily required an important army, and if adequate credits -had been asked for them, a loud protest would have been raised—though -later on the French Chamber granted large sums of money for Syria, -after a superficial debate, not fully realising what would be the -consequence of the vote. - -M. d’Estournelles de Constant, a member of the Senate, wrote to the -French Prime Minister on May 25 that, “after asking the Government -most guardedly—for months in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the day -before in the Senate—to give information about the mysterious military -operations that had been carried on for a year and a half in Asia Minor -and towards Mesopotamia,” he found it necessary to start a debate in -the Senate upon the following question: “What are our armies doing in -Cilicia?”[29] - -Meanwhile the Supreme Council urged the Turkish delegation to sign -the treaty that had been submitted for its approval, and the Allies -were going to negotiate with the representatives of a Government -which, on the whole, was no longer acknowledged by the country. Of -what value might be the signature wrested by the Allies from these -representatives, and how could the stipulations of that treaty -be carried out by the Turks? Most of its clauses raised internal -difficulties in Turkey, and such a confusion ensued that the members of -the delegation did not seem to agree any longer with the members of the -Ottoman Cabinet, and at a certain time even the latter seemed unable -to accept the treaty, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on the -Ottoman Government by the English troops of occupation. - -Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist forces conquered not only the whole of Asia -Minor, but also all the Asiatic coast and the islands of the Marmora, -except Ismid, which was still held by British posts. The Turkish -Nationalists soon after captured Marmora Island, which commanded the -sea route between Gallipoli and Constantinople. - -On June 16 the British forces engaged the Kemalist troops in the Ismid -area. About thirty Indian soldiers were wounded and an officer of the -Intelligence Department was taken prisoner by the Turks. The civilians -evacuated Ismid, and it was hinted that the garrison would do the same. -Mustafa Kemal’s aeroplanes dropped bombs on the town, and the railway -line between Ismid and Hereke was cut by the Nationalists. The British -forces on the southern coast of the Dardanelles withdrew towards -Shanak, whose fortifications were being hurriedly repaired. - -Mustafa Kemal’s plan seemed to be to dispose his forces so as not to be -outflanked, and be able to threaten Smyrna later on. To this end, the -Nationalist forces advanced along the English sector toward the heights -of Shamlija, on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, from which point -they could bombard Constantinople. - -After a long interview with the Sultan, which lasted two hours, on -June 11, the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, owing to the difficulty -of communicating between Paris and Constantinople, and the necessity -of co-ordinating the draft of the answer worked out by the Ottoman -Government and the reports drawn up by the various commissions with the -answer recommended by the delegation, set off to Paris the next day. So -it seemed likely that Turkey would ask for further time before giving -her answer. - -It could already be foreseen that in her answer Turkey would protest -against the clauses of the treaty concerning Thrace and Smyrna, -against the blow struck at the sovereignty of the Sultan by the -internationalisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as thus the -Sultan could no longer leave his capital and go freely to Asia Minor, -and, lastly, against the clauses restoring the privileges of the -Capitulations to the States that enjoyed them before the war. - -Turkey also intended to ask that the Sultan should keep his religious -rights as Caliph over the Mussulmans detached from the Empire, and that -a clause should be embodied in the treaty maintaining the guarantee -in regard to the interior loan raised during the war, for otherwise -a great many subscribers would be ruined and the organisation of the -property of the orphans would be jeopardised. - -At the beginning of the second week of June it was rumoured that the -treaty might be substantially amended in favour of Turkey.[30] Perhaps -Great Britain, seeing how things stood in the East, and that her policy -in Asia Minor raised serious difficulties, felt it necessary to alter -her attitude with regard to Turkish Nationalism which, supported by -the Bolshevists, was getting more and more dangerous in Persia. For -Mr. Lloyd George, who has always allowed himself to be led by the -trend of events, and whose policy had lately been strongly influenced -by the Bolshevists, had now altered his mind, as he often does, and -seemed now inclined, owing to the failure of his advances to the Soviet -Government, to modify his attitude towards Constantinople—after having -exasperated Turkish Nationalism. The debate that was to take place on -June 15 in the House of Lords as to what charges and responsibilities -England had assumed in Mesopotamia, was postponed—which meant much; and -the difficulties just met with by the British in the Upper Valley of -the Tigris and the Euphrates in their struggle with the Arabs convinced -them of the advisability of a revision of the British policy towards -both the Arabs and the Turks. - -On the other hand, it did not seem unlikely that M. Venizelos, who -was being expected in London, might have seen the mistake the Supreme -Council had made when it had granted the Greek claims so fully, and -that the apprehension he was entitled to feel about the reality of the -huge advantages obtained by Greece might have a salutary influence on -him. Yet nothing of the kind happened, and in a long letter to the -_Daily Telegraph_ (June 18) he asserted not only the rights of Greece -to Smyrna, but his determination to have them respected and to prevent -the revision of the treaty. - -M. Venizelos, “the great victor of the war in the East,” as he was -called in London, even supported his claims by drawing public attention -to the intrigues carried on by Constantine’s supporters to restore him -to the throne. He maintained that the revision of the treaty would -second the efforts which were then being made in Athens by the old -party of the Crown, which, he said, was bound to triumph if Greece -was deprived of the fruits of her victory and if the Allies did not -redeem their pledges towards her. But then it became obvious that the -Greeks did not despise Constantine so much after all, and their present -attitude could not in any way be looked upon as disinterested. - -It might have been expected, on the other hand, that Count Sforza, who -had been High Commissioner in Constantinople, where he had won warm -sympathies, would maintain the friendly policy pursued by Italy since -the armistice towards Turkey—that is to say, he would urge that the -time had come to revise the treaty of peace with Turkey which, since -it had been drawn up at San Remo, had constantly been opposed by the -Italian Press. All the parties shared this view, even the clerical -party, and one of its members in the Chamber, M. Vassalo, who had just -come back from Turkey, energetically maintained it was impossible to -suppress the Ottoman Empire without setting on fire the whole of Asia. -The Congress of the Popular Party in Naples held the same opinion. -Recent events also induced Italy to preserve the cautious attitude she -had assumed in Eastern affairs since the armistice, and she naturally -aimed at counterbalancing the supremacy that England, if she once ruled -over Constantinople and controlled Greater Greece, would enjoy over not -only the western part, but the whole, of the Mediterranean Sea. - -Henceforth it was obvious that the chief stipulations of the treaty -that was to be enforced on Turkey were doomed to failure, and it was -asked with no little anxiety whether the Powers would be wise enough -to take facts into account and reconsider their decisions accordingly, -or maintain them and thus pave the way to numerous conflicts and -fresh difficulties. Indeed, the outcome of the arrangements they had -laboriously elaborated was that things in the East had become more -intricate and critical than before. No State wished to assume the -task of organising the Armenian State: the American Senate flatly -refused; Mr. Bonar Law formally declared in the House of Commons that -England had already too many responsibilities; France did not see -why she should take charge of it; Italy accepted no mandate in Asia -Minor. Syria, on the other hand, protested against its dismemberment. -Mesopotamia was rising against the English at the very time when the -Ottoman Nationalists entered an indignant protest against the cession -of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece. - -It was to be wished, therefore, from every point of view that not only -some articles of the treaty presented to the Turks, but the whole -document, should be remodelled, and more regard should be paid to the -lawful rights of the Ottoman Empire, a change which could only serve -French interests. - -But though reason and her interest urged France to maintain the Ottoman -Empire—which she attempted to do to some extent—she allowed herself -to be driven in a contrary direction by England, who thought she -could take advantage of the perturbation caused by the war within the -Turkish Empire to dismember it—not realising that this undertaking -went against her own Asiatic interests, which were already seriously -endangered. Such a submission to the English policy was all the more -to be regretted as Mr. Lloyd George had but grudgingly supported -the French policy with regard to Germany, and after the San Remo -conversations it seemed that France would have to consent to heavy -sacrifices in the East in return for the semi-approbation he had -finally granted her. This policy of England well might surprise the -French—who have always reverenced the British parliamentary system; -for the so-styled imperialist policy of Queen Victoria or King Edward, -though it has been violently criticised, had really kept up the old -traditions of British Liberalism, and had nothing in common with the -greed and cool selfishness of such demagogues and would-be advanced -minds as Mr. Lloyd George, who stands forth before the masses as the -enemy of every imperialism and the champion of the freedom of peoples. -But the former leaders of English foreign policy were not constantly -influenced by their own political interests; they knew something of -men and countries; and they had long been thoroughly acquainted with -the ways of diplomacy. Both in England and France, everyone should now -acknowledge their fair-mindedness, and pay homage alike to their wisdom -and perspicacity. - -Many people in France now wondered with some reason what the 80,000 -French soldiers round Beyrut were doing—whether it was to carry out -the expedition that had long been contemplated against Damascus, or to -launch into an adventure in Cilicia. - -M. d’Estournelles de Constant, who had first wished to start a debate -in the French Chamber on the military operations in Syria and Cilicia, -addressed the following letter, after the information given by M. -Millerand before the Commission of Foreign Affairs, to M. de Selves, -chairman of this Commission: - - “I feel bound to let the Commission know for what reasons I have - determined not to give up, but merely postpone the debate I wanted - to start in the Chamber concerning our military operations in Syria - and Cilicia. - - “The Premier has given as much consideration as he could to the - anxieties we had expressed before him. He has inherited a situation - he is not responsible for, and seems to do his best to prevent - France from falling into the dreadful chasm we had pointed out - to him. We must help him in his most intricate endeavours, for - France is not the only nation that has to grapple with the perilous - Eastern problem. She must work hand in hand with her allies to - avert this peril. The whole world is threatened by it. Our Allies - should understand that the interest of France is closely connected - with their interests. France guards the Rhine; she is practically - responsible for the execution of the treaty with Germany. - - “How can she perform such a task, together with the administration - of Alsace and Lorraine and the restoration of her provinces - laid waste by the Germans, if she is to scatter her effort and - her reduced resources both in Europe and all her large colonial - empire and in Asia Minor among peoples who have long welcomed her - friendship, but abhor any domination? - - “France would do the world an immense service by openly reverting - to the war aims proclaimed by herself and her allies. Far from - endangering, she would thus strengthen her traditional influence in - the East; she would thus do more than by risky military operations - to smother the ambitions and rebellions that might set on fire - again the Balkan States, Anatolia, and even Mesopotamia. - - “After five years of sacrifices that have brought us victory, to - start on a would-be crusade against the Arabs and Turks in a remote - country, in the middle of summer, would imply for France as well as - for England, Italy, Greece, and Serbia, the beginning of a new war - that might last for ever, to the benefit of anarchy. - - “At any rate I ask that the intended treaty of peace with Turkey, - which has not been signed yet, should not be presented to the - French Parliament as an irremediable fact.” - -After a long debate on Eastern affairs and on the questions raised by -M. Millerand’s communications, the Commission for Foreign Affairs, -seeing things were taking a bad turn, and the situation of France in -Syria, Cilicia, and Constantinople was getting alarming, decided on -June 15 to send a delegation to the East to make an inquiry on the spot. - -At the first sitting of the French Chamber on June 25, 1920, M. Briand, -who three months before had made a speech in favour of the 1916 -agreements which were being threatened by English ambition, though he -considered the Turkish bands “went too far,” and our policy “played -too much into their hands,” felt it incumbent on him to say: - - “When we leave a nation like Turkey, after a long war, for over a - year, under what might be called a Scotch douche, telling her now - ‘Thou shalt live,’ now ‘Thou shalt not live,’ we strain its nerves - to the extreme, we create within it a patriotic excitement, a - patriotic exasperation, which now becomes manifest in the shape of - armed bands. We call them bands of robbers; in our own country we - should call them ‘bands of patriots.’” - -In the course of the general discussion of the Budget, during a debate -which took place on July 28 in the Senate, an amendment was brought in -by M. Victor Bérard and some of his colleagues calling for a reduction -of 30 million francs on the sums asked for by the Government, which -already amounted, as a beginning, to 185 million francs. - -M. d’Estournelles de Constant then expressed his fear that this Eastern -expedition might cause France to make sacrifices out of proportion to -her resources in men and money, and asked how the Government expected -to recuperate the expenditure incurred in Syria. - -M. Victor Bérard, in his turn, sharply criticised our Eastern policy. - -M. Bompard, too, expressed his fears concerning our Syrian policy, and -M. Doumergue asked the Government to consent to a reduction of the -credits “to show it intended to act cautiously in Syria.” - -But after M. Millerand’s energetic answer, and after M. Doumer, -chairman of the Commission, had called upon the Senate to accept the -figures proposed by the Government and the Commission, these figures -were adopted by 205 votes against 84. - -M. Romanos, interviewed by the _Matin_,[31] and soon after M. -Venizelos, at the Lympne Conference, maintained that the treaty could -be fully carried out, and the Greeks felt quite able to enforce it -themselves. - -As the Allied troops were not sufficient to take decisive action, and -as a large part of the Ottoman Empire had been assigned to Greece, -England herself soon asked why the latter should not be called upon to -pay for the operation if she insisted upon carrying it out. - -About June 20 the situation of the British troops became rather -serious, as General Milne did not seem to have foreseen the events and -was certainly unable to control them. - -The Nationalist troops, which met with but little resistance, continued -to gain ground, and after marching past Ismid occupied Guebze. The -Government forces were retreating towards Alemdagh. - -By this time the Nationalists occupied the whole of Anatolia, and -the English held but a few square miles near the Dardanelles. The -Nationalists, who had easy access to both coasts of the Gulf of Ismid, -attempted to blow up the bridges on the Haïdar-Pasha-Ismid railway -line. Though the English were on the lookout, four Turkish aeroplanes -started from the park of Maltepe, bound for Anatolia. One of them was -piloted by the famous Fazil Bey, who had attacked English aeroplanes -during their last flight over Constantinople a few days before the -armistice in October, 1918. - -Indeed, the Government forces only consisted of 15,000 specialised -soldiers, artillerymen or engineers, with 6 light batteries of 77 guns -and 2 Skoda batteries; in addition to which 20,000 rifles had been -given to local recruits. The Nationalists, on the contrary, opposed -them with 35,000 well-equipped men commanded by trained officers. -Besides, there was but little unity of command among the Government -forces. Anzavour Pasha, who had been sent with some cavalry, had -refused to submit to headquarters, and at the last moment, when ordered -to outflank the enemy and thus protect the retreat of the Government -forces, he had flatly refused to do so, declaring he was not going to -be ordered about by anybody. - -So, considering how critical the situation of the British troops was -in the zone of the Straits, England immediately made preparations -to remedy it and dispatched reinforcements. The 2nd battalion of -the Essex Regiment was held in readiness at Malta, and the light -cruiser _Carlisle_ kept ready to set off at a few minutes’ notice. -All available destroyers had already left Malta for the Eastern -Mediterranean, where the first and fourth squadrons had already -repaired. Besides, the cruiser _Ceres_, which had left Marseilles for -Malta, received orders on the way to steam straight on to the Ægean -Sea. All the Mediterranean fleet was concentrated in the East, while -in the Gulf of Ismid the English warships, which were already there, -carefully watched the movements of the Turkish Nationalist forces. - -Such a state of things naturally brought about some anxiety in London, -which somewhat influenced Mr. Lloyd George’s decisions. - -During the Hythe Conference, after some conversations on the previous -days with Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, and Mr. Philip Kerr, in which -he had offered to put the Greek Army at the disposal of the Allies, M. -Venizelos, accompanied by Sir John Stavridi, a rich Greek merchant of -London, who had been his intimate adviser for several years, went on -Saturday evening, June 18, to the Imperial Hotel at Hythe, where were -met all the representatives and experts whom Sir Philip Sassoon had not -been able to accommodate at his mansion at Belcair, to plead the cause -of Greek intervention with them. - -M. Venizelos, on the other hand, in order to win over the British -Government to his views, had secured the most valuable help of Sir -Basil Zaharoff, who owns most of the shares in the shipbuilding yards -of Vickers and Co. and who, thanks to the huge fortune he made in -business, subsidises several organs of the British Press. He, too, has -been a confidential adviser of M. Venizelos, and has a great influence -over Mr. Lloyd George, owing to services rendered to him in election -time. So it has been said with reason that M. Venizelos’ eloquence -and Sir Basil Zaharoff’s wealth have done Turkey the greatest harm, -for they have influenced Mr. Lloyd George and English public opinion -against her. - -According to M. Venizelos’ scheme, which he meant to expound before -the Conference, the Turkish Nationalist army, concentrated in the -Smyrna area, could be routed by a quick advance of the Greek forces, -numbering 90,000 fully equipped and well-trained men, who would capture -the railway station of Afium-Karahissar. This station, being at the -junction of the railway line from Smyrna and the Adana-Ismid line, via -Konia, the only line of lateral communication Mustafa Kemal disposed -of, would thus be cut off, and the Nationalist leader would have to -withdraw towards the interior. His resistance would thus break down, -and the British forces on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmora that -M. Venizelos offered to reinforce by sending a Greek division would be -at once freed from the pressure brought to bear on them, which, at the -present moment, they could hardly resist. - -The next day the Allies decided to accept M. Venizelos’ offer, as the -Greek troops were on the spot and no other force could arrive soon -enough to relieve the British forces, which were seriously threatened. - -Mr. Lloyd George declared that the British Government was sending to -the spot all the ships it had at its disposal, but that this naval -intervention could not affect the situation much without the help of -the Greek Army. - - “Without the Greek help,” he said, “we may be driven to an - ignominious evacuation of that region of Asia Minor before Kemal’s - forces, which would certainly have a terrible repercussion - throughout the East and would pave the way to endless - possibilities.” - -This was also the view held by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial -General Staff. - -Marshal Foch, too, was asked his advice about the Greek co-operation. -He had already declared at San Remo, in agreement with Marshal Wilson, -that an army of 300,000 or 400,000 well-equipped men would be needed to -conquer Asia Minor. Now, after making full reserves in regard to the -political side of the question, he merely remarked that from a strictly -military point of view, Greek co-operation might be a decisive element -of success; moreover, in a report he had drawn up a few months before, -he had pointed out the advantage that an active co-operation of the -Greek Army was sure to bring, from a military point of view. - -M. Millerand, while admitting these advantages, is said to have raised -some serious objections to the scheme. - -Finally, as the question could not be solved definitely without Italy’s -consent, it was adjourned till the Boulogne Conference met. - -Mr. Lloyd George accepted this solution the more readily as he only -seemed to look upon M. Venizelos’ scheme as an experiment; and he -wanted to gain time, in order to know whether he was to pursue it, -till facts had proved that M. Venizelos was right and the Turkish -Nationalists’ resistance could be overcome in a short time. If after -some time things did not turn out as he expected, he would merely -resort to another policy, as is usual with him. But England, meanwhile, -was in an awkward situation, since, while accepting the help of an -ally, she hinted at the same time that she would not stand by the -latter if things turned out wrong. On the other hand, it was surprising -that the Supreme Council should take such decisions before receiving -Turkey’s answer and knowing whether she would sign the treaty. - -When the decisions taken at Hythe in regard to the part to be entrusted -to Greece were made known on June 21 at the Boulogne Conference, they -brought forth some remarks on the part of Count Sforza, who refused to -engage Italy’s responsibility in the policy that was being recommended. -He thought it his duty to make reservations in regard to the -timeliness of these decisions and the consequences that might ensue, -referring to the technical advice given at San Remo by Marshal Foch and -Marshal Wilson as to the huge forces they thought would be needed to -enforce the treaty against the Nationalists’ wish. - -Soon after—on July 13—M. Scialoja, in the long speech he delivered -before the Senate to defend the attitude of Italy in the Peace -Congress, declared that Italy could not be held responsible for the -serious condition of things now prevailing in Asia Minor and the East, -for she had attempted, but in vain, to secure a more lenient treatment -for Turkey. Finally, in spite of all the objections raised against -the treaty, and the difficulties that would probably ensue, it was -decided at the few sittings of the Boulogne Conference that the Ottoman -delegation should be refused any further delay in giving their answer, -which averted any possibility of revision of the treaty. The Powers -represented in the Conference gave a free hand to Greece in Asia Minor, -because they had not enough soldiers there themselves—let us add that -none of them, not even England probably, cared to rush into a new -Eastern adventure. The Greeks had none but themselves to blame; their -landing at Smyrna had started the Nationalist movement, and now they -bore the brunt of the fight. - -This new decision implied the giving up of the policy of conciliation -which might have been expected after the three weeks’ armistice -concluded on May 30 between the French Staff and the Nationalists, -which seemed to imply that the French military authorities intended to -evacuate the whole of Cilicia, left by the treaty to Turkey. Owing -to the serious consequences and infinite repercussions it might have -through the Moslem world, the new decision heralded a period of endless -difficulties. - -Even the Catholic Press did not much appreciate the treaty, and had -been badly impressed by recent events. The Vatican, which has always -sought to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of an -Orthodox Power, might well dread the treaty would give the Phanar a -paramount influence in the East, if Greece became the ruling Power both -at Stambul and Jerusalem. In the first days of the war, when at the -time of the Gallipoli expedition Constantinople seemed doomed to fall, -the Holy See saw with some anxiety that the Allies intended to assign -Constantinople to Russia, and it then asked that at least Saint Sophia, -turned into a mosque by the Turks, should be given back to the Catholic -creed. This fear may even have been one of the reasons which then -induced the Holy See to favour the Central States. M. René Johannet, -who was carrying on a campaign in the newspaper _La Croix_[32] for the -revision of the treaty, wrote as follows: - - “But then, if Asia Minor is deprived of Smyrna and thus loses at - least half her resources, we ask with anxiety where France, the - chief creditor of Turkey, will find adequate financial guarantees? - To give Smyrna to Greece is to rob France. If the Turks are - stripped of everything, they will give us nothing. - - “Lastly, the fate of our innumerable religious missions, of - which Smyrna is the nucleus, is to us a cause of great anxiety. - After the precedents of Salonika and Uskub, we have everything to - fear. The Orthodox Governments hate Catholicism. Our religious - schools—that is to say, the best, the soundest part of our national - influence—will soon come to nothing if they are constantly worried - by the new lords of the land. How can we allow this?” - -According to the account given by the Anatolian newspapers of the -sittings of the Parliament summoned by Mustafa Kemal to discuss the -conditions of peace, very bitter speeches had been delivered. The -Assembly had passed motions denouncing the whole of the treaty, and -declaring the Nationalists were determined to oppose its being carried -out, supposing it were signed by Damad Ferid Pasha, or any venal slave -of the foreigner, and to fight to the bitter end. - -Mustafa Kemal was said to have declared, in a conversation, that he had -not enough soldiers to make war, but he would manage to prevent any -European Power establishing dominion in Asia Minor. And he is reported -to have added: “I don’t care much if the Supreme Council ejects the -Turks from Europe, but in this case the Asiatic territories must remain -Turkish.” - -The Greek Army, which, according to the decisions of the Conference, -had started an offensive on the Smyrna front, after driving back the -Nationalists concentrated at Akhissar, occupied the offices of the -captainship of the port of Smyrna and the Ottoman post-office. - -On June 20, at Chekmeje, west of Constantinople on the European coast -of the Marmora, a steamer had landed a detachment of Kemalist troops, -which the British warships had immediately bombarded at a range of -eight miles. - -On June 21 and 22 two battalions, one English and the other Indian, -landed on the Asiatic coast and blew up the eighty guns scattered all -along the Straits, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. - -On June 23 the 13th Greek division attacked Salikili and occupied it. A -column of cavalry advanced towards Kula. - -On June 24 the Greek troops carried on their advance in four directions -and the Nationalists withdrew, fighting stoutly all the time. - -On June 25 the Greeks overcame their resistance and captured Alashehr, -formerly called Philadelphia, an important town on the Smyrna-Konia -line, about 100 miles from Smyrna, took some prisoners and captured -material. - -On July 1 the Greeks occupied Balikesri, an important station on the -Smyrna-Panderma line, nearly fifty miles to the north of Soma, in spite -of the Nationalists’ energetic resistance. - -On July 3 a landing of Greek troops hastened the fall of Panderma. Some -detachments which had landed under the protection of the fleet marched -southwards, and met the enemy outposts at Omerkeui, fifteen miles to -the north-west of Balikesri. - -Then on July 7 M. Venizelos stated at the Spa Conference that -the Greek offensive against Mustafa Kemal’s forces which had -begun on June 22 and whose chief objective was the capture of the -Magnesia-Akhissar-Soma-Balikesri-Panderma line, had ended victoriously -on July 2, when the forces coming from the south and those landed at -Panderma had effected a junction, and that the scheme of military -operations drawn up at Boulogne, which was to be carried out in two -weeks, according to General Paraskevopoulos’ forecast, had been -brought to a successful end in eleven days. - -On July 8 Brusa was occupied by the Greek army, and Mudania and -Geumlek by British naval forces. Before the Greek advance began every -wealthy Turk had fled to the interior with what remained of the 56th -Turkish division, which had evacuated Brusa on July 2. Brusa had been -occupied by the Greeks without any bloodshed. A good number of railway -carriages and a few steam-engines belonging to a French company had -been left undamaged by the Turks on the Mudania line. The British naval -authorities, under the pretext that some shots had been fired from the -railway station, had had it shelled, together with the French manager’s -house, and all that was in these two buildings had been looted by -British sailors and the Greek population of Mudania. - -Some misleading articles in the Greek and English Press, which were -clearly unreliable, extolled the correct attitude of the Greek troops -towards the inhabitants during their advance in Asia Minor. According -to the Greek communiqué of July 17, “the Nationalists, now deprived -of any prestige, were being disarmed by the Moslem population which -earnestly asked to be protected by the Greek posts,” and “the Turks, -tired of the vexatious measures and the crushing taxes enforced by the -Kemalists, everywhere expressed their confidence and gratitude towards -the Greek soldiers, whom they welcomed as friends and protectors.” - -At the same time political circles in Athens openly declared that -the Greek operations in Asia Minor had now come to an end, and that -Adrianople and Eastern Thrace would soon be occupied—this occupation -being quite urgent as the Turks already evinced signs of resistance, -and the Bulgarians were assuming a threatening attitude. Moreover, -as might have been foreseen, the Greeks already began to speak of -territorial compensations after their operations in Asia Minor and of -setting up a new State. - -General Milne, whose forces had been reinforced by Greek elements, also -undertook to clear all the area lying between Constantinople and Ismid -from the irregular Turkish troops that had made their way into it. - -On July 7 it was officially notified by the British Headquarters that -“military movements were going to take place in the direction of -Ismid, and so the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus was considered as a -war zone.” Accordingly troops quartered in that district, and soldiers -employed in the various services, were to be recalled to the European -shore at once, and the next day any Turkish soldier found within that -zone would be treated as an enemy. - -The great Selimie barracks, at Skutari, were therefore evacuated by the -Turks, who thus had no troops left on the Asiatic shore of the Straits. - -At Pasha Bagtche Chiboukli, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, -Greek soldiers helped to disarm the population, and searched everybody -who landed at that village. - -At Stambul, on the great bridge of Karakeui, British agents halted all -officers and soldiers wearing the Turkish uniform, and directed them to -the buildings of the English gendarmerie to be examined. - -The Alemdagh district was occupied, and General Milne had all the -Government troops disarmed, on the pretext of their questionable -attitude and the weakness of the Turkish Government. Yet the latter -had, of its own accord, broken up the Constantinople army corps, and -replaced it by one division that was to be dissolved, in its turn, -after the signature of the Peace Treaty, as according to the terms of -peace only 700 Turkish soldiers had a right to reside in Constantinople -as the Sultan’s guard. - -In an article of _Le Matin_, July 7, 1920, under the title, “A New -Phase of the Eclipse of French Influence in the East,” M. André -Fribourg pointed out the encroachment of the British Commander in -Constantinople. - - * * * * * - -The decision taken by the Allies at Boulogne not to grant any further -delay had placed the Turks in a difficult situation. The Grand Vizier, -who had come to Paris in the hope of negotiating, handed his answer on -the 25th, in order to keep within the appointed time. - -The Supreme Council examined this answer on Wednesday, July 7, at Spa. -After hearing the English experts, who advised that any modification -should be rejected, the Council refused to make any concessions on all -the chief points mentioned in the Turkish answer, and only admitted a -few subsidiary requests as open to discussion. It deputed a Commission -of political experts to draw up an answer in collaboration with the -military experts. - -Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior, Reshid Bey, chairman of the -Ottoman delegation, who had left Constantinople on the 25th, and had -arrived in Paris with Jemil Pasha only at the beginning of July, sent -a note to the Secretary of the Peace Conference to be forwarded to M. -Millerand at Spa. This note, which came to hand on July 11, completed -the first answer. It included the decisions taken in Constantinople -during Damad Ferid’s stay at Versailles. - -The remarks offered by the Ottoman delegation about the peace -conditions presented by the Allies made up a little book of forty pages -with some appendices, which was handed to the Conference on the 25th. -The answer, which had been revised in Constantinople, and consisted -of forty-seven pages, was delivered a few days after; it differed but -little from the first. - -This document began with the following protest against the conditions -enforced on Turkey: - - “It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations - nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her - former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of - the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks, - but throughout the Moslem world. - - “Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish - treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment. - - “Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of - nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman Empire - which they erect to the rank of free, independent States (Armenia - and the Hejaz), or independent States under the protection of a - mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria); not only do - they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and Cyprus, which are to be ceded - to Great Britain; not only do they require Turkey to give up all - her rights and titles to Libya and the States of the Ægean Sea: - they even mean to strip her, notwithstanding the said principle - of nationalities, of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which - countries, in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to - Greece, who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors, - though she has not even been at war with Turkey. - - “Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in an indirect - way to slice the rest of the country into zones of influence. - - “In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the Ottoman - Empire would already be taken from it. With regard to the number - of inhabitants, it would be at least two-thirds. If we consider - the economic wealth and natural resources of the country, the - proportion would be greater still. - - “But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the treaty - adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the Ottoman - State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not be her own mistress. - Side by side with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish - Government—or even above them in some cases—a ‘Commission of the - Straits’ would rule over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and - the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this - Commission, whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it. - - “In addition to these two powers, there would be a third one—the - military power exercised by the troops of occupation of three - States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand even of the - Ottoman gendarmerie. - - “Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would thus be - taken away from Turkey, whose capital would henceforth be within - the range of her enemies’ guns. - - “The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed upon - in all matters relating to legislation, international treaties, - finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so that finally - the crippled Ottoman Empire would be stripped of every attribute of - sovereignty both at home and abroad, but would be held responsible - all the same for the execution of the Peace Treaty and the - international obligations pertaining to every State. - - “Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice, would - constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial anomaly. - For, on the one hand, it is impossible to maintain a State and - at the same time divest it of all that is an essential judicial - condition of its existence; and, on the other hand, there cannot be - any responsibility where there is no liberty. - - “Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey should - continue to exist, in which case they should make it possible for - her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying due regard to her - rights as a free, responsible State. - - “Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should then execute - their own sentence themselves, without asking the culprit—to whom - they did not even give a hearing—to append his signature to it and - bring them his co-operation.” - -After these general considerations and some remarks as to the -responsibility of Turkey, the fundamental rights of the State, and -the right of free disposal of peoples, the Ottoman Government made -counter-proposals which were quite legitimate, and at the same time -bore witness to its goodwill. - -This document, to which we refer the reader for further particulars, -may be summed up as follows: The Turkish Government recognises the new -States of Poland, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, and Czecho-Slovakia. It -confirms the recognition made by Turkey in 1918 of Armenia as a free, -independent State. It also recognises the Hejaz as a free, independent -State. It recognises the French protectorate over Tunis. It accepts all -economic, commercial, and other consequences of the French protectorate -over Morocco, which was not a Turkish province. It renounces all rights -and privileges over Libya and the isles and islets of the Ægean Sea. -It recognises Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, as independent States. It -recognises the British protectorate over Egypt, the free passage of -the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Soudan, the -annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain. - -In regard to Constantinople and the régime of the zone of the Straits, -the Ottoman delegation remarked that according to the terms of the -treaty there would be together in that town— - - “First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government, - whose rights and titles shall be maintained. - - “Secondly, the Commission of the Straits. - - “Thirdly, the military powers of occupation. - - “Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and - Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with the military and - naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.” - -With them would be— - - “Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military - Organisation. - - “Sixthly, the Commission of Finance. - - “Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. - - “Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.” - -After going over all the objections raised by the coexistence of these -various bodies, whose powers would encroach upon each other or would be -exactly similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents accredited -to the Sultan should hold such functions, the memorandum opposed the -following reasons to the decisions of the Conference: - - “First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institute _an - international judicial and political organisation_ of the Straits. - - “Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf - of _some_ States, attended with all the international risks - pertaining to it. - - “Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitute _a direct and - deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and - security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the - freedom of passage_ of the Straits. - - “Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime - would create a kind of _international moral person by the side of - the States, which would not represent the League of Nations_. - - “Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some - respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of - territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be - placed under the mandate of a Power _appointed by the League of - Nations_ mainly in accordance with _the wishes of the populations - concerned_, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of - Nations of the exercise of its mandate. - - “Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the - Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime instituted - by the draft of the treaty would _favour their nationalisation by - another State_. - - “The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised - by means of an international organisation—viz., _a judicial - organisation representing all the Powers_.” - -Therefore, the Government allows the free passage of the Straits, but -asks that they should be controlled only by the League of Nations, and -that the Straits zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation -“should be reduced territorially to what is necessary to guarantee the -free passage of the Straits.” Turkey declares herself ready to accept -“this scheme, if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were -fixed as follows”: - - “(_a_) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all - the Gallipoli Peninsula. - - “(_b_) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the Sea of - Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui.” - -She thus agrees to “all restrictions to her sovereignty over the -Straits that are necessary to control the navigation and ensure their -opening to all flags on a footing of complete equality between the -States.” - -Further, - - “As regards all matters concerning the region of the Straits and - the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is willing to discuss a - convention instituting for these waters a régime of the same kind - as the one established for the Suez Canal by the Constantinople - treaty of October 29, 1888, the very régime advocated by Great - Britain (Art. 109).” - -The Ottoman Government—this article, together with the one concerning -the Hejaz that will be mentioned later on, was the most important -addition in the revised answer drawn up at Constantinople—wishes the -islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, lying before the entrance to the -Dardanelles, to be included in the zone of the Straits—that is to -say, to remain Ottoman territories under inter-Allied occupation. -The Allies intended to give these islands to Greece, and it was -feared in Constantinople the latter might hand them over to another -Power—England, for instance—that would cede her Cyprus in exchange. - -Among a great many measures intended for ensuring the security of -Constantinople, the Ottoman Government chiefly asks for the limitation -of the number of foreign warships allowed to stay in Turkish waters. - -It wants to maintain, under Ottoman sovereignty, Eastern Thrace within -its pre-war boundaries, and Smyrna with the surrounding area, which -shall be evacuated by Hellenic troops, and may be occupied for three -years at the utmost by troops of the chief Allied Powers. - -The Ottoman Government asks for an international inquiry to fix the -frontiers of Kurdistan according to the principle of nationalities, in -case the Kurds—who, it firmly believes, are “indissolubly attached to -His Majesty the Sultan,” and who “have never wished, and will never -have the least desire, to be completely independent or even to relax -the bonds that link them with the Turkish people”—should express the -wish to enjoy local autonomy. The intended frontier between Syria -and Mesopotamia should also be altered, for otherwise it would cut -off from the Ottoman Empire a predominantly Turkish population; “an -international commission should make a thorough inquiry with a view to -ascertain facts from an ethnic point of view.” - -It also wants the King of the Hejaz to pledge himself to respect the -titles and prerogatives of the Sultan as Caliph over the holy cities -and places of Mecca and Medina. - -Lastly, it declares itself ready to accept, without asking for -reciprocity, the clauses concerning the protection of minorities. - -Meanwhile the Greeks seemed eager to carry on their campaign in Asia -Minor, without even waiting for the definite settlement of the treaty. -According to information sent from Greece,[33] the Hellenic army, -having reached all its objectives, was waiting for the decisions of the -Spa Conference, and if the latter wished her to carry on her operations -in Asia Minor, her fourth objective would probably be Eskishehr, the -nucleus of the Anatolian railways, which commands all the traffic and -revictualling of Asia Minor, and whose fall would perhaps bring the war -to an end. - -The Allied answer to the Turkish request for further delays and to the -Turkish remarks was handed to the Ottoman delegation on July 17. - -In this answer, the main lines or perhaps even the very words of which -had been settled at Spa, the Allies only repeated their previous -arguments—some of which were ineffective and others unfounded; and both -the letter and the spirit of the answer were most unconciliatory. - -The assertion that “Turkey entered into the war without the shadow of -an excuse or provocation,” recurred again in it and was fully enlarged -upon. The events that had taken place lately and the character they -had assumed since the end of hostilities did not seem to have taught -the writers or instigators of the answer anything at all. We do not -wish here to mitigate in any way the responsibilities of Turkey or her -wrongs to the Allies; yet we should not overlook the most legitimate -reasons that drove her to act thus, and we must own she had a right -to mistrust the promises made to her. For the policy that the Allies -pursued at that time and that they have not wholly repudiated obviously -proved that they would give a free hand to Russia to carry out her -ambitious schemes on Constantinople and Turkey-in-Asia, as a reward for -her energetic share in the war. - -Besides, a fact helps us to understand how Turkey was driven to enter -into the war and accounts for her apprehension of England and the -Anglo-Hellenic policy pursued by England in relation with her later on, -both in the working out of the Sèvres treaty and after the signature of -this treaty; it is the proposition made by England to Greece to attack -Turkey. According to the letter that M. Venizelos addressed to King -Constantine on September 7, 1914, sending in his resignation, which was -not accepted by the King, Admiral Kerr, the very man whom later on, -in 1920, the British Government was to entrust with a mission to the -Hellenic King while he was at Lucerne, formally waited upon the latter -to urge him to attack Turkey. The King is said to have laid down as a -necessary condition to his consent that Britain should guarantee the -neutrality of Bulgaria and should contrive to bring Turkey to afford -him a pretext for opening hostilities. Admiral Kerr, speaking on -behalf of the British Government, is reported to have given him full -guarantee on the first point; but with reference to the second point he -hinted that he thought it unnecessary to seek for a pretext or wait for -a provocation as the Hellenic policy constantly evinced a feeling of -hostility towards Turkey.[34] - -In this answer the Allies again reproached the Turks with their -atrocities—without mentioning the atrocities committed by the Armenians -against the Turks; and yet at that time Mr. Lloyd George seemed to -have wholly forgotten the German atrocities, for he did not say a -word about the punishment of the war criminals, and seemed ready to -make concessions as to the reparations stipulated in the treaty with -Germany. Why should the Turks be chastised—as was said at the time—if -the other criminals were not punished? Was it merely because they were -weaker and less guilty than the Germans? - -Though it was a palpable falsehood, it was asserted again in this -document that in Thrace the Moslems were not in a majority. - -The Powers also gravely affirmed they contemplated for Smyrna “about -the same régime as for Dantzig,” which could not greatly please either -the Greeks or the Turks, judging from the condition of the Poles in the -Baltic port; but they did not add that perhaps in this case too England -would finally control the port. - -“With regard to the control of the Straits,” said the document, “the -Powers must unhesitatingly take adequate measures to prevent the -Turkish Government from treacherously trampling upon the cause of -civilisation.” It seemed to be forgotten that Turkey insisted upon -keeping them in order to prevent Russia from seizing them; and at the -very time when the note was drawn up some newspapers declared—which -might have sufficed to justify the Turkish claim—that the passage of -the Straits must be free in order to allow the Allies to send munitions -to Wrangel’s army. - -The Allies, however, decided to grant to “Turkey, as a riparian Power -and in the same manner and on the same conditions as to Bulgaria, the -right to appoint a delegate to the Commission and the suppression -of the clause through which Turkey was to surrender to the Allied -Governments all steamers of 1,600 tons upwards.” These were the only -two concessions made to Turkey. - -The Allies’ answer laid great stress upon the advantages offered by -the organisation of a financial control of Turkey, which, to quote the -document itself, “was introduced for no other purpose than to protect -Turkey against the corruption and speculation which had ruined her in -the past.” As a matter of fact, that corruption and speculation had -been let loose in Turkey by the Great Powers themselves, under cover of -the privileges given by the Capitulations. - -Judging from the very words of the clause which left Constantinople in -the hands of the Turks, the Allies seemed to allow this merely out of -condescension, and even alleged that the territory left to Turkey as a -sovereign State was “a large and productive territory.” - -Finally, the note concluded with the following threat: - - “If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if - it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia - or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the - terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by - ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.” - -These lines plainly show that some Powers had not given up the idea of -ejecting the Turks from Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity -that might warrant another European intervention to carry out their -plans and satisfy their ambition; and yet this policy, as will be seen -later on, went against their own interests and those of Old Europe. - -The idea that the British Premier entertained of the important -strategic and commercial consequences that would ensue if the Near East -were taken away from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory -to the historical part played by Turkey; and by disregarding the -influence of Turkey in European affairs in the past and the present, he -made a grievous political mistake. If one day Germany, having become a -strong nation again, should offer her support to Turkey, cut to pieces -by England, all the Turks in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George’s -policy, especially as M. Venizelos might then have been replaced by -Constantine or the like. - -Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring on July 27 at 12 -midnight, to let the Allies definitely know whether she accepted the -clauses of the treaty and intended to sign it. - -This comminatory answer did not come as a surprise. Mr. Lloyd George -openly said he was convinced the Greeks would be as successful in -Thrace as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to foresee but -did not mean much for the future; and he thought he was justified in -declaring with some self-satisfaction before the Commons on July 21, -1920— - - “The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any - particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid - of what might happen if he disappeared. - - “The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. - Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have - no reason to regret it.” - -The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval group, including -two British dreadnoughts, effected a landing in the ports of Erekli, -Sultan Keui (where they met with no resistance), and Rodosto, which was -occupied in the afternoon. - -The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the Marmora reached the -Chorlu-Muradli line on the railway, and their immediate objective was -the occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway in order to cut -off all communications between Jafer Tayar’s troops and the Nationalist -elements of the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this position -they would be able to threaten Jafer Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their -flanks and rear in order to compel them to withdraw their troops from -the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they did not cross -the Bulgarian frontier. - -The Greek operations against Adrianople began on July 20. The Turkish -Nationalists had dug a network of trenches on the right bank of the -Tunja, which flows by Adrianople; they offered some resistance, and -bombarded the bridgeheads of Kuleli Burgas and of the suburbs of -Karagatch, three miles from Adrianople, where the Greeks had taken -their stand for over a month. But on Saturday, July 24, the confident -spirit of the Turkish civilians and officers suddenly broke down when -it was known that the Greeks had landed on the shores of the Marmora, -had reached Lule Burgas, and threatened to encircle the troops that -defended Adrianople. In the absence of Jafer Tayar, who had repaired -to the front, the officers suddenly left the town without letting it -be known whether they were going to Northern Thrace or withdrawing -to Bulgaria, and the soldiers, leaving the trenches in their turn, -scattered all over Adrianople. The white flag was hoisted during the -night, and the next day at daybreak a delegation, including Shevket -Bey, mayor of the town, the mufti, the heads of the Orthodox and Jewish -religious communities, repaired to the Hellenic outposts, at Karagatch, -to ask the Greeks to occupy the town at once. At 10 o’clock the troops -marched into the town, and by 12 they occupied the Konak, the prefect’s -mansion, where the Turks had left everything—archives, furniture, -carpets, and so on. - -Meanwhile, it was reported that 12,000 Turks who had refused to -surrender and accept Greek domination crossed the Bulgarian frontier. - -As soon as the Grand Vizier came back to Constantinople a conflict -arose between the latter, who maintained Turkey was compelled to sign -the treaty, and some members of the Cabinet. As the Grand Vizier, -who was in favour of the ratification, hesitated to summon the Crown -Council, the Minister of Public Works, Fakhr ed Din, Minister of Public -Education, Reshid, Minister of Finance and provisional Minister of -the Interior, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, who all wanted the Council to be -summoned, are said to have offered their resignation, which was not -accepted by the Sultan—or at any rate was no more heard of. - -On July 20 the Sultan summoned a Council of the Imperial Family, -including the Sultanas, and on July 22 the Crown Council, consisting -of fifty-five of the most prominent men in Turkey, among whom were -five generals, a few senators, the members of the Cabinet, and some -members of the former Government. The Grand Vizier spoke first, and -declared Turkey could not do otherwise than sign the treaty. All the -members of the Council supported the Government’s decision, with the -exception of Marshal Fuad, who had already used his influence with the -Sultan in favour of the Nationalists and who said the Turks should die -rather than sign such a peace, and of Riza Pasha, who had commanded -the artillery before the war, who said Turkey did not deserve such a -grievous punishment and refused to vote. Turkey had been at war for -ten years, which partly accounts for the decision taken. Therefore -the order to sign the treaty of peace was officially given, and, as -had already been announced, General Hadi Pasha, of Arabian descent, -Dr. Riza Tewfik Bey, and Reshad Halis Bey, ambassador at Berne, were -appointed Turkish plenipotentiaries. - -The Grand Vizier in an appeal to Jafer Tayar, the Nationalist leader -in Thrace, begged of him “to surrender at once and leave Thrace to -the Greek army.” He concluded with these words: “We fully recognise -your patriotism, but protracting the war would be detrimental to the -interests of the nation. You must submit.” - -Then the question arose how the treaty—which now admitted of no -discussion—after being enforced and carried out by arms, before the -delay for acceptance granted to the Ottoman Government had come to an -end, against all rules of international law and diplomatic precedents, -could solve the Eastern question. - -Of course it was alleged that the Greek offensive in Anatolia had -nothing to do with the treaty of peace presented to Turkey, that it -only constituted a preventive measure in support of the treaty and it -was not directed against the Stambul Government, but against Mustafa -Kemal’s troops, which had broken the armistice by attacking the British -troops on the Ismid line. Yet this was but a poor reason, and how was -it possible to justify the Greek attack in Thrace, which took place -immediately after? The fact was that England and Greece, being afraid -of losing their prey, were in a hurry to take hold of it, and neither -Mr. Lloyd George nor M. Venizelos shrank from shedding more blood to -enforce a treaty which could not bring about peace. - -Now that the Allies had driven a Government which no longer represented -Turkey to accept the treaty, and the latter had been signed, under -English compulsion, by some aged politicians, while the Greeks and -the British partitioned the Ottoman Empire between themselves, was -it possible to say that all the difficulties were settled? The -signature of the treaty could but weaken the tottering power of the -Sultan. Moreover, England, eager to derive the utmost benefit from -the weakness of Turkey, raised the question of the Caliphate; it was -learned from an English source that the title of Caliph had been -offered to the Emir of Afghanistan, but the latter had declined the -offer. On the other hand, how could Mustafa Kemal be expected to -adhere to the decisions taken in Constantinople? It was to be feared, -therefore, the agitation would be protracted, for an Anatolian campaign -would offer far greater difficulties than those the Greek army had had -to overcome on the low plains along the sea; and at Balikesri, standing -at an altitude of 400 feet, begin the first slopes of the Anatolian -uplands. As a matter of fact, Turkey was not dead, as Mr. Lloyd -George believed, but the policy of the British Premier was doomed to -failure—the same policy which the Soviets were trifling with, which was -paving the way to the secession of Ireland, and may one day cost Great -Britain the loss of India and Egypt. - -It has even been said the Bolshevists themselves advised Turkey to sign -the treaty in order to gain time, and thus organise a campaign in which -the Bolshevist forces and the Nationalist forces in Turkey and Asia -Minor would fight side by side. - -The Ottoman delegation, consisting of General Hadi Pasha, Riza Tewfik -Bey, a senator, and the Turkish ambassador at Berne, Reshad Halis Bey, -arrived in Paris on Friday, July 30. The signature of the treaty, which -was first to take place on July 27 and had been put off till the next -Thursday or Saturday because the delegates could not arrive in time, -was at the last moment postponed indefinitely. - -Some difficulties had arisen between Italy and Greece concerning -the “Twelve Islands,” or Dodecanese, and this Italo-Greek incident -prevented the signature of the treaty. For it was stipulated in Article -122 of the treaty: - - “Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the islands of - the Ægean Sea—viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, - Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, and - Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the islets pertaining thereunto, - together with the Island of Castellorizzo.” - -The thirteen islands mentioned here constitute what is called the -Dodecanese, and Italy had taken possession of them in 1912, during the -war with the Ottoman Empire. But in July, 1919, an agreement, which -has already been mentioned, had been concluded between the Italian -Government, represented by M. Tittoni, and the Greek Government, -represented by M. Venizelos, according to which Italy ceded to Greece -the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, which was to share the fate of Cyprus, -and pledged herself not to object to Greece setting foot in Southern -Albania. Of course, Italy in return was to have advantages in Asia -Minor and the Adriatic Sea. - -At the meeting of the Supreme Council held in London before the San -Remo Conference to draw up the Turkish treaty, M. Venizelos had stated -that Greece could not accept Article 122, if the Italo-Greek agreement -did not compel Italy to cede the Dodecanese to Greece. M. Scialoja, -the Italian delegate, had answered that on the day of the signature -of the Turkish treaty an agreement would be signed between Italy and -Greece, through which Italy transferred to Greece the sovereignty of -the aforesaid islands. - -Now Italy, in 1920, considered that the agreement which was binding -on both parties had become null and void, as she had not obtained any -of the compensations stipulated in it, and so she thought she had a -right now not to cede the islands—Castellorizzo, though inhabited by -12,000 Greeks, not being included in the agreement. As to Rhodes, that -was to share the fate of Cyprus: England did not seem willing now to -cede it to Greece; so that was out of the question for the moment. -Moreover, the Italian Government insisted upon keeping the Island of -Halki, or Karki, lying near Rhodes. Lastly, as Italy, after the solemn -proclamation of the autonomy and independence of Albania, had been -obliged to evacuate nearly the whole of Albania, the cession to Greece -of part of Southern Albania could not be tolerated by Italian public -opinion and had now become an utter impossibility. - -Under such circumstances the Greek Government had stated it was no -longer willing to sign the Turkish treaty, which, if the previous -agreement alone is taken into account, assigns the Dodecanese to -Italy. This incident at the last moment prevented the signature of the -treaty which had been so laboriously drawn up, and put the Powers in -an awkward situation since the regions occupied by the Greek armies -in Asia Minor were five times as large as the Smyrna area assigned to -Greece, and obviously could not be evacuated by the Greeks before a -state of peace was restored between them and Turkey. - -The signature of the treaty, which had been put off at first, as -has just been mentioned, till the end of July, was, after various -delays, arranged for Thursday, August 5, then postponed till the next -Saturday, and finally took place only three days later. - -Meanwhile, the Armenian delegation raised another objection, and -informed the Allies that as their president, Nubar Pasha, had been -admitted by the Allied Governments to the signature of the Peace -Treaty, as representing the Armenians of Turkey and the Armenian -colonies, they thought it unfair not to let him sign the Turkish treaty -too, merely because he represented the Turkish Armenians. The Allies -advised the Armenians for their own sake not to insist, in order to -avoid an official protest of Turkey against the treaty after its -signature, under the pretext that it had not been signed regularly. - -In the House of Lords the treaty was sharply criticised by Lord Wemyss, -especially in regard to the condition of Smyrna and the cession of -Eastern Thrace to Greece. - -In the speech he delivered on Friday, August 6, at Montecitorio, -Count Sforza, coming to the question of the Dodecanese, summed up the -Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of July 29, 1919, as follows: - - “Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the Greek - claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even pledged herself to - support the Greek demand of annexing Southern Albania. Greece, in - return for this, pledged herself to give Italy a free zone in the - port of Santi Quaranta, and to give Italian industry a right of - preference for the eventual building of a railway line beginning at - this port. - - “Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the Italian - mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty over - Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu Canal already - prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14, when Greece had - promised not to build any military works on the coast between Cape - Stilo and Aspriruga. - - “Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfaction in - Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favour of Italy, - all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered Italian - interests. - - “The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support each other - at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia Minor. - - “Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the - sovereignty of the isles of the Ægean Sea, except Rhodes, to which - the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal administrative - autonomy. - - “Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty of the - Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia Minor, and - Greece took a similar engagement with respect to the Italians. - - “Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two countries wished - to resume their full liberty of action. - - “Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in which - she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide their own - fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not be taken before - five years after the signature of the Peace Treaty.” - -Count Sforza proceeded to say that on July 22, after coming back from -Spa, he had addressed M. Venizelos a note to let him know that the -Allies’ decisions concerning Asia Minor and the aspirations of the -Albanian people compelled the Italian Government to alter their policy -in order to safeguard the Italian interests in those regions: - - “Under the circumstances, the situation based on the agreement of - July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be followed at the - Conference was substantially modified. - - “Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agreement, - now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian Government, - urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to consider the situation - afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive at a satisfactory and - complete understanding. - - “The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is most - deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East. When - I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I felt - convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the territorial - integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to, and at the same - time I was serving the true interests of Hellenism.” - -In an interview published by the _Stampa_, M. Tittoni on his side -declared, concerning the Dodecanese and the arrangement he had -negotiated with M. Venizelos, that, as circumstances had changed, the -clauses of the agreement had become null and void. - -Alluding to the note handed by him on coming to Paris to M. Clémenceau -and Mr. Lloyd George and recently read to the Senate by M. Scialoja, he -complained that the Allies supported the Greek claims in Asia Minor, -and overlooked the Italian interests in the same region. As Greece had -got all she wanted and Italy’s hopes in Asia Minor had been frustrated, -the agreement with M. Venizelos was no longer valid, according to him, -and he concluded thus: “The agreement became null and void on the day -when at San Remo the draft of the Turkish treaty was definitely drawn -up.” Finally, on August 9 Greece and Italy came to an agreement, and a -protocol was signed. The Dodecanese, according to the Tittoni-Venizelos -agreement, were given up to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, -which, for the present, remained in the hands of Italy. In case England -should cede Cyprus to Greece, a plebiscite was to be taken at Rhodes -within fifteen years, instead of five years as had been settled before. -There was no reason why Italy should give up Rhodes if England, which -had ruled over Cyprus since 1878, did not hand it over to Greece. The -League of Nations was to decide in what manner this plebiscite was to -be taken; meanwhile Italy would grant Rhodes a wide autonomy. According -to the account given of the Italo-Greek agreement, it includes some -stipulations concerning Smyrna, and at the request of the Italian -Government the Italian schools, museums, and subjects enjoy a special -treatment. Italy keeps her privilege for the archæological excavations -at Kos. - -Not a word was said of Albania, though there had been some clauses -about it in the 1919 agreement. Italy and Greece were to make separate -arrangements with the Albanians. - -Yugo-Slavia in its turn protested in regard to the share of the Turkish -debt that was assigned to her and complained that the charges inherent -in the Turkish territories she had received in 1913 were too heavy. - -King Hussein too was dissatisfied with the Syrian events and the -attitude of France. So he refused to adhere to the treaty, though -it indirectly acknowledged the independence of his States and his -own sovereignty. He thus showed he really aimed at setting up a huge -Arabian Kingdom where his sons would have only been his lieutenants -in Syria and Mesopotamia. Besides, King Hussein earnestly begged that -the Kingdom of Mesopotamia, which had hitherto been promised to his -son Abdullah, should be given to the Emir Feisal as a compensation for -Syria, and a hint was given that England would not object to this. - -Then the Turkish delegates, seeing the Allies at variance, raised -objections to the treaty, and on the morning of August 10 Hadi Pasha -informed the Conference he could not sign the treaty if the Allies -could not agree together. However, at the earnest request of a high -official of the Foreign Office and after he had been repeatedly urged -to do so, he consented to sign the treaty in the afternoon at Sèvres. - -Together with the Turkish treaty seven treaties or agreements were also -signed—namely: - - “A treaty in regard to Thrace; sanctioning the cession to Greece - of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance with the - Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet to the sea at - the port of Dedeagatch. - - “A tripartite convention between England, France, and Italy, - settling the zones of economic influence of France and Italy in the - Ottoman territory of Asia Minor. - - “A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ‘Twelve Islands’ to - Greece—a plebiscite was to be taken in regard to the sovereignty - over Rhodes. - - “A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling the - question of the minorities in the future Armenian State. - - “A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them - protection in the territories that had newly been occupied by - Greece. - - “A treaty concerning the New States, settling administrative - questions between Italy and the States which occupied territories - formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary. - - “A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at some places - where they had not yet been definitely laid down.” - -According to the terms of the agreement concerning the protection -of minorities, Greece pledged herself to grant to Greek subjects -belonging to minorities in language, race, or religion the same civil -and political rights, the same consideration and protection as to -the other Greek subjects, on the strength of which France and Great -Britain gave up their rights of control over Greece, established by the -London treaty of 1832, their right of control over the Ionian Islands -established by the London treaty of 1864, and their right of protection -of religious freedom conferred by the London Conference of 1830. - -Greece pledged herself also to present for the approval of the League -of Nations within a year a scheme of organisation of Adrianople, -including a municipal council in which the various races should be -represented. All the clauses of the treaty for the protection of -minorities were under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Greece -also pledged herself to give the Allies the benefit of the “most -favoured nation” clause till a general commercial agreement had been -concluded, within five years, under the patronage of the League of -Nations. - -All these delays and incidents bore witness to the difficulty of -arriving at a solution of the Eastern question in the way the Allies -had set to work, and to the frailty of the stipulations inserted in the -treaty. - -They also testified to the lack of skill and political acuteness -of Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, the British Premier, owing to the -large concessions he had made to Greece, had managed to ensure the -preponderance of British influence in Constantinople and the zone of -the Straits, and by seeking to set up a large Arabian Empire he had -secured to his country the chief trunk of the Baghdad Railway. - -But the laborious negotiations which had painfully arrived at the -settlement proposed by the Conference did not seem likely to solve the -Eastern question definitely. It still remained a burning question, and -the treaty signed by the Ottoman delegates was still most precarious. -Accordingly Count Sforza, in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, made the -following statement with regard to Anatolia: - - “Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but practically - everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had occurred. The Moslem - East wants to live and develop. It, too, wants to have an influence - of its own in to-morrow’s world. To the Anatolian Turks it has been - our wish to offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic - and moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty of - Turkey.” - -The signatures of plenipotentiaries sent by a Government which remained -in office merely because its head, Damad Ferid, was a tool in the hands -of England, were no guarantee for the future, and the failure of the -revolutionary movement indefinitely postponed the settlement of the -Eastern question which for half a century has been disturbing European -policy. - -Islam remains, notwithstanding, a spiritual force that will survive -all measures taken against the Sublime Porte, and the dismemberment of -the Ottoman Empire does not solve any of the numerous questions raised -by the intercourse of the various races that were formerly under the -Sultan’s rule. Russia has not given up her ambitious designs on the -Straits, and one day or another she will try to carry them out; and it -is to be feared that German influence may benefit by the resentment of -the Turkish people. These are some of the numerous sources of future -conflicts. - -On the day that followed the signature of the treaty all the Turkish -newspapers in Constantinople were in mourning and announced it as a day -of mourning for the Turkish nation. - -At Stambul all public entertainments were prohibited, all shops and -public buildings were closed. Many Turks went to the mosques to pray -for the welfare of the country, the people who seek nothing but peace -and quietude looked weary and downcast. - -A few organs of the Turkish Press violently attacked the delegates who -had signed “the death-warrant of Turkey and laid the foundations of a -necessary policy of revenge.” - -[Illustration: TURKEY UNDER THE TREATY OF SÈVRES.] - -[Illustration: SCHEMATIC MAP OF THE TERRITORIES LOST BY TURKEY -SINCE 1699, AND OF THE TERRITORIES LEFT TO TURKEY BY THE SÈVRES -TREATY.] - -Others hoped the Great Powers would take into account the goodwill of -Turkey, and would gradually give up some of their intolerable demands. - -Others, finally, bewailing the direful downfall of the Turkish Empire -and insisting upon the lesson taught by this historical event for the -future, hoped that the future would forcibly bring on a revision of -that “iniquitous and impracticable” treaty of peace. - -In France, M. Pierre Loti devoted one of his last articles to the -treaty, which he called “the silliest of all the silly blunders of our -Eastern policy.”[35] - -The map on p. 269 shows the area left to the Turks in Europe and in -Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sèvres. There will be seen the territories -of Mesopotamia under English mandate, those of Syria under French -mandate, and those which have been added to Palestine and are -practically under English control. There will also be seen the regions -on which France and Italy, in virtue of the tripartite agreement -signed on August 10, 1920, enjoy preferential claims to supply the -staff required for the assistance of the Porte in organising the local -administration and the police. The contracting Powers in that agreement -have undertaken not to apply, nor to make or support applications, on -behalf of their nationals, for industrial concessions in areas allotted -to another Power. - -The map on p. 270 is a scheme of the territories lost by Turkey from -1699 down to the Sèvres Treaty; it shows that, by completing the -dismemberment of Turkey, the treaty aimed at her annihilation. - - -Footnotes: - - 26: _The Times_, March 26, 1920. - - 27: _The Times_, March 27, 1920: “Mesopotamia and the Mandate.” - - 28: The very words of this agreement were given by M. Pierre Loti - in his book, _La Mort de notre chère France en Orient_, p. 153. - - 29: _Journal des Débats_, May 26, 1920. - - 30: _Daily Telegraph_, June 12, 1920. - - 31: _Matin_, June 12, 1920. - - 32: _La Croix_, July 14, 1920. - - 33: _Le Temps_, July 17, 1920. - - 34: Cf. _Ex-King Constantine and the War_, by Major J. M. Melas, - p. 239. - - 35: The _Œuvre_, August 20, 1920. - - - - -VII - -THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE - - -The condition of affairs in the East now seemed all the more alarming -and critical as the Allies, after dismembering Turkey, did not seem -to have given up their plan of evicting the Turks. This policy, which -had taken Armenia from Turkey, but had not succeeded in ensuring her a -definite status, could only hurry on the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian -movements, drive them to assert their opposition more plainly, and thus -bring them closer together by reinforcing Pan-Islamism. - -Of course it had been said at the beginning of January, 1920, that -the Turks were downhearted, that Mustafa Kemal was short of money, -that he had to encounter the opposition of the other parties, and -that his movement seemed doomed to failure. It was also asserted -that his army was only made up of bands which began to plunder the -country, and that anarchy now prevailed throughout Turkey-in-Asia. Yet -the Nationalist generals soon managed to intercept the food-supply -of Constantinople, and when the conditions of the Peace Treaty were -made known the situation, as has just been seen, underwent a complete -change. They held in check the English till the latter had called the -Greeks to their help, and though at a certain stage it would have been -possible to negotiate and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal, now, on -the contrary, it was impossible to do so, owing to the amplitude and -strength gained by the Nationalist movement. - -It was soon known that many a parley had been entered into between -Turkish and Arabian elements, that some Turkish officers had gone over -to the Arabian Nationalists of Syria and had taken command of their -troops, and though a political agreement or a closer connection between -the two elements did not ensue, yet the Turks and the Arabs, dreading -foreign occupation, organised themselves and were ready to help each -other to defend their independence. - -We should bear in mind what Enver Pasha, who was playing a questionable -part in the East, and Fethy Bey had once done in Tripoli. Turkish -officers might very well, if an opportunity occurred, impart to these -bands the discipline and cohesion they lacked and instil into them a -warlike spirit; or these bands might side with the Bolshevists who had -invaded the Transcaspian isthmus; they would have been able to hinder -the operations that the Allies had once seemed inclined to launch into, -but had wisely given up, and they could always raise new difficulties -for the Allies. - -Lastly, the idea, once contemplated and perhaps not definitely given -up, to send back to Asia the Sultans and viziers who, after their -centuries-old intercourse with the West, had become “Europeanised” -and to whom the ways and manners of our diplomacy had grown familiar, -could only modify their foreign policy to our disadvantage, and give it -an Asiatic turn; whereas now, having long associated Ottoman affairs -with European affairs, they have thus been brought to consider their -own interests from a European point of view. The influence of this -intercourse with Europe on the Constantinople Government naturally -induced it to exercise a soothing influence over the Mussulmans, which -was to the advantage of both Europe and Turkey. It is obvious that, on -the contrary, the eviction of the Sultan, at a time when the Arabian -world and the Turkish world were being roused, would have left the -Allied Powers face to face with anarchist elements which, being spurred -on by similar religious and nationalist passions, would have grouped -together; and one day the Powers would have found themselves confronted -with the organised resistance of established governments. Even as -things are now, who can foresee what will be all the consequences in -the East of the clauses enforced on Turkey by the Sèvres Treaty? - - -1. THE TURCO-ARMENIAN QUESTION. - -The Armenian question, which has convulsed Turkey so deeply and made -the Eastern question so intricate, originated in the grasping spirit -of Russia in Asia Minor and the meddling of Russia in Turkish affairs -under pretence of protecting the Armenians. This question, as proved -by the difficulties to which it has given rise since the beginning, is -one of the aspects of the antagonism between Slavs and Turks, and a -phase of the everlasting struggle of the Turks to hinder the Slavs from -reaching the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to which the Russians -have always striven to get access either through Asia Minor or through -Thrace, or through both countries at once. - -Yet Mohammed II, after taking Constantinople, had in 1461 instituted a -patriarchate in favour of the Armenians. Later on various rights were -granted to them at different times by Imperial firmans. - -Some Armenian monks of Calcutta, availing themselves of the liberty -they enjoyed in India, founded at the beginning of the eighteenth -century the _Aztarar_ (the Newsmonger), the first newspaper published -in the Armenian language; and at the end of the same century the -Mekhitharists published in Venice _Yeghanak Puzantian_ (the Byzantine -Season). About the middle of the nineteenth century, the same monks -edited a review of literature and information, _Pazmareb_, which still -exists. The Protestant Armenians too edited a review of propaganda, -_Chtemaran bidani Kidehatz_, at Constantinople. Finally, in 1840, -the first daily paper printed in the Armenian language, _Archalouis -Araradian_ (the Dawn of Ararat), was published at Smyrna. - -In 1857, in the monastery of Varag, near Van, Miguirditch Krimian, who -later on became Patriarch and Catholicos, established printing-works. -Under the title of _Ardziv Vaspourakani_ (the Eagle of Vaspourakan) he -edited a monthly review to defend the cause of Armenian independence, -and at the same time a similar review, _Ardziv Tarono_ (the Eaglet of -Taron), was published at Mush. About the same time the Armenians in -Russia too began to publish various periodicals, such as _Hussissapail_ -(the Aurora Borealis), a review printed at Moscow in 1850, and several -newspapers at Tiflis and Baku. In 1860 the Armenians were allowed -to hold an Armenian National Assembly to discuss and settle their -religious and national affairs. - -From the fourteenth century till about 1860, the Armenian element lived -on good terms with the Moslem element, and some Armenians persecuted -in Russia even sought refuge in Turkey. The Turks, on their coming, -had found Armenians, but no Armenia, for the latter country, in the -course of a most confused history, had enjoyed but short periods of -independence with ever-changing frontiers; and the Armenians who had -successively been under Roman, Seljuk, Persian, and Arabian dominion -lived quietly with the Turks for six centuries. - -But in 1870 a group of young men revived and modified a movement which -had been started and kept up by Armenian monks, and wrote books in -Constantinople in favour of the Armenians. - -In 1875, Portokalian established the first revolutionary Armenian -Committee, and edited a newspaper, _Asia_. Soon afterwards the -_Araratian_ committee was formed, aiming at establishing a close -connection between Turkish and Russian Armenians, followed by other -committees such as _Tebrotssassiranz_, _Arevelian_, and _Kilikia_. - -Other committees with charitable or economic purposes, such as “The -Association of Kindness” and “The Association of Benevolence,” which -were started in 1860 with a large capital to develop the natural -resources of Cilicia, also played a part in the Armenian movement. - -The Armenian question began really to arise and soon grew more and more -acute in 1878, after the Turco-Russian war, at a time when Turkey -had to face serious domestic and foreign difficulties. This question -was dealt with in Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty of July 10, -1878, and Article 61 of the Berlin treaty. Article 16 of the San -Stefano treaty, drawn up at the Armenians’ request, and supported by -the Russian plenipotentiaries, stated that “the Sublime Porte pledges -itself to realise without any more delay the administrative autonomy -rendered necessary by local needs in the provinces inhabited by -Armenians.” The Turks raised an objection to the words “administrative -autonomy” and wanted them to be replaced by “reforms and improvements,” -but the Russians then demanded the occupation of Armenia by the Tsar’s -troops as a guarantee. The Berlin Congress did away with this clause of -guarantee, and instead of the words proposed by Russia adopted those -asked for by Turkey. - -In order to acquire a moral influence over the Armenians living in -Turkey and play a prominent part among them, the Orthodox Christians -who were devoted to the Tsar endeavoured to get themselves recognised -as a superior power by the patriarchate of Constantinople, and with the -help of Russian political agents they succeeded in their endeavours. It -was soon observed that the new connection between the Catholicos and -the Constantinople Patriarchate aimed at, and succeeded in, starting -an anti-Turkish movement within the Armenian populations of Russia and -Asia Minor. - -When the Russians arrived close to Constantinople, at the end of the -Turco-Russian war, Nerses Varzabedian, who had succeeded Krimian, was -received by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and handed him a memorandum, -in which, after stating all the Armenian grievances against the -Ottoman Government, he asked “that the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor -inhabited by Armenians should be proclaimed independent or at least -should pass under the control of Russia.” Four prelates were sent -separately to Rome, Venice, Paris, and London to make sure of the -Powers’ support, and met together at the Berlin Congress. Though they -strongly advocated the maintenance of Article 16 of the San Stefano -treaty, they only succeeded in getting Article 61 of the Berlin treaty. - -It was not until about 1885 that what was afterwards called the -Armenian movement began to be spoken of, and then some Armenian -revolutionaries who had sought shelter in England, France, Austria, and -America began to edit periodicals, form committees, inveigh against the -would-be Turkish exactions, and denounce the violation of the Berlin -treaty. - -These ideas of independence soon made more and more headway and the -prelates who, after Nerses’ death, were known for their pro-Turkish -feelings, as Haroutian Vehabedian, Bishop of Erzerum, made Patriarch in -1885, were forsaken by the Armenian clergy and soon found themselves in -opposition to the committees. - -In 1888 Khorene Achikian, who succeeded Vehabedian, was also accused of -being on friendly terms with the Turks, and the committees strove to -have him replaced by Narbey, who had been a member of the delegation -sent to Europe for the Berlin Congress. - -This Armenian movement naturally caused some incidents between the -various elements of the population, which were magnified, brought by -the bishops and consuls to the knowledge of the European Powers, and -cited as the outcome of Turkish cruelty. - -After the Turco-Russian war, the revolutionary agitation which stirred -up Russia and the Caucasus had its repercussion among the Armenians, -and the harsh measures of the Tsar’s Government only strengthened the -agitation by increasing Armenian discontent. - -Miguirditch Portokalian, a teacher living at Van, came to Marseilles, -where in 1885 he edited a newspaper, _Armenia_. At the same time Minas -Tscheraz started another newspaper in Paris under the same title. These -publicists, both in their journals and in meetings, demanded that -Article 61 of the Berlin treaty should be carried out. - -In 1880 some revolutionary committees were formed in Turkey. In 1882 -“The Association of the Armed Men” was founded at Erzerum; some of its -members were arrested, and the association itself was dissolved in 1883. - -A rising took place at Van in 1885 on the occasion of the election of a -bishop, and some insurrectionist movements occurred at Constantinople, -Mush, and Alashehr under various pretexts. - -Next year, in 1886, one Nazarbey, a Caucasian by birth, and his -wife Maro, formed in Switzerland the _Huntchag_ (the Bell), a -social-democrat committee that aimed at getting an autonomous -administration for the Armenians, and published in London a monthly -periodical bearing the same name. This committee meant to achieve its -object not through the intervention or mediation of the European -Powers—to which it thought it useless to make another appeal, as their -individual interests were so much at variance—but solely by the action -of its organisations throughout the country, which were to raise funds, -equipment, foment troubles, weaken the Government, and take advantage -of any opportunity that might occur. - -The _Huntchag_ committee found representatives in every great -town—Smyrna, Aleppo, Constantinople, etc.—and its organisation was -completed in 1889. - -In 1890, at the instigation of the Huntchagists, a rebellion broke out -at Erzerum, and incidents occurred in various places. At Constantinople -a demonstration of armed men, headed by the Patriarch Achikian, -repaired to the Sublime Porte to set forth their grievances, but -were scattered; and the Patriarch, who was reproached with being too -moderate, and whose life was even attempted, had to resign. - -In fact the _Huntchag_ committee, which enlisted the effective and -moral support of the representatives of the Powers, especially those of -Russia and England, carried on its intrigues without intermission, and -increased its activity. - -On Sunday, March 25, 1894, at Samsun, in the ground adjoining the -church, one Agap, living at Diarbekir, who had been chosen by the -_Huntchag_ committee to kill the Patriarch Achikian because he was -accused of being on friendly terms with the Ottoman Government, fired -at the prelate with a revolver, but missed his mark. After this -criminal attempt, Achikian resigned his office, and Mathew Ismirlian, -supported by the committees, was elected Patriarch, owing to the -pressure brought to bear on the National Assembly. The new Patriarch -immediately became chairman of the _Huntchag_ committee, which he -developed, and soon after appointed President of the Ecclesiastical -Council of the Patriarchate and later on Catholicos of Cilicia a -certain priest, Kirkor Alajan, who had been dismissed and sent to -Constantinople for insulting the Governor of Mush. - -A few Armenians, dissatisfied with the programme of the Huntchagists, -founded a new association in 1890 under the name of _Troshak_, which -later on was called _Tashnaktsutioun_, and edited the _Troshak_ -newspaper. The members of this committee often resorted to threats -and terror to get the funds they needed, and did not shrink from -assassinating whoever refused to comply with the injunctions of the -committee. - -In 1896 the committees attempted to seize the Ottoman Bank. Some armed -komitadjis, who had come from Europe with Russian passports, rushed -into the Ottoman Bank, but were driven back by Government troops. -But the promoters of the raid were not arrested, owing to their -being protected by the Russian and French authorities. Attended by -Maximof, an Armenian by birth, first dragoman of the Russian embassy, -and Rouet, first dragoman of the French embassy, they were brought -by the dispatch-boat of the latter embassy on board the _Gironde_, -a packet-ship of the Messageries Maritimes. The adherents of the -_Troshak_, entrenched in the churches of Galata, Samatra, and the -Patriarchate, begged for mercy, while Armene Aktoni, one of the leaders -of the committee, committed suicide after waiting for the coming of -the English fleet on the heights of Soulou-Monastir, at Samatra. - -The bishops continued to solicit, and to some extent obtained, -the support of the Russian, English, and French consuls; yet Mgr. -Ismirlian, who had sent an ultimatum to the Imperial Palace and never -ceased to intrigue, was finally dismissed in 1896 and sent to Jerusalem. - -At that time many Armenians set off to Europe and America, and the -Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent some delegates to the Hague Conference -to lay before it the Armenian plight in Turkey. These committees, which -displayed so much activity in Turkey, did not attempt anything on -behalf of their fellow-countrymen in Russia. - -The committees which had been founded during or before Nerses’ -patriarchate under the names of _Ararat_, _The Orient_, _The Friends -of Education_, _Cilicia_, were all grouped, in 1890, into one called -_Miatzal Anikeroutioun Hayotz_, which association continued to -organise committees even in the smallest villages, taking advantage -of the tolerance of the Ottoman Government and its benevolence to the -Armenians to carry on an active anti-Turkish propaganda. - -This propaganda was supported by the Armenian bishops in the eastern -provinces, where they endeavoured to bring about European intervention. -On the other hand the Russians, as eager as ever to domineer over both -the Orthodox Church and Armenia, incited the Armenians against the -Turks by all possible means and urged them to fulfil their national -aspirations, as they knew full well they would thus bring them more -easily under Russian sovereignty. - -The influence of these committees, as will be seen later on, had a very -important bearing on the events that took place in Asia Minor at that -time. - -Risings, which may be traced back to 1545 and lasted till the -proclamation of the 1908 constitution, were continually taking place in -the mountainous area of Zeitun. They were partly brought about by the -feudal system of administration still prevailing in that region. Each -of the four districts of Zeitun was governed by a chief who had assumed -the title of “ishehan” or prince, a kind of nobleman to whom Turkish -villages had to pay some taxes collected by special agents. The action -of the committees, of course, benefited by that state of things, to -which the Ottoman Government put an end only in 1895. - -The Armenians had already refused to pay the taxes and had rebelled -repeatedly between 1782 and 1851, at which time the Turks, incensed -at the looting and exactions of the Armenian mountaineers, left their -farms and emigrated. Till that time the rebellions of Zeitun could be -partly accounted for by the administration of the “ishehan.” But the -leaders of the Armenian movement soon took advantage of these continual -disturbances and quickly gave them another character. The movement was -spurred on and eagerly supported by Armenians living abroad, and in -1865, after the so-called Turkish exactions, the Nationalist committees -openly rebelled against the Government and demanded the independence -of Zeitun. Henceforth rebellion followed rebellion, and one of them, -fomented by the Huntchagists, lasted three months. - -In 1890 the _Huntchag_ and _Tashnaktsutioun_ committees stirred up -riots at Erzerum, and in 1894 at Samsun, where the Patriarch Ashikian -was fired at, as has just been seen. In 1905 the Tashnakists started a -new insurrection. The rebellion extended to Amasia, Sivas, Tokat, Mush, -and Van, and the committees endeavoured to spread and intensify it. In -1905-06 the manœuvres of the Armenian committees succeeded in rousing -hostile feelings between Kurds and Armenians, which no reform whatever -seemed able to soothe. And in 1909-10, when new troubles broke out, the -revolutionary leaders openly attacked the Government troops. - -Two years after the confiscation and handing over to the Ottoman -Government of the Armenian churches on June 21, 1903, massacres -took place at Batum on February 6, 1905, and later on at Erivan, -Nakhitchevan, Shusha, and Koshak. In 1908 the Tsar’s sway in the whole -of Caucasus became most oppressive, and a ukase prescribed the election -of a new catholicos to succeed Mgr. Krimian, who had died in October, -1907. Mgr. Ismirlian was appointed in his stead in 1908. By that time -the Russian sway had become so oppressive that the Tashnakists took -refuge in Constantinople, where the Young Turks openly declared in -favour of the Russian Armenians. - - * * * * * - -It might have been expected that after the proclamation of the -Constitution the committees, who had striven to hurry on the downfall -of the Empire through an agitation that might have brought about -foreign intervention, would put an end to their revolutionary schemes -and turn their activity towards social and economic questions. -Sabah-Gulian, a Caucasian by birth, president of the _Huntchag_, at -a meeting of this committee held in 1908 in Sourp-Yerourtoutioun -church at Pera, speaking of the Huntchagists’ programme and the -constitutional régime, declared: “We, Huntchagists, putting an end to -our revolutionary activity, must devote all our energy to the welfare -of the country.” On the other hand Agnoni, a Russian by birth, one of -the presidents of the _Tashnaktsutioun_, stated that “the first duty -of the Tashnakists would be to co-operate with the Union and Progress -Committee in order to maintain the Ottoman Constitution and ensure -harmony and concord between the various elements.” - -The union of the committees did not last long, as they held widely -different views about the new condition of the Turkish Empire; -but soon after the _Tashnaktsutioun_, the _Huntchag_, and the -_Veragaznial-Huntchag_ committees were reorganised and new committees -formed throughout Turkey. The _Ramgavar_ (the Rights of the People) -committee was instituted in Egypt by M. Boghos Nubar after the -proclamation of the Constitution, and displayed the greatest activity. -This committee, in March, 1914, agreed to work on the same lines with -the _Huntchag_, the _Tashnaktsutioun_, and the _Veragaznial-Huntchag_. -Another committee, the _Sahmanatragan_, was also constituted. They made -sure of the support of the Patriarchate and the bishops to reassert -their influence and spread a network of ramifications all over the -country in order to triumph at the elections. They carried on an active -propaganda to conciliate public opinion, by means of all kinds of -publications, school books, almanacs, postcards, songs, and so on, all -edited at Geneva or in Russia. - -As early as 1905 the Armenian committees had decided at a congress held -in Paris to resort to all means in order to make Cilicia an independent -country. Russia, on the other hand, strove hard to spread orthodoxy -in the districts round Adana, Marash, and Alexandretta, in order to -enlarge her zone of influence on this side and thus get an outlet to -the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Bishop of Adana, Mosheg, did -his best to foment the rebellion which was to break out soon after. - -In this way the Armenian Christians contributed to the extension of the -Russian Empire. In 1904-05, the Nestorians asked for Russian priests -and expressed their intention to embrace the Orthodox Faith. The -Armenians of Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Kharput in 1907 handed the Russian -consul a petition bearing over 200,000 signatures, in which they asked -to become Russian subjects. - -The Huntchagist leader, Sabah-Gulian, even owned in the _Augah -Hayassdan_ (Independent Armenia) newspaper that the members of the -committee had taken advantage of the Turks’ carelessness to open shops, -where rifles were being sold at half-price or even given away. - -The Armenian committees took advantage of the new parliamentary -elections to stir up a new agitation. They increased their activity, -and, contrary to their engagements, corresponded with the members of -the opposition who had fled abroad. - -During the Balkan war in 1913 the Tashnakist committees issued -manifestoes against the Ottoman Government and the Union party. The -Russian consuls at Erzerum and Bitlis did not conceal their sympathy, -and at Van the Russian consul threatened to the vali to ask Russian -troops to come through Azerbaïjan under the pretext of averting the -fictitious dangers the Armenians were supposed to run, and of restoring -order. - -Now, whereas Russia at home unmercifully stifled all the attempts of -the Armenian committees, she encouraged and energetically supported the -agitators in Turkey. Moreover, in the report addressed by the Russian -consul at Bitlis to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, dated -December 24, 1912, and bearing number 63, the Russian Government was -informed that the aim of the Tashnakists was, as they expressly said, -“to bring the Russians here,” and that, in order “to reach this end, -the Tashnakists are resorting to various means, and doing their best to -bring about collisions between Armenians and Moslems, especially with -Ottoman troops.” In support of this statement he mentioned a few facts -that leave no doubt about its veracity. - -This report contained the following lines, which throw considerable -light on the Allies’ policy: - - “Your Excellency will understand that the future collisions between - Armenians and Moslems will partly depend on the line of conduct - and activity of the _Tashnaktsutioun_ committee, on the turn - taken by the peace negotiations between Turkey and the Slavonic - States of the Balkans, and on the eventuality of an occupation of - Constantinople by the Allies. If the deliberations of the London - Conference did not bring about peace, the coming downfall of the - Ottoman capital would certainly influence the relations between - Moslems and Armenians at Bitlis. - - “Both in towns and in the country the Armenians, together with - their religions leaders, have always displayed much inclination - and affection for Russia, and have repeatedly declared the Turkish - Government is unable to maintain order, justice, and prosperity - in their country. Many Armenians have already promised to offer - the Russian soldiers their churches to be converted into orthodox - places of worship. - - “The present condition of the Balkans, the victory of the Slav and - Hellenic Governments over Turkey, have delighted the Armenians and - filled their hearts with the cheerful hope of being freed from - Turkey.” - -Of course, the coming to Bitlis of a mixed Commission of Armenians and -Turks under the presidency of an Englishman, in order to carry out -reforms in the Turkish provinces near the Caucasus, did not please -the Armenians and Russians who had sacrificed many soldiers to get -possession of these regions. - -Taking advantage of the difficulties experienced by the Ottoman -Government after the Balkan war, the committees agreed together to -raise anew the question of “reforms in the Eastern provinces.” A -special commission, presided over by M. Boghos Nubar, was sent by -the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to the European Governments to uphold -the Armenian claims. At the same time a campaign was started by the -Armenian newspapers of Europe, Constantinople, and America, especially -by the _Agadamard_, the organ of the _Tashnaktsutioun_ committee, which -had no scruple in slandering the Turks and announcing sham outrages. - -In 1913 Russia proposed a scheme of reforms to be instituted in -Armenia. It was communicated by M. de Giers to the Six Ambassadors’ -Conference, which appointed a commission to report on it. As the German -and Austrian representatives raised objections to the Russian scheme -before that Commission of Armenian Reforms, which met from June 20 to -July 3, 1913, at the Austrian embassy at Yeni Keui, Russia, after this -defeat, strove to bring over Germany to her views. - -In September, 1913, M. de Giers and M. de Wangenheim came to terms -on a programme to which the Porte opposed a counter-proposal. Yet -the Russian representatives succeeded in concluding a Russo-Turkish -agreement, January 26 to February 8, 1914. - -When the scheme of reforms was outlined, and the powers and -jurisdiction of the inspectors and their staff were settled, the -Catholicos sent a telegram of congratulation to M. Borghos Nubar and -the latter sent another to M. Sazonov, for the Armenian committees -considered the arrangement as a first step towards autonomy. Encouraged -by this first success, the committees exerted themselves more and more. -The _Tashnaksutioun_ transferred its seat to Erzerum, where it held a -congress. The _Huntchag_ committee sent to Russia and Caucasus several -of its most influential members to raise funds in order to foment -a rising to attack the Union and Progress party especially, and to -overthrow the Government. Such was the state of things when war broke -out. - -The Patriarch, who passed himself off as representing the Armenian -people, gathered together under his presidency the leaders of -the _Tashnaktsutioun_, the _Huntchag_, the _Ramgavar_, and the -_Veragaznial-Huntchag_, and the members of the National Assembly who -were affiliated to these committees to decide what attitude they were -to take in case the Ottoman Government should enter into the war. No -decision was taken, the Huntchagists declining to commit themselves and -the Tasknakists stating they preferred waiting to see how things would -turn out. Yet these committees carried on their activities separately, -and sent instructions to the provinces that, if the Russians advanced, -all means should be resorted to in order to impede the retreat of the -Ottoman troops and hold up their supplies, and if, on the contrary, -the Ottoman army advanced, the Armenian soldiers should leave their -regiments, form themselves into groups, and go over to the Russians. - -The committees availed themselves of the difficulties of the Ottoman -Government, which had recently come out of a disastrous war and had -just entered into a new conflict, to bring about risings at Zeitun, -in the sandjaks of Marash and Cesarea, and chiefly in the vilayet of -Van, at Bitlis, Talori, and Mush in the vilayet of Bitlis, and in the -vilayet of Erzerum. - -In the sandjaks of Erzerum and Bayazid, as soon as the decree of -mobilisation was issued, most of the Armenian soldiers went over to the -Russians, were equipped and armed anew by them, and then sent against -the Turks. The same thing occurred at Erzindjan, where three-fourths of -the Armenians crossed the Russian frontier. - -The Armenians of the vilayet of Mamouret’ ul Azig (Kharput), where -the Mussulmans were also attacked and where depots of arms had been -concealed, provided with numerous recruits the regiments dispatched -by Russia to Van and the Persian frontier. Many emissaries had been -sent from Russia and Constantinople to Dersim and its area to raise -the Kurds against the Ottoman Government. So it was in the vilayet of -Diarbekir, though the Armenians were in a minority. Depots of arms of -all descriptions were discovered there, together with many refractory -soldiers. - -In the Karahissar area, where several revolutionary movements had -broken out during and after the Balkan war, the Armenians refused to -obey the decree of mobilisation and were only waiting for the coming of -the Russians to rebel. - -Similar incidents—such as mutinous soldiers, attacks against the Turks, -threats to families of mobilised Ottomans—occurred in the vilayet of -Angora. - -In the vilayet of Van, when the Russians, reinforced by Armenian -volunteers, started an offensive, some Armenian peasants gathered -together and prepared to attack the Ottoman officials and the -gendarmerie. At the beginning of 1915 rebellions took place at Kevash, -Shatak, Havassour, and Timar, and spread in the kazas of Arjitch and -Adeljivaz. At Van over five thousand rebels, seven hundred of whom -attacked the fortress, blew up the military and Government buildings, -the Ottoman Bank, the offices of the Public Debt, the excise office, -the post and telegraph offices, and set fire to the Moslem quarter. -When this insurrection subsided about the end of April, numerous -Armenian bands, led by Russian officers, attempted to cross the Russian -and Persian frontiers. - -After the capture of Van, the Armenians gave a great dinner in -honour of General Nicolaiev, commander-in-chief of the Russian army -in Caucasus, who made a speech in which he said: “Since 1826, -the Russians have always striven to free Armenia, but political -circumstances have always prevented their success. Now, as the grouping -of nations has been quite altered, we may hope Armenians will soon -be free.” Aram Manoukian, known as Aram Pasha, soon after appointed -provisional Governor of Van by General Nicolaiev, replied: “When we -rose a month ago, we expected the Russians would come. At a certain -moment, our situation was dreadful. We had to choose between surrender -and death. We chose death, but when we no longer expected your help, it -has suddenly arrived.”[36] - -The Armenian bands even compelled the Ottoman Government to call back -troops from the front to suppress their revolutionary manœuvres in -the vilayet of Brusa and the neighbourhood. At Adana, as in the other -provinces, all sorts of insurrectionary movements were smouldering. - -Under such circumstances, the Turkish Government tried to crush these -revolutionary efforts by military expeditions, and the repression -was merciless. A decree of the Government about changes of residence -of the Armenian populations included measures for the deportation of -Armenians. As the Turks are generally so listless, and as similar -methods had been resorted to by the Germans on the Western front, these -measures may have been suggested to the Turks by the Germans. - -Tahsin Pasha, Governor of Van, was replaced by Jevdet Bey, Enver’s -brother-in-law, and Khalil Pasha, another relation of Enver, had -command of the Turkish troops in the Urmia area. Talaat sent Mustafa -Khalil, his brother-in-law, to Bitlis. - -The revolutionary manœuvres of the Armenians and the repressive -measures of the Turks, with their mutual repercussions, could not but -quicken the old feuds; so the outcome was a wretched one for both -parties. - -One cannot wonder that under such conditions continuous conflicts arose -between the two elements of the population, that reprisals followed -reprisals on either side, first after the Turco-Russian war, again -after the events of 1895-96, then in the course of the Adana conflict, -during the Balkan war, and finally during the late war. But it is -impossible to trust the information according to which the number of -the Armenians slaughtered by the Turks rose to over 800,000 and in -which no mention is made of any Turks massacred by the Armenians. These -figures are obviously exaggerated,[37] since the Armenian population, -which only numbered about 2,300,000 souls before the war throughout -the Turkish Empire, did not exceed 1,300,000 in the eastern provinces, -and the Armenians now declare they are still numerous enough to make -up a State. According to Armenian estimates there were about 4,160,000 -Armenians in all in 1914—viz., 2,380,000 in the Ottoman Empire, -1,500,000 in Russia, 64,000 in the provinces of the Persian Shah -and in foreign colonies, and about 8,000 in Cyprus, the isles of the -Archipelago, Greece, Italy, and Western Europe. - -The best answer to the eager and ever-recurring complaints made by the -Armenians or at their instigation is to refer the reader to a report -entitled “Statistics of the Bitlis and Van Provinces” drawn up by -General Mayewsky, who was Russian consul first at Erzerum for six years -and later on at Van, and in this capacity represented a Power that had -always showed much hostility to Turkey. It was said in it: - - “All the statements of the publicists, which represent the Kurds as - doing their best to exterminate the Armenians, must be altogether - rejected. If they were reliable, no individual belonging to an - alien race could have ever lived in the midst of the Kurds, and - the various peoples living among them would have been obliged to - emigrate bodily for want of bread, or to become their slaves. - Now nothing of the kind has occurred. On the contrary, all those - who know the eastern provinces state that in those countries the - Christian villages are at any rate more prosperous than those of - the Kurds. If the Kurds were only murderers and thieves, as is - often said in Europe, the prosperous state of the Armenians till - 1895 would have been utterly impossible. So the distress of the - Armenians in Turkey till 1895 is a mere legend. The condition of - the Turkish Armenians was no worse than that of the Armenians - living in other countries. - - “The complaints according to which the condition of the Armenians - in Turkey is represented as unbearable do not refer to the - inhabitants of the towns, for the latter have always been free and - enjoyed privileges in every respect. As to the peasants, owing to - their perfect knowledge of farmwork and irrigation, their condition - was far superior to that of the peasants in Central Russia. - - “As to the Armenian clergy, they make no attempt to teach religion; - but they have striven hard to spread national ideas. Within the - precincts of mysterious convents, the teaching of hatred of - the Turk has replaced devotional observances. The schools and - seminaries eagerly second the religious leaders.” - -After the collapse of Russia, the Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars -formed a Transcaucasian Republic which was to be short-lived, and we -have dealt in another book with the attempt made by these three States -together to safeguard their independence.[38] - -The Soviet Government issued a decree on January 13, 1918, stipulating -in Article 1 “the evacuation of Armenia by the Russian troops, and the -immediate organisation of an Armenian militia in order to safeguard the -personal and material security of the inhabitants of Turkish Armenia,” -and in Article 4, “the establishment of a provisional Armenian -Government in Turkish Armenia consisting of delegates of the Armenian -people elected according to democratic principles,” which obviously -could not satisfy the Armenians. - -Two months after the promulgation of this decree, the Brest-Litovsk -treaty in March, 1918, stipulated in Article 4 that “Russia shall do -her utmost to ensure the quick evacuation of the eastern provinces of -Anatolia. Ardahan, Kars, and Batum shall be evacuated at once by the -Russian troops.” - -The Armenians were the more dissatisfied and anxious after these events -as they had not concealed their hostile feelings against the Turks -and their satisfaction no longer to be under their dominion; they now -dreaded the return of the Turks, who would at least make an effort to -recover the provinces they had lost in 1878. - -In April of the same year fighting was resumed, and Trebizond, -Erzinjan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van were recaptured by the Turks. -After the negotiations between the Georgians and the Turks, and the -arrangements that supervened, the Armenians constituted a Republic in -the neighbourhood of Erivan and Lake Sevanga (Gokcha). - - * * * * * - -After the discussion of the Armenian question at the Peace Conference -and a long exchange of views, Mr. Wilson, in August, 1919, sending -a note direct to the Ottoman Government, called upon it to prevent -any further massacre of Armenians and warned it that, should the -Constantinople Government be unable to do so, he would cancel the -twelfth of his Fourteen Points demanding “that the present Ottoman -Empire should be assured of entire sovereignty”—which, by the by, is -in contradiction with other points of the same message to Congress, -especially the famous right of self-determination of nations, which he -wished carried out unreservedly. - -The Armenians did not give up the tactics that had roused Turkish -animosity and had even exasperated it, for at the end of August they -prepared to address a new note to the Allied High Commissioners -in Constantinople to draw their attention to the condition of the -Christian element in Anatolia and the dangers the Armenians of the -Republic of Erivan were beginning to run. Mgr. Zaven, Armenian -Patriarch, summed up this note in a statement published by _Le Temps_, -August 31, 1919. - -Mr. Gerard, former ambassador of the United States at Berlin, in a -telegram[39] addressed to Mr. Balfour on February 15, 1920, asserted -that treaties for the partition of Armenia had been concluded during -Mr. Balfour’s tenure of the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs -and at a time when the Allied leaders and statesmen had adopted the -principle of self-determination of peoples as their principal war-cry. -He expressed distress over news that the Allies might cut up Armenia, -and said that 20,000 ministers, 85 bishops, 250 college and university -presidents, and 40 governors, who had “expressed themselves in favour -of unified Armenia, will be asked to join in condemnation of decimation -of Armenia.” He added that Americans had given £6,000,000 for Armenian -relief, and that another £6,000,000 had been asked for. Americans were -desirous of aiding Armenia during her formative period. “Ten members of -our committee, including Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root, and with the approval -of Senator Lodge, had telegraphed to the President that America should -aid Armenia. We are earnestly anxious that Britain should seriously -consider American opinion on the Armenian case. Can you not postpone -consideration of the Turkish question until after ratification of the -treaty by the Senate, which is likely to take place before March?” - -Mr. Balfour, in his reply dispatched on February 24, said: - - “In reply to your telegram of February 16, I should observe that - the first paragraph seems written under a misapprehension. I - concluded no treaties about Armenia at all. - - “I do not understand why Great Britain will be held responsible - by 20,000 ministers of religion, 85 bishops, 250 university - professors, and 40 governors if a Greater Armenia is not forthwith - created, including Russian Armenia on the north and stretching to - the Mediterranean on the south. - - “Permit me to remind you of the facts. - - “1. Great Britain has no interests in Armenia except those based - on humanitarian grounds. In this respect her position is precisely - that of the United States. - - “2. I have always urged whenever I had an opportunity that the - United States should take its share in the burden of improving - conditions in the pre-war territories of the Turkish Empire and - in particular that it should become the mandatory in Armenia. - Events over which Great Britain had no control have prevented this - consummation and have delayed, with most unhappy results, the - settlement of the Turkish peace. - - “3. There appears to be great misconception as to the condition of - affairs in Armenia. You make appeal in your first sentence to the - principle of self-determination. If this is taken in its ordinary - meaning as referring to the wishes of the majority actually - inhabiting a district, it must be remembered that in vast regions - of Greater Armenia the inhabitants are overwhelmingly Mussulman, - and if allowed to vote would certainly vote against the Armenians. - - “I do not think this conclusive; but it must not be forgotten. - Whoever undertakes, in your own words, to aid Armenia during her - formative period must, I fear, be prepared to use military force. - Great Britain finds the utmost difficulty in carrying out the - responsibilities she has already undertaken. She cannot add Armenia - to their number. America with her vast population and undiminished - resources, and no fresh responsibilities thrown upon her by the - war, is much more fortunately situated. She has shown herself most - generous towards these much oppressed people; but I greatly fear - that even the most lavish charity, unsupported by political and - military assistance, will prove quite insufficient to deal with the - unhappy consequences of Turkish cruelty and misrule. - - “If I am right in inferring from your telegram that my attitude on - the question has been somewhat misunderstood in America, I should - be grateful if you would give publicity to this reply.” - -On February 28 Mr. Gerard telegraphed to Mr. Balfour that in referring -to treaties made during Mr. Balfour’s period of office he had in mind -the Sykes-Picot compact. After saying that “Great Britain and France -could not be justified in requiring American aid to Armenia as a -condition precedent to their doing justice to Armenia,” he declared -that “Armenia’s plight since 1878 is not unrelated to a series of -arrangements, well meant, no doubt, in which Great Britain played a -directive rôle,” and he concluded in the following terms: - - “Our faith in chivalry of Great Britain and France and our - deliberate conviction in ultimate inexpediency of allowing Turkish - threat to override concerted will of Western civilisation through - further sacrifice of Armenia inspire us to plead with you to - construe every disadvantage in favour of Armenia and ask you to - plan to aid her toward fulfilment of her legitimate aspirations, - meanwhile depending on us to assume our share in due time, bearing - in mind imperative necessity of continued concord that must exist - between our democracies for our respective benefit and for that of - the world.” - -Soon after, Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords: “It must be owned -the Armenians during the last weeks did not behave like innocent little -lambs, as some people imagine. The fact is they have indulged in a -series of wild attacks, and proved blood-thirsty people.” _The Times_ -gave an account of these atrocities on March 19. - -At the beginning of February, 1920, the British Armenia Committee -of London had handed to Mr. Lloyd George a memorandum in which the -essential claims of Armenia were set forth before the Turkish problem -was definitely settled by the Allies. - -In this document the Committee said they were sorry that Lord Curzon on -December 17, 1919, expressed a doubt about the possibility of the total -realisation of the Armenian scheme, according to which Armenia was -to stretch from one sea to the other, especially as the attitude of -America did not facilitate the solution of the Armenian question. After -recalling Lord Curzon’s and Mr. Lloyd George’s declarations in both the -House of Lords and the House of Commons, the British Armenia Committee -owned it was difficult, if the United States refused a mandate and -if no other mandatory could be found, to group into one nation all -the Ottoman provinces which they believed Armenia was to include; yet -they drafted a programme which, though it was a minimum one, aimed -at completely and definitely freeing these provinces from Turkish -sovereignty. It ran as follows; - - “An Ottoman suzerainty, even a nominal one, would be an outrage, - as the Ottoman Government deliberately sought to exterminate the - Armenian people. - - “It would be a disgrace for all nations if the bad precedents of - Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia, and Crete were followed, and if similar - expedients were resorted to, in reference to Armenia. The relations - between Armenia and the Ottoman Empire must wholly cease, and the - area thus detached must include all the former Ottoman provinces. - The Ottoman Government of Constantinople has for many years kept - up a state of enmity and civil war among the various local races, - and many facts demonstrate that when once that strange, malevolent - sovereignty is thrust aside, these provinces will succeed in living - together on friendly, equable terms.” - -The British Armenia Committee asked that the Armenian territories which -were to be detached from Turkey should be immediately united into -an independent Armenian State, which would not be merely restricted -to “the quite inadequate area of the Republic of Erivan,” but would -include the former Russian districts of Erivan and Kars, the zone of -the former Ottoman territories with the towns of Van, Mush, Erzerum, -Erzinjan, etc., and a port on the Black Sea. This document proclaimed -that the Armenians now living were numerous enough “to fortify, -consolidate, and ensure the prosperity of an Armenian State within -these boundaries, without giving up the hope of extending farther.” It -went on thus: - - “The economic distress now prevailing in the Erivan area is due - to the enormous number of refugees coming from the neighbouring - Ottoman provinces who are encamped there temporarily. If these - territories were included in the Armenian State, the situation - would be much better, for all these refugees would be able to - return to their homes and till their lands. With a reasonable - foreign support, the surviving manhood of the nation would suffice - to establish a National State in this territory, which includes but - one-fourth of the total Armenian State to be detached from Turkey. - In the new State, the Armenians will still be more numerous than - the other non-Armenian elements, the latter not being connected - together and having been decimated during the war like the - Armenians.” - -Finally, in support of its claim, the Committee urged that the -Nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal was a danger to England, and -showed that only Armenia could check this danger. - - “For if Mustafa Kemal’s Government is not overthrown, our new - Kurdish frontier will never be at peace; the difficulties of its - defence will keep on increasing; and the effect of the disturbances - will be felt as far as India. If, on the contrary, that focus of - disturbance is replaced by a stable Armenian State, our burden will - surely be alleviated.” - -Then the British Armenia Committee, summing up its chief claims, asked -for the complete separation of the Ottoman Empire from the Armenian -area, and, in default of an American mandate, the union of the Armenian -provinces of the Turkish Empire contiguous to the Republic of Erivan -with the latter Republic, together with a port on the Black Sea. - -In the report which had been drawn up by the American Commission of -Inquiry sent to Armenia, with General Harboor as chairman, and which -President Wilson had transmitted to the Senate at the beginning of -April, 1920, after the latter assembly had asked twice for it, no -definite conclusion was reached as to the point whether America was to -accept or refuse a mandate for that country. The report simply declared -that in no case should the United States accept a mandate without the -agreement of France and Great Britain and the formal approbation of -Germany and Russia. It merely set forth the reasons for and against the -mandate. - -It first stated that whatever Power accepts the mandate must have -under its control the whole of Anatolia, Constantinople, and -Turkey-in-Europe, and have complete control over the foreign relations -and the revenue of the Ottoman Empire. - -Before coming to the reasons that tend in favour of the acceptance of -the mandate by the United States, General Harboor made an appeal to -the humanitarian feelings of the Americans and urged that it was their -interest to ensure the peace of the world. Then he declared their -acceptance would answer the wishes of the Near East, whose preference -undeniably was for America, or, should the United States refuse, for -Great Britain. He added that each Great Power, in case it could not -obtain a mandate, would want it to be given to America. - -The report valued the expenditure entailed by acceptance of the mandate -at 275 million dollars far the first year, and $756,140,000 for the -first five years. After some time, the profits made by the mandatory -Power would balance the expenses, and Americans might find there a -profitable investment. But the Board of Administration of the Ottoman -Debt should be dissolved and all the commercial treaties concluded by -Turkey should be cancelled. The Turkish Imperial Debt should be unified -and a sinking fund provided. The economic conditions granted to the -mandatory Power should be liable to revision and might be cancelled. - -Further, it was observed that if America refused the mandate the -international rivalries which had had full scope under Turkish dominion -would assert themselves again. - -The reasons given by the American Commission against acceptance of the -mandate were that the United States had serious domestic problems to -deal with, and such an intervention in the affairs of the Old World -would weaken the standpoint they had taken on the Monroe doctrine. -The report also pointed out that the United States were in no way -responsible for the awkward situation in the East, and they could not -undertake engagements for the future—for the new Congress could not -be bound by the policy pursued by the present one. The report also -remarked that Great Britain and Russia and the other Great Powers too -had taken very little interest in those countries, though England had -enough experience and resources to control them. Finally, the report -emphasised this point—that the United States had still more imperious -obligations towards nearer foreign countries, and still more urgent -questions to settle. Besides, an army of 100,000 to 200,000 men would -be needed to maintain order in Armenia. Lastly, a considerable outlay -of money would be necessary, and the receipts would be at first very -small. - -On the other hand, the British League of Nations Union asked the -English Government to give instructions to its representatives to -support the motion of the Supreme Council according to which the -protection of the independent Armenian State should be entrusted to the -League of Nations. - -According to the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, President -Wilson had been asked to act as an arbiter to lay down the Armenian -frontiers on the side of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and -Trebizond. - -Under these circumstances the complete solution of the Armenian problem -was postponed indefinitely, and it is difficult to foresee how the -problem will ever be solved. - - -2. THE PAN-TURANIAN AND PAN-ARABIAN MOVEMENTS. - -The attempts at Russification made immediately after the 1877 war -by means of the scholastic method of Elminski resulted in the first -manifestations of the Pan-Turanian movement. They arose, not in Russia, -but in Russian Tatary. The Tatars of the huge territories of Central -Asia, by reason of their annexation to the Russian Empire and the -indirect contact with the West that it entailed, and also owing to -their reaction against the West, awoke to a consciousness of their -individuality and strength. - -A series of ethnographic studies which were begun at that time by M. -de Ujfalvi upon the Hungarians—all the peoples speaking a Finno-Ugrian -idiom descending from the same stock as those who speak the Turkish, -Mongol, and Manchu languages—and were continued by scholars of various -nationalities, gave the Pan-Turanian doctrine a scientific basis; -the principles of this doctrine were laid down by H. Vambéry,[40] -and it was summed up by Léon Cahun in his _Introduction a l’histoire -de l’Asie_.[41] This Turco-Tartar movement expanded, and its most -authoritative leaders were Youssouf Ahtchoura Oglou; Ahmed Agayeff, -who was arrested at the beginning of the armistice by the English as a -Unionist and sent to Malta; and later Zia Geuk Alp, a Turkish poet and -publicist, the author of _Kizil-Elma_ (The Red Apple), who turned the -Union and Progress Committee towards the Pan-Turanian movement though -he had many opponents on that committee, and who was arrested too and -sent to Malta. - -Islam for thirteen centuries, by creating a religious solidarity -between peoples of alien races, had brought about a kind of religious -nationality under its hegemony. But the ambitious scheme of -Pan-Islamism was jeopardised in modern times by new influences and -widely different political aspirations. It was hoped for some time that -by grouping the national elements of Turkey and pursuing a conciliatory -policy it would be possible to give a sound basis to that religious -nationality. But that nationality soon proved unable to curb the -separatist aspirations of the various peoples subjected to the Turkish -yoke, and then, again, it wounded the pride of some Turkish elements -by compelling them to obey the commandments of Islam, to which all the -Turanian populations had not fully adhered. The Pan-Islamic movement -later on grew more and more nationalist in character, and assumed a -Pan-Turkish tendency, though it remained Pan-Turanian—that is to say, -it still included the populations speaking the Turkish, Mongol, and -Manchu languages. - -Without in any way giving up the Pan-Islamic idea, Turkish Nationalism -could not but support the Pan-Turanian movement, which it hoped would -add the 18 million Turks living in the former Russian Empire, Persia, -and Afghanistan, to the 8 million Turks of the territories of the -Ottoman Empire. - -Owing to its origin and the character it has assumed, together with the -geographical situation and importance of the populations concerned, -this movement appears as a powerful obstacle to the policy which -England seems intent upon pursuing, and to which she seeks to bring -over Italy and France. It also exemplifies the latent antagonism which -had ever existed between the Arabian world and the Turkish world, and -which, under the pressure of events, soon asserted itself. - -Indeed, the mutual relations of the Arabs and the Turks had been slowly -but deeply modified in the course of centuries. - -After the great Islamic movement started by Mohammed in the seventh -century, the Arabs who had hitherto been mostly confined within the -boundaries of the Arabian peninsula spread to the west over the whole -of Northern Africa as far as Spain, and to the east over Mesopotamia -and a part of Persia. In the twelfth century Arabian culture reached -its climax, for the Arabian Caliphs of Baghdad ruled over huge -territories. At that time Arabic translations revealed to Europe the -works of Aristotle and of the Chaldean astronomers, and the Arabs, -through Spain, had an important influence on the first period of modern -civilisation. - -In 1453, when the Turks, who had extended their dominion over all the -shores of the Mediterranean, settled at Constantinople, which became -the capital of the Islamic Empire, the influence of Arabia decreased; -yet the Arabs still enjoyed in various parts political independence and -a kind of religious predominance. - -For instance, the Arabs settled in the north of Western Africa, after -losing Spain, became quite independent, and formed the Empire of -Morocco, which was not under the suzerainty of Constantinople. - -The Arabian tribes and Berber communities of Algeria and Tunis, which -had more or less remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were no -longer amenable to him after the French conquest. The Pasha of Egypt, -by setting up as an independent Sovereign, and founding the hereditary -dynasty of the Khedives, deprived the Ottoman dominion of Egypt, -where the Arabs were not very numerous, but had played an important -part in the development of Islam. The Italian conquest took away from -Turkey the last province she still owned in Africa. Finally, when the -late war broke out, England deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was -travelling in Europe and refused to go back to Egypt. She proclaimed -her protectorate over the Nile valley, and, breaking off the religious -bond that linked Egypt with the Ottoman Empire, she made Sultan of -Egypt, independent of the Sultan of Constantinople, Hussein Kamel, -uncle of the deposed Khedive, who made his entry into Cairo on December -20, 1914. - -The Turks, however, kept possession of the Holy Places, Mecca and -Medina, which they garrisoned and governed. This sovereignty was -consolidated by the railway of the pilgrimage. The investiture of the -Sherif of Mecca was still vested in them, and they chose the member of -his family who was to succeed him, and who was detained as a hostage -at Constantinople. But after the failure of the expedition against the -Suez Canal during the late war, and at the instigation of England, the -Sherif, as we shall see, proclaimed himself independent, and assumed -the title of Melek, or King of Arabia. - -On the other hand, the province of the Yemen, lying farther south -of the Hejaz, has always refused to acknowledge the authority of -Constantinople, and is practically independent. Lastly, at the southern -end of the Arabian peninsula, the English have held possession of Aden -since 1839, and have extended their authority, since the opening of the -Suez Canal in 1869, over all the Hadramaut. All the sheiks of this part -of Arabia along the southern coast, over whom the authority of Turkey -was but remotely exercised and was practically non-existent, naturally -accepted the protectorate of England without any difficulty, in return -for the commercial facilities she brought them and the allowances -she granted them, and in 1873 Turkey formally recognised the English -possession of this coast. - -On the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula the territory of the -Sultan of Oman, or Maskat, lying along the Persian Gulf, has been -since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the authority -of the Viceroy of India. This authority extends nowadays over all -the territories lying between Aden and Mesopotamia, which are in -consequence entirely under English sway. - -Moreover, the English have proclaimed their protectorate over the Sheik -of Koweit. - -Koweit had been occupied by the British Navy after the Kaiser’s visit -to Tangier, and thus Germany had been deprived of an outlet for her -railway line from Anatolia to Baghdad. The Rev. S. M. Zwemer, in a book -written some time ago, _Arabia, the Birthplace of Islam_, after showing -the exceptional situation occupied by England in these regions, owned -that British policy had ambitious designs on the Arabian peninsula and -the lands round the Persian Gulf. - -Since the outbreak of the war, Ottoman sovereignty has also lost the -small Turkish province of Hasa, between Koweit and Maskat, inhabited -entirely by Arabian tribes. - -The rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca against the temporal power of -the Sultans of Mecca shows how important was the change that had -taken place within the Arabian world, but also intimates that the -repercussions of the war, after accelerating the changes that were -already taking place in the relations between the Arabs and the Turks, -must needs later on bring about an understanding or alliance between -these two elements against any foreign dominion. In the same way, the -encroachments of England upon Arabian territories have brought about a -change in the relations between the Arabs and the English; in days of -yore the Arabs, through ignorance or because they were paid to do so, -more than once used English rifles against the Turks; but the recent -Arabian risings against the British in Mesopotamia seem to prove that -the Arabs have now seen their mistake, and have concluded that the -English were deceiving them when they said the Caliphate was in danger. - -Finally, in order to pave the way to a British advance from Mesopotamia -to the Black Sea, England for a moment contemplated the formation of -a Kurdistan, though a long existence in common and the identity of -feelings and creed have brought about a deep union between the Kurds -and the Turks, and a separation is contrary to the express wishes of -both peoples. - - * * * * * - -It is a well-known fact that the descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s -cousin, who founded the dynasty of the Sherifs, or Nobles, took the -title of Emirs—_i.e._, Princes—of Mecca, and that the Emir of the Holy -Places of Arabia had always to be recognised by the Sherif to have a -right to bear the title of Caliph. This recognition of the Caliphs by -the Sherifs was made public by the mention of the name of the Caliph -in the Khoutba, or Friday prayer. - -In consequence of political vicissitudes, the Emirs of Mecca -successively recognised the Caliphs of Baghdad, the Sultans of Egypt -until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517, and the Sultans of -Turkey, whose sovereignty over the Holy Places has always been more or -less nominal, and has hardly ever been effective over the Hejaz. - -When the Wahhabi schism took place, the Wahhabis, who aimed at -restoring the purer doctrines of primitive Islam, and condemned the -worship of the holy relics and the Prophet’s tomb, captured Mecca and -Medina. - -Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, was deputed by the Porte to reconquer the -Holy Places, which he governed from 1813 to 1840. Since that time the -Ottoman Government has always appointed a Governor of the Hejaz and -maintained a garrison there, and the Porte took care a member of the -Sherif’s family should reside in Constantinople in order to be able to -replace the one who bore the title of Sherif, should the latter ever -refuse to recognise the Caliph. - -Long negotiations were carried on during the war between the British -Government and Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, -concerning the territorial conditions on which peace might be restored -in the East. These views were set forth in eight letters exchanged -between July, 1915, and January, 1916. - -In July, 1915, the Sherif offered his military co-operation to the -British Government, in return for which he asked it to recognise the -independence of the Arabs within a territory including Mersina and -Adana on the northern side and then bounded by the thirty-seventh -degree of latitude; on the east its boundary was to be the Persian -frontier down to the Gulf of Basra; on the south the Indian Ocean, with -the exception of Aden; on the west the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as -far as Mersina. - -On August 30, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British resident in Cairo, -observed in his answer that discussion about the future frontiers was -rather premature. - -In a letter dated September 9, forwarded to the Foreign Office on -October 18 by Sir Henry MacMahon, the Sherif insisted upon an immediate -discussion. As he forwarded this letter, Sir Henry MacMahon mentioned -the following statement made to him by the Sherif’s representative in -Egypt: - - “The occupation by France of the thoroughly Arabian districts of - Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus would be opposed by force of arms - by the Arabs: but with the exception of these districts, the Arabs - are willing to accept a few modifications of the north-western - frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.” - -On October 24, 1915, by his Government’s order, Sir Henry MacMahon -addressed the Sherif the following letter: - - “The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria - lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and - Aleppo cannot be looked upon as merely Arabian, and should be - excluded from the limits and frontiers that are being discussed. - With these modifications, and without in any way impairing our - present treaties with the Arabian chiefs, we accept your limits - and frontiers. As to the territories within these limits, in - which Great Britain has a free hand as far as she does not injure - the interests of her ally, France, I am desired by the British - Government to make the following promise in answer to your letter. - - “‘With the reservation of the above-mentioned modifications, Great - Britain is willing to recognise and support Arabian independence - within the territories included in the limits and frontiers - proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.’” - -On November 5, 1915, the Sherif, in his answer, agreed to the -exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but maintained his claims on the other -territories, especially Beyrut. - -On December 13 Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s -renunciation of Mersina and Adana. - -On January 1, 1916, the Sherif wrote that, not to disturb the -Franco-British alliance, he would lay aside his claims to Lebanon -during the war; but he would urge them again on the conclusion of -hostilities. - -On January 30, 1916, Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s wish -to avoid all that might be prejudicial to the alliance between France -and England, and stated that the friendship between France and England -would be maintained after the war. - -On June 10, 1916, a rebellion broke out at Mecca. At daybreak the -barracks were encircled by Arabs. Hussein ibn Ali, who was at the head -of the movement, informed the Turkish commander that the Hejaz had -proclaimed its independence. On June 11 the Arabs captured the Turkish -fort of Bash-Karacal, and on the 12th Fort Hamadie. Soon after Jeddah -surrendered, and on September 21 El Taif. - -In a proclamation dated June 27, 1916, the Sherif Hussein ibn Ali -stated the political and religious reasons that had induced him to -rebel against the Ottoman Government. He declared the latter was in -the hands of the Young Turk party, that the Committee of Union and -Progress had driven the country to war, was destroying the power of the -Sultan, and had violated the rights of the Caliphate. - -On October 5 the Sherif Hussein formed an Arabian Cabinet, convened an -Assembly, and on November 6 caused himself to be proclaimed King of the -Arabs. - -In November, 1916, he issued a second proclamation, not so lofty in -tone, but more wily in its wording, which seemed to lack personality -in its inspiration. It began thus: “It is a well-known fact that the -better informed people in the Moslem world, Ottomans and others, saw -with much misgiving Turkey rush into the war.” He then stated that— - - “The Ottoman Empire is a Moslem empire, whose wide territories have - a considerable sea-frontage. So the policy of the great Ottoman - Sultans, inspired by this twofold consideration, has always aimed - at keeping on friendly terms with the Powers that rule over the - majority of Moslems and at the same time hold the mastery of the - seas.” - -He went on as follows: - - “The one cause of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the - extermination of its populations was the short-sighted tyranny - of the leaders of the Unionist faction—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, - and their accomplices; it is the giving up of the political - traditions established by the great Ottoman statesmen and based - on the friendship of the two Powers that deserve most to be - glorified—England and France.” - -He shared the opinion of those who reproached the Turks with the -“atrocities committed by Greeks and Armenians”; he called upon them -“the reprobation of the world”; and he wound up his proclamation with -these words: - - “Our hatred and enmity go to the leaders who are responsible for - such doings—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices. We will - not have anything to do with such tyrants, and in communion with - all believers and all unprejudiced minds in the Ottoman Empire and - Islam throughout the world we declare our hatred and enmity towards - them, and before God we separate our cause from their cause.” - -Great Britain later on insisted upon this point—that the question of -the territorial conditions with a view to restoring peace had not been -dealt with since the beginning of 1916, except in the above-mentioned -exchange of notes. In September, 1919, in a semi-official communication -to the Press, she emphatically declared that it followed from these -documents: - -(1) That in the letter dated October 24, 1915, which formulates the -only engagement between Great Britain and the Sherif, the British -Government had not pledged itself to do anything contrary to the -Anglo-French treaty of 1916. - -(2) That no fresh engagement had been entered into by Great Britain -with the Sherif since the beginning of the negotiations that M. Georges -Picot had been directed to carry on in London to pave the way to the -treaty of 1916. For the negotiators had met for the first time on -November 23, 1915, and the last two letters exchanged in January, 1916, -added nothing to the engagements made with King Hussein in the letter -of October 24 of the previous year. - -Finally, on March 5, 1917, Hussein, now King of the Hejaz, sent an -appeal to all the Moslems of Turkey against the Ottoman Government, -which he charged with profaning the tomb of the Prophet in the course -of the operations of June, 1916. - -On October 1, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at the head of his own -victorious troops, but not with the Allied armies, after fighting all -the way from Maan to Aleppo, a distance of above 400 miles. By his -military and political activity, he had succeeded in quelling the -private quarrels between tribes, and grouping round him the Arabian -chiefs, between whom there had been much rivalry not long before, at -the same time protecting the right flank of the British army, which was -in a hazardous position. - -Without giving up his favourite scheme, he was thus brought face to -face with the Syrian question. - -Though the Arabian movement cannot be looked upon merely as the outcome -of the arrangements concluded in regard to Syria between the Allies -during the war, the latter seem at least to have brought about a state -of things which reinforced the Syrian aspirations and encouraged them -to assert themselves. - -The Syrians had once more taken advantage of the events which had -convulsed Europe, and had had their after-effects in Asia Minor, to -assert their determination to be freed from Ottoman sovereignty; and -now they hoped to bring the Peace Conference to recognise a mode of -government consistent with their political and economic aspirations. - -The suppression of the autonomy of Lebanon, the requisitions, the -administrative measures and prosecutions ordered in 1916 by Jemal Pasha -against the Syrians, who wanted Syria to be erected into an independent -State, had not succeeded in modifying the tendency which for a long -time had aimed at detaching Syria from the Ottoman Empire, and at -taking advantage of the influence France exercised in the country to -further this aim. - -In 1912 M. R. Poincaré, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly -stated before the French Chamber that the French and British -Governments shared exactly the same views concerning the Syrian -question. Yet later facts soon proved that the English policy would -necessarily conflict with French influence and try to destroy it after -turning it to her own advantage. Simultaneously the Turks saw that the -time had come to modify the existing régime. - -M. Defrance, who is now French High Commissioner in Turkey, but was -then French Consul-General at Cairo, informed the French Government -that the Ottoman Committee of decentralisation was of opinion that -Syria should become an autonomous country, governed by a Moslem prince -chosen by the people, and placed under the protection of France. - -On March 11, 1914, M. Georges Leygues again raised the Syrian question -before the French Parliament. He maintained that the axis of French -policy lay in the Mediterranean—with Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco on -one side and on the other side Syria and Lebanon, the latter being the -best spheres open to French action on account of the economic interests -and moral influence France already exercised there. And the French -Parliament granted the sums of money which were needed for developing -French establishments in the East. - -About the same time the Central Syrian Committee expressed the wish -that the various regions of Syria should be grouped into one State, -under French control. Fifteen Lebano-Syrian committees established -in various foreign countries expressed the same wish; the Manchester -committee merely asked that Syria should not be partitioned. A Syrian -congress, held at Marseilles at the end of 1918 under the presidency of -M. Franklin Bouillon, declared that for various economic and judicial -reasons France could be of great use to Syria, in case the direction of -the country should be entrusted to her. - -But the establishment of a Syrian State, whether enjoying the same -autonomy as Lebanon has had since 1864 under the guarantee of France, -England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on Italy, or being -governed in another way, was in contradiction to the arrangements -made by France and England in 1916. Though the agreement between -these two Powers has never been made public, yet it is well known -that it had been decided—contrary to the teaching of both history and -geography—that Syria should be divided into several regions. Now, the -centre of Syria, which stretches from the Euphrates to the sea, happens -to be Damascus, and this very town, according to the British scheme, -was to be included in an Arabian Confederation headed by the Hejaz. - -At the beginning of 1916, the Emir Feisal came to Paris, and, after the -conversations held in France, a satisfactory agreement seemed to have -been reached. - -The Emir Feisal was solemnly received in January, 1919, at the Hôtel -de Ville in Paris, and in the course of a reception at the Hôtel -Continental, the Croix de Guerre of the first class was presented to -the Arab chief on February 4, with the following “citation”: - - “As early as 1916, he resolutely seconded the efforts of his - father, the King of the Hejaz, to shake off the Turkish yoke and - support the Allied cause. - - “He proved a remarkable, energetic commander, a friend to his - soldiers. - - “He planned and carried out personally several important operations - against the Damascus-Medina railway, and captured El-Ouedjy and - Akaba. - - “From August, 1917, till September, 1918, he led numerous attacks - north and south of Maan, capturing several railway stations and - taking a great number of prisoners. - - “He helped to destroy the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Turkish armies by - cutting off their communications to the north, south, and west of - Deraa, and after a very bold raid he entered Damascus on October 1, - and Aleppo on the 26th with the Allied troops.” - -On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of the Ten on behalf of his -father, Hussein ibn Ali, to recognise the independence of the Arabian -peninsula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various regions of -Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He did not hesitate to remind the -members of the Conference that he was speaking in the name of a people -who had already reached a high degree of civilisation at a time when -the Powers they represented did not even exist; and at the end of the -sitting in the course of which the scheme of a League of Nations was -adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about the partition of -the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire between the Great Powers -should be definitely cancelled. - -In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria, under the pretext of using -his influence in favour of a French collaboration. He was given an -enthusiastic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian movement, -which was partly his own work, declared their hostility to any policy -that would bring about a mandate for Syria. - -On March 7 it was announced that a National Syrian Congress, sitting -at Damascus, had just proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the -Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King of Syria. - -It was reported that a declaration, issued by a second congress that -was held in the same town and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia, -had been read at the same sitting, through which the latter congress -solemnly proclaimed the independence of Irak—Mesopotamia—with the Emir -Abdullah, the Emir Feisal’s brother, as King under the regency of -another brother of his, the Emir Zeid. - -All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise in London, though -something of the kind ought to have been expected. - -In the above-mentioned document, after recalling the part played by -the Arabs in the war and the declarations made by the Allies about the -right of self-determination of peoples, the Congress declared the time -had come to proclaim the complete independence and unity of Syria, and -concluded as follows: - - “We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian nation in - every part of Syria, speaking in her name and declaring her will, - have to-day unanimously proclaimed the independence of our country, - Syria, within her natural boundaries, including Palestine, which - independence shall be complete, without any restriction whatsoever, - on the basis of a civil representative government. - - “We will take into account every patriotic wish of all the - inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of their - country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition Lebanon shall - stand aloof from any foreign influence. - - “We reject the Zionists’ claim to turn Palestine into a national - home for the Jews or a place of immigration for them. - - “We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, who has always - fought for the liberation of the country, and whom the nation looks - upon as the greatest man in Syria, as constitutional King of Syria - under the name of H.M. Feisal I. - - “We hereby proclaim the military governments of occupation hitherto - established in the three districts have now come to an end; they - shall be replaced by a civil representative government, responsible - to this Council for anything relating to the principle of the - complete independence of the country, till it is possible for - the government to convene a Parliament that shall administer the - provinces according to the principles of decentralisation.” - -The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw their troops from Syria, -and stated that the national police and administration would be fully -able to maintain order. - -To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the suggestions, or at least -refused to comply with the extreme demands, of the Nationalists of -Damascus and Palestine—whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played in these -regions the same part as the Committee of Union and Progress—for after -forming a Government of concentration, he had merely summoned one class -of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence had decreed the -mobilisation of several classes, and in agreement with General Gouraud -he had appointed administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his -cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man. Yet, whether he wished -to do so or not, whether he was an accomplice of the leaders or not, -the fact is that, after being the agent of England, he became the agent -of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in having the independence of -the Arabian countries of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of -the Hejaz. - -Thus it turned out that the foundation of an Arabian State assumed a -capital importance at the very time when the future condition of the -Ottoman Empire was under discussion. - -In the course of the interview between M. Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd -George, as the Prime Minister asked him whether he was averse to the -action of the Syrian Moslems, who had acknowledged the Emir Feisal as -King of Arabia and proclaimed an independent Moslem State unconnected -with the Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after hinting -that “this matter can well be left for settlement amongst Muslims,” -made the following statement: - - “Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard to - the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other religious - obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require us to - approach the Turks and Arabs. ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore - make peace between your brethren,’ is a Quranic injunction. We have - come here in the interests of peace and reconciliation, and propose - going to the Arabs and Turks for the same purpose. - - “Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the Khilafat - with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim that the local - centre of their Faith—namely, the ‘Island of Arabia’—should remain - inviolate and entirely under Muslim control. This is based on the - dying injunction of the Prophet himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as - its name indicates, is the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the fourth boundary - being the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes - Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly - known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula. Muslims can - acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control, whether in the shape of - mandates or otherwise, over any portion of this region. Religious - obligations, which are absolutely binding on us, require that there - at least there shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not - specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control. In order to - make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements, - sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises - independent control there. - - “But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and resources - and naval and military forces for the Khalifa, the necessity for - the utmost economy which has to rule and govern all our claims in - these matters suggests that both these requirements may easily be - satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-Arab remains, as before the war, under - the direct sovereignty of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that - if we have opportunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall - bring about a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all, - it cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such a - character that other Powers are bound to interfere.” - -Moreover, he added: - - “With regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a little while - ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with regard to the - feasibility of an adjustment between the Khalifa and the Arabs. As - I have already pointed out, there is the Quranic injunction: ‘All - Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren.’ - That is a duty laid upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session, - the All-India Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising - a delegation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia to - reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the Khilafat - as Mussulmans. No population and no territory could be so dear to - the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia. The Turks could not win such - affection from us as the Arabs do. This is the land that we want - to keep purely under Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves - want a mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound by - our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it cannot be - through antipathy against the Arabs or because of any particular - sympathy for the Turks that we desire the Khalifa’s sovereignty - over the Island of Arabia. The Turks are much farther removed from - us. Very few of us know anything of the Turkish language; very few - of us have travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large - numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to die there. So - many Mussulmans settle down and marry in Arabia; one of my own - aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever we have met Arabs on our journey—we - have had no opportunity, of course, of discussing the subject with - well-educated people, but—we have asked the class of people we have - met what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz—‘King’ - in a land where God alone is recognised as a king: nobody can ever - claim kingship there. They said his was an act that they condemned, - it was an act they did not in the least like. They considered it - to be wrong; the Arabs spoke disparagingly of it. I do not know to - what extent it may be true, but there are a number of people who - now come forward as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what - Emir Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam; - it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were for - Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very significant - that such apologies should be made now. Honestly, we have no - apprehensions that we could not reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. - This is a question which I think the Allied Council, the Peace - Conference, could very well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst - themselves. We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into - a position of subservience to the Turks.” - -Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he concluded his speech -thus: - - “That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federation as we - dream of becomes a reality—and I do not see why it should not—the - Arabs would have all the independence they require. They may - claim national independence, but they cannot forget that Islam is - something other than national, that it is supernational, and the - Khilafat must be as dear to them as it is to us. Even now the King - of the Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began - to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published in his - official organ, _Al-Qibla_, that he wanted to be called King of - the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved only for the - Khalifa.” - -M. Syud Hossain declared in his turn: - - “We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed - to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this - reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till - now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the - first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the - Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is, - from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations - with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence. - On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that - region, but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with - the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both - Arabs and Turks are Muslims.” - -Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician -troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among -the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had -gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in -favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All -these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in -favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir -Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was -proclaimed King. - -General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning -of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the -French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters -written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both -Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country, -and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress -concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish -anarchy and the riots of Mosul. - -The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much -discontent in Lebanon. - -A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government -of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus -Congress. About a thousand people were present, and the following -motions were passed unanimously: - - “1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian - Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its - frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to - collaborate with France. - - “2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the - demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its - vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the - populations. - - “3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by - the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was - never regularly constituted. - - “4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent - by Lebanon who are now in Paris. - - “5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with - the collaboration of France. - - “6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting - of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future - constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860. - - “7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the - national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white - part.” - -This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak -of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest -from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met -with Christian opposition. - -Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the -following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference: - - “Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has - had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically - against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation - established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.” - -Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at -Damascus included only extremists who worked hand in hand with the -Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the -opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and -their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground -to restore the unity of Arabia. - -On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition -of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but -disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling -of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British -officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple -French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this -movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they -were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them -in India and now logically was turning against them. - -The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to -General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did -not want them as masters and conquerors. - -The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the -boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir -Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus -Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English -in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy -the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the -junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line -leading to the Hejaz. At the same time, by way of reprisal for the -capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and -Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the -rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which -was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty. - -On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a -decree of general mobilisation. - -According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the -Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir -Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks -during the war, and later with both the English and the French after -the cessation of hostilities. - - “The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in - the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to - hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on - his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given - him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian - State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack - was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be - possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with - the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general - I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with - the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the - guarantees that were demanded. - - “I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point. - So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon. - According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the - Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy - to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, - while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone - or between the sea and the Jordan.”[42] - -As was pointed out by the _Journal des Débats_, which quoted the -preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was -quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also -have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in -mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a -consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918, -but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918, -caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals -he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any -rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the -suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and, -since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to -play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the -Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence. - -We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’ -aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude, -because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at -the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard -their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every -particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India -and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy. - -Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it -has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from -its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’s -counsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell, -too, played an influential part in that movement. - -Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was -hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no -objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened -by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus -things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the -information given by _Le Temps_ on July 20, 1920, it appeared that as -early as January, 1919— - - “The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the - Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish - Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times - travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and _vice versa_ to carry - instructions. - - “At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the - population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government - relies or will rely on us.’ - - “The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties - to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to - Cilicia by rail.” - -In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such -as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration -of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say -nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and -the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14, -addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired -on the 18th: - - “Recognition of the French mandate for Syria. - - “Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway. - - “The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and - Rayak. - - “The immediate abolition of forced recruiting. - - “Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, - 1919. - - “Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency. - - “Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers. - - “Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If - these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by - arms.” - -Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent -prevailing among the population and the differences between the various -factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two -towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon, -had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become -parts of Lebanon. - -An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the -condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the -French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British -interests in that region. - -Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he -could give any information regarding the new military action of France -in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French -to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the -Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet -been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His -Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab -Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the -decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms of the -Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered: - - “The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The - terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to - the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His - Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully, - been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the - outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider - that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their - disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government - on the matter.” - -Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again: - - “Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from - this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon - between the British and French Governments last year, and that they - have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at - Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of - hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?” - -Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information, -Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn: - - “Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these - proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly - with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact - that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention - of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause - representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?” - -Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply: - - “We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not - accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is - against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here - to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French - Government.” - -Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether the British Government -was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered: - - “The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion - the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area - was not inconsistent with that pledge.” - -Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment -of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to -British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new -hostilities in Syria. He said that first— - - “He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and - commission committed by the British Government, and more - particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank - and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed - be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply - involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs - before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and - above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the - French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know - exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how - far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those - commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far - we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific - than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the - independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by - their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an - independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, - Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate - these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible - for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand - by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we - ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for - us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, - unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had - been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come - to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were - responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the - mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council of the League - of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established - there should be no disturbance of the _status quo_ without the - willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our - greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. - The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of - British diplomacy.” - -Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir -and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France -and the Arabs: - - “As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented - the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very - well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now - that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... - Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but - the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never - allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer - of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France - had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, - on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a - Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical - traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France - had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League - of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was - absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to - be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the - Government was to make representations at once to both the French - and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted - to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.” - -Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, and owned that under -the terms of the treaty with Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, -but the whole difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum without -consulting Great Britain. According to the three speakers, England was -interested in the question, owing to her engagements with the Emir -Feisal, and the after-effects which French action might have in Syria -and the neighbouring regions. - -Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account both the section -of public opinion on behalf of which the three speakers had spoken, -and the feelings of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who -hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the arrangements which -had just been concluded, that France had the same mandate for Syria -as Great Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to prove that -the situation of England in Mesopotamia was very much the same as the -situation of France in Syria. He expressly said: - - “The real question before the House was whether the British - Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France - had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, - the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise - and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions - of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great - Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the - interests of her ally France.’ ... - - “It was said that the independence of the Arab people was - incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of - the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, - and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate - in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was - uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the _status - quo_. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, - and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was - not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of - occupation of territories in which later we should have no - interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British - troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San - Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the - French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir - Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris - he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that - territory. - - “We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French - Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and - you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are - breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, - and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking - you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with - the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in - Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an - independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by - Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be - that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we - claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It - was said that this action of the French Government was contrary - to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. - That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made - a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French - mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, - ‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly - compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities - properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only - entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form - of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the - colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French - Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the - House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, - ‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to - interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’? - - “The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours - to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that - we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace - Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any - other independent body.... - - “Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least - to assume that the French Government had something of a case for - the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which - the French described the necessity of their taking this action. - They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been - massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was - responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether - it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the - situation was one which the French Government could not allow - to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they - depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of - their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in - Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to - get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the - supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a - condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they - were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very - good case.” - -On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for -Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever -admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government, -answered: - - “They had been in communication with the French Government on that - point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention - of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been - accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’ - - “A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one - would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government. - They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war, - but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both - of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility - of King Hussein having any authority in his country.... - - “They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the - question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British - and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal - to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir - Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either - occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in - connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly - than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House - must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the - Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what - happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it - was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in - Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object, - and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic - aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was - hopeless. There was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind - and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people - than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French - Government in this matter was a very serious thing.” - -The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the -English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just -informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India -had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief -had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might -require. - -It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for -such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France -was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in -Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though -both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to -prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome -of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian -movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East -against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards -Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that -France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from -the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient -in number. - -M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French -Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and -apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had -officially recognised she had no right to meddle with Syrian affairs; -and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir -who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France -to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France -alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over -Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria. - -Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent of _The Times_ -wrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr. -Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy -in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he -could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent -them from coming to his help. - -The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last -inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, -respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir -Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in -Mesopotamia. But the _Daily Express_ of July 17 seemed apprehensive -lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and -replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during -the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of -the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the -Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian -leader. - -General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir -Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action -had been started. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had, -on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its -way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been -sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from -coming to hand the appointed day. - -The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the -doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was -that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that -guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the -east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars. -Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed -to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French -column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from -Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at -Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the -Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the -latter town. - -France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order -to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the -policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her -to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of -England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept, -might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of the -_Œuvre_, July 22, “the death of France in the East.” - -Even the Christians[43]—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to -leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the -Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama, -Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation -of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to -France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest -to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what -he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative -Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave -for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal -to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were -imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of -deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable -information from the East. - -On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of -Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as -far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed -them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the -afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering -any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of -the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them -on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King -of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs -on account of the damage done by the war bands in the western zone; -general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should -be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should -be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals -tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course, -assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to -collaborate with the French. - -The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave -the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and -sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne. - -Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria -or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria -and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French -Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed -Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the -delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The -new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along -the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des -Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and -Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area, -with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis -in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection -with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government; -Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality. -In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered all its former -territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises -made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the -claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of -Lebanon. - -Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a -mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start -with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians? -The question was all the more important as the discontent brought -about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the -neighbouring regions. - -Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the -east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between -Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the -past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal, -and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey -Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction -was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi -Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was -attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed -Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line -was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight -with Arabian bands at Mosmieh. - -Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist -troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men -consisting of French troops and native recruits, after being blockaded -at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was -short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured -by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina, -where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was -also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French -warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied -by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the -other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to -Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of -fugitives. - -In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs -evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake -Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred. - -The _Sunday Times_ of August 21, 1920, in an article in which the -attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered -whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even -by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus: - - “Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling - with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to - be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined - when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.” - -The _Observer_ too asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money -could restore the situation, and added: - - “The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when - we realise that so much blood and money has been wasted for a - lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when - we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on - people who plainly show they do not want it.” - - * * * * * - -The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from -the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the -Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the -Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics, -belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise -nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them, -the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his -spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a -religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other -dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali, -the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as -Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near -the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had -a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the -Shia as their Holy Places. - -Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s -family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious -sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their -bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to -the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of -Mesopotamia are still Shia, this schism practically divides the -Persian world from the Turkish world. - -But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for -the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat -should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, -to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman -Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his -title of Caliph to assume it themselves. - -So their case is entirely different from that of the people of -Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their -own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an -hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of -their State. - -The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and -so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in -freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople. - -Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia -that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately -asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns, -where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the -controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right -to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish, -in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the -Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present -events. - -Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his -successor in the tribe of Koreish, does not seem at all, according -to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme -spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community -related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to -this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not -yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was -the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the -fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the -interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s -death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors -to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction -to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been -guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the -Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he -would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office, -and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family. - -The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political -and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in -Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of -Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of -deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as -superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the -assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the -Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans -have a merely nominal power. - -When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz and Nejd to Syria, Ibn -Saud refused to let Nejd fall under the suzerainty of the King of the -Hejaz, who was powerful merely because he was supported by Europe and -because Syria is a rich country. Most likely the religious question -had something to do with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis, -who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support, suddenly attacked the -troops of the sons of the King of the Hejaz which were in the Taif -area, and defeated them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emir gained a few more -victories, and was about to threaten the Holy Cities when the rising of -the Orthodox Moslem tribes compelled him to retreat. - -So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose independence was threatened -by the Sunnis of the Hejaz, whom they look upon as heretics, still -embittered the dissensions in the Arab world. - -It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement was at first started -by the Turks, which would not have been unlikely at a time when it was -Turkey’s interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties to -the Allies after the Sherif’s treason; but now it was no longer her -interest—and it was beyond her power—to stir up an agitation. - -The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria in the eighth century, -and played an important part in the East till the twelfth century, have -also broken off with the Shia. - -Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of Lebanon and the greater -part of Anti-Lebanon between Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean, -profess the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at the beginning -of the eleventh century. They had withdrawn to Lebanon and long -repelled the attacks of the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged -only in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but practically -they have remained almost independent. They have often fought with the -Maronite Christians living to the north, especially in 1860, and there -is still much hostility between them. - -Moreover, all Moslem communities, without exception—whether the -communities governed by independent national sovereigns such as -Afghanistan; or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem Powers -such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara; or the communities living -under a non-Moslem rule, as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia, -and also India and China—give their allegiance to the Sultan as Caliph, -though they are always at liberty to refuse it. Even the Moslem -communities of Algeria and Tunis, which are connected with those of -Morocco by their common origin and language, and live close by them, -do not deem it a sufficient reason to recognise the Emir of Morocco as -Caliph that he is a descendant of the Prophet. - -An even more striking argument is that the community of the Hejaz, -which rebelled against Turkish sovereignty during the war and has -made itself politically independent, still maintains its religious -allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King, Hussein, who is the -most authentic descendant of the Prophet, and who rules over the two -holiest towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the armistice -addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious allegiance drawn up -in the most deferential terms. The possession of Mecca and Medina -being one of the attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a -great religious and political importance owing to the great annual -pilgrimage, King Hussein might have taken advantage of this to dispute -with the Sultan the title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him -to do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then the British -Government, giving up all hope of bringing about the transference of -the Caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded -a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din. - -Considering the intricate situation in the East due to the variety -of races and religions, and the movements of all sorts by which the -populations of those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise -to increase the general restlessness by a vain intervention of -the Powers, and to dismember what remains of Turkey in Europe and -Aria Minor, a dismemberment which would necessarily have violent -repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem world. Though -the recent movements of emancipation in the East to a certain extent -meet the legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat cleared -the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously most perilous to -infringe upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, to endeavour to drive away the -Turks into Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam by -compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to give up their cherished -independence and submit to an Arab imperialism which would soon become -British imperialism. At the present moment all the Moslem elements are -determined to unite together against any enemy of their liberty; and -all Moslems, without any distinction of creed or race, might very well -one day flock to the standard of a bold leader who should take up arms -in the name of Islam, in order to safeguard their independence. - - * * * * * - -These movements, and many other similar ones, were encouraged and -strengthened by the development of the principle of nationalities and -the support given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carrying it -out to its strictly logical consequences, without paying heed to the -limitations imposed by the present material and political conditions. -But we do not think it is true to say, as has been urged, that the -assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples was the initial -cause of these movements. The movement in favour of the rights of -nationalities originated long before Mr. Wilson’s declarations, which -merely hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused it to swerve -somewhat from its original direction. - -This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to proceed—though other -factors have intervened in it—from a kind of reaction against the -standardising tendency, from a material and moral point of view, of -modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-Saxon civilisation, -and also from a reaction against the extreme unification aimed at by -russifying the numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire. -Modern civilisation, having reached its present climax, has aimed—and -its political and social repercussions have had the same influence—at -doing away with all differences between human minds and making the -world homogeneous; thus all men would have been brought to live in the -same way, to have the same manners, and their requirements would have -been met in the same way—to the very great advantage of its enormous -industrial development. Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human -nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions and perturbations -experienced by the States, and a reaction set in among those who -hitherto only aimed at enslaving various human groups, or linked them -together politically in a most artificial way. Then the same feeling -spread among all those peoples. - -All this enables us to see to what extent this movement is legitimate, -and to know exactly what proportions of good and evil it contains. - -It rightly asserts that various peoples have different natures, and -by protecting their freedom, it aims at ensuring the development of -their peculiar abilities. For let us not forget that the characters of -peoples depend on physical conditions, that even the features we may -not like in some peoples are due to the race, and that if, by blending -and mixing populations nowadays these features are modified, they are -generally altered only from bad to worse. - -But this principle is true only so far as it frees and enables to shape -their own destinies peoples who have distinctive qualities of their -own and are able to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended—as -has been attempted in some cases—to States within which men descending -from various races or having belonged in the course of centuries to -different nationalities have long been united, and through a long -common history and a centuries-old co-operation have formed one nation. -This is one of the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson’s conception, and -one of the bad consequences it has entailed. - -The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, which the British -wished for but which they dared not carry into effect, does not thwart -the scheme of the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a -reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign intervention, and -thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian movement. Though this movement cannot -carry out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously must urge -those populations to constitute a State based both on the community -of religion and the community of race of its various elements, and -from which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled—viz., Slavs, -Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were all an inherent source of -weakness to the Turkish Empire. This new State would include Anatolia, -Russian Azerbaïjan, and Persian Azerbaïjan, the Russian territories -in Central Asia—viz., Russian Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara—the whole of -the region of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations of -the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan would necessarily be -attracted. - -As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able to gain their -friendship, though they have done their best to do so, and have drawn -but little profit from the money squandered plentifully in their -vast deserts. And the Russians have always stood in the way of an -understanding between Turkey and the Arabian territories, because -it would have benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would have -hindered both their own designs on the territories of Asia Minor and -the ambitions of the Orthodox Church. Yet to the Turks as well as the -Arabs—and even to the Europeans—it would be a great advantage not to -injure the understanding and goodwill that Islam engenders among these -peoples, since its creed has both a religious and a political aspect. - -The maintenance of this Islamic union has been wrongly called—in the -disparaging sense of the word—Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing -in common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, -Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism, Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all -imperialistic doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military -or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their own religious -creeds and the extension of the influence of their Churches. While -Pan-Germanism aims at the hegemony of the world; while Pan-Americanism -wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-Slavism wishes to -gather together all the Slavonic elements—which is defensible—but also -means to supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe, which it -considers as “rotten,” and to renovate the world; while Pan-Polism, -which has not such ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism, -to conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater Poland or -Greater Greece—Islam, which does not try to make any proselytes, has -no other ambition than to group all Moslem elements according to the -commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having both a political and a -religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic concept might be defensible, and would -be legitimate from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot be so -from the Christian point of view. Pan-Catholicism, on the contrary, is -an impossible thing, because Christianity does not imply a political -doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power—though such a doctrine -has sometimes been advocated. For in the doctrine of monarchy, -especially in France, religion has always been held merely as a help, -a support, and the monarch, though he has often been a defender of the -Faith, has never looked upon his power as dependent on the Papacy or -bound up with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself in, -and give birth to, a huge political movement—a Pan-Islamic movement -in the imperialistic sense of the word—aiming at constituting a huge -theocratic State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are now -living. But there is between all Moslems a deep moral solidarity, a -mighty religious bond which accounts for their sympathetic feeling -towards Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem inhabitants of -countries which have lost their independence still earnestly defend and -jealously maintain the privileges and dignity of the Caliph. - -So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs of Islam, and the -mistake has been made wilfully. Those who profess such an opinion are -Pan-Slavic Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the world as -to their true intent, and thus prepare for territorial annexations, -because Pan-Slavism is the enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has -always been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe, it is -the interest of the latter, in order to defend its civilisation, not -to fight against Islamism, but even to support it. This necessity has -been understood by many Catholics who have always been favourable to -Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accounts for the long friendly -intercourse between Moslems and Catholics, and the Moslems’ tolerance -toward the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is in complete -contradiction to their own faith. On the other hand, Islam appears as -counterbalancing Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future -of thought and morality and of any culture would be endangered if the -60 million Indian Moslems and the 220 million Indian Brahminists, -Buddhists, and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr. Lloyd -George and were connected with Protestantism. - -Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the audience that he granted -in July, 1920, to Prince Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission -to Arabia, before his departure, after saying that the Moslem world -resented the hostile attitude of the Powers towards the Sultan of -Constantinople, declared that the Moslems are not actuated by any -feeling of conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right to -preserve their independence. - - -Footnotes: - - 36: _Hayassdan_, July 6, 1915; No. 25. - - 37: We are the more anxious to correct these figures as in 1916, - at a time when it was difficult to control them, we gave about - the same figures in a note to the Société d’Anthropologie as to - the demographic consequences of the war. We then relied upon the - documents that had just been published and on the statements of the - Rev. Harold Buxton. - - 38: _Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes_ (Paris, 1919). - - 39: _The Times_, March 15, 1920. - - 40: H. Vambéry. _Cagataische Sprachstudien_ (Leipzig, 1867); - _Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Turko-Tatarischen Sprachen_ - (Leipzig, 1875); _Das Turkenvolk_ (1885). - - 41: Léon Cahun, _Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie, Turcs et - Mongols, des origines à 1405_ (Paris, 1896). - - 42: Liman von Sanders, _Fünf Jahre Türkei_, pp. 330-331. - - 43: _Le Temps_, July 21, 1920. - - - - -VIII - -THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY - - -The Supreme Council, in the course of one of its last sittings, -decided in January, 1920, practically to recognise the independence of -Georgia,[44] Azerbaïjan, and Armenia. - -It is deeply to be regretted that this decision came so late, for, -considering the circumstances under which it was taken, it seemed to -have been resorted to _in extremis_ and under the Bolshevist threat. - -It was even announced, then denied, that the Allies were going to send -contingents to the Caucasus in order to check the Bolshevist advance -towards Armenia, Turkey, Persia, and possibly towards Mesopotamia and -India. But under the present circumstances, the Allies were not likely -now to get all the benefit they might have derived from this measure if -it had been taken long ago; and, on the other hand, this measure was -not likely to produce any effect if the new States were not recognised -definitely and could not rely on the Allies’ moral and material support. - -Since Georgia, Azerbaïjan, and Armenia seemed to have been recognised -as independent States, in order to incite them to check the Reds’ -advance, how was it that the Republic of Northern Caucasus had not been -treated similarly? The reason given by the Supreme Council was that, as -the greater part of this State was occupied by Denikin’s forces, it did -not think it proper to take a decision about it. The true reason was -that the Supreme Council wanted to favour the Pan-Russian general, and -it was even rumoured that Koltchak and Denikin had demanded this rich -country to be set aside for the Tsar, whom they wanted to restore to -the throne. - -Out of the 25 or 30 million Moslems living in the whole of Russia, 6 -or 8 millions were scattered in the region of the Volga (Orenburg, -Kazan) and in the Crimea; they were about 6 millions in Turkistan -and 7 millions in the Caucasus region; about 2 millions in Northern -Caucasus, 300,000 to 500,000 in Kuban, 600,000 in Georgia, 3,500,000 in -Azerbaïjan. Half the population is Moslem in the new Armenian State, -for only in two districts are the Armenians in a majority, the Tatars -being in a majority in the others. It should be borne in mind that all -these Moslems, after the downfall of Tsardom, had turned their hopes -towards the Allies, especially England, to safeguard their political -independence. Unfortunately neither Great Britain nor France paid any -heed to the repeated entreaties of M. Haidar Bammate, then Minister of -Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Caucasus, or later on to -the appeals of the Georgian statesmen. - -This omission appears all the more unaccountable if we remember -that the Allies, by settling the fate of Armenia on this occasion, -encroached upon the Turkish question and confused it with the Russian -question, which was already intricate enough; and as it is clear that -another obvious reason for the Allies’ decision was to befriend the -Moslem populations of those regions, that they might not join the -Bolshevist cause, why then had Christian Armenia been included in the -aforesaid settlement, while Northern Caucasus had been excluded from -it? Of course, it is not to be regretted that Armenia benefited by the -Allies’ decision, but it is impossible logically to explain how it came -to be included in their measure on account of its close relations with -Georgia and Azerbaïjan, when, as a matter of fact, the latter republics -want to form a close union with Caucasus. It was quite as urgent, -therefore, to recognise the Republic of Northern Caucasus as the other -three countries. - -Moreover, as the Allies wanted to keep Bolshevism out of Transcaucasia, -it seemed obvious that their first measure, from a military point of -view, should have been to hold a strong position in the Caucasus Range, -whose slopes were being lapped by the Red tide, and to organise its -defence. - -Indeed, the key to the defence of Transcaucasia lies to the north of -the Caucasus Range. Four passes, crossing the mountains from the north -to the south, give access to it: the defile of Sukhum; the road leading -from Alatyr to Kutaris; the Georgian military road from Vladikavkaz to -Tiflis; lastly, the gates of Derbent, along the Caspian Sea. Only the -first of these defiles was held by the Georgians; the other three were -in the hands of the mountaineers, “the Gortsy”—viz., the Chechens, the -Ossetes, the Ingushes, the Kabardians, and the Daghestanians, who make -up the Republic of Northern Caucasus. It was easy for the mountaineers -to set up a first line of defence on the Rivers Terek and Malka, which -constitute a good strategic position, a second line before the defiles, -and, should some detachments venture across the latter, they would be -quickly stopped by the mountaineers. If, on the contrary, nothing was -done, the Bolshevists could easily cross the defiles and destroy the -Batum-Baku railway. These tribes, who had displayed so much energy -sixty years ago for the conquest of their liberty, had fought against -the Bolshevists from November, 1917, till February, 1919; so they had a -right to expect the Allies would support their claims. - -Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the same manœuvre to -which it was indebted for its failure on the Baltic coast, and which -repeatedly deferred a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies -refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States definitely, and -even tried to restore Russia to its former state; they even urged the -Baltic States, till Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been defeated, -to carry on the onerous struggle they had undertaken and to make all -sacrifices of men and money to capture Petrograd, which they were not -eager to do, as they would have merely paved the way to the coming of -the Pan-Russian generals. - -The Allies made a similar mistake when they indirectly asked the -mountaineers of Caucasus, who wanted to be independent, to attack the -Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would recognise their -independence. Of course, the mountaineers refused to play such a part, -for they risked finding themselves confronted one day or another with a -Russia that would despise their national aspirations and would oppress -them. - -The situation could have been saved and the balance between the States -on the confines of the Russian Empire could have been restored only -by a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples, after their -independence should have been recognised; the representatives of -Georgia and Azerbaïjan agreed on this point with the representatives -of Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to help each other -mutually. - -In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme Council to which -the delegates of Georgia and Azerbaïjan had been invited, the latter -declared “that the mountaineers were brave, that they had constituted -some of the best units of the former Russian army, and were bent upon -stopping the Bolshevists, but they lacked arms and ammunition.” - -Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies could not possibly ignore -these peoples’ determination and turn a deaf ear to their earnest -request, yet they took no decision. - -With regard to the Moslem question this attitude of the Conference, -which seemed bent upon ignoring Northern Caucasus, was equally -strange, for it was bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem -populations. It was the more unaccountable as the Bolshevists, who set -up as protectors of these populations, had sent many emissaries among -them, who could not but derive profit from the Allies’ attitude. The -Bolshevists had, of course, immediately recognised Daghestan a Moslem -State. - -Nor had the Republic of Northern Caucasus any reason to be satisfied -with the attitude assumed by the British mission sent to Baku, for -this mission had constantly supported General Denikin, and seemed to -endeavour to destroy the economic and political Caucasian union it had -formed with Georgia and Azerbaïjan. The only theory which accounts for -the British attitude is that the English meant to remain masters of -Baku, and to leave the Russians the oil-field of Groznyi in Northern -Caucasus, the output of which was already important before the war, and -would certainly increase. But they were mistaken in thinking that the -petroleum of Groznyi, which was partly used as fuel by the Vladikavkaz -railway and partly sent to the Black Sea ports to be sold to Western -Europe, was utilised in Central Russia; it is chiefly the petroleum of -the Baku area, lying farther south, which is easily conveyed to Russia -across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga. - -Again, the Allies ought to have taken into account that the troublous -state into which the Moslem world had been thrown by the settlement -of the Turkish question as it was contemplated by the Peace -Conference might have most important reactions in all directions on -the populations of the former Russian Empire which now wanted to be -independent. - -Yet the claims which the delegations of the Republics of Georgia and -Azerbaïjan—together with Northern Caucasus—had set forth in January in -the course of their reception by the Supreme Council concerning the -support they might expect from the Great Powers in case they should -be attacked by the Soviets, brought forth no answer; and the Allies -adjourned both the question of the defence of the Transcaucasian -Republics and the question of their independence. - -In consequence of all this, Northern Caucasus soon fell a prey to -Bolshevism, and some insurrections broke out in Georgia. The Soviet -Government sent a great many agitators to these regions. Then the Red -army advanced in two columns, one of which defeated Denikin and crossed -the Kuban to invade Caucasus, and the other spread over Kurdistan, -whence, after winning over to its cause the Tatar and pro-Russian -elements of the neighbouring regions, it extended its field of action -as far as Persia and Mesopotamia. - -As early as February the Russian Bolshevists concentrated important -forces near the northern frontier of Azerbaïjan under pretence of -driving away the remnants of Denikin’s army, and after hurriedly -getting up a “Soviet Government” at Daghestan, drew near the frontier -of Azerbaïjan. - -Meanwhile their agents carried on an energetic propaganda at Baku, -where the inexperienced Moslem leaders of Azerbaïjan had foolishly -left almost all the administration of the country in the hands of -functionaries of the old régime or Russian officers who thought that -Bolshevism, especially with the national character it had newly -assumed, might restore Russia to its former state. - -Within the country an economic crisis on the one hand, and on the -other hand the Armenians’ aggressions, in the course of which they -had massacred many Mussulmans, especially at Karabagh, had raised a -widespread discontent against the Cabinet. - -Emboldened by the success of the Bolshevists, who benefited by these -disturbances, their local accomplices, some Russian workmen supported -by about a hundred Moslem workmen, helped to organise a series of -raids. During the night of April 26-27 the northern frontier of -Azerbaïjan was crossed at the railway station of Jalama by a Bolshevist -armoured train, for the main body of the army of Azerbaïjan had been -dispatched to Karabagh and Kasakg to repel an Armenian attack, so that -only one armoured train and a few hundred soldiers had been left on the -northern frontier. This small detachment could not prevent the advance -of the Red forces which followed the train, though it did its duty -bravely and destroyed the railway track. On April 27 the Bolshevist -forces reached the station of Khatchmaz, where they were greeted by a -group of local communists. - -At Baku, where the population lived in a state of indifference and -passivity, the local communists, encouraged by the advance of the -Russian Bolshevists, addressed an ultimatum to the Government, which -had declared itself in favour of armed resistance, demanding the -resignation of the Cabinet and the handing over of the Government to -the revolutionary committee which had just been formed. This ultimatum -was enforced by the threat of the bombardment of the town by the fleet -of the Caspian Sea. - -The Government, which had vainly asked Georgia for assistance, and had -proposed to Armenia, before the common danger, to put an end to the -hostilities at Karabagh in order to withdraw its troops and dispatch -them to the northern frontier, was compelled on April 28 to hand over -the power to the people’s commissioners. The members of the Cabinet, -against whom the Bolshevists had issued a writ of arrest, hurried away -and the communists immediately resorted to their usual methods of -terrorism and plunder. - -Instead of the “Moslem Brethren” the Bolshevist emissaries had spoken -of, the inhabitants of Baku saw some Russian Bolshevists, accompanied -by Armenians who had been expelled by the former Government, take -possession of the town. As soon as they arrived, the latter arrested -all the foreign missions, except the Persian mission. As the national -army was detained on the southern frontier by constant Armenian -attacks, the invaders dispatched Russian detachments in all directions, -to take possession of the entire country. They addressed an ultimatum -to Armenia, demanding the evacuation of Karabagh. At the same time -Russian forces were sent via Zakatali towards the Georgian frontier. -At Baku the Moslem militia was replaced by Russian workmen, and at -the same time orders were given immediately to disarm the population -of Ganjha (Elisavetpol), where the governor and some notables were -arrested and incarcerated. - -It is reported that at Ganjha 15,000 Moslems were slaughtered by the -Reds. - -A correspondent of _Il Secolo_, on coming back from Caucasus, wrote an -article entitled “The East on Fire” on May 25, 1920: - - “The information that we have just received from Constantinople, - Anatolia, Caucasus, and Persia could not possibly be worse. - Bolshevism has won over Caucasus to its policy, and from Baku it - is carrying on a more and more energetic propaganda in Persia and - Turkistan. The British are already fighting in the latter country - with Bolshevism. All this might have been foreseen. - - “As it is cut off from Europe and encircled by hostile bayonets, - Bolshevism, which originated in Asia, is now spreading over Asia. - This does not mean that Caucasus and Asia are ripe for a revolution - of the poor against the rich. It would be a foolish thing to say - this. In Asia everybody is poor, but nobody starves. In Asia - there is no industry, there are no organisations; therefore, - there is no socialist movement on the whole. But anybody who has - been to Caucasus lately must necessarily have noticed, to his - great surprise, evidences of a Moslem Bolshevism headed by Enver - Pasha and his brother Noury. The Republic of the mountaineers of - Daghestan, the first that joined the Bolshevist movement and made - easier the advance of the Reds towards the south, is headed by - Enver Pasha. In Azerbaïjan many fanatic admirers of Russia are to - be met with. - - “And what are the reasons for this? They are many. First, the - desperate condition of the new States which came into being - immediately after the Brest-Litovsk peace. In Paris the Conference - laid down frontiers, but never thought the first thing to do was to - put an end to the economic crisis prevailing in those countries. - And so an absurd thing happened—wealthy countries living in - frightful misery, and issuing paper currency which was of no value - on the world’s markets. Typical is the case of Azerbaïjan, which - had millions of tons of petroleum at Baku, but did not know where - or how to export them.” - -In July it was announced that the situation of the Moslems in Armenia -had become critical, as for the last two months the Erivan Government -and the “Tashnak” party had been carrying on a policy of violence and -massacres against them. What remained of the Moslem populations had -been compelled to leave their homes and property and flee to Persia. -The Armenian Government had even appointed a Commission especially -to draw up a list of the crops left by the Moslems and the Greeks in -the district. At the end of June, in the district of Zanguibazar, -about twenty Moslem villages had been destroyed by bombardments and -their inhabitants put to death. By that time the Moslem population -of Transcaucasia was being attacked both by the Armenians and the -Bolshevists. - -M. Khan-Khoiski, ex-Prime Minister, and Dr. H. Aghaef, former -Vice-President of the Parliament of Azerbaïjan, were assassinated at -Tiflis, where they had sought refuge, the former on June 19 and the -latter on July 19, by Armenians belonging to the “Tashnak” party, of -which the leader of the Armenian Government and most Ministers are -members. - -This murder of the leaders of Azerbaïjan, who carried on the war -against the invaders of their country, served the Bolshevist cause, but -aroused much resentment among the Moslems of Azerbaïjan and Georgia, -who were exasperated by the Bolshevists’ frightful tyranny and now -hated Bolshevism as much as they had formerly hated Tsardom. - -The delegation of Azerbaïjan handed to the Spa Conference a note in -which they drew its attention to the condition of their country. On the -other hand, the members of the former Cabinet made energetic efforts -to rid their country of the Bolshevist invasion. For this purpose they -sent delegates to Daghestan and Northern Caucasus to plan a common -resistance, as Daghestan, the tribes of the mountains of Northern -Caucasus, and Azerbaïjan were on friendly terms and shared the same -views. By this time a small part of the Red armies still occupied -the Baku area, whence the Bolshevists sent reinforcements to the -detachments fighting in Persia. - -About the same time it was announced that Enver Pasha had been -appointed commander-in-chief of the Bolshevist forces advancing towards -India, and the Bolshevist troops in Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, -and Turkistan had been put under his command. In this way the Soviets -probably sought to compel England to make peace with Russia at once. - -At Tabriz a separatist movement was beginning to make itself felt with -a view to bringing about the union of Persian Azerbaïjan, of which this -town is the centre, with the Republic of Azerbaïjan, the capital of -which is Baku. - -All this Bolshevist activity naturally caused much anxiety among those -who closely watched the development of Eastern events, for Soviet -Russia in another way and with different aims merely carried on the -work of Russian imperialism both in order to hold Great Britain in -check in the East and to give the whole world the benefit of the Soviet -paradise. As the Allied policy with regard to Turkey had roused the -whole of Islam, the union of the Bolshevist elements and the Turkish -Nationalists seemed inevitable when the question of the future fate of -Caucasus should be settled. It was only too much to be feared, after -what had just taken place in Azerbaïjan, that Soviet Russia, feeling -it necessary to get the start of the Turkish Nationalists, would try -to take possession of Georgia now she held Azerbaïjan, as a guarantee -both against the hostility of England and against the opposition that -might sooner or later arise on the Turkish side. It then appeared that -the Turkish Nationalists had come to a merely provisional agreement -with the Russian Bolshevists to disengage themselves on the Russian -side, and secure their help against Europe, which threatened Turkey; -and that, on the contrary, the Angora Government, some members of -which are Chechens and Ossetes, when brought face to face with the old -historical necessities, would be one day compelled to resort to the old -policy of defending the Moslem world against the Slavonic world. For -notwithstanding the inherent incompatibility between the minds of these -two peoples, the Allied policy, through its blunders, had achieved -the paradoxical result of making a Russo-Turkish alliance temporarily -possible, and to bring together the Moslems—so unresponsive as a rule -to the idle verbiage and subversive tendencies of revolutionists—and -the Bolshevist Slavs, who were still their political enemies. And so it -turned out that the attitude assumed by the various European Powers in -regard to the Turkish problem and the solution that was to eventuate -were prominent factors in the future relations between each of those -Powers and Asia. Now the Turks, who alone are able to bring about an -understanding between the Moslems of Caucasus and those of Asia, are -also the only people who can bring about a lasting peace in that part -of the confines of Europe and Asia, and settle the relations between -those Moslem populations and the West. - - -Footnote: - - 44: Since the French edition of this book was published, Georgia - was recognised, _de jure_, by the Supreme Council in January, 1921. - - - - -IX - -TURKEY AND THE SLAVS - - -Through a singular aberration, the dismemberment of Turkey and the -Turks’ eviction from Europe were being advocated at a time when the -idea of the restoration of Russia had not yet been given up, for the -various States now detached from the former Russian Empire had not -yet been definitely recognised; and among the promoters or supporters -of this policy were many defenders of old Russia under a more or less -transparent disguise. - -Though, from the point of view of European policy, the situation of -the two countries widely differed, by dismembering Turkey before the -Russian question was settled, at least in its solvable part—viz., with -regard to the heterogeneous peoples—the Allies made a mistake of the -same kind, or at least of the same magnitude, as the one they had made -when they dismembered the Dual Monarchy and yet did not destroy German -unity, or rather Prussian hegemony. - -Russia had already taken possession of several Turkish territories, and -not so long ago she plainly declared she had not given up her ambitious -designs on Constantinople. - -This open hostility of the Russians toward the Turks is of very long -standing. - -The first Russian attacks against Turkey, as explained in the early -part of this book, date back to 1672. After the victory of Poltava, -in 1709, which the next year gave him Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia, -Peter the Great turned against the Turks, the allies of Charles XII, -King of Sweden. But Charles XII, who had sought shelter at Bender, in -Turkey, after the battle of Poltava, brought over the Grand Vizier -Baltaji Mohammed to his views, and induced him to declare war on -Turkey. Peter the Great, encircled by the Turks at Hush, between the -Pruth and the marshes, was going to capitulate when Catherine I, in -order to save him, made peace by bribing the Grand Vizier, who soon -after was exiled to Mytilene. The Turks only demanded the restitution -of Azov in 1711. In 1732 Peter the Great took from Persia the provinces -of Daghestan, Derbend, Shirwan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. At that time, -while Villeneuve was ambassador at Constantinople (1728-41) and Austria -and Russia began to turn greedy eyes on Turkey, France declared “the -existence of Turkey was necessary to the peace of Christendom,” and -later on Choiseul-Gouffier, who was the French king’s last ambassador -from 1784 to 1792, strove to save the Turks from the ambitious designs -of Catherine II. - -Catherine, taking advantage of the intrigues carried on in the Morea -with two Greeks, Papas-Oghlou and Benaki, dispatched a fleet to the -Mediterranean to bring about a Greek rising against Turkey; the Ottoman -fleet which sought shelter at Tchesmé, on the coast of Asia Minor, was -burnt by Russian fireships on July 7, 1770. - -After the 1770-74 war, the Porte, which was Poland’s ally, lost -Bukovina and Lesser Tatary, whose independence was recognised by the -treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji on July 21, 1774, but which became a Russian -province in 1783. The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji ceded Kinburn and -Yenikale to Russia, left to the Christians the principalities lying to -the north of the Danube, and guaranteed the Orthodox Greeks’ liberty -under the patronage of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. -Catherine II also compelled the Turks by the same treaty not to defend -the independence of Poland, threatened by Russia with the complicity of -the Great Powers, and to give her a right of intervention in their home -affairs. The Tatars of the Crimea and Kuban, detached from Turkey, soon -after fell under the Russian sway, in 1783. The Sultan even had to sign -a treaty granting a right of free navigation in the Black Sea and in -the rivers of his empire. - -About the same time the European Powers began to interfere in -Turkey: that was the beginning of the “Eastern question.” In -opposition to the Austro-Russian alliance of Catherine and Joseph II, -England, dissatisfied with Russia’s attitude in the American War of -Independence, and wishing to find allies in Germany to counterbalance -Russian influence in Europe, concluded an alliance with Prussia, -Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. The death of Frederic II soon put an end to -this coalition, and Russia’s unfriendly attitude, her encroachments in -Caucasus, and her territorial claims in Bessarabia, compelled Turkey -on August 16, 1787, to declare war on Catherine, and Joseph II entered -into the war in 1788. The Austrians took Khotin; the Turkish fleet was -destroyed at Otchakov; Belgrade fell on October 8, 1789. Then Leopold, -Joseph II’s brother, left the Turks and made peace with Turkey at -Sistova on August 4, 1791. The Russians, who had defeated the Turks -at Machin, were about to invade the Empire when, as a result of the -intervention of England and Prussia, a treaty of peace was signed at -Jassy, by which the Dniester became the new frontier between the two -States. Thus Russia, who owing to the perturbed state of Europe was -preparing to dismember Poland, was compelled to give up her dream of -restoring the Byzantine Empire. - -After the 1809-12 war, Turkey lost the provinces lying between the -Dnieper and the Danube which were ceded to Russia by the treaty of -Bukharest. - -Russia, who, by the convention of Akkerman in October, 1826, -had compelled Turkey to recognise the autonomy of Serbia and -Moldo-Wallachia and cede her the ports of the coast of Circassia -and Abkasia, declared war on her again on April 26, 1828, after the -manifesto she had issued to her Moslem subjects on December 28, -1827. The Russians took Braila, advanced as far as Shumla, captured -Varna, and laid siege to Silistria, but the plague and food shortage -compelled them to make a disastrous retreat. In Asia they took Kars, -Akhalzikel, and Bayazid. The next year they entered Erzerum; Diebitch -captured Silistria, outflanked the Grand Vizier’s army shut up in -Shumla, crossed the Balkan mountains, and laid siege to Adrianople. On -September 14, 1820, Turkey signed a treaty in the latter town, which -put Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia under Russian protectorate, and by -which she ceded to Russia all the coast of Transcaucasia, granted her -the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and promised to -pay a war contribution of 137 million francs. - -In 1833 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who, not having been able to -obtain the Morea through the Powers’ support, wanted to capture Syria, -defeated the Turks at Konia and threatened Constantinople. The Tsar, -Nicholas I, who hoped he could turn Turkey into a kind of Russian -protectorate, then sent Mouraviev to Mahmoud to offer to put at his -disposal a fleet and an army to fight with Mehemet Ali. A Russian fleet -came and cast anchor before Constantinople, and a Russian detachment -landed in the town. But then France, Austria, and Prussia, perhaps -foreseeing the danger of a Russian occupation which might pave the -way to a definite possession, asked the Sultan to make the necessary -concessions to his vassal, and the latter to accept them. The treaty of -Kutahia, signed on May 4, 1833, gave the Pasha of Egypt the whole of -Syria and the province of Adana. Russia withdrew her troops, but did -not lay down arms, and thus Count Orlov compelled the Porte to sign -the treaty of Unkiar-i-Skelessi, which stipulated an offensive and -defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey, and the closing of the -Dardanelles to the other Powers. Turkey was now under Russian tutelage. - -After the defection of Ahmed Pasha, who led the Turkish fleet -at Alexandria, Great Britain, lest Russia should establish her -protectorate over Turkey, offered to France, through Lord Palmerston, -to participate in a naval demonstration, but France declined -the offer. Metternich then suggested a conference between the -representatives of the five Great Powers, in order to substitute their -guarantee for a Turkish protectorate. On July 27, 1839, the ambassadors -handed the Sublime Porte a note communicating their agreement, and -advising that no definite decision should be taken without their -co-operation. Then England, having no further fear of Russian -intervention, turned against Mehemet Ali, and Baron de Brunov even -proposed an Anglo-Russian agreement. - -Owing to the intervention of Austria, which was averse to a war with -France, the question of Egypt was only settled on July 13, 1841, by -a hatti-sherif, which gave Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of -Egypt, and by the treaty of London, which guaranteed the neutrality -of the Straits, as Russia wanted to control the Straits and conquer -Constantinople to free the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula from -the so-called Ottoman tyranny, and “relight the tapers which had been -put out by the Turks” in St. Sophia, restored to Orthodoxy. France, -following the old traditions of her foreign policy and in agreement -with England, confined the Russians within the Black Sea by the -convention of the Straits in 1841, and thus secured, not the integrity, -but the existence of the Turkish Empire. - -But the Tsar, Nicholas I, who was bent on defending the Greek faith -within the Ottoman Empire, was anxious to see Turkey pursue the work -of the Tanzimat—_i.e._, the new régime—confirmed by the promulgation -by Abdul Mejid of the hatti-sherif of Gulhané on November 3, 1839. In -1844 he made overtures concerning the partition of Turkey, to England, -to which the latter country turned a deaf ear. Thanks to the support of -Great Britain and France, the Turkish troops, which had been sent to -Moldavia and Wallachia after the riots which had broken out after the -revolution, compelled the Tsar in 1849-51 to withdraw his army beyond -the Pruth. - -In 1850 France protested against the encroachments of Russia in the -East, who, in order to protect the Greek monks living in Palestine and -secure her own religious domination, wanted to deprive the Roman monks -of their time-honoured rights over the Christian sanctuaries. - -In 1853 the Tsar sent Prince Menshikov to Constantinople in order to -demand a formal treaty granting the Greek Church religious independence -and temporal privileges. The Sublime Porte, backed by France and -England, rejected the ultimatum. The latter Powers then sent a -fleet to the Dardanelles, and the next month—on July 4, 1853—Russia -occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. At the instigation of Austria, the -Powers assembled at Vienna on the 24th of the same month drew up a -conciliatory note, which was rejected by Russia. Then the English -fleet sailed up the Dardanelles, and on October 4 Turkey declared war -on Russia. Austria tried again, at the Vienna Conference which she -reopened in December, 1853, to bring about an understanding between -Russia and Turkey. But Nicholas I declared that he meant to treat -only with England and Prussia to restore peace in the East, which -Turkey looked upon as an affront. He also rejected Napoleon III’s -mediation on January 29, 1854, and the Franco-English summons on -February 27, upon which France declared war on him. Notwithstanding -the political views which unfortunately are still held by most of the -present diplomatists, and in pursuance of which the Powers had already -checked Mehemet Ali’s success and prevented Turkey resuming her former -state, France and England realised the dangerous consequences of the -Russian threat and backed Turkey. In consequence of the manœuvres of -Austria and the unwillingness of Prussia, who had declared “she would -never fight against Russia,” the Allies, who were at Varna, instead -of attacking the principalities, decided to launch into the Crimean -expedition. Finally, after the ultimatum drawn up by Austria, to which -the Emperor Alexander submitted at the instigation of Prussia, a treaty -of peace signed in Paris on March 30, 1856, recognised the integrity -of Turkey, abolished the Russian protectorate over the principalities, -and guaranteed the independence of Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, -under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Our diplomats seem then -to have partly realised the extent of the danger constituted by the -Slavs, and to have understood that the Turks, by driving back the Slavs -and keeping them away from Western and Mediterranean Europe since the -fourteenth century, had enabled Western civilisation to develop. - -As the influence of France in Turkey was imperilled after her defeat -in 1870, Russia took advantage of this to declare she would no longer -submit to the most important clauses of the London treaty of March -13, 1871. Russia, whose ambassador in Turkey at that time was General -Ignatiev, took in hand the cause of the independence of the Bulgarian -Church, for which, in 1870, she had obtained the creation of a national -exarchate with its own hierarchy, which had exasperated the Phanar at -Constantinople and brought about deadly encounters between Turks and -Bulgarians. - -In 1875 Russia, alarmed at the reforms instituted by Turkey, and -fearing the European organisation she was attempting to introduce -into the Empire might strengthen it and thus prove an obstacle to the -realisation of her designs, fomented a Christian rising in Bosnia and -Herzegovina, which was a pretext for her to declare war on Turkey. -Russia, backed by the Bulgarians, obliged Turkey to agree to an -armistice and to an International Conference at Constantinople. In -consequence of the rejection by Turkey of the protocol of London and -the Russian comminatory note which followed it, Russia carried on the -hostilities which, after the defeat of Plevna in Europe and the capture -of Kars in Asia, led to the negotiations of San Stefano, on March 3, -1878. - -Lastly, in the same year, on the occasion of the treaty of Berlin, -which gave Kars to Russia and modified the San Stefano preliminaries -by cancelling several of the advantages Russia hoped to obtain, -France, pursuing her time-honoured policy, showed clearly her sympathy -for Turkey, by bringing to bear on her behalf the influence she had -regained since 1871. - -By so doing, France incurred Germany’s anger, for we have already -shown the latter country’s sympathy for Slavism. As recent events have -proved once more, an alliance with Russia could only be brought about -by a corresponding understanding with Germany, since Russia, where -German influence has been replaced by Slavonic influence, is now being -invincibly drawn towards Germany, where Slavonic influence is now -prevalent. This twofold understanding could only be brought about by -sacrificing the whole of Western Europe and all her old civilisation. -The Europe “which ends on the Elbe,” as has been said, would become -more and more insignificant in such a political concept, and there -would only remain in the world, standing face to face for a decisive -struggle, the Germano-Russians and the Anglo-Saxons. - -Spurred on by the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria, consequent -on the rising of September 18, 1885, at Philippopolis, the Macedonian -Slavs carried on an agitation the next year, in 1886, in favour of -their union with Bulgaria, and resorted to an insurrection in 1895-96. - -Lastly, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13, notwithstanding the complexity -and intricacy of the interests at stake, may be looked upon to a -certain extent as a fresh outcome of the Slavonic pressure and the -ambitions of Orthodoxy. - - * * * * * - -The Russians, who had driven back the Turanian peoples to Turkistan, -began the conquest of this country in 1815. From 1825 to 1840 they -subdued the Khirgiz. They took Khiva in 1854, and in 1864 conquered -the lower valley of the Syr Daria. In 1863 they occupied Tashkent, and -in 1867 grouped the territories they had conquered under the authority -of the Governor-General of Turkistan. In 1873 they occupied all the -country lying between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and in 1876 -took Kokand. - -Even before the war, as has already been seen, Russia had turned her -attention in the East towards Armenia, who, owing to her situation, -could best serve her policy of expansion in Asia Minor. According to -the plans of the Imperial Russian Government set forth on June 8, 1813, -Armenia was to be converted into an autonomous province under the power -of a governor-general, including the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, -Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas, with the exception of a few territories -whose boundaries had not yet been fixed. But in a memorandum presented -at the same time, the Imperial Russian Government insisted upon “the -close connection between the Armenian question and the problems the -Russian administration had to solve in Transcaucasia.” These plans lay -in abeyance, for they were opposed by the German policy, which was -hostile to any Russian encroachment on Turkish territories; and Russia, -on the other hand, prevented Germany obtaining the concession of a -railway line which was to connect the Turkish ports on the Black Sea, -Samsun and Trebizond, with the Baghdad Railway and the Mediterranean -Sea at Alexandretta, and settling down on the coast of the Black Sea. - -As the Entente had given Russia a free hand, the latter country, as -has been seen, resumed the realisation of her plans as soon as war -broke out. Russia, who had begun the conquest of Caucasus in 1797 and -of the Transcaspian isthmus from 1828 to 1878, occupied Upper Armenia -in 1914-15. The Young Turks, who believed in the triumph of Germany, -expected that, thanks to the latter, they could hold in check the -Russian designs, and for this reason stood by her side. - -Meanwhile the Russian policy with regard to Turkey asserted itself more -and more energetically, especially in reference to Constantinople, so -that the antagonism of the two nations, created by Muscovite ambition, -had grown into a deep and lasting hostility. - -It was recommended in the testament which is supposed to have been -written by Peter the Great— - - “Article 9. To draw as close as possible to Constantinople and - India, for he who rules over that city will rule over the world. - It is advisable, therefore, to bring about continual wars, now in - Turkey, now in Persia, to establish shipbuilding yards on the Black - Sea, gradually to get the mastery of that sea and of the Baltic - Sea—the possession of these two seas being absolutely necessary - for the triumph of our plans—to hurry on the decay of Persia, to - advance as far as the Persian Gulf, to restore the once thriving - Eastern trade, if possible through Syria, and to advance as far as - India, the emporium of the world. - - “When once we are there, we shall no longer be dependent on English - gold. - - “Article 11. To show the House of Austria it has an interest in - ejecting the Turks from Europe, and to neutralise her jealousy when - we shall conquer Constantinople, either by bringing about a war - between her and the old European States, or by giving her a share - of the conquest—and take it back from her later on.” - -Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did not carry out her -plans by force of arms, for the other Powers would have opposed -them; but she resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph. -She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by -supporting and grouping the Christian elements included in this empire, -especially those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus she -really partitioned the Empire and bound to herself the old Ottoman -provinces now raised to the rank of autonomous States. She acted most -cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peacefully she sought -to dismember Turkey gradually and weaken her in order to finally rule -over her. It has been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians -opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands to-day, and already -advocated the solution they have always insisted upon.[45] - -A century ago Alexander I declared it was time to drive the Turks out -of Europe. Talleyrand, in the account he gave of the conversations -between that Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that he said -one day: - - “Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at Tilsit the - liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened sovereigns. Our - age, still more than our policy, requires that the Turks be driven - into Asia; it will be a noble deed to free these beautiful lands. - Humanity wants the eviction of those barbarians; civilisation - demands it.” - -But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian policy, for at the end -of his life he said at St. Helena: “I could have shared Turkey with -Russia; many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor, Alexander -I, but every time Constantinople proved the stumbling-block. The Tsar -demanded it, and I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it -is worth an empire.” - -At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons of March 29, 1791, -some speakers expressed the anxiety felt in Great Britain, just -after Catherine II had annexed the Crimea, lest the Russians should -capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader of the Liberal -party, declared he saw no ground for fear in the constant increase of -Muscovite power; he did his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her -side, continued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from England; -he recalled that the British themselves had opened the Mediterranean to -Russian ships twenty years before, and he had told the French Minister -Vergennes, who desired him to protest against the annexation of the -Crimea, that Great Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with -Catherine II. - -Unfortunately, the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s ambassador, and -the Comte de Bonneval, who had been converted to Islam, had been -the last Frenchmen who had supported the Sublime Porte against the -Russian Tsar’s hostility and endeavoured to use Islam as the protector -of the liberty of peoples imperilled by the Tsars; and yet this old -policy of France had the advantage both of benefiting French trade and -counterbalancing the power of the enemies of France.[46] On the other -hand, at the Congress of Sistovo in 1791, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who -acted as mediator in the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish treaty of -peace, recommended his fellow-countrymen “to let the Turks dwindle -down in their own dull way.” So now French policy and English policy -were going the same way. - -During the reign of Charles X, the Polignac Cabinet was willing to -sacrifice Constantinople to the Russians in return for the left bank -of the Rhine, and in 1828 Chateaubriand, French ambassador at Rome, -favoured an alliance with the Tsar in order to obtain the revision of -the 1815 treaties, at the cost of Constantinople. Moreover, Admiral Sir -Edward Codrington, by destroying the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino -on October 20, 1827, with the combined fleets of Great Britain, France, -and Russia, furthered the Russian Tsar’s plans. - -As the direct capture of the Straits was bound to raise diplomatic -difficulties, Nicholas I, on September 4, 1892, summoned a secret -council to discuss what policy Russia was to pursue on this point. -The opinion which prevailed was expressed in a memorandum drawn up -by a former diplomatist, Dimitri Dashkov, then Minister of Justice, -and in a draft partition of the Turkish Empire penned by a Greek, -Capodistria. This secret committee, dreading the opposition of the -Western States, decided to postpone the partition lest, as Great -Britain and France refused their consent, it should not finally benefit -the designs of Russia and Greece on Constantinople. These secret -debates have been summed up in a book published in 1877;[47] and M. -Goriainov, in the book he wrote on this question in 1910,[48] thought -it proper to praise the consistent magnanimity of the Tsars towards the -Turks—whereas the policy which maintained that no reforms would ever -be instituted by Turkey of her own free-will if they were not urged -on by diplomatic intrigues or international interference, and that -“the sick man” could only be restored to health by the intervention of -Christendom and under the Orthodox tutelage, was the real cause of the -decay of Turkey and the origin of all the intricacies of the Eastern -problem. - -In 1830 Lord Holland, Fox’s nephew—it will be remembered that on -March 29, 1791, Fox had said in the House of Commons he was proud of -supporting Russia’s advance to the East, in opposition to William -Pitt, who wanted to admit Turkey into the European concert—declared he -was sorry, as “a citizen of the world,” that the Russians had not yet -settled down in the Golden Horn. - -Besides, whereas the Tories felt some anxiety at the territorial -development of Russia—without thinking of making use of Turkey to -consolidate the position in the East—the Whigs, on the contrary, to use -the words of Sir Robert Adair in 1842, thought they could bring the -Muscovite Empire into the wake of the United Kingdom. - -In June, 1844, the Tsar himself came to London in order to induce Great -Britain to approve his Eastern policy, and Russian diplomacy felt so -confident she could rely on the support of the English Liberal Cabinet -that in 1853 Nicholas I, in the overtures made to Sir Hamilton Seymour, -expressed his conviction that he could settle the Turkish problem in -ten minutes’ conversation with Lord Aberdeen. - -On June 4, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield, who looked upon the part of England -in the East as that of a moral protectorate over Islam and a mediator -between Europe and Asia, by ensuring the institution of a system of -reforms, signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey, by which England -pledged herself to protect the Porte against Russian greediness in -Asia. Unfortunately, Mr. Gladstone, under the influence of the ideas we -have already expounded,[49] soon reversed the Eastern policy of England -and unconsciously made his country the Tsar’s ally against Turkey. - -Russia, to whom it was now impossible, since the Bulgarians and -Rumanians were no longer under Ottoman dominion, to reach the shores -of the Bosphorus through Thrace and to conquer Constantinople and the -Straits, which had been the aim of her policy for centuries, then -turned her designs towards Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, as we have -just seen, in order to reach Constantinople through Asia. - -Tiutshev, in one of his poems entitled _Russian Geography_, said: - - “Moscow, Peter’s town, and Constantine’s town, are the three sacred - capitals of the Russian Empire. But how far do its frontiers extend - to the north and the east, to the south and the west? Fate will - reveal it in the future. Seven inland seas and seven great rivers, - from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga - to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian - Empire, and it will last through untold centuries! So did the - Spirit predict. So did Daniel prophesy!” - -And in another place: - - “Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come! - And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will - shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou - Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.” - -The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the -first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina -are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations -concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession -was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the -other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or -indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly. - -At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had -proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of -that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though -she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted -nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she -had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual -Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the -idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated -that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity -claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty -over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de -Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate -Austria and to bring her to rely more and more on German friendship -by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between -London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused -in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make -England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already -prevailing between Austria and Russia. - -Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her -willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her -to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was -revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of -England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia -whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour -of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg -Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should -these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and -Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely -strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out -that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon -the meeting of the Conference. - -Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on -Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of -Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister, -which were published in the _Daily Telegraph_ in January, 1921. In one -of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a -Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of M. de Nelidov, -at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey. - - “In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there - was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a - similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned - from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St. - Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures - which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced - me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my - views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November - 21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The - ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in - Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would - create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the - Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special - conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted - that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future - in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must - occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War - Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the - occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople, - was a veritable _idée fixe_. The other Ministers refrained from - expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot - to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and - determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration - would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter - the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor - Alexander III left Russia. - - “The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members - of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that - he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at - least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such - events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext - for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military - authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately - to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops - in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov - considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by - sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting - him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be - immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and - also to the Minister of the Navy.” - -M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and -war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of -the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the -fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director. - - “Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain from - sharing my apprehensions with several persons very intimate - with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich and - Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know whether it was the influence of - these men or the influence of that Power which rules the whole - world and which we call God, but His Majesty changed his mind - and instructed Nelidov, soon after the latter’s departure for - Constantinople, to give up his designs.” - -After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29 and 30, the -Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914, issued a manifesto to his people, -which, though sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia’s designs -on Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail herself of -circumstances to carry them out. - - “The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacherously to - attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the peoples of Russia, - feel quite confident that Turkey’s rash intervention will only - hurry on her doom, and open to Russia the way to the solution of - the historical problem bequeathed to us by our forefathers on the - shores of the Black Sea.”[50] - -In the course of an audience which Nicholas II granted to M. Maurice -Paléologue, French ambassador, at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21, -1914, and in the course of which he laid down the main lines of the -peace which he thought should be dictated to the Central Powers, he -considered how the settlement of the war would affect the other -nations, and declared: - - “In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of the - Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the Turkish - yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia? I will annex it only if the - Armenians expressly ask me to do so. Otherwise, I will grant them - an autonomous régime. Lastly, I shall have to ensure for my Empire - the free passage of the Straits.... - - “I have not quite made up my mind on many points; these are such - fateful times! Yet I have arrived at two definite conclusions: - first, that the Turks must be driven out of Europe; secondly, - that Constantinople should henceforth be a neutral town, under an - international régime. Of course, the Mussulmans would have every - guarantee for the protection of their sanctuaries and shrines. - Northern Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria. - The rest of the country, between this line and the coast, with - the exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to - Russia.”[51] - -About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice Paléologue, public -opinion in Russia was unanimous on this point, that— - - “The possession of the Straits is of vital interest to the Empire - and far exceeds in importance all the territorial advantages - Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany and Austria.... The - neutralisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be an - unsatisfactory, mongrel compromise, pregnant with dangers for the - future.... Constantinople must be a Russian town.... The Black Sea - must become a Russian lake.”[52] - -In the formal statement of the Government policy read on February 9, -1915, at the opening of the Duma, after mention had been made of the -victories gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the following -sentence occurred: “Brighter and brighter does the radiant future of -Russia shine before us in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which -washes the battlements of Constantinople.” - -Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits in the speech which -followed, but he declared: “The day is drawing near when the economic -and political problems arising from the necessity for Russia to have -free access to the open sea will be solved.” - -Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in his turn: “The Straits -are the key of our house, so they must be handed over to us, together -with the Straits area.” - -Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for his declaration, -concluded his speech in these terms: - - “We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be - completed. We now feel confident that the possession of - Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time, through - diplomatic and military channels.” - -The question of Constantinople captivated public opinion at that time, -and in February, 1915, it engrossed the minds of all prominent men in -Russia. Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have just read, -that a victorious peace must give Constantinople to Russia. - -At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not refrain from raising -this question with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, and -asked them to give him an assurance that the Governments of London and -Paris would consent after the war to the annexation of Constantinople -by Russia.[53] - -On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of General Pau, Nicholas -II talked on the same subject to M. Paléologue. The Emperor, after -recalling the conversation he had had with him in November of the -previous year, in the course of which he had said France could rely -upon Russia, and telling him he had not altered his mind, said: - - “There is a point, however, about which recent events compel me to - say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The question of the Straits - engrosses the Russian mind more and more every day. I consider I - have no right to impose on my people the dreadful sacrifices of - the present war without granting as a reward the fulfilment of - their age-long aspirations. So I have made up my mind, sir. I do - not want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople and - the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in November last - is the only possible one, the only practical one. The city of - Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my - Empire; yet I have no objection, as far as the administration of - the city is concerned, to a special régime making allowance for - foreign interests. You know that England has already sent me her - approval. If any minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your - Government to help me to smooth them.”[54] - -On March 8, M. Paléologue told M. Sazonov that he had just received -a telegram from M. Delcassé, and was in a position to give him the -assurance that he could rely on the French Government’s friendly -offices in settling the questions of Constantinople and the Straits -according to the wishes of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly, -and added these significant words: “Your Government has done the -Alliance a priceless service ... a service the extent of which perhaps -you do not realise.”[55] On the 15th the French Government, having -examined the conditions of peace which the Allies meant to impose on -Turkey, informed the Russian Government of the compensations France -required in Syria. - -On March 16, after being received by the Emperor at the General -Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as -commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation -with M. Paléologue, speaking as French ambassador, and requested him -to inform his Government that he considered the immediate military -co-operation of Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity. The -French ambassador suggested that the Russian claims on Constantinople -and the Straits would, perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the -Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered: “That’s the business of -diplomacy. I won’t have anything to do with it.”[56] - -Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister -of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of -the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,[57] shows how -deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question -at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they -were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order -to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we -pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully -aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side -of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake. - - IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, - _February_ 5, 1916 (o.s.). - - “Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General - Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum - could be best exploited. - - “Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in - Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with - Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that - such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within - a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the - negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly - fears will be attended with a new catastrophe. - - “Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus - are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier - from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in - General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious - success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense. - - “Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with - Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of - his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by - our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised. - - “According to him, it would be most important to specify the war - aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this - is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his - opinion might be of some weight. - - “In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following - conclusions: - - “Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey - entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of - the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our - expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The - longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to - secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General - Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December, - 1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion. - - “The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts - of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most - important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that - at the present time it is more important for us to recover the - Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must - by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will - require great efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of - some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices. - - “Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would - bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real - ‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on - the basis of the _status quo ante bellum_, including the - restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by - the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans, - with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German - reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on - such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could - send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our - side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople. - England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the - Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She - would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to - Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and - liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the - reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy, - the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should - be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern - route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with - Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of - Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we - all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished - schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry - on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal - can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we - postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return - for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure - a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and - moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us - back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars, - why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and - Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should - have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet - meet the requirements of Russia. - - “Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly, - as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the - brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of - the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon - this as a highly profitable scheme. - - “Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the - conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance - attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that - we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at - once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony, - reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in - the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople. - The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must - necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, - too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both - by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the - loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to - convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish - purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a - deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial - arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey. - - “But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the - present, the important points are: - - “1. Plainly to define our real war aim. - - “2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate - peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once. - - “3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our - Allies for such a turn of events. - - “I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General - Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard - to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical - call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question, - but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the - situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time - from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only - momentarily—impossible.” - -It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine -maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, -it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was -the conquest of Constantinople. - -In an article entitled “_La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du -Bosphore_,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov -confirmed the Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on -all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled -that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European -nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805, -and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of -the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of -any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871 -had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had -always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea -to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the -policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on -in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. -So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the -dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian -sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised. - -Taking up this question again in an interview with a correspondent of -_Le Temps_ in April, 1917, M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern -Europe, as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved “the -liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the liberation of -the peoples living in Asia Minor, the independence of Arabia, Armenia, -and Syria, and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey’s right -to the possession of the Straits.” Nobody knows what was to become -of the Turks in such a solution, or rather it is only too plain that -“the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe” meant that -Russia would take possession of the Straits and rule over the Turkish -territories in Asia Minor. - -Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshevists in Russia were -plainly drawing nearer to Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget -the pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency he himself openly -displayed, came to this conclusion: - -“The Straits to Russia—that, in my opinion, is the only way out of the -difficulty. The neutralisation of the Straits would always involve -many serious dangers to peace, and Russia would be compelled to keep -up a powerful war fleet in the Black Sea to defend our coasts. It -would give the warships of all countries a free access to our inland -sea, the Black Sea, which might entail untold disasters. Germany wants -the Straits in order to realise her dreams of hegemony, for her motto -is ‘Berlin-Baghdad,’ and we, Russians, want the Straits that our -importation and exportation may be secure from any trammels or threats -whatever. Nobody can entertain any doubt, therefore, as to which Power -is to own the Straits; it must be either Germany or Russia.” - -Prince Lvov, M. Sazonov, M. Chaikovsky, and M. Maklakov, in a -memorandum addressed to the President of the Peace Conference on July -5, 1919, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia, stated the -Russian claims with regard to Turkey, and the solution they proposed -to the question of the Straits and Constantinople was inspired by the -agreements of 1915 and showed they had not given up anything of their -ambition. For, though they had no real mandate to speak of the rights -of New Russia they declared: - - “New Russia has, undoubtedly, a right to be associated in the task - of regeneration which the Allied and Associated Powers intend to - assume in the former Turkish territories. - - “Thus, the question of the Straits would be most equitably settled - by Russia receiving a mandate for the administration of the Straits - in the name of the League of Nations. Such a solution would - benefit both the interests of Russia and those of the whole world, - for the most suitable régime for an international road of transit - is to hand over its control to the Power which is most vitally - interested in the freedom of this transit. - - “This solution is also the only one which would not raise any of - the apprehensions which the Russian people would certainly feel if - the aforesaid mandate were given to any other Power or if a foreign - military Power controlled the Straits. - - “For the moment, Russia, in her present condition, would be - satisfied if the control of the Straits were assigned to a - provisional international administration which might hand over its - powers to her in due time, and in which Russia in the meantime - should hold a place proportionate to the part she is called upon to - play in the Black Sea. - - “As to Constantinople, Russia cannot think for one moment of ceding - this city to the exclusive administration of any other Power. And - if an international administration were established, Russia should - hold in it the place that befits her, and have a share in all that - may be undertaken for the equipment, exploitation, and control of - the port of Constantinople.” - -Some documents, which were found by the Bolshevists in the Imperial -Record Office, concerning the conferences of the Russian Staff in -November, 1913, and which have just been made public, testify to the -continuity of the aforesaid policy and the new schemes Russia was -contemplating. It clearly appears from these documents that M. Sazonov, -Minister of Foreign Affairs, had represented to the Tsar the necessity -of preparing not only plans of campaign, but a whole organisation for -the conveyance by rail and sea of the huge forces which were necessary -to capture Constantinople, and that the Crown Council was of opinion -this plan should be carried out in order to bring the Russians to -Constantinople and secure the mastery of the Straits. - -At the present time, forty or fifty thousand[58] Russian emigrants, -fleeing before the Bolshevists, have reached Pera and have settled -down in it; others are arriving there every day, who belong to the -revolutionary socialist party—an exiled party temporarily—or who are -more or less disguised Bolshevist agents. It is obvious that all these -Russians will not soon leave Constantinople, which they have always -coveted, especially as the Bolshevists have by no means renounced the -designs of the Tsars on this city or their ambitions in the East. - -Not long ago, according to the _Lokal Anzeiger_,[59] a prominent member -of the Soviet Government declared that, to safeguard the Russian -interests in the East and on the Black Sea, Constantinople must fall to -Russia. - -Being thus invaded by Russian elements of all kinds, Constantinople -seems doomed to be swallowed up by Russia as soon as her troubles are -over, whether she remains Bolshevist or falls under a Tsar’s rule -again; then she will turn her ambition towards the East, which we have -not been able to defend against the Slavs, and England will find her -again in her way in Asia and even on the shores of the Mediterranean -Sea. - -On the other hand, as Germany is endeavouring to come to an -understanding with Russia and as the military Pan-Germanist party has -not given up hope of restoring the Kaiser to the throne, if the Allies -dismembered Turkey—whose policy is not historically linked with that of -Germany, and who has no more reason for being her ally now, provided -the Allies alter their own policy—they would pave the way to a union of -the whole of Eastern Europe under a Germano-Russian hegemony. - -Again, the Turks, who originally came from Asia, are now a -Mediterranean people owing to their great conquests and their wide -extension in the fifteenth century, and though in some respects these -conquests may be regretted, they have on the whole proved beneficial -to European civilisation, by maintaining the influence of the culture -of antiquity. Though they have driven back the Greeks to European -territories, they have not, on the whole, attempted to destroy the -traditions bequeathed to us by antiquity, and the Turk has let the -quick, clever Greek settle down everywhere. His indolence and fatalism -have made him leave things as they were. What would have happened if -the Slavs had come down to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea? The -Bulgars and Southern Slavs, though they were subjected to Greco-Latin -influences, displayed much more activity and were proof against most -of these influences. But the Turks checked the Slavs’ advance to the -south; and, were it only in this respect, they have played and still -play a salutary part of which they should not be deprived. - -The new policy pursued by France towards Turkey becomes the more -surprising—coming after her time-honoured Turkish policy and after the -recent mistakes of her Russian policy—as we see history repeat itself, -or at least, similar circumstances recur. Even in the time of the -Romans the events of Syria and Mesopotamia were connected with those of -Central Europe; as Virgil said: “Here war is let loose by Euphrates, -there by Germany.” Long after, Francis I, in order to check the -ambitious designs of Charles V, Emperor of Germany, who, about 1525, -dreamt of subduing the whole of Europe, sought the alliance of Soliman. -The French king, who understood the Latin spirit so well and the great -part it was about to play in the Renaissance, had foreseen the danger -with which this spirit was threatened by Germany. - -Moreover, a recent fact throws into light the connection between the -German and Russian interests in the Eastern question, and their similar -tendencies. For Marshal von der Goltz was one of the first to urge -that the Turkish capital should be transferred to a town in the centre -of Asia Minor.[60] Of course, he professed to be actuated only by -strategic or administrative motives, for he chiefly laid stress on the -peculiar geographical situation of the capital of the Empire, which, -lying close to the frontier, is directly exposed to a foreign attack. -But did he not put forward this argument merely to conceal other -arguments which concerned Germany more closely? Though the Germans -professed to be the protectors of Islam, did not the vast Austro-German -schemes include the ejection of the Turks from Europe to the benefit of -the Slavs, notwithstanding the declarations made during the war by some -German publicists—M. Axel Schmidt, M. Hermann, M. Paul Rohrbach—which -now seem to have been chiefly dictated by temporary necessities? - -Thus the Turkish policy of the Allies is the outcome of their Russian -policy—which accounts for the whole series of mistakes they are still -making, after their disillusionment with regard to Russia. - -For centuries, Moscow and Islam have counterpoised each other: the -Golden Horde having checked the expansion of Russia, the latter did -her best to bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It had -formerly been admitted by the Great Powers that the territorial -integrity of the Ottoman Empire should not be infringed upon, for it -was the best barrier to Russia’s claims on the Straits and her advance -towards India. But after the events of the last war, England, reversing -her traditional policy, and the Allies, urged on by Pan-Russian -circles, have been gradually driven to recognise the Russian claims to -Constantinople in return for her co-operation at the beginning of the -war. - -The outcome of this policy of the Allies has been to drive both the -new States, whose independence they persistently refused to recognise, -and the old ones, whose national aspirations they did not countenance, -towards Bolshevism, the enemy of the Allies; it has induced them, -in spite of themselves, to come to understandings with the Soviet -Government, in order to defend their independence. England in this way -runs the risk of finding herself again face to face with Russia—a new -Russia; and thus the old Anglo-Russian antagonism would reappear in -another shape, and a more critical one. Sir H. Rawlinson[61] denounced -this danger nearly half a century ago, and now once more, though in a -different way, “India is imperilled by the progress of Russia.” - -However, there is no similarity between Pan-Turanianism and Bolshevism, -though an attempt has been made in press polemics or political -controversies to confound the one with the other. They have no common -origin, and the utter incompatibility between Bolshevism and the spirit -of Western Europe exists likewise to another extent and for different -reasons between Bolshevism and the spirit of the Turks, who, indeed, -are not Europeans but Moslems, yet have played a part in the history of -Europe and thus have felt its influence. The Turks—like the Hungarians, -who are monarchists and have even sought to come to an understanding -with Poland—have refused to make an alliance with the Czecho-Slovaks, -who have Pan-Slavic tendencies; and so they cannot become Bolshevists -or friendly to the Bolshevists. But, if the Allies neither modify their -attitude nor give up the policy they have pursued of late years, the -Turks, as well as all the heterogeneous peoples that have broken loose -from old Russia, will be driven for their own protection to adopt -the same policy as new Russia—the latter being considered as outside -Europe; and thus the power of the Soviet Government will be reinforced. - -We have been among the first to show both the danger and the inanity of -Bolshevism; and now we feel bound to deplore that policy which merely -tends to strengthen the Bolshevists we want to crush. Our only hope is -that the influence of the States sprung from old Russia or situated -round it on Soviet Russia—with which they have been obliged to come -to terms for the sake of self-defence—will complete the downfall of -Bolshevism, which can only live within Russia and the Russian mind, -but has already undergone an evolution, owing to the mistakes of the -Allies, in order to spread and maintain itself. - -As to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it seems that far from -solving the Eastern question, it is likely to bring about many fresh -difficulties, for it is a political mistake as well as an injustice. - -This dismemberment, impudently effected by England, is not likely to -turn to her advantage. Of course, owing to the treaty, British hegemony -for the present extends over Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Kurdistan, -and is likely to prevail over the international régime foreshadowed -by the same treaty; but the organisation which Great Britain wants -thus to enforce on the East, if ever it is effective, seems most -precarious. For, even without mentioning Turkey, which does not seem -likely to submit to this scheme, and where the Nationalist movement -is in open rebellion, or Armenia, whose frontiers have not been fixed -yet, the condition of Kurdistan, which England coveted and had even at -one moment openly laid claim to, is still uncertain; the Emir Feisal, -who is indebted to her for his power, is attempting to get out of her -hand; finally, by putting Persia under her tutelage, she has roused the -national feeling there too, and broken of her own accord the chain she -intended to forge all round India, after driving Germany out of Asia -Minor and capturing all the routes to her Asiatic possessions. - -Now it is questionable whether Great Britain—in spite of the skill -with which her administration has bent itself to the ways of the very -various peoples and the liberal spirit she has certainly evinced in -the organisation of the Dominions belonging to the British Empire, -the largest empire that has ever existed—will be powerful enough to -maintain her sovereignty over so many peoples, each of which is proud -of its own race and history, and to organise all these countries -according to her wish. - -As to France, she is gradually losing the moral prestige she once -enjoyed in the East, for the advantages she has just gained can only -injure her, and also injure the prestige she still enjoys in other -Moslem countries; whereas, by pursuing another policy, she might have -expected that the German defeat would restore and heighten her prestige. - -It follows from all this that the Turkish problem, as we have -endeavoured to describe it—considering that for centuries an -intercourse has been maintained between the Moslem world and -Mediterranean Europe, and that a Moslem influence once made itself felt -on Western civilisation through Arabic culture—cannot be looked upon -as a merely Asiatic problem. It is a matter of surprise that Islam, -five centuries after Christ, should have developed in the birthplace of -Christianity, and converted very numerous populations, whose ways and -spirit it seems to suit. One cannot forget either that Islam acted as -a counterpoise to Christianity, or that it played an important part in -our civilisation by securing the continuance and penetration of Eastern -and pagan influences. So it is obvious that nowadays the Turkish -problem is still of paramount importance for the security of Western -civilisation, since it concerns all the nations round the Mediterranean -Sea, and, moreover, all the Asiatic and African territories inhabited -by Moslems, who have always been interested in European matters and are -even doubly concerned in them now.[62] - -Footnotes: - - 45: Albert Sorel, _La Question d’Orient au XVIIIᵉ siècle_, pp. 81, - 85, 277. - - 46: Albert Vandal, _Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis - XV_, pp. 4, 8, 331, 447. - - 47: Martens, _Étude historique sur la politique russe dans la - question d’Orient_, 1877. - - 48: Goriainov, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, 1910, pp. 25-27. - - 49: See _supra_, p. 114. - - 50: _Daily Telegraph_, January 5, 1921. - - 51: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 15, 1921, pp. 261, 262: Maurice - Paléologue. “La Russie des Tsars pendant la guerre.” - - 52: _Ibid._, pp. 274, 275. - - 53: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, p. 573. - - 54: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, pp. 574, 575. - - 55: _Ibid._ - - 56: _Ibid._, pp. 578, 579. - - 57: The editor was M. Markine. - - 58: Now there are about 200,000. - - 59: August 10, 1920. - - 60: Von der Goltz, “Stärke und Schwäche des turkischen Reiches,” in - the _Deutsche Rundschau_, 1897. - - 61: H. Rawlinson, _England and Russia in the East_ (1875). - - 62: The French edition of this book bears the date August, 1920. - - -PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER - - - - -Transcriber’s Notes: - -The original spelling, accentuation, punctuation, and hyphenation has -been retained, except for a small number of apparent printer’s errors. - -‘Ali-Hayar-Midhat’ corrected to read ‘Ali-Haydar-Midhat’ in Footnote 7. - -‘General Imail Fazil Pasha’ corrected to read ‘General Ismail Fazil -Pasha’ on folio page 185. - -‘Abderhaman Youssef Pasha’ corrected to read ‘Abdurrahman Youssef -Pasha’ on folio page 343. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Turks and Europe, by Gaston Gaillard - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TURKS AND EUROPE *** - -***** This file should be named 51761-0.txt or 51761-0.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/7/6/51761/ - -Produced by Brian Wilcox, Turgut Dincer and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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} - - -@media handheld {p.largeimg {display: none;}} - -#half-title -{ - text-align: center; - font-size: large; -} - -@media screen -{ - #half-title - { - margin: 6em 0; - } -} - -@media print, handheld -{ - #half-title - { - page-break-before: always; - page-break-after: always; - } -} - - </style> - </head> -<body> - - -<pre> - -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Turks and Europe, by Gaston Gaillard - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Turks and Europe - -Author: Gaston Gaillard - -Release Date: April 14, 2016 [EBook #51761] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: UTF-8 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TURKS AND EUROPE *** - - - - -Produced by Brian Wilcox, Turgut Dincer and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<p id="half-title">THE TURKS AND EUROPE</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="chapter"><p class="larger center">BY THE SAME AUTHOR</p></div> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Culture et Kultur.</b> 1 vol. gr. in-8, 242 p. Berger-Levrault, -Paris, 1916.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Judaïsme et Kultur.</b> 38 p. Giard et Brière, Paris, 1917.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Le Germanisme et les Cultures antiques.</b> <em>Revue des Nations -latines</em>, Florence, décembre 1917.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Les Jésuites et le Germanisme.</b> 29 p. Giard et Brière, -Paris, 1918.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Amérique Latine et Europe occidentale.</b> 1 vol. in-12, 301 p. -Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1918.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>L’Allemagne et le Baltikum.</b> 1 vol. in-8 raisin, 279 p. et 7 -cartes. Chapelot, Paris, 1919.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes.</b> 1 vol. in-8 raisin, -79 p. Chapelot, Paris, 1919.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Les Turcs et l’Europe.</b> 1 vol. in-12, 384 p. Chapelot, 1920.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>La Beauté d’une Femme.</b> <em>Roman.</em> 1 vol. in 12. P.-V. Stock, -Paris, 1907.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>La Fille nue.</b> <em>Roman.</em> 1 vol. in-12. Albin Michel, Paris, -1914.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Recherches sur le temps que la précipitation met à apparaître -dans les solutions d’hyposulfite de soude.</b> 1 vol. in-8. -Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1905.</span></p> - -<p class="hangingindent2"><span lang="fr" xml:lang="fr"><b>Nobilisme.</b> <em>Essai sur les fondements de la culture.</em> 1 vol. -in-12. Société française d’imprimerie et de librairie, Paris, 1909.</span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="chapter"><h1 id="THE_TURKS_AND_EUROPE"> -THE TURKS AND<br /> -EUROPE</h1></div> - -<h2><span class="smallest">BY</span><br /> -GASTON GAILLARD</h2> - -<p class="center noindent"><span class="small">LONDON: THOMAS MURBY & CO.</span><br /> -<span class="smaller">1 FLEET LANE, E.C.<br /> -1921</span></p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v">v</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2></div> - -<div class="center"> -<table class="myleft" border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="1" summary="contents"> -<tr> -<th colspan="3"> </th> -<th class="tdr"><span class="smallest normal">PAGES</span></th> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt">I.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Turks</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#I">1</a>-8</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">II.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Turkish Empire:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">Its History—The Capitulations—The East, a -Fashion in Europe—The Turkish Empire and the War</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#II">9</a>-28</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">III.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Turkey and the War</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"><a href="#III">29</a>-42</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">IV.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Turkey and the Conference:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">The Agreements before the Armistice—Occupation of Smyrna by Greece—The -First Ottoman Delegation—Dismissal of the First Delegation—Situation of -the Ottoman Government and the Nationalist Movement—Foreign Interests -in Turkey—Resources of Turkey—The Damad Ferid Cabinet resigns—The Ali -Riza Ministry—The Marash Incidents—The Urfa and Aintab Incidents—The -Silence of the United States—The Turkish Question -Resumed—The Anglo-American Protestant Campaign—Repercussions -in India—Repercussions in Northern Africa—The Indian Caliphate -Delegation—Value of Islam—Union -of the Churches—Islam <em>versus</em> Orthodoxy—The Persian National -Movement</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#IV">43</a>-150</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">V.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Occupation of Constantinople:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">The Treaty before the London and Paris Parliaments—Resignation of the -Salih Pasha Cabinet—The New Damad Ferid Cabinet</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#V">151</a>-168</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">VI.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Treaty with Turkey:</span> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi">vi</a></span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">Mustafa Kemal’s Protest—Protests of Ahmed Riza and Galib Kemaly—Protest -of the Indian Caliphate Delegation—Survey of the Treaty—The Turkish -Press and the Treaty—Jafer Tayar at Adrianople—Operations of the -Government Forces against the Nationalists—French Armistice in -Cilicia—Mustafa Kemal’s Operations—Greek Operations in Asia Minor—The -Ottoman Delegation’s Observations at the Peace Conference—The Allies’ -Answer—Greek Operations in Thrace—The Ottoman Government decides -to sign the Treaty—Italo-Greek Incident, and Protests of Armenia, -Yugo-Slavia, and King Hussein—Signature of the Treaty</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#VI">169</a>-271</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">VII.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">1. <em>The Turco-Armenian Question</em></p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#VII">274</a>-304</td> -</tr><tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">2. <em>The Pan-Turanian and Pan-Arabian Movements</em>:<br /> -Origin of Pan-Turanism—The Turks and the Arabs—The Hejaz—The Emir -Feisal—The Question of Syria—French Operations in Syria—Restoration of -Greater Lebanon—The Arabian World and the Caliphate—The Part played by -Islam</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#Pan_Turanian">304</a>-356</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">VIII.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">The Moslems of the Former Russian Empire and Turkey:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">The Republic of Northern Caucasus—Georgia and Azerbaïjan—The -Bolshevists in the Republics of Caucasus and of the Transcaspian -Isthmus—Armenians and Moslems</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#VIII">357</a>-369</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2">IX.</td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt2" colspan="2"><span class="smcap">Turkey and the Slavs:</span></td> -<td class="tdr vertb padt2"> </td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td> </td> -<td> </td> -<td class="tdl vertt padt1"><p class="indent">Slavs <em>versus</em> Turks—Constantinople and Russia</p></td> -<td class="tdr vertb"><a href="#IX">370</a>-408</td> -</tr> -</table></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"> -<p class="center noindent"><span class="largest">THE TURKS AND EUROPE</span></p></div> - -<h2 id="I">I<br /> -<br /> -THE TURKS</h2> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> peoples who speak the various Turkish dialects and who bear the -generic name of Turcomans, or Turco-Tatars, are distributed over huge -territories occupying nearly half of Asia and an important part of -Eastern Europe. But as we are only considering the Turkish question -from the European point of view, no lengthy reference is needed to -such Eastern groups as those of Turkish or Mongol descent who are -connected with the Yenisseians of Northern Asia and the Altaians. The -Russians call these peoples Tatars, and they, no doubt, constituted -the “Tubbat” nation, referred to by the Chinese historians under the -name of “Tou-Kiou” up to the seventh century after Christ. These very -brief facts show the importance of the race and are also sufficient -to emphasise the point that these people are akin to those Turks of -Western Asia who are more closely connected with the Europeans.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></span></p> - -<p>The Western Turkish group includes the Turcomans of Persia and Russian -or Afghan Turkistan; the Azerbaïjanians, who are probably Turkisised -Iranians, living between the Caucasus Mountains and Persia; and, -lastly, the Osmanli Turks, who are subjects of the Sultan, speak the -Turkish language, and profess Islam.</p> - -<p>Close to this group, but farther to the East, the central group also -concerns us, for some of its representatives who now inhabit the -boundaries of Europe made repeated incursions into Europe in various -directions. In the plains lying between the River Irtish and the -Caspian Sea live the Kirghiz-Kazaks, and in the Tien-Shien Mountains -the Kara-Kirghiz, who have preserved many ancient Old Turkish customs, -and seem to have been only slightly Mohammedanised. The Usbegs and -the Sartis of Russian Turkistan, on the other hand, have been more or -less Iranised. Finally, on the banks of the Volga are to be found the -Tatars of European Russia. Among them the Tatars of Kazan, who are -descended from the Kiptchaks, came to the banks of the Volga in the -thirteenth century and mingled with the Bulgars. These Tatars differ -from the Tatars of Astrakhan, who are descendants of the Turco-Mongols -of the Golden Horde, and are connected with the Khazars, and from the -Nogaïs of the Crimea, who are Tatars of the steppes who more or less -inter-married with other races—the Tatars of the Tauris coast being the -hybrid descendants of the Adriatic race and the Indo-Afghan race. They -are to be found near Astrakhan and in the Caucasus Mountains, and even, -perhaps, as far as Lithuania, “where, though still being Mohammedans, -they have adopted the language and costume of the Poles.”<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">1</a></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The invasion of Europe by the Turks appears as the last great ethnic -movement that followed the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></span> so-called period of migration of peoples -(second to sixth centuries <span class="smcap lowercase">A.D.</span>) and the successive movements -it entailed.</p> - -<p>Let us consider only the migrations of those who concern us most -closely, and with whom the Turks were to come into contact later on. -First the Slavs spread westward towards the Baltic and beyond the Elbe, -and southward to the valley of the Danube and the Balkan Peninsula. -This movement brought about the advance of the Germans towards the -west, and consequently the advance of the Celts towards Iberia and as -far as Spain. Owing to the invasion of the Huns in the fifth century -and in the sixth of the Avars, who, after coming as far as Champagne, -settled down in the plains of Hungary and the territories lying farther -to the south which had already been occupied by the Dacians for several -centuries, the Slavs were cut into two groups. About the same time, the -Bulgars came from the banks of the Volga and settled on the banks of -the Danube.</p> - -<p>In the ninth century, owing to a new migration of masses of Slavonic -descent, the Hungarians, driven by tribes of Petchenegs and Polovts -into Southern Russia, crossed the Carpathian Mountains and took up -their abode in the valley of the Tirzah. While the Magyar Turks settled -in Hungary, the Kajar Turks occupied the hinterland of Thessalonica in -Macedonia. In the twelfth century, the Germans, driving the Western -Slavs as far as the banks of the Vistula, brought about a reaction -towards the north-east of the Eastern Slavs, whose expansion took place -at the expense of the Finnish tribes that lived there.</p> - -<p>Only in the thirteenth century did the Turco-Mongols<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></span> begin to migrate -in their turn; they occupied the whole of Russia, as far as Novgorod -to the north, and reached Liegnitz in Silesia. But, although they soon -drew back from Western Europe, they remained till the fifteenth century -in Eastern Russia, and in the eighteenth century they were still in the -steppes of Southern Russia, and in the Crimea.</p> - -<p>Finally, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Osmanli Turks -invaded the Balkan Peninsula, where they met such of their kindred -as the Kajars, the Tchitaks, and the Pomaks, who were heathens or -Christians, and later on embraced Islam. They invaded Hungary and made -incursions into Lower Austria.</p> - -<p>Then began the migration of the Little Russians into the upper valley -of the Dnieper, and in the sixteenth century they set off towards the -steppes of Southern Russia, while the Great Russians began to advance -beyond the Volga towards the Ural, a movement which reached Siberia, -and still continues.</p> - -<p>It follows, necessarily, that in the course of these huge migrations, -the so-called Turkish race was greatly modified; the Turks of the -Eastern group mixed with the Mongols, the Tunguses, and the Ugrians; -and those of the Western group in Asia and Europe with various -Indo-Afghan, Assyrian, Arab, and European elements, especially with -those living near the Adriatic: the Greeks, the Genoese, the Goths, -etc. Thus the Osmanli Turks became a mixture of many races.</p> - -<p>Though ethnologists do not agree about the various ethnic elements of -the Turco-Tatar group, it is certain, all the same, that those who came -to Asia Minor early<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></span> associated for a long time with the people of -Central Asia, and Vambéry considers that a Turkish element penetrated -into Europe at a very early date.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">2</a></p> - -<p>Though the Arabs in the seventh century subdued the Turks of Khiva, -they did not prevent them from penetrating into Asia Minor, and the -Kajars, who were not Mohammedans, founded an empire there in the eighth -century. At that period the Turks, among whom Islam was gaining ground, -enlisted in the Khalifa’s armies, but were not wholly swallowed up by -the Arab and Moslem civilisation of the Seljukian dynasty, the first -representatives of which had possibly embraced Nestorian Christianity -or Islam. Henceforth Asia Minor, whence the previous Turkish elements -had almost disappeared, began to turn into a Turkish country.</p> - -<p>All the Turks nowadays are Mohammedans, except the Chuvashes (Ugrians) -who are Christians, and some Shamanist Yakuts.</p> - -<p>As will be shown later on, these ethnographic considerations should not -be neglected in settling the future conditions of the Turks and Slavs -in Europe, in the interest of European civilisation.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>About half a century ago Elisée Reclus wrote as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“For many years has the cry ‘Out of Europe’ been uttered not only -against the Osmanli leaders, but also against the Turks as a -whole, and it is well known that this cruel wish has partly been -fulfilled; hundreds of thousands of Muslim emigrants from Greek -Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></span> Bulgaria have sought refuge -in Asia Minor, and these fugitives are only the remnants of the -wretched people who had to leave their ancestral abodes; the exodus -is still going on, and, most likely, will not leave off till the -whole of Lower Rumelia has become European in language and customs. -But now the Turks are being threatened even in Asia. A new cry -arises, ‘Into the Steppes,’ and to our dismay we wonder whether -this wish will not be carried out too. Is no conciliation possible -between the hostile races, and must the unity of civilisation be -obtained by the sacrifice of whole peoples, especially those that -are the most conspicuous for the noblest qualities—uprightness, -self-respect, courage, and tolerance?”<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">3</a> -</p></div> - -<p>For a long time this state of affairs did not seem to change much, but -after the recent upheaval of Europe it has suddenly become worse.</p> - -<p>Very different races, who have more or less intermingled, live on -either side of the Bosphorus, for Elisée Reclus says:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Peninsula, the western end of the fore part of the continent, -was a place where the warlike, wandering, or trading tribes, -coming from the south-east and north-east, converged naturally. -Semitic peoples inhabited the southern parts of Anatolia, and in -the centre of that country their race, dialects, and names seem to -have prevailed among numerous populations; in the south-west they -seem to have intermingled with coloured men, perhaps the Kushits. -In the eastern provinces the chief ethnic elements seem to have -been connected with the Persians, and spoke languages akin to Zend; -others represented the northern immigrants that bore the generic -name of Turanians. In the West migrations took place in a contrary -direction to those that came down from the Armenian uplands; -Thracians were connected by their trade and civilisation with the -coastlands of Europe and Asia sloping towards the Propontis, and -between both parts of the world Greeks continually plied across the -Ægean Sea.”<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">4</a> -</p></div> - -<p>Thus the common name of “Turks” is wrongly given to some Moslem -elements of widely different origin, who are to be found in Rumelia and -Turkey-in-Asia,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></span> such as the Albanians, who are akin to Greeks through -their common ancestors, the Pelasgians, the Bosnians, and the Moslem -Bulgars, the offspring of the Georgian and Circassian women who filled -the harems, and the descendants of Arabs or even of African negroes.</p> - -<p>After the internal conflicts between some of these elements, the -quarrels with other foreign elements, and the keen rivalry which -existed generally, each section seems to have held the Turk responsible -for whatever wrong was done, and the Turk was charged with being the -cause of all misfortunes—almost in the same way as the Jews: the Turks -have become, as it were, the scapegoats.</p> - -<p>Yet, in 1665, in his account of his travels in the East, M. de -Thévenot, who died at Mianeh in 1667, praised Turkish morality and -tolerance.</p> - -<p>Elisée Reclus wrote:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Turkish domination is merely outward, and does not reach, so to -say, the inner soul; so, in many respects, various ethnic groups in -Turkey enjoy a fuller autonomy than in the most advanced countries -of Western Europe.” -</p></div> - -<p>Ubicini speaks in the same manner, and Sir H. Bulwer states that:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As to freedom of faith and conscience, the prevailing religion in -Turkey grants the other religions a tolerance that is seldom met -with in Christian countries.” -</p></div> - -<p>Unfortunately the Turk’s mentality, in spite of what his enemies say, -does not help him. Owing to his nature, he is quite unable to defend -himself and to silence his slanderers.</p> - -<p>For, as E. Reclus remarked:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“They are not able to cope with the Greeks, who, under pretence of -pacific dealings, take vengeance for the war of <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></span>extermination, -the traces of which are still to be seen in Cydonia and Chio. They -do not stand an equal chance of winning; most of them only know -their own language, while a Greek speaks several languages; they -are ignorant and artless by the side of clever, shrewd adversaries. -Though he is not lazy, the Turk does not like to hurry; ‘Haste -is devilish, patience is godly,’ he will often say. He cannot do -without his ‘kief,’ an idle dream in which he lives like a mere -plant, without any exertion of his mind and will, whereas his -rival, always in earnest, can derive profit even from his hours -of rest. The very qualities of the Turk do him harm: honest, -trustworthy, he will work to the end of his life to pay off a -debt, and the business man takes advantage of this to offer him -long credits that shall make a slave of him for ever. There is an -axiom among business men in Asia Minor: ‘If you wish to thrive, do -not grant a Christian more credit than one-tenth of his fortune; -risk ten times as much with a Mohammedan.’ Encumbered with such a -credit, the Turk no longer possesses anything of his own; all the -produce of his work will go to the usurer. His carpets, his wares, -his flocks, even his land, will pass gradually into the hands of -the foreigner.”<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">5</a> -</p></div> - -<p>But since the time when this was written the Turkish mind has changed. -The Turks have set to work to learn languages, especially French. A -large part of the younger generation concern themselves with what takes -place in the West, and this transformation, which the Greeks and other -Europeans looked upon as endangering their situation in Turkey, may be -one of the factors of the present conflict.</p> - -<p>Besides, E. Reclus added: “The Greeks already hold, to the great -prejudice of the Turks, numerous industries and all the so-called -liberal professions, and as dragomans and journalists they are the only -informers of the Europeans, and control public opinion in the West.”<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">6</a></p> - - -<p>Footnotes:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">1</span></a> J. Deniker, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Les Races et les peuples de la terre</cite> (Paris, 1900), -p. 438. Zaborowski, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Tartares de la Lithuanie</cite> (1913).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">2</span></a> Deguignes, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Histoire générale des Huns</cite> (1750 and 1756); -L. Cahun, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Turcs et Mongols, des origins à 1405</cite> (Paris, 1896); -Vambéry, <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Das Turkenvolk</cite> (1885).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">3</span></a> Elisée Reclus, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Nouvelle géographie universelle</cite> (1884), -ix., p. 547.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">4</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 536.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">5</span></a> Elisée Reclus, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Nouvelle géographie universelle</cite> (1884), -ix., p. 546.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">6</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em>, p. 550.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="II">II<br /> -<br /> -THE TURKISH EMPIRE</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> Turks who lived in Turkistan and territories lying to the north of -China arrived in the tenth century and settled down in Persia and Asia -Minor, together with some allied or subject races, such as the Tatars. -There they founded several dynasties. Out of the numerous branches -of the Turkish race we will only deal with the Ottomans, who were to -establish their rule in Asia Minor and Europe.</p> - -<p>People too often forget the wonderful rise of the Turkish Empire, -which for nearly three centuries increased its power and enlarged its -territories; and they lay too much stress on its decline, which began -two centuries and a half ago.</p> - -<p>The Oghouz tribe of Kaï, following the Seljuks more or less closely -in their migrations, reached the uplands of Asia Minor about the end -of the tenth century. While part of the latter retraced their steps -towards the territories from which they had started, the others settled -down and founded the Empire of Rum. The Seljukian chief, Ala Eddin -Kaï Kobad I, gave to Erthoghrul, a son of Suleiman Khan, the ancestor -of the Seljukian dynasty of Konia, the summer pasturage of Mount -Toumanitch, south of Brusa, on the boundaries of the Roman Empire of -Byzantium. Erthoghrul and his successors<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></span> strengthened and enlarged -their dominions and laid the foundation of Ottoman power.</p> - -<p>Othman, or Osman, settled at Karahissar about the end of the thirteenth -century, at the time when the Seljukian Empire of Rum was destroyed by -Mongol inroads, and he conquered several of its principalities.</p> - -<p>Orkhan conquered the rest of Asia Minor and set foot in Europe in -1355. Amurath I took Adrianople, subjugated Macedonia and Albania, and -defeated the Serbs at the battle of Kossowo in 1389. By the victory -of Nicopolis in 1396 Bajazet I conquered Bulgaria and threatened -Constantinople, but Tamerlain’s invasion and Bajazet’s defeat in -1402 at Ancyra postponed the downfall of the Byzantine Empire. The -Turkish Empire recovered under Mohammed I and Amurath II, who made -new conquests and entirely subdued the Serbians in 1459, Mohammed II -took Constantinople in 1453, quickly subdued the Greek peninsula, and -annihilated the Byzantine Empire. He also took Carmania, the Empire -of Trebizond in 1461, Bosnia, Wallachia in 1462, and Lesser Tartary, -and even made an incursion into Italy. The Turkish Empire continued -to expand for nearly another century. In 1517 Selim I turned Syria, -Palestine, and Egypt into Ottoman provinces; he took Mecca and acquired -Algiers in 1520. Soliman II made new conquests. In Asia he added to -the Empire Aldjeziresh and parts of Armenia, Kurdistan, and Arabia; in -Europe, after capturing part of Hungary, Transylvania, Esclavonia, and -Moldavia, and taking Rhodes from the Knights, he came to the gates of -Vienna in 1529, and in 1534 added Tunis to his empire, and Tripoli in -1551. At<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></span> the beginning of his reign Selim II conquered the Yemen, and -in 1571 took Cyprus from the Venetians; but next year the Turkish fleet -was utterly destroyed at the battle of Lepanto.</p> - -<p>Turkish domination then reached its climax, and from this time began -its downfall. Internal difficulties soon showed that the Ottoman Empire -was beginning to decline. From 1595 to 1608 Turkey lost territory in -Hungary, though, on the other hand, by the battle of Choczim, she -conquered new districts in Poland. After a few perturbed years, in 1669 -Mohammed IV took Candia, which Ibrahim had vainly attempted to conquer.</p> - -<p>But henceforth the decline of the Empire was rapid, and its territories -were dislocated and dismembered. The regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and -Tripoli became practically independent. By the fall of Carlovitz, which -put an end to the 1682-1699 war, the Turks lost nearly the whole of -Hungary. By the treaty of Passarovitz, they lost Temesvar and a part -of Serbia, which was restored to them by the peace of Belgrade in -1740. The Russians, with whom they had been fighting since 1672, and -who began to get the upper hand during the 1770-74 war, took from them -Bukovina and Lesser Tartary, the independence of which was recognised -by the treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji. After a new war from 1809 to 1812, -the treaty of Bukharest gave to Russia the provinces lying between -the Dnieper and the Danube. In 1809 Turkey lost the Ionian Islands, -which became independent under an English protectorate. The victory -of Navarino made Greece free in 1827. The Turks were obliged to cede -Turkish Armenia to Russia in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></span> 1829, and, after a new war with Russia, -Wallachia, Moldavia, and Serbia were put under Russian protection by -the treaty of Adrianople. France conquered Algeria in 1831. In 1833 -the pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, rebelled, captured Syria, defeated -the Turks at Konia, and threatened Constantinople. Turkey, lying at -the mercy of Russia, opened the Bosphorus to her ships and closed the -Dardanelles to the other Powers by the treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi in -1833.</p> - -<p>Yet a reaction took place, and it seemed that Mehemet Ali, who helped -the Sultan to subdue the insurgent Greeks, was likely to stop the -downfall of Turkey. But his fleet was annihilated at Navarino, October -20, 1827, by the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia. He -received Candia from the Sultan as a reward for his co-operation, but, -not having been able to obtain Syria, he broke off with the Sublime -Porte. An intervention of the European Powers put an end to his -triumph. Turkey recovered the territories she had lost, and, in return -for this restitution and for giving back the Turkish fleet, he obtained -the hereditary government of Egypt under the suzerainty of the Porte.</p> - -<p>Turkey then attempted to revive and to strengthen her condition by -organisation on European lines.</p> - -<p>As early as 1830 a liberal movement had made itself felt in Turkey as -in many other States. The Ottoman Government realised, too, that it was -necessary to get rid of the Russian influence imposed upon her by the -treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi, and so was compelled to institute reforms.</p> - -<p>As early as 1861 Midhat Pasha, first as vali of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></span> Danubian -province, then as vali of Baghdad in 1869, and later on in Arabia, -showed much enterprise and evinced great qualities of organisation and -administration. When recalled to Constantinople, he became the leader -of the Young Turk party.</p> - -<p>Mahmoud II and Abdul Mejid renewed the attempts already made by Selim -III at the end of the eighteenth century, with a view to putting an end -to the utter confusion of the Empire, and instituted various reforms -borrowed from Europe. In 1853 France and England helped Turkey to repel -a new Russian aggression, and the treaty of March 30, 1856, after the -Crimean war, guaranteed her independence.</p> - -<p>But the reign of Abdul Aziz, which had begun in such a brilliant way, -proved unfortunate later on. A rising in Crete was suppressed with -great difficulty in 1867; in 1875 Herzegovina and Bosnia, urged on by -Russia, rebelled, and Serbia, who backed the rebels, was defeated in -1876. Abdul Aziz, on account of his wasteful financial administration -as well as his leaning towards Russia, which he considered the -only State to be favoured because it was an autocratic government, -unconsciously aided the Tsar’s policy against his own country, and -uselessly exhausted the resources of Turkey. Yet under his reign the -judicial system, the army, and the administration were reorganised, -the legislation was secularised, and Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans -were set on a footing of equality. These reforms, prepared by his two -predecessors, were carried out by him. He was forced to abdicate by an -insurrection in 1876, and committed suicide.</p> - -<p>His successor, Mourad V, became mad and reigned<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></span> only a few months. -He was dethroned and replaced by his brother Abdul Hamid, who, on -December 23, 1876, suspended the liberal constitution that the Grand -Vizier Midhat Pasha had promulgated. On February 5, 1877, he disgraced -Midhat Pasha, who left the country and lived abroad. Midhat Pasha was -allowed to come back to Turkey later, and ordered to reside in the Isle -of Crete. He was then appointed governor of the vilayet of Smyrna, -but was charged with the murder of Abdul Aziz, imprisoned in the -fortress of Taïf in Arabia, and assassinated on February 26, 1883.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">7</a> -A rising of Bulgaria, which the Turks put down ruthlessly, caused -European intervention and a new war with Russia backed by Rumania and -Montenegro. The Turks, beaten in 1877, had to sign the preliminaries of -San Stefano, modified by the treaty of Berlin in 1878. Rumania, Serbia, -and Montenegro became independent States; Eastern Rumelia an autonomous -country; and Bulgaria a tributary principality. Austria occupied Bosnia -and Herzegovina, England Cyprus, and in Asia the Russians received -Kars, Ardahan, and Batum. The Berlin Conference in 1880 allowed Greece -to occupy Larissa, Metzovo, and Janina.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">8</a></p> - -<p>In 1898 Turkey slightly recovered, and in seventeen days her armies -routed Greece, and the country would have ceased to exist but for the -Tsar’s intervention with the Sultan.</p> - -<p>However, as the condition of Turkey at the end of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></span> Abdul Hamid’s reign -was growing more and more critical, the old ambitions entertained by -several Great Powers revived. At the meeting of Edward VII and Nicholas -II at Reval, the question of the extension of the European control -which already existed in Macedonia was discussed.</p> - -<p>The revolution of July 23, 1908, which put an end to Abdul Hamid’s -autocratic rule, instituted constitutional government in Turkey. -The Great Powers were at first taken aback, but without troubling -themselves about Turkey’s chance of regeneration, they carried on their -rivalries, all trying to derive some profit from Turkey in case she -should become prosperous and powerful, and at the same time doing their -best to prevent her from reviving in order to be able to domineer over -her and exhaust her the more easily.</p> - -<p>For a long time previously many Turks of the younger generation, -who regretted the condition of the Empire, and were acquainted with -European ideas, had realised that, if Turkey was not to die, she must -reform herself. They had tried to further this aim by literary methods -and had carried on propaganda work abroad, being unable to do so in -Turkey. The reign of Abdul Hamid, during which the old régime had -become more and more intolerable, was to bring about its overthrow, -and in this respect the revolutionary movement was the outcome of -Turkey’s corruption. Among the numerous instigators of this movement, -Enver Bey and Niazi Bey, who were then only captains garrisoned in -Macedonia, soon became the most prominent. The revolutionary elements -were chiefly recruited from the university students, especially those -of the School of Medicine<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></span> and of the Mulkieh School. Officers of the -highest rank, such as Marshal Redjeb Pasha, who, when governor of -Tripoli, had plotted against Abdul Hamid, were on the committee; but -the masses, among whom the Young Turk propaganda had not penetrated, -at first stood aloof, as they did not know the views of the members of -the committee, who, before the revolution, had been obliged to carry on -their propaganda very cautiously and among few people, for fear of the -Sultan’s reprisals.</p> - -<p>The movement started from Albania. Macedonia, the province which was -most likely to be wrested from the Empire, and Syria immediately -followed the lead, and the revolutionary movement soon met with -unanimous approval.</p> - -<p>On April 13, 1909, a reactionary movement set in which failed only -because of Abdul Hamid’s irresolute, tottering mind. It was supported -by the garrison of Constantinople, which comprised Albanian troops, -the very men who had lent their aid to the revolution at first, but -had been brought back to the Sultan’s party by the lower clergy and -politicians whose interest it was to restore Abdul Hamid’s autocratic -rule, or whose personal ambitions had been baulked. Troops, comprising -Albanians, Bosnians, and Turkish elements, and reinforced by Greek, -Bulgarian, and Serbian volunteers, old komitadjis, were summoned to -Salonika.</p> - -<p>The reaction of April 13 seems to have been partly due to foreign -intrigue, especially on the part of England, who, anxious at seeing -Turkey attempt to gain a new life, tried to raise internal difficulties -by working up the fanaticism of the hodjas, most of whom<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></span> were paid -and lodged in seminaries, and so were interested in maintaining Abdul -Hamid’s autocratic government. These manœuvres may even have been the -original cause of the reactionary movement.</p> - -<p>Mr. Fitzmaurice, dragoman of the English embassy, was one of the -instigators of the movement, and the chief distributor of the money -raised for that purpose. He seems to have succeeded in fomenting the -first internal difficulties of the new Turkish Government. After -the failure of the reactionary movement, the Committee of Union and -Progress demanded the dismissal of Mr. Fitzmaurice, who later on -settled at Sofia, where he continued his intrigues.</p> - -<p>Then the government passed into the hands of the Committee of Union and -Progress which had brought on the revolution, and which practically -governed the country from 1908 till the signing of the armistice -between the Allies and Turkey.</p> - -<p>The Committee of Union and Progress, which at the outset had shown a -liberal and enlightened spirit, soon became very powerful; but, being -the only ruling power in the country, they soon left the straight -path and began to indulge in corrupt practices. The leaders’ heads -were turned by their sudden success, and they were not sufficiently -strong-minded to resist the temptations of office in a time of crisis. -All the power was soon concentrated in the hands of a few: Talaat, -Enver, and Jemal, all three men of very humble origin, who, when still -young, had risen rapidly to the highest eminence in the State.</p> - -<p>Enver, born on December 8, 1883, was the son of a road-surveyor. At -twenty he left the cadet school of Pancaldi, and became a prominent -figure at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></span> time of the revolution. After Abdul Hamid’s downfall, -he was sent to Berlin, whence he returned an enthusiastic admirer of -Germany. After distinguishing himself in Tripoli, he was made War -Minister at the end of the Balkan war. He was naturally very bold; his -brilliant political career made him vain, and soon a story arose round -him. He became rich by marrying a princess of the Imperial Family, the -Sultan’s niece, but it was wrongly said that he married a daughter of -the Sultan—a mistake which is easily accounted for as in Turkey anybody -who marries a princess of the Imperial Family bears the title of -imperial son-in-law, Damad-i-Hazret-i-Shehriyari. At any rate, Enver’s -head was turned by his good fortune.</p> - -<p>Talaat is supposed to be the son of a <em>pomak</em>—that is to say, his -ancestors were of Bulgarian descent and had embraced Islam. He was born -at Adrianople in 1870, received an elementary education at the School -of the Jewish Alliance, then became a clerk in a post-office and later -on in a telegraph-office. Owing to the liberal ideas he propounded -and the people he associated with, he was sentenced to imprisonment. -Two years after, in 1896, when he came out of prison, he was exiled -to Salonika, a centre of propaganda of the Young Turks who were then -attempting to overthrow Abdul Hamid. He had learned very little at -school, but had a quick wit and great abilities; so he soon obtained a -prominent place among the leaders of the revolutionary movement, and in -a short time became a moving spirit in the party, together with Enver, -Marniassi Zadé Refik Bey, and Javid Bey. Very strongly built,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></span> with -huge, square fists on which he always leant in a resolute attitude of -defiance, Talaat was a man of great will power. When the constitution -was granted to the Turkish people, he went to Adrianople, where he was -returned Member of Parliament. Soon after he became Vice-President of -the Chamber, then Minister of the Interior. But he always remained an -unassuming man and led a quiet life in a plain house. He was among -those who desired to turn his country into a modern State, in the -Anglo-Saxon sense of the word, with the help of Germany and by using -German methods, which was perhaps his greatest mistake. When war broke -out, Talaat was Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet in which the -Egyptian prince Said Halim was Grand Vizier. On February 4, 1917, when -this Ministry resigned, he became Grand Vizier, and on February 17, in -the course of the sitting of the Constantinople Parliament, he declared -that he intended to maintain the alliance with Germany to the end.</p> - -<p>Jemal Pasha is of Turkish descent. He left the War Academy as Captain -of the Staff, and married the daughter of Bekir Pasha, who commanded a -division of the second army garrisoned at Adrianople. This Bekir Pasha -had risen from the ranks, and when he was still a non-commissioned -officer had throttled Midhat Pasha with his own hands. It has -been wrongly stated that his father was the public executioner at -Constantinople during the reign of Mahmoud II. Whereas Talaat’s and -Enver’s manners were distant, Jemal professed to be affable and strove -to please, though he was very cruel at heart. He was looked upon as a -friend of France<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></span> when he came to Paris in 1914 to raise the Ottoman -loan. He was appointed military governor of Constantinople after Nazim -Pasha’s murder, January 10, 1913, in which he and Talaat and Enver had -a share; then he became Minister of Marine.</p> - -<p>Talaat fully represented the Committee of Union and Progress, and -was supported by it, but Enver and Jemal, though also members, did -not make use of their connection with the party. Indeed Enver, who -disagreed with Talaat, had nothing to do with the party after he had -been appointed War Minister, and when he was called upon to resign -during the war, he retained his office with the support of Germany. -Only the difficulties which the Empire experienced could have brought -together three men who were actuated by such widely different motives; -at any rate the omnipotence of the Union and Progress Committee, which -even caused some liberals to regret the passing of the old régime, was -contrary to the constitutional system which the party had purposed to -institute in Turkey.</p> - -<p>Though the leaders of the Unionist movement drove Turkey to the verge -of ruin, yet the movement itself to a certain extent aroused in the -Turkish people a consciousness of their rights, which they had nearly -given up under the control of foreign countries; the movements of -opinion brought about, and even the reaction that set in finally, -roused that national feeling, which found expression soon after the -events of the last war.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>It must be acknowledged that the Capitulations, the extension of -which led to the improper interference<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></span> of foreign nations in the -home affairs of the Ottoman State and gave them a paramount power -over it, formed one of the chief causes of the modern ruin of Turkey, -by weakening and disintegrating it. The extension of the economic -Capitulations was made possible by the carelessness of the Mussulmans -in commercial matters, and by their natural indolence, while the -extension of the judicial Capitulations, which originated in a Moslem -custom dating from the Middle Ages, seems to have been due to the -condescension of the Sultans.</p> - -<p>It is a well-known fact that Mehmet II, by the treaty he signed in -1434, granted to the Republic of Venice extra-territorial privileges -consisting of commercial immunities, the benefit of which was claimed -afterwards by the Powers the Porte had then to deal with. Those -immunities, renewed with slight alterations, constituted what was later -on called the Capitulations.</p> - -<p>In 1528 Soliman II officially ratified the privileges which French and -Catalonian merchants living in Constantinople had been enjoying for -a long time, according to an old custom. The treaty signed by this -monarch in 1535 confirmed the old state of affairs. By this treaty the -French king, Francis I, both secured the help of Turkey against his -enemies, and promised the Ottoman Empire the protection of France; at -the same time he obtained for French merchants the privilege of trading -in the Eastern seas, preferential customs duties on their goods, the -obligation for all foreigners trading in the East to sail under the -French flag, and the privilege of appointing consuls in the Levant who -had jurisdiction<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></span> over their fellow-countrymen. Lastly, the treaty -not only secured to France the protectorate of the Holy Places, but -also entrusted her with the defence of all the Latin religious orders, -of whatever nationality, which were beginning at that time to found -establishments in the East.</p> - -<p>These stipulations, renewed in 1569, 1581, 1604, and 1673, secured -to France both commercial supremacy and much prestige throughout the -Ottoman Empire, and gave a permanent character to the concessions made -by Turkey. The agreement that sealed them and seemed unchangeable soon -induced other foreign nations to claim further privileges.</p> - -<p>By the end of the sixteenth century Turkey had to grant similar -privileges to Great Britain, and the contest between the British -representative, Sir Thomas Glover, and Jean de Gontaut-Biron, the -French ambassador, has become historical. Nevertheless France for -nearly two centuries maintained her position and influence.</p> - -<p>So it was with Russia in 1711 and the United States in 1830. The -Ottoman Empire had even to concede almost equal advantages to Greece -and Rumania, countries which had enlarged their boundaries at her -expense.</p> - -<p>Such privileges, which were justifiable at the outset, soon brought -on unrestricted and unjustifiable interference by foreign Powers in -Turkish affairs. The Powers attempted to justify the establishment -and maintenance of this régime by alleging they had to protect their -subjects against the delays or evil practices of the Turkish courts of -justice, though the Powers that had managed to gain great influence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></span> in -Turkey were already able, through their embassies, to defend fully the -rights and interests of their own subjects.</p> - -<p>In virtue of the judicial privileges, all differences or misdemeanours -concerning foreigners of the same nationality were amenable to the -consuls of the country concerned, whose right of jurisdiction included -that of arrest and imprisonment; cases between foreigners of different -nationalities were heard in the court of the defendant, this applying -to both lawsuits and criminal cases; while, in lawsuits between Turkish -subjects and foreigners, the jurisdiction belonged to the Ottoman -tribunals; but, as the Consul was represented in court by an assessor -or a dragoman, the sentence depended chiefly on the latter. As a matter -of fact, these privileges only favoured the worst class of foreigners, -and merely served to make fraud easier.</p> - -<p>Lastly, from an economic point of view, the Capitulations injured the -Turkish treasury by binding the Ottoman State and preventing it from -establishing differential duties, at a time when a war of tariffs was -being carried on between all States.</p> - -<p>During the reign of Abdul Hamid, owing to the facilities given by this -state of things, the interference of the Powers in Turkish affairs -reached such a climax that they succeeded not only in bringing Turkey -into a condition of subjection, but in disposing of her territories, -after dividing them into regions where their respective influence was -paramount. The greediness of the Powers was only restrained by the -conflicts their rivalry threatened to raise. If one of them obtained -a concession, such as the building<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></span> of a railway line in the region -assigned to it, the others at once demanded compensation, such as the -opening of harbours on the sea-fronts assigned to them. Things went so -far that Russia, though she could not compete with the Powers whose -rivalry gave itself free scope at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, -intervened to hinder Turkey from constructing a system of railways in -Eastern Asia Minor, alleging that the building of these lines would -endanger her zone of influence. The railway concessions had to be given -to her, though she never attempted to construct any of the lines.</p> - -<p>In addition, by laying stress on the Capitulations, in which nothing -could be found that supported their demands, the Great Powers -established foreign post-offices in the ports of the Empire. These -post-offices, which enjoyed the privilege of extra-territoriality, were -only used by foreign merchants and persons of note to smuggle in small -parcels, and by native agitators to correspond safely with agitators -living abroad.</p> - -<p>Of course Turkey, being thus brought into subjection, did not develop -so rapidly as the nations which, not being under any foreign tutelage, -enjoyed independence; and it is unfair to reproach her with keeping -behind them.</p> - -<p>After the revolution, and owing to many requests of the Turkish -Government, some economic alterations were made in the Capitulations, -such as the paying of the tradesman’s licence tax by foreigners, and -the right of the State to establish monopolies. Austria-Hungary, when -the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled, consented to give up -her privilege concerning the customs duties, on condition that other<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></span> -Powers did the same. A short time after Germany promised to do so, but, -among the other Powers, some refused, and others laid down conditions -that would have brought more servitude to Turkey and would have cost -her new sacrifices.</p> - -<p>The Unionist Government, as will be shown later, cancelled the -Capitulations during the last war.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>After recalling the wonderful political fortune of the Turkish Empire, -we should remember that, after bringing Eastern influences to Western -countries, it had also an influence of its own which was plainly felt -in Europe. Western art drew its inspiration from Eastern subjects, and -at the end of the eighteenth century everything that was Turkish became -the fashion for a time.</p> - -<p>This influence was the natural outcome of the close intercourse with -the Levant from the Renaissance till the eighteenth century, and of the -receptions given in honour of Eastern men of mark during their visits -to European courts. It is not intended to discuss the question of the -relation between Turkish art and Arabian art, and its repercussion on -Western art, or of Eastern influence in literature; but it will be -well to show how much attraction all Turkish and Eastern things had -for the people of the time, and how happily the imitation of the East -influenced decorative art and style, as if the widely different tastes -of societies so far apart had reached the same stage of refinement and -culture.</p> - -<p>Records are still extant of the famous embassy sent by the Grand Turk -during the reign of Louis XIV,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></span> and the embassy sent by the Sultan of -Morocco to ask for the hand of the Princess de Conti, for in Coypel’s -painting in the Versailles Museum can be seen the ambassadors of the -Sultan of Morocco witnessing a performance of Italian comedy in Paris -in 1682. Later on the Turkish embassy of Mehemet Effendi in 1721 was -painted by Ch. Parrocel.</p> - -<p>Lievins’ “Soliman” in the Royal Palace of Berlin, a few faces drawn -by Rembrandt, his famous portrait known as “The Turk with the Stick” -in MacK. Tomby’s collection, which is more likely to be the portrait -of an aristocratic Slav, the carpet in “Bethsabe’s Toilet after a -Bath,” bear witness to the Eastern influence. So do the Turkish -buildings of Peter Koeck d’Aelst, who was the director of a Flemish -manufactory of tapestry at Constantinople during Soliman’s reign; -the scenes of Turkish life and paintings of Melchior Lorch, who also -lived at Constantinople about the same time and drew the Sultan’s and -the Sultana’s portraits; and the pictures of J.-B. van Mour, born at -Valenciennes, who died in Constantinople, where he had been induced to -come by M. de Ferriol, the French King’s Ambassador; of A. de Favray; -and of Melling, the Sultana Hadidge’s architect, who was called the -painter of the Bosphorus.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">9</a></p> - -<p>There may also be mentioned Charles Amédée van Loo’s pictures: “A -Sultana’s Toilet,” “The Sultana ordering the Odalisks some Fancy Work,” -“The Favourite Sultana with her Women attended by White<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></span> and Black -Eunuchs,” “Odalisks dancing before the Sultan and Sultana,” most of -which were drawn for the king from 1775 to 1777, and were intended as -models for tapestries; and also the portrait of Madame de Pompadour -as an odalisk, “The Odalisk before her Embroidery Frame,” and “A -Negress bringing the Sultana’s Coffee,” by the same painter. To these -may be added Lancret’s Turkish sketches, the drawings and pastels of -Liotard, who left Geneva for Paris about 1762, then lived in the ports -of the Levant and Constantinople, and came back to Vienna, London, -and Holland, and whose chief pictures are: “A Frankish Lady of Pera -receiving a Visit,” “A Frankish Lady of Galata attended by her Slave”; -and also Fragonard’s “New Odalisks introduced to the Pasha,” his sepia -drawings, Marie Antoinette’s so-called Turkish furniture, etc.</p> - -<p>In music any sharp, brisk rhythm was styled <em>alla turca</em>—that is, in -the Turkish style. We also know a Turkish roundelay by Mozart, and a -Turkish march in Beethoven’s “Ruins of Athens.”</p> - -<p>At the end of the eighteenth century, not only did people imitate the -gorgeousness and vivid colours of Turkish costumes, but every Turkish -whim was the fashion of the day. Ingres, too, took from Turkey the -subjects of some of his best and most famous paintings: “The Odalisk -lying on her Bed,” “The Turkish Bath,” etc.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Lastly, the Great War should teach us, in other respects too, not -to underrate those who became our adversaries owing to the mistake -they made in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></span> joining the Central Powers. For the “Sick Man” raised -an army of nearly 1,600,000 men, about a million of whom belonged to -fighting units, and the alliance of Turkey with Germany was a heavy -blow to the Allied Powers: Russia was blockaded, the Tsar Ferdinand -was enabled to attack Serbia, the blockade of Rumania brought on the -peace of Bukharest, Turkish troops threatened Persia, owing to which -German emissaries found their way into Afghanistan, General Kress von -Kressenstein and his Ottoman troops attacked the Suez Canal, etc. All -this gave the Allies a right to enforce on Turkey heavy terms of peace, -but did not justify either the harsh treatment inflicted upon her -before the treaty was signed, or some of the provisions of that treaty. -It would be a great mistake to look upon Turkey as of no account in the -future, and to believe that the nation can no longer play an important -part in Europe.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">7</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Midhat Pacha, Sa vie et son œuvre</cite>, by his son -Ali-Haydar-Midhat Bey (Paris, 1908).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">8</span></a> Janina was occupied by Greece in 1912-18.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">9</span></a> Cf. A. Boppe, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Les Peintres du Bosphore au dix-huitième -siècle</cite> (Paris, 1919).</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="III">III<br /> -<br /> -TURKEY AND THE WAR</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">It</span> is a well-known fact that Germany, while carefully organising -the conflict that was to lay waste the whole world and give her the -hegemony of the globe, had not neglected Turkey. Her manœuvres ended, -before the war, in concluding a Turco-German treaty of alliance, signed -in Constantinople at four o’clock in the afternoon of August 2, 1914, -by Baron von Wangenheim and the Grand Vizier Said Halim, an Egyptian -prince, cousin to the former Khedive of Egypt and Mehemet Ali’s -grandson. It seems that the Turkish negotiators had plainly told the -German representatives that they only meant to fight against Russia, -and they did not even require any guarantee against the action of -France and England.</p> - -<p>The spirit in which these negotiations were carried on has been lately -corroborated by a statement of M. Bompard, former French Ambassador at -Constantinople, who, in answer to a newspaper article concerning the -circumstances under which Turkey entered into the war, and the episode -of the <em>Goeben</em> and the <em>Breslau</em>,<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">10</a> wrote in the same newspaper:<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">11</a></p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Owing to the treaty of August 2, Turkey was ipso facto a -belligerent; yet though the military authorities acted in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></span> -conformity with the treaty, the civil authorities—<em>i.e.</em>, the -Government, properly speaking—had a somewhat different attitude. In -the first place, the Government denied it was at war with France -and England. The Grand Vizier had even made a formal declaration -of neutrality in Paris and London; it only had to do with Russia; -besides, the thing was not urgent, as the Russian decree of -mobilisation had just been issued.”</p></div> - -<p>In the first article of the treaty it was stated that both Powers -should maintain a strict neutrality in the conflict between -Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This clause, however, was only intended to -give the treaty a pacific appearance, for it was said in Clause 2 that -if Russia intervened and thus compelled Germany to support her ally, -Austria-Hungary, Turkey should be under the same obligation.</p> - -<p>Now, on the previous day, Germany had declared war on Russia, and thus -the second article came into effect immediately. So by this treaty -Germany really wanted to throw Turkey into the war by the side of the -Central Powers.</p> - -<p>The other clauses laid down the conditions of a military co-operation. -The most important one was that Turkey pledged herself to let the -German military mission have the control in the conduct of operations, -“according to what was agreed between His Excellency the War Minister -and the President of the Military Mission.” Theoretically the treaty -was to come to an end on December 31, 1918, but, if not denounced six -months before that date, it was to be renewed for five years more.</p> - -<p>Clause 8 and last expressly said that the agreement was to be kept -secret.</p> - -<p>On October 29, 1914, two Turkish torpedo-boats entered the port of -Odessa, sank a Russian gun-boat,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></span> and fired at the French liner -<em>Portugal</em>, and a Turco-German squadron made a surprise attack upon -Theodosia and Novorossisk. Then the Allied Powers declared war on -Turkey on November 5.</p> - -<p>Yet, after keeping neutral during the first three months of the war, -Turkey seems to have had some hesitation in entering the conflict, -notwithstanding German pressure. Most of her statesmen, who had weighed -the financial and political consequences of her intervention, did not -seem to consider they were to the advantage of their country; but -the ambitious aims of Enver Pasha, who was devoted to Germany, for -his success depended on her triumph, prevailed upon Turkey to yield. -On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, pointed out -on October 2, 1914, to the Austrian ambassador, who urged Turkey to -utilise her fleet, that if the latter was ever defeated by the Russian -fleet, Constantinople would be endangered. But a few days after, on -October 15, he declared that the only obstacle to Turkish intervention -was the penury of the treasury. Indeed, it is probable that Javid Bey, -Minister of Finance, who had just signed an agreement with France -concerning Turkish railways and finance, was not very eager to declare -war on a country whose financial help was indispensable. He had even -made overtures on several occasions to the ambassadors of the Entente, -on behalf of the moderate members of the Ministry. In August, 1914, -he offered to come to an agreement with the Entente providing that -the Capitulations were suppressed, and in September he asked them to -recognise the suppression of the Capitulations in order to be able to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></span> -demobilise the Ottoman army. He resigned after the declaration of war, -but consented to be member of a new Cabinet the next year.</p> - -<p>It seems probable, too, that Talaat for rather a long time favoured -an attitude of neutrality in order to obtain for Turkey, among -other political and economic advantages, the suppression of the -Capitulations, and that only later on he finally, like Jemal, Minister -of Marine, sided with Enver Pasha and the Germans. On September 6 -Talaat Bey told Sir L. du Pan Mallet that there was no question of -Turkey entering the war,<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">12</a> and on September 9 he declared to the same -ambassador, with regard to the Capitulations, that the time had come to -free Turkey from foreign trammels.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">13</a></p> - -<p>Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish Minister at Athens, in a telegram addressed -to Said Halim Pasha on June 15, 1914, had informed him he had just -learnt that “Greece, by raising a conflict, expected a general -conflagration would ensue which might bring on the opening of the -question of Turkey-in-Asia.” On August 7, 1914, he stated in another -dispatch sent from Athens to the Sublime Porte:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In the present war England, according to all probabilities, will -have the last word. So if we are not absolutely certain to triumph -finally, it would be a highly venturesome thing for us to rush -into an adventure, the consequences of which might be—which God -forbid—fatal to our country.” -</p></div> - -<p>In a long report dated September 9, 1914, he added:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The present circumstances are so critical and so fraught with -danger that I take the liberty humbly to advise the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></span> Imperial -Government to keep a strict neutrality in the present conflicts, -and to endeavour to soothe Russia....</p> - -<p>“The compact lately signed in London by the Allies shows that the -war is expected to last long.... A State like the Ottoman Empire, -which has enormous unprotected sea-coasts and remote provinces open -to foreign intrigues, should certainly beware of the enmity of a -malignant and vindictive country like England....” -</p></div> - -<p>So it appears that the decision of Turkey was not taken unanimously and -only after much hesitation.</p> - -<p>Henceforth the operations engaged in by both sides followed their due -course.</p> - -<p>In Europe the Franco-British squadrons under the command of Admiral -Carden began on November 3 to bombard the forts which guarded the -entrance of the Dardanelles. On February 25, 1915, a combined attack of -the Allied fleets took place, and on March 18 a general attack was made -by the Franco-British squadrons, in which three of their ironclads were -sunk, four were severely damaged, and other ships were disabled.</p> - -<p>On April 25 to 27 the English and French troops landed in Gallipoli, -and after driving back the Turks advanced on May 6 to 8. But when the -expeditionary corps had failed to reach Krithia and the Kareves-Dere, -then, after a violent offensive of the Turks, which was repulsed -on June 21, and the failure of a diversion against the Sari-Bair -Mountains, it was withdrawn on January 8, 1916.</p> - -<p>In Asia, after the Turkish naval action in the Black Sea, and the -march of the Turkish troops against Kars and Tiflis, the Russians -invaded Armenia, in Asia Minor, on November 4, 1914, and took Ardost. -On November 8 they captured Bayazid and Kuprikeui;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></span> Ardahan and -Sary-Kamysh, where, as will be seen later on, the Armenians were partly -responsible for the Turkish retreat, December 21 and 22; on May 19, -1915, Van fell; then, in the following year, Erzerum (February 16, -1916), Mush (February 18), Bitlis (March 2), Trebizond (April 18), -Baiburt (July 16), and Erzinjan (July 25). Thus the Russian troops had -conquered the four provinces of Erzerum, Van, Trebizond, and Bitlis, -extending over an area of 75,000 square miles.</p> - -<p>In Mesopotamia the British brigade of Indian troops came into action on -November 8, 1914, and captured the little fort at Fao, which commands -the entrance of the Shatt-el-Arab. On November 17 it was victorious -at Sihan, took Basra on the 22nd, and Korna on December 9 of the same -year. Next year, on July 3, 1915, the British troops captured Amara, -Suk-esh-Shuyukh on July 21, Naseriya on the 25th of the same month, and -on September 29 they occupied Kut-el-Amara, which the Turks recaptured -on April 18, 1916, taking General Townshend prisoner. On February 28, -1917, Kut-el-Amara fell again to British arms, then Baghdad on March -11. On April 2, 1917, the English and Russian forces joined together at -Kizilrobat on the main road to Persia, and all the Indian frontier was -wholly freed from the Turco-German pressure.</p> - -<p>But after the Russian revolution, the Turks successively recaptured all -the towns the Russian troops had conquered in Transcaucasia and Asia -Minor, and soon threatened Caucasus.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile in Arabia the Turks had suddenly invaded the Aden area, where -they were beaten on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></span> the 21st by the British at Sheikh-Othman and on -the 25th at Bir-Ahmed.</p> - -<p>On June 10, 1916, the Arab rising broke out. On June 14 they were -masters of Mecca. On July 1 they took Jeddah, then Rabagh, then -Yambo on the Red Sea. On November 6, 1916, the Sherif of Mecca, the -Emir Hussein, was proclaimed King of the Hejaz, under the name of -Hussein-Ibn-Ali.</p> - -<p>As early as November 3, 1914, Turkey, which occupied all the Sinai -Peninsula, threatened Egypt. A first Turkish offensive against the -Suez Canal was checked from February 2 to 4 simultaneously before -El-Kantara, Al-Ferdan, Toussoun, and Serapeum. A second Turkish -offensive, started on July 29, 1916, was also crushed before Romani -near the Suez Canal, on the 5th at Katia and on the 11th at Bir-el-Abd.</p> - -<p>The British army then launched a great offensive in December, 1916, -which resulted, on December 21, in the capture of El-Arish, on the -boundary of the Sinaitic desert, and in the occupation of Aleppo on -October 26, 1918. On January 9, 1917, they took Rafa, then Beersheba on -October 31, 1917, Gaza on November 7, and Jaffa on November 17; and on -December 11, 1917, General Allenby entered Jerusalem.</p> - -<p>In September, 1918, a new offensive took place, backed by the French -troops that took Nablus, and the French navy that made the British -advance possible by bombarding the coast. General Allenby entered Haïfa -and Acre on September 23 and Tiberias on the 24th, and on the 28th he -effected his junction with the troops of the King of the Hejaz. He<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></span> -entered Damascus on October 1 with the Emir Feisal, who commanded the -Arabian army. On October 6 the French squadron sailed into the port -of Beyrut, which was occupied on the 7th. Tripoli was captured on the -13th, Homs on the 15th, Aleppo on the 26th of October, 1918. By this -time Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia, and Arabia had fallen into the hands -of the Allies.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the disintegration of the Turkish troop was completed -by General Franchet d’Espérey’s offensive and the capitulation of -Bulgaria. Turkey applied to General Townshend—who had been taken -prisoner at Kut-el-Amara—to treat with her victors. The negotiations of -the armistice were conducted by Rauf Bey, Minister of the Navy; Reshad -Hikmet Bey, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and Sadullah -Bey, head of the general staff of the Third Army.</p> - -<p>As early as 1916 Turkey of her own authority had suppressed the -Capitulations—<em>i.e.</em>, the conventions through which the Powers, as has -been seen, had a right, amongst other privileges, to have their own -tribunals and post-offices; and by so doing she had freed herself from -the invidious tutelage of Europe.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government, in a note sent on November 1, 1916, by the -Turkish ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna to the German and Austrian -Ministers of Foreign Affairs, notified to their respective Governments -and the neutrals that henceforth they looked upon the two international -treaties of Paris and Berlin as null and void.</p> - -<p>Now the treaties of Paris in 1856 and of Berlin in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></span> 1878 were the most -important deeds that had hitherto regulated the relations between -the Ottoman Empire and the other European Powers. The treaty of -Paris confirmed the treaty of 1841, according to which the question -of the closing of the Straits to foreign warships was considered as -an international question which did not depend only on the Turkish -Government.</p> - -<p>The Berlin treaty of 1878, too, asserted a right of control and -tutelage of the Powers over Turkey, and in it Turkey solemnly promised -to maintain the principle of religious liberty, to allow Christians to -bear evidence in law-courts, and to institute reforms in Armenia.</p> - -<p>As the King of Prussia and the Emperor had signed the treaty of Paris, -and the Austrian Emperor and the German Emperor had signed the treaty -of Berlin, Turkey could not denounce these treaties without the assent -of these two allied countries, which thus gave up the patrimonial -rights and privileges wrested from the Sultan by Western Europe in the -course of the last three centuries. This consideration accounts for the -support Turkey consented to give the Central Powers and the sacrifices -she engaged to make.</p> - -<p>In order to understand the succession of events and the new policy -of Turkey, the reader must be referred to the note of the Ottoman -Government abrogating the treaties of Paris and Berlin which was handed -on November 1, 1916, by the Turkish ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna -to the German and Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This note, -recalling the various events which had taken place, pointed out that -they justified Turkey in casting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></span> off the tutelage of both the Allied -Powers and the Central Powers:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Owing to the events that took place in the second half of the last -century, the Imperial Ottoman Empire was compelled, at several times, -to sign two important treaties, the Paris treaty on March 30, 1866, -and the Berlin treaty on August 3, 1878. The latter had, in most -respects, broken the balance established by the former, and they were -both trodden underfoot by the signatories that openly or secretly broke -their engagements. These Powers, after enforcing the clauses that were -to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire, not only did not care for -those that were to its advantage, but even continually opposed their -carrying out.</p> - -<p>“The Paris treaty laid down the principle of the territorial integrity -and independence of the Ottoman Empire; it also stipulated that this -clause should be fully guaranteed by all the Powers, and forbade any -meddling, either with the relations between the Imperial Government and -its subjects, or with the interior administration of the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>“Nevertheless, the French Government kept on interfering by force -of arms in Ottoman territory, and demanded the institution of a new -administrative organisation in Lebanon. Then the Powers signatory to -the treaty were compelled to participate in this action by diplomatic -ways, in order not to let France have a free hand in carrying out her -plans, which were contrary to the Paris treaty and paved the way to -territorial encroachments.</p> - -<p>“On the other hand, the Russian Government, pursuing a similar policy, -held in check by an ultimatum the action of the Porte against the -principalities of Serbia and Montenegro, where it had raised an -insurrection, and which it had fully provided with arms, supplies, -officers, and soldiers; and after demanding the institution of a new -foreign administration in some Ottoman provinces and of a foreign -control over their home affairs, it finally declared war against Turkey.</p> - -<p>“In the same manner the clauses of the Paris treaty did not hinder -either the French Government from occupying Tunis and turning this -province of the Ottoman Empire into a French protectorate—or the -English from occupying Egypt to become the ruling power there, and -from encroaching upon Ottoman sovereignty in the south of the Yemen, -in Nejed, Koweit, Elfytyr, and the Persian Gulf. In spite of the same -clauses the four Powers now at war against Turkey have also recently -modified the condition of Crete and instituted <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></span>a new state of things -inconsistent with the territorial integrity that they had guaranteed.</p> - -<p>“Finally Italy, without any serious reason, merely in order to have -territorial compensations after the new political situation created in -Northern Africa, did not hesitate to declare war against the Ottoman -Empire, and did not even comply with the engagement she had taken, in -case of a contention with the Imperial Government, to refer the case to -the mediation of the Powers signatory of the treaty before resorting to -war.</p> - -<p>“It is not necessary to mention all the other cases of interference in -the home affairs of the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>“The Berlin treaty, concluded after the events of 1877-78, completely -remodelled the Paris treaty by creating in European Turkey a new state -of things, which was even modified by posterior treaties. But soon -after the Berlin treaty the Russian Government showed how little it -cared for its engagements. Even before capturing Batum it managed to -annex that fortified place by declaring openly and officially its -intention to turn it into a free trade port. The British Government -consented to renew some of its engagements. Yet the Cabinet of -Petrograd, after fulfilling its aspirations, simply declared that the -clause relating to this case was no longer valid, and turned the town -into a naval station. As for the British Government, it did not carry -out any of the protective measures it had hinted at, which shows how -little it cared for the régime instituted by the Berlin treaty.</p> - -<p>“Though the Imperial Ottoman Government scrupulously submitted to -the harsh, heavy clauses of the treaty, a few previsions that were -favourable to it were never carried out, in spite of its own insistence -and that of its protectors, because one of the Powers thought it its -own interest to raise difficulties to the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>“It ensues from all this that the fundamental and general clauses -of the treaties of Paris and Berlin, concerning the Ottoman Empire, -were annulled <em>ipso facto</em> by some of the signatories. Now, since the -clauses of an international deed that are to the advantage of one of -the contracting parties have never been carried out, it is impossible -that the obligations contracted by this party should be considered as -valid still. Such a state of things makes it necessary, as far as the -aforesaid party is concerned, to annul such a treaty. It should also -be borne in mind that, since the conclusion of these two treaties, the -situation has completely changed.</p> - -<p>“Since the Imperial Government is at war with four of the signatory -Powers, to whose advantage and at whose eager <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></span>request the -aforesaid treaties were concluded, it follows that these treaties -have become null and void, as far as the relations between Turkey -and these Powers are concerned.</p> - -<p>“Besides, the Imperial Government has concluded an alliance on a -footing of complete equality with the other two signatory Powers. -Henceforth the Ottoman Empire, being definitely freed from its -condition of inferiority and from the international tutelage some -of the Great Powers had an interest in maintaining, now sits in the -European concert with all the rights and privileges of a completely -independent State; and this new situation cancels even the causes -of the aforesaid international agreements.</p> - -<p>“All these considerations deprive the aforesaid contracts of any -binding value.</p> - -<p>“Nevertheless, that there may lurk no uncertainty on this head in -the mind of the contracting Powers that have turned their friendly -relations into an alliance with Turkey, the Imperial Government -begs to inform the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments that it -has annulled the treaties of 1856 and 1878.</p> - -<p>“It also feels bound to declare that, in accordance with the -principles of international law, it will certainly avail itself -of such rights as are to its advantage, and have not yet been -recognised.</p> - -<p>“On the other hand, the Imperial Government, under the pressure -of France, had been compelled to grant the sanjaks of Lebanon a -strictly administrative and restricted autonomy, that might be -a pretext to a certain extent to the intervention of the Great -Powers. Though this situation was never sanctioned by a regular -treaty, but by interior laws in 1861 and 1864, the Imperial Ottoman -Government, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, feels bound to -declare that it puts an end to that state of things, and, for the -reasons mentioned above, it institutes in this sandjak the same -administrative organisation as in the other parts of the Empire.”</p></div> - -<p>After the military defeat of autumn, 1918, the leaders of the Committee -of Union and Progress who had governed the Ottoman Empire since 1905 -disappeared, and the statesmen of the former régime came into office -again. In the very first days of October, 1918, the Talaat Pasha -Cabinet had offered its resignation, which had not been accepted at -first by the Sultan.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></span></p> - -<p>The new Ottoman Cabinet made a declaration of policy to Parliament on -Wednesday, October 23, 1918. In the opening address, read by the Grand -Vizier Izzet Pasha, an amnesty was promised to all political offenders. -Turkey stated she was quite ready to accept a peace, based on Mr. -Wilson’s fourteen points, and to grant at once to all the elements of -the population, without any distinction of nationality or religion, -full political rights and the right to a share in the administration -of the country. She also promised to solve the question of the Arabian -vilayets, to take into consideration their national aspirations, and to -grant them an autonomous administration, provided the bonds existing -between them, the Caliphate, and the Sultan, should be maintained. The -whole Chamber, with the exception of ten deputies who refused to vote, -passed a vote of confidence in the new Cabinet.</p> - -<p>After the French victory in the East and the capitulation of Bulgaria, -the political changes, which had already begun in Turkey, soon became -quite pronounced. Talaat Pasha, whose ideas differed utterly from those -of Enver Pasha, and who had more and more confined his activity to the -war department, had gradually lost his influence over the policy of -the Empire since the death of Mehmed V. After having taken his share, -together with Enver and Jemal, in bringing Turkey into the war by the -side of the Central Powers in 1914, he now realised that the game was -up. Besides, the Ottoman Press now openly attacked the Cabinets of -the two Empires, and reproached them with neglecting the interests of -the Porte when the additional treaty of Brest-Litovsk<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></span> was drafted, -during the negotiations of Bukharest, and later on in the course of the -negotiations with the Cabinet of Sofia.</p> - -<p>Talaat, Javid, and Enver sought shelter in Berlin. Their flight greatly -affected the new Constantinople Government on account of some financial -malversations which had occurred while the leaders of the Committee of -Union and Progress were in office. So the Sublime Porte in December, -1918, demanded their extradition, which Germany refused to grant. In -April, 1919, Talaat, who lived in Berlin under the name of Sali Ali -Bey, and who later on opened a public-house in that city, was sentenced -to death by default in Constantinople, and a year later, in March, -1920, England, according to a clause of the Versailles treaty, put him -down on the list of the war-criminals<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">14</a> whose extradition might be -demanded.</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">10</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">L’Éclair:</cite> “Comment le Goeben et le Breslau échappèrent -aux flottes alliées,” by Henry Miles, June 16, 1921.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">11</span></a> M. Bompard’s letter to the editor of the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Éclair</cite>, June -23, 1921.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">12</span></a> Blue Book, No. 64.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">13</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em>, No. 70.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">14</span></a> Since the publication of the French edition of this -book Talaat was murdered on March 15, 1921, at Charlottenburg, by an -Armenian student named Solomon Teilirian, aged twenty-four, a native of -Salmas in Persia.</p></div> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></span></p> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="IV">IV<br /> -<br /> -TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">As</span> early as 1916 the Allies seem to have come to an agreement over the -principle of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In their answer to -President Wilson they mentioned among their war aims “to enfranchise -the populations enslaved to the sanguinary Turks,” and “to drive out -of Europe the Ottoman Empire, which is decidedly alien to Western -civilisation.”</p> - -<p>According to the conventions about the impending partition of Turkey -concluded between the Allies in April and May, 1916, and August, 1917, -Russia was to take possession of the whole of Armenia and Eastern -Anatolia, Constantinople, and the Straits. In virtue of the treaty -signed in London on May 16, 1916, fixing the boundaries of two zones of -British influence and two zones of French influence, France and England -were to share Mesopotamia and Syria, France getting the northern part -with Alexandretta and Mosul, and England the southern part with Haïfa -and Baghdad. According to the treaty of August 21, 1917, Italy was -to have Western Asia Minor with Smyrna and Adalia. Palestine was to -be internationalised and Arabia raised to the rank of an independent -kingdom.</p> - -<p>But, following the breakdown of Russia and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></span> entrance of America -into the war, the conventions of 1916 and 1917 were no longer held -valid. President Wilson declared in the fourteenth of his world-famous -points that: “The Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire should be -assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nations now under Turkish -rule should be assured security of life and autonomous development.”</p> - -<p>It follows that the partition of Turkish territories such as -Mesopotamia or Syria between Powers that had no right to them, as was -foreshadowed in the conventions of 1916, was no longer admitted; and -the Conference in February, 1919, decided, at Mr. Wilson’s suggestion, -that all territories that belonged to the Ottoman Empire before should -be put under the control of the League of Nations, which was to assign -mandates to certain Great Powers.</p> - -<p>According to the decisions taken at that time, and at the special -request of M. Venizelos, the Greeks obtained all the western coast -of Asia Minor between Aivali and the Gulf of Kos, with Pergamus, -Smyrna, Phocœa, Magnesia, Ephesus, and Halicarnassus, and a hinterland -including all the vilayet of Aidin, except the sanjak of Denizli and -part of that of Mentesha (Mughla).</p> - -<p>The Italian delegation thought fit to make reservations about the -assignment of Smyrna to Greece.</p> - -<p>It seems that in the course of the conversations at -St-Jean-de-Maurienne—Greece being still neutral at the time—M. Ribot -asked Baron Sonnino whether Italy, to facilitate the conclusion of -a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, would eventually consent to -give up Trieste in exchange for Smyrna. The Italian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></span> delegation had -merely noted down the offer, without giving an answer. The Italian -diplomats now recalled that offer as an argument, not so much to lay -a claim to Smyrna—as their subsequent attitude showed—as to prevent a -change to Italy’s disadvantage in the balance of power in the Eastern -Mediterranean, and an infringement of the London treaty that guaranteed -her definite possession of the Dodecanese.</p> - -<p>Moreover, according to Article 9 of the London treaty, in case of a -partition of Asia Minor, or merely in case zones of influence should -be marked out in it, Italy was to have the same share as the other -Powers and receive, together with the province of Adalia, where she had -acquired a paramount influence and obtained a recognition of her rights -from Turkey in 1912, the neighbouring regions. In accordance with this -article, the Conference seemed inclined to give Italy an international -mandate for all the part of Asia Minor that was to be left to the -Turks—namely, all the Anatolian plateau, including the vilayets of -Kastamuni, Brusa, Angora, Konia, and Sivas. It is obvious that the -difficulties raised by the assignment of Smyrna to Greece could not -but be aggravated by the new political situation in case this mandate -should be given to the Italians.</p> - -<p>Consequently, when the Italians saw Smyrna assigned to Greece, they -were all the more anxious to give to their new zone of influence in -Asia Minor an outlet to the sea that should not depend on the great -port of Western Asia Minor. After considering Adalia, Makri, and -Marmaris, which are good harbours but do not communicate with the -interior and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></span> are not connected with the chief commercial routes of -the continent, their attention was drawn to Kush-Adassi, called by the -Greeks New Ephesus and by themselves Scala Nuova, a port that numbered -about 6,000 souls before the war, lying opposite to Samos, in the Gulf -of Ephesus, about ten miles from the ruin of the old town of the same -name and the Smyrna-Aidin railway.</p> - -<p>This port, which is situated on the mouth of the Meander, might easily -be connected by a few miles of railroad with the main railway line -to the south of Ayasaluk which brings towards the Ægean Sea all the -produce of Asia Minor; then it would divert from Smyrna much of the -trade of Aidin, Denizli, and the lake region. To the merchants of -Asia Minor—who deal with Syria, Egypt, Greece, Italy, and all Western -Europe, excepting those who trade with the Black Sea—the Kush-Adassi -line would be both faster and cheaper, if this port was as well -equipped as Smyrna.</p> - -<p>But, as Kush-Adassi happened to be in the zone which at first had been -assigned to Greece and whose frontier goes down to the south as far as -Hieronda Bay, Italy endeavoured in every way to carry farther to the -north the boundaries of the Italian zone, in order to include this port -in it. For this purpose, Italy took advantage of the troubled condition -of the area round Aidin, Sokia, and Cape Mycale to send a police -force up the Meander and the railway line along it, in order to carry -her control up to the Gulf of Ephesus. Of course the territory lying -between Hieronda and Kush-Adassi still remained part of the Greek zone -of occupation, but, all the same, Italy set<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></span> foot in it. Her diplomats -soon turned this fact into a right of possession.</p> - -<p>M. Tittoni soon after agreed to play the part of arbiter in the -question of the southern frontier of Bulgaria; and in July, 1919, it -was announced that after some conversations between M. Venizelos and -M. Tittoni an understanding had been reached about Thrace and Northern -Epirus, whereby Greece agreed to enlarge the northern part of the -Italian zone of occupation in Asia Minor, and gave up to Italy the -valley of the Meander. So, though on the whole M. Tittoni’s arbitration -was in favour of Greece, Italy obtained the territorial triangle -included between Hieronda, Nazili, and Kush-Adassi, the control over -the Meander, and to a certain extent over the railway. In return for -this, Italy promised to cede to Greece the Dodecanese except one, -captured by Italy in 1912 during her war with Turkey, together with the -Isle of Rhodes, though she had a right to keep the latter for at least -five years. In case England should grant the inhabitants of Cyprus the -right to pass under Greek sovereignty, Italy was to hold a plebiscite -in Rhodes and let the native population become Greeks if they wished. -By supporting the Greek claims in Thrace, Italy won the sympathies of -Greece at a time when the latter both consolidated the rights of Italy -on the continent and strengthened her own situation in the Dodecanese.</p> - -<p>The control over the eastern part of Asia Minor which was to fall to -the lot of the Armenians and included the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, -Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, and probably Trebizond—the population<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></span> -of the latter vilayet consisting chiefly of Moslems with a Greek -minority—was to be assumed, so the Great Powers thought, by the United -States.</p> - -<p>It should be remembered that the question of the eastern vilayets -was raised for the first time by the Tsars of Russia, and gave them -a pretext for intervening in the domestic affairs of Turkey and thus -carrying out their plans of expansion in Asia Minor. As a matter of -fact, those vilayets were not really Armenian. The Armenians were in a -minority there, except in two or three districts where, as throughout -the Ottoman Empire, they were mixed up with Turks. They had lived -peaceably together till the Powers thought fit to support the claims -of the Armenians and incite them to rebel, in order to further their -own aims in Turkey, by a misuse of the privileges granted them by the -Capitulations.</p> - -<p>Constantinople and the Straits seemed likely to be internationalised.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the Arabian part of the Turkish Empire was to be cut off from -it, though nobody could tell expressly in what manner, but in a way -which it was easy to foresee.</p> - -<p>We shall deal later on with the negotiations that took place during -the war between the British Government and Hussein, Grand Sherif of -Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, and we have already mentioned the -help given to the British army by the Emir Feisal’s troops, after the -aforesaid negotiations. These facts throw a light on the policy pursued -by England later on; and besides, immediately after the hostilities, -in a speech made in London on Friday, November 1, 1918, Mr. Barnes, a -Labour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></span> member of the British Cabinet, while speaking on the armistice -with Turkey, acknowledged:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We could have signed it before, for we held the Turks at our -discretion. For the last fortnight the Turks had been suing for -peace, but we were on the way to Aleppo, which is to be the capital -of the future independent Arab State, established in an Arab -country and governed by Arabs. So we did not want to have done with -the Turks till we had taken Aleppo.”</p></div> - -<p>Such was the condition of the Turkish problem when the Peace Conference -took it in hand for the first time.</p> - -<p>Rivalries naturally soon arose.</p> - -<p>The Emir Feisal, supported by England, laid claim not only to the -whole of Arabia, but also to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia to -make up a huge Arab Empire, under his father’s rule. France, who -opposed that plan, convened a Syrian Congress in Marseilles, to raise -a protest against the partition of Syria as had been laid down by the -Franco-English agreement of 1916.</p> - -<p>Soon after the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna on the morning of May -15, 1919, brought about a serious conflict.</p> - -<p>It is noteworthy that after General Allenby’s victories in Palestine -and the resignation and flight of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, General -Izzet Pasha, who had been appointed Grand Vizier, had signed, on -October 31, 1918, a convention of armistice, which put Turkish ports -and railways under the Allies’ provisional control and allowed them “in -case things should become alarming for them” to occupy “all strategic -points.” This armistice had been concluded on the basis of Mr. Wilson’s -principle that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></span> “to the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire an -unqualified sovereignty should be ensured.” In no respect had the -Turks broken the agreement when the Allies infringed it by allowing -the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. This occupation, carried on in spite of -France, who was not energetic enough, and one might almost say in spite -of Italy, created a very serious situation.</p> - -<p>Indeed, no good reason could be given in support of this decision. By -the help of misleading or false information cleverly worded and widely -distributed by a propaganda which overwhelmed the Press—and was only -equalled by the propaganda carried on by Poland—political manœuvres -induced the Allies to allow Greece, who wished to become “Greater -Greece” and wanted Epirus, Thrace, Constantinople, Smyrna, Trebizond, -and Adana, to occupy a region belonging to Anatolia, where the Turkish -element predominates more than in all the rest of the Ottoman Empire, -for there are only 300,000 Greeks against about 1,300,000 Turks. This -permission granted to Greece was the more surprising as it seems to -have been obtained because the Greek Government had informed the -Supreme Council that the disorder prevailing in the vilayet of Smyrna -was a danger to the non-Turkish populations.</p> - -<p>Now the report of the Inter-allied Commission about the Greek -occupation of Smyrna and the neighbouring territories which was sent -later on and was dated from Constantinople, October 12, 1919, began as -follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The inquiry has proved that since the armistice the general -condition of the Christians of the vilayet of Aidin<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></span> has been -satisfactory, and their security has not been threatened.</p> - -<p>“If the occupation of Smyrna was ordered by the Peace Conference -owing to inaccurate information, the primary responsibility lies -with the individuals or governments that gave or transmitted -inconsiderately such information as is mentioned in No. 1 of the -established facts.</p> - -<p>“It is obvious, therefore, that this occupation was not at all -justifiable, and violated the terms of the armistice concluded -between the Powers and Turkey.”</p></div> - -<p>Moreover, to quote the very words of that report, the Greek occupation, -“far from appearing as carrying out a civilising mission, has -immediately put on the aspect of a conquest and a crusade.”</p> - -<p>This inquiry, on the one hand, acknowledged that the responsibility -for the events that took place at Smyrna on May 15 and 16 and in the -immediate neighbourhood during the first days following the landing, -lay with the Greek headquarters and some officers who did not perform -their duty. On the other hand it stated that part of the responsibility -rested with the Turkish authorities at Smyrna, who took no step to -prevent the escape and arming of common law prisoners before the coming -of the Greeks. Then it went on as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In the person of the high civil authority that represents it -at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the serious -disturbances that ended in bloodshed in the interior of the country -during the advance of the Greek troops.... The Greeks alone are -responsible for the bloodshed at Menemen.... The Greek officers who -were at Menemen quite neglected their duty.”</p></div> - -<p>And the Commission wound up its report with this:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In the occupied region, putting aside the towns of Smyrna—where -the number of Christians is high, but the <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></span>number of Greek -Christians much inferior to that of the Turks—and Aivali, the -predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek element is -undeniable.” -</p></div> - -<p>So we easily understand the violent and justifiable indignation felt by -the Turks when the Greek troops landed, for they could not forget that -now there were no Turks in Thessaly, where they numbered 150,000 in -1878, or in the Morea, where there had once been 300,000, and that in -Greece only about 20,000 were left of the 100,000 that had once lived -there.</p> - -<p>M. Venizelos, in a letter addressed on May 29 to the President of the -Conference, thought it his duty to give particulars about the way -the occupation had been effected. After setting right what he styled -“the wrong and misleading information given by newspapers,” he stated -that the Greeks had “arrived at Aidin, on the southern side, east -of Nymphaton and north of the River Ermos.” The Great Powers having -asked the Greek Government, as he said expressly in his letter, “to -occupy Smyrna and its environs” without stating exactly how far the -environs of Smyrna reached, he thought he had a right to look upon this -operation—which had been attended with a few incidents and had not -been received everywhere with unmixed joy—as the outcome of a settled -policy. After this occupation public meetings of protest took place in -Constantinople.</p> - -<p>An important Crown Council was held in the afternoon of May 26 at -Yildiz-Kiosk, in order to enable the various political groups to -express their opinion concerning the recent events.</p> - -<p>The Sultan, attended by the princes of the Imperial Family, opened the -meeting, and stated it had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></span> thought necessary to call together the -most eminent men of Turkey that they might express their opinion about -the critical condition of the country.</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier, after recalling the events that had taken place in -Turkey since the beginning of the war, asked the audience to let him -have their opinions.</p> - -<p>The Unionist group said they were dissatisfied with the composition of -the Ministry, and demanded a Coalition Government, in which all parties -should be represented.</p> - -<p>Another political group asked the Crown Council to form itself into a -National Assembly.</p> - -<p>Somebody else showed the inanity of such suggestions and proposed -to entrust the mandate of the administration of Turkey to a Great -Power—without mentioning which Power. He added: “Otherwise Turkey will -be dismembered, which would be her ruin.”</p> - -<p>As the assembly had merely consultative powers, no decision was reached.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of June, 1919, the Ottoman League sent from Geneva to -Mr. Montagu, British Secretary for India, the following note:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Ottoman League has examined the statements which your -Excellency was so kind as to make at the Peace Conference, -regarding the subsequent fate of the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>“We have always been convinced that His Britannic Majesty’s -Government in its relations with our country would resume its -traditional policy, which was started and advocated by the most -famous English statesmen, and that, after obtaining the guarantees -required for the safety of its huge dominions, it would refuse to -countenance any measure aiming at the oppression and persecution of -Moslems. -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></span></p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The British Government can realise better than any other Power the -disastrous consequences that would necessarily follow throughout -Islam on the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and any blow struck at -its vital parts, especially at its capital, the universally revered -seat of the Khilafat, where the best works of Moslem civilisation -have been gathered for centuries.</p> - -<p>“We feel certain that your Excellency will also realise better -than anybody else of what importance would be to Great Britain the -loyalty, not only of the Ottoman Moslems without any distinction of -race, but of all the Mohammedans whose destiny is presided over by -His Britannic Majesty.” -</p></div> - -<p>At last, about the end of the month, the treaty with Turkey was drafted -by the Conference, and on June 11 the Turkish representatives were -brought to France on board the French ironclad <em lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Démocratie</em>.</p> - -<p>The delegation included Tewfik Pasha, Riza Tewfik Bey, with Reshid Bey, -former Minister of the Interior, as adviser. At its head was Damad -Ferid Pasha, the Sultan’s brother-in-law, who, after the resignation of -the Tewfik Pasha Cabinet at the beginning of March, 1919, had formed a -new Ministry.</p> - -<p>As was stated in the Allies’ answer to the Porte in the letter -addressed to the Turkish Premier, Damad Ferid Pasha, Turkey had not -attempted in the memorandum handed to the Conference to excuse the -Germano-Turkish intrigues which had paved the way for her to take part -in the war on the side of the Germans; neither had she attempted to -clear herself of all the crimes she was charged with. Damad Ferid Pasha -had simply pleaded that only the “Young Turks” of the Committee of -Union and Progress were responsible for the Ottoman policy during the -last five years, and that, if they had governed the Empire, as it were, -in the name of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></span> Germans, the whole Turkish nation could not be held -responsible for this.</p> - -<p>The Allies pointed out in their reply that they could not accept the -distinction which cast all the blame on the Government and alleged the -misdeeds were not imputable to the Turkish people merely because these -misdeeds were abhorrent to Turkish ideas, as shown in the course of -centuries. So the Allies informed the delegation they could not grant -their request to restore Ottoman sovereignty over territories that had -been taken away from them before.</p> - -<p>Yet the Council, though they declared they could not accept such views -or enter upon such a controversy, launched into considerations on -Turkish ideas and Turkish influence in the world which, to say the -least, were most questionable, as will be seen later on.</p> - -<p>They stated, for instance, that no section of the Turkish people had -ever been able to build up a lasting political organisation, the huge -Empires of the Hioung-nous, the Ouigours, and the Kiptchaks having been -of short duration. The Supreme Council also asserted that the lack -of stability of the Ottoman Empire—which was represented as unable -to develop—was due to the various origins of its elements. But other -influences were laid aside, which have been at work, especially during -the modern period, since the beginning of the decline. It should be -borne in mind that three centuries ago the civilisation and prosperity -of the Ottoman Empire were not inferior to those of the Western -nations, and its inferiority appeared only nowadays, when Germany -and Italy founded their unity, while the European States did<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></span> not do -anything in Turkey to improve—or even did much to aggravate—a condition -of things that left to Turkey no possibility of recovery. If Moslem -civilisation is quite different from Western civilisation, it does not -follow necessarily that it is inferior to it. For several centuries -its religious and social ideals safeguarded and ruled, to their -satisfaction, the lives of numerous populations in the Levant, whereas -more modern ideals in the West have not yet succeeded in bringing about -conditions of life that can meet the requirements of man’s mind and -physical nature. As to the so-called combativeness of the Turks and -their supposed fanaticism—which may be only due, considering they were -nomads at first, to their quick and headstrong nature—they both were -certainly lessened by their intercourse and especially intermarriages -with the Mongols, a quiet and peaceful people largely influenced by -Buddhism and Lamaism, which they all profess, except a few Bouriate -tribes that are still Shamanist. Moreover, even if such suppositions -were true, their mixing with Western people could only have a good -influence in soothing their original nature, whereas their eviction to -Asia, by depriving them of any direct and close contact with Europe, -would have the effect of reviving their former propensities.</p> - -<p>Finally, the aforesaid document, though it was really superficial and -rather vague on this point, purposed to give a crushing answer to the -arguments of the Ottoman memorandum about the religious rivalries; yet -these arguments were well grounded and most important, as appeared when -the Protestant<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></span> campaign broke out and Anglo-American opinion demanded -the ejection of the Turks.</p> - -<p>On June 27, 1919, the President of the Peace Conference in Paris -addressed a second letter to Damad Ferid Pasha to inform him that the -solution of the Turkish problem was postponed.</p> - -<p>After stating that the declarations made before the Peace Conference -by the Ottoman delegation “have been, and will continue to be, -examined most attentively, as they deserve to be,” the letter went -on to say that “they involve other interests than those of Turkey, -and raise international questions, the immediate solution of which is -unfortunately impossible; and it ended thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Therefore, though the members of the Supreme Council -are eager to restore peace definitely and fully realise it is a -dangerous thing to protract the present period of uncertainty, -yet a sound study of the situation has convinced them that -some delay is unavoidable.</p> - -<p>“They are of opinion, therefore, that a longer stay in Paris of the -Ottoman delegation, which the Ottoman Government had asked to be -allowed to send to France, would not be conducive to any good.</p> - -<p>“Yet a time will come when an exchange of views will be profitable -again; then the Allied and Associated Powers will not fail to -communicate with the Ottoman Government as to the best means to settle -the question easily and rapidly.”</p></div> - -<p>One of the reasons given for this adjournment was the protest handed to -Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, by the Maharaja of Bikanir -in the name of the Moslems of India, a protest which is supposed to -have shaken the decisions already taken by the British Government.</p> - -<p>At any rate, instead of maintaining the negotiations on a sound basis, -and dealing squarely with the difficulties of the Turkish question, -which would have<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></span> made it possible to reach a better and more permanent -solution, the Allies seemed to wish to break off the debates, or -at least to postpone the discussion, in order to manœuvre and gain -time. Perhaps they did it on purpose, or the negotiations came to an -untimely end because, among the men who had assumed the charge of -European affairs, some meant to intervene in them all the more eagerly -because they did not know anything about them. They were not aware -or had forgotten that in dealing with Eastern affairs or in pursuing -negotiations with people of ancient civilisation, a great deal of -delicacy, discretion, and shrewdness is required at the same time, -and that generally diplomatists must expect plenty of haggling and -procrastination, must avoid clashing with the adversary, and be able -repeatedly to drop and resume a discussion smoothly, sometimes after -long delays.</p> - -<p>Somebody then quoted the words of the well-known French traveller -Chardin in regard to Chevalier Quirini who, about 1671, carried on -negotiations in Constantinople with the Vizier Ahmed Küprüli on behalf -of the Republic of Venice:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I heard M. Quirini say, when I had the honour of calling upon -him, that the policy of the Turks far excelled that of the -Europeans; that it was not restrained by maxims and regulations, -but was wholly founded on, and regulated by, discernment. This -policy, depending on no art or principles, was almost beyond -anybody’s reach. So he candidly confessed that the vizier’s conduct -was an utter mystery to him, and he was unable to fathom its -discrimination, depth, secrecy, shrewdness, and artfulness.” -</p></div> - -<p>It is noteworthy that the same vizier was also able to cope -successively with three ambassadors of Louis XIV.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></span></p> - -<p>The direction taken from the outset by the deliberations of the -Conference, and the standpoint it took to settle the Turkish question, -showed it was about to give up the traditional policy of the French -kings in the East, which had been started by Francis I, and the last -representatives of which had been the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s -ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval.</p> - -<p>As early as the end of the eighteenth century Voltaire, though he -extolled Turkish tolerance throughout his “Essai sur la tolérance,” -and wrote that “two hundred thousand Greeks lived in security -in Constantinople,” advocated quite a different policy in his -“Correspondance,” and took sides with the Russians against the Turks. -After confessing that “he had no turn for politics,” and stating in -“Candide” that he only cared for the happiness of peoples, he wrote to -Frederick II:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I devoutly hope the barbarous Turks will be driven out of the -land of Xenophon, Socrates, Plato, Sophocles, and Euripides. If -Europe really cared, that would soon be done. But seven crusades of -superstition were once undertaken, and no crusade of honour will -ever be undertaken; all the burden will be left to Catherine.” -</p></div> - -<p>He did not conceal how highly pleased he was with the events of -1769-71, and he wrote to the “Northern Semiramis,” as he styled her:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It is not sufficient to carry on a fortunate war against such -barbarians; it is not enough to humble their pride; they ought to -be driven away to Asia for ever. Your Imperial Majesty restores me -to life by killing the Turks. It has always been my opinion that if -their empire is ever destroyed, it will be by yours.” -</p></div> - -<p>Indeed, some people maliciously hinted at the time that Voltaire’s -opinion of the Turks was due to his<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></span> disappointment at the failure -of his play “Mahomet, ou le fanatisme,” and that it was for the same -reason he wrote in his “Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations” -while he was Madame du Chatelet’s guest:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Force and rapine built up the Ottoman Empire, and the quarrels -between Christians have kept it up. Hardly any town has ever been -built by the Turks. They have allowed the finest works of antiquity -to fall to decay; they rule over ruins.” -</p></div> - -<p>It seems that the members of the Supreme Council, in their answer to -the Turkish delegation, only harped upon this old theme, and amplified -it, and that in their settlement of the question they were inspired -by similar considerations, evincing the same misunderstanding of -Turkey and the same political error. The Supreme Council might have -remembered J. J. Rousseau’s prophecy in his “Contrat Social,” which -might very well be fulfilled now: “The Russian Empire will endeavour to -subjugate Europe, but will be subjugated. The Tatars, its subjects and -neighbours, will become its masters and ours too.”<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">15</a></p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The negotiations which had just been broken off could only have been -usefully carried on if the Allies had quite altered their policy and -had realised the true condition of the Ottoman Empire and the interests -of the Western nations, especially those of France.</p> - -<p>The condition of the Ottoman Empire, as will be seen later on, when -we shall dwell upon the slow and deep disintegration which had taken -place among the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></span> Turkish and Arabian populations, was on the whole as -follows: The Young Turk revolution, on which great hopes were built, -had ended lamentably: the Austrians had wrested Bosnia-Herzegovina from -Turkey; the Turco-Italian war had taken from her another slice of her -territory; then the coalition of the Balkan States had arisen, which -seems to have been prepared and supported by England and by the other -nations which followed her policy. Finally, the treaty of Bukharest -confirmed the failure of the principle—once solemnly proclaimed by -France and England—of the territorial integrity of Turkey. So the Turks -no longer had any confidence in Europe, and, being sacrificed once more -in the Balkan war, and as they could no longer trust England, they were -necessarily thrown into the arms of Germany.</p> - -<p>After Abdul Hamid, Mehmed V, with his weak, religious mind, allowed -himself to be led by Enver, and his reign, disturbed by three wars, -cost Turkey huge territorial losses. Mehmed VI, being more energetic -and straightforward, tried to restore order in the State, and to put an -end to the doings of the Committee of Union and Progress.</p> - -<p>Then, too, the Crown Prince, Abdul Mejid, a man about fifty, who -speaks French very well, evinces the same turn of mind. After seeing -what Germany could do with the Turkish Empire, such men, who had not -kept aloof from modern ideas, and to whom European methods were not -unfamiliar, had made up their mind that the Turks should not be driven -out of Europe. But Mejid Effendi was soon deprived of influence through -intrigues, and henceforth engaged in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">62</a></span> his favourite hobby, painting, in -his palace on Skutari Hill, and kept away from politics.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal, who had been sent to Amasia as Inspector-General of the -Eastern army, had secretly raised an army on his own account, with the -help of Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine in the Izzet Cabinet. When -recalled to Constantinople by the Turkish Government in July, 1919, he -had refused to obey, and had proclaimed himself his own master. Though -he had once gone to Berlin with the Sultan, who was only Crown Prince -at the time, the latter degraded him and deprived him of the right of -wearing his decorations—which could only have been a political measure -intended to show that the throne and the Government could not openly -countenance the movement that was taking place in Anatolia.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal, brought up at Salonika, had only become well known in -Constantinople during the Revolution of 1908. During the war in the -Balkan Peninsula he had distinguished himself at Chatalja, and after -being promoted colonel he was sent as military attaché to Sofia, and -then charged with a mission in Paris. He came back to Constantinople in -1914, a short time before war broke out.</p> - -<p>Of course, when he had started his career a long time previously, -Mustafa Kemal had been connected indirectly with the Union and -Progress party, as he was at the head of the revolutionary group -in which this association originated, but he was never a member of -the Merkez-i-Oumimi, the central seat of the Committee of Union and -Progress. He was a good officer, very fond of his profession, and, as -he loathed politics, he had soon kept away from them, and consequently<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">63</a></span> -never played any part in them, and was hardly ever influenced by them. -Yet the supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, who have -made great mistakes, but have always been patriots, have necessarily -been compelled lately to co-operate with him, though they did not like -to do so at the outset.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly the real leader of the movement which had -already spread over the whole of Anatolian Turkey. As his influence -was enormous and he had an undeniable ascendancy over the Turkish -troops he had recruited, his power was soon acknowledged from Cartal, -close to Constantinople to the Persian frontier. He had compelled -Liman von Sanders to give him command of a sector at a moment when the -Turks seemed to be in a critical situation during the attack of the -Anglo-French fleet in the Dardanelles, and by not complying with his -orders he had saved the Turkish army by the victory of Anafarta, and -perhaps prevented the capture of Constantinople, for two hours after -the Allies, whose casualties had been heavy, retired.</p> - -<p>But he had soon come into conflict with Enver Pasha. Their disagreement -had begun during the war of Tripoli; it had increased during the Balkan -war, and had now reached an acute state. The chief reason seems to be -that they held quite different opinions about the organisation of the -army and the conduct of the war operations. Mustafa Kemal having always -refused to take part in politics after the Young Turk revolution of -1908, it seems difficult to believe this hostility could be accounted -for by political reasons, though the situation had now<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">64</a></span> completely -changed. As to Mustafa Kemal’s bickerings and petty quarrels with -several German generals during the war, they seem to have had no other -cause than a divergence of views on technical points.</p> - -<p>In consequence of this disagreement Mustafa Kemal was sent to -Mesopotamia in disgrace. He came back to Constantinople a few weeks -before the armistice. After the occupation of Smyrna he was appointed -Inspector-General of Anatolia, where he organised the national movement.</p> - -<p>By Mustafa Kemal’s side there stood Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine, -who, during the Balkan war, as commander of the cruiser <em>Hamidié</em>, -had made several raids in Greek waters, had then been one of the -signatories of the Moudros armistice, and now was able to bring over -to the Anatolian movement many naval officers and sailors, and General -Ali Fuad Pasha, the defender of Fort Pisani at Janina during the Balkan -war, who had a great prestige among the troops.</p> - -<p>Bekir Sami Bey, once Governor-General, and Ahmed Rustem Bey, formerly -ambassador at Washington, were the first political men of note who -joined the nationalist movement. On Mustafa Kemal’s arrival at Erzerum, -Kiazim Karabekir, together with the other commanders, acknowledged -him as their chief, and pledged themselves to support him against -Constantinople.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal openly charged the Government with betraying Turkey to -the Allies, and asked all those who wanted to defend their country -and their religion to join him. At that time he only had at his -disposal two divisions of regular troops; he sent<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></span> an appeal to the -populations of Sivas and Ushak, and many volunteers joined his colours. -Colonel Bekir Sami, who commanded the Panderma-Smyrna line and all the -district, also rebelled against the Constantinople Government, and soon -his 10,000 soldiers joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, who assumed the -general command of all the insurgent troops. On the other hand, Kiazim -Bey threatened to resume hostilities, in case too heavy conditions -should be forced on Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, as he refused to make any -concessions to the victors of Turkey, and opposed any separatist idea -or the cession of any Ottoman territories, of course had with him -a large section of public opinion, which was roused by the Allies’ -threat to take from Turkey half her possessions, Thrace, Smyrna, and -Kurdistan, and to drive the Sultan into Asia.</p> - -<p>On July 23, a Congress of the committees which had been established in -various parts of the Empire for the defence of the national rights was -held at Erzerum.</p> - -<p>The proceedings were secret, but at the end of the congress an -official report was sent to the High Commissioners of the Allies in -Constantinople.</p> - -<p>An “Anatolian and Rumelian League for the Defence of the National -Rights” was formed, which later on was called the “National -Organisation.” According to what has become known about the sittings -of the Congress, the principles that were to control the action of -the National Organisation and to constitute its programme were the -following: (1) Grouping of the various Moslem nationalities of the -Empire into a whole politically and geographically<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></span> indivisible and -administered so as to ensure the respect of their ethnic and social -differences. (2) Equality of rights for non-Moslem communities so -far as consistent with the principle of the political unity of the -State. (3) Integrity of the Empire within the boundaries of Turkish -sovereignty as they were in September, 1918, when the armistice was -concluded—which are almost the same as the ethnic boundaries of Turkey. -(4) No infringement whatever on the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire. -A special article expressed the sincere wish on the part of the Turkish -nation, with a view to the general restoration of Turkey, to accept the -support of any Western country, providing the latter did not aim at an -economic or political subjection of any kind.</p> - -<p>This programme was sanctioned in the course of a second Congress which -was held at Sivas at the beginning of September, 1919, to allow the -local committees which had not been able to send delegates to Erzerum -to give their approbation to it and to adhere to the national movement.</p> - -<p>The executive functions of the Congress were entrusted to a -representative committee presided over by Mustafa Kemal, and consisting -of members chosen by the Congress, who were: Reouf Bey, Bekir Sami Bey, -Hoja Raif Effendi, Mazhar Bey, once vali of Bitlis, and later on Ahmed -Rustem Bey, once Turkish ambassador at Washington, Haidar Bey, once -vali of Kharput, and Hakki Behij Bey.</p> - -<p>The local militias which had been raised took the name of national -forces; and when they had been linked with the regular army, they were -put by Mustafa Kemal under the command of Kara Bekir<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></span> Kiazim Pasha, who -became commander-in-chief in Eastern Anatolia, and Ali Fuad Pasha, who -had the command of the forces of Western Anatolia.</p> - -<p>Two delegates of the “Liberal Entente,” some leaders of which group -seemed open to foreign influence, were sent to Constantinople to ask -the Central Committee what attitude was to be taken, and were prudently -ordered to enjoin the supporters of the Liberal Entente to be most -careful.</p> - -<p>But though part of the Constantinople Press seemed to deny any -importance to the Anatolian movement, the Stambul Government deemed it -proper to send missions to Trebizond, Angora, and Eskishehr, headed by -influential men, in order to restore order in those regions. It also -directed two of its members to go to the rebellious provinces to see -how things stood, and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal. Some of these -missions never reached the end of their journey; most of them had to -retrace their steps, some did not even set out. In September, 1919, -Marshal Abdullah Pasha, who had instructions to reach Mustafa Kemal at -Trebizond, and enjoin him to give up his self-assumed command, did not -stir from Constantinople. The Government also sent General Kemal Pasha, -commander of the gendarmerie, to scatter the nationalist irregular -troops, but nothing was heard of him after a while, and he was supposed -to have been taken prisoner by, or gone over to, the rebels. The -Anatolian valis and commanders who had been summoned to Constantinople -did not come, protesting they could not do so or were ill.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal sent back to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></span> Constantinople Jemal -Bey, vali of Konia, and a few functionaries, who had remained loyal -to the Stambul Government. Ismaïl Bey, vali of Brusa, one of the most -important leaders of the Liberal Entente, was driven out of office by -both Governments.</p> - -<p>In addition, the cleavages already existing in the Ottoman Empire, -which since 1913 only included the prominently Moslem provinces, had -widened, and endangered the unity of the Empire. In the provinces where -the Arabic-speaking Moslems were in a majority the authority of the -Turkish Government dwindled every day; they meant to shake off the -Ottoman yoke, and at the same time to keep off any Western influence; -they also wished more and more eagerly to part from the provinces -where the Turks and Ottoman Kurds—who aim at uniting together—are in a -majority.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>For the last four centuries France had enjoyed an exceptional situation -in Turkey. Her intellectual influence was paramount; French was not -only known among the upper classes, but it was also in current use in -politics and business, and even a good many clerks in post-offices and -booking-offices at Constantinople understood it.</p> - -<p>French schools, owing to their very tolerant spirit, were very popular -among nearly all classes of the Turkish population, and the sympathies -we had thus acquired and the intellectual prestige we enjoyed were -still more important than our material interests. Nearly 25,000 -children attended the French elementary schools, most of them religious -schools, which<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></span> bears witness both to the confidence the Mahommedans -had in us, and the tolerance they showed. The Grammar School of -Galata-Serai, established in 1868 by Sultan Abdul Aziz with the -co-operation of Duruy, French Minister of Public Education, and several -other secondary schools which are now closed, diffused French culture -and maintained sympathy between the two peoples. The Jesuits’ school of -medicine at Beyrut also spread our influence.</p> - -<p>The material interests of France in Turkey were also of great -importance; and it was, therefore, a great mistake for France to -follow a policy that was bound to ruin the paramount influence she -had acquired. The other Western States had as important interests as -France; and it was necessary to take all these facts into account if an -equitable settlement of the Turkish question was to be reached.</p> - -<p>France, England, and Germany were, before the war, the three Powers -that owned the most important financial concerns in Turkey, France -easily holding the premier position, owing to the amount of French -capital invested in Turkish securities, Government stocks, and private -companies.</p> - -<p>From 1854 to 1875 thirteen loans—almost one every year—were issued by -the Ottoman Government, ten being entrusted to the care of French banks -or financial establishments controlled by French capital.</p> - -<p>These thirteen loans have only an historical interest now, except the -three loans issued in 1854, 1855, and 1871, secured on the Egyptian -tribute, which still exist with some modifications, but may be looked -upon as Egyptian or rather English securities, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></span> were not included -in the settlement effected in 1881 which converted them into new bonds, -and the 1870-71 loan, styled “Lots Turcs,” the whole of which at the -time was subscribed by Baron Hirsch in return for the concession of -railways in Europe. To them let us add another financial operation -effected about 1865, consisting in the unification of the various bonds -of the interior debt and their conversion into bonds representing a -foreign debt.</p> - -<p>Most of these operations were controlled by the Imperial Ottoman Bank, -founded by the most influential English and French financial groups, to -which the Ottoman Government by its firmans of 1863 and 1875 granted -the privilege of being the State bank. It thus has the exclusive right -of issuing banknotes, and has the privilege of being the general -paymaster of the Empire and the financial agent of the Government, both -at home and abroad.</p> - -<p>The financial activity of the French companies was only interrupted by -the 1870 war. The only competition met with was that of a few English -banks, which no doubt intended to second the views of the British -Government in Egypt, and of an Austrian syndicate for the building -of the Balkan railways which, later on, furthered the penetration of -Austria-Hungary in Eastern Europe.</p> - -<p>In 1875 the nominal capital of the Ottoman debt rose to 5,297,676,500 -francs. The Ottoman Government, finding it impossible to pay the -interest on the Government stocks, announced its decision on October -6, 1875, to give only one-half in cash in the future. The Imperial -Ottoman Bank, which was practically under French control owing to the -importance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></span> of the French capital invested in it, raised a protest on -behalf of the bondholders.</p> - -<p>The Porte then agreed to make arrangements with the French, the -Italians, the Austrians, the Germans, and the Belgians. The claims -of the bondholders were laid before the plenipotentiaries who had -met at Berlin to revise the preliminaries of San Stefano, and were -sanctioned by the Berlin treaty signed on July 13, 1878. They had three -chief objects: First, to secure the right of first mortgage which the -creditors of the Empire held from the loans secured on the Russian war -indemnity; secondly, to appoint the contributive share of the Ottoman -debt incumbent on the provinces detached from the Empire; thirdly, to -decide what was to be done to restore Turkish finance.</p> - -<p>After the conversations with the plenipotentiaries assembled at Berlin, -and chiefly owing to the intervention of the French representative, M. -Waddington, the Congress embodied the following clauses in the treaty -in order to protect the interests of the bond-holders: Bulgaria was to -pay the Sultan a tribute; part of the revenue of Eastern Rumelia was -to be assigned to the payment of the Ottoman Public Debt; Bulgaria, -Serbia, and Montenegro were to assume a part of the Ottoman debt -proportionately to the Turkish territories annexed by each of them; all -the rights and duties of the Porte relating to the railways of Eastern -Rumelia were to be wholly maintained; finally, the Powers advised the -Sublime Porte to establish an international financial commission in -Constantinople.</p> - -<p>In this way the Berlin treaty laid down the principles<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></span> on which every -financial reorganisation was to be based whenever a province should be -detached from the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>Then the mandatories of the bondholders began to negotiate directly -with the Ottoman Empire, but as the various schemes that were proferred -failed, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, supported by the Galata bankers, -proposed an arrangement that was sanctioned by the Convention of -November 10 to 22, 1879. In this way the administration of the Six -Contributions was created, to which were farmed out for a period of -ten years the revenues derived from stamp duties, spirits in some -provinces, the fisheries of Constantinople and the suburbs, and the -silk tax within the same area and in the suburbs of Adrianople, -Brusa, and Samsun; it was also entrusted with the collection and -administration of the revenues proceeding from the monopolies in salt -and tobacco.</p> - -<p>At the request of the Imperial Ottoman Bank the revenues of this -administration, first allocated to the Priority Bonds, of which -she owned the greater part, were divided later on between all the -bondholders.</p> - -<p>In this way the important agreement known as the decree of Muharrem, in -which the French played a paramount part, was made possible (December -8 to 20, 1881), according to which the original capital of the foreign -Turkish loans was brought down to the average price of issue, plus 10 -per cent. of this new capital as a compensation for the interest that -had not been paid since 1876. The old bonds were stamped, converted, -and exchanged for new bonds called Bonds of the Unified Converted -Debt,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></span> except the “Lots Turcs,” which, being premium bonds, were -treated separately.</p> - -<p>The interest of the Converted Debt was fixed at from 1 to 4 per cent. -of the new capital.</p> - -<p>As to the amortisation, the decree divided the various foreign -loans into several series according to the value of the mortgage; -this classification stated in what order they would be subject to -amortisation.</p> - -<p>The outcome of these negotiations, the decree of Muharrem, also -established a set of concessions which could not be revoked before the -extinction of the debt, and organised the administration of the Ottoman -Public Debt, which was to collect and administer, on behalf of the -Ottoman bondholders, the revenues conceded as guarantee of the debt.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government pledged itself to allocate to the payment -of the interest and to the amortisation of the reduced debt till -its extinction the following revenues: the monopolies in salt and -tobacco; the Six Contributions (tobacco, salt, spirits, stamps, -fisheries, silk); any increase in the customs duties resulting from -the modification of the commercial treaties; any increase of the -revenues resulting from new regulations affecting patents and licences -(<em>temettu</em>); the tribute of the principality of Bulgaria; any surplus -of the Cyprus revenues; the tribute of Eastern Rumelia; the produce of -the tax on pipe tobacco (<em>tumbeki</em>); any sums which might be fixed as -contributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for the -service of the debt.</p> - -<p>The administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was entrusted to “the -Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt,” commonly -known as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></span> “the Public Debt,” consisting of delegates of Ottoman -bondholders of all nations. The French owned by far the greater part -of the debt. The English represented the Belgians in the Council, the -shares of these two countries in the debt being about equal.</p> - -<p>This international council, who attended to the strict execution of -the provisions of the decree, deducted all the sums required for -the interest and the sinking fund, and made over the balance to the -Imperial treasury.</p> - -<p>The decree of Muharrem also entrusted to the Public Debt the control -of the cultivation and the monopoly of the sale of tobacco throughout -the Turkish Empire. Later on, in 1883, the Public Debt farmed out its -rights to an Ottoman limited company, the “Régie Co-intéressée des -Tabacs de l’Empire,” formed by a financial consortium including three -groups: the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was a Franco-English concern; -the German group of the B. Bleichröder Bank; and the Austrian group of -the Kredit Anstalt with a capital of 100 million francs. Only one-half -of this capital was paid up—<em>i.e.</em>, 50 million francs—which was cut -down to 40 million francs on November 28, 1899, to make up for the -losses of the first three years. It is thought in French financial -circles that half this capital—viz., 20 million francs—is French, and -the rest chiefly Austrian.</p> - -<p>The “Régie,” whose activities extend throughout the Empire, may be -looked upon as one of the most important financial concerns of the -Ottoman Empire. It has branches in all the chief centres, controls -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></span> cultivation of tobacco, records the production, buys native and -foreign tobaccos, issues licences for the sale of tobacco, and advances -money to the growers; its chief factories are at Samsun, Aleppo, Adana, -Smyrna, etc. In return for the monopoly it enjoys, it owes the Public -Debt a fixed yearly payment, and has to divide a fixed proportion of -its net profits between the Public Debt and the Ottoman Government.</p> - -<p>The share of France in the Council of the Public Debt, in which French -was the official language, gave her a paramount influence and prestige -in the Ottoman Empire. Owing to the importance and extent of the part -played by the Council of the Debt, in which the influence of France -was paramount, the latter country indirectly acquired an influence in -the administration of the <em>Malié</em>—<em>i.e.</em>, in the administration of -the Turkish treasury—and in this way Turkey was obliged on several -occasions to call for the advice of French specialists for her -financial reorganisation.</p> - -<p>But the Ottoman Government, in order to consolidate its floating debt, -which had not been included in the previous liquidation, was soon -compelled to borrow money abroad. Besides, it wanted to construct a -system of railways at that time.</p> - -<p>The loan guaranteed by the customs duties in 1886, the Osmanie loan in -1890, the 4 per cent. Tombac preferential loan in 1893, the Eastern -Railway loan in 1894, the 5 per cent. 1896 loan, and the 4 per cent. -1901 loan, were all floated in France, and the English had no share in -the financial operations between 1881 and 1904.</p> - -<p>During the same period Germany, through the Deutsche Bank, took up the -Fishery loan in 1888<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></span> and the 4 per cent. Baghdad Railway loan in 1903. -Later on the German financial companies, together with the Deutsche -Bank, gave Turkey as much support as the French banks, in order to -promote Pan-Germanism in the East and oust French influence. The chief -financial operations carried on by these companies were the Baghdad -Railway loan, the Tejhizat loan for the payment of military supplies, -and the 1911 loan, which were both a guarantee and an encouragement -for the German policy of penetration in Turkey, and paved the way to a -Germano-Ottoman understanding.</p> - -<p>France continued to subscribe all the same, from 1903 to 1914, to six -of the twelve Turkish loans raised by the Ottoman Government; four -others were taken up by Germany, another by England, and the sixth—the -4 per cent. 1908 loan—was issued one-half in France, one-fourth in -Germany, and one-fourth in England. In 1914, as a reward for issuing -a loan of 800 million francs in Paris—the first slice being 500 -million—France obtained the settlement of several litigious cases and -new concessions of railways and ports.</p> - -<p>At the outbreak of the war, the external debt of Turkey, including the -Unified Debt and other loans, amounted to 3½ milliards of francs, -whereas the Turkish revenue hardly exceeded 500 million francs. -One-third of this sum went to the sinking fund of the external debt, -of which, roughly speaking, France alone owned nearly 60 per cent., -Germany nearly 26 per cent., and England a little more than 14 per cent.</p> - -<p>In addition to this, in the sums lent to Turkey by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">77</a></span> private companies, -the share of France was about 50 per cent.—<em>i.e.</em>, over 830 million -francs; that of Germany rose to 35 per cent.; and that of England a -little more than 14 per cent.</p> - -<p>Foreign participation in the great works and the various economic or -financial concerns in Turkey may be summed up as follows:</p> - -<div class="center"> -<table class="myleft" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="2" summary="economics"> -<tr> -<th class="bord_top_yes bord_right_yes bord_bot_yes"> </th> -<th class="tdc bord_top_yes bord_right_yes bord_bot_yes"><span class="normal"> <em>France.</em> </span></th> -<th class="tdc bord_top_yes bord_right_yes bord_bot_yes"><span class="normal"> <em>England.</em> </span></th> -<th class="tdc bord_top_yes bord_bot_yes"><span class="normal"><em>Germany. </em> </span></th> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Banks</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">37·7</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">33·3</td> -<td class="tdc">28·0</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Railways</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">46·9</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">10·4</td> -<td class="tdc">46·6</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Ports and wharves</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">67·9</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">12·2</td> -<td class="tdc">19·7</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Water</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">88·6</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">—</td> -<td class="tdc">11·3</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Mines</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">100·0</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">—</td> -<td class="tdc">—</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">Various concerns</td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">62·8</td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">24·1</td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes">13·0</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_right_yes">Total per cent.</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">50·5</td> -<td class="tdc bord_right_yes">14·3</td> -<td class="tdc">35·0</td> -</tr> -<tr> -<td class="bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">Capital (million Francs) </td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">830</td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes bord_right_yes">235</td> -<td class="tdc bord_bot_yes">575</td> -</tr></table></div> - -<p>Not only had France an important share in the organisation of Turkish -finances, but had opened three banks while the English established -but one, the National Bank of Turkey, which holds no privilege from -the State, and is merely a local bank for business men. Two German -banks—the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Deutsche Palästina Bank, founded -almost as soon as Germany began to show her policy regarding Turkish -Asia—had turned their activity towards Turkey, as we have just seen.</p> - -<p>France incurred an outlay of 550 million francs—not including the sums -invested in companies which were not predominantly French, such as the -Baghdad Railway—for the building of 1,500 miles of railway lines, while -the Germans built almost as many, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">78</a></span> the English only 450 miles; and -France spent 58 million francs for the ports, whereas the English only -spent 10 million francs.</p> - -<p>The railway concessions worked by French capital included the -Damascus-Hama line, which afterwards reached Jaffa and Jerusalem; -the tramways of Lebanon; the Mudania-Brusa line; the Smyrna-Kassaba -railway; the Black Sea railways which, according to the 1914 agreement, -were to extend from Kastamuni to Erzerum, and from Trebizond to -Kharput, and be connected with the Rayak-Ramleh line—viz., 1,600 miles -of railway altogether in Syria; the Salonika-Constantinople line.</p> - -<p>Before the London treaty, the Eastern railways in European Turkey, -representing 600 miles, were worked by Austro-German capital, and the -Salonika-Monastir line, 136 miles in length, had a German capital of 70 -million francs.</p> - -<p>The concessions with German capital in Asia Minor formed a complete -system of railways, including the Anatolian railways, with a length of -360 miles and a capital of 344,500,000 francs; the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana -line, 42 miles, capital 9,200,000 francs; the Baghdad Railway, whose -concession was first given to the Anatolian railways but was ceded in -1903 to the Baghdad Railway Company, and which before the war was about -190 miles in length.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/i079.jpg" width="600" height="351" alt="" /> -<p class="caption noindent"><span class="smcap">Map of the Railways of the Ottoman Empire and the -Chief Mining Concerns under Foreign Control before the War</span>.</p> -<p class="largeimg"><a href="images/i079_large.jpg">Larger image</a> (191 kB)</p></div> - -<p>As the building of this system of railways closely concerned the French -companies of the Smyrna-Kassaba and Beyrut-Damascus railways and the -English company of the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French companies and -the Ottoman Imperial Bank concluded arrangements with the holders of -the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></span> concessions to safeguard French interests as much as possible. Thus a -French financial group took up a good many of the Baghdad bonds (22,500 -and 21,155 bonds) and numerous shares of the “Société de construction -du chemin de fer” established in 1909. On the whole, the share of the -French consortium before the war amounted to 4,000,000 francs on the -one hand, and 1,950,000 francs on the other; the share of the German -consortium was 11,000,000 and 8,050,000 francs.</p> - -<p>The concessions controlled by English capital were the Smyrna-Aidin -line, 380 miles long, with a capital of 114,693,675 francs, and the -Smyrna-Kassaba line, which was ceded later on to the company controlled -by French capital which has already been mentioned. They were the first -two railway concessions given in Turkey (1856 and 1863).</p> - -<p>In Constantinople the port, the lighthouses, the gasworks, the -waterworks, and the tramways were planned and built by French capital -and labour.</p> - -<p>The port of Smyrna, whose concession was given in 1867 to an English -company and two years after passed into the hands of some Marseilles -contractors, was completed by the “Société des quais de Smyrne,” a -French limited company. The diversion of the Ghedis into the Gulf of -Phocea in order to prevent the port being blocked up with sand was the -work of a French engineer, Rivet.</p> - -<p>The Bay of Beyrut has also been equipped by a French company founded -in 1888 under the patronage of the Ottoman Bank by a group of the -chief French shareholders of the Beyrut-Damascus road and other French -financial companies.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></span></p> - -<p>Moreover, according to the 1914 agreements, the ports of Ineboli and -Heraclea on the Black Sea, and the ports of Tripoli, Jaffa, and Haïfa -in Syria, were to be built exclusively by French capital. So it was -with the intended concessions of the ports of Samsun and Trebizond.</p> - -<p>At Beyrut a French group in 1909 bought up the English concession for -the building of the waterworks and pipelines, and formed a new company. -French capital, together with Belgian capital, also control the Gas -Company, Tramway Company, and Electric Company of Beyrut. Only at -Smyrna, where the gasworks are in the hands of an English company and -the waterworks are owned by a Belgian company has France not taken part -in the organisation of the municipal services.</p> - -<p>Only the port of Haïdar-Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian Railway, -has been ceded by this company to a financial company whose shares are -in German hands.</p> - -<p>To these public establishments should be added such purely private -industrial or commercial concerns as the Orosdi-Back establishments; -the Oriental Tobacco Company; the Tombac Company; the “Société -nationale pour le commerce, l’industrie et l’agriculture dans l’Empire -ottoman”; the concession of Shukur-ova, the only French concession of -landed property situated in the Gulf of Alexandretta on the intended -track of the Baghdad Railway, including about 150,000 acres of Imperial -land, which represent an entirely French capital of 64 million francs; -the Oriental Carpet Company, which is a Franco-British concern; the -Joint Stock Imperial Company of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></span> Docks, Dockyards, and Shipbuilding -Yard, which is entirely under British control, etc.</p> - -<p>During the war, the share of France and that of England were increased, -as far as the Public Debt is concerned, by the amount of the coupons -which were not cashed by the stockholders of the Allied countries, -while the holders of Ottoman securities belonging to the Central Powers -cashed theirs.</p> - -<p>Beyond this, Turkey borrowed of Germany about 3½ milliards of -francs. An internal loan of 400 million francs had also been raised. -To these sums should be added 2 milliards of francs for buying war -supplies and war material, and the treasury bonds issued by Turkey for -her requisitions, which cannot be cashed but may amount to about 700 -million francs. As the requisitions already made during the Balkan -wars, which amounted to 300 or 400 million francs, have not yet been -liquidated, the whole Turkish debt may be valued at over 10 billion -francs.</p> - -<p>Finally, in the settlement of the Turkish question, the war damages -borne by the French in Turkey should also be taken into account, which -means an additional sum of about 2 milliards of francs.</p> - -<p>The French owned in Turkey great industrial or agricultural -establishments, which were wholly or partly destroyed. At -Constantinople and on the shores of the Marmora alone they had about -fifty religious or undenominational schools, which were half destroyed, -together with everything they contained, perhaps in compliance with the -wishes of Germany, who wanted to ruin French influence for ever in that -country.</p> - -<p>In order to keep up French influence in the East,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></span> the High -Commissioner of the Republic had, in the early days of the armistice, -warned his Government it was necessary to provide a fund at once to -defray the expenses of the schools and other institutions established -by the French in Turkey in pre-war time—which sums of money were to be -advanced on the outstanding indemnity. For want of any existing law, -this request could not be complied with; but, as will be seen later on, -the Peace Treaty, though it says nothing about this urgent question, -states that the indemnities due to the subjects of the Allied Powers -for damages suffered by them in their persons or in their property -shall be allotted by an inter-Allied financial commission, which alone -shall have a right to dispose of Turkish revenue and to sanction the -payment of war damages. But all this postpones the solution of the -question indefinitely.</p> - -<p>In the settlement of the Turkish question, the chief point is how -Turkey will be able to carry out her engagements, and so, in her -present condition, the policy which England and America, followed by -Italy and France, seem to advocate, is a most questionable one.</p> - -<p>Javid Bey has even published an account of the condition of Turkey, in -which he finds arguments to justify the adhesion of his country to the -policy of Germany.</p> - -<p>Nevertheless it seems that Turkey, where the average taxation is now -from 23 to 25 francs per head, can raise fresh taxes. The revenue -of the State will also necessarily increase owing to the increase -of production, as a tithe of 10 to 12 per cent. is levied on all -agricultural produce. Finally, the building of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></span> new railway lines and -the establishment of new manufactures—to which, it must be said, some -competing States have always objected for their own benefit but to the -prejudice of Turkey—would enable her to make herself the manufactured -goods she bought at a very high price before, instead of sending abroad -her raw materials: silk, wool, cotton, hemp, opium, etc.</p> - -<p>The soil of Turkey, on the other hand, contains a good deal of mineral -and other wealth, most of which has not been exploited yet. There is a -good deal of iron in Asia Minor, though there exists but one iron-mine, -at Ayasmat, opposite to Mitylene, the yearly output of which is only -30,000 tons. The most important beds now known are those of the Berut -Hills, north of the town of Zeitun, about fifty miles from the Gulf of -Alexandretta, which may produce 300,000 tons a year. Chrome, manganese, -and antimony are also found there.</p> - -<p>There is copper everywhere in the north, in thin but rich layers, -containing 20 per cent. of metal. The chief mine, which is at Argana, -in the centre of Anatolia, is a State property. A French company, the -Syndicate of Argana, founded for the prospecting and exploitation of -the copper concessions at Argana and Malatia, and the concessions of -argentiferous lead at Bulgar-Maden, had begun prospecting before the -war.</p> - -<p>Lead, zinc, and silver are found, too, in the Karahissar area, where -is the argentiferous lead mine of Bukar-Dagh, once a State property. -Before the war a French company of the same type as the one above -mentioned, the Syndicate of Ak-Dagh, had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></span> obtained the right to explore -the layers of zinc and argentiferous lead in the vilayet of Angora. -The mines of Balia-Karaidin (argentiferous lead and lignite) lying -north-east of the Gulf of Adramyti in the sanjak of Karassi, are -controlled by French capital. The English syndicate Borax Consolidated -has the concession of the boracite mines in the same sandjak.</p> - -<p>The range of Gumich-Dagh, or “Silver Mountain,” contains much emery. -At Eskishehr there are mines of meerschaum, and in the Brusa vilayet -quarries of white, pink, and old-blue marble, lapis-lazuli, etc.</p> - -<p>A few years ago gold layers were being exploited at Mender-Aidin, -near Smyrna, and others have been found at Chanak-Kale, near the -Dardanelles. Some gold-mines had been worked in Arabia in remote ages.</p> - -<p>There are oil-fields throughout the peninsula, lying in four parallel -lines from the north-west to the south-east. The best-known fields -are in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad, where nearly two hundred -have been identified; others have also been found near the Lake of -Van, and at Pulk, west of Erzerum, which are not inferior to those of -Mesopotamia; and others fifty miles to the south of Sinope.</p> - -<p>There are almost inexhaustible layers of excellent asphalt at Latakieh, -on the slopes of the Libanus, and others, quite as good, at Kerkuk, -Hit, and in several parts of Mesopotamia.</p> - -<p>Finally, some coal-mines are being worked at Heraclea which are -controlled by French capital, and coal outcrops have been found lately -in the Mosul area near the Persian frontier, between Bashkala and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></span> -Rowanduz and Zahku, close to the Baghdad Railway. But the treaty, as -will be shown later on, is to deprive Turkey of most of these sources -of wealth.</p> - -<p>Among the other products of Turkey may be mentioned carpets, furs (fox, -weasel, marten, and otter), and, particularly, silks. The silks of -Brusa are more valuable than those of Syria—the latter being difficult -to wind; their output has decreased because many mulberry-trees -were cut down during the war, but the industry will soon resume its -importance.</p> - -<p>Turkey also produces a great quantity of leather and hides, and various -materials used for tanning: valonia, nut-gall, acacia. It is well known -that for centuries the leather trade has been most important in the -East, numerous little tanyards are scattered about the country, and -there are large leather factories in many important towns. The Young -Turks, realising the bright prospects of that trade, had attempted to -prohibit the exportation of leathers and hides, and to develop the -leather manufacture. During the summer of 1917 the National Ottoman -Bank of Credit opened a leather factory at Smyrna, and appointed an -Austrian tanner as its director. Owing to recent events, it has been -impossible to establish other leather factories, but this scheme is -likely to be resumed with the protection of the Government, for the -leather industry may become one of the chief national industries.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The Peace Conference, by postponing the solution of the Turkish problem -indefinitely, endangered not only French interests in Turkey, but the -condition of Eastern Europe.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></span></p> - -<p>The consequences of such a policy soon became obvious, and at the -beginning of August it was reported that a strong Unionist agitation -had started. The Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, after the answer given -by the Entente to the delegation he presided over, was discredited, as -it could not even give the main features of the forthcoming peace, or -state an approximate date for its conclusion. He could have remained -in office only if the Allies had supported him by quickly solving the -Turkish problem. Besides, he soon lost all control over the events that -hurried on.</p> - -<p>In the first days of summer, the former groups of Young Turks were -reorganised in Asia Minor; some congresses of supporters of the Union -and Progress Committee, who made no secret of their determination not -to submit to the decisions that the Versailles Congress was likely to -take later on, were held at Erzerum, Sivas, and Amasia, and openly -supported motions of rebellion against the Government. At the same -time the Turkish Army was being quickly reorganised, outside the -Government’s control, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf -Bey. An openly nationalist, or rather national, movement asserted -itself, which publicly protested both against the restoration of the -old régime and the dismemberment of Turkey.</p> - -<p>Even in Constantinople the Unionist Committee carried on an -unrestrained propaganda and plotted to overthrow Damad Ferid Pasha -and put in his place Izzet Pasha, a shrewd man, who had signed the -armistice with the Allies, and favoured a policy of compromise.</p> - -<p>This movement had started after the resignation of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></span> the Izzet Pasha -Cabinet, when the prominent men of the Unionist party had to leave -Constantinople. First, it had been chiefly a Unionist party, but had -soon become decidedly national in character. Everywhere, but chiefly -in Constantinople, it had found many supporters, and the majority of -the cultured classes sympathised with the leaders of the Anatolian -Government.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the Allies, by allowing the Greeks to land in Smyrna without -any valid reason, had started a current of opinion which strengthened -the nationalist movement, and raised the whole of Turkey against them.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of October, 1919, the Sultan replaced Damad Ferid -Pasha by Ali Riza Pasha as Prime Minister. Reshid Pasha, formerly -Minister of Public Works and ambassador at Vienna, who had been -ambassador at Rome till the revolution of 1908, and had been first -Turkish delegate in the Balkan Conference in London in 1912-13, became -Minister of Foreign Affairs.</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier General Ali Riza had been Minister of War, and Reshid -Pasha Foreign Minister in the Tewfik Cabinet, which had come into -office in December, 1918, at a time when the Porte was anxious to -conciliate the Allies. Ali Riza had led the operations on the Balkan -front in 1912 and 1913, but had refused to assume any command during -the Great War, as he had always opposed the participation of Turkey in -this war. As he was rather a soldier than a diplomat, his policy seemed -likely to be led by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who -was said to be a friend of France.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></span></p> - -<p>General Jemal Pasha Kushuk, who became War Minister, was quite a -Nationalist. He was called Jemal Junior, to distinguish him from the -other Jemal who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Turkish Army -during the war. He, too, had commanded in Palestine. He was popular in -the army and among the Unionists. Rightly or wrongly, he was supposed -to be in correspondence with Kemal, the leader of the Nationalist -movement in Asia Minor, and his appointment intimated that Ali Riza did -not want to break off with Kemal, whose rebellion had brought about -Damad Ferid’s resignation.</p> - -<p>Said Mollah, Under-Secretary of Justice, a friend of England, edited -the newspaper <cite>Turkje Stambul</cite>, in which he carried on a strong -pro-English propaganda. It was said he was paid by Abdul Hamid to spy -upon a former Sheik-ul-Islam, Jemal ed Din Effendi, his uncle and -benefactor. It seems that by appointing him the Sultan wished to create -a link within the new Government between the supporters of England and -those of France, in order to show that in his opinion Turkey’s interest -was, not to put these two nations in opposition to each other, but, on -the contrary, to collaborate closely with them both for the solution of -Eastern affairs.</p> - -<p>Sultan Mehemet VI, by doing so, endeavoured to restore calm and -order in Turkey, and also to enhance his prestige and authority over -the Nationalist rebels in Anatolia who, at the Congress of Sivas, -had plainly stated they refused to make any compromise either with -the Porte or the Allies. The choice of the new Ministers marked a -concession to the Nationalist and revolutionary spirit.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></span></p> - -<p>About the end of 1919 there were serious indications that the -Nationalist movement was gaining ground in Cilicia, and in January, -1920, disturbances broke out in the Marash area.</p> - -<p>In September, 1919, some armed bands, wearing the khaki uniform of -the regular Turkish Army, had been recruited at Mustafa Kemal’s -instigation. A French officer had been sent to Marash for the first -time to watch over the Jebel Bereket district, which commands all the -tunnels of the Baghdad Railway between Mamurah and Islahie. In December -one of those armed bands, numbering about 200 men, occupied the road -leading from Islahie to Marash, and intercepted the mail.</p> - -<p>As the conditions that were likely to be enforced upon Turkey were -becoming known, discontent increased. General Dutieux, commanding -the French troops of Cilicia, determined to send a battalion as -reinforcement. The battalion set off at the beginning of January and -arrived at Marash on the 10th, after some pretty sharp fighting on -the way at El Oglo. As the attacks were getting more numerous and the -Nationalist forces increased in number, a new French detachment, more -important than the first, and provided with artillery, was dispatched -to Islahie, which it reached on the 14th. This column met with no -serious incident on the way from Islahie to Marash; it reached Marash -on the 17th, at which date it was stated that all the district of Urfa, -Aintab, Antioch, Marash, and Islahie was pacified.</p> - -<p>That was a mistake, for it soon became known that the chiefs of -Bazarjik, a place lying halfway between Marash and Aintab, had gone -over to the Kemalists,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></span> and had just sent an ultimatum to the French -commander demanding the evacuation of the country.</p> - -<p>On February 3 the French troops at Marash were attacked by Turkish and -Arabian troops coming from the East, who intended to drive them away, -and join the main body of the Arabian army.</p> - -<p>A French column under the command of Colonel Normand reached Marash, -and after a good deal of hard fighting with the Nationalists, who were -well armed, relieved the French. But Armenian legionaries had most -imprudently been sent; and after some squabbles, which might have been -foreseen, between Moslems and Armenians, the French commander had -bombarded the town, and then had been compelled to evacuate it. These -events, later on, led to the recall of Colonel Brémond, whose policy, -after the organisation of the Armenian legions, had displeased the -Moslem population.</p> - -<p>Two months after the Marash affair on February 10 the tribes in the -neighbourhood of Urfa, which the French, according to the Anglo-French -agreement of 1916, had occupied at the end of 1919 after about a year -of British occupation, attacked the stations of the Baghdad Railway -lying to the south, and cut off the town from the neighbouring posts. -The French detachment was first blocked up in the Armenian quarter, was -then attacked, and after two months’ fighting, being on the verge of -starvation, had to enter into a parley with the Turkish authorities and -evacuate the town on April 10. But while the French column retreated -southwards, it was assailed by forces far superior in number, and -had to surrender; some men were slaughtered, others marched back to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></span> -Urfa or reached the French posts lying farther south of Arab Punar or -Tel-Abiad.</p> - -<p>On April 1—that is to say, nearly at the same time—the Turks attacked -the American mission at Aintab. French troops were sent to their help -as soon as the American consul-general at Beyrut asked for help. They -arrived on April 17, and, after resisting for eighteen days, the few -members of the American mission were able to withdraw to Aleppo, where -they met with American refugees from Urfa, with the French column sent -to relieve them.</p> - -<p>In a speech made in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies about the -validation of the mandate of the members for Adana, Mersina, and other -districts of Asia Minor, Reouf Bey, a deputy and former Minister of -Marine, maintained that the occupation of Cilicia had not been allowed -in the armistice, and so the occupation of this province by the French -was a violation of the treaty.</p> - -<p>In the middle of February the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign -Affairs handed the Allied representatives a memorandum drawn up by the -Government to expound the situation brought about by the postponement -of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and chiefly requested:</p> - -<p>(1) That the Turkish inhabitants, in the districts where they were in -a majority, should be left under Turkish sovereignty, and that their -rights should be guaranteed.</p> - -<p>(2) That the position of the regions occupied by the Allies should be -altered.</p> - -<p>(3) That the Turkish delegation should be heard before irrevocable -decisions were taken.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">93</a></span></p> - -<p>The Allies, too, felt it was necessary to come to a settlement; and -as they had waited too long since they had dismissed the Turkish -delegation in July of the previous year, the situation was getting -critical now. As the United States, which took less and less interest -in European affairs, did not seem anxious to intervene in the solution -of the Eastern problem, Mr. Lloyd George, on Thursday, December 18, -1919, in an important speech in which he gave some information about -the diplomatic conversations that were taking place in London, came to -the Turkish question and stated that the terms of the treaty would soon -be submitted to Turkey.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“My noble friend said: Why could you not make peace with Turkey, -cutting out all the non-Turkish territories, and then leaving -Constantinople and Anatolia to be dealt with?’ I think on -consideration he will see that is not possible. What is to be done -with Constantinople? What is to be done with the Straits?... If -those doors had been open, and if our fleet and our merchant ships -had been free to go through ... the war would have been shortened -by two or three years. They were shut treacherously in our faces. -We cannot trust the same porter. As to what will remain much -depended on whether America came in.... Would America take a share, -and, if so, what share? France has great burdens, Britain has great -burdens, Italy has great burdens. Much depended on whether America, -which has no great extraneous burdens, and which has gigantic -resources, was prepared to take her share.... But until America -declared what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the position -might have led to misunderstandings with America and would have -caused a good deal of suspicion, and we regard a good understanding -with America as something vital. That is the reason why we could -not make peace with Turkey....</p> - -<p>“We are entitled to say now: ‘We have waited up to the very limits -we promised, and we have waited beyond that.’ The decision of -America does not look promising.... Therefore we consider now, -without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference, -and without in the least <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">94</a></span>wishing to deprive the United States of -America of sharing the honour of guardianship over these Christian -communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with -Turkey, and we propose to do so at the earliest possible moment. -We have had some preliminary discussions on the subject. As far as -they went they were very promising. They will be renewed, partly in -this country, partly probably in France, in the course of the next -few days, and I hope that it will be possible to submit to Turkey -the terms of peace at an early date.” -</p></div> - -<p>But as the Allies, instead of dictating terms of peace to Turkey at -the end of 1918, had postponed the settlement of the Turkish question -for fourteen months, as they had dismissed the Ottoman delegation -after summoning it themselves, and as the question was now about to be -resumed under widely different circumstances and in quite another frame -of mind, the Paris Conference found itself in an awkward situation.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>About the end of the first half of February, 1920, the Peace Conference -at last resumed the discussion of the Turkish question.</p> - -<p>The task of working out a first draft of the treaty of peace with -Turkey had been entrusted by the Supreme Council to three commissions. -The first was to draw up a report on the frontiers of the new Republic -of Armenia; the second was to hold an inquiry into the Ottoman debt and -the financial situation of Turkey; and the third was to examine the -claims of Greece to Smyrna.</p> - -<p>It had been definitely settled that the Dardanelles should be placed -under international control, and the Conference was to decide what kind -of control it would be, what forces would be necessary to enforce<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">95</a></span> it, -and what nationalities would provide these forces. There remained for -settlement what the boundaries of the Constantinople area would be, and -what rights the Turks would have over Adrianople.</p> - -<p>The discussion of the Turkish question was resumed in an untoward way, -which at first brought about a misunderstanding. The English wanted -the debate to be held in London, and the French insisted upon Paris. -Finally it was decided that the principles should be discussed in -London, and the treaty itself should be drawn up in Paris.</p> - -<p>At the first meetings of the Allies concerning Constantinople, the -English strongly urged that the Turks should be turned out of Europe, -and the French held the contrary opinion. Later on a change seems to -have taken place in the respective opinions of the two Allies. The -English, who were far from being unanimous in demanding the eviction of -the Turks, gradually drew nearer to the opinion of the French, who now, -however, did not plead for the Turks quite so earnestly as before.</p> - -<p>This change in the English point of view requires an explanation.</p> - -<p>The English, who are prone to believe only what affects them, did not -seem to dread the Bolshevist peril for Europe, perhaps because they -fancied England was quite secure from it; on the contrary, they thought -this peril was more to be dreaded for the populations of Asia, no doubt -because it could have an easier access to the English possessions. The -success of Bolshevism with the Emir of Bokhara, close to the frontiers -of India, seemed to justify their fears. Bolshevism, however, is -something quite special to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">96</a></span> the Russian mind; other nations may be led -astray or perverted by it for a time, but on the whole they cannot -fully adhere to it permanently. Besides, it appears that Bolshevism has -been wrongly looked upon as something Asiatic. Of course, it has been -welcomed by the Slavs on the confines of Europe, and seems to agree -with their mentality; but in fact it does not come from Asia, but from -Europe. Lenin and Trotsky, who were sent by Germany from Berlin to St. -Petersburg in a sealed railway-carriage and had lived before in Western -Europe, imported no Asiatic ideas into Russia. They brought with them a -mixture of Marxist socialism and Tolstoist catholicism, dressed up in -Russian style to make it palatable to the moujik, and presented to the -intellectual class, to flatter Slav conceit, as about to renovate the -face of Europe.</p> - -<p>The English did not realise that their own policy, as well as that -of their Allies, had run counter to their own aims, that they had -actually succeeded in strengthening the position of the Soviets, and -that if they kept on encroaching upon the independence and territorial -integrity of the heterogeneous Eastern populations of Russia and -the peoples of Asia Minor, they would definitely bring them over to -Bolshevism. Of course, these peoples were playing a dangerous game, and -ran the risk of losing their liberty in another way, but they clung -to any force that might uphold them. Mustafa Kemal was thus induced -not to reject the offers the Moscow Government soon made him, but it -did not seem likely he would be so foolish as to keep in the wake of -the Soviets, for the latter are doomed to disappear sooner or later, -unless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">97</a></span> they consent to evolution, supposing they have time to change. -The Allies, on the other hand, especially the English, forgot that -their policy risked giving Constantinople indirectly to Russia, where -Tsarist imperialism had been replaced by Bolshevist imperialism, both -of which are actuated by the same covetous spirit.</p> - -<p>The fear of Bolshevism, however, had a fortunate consequence later -on, as it brought about in 1920 a complete change in British ideas -concerning Turkey and Constantinople. The London Cabinet realised -that the Turks were the first nation that the Bolshevist propaganda -could reach, and to which the Moscow Government could most easily and -effectually give its support against British policy in Asia Minor, -which would make the situation in the East still more complicated. So, -in order not to drive the Ottoman Government into open resistance, -England first showed an inclination to share the view, held by France -from the outset, that the Turks should be allowed to remain in -Constantinople.</p> - -<p>So the British Government instructed Admiral de Robeck, British High -Commissioner in Constantinople, to bring to the knowledge of the Turks -that the Allies had decided not to take Constantinople from them, but -also warn them that, should the Armenian persecutions continue, the -treaty of peace with Turkey might be remodelled.</p> - -<p>The Turkish Press did not conceal its satisfaction at seeing that -Constantinople was likely to remain the capital of the Empire, and -was thankful to France for proposing and supporting this solution. -Meanwhile a new party, “the Party of Defence and Deliverance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">98</a></span> of the -Country,” to which a certain number of deputies adhered, and which was -supposed to be accepted and supported by the whole nation, had solemnly -declared that no sacrifice could be made concerning the independence -of the Ottoman Empire, and the integrity of Constantinople and the -coast of the Marmora, merely recognising the freedom of passage of the -Straits for all nations. This party now held great demonstrations.</p> - -<p>At the end of February the Minister of the Interior at Constantinople -addressed to all the public authorities in the provinces the following -circular:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I have great pleasure in informing you that Constantinople, -the capital of the Khilafat and Sultanate, will remain ours, by -decision of the Peace Conference.</p> - -<p>“God be praised for this! This decision implies that, as we -earnestly hope, our rights will be safeguarded and maintained.</p> - -<p>“You should do the utmost in your power and take all proper -measures to prevent at all times and especially at the present -delicate juncture untoward incidents against the non-Moslem -population. Such incidents might lead to complaints, and affect the -good dispositions of the Allies towards us.” -</p></div> - -<p>In the comments of the Ottoman Press on the deliberations of the -Peace Conference regarding the peace with Turkey, the more moderate -newspapers held the Nationalists responsible for the stern decisions -contemplated by the Powers, and asked the Government to resist them -earnestly.</p> - -<p>Great was the surprise, therefore, and deep the emotion among the -Turks, when, after the aforesaid declarations, on February 29, the -English fleet arrived and a large number of sailors and soldiers -marched along the main streets of Pera, with fixed bayonets, bands -playing, and colours flying.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">99</a></span></p> - -<p>A similar demonstration took place at Stambul on the same day, and -another on the following Wednesday at Skutari.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>A sudden wave of discussion spread over Great Britain at the news that -the Turks were going to keep Constantinople, and made an impression -on the Conference, in which there were still some advocates of the -eviction of the Turks.</p> - -<p>A memorandum signed by Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. J. H. Thomas, -requiring that the Turks should be driven out of Europe, raised some -discussion in the House of Commons. In answer to this memorandum some -members sent a circular to their colleagues, to ask them to avoid, -during the sittings of the Peace Conference, all manifestations that -might influence its decisions concerning foreign affairs. Another -group, in an appeal to Mr. Lloyd George, reminded him that in his -declaration of January 5, 1918, he had stated that the English did not -fight to wrest her capital from Turkey, and that any departure from -this policy would be deeply resented in India.</p> - -<p>Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Bryce proved the most determined adversaries -of the retention of the Turks in Europe.</p> - -<p>According to the <cite>Daily Mail</cite>, even within the British Cabinet widely -different views were held about Constantinople. One section of the -Cabinet, led by Lord Curzon, asked that the Turks should be evicted -from Europe; and another, led by Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, -favoured the retention of the Turks in Constantinople, provided they -should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">100</a></span> give up their internal struggles and submit to the decisions of -the Allies.</p> - -<p><cite>The Times</cite> severely blamed the Government for leaving the Turks in -Constantinople; it maintained it was not too late to reconsider their -decision; and it asked that Constantinople should in some way be placed -under international control.</p> - -<p>The <cite>Daily Chronicle</cite> also stated that it would have been better if -the Turks had been evicted from Constantinople, and expressed the hope -that at any rate public opinion would not forget the Armenian question. -At the same time—<em>i.e.</em>, at the end of February, 1920—American leaders -also asked that the Turks should be compelled to leave Constantinople, -and a strong Protestant campaign started a powerful current of opinion.</p> - -<p>On Sunday evening, February 29, a meeting of so-called “non-sectarians” -was held in New York, with the support of the dignitaries of St. John’s -Cathedral.</p> - -<p>The Bishop of Western Pennsylvania, after holding France responsible -for the present situation because it owned millions of dollars of -Turkish securities, declared: “Though I love England and France, we -must let these two countries know that we will not shake hands with -them so long as they hold out their hands to the sanguinary Turk.”</p> - -<p>Messages from Senator Lodge, the presidents of Harvard and Princeton -Universities, M. Myron, T. Herrick, and other Americans of mark were -read; asking President Wilson and the Supreme Council that the Ottoman -rule in Constantinople should come to an end. Motions were also carried -requesting that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">101</a></span> the Turks should be expelled from Europe, that the -Christians should no longer be kept under Moslem sway, and that the -Allies should carry out their engagements with regard to Armenia.</p> - -<p>Another movement, similar in character to the American one, was started -in England at the same time.</p> - -<p>The Archbishop of Canterbury, with the other Anglican bishops and some -influential men, addressed a similar appeal to the British Government.</p> - -<p>Twelve bishops belonging to the Holy Synod of Constantinople sent a -telegram to the Archbishop of Canterbury, entreating his support that -no Turk might be left in Constantinople. In his answer, the Archbishop -assured the Holy Synod that the Anglican Church would continue to do -everything conducive to that end.</p> - -<p>The Bishop of New York also telegraphed to the Archbishop of Canterbury -on behalf of about a hundred American bishops, to thank him for -taking the lead in the crusade against the retention of the Turks in -Constantinople. The Archbishop replied that he hoped America would -assume a share in the protection of the oppressed nationalities in the -East.</p> - -<p>The personality of the promoters plainly showed that religious -interests were the leading factors in this opposition, and played a -paramount part in it, for the instigators of the movement availed -themselves of the wrongs Turkey had committed in order to fight against -Islam and further their own interests under pretence of upholding the -cause of Christendom.</p> - -<p>So, in February, after the formidable campaign started in Great Britain -and the United States, at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">102</a></span> very time when the treaty of peace with -Turkey was going to be discussed again, and definitely settled, the -retention of the Turkish Government in Constantinople was still an open -question.</p> - -<p>On February 12 the Anglo-Ottoman Society addressed to Mr. Lloyd George -an appeal signed by Lord Mowbray, Lord Lamington, General Sir Bryan -Mahon, Professor Browne, Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, and several other -well-known men, referring to the pledge he had made on January 5, 1918, -to leave Constantinople to the Turks. The appeal ran as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We, the undersigned, being in touch with Oriental opinion, view with -shame the occupation of the vilayet of Aidin, a province ‘of which the -population is predominantly Turkish,’ by Hellenic troops; and have -noticed with alarm the further rumours in the Press to the effect that -part of Thrace—and even Constantinople itself—may be severed from the -Turkish Empire at the peace settlement, in spite of the solemn pledge -or declaration aforesaid, on the one hand, and, on the other, the -undeniable growth of anti-British feeling throughout the length and -breadth of Asia, and in Egypt, owing to such facts and rumours.</p> - -<p>“We beg you, in the interests not only of England or of India but of -the peace of the world, to make good that solemn declaration not to -deprive Turkey of Thrace and Asia Minor, with Constantinople as her -capital.” -</p></div> - -<p>The next week a memorandum was handed to Mr. Lloyd George and printed -in the issue of <cite>The Times</cite> of February 23. It was signed by, among -others, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishop of London, -Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. A. G. Gardiner (late editor of the <cite>Daily -News</cite>), the socialist leader Hyndman, Lord Bryce (formerly ambassador -to the United States), the well-known writer Seton-Watson, Dr. Burrows, -Principal of King’s College, Professor Oman, and many professors -of universities.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">103</a></span> In it the same desires lurked behind the same -religious arguments, under cover of the same social and humanitarian -considerations—viz., that the Turks should no longer be allowed -to slaughter the Armenians, and that they should be expelled from -Constantinople.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As to Constantinople itself, it will be a misfortune and indeed -a scandal if this city is left in Turkish hands. It has been for -centuries a focus of intrigue and corruption; and it will so -continue as long as the Turkish Government has power there. If -Constantinople were transferred to the control of the League of -Nations, there would be no offence to genuine Moslem sentiment. -For the Khilafat is not, and never has been, attached to -Constantinople. The Sultan, if he retains the Khilafat, will be -just as much a Khalifa, in the eyes of Moslems all over the world, -at Brusa or Konia, as at Stambul.” -</p></div> - -<p>Now the absurdity of such arguments is patent to all those who know -that “the focus of intrigue and corruption” denounced in this document -is the outcome of the political intrigues carried on by foreigners in -Constantinople, and kept up by international rivalries. As to the exile -of the Sultan to Brusa or Konia, it could only have raised a feeling of -discontent and resentment among Moslems and roused their religious zeal.</p> - -<p>Such a movement was resented by the Turks all the more deeply as, -it must be remembered, they have great reverence for any religious -feeling. For instance, they still look upon the Crusades with respect, -because they had a noble aim, a legitimate one for Catholics—viz., the -conquest of the Holy Places; though later on behind the Crusaders, -as behind all armies, there came all sorts of people eager to derive -personal profit from those migrations of men. But they cannot entertain -the least consideration or regard for a spurious religious movement, -essentially<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">104</a></span> Protestant, behind which Anglo-Saxon covetousness is -lurking, and the real aim of which is to start huge commercial -undertakings.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the Greek claims which asserted themselves during the -settlement of the Turkish question partly originated in the connection -between the Orthodox Church, not with Hellenism in the old and -classical sense of the word, as has been wrongly asserted, but -with Greek aspirations. For the Œcumenical Patriarch, whose see is -Constantinople, is the head of the Eastern Church, and he still enjoys -temporal privileges owing to which he is, in the Sultan’s territory, -the real leader of the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Though the -countries of Orthodox faith in Turkey have long enjoyed religious -autonomy, their leaders keep their eyes bent on Constantinople, for in -their mind the religious cause is linked with that of the Empire, and -the eventual restoration of the Greek Empire in Constantinople would -both consolidate their religious faith and sanction their claims.</p> - -<p>In spite of what has often been said, it seems that the Christian -Church did not so much protect Hellenism against the Turks as the -Orthodox Church enhanced the prosperity of the Greeks within the -Turkish Empire. The Greek Church, thanks to the independence it enjoyed -in the Ottoman Empire, was a sort of State within the State, and had -a right to open and maintain schools which kept up moral unity among -the Greek elements. So it paved the way to the revolutionary movement -of 1821, which was to bring about the restoration of the Greek kingdom -with Athens as its capital; and now it serves<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">105</a></span> the plans of the -advocates of Greater Greece. Let us add that nowadays the Greek Church, -like the Churches of all the States that have arisen on the ruins of -Turkey, has its own head, and has freed itself from the tutelage of the -Patriarch for the administration of its property.</p> - -<p>Lord Robert Cecil, who had taken the lead in that politico-religious -movement, wrote on February 23 in the <cite>Evening Standard</cite> a strong -article in which he said something to this purpose: “Constantinople is -a trophy of victories, not the capital of a nation. From Constantinople -the Turks issue cruel orders against the Christian population. From the -point of view both of morality and of prudence, the Stambul Government -must not be strengthened by such an exorbitant concession on the part -of the Allies.”</p> - -<p>In the debate which took place on Wednesday, February 25, 1920, -in the House of Commons regarding the retention of the Turks in -Constantinople, after a question of Lord Edmund Talbot, Sir Donald -Maclean, who spoke first, urged that if the Turks were not expelled -from Constantinople all the worst difficulties of the past would occur -again, and would endanger the peace of the world.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The decision of the Peace Conference was a great surprise to most -people. We owed nothing to the Turks. They came into the war gladly -and without any provocation on our part. They became the willing -and most useful ally of Germany. If the Turks were left in the -gateway of the world, they would be at their old game again.”<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">16</a> -</p></div> - -<p>Sir Edward Carson said just the reverse:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It was suggested that we should drive the Turks out of -Constantinople.... If the Allies wanted to drive the Turks<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">106</a></span> out of -Constantinople, ... they would have to commence another war, and -it would not be a small war. You must not talk of cutting down the -Army and the Navy, and at the same moment censure the Government -because they had not settled the question of driving the Turks -out.”<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">17</a> -</p></div> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George, speaking after them both, began thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“This is not a decision, whichever way you go, which is free from -difficulty and objection. I do not know whether my right hon. -friend is under the impression that if we decided to expel the -Turk from Constantinople the course would be absolutely clear. -As a matter of fact, it is a balancing of the advantages and the -disadvantages, and it is upon that balance and after weighing very -carefully and for some time all the arguments in favour and all -the arguments against, all the difficulties along the one path -and all the difficulties you may encounter on the other, and all -the obstacles and all the perils on both sides, that the Allied -Conference came to the conclusion that on the whole the better -course was to retain the Turk in Constantinople for achieving a -common end.” -</p></div> - -<p>Then he explained that the agreement concerning the substitution of -the Russians for the Turks in Constantinople had become null and void -after the Russian revolution and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and that -at the present date the Bolshevists were not ready to assume such a -responsibility, should it be offered to them.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I will deal with two other pledges which are important. My right -hon. friend referred to a pledge I gave to the House in December -last, that there would not be the same gate-keeper, but there would -be a different porter at the gates.... It would have been the -height of folly to trust the guardianship of these gates to the -people who betrayed their trust. That will never be done. They will -never be closed by the Turk in the face of a British ship again....</p> - -<p>“The second pledge, given in January, 1918, was given after full -consultation with all parties, and the right hon. member for -Paisley and Lord Grey acquiesced. There was a real<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">107</a></span> desire to make -a national statement of war aims, a statement that would carry all -parties along with it, and they all agreed. It was a carefully -prepared declaration, which I read out, as follows: ‘Nor are we -fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its -capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and -Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race. Outside Europe -we believe that the same principle should be applied.... While -we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the -homeland of the Turkish race, with its capital in Constantinople, -the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being -internationalised and neutralised’ (as they will be), ‘Arabia, -Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment -entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions.’ -That declaration was specific, unqualified, and deliberate. It was -made with the consent of all parties in the community....</p> - -<p>“The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting went up -appreciably from that very moment....</p> - -<p>“Now we are told: ‘That was an offer you made to Turkey, and they -rejected it, and therefore you were absolutely free.’ It was more -than that. It was a statement of our war aims for the workers -of this country, a statement of our war aims for India. It is -too often forgotten that we are the greatest Mohammedan Power in -the world. One-fourth of the population of the British Empire is -Mohammedan.... We gave a solemn pledge and they accepted it, and -they are disturbed at the prospect of our not abiding by it.... -There is nothing which would damage British power in Asia more than -the feeling that you could not trust the British word. That is the -danger. Of course it would be a fatal reputation for us....</p> - -<p>“When the peace terms are published there is no friend of the -Turk, should there be any left, who will not realise that he has -been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his crimes, -and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his Empire, his -country under the Allied guns, deprived of his army, his navy, -his prestige—the punishment will be terrible enough to satisfy -the bitterest foe of the Turkish Empire, drastic enough for the -sternest judge. My right hon. friend suggested that there was a -religious issue involved. That would be the most dangerous of all, -and the most fatal. I am afraid that underneath the agitation -there is not only the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but -there is something of the old feeling of Christendom against the -Crescent. If it is believed in the Mohammedan world that our<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">108</a></span> terms -are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the Prophet -before that of Christendom, it will be fatal to our government -in India. It is an unworthy purpose to achieve by force. It is -unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of our faith.</p> - -<p>“Let us examine our legitimate peace aims in Turkey. The first -is the freedom of the Straits. I put that first for two reasons, -which I shall refer to later on. It was put first by my right -hon. friend, and I accept it. The second is the freeing of the -non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman sway; the preservation -for the Turk of self-government in communities which are mainly -Turkish, subject to two most important reservations. The first -is that there must be adequate safeguards within our power for -protecting the minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in -the past. The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power -of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule which -were once the granary of the Mediterranean....</p> - -<p>“You can get the great power of Constantinople from its -geographical situation. That is the main point. It is the main -point for two reasons. The first is, when you consider the future -possibilities of the Black Sea. You have there six or seven -independent communities or nations to whom we want access. It -is essential that we should have a free road, a right-of-way to -these countries, whatever the opinion of the Turk may be. His -keeping of the gates prolonged the war, and we cannot have that -again. Therefore, for that reason, it is coming to an end. The -second reason why the guardianship of the gates is important is -because of its effect upon the protection of minorities. How do -we propose that that should be achieved? Turkey is to be deprived -entirely of the guardianship of the gates. Her forts are to be -dismantled. She is to have no troops anywhere within reach of these -waters. More than that, the Allies mean to garrison those gates -themselves.... I was going to say that we have been advised that, -with the assistance of the Navy, we shall be able to garrison the -Dardanelles and, if necessary, the Bosphorus, with a much smaller -force because of the assistance to be given by the Navy for that -purpose. Turkey will not be allowed a navy. What does she want with -a navy? It was never of the slightest use to her when she had it. -She never could handle it. That is the position in regard to the -Straits.</p> - -<p>“What is the alternative to that proposal? The alternative to -that proposal is international government of Constantinople and -the whole of the lands surrounding the Straits. It would <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">109</a></span>mean -a population of 1,500,000 governed by the Allies—a committee -representing France, Italy, Great Britain, and, I suppose, some -day Russia might come in, and, it might be, other countries. -America, if she cared to come in. Can anyone imagine anything more -calculated to lead to that kind of mischievous intriguing, rivalry, -and trouble in Constantinople that my right hon. friend deprecated -and, rightly, feared? How would you govern it? Self-government -could not be conferred under those conditions. It would have to -be a military government.... It would require, according to every -advice we have had, a very considerable force, and it would add -very considerably to the burdensome expenditure of these countries, -and it would be the most unsatisfactory government that anyone -could possibly imagine.</p> - -<p>“We had hoped that two of the great countries of the world would -have been able to help us in sharing the responsibility for the -government of this troubled country; but for one reason or another -they have fallen out. There was first of all Russia. She is out of -the competition for a very unpleasant task. Then there was America. -We had hopes, and we had good reason for hoping, that America would -have shared these responsibilities. She might probably have taken -the guardianship of the Armenians, or she might have taken the -guardianship of Constantinople. But America is no claimant now, and -I am not going to express an opinion as to whether she ever will -be, because it would be dangerous to do so; but for the moment we -must reckon America as being entirely out of any arrangement which -we contemplate for the government of Turkey and for the protection -of the Christian minorities in that land.... I ask my noble friend, -if he were an Armenian would he feel more secure if he knew that -the Sultan and his Ministers were overlooked by a British garrison -on the Bosphorus, and that British ships were there within reach, -than if the Sultan were at Konia, with hundreds of miles across -the Taurus Mountains to the nearest Allied garrison, and the sea -with its great British ships and their guns out of sight and out of -mind? I know which I would prefer if I were an Armenian with a home -to protect.”<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">18</a> -</p></div> - -<p>The Prime Minister concluded his speech by saying that the Allies -chiefly desired to take from the Turks the government of communities of -alien race and religion, which would feel adequately protected<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">110</a></span> when -they knew that their former persecutors must sign the decree for their -liberation under the threat of English, French, and Italian guns. Yet -he could not dissemble his own misgivings.</p> - -<p>In the discussion that followed Lord Robert Cecil said that, in any -settlement with regard to Armenia, he trusted there would not only be a -considerable increase in the present area of the Armenian Republic, but -that Armenia would be given some access to the Black Sea in the north. -Without that he was satisfied that the Armenian Republic would have the -greatest difficulty in living. He earnestly hoped that every influence -of the British Government would be used to secure that Cilicia -should be definitely removed from Turkish sovereignty. He repeated -once more that he was sorry the Turks were going to be retained in -Constantinople, but that—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“No one wished to turn the Sultan out; the central thing was to get -rid of the Sublime Porte as the governor of Constantinople. That -did not mean turning anybody out; it merely meant that we were not -to hand back Constantinople to the Turkish Government.”</p></div> - -<p>He had the greatest regard for the feelings of the Indians in -that matter, but was surprised they insisted upon the retention of -the Sultan in Constantinople. He thought that there was not the -slightest ground for maintaining the Sultan as Caliph of Mohammedanism, -and, even if there were, there was nothing at all vital about his -remaining in Constantinople. So far as the Turks were concerned, -what was Constantinople? It was not a national capital; it had been -occupied by the Turks as their great trophy <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">111</a></span> of victory. -He entirely approved of the statement of 1918, and, in the same -circumstances, he would make it again. It seemed to him perfectly -fantastic to say that ever since 1918 we had held out to our Indian -fellow-subjects an absolute undertaking that Constantinople should -remain in the hands of the Turks.</p> - -<p>Then Mr. Bonar Law rose, and declared that it would be easier -to have control over the Turkish Government if it was left in -Constantinople, instead of transferring it to Konia,</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Our fleet at Constantinople would be a visible emblem of power. -The Allies believed that the pressure they would be able to -exercise would have an effect throughout the Turkish Empire, but it -would not be so if we sent the Turks to Konia. An hon. member had -said that some Armenians had told him that they desired the Turks -to be sent out of Constantinople. Let the Armenians consider the -facts as they now were.</p> - -<p>“If there was one thing which more than another was likely to make -the League of Nations a failure it was to hand over this question -to them. In 1917 it was arranged that if we were victorious in the -war, Russia would become the possessor of Constantinople. But all -that fell to the ground, and in 1918 a new situation arose, and -a solemn document was put before the British people in which it -was stated that one of our war aims was not to turn the Turks out -of Constantinople. Overwhelming reasons were required to justify -departure from that declaration, and those overwhelming reasons had -not been forthcoming. When it was hoped and expected that America -would accept a mandate in regard to Turkey there was no question of -turning the Turks out of Constantinople.”<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">19</a> -</p></div> - -<p>The debate, which came to an end after this statement by Mr. Bonar Law, -was not followed by a vote.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">112</a></span></p> - -<p>Mr. Montagu, Secretary for India, stated in an interview printed in the -<cite>Evening Standard</cite>, February 25:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If one of the results of the war must needs be to take away -Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the liberty of -respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as president, of the Indian -delegation in the Peace Conference, that we ought not to have -asked Indians to take part in the war against Turkey. Throughout -India, all those who had to express their opinion on this subject, -whatever race or religion they may belong to, are of opinion that -Constantinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal -and external peace of India is to be preserved.</p> - -<p>“The Turks, who are the chief part of the population in -Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other community -to the possession of that city. So we have to choose between -the Turks and an international régime. Now in the history of -Constantinople examples have occurred of the latter régime, and -the results were not so good that it cannot be said a Turkish -government would not have done better.” -</p></div> - -<p>This opinion was upheld by a good many British newspapers, -notwithstanding Lord Robert Cecil’s campaign.</p> - -<p>Yet under the pressure of a section of public opinion and the agitation -let loose against Turkey, England seemed more and more resolved to -occupy Constantinople, and <cite>The Times</cite>, though it had never been averse -to the eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, now showed some -anxiety:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We cannot imagine how the greatest lovers of political -difficulties in Europe should have ever dreamt that Constantinople -should be occupied exclusively by British troops, or that such a -decision may have been taken without previously taking the Allies’ -advice.</p> - -<p>“As things now stand, we are not at all surprised that such stories -may have given birth to a feeling of distrust towards us. These are -the fruits of a policy tainted with contradiction and weakness. The -Allied countries refuse to sacrifice any more gold or human lives, -unless their honour is concerned. They will not consent to go to -war in order to safeguard the interests of a few international -financiers, who want to dismember Turkey-in-Asia.” -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">113</a></span></p> - -<p>This movement was brought about by the explosion of very old feelings -which had been smouldering for nearly forty years, had been kept alive -by the Balkan war, and had been roused by the last conflict. Even at -the time of Catherine II the merchants of the City of London merely -looked upon Russia as a first-rate customer to whom they sold European -and Indian goods, and of whom in return they bought raw materials which -their ships brought to England. So they felt inclined to support the -policy of Russia, and, to quote the words of a French writer in the -eighteenth century, the English ambassador at Constantinople was “le -chargé d’affaires de la Russie.” So a party which took into account -only the material advantages to be drawn from a closer commercial -connection with Russia arose and soon became influential. William Pitt -inveighed against this party when, in one of his speeches, he refused -to argue with those who wanted to put an end to the Ottoman Empire. But -the opinion that England can only derive economic advantages from the -dismemberment of Turkey in favour of Russia soon found a new advocate -in Richard Cobden, the leader of the Manchester school, who expounded -it in a little book, <cite>Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer</cite>, printed -at Edinburgh in 1835. This dangerous policy was maintained, in spite -of David Urquhart’s campaign against the Tsarist policy in the East -in a periodical, <cite>The Portfolio</cite>, which he had founded in 1833, and, -notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by Blacque, a Frenchman, -editor of <cite>The Ottoman Monitor</cite>, to show that Europe was being cheated -by Russia, and was going the wrong way in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">114</a></span> her attitude towards Turkey. -And the same foolish policy consistently pursued by Fox, Gladstone, and -Grey towards Tsardom is still carried on by Britain towards Bolshevism. -The same narrowly utilitarian views, the typical economic principles -of the Manchester School, linked with Protestant ideas, and thus -strengthened and aggravated by religious feeling, seem still to inspire -the Russian policy of Britain as they once inspired the old “bag and -baggage” policy of Mr. Gladstone, the “Grand Old Man,” that the Turks -should be expelled from Constantinople with bag and baggage. Indeed, -this policy may be looked upon as an article of faith of the English -Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone’s religious mind, which was alien to the -Islamic spirit, together with the endeavours of the economists who -wanted to monopolise the Russian market, brought about an alliance with -Holy Orthodox Russia, and within the Anglican Church a movement for -union with the Holy Synod had even been started.</p> - -<p>That campaign was all the more out of place as the Turks have -repeatedly proclaimed their sympathy for England and turned towards -her. Just as after the first Balkan war the Kiamil Cabinet had made -overtures to Sir Edward Grey, after the armistice of November 11 Tewfik -Pasha, now Grand Vizier, had also made open proposals. England had -already laid hands on Arabia and Mesopotamia, but could not openly lay -claim to Constantinople without upsetting some nations with whom she -meant to keep on good terms, though some of her agents and part of -public opinion worked to that end. Generally she showed more diplomacy -in conforming her conduct<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">115</a></span> with her interests, which she did not defend -so harshly and openly.</p> - -<p>But religious antagonism and religious intolerance were at the bottom -of that policy, and had always instigated and supported it. The -Anglicans, and more markedly the Nonconformists, had taken up the cry, -“The Turk out of Europe,” and it seems certain that the religious -influence was paramount and brought on the political action. Mr. -Lloyd George, who is a strong and earnest Nonconformist, must have -felt it slightly awkward to find himself in direct opposition to his -co-religionists on political grounds. Besides, the British Government, -which in varied circumstances had supported contradictory policies, -was in a difficult situation when brought face to face with such -contradictions.</p> - -<p>It also seems strange at first that the majority of American public -opinion should have suffered itself to be led by the campaign of -Protestant propaganda, however important the religious question -may be in the United States. Though since 1831 American Protestant -missionaries have defrayed the expenses of several centres of -propaganda among the Nestorians (who have preserved the Nazarene -creed), paid the native priests and supported the schools, America -has no interests in those countries, unless she thus means to support -her Russian policy. But her economic imperialism, which also aims at -a spiritual preponderance, would easily go hand in hand with a cold -religious imperialism which would spread its utilitarian formalism over -the life and manners of all nations.</p> - -<p>At any rate, the plain result of the two countries’<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">116</a></span> policy was -necessarily to reinforce the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian movements.</p> - -<p>Of course, Mr. Wilson’s puritanism and his ignorance of the complex -elements and real conditions of European civilisation could not -but favour such a movement, and on March 5 the <cite>New York World</cite>, a -semi-official organ, plainly said that Mr. Wilson would threaten again, -as he had already done about Italy, to withdraw from European affairs, -if the treaty of peace with Turkey left Constantinople to the Turks, -and gave up all protection of the Christian populations in Turkey.</p> - -<p>The traditional hostility of America towards Turkey—one of the -essential reasons of which has just been given—demanded that Turkey -should be expelled from Europe, and the Empire should be dismembered. -President Wilson, in Article 12 of his programme, had mentioned the -recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire; yet the American -leaders, though they pointed out that a state of war had never existed -between the United States and Turkey, were the first to demand the -eviction of the Turks; and the <cite>Chicago Tribune</cite> of March 8 hinted -that an American cruiser might be sent to the Bosphorus. On March 6 -Senator Kling criticised in the Senate the Allies’ proposals aiming at -tolerating Turkish sway in Asia Minor. The United States even backed -the Greek claims, and on the same day Mr. Lodge moved that the Peace -Conference should give to Greece Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, and -the western coast of Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Mr. Morgenthau, too, criticised the terms of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">117</a></span> settlement which -allowed Constantinople to remain a Turkish city; he maintained that -such a solution could only be another inducement for America to keep -away from European affairs, and declared that Europe would fail -to do her duty if she did not punish Turkey. Yet at the same time -America, and shortly after England, were endeavouring to mitigate the -responsibility of Germany, objecting, not to her punishment, which had -never been demanded by France, but to the complete execution of the -most legitimate measures of reparation, and made concessions on all -points that did not affect their own interests. In fact, they merely -wanted to resume business with Germany at any cost and as soon as -possible.</p> - -<p>English newspapers printed an appeal to French and British public -opinion drawn up by some eminent American citizens, asking for the -eviction of the Turks from Constantinople and the autonomy of Armenia.</p> - -<p>The British Press, however, remarked that it was not sufficient to -express wishes, and it would have been better if the Americans had -assumed a share of responsibility in the reorganisation of Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Now, why did a section of British and American public opinion want to -punish Turkey, whereas it refused to support the French and Belgian -claims to reparation? In order to form an impartial judgment on Turkey, -one should look for the motives and weigh the reasons that induced her -to take part in the war, and then ascertain why some members of her -political parties most preposterously stood by the side of Germany. -If the latter pursued such a policy,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">118</a></span> perhaps it was because Germany, -who aimed at extending her influence over the whole of Eastern Asia, -displayed more ability and skill than the Allies did in Turkey, and -because the policy of the Powers and their attitude towards the -Christians raised much enmity against them.</p> - -<p>On such a delicate point, one cannot do better than quote the words of -Suleyman Nazif Bey in a lecture delivered in honour of Pierre Loti at -the University of Stambul on January 23, 1920:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“When we linked our fate with that of Germany and Austria, the -Kaiser’s army had already lost the first battle of the Marne. It -is under such untoward and dangerous circumstances that we joined -the fray. No judicious motive can be brought forward to excuse -and absolve the few men who drove us lightheartedly into the -conflagration of the world war.</p> - -<p>“If Kaiser Wilhelm found it possible to fool some men among us, and -if these men were able to draw the nation behind them, the reason -is to be found in the events of the time and in the teachings of -history. Russia, who, for the last two and a half centuries has -not given us a moment of respite, did not enter into the world war -in order to take Alsace-Lorraine from Prussia and give it back to -France. The Muscovites thought the time had come at last to carry -out the dream that had perpetually haunted the Tsars ever since -Peter the Great—that is to say, the conquest of Anatolia and the -Straits.</p> - -<p>“It is not to Europe but to our own country that we must be held -responsible for having entered into the war so foolishly, and still -more for having conducted it so badly, with so much ignorance -and deceit. The Ottoman nation alone has a right to call us to -account—the Great Powers had paid us so little regard, nay, they -had brought on us such calamities, that the shrewd Kaiser finally -managed to stir up our discontent and make us lay aside all -discretion and thoughtfulness by rousing the ancient legitimate -hatred of the Turks.</p> - -<p>“Read the book that the former Bulgarian Premier, Guéchoff, wrote -just after the Balkan war. You will see in it that the Tsar -Nicholas compelled, as it were by force, the Serbs and Bulgars, who -had been enemies for centuries, to conclude an alliance in order -to evict us from Europe. Of course,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">119</a></span> Montenegro followed suit. -France approved, then even urged them to do so; and then one of the -leading figures of the times intervened to make Greece join that -coalition intended to drive the Turks out of Europe. The rest is -but too well known. The Bulgarian statesman who owns all this is -noted for his hatred of Turkey.</p> - -<p>“Let us not forget this: so long as our victory was considered as -possible, the Powers declared that the principle of the <em>status quo -ante bellum</em> should be religiously observed. As soon as we suffered -a defeat, a Power declared this principle no longer held good; it -was the ally of the nation that has been our enemy for two and a -half centuries, and yet it was also most adverse to the crafty -policy that meant to cheat us....</p> - -<p>“Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us we have been -thankful for it. I know the history of my country full well; in her -annals, many mistakes and evil doings have occurred, but not one -line relates one act of ingratitude. After allowing the Moslems -of Smyrna to be slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having -hushed up this crime, Europe now wants—so it seems at least—to -drive us out of Constantinople and transfer the Moslem Khilafat -to an Anatolian town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve it -inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the antique -curios of the Museum. When the Turks shall have been expelled from -Constantinople, the country will be so convulsed that the whole -world will be shaken. Let nobody entertain any doubt about this: if -we go out of Constantinople a general conflagration will break out, -that will last for years or centuries, nobody knows, and will set -on fire the whole of the globe.</p> - -<p>“At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of -Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by Mohammed -to his people, the Moslem Empire of Andalusia was falling to -decay—that is to say, in the south-east of Europe a Moslem State -arose on the ruins of a Christian State, while in the south-west -of Europe a Christian State was putting an end to the life of a -Moslem State. The victor of Constantinople granted the Christian -population he found there larger religious privileges than those -granted to it by the Greek Empire. The ulcer of Phanar is still -the outcome of Sultan Mohammed’s generosity. What did Spain do -when she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of Europe? -She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens or sending to -the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who refused to embrace -Christianity. I mention this historical<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">120</a></span> fact here, not to -criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give an instance of the -way in which the Spaniards availed themselves of the conqueror’s -right Heaven had awarded them. And I contrast the Christians’ -cruelty with the Turks’ gentleness and magnanimity when they -entered Constantinople!” -</p></div> - -<p>To adopt the policy advocated by Anglo-American Protestants was -tantamount to throwing Islam again towards Germany, who had already -managed to derive profit from its defence. Yet Islamism has no natural -propensity towards Germanism; on the contrary, Islam in the sixteenth -century, at the time of its modern development, intervened in our -culture as the vehicle of Eastern influences. That policy also hurt the -religious feelings of the Mussulmans and roused their fanaticism not -only in Turkey, but even in a country of highly developed intellectual -life like Egypt, and in this respect it promoted the cause of the most -spirited and most legitimate Nationalism.</p> - -<p>Besides, in the note which the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs -handed in January, 1920, to the High Commissioners of the Allies, -together with a scheme of judicial reforms, it was said notably:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situation of -Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot deprive a -nation of her right to political existence, this right being based -on the principles of justice and humanity confirmed by President -Wilson’s solemn declaration and recognised by all the belligerents -as the basis of the peace of the world. It is in accordance with -these principles that an armistice was concluded between the Allied -Powers and Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene -shall restore order and peace to the East.</p> - -<p>“Any solution infringing upon Ottoman unity, far from ensuring -quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into a hotbed of -endless perturbation. Therefore the only way to institute stability -in the new state of things is to maintain Ottoman sovereignty.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">121</a></span></p> - -<p>“Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute at -various times were not attended with the results she expected, this -is due to an unfavourable state of things both abroad and at home.</p> - -<p>“Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an unbearable -situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to modernise its -administration so as to open up an era of prosperity and -progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has firmly resolved, in -a broadminded spirit, to institute a new organisation, including -reforms in the judicial system, the finance, and the police, and -the protection of the minorities.</p> - -<p>“As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely -carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept -the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition its -independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride -shall not be wounded.”</p></div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>As soon as it was known in what spirit the treaty of peace with Turkey -was going to be discussed between the Powers, and what clauses were -likely to be inserted in it, a clamour of protest arose throughout the -Moslem world.</p> - -<p>That treaty could not but affect the most important group of -Mohammedans, the Indian group, which numbers over 70 million men and -forms nearly one-fourth of the population of India. As soon as the -conditions that were to be forced on Turkey were known in India, they -roused deep resentment, which reached its climax after the Amritsar -massacre. Some of the clauses which the Allies meant to insert in the -treaty plainly ran counter to the principles of Mohammedanism; and as -they hurt the religious feelings of the Moslems and disregarded the -religious guarantees given to the Hindus and all the Moslem world by -the present British Cabinet and its predecessors, they could not but -bring on new conflicts in the future. Besides, the blunders<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">122</a></span> of the -last five years had united Hindus and Mohammedans in India, as they -united Copts and Mohammedans in Egypt later on, and it was also feared -that the Arabs, whose hopes had been frustrated, would side with the -Turkish Nationalists.</p> - -<p>At the end of 1918, Dr. Ansari, M.D., M.S., chairman of the Committee -of the All-India Muslim League, in the course of the session held at -Delhi at that time, set forth the Muslim grievances. But the address he -read could not receive any publicity owing to the special repressive -measures taken by the Government of India.</p> - -<p>In September, 1919, a Congress of Mohammedans, who had come from all -parts of India and thus represented Muslim opinion as a whole, was -held at Lucknow, one of the chief Muslim centres. In November another -congress for the defence of the Caliphate met at Delhi; it included -some Hindu leaders, and thus assumed a national character. Next month a -third congress, held at Amritsar, in the Punjab, was presided over by -Shaukat Ali, founder and secretary of the Society of the Servants of -the Ka’ba, who had been imprisoned like his brother Mohammed Ali and -released three days before the congress; it was attended by over 20,000 -Hindus and Mussulmans.</p> - -<p>This meeting confirmed the resolution taken by the previous congress to -send to Europe and America a delegation from India for the defence of -the Caliphate. On January 19, 1920, a deputation of Indian Mussulmans -waited upon the Viceroy of India at Delhi, to request that a delegation -might repair to Europe and America, according to the decision of the -congress,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">123</a></span> in order to expound before the allied and associated nations -and their governments the Moslems’ religious obligations and Muslim and -Indian sentiment on the subject of the Caliphate and cognate questions, -and to be their representatives at the Peace Conference.</p> - -<p>The non-Mussulman Indians supported the claims which the 70 millions of -Indian Mussulmans, their fellow-countrymen, considered as a religious -obligation. In an address drawn up by the great Hindu leader, the -Mahatma Gandhi, and handed on January 19, 1920, by the deputation of -the General Congress of India for the Defence of the Caliphate to His -Excellency Baron Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor of India, in order to -lay their aims before him, they declared they raised a formal protest -lest the Caliphate should be deprived of the privilege of the custody -and wardenship of the Holy Places, and lest a non-Muslim control, in -any shape or form whatever, should be established over the Island of -Arabia, whose boundaries, as defined by Muslim religious authorities, -are: the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian -Gulf, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, thus including Syria, Palestine, -and Mesopotamia, beside the Peninsula of Arabia.</p> - -<p>This General Congress of India, according to the manifesto it adopted -during its sittings at Bombay on February 15, 16, and 17, 1920, gave to -the delegation sent to Europe the following mandate, with respect to -the Muslim claims regarding the Caliphate and the “Jazirat-ul-Arab”:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“With respect to the Khilafat it is claimed that the Turkish Empire -should be left as it was when the war broke out;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">124</a></span> however, though -the alleged maladministration of Turks has not been proved, the -non-Turkish nationalities might, if they wished, have within the -Ottoman Empire all guarantees of autonomy compatible with the -dignity of a sovereign State.” -</p></div> - -<p>And the manifesto continued thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The slightest reduction of the Muslim claims would not only hurt -the deepest religions feelings of the Moslems, but would plainly -violate the solemn declarations and pledges made or taken by -responsible statesmen representing the Allied and Associated Powers -at a time when they were most anxious to secure the support of the -Moslem peoples and soldiers.” -</p></div> - -<p>The anti-Turkish agitation which had been let loose at the end of -December, 1919, and had reached its climax about March, 1920, had -an immediate repercussion not only in India, where the Caliphate -Conference, held at Calcutta, decided to begin a strike on March 19 and -boycott British goods, if the agitation for the expulsion of the Turks -from Constantinople did not come to an end in England.</p> - -<p>At Tunis, on March 11, after a summons had been posted in one of the -mosques calling upon the Muslim population to protest against the -occupation of Constantinople, a demonstration took place before the -Residency. M. Etienne Flandin received a delegation of native students -asking him that France should oppose the measures England was about -to take. The minister, after stating what reasons might justify the -intervention, evaded the question that was put him by declaring that -such measures were mere guarantees, and stated that even if France -were to take a share in them, the Mussulmans should feel all the more -certain that their religious creed would be respected.</p> - -<p>The measures that were being contemplated could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">125</a></span> not but raise much -anxiety and indignation among the Moslem populations and might have had -disastrous consequences for France in Northern Africa. This was clearly -pointed out by M. Bourgeois, President of the Committee of Foreign -Affairs, in his report read to the Senate when the conditions of the -peace that was going to be enforced on Turkey came under discussion.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We cannot ignore the deep repercussions which the intended -measures in regard to Turkey may have among the 25 million Moslems -who live under our rule in Northern Africa. Their reverence and -devotion have displayed themselves most strikingly in the course of -the war. Nothing must be done to alter these feelings.” -</p></div> - -<p>Indeed, as M. Mouktar-el-Farzuk wrote in an article entitled “France, -Turkey, and Islam,” printed in the <cite>Ikdam</cite>, a newspaper of Algiers, on -May 7, 1920—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If the French Moslems fought heroically for France and turned -a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still -preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and they would be greatly -distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a -share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>“That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe as a -manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism or Pan-Islamism. -Yet it is nothing of the kind. The so-called Moslem fanaticism -is a mere legend whose insanity has been proved by history. -Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind of those who imagined -its existence. The independent Moslem populations, such as the -Persians and the Afghans, are most jealous of their independence, -and do not think in the least of becoming the Sultan’s subjects. -As to those who live under the dominion of a European Power, they -have no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their -material and moral condition, and of preserving their personality -as a race.</p> - -<p>“The true reasons of the Moslems’ sympathy for the Ottoman Empire -are historical, religious, and sentimental reasons.” -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">126</a></span></p> - -<p>The delegation of the Moslems of India for the defence of the Caliphate -sent to the Peace Conference was headed by Mohammed Ali, who, in 1914, -on behalf of the Government of India, had written to Talaat, Minister -of the Interior, to ask him not to side with the Central Empires, -and to show him how difficult the situation of the Indian Mussulmans -would be if Turkey entered into the war against England. On landing in -Venice, he told the correspondent of the <cite>Giornale d’Italia</cite> that the -object of his journey was to convince the Allies that the dismemberment -of the Ottoman Empire would be a danger to the peace of the world.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The country we represent numbers 70 million Mohammedans and 230 -million men belonging to other religions but agreeing with us on -this point. So we hope that if the Allies really want to establish -the peace of the world, they will take our reasons into account. -Italy has hitherto supported us, and we hope the other nations will -follow her example.” -</p></div> - -<p>This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher, representing -Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, to whom they explained the serious -consequences which the carrying out of the conditions of peace -contemplated for Turkey might have in their country.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George, in his turn, received the delegation on March 19, -before it was heard by the Supreme Council. Mohammed Ali, after -pointing to the bonds that link together the Mohammedans of India -and the Caliphate, because Islam is not only a set of doctrines and -dogmas but forms both a moral code and a social polity, recalled -that, according to the Muslim doctrine, the Commander of the Faithful -must always own a territory, an army, and resources to prevent the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">127</a></span> -aggression of adversaries who have not ceased to arm themselves; -he maintained, therefore, that the seat of the Sultan’s temporal -power must be maintained in Constantinople; that Turkey must not be -dismembered; and that Arabia must be left under Turkish sovereignty.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one and -the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph, or the -Khalifa, as we call him—the successor of the Prophet. Because -the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors, or -Khalifas, continue his tradition to this day. The local centre -is the region known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of -Arabia,’ the ‘Land of the Prophets.’ To Islam, Arabia has been not -a peninsula but an island, the fourth boundary being the waters of -the Euphrates and the Tigris....</p> - -<p>“Islam required temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and -for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety and power -could not be achieved, the Muslims said, ‘Let us get hold of the -most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long -as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.’ That is why -we agreed to accept Muslim kings, the Omayyids and the Abbasids, -as Khalifas, now the Sultans of Turkey. They have a peculiar -succession of their own. We have accepted it for the time being -because we must have the strongest Mussulman Power at our disposal -to assist us in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have -accepted it. If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed -that the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community, no -matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen, as they -used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas, the -Khulafa-i-Rashideen, or truly guided Khalifas.</p> - -<p>“But of course we have to make allowances for human nature. The -Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part with his power any more -than the Mamluke rulers of Egypt liked to part with their power -when they gave asylum to a scion of the Abbasids after the sack of -Baghdad in 1258.” -</p></div> - -<p>It follows that “the standard of temporal power necessary for the -preservation of the Caliphate must obviously, therefore, be a relative -one,” and—</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">128</a></span></p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Not going into the matter more fully, we would say that after the -various wars in which Turkey has been engaged recently, and after -the Balkan war particularly, the Empire of the Khalifa was reduced -to such narrow limits that Muslims considered the irreducible -minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to -be the restoration of the territorial <em>status quo ante bellum</em>....</p> - -<p>“When asking for the restoration of the territorial <em>status -quo ante bellum</em>, Muslims do not rule out changes which would -guarantee to the Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans, within the -scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and property -and opportunities of autonomous development, so long as it is -consistent with the dignity and independence of the sovereign -State. It will not be a difficult matter. We have here an Empire -in which the various communities live together. Some already are -sufficiently independent and others hope—and here I refer to -India—to get a larger degree of autonomy than they possess at the -present moment; and consistently with our desire to have autonomous -development ourselves, we could not think of denying it to Arabs or -Jews or Christians within the Turkish Empire.” -</p></div> - -<p>He went on as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The third claim that the Mussulmans have charged us with putting -before you is based on a series of injunctions which require the -Khalifa to be the warden of the three sacred Harams of Mecca, -Medina, and Jerusalem; and overwhelming Muslim sentiment requires -that he should be the warden of the holy shrines of Nejef, Kerbela, -Kazimain, Samarra, and Baghdad, all of which are situated within -the confines of the ‘Island of Arabia.’</p> - -<p>“Although Muslims rely on their religious obligations for the -satisfaction of the claims which I have specified above, they -naturally find additional support in your own pledge, Sir, with -regard to Constantinople, Thrace, and Asia Minor, the populations -of which are overwhelmingly Muslim. They trust that a pledge -so solemnly given and recently renewed will be redeemed in its -entirety. Although the same degree of sanctity cannot be claimed -for Constantinople as for the three sacred Harams—Mecca, Medina, -and Jerusalem—Constantinople is nevertheless held very sacred -by all the Muslims of the world, and the uninterrupted historic -tradition of nearly five centuries has created such an overwhelming -sentiment with regard to Islambol, or the ‘City of Islam’—a title -which no city has up to this time enjoyed—that an effort to drive -the Turks out ‘bag and baggage’ from the seat<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">129</a></span> of the Khilafat is -bound to be regarded by the Muslims of the world as a challenge -of the modern Crusaders to Islam and of European rule to the -entire East, which cannot be taken up by the Muslim world or the -East without great peril to our own Empire, and, in fact, to the -Allied dominions in Asia and Africa. In this connection, Sir, I -might mention one point, that the Muslims cannot tolerate any -affront to Islam in keeping the Khalifa as a sort of hostage in -Constantinople. He is not the Pope at the Vatican, much less can -he be the Pope at Avignon, and I am bound to say that the recent -action of the Allied Powers is likely to give rise in the Muslim -world to feelings which it will be very difficult to restrain, and -which would be very dangerous to the peace of the world.” -</p></div> - -<p>With regard to the question of the Caliphate and temporal power, on -which the Indian delegation had been instructed to insist particularly, -M. Mohammed Ali, in order to make the Moslem point of view quite clear, -wrote as follows:<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">20</a></p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The moment this claim is put forward we are told that the West -has outgrown this stage of human development, and that people who -relieved the Head of a Christian Church of all temporal power are -not prepared to maintain the temporal power of the Head of the -Muslim Church. This idea is urged by the supporters of the Laic -Law of France with all the fanaticism of the days of the Spanish -Inquisition, and in England, too. Some of the most unprejudiced -people wonder at the folly and temerity of those who come to press -such an anachronistic claim. Others suggest that the Khalifa -should be ‘vaticanised’ even if he is to retain Constantinople, -while the Government of India, who should certainly have known -better, say that they cannot acquiesce in Muslim statements which -imply temporal allegiance to the Khilafat on the part of Indian -Muslims, or suggest that temporal power is of the essence of the -Khilafat. Where such criticisms and suggestions go astray is -in misunderstanding the very nature and ideal of Islam and the -Khilafat, and in relying on analogies from faiths which, whatever -their original ideals, have, for all practical purposes, ceased to -interpret life as Islam seeks to do.” -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">130</a></span></p> - -<p>As he had said in the course of his official interview with the British -Premier, as Islam is not “a set of doctrines and dogmas, but a way of -life, a moral code, and a social polity,”—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Muslims regard themselves as created to serve the one Divine -purpose that runs through the ages, owing allegiance to God in -the first place and acknowledging His authority alone in the last -resort. Their religion is not for Sabbaths and Sundays only, or -a matter for churches and temples. It is a workaday faith, and -meant even more for the market-place than the mosque. Theirs is -a federation of faith, a cosmopolitan brotherhood, of which the -personal centre is the Khalifa. He is not a Pope and is not even a -priest, and he certainly has no pretensions to infallibility. He -is the head of Islam’s Republic, and it is a mere accident, and an -unfortunate accident at that, that he happens to be a king. He is -the Commander of the Faithful, the President of their Theocratic -Commonwealth, and the Leader of all Mussulmans in all matters for -which the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet, whose successor -he is, provide guidance.” -</p></div> - -<p>Therefore, according to the Moslem doctrine—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“There is no such theory of ‘divided allegiance’ here, as -the Government of India consider to be ’subversive of the -constitutional basis on which all Governments are established.’ -‘There is no government but God’s,’ says the Koran, ‘and Him alone -is a Mussulman to serve,’ and since He is the Sole Sovereign of all -mankind, there can be no divided allegiance. All Governments can -command the obedience of the Muslims in the same way as they can -command the obedience of other people, but they can do so only so -far as they command it, as Mr. H. G. Wells would say, in the name -of God and for God, and certainly no Christian Sovereign could -expect to exercise unquestioned authority over a Muslim against -the clear commandments of his Faith when no Muslim Sovereign could -dream of doing it. Mussulmans are required to obey God and His -Prophet and ‘the men in authority from amongst themselves,’ which -include the Khalifa; but they are also required, in case of every -dispute, to refer back to the Holy Koran and to the Traditions -of the Prophet, which are to act as arbitrator. Thus the Khalifa -himself will be disobeyed if he orders that which the Faith -forbids, and if he persists in such unauthorised conduct, he may -not only be disobeyed, but also be deposed. -</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">131</a></span></p> -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“But whatever he could or could not do, the Khalifa was certainly -not a pious old gentleman whose only function in life was to mumble -his prayers and repeat his beads.</p> - -<p>“The best way to understand what he is and what he is not is to go -back to the Prophet whose Khalifa or Successor he is. The Koran -regards man as the vicegerent of God on earth, and Adam was the -first Khalifa of God, and free-willed instrument of divine will. -This succession continued from prophet to prophet, and they were -the guides of the people in all the affairs of life. The fuller and -final revelation came with Mohammed, and since then the Commanders -of the Faithful have been his Khalifas or Successors. But as -religion is not a part of life but the whole of it, and since it -is not an affair of the next world but of this, which it teaches -us to make better, cleaner, and happier, so every Muslim religious -authority has laid it down unequivocally and emphatically that the -allegiance which Muslims owe to the Khalifa is both temporal and -spiritual. The only limits recognised to his authority are the -Commandments of God, which he is not allowed to disobey or defy....</p> - -<p>“The Mussulmans, therefore, do not believe that Christ, for -instance, could have said that His was the kingdom not of this -earth but of Heaven alone; or that men were to render to Cæsar what -was due to Cæsar, and to God what was due to God. Cæsar could not -share the world with God or demand from mankind any allegiance, -even if only temporal, if he did not demand it for God and on -behalf of God. But the ordinary Christian conception has been that -the kingdom of Christ was not of this world, and no Pope or priest -could, consistently with this conception, demand temporal power. It -is doubtful if the Papacy is based on any saying of Christ Himself. -At any rate, the Pope has always claimed to be the successor of -St. Peter and the inheritor of <em>his</em> prerogatives. As such he has -been looked upon as the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven, his -office being strictly and avowedly limited to the spiritual domain. -A study of history makes it only too apparent that the doctrine of -the Papacy grew in Christianity by the application to the Popes of -the epithets which are applied to St. Peter in the Gospels. Just -as St. Peter never had any temporal authority, so the Papacy also -remained, in the first stages of its growth, devoid of temporal -power for long centuries. It was only by a very slow development -that the Popes aspired to temporal power. Thus, without meaning -any offence, it may be said that the acquisition of temporal power -by the Popes was a mere accident, and they have certainly been -divested of it without<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">132</a></span> doing the least violence to the religious -feelings of one half of the Christian world.</p> - -<p>“On the contrary, the temporal power of the Khilafat in Islam is of -the very essence of it, and is traceable not only to the earliest -Khalifas, but to the Prophet himself. This is obviously not the -religious belief of Christian Europe or America; but equally -obviously this is the religious Muslim belief, and after all it is -with the Muslim belief that we are concerned....” -</p></div> - -<p>So, considering the ever-increasing armaments of European and American -nations, “even after the creation of a nebulous League of Nations,” he -asked himself:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“How then can Islam dispense with temporal power? Others maintain -armies and navies and air forces for the defence of their -territories or their commerce, because they love these more than -they hate armaments. To Islam, its culture and ethics are dearer -than territory, and it regards faith as greater than finance. It -needs no army or navy to advance its boundaries or extend its -influence; but it certainly needs them to prevent the aggression of -others.” -</p></div> - -<p>Then M. Mohammed Ali dealt separately with the chief clauses of the -Turkish treaty in the course of his interview with Mr. Lloyd George, -and made the following remarks:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As regards Thrace, it is not necessary to support the Turkish -claim for the retention of Thrace by any further argument than -that of the principle of self-determination. Its fair and honest -application will ensure the satisfaction of that claim.</p> - -<p>“As regards Smyrna, the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, who -were not even at war with Turkey, under the auspices of the Allies, -has shaken to a great extent the confidence which Muslims reposed -in the pledges given to them, and the atrocities perpetrated in -that region have driven them almost to desperation. Muslims can -discover no justification for this action except the desire of -Greek capitalists to exploit the rich and renowned lands of Asia -Minor, which are admittedly the homelands of the Turks. If this -state of affairs is allowed to continue, not only will the Turk -be driven out, ‘bag and baggage,’ from Europe, but he will have -no ‘bag <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">133</a></span>and baggage’ left to him, even in Asia. He would be -paralysed, commercially and industrially, in a land-locked small -Emirate in Asia Minor, the speedy bankruptcy of which is certain. -The application of the principle of self-determination would -entirely rule out the Greek claim in this fertile region, which -obviously tempts the greed of the capitalist and the exploiter.</p> - -<p>“As regards Cilicia, reasons similar to those that have promoted -the action of Greeks in Smyrna seem clearly to prompt the outcry -of the Christian population in Cilicia, and obviously it is the -Gulf of Alexandretta which is attracting some people as the Gulf of -Smyrna is attracting others.” -</p></div> - -<p>Afterwards, coming to the question of the massacres, M. Mohammed Ali -declared:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their utter -detestation of such conduct and their full sympathy for the -sufferers, whether they be Christian or Muslim. But, if the Turk -is to be punished as a criminal, and populations of other races -and creeds are to be released from their allegiance to the Ottoman -Sovereign on the assumption that the Turks have been tyrants in -the past and their rule is intolerable, then the delegation claim -that the whole question of these massacres must be impartially -investigated by an International Commission on which the All-India -Khilafat Conference should be adequately represented.” -</p></div> - -<p>Moreover, the delegation had already said something similar in a -telegram sent to Mr. Lloyd George:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Where casualties have in fact taken place, not only should their -true extent be ascertained, but the Commission should go fully into -the so-called massacres and the intrigues of Tsarist Russia in Asia -Minor after the success of similar intrigues in the Balkans; it -should go into the question of the organisation of revolutionary -societies by the Christian subjects of the Sultan, the rebellious -character of which was subversive of his rule; it should go into -the provocation offered to the Muslim majority in this region, and -the nature of the struggle between the contending parties and the -character of the forces engaged on either side....” -</p></div> - -<p>He went on:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I have no brief for them; I have no brief for the Turks; I have -only a brief for Islam and the India Muslims. What we <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">134</a></span>say is this, -as I said to Mr. Fisher: let there be a thorough inquiry, and if -this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if it establishes to the -satisfaction of the world that the Turks really have been guilty of -unprovoked murders, and have been guilty of these atrocities and -horrible crimes, then we will wash our hands of the Turks.</p> - -<p>“To us it is much more important that not a single stain should -remain on the fair name of Islam. We want to convert the whole -world to our way of thinking, but with what face could we go before -the whole world and say we are the brethren of murderers and -massacrers?</p> - -<p>“But we know the whole history of these massacres to some extent. -It is only in Armenia that the Turk is said to be so intolerant; -there are other parts of the world where he deals with Christian -people, and where he deals with the Jewish community. No complaints -of massacres come from those communities. Then the Armenians -themselves lived under Turkish rule for centuries and never -complained. The farthest back that we can go to discover any trace -of this is the beginning of the last century. But in reality the -‘massacres’ begin only in the last quarter of the last century.</p> - -<p>“It is pretty clear that they begin after the success of efforts -like those made in the Balkans by Russia, which has never disguised -its desire to take Constantinople since the time of Peter the -Great. It has always wanted to go to Tsargrad, as it called it—that -is, the city of the Tsars. They wanted to go there. They tried -these things in the Balkans, and they succeeded beyond their -expectation, only probably Bulgaria became too independent when -it became Greater Bulgaria. But in the case of the Armenians, -they had people who were not very warlike, who had no sovereign -ambitions themselves, and who were also to a great extent afraid -of conversion to another branch of the Orthodox Church, the -Russian branch, so that they were not very willing tools. Still, -they were egged on, and plots and intrigues went on all the time. -These people were incited, and they understood that if they made -a compromise with Tsarist Russia they would get something better. -It was then that these massacres came on the scene. No doubt there -have been several outcries about them; some evidence has been -produced; but there has been no thorough international inquiry -which would satisfy the entire world, Muslim as well as Christian. -It is in that connection that we earnestly appeal to you, to the -whole of Christendom, to the whole of Europe and America, that if -the Turk is to be punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, -that his rule<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">135</a></span> is a blasting tyranny, and that he ought to be -punished, in that case the evidence should be of such a character -that it should be absolutely above suspicion.”</p></div> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George in his reply upbraided Turkey with fighting by the -side of the Central Powers though Great Britain had never fought -against her, and protracting the hostilities by closing the Black Sea -to the British fleet; but he did not seem to realise that the Russian -policy of the Allies partly accounted for Turkey’s decision. Only at -the end of the interview, in answer to a remark of the leader of the -Indian delegation, he pleaded in defence of England “that she had made -no arrangement of any sort with Russia at the expense of Turkey at the -beginning of the war.” Then, before coming to the various points M. -Mohammed Ali had dealt with, Mr. Lloyd George, who had kept aloof for a -long time from the policy of understanding with France, said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I do not understand M. Mohammed Ali to claim indulgence for -Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has -had justice. Germany has had justice—pretty terrible justice. Why -should Turkey escape? Turkey thought she had a feud with us. What -feud had Turkey with us? Why did she come in to try and stab us -and destroy liberty throughout the world when we were engaged in -this life-and-death struggle? Is there any reason why we should -apply a different measure to Turkey from that which we have meted -out to the Christian communities of Germany and Austria? I want -the Mohammedans in India to get it well into their minds that we -are not treating Turkey severely because she is Mohammedan: we are -applying exactly the same principle to her as we have applied to -Austria, which is a great Christian community.” -</p></div> - -<p>As to Arabia—which will be dealt with later on together with the -Pan-Arabian movement—though M. Mohammed Ali had declared that “the -delegation felt no anxiety about the possibility of an understanding<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">136</a></span> -between the Arabs and the Khalifa,” and that the Moslems “did not want -British bayonets to subject the Arabs to Turkey,” Mr. Lloyd George -answered:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Arabs have claimed independence. They have proclaimed Feisal -King of Syria. They have claimed that they should be severed from -Turkish dominion. Is it suggested that the Arabs should remain -under Turkish dominion merely because they are Mohammedans? Is -not the same measure of independence and freedom to be given -to Mohammedans as is given to Christians? Croatia has demanded -freedom, and we have given it to her. It is a Christian community. -Syria has demanded it, and it is given to her. We are applying -exactly the same principles in Christian places, and to impose the -dominion of the Sultan upon Arabia, which has no desire for it, is -to impose upon Arabs something which we certainly would not dream -of imposing upon these Christian communities.”</p></div> - -<p>With regard to Thrace, after owning it was difficult to give reliable -figures and saying that according to the Greek census and the Turkish -census, which differ but little, the Moslem population was in “a -considerable minority,” Mr. Lloyd George stated that “it would -certainly be taken away from Turkish sovereignty.” As to Smyrna, he -asserted that according to his information “a great majority of the -population undoubtedly prefers the Greek rule to the Turkish rule.”</p> - -<p>Concerning the temporal power of the Khalifa, he seemed to have -forgotten the difference which had just been pointed out to him between -the Christian religion and Islam on this point, for he declared:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I am not going to interfere in a religious discussion where -men of the same faith take a different view. I know of -Mohammedans—sincere, earnest, zealous Mussulmans—who take a very -different view of the temporal power from the one which is taken -by M. Mohammed Ali to-day, just as I know of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">137</a></span> Catholics who take -one view and other Catholics who take a very different view of the -temporal power of the Pope. That is a controversy into which I do -not propose to enter.” -</p></div> - -<p>And as if M. Mohammed Ali’s remarks had quite escaped him, he added:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“All I know is this. The Turk will exercise temporal power in -Turkish lands. We do not propose to deprive him of Turkish lands. -Neither do we propose that he should retain power over lands which -are not Turkish. Why? Because that is the principle we are applying -to the Christian communities of Europe. The same principles must be -applied to the Turk.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, without thoroughly investigating the question of the -massacres, he concluded that the responsibility lay with the Ottoman -Government, which “cannot, as it is now constituted, protect its own -subjects”; that Turkey is a “misgoverned country”—a reproach that -might be applied to many other countries, though nobody would think -of declaring they must be suppressed on that account; and that as the -Turks “have been intolerant and have proved bad and unworthy rulers,” -the solutions proposed by the Allies are the only remedy and therefore -are justified.</p> - -<p>And so the old argument that Turkey must be chastised was recapitulated -once more, and, through the mouth of her Prime Minister, England -resorted to threats again, whereas she did not mean to compel Germany -to carry out her engagements fully. This attitude seems to be accounted -for by the fact that Turkey was weak, and was not such a good customer -as Germany. England, while pretending to do justice and to settle -accounts, merely meant to take hold of the Straits.</p> - -<p>Islam has instituted a social polity and culture<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">138</a></span> which, though widely -different from British and American civilisations, and leading to -different methods of life, is not necessarily inferior to them; and -all religious sects, whether Protestant or Catholic, are wrong when -they look upon their own moral conception as superior, and endeavour to -substitute it for that of Islam.</p> - -<p>If we refer to the letter which was written to Damad Ferid Pasha, -president of the Ottoman delegation, in answer to the memorandum -handed on June 17, 1919, to the Peace Conference, and which lacks -M. Clémenceau’s wit and style though his signature is appended to -it, we plainly feel a Puritan inspiration in it, together with the -above-mentioned state of mind.</p> - -<p>One cannot help being sorry to find in so important a document such a -complete ignorance or total lack of comprehension of the Muslim mind, -and of the difference existing between our modern civilisation and what -constitutes a culture. For instance, we read in it the following:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“History records many Turkish victories and also many Turkish -defeats, many nations conquered and many set free. The memorandum -itself hints at a loss of territories which not long ago were still -under Ottoman sovereignty.</p> - -<p>“Yet, in all these changes not one instance occurs in Europe, Asia, -or Africa when the establishment of Turkish sovereignty was not -attended with a decrease of material prosperity or a lower standard -of culture; neither does an instance occur when the withdrawal of -Turkish domination was not attended with an increase of material -prosperity and a higher standard of culture. Whether among European -Christians or among Syrian, Arabian, or African Mussulmans, the -Turk has always brought destruction with him wherever he has -conquered; he has never proved able to develop in peace what he had -won by war. He is not gifted in this respect.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">139</a></span></p> - -<p>This stagnation, which to a certain extent has been noticed in modern -times, may proceed from the fact that the old Turkish spirit was -smothered and Islam was checked by the growth of foreign influence in -Turkey. This is probably due, not chiefly to foreign intrusion in the -affairs of the Ottoman State—for the latter needed the help of foreign -nations—but rather to the selfish rivalries between these nations and -to the mongrel solutions inherent in international régimes by which -Turkish interests were sacrificed.</p> - -<p>It is well known that the decadence of the Arabic-speaking countries -had begun long before they were subjected by the Turks. It has even -been noticed that Turkish domination in Arabia in 1513 checked the -decline of Arabian civilisation, and roused the Syrians, who were in a -similar predicament.</p> - -<p>Besides, the prevailing and paramount concern for material prosperity -which asserts itself in the above-mentioned document, together with -the way in which business men, especially Anglo-Saxons, understand -material prosperity, would account for the variance between the -two civilisations, for it enhances the difference between their -standpoints, and proves that the superiority conferred by spiritual -eminence does not belong to the nations who consider themselves -superior to the Turks.</p> - -<p>The Turkish mind, enriched both by Islamic ethics and by Arabian, -Persian, and Byzantine influences, has risen to a far more definite -and lofty outlook on life than the shallow Anglo-Saxon morality. There -is as much difference between the two as between the architecture -of the Yeshil-Jami, the green mosque of Brusa, the dome of the -Suleymanie, or the kiosk<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">140</a></span> of Baghdad, and the art to which we owe -the “sky-scrapers,” the “flat-iron” buildings, the “Rhine bridges,” -and the “Leipzig buildings,” or between the taste of the man who -can appreciate “loukoums” or rose-jam, and the taste of the man who -prefers “chewing-gum” or the acidulated drops flavoured with amyl -acetate, or even the sweets flavoured with methyl salicylate provided -by the American Government for its army. In the same manner, a similar -confusion is often made between comfort—or what vulgar people call -comfort—and true ease and real welfare; or again between a set of -practical commodities inherent in the utilitarian conception of modern -life, and what makes up culture. The quality of culture evidently does -not depend on the percentage of water-closets or bath-rooms, or the -quantity of calico used per thousand of inhabitants, in a country where -the walls of the houses were once decorated with beautiful enamels, -where the interior courts were adorned with marble fountains, and where -women wore costly garments and silk veils.</p> - -<p>Before throwing contempt on Islam, despising the Arabian and Turkish -civilisations, and hoping that the Moslem outlook on life will make way -for the modern Anglo-Saxon ideal, Mr. Lloyd George and all those who -repeat after him that the Turks have no peculiar gift for governing -peoples, ought to have pondered over Lady Esther Stanhope’s words, -which apply so fittingly to recent events. Being tired of Europe, she -had travelled in the East, and, enticed by the beauty and grandeur of -the Orient, she led a retired life in a convent near Said, dressed as -a Moslem man. One day she was asked by the “Vicomte de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">141</a></span> Marcellus” -whether she would ever go back to Europe, and she answered in some such -words as these—we quote from memory:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Why should I go to Europe? To see nations that deserve to be in -bondage, and kings that do not deserve to reign? Before long the -very foundation of your old continent will be shaken. You have just -seen Athens, and will soon see Tyre. That’s all that remains of -those noble commonwealths so famed for art, of those empires that -had the mastery of the world’s trade and the seas. So will it be -with Europe. Everything in it is worn out. The races of kings are -getting extinct; they are swept away by death or their own faults, -and are getting more and more degenerate. Aristocracy will soon be -wiped out, making room for a petty, effete, ephemeral middle class. -Only the lower people, those who plough and delve, still have some -self-respect and some virtues. You will have to dread everything -if they ever become conscious of their strength. I am sick of your -Europe. I won’t listen to its distant rumours that die away on this -lonely beach. Let us not speak of Europe any more. I have done with -it.”</p></div> - -<p>Besides, all religions accord with the character of the people that -practise them and the climate in which they live. Most likely Islam -perfectly fitted the physical and moral nature of the Turkish race, -since the latter immediately embraced Mohammed’s religion, whereas -it had kept aloof from the great Christian movement which, 500 years -before, had perturbed a large part of the pagan world, and it has -remained faithful to it ever since.</p> - -<p>If the Allies tried to minimise the part played by that religion, which -perfectly suits the character and conditions of life of the people who -practise it, and attempted to injure it, they would really benefit the -domineering aims of Rome and the imperialistic spirit of Protestantism. -In fact, the Vatican tries to avail itself of the recent Protestant -effort, as<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">142</a></span> has already been pointed out, and as various manifestations -will show, to bring about a Christian hegemony which would not be -beneficial either to the peoples of the East or to the civilisation of -the world.</p> - -<p>By doing so, the Allies would drive those peoples towards Germanism, -though they have no natural propensity for it, for they are averse -both to the Lutheran spirit and to the Catholic spirit; yet Germanism -has succeeded in finding its way and even gaining sympathy among them, -because it pretended to come in a friendly spirit.</p> - -<p>It cannot be denied that before the war the Turks endeavoured to -find support among other nations to counterbalance German influence. -But as, above all things, they dreaded the Russian sway—not without -reason, as the latter had already grasped several Turkish provinces -in Asia Minor and represented its advance as the revenge of Orthodoxy -over Islamism—they had turned towards Germany, who, though it secretly -favoured Tsardom, yet pursued an anti-Russian policy.</p> - -<p>Of course, they could not have any illusion about what a German -Protectorate might be to Turkey, for at a sitting of the Reichstag -a German deputy had openly declared: “In spite of our sympathy for -Turkey, we must not forget that the time of her partition has come.” -As early as 1898 the Pan-German League issued a manifesto under the -title <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Deutschlands Ansprüche an das Türkische Erbe</cite> (<cite>The Rights of -Germany to the Heritage of Turkey</cite>). “As soon as the present events -shall bring about the dissolution of Turkey, no other Power will -seriously<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">143</a></span> attempt to raise a protest if the German Empire lays a claim -to a share of it, for it has a right to a share as a great Power, and -it wants it infinitely more than any other great Power, in order to -maintain the national and economic life of hundreds of thousands of its -emigrants.” In the same manner, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia -and Herzegovina, von Aerenberg did not scruple to say: “The opening to -economic life of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia will always be looked upon -as a high deed of German enterprise.” And, alluding to the new field -of activity which was thus opened to Austria-Hungary, he added: “The -possession of Bosnia has made us a Balkan Power; it is our task and -duty to discern when the time shall come, and to turn it to account.”</p> - -<p>But if the Turks chose to side with Germany, it was because the Emperor -“Guilloun” represented himself as the protector of Islam, and promised -to leave the Ottoman Empire its religious sovereignty and the full -enjoyment of Muslim civilisation. Now, as the Turks acknowledge only -Allah’s will, it is foolish to ask a Christian sovereign or a Christian -community to exercise authority over them in order to ensure peace; and -yet the Western Powers, urged on by religious interests, have continued -to interfere in Ottoman affairs from the Christian point of view and in -order to further Christian interests.</p> - -<p>Now we see why Germany, in order not to lose the benefit of her -previous endeavours, readily welcomed the Central Committee for the -Defence of Islam, whose seat was in Berlin, whence it carried on a -vigorous propaganda throughout the Muslim world.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of December, 1919, that committee<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">144</a></span> held a meeting in -Berlin; among the people present were: Talaat Pasha, representing the -Turanian movement; Hussein Bey Reshidof, representing the “Eastern -Central Committee” instituted by the Moscovite Foreign Commissariat for -the liberation of Islam—which is at the head of all the organisations -at work in Persia, the Transcaspian areas, Anatolia, Afghanistan, and -India; Kutchuk Talaat, a representative of the Union and Progress -Committee; Nuri Bedri Bey, representing the Anatolian Kurds; and -delegates from Persia and Afghanistan. There they discussed what -measures should be taken and what means of action should be resorted to -in Muslim countries, especially in Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco.</p> - -<p>It must be owned, on the other hand, that the Catholics in Turkey had -refused—as they have always tried to do in all countries—to acknowledge -the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, and had looked upon -themselves as above the laws of the land, though they laid a claim at -the same time to a share in the government of the country; in short, -they wanted to be both Roman legates and Turkish governors.</p> - -<p>All this does not suffice to justify the measures of oppression the -Turks resorted to, but explains how they were driven to take such -measures, and accounts for the state of mind now prevailing in Turkey, -which has brought about the present troubles. For the foreign Powers, -urged by the Eastern Christians, kept on meddling with Turkish home -affairs, which caused much resentment and anger among the Turks, and -roused religious fanaticism on both sides.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">145</a></span></p> - -<p>If the liberal Western Powers carried on that policy—that is to say, if -they continued to support the Christians against the Moslems—they would -make a dangerous mistake.</p> - -<p>At the present time the Holy See, which has never given up its -ever-cherished dream of universal dominion, plainly shows by its -growing activity that it means to develop its religious influence and -avail itself of the war to strengthen and enlarge it.</p> - -<p>For some time the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, though always a staunch -supporter of the Papacy, restrained that tendency and became a -moderating influence in Rome; but now the Holy See aims at playing a -more important part than ever in all the affairs of Southern Germany -and the countries that have broken loose from the former dual monarchy.</p> - -<p>In order to strengthen the Church and to realise Catholic unity, the -Vatican at the present juncture is exerting all its power in Central -Europe and the Slavonic countries; and is doing its best at the same -time to get in touch with the Protestant world in order to reinforce -its own action by coupling it with the Protestant propaganda.</p> - -<p>Benedict XV has revived the scheme of the longed-for Union of the -Churches in order to win over to Catholicism part or the whole of the -former Orthodox Empire.</p> - -<p>In New Germany the Holy See is endeavouring to bring about an -understanding between Catholics and Protestants, with a view to a -common Christian—rather than strictly Catholic—action. In Austria, -after upholding all the elements of the old régime so long as a -monarchist movement seemed likely to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">146</a></span> triumph, it now gives its -support to Christian Democracy. In Hungary, where the Jesuits and the -Cistercians first worked hand in hand together with an Allied mission -in Budapest to maintain Friedrich, or at least a clerical government, -in power, the Primate, Mgr. Csernoch, and the Lutheran bishop, Mgr. -Sandar Raffaï, have now agreed to work for the same purpose. The Polish -Schlachta, of course, supports these schemes and intrigues, which are -being carried on at Fribourg, in Switzerland, where certain princes -connected with the Imperial House and Prince Louis of Windisch-Graetz -used to meet Waitz, Bishop of Innsbrück.</p> - -<p>Uniatism, or the rite of the United Greek Church, which, though -retaining the Slavonic liturgy, acknowledges the Pope as the supreme -head of the Church, and is paramount in the Carpathian Mountains, -Eastern Galicia, and the Ukraine, favours the extension of the Pope’s -sovereignty over these territories, and naturally the Holy See takes -advantage of this movement to support and reinforce the Church and -bring Orthodox countries under the dominion of Rome.</p> - -<p>Till these great schemes have been carried out, and in order to further -them, the Holy See means to establish between the Orthodox and the -Catholic world an intermediary zone which would be a favourable ground -for its penetration and conquest. To this intent Father Genocchi has -been sent as apostolic visitor to the Ukraine by Cardinal Marini, -prefect of the congregation newly established for the propaganda in the -East, with full powers over both Latin and Greek Catholics, or Uniates. -Father<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">147</a></span> Genocchi is to act in close union with Mgr. Ratti, and both -stand out as powerful agents of the great scheme of the Roman Church.</p> - -<p>While pursuing this direct conquest, Rome endeavours in all countries -to gain the support of all believers in Christ, even the Protestants, -in order to be able to exert an influence on the policy of the -Governments, and thus serve Christian interests.</p> - -<p>At a recent conference of the Czecho-Slovak Catholics, Mgr. Kordatch, -Archbishop of Prague, declared the Catholics would go so far as -to resort to public political action and hold out the hand to the -Protestants, who believe, like them, in the Divinity of Christ and the -Decalogue.</p> - -<p>So any undertaking against Islam or any other Eastern religion cannot -but reinforce the power of Rome, for it aims at destroying the power of -the other creeds which, as well as Catholicism, gratify the aspirations -of the various peoples, and thus legitimately counterbalance its dream -of hegemony.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>Finally, though any communist conception is abhorrent to the Moslem -spirit, which is essentially individualist and so has an aristocratic -trend, and though Bolshevism, as we have already pointed out, is a -specific doctrine which suits only the Russian mind, the attitude of -the Western nations threatened to drive Islam towards Bolshevism, -or at least to create a suitable ground for its expansion. In spite -of the enlightened leaders of Islam, the attitude of the Powers -risked inducing the Moslem masses to lend a willing ear to Bolshevist -promises and to adopt<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">148</a></span> Bolshevism in order to defend the Moslem creed -and customs. Besides, Bolshevism, which was undergoing an evolution, -and was growing more wily, less brutal, but all the more dangerous, -no longer required other nations to adopt its social ideal. In order -to serve a political purpose, it now turned its efforts towards the -Caspian Sea to communicate with Asia Minor and create disturbances in -Central Asia, while, on the other side, it advanced as far as Mongolia.</p> - -<p>After the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement forced by Great -Britain upon Persia, which, in spite of what was officially said to -the contrary, deprived Persia of her independence, Bolshevism saw what -an easy prey was offered to it by the English policy, and concentrated -its efforts on Asia Minor, where it could most easily worry England. -It carried on a very active propaganda in all Asiatic languages in -Turkistan and even in Afghanistan—the result being that the latter -country sent a mission of inquiry to Moscow.</p> - -<p>According to the statement of a Persian reproduced in the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Journal des -Débats</cite> of April 4, 1920, the representatives of the Soviet Government -made advances to the Persian patriotic organisations and told them:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“England despises your rights. Your Government is in her hand. To -organise your resistance, you need a help. We offer it to you, and -ask for nothing in return, not even for your adhesion to our social -doctrine. The reason that urges us to offer you our support is a -political one. Russia, whether she is Bolshevist or not, cannot -live by the side of an England ruling over nearly the whole of the -East. The real independence of your country is necessary to us.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">149</a></span></p> - -<p>Such suggestions could not but attract the attention of the Persians -at a time when, without even waiting for the opening of the Chamber -that had been elected under the influence of British troops in order to -sanction the Anglo-Persian agreement, some English administrators had -already settled in Teheran.</p> - -<p>The same Persian, in agreement with the main body of Persian opinion, -went on:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Shall we have to submit to that shameful régime? Nobody thinks -so in our country. Even those who were not bold enough to protest -openly against the deed of spoliation which the Anglo-Persian -agreement is, are secretly opposed to that agreement. But in order -to avail ourselves of that discontent, to concentrate our forces, -and chiefly to act fast and well, we need help from abroad, at -least at the outset. The Bolshevists offer it to us. I do not -know why we should discard the proposition at once. What makes us -hesitate is their communist doctrine; yet they declare they do not -want at all to ‘bolshevikise’ Persia. As soon as their promise -seems to be quite genuine, it will be our national duty to accept -their help.</p> - -<p>“Whether the Red Dictator’s action in Russia was good or bad is a -question that concerns the Russians alone. The only question for us -is how to find an ally. Now we have not to choose between many.</p> - -<p>“We should have been only too pleased to come to an understanding -with Great Britain, even at the cost of some concessions, provided -our independence were respected. But the British leaders have -preferred trampling upon our rights. Who is to be blamed for this?”</p></div> - -<p>In the same manner as the Kemalist movement, a Nationalist movement was -gaining ground in Persia, like the one which had already brought on the -Teheran events from 1906 to 1909.</p> - -<p>Now, while the Bolshevists, in order to expand and strengthen their -position, did their utmost to convince the Eastern nations that -Bolshevism alone could free them, the Germans, on the other hand,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">150</a></span> -seized the new opportunity that was given them to offer the Mohammedans -their help, and sent them German officers from Russia. In this way, -and through our fault, Bolshevism and Germanism united to foment -disturbances in the East, and join with it against us. That is why Mr. -Winston Churchill said, at the beginning of January: “New forces are -now rising in Asia Minor, and if Bolshevism and Turkish Nationalism -should unite, the outlook would be a serious one for Great Britain.”</p> - - -<p>Footnotes:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">15</span></a> Chapter “Le Peuple.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">16</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, February 27, 1920, p. 8, col. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">17</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, February 27, 1920, p. 8, col. 4.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">18</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, February 27, 1920, p. 9.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">19</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, February 27, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">20</span></a> <cite>India and the Empire</cite>, reprinted from <cite>Foreign Affairs</cite>, -July 1, 1920 (Orchard House, Great Smith Street, Westminster, London, -S.W. 1), pp. 3 f.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">151</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="V">V<br /> -<br /> -THE OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> Allied intervention in Turkey continued to be the subject of -frequent diplomatic conversations between the Powers.</p> - -<p>Though Italy and France seemed to favour a strictly limited action, -England held quite a different opinion, and energetic measures seemed -likely to be resorted to. Lord Derby at the meeting of the Ambassadors’ -Council on March 10 read a telegram from his Government stating it -intended to demand of Germany the extradition of Enver Pasha and Talaat -Pasha, who were on the list of war criminals drawn up a few weeks -before by the British Government, and who at that time were in Berlin.</p> - -<p>As the Allies had not requested that these men should be handed over -to them at the time of the armistice, and as the war criminals whose -extradition had been previously demanded of the Central Powers did -not seem likely to be delivered up to them, this seemed rather an -idle request at a time when it was openly said the Allies wanted to -expel the Turks from Constantinople, when a deep agitation convulsed -the Moslem world and discontent was rife in it. What was the use of -this new threat to Germany if, like the previous one, it was not -to be carried into effect? What would Great Britain do if the two -“undesirables” thought of going to Holland, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">152</a></span> why did she prepare -to punish Turkey when some of her statesmen seemed inclined to make -all sorts of concessions, instead of compelling Germany, the promoter -of the conflict, who had not yet delivered up any German subject, to -execute the treaty without any restriction whatever?</p> - -<p>At the beginning of the armistice England had deported the members and -chief supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, and later on -the high functionaries who had been arrested by Damad Ferid Pasha, -and were about to be court-martialled. One night fifty-four of the -latter out of about 130 were suddenly deported to Malta for fear they -should be set free by the population of Constantinople. Among them -were: Hairi Effendi, ex-Sheik-ul-Islam; the Egyptian prince, Said -Halim Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier; Ahmed Nessiny, ex-Minister of Foreign -Affairs; Halil Bey, ex-Minister of Justice; Prince Abbas Halim Pasha, -ex-Minister of Public Works; Fethy Bey, ex-Minister at Sofia; Rahmi -Bey, Governor-General of vilayet of Smyrna; Jambalat Bey, ex-Minister -of Interior; Ibrahim Bey, a former Minister; and four members of the -Committee: Midhat Shukri; Zia Geuk Alp; Kemal (Kutchuk Effendi); -and Bedreddin Bey, temporary vali of Diarbekir, who was deported as -responsible for the massacres that had taken place in that town, -though at that time he was out of office and had been discharged by -a court-martial. The British even evinced a desperate, undignified -animosity and an utter lack of generosity in regard to the Turkish -generals who had defeated them. They had, as it were, carried away the -spirit of Turkey.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">153</a></span></p> - -<p>Italy, who had followed a most clever, shrewd, and far-sighted policy, -and who had kept some independence within the Supreme Council, had been -very reserved in regard to the Turkish question.</p> - -<p>In regard to Article 9 of the pact of London, which ascribed to Italy, -in case Turkey should be dismembered, a “fair part” of the province -of Adana in Asia Minor, the newspaper <cite>Il Secolo</cite>, in the middle of -January, 1920, expressed the opinion that Italy should give up that -acquisition.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Notwithstanding all that has been written for the last seven -or eight years about the Adalia area, we do not think that its -possession would improve our present economic condition. It would -only estrange from us a nation from which we might perhaps derive -great advantages through an open policy of friendship and liberty.</p> - -<p>“The most profitable scheme would have been to maintain the -national integrity of Turkey and to give Italy, not a mandate over -a reduced State, but a mere administrative control, and to assign -her a few zones of exploitation with mere economic privileges, for -instance, near Heraclea and Adalia.</p> - -<p>“But at the present stage of the Asiatic problem, such a scheme -could hardly be carried out. We must then lay aside all selfish -purposes, and openly and tenaciously defend the integrity and -independence of the Turkish State.</p> - -<p>“Let the Turks be driven away from the districts which are -predominantly Arabian, Greek, or Armenian. But let the Sultan -remain in Constantinople, till the League of Nations has become -stronger and able to assume control of the Straits. Let us not -forget that the Turks chiefly put their confidence in us now, and -that Germany, whose policy had never threatened Turkish territorial -integrity, had succeeded in gaining Turkish friendship and blind -devotion.</p> - -<p>“Italy has not many friends to-day, and so she should not despise a -hand which is willingly held out to her.”</p></div> - -<p>Italy therefore did not warmly approve an expedition against Turkey. -Her semi-official newspapers stated it was owing to Italy that the -Allies’ policy<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">154</a></span> still showed some moderation, and they hinted that the -presence of Italian troops in the contingent landed at Constantinople -was to be looked upon as the best means to prevent extreme measures.</p> - -<p>On Tuesday, March 16, the Allied troops, consisting mostly of British -soldiers, under the command of General Milne, occupied the Ottoman -Government offices.</p> - -<p>It might seem strange that the Allied troops in Constantinople were -commanded by a British general, when the town was the residence of -General Franchet d’Espérey, commander-in-chief of the inter-Allied -troops on the Macedonian front, who, in the decisive battle in which -he broke through the Bulgarian front, had had General Milne under him. -But, after all, it was better for France that an English general should -stand responsible for carrying out the occupation.</p> - -<p>To the student of Eastern events this was but the logical outcome of -a patient manœuvre of England. The documents that have now been made -public plainly show how far-sighted her policy had been.</p> - -<p>General Franchet d’Espérey’s dispositions were suddenly reversed, for -he had not advocated an important military action against Russia or -Turkey when he had taken command of the Eastern army—<em>i.e.</em>, before his -expedition from Salonika towards the Danube—and at the beginning of -October, 1918, he had arranged the French and English divisions so as -to march against Budapest and Vienna, foreseeing the ultimate advance -of the Italian left wing against Munich.</p> - -<p>On October 8, 1918, he was formally enjoined from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">155</a></span> Paris to send the -British divisions which made up his right wing against Constantinople -under the command of an English general.</p> - -<p>Thus, after the defeat of Bulgaria in October, 1918, the British -Government required that the troops sent to the Constantinople area -should be led by a British general. In this way General Milne assumed -command of the British troops stationed round and in Constantinople -when Admiral Calthorpe had concluded the armistice with Turkey, -and as a consequence General Franchet d’Espérey, though still -commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in European Turkey, was now -under the orders of General Milne, commander of the Constantinople -garrison and the forces in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Some time after receiving the aforesaid order, General Franchet -d’Espérey, on October 27, 1918, received a letter from the War -Minister, M. Clémenceau, No. 13644, B.S. 3,<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">21</a> forwarding him “copy of -a letter giving the outline of a scheme of action that was recommended -not only to carry on the war against the Central Powers in Russia, but -also to effect the economic blockade of Bolshevism, and thus bring -about its downfall.” This scheme, after being assented to by the -Allied Powers concerned in it, was to be “the natural outcome of the -operations entrusted to the Allied armies in the East.”</p> - -<p>Finally, in a telegram, No. 14041, B.S. 3, dated November 6, containing -some very curious recommendations, it was said:</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">156</a></span></p> - -<p>“The operations in Southern Russia should be carried on by means of -Greek elements, for instance, which it might be inexpedient to employ -in an offensive against Germany, or by means of the French army in -Palestine.”<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">22</a></p> - -<p>Thus all the plans of the French headquarters were altered by England, -and to her advantage; at the same time part of our endeavours was -broken up and annihilated under the pressure of the Pan-Russian circles -that urged France to intervene in Russia, and the French policy in the -East was wholly at the mercy of England. By saying this, we do not mean -at all to belittle M. Clémenceau’s work during the war, but we only -mention one of the mistakes to which he was driven, in spite of his -energy and determination, by the English and American policy, which had -dazzled some of his collaborators.</p> - -<p>On March 16, at 9 a.m., some British <em>estafettes</em> handed to the Sultan, -in his palace at Yildiz-Kiosk, and to the Sublime Porte a note of -General Milne, commanding the Allied troops in Asia Minor and the town -of Constantinople. It stated that at 10 a.m., with the agreement of the -Italian, French, and British High Commissioners, and according to the -orders of the British Imperial Headquarters, the Allied contingents -would occupy the offices of the Minister of War and the Minister of -Marine, the prefecture, the post and telegraph offices, the town gates, -and the new bridge of Galata. In fact, the town had been occupied at -daybreak by the Allied troops.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">157</a></span></p> - -<p>The note added that for a short time the political administration would -be left to the Turks, but under the control of Allied officers. Martial -law was proclaimed, and, in case of resistance, force would be resorted -to.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government gave no answer, and an hour later all the -measures mentioned by General Milne were carried out. As these -operations took a whole day, all the means of transport and -communication were temporarily stopped.</p> - -<p>At the War Office the soldiers on duty attempted to resist the British -forces. A skirmish ensued, in which two British soldiers were killed, -and an officer and three soldiers wounded; nine Turks, including an -officer, were killed, and a few more wounded.</p> - -<p>At the same hour a Greek destroyer steamed into the Golden Horn, and -cast anchor opposite the Patriarch’s palace.</p> - -<p>Before this, General Milne had had a few deputies and senators -arrested, together with a few men considered as having a share in the -Nationalist movement, such as Kutchuk Jemal Pasha, ex-War Minister -in the Ali Riza Cabinet; Jevad Pasha, formerly head of the staff; -Tchourouk Soulou Mahmoud Pasha, a senator; Dr. Essad Pasha; Galatali -Shefket Pasha, commanding the Straits forces; Reouf Bey, Kara Vassif -Bey, Shevket Bey, Hassan Tahsin Bey, Nouman Ousta Effendi, Sheref Bey, -deputies.</p> - -<p>Reouf Bey and Kara Vassif Bey were considered as representing in the -Turkish Parliament Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the people who ensured the -transmission of his orders.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">158</a></span></p> - -<p>All these men were arrested illegally and brutally, with the consent -of the French Governor, though they had always evinced much sympathy -for France, under the pretext that they corresponded with the national -army; and yet their intervention might have had favourable consequences.</p> - -<p>Among the men arrested that night, Jemal, Jevad, and Mahmoud Pasha, -all three former Ministers, were insulted and sent to prison in their -nightclothes, with their arms bound. Their doors and windows were -broken open, and their Moslem wives were threatened in the harem. Some -children of thirteen or fourteen were also arrested and thrashed. Eight -Turkish soldiers on duty at Shahzade-Bashi were killed in the morning -while they lay asleep on their camp-beds, and the censorship probably -suppressed other deeds of the same kind.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government could not understand how members of Parliament -could be imprisoned, especially by the English, the founders of the -parliamentary system. The deputy Jelal Noury Bey, who is neither a -Nationalist nor a Unionist, was apprehended, merely because he opposed -Ferid Pasha’s policy.</p> - -<p>England, to enhance her influence over public opinion, got control -over the chief newspapers which were not friendly to her. Jelal Noury -Bey, the director of the <cite>Ileri</cite>, a radical newspaper, and Ahmed Emin -Bey, the director of the <cite>Vakit</cite>, were deported. The <cite>Alemdar</cite>, the -<cite>Peyam Sabah</cite>, the <cite>Stambul</cite>, edited by Refi Jevad, Ali Kemal, and -Said Mollah, which, since the first days of the armistice, had praised -the English policy, fell into English hands;<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">159</a></span> which accounts for the -varying attitudes successively assumed by those journals in their -comments on current events. Their editors were mostly members of the -“Club of the Friends of England,” and sought in every possible way -to increase the number of the adherents of that committee, which was -subsidised by the British High Commissioner, and whose chief aim was -that the Turkish mandate should be given to England.</p> - -<p>On March 21, 1920, the British at Skutari requisitioned the police -courts, the law courts, the police station, the town hall, and the -prison, thus almost completely disorganising the administration of the -town.</p> - -<p>In the note signed by the High Commissioners, this occupation was -described as a measure of guarantee, with a view to the execution -of the treaty that was going to be forced on Turkey. Yet it seemed -rather strange that such measures should be taken before the treaty -was concluded—or was it because the English, being aware the treaty -was unacceptable, thought it necessary to gag the Turks beforehand, or -even sought to exasperate them?—for if the Turks offered resistance, -then the English would have a right to intervene very sternly, and -thus could justify the most unjustifiable measures of repression. -What would England and the United States have answered if France had -proposed such coercive measures against Germany in addition to those -of the armistice? It was stated in this note that the occupation would -not last long, and was no infringement upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, -that it aimed at rallying the Turks in a common endeavour to restore -prosperity to Turkey in accordance with the Sultan’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">160</a></span> orders; but it -also threatened that, should disorder last longer in Asia Minor, the -occupation might be extended and the provisions of the treaty might be -made harder, in which case Constantinople would be severed from Turkey.</p> - -<p>The <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite> said about that time:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The political situation, which has evolved so rapidly, plainly -shows it is not enough for the Americans to keep aloof from the -present events. Their national honour is at stake.</p> - -<p>“Public opinion in Great Britain would unanimously side with France -in her operations in Asia Minor, provided France declares herself -willing to accept our co-operation.</p> - -<p>“We easily understand that the occupation of Constantinople came -rather as a surprise to France and Italy, especially if we take -into account that this action closely followed another measure of a -similar kind taken by England within the last fortnight.</p> - -<p>“It seems that this time our Allies have assumed a slightly -different attitude: official France is still hesitating; public -opinion has changed completely, and the pro-Turkish feeling is on -the wane. If France wants to maintain her prestige in the East -unimpaired, she must associate with any political, naval, or -military measure taken by England.</p> - -<p>“The Italian standpoint and interests do not differ much from ours, -or from those of France, but Italian circles plainly advocate a -policy of non-intervention, or an intervention restricted to a -diplomatic action.”</p></div> - -<p>If such proceedings emanating from some American or English circles -were hardly a matter of surprise, the attitude of some Frenchmen of -note was not so easily accounted for.</p> - -<p>M. Hanotaux<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">23</a> was led by a strange political aberration and a curious -oblivion of all the traditional policy of France—unless he deliberately -meant to break off with it, or was blinded by prejudice—when he -assigned Constantinople to Greece, because, according to him, to -give Constantinople to Greece<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">161</a></span> was “to give it to Europe, and to her -worthiest, noblest offspring.”</p> - -<p>Now Hellenism owes nothing to Byzantium, and Byzantinism, imbued -with Christianity, is but remotely and indirectly connected with the -magnificent pagan bloom of Hellenism. Byzantium, as has been shown, was -not only the continuation of Rome in its decay: it had also a character -of its own. Neither was Byzantinism a mere continuation of Hellenism. -It was rather the propagator of Orthodoxy, so that when the Greeks -claimed Byzantium, they could not do so on behalf of Hellenism, but -merely on behalf of Christianity. There is a confusion here that many -people have sought to perpetuate because it serves numerous interests, -those of the Greeks, and also those of the Slavs, who owe their culture -to Byzantium. But whereas Byzantium chiefly taught barbarous Russia -a religion together with the rudiments of knowledge, and opened for -her a door to the Old World, she imparted to Arabian civilisation -knowledge of the works and traditions of antiquity. Russia, who only -borrowed the rites of the Byzantine Church and exaggerated them, did -not derive much profit from that initiation; the Turks and Arabs, on -the contrary, thanks to their own culture, were able to imbibe the old -knowledge bequeathed and handed down to them by Byzantium—leaving aside -the religious bequest. Thus they were enabled to exercise a wholesome -influence, driving out of Constantinople both Orthodoxy and the Slavs -who aimed at the possession of that town.</p> - -<p>As to the so-called Hellenism of Asia Minor, it is true that the -civilisation of ancient Greece spread<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">162</a></span> over several districts on the -coast; but it should be borne in mind that, long before the Greeks, -the Egyptians and various Semitic peoples had settled on the coast of -Lydia—which up to the seventh century <span class="smcap lowercase">B.C.</span> bore the name of -Meonia—and fought there for a long time; and that the Lydians, a hybrid -race akin to the Thracians and Pelasgi commingled with ethnic elements -coming from Syria and Cappadocia, kept up an intercourse between the -Greeks of the coast and Asia<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">24</a> till the Cimmerian invasion convulsed -Asia Minor in the eighth century. Lastly, the Medes, against whom the -Greeks waged three wars, are considered by Oppert,<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">25</a> owing to the -etymology of the name, to be of Turanian descent.</p> - -<p>In fact, the relations between the Turks and the Greeks and the -Byzantians are really most involved. We know to-day that some Turkish -elements, who were converted to the Greek Church long before the -Ottoman Turks embraced Islam, and whose origin is anterior by far to -the establishment of the Seljukian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, -faithfully served the Byzantine Empire from the fifth century -onwards, and were utilised by Justinian for the defence of the -Asiatic boundaries of the Empire—which were also the boundaries of -Christianity—against the attacks of Eastern nations.</p> - -<p>It is difficult to account for the sudden fervid enthusiasm of the -Allies for Greece. For two years she adhered to Constantine’s policy, -perpetrating many an act of treachery against both the Hellenic<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">163</a></span> people -and the Allies, repeatedly violating the Constitution guaranteed by the -Powers that had protected her, and slaughtering many French sailors; -and then, after her unfriendly conduct towards the Allies under cover -of a pro-German neutrality, she had very tardily sided with them. -It was surprising, therefore, that Greece, who had displayed her -pro-German feelings during a great part of the war, would probably -receive some of the most thoroughly Turkish territories of the Ottoman -Empire, though she never fought against that Empire even after she -had deposed King Alexander’s father, in spite of the deplorable -complaisance of some of the Allies.</p> - -<p>Finally, the very day after the occupation of Constantinople, General -Milne, who commanded the British troops of occupation, enjoined the -Salih Pasha Cabinet to resign under pretence that it no longer enjoyed -the Sovereign’s confidence. The Grand Vizier refused to comply with -the English general’s request, as the Government had the confidence of -the Chamber and the Sovereign need not apply to the commander of the -forces of occupation for permission to communicate with his Ministers. -After incarcerating a good many deputies, senators, and political men, -as has just been seen, the general gave the Grand Vizier to understand -that orders had been given for the arrest of the Ministers in case -they should attempt to go to their departments. In order to spare his -country another humiliation, Salih Pasha handed in his resignation to -the Sultan, who, following the advice of England, charged Damad Ferid -to form another Cabinet.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">164</a></span></p> - -<p>It requires all the reasons that have been previously given to enable -us to understand why England threatened and humbled Turkey to such -an extent—the only Power left in the East that could be a factor for -moderation and peace.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal never recognised the Damad Ferid Cabinet, and only -after the latter had resigned and Ali Riza Pasha had been appointed -Grand Vizier did he consent, in order to avoid another conflict -with the Sultan, to enter into negotiations with the Constantinople -Government. Salih Pasha was charged by the Minister to carry on the -negotiations with the Nationalists, and repaired to Amasia. There it -was agreed—first, that the National Organisation should be officially -recognised as a lawful power which was necessary to the defence of the -rights of the country, and should have full liberty of action side -by side with the Government; secondly, that the Cabinet should avoid -taking any decision sealing the fate of the country before Parliament -met; thirdly, that some appointments should be made in agreement with -the National Organisation, after which the latter should not interfere -in the administration of the country.</p> - -<p>Besides, as Mustafa Kemal said later on in a speech made before the -Angora Assembly, though the Sultan had been represented by some as -lacking energy, not maintaining the dignity of the Imperial throne, and -not being a patriot, yet the reason why he had fallen under English -tutelage was that he had seen no other means to save both the existence -of Turkey and his throne.</p> - -<p>The question whether Parliament should meet at<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">165</a></span> Constantinople or in -a province brought on a first disagreement between the Government and -Mustafa Kemal, who finally yielded. But, owing to the occupation of -Constantinople, Parliament soon found itself in a precarious condition, -and the National Organisation decided to hold its sittings at Angora.</p> - -<p>After all these events a deputy, Riza Nour, at the sitting of March 18, -1920, raised a protest against the occupation of Constantinople and -the incarceration of some members of Parliament by the Allies, which -measures were an insult to the dignity of the Turkish Parliament, and -a contravention of the constitutional laws and the law of nations. -This motion, carried unanimously by the Ottoman Chamber and signed -by the Vice-President, M. Hussein Kiazim—the President, for fear of -being prosecuted by the British authorities, having left his official -residence—was forwarded to the Allied and neutral Parliaments, and -the Ottoman Chamber adjourned <em>sine die</em> till it was possible for the -deputies to carry out their mandate safely.</p> - -<p>Ahmed Riza, former President of the Chamber and Senate of the Ottoman -Empire—who, after the failure of Damad Ferid’s mission to Paris, had -addressed an open letter to M. Clémenceau on July 17, 1919, almost -the anniversary day of the Constitution—joined in that protest and -commented upon the treatment some members of Parliament had undergone, -as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It is contrary to all parliamentary rights and principles -throughout the world and to the legal dispositions that guarantee -the inviolability and immunity of all members of the Turkish -Parliament to arrest representatives of the nation while they -are carrying out their mandate. So the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">166</a></span> armed Interference of -the foreigner with our Chamber cannot be in any way excused or -accounted for.</p> - -<p>“Such an arbitrary intrusion, especially on the part of England, -that is looked upon as the founder of the parliamentary system, -will bring everlasting shame to British civilisation.</p> - -<p>“After the illegal arrest of several of its members, the Turkish -Parliament adjourned <em>sine die</em>, as a token of protest, till the -deputies are able to carry out their mandate freely and safely.</p> - -<p>“A note communicated to the Press makes out that some deputies had -been returned under the pressure of the Nationalists and that, -as the Christian elements had had no share in the elections, the -session was illegal.</p> - -<p>“Now, it should be noticed that these elements abstained from -voting at the last elections of their own free will, and that since -the armistice no representative of the Christian communities has -taken an official part in the public functions in the Imperial -Palace. The Nationalist forces cannot be held responsible for this.</p> - -<p>“Neither is it the Nationalists’ fault if the French authorities in -Cilicia arbitrarily prevented the inhabitants of that district from -holding the parliamentary election, thus depriving the people of -their most sacred rights, and violating the terms of the armistice.</p> - -<p>“The acknowledgment of the validity of the mandates of the new -members by the unanimity of their colleagues, the official opening -of Parliament by the speech from the throne, the good wishes and -greetings of the Sultan to the deputies, bear witness that the -assembly legally represented the wishes of the nation and had the -Sovereign’s approbation.</p> - -<p>“Besides, these are strictly internal questions in which the -Allies’ interests are not at all concerned, and with which -foreigners have no right to interfere.</p> - -<p>“At such a solemn hour it would be an utter denial of justice if -the Ottoman deputies were not able to discuss the fundamental -stipulations of the intended Peace Treaty which is to seal the -future fate of their country.</p> - -<p>“Who is to examine the Peace Treaty to-day, and who is to -give its assent to it now the nation has been deprived of its -representatives?</p> - -<p>“Of what value will be a treaty thus worked out secretly, behind -closed doors, and concluded in such conditions? How can the -signature of the members of the Government be considered as binding -the nation? For the new Ministry does not yet represent the Ottoman -nation, since no motion of confidence<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">167</a></span> has hitherto been carried by -a chamber which does not sit; and so it cannot be looked upon as -being legally constituted.</p> - -<p>“Whatever may happen, the nation alone can decide its own fate. If, -at such a serious juncture, when its very existence is at stake, -it were not able to defend its own cause and its own rights freely -through the peaceful vote of its own mandatories, it would be -looked upon by the whole of mankind as the victim of most unfair -treatment, the responsibility of which will one day be determined -by history.”</p></div> - -<p>During Abdul Hamid’s reign Ahmed Riza had of his own will gone into -exile, and from Paris he had wielded great influence over the movement -that led to the revolution of 1908. But when the Young Turk Government -had practically become dictatorial and had yielded to the pressure -that drove it towards Germany, he realised that policy was a failure -and was leading the Empire to ruin; then, though he had been one of -the promoters of the movement, he protested repeatedly in the Senate, -of which he was a member, against the illegal doings of the Government -and its foolhardy policy. As President of the “National Block”—which, -though not a political party properly speaking, aimed at grouping all -the conservative constitutional elements friendly to the Entente—he -seemed likely to play an important part in public life again when, -about the middle of August, 1919, it was rumoured that the Damad Ferid -Government was about to take action against him and his political -friends; and soon after it was made known that he intended to go to -Italy or France till the reopening of the Ottoman Parliament. After -staying in Rome, where he had conversations with some political men of -note in order to establish an intellectual entente between Italians and -Turks, he settled in Paris.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">168</a></span></p> - -<p>The English censorship, which gagged the Turkish newspapers, went so -far as to prevent them from reprinting extracts from French newspapers -that were favourable to the Ottoman cause. It brought ridicule -upon itself by censuring the Bible; in an article in the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Univers -Israélite</cite>, reprinted by the <cite>Aurore</cite>, which quoted and commented on -three verses of chapter xix. of Isaiah, the censor cut off the first -of these verses, which may be interpreted as foreshadowing a League of -Nations, but in which he was afraid the reader might find a hint at a -connection between Egypt and Asia and at the claims of the Turkish and -Egyptian Nationalists. This is the verse, which any reader could easily -restore: “In that day shall there be a highway out of Egypt to Assyria, -and the Assyrian shall come into Egypt and the Egyptian into Assyria, -and the Egyptians shall serve with the Assyrians.”</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">21</span></a> Cf. the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Matin</cite>, June 17, 1920, an interview of M. -Paul Benazet, ex-chairman of the Committee of War Estimates; and the -<cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Œuvre</cite>, July 8, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">22</span></a> Cf. the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Matin</cite>, June 21, 1920, and M. Fribourg’s speech -in the second sitting of June 25, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">23</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Figaro</cite>, March 18, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">24</span></a> Radet, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Mermnades</cite> -(Paris, 1893).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">25</span></a> Oppert, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Peuple des Mèdes</cite>.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">169</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="VI">VI<br /> -<br /> -THE TREATY WITH TURKEY</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">In</span> the course of the debate on the foreign policy of England which -opened on Thursday, March 25, on the third reading of the Finance -Bill, Mr. Asquith, speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the -Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government should no longer hold -in Europe the political power that belonged to it before the war. He -urged, however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to Asia Minor, -where he would quite escape European control. He proposed, therefore, -that the Sultan should be, as it were, “vaticanised”—that is to say, he -should remain in Constantinople, but should only retain his spiritual -power as Caliph, as the Pope does in Rome.</p> - -<p>The Great Powers or the League of Nations would then be entrusted with -the political power in Constantinople, and if the Bosphorus or the -Dardanelles were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of the -Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended with any serious danger.</p> - -<p>As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the <em>status quo ante -bellum</em>. As the frontiers of that region were not quite definite, -sooner or later, he thought, if England remained there, she would be -driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">170</a></span> even the Caspian -Sea, and she had not adequate means for the present to do so. So it was -better for her to confine her action within the Basra zone.</p> - -<p>The Prime Minister, rising in response, first remarked that the cause -of the delays in the negotiations with Turkey and the settlement -of peace was that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the -decision of America, as to the share she intended to take in the -negotiations. He recalled that the Allies had hoped the United States -would not only assume the protection of Armenia properly speaking, -but of Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits of -Constantinople, and went on as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If we had not given time for America to make up her mind it -might have suspected the Allies wanted to take advantage of some -political difficulty to partition Turkey; and it is only when the -United States definitely stated she did not intend to take part in -the Conference that the Allies proceeded to take definite decisions -with regard to the Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the -Allies to make that explanation.”</p></div> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies had contemplated -maintaining only the spiritual power of the Sultan, but unfortunately -this scheme did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the -situation. For Constantinople had to be administered at the same -time, and it is easier to control the Sultan and his Ministers in -Constantinople than if they were relegated to Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which bore such bad fruits -in the course of the Peace Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not -to shut out the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion, added -that if it was proved that the Allies’ control<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">171</a></span> weakened the power of -the Sultan in Asia Minor, it would always be possible to consider the -question afresh—but he hoped that would not be necessary.</p> - -<p>As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribution of the mandates, -he declared:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If America had accepted the responsibility for controlling -Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the Sykes scheme, -had Cilicia assigned to their control, were quite willing to hand -it over to American control. The British, French, and Italians are -quite agreed on the subject, but we have not yet seen a sign. We -have only received telegrams from America, asking us to protect the -Armenians; we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the -responsibility.... We are hoping that France will undertake that -responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We have also -got our responsibility, but we cannot take too much upon our own -shoulders....</p> - -<p>“With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it -depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether they protect -their independence.... I am told that they could easily organise -an army of above 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment, we shall -be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the -assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain -there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to -assist in that respect.”<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">26</a></p></div> - -<p>Finally, with, respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd George urged “it would -be a mistake to give up Baghdad and Mosul.”</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure which we have -incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of -the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take -no responsibility for its development, would be an act of folly -quite indefensible.... They have been consulted about their wishes -in this respect, and I think, almost without exception, they are -anxious that we should stay here, though they are divided about the -kind of independent Government they would like....</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">172</a></span></p> - -<p>“We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the mandatory of -Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has not yet been signed. -It is only on the signing of that treaty that the question of -mandatories will be decided, but when that time comes we shall -certainly claim the right to be the mandatory power of Mesopotamia, -including Mosul.”</p></div> - -<p>In its leading article, <cite>The Times</cite>, criticising the attitude Mr. Lloyd -George had taken in the debate on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on -March 27:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Prime Minister made statements, about the future of -Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said that when -the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally decided, the -British Government would ‘claim the right’ to be the ‘mandatory -Power’ for Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul....</p> - -<p>“Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr. Lloyd George -himself has never grasped the full and dangerous significance of -the adventure he now advocates....</p> - -<p>“The Prime Minister’s reply conveyed the impression that he has -only the very haziest idea about what he proposes to do in this -region, which has been the grave of empires ever since written -history began.”</p></div> - -<p>After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate over Mesopotamia, -including the vilayet of Mosul, <cite>The Times</cite> thought, as had been -suggested by Mr. Asquith, that England should confine her direct -obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that it was only -incidentally and almost in spite of himself that Mr. Asquith had been -driven in 1915 to occupy the larger part of Mesopotamia.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Mr. Asquith says—and he is entirely right—that if we hold a line -in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall sooner or later -be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even to -the Caspian. His view is in complete accord with every lesson to -be derived from our history as an Empire. We have never drawn one -of these vague, unsatisfactory frontiers without being eventually -compelled to move<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">173</a></span> beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the -Middle East, and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops -are alike prohibitive factors.”<a name="FNanchor_27_27" id="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">27</a></p></div> - -<p>The next day, in a similar debate in the French Chamber, M. Millerand, -being asked to give information about the leading principles of the -French Government in the negotiations that were being carried on in -regard to the Turkish treaty, made the following statement, which did -not throw much light on the question:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to organise -a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose—this is the only -resolution that was made public and the only one that the British -Government disclosed in the House of Commons—for this purpose it -has seemed fit to maintain a Sultan in Constantinople.</p> - -<p>“The same principle implies that Turkey will include, together with -the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems, the economic outlets -without which she could not thrive.</p> - -<p>“In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has been -enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the influence she is -entitled to by the important moral and economic interests she owns -in Turkey.</p> - -<p>“This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause—the -war has proved it—viz., the freedom of the Straits, which must -necessarily be safeguarded by an international organisation. It is -also consistent with the respect of nationalities, in conformity -with which some compact ethnic groups who could not possibly -develop under Turkish sovereignty will become independent, and -other guarantees will be given for the protection of minorities.</p> - -<p>“We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests of the first -order. We do not intend that any of them should be belittled; we -want them to develop safely and fully in the future. We shall see -to it especially that the war expenditures of Turkey shall not -curtail the previous rights of French creditors.</p> - -<p>“In the districts where France owns special interests, these -interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">174</a></span> goes without -saying that the Government intends to base its claims on the -agreements already concluded with the Allies.”</p></div> - -<p>At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which M. Bellet asked -that the Eastern question should be definitely settled by putting an -end to Turkish sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail -revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million francs a month from -the English Government and as much from the French Government; he -wondered why he was considered such an important man, and demanded the -execution of the 1916 agreements, which gave us a free hand in Cilicia, -Syria, and the Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these -agreements, rose to say:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It is time we should have a policy in Syria and Cilicia. If we are -not there, who will be there? The 1916 agreements were inspired, -not only by the wish of safeguarding the great interests of France -and maintaining her influence in the Mediterranean, but also -because the best qualified representatives of the peoples of those -countries, who groaned under the Turkish yoke, entreated us not -to forsake them. And it is under these circumstances that in the -middle of the war, urging that a long-sighted policy always proves -the best, we insisted on the settlement of these questions.</p> - -<p>“Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus, of course, -included in the French zone.</p> - -<p>“Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in those -countries?</p> - -<p>“If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing lands; and -who shall deny that we need our share of the petroleum of the world?</p> - -<p>“As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there -to-morrow, who will take our place? Cilicia has cotton, and many -other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States in our place, -then shall we realise what we have lost, but it will be too late!</p> - -<p>“It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle there. -As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are foreseen look -greater than they are really; and some of these <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">175</a></span>difficulties may -have been put forward to dissuade us from going there.</p> - -<p>“It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are based on -our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friendships, and the -summons of the peoples that hold out their arms to us. The question -is whether they shall be countersigned by facts.</p> - -<p>“The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It is in -our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not among the -populations of that country at the time? If we had been there, the -Emir Feisal would have received his investiture from us by our -authority; instead of that, he was chosen by others. Who is to be -blamed for it?</p> - -<p>“Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples; if our -Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written treaties to -be respected, they will be respected.”</p></div> - -<p>Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed to him on March 12, -1920, to state his opinion about the draft of the Turkish settlement -worked out in London, and at the same time to appoint a plenipotentiary -to play a part in the final settlement. His answer was handed to M. -Jusserand, French ambassador, on March 24; he came to the conclusion -finally that Turkey should come to an end as a European Power.</p> - -<p>In this note President Wilson declared that though he fully valued the -arguments set forward for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he -thought that the arguments against the Turks, based on unimpeachable -considerations, were far superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled -that the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish sovereignty in -Europe was an anomalous thing that should come to an end.</p> - -<p>Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned to Turkey, he -thought they should follow the ethnographic boundaries of the Arabian -populations, unless<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">176</a></span> it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which -case the American Government would be pleased—though that did not -imply any criticism—to be told for what reasons new frontiers had been -proposed.</p> - -<p>Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would one day be allowed -to be represented in the International Council that was going to be -instituted for the government of Constantinople and the Straits, as -he felt sure that any arrangement would be stillborn that did not -recognise what he thought was a vital interest to Russia. For the same -reason he was pleased that the condition of the Straits in wartime had -not yet been settled, and was still under discussion; he thought no -decision should be taken without Russia giving her consent.</p> - -<p>Turning to the territorial question, he said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern Thrace -that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong to Greece, -with the exception of the northern part of this province; for the -latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian population, and so, for -the sake of justice and equity, the towns of Adrianople and Kirk -Kilisse, together with their surrounding areas, must be given to -Bulgaria. Not only are the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite -sound from an ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims -on this territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as -she had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by -thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that Serbia -might have a good strategic frontier.”</p></div> - -<p>He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia. He demanded for her -an outlet to the sea, and the possession of Trebizond. He went on thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“With regard to the question whether Turkey should give up her -rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands, -the American Government recommends the method resorted to in the -case of Austria—namely, that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">177</a></span> Turkey should place these provinces -in the hands of the Great Powers, who would decide on their fate.</p> - -<p>“As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified to express -an opinion, for the question is too important to be solved with the -limited information possessed by the Government.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, the President declared he did not think it necessary for his -ambassador to be present at the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he -insisted on being informed of the resolutions that would be taken.</p> - -<p>The <cite>Philadelphia Ledger</cite>, when this note was sent, commented on Mr. -Wilson’s opinion as to the Turkish problem, and especially the fate -of Constantinople, and did not disguise the fact that he favoured -the handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accordance with the -inter-Allied agreements of 1915, 1916, and 1917.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe, and the right -for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the Mediterranean to be -recognised. Thus, to a certain extent, Mr. Wilson will decide in -favour of the fulfilment of the secret promises made by the Allies -to Russia in the course of the war.</p> - -<p>“Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall, and -next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly longed for and -encouraged will come into being. It is calculated that if America -gives her support to Russia at this fateful juncture, Russia will -throw herself into the arms of America, and this understanding -between the two countries will be of immense importance.”</p></div> - -<p>After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and addressed to the -Porte a new collective note requesting the Ministry officially to -disown the Nationalist movement, affairs were very difficult for some -time. As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet’s answer to their note -was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">178</a></span> of the English, French, and -Italian commissioners on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the -Ottoman Premier.</p> - -<p>Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English, who made it -impossible for it to govern the country, the Ministry resigned. The -English required that the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad -Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely.</p> - -<p>Indeed, a secret agreement had already been concluded, on September -12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf -of Great Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the Imperial -Ottoman Government. The existence of this agreement was questioned at -the time, and was even officially denied in the <cite>Stambul Journal</cite>, -April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange of signatures -between them. According to this agreement,<a name="FNanchor_28_28" id="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">28</a> the Sultan practically -acquiesced in the control of Great Britain over Turkey within the -limits fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople remained the seat -of the Caliphate, but the Straits were to be under British control. The -Sultan was to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on behalf of -Great Britain, to support British rule in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the -other zones of British influence, not to object to the creation of an -independent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over Egypt and Cyprus.</p> - -<p>Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-operation of the party of the -Liberal Entente. If the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">179</a></span> information given by the Press is reliable, -it seems that the composition of the new Cabinet was endangered at the -last moment through the opposition of one of the Allied Powers; yet it -was constituted at last.</p> - -<p>The members of the new Cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, who -was both Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, were: Abdullah Effendi, -Sheik-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an opponent of the Union -and Progress Committee, who was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed -Said Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provisionally Minister of -War. The last-named Ministry had been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, -son of the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the Committee of -Union and Progress in 1912, was dismissed from the army in 1914 by -Enver, and was ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of the -war; but he refused this post, and also handed in his resignation as a -member of the Paris delegation; so the Grand Vizier became War Minister -too. The Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey, one of -the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to negotiate the peace with Italy. -Dr. Jemil Pasha, who had once been prefect of Constantinople, became -Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister of Commerce.</p> - -<p>The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on Monday, April 5, in -the afternoon, with the usual ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as -follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha, -considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust -to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah Bey -Sheik-ul-Islam.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">180</a></span></p> - -<p>“The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under the name of -nationalism, are endangering our political situation, which ever -since the armistice had been gradually improving.</p> - -<p>“The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this movement have -proved useless. Considering the recent events and the persistence -of this state of rebellion, which may give rise to the worst evils, -it is now our deliberate wish that all those who have organised -and still support these disturbances shall be dealt with according -to the rigour of the law; but, on the other hand, we want a free -pardon to be granted to all those who, having been led astray, -have joined and shared in the rebellion. Let quick and energetic -measures be taken in order to restore order and security throughout -our Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly -prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and the -throne.</p> - -<p>“It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour to -establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great Allied -Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and the nation, -founding them on the principles of righteousness and justice. Do -your utmost to obtain more lenient conditions of peace, to bring -about a speedy conclusion of peace, and to alleviate the public -distress by resorting to all adequate financial and economic -measures.”</p></div> - -<p>The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish people denounced -the promoters and instigators of the Nationalist movement, and called -upon all Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the “rebels.”</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree condemning the Nationalist -movement, pointing out to Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country -ran on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration of friendly -relations between Turkey and the Allies, and warning the leaders of -the movement that harsh measures would be taken against them. The -Ottoman Government, in a proclamation to the population—which had -no effect, for most of the Turks thought it was dictated by foreign -Powers—denounced<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">181</a></span> all the leaders and supporters of the Nationalist -movement as guilty of high treason against the nation. The proclamation -stated:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still more -eager to save the nation, which is running into great danger. So -it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures against those -who might refuse to go back to their duty according to the high -prescriptions of the Sherif, as is ordered by the Imperial rescript.</p> - -<p>“With this view, the Government proclaims:</p> - -<p>“First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his act, -has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or misleading -instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the insurrectionist -movement, gives tokens of repentance within a week and declares his -loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy the benefit of the Imperial -pardon.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the movements, -together with whosoever shall continue to support them, shall be -punished according to the law and the Sherif’s orders.</p> - -<p>“Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any act of cruelty -or misdemeanour to be committed in any part of the Empire either -by the Moslem population against other elements, or by non-Moslem -subjects against the Moslem population. So it proclaims that -whosoever shall commit such acts, or countenance them, or be party -to them, shall be severely punished individually.”</p></div> - -<p>A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia in order to call upon -Mustafa Kemal to give up his hostility to the Entente and lay down arms -with the least delay.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the Government decided to send some delegates in order to -make inquiries and point out to the leaders of the Nationalist movement -the dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and open rebellion.</p> - -<p>The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp of the War -Minister, and an Allied superior officer.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">182</a></span> Another delegation was to -consist of members of Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey, -member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi; Abdulla Azmi Bey, -member for Kutahia; and Riza Nuri, member for Sinope, the very man -who had brought in a motion against the occupation of Constantinople -and the arrest of some members of the Ottoman Parliament, and who was -credited with having said: “Anatolia has a false conception of the -occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give clear explanations -of the seriousness of the situation in order to avoid disastrous -consequences. We are going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government -about the interests of the nation.”</p> - -<p>An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of the Chamber, and the -members before whom it was read left the Chamber quietly.</p> - -<p>But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet no longer -represented the country, and that in the mind of most Turks it could -no longer express or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose -hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner’s threat, were -given to the Nationalist movement.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist movement had at the -outset co-operated with some questionable elements and had been mixed -up with the intrigues of the former members of the Committee of Union -and Progress. But it now became impossible, in order to belittle it, -to look down upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement. In -consequence of the successive events that had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">183</a></span> taken place since the -armistice and of the attitude of the Allies, especially England, after -the occupation of Constantinople, carried out under British pressure -with the approbation of the French Government notwithstanding the -protest of the French Press, and in view of the provisions that were -likely to be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism, which -could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and meant to maintain her -traditional rights, had tacitly joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa -Kemal, who, at the very outset, had been a member of the Committee of -Union and Progress, had soon disagreed with Enver, and it should be -borne in mind that he was his enemy during the greater part of the war, -as he was an opponent of the German Marshal Falkenhayn. Some people -have tried to make out there was only personal enmity between them, and -have denied the possibility of political opposition; but the very fact -that their enmity would have ruined any common political designs they -might have had proves there were no such designs.</p> - -<p>So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved by the measures mentioned -in the manifesto issued by the Government under pressure of the foreign -occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by recent events.</p> - -<p>At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the Sultan that, in -consequence of the occupation of Constantinople, he broke off all -connection with the central Government, which henceforth was quite -under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to the Mussulmans, he -declared it was necessary to form a new independent Ottoman State in -Anatolia and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">184</a></span> to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason he -gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked upon as Caliph, -for it is a fundamental principle of Islam that the Caliph must -be an independent Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of -Constantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of action. In that -appeal, which was not intended for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis, -Morocco, and Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain alone, -he regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a new crusade against -Islam.</p> - -<p>According to news from Nationalist sources, Mustafa Kemal formed a -Cabinet, in which he was War Minister of the new Anatolian Government.</p> - -<p>It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy of Anatolia and -nahib—<em>i.e.</em>, the Sultan’s representative in Anatolia—Prince Jemal ed -Din, a member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince Shevket -Effendi, and general inspector of the recruiting service; but the -official circles of Constantinople never believed that the prince had -allowed him to use his name.</p> - -<p>At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly elected, which he -intended to convene at Angora. This assembly consisted of the members -of Parliament who had been able to escape from Constantinople and of -deputies chosen by delegated electors and met on April 23 at Angora, -where all sorts of people had come from quite different regions: -Constantinople, Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National Assembly of -Angora meant to be looked upon as a Constituent Assembly, and strove -to introduce wide reforms into the administrative and financial<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">185</a></span> -organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather large committee, which -styled itself the Government Council, and it included General Mustafa -Kemal, Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-President, and -Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second Vice-President, etc.</p> - -<p>The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora when the -Great National Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa Kemal -Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior; -General Feizi Pasha, National Defence; General Ismail Fazil Pasha, -Public Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy; Hakki Behij Bey, -Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of -Staff.</p> - -<p>The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the National movement, and -owing to his prestige had influenced public opinion in favour of this -movement, was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-ul-Islam; -religious affairs were entrusted to a member of a Muslim brotherhood -belonging to the National Assembly.</p> - -<p>According to the information it was possible to obtain, the political -line of conduct adopted by the Nationalists was not only to organise -armed resistance, but also to carry on a strong political and religious -propaganda, both in Turkey and in foreign countries.</p> - -<p>No official letter from Constantinople was to be opened by the -functionaries, who, if they obeyed the Constantinople Government, -were liable to capital punishment. The religious authorities in the -provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brotherhoods<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">186</a></span> were called -upon to protest against the <em>fetva</em> by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of -Constantinople had anathematised the Nationalists.</p> - -<p>But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was how to raise money.</p> - -<p>On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal addressed to M. -Millerand the following letter, in which he vehemently protested -against the occupation of Constantinople and laid down the claims of -the Ottoman people:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing -to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied -troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with -his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held, -and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first -sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present -and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her -Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of -foreigners.</p> - -<p>“The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour to charge me to -bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of -its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms -of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people -in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not -long ago our Parliament—though a Parliament has always been looked -upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in -the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were -wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like -evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic protest of the Parliament; -many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters, was arrested at -his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public -and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had -become right.</p> - -<p>“Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been -violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its -representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive -Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which -Council has taken in hand the government of the country.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">187</a></span> -<p>“I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desiderata -of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29, -1920.</p> - -<p>“First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanry, -together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked -upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all -orders and <em>fetvas</em> issued from Constantinople, so long as it -is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all -engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government -are looked upon by the nation as null and void.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and -composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries-old rights -as a free, independent State. It expresses its wish to conclude a -fair, honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have -the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.</p> - -<p>“Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign -elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the -nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the -general security of the country.</p> - -<p>“Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will meet with a -favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance -of the deep respect with which I have the honour to be Your -Excellency’s most humble, most obedient servant.”</p></div> - -<p>On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met on April 18, 1920, -Ahmed Riza Bey, ex-President of the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman -Empire, who kept a keen lookout on the events that were about to seal -the fate of his country, though he had been exiled by the Damad Ferid -Ministry, addressed another letter to the President of the Conference, -in which he said;</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and democracy, -acknowledge a peace that would lower them to the level of an -inferior race and would treat them worse than the Hungarians -or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively small territories, -whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled. We want to be treated -as a vanquished people, not as an inferior people or a people -in tutelage. The victors may have a right to take from us the -territories they conquered by force<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">188</a></span> of arms; they have no right to -intrude into our home affairs. The Turkish people will willingly -grant concessions of mines and public works to the foreigners who -offer it the most profitable conditions; but it will never allow -the arbitrary partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches -at the expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral; it is all the -more unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war is -comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-Germany and -Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and atrocities against Armenia -and Greece which the Turks are charged with, we deny them earnestly -and indignantly. Let a mixed international commission be formed, -and sent to hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge -ourselves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has -proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon all -charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies.</p> - -<p>“The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919, addressed to -the High Commissioners an official note requesting that neutral -States should appoint delegates charged to inquire into facts and -establish responsibilities; but the request of the Ottoman Cabinet -has hitherto been in vain, as well as that of the League for -National Ottoman Unity made on March 17 of the same year.</p> - -<p>“Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry -assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty brought -against the Turks were unfounded, should induce the Allies, in the -name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the massacres supposed to -have taken place in Cilicia and elsewhere.</p> - -<p>“I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is not -couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider that when -the life and rights of his nation are so grievously endangered it -is most difficult for a patriot to keep his thoughts and feelings -under control.”</p></div> - -<p>As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference, which seemed to have -come to an agreement about the main lines of the treaty to be submitted -to Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this treaty, decided to -summon the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to Paris on May 10.</p> - -<p>In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as president of the -San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">189</a></span> Bey, formerly Ottoman minister -plenipotentiary to Russia, now living in Rome, wrote:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire it has -been asserted that the Turks are not able to administer a large -country inhabited by various races, and they have been especially -charged with hating and oppressing the Christian element. But a -history extending over ten centuries at least plainly shows, by -innumerable facts and truths, the absurdity of such assertions.</p> - -<p>“If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts for the -last 130 years, has not been able to reform and renovate itself -as the other States have done, that is because, in addition to a -thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for the last two -centuries, either the power or the peacefulness that would have -been necessary to bring such a protracted task to a successful end; -for every ten, fifteen, or twenty years, it has been attacked by -its neighbours, and the events of the last twelve years testify -still more forcibly than any others to the fact that any step taken -by the Turks on the way to progress—in the European sense of the -word—was not only resented, but even violently opposed by their -merciless enemies.</p> - -<p>“As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are supposed to -have endured in the Empire, let us merely consider that, whereas in -Europe the Christians mutually slaughtered each other mercilessly -and unceasingly in the name of their sacred Faith, and the -unfortunate Jews were cruelly driven away and tortured in the name -of the same Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a -thousand years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only -tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large, -powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restriction, -under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all possibilities -to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the expense of the -ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal hospitality to many -wretched people banished from Christian Europe.</p> - -<p>“To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays an -iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace and -Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance, and give a -strict account of her home policy towards the non-Greek elements, -especially concerning the condition and fate of the 300,000 Turks -who, before 1883, peopled the wide, fertile plains of Thessaly, -of the hundreds of thousands of Moslem Albanians, subjects of -the Empire, of the 150,000 <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">190</a></span>Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000 -Moslems in Macedonia, whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under -her dominion?</p> - -<p>“I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which will be -an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the victorious Powers -know a great deal more—after the inter-Allied inquiry held four -months ago in Smyrna—about the ‘gentle and fatherly’ manner in -which thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and exterminated by -the descendants of the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded -that essentially Turkish province during the armistice under -pretence of restoring order.”</p></div> - -<p>And after recalling the figures of the various elements of the -population of the Turkish Empire after the 1914 statistics, he -concluded:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful events -that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman land since the -armistice raise only too much horror. So the Turkish people most -proudly and serenely awaits the righteous, humane, and equitable -sanction of the victorious Powers that have assumed before history -the heavy responsibility of placing the whole world on a lasting -basis of justice, concord, and peace.</p> - -<p>“God grant they may choose the best way, the only way, that will -lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged themselves to do, -the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of the Ottoman nation -and its Sultan, who is, at the same time, the supreme head of the -350 million Mussulmans throughout the world.”</p></div> - -<p>On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian Caliphate delegation -addressed a note to the president of the Allied Supreme Council at -San Remo, to the English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the -Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed up their mandate with the -Allied and Associated Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had -previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course of the interview -mentioned previously.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the vast majority -of their co-religionists throughout the world,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">191</a></span> ask that, inasmuch -as independent temporal sovereignty, with its concomitants of -adequate military and economic resources, is of the essence of -the institution of the Khilafat, the Empire of the Khalifa shall -not be dismembered under any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is -recognised by the vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what -is desired is that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be -maintained intact territorially on the basis of the <em>status quo -ante bellum</em>, but without prejudice to such political changes as -give all necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and -independence of the sovereign State for the security of life and -property, and opportunities of full autonomous development for -all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, -comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no account is a Muslim -majority to be placed under the rule of a non-Muslim minority -contrary to the principle of self-determination. In behalf of this -claim, the delegation draw the attention of the Supreme Council -to the declaration of the British Prime Minister, equally binding -on all the Allied and Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918, -he said: ‘Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, -or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which -are predominantly Turkish in race,’ and to President Wilson’s -twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1918, -on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was concluded, and -which required ‘that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman -Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty; that the other -nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured security of -life and autonomous development.’ The delegation submit that any -departure from the pledges and principles set forth above would be -regarded by the people of India, and the Muslim world generally, -as a breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar -assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were induced -to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of the Allied -cause.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious -obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known as the -Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ which includes, besides -the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, shall -continue to be, as heretofore for the last 1,300 years, under -exclusively Muslim control, and that the Khalifa shall similarly -continue to be the Warden and Custodian of the Holy Places and -Holy Shrines of Islam—namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef, -Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the -Jazirat-ul-Arab.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">192</a></span></p> - -<p>Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by the -inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or form, -whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct violation of -the most binding religious injunctions of Islam and the deepest -sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and would, therefore, be -utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans of India and the rest of -the Indian community. In this connection, apart from the religious -obligations to which we refer, the delegation would draw the -attention of the Supreme Council to the proclamation issued by -the Government of India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s -Government, as also the Governments of France and Russia, on -November 2, 1914, in which it was specifically declared that ‘no -question of a religious character was involved’ in this war, and it -was further categorically promised that ‘the Holy Places of Arabia, -including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda, -will be immune from attack or molestation.’”</p></div> - -<p>After pointing out that these were the lowest possible claims the -Mussulmans could set forth, the note went on as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted to the British -Government that a Turkish settlement made in disregard of their -religious obligations, on respect for which their loyalty has -always been strictly conditional, would be regarded by Indian -Mussulmans as incompatible with their allegiance to the British -Crown. This is a contingency which the Mussulmans of India, in -common with all their compatriots, constituting a population of -over three hundred millions, naturally view with the keenest -apprehension and anxiety, and are most earnestly desirous of -preventing by every means in their power. We believe that the -British Government, at any rate, is fully apprised of the range -and intensity of public feeling that has been aroused in India -on this question, and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply -stating here that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented -demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on March 19 -last, the day when the delegation was received by the British Prime -Minister, all business was suspended throughout the continent -of India by Mussulmans and Hindus alike, as a reminder and -reaffirmation of the Muslim case in respect of the future of the -Khilafat. This unprecedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a -loss of millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely -with the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned -with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">193</a></span> -question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal -representations which the Mussulmans of India have put forward -on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by their Faith, a -settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would be destructive of the -very essentials of the Khilafat, a situation would arise in which -it would be futile to expect peace and harmony to prevail in India -and the Muslim world.</p> - -<p>“The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly to -urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of endeavouring to -achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire which would -be in consonance with the most binding religious obligations and -overwhelming sentiments of so large and important a section of the -world community.”</p></div> - -<p>As a consequence of what has just been said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that the Supreme -Council will defer taking any final decisions on this question -in order to afford to them an opportunity, such as they have -repeatedly applied for, of laying their case before the Council. -In answer to our request to be allowed to appear before the -Supreme Council, the British Secretary to the Council intimated to -us that only the accredited Governments of the territories with -whose future the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear -before it, and that at the request of the British Government the -official delegation of India had already been heard. But we have -already represented that the Turkish settlement, involving as it -does the question on the Khilafat, in the preservation of which -the Mussulmans of the world are so vitally interested, does not -obviously seem to be a question on which the Peace Conference -should hear only the Governments of territories with whose future -they are dealing. In fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the -future of the Khilafat, which is the most essential institution -of Islam, transcends in importance the interests of the various -Governments that are being set up in different parts of the -Khilafat territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical -objection will be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice and -securing peace.” -</p></div> - -<p>And, finally, the note concluded:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“With reference to the official delegation of India, which the -Supreme Council has already heard, the Indian Khilafat delegation -would invite the attention of the Council to the fact that, so far -at least, the State and the nation are not one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">194</a></span> in India, and the -delegation submit that a nation numbering more than 315 millions of -people is entitled to a hearing before a final decision is taken -on a question that has incontestably acquired a national status. -The delegation hope that they may, without may disrespect to the -members comprising the official delegation of India, also refer to -the fact that no Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation -in spite of Muslim protest.”</p></div> - -<p>In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the Indian Caliphate -delegation, after the reply made to them by the British secretary of -the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 20, expressed their deep -regret that—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of delegations -representing at best microscopic populations inhabiting meagre -areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which was not at war -with Turkey, to take part in the discussions relating to the -Turkish settlement, should have ignored the claims of a nation -numbering more than 315 millions of people inhabiting the vast -sub-continent of India even to a hearing, and should have denied -the right of several hundred millions more in the rest of the -world professing the Muslim Faith to express their views on the -question involving the disintegration of the Khilafat. In the name -of our compatriots and co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty -once more to point out to the Government of Great Britain and to -her Allies, that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and -tranquillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming -national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen the -value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian people, -is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few persons, -however exalted and eminent, who are now settling the fate of Islam -behind closed doors, a contemptuous disregard of the most binding -and solemn religious obligations imposed on the Muslims by their -Faith.”</p></div> - -<p>The delegation did not conceal their disappointment at the way they had -been received by the Allied representatives and the little attention -paid to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had viewed the -Ottoman question from a lofty standpoint,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">195</a></span> and had brought forward -powerful arguments in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation -were setting forth the Turkish claims before the Peace Conference, the -Press, public opinion, and political circles which had been influenced -in some degree by the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy for -Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference seemed likely to assume -a more favourable attitude towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this -case as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it had received, -kept to its first resolutions, though everything seemed to invite it to -modify them.</p> - -<p>On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in Paris. It comprised the -former Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior; -Fakhr ed Din Bey, Minister of Public Education; and Dr. Jemil Pasha, -Minister of Public Works, accompanied by seventeen advisers and five -secretaries.</p> - -<p>On the previous Thursday, before they left Constantinople, the Sultan -had received the delegates, and had a long conversation with each of -them.</p> - -<p>The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates on the expected -date, May 11.</p> - -<p>We refer the reader to this document, which contains thirteen chapters; -some of the most important provisions are so laboriously worded that -they may give rise to various interpretations, and it is impossible to -sum them up accurately.</p> - -<p>Several clauses of that draft called forth many objections, and we -shall only deal with the most important ones.</p> - -<p>The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish vilayet of Adrianople -or Eastern Thrace—that is to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">196</a></span> say, the territory which includes -Adrianople, the second town and former capital of the Ottoman Empire, -and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror. It only left to European -Turkey a mere strip of land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja -lines. Besides, this region is entirely included in the “Zone of the -Straits” to be controlled by a Commission of the Powers which includes -Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself.</p> - -<p>Now, according to the official census of March, 1914, the Adrianople -vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse, Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a -population of 360,400 Turks—<em>i.e.</em>, 57 per cent. of the inhabitants—as -against 224,680 Greeks, or 35·5 per cent., and 19,888 Armenians. -In addition, though in Eastern Thrace the Moslem populations are -mingled with numerous Greek elements, the majority of the people are -Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of Thrace, 455,000 are -Mussulmans.</p> - -<p>It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number of the Greeks in that -vilayet emigrated into Macedonia, where they were replaced by the -Mussulmans expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of the -162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek Patriarch, 88,000 are -Gagavous—that is to say, are of Turkish descent and speak Turkish.</p> - -<p>Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make up the total area of -the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000 acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem -hands, and the Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres.</p> - -<p>The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which is no longer under -Turkish sovereignty, rises to 362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against -86,000 Greeks,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">197</a></span> or 16·5 per cent., and if the figures representing the -Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are counted, we get a total -number of 700,000 Mussulmans—<em>i.e.</em>, 62·6 per cent.—against 310,000 -Greeks, or 26 per cent.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to Turkey the possession of -that region on January 5, 1918, when he had solemnly declared: “Nor -are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and -renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly -Turkish in race,” and he had repeated this pledge in his speech of -February 25, 1920.</p> - -<p>Yet a month after he declared to the Indian Caliphate delegation, as -has been seen above, that the Turkish population in Thrace was in a -considerable minority, and so Thrace should be taken away from Turkish -rule. If such was the case, it would have been logical to take from -Turkey the whole of Thrace.</p> - -<p>As the Indian delegation inquired at once on what figures the Prime -Minister based his Statements he answered:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures -at the present moment, partly because all censuses taken since -about the beginning of the century are open to suspicion from -racial prejudice, and partly because of the policy of expulsion -and deportation pursued by the Turkish Government both during -and before the war. For instance, apart from the Greeks who were -evicted during the Balkan wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported -into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars, -while about 100,000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish -Thrace. These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But -after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best -estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">198</a></span> -population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313,000 Greeks and -225,000 Turks.... This is confirmed by the study of the Turkish -official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before the -Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to races -in these parts became open to suspicion. According to these -statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the part of -Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of Neuilly was: -Greeks, 304,500: Mussulmans, 265,300; Bulgarians, 72,500.”</p></div> - -<p>On receipt of this communication, the delegation naturally asked to -what region the Greeks “who were evicted during the Balkan wars” -had migrated, and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office -estimates, “counter-migration of Turks had taken place into what is -the present Turkish Thrace,” when Macedonia was made, on the authority -of Englishmen themselves, “an empty egg-shell” and when the Greeks and -Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks in the occupied territories, -to make a “Turkish question” within the newly extended boundaries of -Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of the Turkish population -driven away from Macedonia should settle down in the Turkish territory -conterminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did.</p> - -<p>With regard to the “100,000” Greeks “deported into Anatolia from -Turkish Thrace during the course of these wars,” and the “100,000 -driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace,” the delegation asked -to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been taken, and to what -extent this deportation had affected the proportion of Turkish and -Greek populations in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly be -unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly Greek by including -in its Greek population figures of Greek deportees who had already -served to swell the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">199</a></span> figures of the Greek population in Anatolia. -Under such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime Minister -considered as reliable on January 5, 1918, had been discarded since -and as the figures of a quarter of a century ago were evidently open -to discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme Council should -be given a complete set of figures for every vilayet, and if possible -for every sanjak or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914. But -the Prime Minister’s secretary merely answered that it was impossible -to enter into a discussion “on the vexed question of the population -statistics in these areas.”</p> - -<p>As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that, though there is an -important Greek colony at Smyrna, all the region nevertheless is -essentially Turkish. The figures provided by the Turkish Government, -those of the French Yellow Book, and those given by Vital Cuinet agree -on this point.</p> - -<p>According to the French Yellow Book, the total population of the -vilayet included 78·05 per cent. Turks against 14·9 per cent. Greeks.</p> - -<p>M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417 inhabitants -(971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and for the town of Smyrna 96,250 -Turks against 57,000 Greeks.</p> - -<p>According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914 the town of -Smyrna, where the Greek population had increased, had 111,486 Turks -against 87,497 Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097 -Greeks—<em>i.e.</em>, 18 per cent.—against 1,249,067 Turks, or 77 per cent., -and 20,766 Armenians.</p> - -<p>From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">200</a></span> we should deduct -the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who were expelled from the vilayet, by way -of reprisal after the events of Macedonia in January to June, 1914. The -latter, according to the agreement between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish -minister at Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under the same -head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna who were to be exchanged for -the Mussulmans of Macedonia.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George’s secretary, whom the Indian delegation also asked, in -reference to Smyrna, on what figures he based his statements, answered -on behalf of the Prime Minister:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according to the -American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and impartial, -give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussulmans, 325,000; -Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These figures only relate -to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are other kazas in the -neighbourhood which also show a majority of Greeks.”</p></div> - -<p>Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the sanjak of Smyrna -had, before the war, 377,000 Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks, -while during the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the -Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the kazas of Urla, -Shesmeh, Phocœa, and Kara-Burun in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there -Greek majorities; but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin, -or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. Moreover, the Greek -minority is important only in the kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin; -everywhere else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in -two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent.</p> - -<p>The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">201</a></span> independent State, and -the President of the United States is to arbitrate on the question of -the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of -Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Now, though everybody—including -the Turks—acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to form -an Armenian State, yet when we consider the nature of the population -of these vilayets, we cannot help feeling anxious at the condition of -things brought about by this decision.</p> - -<p>As a matter of fact, in Erzerum there are 673,000 Mussulmans, -constituting 82·5 per cent. of the population, as against 136,000 -Armenians, or 16·5 per cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number -921,000, or 82 per cent. of the population, as against 40,000 -Armenians, or 23·5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van the Muslim -population is 179,000, or 69 per cent., and the Armenian population -67,000, or 26 per cent. In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or -70·5 per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting 27 per cent. -Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussulmans number 2,083,000, and the -Armenians 362,000, the average being 80 per cent. against 13 per cent.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that Turkey has -persistently colonised these territories. The only fact that might -countenance such an assertion is that at various times, especially -after the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in that part of the -Empire, and that in 1864, and again in 1878, Circassians, escaping from -the Russian yoke, took refuge there after defending their country. -The number of the families that immigrated is estimated about 70,000. -Turkey encouraged them<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">202</a></span> to settle down there all the more willingly as -they were a safeguard to her against the constant threat of Russia. But -as early as 1514, at the time of the Turkish conquest, the Armenians -were inferior in number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure that -repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native population northwards -and westwards, and because some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish, -and Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country. In 1643 Abas -Schah, after his victorious campaign against Turkey, drove away nearly -100,000 Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians emigrated -into Russia of their own free will after the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in -1828.</p> - -<p>It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came into existence in -the second century before Christ. It consisted of two independent -States, Armenia Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of Tigrane, -King of Armenia Major, defeated by the Romans, Rome and Persia fought -for the possession of those regions, and, finally, divided them. -Later on there were various Armenian States, which were more or less -independent, but none of them lasted long except the State of Armenia -Minor, which lasted from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till -Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs, the Persians, the -Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines had already brought the Armenian -dominion to an end.</p> - -<p>Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans in Armenia has not -been obtained or maintained, as has been alleged, by the “Turkish -massacres”; it is the outcome of more complex causes—which, of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">203</a></span> course, -is no excuse for the tragic events that took place there. As the -Conference did not seem to pay any attention either to the figures of -M. Vital Cuinet (<cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Turquie d’Asie</cite>, Paris, 1892), or to the figures -published by the French Government in the Yellow Book of 1897, based -upon the data furnished by the Christian Patriarchates, or to the -figures given by General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society -(<cite>Zapiski</cite>, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delegation asked -that a report should be drawn up by a mixed Moslem and non-Moslem -Commission, consisting of men whose integrity and ability were -recognised by their co-religionists; but this suggestion met with no -better success than the international inquiry already suggested by the -delegation in regard to the population of every vilayet in Thrace.</p> - -<p>The chapter dealing with the protection of minorities plainly shows how -much influence the aforesaid Protestant Anglo-American movement had on -the wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous treaties are -included such stipulations as those contained in the Turkish treaty, -and there is a great difference in this respect between the Bulgarian -treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under the term “minority,” -only considers the condition of the Christians, and ensures to them -privileges and power in every respect over the Mussulmans.</p> - -<p>As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne remarked -in its critical examination of the treaty:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience and religion -is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality and order, this -clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">204</a></span></p> - -<p>The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any religious -creed shall be punished in the same way; in the Bulgarian treaty -this clause is omitted, for here it would imply the protection of a -non-Christian religion.”</p></div> - -<p>In regard to Article 139, that “Turkey renounces formally all right of -suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject -to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State,” the Indian -Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter addressed to Mr. -Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ‘rights of -suzerainty or jurisdiction’ over Mussulmans who am not her -subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of Turkey, as -Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as he holds that -office, his very considerable ‘jurisdiction’ over Muslims who are -’subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State.’ -The law of Islam clearly prescribes the character and extent of the -‘jurisdiction’ pertaining to the office of Khalifa, and we cannot -but protest most emphatically against this indirect, but none the -less palpable, attempt on the part of Great Britain and her allies -to force on the Khalifa a surrender of such ‘jurisdiction,’ which -must involve the abdication of the Khalifa.”</p></div> - -<p>The delegation also considered that Article 131, which lays down -that “Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges, which, -under the treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the -Sultan in Libya,” infringes “rights pertaining to the Sultan as -Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded and reserved under the -said treaty of Lausanne.” It also expressed its surprise that “this -categorical and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith, supported -as it is by the unbroken practice of over thirteen hundred years, was -totally disregarded by Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read -in conjunction with Articles 22 and 132,” which cannot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">205</a></span> admit of any -non-Muslim sovereignty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria, -Palestine, and Mesopotamia.</p> - -<p>Referring again to the objection the British Prime Minister pretended -to base on the proclamation of the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and -on the Arabs’ request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian -Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered Mr. Lloyd George, who -had asked them in the course of his reception “whether they were to -remain under Turkish domination merely because they were Mohammedans”:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We would take the liberty to remind you that if the Arabs, who are -an overwhelmingly large majority in these regions, have claimed -independence, they have clearly claimed it free from the incubus -of so-called mandates, and their claim to be freed from Turkish -dominion is not in any way a claim to be subjected to the ‘advice -and assistance’ of a mandatory of the principal Allied Powers. -If the principle of self-determination is to be applied at all, -it must be applied regardless of the wishes and interests of -foreign Powers covetously seeking to exploit regions and peoples -exposed to the danger of foreign domination on account of their -unprotected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally -declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates nor any -other form of political or economic control; and the delegation, -while reiterating their view that an amicable adjustment of Arab -and Turkish claims by the Muslims themselves in accordance with -Islamic law is perfectly feasible, must support the Arab demand for -complete freedom from the control of mandatories appointed by the -Allies.</p> - -<p>“With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires Turkey not -only to recognise it as a free and independent State, but to -renounce all rights and titles there, and Article 99, which makes -no mention of the rights and prerogatives of the Khalifa as Servant -of the Holy Places, are, and must ever be, equally unacceptable to -the Muslim world.”</p></div> - -<p>On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the Eastern question are -closely connected and have assumed still more importance owing to the -Zionist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">206</a></span> movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns the Jews in the -highest degree.</p> - -<p>It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism has been gradually -smothered by Turkish sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire has proved most -hospitable to the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and that -for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both tolerance and security, -and have even prospered in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like -the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old Ottoman Empire, when, -following the precedent of Salonika, they see Greece annex the region -of Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to ask whether Greece, -carried away by a wild imperialism, will not yield to her nationalist -feeling and revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the -Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece to take no -action to make the Jews regret the past; but as the Greek anti-Semitic -feeling is rather economic than religious in character, it is to be -feared that the competition of the two races in the commercial struggle -will keep up that feeling. The annexation of Thrace would probably -concern 20,000 Jews—13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at -Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica, etc. Great Britain -having received a mandate for Palestine—that is to say, virtually a -protectorate—on the condition of establishing “a national home for the -Jews”—whatever the various opinions of the Jews with regard to Zionism -may be—a question is now opened and an experiment is to be tried which -concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with Judaism.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">207</a></span></p> - -<p>In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George of the Indian -Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed Ali told the British Prime Minister -in regard to the Jewish claims in Palestine:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to the Jewish -community, and I think Islam can look back with justifiable pride -on its treatment of this community in the past. No aspiration of -the Jewish community which is reasonable can be incompatible with -Muslim control of the Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman -Government will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such -aspirations of theirs as are reasonable.</p> - -<p>“Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement, with whom -I have had conversations, frankly admit: ‘We do not want political -sovereignty there; we want a home; the details can be arranged and -discussed.’ I asked them: ‘Do you mean that Great Britain herself -should be the sovereign Power there, or should be the mandatory?’ -and they said: ‘No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking -reasonable guarantee that opportunities of autonomous development -would be allowed to us.’ We, ourselves, who have been living in -India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of Faiths. I -think the Indian nationality, which is being built up to-day, will -probably be one of the first examples in the world of a Federation -of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possibility of development -in Palestine on the lines of ‘cultural autonomy.’ The Jews are, -after all, a very small minority there, and I do not believe for -one moment that Jews could be attracted there in such large numbers -as the Zionist enthusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same -thing of an Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which -would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because we, -ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not like -ourselves to say anything about other people that they would -resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians together and -placed them all in a contiguous position, excluding the present -Kurdish community from them, no matter what large slice of land you -gave them, I think they would very much like to go back to the old -status....</p> - -<p>“In the same way I would say of the Jewish community, that they are -people who prosper very much in other lands, and although they have -a great hankering after their home, and no community is so much -bound up with a particular territory as the Jewish community is, -still, I must say that<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">208</a></span> we do not fear there will be any great -migration of such a character that it will form a majority over -the Muslim population. The Jewish community has said: ‘We have no -objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of the -world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper there and -develop on our own lines, and have cultural autonomy.’”</p></div> - -<p>M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, -1920, also observed that—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation desire to -state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of the British -Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely vague, and it is not -clear in what relation the so-called national home for the Jewish -people, which is proposed to be established in Palestine, would -stand to the State proposed to be established there. The Mussulmans -of the world are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish -neighbours, and can challenge a comparison with others in this -respect; and the delegation, in the course of the interview with -you, endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood -of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being accepted -by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the very small Jewish -minority in Palestine is intended to exercise over the Muslim, who -constitute four-fifths of the population, a dominance now, or in -the future, when its numbers have swelled after immigration, then -the delegation must categorically and emphatically oppose any such -designs.”</p></div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed Damad Ferid of the -conditions of the treaty, and which the latter communicated to the -Press, was printed by the <cite>Peyam Sabah</cite>, surrounded with black mourning -lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a supporter of the Government and could -not be accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not given up -all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">209</a></span> the world in -their hands and who have officially proclaimed their determination -to act equitably, will not allow this country, which has undergone -the direst misfortunes for years and has lost its most sacred -rights, to suffer a still more heinous injustice.”</p></div> - -<p>All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full length with the -conditions, unanimously declared that the treaty was unacceptable. The -<cite>Alemdar</cite>, another pro-English newspaper, said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a man -willing to sign it.”</p></div> - -<p>Another newspaper, the <cite>Ileri</cite>, wrote:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously -waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we -read the treaty.” -</p></div> - -<p>The aforesaid <cite>Peyam Sabah</cite>, after a survey of the conditions, came to -this conclusion:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:</p> - -<p>“To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of -Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage -to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of -endless hostility between the various races.</p> - -<p>“To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the -condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty?</p> - -<p>“To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of -peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.”</p></div> - -<p>Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the -treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be -made.</p> - -<p>Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at -Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them -that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to -that effect<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">210</a></span> had been given to the police. Then he is said to have -declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never -sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting -Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there -was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also -informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the -treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber.</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note -which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, -on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be -compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish -answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled.</p> - -<p>But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Gallipoli, by the Turkish -Nationalists, together with the Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia -and Asia Minor, made things worse, and soon became a matter of anxiety -to England.</p> - -<p>After the text of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Turks, -and when the latter had the certainty that their fears were but too -well grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken by the Allies -would be certain to bring about a coalition of the various parties, -and that all Turks, without any distinction of opinion, would combine -to organise a resistance against any operation aiming at taking from -them Eastern Thrace—where the Bulgarian population was also averse to -the expulsion of the Turkish authorities—at assigning Smyrna and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">211</a></span> the -Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the Turkish Empire.</p> - -<p>Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adrianople army corps and had -openly declared against the Sultan’s Government since the latter was at -war with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at the beginning -of May, and it was easy to guess for what purpose. Of course, it had -been rumoured, after he left Constantinople, that the Government was -going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of the kind had been -done, and he still kept his command. When he came back to Adrianople, -not only had no conflict broken out between him and the troops under -his command, but he had been given an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as -it was known that the San Remo Conference had decided to give Thrace to -Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resistance against Greek occupation -was quickly organised. Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth—he was born at -Prishtina—became the leader of the movement. He hurriedly gathered some -contingents made up of regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a -state of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western coast of -the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why Thrace was not granted the right -of self-determination like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy -under the protection of France, whose administration in Western Thrace -had proved equitable and had given satisfaction to that province. -In face of this denial of justice, he had resolved to fight for the -independence of Thrace.</p> - -<p>It was soon known that the Moslem population of Adrianople had held a -meeting at the beginning<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">212</a></span> of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer -Tayar, all the people present had pledged themselves to fight for the -liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration took place at Gumuljina. A -congress including above two hundred representatives of the whole of -Western Thrace had been held about the same time at Adrianople.</p> - -<p>In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also started, and on Sunday, May -9, numerous patriotic demonstrations were held in all the provincial -towns.</p> - -<p>On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and refugees from Thrace, -Macedonia, and the Dobruja living at that time in the town, held a -meeting of several thousand people, and without any distinction of -religion, nationality, or political party carried the following motion -against the decision taken by the San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to -Greece:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“They enter an energetic protest against the resolution to cede -Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice and an -act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as we, and to -the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the Bulgarian people -cannot, of their own free will, accept such a decision of the San -Remo Conference, which would be a cause of everlasting discord -in the Balkans—whereas the victorious Powers of the Entente have -always professed to fight in order to restore peace to those -regions; and they entreat the Governments, which have come to -this decision, to cancel it and to raise Thrace to the rank of -an autonomous, independent State under the protection of all the -Powers of the Entente, or one of them.”</p></div> - -<p>On May 25—that is to say, two days before the Greek occupation—a few -“Young Turk” and Bulgarian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western -Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to oppose the occupation. -At the head of this Government were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">213</a></span> -Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But the latter were -expelled by General Charpy before the Greek troops and authorities -arrived, and the Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest -against Greek domination. They set off to Adrianople, taking with them -the treasury and seals of the Moslem community, and were greeted by -Jafer Tayar.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish Nationalists was -becoming organised, and as soon as the conditions of peace were known -new recruits joined Mustafa Kemal’s forces.</p> - -<p>The Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of the Allies -towards Turkey, were now almost thrown into the arms of the Russian -Bolshevists, who carried on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and -offered to help them to save their independence, though they did so to -serve their own interests.</p> - -<p>Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal’s personal enemy, who stood halfway between -the Allied Powers and the Nationalists, believed that if he did not -displease the Allies, he could pull his country out of its difficulties.</p> - -<p>Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the Turks, the Ottoman -Government had already begun to raise troops to fight the Nationalists. -They were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki, who had formerly -served under Abdul Hamid. It was soon known that this military -organisation had been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the care -of British officers at whose instigation the first contingents had been -sent to Ismid, which was to be the Turkish base.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">214</a></span></p> - -<p>It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha’s troops, who had remained -loyal and were commanded by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik -Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in the Doghandkeui -and Geredi area, east of Adabazar, which they had occupied, and that -the Nationalists, whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated Bolu. -The information was soon contradicted, and at the beginning of the -last week of April it became known that Anzavour and his troops had -just been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this port on the -Marmora had fallen into the Nationalists’ hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had -to leave Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish gunboat, and -Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all the region round Brusa, Panderma, and -Balikesri. Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many officers -and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists in Anatolia.</p> - -<p>It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour, though he was of -Circassian descent, was unknown in his own country. He had been made -pasha to command the Government forces against the Nationalists with -the help of the Circassians, who are numerous in the Adabazar region, -and to co-operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen, who -merely wished to be independent.</p> - -<p>Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some defections took place among -the troops under his command.</p> - -<p>About the same time, the emergency military court had sentenced -to death by default Mustafa Kemal, Colonel Kara Yassif Bey, Ali -Fuad Pasha, who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">215</a></span> commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem Bey, -ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of -the sanitary service, and his wife, Halidé Edib Hanoum, all impeached -for high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement.</p> - -<p>Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad Ferid and the moral and -even material support given to him by the Allies, what could be the -outcome of a military action against the Nationalists? How could the -Ottoman Government compel the Turks to go and fight against their -Anatolian brethren in order to force on them a treaty of peace that -it seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned the ruin of -Turkey?</p> - -<p>In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a slightly Nationalist -Cabinet co-operating with the Chamber would not have stood a better -chance to come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce her to -admit the acceptable parts of the treaty; for should Damad Ferid, who -was not in a good position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail, -what would be the situation of the Government which remained in office -merely because the Allies occupied Constantinople?</p> - -<p>Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that foreign troops would -be maintained in every zone, and that the treaty would be carried -out at any cost. Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at -Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority did not extend -beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was cut off from the rest of the -Empire; it was at Sivas. As no Government force or Allied army was -strong enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">216</a></span> was only -in Anatolia that the latter Government could be crushed by those who, -with Great Britain, had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and were -ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach this end.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it soon became known that at Angora the question -of the Caliph-Sultan had been set aside, and even the Sultan’s name -was now being mentioned again in the <em>namaz</em>, or public prayer offered -every Friday—that is to say, all the parties had practically arrived at -an understanding.</p> - -<p>Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face difficulties, if not -at once, at least in a comparatively short time, inspired information, -probably of Greek origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council -would decide whether France, England, and Italy would have to support -Greece—though one did not see why France and Italy should defray the -expenses of that new adventure by which England first, and Greece -afterwards, would benefit exclusively.</p> - -<p>On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a Crown Council met under -the Sultan’s presidency to examine the terms of the treaty, over -3,000 people held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan Ahmed -Square. Some journalists, who were well known for their pro-English -feelings—such as Ali Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the <cite>Sabah</cite>; -Refi Jevad, editor of the <cite>Alemdar</cite>; Mustafa Sabri, a former -Sheik-ul-Islam—and some politicians delivered speeches. The platform -was draped with black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners -were adorned with crêpe. After the various speakers had explained -the clauses of the treaty and showed<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">217</a></span> they were not acceptable, the -following motions were passed:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“First, in contradiction to the principle of nationalities, the -treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople, Smyrna, -and its area. In case the Allied Powers should maintain their -decisions—which seems most unlikely—we want these regions to be -given local autonomy.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off from the -Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the principle of -nationalities, should be freed from all fetters and bonds hindering -their economic development on the path to progress and peace. To -maintain the Capitulations and extend them to other nations is -tantamount to declaring the Turks are doomed to misery and slavery -for ever.</p> - -<p>“Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable feelings of -the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the same footing as the -other vanquished nations.</p> - -<p>“Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace -conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation, ask -that the treaty should be modified so as to be made more consistent -with right and justice.</p> - -<p>“Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to the -Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace Conference.”</p></div> - -<p>These resolutions were handed after the meeting to M. Defrance, the -senior Allied High Commissioner, who was to forward them to the Peace -Conference.</p> - -<p>As the difficulties increased, and more important and quicker -communications with the Ottoman delegation in Paris were becoming -necessary, the Cabinet thought of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris. -Upon the latter’s advice, and probably at the instigation of the -English, several members of the dissolved Chamber set off to Anatolia -in order to try and bring about an understanding between Damad -Ferid and the Nationalists, for the conditions of the treaty, as -was to be expected, had now nearly healed the rupture between the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">218</a></span> -Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists, especially as the -Anglo-Turkish Army was unable to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid -and his supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it. Even the -English had sent delegates to Mustafa Kemal, who had refused to receive -them.</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at Ismid, found they were -not strong enough, and requested the headquarters merely to stand on -the defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf of Ismid, the -Government forces found themselves in a critical condition, for the -Anatolian troops had occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and -Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that region.</p> - -<p>The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Constantinople, resumed its -sittings at Angora. It criticised the Allies’ policy with regard -to Turkey, especially the policy of England, at whose instigation -Constantinople had been occupied and military measures had been taken -on the coasts of the Black Sea.</p> - -<p>In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the Chamber, Mustafa -Kemal showed that the English occupation of Constantinople had been a -severe blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan. “We must do our -best,” he said, “to free the Sultan and his capital. If we do not obey -his orders just now, it is because we look upon them as null and void, -as he is not really free.”</p> - -<p>The same state of mind showed itself in a telegram of congratulation -addressed to the Sultan on his birthday by the provisional vali of -Angora, who,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">219</a></span> though he did not acknowledge the power of the Central -Government, stated that the population of Angora were deeply concerned -at the condition to which the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanry was -reduced owing to the occupation of Constantinople. This telegram ran -thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The people have made up their minds not to shrink from any -sacrifice to make the Empire free and independent. They feel -certain that their beloved Sovereign is with them at heart and that -their chief strength lies in a close union round the Khilafat.”</p></div> - -<p>Similar dispatches were sent from the most active Nationalist centres -such as Erzerum and Amasia, and by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commanding -the 15th army corps at Erzerum.</p> - -<p>It was plain that, through these demonstrations, Mustafa Kemal and the -Anatolian Nationalists aimed at nullifying the religious pretexts Damad -Ferid availed himself of to carry on the struggle against them. Mustafa -Kemal had even ordered all the ulemas in Anatolia to preach a series -of sermons with a view to strengthening the religious feeling among -the masses. He had also the same political purpose in view when he -sent a circular to the departments concerned to enjoin them to remind -all Mussulmans of the duty of keeping the Ramadhan strictly and of the -penalties they incurred if they publicly transgressed the Moslem fast.</p> - -<p>Besides, the Nationalists strove to turn to account the movement that -had taken place among all classes after the terms of the treaty had -been made known, and their activity continued to increase. Sali Pasha, -who was Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, had<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">220</a></span> escaped to Anatolia in -order to put himself at the disposal of the Nationalists. So their -opposition to the Central Government was asserting itself more and more -strenuously, and the struggle that ensued assumed many forms.</p> - -<p>An armistice, which came into force on May 30, and was to last twenty -days, was concluded at Angora by M. Robert de Caix, secretary of the -High Commissionership in Syria, between the French authorities and the -Turkish Nationalists. Though the terms of this agreement were not made -public, it was known that they dealt chiefly with Cilicia and allowed -France to use the railway as far as Aleppo. Meanwhile, conversations -were being held on the Cilician front, and finally at Angora, to extend -the armistice.</p> - -<p>Indeed, it was difficult to understand why, after the Italians had -evacuated Konia, the French troops had not been withdrawn before the -treaty had been handed to Turkey, for it gave France no right to remain -in Cilicia; and now the situation of the French there was rather -difficult, and their retreat had, of course, become dangerous. It -seemed quite plain that the evacuation of Cilicia had become necessary, -and that henceforth only the coastlands of Syria properly so called -would be occupied.</p> - -<p>So the French policy at this juncture had lacked coherency, for it -seemed difficult to go on with the war and carry on peace negotiations -at the same time.</p> - -<p>This armistice was denounced on June 17 by Mustafa Kemal, who demanded -the evacuation of Adana, the withdrawal of the French detachments -from Heraclea and Zounguldak, and the surrender<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">221</a></span> of the mines to the -Nationalists who lacked coal and wanted Constantinople not to have any. -Besides, some incidents had occurred in the course of the armistice: -some French soldiers who were being drilled near Adana had been fired -at, the railway track had been cut east of Toprak Kale, and telegraphic -communications interrupted repeatedly between Adana and Mersina.</p> - -<p>An encounter occurred on June 11 between the Nationalists and a company -which had been detached at the beginning of the month from a battalion -of a rifle corps that guarded the port and mining works of Zounguldak. -On June 18, after an inquiry, the French commander withdrew from the -spot which had been occupied near Heraclea and the company of riflemen -was brought back to Zounguldak.</p> - -<p>It was obvious that the staff of Cilicia did not seem to have approved -of the armistice which had been concluded by the French authorities -in order not to have anything to fear in this region, and to send all -their forces against the Arabs; and so the head of the Turkish staff, -Ismet Bey, naturally did not wish to renew it.</p> - -<p>As we had entered into a parley with Mustafa Kemal openly and -officially and signed an armistice with him, it seemed likely we meant -to pursue a policy that might bring about a local and provisional -agreement with the Nationalists, and perhaps a definite agreement -later on. If such an armistice was not concluded, a rupture was to be -feared on either side later on, in which case the condition of things -would remain as intricate as before, or military operations would be -resumed in worse conditions<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">222</a></span> than before for both parties. In short, -after treating with Mustafa Kemal it was difficult to ignore him in the -general settlement that was to ensue.</p> - -<p>But no broad view had ever dominated the Allies’ policy since they had -signed the armistice with Turkey in October, 1918. Eastern affairs -had never been carefully sifted or clearly understood; so the Allies’ -action had been badly started. Conflicting ambitions had led them in -a confused way. The policy of England especially, which had proved -harsh and grasping, and also highly dangerous, was at the bottom of -the difficulties the Allies had experienced in the East. So France, -where public opinion and popular feeling were opposed to any Eastern -adventure or any action against Turkey, could not be called upon to -maintain troops in the East or to fight there alone for the benefit of -others. The operations that were being contemplated in the East would -have necessarily required an important army, and if adequate credits -had been asked for them, a loud protest would have been raised—though -later on the French Chamber granted large sums of money for Syria, -after a superficial debate, not fully realising what would be the -consequence of the vote.</p> - -<p>M. d’Estournelles de Constant, a member of the Senate, wrote to the -French Prime Minister on May 25 that, “after asking the Government -most guardedly—for months in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the day -before in the Senate—to give information about the mysterious military -operations that had been carried on for a year and a half in Asia Minor -and towards Mesopotamia,” he found it necessary to start a debate in -the Senate upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">223</a></span> following question: “What are our armies doing in -Cilicia?”<a name="FNanchor_29_29" id="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">29</a></p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Supreme Council urged the Turkish delegation to sign -the treaty that had been submitted for its approval, and the Allies -were going to negotiate with the representatives of a Government -which, on the whole, was no longer acknowledged by the country. Of -what value might be the signature wrested by the Allies from these -representatives, and how could the stipulations of that treaty -be carried out by the Turks? Most of its clauses raised internal -difficulties in Turkey, and such a confusion ensued that the members of -the delegation did not seem to agree any longer with the members of the -Ottoman Cabinet, and at a certain time even the latter seemed unable -to accept the treaty, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on the -Ottoman Government by the English troops of occupation.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal’s Nationalist forces conquered not only the whole of Asia -Minor, but also all the Asiatic coast and the islands of the Marmora, -except Ismid, which was still held by British posts. The Turkish -Nationalists soon after captured Marmora Island, which commanded the -sea route between Gallipoli and Constantinople.</p> - -<p>On June 16 the British forces engaged the Kemalist troops in the Ismid -area. About thirty Indian soldiers were wounded and an officer of the -Intelligence Department was taken prisoner by the Turks. The civilians -evacuated Ismid, and it was hinted that the garrison would do the same. -Mustafa Kemal’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">224</a></span> aeroplanes dropped bombs on the town, and the railway -line between Ismid and Hereke was cut by the Nationalists. The British -forces on the southern coast of the Dardanelles withdrew towards -Shanak, whose fortifications were being hurriedly repaired.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal’s plan seemed to be to dispose his forces so as not to be -outflanked, and be able to threaten Smyrna later on. To this end, the -Nationalist forces advanced along the English sector toward the heights -of Shamlija, on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus, from which point -they could bombard Constantinople.</p> - -<p>After a long interview with the Sultan, which lasted two hours, on -June 11, the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha, owing to the difficulty -of communicating between Paris and Constantinople, and the necessity -of co-ordinating the draft of the answer worked out by the Ottoman -Government and the reports drawn up by the various commissions with the -answer recommended by the delegation, set off to Paris the next day. So -it seemed likely that Turkey would ask for further time before giving -her answer.</p> - -<p>It could already be foreseen that in her answer Turkey would protest -against the clauses of the treaty concerning Thrace and Smyrna, -against the blow struck at the sovereignty of the Sultan by the -internationalisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as thus the -Sultan could no longer leave his capital and go freely to Asia Minor, -and, lastly, against the clauses restoring the privileges of the -Capitulations to the States that enjoyed them before the war.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">225</a></span></p> - -<p>Turkey also intended to ask that the Sultan should keep his religious -rights as Caliph over the Mussulmans detached from the Empire, and that -a clause should be embodied in the treaty maintaining the guarantee -in regard to the interior loan raised during the war, for otherwise -a great many subscribers would be ruined and the organisation of the -property of the orphans would be jeopardised.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of the second week of June it was rumoured that the -treaty might be substantially amended in favour of Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_30_30" id="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">30</a> Perhaps -Great Britain, seeing how things stood in the East, and that her policy -in Asia Minor raised serious difficulties, felt it necessary to alter -her attitude with regard to Turkish Nationalism which, supported by -the Bolshevists, was getting more and more dangerous in Persia. For -Mr. Lloyd George, who has always allowed himself to be led by the -trend of events, and whose policy had lately been strongly influenced -by the Bolshevists, had now altered his mind, as he often does, and -seemed now inclined, owing to the failure of his advances to the Soviet -Government, to modify his attitude towards Constantinople—after having -exasperated Turkish Nationalism. The debate that was to take place on -June 15 in the House of Lords as to what charges and responsibilities -England had assumed in Mesopotamia, was postponed—which meant much; and -the difficulties just met with by the British in the Upper Valley of -the Tigris and the Euphrates in their struggle with the Arabs convinced -them of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">226</a></span> advisability of a revision of the British policy towards -both the Arabs and the Turks.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it did not seem unlikely that M. Venizelos, who -was being expected in London, might have seen the mistake the Supreme -Council had made when it had granted the Greek claims so fully, and -that the apprehension he was entitled to feel about the reality of the -huge advantages obtained by Greece might have a salutary influence on -him. Yet nothing of the kind happened, and in a long letter to the -<cite>Daily Telegraph</cite> (June 18) he asserted not only the rights of Greece -to Smyrna, but his determination to have them respected and to prevent -the revision of the treaty.</p> - -<p>M. Venizelos, “the great victor of the war in the East,” as he was -called in London, even supported his claims by drawing public attention -to the intrigues carried on by Constantine’s supporters to restore him -to the throne. He maintained that the revision of the treaty would -second the efforts which were then being made in Athens by the old -party of the Crown, which, he said, was bound to triumph if Greece -was deprived of the fruits of her victory and if the Allies did not -redeem their pledges towards her. But then it became obvious that the -Greeks did not despise Constantine so much after all, and their present -attitude could not in any way be looked upon as disinterested.</p> - -<p>It might have been expected, on the other hand, that Count Sforza, who -had been High Commissioner in Constantinople, where he had won warm -sympathies, would maintain the friendly policy pursued by Italy since -the armistice towards Turkey—that is<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">227</a></span> to say, he would urge that the -time had come to revise the treaty of peace with Turkey which, since -it had been drawn up at San Remo, had constantly been opposed by the -Italian Press. All the parties shared this view, even the clerical -party, and one of its members in the Chamber, M. Vassalo, who had just -come back from Turkey, energetically maintained it was impossible to -suppress the Ottoman Empire without setting on fire the whole of Asia. -The Congress of the Popular Party in Naples held the same opinion. -Recent events also induced Italy to preserve the cautious attitude she -had assumed in Eastern affairs since the armistice, and she naturally -aimed at counterbalancing the supremacy that England, if she once ruled -over Constantinople and controlled Greater Greece, would enjoy over not -only the western part, but the whole, of the Mediterranean Sea.</p> - -<p>Henceforth it was obvious that the chief stipulations of the treaty -that was to be enforced on Turkey were doomed to failure, and it was -asked with no little anxiety whether the Powers would be wise enough -to take facts into account and reconsider their decisions accordingly, -or maintain them and thus pave the way to numerous conflicts and -fresh difficulties. Indeed, the outcome of the arrangements they had -laboriously elaborated was that things in the East had become more -intricate and critical than before. No State wished to assume the -task of organising the Armenian State: the American Senate flatly -refused; Mr. Bonar Law formally declared in the House of Commons that -England had already too many responsibilities; France did not see -why she<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">228</a></span> should take charge of it; Italy accepted no mandate in Asia -Minor. Syria, on the other hand, protested against its dismemberment. -Mesopotamia was rising against the English at the very time when the -Ottoman Nationalists entered an indignant protest against the cession -of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece.</p> - -<p>It was to be wished, therefore, from every point of view that not only -some articles of the treaty presented to the Turks, but the whole -document, should be remodelled, and more regard should be paid to the -lawful rights of the Ottoman Empire, a change which could only serve -French interests.</p> - -<p>But though reason and her interest urged France to maintain the Ottoman -Empire—which she attempted to do to some extent—she allowed herself -to be driven in a contrary direction by England, who thought she -could take advantage of the perturbation caused by the war within the -Turkish Empire to dismember it—not realising that this undertaking -went against her own Asiatic interests, which were already seriously -endangered. Such a submission to the English policy was all the more -to be regretted as Mr. Lloyd George had but grudgingly supported -the French policy with regard to Germany, and after the San Remo -conversations it seemed that France would have to consent to heavy -sacrifices in the East in return for the semi-approbation he had -finally granted her. This policy of England well might surprise the -French—who have always reverenced the British parliamentary system; -for the so-styled imperialist policy of Queen Victoria or King Edward, -though it has been violently criticised, had really kept up the old -traditions of British Liberalism, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">229</a></span> had nothing in common with the -greed and cool selfishness of such demagogues and would-be advanced -minds as Mr. Lloyd George, who stands forth before the masses as the -enemy of every imperialism and the champion of the freedom of peoples. -But the former leaders of English foreign policy were not constantly -influenced by their own political interests; they knew something of -men and countries; and they had long been thoroughly acquainted with -the ways of diplomacy. Both in England and France, everyone should now -acknowledge their fair-mindedness, and pay homage alike to their wisdom -and perspicacity.</p> - -<p>Many people in France now wondered with some reason what the 80,000 -French soldiers round Beyrut were doing—whether it was to carry out -the expedition that had long been contemplated against Damascus, or to -launch into an adventure in Cilicia.</p> - -<p>M. d’Estournelles de Constant, who had first wished to start a debate -in the French Chamber on the military operations in Syria and Cilicia, -addressed the following letter, after the information given by M. -Millerand before the Commission of Foreign Affairs, to M. de Selves, -chairman of this Commission:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“I feel bound to let the Commission know for what reasons I have -determined not to give up, but merely postpone the debate I wanted -to start in the Chamber concerning our military operations in Syria -and Cilicia.</p> - -<p>“The Premier has given as much consideration as he could to the -anxieties we had expressed before him. He has inherited a situation -he is not responsible for, and seems to do his best to prevent -France from falling into the dreadful chasm we had pointed out -to him. We must help him in his most intricate endeavours, for -France is not the only nation that has to grapple with the perilous -Eastern problem. She must work hand in hand with her allies to -avert <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">230</a></span>this peril. The whole world is threatened by it. Our Allies -should understand that the interest of France is closely connected -with their interests. France guards the Rhine; she is practically -responsible for the execution of the treaty with Germany.</p> - -<p>“How can she perform such a task, together with the administration -of Alsace and Lorraine and the restoration of her provinces -laid waste by the Germans, if she is to scatter her effort and -her reduced resources both in Europe and all her large colonial -empire and in Asia Minor among peoples who have long welcomed her -friendship, but abhor any domination?</p> - -<p>“France would do the world an immense service by openly reverting -to the war aims proclaimed by herself and her allies. Far from -endangering, she would thus strengthen her traditional influence in -the East; she would thus do more than by risky military operations -to smother the ambitions and rebellions that might set on fire -again the Balkan States, Anatolia, and even Mesopotamia.</p> - -<p>“After five years of sacrifices that have brought us victory, to -start on a would-be crusade against the Arabs and Turks in a remote -country, in the middle of summer, would imply for France as well as -for England, Italy, Greece, and Serbia, the beginning of a new war -that might last for ever, to the benefit of anarchy.</p> - -<p>“At any rate I ask that the intended treaty of peace with Turkey, -which has not been signed yet, should not be presented to the -French Parliament as an irremediable fact.”</p></div> - -<p>After a long debate on Eastern affairs and on the questions raised by -M. Millerand’s communications, the Commission for Foreign Affairs, -seeing things were taking a bad turn, and the situation of France in -Syria, Cilicia, and Constantinople was getting alarming, decided on -June 15 to send a delegation to the East to make an inquiry on the spot.</p> - -<p>At the first sitting of the French Chamber on June 25, 1920, M. Briand, -who three months before had made a speech in favour of the 1916 -agreements which were being threatened by English ambition, though he -considered the Turkish bands “went too<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">231</a></span> far,” and our policy “played -too much into their hands,” felt it incumbent on him to say:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“When we leave a nation like Turkey, after a long war, for over a -year, under what might be called a Scotch douche, telling her now -‘Thou shalt live,’ now ‘Thou shalt not live,’ we strain its nerves -to the extreme, we create within it a patriotic excitement, a -patriotic exasperation, which now becomes manifest in the shape of -armed bands. We call them bands of robbers; in our own country we -should call them ‘bands of patriots.’”</p></div> - -<p>In the course of the general discussion of the Budget, during a debate -which took place on July 28 in the Senate, an amendment was brought in -by M. Victor Bérard and some of his colleagues calling for a reduction -of 30 million francs on the sums asked for by the Government, which -already amounted, as a beginning, to 185 million francs.</p> - -<p>M. d’Estournelles de Constant then expressed his fear that this Eastern -expedition might cause France to make sacrifices out of proportion to -her resources in men and money, and asked how the Government expected -to recuperate the expenditure incurred in Syria.</p> - -<p>M. Victor Bérard, in his turn, sharply criticised our Eastern policy.</p> - -<p>M. Bompard, too, expressed his fears concerning our Syrian policy, and -M. Doumergue asked the Government to consent to a reduction of the -credits “to show it intended to act cautiously in Syria.”</p> - -<p>But after M. Millerand’s energetic answer, and after M. Doumer, -chairman of the Commission, had called upon the Senate to accept the -figures proposed by the Government and the Commission, these figures -were adopted by 205 votes against 84.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">232</a></span></p> - -<p>M. Romanos, interviewed by the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Matin</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_31_31" id="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">31</a> and soon after M. -Venizelos, at the Lympne Conference, maintained that the treaty could -be fully carried out, and the Greeks felt quite able to enforce it -themselves.</p> - -<p>As the Allied troops were not sufficient to take decisive action, and -as a large part of the Ottoman Empire had been assigned to Greece, -England herself soon asked why the latter should not be called upon to -pay for the operation if she insisted upon carrying it out.</p> - -<p>About June 20 the situation of the British troops became rather -serious, as General Milne did not seem to have foreseen the events and -was certainly unable to control them.</p> - -<p>The Nationalist troops, which met with but little resistance, continued -to gain ground, and after marching past Ismid occupied Guebze. The -Government forces were retreating towards Alemdagh.</p> - -<p>By this time the Nationalists occupied the whole of Anatolia, and -the English held but a few square miles near the Dardanelles. The -Nationalists, who had easy access to both coasts of the Gulf of Ismid, -attempted to blow up the bridges on the Haïdar-Pasha-Ismid railway -line. Though the English were on the lookout, four Turkish aeroplanes -started from the park of Maltepe, bound for Anatolia. One of them was -piloted by the famous Fazil Bey, who had attacked English aeroplanes -during their last flight over Constantinople a few days before the -armistice in October, 1918.</p> - -<p>Indeed, the Government forces only consisted of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">233</a></span> 15,000 specialised -soldiers, artillerymen or engineers, with 6 light batteries of 77 guns -and 2 Skoda batteries; in addition to which 20,000 rifles had been -given to local recruits. The Nationalists, on the contrary, opposed -them with 35,000 well-equipped men commanded by trained officers. -Besides, there was but little unity of command among the Government -forces. Anzavour Pasha, who had been sent with some cavalry, had -refused to submit to headquarters, and at the last moment, when ordered -to outflank the enemy and thus protect the retreat of the Government -forces, he had flatly refused to do so, declaring he was not going to -be ordered about by anybody.</p> - -<p>So, considering how critical the situation of the British troops was -in the zone of the Straits, England immediately made preparations -to remedy it and dispatched reinforcements. The 2nd battalion of -the Essex Regiment was held in readiness at Malta, and the light -cruiser <em>Carlisle</em> kept ready to set off at a few minutes’ notice. -All available destroyers had already left Malta for the Eastern -Mediterranean, where the first and fourth squadrons had already -repaired. Besides, the cruiser <em>Ceres</em>, which had left Marseilles for -Malta, received orders on the way to steam straight on to the Ægean -Sea. All the Mediterranean fleet was concentrated in the East, while -in the Gulf of Ismid the English warships, which were already there, -carefully watched the movements of the Turkish Nationalist forces.</p> - -<p>Such a state of things naturally brought about some anxiety in London, -which somewhat influenced Mr. Lloyd George’s decisions.</p> - -<p>During the Hythe Conference, after some conversations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">234</a></span> on the previous -days with Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, and Mr. Philip Kerr, in which -he had offered to put the Greek Army at the disposal of the Allies, M. -Venizelos, accompanied by Sir John Stavridi, a rich Greek merchant of -London, who had been his intimate adviser for several years, went on -Saturday evening, June 18, to the Imperial Hotel at Hythe, where were -met all the representatives and experts whom Sir Philip Sassoon had not -been able to accommodate at his mansion at Belcair, to plead the cause -of Greek intervention with them.</p> - -<p>M. Venizelos, on the other hand, in order to win over the British -Government to his views, had secured the most valuable help of Sir -Basil Zaharoff, who owns most of the shares in the shipbuilding yards -of Vickers and Co. and who, thanks to the huge fortune he made in -business, subsidises several organs of the British Press. He, too, has -been a confidential adviser of M. Venizelos, and has a great influence -over Mr. Lloyd George, owing to services rendered to him in election -time. So it has been said with reason that M. Venizelos’ eloquence -and Sir Basil Zaharoff’s wealth have done Turkey the greatest harm, -for they have influenced Mr. Lloyd George and English public opinion -against her.</p> - -<p>According to M. Venizelos’ scheme, which he meant to expound before -the Conference, the Turkish Nationalist army, concentrated in the -Smyrna area, could be routed by a quick advance of the Greek forces, -numbering 90,000 fully equipped and well-trained men, who would capture -the railway station of Afium-Karahissar. This station, being at the -junction of the railway line from Smyrna and the Adana-Ismid<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">235</a></span> line, via -Konia, the only line of lateral communication Mustafa Kemal disposed -of, would thus be cut off, and the Nationalist leader would have to -withdraw towards the interior. His resistance would thus break down, -and the British forces on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmora that -M. Venizelos offered to reinforce by sending a Greek division would be -at once freed from the pressure brought to bear on them, which, at the -present moment, they could hardly resist.</p> - -<p>The next day the Allies decided to accept M. Venizelos’ offer, as the -Greek troops were on the spot and no other force could arrive soon -enough to relieve the British forces, which were seriously threatened.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George declared that the British Government was sending to -the spot all the ships it had at its disposal, but that this naval -intervention could not affect the situation much without the help of -the Greek Army.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Without the Greek help,” he said, “we may be driven to an -ignominious evacuation of that region of Asia Minor before Kemal’s -forces, which would certainly have a terrible repercussion -throughout the East and would pave the way to endless -possibilities.”</p></div> - -<p>This was also the view held by Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial -General Staff.</p> - -<p>Marshal Foch, too, was asked his advice about the Greek co-operation. -He had already declared at San Remo, in agreement with Marshal Wilson, -that an army of 300,000 or 400,000 well-equipped men would be needed to -conquer Asia Minor. Now, after making full reserves in regard to the -political side of the question, he merely remarked that from a strictly -military<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">236</a></span> point of view, Greek co-operation might be a decisive element -of success; moreover, in a report he had drawn up a few months before, -he had pointed out the advantage that an active co-operation of the -Greek Army was sure to bring, from a military point of view.</p> - -<p>M. Millerand, while admitting these advantages, is said to have raised -some serious objections to the scheme.</p> - -<p>Finally, as the question could not be solved definitely without Italy’s -consent, it was adjourned till the Boulogne Conference met.</p> - -<p>Mr. Lloyd George accepted this solution the more readily as he only -seemed to look upon M. Venizelos’ scheme as an experiment; and he -wanted to gain time, in order to know whether he was to pursue it, -till facts had proved that M. Venizelos was right and the Turkish -Nationalists’ resistance could be overcome in a short time. If after -some time things did not turn out as he expected, he would merely -resort to another policy, as is usual with him. But England, meanwhile, -was in an awkward situation, since, while accepting the help of an -ally, she hinted at the same time that she would not stand by the -latter if things turned out wrong. On the other hand, it was surprising -that the Supreme Council should take such decisions before receiving -Turkey’s answer and knowing whether she would sign the treaty.</p> - -<p>When the decisions taken at Hythe in regard to the part to be entrusted -to Greece were made known on June 21 at the Boulogne Conference, they -brought forth some remarks on the part of Count Sforza, who refused to -engage Italy’s responsibility in the policy that was being recommended. -He thought it his duty<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">237</a></span> to make reservations in regard to the -timeliness of these decisions and the consequences that might ensue, -referring to the technical advice given at San Remo by Marshal Foch and -Marshal Wilson as to the huge forces they thought would be needed to -enforce the treaty against the Nationalists’ wish.</p> - -<p>Soon after—on July 13—M. Scialoja, in the long speech he delivered -before the Senate to defend the attitude of Italy in the Peace -Congress, declared that Italy could not be held responsible for the -serious condition of things now prevailing in Asia Minor and the East, -for she had attempted, but in vain, to secure a more lenient treatment -for Turkey. Finally, in spite of all the objections raised against -the treaty, and the difficulties that would probably ensue, it was -decided at the few sittings of the Boulogne Conference that the Ottoman -delegation should be refused any further delay in giving their answer, -which averted any possibility of revision of the treaty. The Powers -represented in the Conference gave a free hand to Greece in Asia Minor, -because they had not enough soldiers there themselves—let us add that -none of them, not even England probably, cared to rush into a new -Eastern adventure. The Greeks had none but themselves to blame; their -landing at Smyrna had started the Nationalist movement, and now they -bore the brunt of the fight.</p> - -<p>This new decision implied the giving up of the policy of conciliation -which might have been expected after the three weeks’ armistice -concluded on May 30 between the French Staff and the Nationalists, -which seemed to imply that the French military authorities intended to -evacuate the whole of Cilicia, left by the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">238</a></span> treaty to Turkey. Owing -to the serious consequences and infinite repercussions it might have -through the Moslem world, the new decision heralded a period of endless -difficulties.</p> - -<p>Even the Catholic Press did not much appreciate the treaty, and had -been badly impressed by recent events. The Vatican, which has always -sought to prevent Constantinople from falling into the hands of an -Orthodox Power, might well dread the treaty would give the Phanar a -paramount influence in the East, if Greece became the ruling Power both -at Stambul and Jerusalem. In the first days of the war, when at the -time of the Gallipoli expedition Constantinople seemed doomed to fall, -the Holy See saw with some anxiety that the Allies intended to assign -Constantinople to Russia, and it then asked that at least Saint Sophia, -turned into a mosque by the Turks, should be given back to the Catholic -creed. This fear may even have been one of the reasons which then -induced the Holy See to favour the Central States. M. René Johannet, -who was carrying on a campaign in the newspaper <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Croix</cite><a name="FNanchor_32_32" id="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">32</a> for the -revision of the treaty, wrote as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“But then, if Asia Minor is deprived of Smyrna and thus loses at -least half her resources, we ask with anxiety where France, the -chief creditor of Turkey, will find adequate financial guarantees? -To give Smyrna to Greece is to rob France. If the Turks are -stripped of everything, they will give us nothing.</p> - -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">239</a></span> - -<p>“Lastly, the fate of our innumerable religious missions, of -which Smyrna is the nucleus, is to us a cause of great anxiety. -After the precedents of Salonika and Uskub, we have everything to -fear. The Orthodox Governments hate Catholicism. Our religious -schools—that is to say, the best, the soundest part of our national -influence—will soon come to nothing if they are constantly worried -by the new lords of the land. How can we allow this?”</p></div> - -<p>According to the account given by the Anatolian newspapers of the -sittings of the Parliament summoned by Mustafa Kemal to discuss the -conditions of peace, very bitter speeches had been delivered. The -Assembly had passed motions denouncing the whole of the treaty, and -declaring the Nationalists were determined to oppose its being carried -out, supposing it were signed by Damad Ferid Pasha, or any venal slave -of the foreigner, and to fight to the bitter end.</p> - -<p>Mustafa Kemal was said to have declared, in a conversation, that he had -not enough soldiers to make war, but he would manage to prevent any -European Power establishing dominion in Asia Minor. And he is reported -to have added: “I don’t care much if the Supreme Council ejects the -Turks from Europe, but in this case the Asiatic territories must remain -Turkish.”</p> - -<p>The Greek Army, which, according to the decisions of the Conference, -had started an offensive on the Smyrna front, after driving back the -Nationalists concentrated at Akhissar, occupied the offices of the -captainship of the port of Smyrna and the Ottoman post-office.</p> - -<p>On June 20, at Chekmeje, west of Constantinople on the European coast -of the Marmora, a steamer had landed a detachment of Kemalist troops, -which the British warships had immediately bombarded at a range of -eight miles.</p> - -<p>On June 21 and 22 two battalions, one English and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">240</a></span> the other Indian, -landed on the Asiatic coast and blew up the eighty guns scattered all -along the Straits, on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles.</p> - -<p>On June 23 the 13th Greek division attacked Salikili and occupied it. A -column of cavalry advanced towards Kula.</p> - -<p>On June 24 the Greek troops carried on their advance in four directions -and the Nationalists withdrew, fighting stoutly all the time.</p> - -<p>On June 25 the Greeks overcame their resistance and captured Alashehr, -formerly called Philadelphia, an important town on the Smyrna-Konia -line, about 100 miles from Smyrna, took some prisoners and captured -material.</p> - -<p>On July 1 the Greeks occupied Balikesri, an important station on the -Smyrna-Panderma line, nearly fifty miles to the north of Soma, in spite -of the Nationalists’ energetic resistance.</p> - -<p>On July 3 a landing of Greek troops hastened the fall of Panderma. Some -detachments which had landed under the protection of the fleet marched -southwards, and met the enemy outposts at Omerkeui, fifteen miles to -the north-west of Balikesri.</p> - -<p>Then on July 7 M. Venizelos stated at the Spa Conference that -the Greek offensive against Mustafa Kemal’s forces which had -begun on June 22 and whose chief objective was the capture of the -Magnesia-Akhissar-Soma-Balikesri-Panderma line, had ended victoriously -on July 2, when the forces coming from the south and those landed at -Panderma had effected a junction, and that the scheme of military -operations drawn up at Boulogne, which was to be carried out in two -weeks, according to General<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">241</a></span> Paraskevopoulos’ forecast, had been -brought to a successful end in eleven days.</p> - -<p>On July 8 Brusa was occupied by the Greek army, and Mudania and -Geumlek by British naval forces. Before the Greek advance began every -wealthy Turk had fled to the interior with what remained of the 56th -Turkish division, which had evacuated Brusa on July 2. Brusa had been -occupied by the Greeks without any bloodshed. A good number of railway -carriages and a few steam-engines belonging to a French company had -been left undamaged by the Turks on the Mudania line. The British naval -authorities, under the pretext that some shots had been fired from the -railway station, had had it shelled, together with the French manager’s -house, and all that was in these two buildings had been looted by -British sailors and the Greek population of Mudania.</p> - -<p>Some misleading articles in the Greek and English Press, which were -clearly unreliable, extolled the correct attitude of the Greek troops -towards the inhabitants during their advance in Asia Minor. According -to the Greek communiqué of July 17, “the Nationalists, now deprived -of any prestige, were being disarmed by the Moslem population which -earnestly asked to be protected by the Greek posts,” and “the Turks, -tired of the vexatious measures and the crushing taxes enforced by the -Kemalists, everywhere expressed their confidence and gratitude towards -the Greek soldiers, whom they welcomed as friends and protectors.”</p> - -<p>At the same time political circles in Athens openly declared that -the Greek operations in Asia Minor had now come to an end, and that -Adrianople and Eastern Thrace would soon be occupied—this occupation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">242</a></span> -being quite urgent as the Turks already evinced signs of resistance, -and the Bulgarians were assuming a threatening attitude. Moreover, -as might have been foreseen, the Greeks already began to speak of -territorial compensations after their operations in Asia Minor and of -setting up a new State.</p> - -<p>General Milne, whose forces had been reinforced by Greek elements, also -undertook to clear all the area lying between Constantinople and Ismid -from the irregular Turkish troops that had made their way into it.</p> - -<p>On July 7 it was officially notified by the British Headquarters that -“military movements were going to take place in the direction of -Ismid, and so the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus was considered as a -war zone.” Accordingly troops quartered in that district, and soldiers -employed in the various services, were to be recalled to the European -shore at once, and the next day any Turkish soldier found within that -zone would be treated as an enemy.</p> - -<p>The great Selimie barracks, at Skutari, were therefore evacuated by the -Turks, who thus had no troops left on the Asiatic shore of the Straits.</p> - -<p>At Pasha Bagtche Chiboukli, on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, -Greek soldiers helped to disarm the population, and searched everybody -who landed at that village.</p> - -<p>At Stambul, on the great bridge of Karakeui, British agents halted all -officers and soldiers wearing the Turkish uniform, and directed them to -the buildings of the English gendarmerie to be examined.</p> - -<p>The Alemdagh district was occupied, and General Milne had all the -Government troops disarmed, on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">243</a></span> the pretext of their questionable -attitude and the weakness of the Turkish Government. Yet the latter -had, of its own accord, broken up the Constantinople army corps, and -replaced it by one division that was to be dissolved, in its turn, -after the signature of the Peace Treaty, as according to the terms of -peace only 700 Turkish soldiers had a right to reside in Constantinople -as the Sultan’s guard.</p> - -<p>In an article of <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Matin</cite>, July 7, 1920, under the title, “A New -Phase of the Eclipse of French Influence in the East,” M. André -Fribourg pointed out the encroachment of the British Commander in -Constantinople.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The decision taken by the Allies at Boulogne not to grant any further -delay had placed the Turks in a difficult situation. The Grand Vizier, -who had come to Paris in the hope of negotiating, handed his answer on -the 25th, in order to keep within the appointed time.</p> - -<p>The Supreme Council examined this answer on Wednesday, July 7, at Spa. -After hearing the English experts, who advised that any modification -should be rejected, the Council refused to make any concessions on all -the chief points mentioned in the Turkish answer, and only admitted a -few subsidiary requests as open to discussion. It deputed a Commission -of political experts to draw up an answer in collaboration with the -military experts.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Minister of the Interior, Reshid Bey, chairman of the -Ottoman delegation, who had left Constantinople on the 25th, and had -arrived in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">244</a></span> Paris with Jemil Pasha only at the beginning of July, sent -a note to the Secretary of the Peace Conference to be forwarded to M. -Millerand at Spa. This note, which came to hand on July 11, completed -the first answer. It included the decisions taken in Constantinople -during Damad Ferid’s stay at Versailles.</p> - -<p>The remarks offered by the Ottoman delegation about the peace -conditions presented by the Allies made up a little book of forty pages -with some appendices, which was handed to the Conference on the 25th. -The answer, which had been revised in Constantinople, and consisted -of forty-seven pages, was delivered a few days after; it differed but -little from the first.</p> - -<p>This document began with the following protest against the conditions -enforced on Turkey:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“It was only fair—and it was also a right recognised by all nations -nowadays—that Turkey should be set on an equal footing with her -former allies. The flagrant inequality proffered by the draft of -the treaty will be bitterly resented not only by 12 million Turks, -but throughout the Moslem world.</p> - -<p>“Nothing, indeed, can equal the rigour of the draft of the Turkish -treaty. As a matter of fact, it is a dismemberment.</p> - -<p>“Not only do the Allies, in the name of the principle of -nationalities, detach important provinces from the Ottoman Empire -which they erect to the rank of free, independent States (Armenia -and the Hejaz), or independent States under the protection of a -mandatory Power (Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria); not only do -they wrench from it Egypt, Suez, and Cyprus, which are to be ceded -to Great Britain; not only do they require Turkey to give up all -her rights and titles to Libya and the States of the Ægean Sea: -they even mean to strip her, notwithstanding the said principle -of nationalities, of Eastern Thrace and the zone of Smyrna, which -countries, in a most iniquitous way, would be handed over to -Greece, who wants to be set on an equal footing with the victors, -though she has not even been at war with Turkey.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">245</a></span></p> - -<p>“Further, they are preparing to take Kurdistan and in an indirect -way to slice the rest of the country into zones of influence.</p> - -<p>“In this way more than two-thirds of the extent of the Ottoman -Empire would already be taken from it. With regard to the number -of inhabitants, it would be at least two-thirds. If we consider -the economic wealth and natural resources of the country, the -proportion would be greater still.</p> - -<p>“But that is not all. To this spoliation, the draft of the treaty -adds a notorious infringement on the sovereignty of the Ottoman -State. Even at Constantinople Turkey would not be her own mistress. -Side by side with His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish -Government—or even above them in some cases—a ‘Commission of the -Straits’ would rule over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and -the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this -Commission, whereas Bulgaria would send a representative to it.</p> - -<p>“In addition to these two powers, there would be a third one—the -military power exercised by the troops of occupation of three -States, whose headquarters would have the upper hand even of the -Ottoman gendarmerie.</p> - -<p>“Any possibility of mere defence against an attack would thus be -taken away from Turkey, whose capital would henceforth be within -the range of her enemies’ guns.</p> - -<p>“The sovereignty of the State would also be deeply infringed upon -in all matters relating to legislation, international treaties, -finance, administration, jurisdiction, trade, etc., so that finally -the crippled Ottoman Empire would be stripped of every attribute of -sovereignty both at home and abroad, but would be held responsible -all the same for the execution of the Peace Treaty and the -international obligations pertaining to every State.</p> - -<p>“Such a situation, which would be an utter denial of justice, would -constitute both a logical impossibility and a judicial anomaly. -For, on the one hand, it is impossible to maintain a State and -at the same time divest it of all that is an essential judicial -condition of its existence; and, on the other hand, there cannot be -any responsibility where there is no liberty.</p> - -<p>“Either the Allied Powers are of opinion that Turkey should -continue to exist, in which case they should make it possible for -her to live and fulfil her engagements by paying due regard to her -rights as a free, responsible State.</p> - -<p>“Or the Allied Powers want Turkey to die. They should then execute -their own sentence themselves, without asking the culprit—to whom -they did not even give a hearing—to append his signature to it and -bring them his co-operation.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">246</a></span></p> - -<p>After these general considerations and some remarks as to the -responsibility of Turkey, the fundamental rights of the State, and -the right of free disposal of peoples, the Ottoman Government made -counter-proposals which were quite legitimate, and at the same time -bore witness to its goodwill.</p> - -<p>This document, to which we refer the reader for further particulars, -may be summed up as follows: The Turkish Government recognises the new -States of Poland, Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, and Czecho-Slovakia. It -confirms the recognition made by Turkey in 1918 of Armenia as a free, -independent State. It also recognises the Hejaz as a free, independent -State. It recognises the French protectorate over Tunis. It accepts all -economic, commercial, and other consequences of the French protectorate -over Morocco, which was not a Turkish province. It renounces all rights -and privileges over Libya and the isles and islets of the Ægean Sea. -It recognises Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, as independent States. It -recognises the British protectorate over Egypt, the free passage of -the Suez Canal, the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Soudan, the -annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain.</p> - -<p>In regard to Constantinople and the régime of the zone of the Straits, -the Ottoman delegation remarked that according to the terms of the -treaty there would be together in that town—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“First, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and the Turkish Government, -whose rights and titles shall be maintained.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, the Commission of the Straits.</p> - -<p>“Thirdly, the military powers of occupation.</p> - -<p>“Fourthly, the diplomatic representatives of France, Britain, and -Italy, deliberating in a kind of council with the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">247</a></span> military and -naval commanders of the Franco-Anglo-Italian forces.”</p></div> - -<p>With them would be—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Fifthly, the Inter-Allied Commissioners of Control and Military -Organisation.</p> - -<p>“Sixthly, the Commission of Finance.</p> - -<p>“Seventhly, the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt.</p> - -<p>“Eighthly, the consuls’ jurisdictions.”</p></div> - -<p>After going over all the objections raised by the coexistence of these -various bodies, whose powers would encroach upon each other or would be -exactly similar, and the impossibility that foreign agents accredited -to the Sultan should hold such functions, the memorandum opposed the -following reasons to the decisions of the Conference:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“First, the draft of the treaty does not in any way institute <em>an -international judicial and political organisation</em> of the Straits.</p> - -<p>“Secondly, it institutes a political and military power on behalf -of <em>some</em> States, attended with all the international risks -pertaining to it.</p> - -<p>“Thirdly, with regard to Turkey it would constitute <em>a direct and -deep infringement on her rights of sovereignty, preservation, and -security, which infringements are not necessary to safeguard the -freedom of passage</em> of the Straits.</p> - -<p>“Fourthly, from an international point of view the intended régime -would create a kind of <em>international moral person by the side of -the States, which would not represent the League of Nations</em>.</p> - -<p>“Fifthly, the new international condition of Turkey would in some -respects be inferior to that of the new States consisting of -territories detached from Turkey, for these new States would be -placed under the mandate of a Power <em>appointed by the League of -Nations</em> mainly in accordance with <em>the wishes of the populations -concerned</em>, and bound to give a periodical account to the League of -Nations of the exercise of its mandate.</p> - -<p>“Sixthly, far from ensuring the internationalisation of the -Straits, which was aimed at by the Powers, the régime instituted<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">248</a></span> -by the draft of the treaty would <em>favour their nationalisation by -another State</em>.</p> - -<p>“The internationalisation of the Straits could only be realised -by means of an international organisation—viz., <em>a judicial -organisation representing all the Powers</em>.”</p></div> - -<p>Therefore, the Government allows the free passage of the Straits, but -asks that they should be controlled only by the League of Nations, and -that the Straits zones mentioned in the scheme of internationalisation -“should be reduced territorially to what is necessary to guarantee the -free passage of the Straits.” Turkey declares herself ready to accept -“this scheme, if restricted to the Straits zone, whose frontiers were -fixed as follows”:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“(<em>a</em>) In Europe the Sharkeui-Karachali line, thus including all -the Gallipoli Peninsula.</p> - -<p>“(<em>b</em>) In Asia a line passing through Kara-Bigha (on the Sea of -Marmora), Bigha, Ezine, and Behramkeui.”</p></div> - -<p>She thus agrees to “all restrictions to her sovereignty over the -Straits that are necessary to control the navigation and ensure their -opening to all flags on a footing of complete equality between the -States.”</p> - -<p>Further,</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As regards all matters concerning the region of the Straits and -the Sea of Marmora, the Ottoman Government is willing to discuss a -convention instituting for these waters a régime of the same kind -as the one established for the Suez Canal by the Constantinople -treaty of October 29, 1888, the very régime advocated by Great -Britain (Art. 109).”</p></div> - -<p>The Ottoman Government—this article, together with the one concerning -the Hejaz that will be mentioned later on, was the most important -addition in the revised answer drawn up at Constantinople—wishes the -islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, lying before the entrance to the -Dardanelles, to be included<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">249</a></span> in the zone of the Straits—that is to -say, to remain Ottoman territories under inter-Allied occupation. -The Allies intended to give these islands to Greece, and it was -feared in Constantinople the latter might hand them over to another -Power—England, for instance—that would cede her Cyprus in exchange.</p> - -<p>Among a great many measures intended for ensuring the security of -Constantinople, the Ottoman Government chiefly asks for the limitation -of the number of foreign warships allowed to stay in Turkish waters.</p> - -<p>It wants to maintain, under Ottoman sovereignty, Eastern Thrace within -its pre-war boundaries, and Smyrna with the surrounding area, which -shall be evacuated by Hellenic troops, and may be occupied for three -years at the utmost by troops of the chief Allied Powers.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman Government asks for an international inquiry to fix the -frontiers of Kurdistan according to the principle of nationalities, in -case the Kurds—who, it firmly believes, are “indissolubly attached to -His Majesty the Sultan,” and who “have never wished, and will never -have the least desire, to be completely independent or even to relax -the bonds that link them with the Turkish people”—should express the -wish to enjoy local autonomy. The intended frontier between Syria -and Mesopotamia should also be altered, for otherwise it would cut -off from the Ottoman Empire a predominantly Turkish population; “an -international commission should make a thorough inquiry with a view to -ascertain facts from an ethnic point of view.”</p> - -<p>It also wants the King of the Hejaz to pledge himself<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">250</a></span> to respect the -titles and prerogatives of the Sultan as Caliph over the holy cities -and places of Mecca and Medina.</p> - -<p>Lastly, it declares itself ready to accept, without asking for -reciprocity, the clauses concerning the protection of minorities.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Greeks seemed eager to carry on their campaign in Asia -Minor, without even waiting for the definite settlement of the treaty. -According to information sent from Greece,<a name="FNanchor_33_33" id="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">33</a> the Hellenic army, -having reached all its objectives, was waiting for the decisions of the -Spa Conference, and if the latter wished her to carry on her operations -in Asia Minor, her fourth objective would probably be Eskishehr, the -nucleus of the Anatolian railways, which commands all the traffic and -revictualling of Asia Minor, and whose fall would perhaps bring the war -to an end.</p> - -<p>The Allied answer to the Turkish request for further delays and to the -Turkish remarks was handed to the Ottoman delegation on July 17.</p> - -<p>In this answer, the main lines or perhaps even the very words of which -had been settled at Spa, the Allies only repeated their previous -arguments—some of which were ineffective and others unfounded; and both -the letter and the spirit of the answer were most unconciliatory.</p> - -<p>The assertion that “Turkey entered into the war without the shadow of -an excuse or provocation,” recurred again in it and was fully enlarged -upon. The events that had taken place lately and the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">251</a></span> character they -had assumed since the end of hostilities did not seem to have taught -the writers or instigators of the answer anything at all. We do not -wish here to mitigate in any way the responsibilities of Turkey or her -wrongs to the Allies; yet we should not overlook the most legitimate -reasons that drove her to act thus, and we must own she had a right -to mistrust the promises made to her. For the policy that the Allies -pursued at that time and that they have not wholly repudiated obviously -proved that they would give a free hand to Russia to carry out her -ambitious schemes on Constantinople and Turkey-in-Asia, as a reward for -her energetic share in the war.</p> - -<p>Besides, a fact helps us to understand how Turkey was driven to enter -into the war and accounts for her apprehension of England and the -Anglo-Hellenic policy pursued by England in relation with her later on, -both in the working out of the Sèvres treaty and after the signature of -this treaty; it is the proposition made by England to Greece to attack -Turkey. According to the letter that M. Venizelos addressed to King -Constantine on September 7, 1914, sending in his resignation, which was -not accepted by the King, Admiral Kerr, the very man whom later on, -in 1920, the British Government was to entrust with a mission to the -Hellenic King while he was at Lucerne, formally waited upon the latter -to urge him to attack Turkey. The King is said to have laid down as a -necessary condition to his consent that Britain should guarantee the -neutrality of Bulgaria and should contrive to bring Turkey to afford -him a pretext for opening hostilities. Admiral Kerr, speaking on -behalf of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">252</a></span> the British Government, is reported to have given him full -guarantee on the first point; but with reference to the second point he -hinted that he thought it unnecessary to seek for a pretext or wait for -a provocation as the Hellenic policy constantly evinced a feeling of -hostility towards Turkey.<a name="FNanchor_34_34" id="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">34</a></p> - -<p>In this answer the Allies again reproached the Turks with their -atrocities—without mentioning the atrocities committed by the Armenians -against the Turks; and yet at that time Mr. Lloyd George seemed to -have wholly forgotten the German atrocities, for he did not say a -word about the punishment of the war criminals, and seemed ready to -make concessions as to the reparations stipulated in the treaty with -Germany. Why should the Turks be chastised—as was said at the time—if -the other criminals were not punished? Was it merely because they were -weaker and less guilty than the Germans?</p> - -<p>Though it was a palpable falsehood, it was asserted again in this -document that in Thrace the Moslems were not in a majority.</p> - -<p>The Powers also gravely affirmed they contemplated for Smyrna “about -the same régime as for Dantzig,” which could not greatly please either -the Greeks or the Turks, judging from the condition of the Poles in the -Baltic port; but they did not add that perhaps in this case too England -would finally control the port.</p> - -<p>“With regard to the control of the Straits,” said the document, “the -Powers must unhesitatingly take<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">253</a></span> adequate measures to prevent the -Turkish Government from treacherously trampling upon the cause of -civilisation.” It seemed to be forgotten that Turkey insisted upon -keeping them in order to prevent Russia from seizing them; and at the -very time when the note was drawn up some newspapers declared—which -might have sufficed to justify the Turkish claim—that the passage of -the Straits must be free in order to allow the Allies to send munitions -to Wrangel’s army.</p> - -<p>The Allies, however, decided to grant to “Turkey, as a riparian Power -and in the same manner and on the same conditions as to Bulgaria, the -right to appoint a delegate to the Commission and the suppression -of the clause through which Turkey was to surrender to the Allied -Governments all steamers of 1,600 tons upwards.” These were the only -two concessions made to Turkey.</p> - -<p>The Allies’ answer laid great stress upon the advantages offered by -the organisation of a financial control of Turkey, which, to quote the -document itself, “was introduced for no other purpose than to protect -Turkey against the corruption and speculation which had ruined her in -the past.” As a matter of fact, that corruption and speculation had -been let loose in Turkey by the Great Powers themselves, under cover of -the privileges given by the Capitulations.</p> - -<p>Judging from the very words of the clause which left Constantinople in -the hands of the Turks, the Allies seemed to allow this merely out of -condescension, and even alleged that the territory left to Turkey as a -sovereign State was “a large and productive territory.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">254</a></span></p> - -<p>Finally, the note concluded with the following threat:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace, still more if -it finds itself unable to re-establish its sovereignty in Anatolia -or to give effect to the treaty, the Allies, in accordance with the -terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider the arrangement by -ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all.”</p></div> - -<p>These lines plainly show that some Powers had not given up the idea of -ejecting the Turks from Europe, and were only awaiting an opportunity -that might warrant another European intervention to carry out their -plans and satisfy their ambition; and yet this policy, as will be seen -later on, went against their own interests and those of Old Europe.</p> - -<p>The idea that the British Premier entertained of the important -strategic and commercial consequences that would ensue if the Near East -were taken away from Turkish sovereignty was obviously contradictory -to the historical part played by Turkey; and by disregarding the -influence of Turkey in European affairs in the past and the present, he -made a grievous political mistake. If one day Germany, having become a -strong nation again, should offer her support to Turkey, cut to pieces -by England, all the Turks in Asia might remember Mr. Lloyd George’s -policy, especially as M. Venizelos might then have been replaced by -Constantine or the like.</p> - -<p>Turkey was granted a period of ten days, expiring on July 27 at 12 -midnight, to let the Allies definitely know whether she accepted the -clauses of the treaty and intended to sign it.</p> - -<p>This comminatory answer did not come as a surprise. Mr. Lloyd George -openly said he was<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">255</a></span> convinced the Greeks would be as successful in -Thrace as they had been in Asia Minor, which was easy to foresee but -did not mean much for the future; and he thought he was justified in -declaring with some self-satisfaction before the Commons on July 21, -1920—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Great Powers had kept the Turk together not because of any -particular confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid -of what might happen if he disappeared.</p> - -<p>“The late war has completely put an end to that state of things. -Turkey is broken beyond repair, and from our point of view we have -no reason to regret it.”</p></div> - -<p>The Greek troops, supported by an Anglo-Hellenic naval group, including -two British dreadnoughts, effected a landing in the ports of Erekli, -Sultan Keui (where they met with no resistance), and Rodosto, which was -occupied in the afternoon.</p> - -<p>The Hellenic forces landed on the coasts of the Marmora reached the -Chorlu-Muradli line on the railway, and their immediate objective was -the occupation of the Adrianople-Constantinople railway in order to cut -off all communications between Jafer Tayar’s troops and the Nationalist -elements of the capital, and capture Lule Burgas. From this position -they would be able to threaten Jafer Tayar and Huhi ed Din on their -flanks and rear in order to compel them to withdraw their troops from -the Maritza, or run the risk of being encircled if they did not cross -the Bulgarian frontier.</p> - -<p>The Greek operations against Adrianople began on July 20. The Turkish -Nationalists had dug a network of trenches on the right bank of the -Tunja, which flows by Adrianople; they offered some resistance, and -bombarded the bridgeheads of Kuleli Burgas and of the suburbs of -Karagatch, three<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">256</a></span> miles from Adrianople, where the Greeks had taken -their stand for over a month. But on Saturday, July 24, the confident -spirit of the Turkish civilians and officers suddenly broke down when -it was known that the Greeks had landed on the shores of the Marmora, -had reached Lule Burgas, and threatened to encircle the troops that -defended Adrianople. In the absence of Jafer Tayar, who had repaired -to the front, the officers suddenly left the town without letting it -be known whether they were going to Northern Thrace or withdrawing -to Bulgaria, and the soldiers, leaving the trenches in their turn, -scattered all over Adrianople. The white flag was hoisted during the -night, and the next day at daybreak a delegation, including Shevket -Bey, mayor of the town, the mufti, the heads of the Orthodox and Jewish -religious communities, repaired to the Hellenic outposts, at Karagatch, -to ask the Greeks to occupy the town at once. At 10 o’clock the troops -marched into the town, and by 12 they occupied the Konak, the prefect’s -mansion, where the Turks had left everything—archives, furniture, -carpets, and so on.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, it was reported that 12,000 Turks who had refused to -surrender and accept Greek domination crossed the Bulgarian frontier.</p> - -<p>As soon as the Grand Vizier came back to Constantinople a conflict -arose between the latter, who maintained Turkey was compelled to sign -the treaty, and some members of the Cabinet. As the Grand Vizier, -who was in favour of the ratification, hesitated to summon the Crown -Council, the Minister of Public Works, Fakhr ed Din, Minister of Public -Education,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">257</a></span> Reshid, Minister of Finance and provisional Minister of -the Interior, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, who all wanted the Council to be -summoned, are said to have offered their resignation, which was not -accepted by the Sultan—or at any rate was no more heard of.</p> - -<p>On July 20 the Sultan summoned a Council of the Imperial Family, -including the Sultanas, and on July 22 the Crown Council, consisting -of fifty-five of the most prominent men in Turkey, among whom were -five generals, a few senators, the members of the Cabinet, and some -members of the former Government. The Grand Vizier spoke first, and -declared Turkey could not do otherwise than sign the treaty. All the -members of the Council supported the Government’s decision, with the -exception of Marshal Fuad, who had already used his influence with the -Sultan in favour of the Nationalists and who said the Turks should die -rather than sign such a peace, and of Riza Pasha, who had commanded -the artillery before the war, who said Turkey did not deserve such a -grievous punishment and refused to vote. Turkey had been at war for -ten years, which partly accounts for the decision taken. Therefore -the order to sign the treaty of peace was officially given, and, as -had already been announced, General Hadi Pasha, of Arabian descent, -Dr. Riza Tewfik Bey, and Reshad Halis Bey, ambassador at Berne, were -appointed Turkish plenipotentiaries.</p> - -<p>The Grand Vizier in an appeal to Jafer Tayar, the Nationalist leader -in Thrace, begged of him “to surrender at once and leave Thrace to -the Greek army.” He concluded with these words: “We fully recognise -your patriotism, but protracting the war<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">258</a></span> would be detrimental to the -interests of the nation. You must submit.”</p> - -<p>Then the question arose how the treaty—which now admitted of no -discussion—after being enforced and carried out by arms, before the -delay for acceptance granted to the Ottoman Government had come to an -end, against all rules of international law and diplomatic precedents, -could solve the Eastern question.</p> - -<p>Of course it was alleged that the Greek offensive in Anatolia had -nothing to do with the treaty of peace presented to Turkey, that it -only constituted a preventive measure in support of the treaty and it -was not directed against the Stambul Government, but against Mustafa -Kemal’s troops, which had broken the armistice by attacking the British -troops on the Ismid line. Yet this was but a poor reason, and how was -it possible to justify the Greek attack in Thrace, which took place -immediately after? The fact was that England and Greece, being afraid -of losing their prey, were in a hurry to take hold of it, and neither -Mr. Lloyd George nor M. Venizelos shrank from shedding more blood to -enforce a treaty which could not bring about peace.</p> - -<p>Now that the Allies had driven a Government which no longer represented -Turkey to accept the treaty, and the latter had been signed, under -English compulsion, by some aged politicians, while the Greeks and -the British partitioned the Ottoman Empire between themselves, was -it possible to say that all the difficulties were settled? The -signature of the treaty could but weaken the tottering power of the -Sultan. Moreover, England, eager to derive the utmost benefit<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">259</a></span> from -the weakness of Turkey, raised the question of the Caliphate; it was -learned from an English source that the title of Caliph had been -offered to the Emir of Afghanistan, but the latter had declined the -offer. On the other hand, how could Mustafa Kemal be expected to -adhere to the decisions taken in Constantinople? It was to be feared, -therefore, the agitation would be protracted, for an Anatolian campaign -would offer far greater difficulties than those the Greek army had had -to overcome on the low plains along the sea; and at Balikesri, standing -at an altitude of 400 feet, begin the first slopes of the Anatolian -uplands. As a matter of fact, Turkey was not dead, as Mr. Lloyd -George believed, but the policy of the British Premier was doomed to -failure—the same policy which the Soviets were trifling with, which was -paving the way to the secession of Ireland, and may one day cost Great -Britain the loss of India and Egypt.</p> - -<p>It has even been said the Bolshevists themselves advised Turkey to sign -the treaty in order to gain time, and thus organise a campaign in which -the Bolshevist forces and the Nationalist forces in Turkey and Asia -Minor would fight side by side.</p> - -<p>The Ottoman delegation, consisting of General Hadi Pasha, Riza Tewfik -Bey, a senator, and the Turkish ambassador at Berne, Reshad Halis Bey, -arrived in Paris on Friday, July 30. The signature of the treaty, which -was first to take place on July 27 and had been put off till the next -Thursday or Saturday because the delegates could not arrive in time, -was at the last moment postponed indefinitely.</p> - -<p>Some difficulties had arisen between Italy and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">260</a></span> Greece concerning -the “Twelve Islands,” or Dodecanese, and this Italo-Greek incident -prevented the signature of the treaty. For it was stipulated in Article -122 of the treaty:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Turkey cedes to Italy all her rights and titles to the islands of -the Ægean Sea—viz., Stampalia, Rhodes, Calki, Scarpanto, Casos, -Piscopis, Nisyros, Calimnos, Leros, Patmos, Lipsos, Symi, and -Cos, now occupied by Italy, and the islets pertaining thereunto, -together with the Island of Castellorizzo.”</p></div> - -<p>The thirteen islands mentioned here constitute what is called the -Dodecanese, and Italy had taken possession of them in 1912, during the -war with the Ottoman Empire. But in July, 1919, an agreement, which -has already been mentioned, had been concluded between the Italian -Government, represented by M. Tittoni, and the Greek Government, -represented by M. Venizelos, according to which Italy ceded to Greece -the Dodecanese, except Rhodes, which was to share the fate of Cyprus, -and pledged herself not to object to Greece setting foot in Southern -Albania. Of course, Italy in return was to have advantages in Asia -Minor and the Adriatic Sea.</p> - -<p>At the meeting of the Supreme Council held in London before the San -Remo Conference to draw up the Turkish treaty, M. Venizelos had stated -that Greece could not accept Article 122, if the Italo-Greek agreement -did not compel Italy to cede the Dodecanese to Greece. M. Scialoja, -the Italian delegate, had answered that on the day of the signature -of the Turkish treaty an agreement would be signed between Italy and -Greece, through which Italy transferred to Greece the sovereignty of -the aforesaid islands.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">261</a></span></p> - -<p>Now Italy, in 1920, considered that the agreement which was binding -on both parties had become null and void, as she had not obtained any -of the compensations stipulated in it, and so she thought she had a -right now not to cede the islands—Castellorizzo, though inhabited by -12,000 Greeks, not being included in the agreement. As to Rhodes, that -was to share the fate of Cyprus: England did not seem willing now to -cede it to Greece; so that was out of the question for the moment. -Moreover, the Italian Government insisted upon keeping the Island of -Halki, or Karki, lying near Rhodes. Lastly, as Italy, after the solemn -proclamation of the autonomy and independence of Albania, had been -obliged to evacuate nearly the whole of Albania, the cession to Greece -of part of Southern Albania could not be tolerated by Italian public -opinion and had now become an utter impossibility.</p> - -<p>Under such circumstances the Greek Government had stated it was no -longer willing to sign the Turkish treaty, which, if the previous -agreement alone is taken into account, assigns the Dodecanese to -Italy. This incident at the last moment prevented the signature of the -treaty which had been so laboriously drawn up, and put the Powers in -an awkward situation since the regions occupied by the Greek armies -in Asia Minor were five times as large as the Smyrna area assigned to -Greece, and obviously could not be evacuated by the Greeks before a -state of peace was restored between them and Turkey.</p> - -<p>The signature of the treaty, which had been put off at first, as -has just been mentioned, till the end of July, was, after various -delays, arranged for Thursday,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">262</a></span> August 5, then postponed till the next -Saturday, and finally took place only three days later.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile, the Armenian delegation raised another objection, and -informed the Allies that as their president, Nubar Pasha, had been -admitted by the Allied Governments to the signature of the Peace -Treaty, as representing the Armenians of Turkey and the Armenian -colonies, they thought it unfair not to let him sign the Turkish treaty -too, merely because he represented the Turkish Armenians. The Allies -advised the Armenians for their own sake not to insist, in order to -avoid an official protest of Turkey against the treaty after its -signature, under the pretext that it had not been signed regularly.</p> - -<p>In the House of Lords the treaty was sharply criticised by Lord Wemyss, -especially in regard to the condition of Smyrna and the cession of -Eastern Thrace to Greece.</p> - -<p>In the speech he delivered on Friday, August 6, at Montecitorio, -Count Sforza, coming to the question of the Dodecanese, summed up the -Tittoni-Venizelos agreement of July 29, 1919, as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Italy pledged herself to support at the Conference the Greek -claims on Eastern and Western Thrace; she even pledged herself to -support the Greek demand of annexing Southern Albania. Greece, in -return for this, pledged herself to give Italy a free zone in the -port of Santi Quaranta, and to give Italian industry a right of -preference for the eventual building of a railway line beginning at -this port.</p> - -<p>“Greece pledged herself to support at the Conference the Italian -mandate over Albania, to recognise Italian sovereignty over -Valona, and confirm the neutralisation of the Corfu Canal already -prescribed by the London Conference in 1913-14, when Greece had -promised not to build any military works on the coast between Cape -Stilo and Aspriruga.</p> - -<p>“Greece pledged herself, in case she should have satisfaction in -Thrace and Southern Albania, to give up, in favour<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">263</a></span> of Italy, -all her territorial claims in Asia Minor which hindered Italian -interests.</p> - -<p>“The Italian and Greek Governments promised to support each other -at the Conference concerning their claims in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>“Italy had already pledged herself to cede to Greece the -sovereignty of the isles of the Ægean Sea, except Rhodes, to which -the Italian Government promised to grant a liberal administrative -autonomy.</p> - -<p>“Italy also pledged herself to respect the religious liberty of the -Greeks who were going to be more under her rule in Asia Minor, and -Greece took a similar engagement with respect to the Italians.</p> - -<p>“Article 7 dealt with what would happen if the two countries wished -to resume their full liberty of action.</p> - -<p>“Italy pledged herself to insert a clause in the treaty, in which -she promised to let the people of Rhodes freely decide their own -fate, on condition that the plebiscite should not be taken before -five years after the signature of the Peace Treaty.”</p></div> - -<p>Count Sforza proceeded to say that on July 22, after coming back from -Spa, he had addressed M. Venizelos a note to let him know that the -Allies’ decisions concerning Asia Minor and the aspirations of the -Albanian people compelled the Italian Government to alter their policy -in order to safeguard the Italian interests in those regions:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Under the circumstances, the situation based on the agreement of -July 29, 1919, as to the line of conduct to be followed at the -Conference was substantially modified.</p> - -<p>“Therefore Italy, in conformity with Article 7 of the agreement, -now resumes her full liberty of action. Yet the Italian Government, -urged by a conciliatory spirit, intends to consider the situation -afresh, as it earnestly wishes to arrive at a satisfactory and -complete understanding.</p> - -<p>“The desire to maintain friendly relations with Greece is most -deeply felt in Italy. Greece is a vital force to the East. When -I tried to get better conditions of peace for Turkey, I felt -convinced I was safeguarding the independence and the territorial -integrity which the Turkish people is entitled to, and at the same -time I was serving the true interests of Hellenism.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">264</a></span></p> - -<p>In an interview published by the <cite>Stampa</cite>, M. Tittoni on his side -declared, concerning the Dodecanese and the arrangement he had -negotiated with M. Venizelos, that, as circumstances had changed, the -clauses of the agreement had become null and void.</p> - -<p>Alluding to the note handed by him on coming to Paris to M. Clémenceau -and Mr. Lloyd George and recently read to the Senate by M. Scialoja, he -complained that the Allies supported the Greek claims in Asia Minor, -and overlooked the Italian interests in the same region. As Greece had -got all she wanted and Italy’s hopes in Asia Minor had been frustrated, -the agreement with M. Venizelos was no longer valid, according to him, -and he concluded thus: “The agreement became null and void on the day -when at San Remo the draft of the Turkish treaty was definitely drawn -up.” Finally, on August 9 Greece and Italy came to an agreement, and a -protocol was signed. The Dodecanese, according to the Tittoni-Venizelos -agreement, were given up to Greece, with the exception of Rhodes, -which, for the present, remained in the hands of Italy. In case England -should cede Cyprus to Greece, a plebiscite was to be taken at Rhodes -within fifteen years, instead of five years as had been settled before. -There was no reason why Italy should give up Rhodes if England, which -had ruled over Cyprus since 1878, did not hand it over to Greece. The -League of Nations was to decide in what manner this plebiscite was to -be taken; meanwhile Italy would grant Rhodes a wide autonomy. According -to the account given of the Italo-Greek agreement, it includes some -stipulations<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">265</a></span> concerning Smyrna, and at the request of the Italian -Government the Italian schools, museums, and subjects enjoy a special -treatment. Italy keeps her privilege for the archæological excavations -at Kos.</p> - -<p>Not a word was said of Albania, though there had been some clauses -about it in the 1919 agreement. Italy and Greece were to make separate -arrangements with the Albanians.</p> - -<p>Yugo-Slavia in its turn protested in regard to the share of the Turkish -debt that was assigned to her and complained that the charges inherent -in the Turkish territories she had received in 1913 were too heavy.</p> - -<p>King Hussein too was dissatisfied with the Syrian events and the -attitude of France. So he refused to adhere to the treaty, though -it indirectly acknowledged the independence of his States and his -own sovereignty. He thus showed he really aimed at setting up a huge -Arabian Kingdom where his sons would have only been his lieutenants -in Syria and Mesopotamia. Besides, King Hussein earnestly begged that -the Kingdom of Mesopotamia, which had hitherto been promised to his -son Abdullah, should be given to the Emir Feisal as a compensation for -Syria, and a hint was given that England would not object to this.</p> - -<p>Then the Turkish delegates, seeing the Allies at variance, raised -objections to the treaty, and on the morning of August 10 Hadi Pasha -informed the Conference he could not sign the treaty if the Allies -could not agree together. However, at the earnest request of a high -official of the Foreign Office and after he had been repeatedly urged -to do so, he consented to sign the treaty in the afternoon at Sèvres.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">266</a></span></p> - -<p>Together with the Turkish treaty seven treaties or agreements were also -signed—namely:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“A treaty in regard to Thrace; sanctioning the cession to Greece -of some territories given up by Bulgaria in accordance with the -Versailles treaty, and giving Bulgaria a free outlet to the sea at -the port of Dedeagatch.</p> - -<p>“A tripartite convention between England, France, and Italy, -settling the zones of economic influence of France and Italy in the -Ottoman territory of Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>“A Greco-Italian convention assigning the ‘Twelve Islands’ to -Greece—a plebiscite was to be taken in regard to the sovereignty -over Rhodes.</p> - -<p>“A treaty between Armenia and the Great Powers, settling the -question of the minorities in the future Armenian State.</p> - -<p>“A treaty in regard to the Greek minorities, ensuring them -protection in the territories that had newly been occupied by -Greece.</p> - -<p>“A treaty concerning the New States, settling administrative -questions between Italy and the States which occupied territories -formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary.</p> - -<p>“A treaty fixing various frontiers in Central Europe at some places -where they had not yet been definitely laid down.”</p></div> - -<p>According to the terms of the agreement concerning the protection -of minorities, Greece pledged herself to grant to Greek subjects -belonging to minorities in language, race, or religion the same civil -and political rights, the same consideration and protection as to -the other Greek subjects, on the strength of which France and Great -Britain gave up their rights of control over Greece, established by the -London treaty of 1832, their right of control over the Ionian Islands -established by the London treaty of 1864, and their right of protection -of religious freedom conferred by the London Conference of 1830.</p> - -<p>Greece pledged herself also to present for the approval of the League -of Nations within a year a scheme of organisation of Adrianople, -including a municipal council in which the various races should<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">267</a></span> be -represented. All the clauses of the treaty for the protection of -minorities were under the guarantee of the League of Nations. Greece -also pledged herself to give the Allies the benefit of the “most -favoured nation” clause till a general commercial agreement had been -concluded, within five years, under the patronage of the League of -Nations.</p> - -<p>All these delays and incidents bore witness to the difficulty of -arriving at a solution of the Eastern question in the way the Allies -had set to work, and to the frailty of the stipulations inserted in the -treaty.</p> - -<p>They also testified to the lack of skill and political acuteness -of Mr. Lloyd George. Of course, the British Premier, owing to the -large concessions he had made to Greece, had managed to ensure the -preponderance of British influence in Constantinople and the zone of -the Straits, and by seeking to set up a large Arabian Empire he had -secured to his country the chief trunk of the Baghdad Railway.</p> - -<p>But the laborious negotiations which had painfully arrived at the -settlement proposed by the Conference did not seem likely to solve the -Eastern question definitely. It still remained a burning question, and -the treaty signed by the Ottoman delegates was still most precarious. -Accordingly Count Sforza, in the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, made the -following statement with regard to Anatolia:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Everybody asserts the war has created a new world; but practically -everybody thinks and feels as if nothing had occurred. The Moslem -East wants to live and develop. It, too, wants to have an influence -of its own in to-morrow’s world. To the Anatolian Turks it has been -our wish to offer a hearty and earnest collaboration on economic -and moral grounds by respecting the independence and sovereignty of -Turkey.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">268</a></span></p> - -<p>The signatures of plenipotentiaries sent by a Government which remained -in office merely because its head, Damad Ferid, was a tool in the hands -of England, were no guarantee for the future, and the failure of the -revolutionary movement indefinitely postponed the settlement of the -Eastern question which for half a century has been disturbing European -policy.</p> - -<p>Islam remains, notwithstanding, a spiritual force that will survive -all measures taken against the Sublime Porte, and the dismemberment of -the Ottoman Empire does not solve any of the numerous questions raised -by the intercourse of the various races that were formerly under the -Sultan’s rule. Russia has not given up her ambitious designs on the -Straits, and one day or another she will try to carry them out; and it -is to be feared that German influence may benefit by the resentment of -the Turkish people. These are some of the numerous sources of future -conflicts.</p> - -<p>On the day that followed the signature of the treaty all the Turkish -newspapers in Constantinople were in mourning and announced it as a day -of mourning for the Turkish nation.</p> - -<p>At Stambul all public entertainments were prohibited, all shops and -public buildings were closed. Many Turks went to the mosques to pray -for the welfare of the country, the people who seek nothing but peace -and quietude looked weary and downcast.</p> - -<p>A few organs of the Turkish Press violently attacked the delegates who -had signed “the death-warrant of Turkey and laid the foundations of a -necessary policy of revenge.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">269</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/i269.jpg" width="600" height="359" alt="" /> -<p class="caption noindent"><span class="smcap">Turkey under the Treaty of Sèvres.</span></p> -<p class="largeimg"><a href="images/i269_large.jpg">Larger image</a> (201 kB)</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">270</a></span></p> - -<div class="figcenter"> -<img src="images/i270.jpg" width="600" height="339" alt="" /> -<p class="caption noindent"><span class="smcap">Schematic Map of the Territories lost by Turkey -since 1699, and of the Territories left to Turkey by the Sèvres -Treaty.</span></p> -<p class="largeimg"><a href="images/i270_large.jpg">Larger image</a> (204 kB)</p> -</div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">271</a></span></p> - -<p>Others hoped the Great Powers would take into account the goodwill of -Turkey, and would gradually give up some of their intolerable demands.</p> - -<p>Others, finally, bewailing the direful downfall of the Turkish Empire -and insisting upon the lesson taught by this historical event for the -future, hoped that the future would forcibly bring on a revision of -that “iniquitous and impracticable” treaty of peace.</p> - -<p>In France, M. Pierre Loti devoted one of his last articles to the -treaty, which he called “the silliest of all the silly blunders of our -Eastern policy.”<a name="FNanchor_35_35" id="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">35</a></p> - -<p>The map on p. <a href="#Page_269">269</a> shows the area left to the Turks in Europe and in -Asia Minor by the Treaty of Sèvres. There will be seen the territories -of Mesopotamia under English mandate, those of Syria under French -mandate, and those which have been added to Palestine and are -practically under English control. There will also be seen the regions -on which France and Italy, in virtue of the tripartite agreement -signed on August 10, 1920, enjoy preferential claims to supply the -staff required for the assistance of the Porte in organising the local -administration and the police. The contracting Powers in that agreement -have undertaken not to apply, nor to make or support applications, on -behalf of their nationals, for industrial concessions in areas allotted -to another Power.</p> - -<p>The map on p. <a href="#Page_270">270</a> is a scheme of the territories lost by Turkey from -1699 down to the Sèvres Treaty; it shows that, by completing the -dismemberment of Turkey, the treaty aimed at her annihilation.</p> - - -<p>Footnotes:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">26</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, March 26, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_27_27" id="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27"><span class="label">27</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, March 27, 1920: “Mesopotamia and the -Mandate.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_28_28" id="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28"><span class="label">28</span></a> The very words of this agreement were given by M. Pierre -Loti in his book, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Mort de notre chère France en Orient</cite>, p. 153.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_29_29" id="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29"><span class="label">29</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Journal des Débats</cite>, May 26, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_30_30" id="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30"><span class="label">30</span></a> <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite>, June 12, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_31_31" id="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31"><span class="label">31</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Matin</cite>, June 12, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_32_32" id="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32"><span class="label">32</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Croix</cite>, July 14, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_33_33" id="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33"><span class="label">33</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Temps</cite>, July 17, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_34_34" id="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34"><span class="label">34</span></a> Cf. <cite>Ex-King Constantine and the War</cite>, by Major J. M. -Melas, p. 239.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_35_35" id="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35"><span class="label">35</span></a> The <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Œuvre</cite>, August 20, 1920.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">272</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="VII">VII<br /> -<br /> -THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> condition of affairs in the East now seemed all the more alarming -and critical as the Allies, after dismembering Turkey, did not seem -to have given up their plan of evicting the Turks. This policy, which -had taken Armenia from Turkey, but had not succeeded in ensuring her a -definite status, could only hurry on the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian -movements, drive them to assert their opposition more plainly, and thus -bring them closer together by reinforcing Pan-Islamism.</p> - -<p>Of course it had been said at the beginning of January, 1920, that -the Turks were downhearted, that Mustafa Kemal was short of money, -that he had to encounter the opposition of the other parties, and -that his movement seemed doomed to failure. It was also asserted -that his army was only made up of bands which began to plunder the -country, and that anarchy now prevailed throughout Turkey-in-Asia. Yet -the Nationalist generals soon managed to intercept the food-supply -of Constantinople, and when the conditions of the Peace Treaty were -made known the situation, as has just been seen, underwent a complete -change. They held in check the English till the latter had called the -Greeks to their help, and though at a certain stage it would have been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">273</a></span> -possible to negotiate and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal, now, on -the contrary, it was impossible to do so, owing to the amplitude and -strength gained by the Nationalist movement.</p> - -<p>It was soon known that many a parley had been entered into between -Turkish and Arabian elements, that some Turkish officers had gone over -to the Arabian Nationalists of Syria and had taken command of their -troops, and though a political agreement or a closer connection between -the two elements did not ensue, yet the Turks and the Arabs, dreading -foreign occupation, organised themselves and were ready to help each -other to defend their independence.</p> - -<p>We should bear in mind what Enver Pasha, who was playing a questionable -part in the East, and Fethy Bey had once done in Tripoli. Turkish -officers might very well, if an opportunity occurred, impart to these -bands the discipline and cohesion they lacked and instil into them a -warlike spirit; or these bands might side with the Bolshevists who had -invaded the Transcaspian isthmus; they would have been able to hinder -the operations that the Allies had once seemed inclined to launch into, -but had wisely given up, and they could always raise new difficulties -for the Allies.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the idea, once contemplated and perhaps not definitely given -up, to send back to Asia the Sultans and viziers who, after their -centuries-old intercourse with the West, had become “Europeanised” -and to whom the ways and manners of our diplomacy had grown familiar, -could only modify their foreign policy to our disadvantage, and give it -an Asiatic turn; whereas now, having long associated Ottoman<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">274</a></span> affairs -with European affairs, they have thus been brought to consider their -own interests from a European point of view. The influence of this -intercourse with Europe on the Constantinople Government naturally -induced it to exercise a soothing influence over the Mussulmans, which -was to the advantage of both Europe and Turkey. It is obvious that, on -the contrary, the eviction of the Sultan, at a time when the Arabian -world and the Turkish world were being roused, would have left the -Allied Powers face to face with anarchist elements which, being spurred -on by similar religious and nationalist passions, would have grouped -together; and one day the Powers would have found themselves confronted -with the organised resistance of established governments. Even as -things are now, who can foresee what will be all the consequences in -the East of the clauses enforced on Turkey by the Sèvres Treaty?</p> - - -<p>1. <span class="smcap">The Turco-Armenian Question.</span></p> - -<p>The Armenian question, which has convulsed Turkey so deeply and made -the Eastern question so intricate, originated in the grasping spirit -of Russia in Asia Minor and the meddling of Russia in Turkish affairs -under pretence of protecting the Armenians. This question, as proved -by the difficulties to which it has given rise since the beginning, is -one of the aspects of the antagonism between Slavs and Turks, and a -phase of the everlasting struggle of the Turks to hinder the Slavs from -reaching the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, to which the Russians -have always striven to get access either<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">275</a></span> through Asia Minor or through -Thrace, or through both countries at once.</p> - -<p>Yet Mohammed II, after taking Constantinople, had in 1461 instituted a -patriarchate in favour of the Armenians. Later on various rights were -granted to them at different times by Imperial firmans.</p> - -<p>Some Armenian monks of Calcutta, availing themselves of the liberty -they enjoyed in India, founded at the beginning of the eighteenth -century the <cite>Aztarar</cite> (the Newsmonger), the first newspaper published -in the Armenian language; and at the end of the same century the -Mekhitharists published in Venice <cite>Yeghanak Puzantian</cite> (the Byzantine -Season). About the middle of the nineteenth century, the same monks -edited a review of literature and information, <cite>Pazmareb</cite>, which still -exists. The Protestant Armenians too edited a review of propaganda, -<cite>Chtemaran bidani Kidehatz</cite>, at Constantinople. Finally, in 1840, -the first daily paper printed in the Armenian language, <cite>Archalouis -Araradian</cite> (the Dawn of Ararat), was published at Smyrna.</p> - -<p>In 1857, in the monastery of Varag, near Van, Miguirditch Krimian, who -later on became Patriarch and Catholicos, established printing-works. -Under the title of <cite>Ardziv Vaspourakani</cite> (the Eagle of Vaspourakan) he -edited a monthly review to defend the cause of Armenian independence, -and at the same time a similar review, <cite>Ardziv Tarono</cite> (the Eaglet of -Taron), was published at Mush. About the same time the Armenians in -Russia too began to publish various periodicals, such as <cite>Hussissapail</cite> -(the Aurora Borealis), a review printed at Moscow in 1850, and several -newspapers at Tiflis and Baku. In 1860<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">276</a></span> the Armenians were allowed -to hold an Armenian National Assembly to discuss and settle their -religious and national affairs.</p> - -<p>From the fourteenth century till about 1860, the Armenian element lived -on good terms with the Moslem element, and some Armenians persecuted -in Russia even sought refuge in Turkey. The Turks, on their coming, -had found Armenians, but no Armenia, for the latter country, in the -course of a most confused history, had enjoyed but short periods of -independence with ever-changing frontiers; and the Armenians who had -successively been under Roman, Seljuk, Persian, and Arabian dominion -lived quietly with the Turks for six centuries.</p> - -<p>But in 1870 a group of young men revived and modified a movement which -had been started and kept up by Armenian monks, and wrote books in -Constantinople in favour of the Armenians.</p> - -<p>In 1875, Portokalian established the first revolutionary Armenian -Committee, and edited a newspaper, <cite>Asia</cite>. Soon afterwards the -<em>Araratian</em> committee was formed, aiming at establishing a close -connection between Turkish and Russian Armenians, followed by other -committees such as <em>Tebrotssassiranz</em>, <em>Arevelian</em>, and <em>Kilikia</em>.</p> - -<p>Other committees with charitable or economic purposes, such as “The -Association of Kindness” and “The Association of Benevolence,” which -were started in 1860 with a large capital to develop the natural -resources of Cilicia, also played a part in the Armenian movement.</p> - -<p>The Armenian question began really to arise and soon grew more and more -acute in 1878, after the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">277</a></span> Turco-Russian war, at a time when Turkey -had to face serious domestic and foreign difficulties. This question -was dealt with in Article 16 of the San Stefano treaty of July 10, -1878, and Article 61 of the Berlin treaty. Article 16 of the San -Stefano treaty, drawn up at the Armenians’ request, and supported by -the Russian plenipotentiaries, stated that “the Sublime Porte pledges -itself to realise without any more delay the administrative autonomy -rendered necessary by local needs in the provinces inhabited by -Armenians.” The Turks raised an objection to the words “administrative -autonomy” and wanted them to be replaced by “reforms and improvements,” -but the Russians then demanded the occupation of Armenia by the Tsar’s -troops as a guarantee. The Berlin Congress did away with this clause of -guarantee, and instead of the words proposed by Russia adopted those -asked for by Turkey.</p> - -<p>In order to acquire a moral influence over the Armenians living in -Turkey and play a prominent part among them, the Orthodox Christians -who were devoted to the Tsar endeavoured to get themselves recognised -as a superior power by the patriarchate of Constantinople, and with the -help of Russian political agents they succeeded in their endeavours. It -was soon observed that the new connection between the Catholicos and -the Constantinople Patriarchate aimed at, and succeeded in, starting -an anti-Turkish movement within the Armenian populations of Russia and -Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>When the Russians arrived close to Constantinople, at the end of the -Turco-Russian war, Nerses Varzabedian, who had succeeded Krimian, was -received<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">278</a></span> by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and handed him a memorandum, -in which, after stating all the Armenian grievances against the -Ottoman Government, he asked “that the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor -inhabited by Armenians should be proclaimed independent or at least -should pass under the control of Russia.” Four prelates were sent -separately to Rome, Venice, Paris, and London to make sure of the -Powers’ support, and met together at the Berlin Congress. Though they -strongly advocated the maintenance of Article 16 of the San Stefano -treaty, they only succeeded in getting Article 61 of the Berlin treaty.</p> - -<p>It was not until about 1885 that what was afterwards called the -Armenian movement began to be spoken of, and then some Armenian -revolutionaries who had sought shelter in England, France, Austria, and -America began to edit periodicals, form committees, inveigh against the -would-be Turkish exactions, and denounce the violation of the Berlin -treaty.</p> - -<p>These ideas of independence soon made more and more headway and the -prelates who, after Nerses’ death, were known for their pro-Turkish -feelings, as Haroutian Vehabedian, Bishop of Erzerum, made Patriarch in -1885, were forsaken by the Armenian clergy and soon found themselves in -opposition to the committees.</p> - -<p>In 1888 Khorene Achikian, who succeeded Vehabedian, was also accused of -being on friendly terms with the Turks, and the committees strove to -have him replaced by Narbey, who had been a member of the delegation -sent to Europe for the Berlin Congress.</p> - -<p>This Armenian movement naturally caused some<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">279</a></span> incidents between the -various elements of the population, which were magnified, brought by -the bishops and consuls to the knowledge of the European Powers, and -cited as the outcome of Turkish cruelty.</p> - -<p>After the Turco-Russian war, the revolutionary agitation which stirred -up Russia and the Caucasus had its repercussion among the Armenians, -and the harsh measures of the Tsar’s Government only strengthened the -agitation by increasing Armenian discontent.</p> - -<p>Miguirditch Portokalian, a teacher living at Van, came to Marseilles, -where in 1885 he edited a newspaper, <cite>Armenia</cite>. At the same time Minas -Tscheraz started another newspaper in Paris under the same title. These -publicists, both in their journals and in meetings, demanded that -Article 61 of the Berlin treaty should be carried out.</p> - -<p>In 1880 some revolutionary committees were formed in Turkey. In 1882 -“The Association of the Armed Men” was founded at Erzerum; some of its -members were arrested, and the association itself was dissolved in 1883.</p> - -<p>A rising took place at Van in 1885 on the occasion of the election of a -bishop, and some insurrectionist movements occurred at Constantinople, -Mush, and Alashehr under various pretexts.</p> - -<p>Next year, in 1886, one Nazarbey, a Caucasian by birth, and his -wife Maro, formed in Switzerland the <em>Huntchag</em> (the Bell), a -social-democrat committee that aimed at getting an autonomous -administration for the Armenians, and published in London a monthly -periodical bearing the same name. This committee meant to achieve its -object not through the intervention<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">280</a></span> or mediation of the European -Powers—to which it thought it useless to make another appeal, as their -individual interests were so much at variance—but solely by the action -of its organisations throughout the country, which were to raise funds, -equipment, foment troubles, weaken the Government, and take advantage -of any opportunity that might occur.</p> - -<p>The <em>Huntchag</em> committee found representatives in every great -town—Smyrna, Aleppo, Constantinople, etc.—and its organisation was -completed in 1889.</p> - -<p>In 1890, at the instigation of the Huntchagists, a rebellion broke out -at Erzerum, and incidents occurred in various places. At Constantinople -a demonstration of armed men, headed by the Patriarch Achikian, -repaired to the Sublime Porte to set forth their grievances, but -were scattered; and the Patriarch, who was reproached with being too -moderate, and whose life was even attempted, had to resign.</p> - -<p>In fact the <em>Huntchag</em> committee, which enlisted the effective and -moral support of the representatives of the Powers, especially those of -Russia and England, carried on its intrigues without intermission, and -increased its activity.</p> - -<p>On Sunday, March 25, 1894, at Samsun, in the ground adjoining the -church, one Agap, living at Diarbekir, who had been chosen by the -<em>Huntchag</em> committee to kill the Patriarch Achikian because he was -accused of being on friendly terms with the Ottoman Government, fired -at the prelate with a revolver, but missed his mark. After this -criminal attempt, Achikian resigned his office, and Mathew Ismirlian, -supported by the committees, was elected Patriarch, owing to the -pressure brought to bear on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">281</a></span> the National Assembly. The new Patriarch -immediately became chairman of the <em>Huntchag</em> committee, which he -developed, and soon after appointed President of the Ecclesiastical -Council of the Patriarchate and later on Catholicos of Cilicia a -certain priest, Kirkor Alajan, who had been dismissed and sent to -Constantinople for insulting the Governor of Mush.</p> - -<p>A few Armenians, dissatisfied with the programme of the Huntchagists, -founded a new association in 1890 under the name of <em>Troshak</em>, which -later on was called <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em>, and edited the <cite>Troshak</cite> -newspaper. The members of this committee often resorted to threats -and terror to get the funds they needed, and did not shrink from -assassinating whoever refused to comply with the injunctions of the -committee.</p> - -<p>In 1896 the committees attempted to seize the Ottoman Bank. Some armed -komitadjis, who had come from Europe with Russian passports, rushed -into the Ottoman Bank, but were driven back by Government troops. -But the promoters of the raid were not arrested, owing to their -being protected by the Russian and French authorities. Attended by -Maximof, an Armenian by birth, first dragoman of the Russian embassy, -and Rouet, first dragoman of the French embassy, they were brought -by the dispatch-boat of the latter embassy on board the <em>Gironde</em>, -a packet-ship of the Messageries Maritimes. The adherents of the -<em>Troshak</em>, entrenched in the churches of Galata, Samatra, and the -Patriarchate, begged for mercy, while Armene Aktoni, one of the leaders -of the committee, committed suicide after waiting<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">282</a></span> for the coming of -the English fleet on the heights of Soulou-Monastir, at Samatra.</p> - -<p>The bishops continued to solicit, and to some extent obtained, -the support of the Russian, English, and French consuls; yet Mgr. -Ismirlian, who had sent an ultimatum to the Imperial Palace and never -ceased to intrigue, was finally dismissed in 1896 and sent to Jerusalem.</p> - -<p>At that time many Armenians set off to Europe and America, and the -Catholicos of Etchmiadzin sent some delegates to the Hague Conference -to lay before it the Armenian plight in Turkey. These committees, which -displayed so much activity in Turkey, did not attempt anything on -behalf of their fellow-countrymen in Russia.</p> - -<p>The committees which had been founded during or before Nerses’ -patriarchate under the names of <em>Ararat</em>, <em>The Orient</em>, <em>The Friends -of Education</em>, <em>Cilicia</em>, were all grouped, in 1890, into one called -<em>Miatzal Anikeroutioun Hayotz</em>, which association continued to -organise committees even in the smallest villages, taking advantage -of the tolerance of the Ottoman Government and its benevolence to the -Armenians to carry on an active anti-Turkish propaganda.</p> - -<p>This propaganda was supported by the Armenian bishops in the eastern -provinces, where they endeavoured to bring about European intervention. -On the other hand the Russians, as eager as ever to domineer over both -the Orthodox Church and Armenia, incited the Armenians against the -Turks by all possible means and urged them to fulfil their national -aspirations, as they knew full well they would thus bring them more -easily under Russian sovereignty.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">283</a></span></p> - -<p>The influence of these committees, as will be seen later on, had a very -important bearing on the events that took place in Asia Minor at that -time.</p> - -<p>Risings, which may be traced back to 1545 and lasted till the -proclamation of the 1908 constitution, were continually taking place in -the mountainous area of Zeitun. They were partly brought about by the -feudal system of administration still prevailing in that region. Each -of the four districts of Zeitun was governed by a chief who had assumed -the title of “ishehan” or prince, a kind of nobleman to whom Turkish -villages had to pay some taxes collected by special agents. The action -of the committees, of course, benefited by that state of things, to -which the Ottoman Government put an end only in 1895.</p> - -<p>The Armenians had already refused to pay the taxes and had rebelled -repeatedly between 1782 and 1851, at which time the Turks, incensed -at the looting and exactions of the Armenian mountaineers, left their -farms and emigrated. Till that time the rebellions of Zeitun could be -partly accounted for by the administration of the “ishehan.” But the -leaders of the Armenian movement soon took advantage of these continual -disturbances and quickly gave them another character. The movement was -spurred on and eagerly supported by Armenians living abroad, and in -1865, after the so-called Turkish exactions, the Nationalist committees -openly rebelled against the Government and demanded the independence -of Zeitun. Henceforth rebellion followed rebellion, and one of them, -fomented by the Huntchagists, lasted three months.</p> - -<p>In 1890 the <em>Huntchag</em> and <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em> committees<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">284</a></span> stirred up -riots at Erzerum, and in 1894 at Samsun, where the Patriarch Ashikian -was fired at, as has just been seen. In 1905 the Tashnakists started a -new insurrection. The rebellion extended to Amasia, Sivas, Tokat, Mush, -and Van, and the committees endeavoured to spread and intensify it. In -1905-06 the manœuvres of the Armenian committees succeeded in rousing -hostile feelings between Kurds and Armenians, which no reform whatever -seemed able to soothe. And in 1909-10, when new troubles broke out, the -revolutionary leaders openly attacked the Government troops.</p> - -<p>Two years after the confiscation and handing over to the Ottoman -Government of the Armenian churches on June 21, 1903, massacres -took place at Batum on February 6, 1905, and later on at Erivan, -Nakhitchevan, Shusha, and Koshak. In 1908 the Tsar’s sway in the whole -of Caucasus became most oppressive, and a ukase prescribed the election -of a new catholicos to succeed Mgr. Krimian, who had died in October, -1907. Mgr. Ismirlian was appointed in his stead in 1908. By that time -the Russian sway had become so oppressive that the Tashnakists took -refuge in Constantinople, where the Young Turks openly declared in -favour of the Russian Armenians.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>It might have been expected that after the proclamation of the -Constitution the committees, who had striven to hurry on the downfall -of the Empire through an agitation that might have brought about -foreign intervention, would put an end to their revolutionary schemes -and turn their activity towards<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">285</a></span> social and economic questions. -Sabah-Gulian, a Caucasian by birth, president of the <em>Huntchag</em>, at -a meeting of this committee held in 1908 in Sourp-Yerourtoutioun -church at Pera, speaking of the Huntchagists’ programme and the -constitutional régime, declared: “We, Huntchagists, putting an end to -our revolutionary activity, must devote all our energy to the welfare -of the country.” On the other hand Agnoni, a Russian by birth, one of -the presidents of the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em>, stated that “the first duty -of the Tashnakists would be to co-operate with the Union and Progress -Committee in order to maintain the Ottoman Constitution and ensure -harmony and concord between the various elements.”</p> - -<p>The union of the committees did not last long, as they held widely -different views about the new condition of the Turkish Empire; -but soon after the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em>, the <em>Huntchag</em>, and the -<em>Veragaznial-Huntchag</em> committees were reorganised and new committees -formed throughout Turkey. The <em>Ramgavar</em> (the Rights of the People) -committee was instituted in Egypt by M. Boghos Nubar after the -proclamation of the Constitution, and displayed the greatest activity. -This committee, in March, 1914, agreed to work on the same lines with -the <em>Huntchag</em>, the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em>, and the <em>Veragaznial-Huntchag</em>. -Another committee, the <em>Sahmanatragan</em>, was also constituted. They made -sure of the support of the Patriarchate and the bishops to reassert -their influence and spread a network of ramifications all over the -country in order to triumph at the elections. They carried on an active -propaganda<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">286</a></span> to conciliate public opinion, by means of all kinds of -publications, school books, almanacs, postcards, songs, and so on, all -edited at Geneva or in Russia.</p> - -<p>As early as 1905 the Armenian committees had decided at a congress held -in Paris to resort to all means in order to make Cilicia an independent -country. Russia, on the other hand, strove hard to spread orthodoxy -in the districts round Adana, Marash, and Alexandretta, in order to -enlarge her zone of influence on this side and thus get an outlet to -the Mediterranean. At the same time, the Bishop of Adana, Mosheg, did -his best to foment the rebellion which was to break out soon after.</p> - -<p>In this way the Armenian Christians contributed to the extension of the -Russian Empire. In 1904-05, the Nestorians asked for Russian priests -and expressed their intention to embrace the Orthodox Faith. The -Armenians of Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Kharput in 1907 handed the Russian -consul a petition bearing over 200,000 signatures, in which they asked -to become Russian subjects.</p> - -<p>The Huntchagist leader, Sabah-Gulian, even owned in the <cite>Augah -Hayassdan</cite> (Independent Armenia) newspaper that the members of the -committee had taken advantage of the Turks’ carelessness to open shops, -where rifles were being sold at half-price or even given away.</p> - -<p>The Armenian committees took advantage of the new parliamentary -elections to stir up a new agitation. They increased their activity, -and, contrary to their engagements, corresponded with the members of -the opposition who had fled abroad.</p> - -<p>During the Balkan war in 1913 the Tashnakist<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">287</a></span> committees issued -manifestoes against the Ottoman Government and the Union party. The -Russian consuls at Erzerum and Bitlis did not conceal their sympathy, -and at Van the Russian consul threatened to the vali to ask Russian -troops to come through Azerbaïjan under the pretext of averting the -fictitious dangers the Armenians were supposed to run, and of restoring -order.</p> - -<p>Now, whereas Russia at home unmercifully stifled all the attempts of -the Armenian committees, she encouraged and energetically supported the -agitators in Turkey. Moreover, in the report addressed by the Russian -consul at Bitlis to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, dated -December 24, 1912, and bearing number 63, the Russian Government was -informed that the aim of the Tashnakists was, as they expressly said, -“to bring the Russians here,” and that, in order “to reach this end, -the Tashnakists are resorting to various means, and doing their best to -bring about collisions between Armenians and Moslems, especially with -Ottoman troops.” In support of this statement he mentioned a few facts -that leave no doubt about its veracity.</p> - -<p>This report contained the following lines, which throw considerable -light on the Allies’ policy:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Your Excellency will understand that the future collisions between -Armenians and Moslems will partly depend on the line of conduct -and activity of the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em> committee, on the turn -taken by the peace negotiations between Turkey and the Slavonic -States of the Balkans, and on the eventuality of an occupation of -Constantinople by the Allies. If the deliberations of the London -Conference did not bring about peace, the coming downfall of the -Ottoman capital would certainly influence the relations between -Moslems and Armenians at Bitlis.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">288</a></span></p> - -<p>“Both in towns and in the country the Armenians, together with -their religions leaders, have always displayed much inclination -and affection for Russia, and have repeatedly declared the Turkish -Government is unable to maintain order, justice, and prosperity -in their country. Many Armenians have already promised to offer -the Russian soldiers their churches to be converted into orthodox -places of worship.</p> - -<p>“The present condition of the Balkans, the victory of the Slav and -Hellenic Governments over Turkey, have delighted the Armenians and -filled their hearts with the cheerful hope of being freed from -Turkey.”</p></div> - -<p>Of course, the coming to Bitlis of a mixed Commission of Armenians and -Turks under the presidency of an Englishman, in order to carry out -reforms in the Turkish provinces near the Caucasus, did not please -the Armenians and Russians who had sacrificed many soldiers to get -possession of these regions.</p> - -<p>Taking advantage of the difficulties experienced by the Ottoman -Government after the Balkan war, the committees agreed together to -raise anew the question of “reforms in the Eastern provinces.” A -special commission, presided over by M. Boghos Nubar, was sent by -the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to the European Governments to uphold -the Armenian claims. At the same time a campaign was started by the -Armenian newspapers of Europe, Constantinople, and America, especially -by the <cite>Agadamard</cite>, the organ of the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em> committee, which -had no scruple in slandering the Turks and announcing sham outrages.</p> - -<p>In 1913 Russia proposed a scheme of reforms to be instituted in -Armenia. It was communicated by M. de Giers to the Six Ambassadors’ -Conference, which appointed a commission to report on it. As the German -and Austrian representatives raised<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">289</a></span> objections to the Russian scheme -before that Commission of Armenian Reforms, which met from June 20 to -July 3, 1913, at the Austrian embassy at Yeni Keui, Russia, after this -defeat, strove to bring over Germany to her views.</p> - -<p>In September, 1913, M. de Giers and M. de Wangenheim came to terms -on a programme to which the Porte opposed a counter-proposal. Yet -the Russian representatives succeeded in concluding a Russo-Turkish -agreement, January 26 to February 8, 1914.</p> - -<p>When the scheme of reforms was outlined, and the powers and -jurisdiction of the inspectors and their staff were settled, the -Catholicos sent a telegram of congratulation to M. Borghos Nubar and -the latter sent another to M. Sazonov, for the Armenian committees -considered the arrangement as a first step towards autonomy. Encouraged -by this first success, the committees exerted themselves more and more. -The <em>Tashnaksutioun</em> transferred its seat to Erzerum, where it held a -congress. The <em>Huntchag</em> committee sent to Russia and Caucasus several -of its most influential members to raise funds in order to foment -a rising to attack the Union and Progress party especially, and to -overthrow the Government. Such was the state of things when war broke -out.</p> - -<p>The Patriarch, who passed himself off as representing the Armenian -people, gathered together under his presidency the leaders of -the <em>Tashnaktsutioun</em>, the <em>Huntchag</em>, the <em>Ramgavar</em>, and the -<em>Veragaznial-Huntchag</em>, and the members of the National Assembly who -were affiliated to these committees to decide what attitude they were -to take in case the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">290</a></span> Ottoman Government should enter into the war. No -decision was taken, the Huntchagists declining to commit themselves and -the Tasknakists stating they preferred waiting to see how things would -turn out. Yet these committees carried on their activities separately, -and sent instructions to the provinces that, if the Russians advanced, -all means should be resorted to in order to impede the retreat of the -Ottoman troops and hold up their supplies, and if, on the contrary, -the Ottoman army advanced, the Armenian soldiers should leave their -regiments, form themselves into groups, and go over to the Russians.</p> - -<p>The committees availed themselves of the difficulties of the Ottoman -Government, which had recently come out of a disastrous war and had -just entered into a new conflict, to bring about risings at Zeitun, -in the sandjaks of Marash and Cesarea, and chiefly in the vilayet of -Van, at Bitlis, Talori, and Mush in the vilayet of Bitlis, and in the -vilayet of Erzerum.</p> - -<p>In the sandjaks of Erzerum and Bayazid, as soon as the decree of -mobilisation was issued, most of the Armenian soldiers went over to the -Russians, were equipped and armed anew by them, and then sent against -the Turks. The same thing occurred at Erzindjan, where three-fourths of -the Armenians crossed the Russian frontier.</p> - -<p>The Armenians of the vilayet of Mamouret’ ul Azig (Kharput), where -the Mussulmans were also attacked and where depots of arms had been -concealed, provided with numerous recruits the regiments dispatched -by Russia to Van and the Persian frontier. Many emissaries had been -sent from Russia and Constantinople to Dersim and its area to raise -the Kurds<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">291</a></span> against the Ottoman Government. So it was in the vilayet of -Diarbekir, though the Armenians were in a minority. Depots of arms of -all descriptions were discovered there, together with many refractory -soldiers.</p> - -<p>In the Karahissar area, where several revolutionary movements had -broken out during and after the Balkan war, the Armenians refused to -obey the decree of mobilisation and were only waiting for the coming of -the Russians to rebel.</p> - -<p>Similar incidents—such as mutinous soldiers, attacks against the Turks, -threats to families of mobilised Ottomans—occurred in the vilayet of -Angora.</p> - -<p>In the vilayet of Van, when the Russians, reinforced by Armenian -volunteers, started an offensive, some Armenian peasants gathered -together and prepared to attack the Ottoman officials and the -gendarmerie. At the beginning of 1915 rebellions took place at Kevash, -Shatak, Havassour, and Timar, and spread in the kazas of Arjitch and -Adeljivaz. At Van over five thousand rebels, seven hundred of whom -attacked the fortress, blew up the military and Government buildings, -the Ottoman Bank, the offices of the Public Debt, the excise office, -the post and telegraph offices, and set fire to the Moslem quarter. -When this insurrection subsided about the end of April, numerous -Armenian bands, led by Russian officers, attempted to cross the Russian -and Persian frontiers.</p> - -<p>After the capture of Van, the Armenians gave a great dinner in -honour of General Nicolaiev, commander-in-chief of the Russian army -in Caucasus, who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">292</a></span> made a speech in which he said: “Since 1826, -the Russians have always striven to free Armenia, but political -circumstances have always prevented their success. Now, as the grouping -of nations has been quite altered, we may hope Armenians will soon -be free.” Aram Manoukian, known as Aram Pasha, soon after appointed -provisional Governor of Van by General Nicolaiev, replied: “When we -rose a month ago, we expected the Russians would come. At a certain -moment, our situation was dreadful. We had to choose between surrender -and death. We chose death, but when we no longer expected your help, it -has suddenly arrived.”<a name="FNanchor_36_36" id="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">36</a></p> - -<p>The Armenian bands even compelled the Ottoman Government to call back -troops from the front to suppress their revolutionary manœuvres in -the vilayet of Brusa and the neighbourhood. At Adana, as in the other -provinces, all sorts of insurrectionary movements were smouldering.</p> - -<p>Under such circumstances, the Turkish Government tried to crush these -revolutionary efforts by military expeditions, and the repression -was merciless. A decree of the Government about changes of residence -of the Armenian populations included measures for the deportation of -Armenians. As the Turks are generally so listless, and as similar -methods had been resorted to by the Germans on the Western front, these -measures may have been suggested to the Turks by the Germans.</p> - -<p>Tahsin Pasha, Governor of Van, was replaced by Jevdet Bey, Enver’s -brother-in-law, and Khalil<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">293</a></span> Pasha, another relation of Enver, had -command of the Turkish troops in the Urmia area. Talaat sent Mustafa -Khalil, his brother-in-law, to Bitlis.</p> - -<p>The revolutionary manœuvres of the Armenians and the repressive -measures of the Turks, with their mutual repercussions, could not but -quicken the old feuds; so the outcome was a wretched one for both -parties.</p> - -<p>One cannot wonder that under such conditions continuous conflicts arose -between the two elements of the population, that reprisals followed -reprisals on either side, first after the Turco-Russian war, again -after the events of 1895-96, then in the course of the Adana conflict, -during the Balkan war, and finally during the late war. But it is -impossible to trust the information according to which the number of -the Armenians slaughtered by the Turks rose to over 800,000 and in -which no mention is made of any Turks massacred by the Armenians. These -figures are obviously exaggerated,<a name="FNanchor_37_37" id="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">37</a> since the Armenian population, -which only numbered about 2,300,000 souls before the war throughout -the Turkish Empire, did not exceed 1,300,000 in the eastern provinces, -and the Armenians now declare they are still numerous enough to make -up a State. According to Armenian estimates there were about 4,160,000 -Armenians in all in 1914—viz., 2,380,000 in the Ottoman Empire, -1,500,000 in Russia, 64,000 in the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">294</a></span> provinces of the Persian Shah -and in foreign colonies, and about 8,000 in Cyprus, the isles of the -Archipelago, Greece, Italy, and Western Europe.</p> - -<p>The best answer to the eager and ever-recurring complaints made by the -Armenians or at their instigation is to refer the reader to a report -entitled “Statistics of the Bitlis and Van Provinces” drawn up by -General Mayewsky, who was Russian consul first at Erzerum for six years -and later on at Van, and in this capacity represented a Power that had -always showed much hostility to Turkey. It was said in it:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“All the statements of the publicists, which represent the Kurds as -doing their best to exterminate the Armenians, must be altogether -rejected. If they were reliable, no individual belonging to an -alien race could have ever lived in the midst of the Kurds, and -the various peoples living among them would have been obliged to -emigrate bodily for want of bread, or to become their slaves. -Now nothing of the kind has occurred. On the contrary, all those -who know the eastern provinces state that in those countries the -Christian villages are at any rate more prosperous than those of -the Kurds. If the Kurds were only murderers and thieves, as is -often said in Europe, the prosperous state of the Armenians till -1895 would have been utterly impossible. So the distress of the -Armenians in Turkey till 1895 is a mere legend. The condition of -the Turkish Armenians was no worse than that of the Armenians -living in other countries.</p> - -<p>“The complaints according to which the condition of the Armenians -in Turkey is represented as unbearable do not refer to the -inhabitants of the towns, for the latter have always been free and -enjoyed privileges in every respect. As to the peasants, owing to -their perfect knowledge of farmwork and irrigation, their condition -was far superior to that of the peasants in Central Russia.</p> - -<p>“As to the Armenian clergy, they make no attempt to teach religion; -but they have striven hard to spread national ideas. Within the -precincts of mysterious convents, the teaching of hatred of -the Turk has replaced devotional observances. The schools and -seminaries eagerly second the religious leaders.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">295</a></span></p> - -<p>After the collapse of Russia, the Armenians, Georgians, and Tatars -formed a Transcaucasian Republic which was to be short-lived, and we -have dealt in another book with the attempt made by these three States -together to safeguard their independence.<a name="FNanchor_38_38" id="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">38</a></p> - -<p>The Soviet Government issued a decree on January 13, 1918, stipulating -in Article 1 “the evacuation of Armenia by the Russian troops, and the -immediate organisation of an Armenian militia in order to safeguard the -personal and material security of the inhabitants of Turkish Armenia,” -and in Article 4, “the establishment of a provisional Armenian -Government in Turkish Armenia consisting of delegates of the Armenian -people elected according to democratic principles,” which obviously -could not satisfy the Armenians.</p> - -<p>Two months after the promulgation of this decree, the Brest-Litovsk -treaty in March, 1918, stipulated in Article 4 that “Russia shall do -her utmost to ensure the quick evacuation of the eastern provinces of -Anatolia. Ardahan, Kars, and Batum shall be evacuated at once by the -Russian troops.”</p> - -<p>The Armenians were the more dissatisfied and anxious after these events -as they had not concealed their hostile feelings against the Turks -and their satisfaction no longer to be under their dominion; they now -dreaded the return of the Turks, who would at least make an effort to -recover the provinces they had lost in 1878.</p> - -<p>In April of the same year fighting was resumed,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">296</a></span> and Trebizond, -Erzinjan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van were recaptured by the Turks. -After the negotiations between the Georgians and the Turks, and the -arrangements that supervened, the Armenians constituted a Republic in -the neighbourhood of Erivan and Lake Sevanga (Gokcha).</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>After the discussion of the Armenian question at the Peace Conference -and a long exchange of views, Mr. Wilson, in August, 1919, sending -a note direct to the Ottoman Government, called upon it to prevent -any further massacre of Armenians and warned it that, should the -Constantinople Government be unable to do so, he would cancel the -twelfth of his Fourteen Points demanding “that the present Ottoman -Empire should be assured of entire sovereignty”—which, by the by, is -in contradiction with other points of the same message to Congress, -especially the famous right of self-determination of nations, which he -wished carried out unreservedly.</p> - -<p>The Armenians did not give up the tactics that had roused Turkish -animosity and had even exasperated it, for at the end of August they -prepared to address a new note to the Allied High Commissioners -in Constantinople to draw their attention to the condition of the -Christian element in Anatolia and the dangers the Armenians of the -Republic of Erivan were beginning to run. Mgr. Zaven, Armenian -Patriarch, summed up this note in a statement published by <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Temps</cite>, -August 31, 1919.</p> - -<p>Mr. Gerard, former ambassador of the United States<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">297</a></span> at Berlin, in a -telegram<a name="FNanchor_39_39" id="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">39</a> addressed to Mr. Balfour on February 15, 1920, asserted -that treaties for the partition of Armenia had been concluded during -Mr. Balfour’s tenure of the post of Secretary for Foreign Affairs -and at a time when the Allied leaders and statesmen had adopted the -principle of self-determination of peoples as their principal war-cry. -He expressed distress over news that the Allies might cut up Armenia, -and said that 20,000 ministers, 85 bishops, 250 college and university -presidents, and 40 governors, who had “expressed themselves in favour -of unified Armenia, will be asked to join in condemnation of decimation -of Armenia.” He added that Americans had given £6,000,000 for Armenian -relief, and that another £6,000,000 had been asked for. Americans were -desirous of aiding Armenia during her formative period. “Ten members of -our committee, including Mr. Hughes and Mr. Root, and with the approval -of Senator Lodge, had telegraphed to the President that America should -aid Armenia. We are earnestly anxious that Britain should seriously -consider American opinion on the Armenian case. Can you not postpone -consideration of the Turkish question until after ratification of the -treaty by the Senate, which is likely to take place before March?”</p> - -<p>Mr. Balfour, in his reply dispatched on February 24, said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In reply to your telegram of February 16, I should observe that -the first paragraph seems written under a misapprehension. I -concluded no treaties about Armenia at all.</p> - -<p>“I do not understand why Great Britain will be held responsible -by 20,000 ministers of religion, 85 bishops,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">298</a></span> 250 university -professors, and 40 governors if a Greater Armenia is not forthwith -created, including Russian Armenia on the north and stretching to -the Mediterranean on the south.</p> - -<p>“Permit me to remind you of the facts.</p> - -<p>“1. Great Britain has no interests in Armenia except those based -on humanitarian grounds. In this respect her position is precisely -that of the United States.</p> - -<p>“2. I have always urged whenever I had an opportunity that the -United States should take its share in the burden of improving -conditions in the pre-war territories of the Turkish Empire and -in particular that it should become the mandatory in Armenia. -Events over which Great Britain had no control have prevented this -consummation and have delayed, with most unhappy results, the -settlement of the Turkish peace.</p> - -<p>“3. There appears to be great misconception as to the condition of -affairs in Armenia. You make appeal in your first sentence to the -principle of self-determination. If this is taken in its ordinary -meaning as referring to the wishes of the majority actually -inhabiting a district, it must be remembered that in vast regions -of Greater Armenia the inhabitants are overwhelmingly Mussulman, -and if allowed to vote would certainly vote against the Armenians.</p> - -<p>“I do not think this conclusive; but it must not be forgotten. -Whoever undertakes, in your own words, to aid Armenia during her -formative period must, I fear, be prepared to use military force. -Great Britain finds the utmost difficulty in carrying out the -responsibilities she has already undertaken. She cannot add Armenia -to their number. America with her vast population and undiminished -resources, and no fresh responsibilities thrown upon her by the -war, is much more fortunately situated. She has shown herself most -generous towards these much oppressed people; but I greatly fear -that even the most lavish charity, unsupported by political and -military assistance, will prove quite insufficient to deal with the -unhappy consequences of Turkish cruelty and misrule.</p> - -<p>“If I am right in inferring from your telegram that my attitude on -the question has been somewhat misunderstood in America, I should -be grateful if you would give publicity to this reply.”</p></div> - -<p>On February 28 Mr. Gerard telegraphed to Mr. Balfour that in referring -to treaties made during Mr. Balfour’s period of office he had in mind -the Sykes-Picot<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">299</a></span> compact. After saying that “Great Britain and France -could not be justified in requiring American aid to Armenia as a -condition precedent to their doing justice to Armenia,” he declared -that “Armenia’s plight since 1878 is not unrelated to a series of -arrangements, well meant, no doubt, in which Great Britain played a -directive rôle,” and he concluded in the following terms:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Our faith in chivalry of Great Britain and France and our -deliberate conviction in ultimate inexpediency of allowing Turkish -threat to override concerted will of Western civilisation through -further sacrifice of Armenia inspire us to plead with you to -construe every disadvantage in favour of Armenia and ask you to -plan to aid her toward fulfilment of her legitimate aspirations, -meanwhile depending on us to assume our share in due time, bearing -in mind imperative necessity of continued concord that must exist -between our democracies for our respective benefit and for that of -the world.”</p></div> - -<p>Soon after, Lord Curzon said in the House of Lords: “It must be owned -the Armenians during the last weeks did not behave like innocent little -lambs, as some people imagine. The fact is they have indulged in a -series of wild attacks, and proved blood-thirsty people.” <cite>The Times</cite> -gave an account of these atrocities on March 19.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of February, 1920, the British Armenia Committee -of London had handed to Mr. Lloyd George a memorandum in which the -essential claims of Armenia were set forth before the Turkish problem -was definitely settled by the Allies.</p> - -<p>In this document the Committee said they were sorry that Lord Curzon on -December 17, 1919, expressed a doubt about the possibility of the total -realisation of the Armenian scheme, according to which Armenia was -to stretch from one sea to the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">300</a></span> other, especially as the attitude of -America did not facilitate the solution of the Armenian question. After -recalling Lord Curzon’s and Mr. Lloyd George’s declarations in both the -House of Lords and the House of Commons, the British Armenia Committee -owned it was difficult, if the United States refused a mandate and -if no other mandatory could be found, to group into one nation all -the Ottoman provinces which they believed Armenia was to include; yet -they drafted a programme which, though it was a minimum one, aimed -at completely and definitely freeing these provinces from Turkish -sovereignty. It ran as follows;</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“An Ottoman suzerainty, even a nominal one, would be an outrage, -as the Ottoman Government deliberately sought to exterminate the -Armenian people.</p> - -<p>“It would be a disgrace for all nations if the bad precedents of -Eastern Rumelia, Macedonia, and Crete were followed, and if similar -expedients were resorted to, in reference to Armenia. The relations -between Armenia and the Ottoman Empire must wholly cease, and the -area thus detached must include all the former Ottoman provinces. -The Ottoman Government of Constantinople has for many years kept -up a state of enmity and civil war among the various local races, -and many facts demonstrate that when once that strange, malevolent -sovereignty is thrust aside, these provinces will succeed in living -together on friendly, equable terms.”</p></div> - -<p>The British Armenia Committee asked that the Armenian territories which -were to be detached from Turkey should be immediately united into -an independent Armenian State, which would not be merely restricted -to “the quite inadequate area of the Republic of Erivan,” but would -include the former Russian districts of Erivan and Kars, the zone of -the former Ottoman territories with the towns of Van, Mush, Erzerum, -Erzinjan, etc., and a port on the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">301</a></span> Black Sea. This document proclaimed -that the Armenians now living were numerous enough “to fortify, -consolidate, and ensure the prosperity of an Armenian State within -these boundaries, without giving up the hope of extending farther.” It -went on thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The economic distress now prevailing in the Erivan area is due -to the enormous number of refugees coming from the neighbouring -Ottoman provinces who are encamped there temporarily. If these -territories were included in the Armenian State, the situation -would be much better, for all these refugees would be able to -return to their homes and till their lands. With a reasonable -foreign support, the surviving manhood of the nation would suffice -to establish a National State in this territory, which includes but -one-fourth of the total Armenian State to be detached from Turkey. -In the new State, the Armenians will still be more numerous than -the other non-Armenian elements, the latter not being connected -together and having been decimated during the war like the -Armenians.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, in support of its claim, the Committee urged that the -Nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal was a danger to England, and -showed that only Armenia could check this danger.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“For if Mustafa Kemal’s Government is not overthrown, our new -Kurdish frontier will never be at peace; the difficulties of its -defence will keep on increasing; and the effect of the disturbances -will be felt as far as India. If, on the contrary, that focus of -disturbance is replaced by a stable Armenian State, our burden will -surely be alleviated.”</p></div> - -<p>Then the British Armenia Committee, summing up its chief claims, asked -for the complete separation of the Ottoman Empire from the Armenian -area, and, in default of an American mandate, the union of the Armenian -provinces of the Turkish Empire contiguous to the Republic of Erivan -with the latter Republic, together with a port on the Black Sea.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">302</a></span></p> - -<p>In the report which had been drawn up by the American Commission of -Inquiry sent to Armenia, with General Harboor as chairman, and which -President Wilson had transmitted to the Senate at the beginning of -April, 1920, after the latter assembly had asked twice for it, no -definite conclusion was reached as to the point whether America was to -accept or refuse a mandate for that country. The report simply declared -that in no case should the United States accept a mandate without the -agreement of France and Great Britain and the formal approbation of -Germany and Russia. It merely set forth the reasons for and against the -mandate.</p> - -<p>It first stated that whatever Power accepts the mandate must have -under its control the whole of Anatolia, Constantinople, and -Turkey-in-Europe, and have complete control over the foreign relations -and the revenue of the Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>Before coming to the reasons that tend in favour of the acceptance of -the mandate by the United States, General Harboor made an appeal to -the humanitarian feelings of the Americans and urged that it was their -interest to ensure the peace of the world. Then he declared their -acceptance would answer the wishes of the Near East, whose preference -undeniably was for America, or, should the United States refuse, for -Great Britain. He added that each Great Power, in case it could not -obtain a mandate, would want it to be given to America.</p> - -<p>The report valued the expenditure entailed by acceptance of the mandate -at 275 million dollars far the first year, and $756,140,000 for the -first five years. After some time, the profits made by<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">303</a></span> the mandatory -Power would balance the expenses, and Americans might find there a -profitable investment. But the Board of Administration of the Ottoman -Debt should be dissolved and all the commercial treaties concluded by -Turkey should be cancelled. The Turkish Imperial Debt should be unified -and a sinking fund provided. The economic conditions granted to the -mandatory Power should be liable to revision and might be cancelled.</p> - -<p>Further, it was observed that if America refused the mandate the -international rivalries which had had full scope under Turkish dominion -would assert themselves again.</p> - -<p>The reasons given by the American Commission against acceptance of the -mandate were that the United States had serious domestic problems to -deal with, and such an intervention in the affairs of the Old World -would weaken the standpoint they had taken on the Monroe doctrine. -The report also pointed out that the United States were in no way -responsible for the awkward situation in the East, and they could not -undertake engagements for the future—for the new Congress could not -be bound by the policy pursued by the present one. The report also -remarked that Great Britain and Russia and the other Great Powers too -had taken very little interest in those countries, though England had -enough experience and resources to control them. Finally, the report -emphasised this point—that the United States had still more imperious -obligations towards nearer foreign countries, and still more urgent -questions to settle. Besides, an army of 100,000 to 200,000 men would -be needed to maintain order in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">304</a></span> Armenia. Lastly, a considerable outlay -of money would be necessary, and the receipts would be at first very -small.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the British League of Nations Union asked the -English Government to give instructions to its representatives to -support the motion of the Supreme Council according to which the -protection of the independent Armenian State should be entrusted to the -League of Nations.</p> - -<p>According to the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, President -Wilson had been asked to act as an arbiter to lay down the Armenian -frontiers on the side of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, and -Trebizond.</p> - -<p>Under these circumstances the complete solution of the Armenian problem -was postponed indefinitely, and it is difficult to foresee how the -problem will ever be solved.</p> - - -<p class="center" id="Pan_Turanian">2. <span class="smcap">The Pan-Turanian and Pan-Arabian Movements.</span></p> - -<p>The attempts at Russification made immediately after the 1877 war -by means of the scholastic method of Elminski resulted in the first -manifestations of the Pan-Turanian movement. They arose, not in Russia, -but in Russian Tatary. The Tatars of the huge territories of Central -Asia, by reason of their annexation to the Russian Empire and the -indirect contact with the West that it entailed, and also owing to -their reaction against the West, awoke to a consciousness of their -individuality and strength.</p> - -<p>A series of ethnographic studies which were begun<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">305</a></span> at that time by M. -de Ujfalvi upon the Hungarians—all the peoples speaking a Finno-Ugrian -idiom descending from the same stock as those who speak the Turkish, -Mongol, and Manchu languages—and were continued by scholars of various -nationalities, gave the Pan-Turanian doctrine a scientific basis; -the principles of this doctrine were laid down by H. Vambéry,<a name="FNanchor_40_40" id="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">40</a> -and it was summed up by Léon Cahun in his <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Introduction a l’histoire -de l’Asie</cite>.<a name="FNanchor_41_41" id="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">41</a> This Turco-Tartar movement expanded, and its most -authoritative leaders were Youssouf Ahtchoura Oglou; Ahmed Agayeff, -who was arrested at the beginning of the armistice by the English as a -Unionist and sent to Malta; and later Zia Geuk Alp, a Turkish poet and -publicist, the author of <cite>Kizil-Elma</cite> (The Red Apple), who turned the -Union and Progress Committee towards the Pan-Turanian movement though -he had many opponents on that committee, and who was arrested too and -sent to Malta.</p> - -<p>Islam for thirteen centuries, by creating a religious solidarity -between peoples of alien races, had brought about a kind of religious -nationality under its hegemony. But the ambitious scheme of -Pan-Islamism was jeopardised in modern times by new influences and -widely different political aspirations. It was hoped for some time that -by grouping the national elements of Turkey and pursuing a conciliatory -policy it would be possible to give a sound<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">306</a></span> basis to that religious -nationality. But that nationality soon proved unable to curb the -separatist aspirations of the various peoples subjected to the Turkish -yoke, and then, again, it wounded the pride of some Turkish elements -by compelling them to obey the commandments of Islam, to which all the -Turanian populations had not fully adhered. The Pan-Islamic movement -later on grew more and more nationalist in character, and assumed a -Pan-Turkish tendency, though it remained Pan-Turanian—that is to say, -it still included the populations speaking the Turkish, Mongol, and -Manchu languages.</p> - -<p>Without in any way giving up the Pan-Islamic idea, Turkish Nationalism -could not but support the Pan-Turanian movement, which it hoped would -add the 18 million Turks living in the former Russian Empire, Persia, -and Afghanistan, to the 8 million Turks of the territories of the -Ottoman Empire.</p> - -<p>Owing to its origin and the character it has assumed, together with the -geographical situation and importance of the populations concerned, -this movement appears as a powerful obstacle to the policy which -England seems intent upon pursuing, and to which she seeks to bring -over Italy and France. It also exemplifies the latent antagonism which -had ever existed between the Arabian world and the Turkish world, and -which, under the pressure of events, soon asserted itself.</p> - -<p>Indeed, the mutual relations of the Arabs and the Turks had been slowly -but deeply modified in the course of centuries.</p> - -<p>After the great Islamic movement started by Mohammed in the seventh -century, the Arabs who<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">307</a></span> had hitherto been mostly confined within the -boundaries of the Arabian peninsula spread to the west over the whole -of Northern Africa as far as Spain, and to the east over Mesopotamia -and a part of Persia. In the twelfth century Arabian culture reached -its climax, for the Arabian Caliphs of Baghdad ruled over huge -territories. At that time Arabic translations revealed to Europe the -works of Aristotle and of the Chaldean astronomers, and the Arabs, -through Spain, had an important influence on the first period of modern -civilisation.</p> - -<p>In 1453, when the Turks, who had extended their dominion over all the -shores of the Mediterranean, settled at Constantinople, which became -the capital of the Islamic Empire, the influence of Arabia decreased; -yet the Arabs still enjoyed in various parts political independence and -a kind of religious predominance.</p> - -<p>For instance, the Arabs settled in the north of Western Africa, after -losing Spain, became quite independent, and formed the Empire of -Morocco, which was not under the suzerainty of Constantinople.</p> - -<p>The Arabian tribes and Berber communities of Algeria and Tunis, which -had more or less remained under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were no -longer amenable to him after the French conquest. The Pasha of Egypt, -by setting up as an independent Sovereign, and founding the hereditary -dynasty of the Khedives, deprived the Ottoman dominion of Egypt, -where the Arabs were not very numerous, but had played an important -part in the development of Islam. The Italian conquest took away from -Turkey the last province she still owned in Africa.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">308</a></span> Finally, when the -late war broke out, England deposed the Khedive Abbas Hilmi, who was -travelling in Europe and refused to go back to Egypt. She proclaimed -her protectorate over the Nile valley, and, breaking off the religious -bond that linked Egypt with the Ottoman Empire, she made Sultan of -Egypt, independent of the Sultan of Constantinople, Hussein Kamel, -uncle of the deposed Khedive, who made his entry into Cairo on December -20, 1914.</p> - -<p>The Turks, however, kept possession of the Holy Places, Mecca and -Medina, which they garrisoned and governed. This sovereignty was -consolidated by the railway of the pilgrimage. The investiture of the -Sherif of Mecca was still vested in them, and they chose the member of -his family who was to succeed him, and who was detained as a hostage -at Constantinople. But after the failure of the expedition against the -Suez Canal during the late war, and at the instigation of England, the -Sherif, as we shall see, proclaimed himself independent, and assumed -the title of Melek, or King of Arabia.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the province of the Yemen, lying farther south -of the Hejaz, has always refused to acknowledge the authority of -Constantinople, and is practically independent. Lastly, at the southern -end of the Arabian peninsula, the English have held possession of Aden -since 1839, and have extended their authority, since the opening of the -Suez Canal in 1869, over all the Hadramaut. All the sheiks of this part -of Arabia along the southern coast, over whom the authority of Turkey -was but remotely exercised and was practically non-existent, naturally -accepted the protectorate of England without any<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">309</a></span> difficulty, in return -for the commercial facilities she brought them and the allowances -she granted them, and in 1873 Turkey formally recognised the English -possession of this coast.</p> - -<p>On the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula the territory of the -Sultan of Oman, or Maskat, lying along the Persian Gulf, has been -since the beginning of the nineteenth century under the authority -of the Viceroy of India. This authority extends nowadays over all -the territories lying between Aden and Mesopotamia, which are in -consequence entirely under English sway.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the English have proclaimed their protectorate over the Sheik -of Koweit.</p> - -<p>Koweit had been occupied by the British Navy after the Kaiser’s visit -to Tangier, and thus Germany had been deprived of an outlet for her -railway line from Anatolia to Baghdad. The Rev. S. M. Zwemer, in a book -written some time ago, <cite>Arabia, the Birthplace of Islam</cite>, after showing -the exceptional situation occupied by England in these regions, owned -that British policy had ambitious designs on the Arabian peninsula and -the lands round the Persian Gulf.</p> - -<p>Since the outbreak of the war, Ottoman sovereignty has also lost the -small Turkish province of Hasa, between Koweit and Maskat, inhabited -entirely by Arabian tribes.</p> - -<p>The rebellion of the Sherif of Mecca against the temporal power of -the Sultans of Mecca shows how important was the change that had -taken place within the Arabian world, but also intimates that the -repercussions of the war, after accelerating the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">310</a></span> changes that were -already taking place in the relations between the Arabs and the Turks, -must needs later on bring about an understanding or alliance between -these two elements against any foreign dominion. In the same way, the -encroachments of England upon Arabian territories have brought about a -change in the relations between the Arabs and the English; in days of -yore the Arabs, through ignorance or because they were paid to do so, -more than once used English rifles against the Turks; but the recent -Arabian risings against the British in Mesopotamia seem to prove that -the Arabs have now seen their mistake, and have concluded that the -English were deceiving them when they said the Caliphate was in danger.</p> - -<p>Finally, in order to pave the way to a British advance from Mesopotamia -to the Black Sea, England for a moment contemplated the formation of -a Kurdistan, though a long existence in common and the identity of -feelings and creed have brought about a deep union between the Kurds -and the Turks, and a separation is contrary to the express wishes of -both peoples.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>It is a well-known fact that the descendants of Ali, the Prophet’s -cousin, who founded the dynasty of the Sherifs, or Nobles, took the -title of Emirs—<em>i.e.</em>, Princes—of Mecca, and that the Emir of the Holy -Places of Arabia had always to be recognised by the Sherif to have a -right to bear the title of Caliph. This recognition of the Caliphs by -the Sherifs was made public by the mention of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">311</a></span> name of the Caliph -in the Khoutba, or Friday prayer.</p> - -<p>In consequence of political vicissitudes, the Emirs of Mecca -successively recognised the Caliphs of Baghdad, the Sultans of Egypt -until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517, and the Sultans of -Turkey, whose sovereignty over the Holy Places has always been more or -less nominal, and has hardly ever been effective over the Hejaz.</p> - -<p>When the Wahhabi schism took place, the Wahhabis, who aimed at -restoring the purer doctrines of primitive Islam, and condemned the -worship of the holy relics and the Prophet’s tomb, captured Mecca and -Medina.</p> - -<p>Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, was deputed by the Porte to reconquer the -Holy Places, which he governed from 1813 to 1840. Since that time the -Ottoman Government has always appointed a Governor of the Hejaz and -maintained a garrison there, and the Porte took care a member of the -Sherif’s family should reside in Constantinople in order to be able to -replace the one who bore the title of Sherif, should the latter ever -refuse to recognise the Caliph.</p> - -<p>Long negotiations were carried on during the war between the British -Government and Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, -concerning the territorial conditions on which peace might be restored -in the East. These views were set forth in eight letters exchanged -between July, 1915, and January, 1916.</p> - -<p>In July, 1915, the Sherif offered his military co-operation to the -British Government, in return for which he asked it to recognise the -independence of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">312</a></span> the Arabs within a territory including Mersina and -Adana on the northern side and then bounded by the thirty-seventh -degree of latitude; on the east its boundary was to be the Persian -frontier down to the Gulf of Basra; on the south the Indian Ocean, with -the exception of Aden; on the west the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as -far as Mersina.</p> - -<p>On August 30, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British resident in Cairo, -observed in his answer that discussion about the future frontiers was -rather premature.</p> - -<p>In a letter dated September 9, forwarded to the Foreign Office on -October 18 by Sir Henry MacMahon, the Sherif insisted upon an immediate -discussion. As he forwarded this letter, Sir Henry MacMahon mentioned -the following statement made to him by the Sherif’s representative in -Egypt:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The occupation by France of the thoroughly Arabian districts of -Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus would be opposed by force of arms -by the Arabs: but with the exception of these districts, the Arabs -are willing to accept a few modifications of the north-western -frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.”</p></div> - -<p>On October 24, 1915, by his Government’s order, Sir Henry MacMahon -addressed the Sherif the following letter:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria -lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and -Aleppo cannot be looked upon as merely Arabian, and should be -excluded from the limits and frontiers that are being discussed. -With these modifications, and without in any way impairing our -present treaties with the Arabian chiefs, we accept your limits -and frontiers. As to the territories within these limits, in -which Great Britain has a free hand as far as she does not injure -the interests of her ally,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">313</a></span> France, I am desired by the British -Government to make the following promise in answer to your letter.</p> - -<p>“‘With the reservation of the above-mentioned modifications, Great -Britain is willing to recognise and support Arabian independence -within the territories included in the limits and frontiers -proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.’”</p></div> - -<p>On November 5, 1915, the Sherif, in his answer, agreed to the -exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but maintained his claims on the other -territories, especially Beyrut.</p> - -<p>On December 13 Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s -renunciation of Mersina and Adana.</p> - -<p>On January 1, 1916, the Sherif wrote that, not to disturb the -Franco-British alliance, he would lay aside his claims to Lebanon -during the war; but he would urge them again on the conclusion of -hostilities.</p> - -<p>On January 30, 1916, Sir Henry MacMahon took note of the Sherif’s wish -to avoid all that might be prejudicial to the alliance between France -and England, and stated that the friendship between France and England -would be maintained after the war.</p> - -<p>On June 10, 1916, a rebellion broke out at Mecca. At daybreak the -barracks were encircled by Arabs. Hussein ibn Ali, who was at the head -of the movement, informed the Turkish commander that the Hejaz had -proclaimed its independence. On June 11 the Arabs captured the Turkish -fort of Bash-Karacal, and on the 12th Fort Hamadie. Soon after Jeddah -surrendered, and on September 21 El Taif.</p> - -<p>In a proclamation dated June 27, 1916, the Sherif Hussein ibn Ali -stated the political and religious reasons that had induced him to -rebel against the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">314</a></span> Ottoman Government. He declared the latter was in -the hands of the Young Turk party, that the Committee of Union and -Progress had driven the country to war, was destroying the power of the -Sultan, and had violated the rights of the Caliphate.</p> - -<p>On October 5 the Sherif Hussein formed an Arabian Cabinet, convened an -Assembly, and on November 6 caused himself to be proclaimed King of the -Arabs.</p> - -<p>In November, 1916, he issued a second proclamation, not so lofty in -tone, but more wily in its wording, which seemed to lack personality -in its inspiration. It began thus: “It is a well-known fact that the -better informed people in the Moslem world, Ottomans and others, saw -with much misgiving Turkey rush into the war.” He then stated that—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Ottoman Empire is a Moslem empire, whose wide territories have -a considerable sea-frontage. So the policy of the great Ottoman -Sultans, inspired by this twofold consideration, has always aimed -at keeping on friendly terms with the Powers that rule over the -majority of Moslems and at the same time hold the mastery of the -seas.”</p></div> - -<p>He went on as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The one cause of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the -extermination of its populations was the short-sighted tyranny -of the leaders of the Unionist faction—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, -and their accomplices; it is the giving up of the political -traditions established by the great Ottoman statesmen and based -on the friendship of the two Powers that deserve most to be -glorified—England and France.”</p></div> - -<p>He shared the opinion of those who reproached the Turks with the -“atrocities committed by Greeks and Armenians”; he called upon them -“the reprobation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">315</a></span> of the world”; and he wound up his proclamation with -these words:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Our hatred and enmity go to the leaders who are responsible for -such doings—Enver, Jemal, Talaat, and their accomplices. We will -not have anything to do with such tyrants, and in communion with -all believers and all unprejudiced minds in the Ottoman Empire and -Islam throughout the world we declare our hatred and enmity towards -them, and before God we separate our cause from their cause.”</p></div> - -<p>Great Britain later on insisted upon this point—that the question of -the territorial conditions with a view to restoring peace had not been -dealt with since the beginning of 1916, except in the above-mentioned -exchange of notes. In September, 1919, in a semi-official communication -to the Press, she emphatically declared that it followed from these -documents:</p> - -<p>(1) That in the letter dated October 24, 1915, which formulates the -only engagement between Great Britain and the Sherif, the British -Government had not pledged itself to do anything contrary to the -Anglo-French treaty of 1916.</p> - -<p>(2) That no fresh engagement had been entered into by Great Britain -with the Sherif since the beginning of the negotiations that M. Georges -Picot had been directed to carry on in London to pave the way to the -treaty of 1916. For the negotiators had met for the first time on -November 23, 1915, and the last two letters exchanged in January, 1916, -added nothing to the engagements made with King Hussein in the letter -of October 24 of the previous year.</p> - -<p>Finally, on March 5, 1917, Hussein, now King of the Hejaz, sent an -appeal to all the Moslems of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">316</a></span> Turkey against the Ottoman Government, -which he charged with profaning the tomb of the Prophet in the course -of the operations of June, 1916.</p> - -<p>On October 1, 1918, Feisal entered Damascus at the head of his own -victorious troops, but not with the Allied armies, after fighting all -the way from Maan to Aleppo, a distance of above 400 miles. By his -military and political activity, he had succeeded in quelling the -private quarrels between tribes, and grouping round him the Arabian -chiefs, between whom there had been much rivalry not long before, at -the same time protecting the right flank of the British army, which was -in a hazardous position.</p> - -<p>Without giving up his favourite scheme, he was thus brought face to -face with the Syrian question.</p> - -<p>Though the Arabian movement cannot be looked upon merely as the outcome -of the arrangements concluded in regard to Syria between the Allies -during the war, the latter seem at least to have brought about a state -of things which reinforced the Syrian aspirations and encouraged them -to assert themselves.</p> - -<p>The Syrians had once more taken advantage of the events which had -convulsed Europe, and had had their after-effects in Asia Minor, to -assert their determination to be freed from Ottoman sovereignty; and -now they hoped to bring the Peace Conference to recognise a mode of -government consistent with their political and economic aspirations.</p> - -<p>The suppression of the autonomy of Lebanon, the requisitions, the -administrative measures and prosecutions ordered in 1916 by Jemal Pasha -against the Syrians, who wanted Syria to be erected into an independent -State, had not succeeded in modifying<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">317</a></span> the tendency which for a long -time had aimed at detaching Syria from the Ottoman Empire, and at -taking advantage of the influence France exercised in the country to -further this aim.</p> - -<p>In 1912 M. R. Poincaré, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly -stated before the French Chamber that the French and British -Governments shared exactly the same views concerning the Syrian -question. Yet later facts soon proved that the English policy would -necessarily conflict with French influence and try to destroy it after -turning it to her own advantage. Simultaneously the Turks saw that the -time had come to modify the existing régime.</p> - -<p>M. Defrance, who is now French High Commissioner in Turkey, but was -then French Consul-General at Cairo, informed the French Government -that the Ottoman Committee of decentralisation was of opinion that -Syria should become an autonomous country, governed by a Moslem prince -chosen by the people, and placed under the protection of France.</p> - -<p>On March 11, 1914, M. Georges Leygues again raised the Syrian question -before the French Parliament. He maintained that the axis of French -policy lay in the Mediterranean—with Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco on -one side and on the other side Syria and Lebanon, the latter being the -best spheres open to French action on account of the economic interests -and moral influence France already exercised there. And the French -Parliament granted the sums of money which were needed for developing -French establishments in the East.</p> - -<p>About the same time the Central Syrian Committee<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">318</a></span> expressed the wish -that the various regions of Syria should be grouped into one State, -under French control. Fifteen Lebano-Syrian committees established -in various foreign countries expressed the same wish; the Manchester -committee merely asked that Syria should not be partitioned. A Syrian -congress, held at Marseilles at the end of 1918 under the presidency of -M. Franklin Bouillon, declared that for various economic and judicial -reasons France could be of great use to Syria, in case the direction of -the country should be entrusted to her.</p> - -<p>But the establishment of a Syrian State, whether enjoying the same -autonomy as Lebanon has had since 1864 under the guarantee of France, -England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on Italy, or being -governed in another way, was in contradiction to the arrangements -made by France and England in 1916. Though the agreement between -these two Powers has never been made public, yet it is well known -that it had been decided—contrary to the teaching of both history and -geography—that Syria should be divided into several regions. Now, the -centre of Syria, which stretches from the Euphrates to the sea, happens -to be Damascus, and this very town, according to the British scheme, -was to be included in an Arabian Confederation headed by the Hejaz.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of 1916, the Emir Feisal came to Paris, and, after the -conversations held in France, a satisfactory agreement seemed to have -been reached.</p> - -<p>The Emir Feisal was solemnly received in January, 1919, at the Hôtel -de Ville in Paris, and in the course of a reception at the Hôtel -Continental, the Croix de<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">319</a></span> Guerre of the first class was presented to -the Arab chief on February 4, with the following “citation”:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As early as 1916, he resolutely seconded the efforts of his -father, the King of the Hejaz, to shake off the Turkish yoke and -support the Allied cause.</p> - -<p>“He proved a remarkable, energetic commander, a friend to his -soldiers.</p> - -<p>“He planned and carried out personally several important operations -against the Damascus-Medina railway, and captured El-Ouedjy and -Akaba.</p> - -<p>“From August, 1917, till September, 1918, he led numerous attacks -north and south of Maan, capturing several railway stations and -taking a great number of prisoners.</p> - -<p>“He helped to destroy the 4th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Turkish armies by -cutting off their communications to the north, south, and west of -Deraa, and after a very bold raid he entered Damascus on October 1, -and Aleppo on the 26th with the Allied troops.”</p></div> - -<p>On February 6, 1919, he asked the Committee of the Ten on behalf of his -father, Hussein ibn Ali, to recognise the independence of the Arabian -peninsula, and declared he aimed at grouping the various regions of -Arabian Asia under one sovereignty. He did not hesitate to remind the -members of the Conference that he was speaking in the name of a people -who had already reached a high degree of civilisation at a time when -the Powers they represented did not even exist; and at the end of the -sitting in the course of which the scheme of a League of Nations was -adopted, he asked that all the secret treaties about the partition of -the Asiatic dominion of the Ottoman Empire between the Great Powers -should be definitely cancelled.</p> - -<p>In March, 1919, the Emir went back to Syria, under the pretext of using -his influence in favour of a French collaboration. He was given an -enthusiastic greeting; but the supporters of the Arabian<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">320</a></span> movement, -which was partly his own work, declared their hostility to any policy -that would bring about a mandate for Syria.</p> - -<p>On March 7 it was announced that a National Syrian Congress, sitting -at Damascus, had just proclaimed Syria an independent country, and the -Emir Feisal, son of the Grand Sherif of Mecca, King of Syria.</p> - -<p>It was reported that a declaration, issued by a second congress that -was held in the same town and styled itself Congress of Mesopotamia, -had been read at the same sitting, through which the latter congress -solemnly proclaimed the independence of Irak—Mesopotamia—with the Emir -Abdullah, the Emir Feisal’s brother, as King under the regency of -another brother of his, the Emir Zeid.</p> - -<p>All this, of course, caused a good deal of surprise in London, though -something of the kind ought to have been expected.</p> - -<p>In the above-mentioned document, after recalling the part played by -the Arabs in the war and the declarations made by the Allies about the -right of self-determination of peoples, the Congress declared the time -had come to proclaim the complete independence and unity of Syria, and -concluded as follows:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We, therefore, the true representatives of the Arabian nation in -every part of Syria, speaking in her name and declaring her will, -have to-day unanimously proclaimed the independence of our country, -Syria, within her natural boundaries, including Palestine, which -independence shall be complete, without any restriction whatsoever, -on the basis of a civil representative government.</p> - -<p>“We will take into account every patriotic wish of all the -inhabitants of Lebanon concerning the administration of their -country and maintain her pre-war limits, on condition Lebanon shall -stand aloof from any foreign influence.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">321</a></span></p> - -<p>“We reject the Zionists’ claim to turn Palestine into a national -home for the Jews or a place of immigration for them.</p> - -<p>“We have chosen His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, who has always -fought for the liberation of the country, and whom the nation looks -upon as the greatest man in Syria, as constitutional King of Syria -under the name of H.M. Feisal I.</p> - -<p>“We hereby proclaim the military governments of occupation hitherto -established in the three districts have now come to an end; they -shall be replaced by a civil representative government, responsible -to this Council for anything relating to the principle of the -complete independence of the country, till it is possible for -the government to convene a Parliament that shall administer the -provinces according to the principles of decentralisation.”</p></div> - -<p>The Congress then asked the Allies to withdraw their troops from Syria, -and stated that the national police and administration would be fully -able to maintain order.</p> - -<p>To some extent the Emir Feisal resisted the suggestions, or at least -refused to comply with the extreme demands, of the Nationalists of -Damascus and Palestine—whose club, the Nadi El Arabi, played in these -regions the same part as the Committee of Union and Progress—for after -forming a Government of concentration, he had merely summoned one class -of soldiers, whereas the Nationalists in his absence had decreed the -mobilisation of several classes, and in agreement with General Gouraud -he had appointed administrator of the disputed region of Bukaa his -cousin, the Emir Jemil, who was a moderate man. Yet, whether he wished -to do so or not, whether he was an accomplice of the leaders or not, -the fact is that, after being the agent of England, he became the agent -of the Nationalists, who had succeeded in having the independence of -the Arabian countries<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">322</a></span> of Asia Minor proclaimed under the leadership of -the Hejaz.</p> - -<p>Thus it turned out that the foundation of an Arabian State assumed a -capital importance at the very time when the future condition of the -Ottoman Empire was under discussion.</p> - -<p>In the course of the interview between M. Mohammed Ali and Mr. Lloyd -George, as the Prime Minister asked him whether he was averse to the -action of the Syrian Moslems, who had acknowledged the Emir Feisal as -King of Arabia and proclaimed an independent Moslem State unconnected -with the Caliphate, the leader of the Indian delegation, after hinting -that “this matter can well be left for settlement amongst Muslims,” -made the following statement:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Just as we have certain religious obligations with regard to -the Khilafat that have brought us here, we have other religious -obligations, equally solemn and binding, that require us to -approach the Turks and Arabs. ‘All Muslims are brothers, wherefore -make peace between your brethren,’ is a Quranic injunction. We have -come here in the interests of peace and reconciliation, and propose -going to the Arabs and Turks for the same purpose.</p> - -<p>“Quite apart from the main claim for preservation of the Khilafat -with adequate temporal power, the Muslims claim that the local -centre of their Faith—namely, the ‘Island of Arabia’—should remain -inviolate and entirely under Muslim control. This is based on the -dying injunction of the Prophet himself. The Jazirat-ul-Arab, as -its name indicates, is the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the fourth boundary -being the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. It therefore includes -Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, as well as the region commonly -known to European geographers as the Arabian peninsula. Muslims can -acquiesce in no form of non-Muslim control, whether in the shape of -mandates or otherwise, over any portion of this region. Religious -obligations, which are absolutely binding on us, require that there -at least there shall be exclusively Muslim control. It does not -specify that it should be the Khalifa’s own control. In order to -make it perfectly clear, I may say the religious requirements, -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">323</a></span>sir, will be satisfied even if the Emir Feisal exercises -independent control there.</p> - -<p>“But, since we have to provide sufficient territories and resources -and naval and military forces for the Khalifa, the necessity for -the utmost economy which has to rule and govern all our claims in -these matters suggests that both these requirements may easily be -satisfied if the Jazirat-ul-Arab remains, as before the war, under -the direct sovereignty of the Khalifa. We have great hopes that -if we have opportunities of meeting our co-religionists we shall -bring about a reconciliation between them and the Turks. After all, -it cannot be said that Turkish rule in Arabia has been of such a -character that other Powers are bound to interfere.”</p></div> - -<p>Moreover, he added:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“With regard to the Arabs, about whom you asked me a little while -ago, the delegation are not apprehensive with regard to the -feasibility of an adjustment between the Khalifa and the Arabs. As -I have already pointed out, there is the Quranic injunction: ‘All -Muslims are brothers, wherefore make peace between your brethren.’ -That is a duty laid upon us, and recently, at the Bombay Session, -the All-India Khilafat Conference passed a resolution authorising -a delegation to proceed to the Hejaz and other parts of Arabia to -reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. Our interest is in the Khilafat -as Mussulmans. No population and no territory could be so dear to -the Muslim as the Arabs and Arabia. The Turks could not win such -affection from us as the Arabs do. This is the land that we want -to keep purely under Muslim control. Even if the Arabs themselves -want a mandate in that country we will not consent. We are bound by -our religious obligations to that extent. Therefore, it cannot be -through antipathy against the Arabs or because of any particular -sympathy for the Turks that we desire the Khalifa’s sovereignty -over the Island of Arabia. The Turks are much farther removed from -us. Very few of us know anything of the Turkish language; very few -of us have travelled in the Turkish Empire. But we do go in large -numbers to Mecca and Medina. So many of us want to die there. So -many Mussulmans settle down and marry in Arabia; one of my own -aunts is an Arab lady. Wherever we have met Arabs on our journey—we -have had no opportunity, of course, of discussing the subject with -well-educated people, but—we have asked the class of people we have -met what they thought of the action of the King of the Hejaz—‘King’ -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">324</a></span>in a land where God alone is recognised as a king: nobody can ever -claim kingship there. They said his was an act that they condemned, -it was an act they did not in the least like. They considered it -to be wrong; the Arabs spoke disparagingly of it. I do not know to -what extent it may be true, but there are a number of people who -now come forward as apologists for the Arabs. They say that what -Emir Feisal and the Sherif did was to save something for Islam; -it was not that they were against the Turks, but they were for -Islam. Whether this was or was not the fact, it is very significant -that such apologies should be made now. Honestly, we have no -apprehensions that we could not reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. -This is a question which I think the Allied Council, the Peace -Conference, could very well leave the Mussulmans to settle amongst -themselves. We do not want British bayonets to force the Arabs into -a position of subservience to the Turks.”</p></div> - -<p>Resuming the idea he had already expressed, he concluded his speech -thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“That can be very easily arranged, and if such a Federation as we -dream of becomes a reality—and I do not see why it should not—the -Arabs would have all the independence they require. They may -claim national independence, but they cannot forget that Islam is -something other than national, that it is supernational, and the -Khilafat must be as dear to them as it is to us. Even now the King -of the Hejaz does not claim to be the Khalifa. When people began -to address him as such, he rebuked them, and he published in his -official organ, <cite>Al-Qibla</cite>, that he wanted to be called King of -the Hejaz, and not Amir-ul-Mumineen, a title reserved only for the -Khalifa.”</p></div> - -<p>M. Syud Hossain declared in his turn:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We are not opposed to the independence of Arabia. We are opposed -to Emir Feisal’s declaration of independence only for this -reason—that Arabia, throughout the history of Islam, has up till -now remained under the direct control of the Khalifa. This is the -first time in the history of Islam that anyone who is not the -Khalifa has set up any claim over Arabia. That is why there is, -from the Muslim point of view, a conflict of religious obligations -with actual facts. We are not opposed to Arabian independence. -On the contrary, we wish very much for complete autonomy in that -region,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">325</a></span> but we want it to be in harmony and not in conflict with -the Khilafat and its claims. The idea is not unrealisable, as both -Arabs and Turks are Muslims.”</p></div> - -<p>Naturally the concentration of the French troops, during the Cilician -troubles, had made the action of the Syrian Nationalists popular among -the Moslem masses. On the other hand, an anti-Zionist agitation had -gained ground in Palestine and quickly developed into a propaganda in -favour of the union of Palestine and Syria under one sovereign. All -these facts, which point to the existence in Syria of a movement in -favour of an independent State, explain how it turned out that the Emir -Feisal, who favoured the scheme of a confederate Arabian Empire, was -proclaimed King.</p> - -<p>General Noury Pasha, sent by the Emir Feisal to London at the beginning -of April, handed to the Foreign Office and to the representative of the -French Foreign Office who happened to be in that city, three letters -written in the Emir’s own hand in which he is said to have asked both -Governments to recognise and support the independence of his country, -and informed them that the measures taken by the Damascus Congress -concerning Mesopotamia merely aimed at putting an end to Turkish -anarchy and the riots of Mosul.</p> - -<p>The proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria brought about much -discontent in Lebanon.</p> - -<p>A meeting was held on March 22 at Baabda, where the General Government -of Lebanon resided, to protest against the decision of the Damascus -Congress. About a thousand people were<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">326</a></span> present, and the following -motions were passed unanimously:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“1. The meeting enters a protest against the right the Syrian -Congress has assumed of disposing of Lebanon, of laying down its -frontiers, of restricting its independence, and of forbidding it to -collaborate with France.</p> - -<p>“2. The Congress asserts the independence of Lebanon. In the -demarcation of its frontiers, allowance should be made for its -vital necessities and the claims repeatedly expressed by the -populations.</p> - -<p>“3. The Congress considers as null and void the decisions taken by -the Damascus Congress concerning Syria, as the latter Congress was -never regularly constituted.</p> - -<p>“4. The Congress confirms the mandate given to the delegates sent -by Lebanon who are now in Paris.</p> - -<p>“5. The Congress confirms the independence of Greater Lebanon with -the collaboration of France.</p> - -<p>“6. The Congress expresses the wish that a Commission consisting -of inhabitants of Lebanon will lay the foundation of the future -constitution of Lebanon, which is to replace the protocol of 1860.</p> - -<p>“7. The Congress asserts the Union of Lebanon and France; the -national emblem shall be the tricolour with a cedar on the white -part.”</p></div> - -<p>This opposition was supported by the Maronite archbishops of the sanjak -of Tripolis, Latakia, Hama, and Homs, who sent a telegram of protest -from Tripolis to Syria on March 13. Thus the Arabian movement also met -with Christian opposition.</p> - -<p>Khyatin Saffita Tabez Abbas, chief of the Alawite tribe, sent the -following protest from Tartus to the Peace Conference:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Without the consent of the Alawite tribes, the Emir Feisal has -had himself proclaimed King of Syria. We protest energetically -against such illegal proceedings. We want an Alawite Confederation -established under the direct and exclusive protectorate of France.”</p></div> - -<p>Of course, it was urged that the Assembly of the Syrian Congress at -Damascus included only extremists<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">327</a></span> who worked hand in hand with the -Turkish Nationalists; it seems, nevertheless, that it represented the -opinions of most Syrians, who wanted to restore the unity of Syria; and -their wish was no doubt connected with the wish that was gaining ground -to restore the unity of Arabia.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, the Anglo-French treaty, which aimed at a partition -of Ottoman Arabia so as to balance French and English interests, but -disregarded the wishes of the peoples, could not but rouse a feeling -of discontent. Moreover, some Anglo-Egyptian agents and some British -officers had foolishly supported this movement in order to cripple -French influence, feeling quite confident they could check this -movement later on and put Syria under their own suzerainty. But they -were soon thrust aside by the movement, which had been fostered by them -in India and now logically was turning against them.</p> - -<p>The Arabs of the interior of Arabia also addressed a proclamation to -General Gouraud stating they welcomed the French as friends, but did -not want them as masters and conquerors.</p> - -<p>The Arabian opposition to France which made itself felt far beyond the -boundaries of independent Syria, the difficulties raised by the Emir -Feisal in the coast area, and the agitation stirred up by the Damascus -Government in Syria since the French troops had relieved the English -in those parts in October, 1919, induced General Gouraud to occupy -the railway stations of Maalhakah and Rayak, the latter being at the -junction of the railway line from Aleppo with the Beyrut-Damascus line -leading to the Hejaz. At<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">328</a></span> the same time, by way of reprisal for the -capture of Mejel-Anjar in the plain of Bukaa lying between Libanus and -Anti-Libanus by the Sherifian troops, he gathered his forces in the -rear of that town at Zahleh and decided to occupy all this area, which -was within the zone put under French control by the 1916 treaty.</p> - -<p>On July 20 the Emir Feisal held a war council at Damascus and issued a -decree of general mobilisation.</p> - -<p>According to the Memoirs of Liman von Sanders, who commanded the -Turkish troops in Syria-Palestine, doubts may be raised as to the Emir -Feisal’s straightforwardness in his dealings first with the Turks -during the war, and later with both the English and the French after -the cessation of hostilities.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The commander of the fourth army, Jemal Pasha, informed me in -the second half of August that the Sherif Feisal was willing to -hold the front occupied by the fourth army along the Jordan on -his own account and with his own troops, if guarantees were given -him by the Turkish Government as to the creation of an Arabian -State. According to the Sherif Feisal an important British attack -was being prepared in the coast zone, and in this way it would be -possible to reinforce the front between the sea and the Jordan with -the troops of the fourth army. Through my Turkish brigadier-general -I instructed General Jemal Pasha to enter into negotiations with -the Sherif Feisal on this point, and I urged Enver to give the -guarantees that were demanded.</p> - -<p>“I never had any answer from either Enver or Jemal on this point. -So I cannot say to what extent Feisal’s offer could be relied upon. -According to what I heard from my brigadier-general, I fancy the -Turks mistrusted his offer, which they considered as a mere decoy -to put our positions along the Jordan in the hands of the Arabs, -while the main English attack was to take place in the coast zone -or between the sea and the Jordan.”<a name="FNanchor_42_42" id="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">42</a></p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">329</a></span></p> - -<p>As was pointed out by the <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Journal des Débats</cite>, which quoted the -preceding lines on July 21, 1920, the opinion of Liman von Sanders was -quite plausible; yet the recent events on the French front may also -have had an influence on the Emir Feisal. Most likely, if we bear in -mind the intrigues he carried on afterwards, his first proposal was a -consequence of the German advance on the Western front in spring, 1918, -but the Allies’ victorious offensive on the Somme on August 8, 1918, -caused him to alter his plans. It is noteworthy that in his proposals -he disclosed where the first English attack was to take place. At any -rate, both suppositions, which corroborate each other, increase the -suspicions that might already be entertained about his sincerity; and, -since then he has obviously taken advantage of every opportunity to -play a double game, or at least to turn all the differences between the -Powers to the advantage of Arabian independence.</p> - -<p>We criticise him the more severely, as we fully understand the Arabs’ -aspirations. We disapprove of his policy and blame his attitude, -because we believe Arabian aspirations cannot be lawfully fulfilled at -the Turks’ expense, and the Arabs cannot expect they will safeguard -their liberty by supporting the English policy in the East in every -particular, especially with regard to the Turks, at a time when India -and Egypt are seeking to shake off that policy.</p> - -<p>Let us add that the Pan-Arabian movement owes the development it -has now taken to Colonel Lawrence’s manœuvres, who diverted it from -its original aim to make use of it, and became the Emir Feisal’s<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">330</a></span> -counsellor in order to influence him in favour of England. Miss Bell, -too, played an influential part in that movement.</p> - -<p>Though the Emir was the leader of a movement which, on the whole, was -hostile to Turkey, and though he asked for English support, he had no -objection to co-operating with the Nationalists, who, being threatened -by the Allies, offered their support in order to conciliate him. Thus -things had come to a more and more confused state. According to the -information given by <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Temps</cite> on July 20, 1920, it appeared that as -early as January, 1919—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Sherifian agents, Noury Shalaan, Mohammed Bey, and the -Emir Mahmoud Faour, are working hand in hand with the Turkish -Nationalists. The Turkish Colonel Selfi Bey has several times -travelled from Anatolia to Damascus and <em>vice versa</em> to carry -instructions.</p> - -<p>“At the beginning of February, Mustafa Kemal sent an appeal to the -population of Anatolia in which he said: ‘The Arabian Government -relies or will rely on us.’</p> - -<p>“The Sherifian authorities are constantly raising difficulties -to prevent the French from sending reinforcements or supplies to -Cilicia by rail.”</p></div> - -<p>In view of the exactions of all sorts the Emir Feisal indulged in, such -as the capture of revenue lawfully belonging to the administration -of the Ottoman debt and the proscription of French currency, to say -nothing of such acts of aggression as attacks on French outposts and -the closing of the railways, General Gouraud on Wednesday, July 14, -addressed to the Arabian chief the following ultimatum, which expired -on the 18th:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Recognition of the French mandate for Syria.</p> - -<p>“Liberty to make use of the Rayak-Aleppo railway.</p> - -<p>“The occupation of Aleppo and the stations lying between Aleppo and -Rayak.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">331</a></span> -<p>“The immediate abolition of forced recruiting.</p> - -<p>“Reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, -1919.</p> - -<p>“Free circulation for the French-Syrian currency.</p> - -<p>“Punishment of the authors of crimes against French soldiers.</p> - -<p>“Acceptance of the above-mentioned conditions within four days. If -these conditions are not complied with, they shall be enforced by -arms.”</p></div> - -<p>Syria, too, was in quite a perturbed state, owing to the discontent -prevailing among the population and the differences between the various -factions which were striving to get the upper hand in the country. Two -towns, Hasbeiya and Rashaya, situated on the slopes of Mount Hermon, -had rebelled against the Sherifian Government and wanted to become -parts of Lebanon.</p> - -<p>An important debate began on July 19 in the House of Commons about the -condition of affairs in Asia Minor and the possible consequences the -French ultimatum addressed to the Emir Feisal might have for British -interests in that region.</p> - -<p>Mr. Ormsby-Gore (Stafford, C.U.) asked the Prime Minister whether he -could give any information regarding the new military action of France -in Syria; whether the twenty-four hours’ ultimatum issued by the French -to the Arab Government in Damascus was submitted to and approved by the -Supreme Council; whether the terms of the mandate for Syria had yet -been submitted to the Allied and Associated Powers; and whether His -Majesty’s Government would use their influence with the French and Arab -Governments to secure the suspension of further hostilities pending the -decision of the Council of the League of Nations on the terms<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">332</a></span> of the -Syrian mandate. To this Mr. Bonar Law answered:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The ultimatum had not been submitted to the Supreme Council. The -terms of the mandate for Syria have not yet been submitted to -the Allied Powers. As regards the last part of the question, His -Majesty’s Government, who had for some time, but unsuccessfully, -been urging the Emir Feisal to come to Europe to discuss the -outstanding questions with the Supreme Council, do not consider -that they can usefully act upon the information at present at their -disposal, but they are in communication with the French Government -on the matter.”</p></div> - -<p>Then Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked again:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Is it a fact that severe casualties have already resulted from -this, and that the French have advanced over the line agreed upon -between the British and French Governments last year, and that they -have advanced from Jerablus to Jisir-Shugr and from the junction at -Rayak; and has he any information with regard to the progress of -hostilities in another part of the Arab area on the Euphrates?”</p></div> - -<p>Mr. Bonar Law having replied that he had not received the information, -Lord Robert Cecil intervened in the discussion, and asked in his turn:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Have the Government considered the very serious effect of these -proceedings on the whole situation in Asia Minor, particularly -with reference to Moslem feeling, and whether, in view of the fact -that these proceedings were apparently in absolute contravention -of Article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, he would cause -representations to be made to our French Allies on the subject?”</p></div> - -<p>Of course, Mr. Bonar Law could only reply:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We are in communication with the French Government, but I do not -accept the statement of my noble friend that what has happened is -against the Treaty of Versailles. It is very difficult for us here -to judge action which is taken on the responsibility of the French -Government.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, to Lord Hugh Cecil’s inquiry whether the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">333</a></span> British Government -was bound by promises made to the Emir Feisal, Mr. Bonar Law answered:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Government are certainly bound by their pledge. In my opinion -the fact that the mandate was given to France to cover that area -was not inconsistent with that pledge.”</p></div> - -<p>Later on, Mr. Ormsby-Gore obtained leave to move the adjournment -of the House in order to call attention to the immediate danger to -British interests in the Middle East arising from the threatened new -hostilities in Syria. He said that first—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“He wished to criticise vigorously the sins of omission and -commission committed by the British Government, and more -particularly by the British Foreign Office. Only by a frank -and full statement by the British Government would bloodshed -be prevented. The responsibility of this country was deeply -involved in view of the pledges which had been given to the Arabs -before they came into the war, while they were our allies, and -above all since the armistice.... It was essential that both the -French Government and the Arab Government in Damascus should know -exactly what the demands of the British Government were, and how -far we were committed and how far we intended to stand by those -commitments. The British taxpayer, too, wanted to know how far -we were committed. Our pledges to the French were less specific -than those to the Arabs. We pledged ourselves to recognise the -independence of the Arabs. The British Government were bound by -their undertaking to Hussein to recognise the establishment of an -independent Arab State comprising within its borders Damascus, -Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. Did the British Government communicate -these pledges frankly to the French Government? We were responsible -for encouraging the Arabs to believe that we were going to stand -by them. Were we going to stand by that pledge or not? If not, we -ought to tell the Arabs so frankly. It was quite impossible for -us to secure the pacification of Arabia, including Mesopotamia, -unless Damascus was at peace. French, Arab, and British areas had -been agreed upon to last until the permanent settlement was come -to, and if there had been a breach of that agreement those who were -responsible for the breach ought to be held responsible. Until the -mandate for Syria had been approved by the Council<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">334</a></span> of the League -of Nations and the new Arab Government in Syria was established -there should be no disturbance of the <em>status quo</em> without the -willing agreement of all parties. For years the Arabs had been our -greatest friends in the East and France our dearest ally in Europe. -The outbreak of hostilities between them revealed the bankruptcy of -British diplomacy.”</p></div> - -<p>Earl Winterton, like Mr. Ormsby-Gore, took up the defence of the Emir -and suggested that Great Britain should act as mediator between France -and the Arabs:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“As one who had fought with the Arabs during the war, he resented -the idea contained in the suggestion that while it was all very -well to use the Arabs during the war, it was not worth while now -that the war was over having a row with France for their sake.... -Prince Feisal had put his case before the Peace Conference, but -the Government, following its usual practice of secrecy, had never -allowed the House to hear a word of it or of the considered answer -of the Supreme Council. He submitted that the claims that France -had to the mandate in Syria were based, and could only be based, -on the law of the League of Nations. He was amazed to see in a -Northcliffe newspaper that day a reference to ‘the great historical -traditions of France in Syria.’ If that suggested that France -had any rights in Syria over and above those given by the League -of Nations they were coming to a very dangerous argument. It was -absurd to treat a people like the Arabs as an upstart people, to -be treated in a condescending way by the Allies. The duty of the -Government was to make representations at once to both the French -and Arab Governments, asking that this matter should be submitted -to arbitration, and that the whole case should be made public.”</p></div> - -<p>Finally, General Seely, a former Minister, rose, -and owned that under the terms of the treaty with -Turkey, France had got a force in Syria, but the whole -difficulty lay in the French issuing an ultimatum -without consulting Great Britain. According to the -three speakers, England was interested in the question, -owing to her engagements with the Emir Feisal,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">335</a></span> -and the after-effects which French action might have -in Syria and the neighbouring regions.</p> - -<p>Mr. Bonar Law, feeling obliged to take into account -both the section of public opinion on behalf of which -the three speakers had spoken, and the feelings -of an Allied country, reminded his opponents, who -hardly concealed their unwillingness to approve the -arrangements which had just been concluded, that -France had the same mandate for Syria as Great -Britain had for Mesopotamia, and endeavoured to -prove that the situation of England in Mesopotamia -was very much the same as the situation of France in -Syria. He expressly said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The real question before the House was whether the British -Government had a right to interfere in a country over which France -had duly received a mandate. It was true that, in October, 1915, -the British Government had declared they were prepared to recognise -and support the independence of the Arabs within those portions -of the territories claimed by the Emir Feisal in which Great -Britain was free to act, but it was added, without detriment to the -interests of her ally France.’ ...</p> - -<p>“It was said that the independence of the Arab people was -incompatible with the mandate. If so, this part of the Treaty of -the Covenant of the League of Nations ought not to have been in, -and France ought not to have been allowed to obtain a mandate -in Syria. It was also said that what the French were doing was -uncalled for; that all that was necessary was to have the <em>status -quo</em>. But British troops were in occupation of all the territories, -and the British Government came to the conclusion that it was -not fair that we should be called upon to bear the burdens of -occupation of territories in which later we should have no -interest. We gave notice that we intended to withdraw the British -troops. The country had therefore to be occupied, and at the San -Remo Conference the mandate for Syria was given definitely to the -French Government. That was not done behind the back of the Emir -Feisal. It was done with his knowledge, and when he was in Paris -he himself agreed that there should be a French mandate for that -territory.</p> - -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">336</a></span> - -<p>“We had accepted a mandate in Mesopotamia. Supposing the French -Government said to us, ‘You are using force in Mesopotamia, and -you are doing it without consulting the French Government. You are -breaking the conditions of the proper homogeneity of the Allies, -and you should not take steps to repulse the troops attacking -you in Mesopotamia until you have come to an arrangement with -the French Government.’ The analogy was complete. We were in -Mesopotamia for the purpose of setting up not a colony, but an -independent Arab State, and, in spite of that, we were attacked by -Arabs all through Mesopotamia. Our answer to the French would be -that the mandate for Mesopotamia had been entrusted to us, and we -claimed to deal with the country in the way we thought right. It -was said that this action of the French Government was contrary -to the whole spirit of the mandate and an independent Arab State. -That was not so. In the ultimatum to which reference had been made -a passage occurred which he would quote. Acceptance of the French -mandate was one of the conditions. ‘The mandate,’ it is stated, -‘will respect the independence of Syria and will remain wholly -compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities -properly invested with powers by the popular will. It will only -entail on the part of the mandatory Power co-operation in the form -of collaboration and assistance, but it will in no case assume the -colonial form of annexation or direct administration.’ The French -Government told us they were acting on that principle, and was the -House of Commons really going to ask the British Government to say, -‘We do not accept your assurance, but we ask you to allow us to -interfere with you in the exercise of your authority’?</p> - -<p>“The mandate having been given, it was clearly no business of ours -to interfere unless some action had been taken so outrageous that -we had a right to say that it was not in accordance with the Peace -Treaty and would not be accepted by the League of Nations or any -other independent body....</p> - -<p>“Had we that justification? He thought we had a right at least -to assume that the French Government had something of a case for -the action they were taking. He had the actual words in which -the French described the necessity of their taking this action. -They pointed out that a large number of French soldiers had been -massacred by Arabs. They did not say that the Emir Feisal was -responsible for that—he did not think the Emir was—but that whether -it was due to his responsibility or want of power to prevent it the -situation was one which the French Government could<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">337</a></span> not allow -to continue. With regard to the railway, on which they said they -depended absolutely under present conditions for the support of -their forces in dealing with the rebellion of Mustafa Kemal in -Cilicia, they complained that they had tried over and over again to -get from the Emir the use of that railway for the purpose of the -supply of their troops, but had failed. They said that that was a -condition of things which they could not allow to continue if they -were to be responsible for the mandate. He thought that was a very -good case.”</p></div> - -<p>On Lord Winterton exclaiming: “Then the French have a mandate for -Damascus! But neither the Arabs nor the Supreme Council have ever -admitted such a mandate,” Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the Government, -answered:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“They had been in communication with the French Government on that -point, and their reply was to this effect: ‘There is no intention -of permanent military occupation. As soon as the mandate has been -accepted and order has been restored the troops will be withdrawn.’</p> - -<p>“A great deal had been said about the claims of Emir Feisal. No one -would recognise them more readily than His Majesty’s Government. -They knew that he and his tribesmen did gallant service in the war, -but he asked the House to remember that but for the sacrifices both -of the French and ourselves, there would have been no possibility -of King Hussein having any authority in his country....</p> - -<p>“They met him over and over again in London and Paris, and when the -question came of giving the mandate, on two occasions the British -and French Governments sent a joint invitation to the Emir Feisal -to come to Europe and discuss the question with them. The Emir -Feisal was not able to come for one reason or another on either -occasion; but he did say that no case of any ally or anyone in -connection with the Peace Treaty was considered more thoroughly -than his, or with more inclination to meet his wishes. The House -must be under no misapprehension. There was great trouble in the -Middle East. Arab fighting would add to that trouble, and what -happened in Syria must have reflex action in Mesopotamia. If it -was assumed, as some hon. members were ready to assume, that we in -Mesopotamia were pursuing solely selfish aims with no other object, -and if they assumed that the French were pursuing imperialistic -aims in Syria with no other object, then, of course, the case was -hopeless. There<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">338</a></span> was no Frenchman who had shown a broader mind -and a greater readiness to grasp the position of other people -than General Gouraud. In any degree to reflect upon the French -Government in this matter was a very serious thing.”</p></div> - -<p>The time seemed very badly chosen indeed for such a debate in the -English Parliament, as Mr. Winston Churchill, War Secretary, had just -informed the Commons that important reinforcements coming from India -had recently been dispatched to Mesopotamia, and the Commander-in-Chief -had been given full powers to take any measures the situation might -require.</p> - -<p>It was the policy of England in the East which stood responsible for -such a state of things. Though the bulk of public opinion in France -was averse to any military action in the East, either in Syria or in -Turkey, yet France was driven to fight, as it were, by England—though -both Governments were supposed to act jointly in the East—in order to -prevent her ally from undermining her influence. Such was the outcome -of England’s ill-omened policy, who first had supported the Arabian -movement and now seemed to forsake it, and thus had roused all the East -against Europe through the resentment caused by her attitude towards -Turkey and Persia. Perhaps England was not very sorry, after all, that -France should divert against herself part of the Arabian forces from -the Mesopotamian front, where the British effectives were insufficient -in number.</p> - -<p>M. Millerand corroborated Mr. Bonar Law’s statements before the French -Chamber, disclosed some of the agreements made with England, and -apologised for being unable to say more; he also declared England had -officially recognised she had no right<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">339</a></span> to meddle with Syrian affairs; -and finally declared that whoever should feel tempted—he meant the Emir -who had just submitted to General Gouraud’s ultimatum—to oppose France -to Great Britain in Asia Minor would now know it would have France -alone in front of him. And yet if one day Great Britain rules over -Mesopotamia, she is not likely to give France a free hand in Syria.</p> - -<p>Just at the same time—on July 20—the Cairo correspondent of <cite>The Times</cite> -wrote that he understood the King of the Hejaz had telegraphed to Mr. -Lloyd George how surprised and disappointed he was at the French policy -in Syria, and asked him to interfere. King Hussein also declared he -could not exert his influence on the Emir Feisal’s brothers or prevent -them from coming to his help.</p> - -<p>The English Government circles, on the other hand, seemed at last -inclined to favour a scheme that would put Syria and Mesopotamia, -respectively under the sovereignty of the Emir Feisal and the Emir -Abdullah, under a French mandate in Syria and a British one in -Mesopotamia. But the <cite>Daily Express</cite> of July 17 seemed apprehensive -lest the French expedition aimed at overthrowing the Emir Feisal and -replacing him by the Emir Said, who had been expelled from Syria during -the British occupation. Let it be said, incidentally, that the Arabs of -the Emir Feisal possessed 100,000 rifles, the very arms taken from the -Turks by the English and left by the latter in the hands of the Arabian -leader.</p> - -<p>General Gouraud’s ultimatum had naturally been accepted by the Emir -Feisal, but a few days after its expiration, and so military action -had been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">340</a></span> started. General Gouraud, according to his communiqué, had, -on July 22, at the Emir’s request, stopped the column that was on its -way from Zaleh to Damascus. Feisal had alleged that his answer had been -sent in due time, but untoward circumstances had prevented it from -coming to hand the appointed day.</p> - -<p>The French General had consented to give him the benefit of the -doubt and halt his troops on certain conditions, one of which was -that his soldiers should not be attacked. Now the French column that -guarded the country between Homs and Tripolis, some distance to the -east of the post of Tel-Kelah, was attacked by Sherifian regulars. -Under these circumstances, and to prevent another attack which seemed -to be preparing between Damascus and Beyrut, the southern French -column that guarded the railway in case of an attack coming from -Damascus, dislodged the Sherifian troops whose headquarters were at -Khan-Meiseloun, in the mountain range which divides the plain of the -Bukaa from the plain of Damascus, and thus the way was open to the -latter town.</p> - -<p>France, who otherwise would not have been obliged to fight in order -to maintain her influence in Syria, was compelled to do so by the -policy in which she was involved. But this policy, which drove her -to inaugurate a Syrian campaign at the very time when by the side of -England she enforced on Turkey a treaty that no Turk could accept, -might have brought about, as Pierre Loti said in an article of the -<cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Œuvre</cite>, July 22, “the death of France in the East.”</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">341</a></span></p> - -<p>Even the Christians<a name="FNanchor_43_43" id="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">43</a>—the Armenians excepted—wished the French to -leave Antioch in order to be able to come to an understanding with the -Moslems who maintained order in the four great towns of Aleppo, Hama, -Homs, and Damascus, occupied by the Sherifian troops. A delegation -of eight members representing the Christian element wanted to go to -France, but the Patriarch of Lebanon handed General Gouraud a protest -to be forwarded to the French Government; he inveighed against what -he called “the shameful conduct of some members of the administrative -Council of Lebanon,” and charged them, just as they were about to leave -for Europe, with receiving important sums of money from the Emir Feisal -to carry on an anti-French propaganda. After this protest, they were -imprisoned by the French authorities: all of which shows the state of -deep unrest then prevailing in Lebanon and our utter lack of reliable -information from the East.</p> - -<p>On July 23 a French column entered Aleppo, after a skirmish north of -Muslemieh, and a reconnoitring body of cavalry which had pushed on as -far as Homs bridge was greeted by some Sherifian officers, who informed -them that the Sherifian troops had left the town. On the 25th, in the -afternoon, the French troops entered Damascus without encountering -any resistance. A new Government was formed after the downfall of -the Sherifian Government, and General Gobet formally notified them -on behalf of General Gouraud that the Emir Feisal was no longer King -of the country. He demanded a war contribution of 10 million francs -on account of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">342</a></span> damage done by the war bands in the western zone; -general disarmament should be proceeded with at once; the army should -be reduced and converted into a body of police; all war material should -be handed over to the French authorities, and the chief war criminals -tried by military courts. All these conditions were, of course, -assented to by the new Government, who expressed their sincere wish to -collaborate with the French.</p> - -<p>The Emir Feisal, who had come back to Damascus, was requested to leave -the country with his family. He set off to England soon after and -sought to meet Mr. Lloyd George at Lucerne.</p> - -<p>Without considering the future relations between Lebanon and Syria -or turning its attention to the future mode of government of Syria -and its four great towns Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, the French -Government decided to restore Greater Lebanon. M. Millerand informed -Mgr. Abdallah Kouri, Maronite Archbishop of Arca, president of the -delegation of Lebanon, of this by a letter dated August 24, 1920. The -new State was to extend from the Nahr-el-Litani, which flows along -the frontier of Palestine, to another State, called “Territoire des -Alaonites,” or, in Arabic, Alawiya, coming between the Lebanon and -Antioch, and to the crests of Anti-Libanus, including the Bukaa area, -with the towns of Rayak and Baalbek. The ports of Beyrut and Tripolis -in Syria were to enjoy local autonomy, but to keep in close connection -with the new State. Beyrut was to be the seat of the new Government; -Tripolis and its suburbs were to be grouped into a municipality. -In this way Greater Lebanon would have recovered<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">343</a></span> all its former -territories, as it was before 1860, in conformity with the promises -made by M. Clémenceau and confirmed by M. Millerand, and with the -claims set forth in 1919 at the Peace Conference by the delegates of -Lebanon.</p> - -<p>Was it not a mistake in Syria, a country over which France had a -mandate and where the proportion of Moslems is three to one, to start -with a policy that favoured Lebanon and consequently the Christians? -The question was all the more important as the discontent brought -about by the Powers’ decisions was far from subsiding in these and the -neighbouring regions.</p> - -<p>Indeed, the Ansarieh tribes, living in the mountainous regions to the -east of Antioch and Alexandretta, and in the Jebel Ansarieh between -Latakia and Tartus, which had persistently kept aloof from us in the -past, made their submission after the downfall of the Emir Feisal, -and several Ansarieh chiefs—Ismail Pasha, Inad, and Ismail Bey -Yaouah—accepted the conditions imposed on them. Yet dissatisfaction -was still rampant in the Hauran area, and the train in which ed Rubi -Pasha, the Syrian Premier, and other Ministers were going to Deraa was -attacked on Friday, August 20, at Kerbet-Ghazeleh by Arabian bands. Ed -Rubi Pasha and Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha were murdered. The railway line -was recaptured later on, but the contingents sent to Deraa had to fight -with Arabian bands at Mosmieh.</p> - -<p>Farther north, in the part of Cilicia entirely occupied by Kemalist -troops, Colonel Brémond, commanding a group of 3,000 to 4,000 men -consisting of French troops and native recruits, after<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">344</a></span> being blockaded -at Adana for six weeks, had to sign a truce in August because he was -short of water, and the provisioning of Adana could only be ensured -by establishing a base in the former Roman port of Karatash. Mersina, -where the French had enlisted all the Armenian and Greek manhood, was -also besieged and blockaded, except along the coast where a French -warship overawed the rebels. Lastly, Tarsus, the third place occupied -by French troops, was in the same predicament, and was cut off from the -other two towns. Under these circumstances whoever could flee sailed to -Cyprus, and the few boats which called at Mersina took away crowds of -fugitives.</p> - -<p>In Mesopotamia the situation was quite as bad, and everywhere the Arabs -evinced much discontent. In the zone of the lower Euphrates and Lake -Hamar, as well as in the Muntefik area, many disturbances occurred.</p> - -<p>The <cite>Sunday Times</cite> of August 21, 1920, in an article in which the -attitude of the British Government was severely criticised, wondered -whether it was not too late to atone for the mistakes of England, even -by expending large sums of money, and concluded thus:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Would it not be wiser to confess our failure and give up meddling -with the affairs of three million Arabs who want but one thing, to -be allowed to decide their own fate? After all, Rome was not ruined -when Hadrian gave up the conquests made by Trajan.”</p></div> - -<p>The <cite>Observer</cite> too asked whether a heavy expenditure of men and money -could restore the situation, and added:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The situation is serious; yet it is somewhat ludicrous too, when -we realise that so much blood and money has been<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">345</a></span> wasted for a -lot of deserts and marshes which we wanted ‘to pacify,’ and when -we remember that our ultimate aim is to impose our sovereignty on -people who plainly show they do not want it.”</p></div> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The diversity of creeds among the various Moslem sects had also, from -the beginning, imperilled the unity of the Arabian world within the -Ottoman Empire by endangering its religious unity. By the side of the -Sunnis, or Orthodox Moslems, the Shia—viz., the rebels or heretics, -belonging to a schism which is almost as old as Islam itself—recognise -nobody but Ali as the lawful successor of Mohammed. According to them, -the title of Caliph should not go outside the Prophet’s family, and his -spiritual powers can only be conferred upon his descendants; so, from a -religious point of view, they do not recognise the power of the other -dynasties of Caliphs—for instance, that of the Ottoman Sultans. As Ali, -the Prophet’s son-in-law, was killed at Kufa in Mesopotamia, and as -Ali’s sons, Hassan and Hossein, were also massacred at Kerbela, near -the ruins of Babylon, together with some of their descendants who had -a lawful right to the title of Imam, Mesopotamia is looked upon by the -Shia as their Holy Places.</p> - -<p>Many wealthy Persians, to whom the worship of the members of Ali’s -family has become a symbol and who consider their death as a religious -sacrifice, have their own coffins carried to Mesopotamia that their -bodies may lie in the holy necropolis of Kerbela or of Nejef, to -the north-east of Mecca and Medina; and as a great many Arabs of -Mesopotamia are still<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">346</a></span> Shia, this schism practically divides the -Persian world from the Turkish world.</p> - -<p>But though the Persians, who have never recognised any Caliph, and for -the last thirteen hundred years have been waiting till the Khilafat -should revert to the lineal descent of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, -to acknowledge a Caliph’s authority, do not recognise the Ottoman -Caliphate, yet their monarchs do not seek to deprive the Sultan of his -title of Caliph to assume it themselves.</p> - -<p>So their case is entirely different from that of the people of -Morocco, who do not recognise the Ottoman Caliphate because their -own sovereigns, as descendants of the Prophet, profess they have an -hereditary right to hold the office of Caliph within the frontiers of -their State.</p> - -<p>The Shia faith has even spread as far as India and the Sunda Isles; and -so the opposition between Shia and Sunnis may play an important part in -freeing Mesopotamia from the Turkish influence of Constantinople.</p> - -<p>Yet the English occupation has been so bitterly resented in Mesopotamia -that the Shia Mujtahids, or imams of Nejef and Kerbela, have lately -asked for the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over these towns, -where are the two famous holy shrines of Islam. Moreover, the -controversy on the question whether the Sultans of Turkey have a right -to the Caliphate, because they do not belong to the tribe of Koreish, -in which the Prophet was born, seems to have come to an end among the -Moslems, or at least to have been laid aside in view of the present -events.</p> - -<p>Moreover, the Prophet, when he advised the Faithful to choose his -successor in the tribe of Koreish, does<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">347</a></span> not seem at all, according -to the best Moslem authorities, to have wished to confer the supreme -spiritual power for ever upon a particular section of the community -related to him by ties of blood, and to have reserved the Caliphate to -this tribe. It seems more likely that, as Islam at that time had not -yet given birth to powerful States, he chose this tribe because it was -the best organised and the strongest, and thus considered it as the -fittest to maintain the independence of the Caliphate and defend the -interests of Islam. Besides, within half a century after the Prophet’s -death the Caliphate passed from Mohammed’s four immediate successors -to the Omayyids for the reason indicated above, and in contradiction -to the theory of lineal descent. It is obvious that, had Mohammed been -guided by family considerations, he would not have merely given the -Faithful some directions about the election of his successor, but he -would have chosen one of his relations himself to inherit his office, -and would have made it hereditary in the latter’s family.</p> - -<p>The Wahhabis, who are connected with the Shia, are likewise a political -and religious sect which was founded in the eighteenth century in -Nejed, a region of Central Arabia conterminous with the north of -Syria. The Wahhabi doctrine aims at turning Islam into a kind of -deism, a rational creed, looking upon all the traditions of Islam as -superstitions, and discarding all religious observances. Since the -assassination of Ibn el Rashid in May, 1920, the present leaders of the -Wahhabis are Abdullah ibn Mitah and Ibn Saud, over whom the Ottomans -have a merely nominal power.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">348</a></span></p> - -<p>When King Hussein planned to join the Hejaz and Nejd to Syria, Ibn -Saud refused to let Nejd fall under the suzerainty of the King of the -Hejaz, who was powerful merely because he was supported by Europe and -because Syria is a rich country. Most likely the religious question -had something to do with this conflict. In August, 1919, the Wahhabis, -who had asked the Emir Ibn Saud for his support, suddenly attacked the -troops of the sons of the King of the Hejaz which were in the Taif -area, and defeated them at Tarabad. The Wahhabi Emir gained a few more -victories, and was about to threaten the Holy Cities when the rising of -the Orthodox Moslem tribes compelled him to retreat.</p> - -<p>So the hostility of the Wahhabis, whose independence was threatened -by the Sunnis of the Hejaz, whom they look upon as heretics, still -embittered the dissensions in the Arab world.</p> - -<p>It has been asserted that this Wahhabi movement was at first started -by the Turks, which would not have been unlikely at a time when it was -Turkey’s interest to divide Arabia in order to raise difficulties to -the Allies after the Sherif’s treason; but now it was no longer her -interest—and it was beyond her power—to stir up an agitation.</p> - -<p>The Ishmaelites, who laid waste Persia and Syria in the eighth century, -and played an important part in the East till the twelfth century, have -also broken off with the Shia.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the Druses, who inhabit the slopes of Lebanon and the greater -part of Anti-Lebanon between Jebeil and Saida along the Mediterranean, -profess the creed of the Caliph Al-Hakem, who lived at the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">349</a></span> beginning -of the eleventh century. They had withdrawn to Lebanon and long -repelled the attacks of the Turks, whose suzerainty they acknowledged -only in 1588. In 1842 the Porte gave them a chief, but practically -they have remained almost independent. They have often fought with the -Maronite Christians living to the north, especially in 1860, and there -is still much hostility between them.</p> - -<p>Moreover, all Moslem communities, without exception—whether the -communities governed by independent national sovereigns such as -Afghanistan; or by sovereigns owing allegiance to non-Moslem Powers -such as Egypt, India, Tunis, Khiva, Bokhara; or the communities living -under a non-Moslem rule, as is the case with those of Algeria, Russia, -and also India and China—give their allegiance to the Sultan as Caliph, -though they are always at liberty to refuse it. Even the Moslem -communities of Algeria and Tunis, which are connected with those of -Morocco by their common origin and language, and live close by them, -do not deem it a sufficient reason to recognise the Emir of Morocco as -Caliph that he is a descendant of the Prophet.</p> - -<p>An even more striking argument is that the community of the Hejaz, -which rebelled against Turkish sovereignty during the war and has -made itself politically independent, still maintains its religious -allegiance to the Sultan; and the present King, Hussein, who is the -most authentic descendant of the Prophet, and who rules over the two -holiest towns of Islam, Mecca and Medina, soon after the armistice -addressed the Sultan a telegram of religious allegiance drawn up -in the most deferential terms.<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">350</a></span> The possession of Mecca and Medina -being one of the attributes of the Caliph, and these towns having a -great religious and political importance owing to the great annual -pilgrimage, King Hussein might have taken advantage of this to dispute -with the Sultan the title of Caliph. England had strongly urged him -to do so, but King Hussein obstinately refused. Then the British -Government, giving up all hope of bringing about the transference of -the Caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to another sovereign, concluded -a secret alliance with Vahid ed Din.</p> - -<p>Considering the intricate situation in the East due to the variety -of races and religions, and the movements of all sorts by which the -populations of those countries are swayed, it seems most unwise -to increase the general restlessness by a vain intervention of -the Powers, and to dismember what remains of Turkey in Europe and -Aria Minor, a dismemberment which would necessarily have violent -repercussions throughout the deeply perturbed Moslem world. Though -the recent movements of emancipation in the East to a certain extent -meet the legitimate wishes of the peoples and have somewhat cleared -the situation in Asia Minor, yet it is obviously most perilous to -infringe upon the Sultan’s sovereignty, to endeavour to drive away the -Turks into Asia, and to set up a kind of fictitious official Islam by -compelling the Moslem peoples of the East to give up their cherished -independence and submit to an Arab imperialism which would soon become -British imperialism. At the present moment all the Moslem elements are -determined to unite together against any enemy of their liberty; and -all Moslems,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">351</a></span> without any distinction of creed or race, might very well -one day flock to the standard of a bold leader who should take up arms -in the name of Islam, in order to safeguard their independence.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>These movements, and many other similar ones, were encouraged and -strengthened by the development of the principle of nationalities and -the support given to it by Mr. Wilson, who was bent upon carrying it -out to its strictly logical consequences, without paying heed to the -limitations imposed by the present material and political conditions. -But we do not think it is true to say, as has been urged, that the -assertion of the right of self-determination of peoples was the initial -cause of these movements. The movement in favour of the rights of -nationalities originated long before Mr. Wilson’s declarations, which -merely hurried on this powerful movement, and also caused it to swerve -somewhat from its original direction.</p> - -<p>This movement, on the whole, seems chiefly to proceed—though other -factors have intervened in it—from a kind of reaction against the -standardising tendency, from a material and moral point of view, of -modern Western civilisation, especially the Anglo-Saxon civilisation, -and also from a reaction against the extreme unification aimed at by -russifying the numerous peoples living within the Russian Empire. -Modern civilisation, having reached its present climax, has aimed—and -its political and social repercussions have had the same influence—at -doing away with all differences between human minds and making the -world homogeneous; thus all men would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">352</a></span> have been brought to live in the -same way, to have the same manners, and their requirements would have -been met in the same way—to the very great advantage of its enormous -industrial development. Of course, all this proved an idle dream; human -nature soon asserted itself, amidst the commotions and perturbations -experienced by the States, and a reaction set in among those who -hitherto only aimed at enslaving various human groups, or linked them -together politically in a most artificial way. Then the same feeling -spread among all those peoples.</p> - -<p>All this enables us to see to what extent this movement is legitimate, -and to know exactly what proportions of good and evil it contains.</p> - -<p>It rightly asserts that various peoples have different natures, and -by protecting their freedom, it aims at ensuring the development of -their peculiar abilities. For let us not forget that the characters of -peoples depend on physical conditions, that even the features we may -not like in some peoples are due to the race, and that if, by blending -and mixing populations nowadays these features are modified, they are -generally altered only from bad to worse.</p> - -<p>But this principle is true only so far as it frees and enables to shape -their own destinies peoples who have distinctive qualities of their -own and are able to provide for themselves. It cannot be extended—as -has been attempted in some cases—to States within which men descending -from various races or having belonged in the course of centuries to -different nationalities have long been united, and through a long -common history and a centuries-old co-operation have formed one nation. -This is one<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_353" id="Page_353">353</a></span> of the erroneous aspects of Mr. Wilson’s conception, and -one of the bad consequences it has entailed.</p> - -<p>The eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, which the British -wished for but which they dared not carry into effect, does not thwart -the scheme of the Turkish Nationalists; it can only bring about a -reaction of the Moslem populations against foreign intervention, and -thus strengthen the Pan-Turanian movement. Though this movement cannot -carry out all its aims, the eviction of the Turks obviously must urge -those populations to constitute a State based both on the community -of religion and the community of race of its various elements, and -from which all alien ethnic elements would be expelled—viz., Slavs, -Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, who were all an inherent source of -weakness to the Turkish Empire. This new State would include Anatolia, -Russian Azerbaïjan, and Persian Azerbaïjan, the Russian territories -in Central Asia—viz., Russian Turkistan, Khiva, Bokhara—the whole of -the region of the Steppes; and towards it the Tatar populations of -the Volga, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkistan would necessarily be -attracted.</p> - -<p>As to the Arabs, the Turks have never been able to gain their -friendship, though they have done their best to do so, and have drawn -but little profit from the money squandered plentifully in their -vast deserts. And the Russians have always stood in the way of an -understanding between Turkey and the Arabian territories, because -it would have benefited the cause of Islam and therefore would have -hindered both their own designs on the territories of Asia Minor and -the ambitions of the Orthodox<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_354" id="Page_354">354</a></span> Church. Yet to the Turks as well as the -Arabs—and even to the Europeans—it would be a great advantage not to -injure the understanding and goodwill that Islam engenders among these -peoples, since its creed has both a religious and a political aspect.</p> - -<p>The maintenance of this Islamic union has been wrongly called—in the -disparaging sense of the word—Pan-Islamism. Yet its ideal has nothing -in common with such doctrines as those of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism, -Pan-Americanism, Pan-Polism, Pan-Hellenism, etc., which are all -imperialistic doctrines aiming at territorial conquests by military -or economic means, and also by the diffusion of their own religious -creeds and the extension of the influence of their Churches. While -Pan-Germanism aims at the hegemony of the world; while Pan-Americanism -wants to control the whole of America; while Pan-Slavism wishes to -gather together all the Slavonic elements—which is defensible—but also -means to supplant the old civilisation of Western Europe, which it -considers as “rotten,” and to renovate the world; while Pan-Polism, -which has not such ambitious aims, merely seeks, like Pan-Hellenism, -to conquer wider territories in order to restore Greater Poland or -Greater Greece—Islam, which does not try to make any proselytes, has -no other ambition than to group all Moslem elements according to the -commandments of the Koran. Yet, Islam having both a political and a -religious purpose, a Pan-Islamic concept might be defensible, and would -be legitimate from the Moslem point of view, whereas it cannot be so -from the Christian point of view. Pan-Catholicism, on the contrary, is -an impossible thing,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_355" id="Page_355">355</a></span> because Christianity does not imply a political -doctrine, and is distinct from temporal power—though such a doctrine -has sometimes been advocated. For in the doctrine of monarchy, -especially in France, religion has always been held merely as a help, -a support, and the monarch, though he has often been a defender of the -Faith, has never looked upon his power as dependent on the Papacy or -bound up with it. Islam, however, does not want to assert itself in, -and give birth to, a huge political movement—a Pan-Islamic movement -in the imperialistic sense of the word—aiming at constituting a huge -theocratic State, including all the 300 million Moslems who are now -living. But there is between all Moslems a deep moral solidarity, a -mighty religious bond which accounts for their sympathetic feeling -towards Turkey, and owing to which even the Moslem inhabitants of -countries which have lost their independence still earnestly defend and -jealously maintain the privileges and dignity of the Caliph.</p> - -<p>So it is a mistake to speak of the ambitious designs of Islam, and the -mistake has been made wilfully. Those who profess such an opinion are -Pan-Slavic Russians who want to deceive public opinion in the world as -to their true intent, and thus prepare for territorial annexations, -because Pan-Slavism is the enemy of Islamism. As this Pan-Slavism has -always been, and is still more than ever, a danger to Europe, it is -the interest of the latter, in order to defend its civilisation, not -to fight against Islamism, but even to support it. This necessity has -been understood by many Catholics who have always been favourable to -Turkey and by the Mussulmans, which accounts<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_356" id="Page_356">356</a></span> for the long friendly -intercourse between Moslems and Catholics, and the Moslems’ tolerance -toward the devotees of a religion which, on the whole, is in complete -contradiction to their own faith. On the other hand, Islam appears as -counterbalancing Protestantism in the East, and it seems the future -of thought and morality and of any culture would be endangered if the -60 million Indian Moslems and the 220 million Indian Brahminists, -Buddhists, and the members of other sects ever listened to Mr. Lloyd -George and were connected with Protestantism.</p> - -<p>Moreover, King Hussein, in the course of the audience that he granted -in July, 1920, to Prince Ruffo, the leader of the Italian mission -to Arabia, before his departure, after saying that the Moslem world -resented the hostile attitude of the Powers towards the Sultan of -Constantinople, declared that the Moslems are not actuated by any -feeling of conquest or proselytism, but simply claim the right to -preserve their independence.</p> - - -<p>Footnotes:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_36_36" id="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36"><span class="label">36</span></a> <cite>Hayassdan</cite>, July 6, 1915; No. 25.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_37_37" id="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37"><span class="label">37</span></a> We are the more anxious to correct these figures as in -1916, at a time when it was difficult to control them, we gave about -the same figures in a note to the Société d’Anthropologie as to the -demographic consequences of the war. We then relied upon the documents -that had just been published and on the statements of the Rev. Harold -Buxton.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_38_38" id="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38"><span class="label">38</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Mouvement pan-russe et les Allogènes</cite> (Paris, 1919).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_39_39" id="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39"><span class="label">39</span></a> <cite>The Times</cite>, March 15, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_40_40" id="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40"><span class="label">40</span></a> H. Vambéry. <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Cagataische Sprachstudien</cite> (Leipzig, 1867); -<cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Etymologisches Wörterbuch der Turko-Tatarischen Sprachen</cite> (Leipzig, -1875); <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Das Turkenvolk</cite> (1885).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_41_41" id="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41"><span class="label">41</span></a> Léon Cahun, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Introduction à l’histoire de l’Asie, Turcs -et Mongols, des origines à 1405</cite> (Paris, 1896).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_42_42" id="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42"><span class="label">42</span></a> Liman von Sanders, <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Fünf Jahre Türkei</cite>, pp. 330-331.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_43_43" id="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43"><span class="label">43</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Temps</cite>, July 21, 1920.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_357" id="Page_357">357</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="VIII">VIII<br /> -<br /> -THE MOSLEMS OF THE FORMER RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TURKEY</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">The</span> Supreme Council, in the course of one of its last sittings, -decided in January, 1920, practically to recognise the independence of -Georgia,<a name="FNanchor_44_44" id="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">44</a> Azerbaïjan, and Armenia.</p> - -<p>It is deeply to be regretted that this decision came so late, for, -considering the circumstances under which it was taken, it seemed to -have been resorted to <em>in extremis</em> and under the Bolshevist threat.</p> - -<p>It was even announced, then denied, that the Allies were going to send -contingents to the Caucasus in order to check the Bolshevist advance -towards Armenia, Turkey, Persia, and possibly towards Mesopotamia and -India. But under the present circumstances, the Allies were not likely -now to get all the benefit they might have derived from this measure if -it had been taken long ago; and, on the other hand, this measure was -not likely to produce any effect if the new States were not recognised -definitely and could not rely on the Allies’ moral and material support.</p> - -<p>Since Georgia, Azerbaïjan, and Armenia seemed to have been recognised -as independent States, in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_358" id="Page_358">358</a></span> order to incite them to check the Reds’ -advance, how was it that the Republic of Northern Caucasus had not been -treated similarly? The reason given by the Supreme Council was that, as -the greater part of this State was occupied by Denikin’s forces, it did -not think it proper to take a decision about it. The true reason was -that the Supreme Council wanted to favour the Pan-Russian general, and -it was even rumoured that Koltchak and Denikin had demanded this rich -country to be set aside for the Tsar, whom they wanted to restore to -the throne.</p> - -<p>Out of the 25 or 30 million Moslems living in the whole of Russia, 6 -or 8 millions were scattered in the region of the Volga (Orenburg, -Kazan) and in the Crimea; they were about 6 millions in Turkistan -and 7 millions in the Caucasus region; about 2 millions in Northern -Caucasus, 300,000 to 500,000 in Kuban, 600,000 in Georgia, 3,500,000 in -Azerbaïjan. Half the population is Moslem in the new Armenian State, -for only in two districts are the Armenians in a majority, the Tatars -being in a majority in the others. It should be borne in mind that all -these Moslems, after the downfall of Tsardom, had turned their hopes -towards the Allies, especially England, to safeguard their political -independence. Unfortunately neither Great Britain nor France paid any -heed to the repeated entreaties of M. Haidar Bammate, then Minister of -Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Northern Caucasus, or later on to -the appeals of the Georgian statesmen.</p> - -<p>This omission appears all the more unaccountable if we remember -that the Allies, by settling the fate of Armenia on this occasion, -encroached upon the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_359" id="Page_359">359</a></span> Turkish question and confused it with the Russian -question, which was already intricate enough; and as it is clear that -another obvious reason for the Allies’ decision was to befriend the -Moslem populations of those regions, that they might not join the -Bolshevist cause, why then had Christian Armenia been included in the -aforesaid settlement, while Northern Caucasus had been excluded from -it? Of course, it is not to be regretted that Armenia benefited by the -Allies’ decision, but it is impossible logically to explain how it came -to be included in their measure on account of its close relations with -Georgia and Azerbaïjan, when, as a matter of fact, the latter republics -want to form a close union with Caucasus. It was quite as urgent, -therefore, to recognise the Republic of Northern Caucasus as the other -three countries.</p> - -<p>Moreover, as the Allies wanted to keep Bolshevism out of Transcaucasia, -it seemed obvious that their first measure, from a military point of -view, should have been to hold a strong position in the Caucasus Range, -whose slopes were being lapped by the Red tide, and to organise its -defence.</p> - -<p>Indeed, the key to the defence of Transcaucasia lies to the north of -the Caucasus Range. Four passes, crossing the mountains from the north -to the south, give access to it: the defile of Sukhum; the road leading -from Alatyr to Kutaris; the Georgian military road from Vladikavkaz to -Tiflis; lastly, the gates of Derbent, along the Caspian Sea. Only the -first of these defiles was held by the Georgians; the other three were -in the hands of the mountaineers, “the Gortsy”—viz., the Chechens, the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_360" id="Page_360">360</a></span> -Ossetes, the Ingushes, the Kabardians, and the Daghestanians, who make -up the Republic of Northern Caucasus. It was easy for the mountaineers -to set up a first line of defence on the Rivers Terek and Malka, which -constitute a good strategic position, a second line before the defiles, -and, should some detachments venture across the latter, they would be -quickly stopped by the mountaineers. If, on the contrary, nothing was -done, the Bolshevists could easily cross the defiles and destroy the -Batum-Baku railway. These tribes, who had displayed so much energy -sixty years ago for the conquest of their liberty, had fought against -the Bolshevists from November, 1917, till February, 1919; so they had a -right to expect the Allies would support their claims.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, French policy resorted again to the same manœuvre to -which it was indebted for its failure on the Baltic coast, and which -repeatedly deferred a solution of the Russian question. For the Allies -refused to settle the condition of the Baltic States definitely, and -even tried to restore Russia to its former state; they even urged the -Baltic States, till Yudenitch, Denikin, and Koltchak had been defeated, -to carry on the onerous struggle they had undertaken and to make all -sacrifices of men and money to capture Petrograd, which they were not -eager to do, as they would have merely paved the way to the coming of -the Pan-Russian generals.</p> - -<p>The Allies made a similar mistake when they indirectly asked the -mountaineers of Caucasus, who wanted to be independent, to attack the -Bolshevists, but gave them no guarantee they would<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_361" id="Page_361">361</a></span> recognise their -independence. Of course, the mountaineers refused to play such a part, -for they risked finding themselves confronted one day or another with a -Russia that would despise their national aspirations and would oppress -them.</p> - -<p>The situation could have been saved and the balance between the States -on the confines of the Russian Empire could have been restored only -by a close understanding of all the Caucasian peoples, after their -independence should have been recognised; the representatives of -Georgia and Azerbaïjan agreed on this point with the representatives -of Northern Caucasus, and these peoples were ready to help each other -mutually.</p> - -<p>In the course of the last sitting of the Supreme Council to which -the delegates of Georgia and Azerbaïjan had been invited, the latter -declared “that the mountaineers were brave, that they had constituted -some of the best units of the former Russian army, and were bent upon -stopping the Bolshevists, but they lacked arms and ammunition.”</p> - -<p>Under such circumstances it seemed the Allies could not possibly ignore -these peoples’ determination and turn a deaf ear to their earnest -request, yet they took no decision.</p> - -<p>With regard to the Moslem question this attitude of the Conference, -which seemed bent upon ignoring Northern Caucasus, was equally -strange, for it was bound to bring about discontent among these Moslem -populations. It was the more unaccountable as the Bolshevists, who set -up as protectors of these populations, had sent many emissaries among -them, who could not but derive profit from the Allies’<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_362" id="Page_362">362</a></span> attitude. The -Bolshevists had, of course, immediately recognised Daghestan a Moslem -State.</p> - -<p>Nor had the Republic of Northern Caucasus any reason to be satisfied -with the attitude assumed by the British mission sent to Baku, for -this mission had constantly supported General Denikin, and seemed to -endeavour to destroy the economic and political Caucasian union it had -formed with Georgia and Azerbaïjan. The only theory which accounts for -the British attitude is that the English meant to remain masters of -Baku, and to leave the Russians the oil-field of Groznyi in Northern -Caucasus, the output of which was already important before the war, and -would certainly increase. But they were mistaken in thinking that the -petroleum of Groznyi, which was partly used as fuel by the Vladikavkaz -railway and partly sent to the Black Sea ports to be sold to Western -Europe, was utilised in Central Russia; it is chiefly the petroleum of -the Baku area, lying farther south, which is easily conveyed to Russia -across the Caspian Sea and up the Volga.</p> - -<p>Again, the Allies ought to have taken into account that the troublous -state into which the Moslem world had been thrown by the settlement -of the Turkish question as it was contemplated by the Peace -Conference might have most important reactions in all directions on -the populations of the former Russian Empire which now wanted to be -independent.</p> - -<p>Yet the claims which the delegations of the Republics of Georgia and -Azerbaïjan—together with Northern Caucasus—had set forth in January in -the course of their reception by the Supreme Council<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_363" id="Page_363">363</a></span> concerning the -support they might expect from the Great Powers in case they should -be attacked by the Soviets, brought forth no answer; and the Allies -adjourned both the question of the defence of the Transcaucasian -Republics and the question of their independence.</p> - -<p>In consequence of all this, Northern Caucasus soon fell a prey to -Bolshevism, and some insurrections broke out in Georgia. The Soviet -Government sent a great many agitators to these regions. Then the Red -army advanced in two columns, one of which defeated Denikin and crossed -the Kuban to invade Caucasus, and the other spread over Kurdistan, -whence, after winning over to its cause the Tatar and pro-Russian -elements of the neighbouring regions, it extended its field of action -as far as Persia and Mesopotamia.</p> - -<p>As early as February the Russian Bolshevists concentrated important -forces near the northern frontier of Azerbaïjan under pretence of -driving away the remnants of Denikin’s army, and after hurriedly -getting up a “Soviet Government” at Daghestan, drew near the frontier -of Azerbaïjan.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile their agents carried on an energetic propaganda at Baku, -where the inexperienced Moslem leaders of Azerbaïjan had foolishly -left almost all the administration of the country in the hands of -functionaries of the old régime or Russian officers who thought that -Bolshevism, especially with the national character it had newly -assumed, might restore Russia to its former state.</p> - -<p>Within the country an economic crisis on the one hand, and on the -other hand the Armenians’<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_364" id="Page_364">364</a></span> aggressions, in the course of which they -had massacred many Mussulmans, especially at Karabagh, had raised a -widespread discontent against the Cabinet.</p> - -<p>Emboldened by the success of the Bolshevists, who benefited by these -disturbances, their local accomplices, some Russian workmen supported -by about a hundred Moslem workmen, helped to organise a series of -raids. During the night of April 26-27 the northern frontier of -Azerbaïjan was crossed at the railway station of Jalama by a Bolshevist -armoured train, for the main body of the army of Azerbaïjan had been -dispatched to Karabagh and Kasakg to repel an Armenian attack, so that -only one armoured train and a few hundred soldiers had been left on the -northern frontier. This small detachment could not prevent the advance -of the Red forces which followed the train, though it did its duty -bravely and destroyed the railway track. On April 27 the Bolshevist -forces reached the station of Khatchmaz, where they were greeted by a -group of local communists.</p> - -<p>At Baku, where the population lived in a state of indifference and -passivity, the local communists, encouraged by the advance of the -Russian Bolshevists, addressed an ultimatum to the Government, which -had declared itself in favour of armed resistance, demanding the -resignation of the Cabinet and the handing over of the Government to -the revolutionary committee which had just been formed. This ultimatum -was enforced by the threat of the bombardment of the town by the fleet -of the Caspian Sea.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_365" id="Page_365">365</a></span></p> - -<p>The Government, which had vainly asked Georgia for assistance, and had -proposed to Armenia, before the common danger, to put an end to the -hostilities at Karabagh in order to withdraw its troops and dispatch -them to the northern frontier, was compelled on April 28 to hand over -the power to the people’s commissioners. The members of the Cabinet, -against whom the Bolshevists had issued a writ of arrest, hurried away -and the communists immediately resorted to their usual methods of -terrorism and plunder.</p> - -<p>Instead of the “Moslem Brethren” the Bolshevist emissaries had spoken -of, the inhabitants of Baku saw some Russian Bolshevists, accompanied -by Armenians who had been expelled by the former Government, take -possession of the town. As soon as they arrived, the latter arrested -all the foreign missions, except the Persian mission. As the national -army was detained on the southern frontier by constant Armenian -attacks, the invaders dispatched Russian detachments in all directions, -to take possession of the entire country. They addressed an ultimatum -to Armenia, demanding the evacuation of Karabagh. At the same time -Russian forces were sent via Zakatali towards the Georgian frontier. -At Baku the Moslem militia was replaced by Russian workmen, and at -the same time orders were given immediately to disarm the population -of Ganjha (Elisavetpol), where the governor and some notables were -arrested and incarcerated.</p> - -<p>It is reported that at Ganjha 15,000 Moslems were slaughtered by the -Reds.</p> - -<p>A correspondent of <cite>Il Secolo</cite>, on coming back from<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_366" id="Page_366">366</a></span> Caucasus, wrote an -article entitled “The East on Fire” on May 25, 1920:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The information that we have just received from Constantinople, -Anatolia, Caucasus, and Persia could not possibly be worse. -Bolshevism has won over Caucasus to its policy, and from Baku it -is carrying on a more and more energetic propaganda in Persia and -Turkistan. The British are already fighting in the latter country -with Bolshevism. All this might have been foreseen.</p> - -<p>“As it is cut off from Europe and encircled by hostile bayonets, -Bolshevism, which originated in Asia, is now spreading over Asia. -This does not mean that Caucasus and Asia are ripe for a revolution -of the poor against the rich. It would be a foolish thing to say -this. In Asia everybody is poor, but nobody starves. In Asia -there is no industry, there are no organisations; therefore, -there is no socialist movement on the whole. But anybody who has -been to Caucasus lately must necessarily have noticed, to his -great surprise, evidences of a Moslem Bolshevism headed by Enver -Pasha and his brother Noury. The Republic of the mountaineers of -Daghestan, the first that joined the Bolshevist movement and made -easier the advance of the Reds towards the south, is headed by -Enver Pasha. In Azerbaïjan many fanatic admirers of Russia are to -be met with.</p> - -<p>“And what are the reasons for this? They are many. First, the -desperate condition of the new States which came into being -immediately after the Brest-Litovsk peace. In Paris the Conference -laid down frontiers, but never thought the first thing to do was to -put an end to the economic crisis prevailing in those countries. -And so an absurd thing happened—wealthy countries living in -frightful misery, and issuing paper currency which was of no value -on the world’s markets. Typical is the case of Azerbaïjan, which -had millions of tons of petroleum at Baku, but did not know where -or how to export them.”</p></div> - -<p>In July it was announced that the situation of the Moslems in Armenia -had become critical, as for the last two months the Erivan Government -and the “Tashnak” party had been carrying on a policy of violence and -massacres against them. What remained of the Moslem populations had -been compelled to leave their homes and property and flee<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_367" id="Page_367">367</a></span> to Persia. -The Armenian Government had even appointed a Commission especially -to draw up a list of the crops left by the Moslems and the Greeks in -the district. At the end of June, in the district of Zanguibazar, -about twenty Moslem villages had been destroyed by bombardments and -their inhabitants put to death. By that time the Moslem population -of Transcaucasia was being attacked both by the Armenians and the -Bolshevists.</p> - -<p>M. Khan-Khoiski, ex-Prime Minister, and Dr. H. Aghaef, former -Vice-President of the Parliament of Azerbaïjan, were assassinated at -Tiflis, where they had sought refuge, the former on June 19 and the -latter on July 19, by Armenians belonging to the “Tashnak” party, of -which the leader of the Armenian Government and most Ministers are -members.</p> - -<p>This murder of the leaders of Azerbaïjan, who carried on the war -against the invaders of their country, served the Bolshevist cause, but -aroused much resentment among the Moslems of Azerbaïjan and Georgia, -who were exasperated by the Bolshevists’ frightful tyranny and now -hated Bolshevism as much as they had formerly hated Tsardom.</p> - -<p>The delegation of Azerbaïjan handed to the Spa Conference a note in -which they drew its attention to the condition of their country. On the -other hand, the members of the former Cabinet made energetic efforts -to rid their country of the Bolshevist invasion. For this purpose they -sent delegates to Daghestan and Northern Caucasus to plan a common -resistance, as Daghestan, the tribes of the mountains of Northern -Caucasus, and Azerbaïjan were on<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_368" id="Page_368">368</a></span> friendly terms and shared the same -views. By this time a small part of the Red armies still occupied -the Baku area, whence the Bolshevists sent reinforcements to the -detachments fighting in Persia.</p> - -<p>About the same time it was announced that Enver Pasha had been -appointed commander-in-chief of the Bolshevist forces advancing towards -India, and the Bolshevist troops in Caucasus, Persia, Afghanistan, -and Turkistan had been put under his command. In this way the Soviets -probably sought to compel England to make peace with Russia at once.</p> - -<p>At Tabriz a separatist movement was beginning to make itself felt with -a view to bringing about the union of Persian Azerbaïjan, of which this -town is the centre, with the Republic of Azerbaïjan, the capital of -which is Baku.</p> - -<p>All this Bolshevist activity naturally caused much anxiety among those -who closely watched the development of Eastern events, for Soviet -Russia in another way and with different aims merely carried on the -work of Russian imperialism both in order to hold Great Britain in -check in the East and to give the whole world the benefit of the Soviet -paradise. As the Allied policy with regard to Turkey had roused the -whole of Islam, the union of the Bolshevist elements and the Turkish -Nationalists seemed inevitable when the question of the future fate of -Caucasus should be settled. It was only too much to be feared, after -what had just taken place in Azerbaïjan, that Soviet Russia, feeling -it necessary to get the start of the Turkish Nationalists, would try -to take possession of Georgia now she held Azerbaïjan, as a guarantee -both against the hostility<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_369" id="Page_369">369</a></span> of England and against the opposition that -might sooner or later arise on the Turkish side. It then appeared that -the Turkish Nationalists had come to a merely provisional agreement -with the Russian Bolshevists to disengage themselves on the Russian -side, and secure their help against Europe, which threatened Turkey; -and that, on the contrary, the Angora Government, some members of -which are Chechens and Ossetes, when brought face to face with the old -historical necessities, would be one day compelled to resort to the old -policy of defending the Moslem world against the Slavonic world. For -notwithstanding the inherent incompatibility between the minds of these -two peoples, the Allied policy, through its blunders, had achieved -the paradoxical result of making a Russo-Turkish alliance temporarily -possible, and to bring together the Moslems—so unresponsive as a rule -to the idle verbiage and subversive tendencies of revolutionists—and -the Bolshevist Slavs, who were still their political enemies. And so it -turned out that the attitude assumed by the various European Powers in -regard to the Turkish problem and the solution that was to eventuate -were prominent factors in the future relations between each of those -Powers and Asia. Now the Turks, who alone are able to bring about an -understanding between the Moslems of Caucasus and those of Asia, are -also the only people who can bring about a lasting peace in that part -of the confines of Europe and Asia, and settle the relations between -those Moslem populations and the West.</p> - - -<p>Footnote:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_44_44" id="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44"><span class="label">44</span></a> Since the French edition of this book was published, -Georgia was recognised, <em>de jure</em>, by the Supreme Council in January, -1921.</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_370" id="Page_370">370</a></span></p></div> - -<div class="chapter"><h2 id="IX">IX<br /> -<br /> -TURKEY AND THE SLAVS</h2></div> - -<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Through</span> a singular aberration, the dismemberment of Turkey and the -Turks’ eviction from Europe were being advocated at a time when the -idea of the restoration of Russia had not yet been given up, for the -various States now detached from the former Russian Empire had not -yet been definitely recognised; and among the promoters or supporters -of this policy were many defenders of old Russia under a more or less -transparent disguise.</p> - -<p>Though, from the point of view of European policy, the situation of -the two countries widely differed, by dismembering Turkey before the -Russian question was settled, at least in its solvable part—viz., with -regard to the heterogeneous peoples—the Allies made a mistake of the -same kind, or at least of the same magnitude, as the one they had made -when they dismembered the Dual Monarchy and yet did not destroy German -unity, or rather Prussian hegemony.</p> - -<p>Russia had already taken possession of several Turkish territories, and -not so long ago she plainly declared she had not given up her ambitious -designs on Constantinople.</p> - -<p>This open hostility of the Russians toward the Turks is of very long -standing.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_371" id="Page_371">371</a></span></p> - -<p>The first Russian attacks against Turkey, as explained in the early -part of this book, date back to 1672. After the victory of Poltava, -in 1709, which the next year gave him Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia, -Peter the Great turned against the Turks, the allies of Charles XII, -King of Sweden. But Charles XII, who had sought shelter at Bender, in -Turkey, after the battle of Poltava, brought over the Grand Vizier -Baltaji Mohammed to his views, and induced him to declare war on -Turkey. Peter the Great, encircled by the Turks at Hush, between the -Pruth and the marshes, was going to capitulate when Catherine I, in -order to save him, made peace by bribing the Grand Vizier, who soon -after was exiled to Mytilene. The Turks only demanded the restitution -of Azov in 1711. In 1732 Peter the Great took from Persia the provinces -of Daghestan, Derbend, Shirwan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. At that time, -while Villeneuve was ambassador at Constantinople (1728-41) and Austria -and Russia began to turn greedy eyes on Turkey, France declared “the -existence of Turkey was necessary to the peace of Christendom,” and -later on Choiseul-Gouffier, who was the French king’s last ambassador -from 1784 to 1792, strove to save the Turks from the ambitious designs -of Catherine II.</p> - -<p>Catherine, taking advantage of the intrigues carried on in the Morea -with two Greeks, Papas-Oghlou and Benaki, dispatched a fleet to the -Mediterranean to bring about a Greek rising against Turkey; the Ottoman -fleet which sought shelter at Tchesmé, on the coast of Asia Minor, was -burnt by Russian fireships on July 7, 1770.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_372" id="Page_372">372</a></span></p> - -<p>After the 1770-74 war, the Porte, which was Poland’s ally, lost -Bukovina and Lesser Tatary, whose independence was recognised by the -treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji on July 21, 1774, but which became a Russian -province in 1783. The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji ceded Kinburn and -Yenikale to Russia, left to the Christians the principalities lying to -the north of the Danube, and guaranteed the Orthodox Greeks’ liberty -under the patronage of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. -Catherine II also compelled the Turks by the same treaty not to defend -the independence of Poland, threatened by Russia with the complicity of -the Great Powers, and to give her a right of intervention in their home -affairs. The Tatars of the Crimea and Kuban, detached from Turkey, soon -after fell under the Russian sway, in 1783. The Sultan even had to sign -a treaty granting a right of free navigation in the Black Sea and in -the rivers of his empire.</p> - -<p>About the same time the European Powers began to interfere in -Turkey: that was the beginning of the “Eastern question.” In -opposition to the Austro-Russian alliance of Catherine and Joseph II, -England, dissatisfied with Russia’s attitude in the American War of -Independence, and wishing to find allies in Germany to counterbalance -Russian influence in Europe, concluded an alliance with Prussia, -Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. The death of Frederic II soon put an end to -this coalition, and Russia’s unfriendly attitude, her encroachments in -Caucasus, and her territorial claims in Bessarabia, compelled Turkey -on August 16, 1787, to declare war on Catherine, and Joseph II entered -into the war in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_373" id="Page_373">373</a></span> 1788. The Austrians took Khotin; the Turkish fleet was -destroyed at Otchakov; Belgrade fell on October 8, 1789. Then Leopold, -Joseph II’s brother, left the Turks and made peace with Turkey at -Sistova on August 4, 1791. The Russians, who had defeated the Turks -at Machin, were about to invade the Empire when, as a result of the -intervention of England and Prussia, a treaty of peace was signed at -Jassy, by which the Dniester became the new frontier between the two -States. Thus Russia, who owing to the perturbed state of Europe was -preparing to dismember Poland, was compelled to give up her dream of -restoring the Byzantine Empire.</p> - -<p>After the 1809-12 war, Turkey lost the provinces lying between the -Dnieper and the Danube which were ceded to Russia by the treaty of -Bukharest.</p> - -<p>Russia, who, by the convention of Akkerman in October, 1826, -had compelled Turkey to recognise the autonomy of Serbia and -Moldo-Wallachia and cede her the ports of the coast of Circassia -and Abkasia, declared war on her again on April 26, 1828, after the -manifesto she had issued to her Moslem subjects on December 28, -1827. The Russians took Braila, advanced as far as Shumla, captured -Varna, and laid siege to Silistria, but the plague and food shortage -compelled them to make a disastrous retreat. In Asia they took Kars, -Akhalzikel, and Bayazid. The next year they entered Erzerum; Diebitch -captured Silistria, outflanked the Grand Vizier’s army shut up in -Shumla, crossed the Balkan mountains, and laid siege to Adrianople. On -September 14, 1820, Turkey signed a treaty in the latter town, which -put Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_374" id="Page_374">374</a></span> under Russian protectorate, and by -which she ceded to Russia all the coast of Transcaucasia, granted her -the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and promised to -pay a war contribution of 137 million francs.</p> - -<p>In 1833 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who, not having been able to -obtain the Morea through the Powers’ support, wanted to capture Syria, -defeated the Turks at Konia and threatened Constantinople. The Tsar, -Nicholas I, who hoped he could turn Turkey into a kind of Russian -protectorate, then sent Mouraviev to Mahmoud to offer to put at his -disposal a fleet and an army to fight with Mehemet Ali. A Russian fleet -came and cast anchor before Constantinople, and a Russian detachment -landed in the town. But then France, Austria, and Prussia, perhaps -foreseeing the danger of a Russian occupation which might pave the -way to a definite possession, asked the Sultan to make the necessary -concessions to his vassal, and the latter to accept them. The treaty of -Kutahia, signed on May 4, 1833, gave the Pasha of Egypt the whole of -Syria and the province of Adana. Russia withdrew her troops, but did -not lay down arms, and thus Count Orlov compelled the Porte to sign -the treaty of Unkiar-i-Skelessi, which stipulated an offensive and -defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey, and the closing of the -Dardanelles to the other Powers. Turkey was now under Russian tutelage.</p> - -<p>After the defection of Ahmed Pasha, who led the Turkish fleet -at Alexandria, Great Britain, lest Russia should establish her -protectorate over Turkey, offered to France, through Lord Palmerston, -to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_375" id="Page_375">375</a></span> participate in a naval demonstration, but France declined -the offer. Metternich then suggested a conference between the -representatives of the five Great Powers, in order to substitute their -guarantee for a Turkish protectorate. On July 27, 1839, the ambassadors -handed the Sublime Porte a note communicating their agreement, and -advising that no definite decision should be taken without their -co-operation. Then England, having no further fear of Russian -intervention, turned against Mehemet Ali, and Baron de Brunov even -proposed an Anglo-Russian agreement.</p> - -<p>Owing to the intervention of Austria, which was averse to a war with -France, the question of Egypt was only settled on July 13, 1841, by -a hatti-sherif, which gave Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of -Egypt, and by the treaty of London, which guaranteed the neutrality -of the Straits, as Russia wanted to control the Straits and conquer -Constantinople to free the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula from -the so-called Ottoman tyranny, and “relight the tapers which had been -put out by the Turks” in St. Sophia, restored to Orthodoxy. France, -following the old traditions of her foreign policy and in agreement -with England, confined the Russians within the Black Sea by the -convention of the Straits in 1841, and thus secured, not the integrity, -but the existence of the Turkish Empire.</p> - -<p>But the Tsar, Nicholas I, who was bent on defending the Greek faith -within the Ottoman Empire, was anxious to see Turkey pursue the work -of the Tanzimat—<em>i.e.</em>, the new régime—confirmed by the promulgation -by Abdul Mejid of the hatti-sherif<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_376" id="Page_376">376</a></span> of Gulhané on November 3, 1839. In -1844 he made overtures concerning the partition of Turkey, to England, -to which the latter country turned a deaf ear. Thanks to the support of -Great Britain and France, the Turkish troops, which had been sent to -Moldavia and Wallachia after the riots which had broken out after the -revolution, compelled the Tsar in 1849-51 to withdraw his army beyond -the Pruth.</p> - -<p>In 1850 France protested against the encroachments of Russia in the -East, who, in order to protect the Greek monks living in Palestine and -secure her own religious domination, wanted to deprive the Roman monks -of their time-honoured rights over the Christian sanctuaries.</p> - -<p>In 1853 the Tsar sent Prince Menshikov to Constantinople in order to -demand a formal treaty granting the Greek Church religious independence -and temporal privileges. The Sublime Porte, backed by France and -England, rejected the ultimatum. The latter Powers then sent a -fleet to the Dardanelles, and the next month—on July 4, 1853—Russia -occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. At the instigation of Austria, the -Powers assembled at Vienna on the 24th of the same month drew up a -conciliatory note, which was rejected by Russia. Then the English -fleet sailed up the Dardanelles, and on October 4 Turkey declared war -on Russia. Austria tried again, at the Vienna Conference which she -reopened in December, 1853, to bring about an understanding between -Russia and Turkey. But Nicholas I declared that he meant to treat -only with England and Prussia to restore peace in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_377" id="Page_377">377</a></span> the East, which -Turkey looked upon as an affront. He also rejected Napoleon III’s -mediation on January 29, 1854, and the Franco-English summons on -February 27, upon which France declared war on him. Notwithstanding -the political views which unfortunately are still held by most of the -present diplomatists, and in pursuance of which the Powers had already -checked Mehemet Ali’s success and prevented Turkey resuming her former -state, France and England realised the dangerous consequences of the -Russian threat and backed Turkey. In consequence of the manœuvres of -Austria and the unwillingness of Prussia, who had declared “she would -never fight against Russia,” the Allies, who were at Varna, instead -of attacking the principalities, decided to launch into the Crimean -expedition. Finally, after the ultimatum drawn up by Austria, to which -the Emperor Alexander submitted at the instigation of Prussia, a treaty -of peace signed in Paris on March 30, 1856, recognised the integrity -of Turkey, abolished the Russian protectorate over the principalities, -and guaranteed the independence of Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia, -under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Our diplomats seem then -to have partly realised the extent of the danger constituted by the -Slavs, and to have understood that the Turks, by driving back the Slavs -and keeping them away from Western and Mediterranean Europe since the -fourteenth century, had enabled Western civilisation to develop.</p> - -<p>As the influence of France in Turkey was imperilled after her defeat -in 1870, Russia took advantage of this to declare she would no longer -submit to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_378" id="Page_378">378</a></span> the most important clauses of the London treaty of March -13, 1871. Russia, whose ambassador in Turkey at that time was General -Ignatiev, took in hand the cause of the independence of the Bulgarian -Church, for which, in 1870, she had obtained the creation of a national -exarchate with its own hierarchy, which had exasperated the Phanar at -Constantinople and brought about deadly encounters between Turks and -Bulgarians.</p> - -<p>In 1875 Russia, alarmed at the reforms instituted by Turkey, and -fearing the European organisation she was attempting to introduce -into the Empire might strengthen it and thus prove an obstacle to the -realisation of her designs, fomented a Christian rising in Bosnia and -Herzegovina, which was a pretext for her to declare war on Turkey. -Russia, backed by the Bulgarians, obliged Turkey to agree to an -armistice and to an International Conference at Constantinople. In -consequence of the rejection by Turkey of the protocol of London and -the Russian comminatory note which followed it, Russia carried on the -hostilities which, after the defeat of Plevna in Europe and the capture -of Kars in Asia, led to the negotiations of San Stefano, on March 3, -1878.</p> - -<p>Lastly, in the same year, on the occasion of the treaty of Berlin, -which gave Kars to Russia and modified the San Stefano preliminaries -by cancelling several of the advantages Russia hoped to obtain, -France, pursuing her time-honoured policy, showed clearly her sympathy -for Turkey, by bringing to bear on her behalf the influence she had -regained since 1871.</p> - -<p>By so doing, France incurred Germany’s anger,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_379" id="Page_379">379</a></span> for we have already -shown the latter country’s sympathy for Slavism. As recent events have -proved once more, an alliance with Russia could only be brought about -by a corresponding understanding with Germany, since Russia, where -German influence has been replaced by Slavonic influence, is now being -invincibly drawn towards Germany, where Slavonic influence is now -prevalent. This twofold understanding could only be brought about by -sacrificing the whole of Western Europe and all her old civilisation. -The Europe “which ends on the Elbe,” as has been said, would become -more and more insignificant in such a political concept, and there -would only remain in the world, standing face to face for a decisive -struggle, the Germano-Russians and the Anglo-Saxons.</p> - -<p>Spurred on by the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria, consequent -on the rising of September 18, 1885, at Philippopolis, the Macedonian -Slavs carried on an agitation the next year, in 1886, in favour of -their union with Bulgaria, and resorted to an insurrection in 1895-96.</p> - -<p>Lastly, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13, notwithstanding the complexity -and intricacy of the interests at stake, may be looked upon to a -certain extent as a fresh outcome of the Slavonic pressure and the -ambitions of Orthodoxy.</p> - -<hr class="tb" /> - -<p>The Russians, who had driven back the Turanian peoples to Turkistan, -began the conquest of this country in 1815. From 1825 to 1840 they -subdued the Khirgiz. They took Khiva in 1854, and in 1864<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_380" id="Page_380">380</a></span> conquered -the lower valley of the Syr Daria. In 1863 they occupied Tashkent, and -in 1867 grouped the territories they had conquered under the authority -of the Governor-General of Turkistan. In 1873 they occupied all the -country lying between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and in 1876 -took Kokand.</p> - -<p>Even before the war, as has already been seen, Russia had turned her -attention in the East towards Armenia, who, owing to her situation, -could best serve her policy of expansion in Asia Minor. According to -the plans of the Imperial Russian Government set forth on June 8, 1813, -Armenia was to be converted into an autonomous province under the power -of a governor-general, including the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, -Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas, with the exception of a few territories -whose boundaries had not yet been fixed. But in a memorandum presented -at the same time, the Imperial Russian Government insisted upon “the -close connection between the Armenian question and the problems the -Russian administration had to solve in Transcaucasia.” These plans lay -in abeyance, for they were opposed by the German policy, which was -hostile to any Russian encroachment on Turkish territories; and Russia, -on the other hand, prevented Germany obtaining the concession of a -railway line which was to connect the Turkish ports on the Black Sea, -Samsun and Trebizond, with the Baghdad Railway and the Mediterranean -Sea at Alexandretta, and settling down on the coast of the Black Sea.</p> - -<p>As the Entente had given Russia a free hand, the latter country, as -has been seen, resumed the realisation<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_381" id="Page_381">381</a></span> of her plans as soon as war -broke out. Russia, who had begun the conquest of Caucasus in 1797 and -of the Transcaspian isthmus from 1828 to 1878, occupied Upper Armenia -in 1914-15. The Young Turks, who believed in the triumph of Germany, -expected that, thanks to the latter, they could hold in check the -Russian designs, and for this reason stood by her side.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile the Russian policy with regard to Turkey asserted itself more -and more energetically, especially in reference to Constantinople, so -that the antagonism of the two nations, created by Muscovite ambition, -had grown into a deep and lasting hostility.</p> - -<p>It was recommended in the testament which is supposed to have been -written by Peter the Great—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Article 9. To draw as close as possible to Constantinople and -India, for he who rules over that city will rule over the world. -It is advisable, therefore, to bring about continual wars, now in -Turkey, now in Persia, to establish shipbuilding yards on the Black -Sea, gradually to get the mastery of that sea and of the Baltic -Sea—the possession of these two seas being absolutely necessary -for the triumph of our plans—to hurry on the decay of Persia, to -advance as far as the Persian Gulf, to restore the once thriving -Eastern trade, if possible through Syria, and to advance as far as -India, the emporium of the world.</p> - -<p>“When once we are there, we shall no longer be dependent on English -gold.</p> - -<p>“Article 11. To show the House of Austria it has an interest in -ejecting the Turks from Europe, and to neutralise her jealousy when -we shall conquer Constantinople, either by bringing about a war -between her and the old European States, or by giving her a share -of the conquest—and take it back from her later on.”</p></div> - -<p>Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did not carry out her -plans by force of arms, for the other Powers would have opposed -them; but she<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_382" id="Page_382">382</a></span> resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph. -She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by -supporting and grouping the Christian elements included in this empire, -especially those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus she -really partitioned the Empire and bound to herself the old Ottoman -provinces now raised to the rank of autonomous States. She acted most -cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peacefully she sought -to dismember Turkey gradually and weaken her in order to finally rule -over her. It has been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians -opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands to-day, and already -advocated the solution they have always insisted upon.<a name="FNanchor_45_45" id="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">45</a></p> - -<p>A century ago Alexander I declared it was time to drive the Turks out -of Europe. Talleyrand, in the account he gave of the conversations -between that Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that he said -one day:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at Tilsit the -liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened sovereigns. Our -age, still more than our policy, requires that the Turks be driven -into Asia; it will be a noble deed to free these beautiful lands. -Humanity wants the eviction of those barbarians; civilisation -demands it.”</p></div> - -<p>But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian policy, for at the end -of his life he said at St. Helena: “I could have shared Turkey with -Russia; many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor, Alexander -I, but every time Constantinople proved the stumbling-block. The Tsar -demanded it, and<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_383" id="Page_383">383</a></span> I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it -is worth an empire.”</p> - -<p>At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons of March 29, 1791, -some speakers expressed the anxiety felt in Great Britain, just -after Catherine II had annexed the Crimea, lest the Russians should -capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader of the Liberal -party, declared he saw no ground for fear in the constant increase of -Muscovite power; he did his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her -side, continued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from England; -he recalled that the British themselves had opened the Mediterranean to -Russian ships twenty years before, and he had told the French Minister -Vergennes, who desired him to protest against the annexation of the -Crimea, that Great Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with -Catherine II.</p> - -<p>Unfortunately, the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s ambassador, and -the Comte de Bonneval, who had been converted to Islam, had been -the last Frenchmen who had supported the Sublime Porte against the -Russian Tsar’s hostility and endeavoured to use Islam as the protector -of the liberty of peoples imperilled by the Tsars; and yet this old -policy of France had the advantage both of benefiting French trade and -counterbalancing the power of the enemies of France.<a name="FNanchor_46_46" id="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">46</a> On the other -hand, at the Congress of Sistovo in 1791, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who -acted as mediator in the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish treaty of -peace, recommended his fellow-countrymen<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_384" id="Page_384">384</a></span> “to let the Turks dwindle -down in their own dull way.” So now French policy and English policy -were going the same way.</p> - -<p>During the reign of Charles X, the Polignac Cabinet was willing to -sacrifice Constantinople to the Russians in return for the left bank -of the Rhine, and in 1828 Chateaubriand, French ambassador at Rome, -favoured an alliance with the Tsar in order to obtain the revision of -the 1815 treaties, at the cost of Constantinople. Moreover, Admiral Sir -Edward Codrington, by destroying the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino -on October 20, 1827, with the combined fleets of Great Britain, France, -and Russia, furthered the Russian Tsar’s plans.</p> - -<p>As the direct capture of the Straits was bound to raise diplomatic -difficulties, Nicholas I, on September 4, 1892, summoned a secret -council to discuss what policy Russia was to pursue on this point. -The opinion which prevailed was expressed in a memorandum drawn up -by a former diplomatist, Dimitri Dashkov, then Minister of Justice, -and in a draft partition of the Turkish Empire penned by a Greek, -Capodistria. This secret committee, dreading the opposition of the -Western States, decided to postpone the partition lest, as Great -Britain and France refused their consent, it should not finally benefit -the designs of Russia and Greece on Constantinople. These secret -debates have been summed up in a book published in 1877;<a name="FNanchor_47_47" id="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">47</a> and M. -Goriainov, in the book he wrote on this question in 1910,<a name="FNanchor_48_48" id="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">48</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_385" id="Page_385">385</a></span> thought -it proper to praise the consistent magnanimity of the Tsars towards the -Turks—whereas the policy which maintained that no reforms would ever -be instituted by Turkey of her own free-will if they were not urged -on by diplomatic intrigues or international interference, and that -“the sick man” could only be restored to health by the intervention of -Christendom and under the Orthodox tutelage, was the real cause of the -decay of Turkey and the origin of all the intricacies of the Eastern -problem.</p> - -<p>In 1830 Lord Holland, Fox’s nephew—it will be remembered that on -March 29, 1791, Fox had said in the House of Commons he was proud of -supporting Russia’s advance to the East, in opposition to William -Pitt, who wanted to admit Turkey into the European concert—declared he -was sorry, as “a citizen of the world,” that the Russians had not yet -settled down in the Golden Horn.</p> - -<p>Besides, whereas the Tories felt some anxiety at the territorial -development of Russia—without thinking of making use of Turkey to -consolidate the position in the East—the Whigs, on the contrary, to use -the words of Sir Robert Adair in 1842, thought they could bring the -Muscovite Empire into the wake of the United Kingdom.</p> - -<p>In June, 1844, the Tsar himself came to London in order to induce Great -Britain to approve his Eastern policy, and Russian diplomacy felt so -confident she could rely on the support of the English Liberal Cabinet -that in 1853 Nicholas I, in the overtures made to Sir Hamilton Seymour, -expressed his conviction that he could settle the Turkish<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_386" id="Page_386">386</a></span> problem in -ten minutes’ conversation with Lord Aberdeen.</p> - -<p>On June 4, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield, who looked upon the part of England -in the East as that of a moral protectorate over Islam and a mediator -between Europe and Asia, by ensuring the institution of a system of -reforms, signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey, by which England -pledged herself to protect the Porte against Russian greediness in -Asia. Unfortunately, Mr. Gladstone, under the influence of the ideas we -have already expounded,<a name="FNanchor_49_49" id="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">49</a> soon reversed the Eastern policy of England -and unconsciously made his country the Tsar’s ally against Turkey.</p> - -<p>Russia, to whom it was now impossible, since the Bulgarians and -Rumanians were no longer under Ottoman dominion, to reach the shores -of the Bosphorus through Thrace and to conquer Constantinople and the -Straits, which had been the aim of her policy for centuries, then -turned her designs towards Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, as we have -just seen, in order to reach Constantinople through Asia.</p> - -<p>Tiutshev, in one of his poems entitled <cite>Russian Geography</cite>, said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Moscow, Peter’s town, and Constantine’s town, are the three sacred -capitals of the Russian Empire. But how far do its frontiers extend -to the north and the east, to the south and the west? Fate will -reveal it in the future. Seven inland seas and seven great rivers, -from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga -to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian -Empire, and it will last through untold centuries! So did the -Spirit predict. So did Daniel prophesy!”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_387" id="Page_387">387</a></span></p> - -<p>And in another place:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come! -And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will -shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou -Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.”</p></div> - -<p>The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the -first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina -are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations -concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession -was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the -other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or -indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly.</p> - -<p>At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had -proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of -that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though -she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted -nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she -had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual -Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the -idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated -that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity -claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty -over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de -Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate -Austria and to<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_388" id="Page_388">388</a></span> bring her to rely more and more on German friendship -by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between -London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused -in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make -England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already -prevailing between Austria and Russia.</p> - -<p>Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her -willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her -to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was -revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of -England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia -whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour -of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg -Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should -these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and -Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely -strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out -that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon -the meeting of the Conference.</p> - -<p>Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on -Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of -Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister, -which were published in the <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite> in January, 1921. In one -of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a -Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_389" id="Page_389">389</a></span> M. de Nelidov, -at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there -was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a -similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned -from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St. -Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures -which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced -me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my -views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November -21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The -ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in -Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would -create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the -Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special -conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted -that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future -in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must -occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War -Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the -occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople, -was a veritable <em>idée fixe</em>. The other Ministers refrained from -expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot -to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and -determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration -would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter -the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor -Alexander III left Russia.</p> - -<p>“The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members -of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that -he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at -least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such -events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext -for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military -authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately -to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops -in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov -considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by -sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting -him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be -immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and -also to the Minister of the Navy.”</p></div> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_390" id="Page_390">390</a></span></p> - -<p>M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and -war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of -the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the -fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain -from sharing my apprehensions with several persons very -intimate with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir -Alexandrovich and Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know -whether it was the influence of these men or the influence of -that Power which rules the whole world and which we call -God, but His Majesty changed his mind and instructed Nelidov, -soon after the latter’s departure for Constantinople, to -give up his designs.”</p></div> - -<p>After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29 and 30, the -Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914, issued a manifesto to his people, -which, though sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia’s designs -on Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail herself of -circumstances to carry them out.</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacherously to -attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the peoples of Russia, -feel quite confident that Turkey’s rash intervention will only -hurry on her doom, and open to Russia the way to the solution of -the historical problem bequeathed to us by our forefathers on the -shores of the Black Sea.”<a name="FNanchor_50_50" id="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">50</a></p></div> - -<p>In the course of an audience which Nicholas II granted to M. Maurice -Paléologue, French ambassador, at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21, -1914, and in the course of which he laid down the main lines of the -peace which he thought should be dictated to the Central Powers, he -considered how the settlement<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_391" id="Page_391">391</a></span> of the war would affect the other -nations, and declared:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of the -Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the Turkish -yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia? I will annex it only if the -Armenians expressly ask me to do so. Otherwise, I will grant them -an autonomous régime. Lastly, I shall have to ensure for my Empire -the free passage of the Straits....</p> - -<p>“I have not quite made up my mind on many points; these are such -fateful times! Yet I have arrived at two definite conclusions: -first, that the Turks must be driven out of Europe; secondly, -that Constantinople should henceforth be a neutral town, under an -international régime. Of course, the Mussulmans would have every -guarantee for the protection of their sanctuaries and shrines. -Northern Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria. -The rest of the country, between this line and the coast, with -the exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to -Russia.”<a name="FNanchor_51_51" id="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">51</a></p></div> - -<p>About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice Paléologue, public -opinion in Russia was unanimous on this point, that—</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The possession of the Straits is of vital interest to the Empire -and far exceeds in importance all the territorial advantages -Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany and Austria.... The -neutralisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be an -unsatisfactory, mongrel compromise, pregnant with dangers for the -future.... Constantinople must be a Russian town.... The Black Sea -must become a Russian lake.”<a name="FNanchor_52_52" id="FNanchor_52_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">52</a></p></div> - -<p>In the formal statement of the Government policy read on February 9, -1915, at the opening of the Duma, after mention had been made of the -victories gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the following -sentence occurred: “Brighter and brighter<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_392" id="Page_392">392</a></span> does the radiant future of -Russia shine before us in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which -washes the battlements of Constantinople.”</p> - -<p>Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits in the speech which -followed, but he declared: “The day is drawing near when the economic -and political problems arising from the necessity for Russia to have -free access to the open sea will be solved.”</p> - -<p>Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in his turn: “The Straits -are the key of our house, so they must be handed over to us, together -with the Straits area.”</p> - -<p>Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for his declaration, -concluded his speech in these terms:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be -completed. We now feel confident that the possession of -Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time, through -diplomatic and military channels.”</p></div> - -<p>The question of Constantinople captivated public opinion at that time, -and in February, 1915, it engrossed the minds of all prominent men in -Russia. Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have just read, -that a victorious peace must give Constantinople to Russia.</p> - -<p>At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not refrain from raising -this question with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, and -asked them to give him an assurance that the Governments of London and -Paris would consent after the war to the annexation of Constantinople -by Russia.<a name="FNanchor_53_53" id="FNanchor_53_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">53</a></p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_393" id="Page_393">393</a></span></p> - -<p>On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of General Pau, Nicholas -II talked on the same subject to M. Paléologue. The Emperor, after -recalling the conversation he had had with him in November of the -previous year, in the course of which he had said France could rely -upon Russia, and telling him he had not altered his mind, said:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“There is a point, however, about which recent events compel me to -say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The question of the Straits -engrosses the Russian mind more and more every day. I consider I -have no right to impose on my people the dreadful sacrifices of -the present war without granting as a reward the fulfilment of -their age-long aspirations. So I have made up my mind, sir. I do -not want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople and -the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in November last -is the only possible one, the only practical one. The city of -Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my -Empire; yet I have no objection, as far as the administration of -the city is concerned, to a special régime making allowance for -foreign interests. You know that England has already sent me her -approval. If any minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your -Government to help me to smooth them.”<a name="FNanchor_54_54" id="FNanchor_54_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">54</a></p></div> - -<p>On March 8, M. Paléologue told M. Sazonov that he had just received -a telegram from M. Delcassé, and was in a position to give him the -assurance that he could rely on the French Government’s friendly -offices in settling the questions of Constantinople and the Straits -according to the wishes of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly, -and added these significant words: “Your Government has done the -Alliance a priceless service ... a service the extent of which perhaps -you do not realise.”<a name="FNanchor_55_55" id="FNanchor_55_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">55</a> On the 15th the French Government,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_394" id="Page_394">394</a></span> having -examined the conditions of peace which the Allies meant to impose on -Turkey, informed the Russian Government of the compensations France -required in Syria.</p> - -<p>On March 16, after being received by the Emperor at the General -Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as -commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation -with M. Paléologue, speaking as French ambassador, and requested him -to inform his Government that he considered the immediate military -co-operation of Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity. The -French ambassador suggested that the Russian claims on Constantinople -and the Straits would, perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the -Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered: “That’s the business of -diplomacy. I won’t have anything to do with it.”<a name="FNanchor_56_56" id="FNanchor_56_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">56</a></p> - -<p>Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister -of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of -the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,<a name="FNanchor_57_57" id="FNanchor_57_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">57</a> shows how -deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question -at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they -were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order -to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we -pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully -aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side -of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake.</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_395" id="Page_395">395</a></span></p> - -<p class="right"><span class="smcap">Imperial Headquarters</span>,<span class="add4em"> </span><br /> -<em>February</em> 5, 1916 (o.s.).</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General -Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum -could be best exploited.</p> - -<p>“Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in -Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with -Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that -such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within -a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the -negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly -fears will be attended with a new catastrophe.</p> - -<p>“Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus -are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier -from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in -General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious -success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense.</p> - -<p>“Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with -Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of -his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by -our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised.</p> - -<p>“According to him, it would be most important to specify the war -aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this -is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his -opinion might be of some weight.</p> - -<p>“In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following -conclusions:</p> - -<p>“Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey -entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of -the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our -expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The -longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to -secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General -Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December, -1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.</p> - -<p>“The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts -of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most -important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that -at the present time it is more important for us to recover the -Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must -by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will -require great<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_396" id="Page_396">396</a></span> efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of -some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.</p> - -<p>“Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would -bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real -‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on -the basis of the <em>status quo ante bellum</em>, including the -restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by -the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans, -with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German -reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on -such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could -send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our -side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople. -England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the -Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She -would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to -Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and -liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the -reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy, -the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should -be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern -route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with -Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of -Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we -all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished -schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry -on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal -can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we -postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return -for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure -a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and -moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us -back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars, -why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and -Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should -have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet -meet the requirements of Russia.</p> - -<p>“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly, -as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the -brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of -the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon -this as a highly profitable scheme.</p> -<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_397" id="Page_397">397</a></span> -<p>“Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the -conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance -attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that -we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at -once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony, -reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in -the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople. -The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must -necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, -too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both -by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the -loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to -convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish -purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a -deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial -arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey.</p> - -<p>“But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the -present, the important points are:</p> - -<p>“1. Plainly to define our real war aim.</p> - -<p>“2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate -peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once.</p> - -<p>“3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our -Allies for such a turn of events.</p> - -<p>“I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General -Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard -to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical -call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question, -but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the -situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time -from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only -momentarily—impossible.”</p></div> - -<p>It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine -maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, -it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was -the conquest of Constantinople.</p> - -<p>In an article entitled “<cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du -Bosphore</cite>,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov -confirmed the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_398" id="Page_398">398</a></span> Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on -all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled -that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European -nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805, -and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of -the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of -any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871 -had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had -always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea -to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the -policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on -in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire. -So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the -dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian -sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised.</p> - -<p>Taking up this question again in an interview with a correspondent of -<cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Temps</cite> in April, 1917, M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern -Europe, as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved “the -liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the liberation of -the peoples living in Asia Minor, the independence of Arabia, Armenia, -and Syria, and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey’s right -to the possession of the Straits.” Nobody knows what was to become -of the Turks in such a solution, or rather it is only too plain that -“the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe” meant that -Russia would take possession of the<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_399" id="Page_399">399</a></span> Straits and rule over the Turkish -territories in Asia Minor.</p> - -<p>Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshevists in Russia were -plainly drawing nearer to Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget -the pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency he himself openly -displayed, came to this conclusion:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“The Straits to Russia—that, in my opinion, is the only way out of the -difficulty. The neutralisation of the Straits would always involve -many serious dangers to peace, and Russia would be compelled to keep -up a powerful war fleet in the Black Sea to defend our coasts. It -would give the warships of all countries a free access to our inland -sea, the Black Sea, which might entail untold disasters. Germany wants -the Straits in order to realise her dreams of hegemony, for her motto -is ‘Berlin-Baghdad,’ and we, Russians, want the Straits that our -importation and exportation may be secure from any trammels or threats -whatever. Nobody can entertain any doubt, therefore, as to which Power -is to own the Straits; it must be either Germany or Russia.”</p></div> - -<p>Prince Lvov, M. Sazonov, M. Chaikovsky, and M. Maklakov, in a -memorandum addressed to the President of the Peace Conference on July -5, 1919, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia, stated the -Russian claims with regard to Turkey, and the solution they proposed -to the question of the Straits and Constantinople was inspired by the -agreements of 1915 and showed they had not given up anything of their -ambition. For, though they had no real mandate to speak of the rights -of New Russia they declared:</p> - -<div class="blockquote"> - -<p>“New Russia has, undoubtedly, a right to be associated in the task -of regeneration which the Allied and Associated Powers intend to -assume in the former Turkish territories.</p> - -<p>“Thus, the question of the Straits would be most equitably settled -by Russia receiving a mandate for the administration of the Straits -in the name of the League of Nations. Such <span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_400" id="Page_400">400</a></span>a solution would -benefit both the interests of Russia and those of the whole world, -for the most suitable régime for an international road of transit -is to hand over its control to the Power which is most vitally -interested in the freedom of this transit.</p> - -<p>“This solution is also the only one which would not raise any of -the apprehensions which the Russian people would certainly feel if -the aforesaid mandate were given to any other Power or if a foreign -military Power controlled the Straits.</p> - -<p>“For the moment, Russia, in her present condition, would be -satisfied if the control of the Straits were assigned to a -provisional international administration which might hand over its -powers to her in due time, and in which Russia in the meantime -should hold a place proportionate to the part she is called upon to -play in the Black Sea.</p> - -<p>“As to Constantinople, Russia cannot think for one moment of ceding -this city to the exclusive administration of any other Power. And -if an international administration were established, Russia should -hold in it the place that befits her, and have a share in all that -may be undertaken for the equipment, exploitation, and control of -the port of Constantinople.”</p></div> - -<p>Some documents, which were found by the Bolshevists in the Imperial -Record Office, concerning the conferences of the Russian Staff in -November, 1913, and which have just been made public, testify to the -continuity of the aforesaid policy and the new schemes Russia was -contemplating. It clearly appears from these documents that M. Sazonov, -Minister of Foreign Affairs, had represented to the Tsar the necessity -of preparing not only plans of campaign, but a whole organisation for -the conveyance by rail and sea of the huge forces which were necessary -to capture Constantinople, and that the Crown Council was of opinion -this plan should be carried out in order to bring the Russians to -Constantinople and secure the mastery of the Straits.</p> - -<p>At the present time, forty or fifty thousand<a name="FNanchor_58_58" id="FNanchor_58_58"></a><a href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">58</a><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_401" id="Page_401">401</a></span> Russian emigrants, -fleeing before the Bolshevists, have reached Pera and have settled -down in it; others are arriving there every day, who belong to the -revolutionary socialist party—an exiled party temporarily—or who are -more or less disguised Bolshevist agents. It is obvious that all these -Russians will not soon leave Constantinople, which they have always -coveted, especially as the Bolshevists have by no means renounced the -designs of the Tsars on this city or their ambitions in the East.</p> - -<p>Not long ago, according to the <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Lokal Anzeiger</cite>,<a name="FNanchor_59_59" id="FNanchor_59_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">59</a> a prominent member -of the Soviet Government declared that, to safeguard the Russian -interests in the East and on the Black Sea, Constantinople must fall to -Russia.</p> - -<p>Being thus invaded by Russian elements of all kinds, Constantinople -seems doomed to be swallowed up by Russia as soon as her troubles are -over, whether she remains Bolshevist or falls under a Tsar’s rule -again; then she will turn her ambition towards the East, which we have -not been able to defend against the Slavs, and England will find her -again in her way in Asia and even on the shores of the Mediterranean -Sea.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, as Germany is endeavouring to come to an -understanding with Russia and as the military Pan-Germanist party has -not given up hope of restoring the Kaiser to the throne, if the Allies -dismembered Turkey—whose policy is not historically linked with that of -Germany, and who has no more reason for being her ally now,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_402" id="Page_402">402</a></span> provided -the Allies alter their own policy—they would pave the way to a union of -the whole of Eastern Europe under a Germano-Russian hegemony.</p> - -<p>Again, the Turks, who originally came from Asia, are now a -Mediterranean people owing to their great conquests and their wide -extension in the fifteenth century, and though in some respects these -conquests may be regretted, they have on the whole proved beneficial -to European civilisation, by maintaining the influence of the culture -of antiquity. Though they have driven back the Greeks to European -territories, they have not, on the whole, attempted to destroy the -traditions bequeathed to us by antiquity, and the Turk has let the -quick, clever Greek settle down everywhere. His indolence and fatalism -have made him leave things as they were. What would have happened if -the Slavs had come down to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea? The -Bulgars and Southern Slavs, though they were subjected to Greco-Latin -influences, displayed much more activity and were proof against most -of these influences. But the Turks checked the Slavs’ advance to the -south; and, were it only in this respect, they have played and still -play a salutary part of which they should not be deprived.</p> - -<p>The new policy pursued by France towards Turkey becomes the more -surprising—coming after her time-honoured Turkish policy and after the -recent mistakes of her Russian policy—as we see history repeat itself, -or at least, similar circumstances recur. Even in the time of the -Romans the events of Syria and Mesopotamia were connected with those of -Central Europe; as Virgil said: “Here war is let<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_403" id="Page_403">403</a></span> loose by Euphrates, -there by Germany.” Long after, Francis I, in order to check the -ambitious designs of Charles V, Emperor of Germany, who, about 1525, -dreamt of subduing the whole of Europe, sought the alliance of Soliman. -The French king, who understood the Latin spirit so well and the great -part it was about to play in the Renaissance, had foreseen the danger -with which this spirit was threatened by Germany.</p> - -<p>Moreover, a recent fact throws into light the connection between the -German and Russian interests in the Eastern question, and their similar -tendencies. For Marshal von der Goltz was one of the first to urge -that the Turkish capital should be transferred to a town in the centre -of Asia Minor.<a name="FNanchor_60_60" id="FNanchor_60_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">60</a> Of course, he professed to be actuated only by -strategic or administrative motives, for he chiefly laid stress on the -peculiar geographical situation of the capital of the Empire, which, -lying close to the frontier, is directly exposed to a foreign attack. -But did he not put forward this argument merely to conceal other -arguments which concerned Germany more closely? Though the Germans -professed to be the protectors of Islam, did not the vast Austro-German -schemes include the ejection of the Turks from Europe to the benefit of -the Slavs, notwithstanding the declarations made during the war by some -German publicists—M. Axel Schmidt, M. Hermann, M. Paul Rohrbach—which -now seem to have been chiefly dictated by temporary necessities?</p> - -<p><span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_404" id="Page_404">404</a></span></p> - -<p>Thus the Turkish policy of the Allies is the outcome of their Russian -policy—which accounts for the whole series of mistakes they are still -making, after their disillusionment with regard to Russia.</p> - -<p>For centuries, Moscow and Islam have counterpoised each other: the -Golden Horde having checked the expansion of Russia, the latter did -her best to bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It had -formerly been admitted by the Great Powers that the territorial -integrity of the Ottoman Empire should not be infringed upon, for it -was the best barrier to Russia’s claims on the Straits and her advance -towards India. But after the events of the last war, England, reversing -her traditional policy, and the Allies, urged on by Pan-Russian -circles, have been gradually driven to recognise the Russian claims to -Constantinople in return for her co-operation at the beginning of the -war.</p> - -<p>The outcome of this policy of the Allies has been to drive both the -new States, whose independence they persistently refused to recognise, -and the old ones, whose national aspirations they did not countenance, -towards Bolshevism, the enemy of the Allies; it has induced them, -in spite of themselves, to come to understandings with the Soviet -Government, in order to defend their independence. England in this way -runs the risk of finding herself again face to face with Russia—a new -Russia; and thus the old Anglo-Russian antagonism would reappear in -another shape, and a more critical one. Sir H. Rawlinson<a name="FNanchor_61_61" id="FNanchor_61_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">61</a> denounced -this danger nearly half a century ago,<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_405" id="Page_405">405</a></span> and now once more, though in a -different way, “India is imperilled by the progress of Russia.”</p> - -<p>However, there is no similarity between Pan-Turanianism and Bolshevism, -though an attempt has been made in press polemics or political -controversies to confound the one with the other. They have no common -origin, and the utter incompatibility between Bolshevism and the spirit -of Western Europe exists likewise to another extent and for different -reasons between Bolshevism and the spirit of the Turks, who, indeed, -are not Europeans but Moslems, yet have played a part in the history of -Europe and thus have felt its influence. The Turks—like the Hungarians, -who are monarchists and have even sought to come to an understanding -with Poland—have refused to make an alliance with the Czecho-Slovaks, -who have Pan-Slavic tendencies; and so they cannot become Bolshevists -or friendly to the Bolshevists. But, if the Allies neither modify their -attitude nor give up the policy they have pursued of late years, the -Turks, as well as all the heterogeneous peoples that have broken loose -from old Russia, will be driven for their own protection to adopt -the same policy as new Russia—the latter being considered as outside -Europe; and thus the power of the Soviet Government will be reinforced.</p> - -<p>We have been among the first to show both the danger and the inanity of -Bolshevism; and now we feel bound to deplore that policy which merely -tends to strengthen the Bolshevists we want to crush. Our only hope is -that the influence of the States sprung from old Russia or situated -round it on Soviet<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_406" id="Page_406">406</a></span> Russia—with which they have been obliged to come -to terms for the sake of self-defence—will complete the downfall of -Bolshevism, which can only live within Russia and the Russian mind, -but has already undergone an evolution, owing to the mistakes of the -Allies, in order to spread and maintain itself.</p> - -<p>As to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it seems that far from -solving the Eastern question, it is likely to bring about many fresh -difficulties, for it is a political mistake as well as an injustice.</p> - -<p>This dismemberment, impudently effected by England, is not likely to -turn to her advantage. Of course, owing to the treaty, British hegemony -for the present extends over Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Kurdistan, -and is likely to prevail over the international régime foreshadowed -by the same treaty; but the organisation which Great Britain wants -thus to enforce on the East, if ever it is effective, seems most -precarious. For, even without mentioning Turkey, which does not seem -likely to submit to this scheme, and where the Nationalist movement -is in open rebellion, or Armenia, whose frontiers have not been fixed -yet, the condition of Kurdistan, which England coveted and had even at -one moment openly laid claim to, is still uncertain; the Emir Feisal, -who is indebted to her for his power, is attempting to get out of her -hand; finally, by putting Persia under her tutelage, she has roused the -national feeling there too, and broken of her own accord the chain she -intended to forge all round India, after driving Germany out of Asia -Minor and capturing all the routes to her Asiatic possessions.</p> - -<p>Now it is questionable whether Great Britain—in<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_407" id="Page_407">407</a></span> spite of the skill -with which her administration has bent itself to the ways of the very -various peoples and the liberal spirit she has certainly evinced in -the organisation of the Dominions belonging to the British Empire, -the largest empire that has ever existed—will be powerful enough to -maintain her sovereignty over so many peoples, each of which is proud -of its own race and history, and to organise all these countries -according to her wish.</p> - -<p>As to France, she is gradually losing the moral prestige she once -enjoyed in the East, for the advantages she has just gained can only -injure her, and also injure the prestige she still enjoys in other -Moslem countries; whereas, by pursuing another policy, she might have -expected that the German defeat would restore and heighten her prestige.</p> - -<p>It follows from all this that the Turkish problem, as we have -endeavoured to describe it—considering that for centuries an -intercourse has been maintained between the Moslem world and -Mediterranean Europe, and that a Moslem influence once made itself felt -on Western civilisation through Arabic culture—cannot be looked upon -as a merely Asiatic problem. It is a matter of surprise that Islam, -five centuries after Christ, should have developed in the birthplace of -Christianity, and converted very numerous populations, whose ways and -spirit it seems to suit. One cannot forget either that Islam acted as -a counterpoise to Christianity, or that it played an important part in -our civilisation by securing the continuance and penetration of Eastern -and pagan influences. So it is obvious that nowadays the Turkish -problem is still of paramount importance<span class="pagenum"><a name="Page_408" id="Page_408">408</a></span> for the security of Western -civilisation, since it concerns all the nations round the Mediterranean -Sea, and, moreover, all the Asiatic and African territories inhabited -by Moslems, who have always been interested in European matters and are -even doubly concerned in them now.<a name="FNanchor_62_62" id="FNanchor_62_62"></a><a href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">62</a></p> - - -<p>Footnotes:</p> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_45_45" id="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45"><span class="label">45</span></a> Albert Sorel, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">La Question d’Orient au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle</cite>, -pp. 81, 85, 277.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_46_46" id="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46"><span class="label">46</span></a> Albert Vandal, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Une ambassade française en Orient sous -Louis XV</cite>, pp. 4, 8, 331, 447.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_47_47" id="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47"><span class="label">47</span></a> Martens, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Étude historique sur la politique russe dans la -question d’Orient</cite>, 1877.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_48_48" id="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48"><span class="label">48</span></a> Goriainov, <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles</cite>, 1910, pp. -25-27.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_49_49" id="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49"><span class="label">49</span></a> See <em>supra</em>, p. 114.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_50_50" id="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50"><span class="label">50</span></a> <cite>Daily Telegraph</cite>, January 5, 1921.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_51_51" id="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51"><span class="label">51</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Revue des Deux Mondes</cite>, March 15, 1921, pp. 261, 262: -Maurice Paléologue. “La Russie des Tsars pendant la guerre.”</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_52_52" id="Footnote_52_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52_52"><span class="label">52</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 274, 275.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_53_53" id="Footnote_53_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53_53"><span class="label">53</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Revue des Deux Mondes</cite>, April 1, 1921, p. 573.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_54_54" id="Footnote_54_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54_54"><span class="label">54</span></a> <cite lang="fr" xml:lang="fr">Revue des Deux Mondes</cite>, April 1, 1921, pp. 574, 575.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_55_55" id="Footnote_55_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55_55"><span class="label">55</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em></p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_56_56" id="Footnote_56_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56_56"><span class="label">56</span></a> <em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 578, 579.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_57_57" id="Footnote_57_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57_57"><span class="label">57</span></a> The editor was M. Markine.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_58_58" id="Footnote_58_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58_58"><span class="label">58</span></a> Now there are about 200,000.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_59_59" id="Footnote_59_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59_59"><span class="label">59</span></a> August 10, 1920.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_60_60" id="Footnote_60_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60_60"><span class="label">60</span></a> Von der Goltz, “Stärke und Schwäche des turkischen -Reiches,” in the <cite lang="de" xml:lang="de">Deutsche Rundschau</cite>, 1897.</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_61_61" id="Footnote_61_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61_61"><span class="label">61</span></a> H. Rawlinson, <cite>England and Russia in the East</cite> (1875).</p></div> - -<div class="footnote"> - -<p><a name="Footnote_62_62" id="Footnote_62_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62_62"><span class="label">62</span></a> The French edition of this book bears the date August, -1920.</p></div> - - -<p class="center noindent">PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER</p> - -<hr class="chap" /> - -<div class="transnote chapter"><p>Transcriber’s Notes:</p> -<p>The original spelling, accentuation, punctuation, and hyphenation has -been retained, except for a small number of apparent printer’s errors.</p> - -<p>‘Ali-Hayar-Midhat’ corrected to read ‘Ali-Haydar-Midhat’ in Footnote 7.</p> - -<p>‘General Imail Fazil Pasha’ corrected to read ‘General Ismail Fazil -Pasha’ on folio page 185.</p> - -<p>‘Abderhaman Youssef Pasha’ corrected to read ‘Abdurrahman Youssef Pasha’ on folio page 343.</p> - -</div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Turks and Europe, by Gaston Gaillard - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE TURKS AND EUROPE *** - -***** This file should be named 51761-h.htm or 51761-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/7/6/51761/ - -Produced by Brian Wilcox, Turgut Dincer and the Online -Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This -file was produced from images generously made available -by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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