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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d7b82bc --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.txt text eol=lf +*.htm text eol=lf +*.html text eol=lf +*.md text eol=lf diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87e6087 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #51843 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51843) diff --git a/old/51843-8.txt b/old/51843-8.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 73b4071..0000000 --- a/old/51843-8.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2952 +0,0 @@ -The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Oregon Question, by Albert Gallatin - -This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with -almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Oregon Question - -Author: Albert Gallatin - -Release Date: April 23, 2016 [EBook #51843] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OREGON QUESTION *** - - - - -Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - -THE OREGON QUESTION. - -BY - -ALBERT GALLATIN. - - -NEW YORK: -BARTLETT & WELFORD, 7 ASTOR HOUSE. - -1846. - - -R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET, NEW YORK. - - - - -THE OREGON QUESTION. - - - - -NUMBER I. - - -I had been a pioneer in collecting facts and stating the case. The only -materials within my reach consisted of the accounts of voyages -previously published, (including that of Maurelle, in Barrington's -Miscellanies), of the varied and important information derived from -Humboldt's New Spain, and of the voyage of the Sutil and Mexicano, the -introduction to which contains a brief official account of the Spanish -discoveries. The statement of the case was the best I was able to make -with the materials on hand, and may be found defective in many respects. -Since that time manuscript journals of several of the voyages have been -obtained at Madrid. New facts have thus been added; others have been -better analyzed, and some errors rectified. Arguments which had been -only indicated have been enforced, and new views have been suggested. -The subject, indeed, seems to be exhausted; and it would be difficult to -add anything to the able correspondence between the two Governments -which has been lately published. - -Ministers charged with diplomatic discussions are not, however, in those -official papers intended for publication, to be considered as -philosophers calmly investigating the questions, with no other object -but to elicit truth. They are always, to a certain extent, advocates, -who use their best endeavors to urge and even strain the reasons that -may be alleged in favor of the claims set up by their Governments; and -in the same manner to repel, if not to deny, all that may be adduced by -the other party. Such official papers are in fact appeals to public -opinion, and generally published when there remains no hope to conclude -for the present an amicable arrangement. - -But, though acting in that respect as advocates, diplomatists are -essentially ministers of peace, whose constant and primary duty is -mutually to devise conciliatory means for the adjustment of conflicting -pretensions, for the continuance of friendly relations, for preventing -war, or for the restoration of peace. It has unfortunately happened that -on this occasion, both Governments have assumed such absolute and -exclusive grounds as to have greatly increased, at least for the -present, the obstacles to an amicable arrangement. - -It is morally impossible for the bulk of the people of any country -thoroughly to investigate a subject so complex as that of the respective -claims to the Oregon territory; and, for obvious reasons, it is much -less understood by the great mass of the population in England than in -the United States. Everywhere, when the question is between the country -and a foreign nation, the people at large, impelled by natural and -patriotic feelings, will rally around their Government. For the -consequences that may ensue, those who are entrusted with the direction -of the foreign relations are alone responsible. Whatever may be the -cause, to whomsoever the result may be ascribed, it appears from the -general style of the periodical press, that, with few exceptions, the -people, both in Great Britain and in the United States, are imbued with -the belief that the contested territory belongs exclusively to -themselves, and that any concession which might be made would be a boon -to the other party. Such opinions, if sustained by either Government and -accompanied by corresponding measures, must necessarily lead to -immediate collisions, and probably to war. Yet, a war so calamitous in -itself, so fatal to the general interests of both countries, is almost -universally deprecated, without distinction of parties, by all the -rational men who are not carried away by the warmth of their feelings. - -In the present state of excitement, an immediate amicable arrangement -is almost hopeless; time is necessary before the two Governments can be -induced to recede from their extreme pretensions. In the meanwhile, -nothing, as it seems to me, should for the present be done, which might -increase the excitement, aggravate the difficulties, or remove the only -remaining barrier against immediate collision. - -The United States claim a right of sovereignty over the whole territory. -The pretensions of the British Government, so far as they have been -heretofore exhibited, though not extending to a claim of absolute -sovereignty over the whole, are yet such as cannot be admitted by the -United States, and, if persisted in, must lead to a similar result. - -If the claim of Great Britain be properly analyzed, it will be found -that, although she has incidentally discussed other questions, she in -fact disregards every other claim but that of actual occupancy, and that -she regards as such the establishment of trading factories by her -subjects. She accordingly claims a participation in the navigation of -the river Columbia, and would make that river the boundary between the -two Powers. This utter disregard of the rights of discovery, -particularly of that of the mouth, sources, and course of a river, of -the principle of contiguity, and of every other consideration whatever, -cannot be admitted by the United States. The offer of a detached -defenceless territory, with a single port, and the reciprocal offers of -what are called free ports, cannot be viewed but as derisory. An -amicable arrangement by way of compromise cannot be effected without a -due regard to the claims advanced by both parties, and to the expediency -of the dividing line.[1] - -An equitable division must have reference not only to the extent of -territory, but also to the other peculiar advantages attached to each -portion respectively. - -From and including Fuca Straits, the country extending northwardly -abounds with convenient sea-ports. From the 42d degree of latitude to -those Straits, there is but one port of any importance, the mouth of the -River Columbia; and this is of difficult and dangerous access, and -cannot admit ships of war of a large size. It is important only as a -port of exports. As one of common resort for supplies, or asylum, in -case of need, for the numberless American vessels engaged in the -fisheries or commerce of the Pacific, it would be almost useless, even -if in the exclusive possession of the United States. It must also be -observed that the navigable channel of the river, from its mouth to -Puget's Island, is, according to Vancouver, close along the northern -shore. Great Britain proposes that the river should be the boundary, and -that the United States should be content with the possession of the port -it offered, in common with herself. It is really unnecessary to dwell on -the consequences of such an arrangement. It is sufficient to say that, -in case of war between the two countries, it would leave the United -States without a single port, and give to Great Britain the indisputable -and exclusive control over those seas and their commerce. - -The first and indispensable step towards an amicable arrangement -consists in the investigation, not so much of the superiority of one -claim over the other, as of the question whether there be sufficient -grounds to sustain the exclusive pretensions of either Government. - -If the claim of the United States to the whole of the contested -territory can be sustained against Great Britain, or if the pretensions -of this Power can to their full extent be maintained against the United -States, it must be, by either party assuming that the other has no -opposite claim of any kind whatever, that there are no doubtful and -debatable questions pending between the two countries. This, if true and -maintained, must necessarily lead to war, unless one of the two Powers -should yield what it considers as its absolute right. But, if there be -any such debatable questions, the way is still open for negotiations; -and both powers may recede from their extreme pretensions, without any -abandonment of positive rights, without disgrace, without impairing -national honor and dignity. - -It has been asserted that the title of the United States to the whole -Oregon territory was maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments. -These must be sought for in the correspondence lately published. They -consist--first, of the assertion of the ancient claim of Spain to the -absolute sovereignty over the whole north-west coast of America as far -north as the 61st degree of north latitude. Secondly, of the cumulated -proofs which sustain the claims of the United States to the various -portions of the territory (whether in their own right, or as derived -from the acquisition of Louisiana and the Spanish discoveries), and of -the refutation of the arguments adduced by the other party. The first -mentioned position would, if it could be sustained, be sufficient to -prove, and is, as I think, the only one that could prove, the absolute -and complete right of the United States to the whole contested -territory. - -It is undoubtedly true that "Spain considered the northwest coast of -America as exclusively her own;" that this claim "had been asserted by -her, and maintained with the most vigilant jealousy, ever since the -discovery of the American continent, or nearly three centuries, as far -north as her settlements or missions extended." There were two ways of -examining the soundness of that claim; an investigation of the -principles on which it was founded, and an appeal to precedents. The -Secretary of State has abstained from discussing the principle; but he -has said that the claim of Spain to sovereignty "had never been -seriously questioned by any European nation: that it had been acquiesced -in by all European Governments." This appears to me the most vulnerable -part of his arguments. - -The early charters of the British monarchs to the colonies bordering on -the Atlantic, extended from sea to sea, from the Atlantic to the Pacific -ocean, with the single exception which excluded from the grants the -places actually occupied by the subjects of any Christian nation. The -right of prior occupancy was recognized; but the general claim of Spain -to the sovereignty of the whole coast bordering on the Pacific was -utterly disregarded. Had that claim been considered as unquestionable, -had it been acquiesced in, it never could have been supposed that, in -any case whatever, England could have a right to bestow on her subjects -a single foot of land bordering on the Pacific. - -Coming down to modern times, the only nations which have set up any -claims or attempted any settlements on the Pacific, north of the -country actually occupied by the Spaniards, are Russia, Great Britain, -and the United States. All three have asserted claims to the -northwestern coasts of America, irreconcilable with the universal -sovereignty claimed by Spain: Russia and England, from the time when -their flags first floated along the coast and their subjects landed on -its shores; the United States from a similar date, or at least from the -time when they acquired Louisiana. - -If the right of Spain was absolute and exclusive to the whole, there was -no reason why it should not have extended beyond the 61st degree of -latitude. The right of Russia was founded only on her discoveries and -the establishment of some trading factories. She respected the right of -Spain only as far as it did not interfere with her own claim. She has, -in fact, extended this more than six degrees further south; and to this -the United States, who had acquired all the rights of Spain, have -assented by a solemn treaty. Whatever might be the boundary acquiesced -in by Spain, it was not Russia which recognized the claim of Spain; it -was Spain which recognized that her claim was not unlimited. And, let it -be also observed, that, since Spain still claimed as far north as the -61st degree of north latitude (the southern limit of the Russian -factories when first visited by Spanish navigators), the United States, -if they believed the Spanish right absolute and exclusive, ought not to -have ceded to Russia a country extending more than six degrees of -latitude along the shores of the Pacific. - -Great Britain contested the exclusive claim of Spain from the year 1778, -the date of Cook's third voyage; and he was the first British navigator -that had for more than two centuries appeared on those coasts. This -doctrine she has maintained ever since. She did not resist the exclusive -claim of Spain by virtue of the Nootka convention, but prior to it. It -was on that ground that she imperiously demanded indemnity and -restoration for the property and factory of one of her subjects, which -had been forcibly taken by the Spanish Government. She even threatened -war; and the Nootka convention was the result of those transactions. -Whatever construction may at this time be given to that instrument, it -is certain at least that Spain by it conceded a portion of the absolute -and sovereign right she had till then asserted; that she yielded the -right of trade with the natives on all that part of the coast lying -north of her actual settlements; and that, by suffering the ultimate -right of sovereignty to remain in abeyance, she made that pretension -questionable which she had contended could not be called in question. - -With respect to the United States, without recurring to former -negotiations which were not attended with any result, it is sufficient -to advert to the convention between them and Great Britain of the year -1818, concluded prior to the date of the treaty by which they acquired -the claims of Spain to the territory north of the 42d degree of north -latitude. - -The United States at that time distinctly claimed, in their own right -and independent of the Spanish claims, that the boundary along the 49th -parallel, which had been agreed on as that between them and Great -Britain, from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, should be -extended to the Pacific. To this division of territory Great Britain -would not accede; and the provision for a joint occupancy during the -next ensuing years was substituted. A clause was inserted that the -agreement should not be taken to affect the claims of any other Power or -State to any part of the country west of the Stony Mountains. This -provision clearly referred to the claims of Russia and Spain. The -northern and southern boundaries of the country, which the two -contracting parties might claim, were left undefined: Great Britain -probably thought herself bound by the Nootka convention to respect the -Spanish claims to the extent provided by that instrument: the United -States could not but recognize those derived from discovery, with which -they were at that time but imperfectly acquainted, since their own -claims were in a great degree derived from a similar source. But the -convention decisively proves that the United States did not acquiesce in -the antiquated claim of Spain to the absolute and exclusive sovereignty -of the whole country; since, if they had recognized that prior claim to -the whole, they could have had none whatever to any portion of it. - -It is therefore undeniable that the assertion of the Spanish claim of -absolute sovereignty cannot be sustained by a presumed acquiescence on -the part of the only nations which now claim the country. It may -perhaps be said that their opposition came too late, and that they -neglected too long to protest against the Spanish pretension on the -Pacific. No stress will be laid on Drake's voyage, which had a warlike -character. But the British charters to their colonies show that those -pretensions were disregarded at a very early date. There was no occasion -for opposition or direct denial, with respect to the Pacific, until the -attention of other nations was directed towards that remote country. -This was neglected because all the commercial nations were, in their -attempts to colonize, or to conquer the foreign and till then unexplored -regions, attracted by countries far more accessible, and were -exclusively engaged in pursuits much more important. The East Indies and -the West India Islands offered a vast and lucrative field for commercial -enterprise and territorial acquisition. With respect to the continent of -America, France, England, and Holland most naturally planted their -colonies on the nearest opposite shores of the Atlantic; and they did it -in opposition to the pretended claim of Spain, which extended to the -whole of America. Although strenuously engaged in extending those -colonies westwardly, these, in the year 1754, twenty years only before -Cook's third voyage, hardly extended beyond the Mississippi. What -immediate interest could then have impelled either France or England to -enter a formal protest against the antiquated claim of Spain to a -country with which they had never attempted even to trade? And what -opportunity had occurred for doing it prior to Cook's voyage? - -But, what is still more conclusive, the country in question was equally -neglected by Spain herself. Some exploring voyages, few of which are -authentic, were indeed made by Spanish navigators; and the claims which -may be derived from their discoveries have now been transferred to the -United States, so far as discovery alone can give a claim, and no -further. But, during more than two centuries that Spain had no -competitor on the Pacific, there was on her part no occupancy, no -settlement, or attempt to make a settlement. She had some missions on -the western coast of the peninsula of California: but her missions or -settlements in Northern or New California are of quite recent date; that -of the most southern (San Diego) in 1769, and that of the most northern -(San Francisco) in 1776, two years only before Cook's arrival at Nootka -Sound. - -In point of fact, the contested territory had been utterly neglected by -Spain. All the energies, such as they were, of her Mexican colonies were -much more advantageously applied to the improvement of the vast and rich -countries which they had conquered, principally to the discovery and -working of the richest and most productive mines of the precious metals -as yet known. - -Anson's expedition was purely military, and confined to southern -latitudes. But the narrative drew the public attention towards the -Pacific ocean, and gave a new impulse to the spirit of discovery. Almost -immediately after the peace of 1763 voyages were undertaken for that -purpose by the Governments of England and France: the Pacific was -explored: the Russians on the other hand had, more than thirty years -before, ascertained the continuity of the American continent from -Behring's Straits to Mount St. Elias. It was then, and not till then, -that Spain, or rather the Mexican Government, awakening from its long -lethargy, extended its missions to New California. In the year 1774, -Perez, with his pilot, Martinez, sailed as far north as the northern -extremity of Queen Charlotte's Island, having anchored in Nootka Sound, -and, as Martinez asserts, perceived the entrance of Fuca's Straits. New -and important discoveries were made by Quadra and Heceta in the year -1775. The sequel is well known. - -But on what foundation did the claim of Spain rest? If she had indeed an -absolute right to the whole country bordering on the Pacific, derived -either from natural or international law, or from usages generally -recognized, it matters but little, as respects right, whether other -nations had acquiesced in, or opposed her claim. If there was no -foundation for that absolute and exclusive right of sovereignty, Spain -could transfer nothing more to the United States than the legitimate -claims derived from her discoveries. - -The discovery gives an incipient claim not only to the identical spot -thus discovered, but to a certain distance beyond it. It has been -admitted that the claim extends generally, though not universally, as -far inland as the sources of rivers emptying into the sea where the -discovery has been made. The distance to which the right or claim -extends along the sea shore may not be precisely defined, and may vary -according to circumstances. But it never can be unlimited; it has never -been recognized beyond a reasonable extent. Spain was the first European -nation which discovered and occupied Florida. A claim on that account to -the absolute sovereignty over the whole of the Atlantic shores as far as -Hudson's Bay, or the 60th degree of latitude, would strike every one as -utterly absurd. A claim on the part of Spain to the sovereignty of all -the shores of the Pacific, derived from her having established missions -in California, would be similar in its nature and extent, and equally -inadmissible. It cannot be sustained as a natural right, nor by the -principles of international law, nor by any general usage or precedent. -The claim of Spain rested on no such grounds. - -It was derived from the bull of Pope Alexander VI., which the Spanish -monarchs obtained in the year 1493, immediately after the discovery of -America by Columbus. By virtue of that bull, combined with another -previously granted to Portugal, and with modifications respecting the -division line between the two Powers, the Pope granted to them the -exclusive sovereignty over all the discoveries made or to be made in all -the heathen portions of the globe, including, it must be recollected, -all the countries in America bordering on the Atlantic, as well as those -on the Pacific ocean. Yet, even at that time, the Catholic Kings of -England, and France did not recognize the authority of the Pope on such -subjects; as evidently appears by the voyages of Cabot under the orders -of Henry VII. of England, and of Cartier under those of the King of -France, Francis I. Subsequently, the colonies planted by both countries, -from Florida to Hudson's Bay, were a practical and continued protest and -denial of the Spanish claim of absolute sovereignty over the whole of -America: whilst the acquiescence of Spain was tantamount to an -abandonment of that claim where it was resisted. Ridiculous as a right -derived from such a source may appear at this time, it was not then thus -considered by Spain; and the western boundary of Brazil is to this day -regulated by the division line prescribed by the Pope. - -I am not aware of any other principle by which the claim ever was or -can be sustained, unless it be the idle ceremony of taking possession, -as it is called. The celebrated Spaniard who first discovered the -Pacific ocean, "Balboa, advancing up to the middle in the waves, with -his buckler and sword, took possession of that ocean in the name of the -King his master, and vowed to defend it, with his arms, against all his -enemies."--(_Robertson._) - -I have dwelt longer on this subject than it may seem to deserve. The -assertion of the solidity of this ancient exclusive Spanish claim has -had an apparent effect on public opinion fatal to the prospect of an -amicable arrangement. I am also fully satisfied that the resort to -vulnerable arguments, instead of strengthening, has a tendency to lessen -the weight of the multiplied proofs, by which the superiority of the -American over the British claim has been so fully established. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[1] I allude here only to the compromise proposed by Great Britain. Her -actual claim, as explicitly stated by herself, is to the whole -territory, limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with other -States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance. - - - - -NUMBER II. - - -It has, it is believed, been conclusively proved that the claim of the -United States to absolute sovereignty over the whole Oregon territory, -in virtue of the ancient exclusive Spanish claim, is wholly unfounded. -The next question is, whether the other facts and arguments adduced by -either party establish a complete and absolute title of either to the -whole; for the United States claim it explicitly; and, although the -British proposal of compromise did yield a part, yet her qualified claim -extends to the whole. It has been stated by herself in the following -words: "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion -of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any part, but to -the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with -other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance." And, -again: "The qualified rights which Great Britain now possesses over the -whole of the territory in question, embrace the right to navigate the -waters of those countries, the right to settle in and over any part of -them, and the right freely to trade with the inhabitants and occupiers -of the same. * * * * * * It is fully admitted that the United States -possess the same rights; but beyond they possess none." - -In the nature of things, it seems almost impossible that a complete and -absolute right to any portion of America can exist, unless it be by -prescriptive and undisputed _actual_ possession and settlements, or by -virtue of a treaty. - -At the time when America was discovered, the law of nations was -altogether unsettled. More than a century elapsed before Grotius -attempted to lay its foundation on Natural Law and the moral precepts of -Christianity; and, when sustaining it by precedents, he was compelled to -recur to Rome and Greece. It was in reality a new case, to which no -ancient precedents could apply,[2] for which some new rules must be -adopted. Gradually, some general principles were admitted, never -universally, in their nature vague and often conflicting. For instance, -discovery varies, from the simple ascertaining of the continuity of -land, to a minute exploration of its various harbors, rivers, &c.; and -the rights derived from it may vary accordingly, and may occasionally be -claimed to the same district by different nations. There is no precise -rule for regulating the time after which the neglect to occupy would -nullify the right of prior discovery; nor for defining the extent of -coast beyond the spot discovered to which the discoverer may be -entitled, or how far inland his claim extends. The principle most -generally admitted was, that, in case of a river, the right extended to -the whole country drained by that river and its tributaries. Even this -was not universally conceded. This right might be affected by a -simultaneous or prior discovery and occupancy of some of the sources of -such river by another party; or it might conflict with a general claim -of contiguity. This last claim, when extending beyond the sources of -rivers discovered and occupied, is vague and undefined: though it would -seem that it cannot exceed in breadth that of the territory on the coast -originally discovered and occupied. A few examples will show the -uncertainty resulting from those various claims, when they conflicted -with each other. - -The old British charters extending from sea to sea have already been -mentioned. They were founded, beyond the sources of the rivers emptying -into the Atlantic, on no other principle than that of contiguity or -continuity. The grant in 1621 of Nova Scotia, by James the First, is -bounded on the north by the river St. Lawrence, though Cartier had more -than eighty-five years before discovered the mouth of that river and -ascended it as high up as the present site of Montreal, and the French -under Champlain had several years before 1621 been settled at Quebec. -But there is another case more important, and still more in point. - -The few survivors of the disastrous expedition of Narvaez, who, coming -from Florida, did in a most extraordinary way reach Culiacan on the -Pacific, were the first Europeans who crossed the Mississippi. Some -years later, Ferdinand de Soto, coming also from Florida, did in the -year 1541 reach and cross the Mississippi, at some place between the -mouth of the Ohio and that of the Arkansas. He explored a portion of the -river and of the adjacent country; and, after his death, Moscoso, who -succeeded him in command, did, in the year 1543, build seven brigantines -or barques, in which, with the residue of his followers, he descended -the Mississippi, the mouth of which he reached in seventeen days. Thence -putting to sea with his frail vessels, he was fortunate enough to reach -the Spanish port of Panuco, on the Mexican coast. The right of discovery -clearly belonged to Spain; but she had neglected for near one hundred -and fifty years to make any settlement on the great river or any of its -tributaries. The French, coming from Canada, reached the Mississippi in -the year 1680, and ascended it as high up as St. Anthony's Falls; and La -Salle descended it in 1682 to its mouth. The French Government did, in -virtue of that second discovery, claim the country, subsequently founded -New Orleans, and formed several other settlements in the interior, on -the Mississippi or its waters. Spain almost immediately occupied -Pensacola and Nacogdoches, in order to check the progress of the French -eastwardly and westwardly; but she did not attempt to disturb them in -their settlements on the Mississippi and its tributaries. We have here -the proof of a prior right of discovery being superseded, when too long -neglected, by that of actual occupancy and settlement. - -The French, by virtue of having thus discovered the mouth of the -Mississippi, of having ascended it more than fifteen hundred miles, of -having explored the Ohio, the Wabash, and the Illinois, from their -respective mouths to their most remote sources, and of having formed -several settlements as above mentioned, laid claim to the whole country -drained by the main river and its tributaries. They accordingly built -forts at Le Boeuf, high up the Alleghany river, and on the site where -Pittsburgh now stands. On the ground of discovery or settlement, Great -Britain had not the slightest claim. General, then Colonel Washington, -was the first who, at the age of twenty-two, and in the year 1754, -planted the British banner on the Western waters. The British claim was -founded principally on the ground of contiguity, enforced by other -considerations. The strongest of these was, that it could not consist -with natural law, that the British colonies, with a population of near -two millions, should be confined to the narrow belt of land between the -Atlantic and the Alleghany Mountains, and that the right derived from -the discovery of the main river should be carried to such an extent as -to allow the French colonies, with a population of fifty thousand, -rightfully to claim the whole valley of the Mississippi. The contest was -decided by the sword. By the treaty of peace of 1763, the Mississippi, -with the exception of New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, was made -the boundary. The French not only lost all that part of the valley which -lay east of that river, but they were compelled to cede Canada to Great -Britain. - -It may, however, happen that all the various claims from which a title -may be derived, instead of pertaining to several Powers, and giving rise -to conflicting pretensions, are united and rightfully belong to one -nation alone. This union, if entire, may justly be considered as giving -a complete and exclusive title to the sovereignty of that part of the -country embraced by such united claims. - -The position assumed by the British Government, that those various -claims exclude each other, and that the assertion of one forbids an -appeal to the others, is obviously untenable. All that can be said in -that respect is, that if any one claim is alone sufficient to establish -a complete and indisputable title, an appeal to others is superfluous. -Thus far, and no farther, can the objection be maintained. The argument -on the part of the United States in reality was, that the Government -considered the title derived from the ancient exclusive Spanish claim as -indisputable; but that, if this was denied, all the other just claims of -the United States taken together constituted a complete title, or at -least far superior to any that could be adduced on the part of Great -Britain. - -It is not intended to enter into the merits of the question, which has -been completely discussed, since the object of this paper is only to -show that there remain on both sides certain debatable questions; and -that therefore both Governments may, if so disposed, recede from some -of their pretensions, without any abandonment of positive rights, and -without impairing national honor and dignity. - -Although Great Britain seems, in this discussion, to have relied almost -exclusively on the right derived from actual occupancy and settlement, -she cannot reject absolutely those derived from other sources. She must -admit that, both in theory and practice, the claims derived from prior -discovery, from contiguity, from the principle which gives to the first -discoverer of the mouth of a river and of its course a claim to the -whole country drained by such river, have all been recognized to a -certain, though not well-defined extent, by all the European nations -claiming various portions of America. And she cannot deny the facts, -that (as Mr. Greenhow justly concludes) the seashore had been generally -examined from the 42d, and minutely from the 45th to the 48th degree of -latitude, Nootka Sound discovered, and the general direction of the -coast from the 48th to the 58th degree of latitude ascertained, by the -Spanish expeditions, in the years 1774 and 1775, of Perez, Heceta, and -Bodego y Quadra; that the American Captain Gray was the first who, in -1792, entered into and ascertained the existence of the River Columbia, -and the place where it empties into the sea; that, prior to that -discovery, the Spaniard Heceta was the first who had been within the -bay, called Deception Bay by Meares, into which the river does empty; -that, of the four navigators who had been in that bay prior to Gray's -final discovery, the Spaniard Heceta and the American Gray were the only -ones who had asserted that a great river emptied itself into that bay, -Heceta having even given a name to the river (St. Roc), and the entrance -having been designated by his own name (Ensennada de Heceta), whilst the -two English navigators, Meares and Vancouver, had both concluded that no -large river had its mouth there; that, in the year 1805, Lewis and -Clarke were the first who descended the river Columbia, from one of its -principal western sources to its mouth; that the first actual occupancy -in that quarter was by Mr. Astor's company, on the 24th of March, 1811, -though Mr. Thompson, the astronomer of the British Northwest Company, -who arrived at Astoria on the 15th of July, may have wintered on or near -some northern source of the river in 52 degrees north latitude; that -amongst the factories established by that American company one was -situated at the confluence of the Okanagan with the Columbia, in about -49 degrees of latitude; that the 42d degree is the boundary, west of the -Stony Mountains, established by treaty between Spain, now Mexico, and -the United States; that the 49th degree is likewise the boundary, from -the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, established by treaty -between Great Britain and the United States; and that therefore the -right of the United States, which may be derived from the principle of -contiguity or continuity, embraces the territory west of the Stony -Mountains contained between the 42d and 49th degrees of latitude. - -Omitting other considerations which apply principally to the territory -north of Fuca Straits, where the claims of both parties are almost -exclusively derived from their respective discoveries, including those -of Spain, it may be rationally inferred from the preceding enumeration -that there remain various questions which must be considered by Great -Britain as being still doubtful and debatable, and that she may -therefore, without any abandonment of positive rights, recede from the -extreme pretensions which she has advanced in the discussion respecting -a division of the territory. But, although conjectures may be formed, -and the course pursued by the Government of the United States may have -an influence on that which Great Britain will adopt, it does not belong -to me to discuss what that Government may or will do. This paper is -intended for the American, and not for the English public; and my -attention has been principally directed to those points which may be -considered by the United States as doubtful and debatable. - -It was expressly stipulated that nothing contained in the conventions of -1818 and 1827 should be construed to impair, _or in any manner affect_, -the claims which either of the contracting parties may have to any part -of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains. After the most -cool and impartial investigation of which I am capable, I have not been -able to perceive any claim on the part of Great Britain, or debatable -question, respecting the territory south of Fuca's Straits, but the -species of occupancy by the British Fur companies between the year 1813 -and October 20th, 1818; and this must be considered in connection with -the restoration of "all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, -taken by either party from the other during the war," provided for by -the treaty of Ghent. To this branch of the subject belongs also the -question whether the establishment of trading factories with Indians may -eventually give a right to sovereignty. My opinion was expressed in the -American counter-statement of the case, dated 19th December, 1826: "It -is believed that mere factories, established solely for the purpose of -trafficking with the natives, and without any view to cultivation and -permanent settlement, cannot, of themselves, and unsupported by any -other consideration, give any better title to dominion and absolute -sovereignty than similar establishments made in a civilized country." -However true this may be as an abstract proposition, it must be admitted -that, practically, the modest British factory at Calcutta has gradually -grown up into absolute and undisputed sovereignty over a population of -eighty millions of people. - -The questions which, as it appears to me, may be allowed by the United -States to be debatable, and therefore to make it questionable whether -they have a complete right to the whole Oregon territory, are: - -1st. The Nootka convention, which applies to the whole, and which, -though not of primary importance, is nevertheless a fact, and the -inferences drawn from it a matter of argument. - -2dly. The discovery of the Straits of Fuca. - -3dly. North of those straits; along the sea shores, the discoveries of -the British contrasted with those of the American and Spanish -navigators; in the interior, the question whether the discovery of the -mouth and the navigation of one of its principal branches, from its -source to the mouth of the river, implies without exception a complete -right to the whole country drained by all the tributaries of such river; -and also the British claim to the whole territory drained by Frazer's -river--its sources having been discovered in 1792 by Sir Alexander -Mackenzie, factories having been established upon it by the British as -early as the year 1806, and the whole river thence to its mouth having -been for a number of years exclusively navigated by British subjects. - -It appears to me sufficient generally to suggest the controverted -points. That which relates to Fuca's Straits is the most important, and -deserves particular consideration. - -If Fuca's voyage in 1592 could be proved to be an authentic document, -this would settle at once the question in favor of the United States; -but the voyage was denied in the introduction to the voyage of the Sutil -and Mexicano. This was an official document, published under the -auspices of the Spanish Government, and intended to vindicate Spain -against the charges, that she had contributed nothing to the advancement -of geography in those quarters. This negative evidence was confirmed by -Humboldt, who says that no trace of such voyage can be found in the -archives of Mexico. Unwilling to adduce any doubtful fact, I abstained -from alluding to it in the statement of the American case in 1826. Later -researches show that, although recorded evidences remain of the voyages -of Gali from Macao to Acapulco in 1584, of the Santa Anna (on board of -which was, as he says, Fuca himself) from Manilla to the coast of -California, where she was captured in 1587 by Cavendish, and of Vizcaino -in 1602-1603, and even of Maldonado's fictitious voyage in 1588, yet no -trace has been found in Spain or Mexico of Fuca's, or any other similar -voyage, in 1692, or thereabout. - -On reading with attention the brief account published by Purchas, I will -say that the voyage itself has much internal evidence of its truth, but -that the inference or conclusion throws much discredit on the whole. The -only known account of the voyage is that given verbally at Venice in -1596, by Fuca, a Greek pilot, to Mr. Lock, a respectable English -merchant, who transmitted it to Purchas. - -Fuca says that he had been sent by the Viceroy of Mexico to discover the -straits of Anian and the passage thereof into the sea, which they called -the North Sea, which is _our Northwest Sea_; that between 47 and 48 -degrees of latitude he entered into a broad inlet, through which he -sailed more than twenty days; and, being then come into the North Sea -already, and not being sufficiently armed, he returned again to -Acapulco. He offered then to Mr. Lock to go into England and serve her -Majesty in a voyage for the discovery perfectly of the Northwest passage -into the South Sea. If it be granted that the inlet through which he -had sailed was really the same as the straits which now bear his name, -that sea into which he emerged, and which he asserts to be _our -Northwest Sea_, must have been that which is now called Queen -Charlotte's Sound, north of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, in about 51 -degrees of latitude. _Our Northwest Sea_ was that which washes the -shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, then universally known as far north -as the vicinity of the 60th degree of latitude. Hudson's Straits had not -yet been discovered, and the discovery of Davis's Straits might not be -known to Fuca. But no navigator at that time, who, like he, had sailed -across both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, could be ignorant that -the northern extremity of Newfoundland, which lies nearly in the same -latitude as the northern entrance of Fuca's Straits, is situated sixty -or seventy degrees of longitude east of that entrance. The only way to -reconcile the account with itself is, to suppose that Fuca believed that -the continent of America did not, on the side of the Atlantic, extend -further north than about the 60th degree, and was bounded northwardly by -an open sea, which extended as far west as the northern extremity of the -inlet through which he had sailed. It is true nevertheless that, between -the years 1774 and 1792, there was a prevailing opinion amongst the -navigators that Fuca had actually discovered an inlet leading towards -the Atlantic. Prior to the year 1787 they were engaged in seeking for -it, and the Spaniards had for that purpose explored in vain the sea -coast lying south of the 48th degree; for it is well known that Fuca's -entrance lies between the 48th and 49th, and not between the 47th and -48th degrees of latitude, as he had announced. - -The modern discovery of that inlet is due to Captain Barclay, an -Englishman, commanding the Imperial Eagle, a vessel owned by British -merchants, but which was equipped at, and took its departure from -Ostend, and which sailed under the flag of the Austrian East India -Company. The British Government, which has objected to the American -claim derived from Captain Gray's discovery of the mouth of the river -Columbia, on the ground that he was a private individual, and that his -vessel was not a public ship, cannot certainly claim anything in virtue -of a discovery by a private Englishman, sailing under Austrian colors. -In that case, and rejecting Fuca's voyage, neither the United States nor -England can lay any claim on account of the discovery of the straits. - -Subsequently, the Englishman, Meares, sailing under the Portuguese flag, -penetrated, in 1768, about ten miles into the inlet, and the American, -Gray, in 1789, about fifty miles. The pretended voyage of the sloop -Washington throughout the straits, under the command of either Gray or -Kendrick, has no other foundation than an assertion of Meares, on which -no reliance can be placed. - -In the year 1790 (1791 according to Vancouver) the Spaniards, Elisa and -Quimper, explored the straits more than one hundred miles, discovering -the Port Discovery, the entrance of Admiralty Inlet, the Deception -Passage, and the Canal de Haro. In 1792 Vancouver explored and surveyed -the straits throughout, together with their various bays and harbors. -Even there he had been preceded in part by the Sutil and Mexicano; and -he expresses his regret that they had advanced before him as far as the -Canal del Rosario. - -Under all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be doubted that the -United States must admit that the discovery of the straits, and the -various inferences which may be drawn from it, are doubtful and -debatable questions. - -That which relates to a presumed agreement of Commissioners appointed -under the treaty of Utrecht, by which the northern boundary of Canada -was, from a certain point north of Lake Superior, declared to extend -westwardly along the 49th parallel of latitude, does not appear to me -definitively settled. As this had been assumed many years before, as a -positive fact, and had never been contradicted, I also assumed it as -such and did not thoroughly investigate the subject. Yet I had before me -at least one map (name of publisher not recollected), of which I have a -vivid recollection, on which the dividing lines were distinctly marked -and expressly designated, as being in conformity with the agreement of -the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. The evidence against the -fact, though in some respects strong, is purely negative. The line, -according to the map, extended from a certain point near the source of -the river Saguenay, in a westerly direction, to another designated -point on another river emptying either into the St Lawrence or James's -Bay; and there were, in that way, four or five lines following each -other, all tending westwardly, but with different inclinations -northwardly or southwardly, and all extending, from some apparently -known point on a designated river, to another similar point on another -river; the rivers themselves emptying themselves, some into the river -St. Lawrence and others into James's Bay or Hudson's Bay, until, from a -certain point lying north of Lake Superior, the line was declared to -extend along the 49th degree of latitude, as above stated. It was with -that map before me that the following paragraph was inserted in the -American statement of December, 1826: - - - "The limits between the possessions of Great Britain in North - America, and those of France in the same quarter, namely, Canada - and Louisiana, were determined by Commissioners appointed in - pursuance of the treaty of Utrecht. From the coast of Labrador to a - certain point North of Lake Superior, those limits were fixed - according to certain metes and bounds; and from that point the line - of demarcation was agreed to extend indefinitely due west, along - the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. It was in conformity - with that arrangement that the United States did claim that - parallel as the northern boundary of Louisiana. It has been - accordingly thus settled, as far as the Stony Mountains, by the - convention of 1818 between the United States and Great Britain; and - no adequate reason can be given why the same boundary should not be - continued as far as the claims of the United States do extend, that - is to say, as far as the Pacific ocean." - - -It appears very extraordinary that any geographer or map-maker should -have invented a dividing line, with such specific details, without -having sufficient grounds for believing that it had been thus determined -by the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. It is also believed -that Douglass' Summary (not at this moment within my reach) adverts to -the portion of the line from the coast of Labrador to the Saguenay. -Finally, the allusion to the 49th parallel, as a boundary fixed in -consequence of the treaty of Utrecht, had been repeatedly made in the -course of preceding negotiations, as well as in the conferences of that -of the year 1826; and there is no apparent motive, if the assertion was -known by the British negotiators not to be founded in fact, why they -should not have at once denied it. It may be, however, that the -question having ceased to be of any interest to Great Britain since the -acquisition of Canada, they had not investigated the subject. It is of -some importance, because, if authenticated, the discussion would be -converted from questions respecting undefined claims, into one -concerning the construction of a positive treaty or convention. - -It is sufficiently clear that, under all the circumstances of the case, -an amicable division of the territory, if at all practicable, must be -founded in a great degree on expediency. This of course must be left to -the wisdom of the two Governments. The only natural, equitable, and -practicable line which has occurred to me, is one which, running through -the middle of Fuca Straits, from its entrance to a point on the main, -situated south of the mouth of Frazer's river, should leave to the -United States all the shores and harbors lying south, and to Great -Britain all those north of that line, including the whole of Quadra and -Vancouver's Island. It would be through Fuca's Straits a nearly easterly -line, along the parallel of about 48½ degrees, leaving to England the -most valuable and permanent portion of the fur trade, dividing the -sea-coast as nearly as possible into two equal parts, and the ports in -the most equitable manner. To leave Admiralty Inlet and its Sounds to -Great Britain, would give her a possession in the heart of the American -portion of the territory. Whether from the point where the line would -strike the main, it should be continued along the same parallel, or run -along the 49th, is a matter of secondary importance. - -If such division should take place, the right of the inhabitants of the -country situated on the upper waters of the Columbia to the navigation -of that river to its mouth, is founded on natural law; and the principle -has almost been recognized as the public law of Europe. Limited to -commercial purposes, it might be admitted, but on the express condition -that the citizens of the United States should in the same manner, and to -the same extent, have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence. - -But I must say that, whatever may be the ultimate destinies of the -Oregon territory, I would feel great regret in seeing it in any way -divided. An amicable division appears to me without comparison -preferable to a war for that object between the two countries. In every -other view of the subject it is highly exceptionable. Without adverting -for the present to considerations of a higher nature, it may be -sufficient here to observe, that the conversion of the northern part of -the territory into a British colony would in its effects make the -arrangement very unequal. The United States are forbidden by their -Constitution to give a preference to the ports of one State over those -of another. The ports within the portion of territory allotted to the -United States would of course remain open to British vessels; whilst -American vessels would be excluded from the ports of the British colony, -unless occasionally admitted by special acts depending on the will of -Great Britain. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[2] Grotius, however, sustains the right of occupation by a maxim of the -Civil Roman Code. - - - - -NUMBER III. - - -Beyond the naked assertion of an absolute right to the whole territory, -so little in the shape of argument has been adduced, and so much warmth -has been exhibited in the discussion of the subject, that it cannot be -doubted that the question has now become, on both sides, one of feeling -rather than of right. This, in America, grows out of the fact that, in -this contest with a European nation, the contested territory is in -America and not in Europe. It is identical with the premature official -annunciation, that the United States could not acquiesce in the -establishment of any new colony in North America by any European nation. -This sentiment was already general at the time when it was first -publicly declared; and now that it has been almost universally avowed, -there can be no impropriety in any private citizen to say, as I now do, -that I share in that feeling to its full extent. For the Americans, -Oregon is or will be home: for England, it is but an outpost, which may -afford means of annoyance, rather than be a source of real power. In -America all have the same ultimate object in view; we differ only with -respect to the means by which it may be attained. - -Two circumstances have had a tendency to nourish and excite these -feelings. The British fur companies, from their position, from their -monopolizing character, from their natural influence upon the Indians, -and from that, much greater than might have been expected, which they -have constantly had upon the British Government in its negotiations with -the United States, have for sixty years been a perpetual source of -annoyance and collisions. The vested interests of the Hudson Bay Company -are at this moment the greatest obstacle to an amicable arrangement. It -is at the same time due to justice to say that, as far as is known, that -company has acted in Oregon in conformity with the terms of the -convention, and that its officers have uniformly treated the Americans, -whether visitors or emigrants, not only courteously, but with great -kindness. - -If the British colonies on the continent of America were an independent -country, or were they placed in their commercial relations, at least -with the United States, on the same footing as the British possessions -in Europe, these relations would be regulated by the reciprocal -interests and wants of the parties immediately concerned. Great Britain -has an undoubted right to persist in her colonial policy; but the result -has been extremely vexatious, and to the United States injurious. All -this is true. But feelings do not confer a right, and the indulgence of -excited feelings is neither virtue nor wisdom. - -The Western States have no greater apparent immediate interest in the -acquisition of Oregon than the States bordering on the Atlantic. These -stand in greater need of an outlet for their surplus emigrating -population, and to them exclusively, will for the present, the benefit -accrue of ports on the Pacific, for the protection of the numerous -American ships employed in the fisheries and commerce of that ocean. It -is true that in case of war the inhabitants of the Western States will -not, if a naval superiority shall be obtained on the Upper Lakes, feel -those immediate calamities of war to which the country along the -seashore is necessarily exposed; but no section of the United States -will be more deeply affected, by the impossibility of finding during the -war a market for the immense surplus of its agricultural products. It -must also be remembered that a direct tax has heretofore been found as -productive as the aggregate of all the other internal taxes levied by -the General Government; that, in case of war, it must necessarily be -imposed; and that, as it must, in conformity with the Constitution, be -levied in proportion to the respective population of the several States, -it will be much more oppressive on those which have not yet accumulated -a large amount of circulating or personal capital. The greater degree of -excitement which prevails in the West is due to other and more powerful -causes than a regard for self-interest. - -Bordering through the whole of their northern frontier on the British -possessions, the Western people have always been personally exposed to -the annoyances and collisions already alluded to; and it may be that the -hope of getting rid of these by the conquest of Canada has some -influence upon their conduct. Independent of this, the indomitable -energy of this nation has been and is nowhere displayed so forcibly as -in the new States and settlements. It was necessarily directed towards -the acquisition of land and the cultivation of the soil. In that respect -it has performed prodigies. Three millions of cultivators of the soil -are now found between the Lakes and the Ohio, where, little more than -fifty years before, save only three or four half Indian French -settlements, there was not a single white inhabitant. Nothing now seems -impossible to those men; they have not even been sobered by fresh -experience. Attempting to do at once, and without an adequate capital, -that which should have been delayed five-and-twenty years, and might -have then been successfully accomplished, some of those States have had -the mortification to find themselves unable to pay the interest on the -debt they had contracted, and obliged to try to compound with their -creditors. Nevertheless, undiminished activity and locomotion are still -the ruling principles: the Western people leap over time and distance; -ahead they must go; it is their mission. May God speed them, and may -they thus quietly take possession of the entire contested territory! - -All this was as well known to the British Government as to ourselves. A -public and official declaration by the President of the United States -was unnecessary and at least premature. Mr. Rush's correspondence of -1824 bears witness of its unfortunate effect on the negotiations of that -year. These feelings had gradually subsided. But, whatever may be the -cause, the fact that an extraordinary excitement on this subject has -manifested itself, and does now exist on both sides, cannot be denied. -Time is absolutely necessary in order that this should subside. Any -precipitate step now taken by either Government would be attended with -the most fatal consequences. That which, if done some years ago, might -have been harmless, would now be highly dangerous, and should at least -be postponed for the present. - -The first incipient step recommended by the Executive is, to give the -notice that the convention of 1827 shall expire at the end of one year. -This measure at this time, and connected with the avowed intention of -assuming exclusive sovereignty over the whole territory, becomes a -question of peace or war. - -The conventions of 1818 and 1827, whilst reserving the rights of both -parties, allowed the freedom of trade and navigation throughout the -whole territory to remain common to both; and the citizens or subjects -of both powers were permitted to occupy any part of it. The -inconveniences of that temporary arrangement were well understood at the -time. The British fur companies had established factories on the banks, -and even south of the river Columbia, within the limits of that portion -of the country which the United States had, whenever the subject was -discussed, claimed as belonging exclusively to them. The conditions of -the agreement were nominally reciprocal; but, though they did not give, -yet they did in fact leave the British company in the exclusive -possession of the fur trade. This could not be prevented otherwise than -by resorting to actual force: the United States were not then either -ready or disposed to run the risks of a war for that object; and it was -thought more eligible, that the British traders should remain on the -territory of the United States, by virtue of a compact and with their -consent, than in defiance of their authority. It is but very lately that -the Americans have begun to migrate to that remote country: a greater -number will certainly follow; and they have under the convention a -perfect right to occupy and make settlements in any part of the -territory they may think proper, with the sole exception of the spots -actually occupied by the British company. - -What is then the object in view, in giving the notice at this time? This -has been declared without reserve by the President: "At the end of the -year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for -giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national -rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That -they cannot be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and -interests, is too clear to admit of doubt." And it must be recollected -that this candid avowal has been accompanied by the declaration that -"our title to the whole Oregon territory had been asserted and, as was -believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Nothing can -be more plain and explicit. The exclusive right of the United States to -absolute sovereignty over the whole territory must be asserted and -maintained. - -It may not be necessary for that purpose to drive away the British fur -company, nor to prevent the migration into Oregon of British emigrants -coming from the British dominions. The company may, if deemed expedient, -be permitted to trade as heretofore with the Indians. British emigrants -may be treated in the same manner as the other sixty or eighty thousand -who already arrive yearly in the United States. They may at their option -be naturalized, or remain on the same footing as foreigners in other -parts of the Union. In this case they will enjoy no political rights; -they will not be permitted to own American vessels and to sail under the -American flag; the permission to own real property seems, so long as -Oregon remains a territory, to depend on the will of Congress. Thus far -collision may be avoided. - -But no foreign jurisdiction can be permitted, from the moment when the -sovereignty of the United States over the whole territory shall be -asserted and maintained. To this, all those who reside in the territory -must submit. After having taken the decisive step of giving the notice, -the United States cannot, as the President justly states, abandon the -right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor. - -It had been expressly agreed by the convention that nothing contained in -it should affect the claims of either party to the territory. The -all-important question of sovereignty remained therefore in abeyance. -Negotiations for a division of the territory have failed: the question -of sovereignty remains undecided, as it was prior to the convention. If -the United States exercise the reserved right to put an end to the -convention, and if, from the time when it shall have expired, they -peremptorily assume the right of sovereignty over the whole, it cannot -be doubted that Great Britain will at once resist. She will adhere to -the principle she had asserted prior to the Nootka convention, and has -ever since maintained, that actual occupancy can alone give a right to -the country. She will not permit the jurisdiction of the United States -to be extended over her subjects: she will oppose the removal, arrest, -or exercise of any other legal process, against her justices of the -peace, against any other officers who directly or indirectly act under -her authority, against any of her subjects; and she will continue to -exercise her jurisdiction over all of them throughout the whole -territory. Whatever either Power asserts must be maintained: military -occupation and war must necessarily ensue. - -A portion of the people, both in the West and elsewhere, see clearly -that such must be the consequence of giving the notice. Such men openly -avow their opinions, prefer war to a longer continuation of the present -state of things, are ready to meet all the dangers and calamities of the -impending conflict, and to adopt at once all the measures which may -ensure success. With them, the discussion brings at once the question to -its true issue: Is war necessary for the object they have in view? Or -may it not be attained by peaceable means? It is a question of war or -peace, and it is fairly laid before the nation. - -But many respectable men appear to entertain hopes that peace may still -be preserved after the United States shall have assumed, or attempted to -assume, exclusive sovereignty. The reverse appears to me so clear, so -obvious, so inevitable, that I really cannot understand on what grounds -these hopes are founded. - -Is it thought that the President will not, after the assent of Congress -has been obtained (and whether immediately or at the end of this -session, is quite immaterial), give the notice which he has asked -Congress to authorize? Or is it supposed that a change in the form -which, in order to avoid responsibility, would give him a discretionary -power, could lead to a different result, or be anything else but a -transfer by Congress to the Executive of the power to declare war? - -Can it be presumed that when, after the expiration of the term of -notice, the convention shall have been abrogated, the President will not -assert and maintain the sovereignty claimed by the United States? I have -not the honor of a personal acquaintance with him; I respect in him the -First Magistrate of the Nation; and he is universally represented as of -irreproachable character, sincere, and patriotic. Every citizen has a -right to differ with him in opinion: no one has that of supposing that -he says one thing and means another. I feel an intimate conviction of -his entire sincerity. - -Is it possible that any one, who does not labor under a singular -illusion, can believe that England will yield to threats and defiance -that which she has refused to concede to our arguments? Reverse the -case: Suppose for a moment that Great Britain was the aggressor, and had -given the notice; declaring, at the same time, that, at the expiration -of the year, she would assume exclusive sovereignty over the whole -country, and oppose the exercise of any whatever by the United States: -is there any American, even amongst those who set the least value on the -Oregon territory, and are most sincerely desirous of preserving peace, -who would not at once declare that such pretension on the part of Great -Britain was outrageous and must be resisted? - -It is not certainly the interest of Great Britain to wage war against -the United States, and it may be fairly presumed that the British -Government has no such wish. But England is, as well as the United -States, a great, powerful, sensitive, and proud nation. Every effusion -of the British press which displays hostility to the United States, -produces an analogous sentiment, and adds new fuel to excitement in -America. A moment's reflection will enable us to judge of the inevitable -effect of an offensive and threatening act, emanating from our -Government; an act which throws, in the face of the world, the gauntlet -of defiance to Great Britain. Her claims and views, as laid down in her -statement of December, 1826, remove every doubt respecting the steps she -will take. "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any -portion of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any -part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy in -common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in -abeyance. * * * * The pretensions of Great Britain tend to the mere -maintenance of her own rights, _in resistance to the exclusive -character_ of the pretensions of the United States. * * * * These rights -embrace the right to navigate the waters of those countries, _the right -to settle in and over any part of them_, and the right freely to trade -with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same. It is fully _admitted_ -that the _United States possess the same rights_. But beyond these -rights, they possess none. To the interests and establishments which -British industry and enterprise have created Great Britain owes -protection. _That protection will be given_, both as regards settlement -and freedom of trade and navigation, with every attention not to -infringe the co-ordinate rights of the United States." - -Thus, the United States declare that they give notice of the abrogation -of the convention, with the avowed determination of asserting their -assumed right of absolute and _exclusive sovereignty_ over the whole -territory of Oregon. And Great Britain has explicitly declared that her -pretensions were, _in resistance_ to the _exclusive_ character of those -of the United States; and that protection will be given both as regards -settlement and freedom of trade and navigation to the interests and -establishments which British industry and enterprise have created. - -How war can be avoided, if both Powers persist in their conflicting -determinations, is incomprehensible. Under such circumstances -negotiation is morally impossible during the year following the notice. -To give that notice, with the avowed determination to assume exclusive -sovereignty at the end of the year, is a decisive, most probably an -irretrievable, step. "After that period the United States cannot abandon -their right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor." - -The question of sovereignty has never been decided. Simply to give -notice of the abrogation of the convention, would leave the question in -the same situation: it would remain in abeyance. But when the President -has recommended that the notice should be given with the avowed object -of assuming exclusive sovereignty, an Act of Congress, in compliance -with his recommendation, necessarily implies an approbation of the -object for which it is given. If the notice should be given, the only -way to avoid that implication and its fatal consequences, is to insert -in it, an explicit declaration, that the sovereignty shall not be -assumed. But then why give the notice at all? A postponement is far -preferable, unless some other advantage shall be obtained by the -abrogation of the convention. This must be examined, and it is necessary -to inquire whether any and what measures may be adopted, without any -violation of the convention, that will preserve the rights and -strengthen the position of the United States. - - - - -NUMBER IV. - - -The acts which the government of the United States may do, in conformity -with the convention, embrace two objects: the measures applicable to the -territory within their acknowledged limits which may facilitate and -promote migration; and those which are necessary for the protection of -their citizens residing in the Oregon territory. - -It is a remarkable fact that, although the convention has now been in -force twenty-seven years, Congress has actually done nothing with -respect to either of those objects. Enterprising individuals have, -without any aid or encouragement by Government, opened a wagon-road -eighteen hundred miles in length, through an arid or mountainous region, -and made settlements on or near the shores of the Pacific, without any -guaranty for the possession of the land improved by their labors. Even -the attempt to carry on an inland trade with the Indians of Oregon has -been defeated, by the refusal to allow a drawback of the high duties -imposed on the importation of foreign goods absolutely necessary for -that commerce. Thus the fur trade has remained engrossed by the Hudson -Bay Company; missionaries were, till very lately, almost the only -citizens of the United States to be found in Oregon; the United States, -during the whole of that period, have derived no other advantage from -the convention than the reservation of their rights, and the express -provision that these should in no way be affected by the continuance of -the British factories in the territory. And, now that the tide of -migration has turned in their favor, they are suddenly invited to assume -a hostile position, to endure the calamities and to run the chances and -consequences of war, in order to gain an object which natural and -irresistible causes, if permitted to operate, cannot fail ultimately to -attain. - -The measures applicable to the territory within the acknowledged limits -of the U. States have generally been recommended by the President. A -very moderate appropriation will be sufficient to improve the most -difficult portions of the road: and block-houses or other temporary -works, erected in proper places and at convenient distances, and -garrisoned by a portion of the intended additional force, will protect -and facilitate the progress of the emigrants. However uninviting may be -the vast extent of prairies, destitute of timber, which intervene -between the western boundary of the State of Missouri and the country -bordering on the Stony Mountains, it seems impossible that there should -not be found some more favored spots where settlements may be formed. If -these were selected for military posts, and donations of land were made -to actual settlers in their vicinity, a series of villages, though -probably not a continuity of settlements, would soon arise through the -whole length of the road. The most important place, that which is most -wanted, either as a place of rest for the emigrants, or for military -purposes, is one in the immediate vicinity of the Stony Mountains. -Reports speak favorably of the fertility of the soil in some of the -valleys of the upper waters, within our limits--of Bear's river, of the -Rio Colorado, and of some of the northern branches of the river Platte. -There, also, the seat of justice might be placed of the new territory, -whose courts should have superior jurisdiction over Oregon. - -The measures which the United States have a right to carry into effect -within the territory of Oregon must now be considered. - -The only positive condition of the convention is, that the territory in -question shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the -navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open to vessels, -citizens, and subjects of the two Powers. - -For the construction put on this article by Great Britain, it is -necessary to recur again to the statement of her claim, as given by -herself, and to her own acts subsequent to the convention. - -The acts of England, subsequent to the convention of 1818, are to be -found in the various charters of the Hudson Bay Company (observing that -some of their most important provisions, though of a much earlier date, -stand unrepealed), and in the act of Parliament of the year 1821, which -confirms and extends a prior one of the year 1803. It must also be -recollected that, by grants or acts subsequent to the convention, the -ancient Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company of Montreal have -been united together, preserving the name of Hudson Bay Company. - -This Company was and remains a body corporate and politic, with -provisions for the election of a Governor and other officers, who direct -its business; and amongst other powers, the Company is empowered to -build fortifications for the defence of its possessions, as well as to -make war or peace with all nations or people, not Christian, inhabiting -their territories, which now embrace the entire Oregon. By the act of -Parliament of 1821, the jurisdiction of the courts of Upper Canada is -extended, in all civil and criminal cases, to the Oregon territory; -provision is made for the appointment of justices of the peace within -the said territory, with a limited jurisdiction, and power to act as -Commissioners in certain cases, and to convey offenders to Upper Canada. - -It must also be observed that, although the Company is forbidden to -claim any exclusive trade with the Indians, to the prejudice or -exclusion of any citizen of the United States who may be engaged in the -same trade, yet the jurisdiction above mentioned is, by the letter of -the act, extended to any persons whatsoever residing or being within the -said territory. The British Plenipotentiaries did, however, explicitly -declare, in the course of the negotiations of 1826-1827, that the act -had no other object but the maintenance of order amongst British -subjects, and had never been intended to apply to citizens of the United -States. - -It is perfectly clear that, since it has been fully admitted that the -United States possess the same rights over the territory as Great -Britain, they are fully authorized, under the convention, to enjoy all -the rights which Great Britain claims for herself, and to exercise that -jurisdiction which she has assumed as being consistent with the -convention. - -The citizens of the United States have, therefore, at this time a full -and acknowledged right to navigate the waters of the Oregon territory, -_to settle in and over any part of it_, and freely to trade with the -inhabitants and occupiers of the same. And the Government of the United -States is likewise fully authorized to incorporate any company or -association of men for the purpose of trading or of occupying and -settling the country; to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of any of -its territories lying within its acknowledged limits, in all civil and -criminal cases, to the territory aforesaid; to appoint within the same -justices of the peace and such other officers as may be necessary for -carrying the jurisdiction into effect; and also to make war and peace -with the Indian inhabitants of the territory, including the incidental -power to appoint agents for that purpose. - -On the other hand, it seems to be understood that, so long as the -convention remains in force, neither Government shall lay duties in the -Territory on tonnage, merchandise, or commerce; nor exercise exclusive -jurisdiction over any portion of it; and that the citizens and subjects -of the two Powers, residing in or removing to the territory, shall be -amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country respectively. - -It has been contended by the British Government that the establishment -of any military post, or the introduction of any regular force under a -national flag, by either Power, would be an act of exclusive -sovereignty, which could not be permitted to either whilst the -sovereignty remained in abeyance. Under existing circumstances, it is -believed that such an act would be highly dangerous, and prove -unfavorable to the United States. - -But the establishment by the United States of a Territorial Government -over Oregon is also objected to on the same principle. The want of such -government appears to be the only serious inconvenience attending a -continuance of the convention, and requires special consideration. - -The United States have the same right as Great Britain, and are equally -bound, to protect their citizens residing in the Oregon territory, in -the exercise of all the rights secured to them by the convention. It has -been fully admitted that these rights embrace the right to settle in and -over any part of the territory, and that they are to be, in all cases -whatever, amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country. The -subjects of Great Britain, who are not in the employ of the Hudson Bay -Company, are forbidden to trade with the natives; and the company does -in fact control and govern all the British subjects residing in the -territory. This gives a strong guaranty against the violation, by rash -individuals, of the rights of the citizens of the United States. Should -any of them, however, be disturbed in the exercise of their legitimate -rights, and the company should be unable or unwilling to relieve and -indemnify them, the United States would be justly entitled to appeal to -the British Government for the redress of a violation of rights secured -by the convention; for the British Government has preserved a control -over the Hudson Bay Company, and does in fact, through it, govern the -British subjects who reside in the territory. - -The United States are placed, in that respect, in a very different -situation. It is not believed that the General Government is authorized -to incorporate, as a political body, a commercial company, with such -powers as would give it an efficient control over the private citizens -residing in the territory. Such delegation of powers, either by any of -the States or by Congress, is wholly inconsistent with our institutions. -The United States may indeed give to their citizens in Oregon a regular -and complete judiciary system; and they may also extend to them, as the -British Government has done on its part, the laws of an adjacent -territory. But an executive local power is wanted in this case, as it is -everywhere else, under any form of government whatever, to cause the -laws to be executed, and to have that general control which is now -exercised, through the Hudson Bay Company, by the British Government. -There are, besides, various acts of a public though local nature, such -as opening roads, making bridges, erecting block-houses for protection -against the natives, providing for the destitute, &c., all which are -performed by the Hudson Bay Company, and cannot be accomplished by -insulated individuals, bound by no legal association or government. - -Whether any measures may be devised, other than a territorial -government, that will be sufficient for the purpose intended; whether -all the American citizens residing in Oregon might not be incorporated -and made a body politic, with powers equivalent to those vested in the -Hudson Bay Company, and with the reservation by the General Government -of a check or control analogous to that reserved by the Government of -Great Britain, are questions worthy of serious consideration. But Great -Britain has the same interest as the United States to prevent collision -during the continuance of the convention; and it is believed that, if -negotiations should be renewed, with an equal and sincere desire on both -sides to preserve friendly relations, there would be no difficulty at -this time in coming to an understanding on the subject. It would seem -sufficient that this should be accompanied with provisions, preventing -the possibility of the powers exercised by the United States being ever -applied to British subjects, and with an explicit declaration that these -powers should never be construed as an admission by Great Britain of any -claim of the United States to exclusive sovereignty. - -There is another important subject which has not, it is believed, ever -been discussed by the two Powers. This is the claim to the ownership of -the places settled and improved under the convention. It seems to me -that, on the principles of both natural and international law, these -rights, to a defined extent, should be respected by each Power -respectively, whose sovereignty over the portion of the territory in -which such improved settlements may be situated will ultimately be -recognized. It appears also that the United States may, in conformity -with the convention, and without affecting in any shape the claims -advanced by Great Britain, pass a law declaring that they abandon or -grant without warranty, to such of their citizens as shall have made -actual and bonâ fide settlements in any part of Oregon, under the -convention, all the rights of and claims to the ownership of the soil, -on which such settlements shall have been made, which the United States -may now or hereafter claim or acquire: limiting and defining the extent -of the grant in the same manner as would be done if such grant was -absolute; and promising that the title should be confirmed, in case and -whenever the sovereignty of the United States was recognized or asserted -and maintained. - -The prolongation, in 1827, of the convention of 1818, was evidently -intended as a temporary measure, since it was made revocable at the will -of either party. The plenipotentiaries of the two Powers had been unable -to agree on the terms of a definitive arrangement, or even in defining -with precision the conditions on which the convention of 1818 might be -continued for a determinate period. It will be seen, by reference to the -protocols and correspondence, that, although it was generally admitted -that neither party ought during such continuance to exercise any -exclusive sovereignty over the territory, the American Plenipotentiary -declined to agree to any convention containing an express provision to -that effect, or accompanied by the insertion in the protocol of a -declaration for the same purpose by the British Plenipotentiaries. The -reason was not only because an exclusive right over Astoria and its -dependencies was claimed by the United States, but principally because -it was anticipated that, in order to have in fact an authority equal to -that exercised by the Hudson Bay Company, it would become necessary for -the United States to perform acts which the British Government might -contend to be forbidden by such express provision or declaration. The -consequence was, that the convention recognizes some certain rights, and -imposes no positive restrictions but only such, as may be supposed to be -implied in the clause which declares, that nothing contained in it -should be construed to impair or affect the claims of either party. The -probability that it might become necessary for the United States to -establish a territory or some sort of government over their own citizens -was explicitly avowed; the deficiencies of the renewed convention of -1827, and the inconveniences which might ensue, were fully understood; -and the continuance of that of 1818, made revokable at will, was agreed -on, with the hope that the two Powers would embrace an early -opportunity, if not to make a definitive arrangement, at least to -substitute for the convention another, defining with precision the acts -which both parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform so long as -the sovereignty remained in abeyance. - -The inconveniences alluded to have been fairly stated in this paper, and -some of the means by which they may be avoided have been suggested. It -is not, therefore, on account of the intrinsic value of the convention -that its abrogation is objectionable and dangerous. It is because -nothing is substituted in its place; it is because, if the two Powers -are not yet prepared to make a definitive agreement, it becomes the duty -of both Governments, instead of breaking the only barrier which still -preserves peace, to substitute for the existing convention one adapted -to the present state of things, and which shall prevent collisions until -the question of sovereignty shall have been settled. The inconveniences -which were only anticipated have become tangible, from the time when -American citizens, whom the United States are bound to protect, began to -make settlements in the territory of Oregon. The sudden transition, from -an agreement however defective to a promiscuous occupancy, without any -provisions whatever that may prevent collisions, is highly dangerous. -When this is accompanied by an avowed determination on the part of the -United States to assume that exclusive sovereignty which Great Britain -has positively declared she would resist, War becomes inevitable. - - - - -NUMBER V. - - -It may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of certainty, the -number of citizens of the United States who, aided by these various -measures, will, within any given period, remove to the territory beyond -the Stony Mountains. It is certain that this number will annually -increase, and keep pace with the rapid increase of the population of the -Western States. It cannot be doubted that ultimately, and at no very -distant time, they will have possession of all that is worth being -occupied in the territory. On what principle, then, will the right of -sovereignty be decided? - -It may, however, be asked whether, if this be the inevitable consequence -of the continuance of the convention, England will not herself give -notice that it shall be abrogated. It might be sufficient to answer that -we must wait till that notice shall have been given, and the subsequent -measures which England means to adopt shall have been made known to us, -before we assume rashly a hostile position. The United States may govern -themselves; although they may irritate Great Britain, they cannot -control the acts of her Government. The British Government will do -whatever it may think proper; but for the consequences that may ensue it -will be alone responsible. Should the abrogation of the convention on -her part be followed by aggressive measures; should she assume exclusive -possession over Oregon or any part of it, as it is now proposed that the -United States should do, America will then be placed in a defensive -position; the war, if any should ensue, will be one unprovoked by her, a -war purely of defence, which will be not only sustained, but approved -by the unanimous voice of the nation. We may, however, be permitted to -examine what motive could impel England, what interest she might have, -either in annulling the convention or in adopting aggressive measures. - -When it is recommended that the United States should give notice of the -abrogation of the convention, it is with the avowed object of adopting -measures forbidden by the convention, and which Great Britain has -uniformly declared she would resist. But, according to the view of the -subject uniformly taken by her, from the first time she asserted the -rights she claims to this day, the simple abrogation of her convention -with the United States will produce no effect whatever on the rights, -relations, and position of the two Powers. Great Britain, from the date -at least of Cook's third voyage, and prior to the Nootka convention, did -deny the exclusive claim of Spain, and assert that her subjects had, in -common with those of other States, the right freely to trade with the -natives, and to settle in any part of the Northwestern coast of America, -not already occupied by the subjects of Spain. The Nootka convention was -nothing more than the acquiescence, on the part of Spain, in the claims -thus asserted by Great Britain, leaving the sovereignty in abeyance. And -the convention between the United States and Great Britain is nothing -more nor less than a temporary recognition of the same principle, so far -as the two parties were concerned. England had, prior to that -convention, fully admitted that the United States possessed the same -rights as were claimed by her. The abrogation of the convention by her -will leave those rights precisely in the same situation as they now -stand, and as they stood prior to the convention. It cannot therefore be -perceived what possible benefit could accrue to Great Britain from her -abrogation of that instrument; unless, discarding all her former -declarations, denying all that she has asserted for more than sixty -years, retracting her admission of the equal rights of the United States -to trade, to occupy, and to make settlements in any part of the country, -she should, without cause or pretext, assume, as is now threatened on -the part of the United States, exclusive sovereignty over the whole or -part of the territory. It may be permitted to believe that the British -Government entertains no such intention. - -It may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no -disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She has, -indeed, declared most explicitly her determination to protect the -British interests that had been created by British enterprise and -capital in that quarter. But, by giving a monopoly of the fur trade to -the Hudson Bay Company, she has virtually arrested private efforts on -the part of British subjects. Her Government has been in every other -respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless about the ultimate -fate of Oregon. The country has been open to her enterprise at least -fifty years; and there are no other British settlements or interests -within its limits than those vested in, or connected with the Hudson Bay -Company. Whether the British Government will hereafter make any effort -towards that object cannot be known; but as long as this right to -colonize Oregon shall remain common to both Powers, the United States -have nothing to apprehend from the competition. - -The negotiations on that subject between the two Governments have been -carried on, on both sides, with perfect candor. The views and intentions -of both parties were mutually communicated without reserve. The -conviction on the part of America that the country must ultimately be -occupied and settled by her agricultural emigrants, was used as an -argument why, in case of a division of the territory, the greater share -should be allotted to the United States. The following quotation, from -the American statement of the case of December, 1826, proves that this -expectation was fairly avowed at the time: - - - "If the present state of occupancy is urged on the part of Great - Britain, the probability of the manner in which the territory west - of the Rocky Mountains must be settled belongs also essentially to - the subject. Under whatever nominal sovereignty that country may be - placed, and whatever its ultimate destinies may be, it is nearly - reduced to a certainty that it will be almost exclusively peopled - by the surplus population of the United States. The distance from - Great Britain, and the expense incident to emigration, forbid the - expectation of any being practicable from that quarter but on a - comparatively small scale. Allowing the rate of increase to be the - same in the United States and in the North American British - possessions, the difference in the actual population of both is - such that the progressive rate which would, within forty years, add - three millions to these, would within the same time give a positive - increase of more than twenty millions to the United States. And if - circumstances, arising from localities and habits, have given - superior facilities to British subjects of extending their commerce - with the natives, and to that expansion which has the appearance, - and the appearance only, of occupancy, the slower but sure progress - and extension of an agricultural population will be regulated by - distance, by natural obstacles, and by its own amount." - - -There was no exaggeration in that comparative view; the superiority of -the progressive increase of population in the United States was, on the -contrary, underrated. The essential difference is, that migration from -the United States to Oregon is the result of purely natural causes, -whilst England, in order to colonize that country, must resort to -artificial means. The number of American emigrants may not, during the -first next ensuing years, be as great as seems to be anticipated. It -will at first be limited by the amount of provisions with which the -earlier settlers can supply them during the first year, and till they -can raise a crop themselves; and the rapidity with which a new country -may be settled is also lessened where maize cannot be profitably -cultivated. - -Whether more or less prompt, the result is nevertheless indubitable. The -snowball sooner or later becomes an avalanche: where the cultivator of -the soil has once made a permanent establishment game and hunters -disappear; within a few years the fur trade will have died its natural -death, and no vestige shall remain, at least south of Fuca's Straits, of -that temporary occupancy, of those vested British interests, which the -British Government is now bound to protect. When the whole territory -shall have thus fallen in the possession of an agricultural industrious -population, the question recurs, by what principle will then the right -of sovereignty, all along kept in abeyance, be determined? - -The answer is obvious. In conformity with natural law, with that right -of occupancy for which Great Britain has always contended, the occupiers -of the land, the inhabitants of the country, from whatever quarter they -may have come, will be of right as well as in fact the sole legitimate -sovereigns of Oregon. Whenever sufficiently numerous, they will decide -whether it suits them best to be an independent nation or an integral -part of our great Republic. There cannot be the slightest apprehension -that they will choose to become a dependent colony; for they will be the -most powerful nation bordering on the American shores of the Pacific, -and will not stand in need of protection against either their Russian or -Mexican neighbors. Viewed as an abstract proposition, Mr. Jefferson's -opinion appears correct, that it will be best for both the Atlantic and -the Pacific American nations, whilst entertaining the most friendly -relations, to remain independent rather than to be united under the same -Government. But this conclusion is premature; and the decision must be -left to posterity. - -It has been attempted in these papers to prove-- - -1. That neither of the two Powers has an absolute and indisputable right -to the whole contested territory; that each may recede from its extreme -pretensions without impairing national honor or wounding national pride; -and that the way is therefore still open for a renewal of negotiations. - -2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice of the -abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert and -maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty over -the whole territory; that Great Britain is fully committed on that -point, and has constantly and explicitly declared that such an attempt -would be resisted, and the British interests in that quarter be -protected; and that war is therefore the unavoidable consequence of such -a decisive step--a war not only necessarily calamitous and expensive, -but in its character aggressive, not justifiable by the magnitude and -importance of its object, and of which the chances are uncertain. - -3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in a great -degree be avoided; that, if no war should ensue, they will be the same, -if not greater, without than under a convention; that not a single -object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, unless it be to -do something not permitted by the present convention, and therefore -provoking resistance and productive of war. If a single other advantage -can be gained by giving the notice, let it be stated. - -4th. That it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, whether -under or without a convention, the United States have the same rights as -herself, to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and make settlements in -and over every part of the territory; and that, if this state of things -be not disturbed, natural causes must necessarily give the whole -territory to the United States. - -Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject may be -postponed for the present; that Government should not commit itself by -any premature act or declaration; that, instead of increasing the -irritation and excitement which exist on both sides, time be given for -mutual reflection, and for the subdual or subsidence of angry and -violent feelings. Then, and then only, can the deliberate opinion of the -American people on this momentous question be truly ascertained. It is -not perceived how the postponement for the present and for a time can, -in any shape or in the slightest degree, injure the United States. - -It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has often abused -her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner than by the -impressment of seamen, whether American, English, or other foreigners, -sailing under and protected by the American flag. I am not aware that -there has ever been any powerful nation, even in modern times, and -professing Christianity, which has not occasionally abused its power. -The United States, who always appealed to justice during their early -youth, seem, as their strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a -similar disposition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations, -might not the two nations, by their united efforts, promote a great -object, and worthy of their elevated situation? - -With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which extends from -42 to 54° 40´ north latitude, all the American shores of the Pacific -Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied, on the north -by the factories of the Russian Fur Company, southwardly by -semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europeans of Spanish descent and of -native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened, -intelligent, and liberal men, have heretofore failed in the attempt to -establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty, -preserve order, and protect persons and property. It is in Oregon alone -that we may hope to see a portion of the western shores of America -occupied and inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may -exercise a moral influence over her less favored neighbors, and extend -to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that -account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territory may -not be divided. The United States and England are the only Powers who -lay any claim to that country, the only nations which may and must -inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in the power of either Government to -prevent this taking place; but it depends upon them, whether they shall -unite in promoting the object, or whether they shall bring on both -countries the calamities of an useless war, which may retard but not -prevent the ultimate result. It matters but little whether the -inhabitants shall come from England or from the United States. It would -seem that more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a -period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to the -population of the United States by migrations from the dominions of -Great Britain; yet, since permitted by both Powers, they may be presumed -to be beneficial to both. The emigrants to Oregon, whether Americans or -English, will be united together by the community of language and -literature, of the principles of law, and of all the fundamental -elements of a similar civilisation. - -The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the North-west -Coast of America is all that England can expect, all perhaps that the -United States ought to desire. It seems almost incredible that, whilst -that object may be attained by simply not impeding the effect of natural -causes, two kindred nations, having such powerful motives to remain at -peace, and standing at the head of European and American civilisation, -should, in this enlightened age, give to the world the scandalous -spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an -unnatural and an unnecessary war; that they should apply all their -faculties and exhaust their resources in inflicting, each on the other, -every injury in their power, and for what purpose? The certain -consequence, independent of all the direct calamities and miseries of -war, will be a mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate -fate of Oregon will be the same as if the war had not taken place. - - - - -APPENDIX. - - -WAR EXPENSES. - -Those expenses may be arranged under three heads: 1st. Such as are of a -permanent nature, and should be considered as belonging to the Peace -establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which should be adopted when -there is an impending danger of war. 3dly. Those which actual war -renders necessary. - -To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that -require considerable time to be executed, and cannot, without great -difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are fortifications, -building ships of war including steamers, accumulating materials for the -same purpose, Navy Yards, providing a sufficient artillery, and other -important objects of the ordnance department. It may be taken for -granted, that Government has done, or will do all that is necessary and -practicable in that respect. - -The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there is danger -of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety of opinions must -be expected. It has been repeatedly asserted, that such is the structure -of our Government, that it never will or can prepare for war, till after -it has actually commenced; that is to say, that, because Congress was -dilatory in making effectual provision for carrying on the last war -against Great Britain, and because the Administration, at the time when -it was declared, was inefficient and not well calculated for conducting -it, the United States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement -of every war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be -induced to put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other -use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were -formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people for being -sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. They must be -told the whole truth; and if they are really in favor of war, they will -cheerfully sustain Government in all the measures necessary to carry it -into effect. The frank annunciation of the necessity of such measures is -called, "creating a panic." It is not the first time that under similar -circumstances the same language has been held. If there be no danger or -intention of making war, those create a panic, who proclaim a -determination to assert the exclusive sovereignty of the United States -over the whole contested territory, with the full knowledge that Great -Britain has uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any -such attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the -attempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite for -carrying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the public -sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have become -impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxation, for which -the Nation had not been prepared. - -I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military character, -otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts. - -The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 1812, -were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a sufficient -regular force. Government had obtained a correct statement of the -regular force of the British in Canada, with the exception of the -garrison of Quebec. This last was estimated at about three thousand men, -and could not be lessened without great inconvenience and some danger. -The regular force at Montreal, St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to -1130 men; that in the whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an -additional military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th of -January, 1812. The selection of the officers was not completed before -the termination of that year; the recruiting service was not organized -in time; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most -moderate calculation; and the total number recruited was so small, as to -render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of the most -important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as was the force -by which they were defended. The volunteer act was also extremely -unproductive. At that time the treasury was amply supplied; and the want -was not that of money, but of a regular force. - -Such force cannot be raised without money; and yet it will be admitted -that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress to lay internal -taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. In order to provide -means for having an additional regular force ready to act as soon as -actual war takes place, a loan and Treasury notes must be resorted to. -But it is deemed absolutely necessary, that the internal taxes should be -imposed simultaneously with the declaration of war, and that provision -should be made for their immediate collection. With the exception of the -act for doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any -law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year after -the declaration of the last war; nor did it even lay a second direct tax -in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit was ruined, after -Treasury notes which were had due remained unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas -had been placed at the head of the Treasury, that at last the laws for -imposing a double direct tax, for increasing the rate of the existing -internal duties, and for laying new ones, were enacted. The peace was -ratified immediately after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000 -dollars were paid in the Treasury before the end of the war, on account -of the direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were -received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 1815, -1816 and 1817. - -The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an immediate -collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing such taxes -shall have been passed, are those on which I may speak with confidence. -These consist simply in a previous organization of the machinery -necessary for the collection of every species of internal taxes, and the -assessment of a direct tax. The proper selection of the numerous -officers necessary for the collection always consumes several months. A -previous selection and appointment of those officers would obviate that -difficulty, and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should -receive no pay till called into actual service; this would be the -natural consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this -being a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary -measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury should, -at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with all the -necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts. - -The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every individual -who possesses such property, is the only operation which requires -considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. This cannot be -otherwise obviated than by making that assessment a preparatory measure, -to be completed before actual war takes place. - -In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I -undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the several -Counties and State Districts in each State; and the Act of 2d August, -1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of dollars, was passed -in conformity with that apportionment The process was easy for every -State in which there was a direct State tax; but though derived from the -best data that could be collected, it was defective and partly arbitrary -for the States in which there was no State tax. As there is at present -hardly any (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this -mode may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This will -reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota of each -County or District, on the several individuals liable to the tax, and -the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding probably two -hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and correct assessment will, of -course, be provided for, with respect to the direct taxes which may be -laid after the first year of the war. - -The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove useless if -the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war should not take -place; but certainly this is too small an item to deserve consideration. - -This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary in -order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other internal -taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have been imposed by -Congress. - -The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a war with -England, and the resources for defraying them, are the next objects of -inquiry. - -It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the -expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrearages due -on account of the military services at the time when the peace was -ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public documents -which I have seen. Although the laws show the number of men voted, that -of those actually raised has never to my knowledge been officially -stated. There can be no doubt that the want of a proper organization -increased the amount of expenditure much beyond that which would have -been sufficient under a regular and efficient system. This has -undoubtedly been much improved; yet the expenses incurred in the -Seminole war, compared with the number of men employed and that of the -hostile Indians, show that either there are still some defects in the -organization, or that there were great abuses in the execution. - -The payments from the Treasury for the military department, embracing -only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, and exclusive of -those for fortifications and the Indian department, amounted for the -year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the year 1814 to 20,508,000 -dollars. The disbursements for the navy are stated at 6,446,000 and -7,311,000 dollars for these two years respectively. By comparing the -reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817, -it would appear that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded -ten millions of dollars: and it seems certain that the actual war -expenses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of -dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that year -amounted to 35,000 men. - -The population of the United States has nearly trebled during the -thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the last war -against England was declared. Their wealth and resources have increased -in the same ratio; and that, in case of war, these should be brought -into action as promptly as possible, admits of no doubt. Once engaged in -the conflict, to make the war as efficient as possible will shorten its -duration, and can alone secure honorable terms of peace. I have not the -documents necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual -expenses of a war with Great Britain; and if I had, I could not at this -time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely necessary in order -to draw correct inferences. Taking only a general view of the subject, -and considering the great difference of expense in keeping a navy in -active service, between one of eight frigates and one of ten ships of -the line, fourteen frigates and a competent number of steamers; that -Texas and Oregon are additional objects of defence; that the extensive -system of fortifications which has been adopted will require about -fifteen thousand additional men; and that, in order to carry a -successful and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the -British dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely -necessary; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that, -after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the country -shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and naval -expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. To this -must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, for the year -ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near fifteen millions, but -which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes may be reduced to eleven -millions and a half. The gross annual expenses for all objects will be -estimated at seventy-seven millions; to be increased annually by the -annual interest on each successive loan. - -In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans required to -defray that expense, the first question which arises, is the diminution -of the revenue derived from customs, which will be the necessary -consequence of the war. - -The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source of -revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814, -respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars; and the -nett revenue which accrued during those three years respectively -amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. From the 1st -of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was doubled; and in -order to compare these receipts with those collected in peace time, they -must be reduced for those three years respectively, to 7,470,000,[3] -6,600,000 and 3,000,000; or, if the revenue accrued be compared (which -is the correct mode), to 9,850,000,[3] 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars. -At that time the duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed, -collected on an average only six or eight months later; and the -unexpected importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American -vessels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the -declaration of war and to the act which doubled the rate of duties, -swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only in 1814 -that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived from that source -was felt. - -The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage employed in -the foreign trade of the United States is strongly exhibited by the -following statement: - - -Tonnage in foreign trade, U. S. American ves. Foreign ves. Total. - - Year 1811 948,207 33,203 981,450 - " 1812 667,999 47,099 715,098 - " 1813 237,348 113,827 351,175 - " 1814 59,626 48,302 107,928 - - -And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 1814, -Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of Europe, and that -these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly ventured to trade with -us. - -The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, as well -as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the eleven years 1801 -to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual average of about -12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven years the average amount of -tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States was 943,670 -tons, of which 844,170 were in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels. - -Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had been -reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if compared -according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importations), the -tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States to nearly one -ninth; and that of the American vessels employed in that trade, to one -fourteenth part of their respective average amount during the eleven -years of peace. - -The small American navy did during the last war with England all and -more than could have been expected. The fact was established to the -satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain herself, that the navy of -the United States, with a parity of force, was at least equal to that of -England. But the prodigious numerical superiority of the British navy -rendered it impossible for a few frigates to protect the commerce of the -United States, which was accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten -ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller -vessels. The great numerical superiority of the British navy still -continues; and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion -will be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in -our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force that -can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance into -consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, though -much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. Although the -actual diminution which will be experienced is altogether conjectural, I -think that no great error is to be apprehended in estimating the revenue -from customs, after the first year of the war, at about one half of its -present amount; and the whole revenue from that source, from the sale of -lands and all the branches of the existing income, at fourteen millions -of dollars; leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions, -besides the interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be -estimated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However -energetic and efficient Congress and the Executive may be, the resources -and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought forth: the -expenses will therefore be less during the first year, after which the -whole amount will be required and will be annually wanted. In reference -therefore to the second year of the war-- - - - Assuming the total war expenses at $65,000,000 - All the others at 12,000,000 - ------------ - In all, $77,000,000 - From which deduct for existing revenue, 14,000,000 - ------------ - To be provided for by taxes and loans, $63,000,000 - On the principle that the amount of annual taxes - should be at least equal to the expenses of - the peace establishment and the interest on - the war loans, annual peace expenses at 27,000,000 - And for interest on the loans of 1st and 2d years, - viz. 1st year 25, and 2d year 45 millions at - 7 per cent. 5,000,000 - ------------ - Together, $32,000,000 - From which deduct existing revenue, 14,000,000 - ------------ - Leaves to be provided for by new taxes, at least $18,000,000 - And by loans, 45,000,000 - ------------ - $63,000,000 - - -The estimate of 5,000,000 dollars for the interest of the loans the -second year after the war, is founded on the supposition that the direct -and other internal taxes or duties laid for the first year, together -with the existing revenue, and twenty-five millions borrowed by loans or -Treasury notes, will be sufficient to defray the expense incurred prior -to and during the first year of the war. The deficiency in the regular -force for that year must be supplied by large drafts of militia, which -will be as expensive at least as the regular soldiers whose place they -will supply. - -But it appears very doubtful whether such a large sum as forty-five -millions can be raised annually by loans and Treasury notes. It is -necessary in the first place to correct some erroneous opinions -respecting the extent to which these notes may be kept in circulation, -and the legitimate objects to which they may be applied. - -The Treasury notes were first introduced on my suggestion, which was no -new discovery, since they are a mere transcript of the Exchequer Bills -of Great Britain. As these have been resorted to for more than a -century, and have never become there a portion of the ordinary currency, -the extent to which they may be used for other purposes is well -ascertained, and bears always a certain ratio to the wealth of the -country and to the revenue of the State. Whether issued to the bank as -an anticipation of the revenue, or used by capitalists for short -investments, the gross amount has rarely exceeded twenty millions -sterling. Judging from past experience, the amount which may, in time of -war, be kept in circulation at par in the United States falls far short -of a proportionate sum. - - - The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the years 1812 - and 1813 amounted to $8,930 000 - Of which there had been paid including interest $4,240 000 - - -The amount in actual circulation was less than five millions, and thus -far they had been kept at par. - -All the demands from the other departments had been met by the Treasury, -and there were but few, if any, outstanding arrears. Nothing had as yet -been collected on account of the direct tax and of the internal duties. -Besides the five millions of Treasury Notes, there had been paid into -the Treasury in the years 1812 and 1813, $28,740,000 on account of war -loans, and $22,283,000 from the customs. The balance in the Treasury -amounted to $5,196,542 on the 31st December, 1813. - -The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the year 1814 amounted to -near eight millions, and there had been paid off during the same year, -including interest, $2,700,000; making an addition of about five -millions and a half, and the total amount outstanding about ten millions -and a half. The receipts during that year, on account of the direct tax -and internal duties, amounted to $3,877,000, from war loans to -$15,080,000, and from customs to only six millions. Before the end of -the year, Government was unable to pay the notes which had become due. -It is perfectly clear that, if new notes could not be issued in lieu of -those which had become due, it was because they had fallen below par, -and therefore that the amount outstanding was greater than the demand -for them. There was but one remedy, and it was very simple. A reduction -in that amount must be made, by funding at their market price a quantity -sufficient to re-establish the equilibrium. But all the banks west of -New England had in the meanwhile suspended their specie payments. A -period of anarchy in the currency of the country was the consequence, -and lasted till those payments were resumed in the year 1817. - -The result of the suspension of specie payments in England was, that the -notes of the Bank of England became in fact a legal tender and the -standard of the currency. All the other banks were obliged to keep their -own notes on a par with those of that bank; and all that was necessary -in order to prevent a depreciation, was to regulate the issues of the -Bank of England, so as to keep them at par with gold and silver. -Nevertheless, the clamor for more currency prevailed; the bank found it -very convenient and profitable to issue notes which it was not obliged -to pay, and these finally depreciated twenty-five per cent. But in the -United States the banks were under no other control than that of the -several States respectively. The consequence was, that we had fifty and -more species of local currencies, varying in value in the different -States or districts of country, and from time to time in the same -district. The banks might with facility have resumed specie payments -during the first year of peace. The efforts of the Secretary of the -Treasury to induce them to resume proved unsuccessful; and the -resumption did not take place till after a new Bank of the United States -had been organized. - -We have had two general suspensions of specie payments, the last at a -time of profound peace. I was then behind the scenes, had some agency in -restoring specie payments, and may speak on that subject with knowledge -and confidence. The obstacles came partly from the Banks, principally -from the Debtor interest, which excites sympathy and preponderates -throughout the United States. The mis-named Bank of the United States, -and the banks under its influence, were, it is true, a formidable -impediment; and this obstacle is now fortunately removed. Still the -continuance of specie payments stands, whenever a crisis occurs, on a -most precarious basis; and if any important place, especially New York, -happened to break, all the banks through the United States would -instantaneously follow the example. This is the most imminent danger to -which the Treasury of the United States will be exposed in time of war; -and what effect the Sub-Treasury system may produce in that respect -remains to be tested by experience. - -It is impossible to draw any inference respecting Treasury Notes, from -what took place in the United States during the confused state of the -currency in the years 1815 and 1816. The taxes were paid everywhere with -the cheapest local currency, in Treasury Notes only in the places where -specie payments had been continued, or where bank notes were nearly at -par. The depreciation of the Treasury Notes was arrested by the fact, -that they might at all times be converted into a six or seven per cent. -stock; but in that case they became assimilated to a direct loan. They -never can become a general currency, on account of their varying value, -so long as they bear an interest and are made payable at some future -day. In order to give them that character, they should assume that of -bank notes, bearing no interest and payable on demand. It does not -require the gift of prophecy to be able to assert that, as the wants of -Government increased, such notes would degenerate into paper money to -the utter ruin of the public credit. - -They may, however, be made a special currency for the purpose of paying -taxes as gold and silver, and to the exclusion of any other species of -paper currency. The amount which might be thus kept in circulation, in -addition to that wanted for short investments, would be limited by the -gross amount of the annual revenue, and bear but a small proportion to -it; since one thousand dollars, in silver or in any paper currency, are -sufficient to effect in one year fifty payments of the same amount. - -Although the amount kept in circulation may fluctuate according to -circumstances, the fundamental principle is, that the issue of such -notes is an anticipation of the revenue, which, after it has reached the -maximum that may be kept in circulation without being depreciated, never -can be increased. Be the amount ten or twenty millions, the anticipation -may be continued, but not renewed; it is not an annual resource, but -one, the whole amount of which never can exceed that which may be kept -in circulation. The operation consists in re-issuing annually the -amount which is paid off in the year. Whenever, owing to incidental -fluctuations, the amount to be redeemed by the Treasury exceeds that -which may be re-issued, the difference must be immediately funded at the -market price of the notes, so as to keep them always at par or a little -above par. - -It is evident, that if the direct tax and internal duties laid in -August, 1813, had been imposed in July, 1812; and if the acts of -January, 1815, which increased both, had been enacted in August, 1813; -there would have been an addition of at least eight millions to the -revenue of the years 1812 and 1813; the Treasury Notes which had become -due would have been paid, public credit would have been maintained, and -the amount of war loans lessened. - -The principal causes of the fall of public stocks during a war, and of -the consequent necessity of borrowing on dearer terms, are a want of -confidence in Government, and the large amount of stocks thrown in the -market beyond the natural demand for them. The effect of this last cause -is remarkably illustrated by the fluctuations in the price of the stocks -of Great Britain, where it does not appear that there ever was a want of -confidence in the ability and fidelity of Government in fulfilling its -engagements. The British three per cents. are now, and were before the -war of American Independence, and before those which had their origin in -the French revolution, near par or at par. They fell gradually during -the war of independence, and were as low as fifty-four in February, -1782. The long war with France was attended with the same result, and -the three per cents. had fallen to fifty-five in July, 1812. -Notwithstanding the deranged state of the finances of the United States -in 1814, the American stocks had not fallen in the same proportion. Such -great depreciation is the result of the long continuance of a war. No -one can say what would have been its progress, had the last war with -England continued much longer. - -There was not, however, at that time, at least in America, any want of -confidence in the Government: no one doubted that it would ultimately -faithfully discharge all its engagements. Although the General -Government is in no way responsible for the errors of any of the -individual States, it is nevertheless certain, that the credit of the -Union has been injured abroad by the failure of several of the States to -fulfil their engagements, and that no expectation can be entertained of -being able to borrow money in Europe. It is not less true that the -Administration will cease to enjoy the confidence of American -capitalists, if the measures it has recommended should be adopted and -productive of war. No one can doubt that, if that event should take -place, the Americans will fight in defence of their country, and none -with greater zeal and bravery than the people of the Western States. -During the last war, their militia and volunteers flocked either to the -Lakes, to New Orleans, or wherever there was danger; nor did they refuse -to take part in offensive operations, and to serve without the limits of -the United States. But men cannot, either there or elsewhere, afford to -render gratuitous services. Whether regulars, volunteers, or militia, -they must be fed, clothed, transported, supplied with arms and -artillery, and paid. There is as yet but very little active circulating -capital in the new States: they cannot lend; they, on the contrary, want -to borrow money. This can be obtained in the shape of loans only from -the capitalists of the Atlantic States. A recurrence to public documents -will show that all the loans of the last war were obtained in that -quarter. - -Men of property are perhaps generally more timid than others, and -certainly all the quiet people, amongst whom the public stocks are -ultimately distributed, are remarkably cautious. Prudent capitalists, -who do not speculate, and consider public stocks only as convenient and -safe investments, will not advance money to Government so long as it is -controlled by men whom they consider as reckless, and as entertaining -rather lax opinions respecting public credit. Yet money will be -obtained, but on much dearer terms than if public confidence was -unimpaired. There will always be found bold speculators, who will -advance it at a premium--enhanced by the want of competition, and -proportionate to the risks they may be supposed to incur. Independent of -this, it is most certain that the rate of interest at which loans may be -obtained, will always be increased in proportion to their magnitude. The -only ways by which these difficulties may be obviated, or at least -lessened, are perfect fidelity in fulfilling the engagements of -Government; an economical, that is to say, a skilful application of the -public moneys to the most important objects, postponing all those which -are not immediately wanted, or are of inferior real utility; and an -increase of the amount of revenue derived from taxation. This has the -double advantage of diminishing the amount to be borrowed, and of -inspiring confidence to the money-lenders. In all cases, direct loans -will be preferable to, and prove a cheaper mode of raising money than -the over issues of Treasury Notes. - -The Act of July, 1812, which doubled the duties on importations, -afforded a resource which, on account of the high rate at this time of -those duties, cannot now be resorted to. Duties may, however, be levied -on the importation of Tea and Coffee, and perhaps some other articles -now duty free. Other modifications may be found useful, but it may be -difficult to ascertain, even without any regard to protection, what are -the rates of duties which should be imposed in time of war on the -various imported articles, in order to render the revenue derived from -that source as productive as possible. - -It must also be observed that if, on account of the credit then allowed -for the payment of duties on importations, the Treasury had, when the -war of 1812 commenced, a resource in the revenue previously accrued but -not yet collected, which does not now exist; on the other hand the -United States were still encumbered with a considerable portion of the -Revolutionary debt, and the payments on account of its principal and -interest amounted during the years 1812, 1813, 1814, to about -$11,000,000, whilst the annual interest on the now existing debt is less -than one million. - -The direct tax of the year 1815 amounted to $6,000,000, and the revenue -which accrued during the same year, on the aggregate of internal duties, -as increased or imposed at the same time, amounted to about the same -sum. That year is also the most proper for a comparative view of the -revenue derived from each object. In the subsequent years the revival of -business increased the amount derived from the duties connected with the -commerce of the country, much beyond that which could be collected in -time of war; whilst, on the other hand, the excise on spirits was much -less productive. The nett revenue derived from internal duties, which -accrued during that year was in round numbers, about - - - Excise on spirits $2,750,000 - Licences to retailers 880,000 - Sales at auction 780,000 - Stamp duties 420,000 - Tax on carriages 150,000 - Refined sugar 80,000 - Several manufactured articles 840,000 - Household furniture 20,000 - Watches worn by individuals 80,000 - ---------- - Total $6,000,000 - - -The three last items were those added on Mr. Dallas's recommendation to -the first items laid in 1813, but the rate of which was increased, also -on his recommendation. The manufactured articles not before taxed on -which the new duties were laid were, pig and bar iron, nails; wax and -tallow candles; hats, caps and umbrellas; paper and playing cards; -leather, saddles, bridles, boots and shoes; beer, ale and porter; snuff, -cigars and manufactured tobacco. This was the boldest measure proposed -by the Secretary, for these duties were from their nature intrinsically -obnoxious. Yet no voice was raised against them; and so far from -becoming unpopular, Mr. Dallas, by his courage and frankness, acquired a -well-earned popularity. No stronger proof can be adduced of the -propriety of telling the whole truth and placing an entire confidence in -the people. - -The only important measure omitted at that time, was an Act of Congress -ordering that all the Treasury notes actually due and not paid should be -immediately funded at their nominal value; that is to say, that for -every one hundred dollars in Treasury notes, the same amount of funded -stock should be issued as it was necessary to give for one hundred -dollars in gold or silver. It was impossible to obtain a regular loan in -time, and on reasonable terms, for the purpose of defraying the war -expenses of the first six months of the year 1815. There was an absolute -necessity for recurring to Treasury notes for that purpose, and the -attention of the Treasury was forcibly directed to that object. But the -first and fundamental element of public credit is the faithful and -punctual fulfilment of the public engagements; and the payment of the -Treasury notes, when becoming due, was as necessary as that of the -interest of the funded debt, which never was suspended during the war. -As an immediate and considerable issue of Treasury notes was absolutely -necessary, it was not sufficient that they might be convertible into a -funded stock, which was already much below par, since that would be in -fact an issue of depreciated paper. The Act should, therefore, have -pledged the public faith, that if the Treasury notes were not discharged -in specie when they became due, they should be funded at their nominal -value on the same terms as above stated. Mr. Dallas to great energy -united pre-eminent talents, he wanted only experience; and I have no -doubt that, had the war continued, he would within six months have -adopted that course. If I have alluded here to this subject, it is on -account of the primary importance, if placed hereafter in a similar -difficult position, of adhering rigorously to those principles -respecting the legitimate use of Treasury notes and the punctual -discharge of every public engagement, which are absolutely necessary for -the maintenance of public credit. - -Since a direct tax of six millions could be raised thirty years ago, -there can be no difficulty in raising one of nine millions at the very -beginning of the war: this must be gradually increased, but would be -most heavily felt if beyond eighteen millions. Should an equal sum be -raised by internal duties, the annual loans wanted after the first year -of the war would be lessened in the same proportion. The following -estimate may assist in forming a correct opinion on that subject:-- - - - The stamp duties, those on sales at auction, the - licences of retailers, and the carriage tax, - which accrued in the year 1815, amounted - together to $2,230,000, and may be now estimated - at twice as much $4,460,000 - - The aggregate annual value of leather, boots, - shoes, and other manufactures of leather; of - hats, caps and bonnets; snuff and cigars; - paper and playing cards, manufactured in the - United States, are estimated by the last census - at fifty-three millions, a tax on which of ten - per cent would give 5,300,000 - - On the same authority, three millions pounds of - spermaceti and wax candles would yield, at - five cents per pound, 150,000 - - Three millions two hundred and fifty thousand - pounds of refined sugar, at the same rate 160,000 - - Five hundred tons of pig and bar iron, nails and - brads, at two dollars per ton 1,000,000 - - The gross amount of spirits and beer manufactured - in the United States, is stated in the - census at sixty-five millions of gallons; but - the happy influence of the Temperance cause - has probably reduced this amount to less than - fifty millions, a tax on which of ten cents per - gallon 5,000,000 - ---------- - $16,070,000 - - -I have inserted only such articles as were heretofore taxed, and have no -means of indicating such other as might be added or preferred; nor must -I be understood as recommending any specially, or in reference to the -rates of duties to be imposed on any one. - -It has been very generally asserted that men of property were averse to -the war because the losses and burthens which it must occasion fall -exclusively upon them; and that poor men were generally in favor of war, -because they had nothing to lose. - -It is true that the first great loss, caused by the war, will fall -immediately on those interested in the maritime commerce of the United -States, either as owners, insurers, or in any way employed in it. -Considering the imminent danger to which is exposed the immense amount -of American property afloat on every sea, and the certain annihilation, -during the war, of the fisheries, of the commerce with Great Britain, -and of that with all the countries beyond Cape Horn and the Cape of Good -Hope, the American merchants may be alarmed at the prospect of a war, -the necessity of which they do not perceive. But if the apprehension of -immediate danger is more vividly felt, the calamitous effects of the war -on the agricultural interests are not less certain. The price of all the -products, of which large quantities are exported, must necessarily fall -so low that all the farmers must lessen the amount and with it their -income, whilst they must pay dearer for all the articles which they are -obliged to purchase. The distinction between rich and poor is vague. The -most numerous class in the United States is that of the men who are at -the same time owners and cultivators of the soil, and who have but -small properties and a very moderate income. Every diminution of this, -whether from the want of a market or from any additional tax, is in that -and the corresponding class of mechanics, attended with the privation of -the necessaries or comforts of life. The really rich, the capitalists -who have independent incomes, and are not obliged to engage in any of -the active pursuits of life, may, in any calamitous season, accumulate -less, or at most, must retrench only some luxuries. Thus the unavoidable -losses and burthens which are the consequences of a war, fall with the -greatest weight on those who derive their means of existence from the -pursuits of industry, and whose industry alone contributes to the -increase of the general wealth of the country. - -But this is not all. Exclusive of those who, either as contractors, or -in some other way, are concerned with the large supplies wanted for the -support of the army and navy, there is a class of capitalists who are -enriched by the war. These are the money lenders, who shall have been -bold enough to take up the public loans: unless indeed it should be -intended to break public faith, and, on the return of peace, to question -the obligation to pay them, upon the pretence of their enormous profits. -What these profits are may be again illustrated by the example of Great -Britain. - -It has already been seen that, whenever a war is one of long -continuance, the British Government may at first borrow at par, and ends -by being compelled to sell its stock at the rate of fifty per cent of -its nominal value; which gives for the whole of the war loans an average -of about 75 per cent. In point of fact that Government received in the -year 1812 less than 55 per cent; for the money actually received -consisted of bank notes, which had then depreciated twenty per cent; so -that the money lenders gave only that which was equivalent to forty-four -per cent, in gold or silver, of the nominal value of the stock which -they received. Besides receiving the interest on the nominal amount of -the stock till the principal shall have been paid, they might shortly -after the peace, and may now, receive from ninety-seven per cent to par, -in gold or silver, for that same stock for which they gave but -forty-four. Thus, assuming the public debt of Great Britain at eight -hundred thousand pounds sterling; not only was the whole of that -capital destroyed by the wars; not only are the British people subject -now, and it would seem for ever, to a burthen of taxes sufficient to pay -the interest on that debt; but of the eight hundred millions thus -consumed, only six hundred were received by the public, and the other -two hundred millions made the rich capitalists, who had advanced the -money, still richer. - -There is another class of men who may occasionally derive wealth from a -war. Privateering consists in robbing of their property unarmed and -unresisting men, engaged in pursuits not only legitimate but highly -useful. It is nothing more nor less than legalized Piracy. For this the -United States are not responsible; and it must be admitted, that the -practice of all nations justifies them in resorting to those means, in -order to make the enemy feel the calamities of war. But the necessity of -resorting to means immoral in themselves affords an irrefragable -argument against precipitating the country into war for slight causes, -indeed against any war which is not purely in self defence. - -It is equally untrue to assert that the poorer class of people, by which -must be meant all the laborers, or generally those who live on their -wages, have nothing to lose by the war. - -In this, and other large cities, for every thousand merchants, or men of -capital who may be injured or thrown out of business, there are ten -thousand men living on wages, whose employment depends directly or -indirectly on the commerce of those cities. The number of common -laborers is proportionately less in the purely agricultural districts. -But it is evident that in both, a considerable number must be thrown out -of employment either by the destruction of commerce, or in consequence -of the lessened value and quantity of the agricultural products. And it -seems impossible that this should take place without affecting the rate -of wages, than which a more afflicting evil could not fall on the -community. There is no man of pure and elevated feelings who does not -ardently wish, that means could be devised to ameliorate the state of -society in that respect, so as that those who live by manual labor -should receive a more just portion of the profits, which are now very -unequally divided between them and their employers. - -But even if the rate of wages was not materially affected, yet when it -is said that the poor have nothing to lose by war, it must be because -their lives are counted for nothing. Whether militia, regulars, or -sailors, the privates, the men who actually fight the battles, are -exclusively taken from amongst the poorer classes of society. Officers -are uniformly selected from the class which has some property or -influence. They indeed risk gallantly their lives, but with the hopes of -promotion and of acquiring renown and consideration. According to the -present system, at least of the regular army, it is extremely rare, -almost impossible that a private soldier should ever rise to the rank of -an officer. In the course of a war thousands are killed, more die of -diseases, and the residue, when disbanded, return home with habits -unfavorable to the pursuits of industry. And yet it is asserted that -they are predisposed for war, because they have nothing to lose. - -As yet, however, we have had recourse only to voluntary enlistments for -raising a regular force; the pay or bounties must be increased in order -to obtain a sufficient number; and thus far to become a private soldier -has been a voluntary act. The calling of militia into actual service is -a modified species of conscription, and it has also been deemed a -sufficient burthen to limit the time of that service to six months. -Another plan is now contemplated by those who are so eager to plunge the -country into a war. Fearing that the sufficient number of men may not be -voluntarily raised, they propose that the militia should be divided into -two portions; those belonging to the first class shall, if called into -actual service, be bound to serve twelve months instead of six; and the -other portion shall be liable to furnish a number of recruits for the -army, not exceeding one tenth part of their total number. This last -provision seems to be borrowed from the Russian military code. The -Emperor of Russia requires each village to supply him with a certain -number of men, in proportion to that of the male population. In time of -war he requires, at the rate of three men for each hundred males, which -answers nearly to that of ten for every one hundred men enrolled in the -militia; and he also grants to the serfs the same privilege intended to -be allowed to a portion of the militia by the new project, that of -selecting the recruits amongst themselves. - -If it be any consolation, it is certain that, although we may not -invade England, the evils arising from the war will be as sensibly and -more permanently felt by Great Britain than by the United States. Her -efforts must be commensurate with those of the United States, much -greater by sea in order to be efficient, in every respect more expensive -on account of her distance from the seat of war. Such is the rapidly -progressive state of America, that the industry of the people will, in a -few years of peace, have repaired the evils caused by the errors of -Government. England will remain burthened with additional debt and -taxation. - -An aged man, who has for the last thirty years been detached from party -politics, and who has now nothing whatever to hope or to fear from the -world, has no merit in seeking only the truth and acting an independent -part. But I know too well, and have felt too much the influence of party -feeling, not to be fully aware that those men will be entitled to the -highest praise, who, being really desirous of preserving peace, shall on -this momentous occasion dare to act for themselves, notwithstanding the -powerful sympathies of party. Yet no sacrifice of principles is -required: men may remain firmly attached to those on which their party -was founded and which they conscientiously adopted. There is no -connexion between the principles or doctrines on which each party -respectively was founded, and the question of war or peace with a -foreign nation which is now agitated. The practice which has lately -prevailed to convert every subject, from the most frivolous to the most -important, into a pure party question, destroys altogether personal -independence, and strikes at the very roots of our institutions. These -usages of party, as they are called, make every man a slave, and -transfer the legitimate authority of the majority of the nation to the -majority of a party, and, consequently, to a minority of the sovereign -people. If it were permitted to appeal to former times, I would say -that, during the six years that I had the honor of a seat in Congress, -there were but two of those party meetings, called for the purpose of -deliberating upon the measures proper to be adopted. The first was after -the House had asserted its abstract right to decide on the propriety of -making appropriations necessary to carry a treaty into effect, whether -such appropriations should be made with respect to the treaty with -England of 1794. The other was in the year 1798, respecting the course -proper to be pursued after the hostile and scandalous conduct of the -French Directory. On both occasions we were divided; and on both the -members of the minority of each meeting were left at full liberty to -vote as they pleased, without being on that account proscribed or -considered as having abandoned the principles of the party. This, too, -took place at a time when, unfortunately, each party most erroneously -suspected the other of an improper attachment to one or the other of the -great belligerent foreign nations. I must say that I never knew a man -belonging to the same party as myself, and I have no reason to believe -that there was any in the opposite party, who would have sacrificed the -interests of the country to those of any foreign power. I am confident -that no such person is to be found now in our councils or amongst our -citizens; nor am I apt to suspect personal views, or apprehensive of the -effect these might produce. My only fear is that which I have expressed, -the difficulty for honorable men to disenthral themselves from those -party sympathies and habits, laudable and useful in their origin, but -which carried to excess become a tyranny, and may leave the most -important measures to be decided in the National Councils by an -enthusiastic and inflamed minority. - -FOOTNOTE: - -[3] Estimated for 1812. - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Oregon Question, by Albert Gallatin - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OREGON QUESTION *** - -***** This file should be named 51843-8.txt or 51843-8.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/8/4/51843/ - -Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or -re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included -with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org/license - - -Title: The Oregon Question - -Author: Albert Gallatin - -Release Date: April 23, 2016 [EBook #51843] - -Language: English - -Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 - -*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OREGON QUESTION *** - - - - -Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - - - - - -</pre> - - -<div class="center"><a name="cover.jpg" id="cover.jpg"></a><img src="images/cover.jpg" alt="cover" /></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span></p> - -<h1>THE<br />OREGON QUESTION.</h1> - -<p class="bold space-above">BY</p> - -<p class="bold2 space-above">ALBERT GALLATIN.</p> - -<hr class="smler" /> - -<p class="bold space-above">NEW YORK:<br />BARTLETT & WELFORD, 7 ASTOR HOUSE.</p> - -<p class="bold">1846.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span></p> - -<hr class="smler" /> - -<p class="center">R. CRAIGHEAD, PRINTER, 112 FULTON STREET, NEW YORK.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span></p> - -<p class="bold2">THE OREGON QUESTION.</p> - -<h2>NUMBER I.</h2> - -<p>I had been a pioneer in collecting facts and stating the case. The only -materials within my reach consisted of the accounts of voyages -previously published, (including that of Maurelle, in Barrington's -Miscellanies), of the varied and important information derived from -Humboldt's New Spain, and of the voyage of the Sutil and Mexicano, the -introduction to which contains a brief official account of the Spanish -discoveries. The statement of the case was the best I was able to make -with the materials on hand, and may be found defective in many respects. -Since that time manuscript journals of several of the voyages have been -obtained at Madrid. New facts have thus been added; others have been -better analyzed, and some errors rectified. Arguments which had been -only indicated have been enforced, and new views have been suggested. -The subject, indeed, seems to be exhausted; and it would be difficult to -add anything to the able correspondence between the two Governments -which has been lately published.</p> - -<p>Ministers charged with diplomatic discussions are not, however, in those -official papers intended for publication, to be considered as -philosophers calmly investigating the questions, with no other object -but to elicit truth. They are always, to a certain extent, advocates, -who use their best endeavors to urge and even strain the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span> reasons that -may be alleged in favor of the claims set up by their Governments; and -in the same manner to repel, if not to deny, all that may be adduced by -the other party. Such official papers are in fact appeals to public -opinion, and generally published when there remains no hope to conclude -for the present an amicable arrangement.</p> - -<p>But, though acting in that respect as advocates, diplomatists are -essentially ministers of peace, whose constant and primary duty is -mutually to devise conciliatory means for the adjustment of conflicting -pretensions, for the continuance of friendly relations, for preventing -war, or for the restoration of peace. It has unfortunately happened that -on this occasion, both Governments have assumed such absolute and -exclusive grounds as to have greatly increased, at least for the -present, the obstacles to an amicable arrangement.</p> - -<p>It is morally impossible for the bulk of the people of any country -thoroughly to investigate a subject so complex as that of the respective -claims to the Oregon territory; and, for obvious reasons, it is much -less understood by the great mass of the population in England than in -the United States. Everywhere, when the question is between the country -and a foreign nation, the people at large, impelled by natural and -patriotic feelings, will rally around their Government. For the -consequences that may ensue, those who are entrusted with the direction -of the foreign relations are alone responsible. Whatever may be the -cause, to whomsoever the result may be ascribed, it appears from the -general style of the periodical press, that, with few exceptions, the -people, both in Great Britain and in the United States, are imbued with -the belief that the contested territory belongs exclusively to -themselves, and that any concession which might be made would be a boon -to the other party. Such opinions, if sustained by either Government and -accompanied by corresponding measures, must necessarily lead to -immediate collisions, and probably to war. Yet, a war so calamitous in -itself, so fatal to the general interests of both countries, is almost -universally deprecated, without distinction of parties, by all the -rational men who are not carried away by the warmth of their feelings.</p> - -<p>In the present state of excitement, an immediate amicable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>arrangement -is almost hopeless; time is necessary before the two Governments can be -induced to recede from their extreme pretensions. In the meanwhile, -nothing, as it seems to me, should for the present be done, which might -increase the excitement, aggravate the difficulties, or remove the only -remaining barrier against immediate collision.</p> - -<p>The United States claim a right of sovereignty over the whole territory. -The pretensions of the British Government, so far as they have been -heretofore exhibited, though not extending to a claim of absolute -sovereignty over the whole, are yet such as cannot be admitted by the -United States, and, if persisted in, must lead to a similar result.</p> - -<p>If the claim of Great Britain be properly analyzed, it will be found -that, although she has incidentally discussed other questions, she in -fact disregards every other claim but that of actual occupancy, and that -she regards as such the establishment of trading factories by her -subjects. She accordingly claims a participation in the navigation of -the river Columbia, and would make that river the boundary between the -two Powers. This utter disregard of the rights of discovery, -particularly of that of the mouth, sources, and course of a river, of -the principle of contiguity, and of every other consideration whatever, -cannot be admitted by the United States. The offer of a detached -defenceless territory, with a single port, and the reciprocal offers of -what are called free ports, cannot be viewed but as derisory. An -amicable arrangement by way of compromise cannot be effected without a -due regard to the claims advanced by both parties, and to the expediency -of the dividing line.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> - -<p>An equitable division must have reference not only to the extent of -territory, but also to the other peculiar advantages attached to each -portion respectively.</p> - -<p>From and including Fuca Straits, the country extending northwardly -abounds with convenient sea-ports. From the 42d degree<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span> of latitude to -those Straits, there is but one port of any importance, the mouth of the -River Columbia; and this is of difficult and dangerous access, and -cannot admit ships of war of a large size. It is important only as a -port of exports. As one of common resort for supplies, or asylum, in -case of need, for the numberless American vessels engaged in the -fisheries or commerce of the Pacific, it would be almost useless, even -if in the exclusive possession of the United States. It must also be -observed that the navigable channel of the river, from its mouth to -Puget's Island, is, according to Vancouver, close along the northern -shore. Great Britain proposes that the river should be the boundary, and -that the United States should be content with the possession of the port -it offered, in common with herself. It is really unnecessary to dwell on -the consequences of such an arrangement. It is sufficient to say that, -in case of war between the two countries, it would leave the United -States without a single port, and give to Great Britain the indisputable -and exclusive control over those seas and their commerce.</p> - -<p>The first and indispensable step towards an amicable arrangement -consists in the investigation, not so much of the superiority of one -claim over the other, as of the question whether there be sufficient -grounds to sustain the exclusive pretensions of either Government.</p> - -<p>If the claim of the United States to the whole of the contested -territory can be sustained against Great Britain, or if the pretensions -of this Power can to their full extent be maintained against the United -States, it must be, by either party assuming that the other has no -opposite claim of any kind whatever, that there are no doubtful and -debatable questions pending between the two countries. This, if true and -maintained, must necessarily lead to war, unless one of the two Powers -should yield what it considers as its absolute right. But, if there be -any such debatable questions, the way is still open for negotiations; -and both powers may recede from their extreme pretensions, without any -abandonment of positive rights, without disgrace, without impairing -national honor and dignity.</p> - -<p>It has been asserted that the title of the United States to the whole -Oregon territory was maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments. -These must be sought for in the correspondence lately<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span> published. They -consist—first, of the assertion of the ancient claim of Spain to the -absolute sovereignty over the whole north-west coast of America as far -north as the 61st degree of north latitude. Secondly, of the cumulated -proofs which sustain the claims of the United States to the various -portions of the territory (whether in their own right, or as derived -from the acquisition of Louisiana and the Spanish discoveries), and of -the refutation of the arguments adduced by the other party. The first -mentioned position would, if it could be sustained, be sufficient to -prove, and is, as I think, the only one that could prove, the absolute -and complete right of the United States to the whole contested -territory.</p> - -<p>It is undoubtedly true that "Spain considered the northwest coast of -America as exclusively her own;" that this claim "had been asserted by -her, and maintained with the most vigilant jealousy, ever since the -discovery of the American continent, or nearly three centuries, as far -north as her settlements or missions extended." There were two ways of -examining the soundness of that claim; an investigation of the -principles on which it was founded, and an appeal to precedents. The -Secretary of State has abstained from discussing the principle; but he -has said that the claim of Spain to sovereignty "had never been -seriously questioned by any European nation: that it had been acquiesced -in by all European Governments." This appears to me the most vulnerable -part of his arguments.</p> - -<p>The early charters of the British monarchs to the colonies bordering on -the Atlantic, extended from sea to sea, from the Atlantic to the Pacific -ocean, with the single exception which excluded from the grants the -places actually occupied by the subjects of any Christian nation. The -right of prior occupancy was recognized; but the general claim of Spain -to the sovereignty of the whole coast bordering on the Pacific was -utterly disregarded. Had that claim been considered as unquestionable, -had it been acquiesced in, it never could have been supposed that, in -any case whatever, England could have a right to bestow on her subjects -a single foot of land bordering on the Pacific.</p> - -<p>Coming down to modern times, the only nations which have set up any -claims or attempted any settlements on the Pacific, north of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span> the -country actually occupied by the Spaniards, are Russia, Great Britain, -and the United States. All three have asserted claims to the -northwestern coasts of America, irreconcilable with the universal -sovereignty claimed by Spain: Russia and England, from the time when -their flags first floated along the coast and their subjects landed on -its shores; the United States from a similar date, or at least from the -time when they acquired Louisiana.</p> - -<p>If the right of Spain was absolute and exclusive to the whole, there was -no reason why it should not have extended beyond the 61st degree of -latitude. The right of Russia was founded only on her discoveries and -the establishment of some trading factories. She respected the right of -Spain only as far as it did not interfere with her own claim. She has, -in fact, extended this more than six degrees further south; and to this -the United States, who had acquired all the rights of Spain, have -assented by a solemn treaty. Whatever might be the boundary acquiesced -in by Spain, it was not Russia which recognized the claim of Spain; it -was Spain which recognized that her claim was not unlimited. And, let it -be also observed, that, since Spain still claimed as far north as the -61st degree of north latitude (the southern limit of the Russian -factories when first visited by Spanish navigators), the United States, -if they believed the Spanish right absolute and exclusive, ought not to -have ceded to Russia a country extending more than six degrees of -latitude along the shores of the Pacific.</p> - -<p>Great Britain contested the exclusive claim of Spain from the year 1778, -the date of Cook's third voyage; and he was the first British navigator -that had for more than two centuries appeared on those coasts. This -doctrine she has maintained ever since. She did not resist the exclusive -claim of Spain by virtue of the Nootka convention, but prior to it. It -was on that ground that she imperiously demanded indemnity and -restoration for the property and factory of one of her subjects, which -had been forcibly taken by the Spanish Government. She even threatened -war; and the Nootka convention was the result of those transactions. -Whatever construction may at this time be given to that instrument, it -is certain at least that Spain by it conceded a portion of the absolute -and sovereign right she had till then asserted; that she yielded the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span> -right of trade with the natives on all that part of the coast lying -north of her actual settlements; and that, by suffering the ultimate -right of sovereignty to remain in abeyance, she made that pretension -questionable which she had contended could not be called in question.</p> - -<p>With respect to the United States, without recurring to former -negotiations which were not attended with any result, it is sufficient -to advert to the convention between them and Great Britain of the year -1818, concluded prior to the date of the treaty by which they acquired -the claims of Spain to the territory north of the 42d degree of north -latitude.</p> - -<p>The United States at that time distinctly claimed, in their own right -and independent of the Spanish claims, that the boundary along the 49th -parallel, which had been agreed on as that between them and Great -Britain, from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, should be -extended to the Pacific. To this division of territory Great Britain -would not accede; and the provision for a joint occupancy during the -next ensuing years was substituted. A clause was inserted that the -agreement should not be taken to affect the claims of any other Power or -State to any part of the country west of the Stony Mountains. This -provision clearly referred to the claims of Russia and Spain. The -northern and southern boundaries of the country, which the two -contracting parties might claim, were left undefined: Great Britain -probably thought herself bound by the Nootka convention to respect the -Spanish claims to the extent provided by that instrument: the United -States could not but recognize those derived from discovery, with which -they were at that time but imperfectly acquainted, since their own -claims were in a great degree derived from a similar source. But the -convention decisively proves that the United States did not acquiesce in -the antiquated claim of Spain to the absolute and exclusive sovereignty -of the whole country; since, if they had recognized that prior claim to -the whole, they could have had none whatever to any portion of it.</p> - -<p>It is therefore undeniable that the assertion of the Spanish claim of -absolute sovereignty cannot be sustained by a presumed acquiescence on -the part of the only nations which now claim the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span> country. It may -perhaps be said that their opposition came too late, and that they -neglected too long to protest against the Spanish pretension on the -Pacific. No stress will be laid on Drake's voyage, which had a warlike -character. But the British charters to their colonies show that those -pretensions were disregarded at a very early date. There was no occasion -for opposition or direct denial, with respect to the Pacific, until the -attention of other nations was directed towards that remote country. -This was neglected because all the commercial nations were, in their -attempts to colonize, or to conquer the foreign and till then unexplored -regions, attracted by countries far more accessible, and were -exclusively engaged in pursuits much more important. The East Indies and -the West India Islands offered a vast and lucrative field for commercial -enterprise and territorial acquisition. With respect to the continent of -America, France, England, and Holland most naturally planted their -colonies on the nearest opposite shores of the Atlantic; and they did it -in opposition to the pretended claim of Spain, which extended to the -whole of America. Although strenuously engaged in extending those -colonies westwardly, these, in the year 1754, twenty years only before -Cook's third voyage, hardly extended beyond the Mississippi. What -immediate interest could then have impelled either France or England to -enter a formal protest against the antiquated claim of Spain to a -country with which they had never attempted even to trade? And what -opportunity had occurred for doing it prior to Cook's voyage?</p> - -<p>But, what is still more conclusive, the country in question was equally -neglected by Spain herself. Some exploring voyages, few of which are -authentic, were indeed made by Spanish navigators; and the claims which -may be derived from their discoveries have now been transferred to the -United States, so far as discovery alone can give a claim, and no -further. But, during more than two centuries that Spain had no -competitor on the Pacific, there was on her part no occupancy, no -settlement, or attempt to make a settlement. She had some missions on -the western coast of the peninsula of California: but her missions or -settlements in Northern or New California are of quite recent date; that -of the most southern (San Diego) in 1769, and that of the most northern<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span> -(San Francisco) in 1776, two years only before Cook's arrival at Nootka -Sound.</p> - -<p>In point of fact, the contested territory had been utterly neglected by -Spain. All the energies, such as they were, of her Mexican colonies were -much more advantageously applied to the improvement of the vast and rich -countries which they had conquered, principally to the discovery and -working of the richest and most productive mines of the precious metals -as yet known.</p> - -<p>Anson's expedition was purely military, and confined to southern -latitudes. But the narrative drew the public attention towards the -Pacific ocean, and gave a new impulse to the spirit of discovery. Almost -immediately after the peace of 1763 voyages were undertaken for that -purpose by the Governments of England and France: the Pacific was -explored: the Russians on the other hand had, more than thirty years -before, ascertained the continuity of the American continent from -Behring's Straits to Mount St. Elias. It was then, and not till then, -that Spain, or rather the Mexican Government, awakening from its long -lethargy, extended its missions to New California. In the year 1774, -Perez, with his pilot, Martinez, sailed as far north as the northern -extremity of Queen Charlotte's Island, having anchored in Nootka Sound, -and, as Martinez asserts, perceived the entrance of Fuca's Straits. New -and important discoveries were made by Quadra and Heceta in the year -1775. The sequel is well known.</p> - -<p>But on what foundation did the claim of Spain rest? If she had indeed an -absolute right to the whole country bordering on the Pacific, derived -either from natural or international law, or from usages generally -recognized, it matters but little, as respects right, whether other -nations had acquiesced in, or opposed her claim. If there was no -foundation for that absolute and exclusive right of sovereignty, Spain -could transfer nothing more to the United States than the legitimate -claims derived from her discoveries.</p> - -<p>The discovery gives an incipient claim not only to the identical spot -thus discovered, but to a certain distance beyond it. It has been -admitted that the claim extends generally, though not universally, as -far inland as the sources of rivers emptying into the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span> sea where the -discovery has been made. The distance to which the right or claim -extends along the sea shore may not be precisely defined, and may vary -according to circumstances. But it never can be unlimited; it has never -been recognized beyond a reasonable extent. Spain was the first European -nation which discovered and occupied Florida. A claim on that account to -the absolute sovereignty over the whole of the Atlantic shores as far as -Hudson's Bay, or the 60th degree of latitude, would strike every one as -utterly absurd. A claim on the part of Spain to the sovereignty of all -the shores of the Pacific, derived from her having established missions -in California, would be similar in its nature and extent, and equally -inadmissible. It cannot be sustained as a natural right, nor by the -principles of international law, nor by any general usage or precedent. -The claim of Spain rested on no such grounds.</p> - -<p>It was derived from the bull of Pope Alexander VI., which the Spanish -monarchs obtained in the year 1493, immediately after the discovery of -America by Columbus. By virtue of that bull, combined with another -previously granted to Portugal, and with modifications respecting the -division line between the two Powers, the Pope granted to them the -exclusive sovereignty over all the discoveries made or to be made in all -the heathen portions of the globe, including, it must be recollected, -all the countries in America bordering on the Atlantic, as well as those -on the Pacific ocean. Yet, even at that time, the Catholic Kings of -England, and France did not recognize the authority of the Pope on such -subjects; as evidently appears by the voyages of Cabot under the orders -of Henry VII. of England, and of Cartier under those of the King of -France, Francis I. Subsequently, the colonies planted by both countries, -from Florida to Hudson's Bay, were a practical and continued protest and -denial of the Spanish claim of absolute sovereignty over the whole of -America: whilst the acquiescence of Spain was tantamount to an -abandonment of that claim where it was resisted. Ridiculous as a right -derived from such a source may appear at this time, it was not then thus -considered by Spain; and the western boundary of Brazil is to this day -regulated by the division line prescribed by the Pope.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span></p><p>I am not aware of any other principle by which the claim ever was or -can be sustained, unless it be the idle ceremony of taking possession, -as it is called. The celebrated Spaniard who first discovered the -Pacific ocean, "Balboa, advancing up to the middle in the waves, with -his buckler and sword, took possession of that ocean in the name of the -King his master, and vowed to defend it, with his arms, against all his -enemies."—(<i>Robertson.</i>)</p> - -<p>I have dwelt longer on this subject than it may seem to deserve. The -assertion of the solidity of this ancient exclusive Spanish claim has -had an apparent effect on public opinion fatal to the prospect of an -amicable arrangement. I am also fully satisfied that the resort to -vulnerable arguments, instead of strengthening, has a tendency to lessen -the weight of the multiplied proofs, by which the superiority of the -American over the British claim has been so fully established.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> I allude here only to the compromise proposed by Great -Britain. Her actual claim, as explicitly stated by herself, is to the -whole territory, limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with -other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span></p> - -<h2>NUMBER II.</h2> - -<p>It has, it is believed, been conclusively proved that the claim of the -United States to absolute sovereignty over the whole Oregon territory, -in virtue of the ancient exclusive Spanish claim, is wholly unfounded. -The next question is, whether the other facts and arguments adduced by -either party establish a complete and absolute title of either to the -whole; for the United States claim it explicitly; and, although the -British proposal of compromise did yield a part, yet her qualified claim -extends to the whole. It has been stated by herself in the following -words: "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any portion -of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any part, but to -the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy, in common with -other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in abeyance." And, -again: "The qualified rights which Great Britain now possesses over the -whole of the territory in question, embrace the right to navigate the -waters of those countries, the right to settle in and over any part of -them, and the right freely to trade with the inhabitants and occupiers -of the same. * * * * * * It is fully admitted that the United States -possess the same rights; but beyond they possess none."</p> - -<p>In the nature of things, it seems almost impossible that a complete and -absolute right to any portion of America can exist, unless it be by -prescriptive and undisputed <i>actual</i> possession and settlements, or by -virtue of a treaty.</p> - -<p>At the time when America was discovered, the law of nations was -altogether unsettled. More than a century elapsed before Grotius -attempted to lay its foundation on Natural Law and the moral precepts of -Christianity; and, when sustaining it by precedents, he was compelled to -recur to Rome and Greece. It was in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span> reality a new case, to which no -ancient precedents could apply,<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> for which some new rules must be -adopted. Gradually, some general principles were admitted, never -universally, in their nature vague and often conflicting. For instance, -discovery varies, from the simple ascertaining of the continuity of -land, to a minute exploration of its various harbors, rivers, &c.; and -the rights derived from it may vary accordingly, and may occasionally be -claimed to the same district by different nations. There is no precise -rule for regulating the time after which the neglect to occupy would -nullify the right of prior discovery; nor for defining the extent of -coast beyond the spot discovered to which the discoverer may be -entitled, or how far inland his claim extends. The principle most -generally admitted was, that, in case of a river, the right extended to -the whole country drained by that river and its tributaries. Even this -was not universally conceded. This right might be affected by a -simultaneous or prior discovery and occupancy of some of the sources of -such river by another party; or it might conflict with a general claim -of contiguity. This last claim, when extending beyond the sources of -rivers discovered and occupied, is vague and undefined: though it would -seem that it cannot exceed in breadth that of the territory on the coast -originally discovered and occupied. A few examples will show the -uncertainty resulting from those various claims, when they conflicted -with each other.</p> - -<p>The old British charters extending from sea to sea have already been -mentioned. They were founded, beyond the sources of the rivers emptying -into the Atlantic, on no other principle than that of contiguity or -continuity. The grant in 1621 of Nova Scotia, by James the First, is -bounded on the north by the river St. Lawrence, though Cartier had more -than eighty-five years before discovered the mouth of that river and -ascended it as high up as the present site of Montreal, and the French -under Champlain had several years before 1621 been settled at Quebec. -But there is another case more important, and still more in point.</p> - -<p>The few survivors of the disastrous expedition of Narvaez, who, coming -from Florida, did in a most extraordinary way reach <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>Culiacan on the -Pacific, were the first Europeans who crossed the Mississippi. Some -years later, Ferdinand de Soto, coming also from Florida, did in the -year 1541 reach and cross the Mississippi, at some place between the -mouth of the Ohio and that of the Arkansas. He explored a portion of the -river and of the adjacent country; and, after his death, Moscoso, who -succeeded him in command, did, in the year 1543, build seven brigantines -or barques, in which, with the residue of his followers, he descended -the Mississippi, the mouth of which he reached in seventeen days. Thence -putting to sea with his frail vessels, he was fortunate enough to reach -the Spanish port of Panuco, on the Mexican coast. The right of discovery -clearly belonged to Spain; but she had neglected for near one hundred -and fifty years to make any settlement on the great river or any of its -tributaries. The French, coming from Canada, reached the Mississippi in -the year 1680, and ascended it as high up as St. Anthony's Falls; and La -Salle descended it in 1682 to its mouth. The French Government did, in -virtue of that second discovery, claim the country, subsequently founded -New Orleans, and formed several other settlements in the interior, on -the Mississippi or its waters. Spain almost immediately occupied -Pensacola and Nacogdoches, in order to check the progress of the French -eastwardly and westwardly; but she did not attempt to disturb them in -their settlements on the Mississippi and its tributaries. We have here -the proof of a prior right of discovery being superseded, when too long -neglected, by that of actual occupancy and settlement.</p> - -<p>The French, by virtue of having thus discovered the mouth of the -Mississippi, of having ascended it more than fifteen hundred miles, of -having explored the Ohio, the Wabash, and the Illinois, from their -respective mouths to their most remote sources, and of having formed -several settlements as above mentioned, laid claim to the whole country -drained by the main river and its tributaries. They accordingly built -forts at Le Bœuf, high up the Alleghany river, and on the site where -Pittsburgh now stands. On the ground of discovery or settlement, Great -Britain had not the slightest claim. General, then Colonel Washington, -was the first who, at the age of twenty-two, and in the year 1754, -planted the British banner on the Western waters. The British claim was -founded principally<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span> on the ground of contiguity, enforced by other -considerations. The strongest of these was, that it could not consist -with natural law, that the British colonies, with a population of near -two millions, should be confined to the narrow belt of land between the -Atlantic and the Alleghany Mountains, and that the right derived from -the discovery of the main river should be carried to such an extent as -to allow the French colonies, with a population of fifty thousand, -rightfully to claim the whole valley of the Mississippi. The contest was -decided by the sword. By the treaty of peace of 1763, the Mississippi, -with the exception of New Orleans and its immediate vicinity, was made -the boundary. The French not only lost all that part of the valley which -lay east of that river, but they were compelled to cede Canada to Great -Britain.</p> - -<p>It may, however, happen that all the various claims from which a title -may be derived, instead of pertaining to several Powers, and giving rise -to conflicting pretensions, are united and rightfully belong to one -nation alone. This union, if entire, may justly be considered as giving -a complete and exclusive title to the sovereignty of that part of the -country embraced by such united claims.</p> - -<p>The position assumed by the British Government, that those various -claims exclude each other, and that the assertion of one forbids an -appeal to the others, is obviously untenable. All that can be said in -that respect is, that if any one claim is alone sufficient to establish -a complete and indisputable title, an appeal to others is superfluous. -Thus far, and no farther, can the objection be maintained. The argument -on the part of the United States in reality was, that the Government -considered the title derived from the ancient exclusive Spanish claim as -indisputable; but that, if this was denied, all the other just claims of -the United States taken together constituted a complete title, or at -least far superior to any that could be adduced on the part of Great -Britain.</p> - -<p>It is not intended to enter into the merits of the question, which has -been completely discussed, since the object of this paper is only to -show that there remain on both sides certain debatable questions; and -that therefore both Governments may, if so disposed,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span> recede from some -of their pretensions, without any abandonment of positive rights, and -without impairing national honor and dignity.</p> - -<p>Although Great Britain seems, in this discussion, to have relied almost -exclusively on the right derived from actual occupancy and settlement, -she cannot reject absolutely those derived from other sources. She must -admit that, both in theory and practice, the claims derived from prior -discovery, from contiguity, from the principle which gives to the first -discoverer of the mouth of a river and of its course a claim to the -whole country drained by such river, have all been recognized to a -certain, though not well-defined extent, by all the European nations -claiming various portions of America. And she cannot deny the facts, -that (as Mr. Greenhow justly concludes) the seashore had been generally -examined from the 42d, and minutely from the 45th to the 48th degree of -latitude, Nootka Sound discovered, and the general direction of the -coast from the 48th to the 58th degree of latitude ascertained, by the -Spanish expeditions, in the years 1774 and 1775, of Perez, Heceta, and -Bodego y Quadra; that the American Captain Gray was the first who, in -1792, entered into and ascertained the existence of the River Columbia, -and the place where it empties into the sea; that, prior to that -discovery, the Spaniard Heceta was the first who had been within the -bay, called Deception Bay by Meares, into which the river does empty; -that, of the four navigators who had been in that bay prior to Gray's -final discovery, the Spaniard Heceta and the American Gray were the only -ones who had asserted that a great river emptied itself into that bay, -Heceta having even given a name to the river (St. Roc), and the entrance -having been designated by his own name (Ensennada de Heceta), whilst the -two English navigators, Meares and Vancouver, had both concluded that no -large river had its mouth there; that, in the year 1805, Lewis and -Clarke were the first who descended the river Columbia, from one of its -principal western sources to its mouth; that the first actual occupancy -in that quarter was by Mr. Astor's company, on the 24th of March, 1811, -though Mr. Thompson, the astronomer of the British Northwest Company, -who arrived at Astoria on the 15th of July, may have wintered on or near -some northern source of the river in 52 degrees north latitude; that -amongst the factories<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span> established by that American company one was -situated at the confluence of the Okanagan with the Columbia, in about -49 degrees of latitude; that the 42d degree is the boundary, west of the -Stony Mountains, established by treaty between Spain, now Mexico, and -the United States; that the 49th degree is likewise the boundary, from -the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains, established by treaty -between Great Britain and the United States; and that therefore the -right of the United States, which may be derived from the principle of -contiguity or continuity, embraces the territory west of the Stony -Mountains contained between the 42d and 49th degrees of latitude.</p> - -<p>Omitting other considerations which apply principally to the territory -north of Fuca Straits, where the claims of both parties are almost -exclusively derived from their respective discoveries, including those -of Spain, it may be rationally inferred from the preceding enumeration -that there remain various questions which must be considered by Great -Britain as being still doubtful and debatable, and that she may -therefore, without any abandonment of positive rights, recede from the -extreme pretensions which she has advanced in the discussion respecting -a division of the territory. But, although conjectures may be formed, -and the course pursued by the Government of the United States may have -an influence on that which Great Britain will adopt, it does not belong -to me to discuss what that Government may or will do. This paper is -intended for the American, and not for the English public; and my -attention has been principally directed to those points which may be -considered by the United States as doubtful and debatable.</p> - -<p>It was expressly stipulated that nothing contained in the conventions of -1818 and 1827 should be construed to impair, <i>or in any manner affect</i>, -the claims which either of the contracting parties may have to any part -of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains. After the most -cool and impartial investigation of which I am capable, I have not been -able to perceive any claim on the part of Great Britain, or debatable -question, respecting the territory south of Fuca's Straits, but the -species of occupancy by the British Fur companies between the year 1813 -and October 20th, 1818; and this must be considered in connection<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span> with -the restoration of "all territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, -taken by either party from the other during the war," provided for by -the treaty of Ghent. To this branch of the subject belongs also the -question whether the establishment of trading factories with Indians may -eventually give a right to sovereignty. My opinion was expressed in the -American counter-statement of the case, dated 19th December, 1826: "It -is believed that mere factories, established solely for the purpose of -trafficking with the natives, and without any view to cultivation and -permanent settlement, cannot, of themselves, and unsupported by any -other consideration, give any better title to dominion and absolute -sovereignty than similar establishments made in a civilized country." -However true this may be as an abstract proposition, it must be admitted -that, practically, the modest British factory at Calcutta has gradually -grown up into absolute and undisputed sovereignty over a population of -eighty millions of people.</p> - -<p>The questions which, as it appears to me, may be allowed by the United -States to be debatable, and therefore to make it questionable whether -they have a complete right to the whole Oregon territory, are:</p> - -<p>1st. The Nootka convention, which applies to the whole, and which, -though not of primary importance, is nevertheless a fact, and the -inferences drawn from it a matter of argument.</p> - -<p>2dly. The discovery of the Straits of Fuca.</p> - -<p>3dly. North of those straits; along the sea shores, the discoveries of -the British contrasted with those of the American and Spanish -navigators; in the interior, the question whether the discovery of the -mouth and the navigation of one of its principal branches, from its -source to the mouth of the river, implies without exception a complete -right to the whole country drained by all the tributaries of such river; -and also the British claim to the whole territory drained by Frazer's -river—its sources having been discovered in 1792 by Sir Alexander -Mackenzie, factories having been established upon it by the British as -early as the year 1806, and the whole river thence to its mouth having -been for a number of years exclusively navigated by British subjects.</p> - -<p>It appears to me sufficient generally to suggest the controverted<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span> -points. That which relates to Fuca's Straits is the most important, and -deserves particular consideration.</p> - -<p>If Fuca's voyage in 1592 could be proved to be an authentic document, -this would settle at once the question in favor of the United States; -but the voyage was denied in the introduction to the voyage of the Sutil -and Mexicano. This was an official document, published under the -auspices of the Spanish Government, and intended to vindicate Spain -against the charges, that she had contributed nothing to the advancement -of geography in those quarters. This negative evidence was confirmed by -Humboldt, who says that no trace of such voyage can be found in the -archives of Mexico. Unwilling to adduce any doubtful fact, I abstained -from alluding to it in the statement of the American case in 1826. Later -researches show that, although recorded evidences remain of the voyages -of Gali from Macao to Acapulco in 1584, of the Santa Anna (on board of -which was, as he says, Fuca himself) from Manilla to the coast of -California, where she was captured in 1587 by Cavendish, and of Vizcaino -in 1602-1603, and even of Maldonado's fictitious voyage in 1588, yet no -trace has been found in Spain or Mexico of Fuca's, or any other similar -voyage, in 1692, or thereabout.</p> - -<p>On reading with attention the brief account published by Purchas, I will -say that the voyage itself has much internal evidence of its truth, but -that the inference or conclusion throws much discredit on the whole. The -only known account of the voyage is that given verbally at Venice in -1596, by Fuca, a Greek pilot, to Mr. Lock, a respectable English -merchant, who transmitted it to Purchas.</p> - -<p>Fuca says that he had been sent by the Viceroy of Mexico to discover the -straits of Anian and the passage thereof into the sea, which they called -the North Sea, which is <i>our Northwest Sea</i>; that between 47 and 48 -degrees of latitude he entered into a broad inlet, through which he -sailed more than twenty days; and, being then come into the North Sea -already, and not being sufficiently armed, he returned again to -Acapulco. He offered then to Mr. Lock to go into England and serve her -Majesty in a voyage for the discovery perfectly of the Northwest passage -into the South<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span> Sea. If it be granted that the inlet through which he -had sailed was really the same as the straits which now bear his name, -that sea into which he emerged, and which he asserts to be <i>our -Northwest Sea</i>, must have been that which is now called Queen -Charlotte's Sound, north of Quadra and Vancouver's Island, in about 51 -degrees of latitude. <i>Our Northwest Sea</i> was that which washes the -shores of Newfoundland and Labrador, then universally known as far north -as the vicinity of the 60th degree of latitude. Hudson's Straits had not -yet been discovered, and the discovery of Davis's Straits might not be -known to Fuca. But no navigator at that time, who, like he, had sailed -across both the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, could be ignorant that -the northern extremity of Newfoundland, which lies nearly in the same -latitude as the northern entrance of Fuca's Straits, is situated sixty -or seventy degrees of longitude east of that entrance. The only way to -reconcile the account with itself is, to suppose that Fuca believed that -the continent of America did not, on the side of the Atlantic, extend -further north than about the 60th degree, and was bounded northwardly by -an open sea, which extended as far west as the northern extremity of the -inlet through which he had sailed. It is true nevertheless that, between -the years 1774 and 1792, there was a prevailing opinion amongst the -navigators that Fuca had actually discovered an inlet leading towards -the Atlantic. Prior to the year 1787 they were engaged in seeking for -it, and the Spaniards had for that purpose explored in vain the sea -coast lying south of the 48th degree; for it is well known that Fuca's -entrance lies between the 48th and 49th, and not between the 47th and -48th degrees of latitude, as he had announced.</p> - -<p>The modern discovery of that inlet is due to Captain Barclay, an -Englishman, commanding the Imperial Eagle, a vessel owned by British -merchants, but which was equipped at, and took its departure from -Ostend, and which sailed under the flag of the Austrian East India -Company. The British Government, which has objected to the American -claim derived from Captain Gray's discovery of the mouth of the river -Columbia, on the ground that he was a private individual, and that his -vessel was not a public ship, cannot certainly claim anything in virtue -of a discovery by a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span> private Englishman, sailing under Austrian colors. -In that case, and rejecting Fuca's voyage, neither the United States nor -England can lay any claim on account of the discovery of the straits.</p> - -<p>Subsequently, the Englishman, Meares, sailing under the Portuguese flag, -penetrated, in 1768, about ten miles into the inlet, and the American, -Gray, in 1789, about fifty miles. The pretended voyage of the sloop -Washington throughout the straits, under the command of either Gray or -Kendrick, has no other foundation than an assertion of Meares, on which -no reliance can be placed.</p> - -<p>In the year 1790 (1791 according to Vancouver) the Spaniards, Elisa and -Quimper, explored the straits more than one hundred miles, discovering -the Port Discovery, the entrance of Admiralty Inlet, the Deception -Passage, and the Canal de Haro. In 1792 Vancouver explored and surveyed -the straits throughout, together with their various bays and harbors. -Even there he had been preceded in part by the Sutil and Mexicano; and -he expresses his regret that they had advanced before him as far as the -Canal del Rosario.</p> - -<p>Under all the circumstances of the case, it cannot be doubted that the -United States must admit that the discovery of the straits, and the -various inferences which may be drawn from it, are doubtful and -debatable questions.</p> - -<p>That which relates to a presumed agreement of Commissioners appointed -under the treaty of Utrecht, by which the northern boundary of Canada -was, from a certain point north of Lake Superior, declared to extend -westwardly along the 49th parallel of latitude, does not appear to me -definitively settled. As this had been assumed many years before, as a -positive fact, and had never been contradicted, I also assumed it as -such and did not thoroughly investigate the subject. Yet I had before me -at least one map (name of publisher not recollected), of which I have a -vivid recollection, on which the dividing lines were distinctly marked -and expressly designated, as being in conformity with the agreement of -the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. The evidence against the -fact, though in some respects strong, is purely negative. The line, -according to the map, extended from a certain point near the source of -the river Saguenay, in a westerly direction, to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span> another designated -point on another river emptying either into the St Lawrence or James's -Bay; and there were, in that way, four or five lines following each -other, all tending westwardly, but with different inclinations -northwardly or southwardly, and all extending, from some apparently -known point on a designated river, to another similar point on another -river; the rivers themselves emptying themselves, some into the river -St. Lawrence and others into James's Bay or Hudson's Bay, until, from a -certain point lying north of Lake Superior, the line was declared to -extend along the 49th degree of latitude, as above stated. It was with -that map before me that the following paragraph was inserted in the -American statement of December, 1826:</p> - -<blockquote><p>"The limits between the possessions of Great Britain in North -America, and those of France in the same quarter, namely, Canada -and Louisiana, were determined by Commissioners appointed in -pursuance of the treaty of Utrecht. From the coast of Labrador to a -certain point North of Lake Superior, those limits were fixed -according to certain metes and bounds; and from that point the line -of demarcation was agreed to extend indefinitely due west, along -the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. It was in conformity -with that arrangement that the United States did claim that -parallel as the northern boundary of Louisiana. It has been -accordingly thus settled, as far as the Stony Mountains, by the -convention of 1818 between the United States and Great Britain; and -no adequate reason can be given why the same boundary should not be -continued as far as the claims of the United States do extend, that -is to say, as far as the Pacific ocean."</p></blockquote> - -<p>It appears very extraordinary that any geographer or map-maker should -have invented a dividing line, with such specific details, without -having sufficient grounds for believing that it had been thus determined -by the Commissioners under the treaty of Utrecht. It is also believed -that Douglass' Summary (not at this moment within my reach) adverts to -the portion of the line from the coast of Labrador to the Saguenay. -Finally, the allusion to the 49th parallel, as a boundary fixed in -consequence of the treaty of Utrecht, had been repeatedly made in the -course of preceding negotiations, as well as in the conferences of that -of the year 1826; and there is no apparent motive, if the assertion was -known by the British negotiators not to be founded in fact, why they -should not have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span> at once denied it. It may be, however, that the -question having ceased to be of any interest to Great Britain since the -acquisition of Canada, they had not investigated the subject. It is of -some importance, because, if authenticated, the discussion would be -converted from questions respecting undefined claims, into one -concerning the construction of a positive treaty or convention.</p> - -<p>It is sufficiently clear that, under all the circumstances of the case, -an amicable division of the territory, if at all practicable, must be -founded in a great degree on expediency. This of course must be left to -the wisdom of the two Governments. The only natural, equitable, and -practicable line which has occurred to me, is one which, running through -the middle of Fuca Straits, from its entrance to a point on the main, -situated south of the mouth of Frazer's river, should leave to the -United States all the shores and harbors lying south, and to Great -Britain all those north of that line, including the whole of Quadra and -Vancouver's Island. It would be through Fuca's Straits a nearly easterly -line, along the parallel of about 48½ degrees, leaving to England the -most valuable and permanent portion of the fur trade, dividing the -sea-coast as nearly as possible into two equal parts, and the ports in -the most equitable manner. To leave Admiralty Inlet and its Sounds to -Great Britain, would give her a possession in the heart of the American -portion of the territory. Whether from the point where the line would -strike the main, it should be continued along the same parallel, or run -along the 49th, is a matter of secondary importance.</p> - -<p>If such division should take place, the right of the inhabitants of the -country situated on the upper waters of the Columbia to the navigation -of that river to its mouth, is founded on natural law; and the principle -has almost been recognized as the public law of Europe. Limited to -commercial purposes, it might be admitted, but on the express condition -that the citizens of the United States should in the same manner, and to -the same extent, have the right to navigate the river St. Lawrence.</p> - -<p>But I must say that, whatever may be the ultimate destinies of the -Oregon territory, I would feel great regret in seeing it in any way -divided. An amicable division appears to me without comparison -preferable to a war for that object between the two countries. In<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span> every -other view of the subject it is highly exceptionable. Without adverting -for the present to considerations of a higher nature, it may be -sufficient here to observe, that the conversion of the northern part of -the territory into a British colony would in its effects make the -arrangement very unequal. The United States are forbidden by their -Constitution to give a preference to the ports of one State over those -of another. The ports within the portion of territory allotted to the -United States would of course remain open to British vessels; whilst -American vessels would be excluded from the ports of the British colony, -unless occasionally admitted by special acts depending on the will of -Great Britain.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Grotius, however, sustains the right of occupation by a -maxim of the Civil Roman Code.</p></div></div> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span></p> - -<h2>NUMBER III.</h2> - -<p>Beyond the naked assertion of an absolute right to the whole territory, -so little in the shape of argument has been adduced, and so much warmth -has been exhibited in the discussion of the subject, that it cannot be -doubted that the question has now become, on both sides, one of feeling -rather than of right. This, in America, grows out of the fact that, in -this contest with a European nation, the contested territory is in -America and not in Europe. It is identical with the premature official -annunciation, that the United States could not acquiesce in the -establishment of any new colony in North America by any European nation. -This sentiment was already general at the time when it was first -publicly declared; and now that it has been almost universally avowed, -there can be no impropriety in any private citizen to say, as I now do, -that I share in that feeling to its full extent. For the Americans, -Oregon is or will be home: for England, it is but an outpost, which may -afford means of annoyance, rather than be a source of real power. In -America all have the same ultimate object in view; we differ only with -respect to the means by which it may be attained.</p> - -<p>Two circumstances have had a tendency to nourish and excite these -feelings. The British fur companies, from their position, from their -monopolizing character, from their natural influence upon the Indians, -and from that, much greater than might have been expected, which they -have constantly had upon the British Government in its negotiations with -the United States, have for sixty years been a perpetual source of -annoyance and collisions. The vested interests of the Hudson Bay Company -are at this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>moment the greatest obstacle to an amicable arrangement. It -is at the same time due to justice to say that, as far as is known, that -company has acted in Oregon in conformity with the terms of the -convention, and that its officers have uniformly treated the Americans, -whether visitors or emigrants, not only courteously, but with great -kindness.</p> - -<p>If the British colonies on the continent of America were an independent -country, or were they placed in their commercial relations, at least -with the United States, on the same footing as the British possessions -in Europe, these relations would be regulated by the reciprocal -interests and wants of the parties immediately concerned. Great Britain -has an undoubted right to persist in her colonial policy; but the result -has been extremely vexatious, and to the United States injurious. All -this is true. But feelings do not confer a right, and the indulgence of -excited feelings is neither virtue nor wisdom.</p> - -<p>The Western States have no greater apparent immediate interest in the -acquisition of Oregon than the States bordering on the Atlantic. These -stand in greater need of an outlet for their surplus emigrating -population, and to them exclusively, will for the present, the benefit -accrue of ports on the Pacific, for the protection of the numerous -American ships employed in the fisheries and commerce of that ocean. It -is true that in case of war the inhabitants of the Western States will -not, if a naval superiority shall be obtained on the Upper Lakes, feel -those immediate calamities of war to which the country along the -seashore is necessarily exposed; but no section of the United States -will be more deeply affected, by the impossibility of finding during the -war a market for the immense surplus of its agricultural products. It -must also be remembered that a direct tax has heretofore been found as -productive as the aggregate of all the other internal taxes levied by -the General Government; that, in case of war, it must necessarily be -imposed; and that, as it must, in conformity with the Constitution, be -levied in proportion to the respective population of the several States, -it will be much more oppressive on those which have not yet accumulated -a large amount of circulating or personal capital. The greater degree of -excitement which prevails in the West is due to other and more powerful -causes than a regard for self-interest.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span></p><p>Bordering through the whole of their northern frontier on the British -possessions, the Western people have always been personally exposed to -the annoyances and collisions already alluded to; and it may be that the -hope of getting rid of these by the conquest of Canada has some -influence upon their conduct. Independent of this, the indomitable -energy of this nation has been and is nowhere displayed so forcibly as -in the new States and settlements. It was necessarily directed towards -the acquisition of land and the cultivation of the soil. In that respect -it has performed prodigies. Three millions of cultivators of the soil -are now found between the Lakes and the Ohio, where, little more than -fifty years before, save only three or four half Indian French -settlements, there was not a single white inhabitant. Nothing now seems -impossible to those men; they have not even been sobered by fresh -experience. Attempting to do at once, and without an adequate capital, -that which should have been delayed five-and-twenty years, and might -have then been successfully accomplished, some of those States have had -the mortification to find themselves unable to pay the interest on the -debt they had contracted, and obliged to try to compound with their -creditors. Nevertheless, undiminished activity and locomotion are still -the ruling principles: the Western people leap over time and distance; -ahead they must go; it is their mission. May God speed them, and may -they thus quietly take possession of the entire contested territory!</p> - -<p>All this was as well known to the British Government as to ourselves. A -public and official declaration by the President of the United States -was unnecessary and at least premature. Mr. Rush's correspondence of -1824 bears witness of its unfortunate effect on the negotiations of that -year. These feelings had gradually subsided. But, whatever may be the -cause, the fact that an extraordinary excitement on this subject has -manifested itself, and does now exist on both sides, cannot be denied. -Time is absolutely necessary in order that this should subside. Any -precipitate step now taken by either Government would be attended with -the most fatal consequences. That which, if done some years ago, might -have been harmless, would now be highly dangerous, and should at least -be postponed for the present.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span></p><p>The first incipient step recommended by the Executive is, to give the -notice that the convention of 1827 shall expire at the end of one year. -This measure at this time, and connected with the avowed intention of -assuming exclusive sovereignty over the whole territory, becomes a -question of peace or war.</p> - -<p>The conventions of 1818 and 1827, whilst reserving the rights of both -parties, allowed the freedom of trade and navigation throughout the -whole territory to remain common to both; and the citizens or subjects -of both powers were permitted to occupy any part of it. The -inconveniences of that temporary arrangement were well understood at the -time. The British fur companies had established factories on the banks, -and even south of the river Columbia, within the limits of that portion -of the country which the United States had, whenever the subject was -discussed, claimed as belonging exclusively to them. The conditions of -the agreement were nominally reciprocal; but, though they did not give, -yet they did in fact leave the British company in the exclusive -possession of the fur trade. This could not be prevented otherwise than -by resorting to actual force: the United States were not then either -ready or disposed to run the risks of a war for that object; and it was -thought more eligible, that the British traders should remain on the -territory of the United States, by virtue of a compact and with their -consent, than in defiance of their authority. It is but very lately that -the Americans have begun to migrate to that remote country: a greater -number will certainly follow; and they have under the convention a -perfect right to occupy and make settlements in any part of the -territory they may think proper, with the sole exception of the spots -actually occupied by the British company.</p> - -<p>What is then the object in view, in giving the notice at this time? This -has been declared without reserve by the President: "At the end of the -year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for -giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national -rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That -they cannot be abandoned without a sacrifice of both national honor and -interests, is too clear to admit of doubt." And it must be recollected -that this candid avowal<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span> has been accompanied by the declaration that -"our title to the whole Oregon territory had been asserted and, as was -believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments." Nothing can -be more plain and explicit. The exclusive right of the United States to -absolute sovereignty over the whole territory must be asserted and -maintained.</p> - -<p>It may not be necessary for that purpose to drive away the British fur -company, nor to prevent the migration into Oregon of British emigrants -coming from the British dominions. The company may, if deemed expedient, -be permitted to trade as heretofore with the Indians. British emigrants -may be treated in the same manner as the other sixty or eighty thousand -who already arrive yearly in the United States. They may at their option -be naturalized, or remain on the same footing as foreigners in other -parts of the Union. In this case they will enjoy no political rights; -they will not be permitted to own American vessels and to sail under the -American flag; the permission to own real property seems, so long as -Oregon remains a territory, to depend on the will of Congress. Thus far -collision may be avoided.</p> - -<p>But no foreign jurisdiction can be permitted, from the moment when the -sovereignty of the United States over the whole territory shall be -asserted and maintained. To this, all those who reside in the territory -must submit. After having taken the decisive step of giving the notice, -the United States cannot, as the President justly states, abandon the -right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor.</p> - -<p>It had been expressly agreed by the convention that nothing contained in -it should affect the claims of either party to the territory. The -all-important question of sovereignty remained therefore in abeyance. -Negotiations for a division of the territory have failed: the question -of sovereignty remains undecided, as it was prior to the convention. If -the United States exercise the reserved right to put an end to the -convention, and if, from the time when it shall have expired, they -peremptorily assume the right of sovereignty over the whole, it cannot -be doubted that Great Britain will at once resist. She will adhere to -the principle she had asserted prior to the Nootka convention, and has -ever since <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>maintained, that actual occupancy can alone give a right to -the country. She will not permit the jurisdiction of the United States -to be extended over her subjects: she will oppose the removal, arrest, -or exercise of any other legal process, against her justices of the -peace, against any other officers who directly or indirectly act under -her authority, against any of her subjects; and she will continue to -exercise her jurisdiction over all of them throughout the whole -territory. Whatever either Power asserts must be maintained: military -occupation and war must necessarily ensue.</p> - -<p>A portion of the people, both in the West and elsewhere, see clearly -that such must be the consequence of giving the notice. Such men openly -avow their opinions, prefer war to a longer continuation of the present -state of things, are ready to meet all the dangers and calamities of the -impending conflict, and to adopt at once all the measures which may -ensure success. With them, the discussion brings at once the question to -its true issue: Is war necessary for the object they have in view? Or -may it not be attained by peaceable means? It is a question of war or -peace, and it is fairly laid before the nation.</p> - -<p>But many respectable men appear to entertain hopes that peace may still -be preserved after the United States shall have assumed, or attempted to -assume, exclusive sovereignty. The reverse appears to me so clear, so -obvious, so inevitable, that I really cannot understand on what grounds -these hopes are founded.</p> - -<p>Is it thought that the President will not, after the assent of Congress -has been obtained (and whether immediately or at the end of this -session, is quite immaterial), give the notice which he has asked -Congress to authorize? Or is it supposed that a change in the form -which, in order to avoid responsibility, would give him a discretionary -power, could lead to a different result, or be anything else but a -transfer by Congress to the Executive of the power to declare war?</p> - -<p>Can it be presumed that when, after the expiration of the term of -notice, the convention shall have been abrogated, the President will not -assert and maintain the sovereignty claimed by the United States? I have -not the honor of a personal acquaintance with him; I respect in him the -First Magistrate of the Nation; and he<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span> is universally represented as of -irreproachable character, sincere, and patriotic. Every citizen has a -right to differ with him in opinion: no one has that of supposing that -he says one thing and means another. I feel an intimate conviction of -his entire sincerity.</p> - -<p>Is it possible that any one, who does not labor under a singular -illusion, can believe that England will yield to threats and defiance -that which she has refused to concede to our arguments? Reverse the -case: Suppose for a moment that Great Britain was the aggressor, and had -given the notice; declaring, at the same time, that, at the expiration -of the year, she would assume exclusive sovereignty over the whole -country, and oppose the exercise of any whatever by the United States: -is there any American, even amongst those who set the least value on the -Oregon territory, and are most sincerely desirous of preserving peace, -who would not at once declare that such pretension on the part of Great -Britain was outrageous and must be resisted?</p> - -<p>It is not certainly the interest of Great Britain to wage war against -the United States, and it may be fairly presumed that the British -Government has no such wish. But England is, as well as the United -States, a great, powerful, sensitive, and proud nation. Every effusion -of the British press which displays hostility to the United States, -produces an analogous sentiment, and adds new fuel to excitement in -America. A moment's reflection will enable us to judge of the inevitable -effect of an offensive and threatening act, emanating from our -Government; an act which throws, in the face of the world, the gauntlet -of defiance to Great Britain. Her claims and views, as laid down in her -statement of December, 1826, remove every doubt respecting the steps she -will take. "Great Britain claims no exclusive sovereignty over any -portion of that territory. Her present claim, not in respect to any -part, but to the whole, is limited to a right of joint occupancy in -common with other States, leaving the right of exclusive dominion in -abeyance. * * * * The pretensions of Great Britain tend to the mere -maintenance of her own rights, <i>in resistance to the exclusive -character</i> of the pretensions of the United States. * * * * These rights -embrace the right to navigate the waters of those countries,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span> <i>the right -to settle in and over any part of them</i>, and the right freely to trade -with the inhabitants and occupiers of the same. It is fully <i>admitted</i> -that the <i>United States possess the same rights</i>. But beyond these -rights, they possess none. To the interests and establishments which -British industry and enterprise have created Great Britain owes -protection. <i>That protection will be given</i>, both as regards settlement -and freedom of trade and navigation, with every attention not to -infringe the co-ordinate rights of the United States."</p> - -<p>Thus, the United States declare that they give notice of the abrogation -of the convention, with the avowed determination of asserting their -assumed right of absolute and <i>exclusive sovereignty</i> over the whole -territory of Oregon. And Great Britain has explicitly declared that her -pretensions were, <i>in resistance</i> to the <i>exclusive</i> character of those -of the United States; and that protection will be given both as regards -settlement and freedom of trade and navigation to the interests and -establishments which British industry and enterprise have created.</p> - -<p>How war can be avoided, if both Powers persist in their conflicting -determinations, is incomprehensible. Under such circumstances -negotiation is morally impossible during the year following the notice. -To give that notice, with the avowed determination to assume exclusive -sovereignty at the end of the year, is a decisive, most probably an -irretrievable, step. "After that period the United States cannot abandon -their right of sovereignty without a sacrifice of national honor."</p> - -<p>The question of sovereignty has never been decided. Simply to give -notice of the abrogation of the convention, would leave the question in -the same situation: it would remain in abeyance. But when the President -has recommended that the notice should be given with the avowed object -of assuming exclusive sovereignty, an Act of Congress, in compliance -with his recommendation, necessarily implies an approbation of the -object for which it is given. If the notice should be given, the only -way to avoid that implication and its fatal consequences, is to insert -in it, an explicit declaration, that the sovereignty shall not be -assumed. But then why give the notice at all? A postponement is far -preferable, unless<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span> some other advantage shall be obtained by the -abrogation of the convention. This must be examined, and it is necessary -to inquire whether any and what measures may be adopted, without any -violation of the convention, that will preserve the rights and -strengthen the position of the United States.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span></p> - -<h2>NUMBER IV.</h2> - -<p>The acts which the government of the United States may do, in conformity -with the convention, embrace two objects: the measures applicable to the -territory within their acknowledged limits which may facilitate and -promote migration; and those which are necessary for the protection of -their citizens residing in the Oregon territory.</p> - -<p>It is a remarkable fact that, although the convention has now been in -force twenty-seven years, Congress has actually done nothing with -respect to either of those objects. Enterprising individuals have, -without any aid or encouragement by Government, opened a wagon-road -eighteen hundred miles in length, through an arid or mountainous region, -and made settlements on or near the shores of the Pacific, without any -guaranty for the possession of the land improved by their labors. Even -the attempt to carry on an inland trade with the Indians of Oregon has -been defeated, by the refusal to allow a drawback of the high duties -imposed on the importation of foreign goods absolutely necessary for -that commerce. Thus the fur trade has remained engrossed by the Hudson -Bay Company; missionaries were, till very lately, almost the only -citizens of the United States to be found in Oregon; the United States, -during the whole of that period, have derived no other advantage from -the convention than the reservation of their rights, and the express -provision that these should in no way be affected by the continuance of -the British factories in the territory. And, now that the tide of -migration has turned in their favor, they are suddenly invited to assume -a hostile position, to<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span> endure the calamities and to run the chances and -consequences of war, in order to gain an object which natural and -irresistible causes, if permitted to operate, cannot fail ultimately to -attain.</p> - -<p>The measures applicable to the territory within the acknowledged limits -of the U. States have generally been recommended by the President. A -very moderate appropriation will be sufficient to improve the most -difficult portions of the road: and block-houses or other temporary -works, erected in proper places and at convenient distances, and -garrisoned by a portion of the intended additional force, will protect -and facilitate the progress of the emigrants. However uninviting may be -the vast extent of prairies, destitute of timber, which intervene -between the western boundary of the State of Missouri and the country -bordering on the Stony Mountains, it seems impossible that there should -not be found some more favored spots where settlements may be formed. If -these were selected for military posts, and donations of land were made -to actual settlers in their vicinity, a series of villages, though -probably not a continuity of settlements, would soon arise through the -whole length of the road. The most important place, that which is most -wanted, either as a place of rest for the emigrants, or for military -purposes, is one in the immediate vicinity of the Stony Mountains. -Reports speak favorably of the fertility of the soil in some of the -valleys of the upper waters, within our limits—of Bear's river, of the -Rio Colorado, and of some of the northern branches of the river Platte. -There, also, the seat of justice might be placed of the new territory, -whose courts should have superior jurisdiction over Oregon.</p> - -<p>The measures which the United States have a right to carry into effect -within the territory of Oregon must now be considered.</p> - -<p>The only positive condition of the convention is, that the territory in -question shall, together with its harbors, bays, and creeks, and the -navigation of all rivers within the same, be free and open to vessels, -citizens, and subjects of the two Powers.</p> - -<p>For the construction put on this article by Great Britain, it is -necessary to recur again to the statement of her claim, as given by -herself, and to her own acts subsequent to the convention.</p> - -<p>The acts of England, subsequent to the convention of 1818, are<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span> to be -found in the various charters of the Hudson Bay Company (observing that -some of their most important provisions, though of a much earlier date, -stand unrepealed), and in the act of Parliament of the year 1821, which -confirms and extends a prior one of the year 1803. It must also be -recollected that, by grants or acts subsequent to the convention, the -ancient Hudson Bay Company and the Northwest Company of Montreal have -been united together, preserving the name of Hudson Bay Company.</p> - -<p>This Company was and remains a body corporate and politic, with -provisions for the election of a Governor and other officers, who direct -its business; and amongst other powers, the Company is empowered to -build fortifications for the defence of its possessions, as well as to -make war or peace with all nations or people, not Christian, inhabiting -their territories, which now embrace the entire Oregon. By the act of -Parliament of 1821, the jurisdiction of the courts of Upper Canada is -extended, in all civil and criminal cases, to the Oregon territory; -provision is made for the appointment of justices of the peace within -the said territory, with a limited jurisdiction, and power to act as -Commissioners in certain cases, and to convey offenders to Upper Canada.</p> - -<p>It must also be observed that, although the Company is forbidden to -claim any exclusive trade with the Indians, to the prejudice or -exclusion of any citizen of the United States who may be engaged in the -same trade, yet the jurisdiction above mentioned is, by the letter of -the act, extended to any persons whatsoever residing or being within the -said territory. The British Plenipotentiaries did, however, explicitly -declare, in the course of the negotiations of 1826-1827, that the act -had no other object but the maintenance of order amongst British -subjects, and had never been intended to apply to citizens of the United -States.</p> - -<p>It is perfectly clear that, since it has been fully admitted that the -United States possess the same rights over the territory as Great -Britain, they are fully authorized, under the convention, to enjoy all -the rights which Great Britain claims for herself, and to exercise that -jurisdiction which she has assumed as being consistent with the -convention.</p> - -<p>The citizens of the United States have, therefore, at this time a<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span> full -and acknowledged right to navigate the waters of the Oregon territory, -<i>to settle in and over any part of it</i>, and freely to trade with the -inhabitants and occupiers of the same. And the Government of the United -States is likewise fully authorized to incorporate any company or -association of men for the purpose of trading or of occupying and -settling the country; to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of any of -its territories lying within its acknowledged limits, in all civil and -criminal cases, to the territory aforesaid; to appoint within the same -justices of the peace and such other officers as may be necessary for -carrying the jurisdiction into effect; and also to make war and peace -with the Indian inhabitants of the territory, including the incidental -power to appoint agents for that purpose.</p> - -<p>On the other hand, it seems to be understood that, so long as the -convention remains in force, neither Government shall lay duties in the -Territory on tonnage, merchandise, or commerce; nor exercise exclusive -jurisdiction over any portion of it; and that the citizens and subjects -of the two Powers, residing in or removing to the territory, shall be -amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country respectively.</p> - -<p>It has been contended by the British Government that the establishment -of any military post, or the introduction of any regular force under a -national flag, by either Power, would be an act of exclusive -sovereignty, which could not be permitted to either whilst the -sovereignty remained in abeyance. Under existing circumstances, it is -believed that such an act would be highly dangerous, and prove -unfavorable to the United States.</p> - -<p>But the establishment by the United States of a Territorial Government -over Oregon is also objected to on the same principle. The want of such -government appears to be the only serious inconvenience attending a -continuance of the convention, and requires special consideration.</p> - -<p>The United States have the same right as Great Britain, and are equally -bound, to protect their citizens residing in the Oregon territory, in -the exercise of all the rights secured to them by the convention. It has -been fully admitted that these rights embrace the right to settle in and -over any part of the territory, and that they<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> are to be, in all cases -whatever, amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country. The -subjects of Great Britain, who are not in the employ of the Hudson Bay -Company, are forbidden to trade with the natives; and the company does -in fact control and govern all the British subjects residing in the -territory. This gives a strong guaranty against the violation, by rash -individuals, of the rights of the citizens of the United States. Should -any of them, however, be disturbed in the exercise of their legitimate -rights, and the company should be unable or unwilling to relieve and -indemnify them, the United States would be justly entitled to appeal to -the British Government for the redress of a violation of rights secured -by the convention; for the British Government has preserved a control -over the Hudson Bay Company, and does in fact, through it, govern the -British subjects who reside in the territory.</p> - -<p>The United States are placed, in that respect, in a very different -situation. It is not believed that the General Government is authorized -to incorporate, as a political body, a commercial company, with such -powers as would give it an efficient control over the private citizens -residing in the territory. Such delegation of powers, either by any of -the States or by Congress, is wholly inconsistent with our institutions. -The United States may indeed give to their citizens in Oregon a regular -and complete judiciary system; and they may also extend to them, as the -British Government has done on its part, the laws of an adjacent -territory. But an executive local power is wanted in this case, as it is -everywhere else, under any form of government whatever, to cause the -laws to be executed, and to have that general control which is now -exercised, through the Hudson Bay Company, by the British Government. -There are, besides, various acts of a public though local nature, such -as opening roads, making bridges, erecting block-houses for protection -against the natives, providing for the destitute, &c., all which are -performed by the Hudson Bay Company, and cannot be accomplished by -insulated individuals, bound by no legal association or government.</p> - -<p>Whether any measures may be devised, other than a territorial -government, that will be sufficient for the purpose intended;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span> whether -all the American citizens residing in Oregon might not be incorporated -and made a body politic, with powers equivalent to those vested in the -Hudson Bay Company, and with the reservation by the General Government -of a check or control analogous to that reserved by the Government of -Great Britain, are questions worthy of serious consideration. But Great -Britain has the same interest as the United States to prevent collision -during the continuance of the convention; and it is believed that, if -negotiations should be renewed, with an equal and sincere desire on both -sides to preserve friendly relations, there would be no difficulty at -this time in coming to an understanding on the subject. It would seem -sufficient that this should be accompanied with provisions, preventing -the possibility of the powers exercised by the United States being ever -applied to British subjects, and with an explicit declaration that these -powers should never be construed as an admission by Great Britain of any -claim of the United States to exclusive sovereignty.</p> - -<p>There is another important subject which has not, it is believed, ever -been discussed by the two Powers. This is the claim to the ownership of -the places settled and improved under the convention. It seems to me -that, on the principles of both natural and international law, these -rights, to a defined extent, should be respected by each Power -respectively, whose sovereignty over the portion of the territory in -which such improved settlements may be situated will ultimately be -recognized. It appears also that the United States may, in conformity -with the convention, and without affecting in any shape the claims -advanced by Great Britain, pass a law declaring that they abandon or -grant without warranty, to such of their citizens as shall have made -actual and bonâ fide settlements in any part of Oregon, under the -convention, all the rights of and claims to the ownership of the soil, -on which such settlements shall have been made, which the United States -may now or hereafter claim or acquire: limiting and defining the extent -of the grant in the same manner as would be done if such grant was -absolute; and promising that the title should be confirmed, in case and -whenever the sovereignty of the United States was recognized or asserted -and maintained.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span></p><p>The prolongation, in 1827, of the convention of 1818, was evidently -intended as a temporary measure, since it was made revocable at the will -of either party. The plenipotentiaries of the two Powers had been unable -to agree on the terms of a definitive arrangement, or even in defining -with precision the conditions on which the convention of 1818 might be -continued for a determinate period. It will be seen, by reference to the -protocols and correspondence, that, although it was generally admitted -that neither party ought during such continuance to exercise any -exclusive sovereignty over the territory, the American Plenipotentiary -declined to agree to any convention containing an express provision to -that effect, or accompanied by the insertion in the protocol of a -declaration for the same purpose by the British Plenipotentiaries. The -reason was not only because an exclusive right over Astoria and its -dependencies was claimed by the United States, but principally because -it was anticipated that, in order to have in fact an authority equal to -that exercised by the Hudson Bay Company, it would become necessary for -the United States to perform acts which the British Government might -contend to be forbidden by such express provision or declaration. The -consequence was, that the convention recognizes some certain rights, and -imposes no positive restrictions but only such, as may be supposed to be -implied in the clause which declares, that nothing contained in it -should be construed to impair or affect the claims of either party. The -probability that it might become necessary for the United States to -establish a territory or some sort of government over their own citizens -was explicitly avowed; the deficiencies of the renewed convention of -1827, and the inconveniences which might ensue, were fully understood; -and the continuance of that of 1818, made revokable at will, was agreed -on, with the hope that the two Powers would embrace an early -opportunity, if not to make a definitive arrangement, at least to -substitute for the convention another, defining with precision the acts -which both parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform so long as -the sovereignty remained in abeyance.</p> - -<p>The inconveniences alluded to have been fairly stated in this paper, and -some of the means by which they may be avoided<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span> have been suggested. It -is not, therefore, on account of the intrinsic value of the convention -that its abrogation is objectionable and dangerous. It is because -nothing is substituted in its place; it is because, if the two Powers -are not yet prepared to make a definitive agreement, it becomes the duty -of both Governments, instead of breaking the only barrier which still -preserves peace, to substitute for the existing convention one adapted -to the present state of things, and which shall prevent collisions until -the question of sovereignty shall have been settled. The inconveniences -which were only anticipated have become tangible, from the time when -American citizens, whom the United States are bound to protect, began to -make settlements in the territory of Oregon. The sudden transition, from -an agreement however defective to a promiscuous occupancy, without any -provisions whatever that may prevent collisions, is highly dangerous. -When this is accompanied by an avowed determination on the part of the -United States to assume that exclusive sovereignty which Great Britain -has positively declared she would resist, War becomes inevitable.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span></p> - -<h2>NUMBER V.</h2> - -<p>It may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of certainty, the -number of citizens of the United States who, aided by these various -measures, will, within any given period, remove to the territory beyond -the Stony Mountains. It is certain that this number will annually -increase, and keep pace with the rapid increase of the population of the -Western States. It cannot be doubted that ultimately, and at no very -distant time, they will have possession of all that is worth being -occupied in the territory. On what principle, then, will the right of -sovereignty be decided?</p> - -<p>It may, however, be asked whether, if this be the inevitable consequence -of the continuance of the convention, England will not herself give -notice that it shall be abrogated. It might be sufficient to answer that -we must wait till that notice shall have been given, and the subsequent -measures which England means to adopt shall have been made known to us, -before we assume rashly a hostile position. The United States may govern -themselves; although they may irritate Great Britain, they cannot -control the acts of her Government. The British Government will do -whatever it may think proper; but for the consequences that may ensue it -will be alone responsible. Should the abrogation of the convention on -her part be followed by aggressive measures; should she assume exclusive -possession over Oregon or any part of it, as it is now proposed that the -United States should do, America will then be placed in a defensive -position; the war, if any should ensue, will be one unprovoked by her, a -war purely of<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span> defence, which will be not only sustained, but approved -by the unanimous voice of the nation. We may, however, be permitted to -examine what motive could impel England, what interest she might have, -either in annulling the convention or in adopting aggressive measures.</p> - -<p>When it is recommended that the United States should give notice of the -abrogation of the convention, it is with the avowed object of adopting -measures forbidden by the convention, and which Great Britain has -uniformly declared she would resist. But, according to the view of the -subject uniformly taken by her, from the first time she asserted the -rights she claims to this day, the simple abrogation of her convention -with the United States will produce no effect whatever on the rights, -relations, and position of the two Powers. Great Britain, from the date -at least of Cook's third voyage, and prior to the Nootka convention, did -deny the exclusive claim of Spain, and assert that her subjects had, in -common with those of other States, the right freely to trade with the -natives, and to settle in any part of the Northwestern coast of America, -not already occupied by the subjects of Spain. The Nootka convention was -nothing more than the acquiescence, on the part of Spain, in the claims -thus asserted by Great Britain, leaving the sovereignty in abeyance. And -the convention between the United States and Great Britain is nothing -more nor less than a temporary recognition of the same principle, so far -as the two parties were concerned. England had, prior to that -convention, fully admitted that the United States possessed the same -rights as were claimed by her. The abrogation of the convention by her -will leave those rights precisely in the same situation as they now -stand, and as they stood prior to the convention. It cannot therefore be -perceived what possible benefit could accrue to Great Britain from her -abrogation of that instrument; unless, discarding all her former -declarations, denying all that she has asserted for more than sixty -years, retracting her admission of the equal rights of the United States -to trade, to occupy, and to make settlements in any part of the country, -she should, without cause or pretext, assume, as is now threatened on -the part of the United States, exclusive sovereignty over the whole or -part of the territory. It may<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span> be permitted to believe that the British -Government entertains no such intention.</p> - -<p>It may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no -disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She has, -indeed, declared most explicitly her determination to protect the -British interests that had been created by British enterprise and -capital in that quarter. But, by giving a monopoly of the fur trade to -the Hudson Bay Company, she has virtually arrested private efforts on -the part of British subjects. Her Government has been in every other -respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless about the ultimate -fate of Oregon. The country has been open to her enterprise at least -fifty years; and there are no other British settlements or interests -within its limits than those vested in, or connected with the Hudson Bay -Company. Whether the British Government will hereafter make any effort -towards that object cannot be known; but as long as this right to -colonize Oregon shall remain common to both Powers, the United States -have nothing to apprehend from the competition.</p> - -<p>The negotiations on that subject between the two Governments have been -carried on, on both sides, with perfect candor. The views and intentions -of both parties were mutually communicated without reserve. The -conviction on the part of America that the country must ultimately be -occupied and settled by her agricultural emigrants, was used as an -argument why, in case of a division of the territory, the greater share -should be allotted to the United States. The following quotation, from -the American statement of the case of December, 1826, proves that this -expectation was fairly avowed at the time:</p> - -<blockquote><p>"If the present state of occupancy is urged on the part of Great -Britain, the probability of the manner in which the territory west -of the Rocky Mountains must be settled belongs also essentially to -the subject. Under whatever nominal sovereignty that country may be -placed, and whatever its ultimate destinies may be, it is nearly -reduced to a certainty that it will be almost exclusively peopled -by the surplus population of the United States. The distance from -Great Britain, and the expense incident to emigration, forbid the -expectation of any being practicable from that quarter but on a -comparatively small scale. Allowing the rate of increase to be the -same in<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span> the United States and in the North American British -possessions, the difference in the actual population of both is -such that the progressive rate which would, within forty years, add -three millions to these, would within the same time give a positive -increase of more than twenty millions to the United States. And if -circumstances, arising from localities and habits, have given -superior facilities to British subjects of extending their commerce -with the natives, and to that expansion which has the appearance, -and the appearance only, of occupancy, the slower but sure progress -and extension of an agricultural population will be regulated by -distance, by natural obstacles, and by its own amount."</p></blockquote> - -<p>There was no exaggeration in that comparative view; the superiority of -the progressive increase of population in the United States was, on the -contrary, underrated. The essential difference is, that migration from -the United States to Oregon is the result of purely natural causes, -whilst England, in order to colonize that country, must resort to -artificial means. The number of American emigrants may not, during the -first next ensuing years, be as great as seems to be anticipated. It -will at first be limited by the amount of provisions with which the -earlier settlers can supply them during the first year, and till they -can raise a crop themselves; and the rapidity with which a new country -may be settled is also lessened where maize cannot be profitably -cultivated.</p> - -<p>Whether more or less prompt, the result is nevertheless indubitable. The -snowball sooner or later becomes an avalanche: where the cultivator of -the soil has once made a permanent establishment game and hunters -disappear; within a few years the fur trade will have died its natural -death, and no vestige shall remain, at least south of Fuca's Straits, of -that temporary occupancy, of those vested British interests, which the -British Government is now bound to protect. When the whole territory -shall have thus fallen in the possession of an agricultural industrious -population, the question recurs, by what principle will then the right -of sovereignty, all along kept in abeyance, be determined?</p> - -<p>The answer is obvious. In conformity with natural law, with that right -of occupancy for which Great Britain has always contended, the occupiers -of the land, the inhabitants of the country, from whatever quarter they -may have come, will be of right as<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span> well as in fact the sole legitimate -sovereigns of Oregon. Whenever sufficiently numerous, they will decide -whether it suits them best to be an independent nation or an integral -part of our great Republic. There cannot be the slightest apprehension -that they will choose to become a dependent colony; for they will be the -most powerful nation bordering on the American shores of the Pacific, -and will not stand in need of protection against either their Russian or -Mexican neighbors. Viewed as an abstract proposition, Mr. Jefferson's -opinion appears correct, that it will be best for both the Atlantic and -the Pacific American nations, whilst entertaining the most friendly -relations, to remain independent rather than to be united under the same -Government. But this conclusion is premature; and the decision must be -left to posterity.</p> - -<p>It has been attempted in these papers to prove—</p> - -<p>1. That neither of the two Powers has an absolute and indisputable right -to the whole contested territory; that each may recede from its extreme -pretensions without impairing national honor or wounding national pride; -and that the way is therefore still open for a renewal of negotiations.</p> - -<p>2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice of the -abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert and -maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty over -the whole territory; that Great Britain is fully committed on that -point, and has constantly and explicitly declared that such an attempt -would be resisted, and the British interests in that quarter be -protected; and that war is therefore the unavoidable consequence of such -a decisive step—a war not only necessarily calamitous and expensive, -but in its character aggressive, not justifiable by the magnitude and -importance of its object, and of which the chances are uncertain.</p> - -<p>3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in a great -degree be avoided; that, if no war should ensue, they will be the same, -if not greater, without than under a convention; that not a single -object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, unless it be to -do something not permitted by the present convention, and therefore -provoking resistance and productive of war. If<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span> a single other advantage -can be gained by giving the notice, let it be stated.</p> - -<p>4th. That it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, whether -under or without a convention, the United States have the same rights as -herself, to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and make settlements in -and over every part of the territory; and that, if this state of things -be not disturbed, natural causes must necessarily give the whole -territory to the United States.</p> - -<p>Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject may be -postponed for the present; that Government should not commit itself by -any premature act or declaration; that, instead of increasing the -irritation and excitement which exist on both sides, time be given for -mutual reflection, and for the subdual or subsidence of angry and -violent feelings. Then, and then only, can the deliberate opinion of the -American people on this momentous question be truly ascertained. It is -not perceived how the postponement for the present and for a time can, -in any shape or in the slightest degree, injure the United States.</p> - -<p>It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has often abused -her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner than by the -impressment of seamen, whether American, English, or other foreigners, -sailing under and protected by the American flag. I am not aware that -there has ever been any powerful nation, even in modern times, and -professing Christianity, which has not occasionally abused its power. -The United States, who always appealed to justice during their early -youth, seem, as their strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a -similar disposition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations, -might not the two nations, by their united efforts, promote a great -object, and worthy of their elevated situation?</p> - -<p>With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which extends from -42 to 54° 40´ north latitude, all the American shores of the Pacific -Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied, on the north -by the factories of the Russian Fur Company, southwardly by -semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europeans of Spanish descent and of -native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened, -intelligent, and liberal men, have<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span> heretofore failed in the attempt to -establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty, -preserve order, and protect persons and property. It is in Oregon alone -that we may hope to see a portion of the western shores of America -occupied and inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may -exercise a moral influence over her less favored neighbors, and extend -to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that -account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territory may -not be divided. The United States and England are the only Powers who -lay any claim to that country, the only nations which may and must -inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in the power of either Government to -prevent this taking place; but it depends upon them, whether they shall -unite in promoting the object, or whether they shall bring on both -countries the calamities of an useless war, which may retard but not -prevent the ultimate result. It matters but little whether the -inhabitants shall come from England or from the United States. It would -seem that more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a -period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to the -population of the United States by migrations from the dominions of -Great Britain; yet, since permitted by both Powers, they may be presumed -to be beneficial to both. The emigrants to Oregon, whether Americans or -English, will be united together by the community of language and -literature, of the principles of law, and of all the fundamental -elements of a similar civilisation.</p> - -<p>The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the North-west -Coast of America is all that England can expect, all perhaps that the -United States ought to desire. It seems almost incredible that, whilst -that object may be attained by simply not impeding the effect of natural -causes, two kindred nations, having such powerful motives to remain at -peace, and standing at the head of European and American civilisation, -should, in this enlightened age, give to the world the scandalous -spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an -unnatural and an unnecessary war; that they should apply all their -faculties and exhaust their resources in inflicting, each on the other, -every injury in their power, and for what purpose? The certain -consequence, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>independent of all the direct calamities and miseries of -war, will be a mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate -fate of Oregon will be the same as if the war had not taken place.</p> - -<hr /> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span></p> - -<h2>APPENDIX.</h2> - -<p class="bold">WAR EXPENSES.</p> - -<p>Those expenses may be arranged under three heads: 1st. Such as are of a -permanent nature, and should be considered as belonging to the Peace -establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which should be adopted when -there is an impending danger of war. 3dly. Those which actual war -renders necessary.</p> - -<p>To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that -require considerable time to be executed, and cannot, without great -difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are fortifications, -building ships of war including steamers, accumulating materials for the -same purpose, Navy Yards, providing a sufficient artillery, and other -important objects of the ordnance department. It may be taken for -granted, that Government has done, or will do all that is necessary and -practicable in that respect.</p> - -<p>The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there is danger -of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety of opinions must -be expected. It has been repeatedly asserted, that such is the structure -of our Government, that it never will or can prepare for war, till after -it has actually commenced; that is to say, that, because Congress was -dilatory in making effectual provision for carrying on the last war -against Great Britain, and because the Administration, at the time when -it was declared, was<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span> inefficient and not well calculated for conducting -it, the United States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement -of every war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be -induced to put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other -use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were -formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people for being -sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. They must be -told the whole truth; and if they are really in favor of war, they will -cheerfully sustain Government in all the measures necessary to carry it -into effect. The frank annunciation of the necessity of such measures is -called, "creating a panic." It is not the first time that under similar -circumstances the same language has been held. If there be no danger or -intention of making war, those create a panic, who proclaim a -determination to assert the exclusive sovereignty of the United States -over the whole contested territory, with the full knowledge that Great -Britain has uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any -such attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the -attempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite for -carrying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the public -sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have become -impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxation, for which -the Nation had not been prepared.</p> - -<p>I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military character, -otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts.</p> - -<p>The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 1812, -were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a sufficient -regular force. Government had obtained a correct statement of the -regular force of the British in Canada, with the exception of the -garrison of Quebec. This last was estimated at about three thousand men, -and could not be lessened without great inconvenience and some danger. -The regular force at Montreal, St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to -1130 men; that in the whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an -additional military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th of -January, 1812. The selection of the officers was not completed before -the termination of that year; the recruiting service was not organized<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span> -in time; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most -moderate calculation; and the total number recruited was so small, as to -render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of the most -important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as was the force -by which they were defended. The volunteer act was also extremely -unproductive. At that time the treasury was amply supplied; and the want -was not that of money, but of a regular force.</p> - -<p>Such force cannot be raised without money; and yet it will be admitted -that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress to lay internal -taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. In order to provide -means for having an additional regular force ready to act as soon as -actual war takes place, a loan and Treasury notes must be resorted to. -But it is deemed absolutely necessary, that the internal taxes should be -imposed simultaneously with the declaration of war, and that provision -should be made for their immediate collection. With the exception of the -act for doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any -law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year after -the declaration of the last war; nor did it even lay a second direct tax -in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit was ruined, after -Treasury notes which were had due remained unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas -had been placed at the head of the Treasury, that at last the laws for -imposing a double direct tax, for increasing the rate of the existing -internal duties, and for laying new ones, were enacted. The peace was -ratified immediately after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000 -dollars were paid in the Treasury before the end of the war, on account -of the direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were -received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 1815, -1816 and 1817.</p> - -<p>The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an immediate -collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing such taxes -shall have been passed, are those on which I may speak with confidence. -These consist simply in a previous organization of the machinery -necessary for the collection of every species of internal taxes, and the -assessment of a direct tax.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span> The proper selection of the numerous -officers necessary for the collection always consumes several months. A -previous selection and appointment of those officers would obviate that -difficulty, and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should -receive no pay till called into actual service; this would be the -natural consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this -being a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary -measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury should, -at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with all the -necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts.</p> - -<p>The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every individual -who possesses such property, is the only operation which requires -considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. This cannot be -otherwise obviated than by making that assessment a preparatory measure, -to be completed before actual war takes place.</p> - -<p>In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I -undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the several -Counties and State Districts in each State; and the Act of 2d August, -1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of dollars, was passed -in conformity with that apportionment The process was easy for every -State in which there was a direct State tax; but though derived from the -best data that could be collected, it was defective and partly arbitrary -for the States in which there was no State tax. As there is at present -hardly any (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this -mode may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This will -reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota of each -County or District, on the several individuals liable to the tax, and -the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding probably two -hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and correct assessment will, of -course, be provided for, with respect to the direct taxes which may be -laid after the first year of the war.</p> - -<p>The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove useless if -the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war should not take -place; but certainly this is too small an item to deserve consideration.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span></p><p>This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary in -order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other internal -taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have been imposed by -Congress.</p> - -<p>The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a war with -England, and the resources for defraying them, are the next objects of -inquiry.</p> - -<p>It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the -expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrearages due -on account of the military services at the time when the peace was -ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public documents -which I have seen. Although the laws show the number of men voted, that -of those actually raised has never to my knowledge been officially -stated. There can be no doubt that the want of a proper organization -increased the amount of expenditure much beyond that which would have -been sufficient under a regular and efficient system. This has -undoubtedly been much improved; yet the expenses incurred in the -Seminole war, compared with the number of men employed and that of the -hostile Indians, show that either there are still some defects in the -organization, or that there were great abuses in the execution.</p> - -<p>The payments from the Treasury for the military department, embracing -only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, and exclusive of -those for fortifications and the Indian department, amounted for the -year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the year 1814 to 20,508,000 -dollars. The disbursements for the navy are stated at 6,446,000 and -7,311,000 dollars for these two years respectively. By comparing the -reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817, -it would appear that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded -ten millions of dollars: and it seems certain that the actual war -expenses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of -dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that year -amounted to 35,000 men.</p> - -<p>The population of the United States has nearly trebled during the -thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the last war -against England was declared. Their wealth and<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span> resources have increased -in the same ratio; and that, in case of war, these should be brought -into action as promptly as possible, admits of no doubt. Once engaged in -the conflict, to make the war as efficient as possible will shorten its -duration, and can alone secure honorable terms of peace. I have not the -documents necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual -expenses of a war with Great Britain; and if I had, I could not at this -time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely necessary in order -to draw correct inferences. Taking only a general view of the subject, -and considering the great difference of expense in keeping a navy in -active service, between one of eight frigates and one of ten ships of -the line, fourteen frigates and a competent number of steamers; that -Texas and Oregon are additional objects of defence; that the extensive -system of fortifications which has been adopted will require about -fifteen thousand additional men; and that, in order to carry a -successful and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the -British dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely -necessary; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that, -after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the country -shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and naval -expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. To this -must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, for the year -ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near fifteen millions, but -which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes may be reduced to eleven -millions and a half. The gross annual expenses for all objects will be -estimated at seventy-seven millions; to be increased annually by the -annual interest on each successive loan.</p> - -<p>In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans required to -defray that expense, the first question which arises, is the diminution -of the revenue derived from customs, which will be the necessary -consequence of the war.</p> - -<p>The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source of -revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814, -respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars; and the -nett revenue which accrued during those three years <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>respectively -amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. From the 1st -of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was doubled; and in -order to compare these receipts with those collected in peace time, they -must be reduced for those three years respectively, to 7,470,000,<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> -6,600,000 and 3,000,000; or, if the revenue accrued be compared (which -is the correct mode), to 9,850,000,<a name="FNanchor_3a_3a" id="FNanchor_3a_3a"></a><a href="#Footnote_3a_3a" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars. -At that time the duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed, -collected on an average only six or eight months later; and the -unexpected importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American -vessels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the -declaration of war and to the act which doubled the rate of duties, -swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only in 1814 -that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived from that source -was felt.</p> - -<p>The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage employed in -the foreign trade of the United States is strongly exhibited by the -following statement:</p> - -<table summary="American and foreign tonnage"> - <tr> - <td class="center">Tonnage in foreign trade, U. S. </td> - <td class="center"> American ves.</td> - <td class="center"> Foreign ves.</td> - <td class="center"> Total.</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="center">Year 1811</td> - <td class="center">948,207</td> - <td class="center"> 33,203</td> - <td class="center">981,450</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="center"> " 1812</td> - <td class="center">667,999</td> - <td class="center"> 47,099</td> - <td class="center">715,098</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="center"> " 1813</td> - <td class="center">237,348</td> - <td class="center">113,827</td> - <td class="center">351,175</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td class="center"> " 1814</td> - <td class="center"> 59,626</td> - <td class="center"> 48,302</td> - <td class="center">107,928</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 1814, -Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of Europe, and that -these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly ventured to trade with us.</p> - -<p>The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, as well -as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the eleven years 1801 -to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual average of about -12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven years the average amount of -tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States was 943,670 -tons, of which 844,170 were in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels.</p> - -<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span></p><p>Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had been -reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if compared -according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importations), the -tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States to nearly one -ninth; and that of the American vessels employed in that trade, to one -fourteenth part of their respective average amount during the eleven -years of peace.</p> - -<p>The small American navy did during the last war with England all and -more than could have been expected. The fact was established to the -satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain herself, that the navy of -the United States, with a parity of force, was at least equal to that of -England. But the prodigious numerical superiority of the British navy -rendered it impossible for a few frigates to protect the commerce of the -United States, which was accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten -ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller -vessels. The great numerical superiority of the British navy still -continues; and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion -will be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in -our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force that -can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance into -consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, though -much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. Although the -actual diminution which will be experienced is altogether conjectural, I -think that no great error is to be apprehended in estimating the revenue -from customs, after the first year of the war, at about one half of its -present amount; and the whole revenue from that source, from the sale of -lands and all the branches of the existing income, at fourteen millions -of dollars; leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions, -besides the interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be -estimated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However -energetic and efficient Congress and the Executive may be, the resources -and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought forth: the -expenses will therefore be less during the first year, after which the -whole amount will be required and will be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>annually wanted. In reference -therefore to the second year of the war—</p> - -<table summary="expenses"> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">Assuming the total war expenses at</td> - <td>$65,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">All the others at</td> - <td>12,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td> </td> - <td class="left">In all,</td> - <td class="center">$77,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">From which deduct for existing revenue,</td> - <td>14,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">To be provided for by taxes and loans,</td> - <td>$63,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">On the principle that the amount of annual taxes</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">should be at least equal to the expenses of</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">the peace establishment and the interest on</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">the war loans, annual peace expenses at</td> - <td>27,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">And for interest on the loans of 1st and 2d years,</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">viz. 1st year 25, and 2d year 45 millions at</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">7 per cent.</td> - <td>5,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td></td> - <td class="left">Together,</td> - <td class="center">$32,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">From which deduct for existing revenue,</td> - <td>14,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">Leaves to be provided for by new taxes, at least</td> - <td>$18,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">And by loans,</td> - <td>45,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3"></td> - <td>$63,000,000</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>The estimate of 5,000,000 dollars for the interest of the loans the -second year after the war, is founded on the supposition that the direct -and other internal taxes or duties laid for the first year, together -with the existing revenue, and twenty-five millions borrowed by loans or -Treasury notes, will be sufficient to defray the expense incurred prior -to and during the first year of the war. The deficiency in the regular -force for that year must be supplied by large drafts of militia, which -will be as expensive at least as the regular soldiers whose place they -will supply.</p> - -<p>But it appears very doubtful whether such a large sum as forty-five -millions can be raised annually by loans and Treasury notes. It is -necessary in the first place to correct some erroneous opinions -respecting the extent to which these notes may be kept in circulation, -and the legitimate objects to which they may be applied.</p> - -<p>The Treasury notes were first introduced on my suggestion,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span> which was no -new discovery, since they are a mere transcript of the Exchequer Bills -of Great Britain. As these have been resorted to for more than a -century, and have never become there a portion of the ordinary currency, -the extent to which they may be used for other purposes is well -ascertained, and bears always a certain ratio to the wealth of the -country and to the revenue of the State. Whether issued to the bank as -an anticipation of the revenue, or used by capitalists for short -investments, the gross amount has rarely exceeded twenty millions -sterling. Judging from past experience, the amount which may, in time of -war, be kept in circulation at par in the United States falls far short -of a proportionate sum.</p> - -<table summary="Treasury Notes issued"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">The amount of Treasury Notes issued during</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td class="left">the years 1812 and 1813 amounted to</td> - <td>$8,930 000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Of which there had been paid including interest </td> - <td>$4,240 000</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>The amount in actual circulation was less than five millions, and thus -far they had been kept at par.</p> - -<p>All the demands from the other departments had been met by the Treasury, -and there were but few, if any, outstanding arrears. Nothing had as yet -been collected on account of the direct tax and of the internal duties. -Besides the five millions of Treasury Notes, there had been paid into -the Treasury in the years 1812 and 1813, $28,740,000 on account of war -loans, and $22,283,000 from the customs. The balance in the Treasury -amounted to $5,196,542 on the 31st December, 1813.</p> - -<p>The amount of Treasury Notes issued during the year 1814 amounted to -near eight millions, and there had been paid off during the same year, -including interest, $2,700,000; making an addition of about five -millions and a half, and the total amount outstanding about ten millions -and a half. The receipts during that year, on account of the direct tax -and internal duties, amounted to $3,877,000, from war loans to -$15,080,000, and from customs to only six millions. Before the end of -the year, Government was unable to pay the notes which had become due. -It is perfectly clear that, if new notes could not be issued in lieu of -those which had become due, it was because they had fallen below par, -and therefore that the amount outstanding was greater than the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span> demand -for them. There was but one remedy, and it was very simple. A reduction -in that amount must be made, by funding at their market price a quantity -sufficient to re-establish the equilibrium. But all the banks west of -New England had in the meanwhile suspended their specie payments. A -period of anarchy in the currency of the country was the consequence, -and lasted till those payments were resumed in the year 1817.</p> - -<p>The result of the suspension of specie payments in England was, that the -notes of the Bank of England became in fact a legal tender and the -standard of the currency. All the other banks were obliged to keep their -own notes on a par with those of that bank; and all that was necessary -in order to prevent a depreciation, was to regulate the issues of the -Bank of England, so as to keep them at par with gold and silver. -Nevertheless, the clamor for more currency prevailed; the bank found it -very convenient and profitable to issue notes which it was not obliged -to pay, and these finally depreciated twenty-five per cent. But in the -United States the banks were under no other control than that of the -several States respectively. The consequence was, that we had fifty and -more species of local currencies, varying in value in the different -States or districts of country, and from time to time in the same -district. The banks might with facility have resumed specie payments -during the first year of peace. The efforts of the Secretary of the -Treasury to induce them to resume proved unsuccessful; and the -resumption did not take place till after a new Bank of the United States -had been organized.</p> - -<p>We have had two general suspensions of specie payments, the last at a -time of profound peace. I was then behind the scenes, had some agency in -restoring specie payments, and may speak on that subject with knowledge -and confidence. The obstacles came partly from the Banks, principally -from the Debtor interest, which excites sympathy and preponderates -throughout the United States. The mis-named Bank of the United States, -and the banks under its influence, were, it is true, a formidable -impediment; and this obstacle is now fortunately removed. Still the -continuance of specie payments stands, whenever a crisis occurs, on a -most precarious basis; and if any important place, especially New York,<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span> -happened to break, all the banks through the United States would -instantaneously follow the example. This is the most imminent danger to -which the Treasury of the United States will be exposed in time of war; -and what effect the Sub-Treasury system may produce in that respect -remains to be tested by experience.</p> - -<p>It is impossible to draw any inference respecting Treasury Notes, from -what took place in the United States during the confused state of the -currency in the years 1815 and 1816. The taxes were paid everywhere with -the cheapest local currency, in Treasury Notes only in the places where -specie payments had been continued, or where bank notes were nearly at -par. The depreciation of the Treasury Notes was arrested by the fact, -that they might at all times be converted into a six or seven per cent. -stock; but in that case they became assimilated to a direct loan. They -never can become a general currency, on account of their varying value, -so long as they bear an interest and are made payable at some future -day. In order to give them that character, they should assume that of -bank notes, bearing no interest and payable on demand. It does not -require the gift of prophecy to be able to assert that, as the wants of -Government increased, such notes would degenerate into paper money to -the utter ruin of the public credit.</p> - -<p>They may, however, be made a special currency for the purpose of paying -taxes as gold and silver, and to the exclusion of any other species of -paper currency. The amount which might be thus kept in circulation, in -addition to that wanted for short investments, would be limited by the -gross amount of the annual revenue, and bear but a small proportion to -it; since one thousand dollars, in silver or in any paper currency, are -sufficient to effect in one year fifty payments of the same amount.</p> - -<p>Although the amount kept in circulation may fluctuate according to -circumstances, the fundamental principle is, that the issue of such -notes is an anticipation of the revenue, which, after it has reached the -maximum that may be kept in circulation without being depreciated, never -can be increased. Be the amount ten or twenty millions, the anticipation -may be continued, but not renewed; it is not an annual resource, but -one, the whole amount of which never can exceed that which may be kept -in circulation.<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span> The operation consists in re-issuing annually the -amount which is paid off in the year. Whenever, owing to incidental -fluctuations, the amount to be redeemed by the Treasury exceeds that -which may be re-issued, the difference must be immediately funded at the -market price of the notes, so as to keep them always at par or a little -above par.</p> - -<p>It is evident, that if the direct tax and internal duties laid in -August, 1813, had been imposed in July, 1812; and if the acts of -January, 1815, which increased both, had been enacted in August, 1813; -there would have been an addition of at least eight millions to the -revenue of the years 1812 and 1813; the Treasury Notes which had become -due would have been paid, public credit would have been maintained, and -the amount of war loans lessened.</p> - -<p>The principal causes of the fall of public stocks during a war, and of -the consequent necessity of borrowing on dearer terms, are a want of -confidence in Government, and the large amount of stocks thrown in the -market beyond the natural demand for them. The effect of this last cause -is remarkably illustrated by the fluctuations in the price of the stocks -of Great Britain, where it does not appear that there ever was a want of -confidence in the ability and fidelity of Government in fulfilling its -engagements. The British three per cents. are now, and were before the -war of American Independence, and before those which had their origin in -the French revolution, near par or at par. They fell gradually during -the war of independence, and were as low as fifty-four in February, -1782. The long war with France was attended with the same result, and -the three per cents. had fallen to fifty-five in July, 1812. -Notwithstanding the deranged state of the finances of the United States -in 1814, the American stocks had not fallen in the same proportion. Such -great depreciation is the result of the long continuance of a war. No -one can say what would have been its progress, had the last war with -England continued much longer.</p> - -<p>There was not, however, at that time, at least in America, any want of -confidence in the Government: no one doubted that it would ultimately -faithfully discharge all its engagements. Although the General -Government is in no way responsible for the errors of any of the -individual States, it is nevertheless certain, that<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span> the credit of the -Union has been injured abroad by the failure of several of the States to -fulfil their engagements, and that no expectation can be entertained of -being able to borrow money in Europe. It is not less true that the -Administration will cease to enjoy the confidence of American -capitalists, if the measures it has recommended should be adopted and -productive of war. No one can doubt that, if that event should take -place, the Americans will fight in defence of their country, and none -with greater zeal and bravery than the people of the Western States. -During the last war, their militia and volunteers flocked either to the -Lakes, to New Orleans, or wherever there was danger; nor did they refuse -to take part in offensive operations, and to serve without the limits of -the United States. But men cannot, either there or elsewhere, afford to -render gratuitous services. Whether regulars, volunteers, or militia, -they must be fed, clothed, transported, supplied with arms and -artillery, and paid. There is as yet but very little active circulating -capital in the new States: they cannot lend; they, on the contrary, want -to borrow money. This can be obtained in the shape of loans only from -the capitalists of the Atlantic States. A recurrence to public documents -will show that all the loans of the last war were obtained in that -quarter.</p> - -<p>Men of property are perhaps generally more timid than others, and -certainly all the quiet people, amongst whom the public stocks are -ultimately distributed, are remarkably cautious. Prudent capitalists, -who do not speculate, and consider public stocks only as convenient and -safe investments, will not advance money to Government so long as it is -controlled by men whom they consider as reckless, and as entertaining -rather lax opinions respecting public credit. Yet money will be -obtained, but on much dearer terms than if public confidence was -unimpaired. There will always be found bold speculators, who will -advance it at a premium—enhanced by the want of competition, and -proportionate to the risks they may be supposed to incur. Independent of -this, it is most certain that the rate of interest at which loans may be -obtained, will always be increased in proportion to their magnitude. The -only ways by which these difficulties may be obviated, or at least -lessened, are perfect fidelity in fulfilling the engagements of -<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>Government; an economical, that is to say, a skilful application of the -public moneys to the most important objects, postponing all those which -are not immediately wanted, or are of inferior real utility; and an -increase of the amount of revenue derived from taxation. This has the -double advantage of diminishing the amount to be borrowed, and of -inspiring confidence to the money-lenders. In all cases, direct loans -will be preferable to, and prove a cheaper mode of raising money than -the over issues of Treasury Notes.</p> - -<p>The Act of July, 1812, which doubled the duties on importations, -afforded a resource which, on account of the high rate at this time of -those duties, cannot now be resorted to. Duties may, however, be levied -on the importation of Tea and Coffee, and perhaps some other articles -now duty free. Other modifications may be found useful, but it may be -difficult to ascertain, even without any regard to protection, what are -the rates of duties which should be imposed in time of war on the -various imported articles, in order to render the revenue derived from -that source as productive as possible.</p> - -<p>It must also be observed that if, on account of the credit then allowed -for the payment of duties on importations, the Treasury had, when the -war of 1812 commenced, a resource in the revenue previously accrued but -not yet collected, which does not now exist; on the other hand the -United States were still encumbered with a considerable portion of the -Revolutionary debt, and the payments on account of its principal and -interest amounted during the years 1812, 1813, 1814, to about -$11,000,000, whilst the annual interest on the now existing debt is less -than one million.</p> - -<p>The direct tax of the year 1815 amounted to $6,000,000, and the revenue -which accrued during the same year, on the aggregate of internal duties, -as increased or imposed at the same time, amounted to about the same -sum. That year is also the most proper for a comparative view of the -revenue derived from each object. In the subsequent years the revival of -business increased the amount derived from the duties connected with the -commerce of the country, much beyond that which could be collected in -time of war; whilst, on the other hand, the excise on spirits was much -less productive. The nett revenue derived from internal duties, which -accrued during that year was in round numbers, about<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span></p> - -<table summary="nett revenue derived from internal duties"> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Excise on spirits</td> - <td>$2,750,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Licences to retailers</td> - <td>880,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Sales at auction</td> - <td>780,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Stamp duties</td> - <td>420,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Tax on carriages</td> - <td>150,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Refined sugar</td> - <td>80,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Several manufactured articles</td> - <td>840,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Household furniture</td> - <td>20,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="2" class="left">Watches worn by individuals</td> - <td>80,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td></td> - <td>Total </td> - <td>$6,000,000</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>The three last items were those added on Mr. Dallas's recommendation to -the first items laid in 1813, but the rate of which was increased, also -on his recommendation. The manufactured articles not before taxed on -which the new duties were laid were, pig and bar iron, nails; wax and -tallow candles; hats, caps and umbrellas; paper and playing cards; -leather, saddles, bridles, boots and shoes; beer, ale and porter; snuff, -cigars and manufactured tobacco. This was the boldest measure proposed -by the Secretary, for these duties were from their nature intrinsically -obnoxious. Yet no voice was raised against them; and so far from -becoming unpopular, Mr. Dallas, by his courage and frankness, acquired a -well-earned popularity. No stronger proof can be adduced of the -propriety of telling the whole truth and placing an entire confidence in -the people.</p> - -<p>The only important measure omitted at that time, was an Act of Congress -ordering that all the Treasury notes actually due and not paid should be -immediately funded at their nominal value; that is to say, that for -every one hundred dollars in Treasury notes, the same amount of funded -stock should be issued as it was necessary to give for one hundred -dollars in gold or silver. It was impossible to obtain a regular loan in -time, and on reasonable terms, for the purpose of defraying the war -expenses of the first six months of the year 1815. There was an absolute -necessity for recurring to Treasury notes for that purpose, and the -attention of the Treasury was forcibly directed to that object. But the -first and fundamental element of public credit is the faithful and -punctual fulfilment of the public engagements; and the payment of the -Treasury notes, when becoming due, was as necessary as that of the -interest of the funded debt, which never was suspended during the war. -As an immediate and considerable issue of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>Treasury notes was absolutely -necessary, it was not sufficient that they might be convertible into a -funded stock, which was already much below par, since that would be in -fact an issue of depreciated paper. The Act should, therefore, have -pledged the public faith, that if the Treasury notes were not discharged -in specie when they became due, they should be funded at their nominal -value on the same terms as above stated. Mr. Dallas to great energy -united pre-eminent talents, he wanted only experience; and I have no -doubt that, had the war continued, he would within six months have -adopted that course. If I have alluded here to this subject, it is on -account of the primary importance, if placed hereafter in a similar -difficult position, of adhering rigorously to those principles -respecting the legitimate use of Treasury notes and the punctual -discharge of every public engagement, which are absolutely necessary for -the maintenance of public credit.</p> - -<p>Since a direct tax of six millions could be raised thirty years ago, -there can be no difficulty in raising one of nine millions at the very -beginning of the war: this must be gradually increased, but would be -most heavily felt if beyond eighteen millions. Should an equal sum be -raised by internal duties, the annual loans wanted after the first year -of the war would be lessened in the same proportion. The following -estimate may assist in forming a correct opinion on that subject:—</p> - -<table summary="annual loans wanted"> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">The stamp duties, those on sales at auction, the</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">licences of retailers, and the carriage tax,</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">which accrued in the year 1815, amounted</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">together to $2,230,000, and may be now</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">estimated at twice as much</td> - <td>$4,460,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">The aggregate annual value of leather, boots,</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">shoes, and other manufactures of leather; of</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">hats, caps and bonnets; snuff and cigars;</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">paper and playing cards, manufactured in the</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">United States, are estimated by the last census</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">at fifty-three millions, a tax on which of ten</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">per cent would give</td> - <td>5,300,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">On the same authority, three millions pounds of</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">spermaceti and wax candles would yield, at</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">five cents per pound,</td> - <td>150,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>Three millions two hundred and fifty thousand</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">pounds of refined sugar, at the same rate</td> - <td>160,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">Five hundred tons of pig and bar iron, nails and</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">brads, at two dollars per ton</td> - <td>1,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="3" class="left">The gross amount of spirits and beer manufactured</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">in the United States, is stated in the</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">census at sixty-five millions of gallons; but</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">the happy influence of the Temperance cause</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">has probably reduced this amount to less than</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">fifty millions, a tax on which of ten cents per</td> - <td></td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td> </td> - <td colspan="2" class="left">gallon</td> - <td>5,000,000</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">—————</td> - </tr> - <tr> - <td colspan="4">$16,070,000</td> - </tr> -</table> - -<p>I have inserted only such articles as were heretofore taxed, and have no -means of indicating such other as might be added or preferred; nor must -I be understood as recommending any specially, or in reference to the -rates of duties to be imposed on any one.</p> - -<p>It has been very generally asserted that men of property were averse to -the war because the losses and burthens which it must occasion fall -exclusively upon them; and that poor men were generally in favor of war, -because they had nothing to lose.</p> - -<p>It is true that the first great loss, caused by the war, will fall -immediately on those interested in the maritime commerce of the United -States, either as owners, insurers, or in any way employed in it. -Considering the imminent danger to which is exposed the immense amount -of American property afloat on every sea, and the certain annihilation, -during the war, of the fisheries, of the commerce with Great Britain, -and of that with all the countries beyond Cape Horn and the Cape of Good -Hope, the American merchants may be alarmed at the prospect of a war, -the necessity of which they do not perceive. But if the apprehension of -immediate danger is more vividly felt, the calamitous effects of the war -on the agricultural interests are not less certain. The price of all the -products, of which large quantities are exported, must necessarily fall -so low that all the farmers must lessen the amount and with it their -income, whilst they must pay dearer for all the articles which they are -obliged to purchase. The distinction between rich and poor is vague. The -most numerous class in the United States is that of the men who are at -the same time owners and cultivators of the<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span> soil, and who have but -small properties and a very moderate income. Every diminution of this, -whether from the want of a market or from any additional tax, is in that -and the corresponding class of mechanics, attended with the privation of -the necessaries or comforts of life. The really rich, the capitalists -who have independent incomes, and are not obliged to engage in any of -the active pursuits of life, may, in any calamitous season, accumulate -less, or at most, must retrench only some luxuries. Thus the unavoidable -losses and burthens which are the consequences of a war, fall with the -greatest weight on those who derive their means of existence from the -pursuits of industry, and whose industry alone contributes to the -increase of the general wealth of the country.</p> - -<p>But this is not all. Exclusive of those who, either as contractors, or -in some other way, are concerned with the large supplies wanted for the -support of the army and navy, there is a class of capitalists who are -enriched by the war. These are the money lenders, who shall have been -bold enough to take up the public loans: unless indeed it should be -intended to break public faith, and, on the return of peace, to question -the obligation to pay them, upon the pretence of their enormous profits. -What these profits are may be again illustrated by the example of Great -Britain.</p> - -<p>It has already been seen that, whenever a war is one of long -continuance, the British Government may at first borrow at par, and ends -by being compelled to sell its stock at the rate of fifty per cent of -its nominal value; which gives for the whole of the war loans an average -of about 75 per cent. In point of fact that Government received in the -year 1812 less than 55 per cent; for the money actually received -consisted of bank notes, which had then depreciated twenty per cent; so -that the money lenders gave only that which was equivalent to forty-four -per cent, in gold or silver, of the nominal value of the stock which -they received. Besides receiving the interest on the nominal amount of -the stock till the principal shall have been paid, they might shortly -after the peace, and may now, receive from ninety-seven per cent to par, -in gold or silver, for that same stock for which they gave but -forty-four. Thus, assuming the public debt of Great Britain at eight -hundred thousand pounds sterling; not only was the whole of that -capital<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span> destroyed by the wars; not only are the British people subject -now, and it would seem for ever, to a burthen of taxes sufficient to pay -the interest on that debt; but of the eight hundred millions thus -consumed, only six hundred were received by the public, and the other -two hundred millions made the rich capitalists, who had advanced the -money, still richer.</p> - -<p>There is another class of men who may occasionally derive wealth from a -war. Privateering consists in robbing of their property unarmed and -unresisting men, engaged in pursuits not only legitimate but highly -useful. It is nothing more nor less than legalized Piracy. For this the -United States are not responsible; and it must be admitted, that the -practice of all nations justifies them in resorting to those means, in -order to make the enemy feel the calamities of war. But the necessity of -resorting to means immoral in themselves affords an irrefragable -argument against precipitating the country into war for slight causes, -indeed against any war which is not purely in self defence.</p> - -<p>It is equally untrue to assert that the poorer class of people, by which -must be meant all the laborers, or generally those who live on their -wages, have nothing to lose by the war.</p> - -<p>In this, and other large cities, for every thousand merchants, or men of -capital who may be injured or thrown out of business, there are ten -thousand men living on wages, whose employment depends directly or -indirectly on the commerce of those cities. The number of common -laborers is proportionately less in the purely agricultural districts. -But it is evident that in both, a considerable number must be thrown out -of employment either by the destruction of commerce, or in consequence -of the lessened value and quantity of the agricultural products. And it -seems impossible that this should take place without affecting the rate -of wages, than which a more afflicting evil could not fall on the -community. There is no man of pure and elevated feelings who does not -ardently wish, that means could be devised to ameliorate the state of -society in that respect, so as that those who live by manual labor -should receive a more just portion of the profits, which are now very -unequally divided between them and their employers.</p> - -<p>But even if the rate of wages was not materially affected, yet<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> when it -is said that the poor have nothing to lose by war, it must be because -their lives are counted for nothing. Whether militia, regulars, or -sailors, the privates, the men who actually fight the battles, are -exclusively taken from amongst the poorer classes of society. Officers -are uniformly selected from the class which has some property or -influence. They indeed risk gallantly their lives, but with the hopes of -promotion and of acquiring renown and consideration. According to the -present system, at least of the regular army, it is extremely rare, -almost impossible that a private soldier should ever rise to the rank of -an officer. In the course of a war thousands are killed, more die of -diseases, and the residue, when disbanded, return home with habits -unfavorable to the pursuits of industry. And yet it is asserted that -they are predisposed for war, because they have nothing to lose.</p> - -<p>As yet, however, we have had recourse only to voluntary enlistments for -raising a regular force; the pay or bounties must be increased in order -to obtain a sufficient number; and thus far to become a private soldier -has been a voluntary act. The calling of militia into actual service is -a modified species of conscription, and it has also been deemed a -sufficient burthen to limit the time of that service to six months. -Another plan is now contemplated by those who are so eager to plunge the -country into a war. Fearing that the sufficient number of men may not be -voluntarily raised, they propose that the militia should be divided into -two portions; those belonging to the first class shall, if called into -actual service, be bound to serve twelve months instead of six; and the -other portion shall be liable to furnish a number of recruits for the -army, not exceeding one tenth part of their total number. This last -provision seems to be borrowed from the Russian military code. The -Emperor of Russia requires each village to supply him with a certain -number of men, in proportion to that of the male population. In time of -war he requires, at the rate of three men for each hundred males, which -answers nearly to that of ten for every one hundred men enrolled in the -militia; and he also grants to the serfs the same privilege intended to -be allowed to a portion of the militia by the new project, that of -selecting the recruits amongst themselves.</p> - -<p>If it be any consolation, it is certain that, although we may not<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span> -invade England, the evils arising from the war will be as sensibly and -more permanently felt by Great Britain than by the United States. Her -efforts must be commensurate with those of the United States, much -greater by sea in order to be efficient, in every respect more expensive -on account of her distance from the seat of war. Such is the rapidly -progressive state of America, that the industry of the people will, in a -few years of peace, have repaired the evils caused by the errors of -Government. England will remain burthened with additional debt and -taxation.</p> - -<p>An aged man, who has for the last thirty years been detached from party -politics, and who has now nothing whatever to hope or to fear from the -world, has no merit in seeking only the truth and acting an independent -part. But I know too well, and have felt too much the influence of party -feeling, not to be fully aware that those men will be entitled to the -highest praise, who, being really desirous of preserving peace, shall on -this momentous occasion dare to act for themselves, notwithstanding the -powerful sympathies of party. Yet no sacrifice of principles is -required: men may remain firmly attached to those on which their party -was founded and which they conscientiously adopted. There is no -connexion between the principles or doctrines on which each party -respectively was founded, and the question of war or peace with a -foreign nation which is now agitated. The practice which has lately -prevailed to convert every subject, from the most frivolous to the most -important, into a pure party question, destroys altogether personal -independence, and strikes at the very roots of our institutions. These -usages of party, as they are called, make every man a slave, and -transfer the legitimate authority of the majority of the nation to the -majority of a party, and, consequently, to a minority of the sovereign -people. If it were permitted to appeal to former times, I would say -that, during the six years that I had the honor of a seat in Congress, -there were but two of those party meetings, called for the purpose of -deliberating upon the measures proper to be adopted. The first was after -the House had asserted its abstract right to decide on the propriety of -making appropriations necessary to carry a treaty into effect, whether -such appropriations should be made<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span> with respect to the treaty with -England of 1794. The other was in the year 1798, respecting the course -proper to be pursued after the hostile and scandalous conduct of the -French Directory. On both occasions we were divided; and on both the -members of the minority of each meeting were left at full liberty to -vote as they pleased, without being on that account proscribed or -considered as having abandoned the principles of the party. This, too, -took place at a time when, unfortunately, each party most erroneously -suspected the other of an improper attachment to one or the other of the -great belligerent foreign nations. I must say that I never knew a man -belonging to the same party as myself, and I have no reason to believe -that there was any in the opposite party, who would have sacrificed the -interests of the country to those of any foreign power. I am confident -that no such person is to be found now in our councils or amongst our -citizens; nor am I apt to suspect personal views, or apprehensive of the -effect these might produce. My only fear is that which I have expressed, -the difficulty for honorable men to disenthral themselves from those -party sympathies and habits, laudable and useful in their origin, but -which carried to excess become a tyranny, and may leave the most -important measures to be decided in the National Councils by an -enthusiastic and inflamed minority.</p> - -<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTE:</h3> - -<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3a_3a" id="Footnote_3a_3a"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3a_3a"></a><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Estimated for 1812.</p></div></div> - - - - - - - - -<pre> - - - - - -End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Oregon Question, by Albert Gallatin - -*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE OREGON QUESTION *** - -***** This file should be named 51843-h.htm or 51843-h.zip ***** -This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: - http://www.gutenberg.org/5/1/8/4/51843/ - -Produced by Martin Pettit and the Online Distributed -Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was -produced from images generously made available by The -Internet Archive) - - -Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions -will be renamed. - -Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no -one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation -(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without -permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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